alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03

- 19

- 00397

- CR

Tarrance Shon Forister, Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE 26TH DISTRI CT COURT OF WILLIAMS ON COUNTY NO. 17

- 0568

- K26, THE HONORABLE DONNA GAY LE KING, JUDGE PRESI D I NG

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant Tarrance Shon Forister has filed a motion to dismiss his appeal. The

motion is signed by both appellant and his attorney. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a). We g rant the

motion and dismiss the a

ppeal. See i d

.

____________ ______________________________

Chari L. Kelly, Justice

Before Justices Goodwin, Kelly, and Smith

Dismissed on Appellant’s Motion

Filed: April 24

, 2020

D o Not Publish
#### Will of Puls: Rahte and another, Appellants, vs. Cook, Executor, Respondent.

*March 14*

May *1, 1945.*

*661
      *Charles H. Gorman*and *Emmet Horan,*both of Milwaukee, for the appellants.

For the respondent there was a brief by *Kelly & Nuss*and /. *E. O’Brien,*all of Fond du Lac, and oral argument by *Mr. O’Brien.*

Per Curiam.

The first contention made by the contestants is that the will is not a natural will merely because it was natural according to Mr. Puls’ standards as found by the court; and, second, that because of the confidential relationship existing between the principal beneficiary and the testator, the burden of proof was shifted to the proponent. These contentions are fully discussed and dealt with in the matter of the *Will of Faulks*(1945), *ante,*p. 319, 17 N. W. (2d) 423.

The will is not unnatural. Nephews and nieces had no legal claim upon the testator for support. Their conduct toward him gave them no other claim to his beneficence.

*662The burden of proof was at all times upon the contestants to establish undue influence by clear and satisfactory evidence. They failed to sustain that burden.

There remain only questions of fact. We have carefully examined the evidence and considered the briefs and arguments of counsel and our conclusion is that the findings of the court are amply sustained. No useful purpose would be .served by a detailed statement of the facts.

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 2000, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                         370,586
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  131,928
<ALLOWANCES>                                     2,595
<INVENTORY>                                    145,880
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             1,643,293
<PP&E>                                       3,557,817
<DEPRECIATION>                                 965,994
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,414,236
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        4,034,397
<BONDS>                                        113,491
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  1,475,175
<COMMON>                                        19,414
<OTHER-SE>                                 (1,258,241)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,414,236
<SALES>                                         48,678
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               148,206
<CGS>                                           15,109
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   15,109
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               713,764
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           2,155,390
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,534,039)
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,534,039)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,534,039)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.18)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.18)


</TABLE>
MORGANTON,

SEPTEMBER TERM, 1791.

#### Swann *v.*Gauge.

Note given to a married woman who lived separate; the husband never assented to the contract, ami the debt was attached as due to him. — Per Vt imuiams, the only Judge in Court, assent of the husband is not necessary, the debt becomes his immediately upon delivery to the feme.

Note. — In such case, the husband might sue alone, or join his wife with him, which shews that the debt is due to him. 1 *Chit. Plead.*19.— The husband’s assent would be presumed, until the contrary was shewn.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 4.15

                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

                                       OF

                        KELLOGG COMPANY CAPITAL TRUST III



         THIS Certificate of Trust of Kellogg Company Capital Trust III (the
"Trust") is being duly executed and filed on behalf of the Trust by the
undersigned, as trustees, in order to form a Delaware Business Trust, pursuant
to the requirements of the Business Trust Act of the State of Delaware (12 Del.
C. Section 1810 et seq.) (the "Act").

         1. Name. The name of the business trust is Kellogg Company Capital
Trust III.

         2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of
the Trust in the State of Delaware are as follows:

                  The Bank of New York (Delaware)
                  White Clay Center
                  Route 273
                  Newark, Delaware 19711

         3. Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective as of
the date of filing with the office of the Secretary of State of the State of
Delaware.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have duly executed this Certificate
of Trust in accordance with Section 3811(a)(1) of the Act as of the date written
below.

Executed on this 22nd day of October, 2001.





