alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Harvey, Appellant, vs. Hartwig, Respondent.

*September 9*

October *6, 1953.*

*640For the appellant there was a brief and oral argument by *Louis R. Potter*of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief and oral argument by *Bernard C. Westfahl*of Milwaukee.

Brown, J.

No bill of exceptions was settled and the appeal from the judgment is before us on the pleadings, charge to the jury, verdict, and judgment. The pleadings frame the issue which the court sent to the jury and which the jury answered. The judgment is in accord with the verdict. For lack of a bill of exceptions, this court cannot go further into plaintiff’s claims of error. *Davis v. Davis*(1951), 259 Wis. 1, 2, 47 N. W. (2d) 338, and authorities there cited. *Berkemeyer v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co.*(1950), 256 Wis. 386, 387, 41 N. W. (2d) 303. The charge to the jury is correct as abstract law; whether it was a sufficient charge under *641the circumstances of this case depends on the evidence adduced at the trial, concerning which we have no information.

We are likewise without power to consider plaintiff’s affidavits supporting his motion for a new trial. We cannot tell whether the trial court erred in denying the motion unless we know what evidence was already before the court. The record made on the trial must determine all questions of fact and such record is not before us, nor can its place be filled by the numerous affidavits which plaintiff has filed to support his argument here on factual matters.

We may not reverse a trial court unless the record of its proceedings shows that error was committed. Since the appellant has not brought us a record showing error we must affirm.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed. Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-41457 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus LEODEGARIO ORTIZ-ZACARIAS, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. L-01-CR-681-ALL

-------------------- February 20, 2003 Before WIENER, EMILIO M. GARZA, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Leodegario Ortiz-Zacarias appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal reentry into the United States following deportation. Ortiz argues that the magistrate judge was without jurisdiction or authority to conduct his rearraignment hearing because the district court did not formally refer the case to the magistrate judge. Ortiz did not object in the district court to the magistrate judge’s exercise of authority. He waived his right to raise theNo. 01-41457 -2- procedural defect in his guilty plea proceeding as a basis for relief. United States v. Bolivar-Munoz , 313 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 2002). Ortiz also argues that the “felony” and “aggravated felony” provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1) and (2) are unconstitutional because they are treated as sentencing factors rather than as elements of the offense. Ortiz acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by Almendarez-Torres v. United States , 523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998), but asserts that the decision has been cast into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). He seeks to preserve his argument for further review. Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres
. See Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit , 231 F.3d 979, 984 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1201 (2001). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres “unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it.” Dabeit , 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 450

To amend title 37, United States Code, to authorize additional special pay

for board certified veterinarians in the Armed Forces and the Public

Health Service.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 24, 1999

Mr. ALLARD introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To amend title 37, United States Code, to authorize additional special pay for board certified veterinarians in

the Armed Forces and the Public Health Service.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PAY FOR BOARD CER4 TIFIED VETERINARIANS IN THE ARMED

5 FORCES AND PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE.

6 (a) AUTHORITY.—Section 303 of title 37, United

7 States Code, is amended—

8 (1) by inserting ‘‘(a) MONTHLY SPECIAL

9 PAY.—’’ before ‘‘Each’’; and
2

•S 450 IS

1 (2) by adding at the end the following:

2 ‘‘(b) ADDITIONAL SPECIAL PAY FOR BOARD CER3 TIFICATION.—A commissioned officer entitled to special

4 pay under subsection (a) who has been awarded a diploma

5 as a Diplomate in a specialty recognized by the American

6 Veterinarian Medical Association is entitled to special pay

7 (in addition to the special pay under that subsection) at

8 the same rate as is provided under section 302c(b) of this

9 title for an officer referred to in that section who has the

10 same number of years of creditable service as the commis11 sioned officer.’’.

12 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Section 303(b) of title 37,

13 United States Code, as added by subsection (a), shall

14 apply with respect to months beginning after September

15 30, 1999.

