In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

No. 06-2170

RICHARD REYNOLDS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

DAWN JAMISON and CHRISTOPHER DARR,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 05 C 2138—Harold A. Baker, Judge.

____________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 29, 2006—DECIDED JUNE 8, 2007

____________

Before BAUER, CUDAHY, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. Richard Reynolds was arrested

on two occasions—July 12, 2004 and November 28,

2004—by the defendant, Officer Christopher Darr. The

first arrest concerned threatening phone calls that

Reynolds made to his ex-girlfriend, Dawn Jamison, the

other defendant in the present case. This arrest ultimately led to a protective order entered against Reynolds,

and the second arrest concerned an alleged violation of

this order. In June 2005, the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 lawsuit against both Officer Darr and Jamison,

claiming that the defendants conspired to violate his right

to be free from unreasonable seizure by arresting him
2 No. 06-2170

without probable cause. Officer Darr filed a motion to

stay discovery, along with a motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Jamison also filed

a motion for summary judgment. The district court held

that discovery would not lead to any triable issue with

respect to the July 12, 2004 arrest, but allowed Reynolds

leave to conduct limited discovery to determine if Officer

Darr had probable cause to arrest him on November 28,

2004. In a subsequent opinion, the court granted both

Officer Darr and Jamison’s motions for summary judgment. Reynolds now appeals. We affirm.

I. Background

Reynolds and Jamison had been in a romantic relationship, which ended sometime in 2004. On July 12, 2004,

Reynolds contacted Urbana Animal Control about a

dispute with Jamison over a dog in Jamison’s possession,

which Reynolds claimed he owned. An animal control

officer along with Officer Darr responded to the call and

spoke with Reynolds. Darr then contacted Jamison at her

workplace to discuss the dispute over the dog. In the

course of that conversation, Jamison revealed that

Reynolds had contacted her at least five times that day

to harass her. On one of those occasions, Jamison claims

that she put the telephone on speaker phone so that her

co-workers could hear the conversation. Jamison also told

Darr that during one phone call, Reynolds threatened to

harm Jamison’s son and dog. Darr continued the investigation at Jamison’s office where she showed Darr a computer

log recording sixty-one phone calls from Reynolds and

mentioned that some of the later calls were threatening

in nature. Darr also claims that he listened to several

threatening voicemails Jamison had saved and spoke with

Jamison’s co-workers regarding the threatening calls.

Later that same day, after reviewing the information he
No. 06-2170 3

1 Under Illinois law, harassment by telephone is defined as:

[U]se of telephone communication for any of the following

purposes:

(1) Making any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent with an intent to offend; or

(2) Making a telephone call, whether or not conversation

ensues, with intent to abuse, threaten or harass any

person at the called number; or

(3) Making or causing the telephone of another repeatedly to ring, with intent to harass any person at the

called number; or

(4) Making repeated telephone calls, during which

conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the

called number; or

(4.1) Making a telephone call or knowingly inducing a

person to make a telephone call for the purpose of

harassing another person who is under 13 years of age,

regardless of whether the person under 13 years of age

consents to the harassment, if the defendant is at least

16 years of age at the time of the commission of the

offense; or

(5) Knowingly permitting any telephone under one’s

control to be used for any of the purposes mentioned

herein.

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 135/1-1.

had gathered, Darr questioned Reynolds and arrested him

for telephone harassment.1

 After Reynolds’ arrest, Jamison

brought Darr a CD that contained 72 voicemails left by

Reynolds at her work.

The next day, July 13, 2004, the Champaign County

Circuit Court granted Jamison an Order of Protection

against Reynolds. The Order of Protection provided:
4 No. 06-2170

Respondent is further ordered and enjoined as follows:

No contact whatsoever. No contact by phone, cell

phone, mail, email, fax, or third person with protected

persons and must remain 500 ft away from protected

persons and places at all times. When Respondent

visits his relatives on East Pennsylvania, respondent

must use Philo Road entrance and exit only and must

remain 500 feet away from protected persons and

places at all times.

(Appellant Brief at 7.) Reynolds ultimately pleaded guilty

to the offense of harassment by telephone for making a

threatening call between May 2004 and July 2004.

On November 28, 2004, Reynolds attended a gathering

at his grandparents’ home, which is located on East

Pennsylvania, near Jamison’s home. According to the

Metropolitan Computer-aided Dispatch service (METCAD)

records, Jamison called 911/METCAD to report that

Reynolds was violating an order of protection. Jamison

alleged that she observed Reynolds drive back and forth

in front of her home several times, aim the truck at her

son’s bedroom and rev the engine.

After the police dispatcher received Jamison’s call,

Sergeant Dan Morgan contacted Officer Darr and notified

him of the domestic dispute between Jamison and

Reynolds. Morgan asked Darr to accompany him, in a

separate vehicle, to investigate the alleged violation of an

order of protection. After the officers had been dispatched,

Jamison called 911 again to report that Reynolds was

leaving the vicinity of her house and might be heading

home or to his parents’ house. Upon receiving this dispatch, Sergeant Morgan and Officer Darr split up to try

to locate Reynolds. Darr did not speak with Jamison

that night.

