1 The Honorable Richard E. Dorr, United St ates District Judge for the Western District of Missouri. 

## United States Court of Appeals FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________ No. 08-1033

___________ United States of America, *
* Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the Western * District of Missouri. Richard A. Hugh, *
* Appellant. *
*

___________ Submitted: June 11, 2008 Filed: July 7, 2008

___________ Before MELLOY, ARNOLD, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________ MELLOY, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Richard Hugh of intercepting a wire communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). On appeal, Hugh argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the district court 1 erred by sentencing him to 18 months in prison. We affirm the judgment of the district court.-2- I. Background Richard Hugh was a part-time bail bondsman/bounty hunter in and around Springfield, Missouri. On April 6, 2005, Hugh’s wife, a bail bond agent, posted $5,000 bail for Basil Minor. H ugh tried to keep tabs on Minor, but was unsuccessful. On July 7, 2005, Minor missed his court appearance, and the court forfeited the bond. Hugh continued to pursue Minor. Believing that Minor regularly communicated with a woman named Kimberly Loftis, Hugh tappe d into the phone line at Loftis’s house.
Several witnesses obser ved Hugh around the Loftis house on December 23 and 24, 2005. On December 24, Hugh informed Nancy Bertz, who resided with Loftis, that he was recording all of the telephone conversations at the house. When officers arrived at Loftis’s house, they found wi retapping equipment affixed to the telephone box. Police subsequently executed a s earch warrant at Hugh’s home and found recordings of telephone conve rsations from Loftis’s house and equipment that could be used to tap into a phone line. When the police interviewed Hugh about his suspicious behavior, Hugh stated, “I understand, yes I put a tap on her phone.” Hugh recante d during the interview and at trial. The jury, however, found Hugh gu ilty of one count of interception of wire communications, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a). At sentencing, the district court adopt ed the presentence investigation report without change. Hugh had a to tal offense level of 14 and a criminal history category of I, which yielded an advisory Guidelin es range of 15 to 21 months. The district court applied a 3-level enhancement for committing the offense for the purpose of economic gain. See U.S.S.G. § 2H3.1. The government argued that Hugh should have had an even higher o ffense level because he admitted to tapping phone lines on previous occasions. The district court, however, rejected the government’s argument. After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fact ors, the district court sentenced Hugh to 18 months in prison and 2 years of supervised release.-3- Hugh contends that the evidence was in sufficient for a conviction because his crime required the government to prove he acted with a “bad purpose.” Hugh also argues that the district court erred by addi ng 3 offense levels for economic gain and by failing to adequately consider the § 3553(a) factors.
II. Discussion We review the sufficiency of the eviden ce in the light most favorable to the government and reverse only if no reasonable jury coul d have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Sykes , 977 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (8th Cir. 1992). We review f actual determinations at sentencing, such as the district court’s finding that the offense was comm itted for the purpose of economic gain, for clear error. United States v. Allebach , 526 F.3d 385, 388 (8th Ci r. 2008). We review the district court’s application of the Guidelines de novo. Id. Hugh argues that the government was requi red to prove he acted with a “bad purpose.” Hugh relies on United States v. Ross , 713 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1983). In Ross , this court considered whether evidence obtained incidentally by a telephone repairman could be used against a defendant. Id. at 392. This court held that a telephone repairman could testify to incriminating statements overheard while repairing a phone line because the repairma n did not “willfully” violate § 2511. Id. at 391-92 (noting that Congress used “willfu lly” to denote a “bad purpose,” which the telephone repairman did not have ). This court further held that evidence obtained by the repairman was admissible because hi s actions fell within the exception for telecommunication workers in § 2511(2)(a)(I). Id. at 392. Hugh’s reliance on Ross is misplaced for three reasons. First, Ross focused on the admissibility of evidence obtained through wiretapping. This case, however, deals with a conviction under the statute. Sec ond, unlike the telephone repairman, Hugh is not a telecommunications worker. Ther efore, Hugh cannot rely on a statutory exemption for his conduct. Third, the statute no longer requi res that a defendant “willfully” violate the statute. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (1983) with 18 U.S.C.-4- § 2511(1)(a) (2007). The Government is onl y required to prove that the act was done “intentionally.” 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2007). Hugh’s own admissions indicate that hi s clear intention was to intercept communications between Loftis and Minor. Hugh’s intentions are further confirmed by the recordings of telephone conversati ons from Loftis’s house that were found in Hugh’s home. We find that the evidence wa s sufficient for the jury to convict Hugh.
The district court found that a 3-leve l enhancement was warranted because the purpose of the offense was “to obtain dir ect or indirect commercial advantage or economic gain.” U.S.S.G. § 2H3.1(b)(1). Hugh argues that no financial gain was obtained and that the offens e was actually motivated by a desire to apprehend a fugitive. Evidence presented at trial strongly supports the district court’s finding that Hugh’s purpose was to obtain fi nancial benefit. It make s no difference that Hugh did not actually make any money from his offense. The Guidelines do not require that the defendant actually benefit financially. Th e Guidelines merely require that the “purpose” of the offense was economic gain . U.S.S.G. § 2H3.1(b)(1). Hugh’s wife posted bail for Minor. When Hugh was unable to locate Minor, Hugh went to the Lawrence County Court and asked for a re mittance, which was refused. Hugh searched for Minor before and after th e forfeiture of the bond. This evidence adequately supports the conclusion thatHugh was trying to recover the $5,000 bond that his wife posted for Minor. The districtcourt did not commit clear error in finding that the purpose of Hugh’s actions was economic gain. Hugh also argues that the district court erred in failing to adequately consider the § 3553(a) factors. A district court shoul d start with the advisory Guidelines range and consider all of the § 3553(a) factors. Gall v. United States , 128 S. Ct. 586, 596 (2007). Ultimately, the court must impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). While the district court is obliged to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, it is not required to “‘categorically rehearse each of the section 3553(a) factors on the record when it imposes a sentence as long as it-5- is clear that they were consid ered.’” United States v. Austad , 519 F.3d 431, 436 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Dieken , 432 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2006)). The district court clearly consideredthe § 3553(a) factors when sentencing Hugh. The district court made specific reference to several factors:
But the nature and circum stances here, the seriousness of the offense, the deterrence here to other people not to boldly go out there and think that they have the law in their own hands . . . and to protect the public . . . I think the Guideline range is a reasonable range. Given that the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explained its reasons for imposing a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range, we find no procedural or substantive e rror affecting the reasonableness of the sentence. See Gall , 128 S. Ct. at 597. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

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