Æ
##### 



Exhibit 31.2 Certification Pursuant To
Section 302 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002 I, Jeffrey R. Mistarz, certify that:  1.
    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Electric City Corp. (the
Corporation)2.
    Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;3.
    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Corporation as of,
and for, the periods presented in this report;4.
    The Corporations other certifying officers and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Corporation and have:  a.
    Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
ensure that material information relating to the Corporation, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,
particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b.
    Evaluated the effectiveness of the Corporations disclosure controls
and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andc.
    Disclosed in this report any change in the Corporations internal
control over financial reporting that occurred during the Corporations most
recent fiscal quarter (the Corporations fourth fiscal quarter in the case of
an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
materially affect, the Corporations internal control over financial reporting;
and  5.
    The Corporations other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our
most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Corporations auditors and the audit committee of the Corporations board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):  a.
    All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
likely to adversely affect the Corporations ability to record, process,
summarize and report financial information; andb.
    Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
employees who have a significant role in the Corporations internal control
over financial reporting. Date: March 31, 2005 /s/ Jeffrey R. MistarzJeffrey R. MistarzChief Financial Officer
 48
#### In the Matter of Allstate Insurance Company, Respondent, v Angelina Duffy, Respondent, and Merchants Mutual *477Insurance Company, Appellant. State Farm Indemnity Company, Proposed Additional Respondent.

[772 NYS2d 588]

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 75 to permanently stay arbitration of an uninsured/underinsured motorist claim, in which Angelina Duffy cross-petitioned, inter alia, to add Merchants Mutual Insurance Company as a party and to compel it to proceed to arbitration of her claim for uninsured/ underinsured motorist benefits, Merchants Mutual Insurance Company appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Thomas, J.), dated October 10, 2002, as granted those branches of the cross petition which were to add it as a party and to compel it to proceed to arbitration of Angelina Duffy’s claim for uninsured/ underinsured motorist benefits against it.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with one bill of costs.

Whether Angelina Duffy is entitled to uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits under a policy issued by Merchants Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter Merchants) relates to whether certain conditions of coverage were satisfied, not whether the parties agreed to arbitrate. Accordingly, because the appellant failed to seek a stay of Angelina Duffy’s demand for arbitration of her claim for those benefits within the 20-day limitation period set forth in CPLR 7503 (c), the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of Duffy’s cross petition which were to add Merchants as a party and to compel it to proceed to arbitration *(see*CPLR 7503 [c]; *Matter of Steck [State Farm Ins. Co.],*89 NY2d 1082, 1084 [1996]; *Matter of Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v Anemone,*271 AD2d 690 [2000]; *Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Rosado,*271 AD2d 527, 528 [2000]; *Matter of Allstate Ins. Co. v Taylor,*271 AD2d 443 [2000]). Ritter, J.P., Santucci, Adams and Crane, JJ., concur.
#### RICHMOND COLE v. THE CAROLINA CENTRAL RAILWAY COMPANY.

It is not error in the court below *to*refuse to dismiss an action against a railroad company, on the ground that the court had not jurisdiction thereof, because the charter of the defendant’s company provides the manner, in which a parly injured by the construction of its road, shall proceed to recover damages, where the complaint, does not allege that the cause of action arose from the construction of said road.

This was a motion in the cause heard before Buxton,at Fall Term, 1875, of RiohhoNd Superior Court.

The complaint was filed at Fall Term, 1878, alleging that the defendant had changed the course of a certain stream, and claiming damages therefor.

At Fall Term, 1874, the case was, by consent, referred to two referees, with leave to choose an umpire in case of disagreement, the award to be made a rule of court. The referees chosen refused to act. No answer has ever been filed.

At Fall Term, 1875, the defendant moved the court to dismiss the action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction thereof, because the plaintiff can only pursue the remedy prescribed by the charter of the defendant company. It was. a fact, disputed by the connsel, whether the damages complained of, were incidental to the construction of the road, and necessarily occasioned thereby. The counsel for the plaintiff contending that it was, the counsel for the defendant contending that it was not.

His Honor refused to dismiss the action, because the complaint does not allege that the damages are caused by the location of the defendants’ road upon the lands of the plaintiff..

From this ruling of his Honor, tlie defendant appealed.

*Steele*cfe *Walker,*Strange, and *Bunbee,*for appellant-

*Shaw*and *Bind ale,*contra.

*588Peabsok, C. J.

For the reason by his Honor, we concur In his opinion.

Pee Cuetam. No error. Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED
FROM THE STATEMENTS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND
AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1996 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                    0000925662
<NAME> THE THORSDEN GROUP, LTD.
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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              Mar-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                                 Apr-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                                   Dec-31-1996
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                1
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</TABLE>
#### Paulson, Appellant, vs. Paulson, Respondent.