While en route, Officer Darr accessed METCAD to

retrieve the details of the order of protection. These details
No. 06-2170 5

2 The LEADS/SOS system is a system regularly relied upon by

police officers to provide information such as whether there is

an order of protection involving a particular individual.

noted no exception for visits to Reynolds’ grandparents’

house on East Pennsylvania. When Darr ultimately located Reynolds’ vehicle and pulled him over, he also

checked the Law Enforcement Agency Database System

(LEADS) which verified the order of protection against

Reynolds.2

 Darr’s onboard computer showed that Reynolds

was prohibited from coming within 500 feet of Jamison’s

house—1308 East Pennsylvania Avenue—but did not

include any exception concerning Reynolds’ grandparents’

house. When Darr questioned Reynolds, he confirmed

that he had been visiting his grandparents’ house, which

Darr learned—either from Reynolds himself, the dispatch

or from Sergeant Morgan—was located at 1311 East

Pennsylvania Avenue. From his familiarity with the

area and his experience as a police officer, Darr knew

that Reynolds’ grandparents house was within 500 feet of

Jamison’s home. Reynolds explained to Darr that there

was an exception to the order of protection and requested

that he or someone else be allowed to retrieve his copy of

the order. At this point, Darr also allegedly checked

with the Champaign County Jail Records Division, which

maintains copies of orders of protection that are entered

by Champaign County courts, but again did not find any

exception to the order of protection. Officer Darr then

placed Reynolds under arrest for violating the protection

order. Reynolds spent the night in jail, but the charge

was dismissed the next day.

On June 13, 2005, Reynolds filed the present lawsuit

against Darr and Jamison pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging that the defendants conspired to violate his

Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
6 No. 06-2170

seizure when he was arrested on both July 12, 2004 and

November 28, 2004. The defendants filed separate motions for summary judgment. Darr argued that he was

entitled to qualified immunity. Officer Darr also filed a

motion to stay discovery arguing that discovery was

unnecessary because his motion for summary judgment

was based, in part, on qualified immunity. The district

court denied Darr’s motion to stay discovery, and allowed

for limited discovery as to two issues: “whether Darr, while

on duty as an Urbana police officer, responded to a police

dispatch that resulted in Reynolds’ November 28, 2004

arrest, and whether Darr acted prudently during the

arrest by checking his onboard computer for the terms of

the order of protection.” Reynolds v. Jamison (Reynolds I),

No. 05-2138, slip op. at 5-6 (C.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2006). On

March 30, 2006, the district court granted the defendants’

motions for summary judgment and disposed of all claims.

Reynolds v. Jamison (Reynolds II), No. 05-2138, slip op.

at 3 (C. D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2006). Reynolds appeals both the

district court’s decision to limit discovery and its grant of

summary judgment.

II. Discussion

A. Discovery Order

We review a district court’s decision to limit discovery

for abuse of discretion. Vallone v. CNA Fin. Corp., 375

F.3d 623, 629 (7th Cir. 2004). “A court does not abuse its

discretion unless one or more of the following circumstances is present: (1) the record contains no evidence upon

which the court could have rationally based its decision; (2)

the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3)

the decision is based on clearly erroneous factual findings;

or (4) the decision clearly appears arbitrary.” Id. (internal

quotations marks omitted). The complaining party must

also establish that the district court’s decision resulted in
No. 06-2170 7

“actual and substantial prejudice.” Stagman v. Ryan, 176

F.3d 986, 994 (7th Cir. 1999).

In the present case, the district court examined the

need for discovery in light of Officer Darr’s motion for

summary judgment. Noting the burden placed on the party

moving for summary judgment, the court held that any

discovery should relate to disputed material facts concerning Reynolds’ § 1983 claim, namely any material facts

concerning whether Darr had probable cause to arrest

Reynolds in July or in November.

1. The July 12, 2004 Arrest

For the July 12, 2004 arrest, the district court determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact

relevant to the question whether Darr had probable cause

to arrest Reynolds. In brief, whether a law enforcement

officer had probable cause depends on whether, at the

time of the arrest, it was reasonable for the officer to

believe that the defendant had committed or was committing an offense. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This

standard will be discussed in more detail in connection

with the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

The court based its decision, in part, on the police report,

which discussed the evidence presented to Officer Darr

prior to his arrest of Reynolds. In sum, the report provided that:

Jamison showed Darr a computerized phone log

displaying numerous phone calls from Reynolds. She

told Darr she’d received five phone calls that day,

and she considered several of those to be threatening.

Darr then went to Reynolds, questioned him, and

arrested him for harassment by telephone.

Reynolds I, slip op. at 4. In the court’s view, these undisputed facts demonstrated that Darr had probable cause
8 No. 06-2170

to arrest Reynolds. Additional discovery would not uncover

any disputed facts material to this central question. In

addition, the court discussed Reynolds’ subsequent guilty

plea to the telephone harassment charge. The court

regarded the guilty plea as conclusive evidence that Officer

Darr had probable cause to arrest Reynolds. Because of

the preclusive effect of the guilty plea, the court determined that additional discovery was not necessary in

relation to the July 12, 2004 arrest.

Reynolds now argues that the district court’s order

precluding discovery with respect to the July 12, 2004

arrest was an abuse of discretion because: (1) the decision

was based on clearly erroneous factual findings, and (2)

the decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law.

We reject both contentions.

As for the factual findings, Reynolds argues that the

district court abused its discretion by relying on facts in

dispute. First, Reynolds asserts that, in light of his

denial to Officer Darr of Jamison’s allegations, the court

abused its discretion by relying on the fact that Jamison

had received threatening phone calls. There is no dispute

that Reynolds denied making the threatening phone

calls. Officer Darr presumably found Jamison’s account of

the threatening phone calls to be more credible than

Reynolds’ denial. When acting on the complaint of a

reasonably believable putative victim, an officer “[is] under

no constitutional obligation to exclude all suggestions that

the witness or victim is not telling the truth.” Beauchamp

v. City of Noblesville, Indiana, 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir.

2003). Reynolds’ denial does not negate probable cause

for his arrest; therefore, the district court did not abuse

its discretion by relying on the fact that Jamison received threatening phone calls from Reynolds in deciding

to preclude discovery.