                                     THE BANK OF NEW YORK (DELAWARE), AS TRUSTEE


                                     By:    /s/ William T. Lewis
                                     Name:  William T. Lewis
                                     Title: Senior Vice President
To: John Schakenbach/DC/USEPA/US@EPA

From: Peter Westlin/RTP/USEPA/US

Date: 08/05/2010 09:52AM

Cc: Brian Shrager/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Bill Maxwell/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Barrett 

Parker/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA

Subject: Re: ICR Testing for MACT Rules

John:

I understand that many of the testing companies are involved in the ICR testing and, more 

critical to meeting deadlines, all of the D/F labs. I believe that the utility reports are due 

the middle of September; Brian or Bill can confirm or correct that. You may or may not 

know that we also have ICR testing in progress for ferroalloy plants, secondary aluminum, 

phosphoric acid, and phosphate rock. Soon, we will have ICRs issued for refineries, primary 

aluminum, and some others I can not recall right now. The testing companies and labs are 

going to be very busy for some time. 

Peter Westlin

Measurement Policy Group

OAQPS, SPPD

919-541-1058

ICR Testing for MACT Rules

ICR Testing for MACT Rules

John 

Schakenbach 

to:Peter Westlin 08/04/2010 

05:34 PM

Peter,

I'm still working on the response to comments for the AETB / PGVP proposed rule. Are a lot 

of stack test companies currently doing testing for the ICR for the upcoming MACT rules? 

When are the deadlines for completion of this testing? Thanks

John Schakenbach

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Clean Air Markets Division

schakenbach.john@epa.gov

Phone: 202-343-9158

Fax: 202-343-2359
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 360

To control emergency spending by limiting such spending to natural disasters.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 3, 1999

Mr. GRAMS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Governmental Affairs

A BILL

To control emergency spending by limiting such spending

to natural disasters.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Emergency Spending

5 Control Act of 1999’’.

6 SEC. 2. PRESIDENT’S BUDGET.

7 Section 1105(b) of title 31, United States Code, is

8 amended by adding at the end the following:

9 ‘‘(33) a separate appropriation account for ap10 propriations for emergency spending for emergency

11 requirements (as defined in section 250(c) of the
2

•S 360 IS

1 Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control

2 Act of 1985) that equals the annual average of

3 emergency spending for emergency requirements in

4 the 5 fiscal years preceding the budget year.’’.

5 SEC. 3. LIMITATION OF EMERGENCY SPENDING TO NATU6 RAL DISASTERS.

7 Section 250(c) of the Balanced Budget and Emer8 gency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (2 U.S.C. 900(c)) is

9 amended by adding at the end the following:

10 ‘‘(20) The term ‘emergency requirement’ means

11 appropriations or spending for a natural disaster de12 clared by the President.’’.

13 SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE.

14 This Act and the amendments made by this Act shall

15 apply to fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 2001.

Æ
Cite as 2015 Ark. 338

SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS

IN THE MATTER OF THE

APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL

JUSTICE

Opinion Delivered September 24, 2015

PER CURIAM

Honorable David Newbern shall be appointed as a special justice, and shall be given

authority for the express purpose of swearing in newly appointed Arkansas Supreme Court

Chief Justice Howard W. Brill on October 23, 2015.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Arkona, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the  quarterly  period  ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Stephen
L. Russo, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that
to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.

/s/ Stephen L. Russo
----------------------------
    Stephen L. Russo
    Chief Financial Officer
    August 14, 2003

This  certification  accompanies  the  Report  pursuant  to  Section  906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed  filed by the  Company  for  purposes of
Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
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<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS INCLUDED IN TELE-COMMUNICATIONS, INC.'S QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q
FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS. PRIMARY AND DILUTED EARNINGS PER SHARE
REPRESENT EARNINGS PER SHARE OF THE COMPANY'S TCI GROUP STOCK. SEE THE
COMPANY'S CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS.

</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000,000
       
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
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<RECEIVABLES>                                      430
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                         91
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                          13,133
<DEPRECIATION>                                   4,366
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  30,575
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                         15,118
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                              654
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           937
<OTHER-SE>                                       3,425
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    30,575
<SALES>                                            734
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 6,089
<CGS>                                              453
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    2,056
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,150
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 803
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  (598)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       160
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (438)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (438)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.75)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.75)
        

</TABLE>
#### Boyd, by Guardian *ad litem,*and others, Respondents, vs. Department of Taxation, Appellant. [Two cases.]

*November 13*

December *8, 1942.*

For the appellant there was a brief by the *Attorney General*and *Harold H. Persons,*assistant attorney general, and oral argument by *Mr. Persons*and *Mr. Neil Conway,*inheritance tax counsel.

For the respondents there was a brief by *Lecher, Michael, Whyte & Spohn*of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *George D. Spohn.*

Rosenberry, C. J.