*October 4*

November *9, 1954.*

*641For the appellant there was a brief by *Leo W. Slensby,*attorney, and *William B. Rubin*of counsel, both of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Mr. Rubin.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *Fairchild, Foley & Sammond, Vernon A. Swanson,*and *Harrold J. McComas,*all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Mr. Swanson*and *Mr. McComas.*

Gehl, J.

If it be determined that the provision of the judgment is valid it follows that it is not necessary to determine the questions of present jurisdiction and practice which are raised by defendant.

Petitioner construes the judgment as depriving the minor son of support and as operating to relieve the father from the obligation to support him. Consequently, it is contended that the provision is void. Her contention cannot be sustained. Sec. 247.24, Stats., provides that in rendering a judgment for divorce the court *“may*make” further provision therein concerning the maintenance of the minor children of the parties. It is not required that such provision be made.

Assuming that she correctly construes the provision, it is not void. A judgment in a divorce case must be read and construed in the light of the applicable statutes. Had the court expressly and unequivocally directed by the terms of the judgment that the father should be relieved from the obligation to support the child, the determination would not have been conclusive and final nor would it be void. Under the provisions of sec. 247.32, Stats., revision of the judgment *642might upon proper showing have been had at any time during the lifetime of the father. *Lessig v. Lessig,*136 Wis. 403, 117 N. W. 792.

The court had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. It had the power to grant to the plaintiff an allowance for the support of the child of the parties or to withhold such grant. If the allowance made was inadequate or even if it be construed as no allowance at all, it was merely erroneous. It might have been corrected by appeal or by a motion to modify, but it is not open to a motion to vacate it as void.

*By the Court.*— Order affirmed.
```

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 212 (Friday, November 1, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 87426]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-25459]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

[NASA Document No: NASA-24-076]

Astrophysics Advisory Committee; Correction

AGENCY: National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

ACTION: Notice of meeting, correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: NASA published a document in the Federal Register on October 
29, 2024 concerning an Astrophysics Advisory Committee Meeting. The 
document needs to be updated to add language regarding the need to 
publish this notice less than 15 calendar days before meeting date.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jamie Krauk, 202-358-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Correction

    In the Federal Register of October 29, 2024, in FR Doc. 2024-25082, 
on page 85989, in the second column, add a final paragraph to the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section to read:
    ``Per Sec.  102-3.150(b) of the FACA Final Rule, this notification 
is published with fewer than 15 calendar days notice as a result of 
exceptional circumstances that required substantive changes due to 
recent cybersecurity incidents.''

Emily Pellegrino,
Program Analyst, NASA Directives and Regulations.
[FR Doc. 2024-25459 Filed 10-31-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE P
```
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 617 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 617

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage 
under the medicare program of insulin pumps as items of durable medical 
                               equipment.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 15, 1999

  Ms. Collins introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide for coverage 
under the medicare program of insulin pumps as items of durable medical 
                               equipment.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Medicare Insulin Pump Coverage Act 
of 1999''.

SEC. 2. COVERAGE OF INSULIN PUMPS UNDER MEDICARE.

    (a) Inclusion as Item of Durable Medical Equipment.--Section 
1861(n) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(n)) is amended by 
inserting before the semicolon the following: ``, and includes insulin 
infusion pumps (as defined in subsection (uu)) prescribed by the 
physician of an individual with Type I diabetes who is experiencing 
severe swings of high and low blood glucose levels and has successfully 
completed a training program that meets standards established by the 
Secretary or who has used such a pump without interruption for at least 
18 months immediately before enrollment under part B''.
    (b) Definition of Insulin Infusion Pump.--Section 1861 of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x) is amended by adding at the end 
the following:

                        ``Insulin Infusion Pump

    ``(uu) The term `insulin infusion pump' means an infusion pump, 
approved by the Federal Food and Drug Administration, that provides for 
the computerized delivery of insulin for individuals with diabetes in 
lieu of multiple daily manual insulin injections.''.
    (c) Payment for Supplies Relating to Infusion Pumps.--Section 
1834(a)(2)(A) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395m(a)(2)(A)) is 
amended--
            (1) in clause (ii), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in clause (iii), by inserting ``or'' at the end; and
            (3) by inserting after clause (iii) the following:
                            ``(iv) which is an accessory used in 
                        conjunction with an insulin infusion pump (as 
                        defined in section 1861(uu)),''.
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply with respect to items of durable medical equipment furnished 
under title XVIII of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395 et seq.) 
on or after the date of enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```