Second, Reynolds states that both he and Jamison placed

telephone calls to each other throughout the course of their
No. 06-2170 9

3 Judge Rovner, partially dissenting, believes that Reynolds

should have been afforded an opportunity to “test” the contents

of the police report through discovery. The three factual challenges that he raises—that he denied placing a harassing call,

that he and Jamison exchanged a number of calls with each other

over the course of their relationship and that he called the police

first—in no way challenge the contents of the police report.

Where the plaintiff in a § 1983 case fails to challenge any of the

factual underpinnings alleged in a police report, it is appropriate for the district court to deny discovery and rely on the police

report in granting summary judgment to the defendant police

(continued...)

relationship. Reynolds argues that, because over the course

of their tumultuous relationship calls were made by both

parties, the number of allegedly threatening phone calls

relied upon by Officer Darr to make the July 12, 2004

arrest did not amount to harassment. Again, this allegation is not material nor are the relevant facts in dispute.

Whether Jamison also placed calls to Reynolds does not

bear on whether, at the time he arrested the plaintiff,

Officer Darr had probable cause. If Officer Darr reasonably

believed that Reynolds had committed the crime of telephone harassment, then he had probable cause to arrest

the plaintiff. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in precluding discovery as to the July 12th arrest.

Third, Reynolds asserts that Jamison only mentioned

the threatening calls after Darr questioned her about

Reynolds’ complaint about the dog dispute. The fact that

Reynolds originally called the police concerning the dispute over a dog and Jamison only discussed the calls after

being questioned by Officer Darr is immaterial and is not

in dispute. None of the material facts relied upon by

the district court were in dispute and, thus, the court

did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery as to the

July 12, 2004 arrest.3
10 No. 06-2170

3 (...continued)

officer. See Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 991 (7th Cir.

2000) (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment

where the plaintiff “did not present anything that would create

a genuine issue of material fact nor did he point to any specific

controverted factual issue that he would be able to present

after conducting depositions.”).

The plaintiff next argues that the district court abused

its discretion by ruling that Reynolds’ prior guilty plea was

conclusive evidence that Darr had probable cause at the

time of the arrest and, thus, that additional discovery

regarding the July 12 arrest was unnecessary. Since

Reynolds was convicted in Illinois state court, we must

look to the law of Illinois to determine the actual effect of

his guilty plea. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101

(1980) (holding that federal courts are to give judgments of

state courts the same preclusive effect in federal actions

under § 1983 that they would be given under the state’s

own law). The Illinois Supreme Court has previously

held that a guilty plea “is an admission which may be

received against him in a subsequent proceeding,” See, e.g.,

Smith v. Andrews, 203 N.E.2d 160, 163 (Ill. 1965). However, more recently, the Illinois Supreme Court stated

that application of collateral estoppel with respect to a

guilty plea must be determined on a case-by-case basis.

Talarico v. Dunlap, 685 N.E.2d 325, 332 (Ill. 1997) (taking

into account both the claimant’s “incentive to litigate” the

charges against him in state court and the “seriousness

of the allegations or the criminal charge at the prior

hearing”).

While it does not appear that the district court analyzed

Reynolds’ criminal conviction in a way that would satisfy

Talarico, the district court’s decision to preclude discovery did not solely, or even predominantly, rest on the

conclusion that Reynolds’ prior guilty plea constituted
No. 06-2170 11

conclusive evidence of probable cause. Importantly, the

court concluded that the evidence presented in the

police report was sufficient to demonstrate that Darr

had probable cause and did not find any of Reynolds’

arguments to the contrary convincing. Therefore, we

conclude that any error on the part of the district court

in relying on Reynolds’ guilty plea in limiting discovery

was harmless. Because of the court’s additional analysis,

it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to conclude that discovery with respect to the July 12 arrest

was unnecessary.

2. The November 28, 2004 Arrest

As for the November 28, 2004 arrest, the district court

allowed Reynolds to engage in limited discovery. The court

concluded that there were only two disputed facts relevant in determining the defendants’ summary judgment

motions and, thus, limited discovery to: (1) whether Officer

Darr responded to a police dispatch; and (2) whether

Darr checked his on-board computer to verify the terms

of the order of protection before arresting Reynolds.

Reynolds I, slip op. at 5-6. Both of these issues are relevant to whether Officer Darr had probable cause to arrest

Reynolds, or whether, as Reynolds argues, Darr was

motivated by an alleged personal relationship with

Jamison.

Reynolds first argues that there was no legal basis for

the court to limit discovery in this manner. As has been

noted, the district court assessed the need for discovery

in light of Darr’s motion for summary judgment on grounds

of qualified immunity, and accordingly limited the discovery order to issues of fact concerning whether Darr had

probable cause to arrest Reynolds on November 28, 2004.

The court did not abuse its discretion in limiting discovery
12 No. 06-2170

to issues of material fact tending to prove or negate that

Officer Darr had probable cause.

Reynolds also argues that the district court abused its

discretion in limiting discovery by relying on erroneous

findings of fact, namely by relying only on the facts as

asserted by the defendants. Specifically, Reynolds

asserts that the court failed to consider that Reynolds

denied engaging in any of the conduct alleged by Jamison.

The fact that Reynolds denied the allegation is not disputed. In determining whether probable cause existed, the

district court correctly concluded that discovery concerning the fact of Reynolds’ denial was not necessary. To the

extent Reynolds is arguing that his denial should have

negated probable cause, that contention will be discussed in the summary judgment section which follows.

Reynolds also asserts that the court failed to consider

that Darr had no reasonable basis to conclude that

Reynolds was in violation of the Emergency Order of

Protection. The limited discovery ordered by the court,

however, expressly allowed examination of this issue.