The question involved in these cases is whether the twenty-five per cent additional tax imposed by par. (e) of sub. (3) of sec. 4, ch. 363, Laws of 1933, is applicable to the entire value of gifts made during a calendar year or only to the portion not in excess of $25,000? These cases are ruled by the cases in which Clara A. Miller, donor, is respondent and the Wisconsin Department of Taxation is *625appellant, *ante,*p. 615, 6 N. W. (2d) 827. Reference is made to the opinion and discussion in those cases, and in accordance with that opinion, the judgment in each case is affirmed.

*By the Court.*— Judgment in each case is affirmed.
#### Rosenberg & Estis, P. C., Plaintiff, v Laura K. Stewart, Defendant.

Civil Court of the City of New York, New York County,

December 15, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Rosenberg & Estis, P. C.,*plaintiff *pro se. Aegis J. Frumento*for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Seymour Schwartz, J.

In this action for attorneys’ fees, plaintiff moves for a protective order with respect to defendant’s demand for discovery and inspection of all of plaintiff’s files relating to defendant, its former client. Defendant interposed a counterclaim alleging malpractice and contends that plaintiff’s files are essential to her prosecution of the counterclaim. Plaintiff argues that compliance with the demand for discovery and inspection would effectively nullify its retaining lien on the files.

The retaining lien is analogous to the artisan’s or mechanic’s lien, for like any other craftsman, an attorney may retain his work product until paid. *(Mercantini v Innamorati,*27 Misc 2d 881 [1960], *lv denied, amended on other grounds*12 AD2d 794 [1961].) The lien is designed to inconvenience the client by denying access to pleadings and papers which in *73themselves are ordinarily without intrinsic value. *(Goldman v Rafel Estates,*269 App Div 647 [1945].)

However, the files here are of significant value to defendant since without them she may be foreclosed from successfully prosecuting her counterclaim. There is no authority for the proposition that a retaining lien may be asserted to bar a malpractice claim, particularly since the lien is forfeited where an attorney withdraws from a pending matter without just cause, as defendant alleges. *(Goldman v Rafel Estates, supra.)*

The court notes that in *Rosen v Rosen*(97 AD2d 837 [2d Dept 1983]), a case not cited by either side, the Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed an award of a charging lien instead of a retaining lien, where due to the former client’s indigency a retaining lien would have prevented her from obtaining her file and thereby "render it almost impossible to prepare her case [a matrimonial action] for trial”. *(Supra,*97 AD2d, at 837; *accord, Williams v Hertz Corp.,*75 AD2d 766 [1st Dept 1980].)

In weighing the competing interests of an attorney to his retaining lien, and a former client to disclosure of files needed to proceed with a claim of legal malpractice, the client’s rights are paramount.

Accordingly, the motion for a protective order is denied.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by 9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pa ne l una ni m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l a r g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T UN I T E D S T AT E S OF AME R I C A, P l ai nt i ff

- A pp el l ee , v. DA RNE L L GA R C I A, D e f

e n d a n t - A p p e lla n t. N o. 08- 50161 D . C . N o . 2 : 8 8 -cr-0 0 9 8 3 -T JH ME MOR AN DU M *

A pp ea l fr om the U ni t ed S t at es D i stri ctC ou rt f o rth e C e n tr a l D is tr ic t o f C a lif o rn ia T e rry J . H a tt e r , J r . , D i s tr i c tJudge , P r e s i di ng S ubm i tt e d M a y25, 2010 ** B e f o r e : C A N B Y , T H O M A S , a n d W . F L E T C H E R , C ir c u it J u d g e s . C al i forni a s t at e pri soner D arnel l G ar ci a app ea l s pro se fr om the di stri ct c ourt ’ s j udgm e ntdi s m i s s i ng hi s habe a s pe t i t i on. W e ha ve j ur i s di c t i on unde r28 U . S. C. § 1 2 9 1 , a n d w e a f f i rm. 

