alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 10.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
           AS ADOPTED BY SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

           I, Yoel Katzir, as President and Chief Executive Officer of B.V.R.
Systems (1998) Ltd. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as
adopted by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:

           (1) the accompanying amendment on Form 20-F/A to Form 20-F report for
the period ending December 31, 2002 as filed with the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

           (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.


Dated:  May 28, 2003
                                           /s/ Yoel Katzir
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Yoel Katzir

                                           President and Chief Executive Officer
### THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

13

- 14

- 00070

- CV
Engelman Irrigation District

v. Shields Brothers, Inc.
On Appeal from the 93rd District Court of Hidalgo County , Texas Trial Cause No. C

- 2743

- 10

- B

JUDGMENT THE THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS, having cons idered this cause on appeal, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed . The Court orders the judgment of the trial court AFFIRMED . Costs of the appeal are adjudged against appellant. We further order this decision certified below for observance. January 15, 2015
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JEFFERSON BUNING,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS III, Attorney

General; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-16198

D.C. No. 

2:15-cv-01176-APG-VCF

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Andrew P. Gordon, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 5, 2017** 

San Francisco, California

Before: GRABER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL,*** Chief

District Judge.

 

FILED

DEC 07 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, Chief United States District Judge

for the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
Buning appeals the dismissal of his action for failure to timely effect service

of process, as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), (m). We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the action,

because Buning failed to timely serve the United States attorney for the District of

Nevada. See Fed. R. of Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A)(i), (m). Buning did not establish good

cause or excusable neglect for his failure to perfect service of process as required. 

See Lemoge v. United States, 587 F.3d 1188, 1198 (9th Cir. 2009). 

Buning argues either that (1) he was excused for service of process under

Rule 4 because 8 C.F.R. § 336.9(b) controlled or, even if it did not, (2) he

established good cause for failing to comply with Rule 4, because § 336.9(b)

created ambiguity with regard to service of process. Neither argument is

persuasive. 

First, to the extent that Buning has not waived these arguments, because he

failed to provide “any analysis to assist the court in evaluating [his] legal

challenge,” see Indep. Towers of Wash. v. Washington, 350 F.3d 925, 929-30 (9th

Cir. 2003), there is no conflict between Rule 4 and 8 C.F.R. § 336.9(b). Section

336.9(b) merely informs the applicant which agencies must be served under Rule

4(i)(1)(C). Second, even if there were an ambiguity, Buning was aware of the

2
requirements of Rule 4 when he moved under Rule 4(m) for additional time to

serve the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. See Whale v. United

States, 792 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We know of no cases in which

counsel’s failure to read Rule 4 and counsel’s resulting ‘assumption’ that mail

service was valid were held to constitute ‘good cause’ or ‘justifiable excuse.’”). 

Moreover, Buning still failed to effect service in the additional time granted by the

district court. Accordingly, we cannot find good cause or excusable neglect. 1

AFFIRMED.

1Because we affirm the district court’s dismissal under Rule 4(m), we need

not address Buning’s additional arguments on appeal.

3
EXHIBIT 10.BB.1
 AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO THE
EL PASO CORPORATION  2005 SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS PLAN
      Section 4.1 Participants
     Section 6 Claims Procedure




---



##### 



6.1 Submission of Claim
   6.2 Notice of Denial
   6.3 Right to Request Review
  -2-




---



##### 



6.4 Review of Claim
   6.5 Civil Actions under ERISA Section 502(a)
   EL PASO CORPORATIONBy:
    /s/ D. Mark LelandD. Mark LelandIts:
    Chief Financial OfficerDate:
December 17, 2008 ATTEST:By:
    /s/ Marguerite Woung-ChapmanCorporate Secretary -3-
##### 



Exhibit 32 CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the Annual
Report of AMERIGROUP Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-K for
the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof (the Report), Jeffrey L. McWaters, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
hereby certifies to the best of his knowledge, and E. Paul Dunn, Jr., as Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, hereby certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and result of operations of the Company. /s/ Jeffrey L. McWaters Jeffrey L. McWaters
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Date: March xx, 2005
 /s/ E. Paul Dunn, Jr. E. Paul Dunn, Jr.
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Date: March 8, 2005
 This certification accompanies this Report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed
filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
PROMISSORY NOTE
                                 ---------------