Therefore, the district court’s decision to limit discovery

as to the November 28, 2004 arrest did not constitute

an abuse of discretion.

Many of Reynolds’ arguments in opposition to the district

court’s order limiting discovery actually concern his

disagreement with the court’s finding that Officer Darr

had probable cause for his arrests. These arguments

are better invoked in opposition to the district court’s

grant of summary judgment and will be addressed below.

B. Summary Judgment

We review a district court’s denial of summary judgment

on qualified immunity grounds de novo. Leaf v. Shelnutt,

400 F.3d 1070, 1077 (7th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is
No. 06-2170 13

4 In other words, if Darr had probable cause to arrest Reynolds,

Darr did not violate Reynolds’ constitutional rights, and therefore, Jamison could not have conspired with Darr to do so. Thus,

both Darr and Jamison would be entitled to summary judgment.

proper where the “pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The

evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn

from the evidence are construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here, the plaintiff. Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

Relevant to the present case, in order to prevail on a

Section 1983 claim, the claimant must allege “(1) that he

was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation

was visited upon [him] by a person or persons acting

under color of state law.” Kramer v. Village of North Fond

du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004). Additionally,

Reynolds contends that Jamison is also liable under § 1983

because she conspired with Darr to violate his constitutional rights. “To establish § 1983 liability through a

conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a

state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional

rights; and (2) those individual(s) were willful

participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.”

Williams v. Seniff, 342 F.3d 774, 785 (7th Cir. 2003)

(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Therefore,

the § 1983 claim against Jamison is dependent on the

validity of the claim against Darr.4

Governmental actors performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity and are shielded
14 No. 06-2170

from liability, unless the plaintiff can show a violation of

a constitutional right, and, if successful in showing a

constitutional violation, demonstrate that the right was

clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001). This

analysis turns on whether a reasonable officer would have

known that his actions were unconstitutional. Id. at 202.

Here, Reynolds alleges that Darr violated his Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure.

Whether his claim merits redress depends on whether, at

the time of the arrest, Officer Darr had probable cause. A

finding of probable cause absolutely bars a claim for false

arrest under § 1983. Smith v. City of Chicago, 913 F.2d

469, 473 (7th Cir. 1990). Probable cause to arrest existed

if, at the time the decision was made, “the facts and

circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of

which they had reasonably trustworthy information

were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing

that the [individual] had committed or was committing

an offense.” Beck, 379 U.S. at 91. The reasonableness of

the seizure turns on what the officer knew, not whether

he knew the truth or whether he should have known more.

Gramenos v. Jewel Cos., 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986);

see also Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1999)

(holding that an officer’s belief does not have to be correct or even more likely true than false so long as it is

reasonable). The fact that an officer later discovers additional evidence unknown to her at the time of the arrest,

even if it tends to negate probable cause, is irrelevant—we

only care about what the officer knew at the time the

decision was made. Qian, 168 F.3d at 954.

1. The July 12, 2004 Arrest

With respect to the July 12, 2004 arrest, Officer Darr

first argues that Reynolds cannot prevail on his § 1983
No. 06-2170 15

claim because the officer had probable cause to arrest and

is, therefore, entitled to qualified immunity. In order to

defeat Darr’s motion for summary judgment on these

grounds, Reynolds must present sufficient evidence that

would allow a jury to conclude that Officer Darr unreasonably believed that Reynolds had committed the offense of

telephone harassment and, thus, lacked probable cause.

Reynolds has not met this burden.

The undisputed facts demonstrate that Darr had probable cause to arrest Reynolds on July 12, 2004. Officer

Darr contacted Jamison in response to the dispute regarding Reynolds’ dog, at which time Jamison revealed to

Darr that Plaintiff had called her several times that

day—at least one of such calls she considered threatening—and that he had made harassing phone calls to her

at work over a period of months. We have repeatedly

held that a complaint of the putative victim or single

witness is generally sufficient to establish probable cause,

unless the officer has a reason to question the witness’

account. See Beauchamp, 320 F.3d at 743; Woods v. City of

Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 2000); Guzell v.

Hiller, 223 F.3d 518, 519-20 (7th Cir. 2000); Tangwall v.

Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 516 (7th Cir. 1998); Gerald M. v.

Conneely, 858 F.2d 378, 381 (7th Cir. 1988); Gramenos, 797

F.2d at 439. Further, some of Jamison’s co-workers, who

had heard Reynolds threaten her on the phone that day,

relayed that information to Darr. Additionally, Officer

Darr listened to a number of voicemails that Jamison had

saved on her work phone and reviewed a computer printout logging the number of times that Reynolds had called

Jamison at work. In light of all of this information, Darr

determined that Reynolds had committed the offense of

harassment by telephone and arrested Reynolds on

July 12, 2004.

Here, Reynolds raises arguments in opposition to

summary judgment similar to those raised against the
16 No. 06-2170

order limiting discovery. We reject these arguments here

as well. Reynolds contends that the district court erred

in granting summary judgment because disputed material

facts exist. First, Reynolds argues that Officer Darr did

not have probable cause because Reynolds originally

contacted the police regarding his attempt to retrieve his

dog and other possessions from Jamison. Regardless of

who initially contacted the police, Darr’s investigation

revealed that Reynolds’ conduct was criminal in nature.

Second, while Reynolds does not dispute that he made

phone calls to Jamison, he argues that he was falsely

arrested because Jamison also made phone calls to

Reynolds. Officer Darr uncovered no evidence that

Jamison’s calls also were criminal in nature, and once he

reasonably believed that Reynolds had committed a crime,

he had probable cause and was under no duty to investigate further. See Pasiewicz v. Lake Forest Preserve Dist.,

270 F.3d 520, 524 (7th Cir. 2001). The facts presented by

Reynolds therefore do not undermine the district court’s

finding that Officer Darr had probable cause to arrest

Reynolds on July 12th.