# FI LED JU N 11 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 50161 2 G a r c i ac ont e nds tha the ha s s e rve d m or e t i m e tha n i s ne c e s s a rybe c aus e the di stri ctcourtdi d n otm od i fyhi s pre se nt ence i nv es t i gat i on re po rt(“ P S R ”) , or order a s up pl em ent al re po rt , t o ref l ec tthe se nt ence re du ct i on thathe re ce i ved o n d i re ct ap p e a l. G a r c ia ’s p e titio n c h a lle n g e s th e le g a lity , r a th e rth a n th e e x e c u tio n , o f h is s e nt e nc e , a nd hi s c l a i m s do notqua l i f yf orthe s a vi ngs c l aus e of 28 U . S . C . § 2255, w h e r e b y ap r is o n e rm a y c h a lle n g e h is s e n te n c e in a2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 4 1 p e titio n . W e the r e f or e c ons true thi s appe a l a s as uc c e s s i ve § 2255 m ot i on, w hi c h m us tbe c e rtif ie d b y th is c o u rt b e f

o r e it c a n b e p r e s e n te d to th e d is tr ic t c o u rt. Se e H arr is on v . O l l is on , 51 9 F . 3d 95 2, 95 6, 95 9-96 0 (9th C i r. 20 08 ). T he di stri ctcourtthere fore la c k e d ju r is d ic tio n to c o n s id e rth is c la im . See 2 8 U .S .C . § 2 2 4 4 ( b ) ; se e al so U ni ted Stat es v. A l len , 1 5 7 F .3 d 6 6 1 , 6 6 4 ( 9 th C ir . 1 9 9 8 ) . W e c ons true G a r c i a ’ s not i c e of appe a l a s ar e que s tf

orac e rt i f

i c a t e of appe a l abi l i ty on the i s s ue of w he the rhi s m ot i on w a s pr ope r l ydi s m i s s e d a s s e c ond o rs u c c e s s iv e w ith o u t au th o r iz a tio n . S o c o n s tru e d , th e m o tio n is d e n ie d . See 9 th C ir . R . 2 2 - 1 ( d ) ; see a l

so Slack v . McD an i el , 52 9 U . S . 47 3, 48 3-85 (200 0). AF F I RME D.
**EXHIBIT 21.01**

 

**LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES OF CONCUR TECHNOLOGIES, INC.**

 

1. Concur Technologies Pty. Limited, a corporation organized under the laws of Australia. 

 

2. Concur Technologies (UK) Ltd., a corporation organized under the laws of the UnitedKingdom. 

 

3. Captura Software, Inc., a corporation organized under the laws ofthe State of Delaware. 

 

4. Captura Software International, Ltd., a corporationorganized under the laws of the United Kingdom. 

 

5. Captura Asia Pacific Pty.Limited, a corporation organized under the laws of Australia.
EXHIBIT 10.47

                                 FIFTH AMENDMENT

         This Fifth Amendment (the "5th Amendment") is made and entered into as
of this 23th day of February 2000 by and between NATIONAL DIAGNOSTICS, INC., an
Florida corporation ("NDI") and American Enterprise.com, Corp., formerly known
as American Enterprise Solutions, Inc., a Florida corporation ("AESI").

                                    RECITALS

         WHEREAS, NDI and AESI have entered into that certain Merger Agreement
dated February 23, 1998 as amended by that certain First Amendment dated March
17, 1998 and that certain Second Amendment dated April 29, 1998 and that Third
Amendment dated July 24, 1998 and that certain Fourth Amendment dated December
27, 1999 (the "Agreement") pursuant to which it is contemplated with AESI will
be merged (the "Merger") with and into NDI under the terms and conditions
specified in the Agreement; and

         WHEREAS, both parties to the Agreement have authorized and agreed to a
four to one reverse split of the NDI common stock; and

         WHEREAS, AESI and NDI have mutually agreed that it would be in the best
interest of the corporations that AESI oversee the operations and management of
the Brandon Diagnostic Centers, Ltd. and Sunpoint Diagnostics, Inc. effective
immediately;

         NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises set forth herein, and
for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which
are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto, intending to be legally bound,
agree that the Agreement is hereby amended to incorporate and reflect the
following facts, terms and conditions:

         1) the NDI common stock shall be subject to a four to one reverse
         split;

         2) AESI shall oversee the operations and management of the Brandon
         Diagnostics, Ltd. and Sunpoint Diagnostics, Inc. effective as of the
         date of this Amendment.

         This Amendment may be executed in two or more counterparts, each of
which shall be

<PAGE>

deemed an original and all of which together shall constitute but one and the
same instrument.

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as
of the day and year first written above.

                           NATIONAL DIAGNOSTICS, INC.



By: /s/ CURTIS L. ALLISTON
    ------------------------------
                           Name:  Curtis L. Alliston
                           Title: President



                           AMERICAN ENTERPRISE.COM, CORP.



By: /s/ CHARLES BROES
    ------------------------------
                           Name:  Charles Broes
                           Title: C.E.O.