$712,500.00                              Fort Lauderdale, FL, September 28, 2001

FOR VALUE  RECEIVED,  I/WE, or either of us,  promise to pay to the order of BAY
COLONY ASSOCIATES, LTD., the sum Seven hundred twelve thousand, five hundred and
no/100 dollars  ($712,000.00)  at c/o Marquette  Realty,  5601 N. Dixie Highway,
Suite 420, Fort Lauderdale,  Florida 33334,  with interest from date at the rate
of seven (7%) percent per annum until paid, payable as follows:

At Borrower's  option  interest may be accrued or paid during the period between
the date hereof and  September  28,  2004.  On September  28, 2004,  all accrued
interest  shall be paid and  thereafter,  interest  shall  be paid  monthly.  On
September 28, 2006, the principal and any unpaid accrued  interest shall be paid
in full.

Now should it become  necessary to collect his note through an attorney,  either
of us, whether maker, surety, or endorser on this note, hereby agrees to pay all
costs of such collection,  including reasonable  attorney's fee. The drawers and
endorsers  severally  waive  presentment  for  payment,  protest,  and notice of
protest of this note.  IN THE EVENT any payment of interest or principal  not be
paid within THIRTY (30) days after the same becomes due, the holder on this note
may, at his option,  declare the whole  principal sum here to be immediately due
and payable.

PARKSON PROPERTY LLC


By:/s/ Robert G. Tancredi
   =============================================
   Robert G. Tancredi, authorized representative
#### Holmes & Williams *v.*Williams.

From Wake.

Where' a cause stands more than two terms upon replications, and the usual order for commissions, it is regular to set it down for hearing1 ; and where no steps are taken to prepare the cause for trial, the suit may be dismissed for want of prosecution ; but the Plaintiff may, if he please, have the cause set for hearing on bill and answer, or may have it heard; therefore, when the Judge below refused both, and dismissed the bill without hearing, such dismission was held to be erroneous.

Bill filed at April term 1822, the object of which was to set aside a conveyance fraudulently obtained from Complainant Williams. The last step taken in the cause appeared to have been at the. Spring Term of 1823, when commissions to take testimony were ordered, and at the Fall Term of 1825, Defendants moved to dismiss with costs for want of prosecution. Complainants resisted this motion, and prayed the Court either to hear the cause, or set it down for hearing, which the Court refused, and ordered it to be dismissed with *costs;*whereupon Complainants appealed.

T-Tat.t.. Judge —

The rule, that the party should be prepared in two terms to set the cause for hearing, is a good one, it prevents delay, and where the parties have taken no steps to prepare for trial, the causes have been, generally dismissed, because it would avail the party nothing either to have the cause heard, or set for trial in that unprepared *state;*but cases may happen where a Defendant admits enough in his answer to entitle the Complainant to a decree for something, although in other parts of his answer he may deny other allegations in the bill which it is incumbent in the Complainant to establish by proof; however without procuring such proof, the Complainant may wish to have the cause heard on bill and answer, *or*set for hearing upon bill and answer. This *372j (¡link he is 'entitled to have *done;*as it was not done, Í think a writ of Procedendo oiurht to issue: but the ° ’ Complainant will not, of course, be entitled to take tes» ^mony ¡n cause, he can only do it upon sufficient cause shewn.

And of this opinion were the other Judges.
#### Bersch, Respondent, vs. Holton Street State Bank, Appellant.

*May 17*

June *15, 1945.*

*262For the appellant there was a brief by Lines, *Spooner &*Quarles, attorneys, and *Charles B. Quarles*of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Mr. Quarles.*

*Charles Swidler*of Milwaukee, for the respondent.

Fairchild, J.

The general rule is stated in *Schroeder v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.*(1936) 220 Wis. 642, 648, 265 N. W. 559, that one who keeps a store or shop “is bound to exercise reasonable care to keep it in a safe condition for his customers and others whom he invites, expressly or impliedly, to enter on business with him.”