Based on the knowledge he gained from Jamison and

her co-workers, a reasonably prudent officer in Darr’s

position would have believed that Reynolds had committed the offense of telephone harassment. Therefore,

Officer Darr had probable cause to arrest Reynolds on July

12, 2004, see Beck, 379 U.S. at 91, and did not violate

Reynolds’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, see Smith, 913 F.2d at 473. Because

Reynolds cannot show that Officer Darr violated his

constitutional rights, he cannot satisfy the first prong of

the Saucier test and Darr is therefore entitled to qualified

immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02.

The fact that Officer Darr had probable cause to arrest

Reynolds is sufficient to end our inquiry as to the July

12th arrest. However, Darr raises two affirmative bars to
No. 06-2170 17

5 Reynolds argues that his guilty plea cannot have a preclusive

effect because he pleaded guilty to one phone call during the

time period of May 2004 through July 2004, not to a phone call

on July 12, 2004. This argument is frivolous. Although we reject

Officer Darr’s collateral estoppel argument, we do not do so on

this ground.

Reynolds’ suit based on Reynolds’ guilty plea to the offense

of harassment by telephone for making a threatening

call between May 2004 and July 2004. We reject these

arguments, but will address them in an attempt to

clarify an unsettled area of law.

First, Darr argues that Reynolds’ § 1983 claim, with

respect to the July 12, 2004 arrest, is barred by the

doctrine of collateral estoppel. As has been noted, any

preclusive effect of a guilty plea on subsequent litigation

must be determined on a case-by-case basis. See Talarico,

685 N.E.2d at 332. Moreover, the existence of probable

cause and a finding of guilt are two distinct issues. Because Reynolds did plead guilty to making a threatening

phone call to Jamison,5

 it is tempting to say, ex ante, that

Officer Darr’s belief that Reynolds had committed the

offense of telephone harassment must have been reasonable. However, there is no evidence that Reynolds’ guilty

plea established what Darr knew at the time of the

arrest—the relevant time period for the probable cause

analysis. Thus, we decline to conclude that Reynolds’

§ 1983 claim is barred by collateral estoppel. Regardless,

as discussed above, Officer Darr had probable cause to

arrest Reynolds on July 12, 2004 and therefore did not

violate Reynolds’ constitutional rights.

Darr also argues that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477

(1994), bars Reynolds’ claim for false arrest. The broad

rule of Heck is that a plaintiff convicted of a crime in state

court cannot bring a § 1983 claim which, if successful,
18 No. 06-2170

would imply that his conviction was invalid, unless and

until the conviction has been reversed on appeal or otherwise invalidated. Id. at 486-87. In Booker v. Ward, 94 F.3d

1052, 1056 (7th Cir. 1996), this court concluded that,

according to Heck, a plaintiff need not have his conviction

nullified before pursuing a false arrest claim if that false

arrest “does not inevitably undermine a conviction; one can

have a successful wrongful arrest claim and still have a

perfectly valid conviction.” We re-affirmed Booker v.

Ward’s bright-line rule in Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440

F.3d 421, 423 (2006), aff’d, 127 S.Ct. 1091 (2007), holding

that a claim for false arrest, because it does not by its

nature call into question the validity of a conviction, may

go forward immediately, without nullification of the

underlying criminal conviction. In the present case,

Reynolds’ § 1983 claim for false arrest does not impugn the

validity of his underlying conviction for the offense of

telephone harassment. Whether Officer Darr had probable

cause to arrest Reynolds has no bearing on the validity of

his subsequent guilty plea and criminal conviction.

Regardless of these additional arguments, the undisputed facts clearly demonstrate that Officer Darr had

probable cause to arrest Reynolds on July 12, 2004 and

thus is entitled to qualified immunity. We therefore

affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as

to the July 12, 2004 arrest.

2. The November 28, 2004 Arrest

With respect to the November 28, 2004 arrest, the

undisputed facts demonstrate that Officer Darr had

probable cause to arrest Reynolds. Officer Darr was

contacted by his supervisor, Sergeant Morgan, who

informed him that there was a disturbance involving

Jamison and Reynolds that warranted an investigation of

a possible violation of an order of protection. While en
No. 06-2170 19

6 Although not argued by the parties, it is not clear how this

purported “exception” is really an exception at all since the Order

of Protection still requires Reynolds to remain 500 feet from

Jamison even when he is visiting his grandparents. “When

Respondent visits his relatives on East Pennsylvania, respondent

must use Philo Road entrance and exit only and must remain

500 feet away from protected persons and places at all times.”

(Appellant Brief at 7.)

route to locate Reynolds, Darr learned through the police

dispatcher that there was, in fact, an order of protection in

place. When Darr located Reynolds and pulled his vehicle

over, he checked the LEADS/SOS system through his onboard computer, which also confirmed that there was an

order of protection in place. Specifically, the order of

protection that Darr viewed on his on-board computer

mandated that Reynolds stay, at a minimum, 500 feet

away from Jamison’s residence. From his experience as a

police officer, Darr knew that Reynolds’ grandparents’

house was located within 500 feet of Jamison’s home.

There was nothing in LEADS which indicated that there

was any type of exception or amendment that would allow

Reynolds to be within 500 feet of Jamison’s home. Despite

the information provided by LEADS, Reynolds maintained

that he was allowed to go to his grandparents’ house but

could provide no documentation that the order of protection would allow him to do so.6

 To double check, Darr also

contacted the Champaign County Jail Records Division to

determine the specific provisions of the order of protection,

and again found no exception to the order. Based on the

totality of these facts, we conclude that Darr had probable

cause to arrest Reynolds for violating the order of protection on November 28, 2004.

