****************************************************** The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion. In no event will any such motions be accepted before the ‘‘officially released’’ date. All opinions are subjectto modification andtechnical correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative. The syllabus and procedural history accompanying the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service and in the Connecticut LawJournal andboundvolumes of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************SAUNDRA MAGANA v. WELLS FARGO

BANK, N.A., ET AL. (AC 37792)
Gruendel, Lavine and Alvord, Js.*

Argued February 16—officially released April 19, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Miller, J.)Saundra Magana, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff).
Kevin P. Polansky, for the appellee (named defendant).
Elizabeth T. Timkovich, withwhom, onthebrief, was Pierre-Yves Kolakowski, for the appellees (defendant ReconTrust Company, N.A., et al.).Opinion PERCURIAM. Theself-representedplaintiff, Saundra Magana, appeals from the judgment of the trial court grantingthemotionfornonsuitforherfailureto comply withdiscoveryrequeststhatwasfiledbythe defendants Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for the Benefit of the Certificate Holders of Asset-Backed Pass Through Certificates Series 2004-MCW1 (Wells Fargo), ReconTrust Company, N.A., and Bank ofAmerica, N.A. (Bank ofAmerica).1 The plaintiff asserts that the court erred in granting the motion for nonsuit by relying on the bank defendants’ representations that she failed to comply with its discovery orders in the absence of evidence supportingtheir claim. We agree, and, accordingly, reverse the judgment of the trial court. The following facts and procedural history are relevantto this appeal. OnJuly 26, 2013, the plaintiffserved
a complaint seeking an injunction against the bank defendants, as well as the defendants NRT New England, LLC, Lawrence Gagnon, andAuction.com, Inc. The plaintiff alleged that Wells Fargo had foreclosed
on property at 67 Regency Drive in West Hartford that she occupied as a tenant under a lease agreement that she had entered into with the former mortgagor and
owner. She alleged that the lease agreement included
an optiontopurchasetheproperty. Theplaintiffalleged thatBankofAmericaofferedherthe optiontopurchase the property, which she exercised by contacting Gagnon, a representative of Bank ofAmerica. The plaintiff alleged that despite her having accepted the offer to purchase the property, Bank of America scheduled an auctionsale onAuction.com, Inc.’swebsite, whichprejudiced her option to purchase. In her complaint, she requested an ex parte, temporary, and permanent injunction preventing the auction sale that she alleged
was pending at the time the complaint was served. By October 6, 2014, only the bank defendants remained as defendants. On October 4, 2013, the bank defendants had served ontheplaintifftheirfirstrequest for interrogatories and request for documents. The plaintiffreceived an extension until December 13, 2013, to respond. On September 3, 2014, the bank defendants filedamotionforanorderofcompliancerequestingthat the court orderthe plaintiffto respond to the discovery requests or to enter ajudgment of nonsuit against her. On October 6, 2014, the court issued an order granting the motion for compliance, stating ‘‘[a] nonsuit shall enter on November 6, 2014, unless plaintiff responds to defendants’ discovery requests and files a certificate ofcompliance with this orderbefore that deadline.’’ On October 6, 2014, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion. OnNovember5, 2014, theplaintifffiledacertificate of compliance with the court, stating that she had complied with the October 6, 2014 order.On November 19, 2014, the bank defendants filed a motion for nonsuit, stating that the plaintiff had still failed to provide the discovery requests and to comply with the October 6, 2014 order. On December 19, 2014, the court issued an order stating: ‘‘The defendant is entitled to discovery compliance, having requested it
over a year ago. The plaintiff shall serve verified responses to all of the discovery requests in question
on orbefore February 3, 2015, or ajudgment ofnonsuit shall enter. No extensions oftime shallbe grantedwithout a showing of extreme good cause by the plaintiff. If there is no compliance by [that date], the defendant should reclaim this motion and ask that it be referred to the undersigned for adjudication.’’ The plaintifffiled
a verification of compliance on February 3, 2015. On February 25, 2015, the bank defendants filed a supplementtotheirmotionfornonsuit, claimingthattheplaintiff again had failed to comply with the discovery requests and court orders.2 The plaintifffiled an objection to the motion for nonsuit, which the court overruled on March 8, 2015. On March 19, 2015, the court issued an order granting the motion for judgment of nonsuit. The court stated that ‘‘[a] judgment ofnonsuit shall enter because the plaintiff violated this court’s earlier orders regarding discovery compliance.’’ This appeal followed.
Prior to addressing the plaintiff’s claims, we note the applicable standard of review and legal principles. ‘‘Practice Book § 13-14 provides sanctions for failure to answer interrogatories, which the court may order uponmotionasthe ends ofjusticerequire. These orders may vary in severity from entry of a nonsuit or default
or judgment of dismissal to an award of costs of the motion, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.’’ Tuccio

v. Garamella, 114 Conn. App. 205, 208, 969 A.2d 190 (2009). ‘‘Decisions on the entry of such sanctions rest within the sound discretion ofthe trial court.’’ Rullo v. General Motors Corp., 208 Conn. 74, 78, 543 A.2d 279 (1988). ‘‘In order for a trial court’s order of sanctions forviolation ofa discovery orderto withstand scrutiny, three requirements must be met. First, the order to be complied with must be reasonably clear.

. . . This requirement poses a legal question that we will review de novo. Second, the record must establish that the order was in fact violated. This requirement poses a question of fact that we will review using a clearly
erroneous standard of review. Third, the sanction imposed must be proportional to the violation. This requirement poses a question of the discretion of the trial court that we will review for abuse ofthat discretion.’’ Millbrook Owners Assn., Inc. v

. Hamilton Standard, 257 Conn. 1, 17–18, 776 A.2d 1115 (2001).
On appeal, the plaintiff does not assert that the trial court’s orders were not reasonably clear, but rather claims that the court wrongly placed undue relianceon representations made by the bank defendants in deciding to grant their motion for nonsuit. She challenges the trial court’s finding that she failed to comply with its discovery orders. She claims that the court erred by relying solely on the unsupported representations ofthe bank defendants’ counsel that she failed to comply with the discovery requests. Onthe basis ofourreview ofthe record, we conclude that all the court had before it was the plaintiff’s representations that she complied with the court orders, and the representations ofthe bank defendants’ counsel in their motions fornonsuit that she failedto comply with them.3 In light ofthe principle that ‘‘representations of counsel are not evidence and are certainly not proof’’; Martin v. Liberty Bank, 46 Conn. App. 559, 562, 699 A.2d 305 (1997); the court did not have before it any evidence on which it could make a credibility determination. The courthad onlytheparties’ competingrepresentationsregardingwhethertheplaintiffhad complied with the discovery requests and court orders. For this reason, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court should hold an evidentiary hearing in which theparties canpresent evidence supportingtheirrepresentations, permitting the court to make a factual finding as to whether the plaintiff has complied with its orders.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
1 We refer in this opinion to these defendants individually by name where necessary and, collectively, as the bank defendants.

2 None ofthe bank defendants’ three motions had any evidence attached to them supporting their representations that the plaintiff had failed to comply with the discovery requests and court orders.
3 We reject the bank defendants’ argument that the plaintiff’s brief is inadequate to challenge the findings ofthe trial court as clearly erroneous.