In this case, there is testimony to indicate that the bank had notice that the floor was slippery. In time of storm the likelihood of a slippery walk or floor necessarily comes into existence so that even with knowledge that individuals with wet shoes are using the floor, negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to take steps to relieve it, does not necessarily exist. It is considered that under the facts appearing in the record there was no duty resting upon defendant to cause the floor to be kept perfectly dry. It was snowing on that day and customers of the bank could be expected to come in and out of the bank throughout the day. If the defendant were held to the duty of mopping up the floor and keeping it free from snow and wqter, it would require perpetual attention because there would be a continual deposit of moisture *263upon the floor. In *S. S. Kresge Co. v. Fader*(1927), 116 Ohio St. 718, 724, 158 N. E. 174, the court held that where, during a rainstorm some water was blown into the front of the store on account of the opening of the door to admit customers, and the incoming shoppers brought in moisture on their clothing and umbrellas so that the floor became damp and slippery, the owner of the store was not liable to a patron who fell on such floor and was thereby injured. The court said: “It is not the duty of persons in control of such buildings to keep a large force of moppers to mop up the rain as fast as it falls or blows in, or is carried in by wet feet or clothing or umbrellas.” When the weather creates a natural hazard of this sort, a person of ordinary care is not under a duty to keep a floor in a public place completely free of such deposits.

Since defendant has breached no duty, it is guilty of no negligence and hence not liable.

*By the Court.*— Judgment reversed. Cause remanded with directions to reversé the judgment of the civil court and dismiss the complaint.
#### Brasfield v. Whitaker.

From Wake.

The lien created by an execution is continued by an *alias*regularly issuing thereon; and if an execution, at the instance of another Plaintiff, issue after the lien of the first has commenced, and before execution is fully done under it, the *alias*come to the Sheriff’s hands, it shall have the preference.

This was a case agreed as follows: the Plaintiff, *David Brasfield,*at the November Sessions 1820, of Wake County Court, obtained a judgment against one *Mark Cooke,*for g390 34, with interest, &c. and costs. Upon this judgment, the Plaintiff sued out a writ *offi. fa.*returnable to February term of Wake County Court, 1821, directed to the Sheriff of Wake, which in due time came to the hands of the Defendant, then Sheriff of the said County, and which was returned by him endorsed, “nothing to be found.”

Plaintiff then sued out an *alias fi.fia.*returnable to the May Sessions of the same year, which came to the Defendant’s hands on the 6th' of March 1821, and was returned, “ nothing to be found.”

At February Sessions 1821, of Wake County Court, *Hutchins G. Burton*recovered a judgment against *Mark Cooke*for 82512 99, on which *a. fi.fia.*issued, returnable to May Sessions 1821, which came to the Defendant’s hands on the 1st of March 1821. On the samoday, the Defendant levied on a lot and improvements in Raleigh, belonging to *Mark Cooke,*and afterwards,'on the 27th of April, in the same year, sold the same as Sheriff, for guoo, and applied the purchase money to *Burton’s*execution.

The case as above stated, was submitted to Paxton, Judge, who gave judgment for the Plaintiff for the whole amount of his debt, interest and costs. Whereupon Defendant appealed.

*Badger*<$• *Hawks,*for appellant.

Haywood, for appellee.

*310Hare, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the Court:

*Brasjidd’s*execution was a lien on *Cooke's*property, and that lien was continued by the alias execution which |sgne(j regUia|.]y after it.

*Burton's*execution issued after this lien commenced, and execution was not done fully under it, before *Bras-field’s*alias execution came to the bauds of the Sheriff.

*Brasfield’s*execution had the preference, and should have been first satisfied.

JUDGMENT AEEIRMED.
**EXHIBIT 10.11**

**DESCRIPTION OF COMPENSATORY ARRANGEMENTS**

**BETWEEN REGISTRANT AND NON-EMPLOYEE DIRECTORS**

Members of the Board of Directors who are not employees of Concur receive compensation for their services as directors as providedbelow. 

Each outside director who joined the Board prior to June 2003 was granted an option for 50,000 shares under the 1998 DirectorsStock Option Plan on the date he first became a member of the Board of Directors and, if he has served as a director continuously since the date of his original option grant, he is granted an option for 20,000 shares under the 1998 Directors StockOption Plan on the date of each annual meeting of stockholders. 

Each outside director who joined the Board after June 2003 may select oneof the following two options. Under the first option, the outside director receives a cash stipend of approximately $35,000 per year, is granted an option for 40,000 shares under the 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan on the date he first becomes amember of the Board of Directors, and, if he has served as a director continuously since the date of his original option grant, he is granted an option for 10,000 shares under the 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan on the date of each annual meetingof stockholders. Under the second option, the outside director is granted an option for 60,000 shares under the 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan on the date he first becomes a member of the Board of Directors and, if he has served as a directorcontinuously since the date of his original option grant, he is granted an option for 20,000 shares under the 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan on the date of each annual meeting of stockholders. 