Reynolds argues that there are several material facts

in dispute which preclude summary judgment. First,

Reynolds contends that because Darr did not directly
20 No. 06-2170

7 Reynolds’ argument that probable cause did not exist because

the collective knowledge doctrine does not apply is misplaced.

Under the collective knowledge doctrine, the knowledge of one

police officer is imputed to other officers when they are in

communication regarding a suspect. See United States v. Sawyer,

224 F.3d 675, 680 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Hensley,

469 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1985)). This doctrine permits arresting

officers to rely on the knowledge, but not necessarily the conclusions (such as whether probable cause exists), of other officers.

Thus, an arresting officer need not be personally aware of all of

the specific facts supporting probable cause, so long as an officer

who is aware of such facts relay them to the officer effecting

the arrest. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 232-33. Here, Darr was not

relying on information from another law enforcement agency or

police officer that probable cause existed to arrest Reynolds.

Rather, Darr arrived at his own conclusion that probable cause

existed in light of the facts and information that he gathered

through his own investigation.

talk to Jamison on the evening of November 28, 2004, he

was unable to assess her credibility, and thus, it was

unreasonable for him to rely on statements from the

putative victim. This argument lacks merit. Officer Darr

acted on information from Sergeant Morgan of an allegation by Jamison that Reynolds had violated an order of

protection.7 See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221,

232-33 (1985) (allowing a law enforcement officer to

effect an arrest in reliance on information supporting

probable cause supplied by other officers). Darr also

received a METCAD dispatch ticket stating that Reynolds

had possibly violated an order of protection. Moreover,

Darr had already had an opportunity to assess Jamison’s

credibility given his previous interaction with her and

had no reason to believe that Jamison’s call to

911/METCAD was not credible.

Reynolds also argues that the reasonableness of Darr’s

reliance on the order of protection in the LEADS system is
No. 06-2170 21

in dispute. Once he explained to Officer Darr that there

was an exception to the order of protection, Reynolds

argues that Darr should have either believed him or

allowed him to retrieve a copy of the order from his home.

This argument also fails. Darr received, through his

supervisor, credible information that Reynolds had allegedly violated a protective order and after consulting

every source customarily relied upon by police officers

and having found no exception to the order, Darr could

not be expected to believe Reynolds’ declarations of

innocence. In any case, once Darr had probable cause, he

was under no constitutional obligation to further investigate Reynolds’ possible innocence. See Beauchamp, 320

F.3d at 743; Pasiewicz, 270 F.3d at 524.

Further, to the extent Officer Darr violated Reynolds’

constitutional rights by not allowing him to retrieve his

personal copy of the Order of Protection, this constitutional

violation was not clearly established at the time of the

incident, and therefore Officer Darr is still entitled to

qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. On the

whole, the undisputed facts demonstrate that Officer Darr

had probable cause to arrest Reynolds on November 28,

2004. Reynolds has not raised any arguments sufficient to

rebut this conclusion. Accordingly, Officer Darr is entitled to qualified immunity, and we therefore affirm the

district court’s grant of summary judgment.

The policy considerations underlying the qualified

immunity doctrine also direct this result. Law enforcement

officers often encounter competing and inconsistent stories.

If officers were required to determine exactly where the

truth lies before acting, the job of policing would be very

risky financially as well as physically. Askew v. City of

Chicago, 440 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2006). “Police would

respond by disbelieving witnesses (or not acting on allegations) lest they end up paying damages, and the public

would suffer as law enforcement declined.” Id.
22 No. 06-2170

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

order limiting discovery and grant of the defendants’

motion for summary judgment.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I join my colleagues in affirming the grant

of summary judgment as to the November 28, 2004 arrest,

but dissent with respect to the July 12, 2004 arrest. In his

complaint, Reynolds asserted what are conceded to be

viable claims for wrongful arrest in violation of state

and federal law. R. 1 Counts I-III. He was entitled to

discovery on those claims, including in particular the right

to depose the two defendants, Darr and Jamison, in order

to determine what Jamison told Darr about Reynolds’

phone calls and thus to determine what Darr knew

when he made the decision to arrest Reynolds for telephone harassment. But he was never given that opportunity. Instead, the district court treated as conclusive the

version of events that Darr set forth in his police report

concerning the arrest and the fact that Reynolds later

pleaded guilty to telephone harassment. R. 40 at 4. In

both respects, I believe the district court erred.

As my colleagues point out, Reynolds’ ability to recover

on his claim that his July 12 arrest amounted to an

unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment

depends on whether Darr had probable cause to arrest

him. Ante at 14. The assessment of probable cause in turn

focuses on the facts known to Darr at the time of the

arrest. Ante at 14.
No. 06-2170 23

1 Reynolds, of course, knows the nature of his telephonic contact

with Jamison on July 12, 2004 as well as what he himself told

Darr about the telephone calls. Yet, as my colleagues rightly

point out, Darr was not required to believe Reynolds or to

question Jamison’s credibility simply because Reynolds disputed Jamison’s allegations. Ante at 8. This makes it all the

more clear, however, why Jamison and Darr are the key witnesses vis-à-vis the July 12 false arrest claim.

Darr’s decision to arrest Reynolds was based primarily

on the information that Jamison provided to him: what

she told him about Reynolds’ phone calls, what she

showed him on (or printed out from) her computer, and so

forth. This is clear both from the affidavit that Darr

submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment, R. 18-2 ¶¶ 4-5, 7, 9-15, as well as Darr’s police

report, R. 23-8 at 3-5. Only two individuals know what

Jamison conveyed to Darr about her telephonic contact

with Reynolds on July 12: Darr and Jamison. Deposing

those two individuals consequently was the only means

Reynolds had at his disposal to develop the record as to

what transpired between Jamison and Darr and what

Darr knew when he decided to arrest Reynolds.1

 It is

certainly possible that Darr and Jamison, if and when

deposed about the July 12 arrest, might testify entirely

consistently with their affidavits, with Darr’s report, and

with one another. But there is a reason why we allow the

parties to depose one another and their witnesses during the discovery process. Affidavits, responses to interrogatories, and other written statements are typically

drafted by lawyers and by their nature are self-serving.

See, e.g., Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 772 (7th Cir.

2003). Even something like a police report, prepared after

the fact to document what the police officer observed,

what he knew, and why he did what he did, is often

written with a calculating eye to litigation and to the
24 No. 06-2170

2 Darr contends that Reynolds never filed the requisite affidavit

in support of his Rule 56(f) motion. Reynolds did support his

motion with an affidavit, although it appears that the signature

page was inadvertently omitted. See R. 23-5. Darr also suggests

that the affidavit did not sufficiently explain why discovery was

necessary in order to respond to the defendants’ motions for

summary judgment, but in my view the case for discovery was

so straightforward (and made so repeatedly in the various

documents that Reynolds filed) that little elaboration was

required. In any case, the district court did not rely on any

insufficiency in the affidavit in concluding that discovery

was unwarranted.

author’s potential liability. There is no reason to believe

that such written statements invariably tell the complete

and unvarnished truth, and that is why the parties

are entitled to take depositions. Cf. Shoen v. Shoen, 5

F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Written interrogatories

are rarely, if ever, an adequate substitute for a deposition when the goal is a witness’s recollection of conversations. . . . Only by examining a witness live can a lawyer

use the skills of his trade to plumb the depths of a witness’ recollection . . . .”).

Reynolds’ need to depose Darr and Jamison was something that his counsel made clear to the district court at

every opportunity. The point was made repeatedly both in

Reynold’s opposition to Darr’s motion to stay discovery,

see R. 25 (passim), and in the memoranda he filed in

response to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, R. 22 at 3, 11-13, 17-18, 19, 24; R. 36 at 4, 11-13,

23. Reynolds also specifically sought relief pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f). R. 23-2, 23-3.2

Yet the district court came to the conclusion that discovery was unnecessary as to the events leading up to

Reynolds’ arrest on July 12. One of the two bases for the

court’s decision that discovery was unnecessary, and
No. 06-2170 25

3 Reynolds’ decision to plead guilty to telephone harassment

was also among the facts that the court relied on in concluding

that discovery was unnecessary. R. 40 at 4. The relevance of

the guilty plea is discussed below.

that the claims related to the July 12 arrest could be

resolved by way of summary judgment, was that the

relevant facts were set forth in Darr’s police report. “The

police report discusses the evidence presented to Darr

prior to the arrest,” the court observed. R. 40 at 4.

“Jamison showed Darr a computerized phone log displaying numerous phone calls from Reynolds. She told Darr

she’d received five phone calls that day, and she considered several of those to be threatening. Darr then

went to Reynolds, questioned him, and arrested him for

harassment by telephone.” Id. Evidently accepting the

representations set forth in Darr’s report as undisputed

and true, the court concluded that “[n]othing in these

facts suggests that discovery would lead to a triable

issue.” Id.3

 My colleagues acknowledge the court’s reliance on Darr’s report, noting that “the [district] court

concluded that the evidence presented in the police report

was sufficient to demonstrate that Darr had probable

cause,” ante at 11, and that “[i]n the court’s view, these

undisputed facts demonstrated that Darr had probable

cause to arrest Reynolds,” ante at 7-8. They also endorse

this treatment of Darr’s report, remarking that “[n]one of

the material facts relied upon by the district court were

in dispute and, thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying discovery as to the July 12, 2004 arrest.”

Ante at 9.

The problem, of course, is that the representations

in Darr’s report (as to what Jamison said to him, what

she showed him, and what Darr otherwise knew) are not

undisputed. They are untested. And they are untested
26 No. 06-2170

4 As far as I can determine, the only material fact set forth in

Darr’s report that Reynolds himself may have conceded is that

he telephoned Jamison on July 12, 2004. See R. 23-8 at 6.

Reynolds has expressly denied having called her five times.

R. 36-3 at 3 ¶ 12. He has also expressly denied having threatened Jamison, her son, or her dog. R. 22-2 at 3 ¶ 12.

because Reynolds has never been afforded the opportunity to question either Darr or Jamison about the

contents of Darr’s report. See n.1, supra. Absent the

opportunity to depose the only two people with personal

knowledge of what information Jamison conveyed to

Darr, Reynolds could not possibly contest the veracity of

Darr’s report. That is the only sense in which the substance of Darr’s report is undisputed.4

The contents of Darr’s report thus cannot be accepted

as fact. Darr’s report is nothing more than his out-ofcourt statement as to what he was told by Jamison and

what information she gave him. Certainly it is evidence of

what Darr knew when he made the decision to arrest

Reynolds, and in that sense it is relevant to the determination of whether he had probable cause to make the

arrest. But it cannot be treated as the final word on the

subject; the report is not, for example, a judicial finding

that might be entitled to preclusive effect in this litigation. The defendants can no more rely on Darr’s report to

preempt all inquiry into what he knew than an employer

charged with discriminatory discharge can rely on the

written documentation in its personnel file as conclusive

proof of the reason why the plaintiff was fired. Reynolds

is entitled to look behind the report and to question both

its author and Jamison about the contents of that report.

This is routine in false arrest cases.