Beginning March 2007, each outside director has the right to select one of the following two options in replacement of the rights described above. Underthe first option, the outside director receives a cash stipend of approximately $35,000 per year and, if he has served as a director continuously since the date of his original appointment to the Board of Directors, he is granted 3,250 restrictedstock units under the 2007 Equity Incentive Plan on the first business day after the date of each annual meeting of stockholders. Under the second option, the outside director is granted 6,500 restricted stock units under the 2007 Equity IncentivePlan on the first business day after the date of each annual meeting of stockholders for so long as he has served as a director continuously since the date of his original appointment to the Board of Directors. 

All directors are reimbursed for their reasonable travel expenses in attending Board and committee meetings.
#### Allen v. The District Township of Bertram.

1. School Districts: independent district in village. Under § 1800 of the Code, as amended, (see Miller’s Code,) no village of less than two hundred inhabitants may be organized, with contiguous territory, into an independent school district. The inhabitants of contiguous territory are not to be added to the village proper to increase the number to two hundred.

*Appeal from Limn Circuit Court.*

Saturday, December 18.

.ActioN to determine the validity of the organization of *435an independent school district. There was a judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.

*Thompson d> harming,*for appellant.

*J. G. Davis,*for appellee.

BecK, J.

The abstract fails to show the nature of the action, or the remedy sought. But, as the question decided by the court below, and the facts upon which it arises, appear in the abstract, we may properly review the decision of the circuit court. The question presented by the case is this: May an independent school district bo organized in a village of less than two hundred population, when territory contiguous is added thereto which contains inhabitants sufficient in number to increase the population of the whole district to two hundred or more?

Code, § 1800, as amended, (see Miller’s Code,) is as follows: “Sec. 1800. ' Any city, town or village containing not less than two hundred' inhabitants within its limits may be constituted a separate school district; and territory contiguous to such a city, town or village may be included with it as a part of said separate district in the manner hereinafter provided. The village herein mentioned shall be understood to be a collection of inhabitants residing within the limits of a town plat, and not organized into a city or corporated town.”

This provision is plain, and incapable of misconstruction. No village of less than two hundred inhabitants within its limits may be organized into an independent district. ' The inhabitants of contiguous territory are not to be added to the village proper in order to increase the number above two hundred. The provision as to the addition of contiguous territory is applicable without regard to the population of the city, town or village constituting the independent district. It has no relation or connection with the number of the population, and is intended to give authority to add con*436tiguous territory to any independent district organized in a city, town or village.

We reach the conclusion that the circuit court rightly held that, as the village contained less than two hundred population, it could not be organized into an independent district.

AFFIRMED.
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 212 (Friday, November 1, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Page 87309]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-25404]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 8

[PS Docket Nos. 23-239; FR ID 258059]


Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces 15-Business 
Day Filing Window for Cybersecurity Labeling Administrator and Lead 
Administrator Applications; Correction

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule; correction.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Federal Communications Commission is correcting the DATES 
section of a final rule that appeared in the Federal Register on 
October 21, 2024 announcing a 15-business day filing window for 
applications from entities seeking designation as a Cybersecurity 
Labeling Administrator (CLA) and Lead Administrator and also adopting 
additional requirements for CLAs and Lead Administrators.

DATES: Effective November 20, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tara Shostek, Attorney Advisor, 
Cybersecurity and Communications Reliability Division, Public Safety 
and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-8130, or by email to 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#feaa9f8c9fd0ad96918d8a9b95be989d9dd0999188"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="b5e1d4c7d49be6dddac6c1d0def5d3d6d69bd2dac3">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In rule document 2024-23844 at 89 FR 84086, 
appearing on page 84086 in the Federal Register of Monday, October 21, 
2024, in the third column, the DATES section is corrected to read as 
follows:
    Effective date: November 20, 2024, except for amendment 3 (47 CFR 
8.220(f)(14)) which is delayed indefinitely until the Office of 
Management and Budget has completed review under the Paperwork 
Reduction Act. The Commission will publish a document in the Federal 
Register announcing that effective date.

Federal Communications Commission.
Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-25404 Filed 10-31-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P


</pre><script data-cfasync="false" src="/cdn-cgi/scripts/5c5dd728/cloudflare-static/email-decode.min.js"></script></body>
</html>