My colleagues rely on Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d

979, 991 (7th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that it was
No. 06-2170 27

appropriate for the district court to deny Reynolds the

opportunity to take discovery concerning Darr’s report

and then to rely on that report in granting summary

judgment. Ante at 9-10 n.3. With respect, I submit this

grants an overly broad sweep to a dictum in Woods arising

from facts that are readily distinguishable. Although the

plaintiff in Woods, like Reynolds here, argued that he

was never given the opportunity to depose either the

police officers who had arrested him for assault or the

(putative) assault victim whose complaint to the police

had triggered the arrest, there were key circumstances

present in Woods that are missing here. The victim in

Woods had filed a verified criminal complaint with the

police narrating the alleged assault, and the arresting

officers’ report “essentially repeated this account of the

incident[.]” 234 F.3d at 983. The Woods plaintiff did not

dispute that the officers made the decision to arrest him

based on the victim’s complaint. See id. at 984, 990. More

importantly, he did not contest the facts that were alleged

in that complaint and repeated in the arrest report; on the

contrary, he relied on (and therefore admitted) the accuracy of both the complaint and the report in pursuing his

false arrest claim. See id. at 989, 990, 991. Against that

backdrop, the Woods panel naturally concluded that

there was no point in allowing the plaintiff to depose the

victim and the arresting officers before resolving the

validity of the arrest on summary judgment. Id. at 991.

The court made that point in the course of explaining

why it “would most likely affirm” the district court’s grant

of summary judgment even if (contrary to its earlier

conclusion) the lower court had not properly given the

plaintiff adequate notice that it was converting the defendant’s motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment

and an opportunity to respond. Id. Placed in context,

Woods’ unremarkable dictum lends no support to the

notion that a police officer sued for false arrest may rely
28 No. 06-2170

on his own report to foreclose inquiry into what facts

were communicated to him prior to the arrest. “What was

conveyed to the officers goes to the heart of probable

cause,” Washington v. Haupert, 481 F.3d 543, 549 (7th Cir.

2007), and where, as here, the plaintiff lacks personal

knowledge of what the putative victim told the arresting

officer, he is entitled to discovery on that score before the

court treats the officer’s version of events as undisputed

fact.

The other basis for the district court’s conclusion that

discovery was unnecessary as to the July 12 arrest was

Reynolds’ subsequent plea of guilty to the charge of

telephone harassment. R. 40 at 4. Although the court

did not elaborate on the reasons why it thought that

Reynolds’ guilty plea was relevant, the court apparently

agreed with Darr that the plea foreclosed Reynolds from

arguing that his arrest was wrongful in violation of either

federal or state law. Darr maintained that Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), barred

Reynolds’ section 1983 claim because a finding that

Reynolds was arrested without probable cause would

necessarily call into question the validity of his conviction, which Reynolds had not succeeded in having set

aside or otherwise nullified. R. 17 at 5. Darr argued that

the parallel state law claims were precluded on the basis

of collateral estoppel, because Reynolds’ conviction for

telephone harassment necessarily reflected an adjudication that he was properly arrested on that same charge.

Id. at 5-7. Darr has repeated these same arguments on

appeal in defense of the district court’s judgment. Neither

argument withstands scrutiny, however.

Darr’s reliance upon the rule of Heck v. Humphrey as a

bar to the section 1983 claim is mistaken for the reasons

set forth in Wallace v. City of Chicago, 440 F.3d 421, 425-

29 (7th Cir. 2006), aff’d, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007). Probable

cause to arrest is an issue that is entirely distinct from
No. 06-2170 29

sufficiency of evidence to convict. See, e.g., Draper v.

United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311-12, 79 S. Ct. 329, 332

(1959) (noting “the difference between what is required to

prove guilt in a criminal case and what is required to show

probable cause for arrest or search”); Simpson v. Rowan,

73 F.3d 134, 136 (7th Cir. 1995) (“an illegal search or

arrest may be followed by a valid conviction”). Consequently, a finding that Darr lacked probable cause to

arrest Reynolds would not call into question the validity

of his conviction, as my colleagues agree. Ante at 18.

The notion that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars

the state law claims is equally flawed. To begin with, as

my colleagues point out, the district court never engaged

in the case-sensitive scrutiny called for by the Illinois

Supreme Court’s decision in Talarico v. Dunlap, 685

N.E.2d 325, 332 (Ill. 1997). Ante at 10. Such an examination would reveal that at least two of the criteria for the

application of collateral estoppel, see Talarico, 685 N.E.2d

at 328, are not satisfied. First, the issue resolved by

Reynolds’ guilty plea and conviction is not identical to

the issue presented by the state claims he is pursuing

here. Again, whether there was sufficient evidence to

support the defendant’s conviction of a crime is a distinct

question from whether the arresting officer had probable

cause to believe that the defendant committed that crime.

Second, the propriety of Reynolds’ arrest was never

litigated in the state criminal proceeding, see ante at 17,

and the finding that Reynolds was guilty of telephone

harassment in no sense depended on the validity of his

arrest. See Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 315-16, 103

S. Ct. 2368, 2374-75 (1983). Convictions are often if not

usually founded on evidence that is broader than the

evidence known to the police at the moment of arrest, and

the record suggests that is true here. Darr’s own police

report, for example, indicates that after Reynolds’ arrest,
30 No. 06-2170

Jamison delivered to Darr a compact disc containing

seventy-two voicemails from Reynolds. R. 23-8 at 7.

For all of these reasons, I believe that it was error for

the district court to enter summary judgment against

Reynolds as to the July 12, 2004 arrest without first

permitting him to conduct discovery on those claims,

including the depositions of Jamison and Darr. To that

extent, I respectfully dissent.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-02-C-0072—6-8-07