J-S09015-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KERRY RANSOME 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1341 EDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 30, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0003919-2016

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED MAY 27, 2022

Kerry Ransome appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Counsel has also 

filed a Turner/Finley1 “no-merit” letter seeking to withdraw from his 

representation of Ransome. After careful review, we grant counsel’s petition 

to withdraw and affirm.

On March 11, 2016, Ransome kicked open the door to the victim’s 

residence, pointed a gun at her head, and struck her in the head with the 

firearm before fleeing the scene. Ransome and the victim had been dating 

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v. 

Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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prior to the incident. The victim was treated at a nearby hospital for a 

forehead laceration.

Following a waiver trial, Ransome was found guilty of aggravated 

assault, burglary, criminal trespass, simple assault, possession of a firearm 

prohibited, firearms not to be carried without a license, carrying a firearm in 

public in Philadelphia, possession of an instrument of crime, and recklessly 

endangering another person. The trial court sentenced Ransome to an 

aggregate sentence of ten to twenty years in prison, which included a 

mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9714 (“two strikes” 

law).

2

Ransome filed a direct appeal. On appeal, our Court vacated two of 

Ransome’s firearm convictions after concluding that the Commonwealth did 

not establish the length of the gun Ransome possessed, and affirmed the 

judgment of sentence in all other respects. Commonwealth v. Ransome, 

201 A.3d 825 (Pa. Super. 2018) (Table). Ransome filed an unsuccessful 

petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 

Commonwealth v. Ransome, 2268 EDA 2017 (Pa. filed April 8, 2019).

On April 2, 2020, Ransome filed a timely PCRA petition, pro se, and 

supporting memorandum of law, raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial 

and appellate counsel for failing to “contact, interview, or depose [,] call[, or] 

____________________________________________

2 Ransome had previously been convicted of robbery.
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subpoena witnesses[3] who could have provided testimony that would have 

been exculpatory to [him].” Pro Se PCRA Petition, 4/2/20, at 3. Specifically, 

Ransome alleged that these witnesses could attest to the fact that he was the 

“rent payer” and “rental occupant” of the victim’s apartment and, thus, would 

provide a defense to burglary. Id. at 6. William J. Ciancaglini, Esquire, was 

appointed as PCRA counsel and filed an amended PCRA petition. On March 

25, 2021, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.A.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss 

Ransome’s petition without a hearing. Ransome did not file a response to the 

notice. The PCRA court dismissed Ransome’s petition on June 1, 2021.

On June 29, 2021, Attorney Ciancaglini was relieved of his duties, and 

current counsel, John Belli, Esquire, was appointed to represent Ransome 

solely for the purpose of “pursu[ing] any applicable [collateral] appeal to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.” Order, 7/29/21. Ransome filed a timely 

notice of appeal4 and court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of 

errors complained of on appeal.

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3 Ransome’s petition listed the following three witnesses: Shirley Ransome

(Ransome’s mother), Donald Hamilton (the victim’s landlord), and Probation 

Officer James Smith.

4 On August 9, 2021, our Court issued a rule to show cause (RTSC) as to why 

the instant appeal should not be quashed “having been taken from a purported 

order which is not entered upon the appropriate docket pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

301(a)(1).” Order, 8/9/21. Counsel filed a response claiming that he 

“inadvertently listed the date of the order appealed from [as] June 30, 2021, 

instead of June 1, 2021.” Response to RTSC, 8/9/21. Counsel asked that our 

Court not quash the appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902, and either sua sponte correct 

the defect or issue an order permitting counsel to file an amended notice of 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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appeal. On August 10, 2021, our Court entered an order informing the parties 

that the issue raised in the RTSC “will be referred to the panel assigned to 

decide the merits of the appeal.” Per Curiam Order, 9/10/21. On August 11, 

2021, counsel filed an “Application to Amend Notice of Appeal.” On September 

28, 2021, our Court granted counsel’s application and directed counsel to file 

an amended notice of appeal with our prothonotary within seven days. To 

date, counsel has not filed an amended notice of appeal. However, on October 

5, 2021, counsel filed a Turner/Finley “no merit” letter with this Court 

indicating that Ransome’s collateral appeal is “wholly lacking in merit and is 

frivolous.” “No-Merit” Letter, 10/5/21, at 1. In his letter, counsel notes that 

he “was . . . appointed and filed a notice of appeal and a [Rule] 1925(b) 

Statement of Matters” for Ransome. Id. at 4.

We note that “[i]t is implicit in Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 904, 

which governs the content of the notice of appeal, that the correct date of the 

order appealed should be included in the notice of appeal.” Commonwealth 

v. Martin, 462 A.2d 859, 860 (Pa. Super. 1983), overruled on other grounds, 

Commonwealth v. Graves, 508 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 1986). Here, the notice of 

appeal states that the appeal is from the June 30, 2021 order denying postconviction collateral relief. However, the correct date of the order denying 

PCRA relief is June 1, 2021. On that basis alone, we could quash this appeal. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 904. Nevertheless, we are cognizant of the fact that our rules 

of appellate procedure “shall be liberally construed to secure the just, 

speedy[,] and inexpensive determination of every matter.” Pa.R.A.P. 105. 

Here, Ransome filed his notice of appeal within 30 days of the date that the 

trial court filed the order denying his PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 903 (time 

for appeal). Notably, Pa.R.A.P. 902 states that the “[f]ailure of an appellant 

to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not 

affect the validity of the appeal, but it is subject to such action as the appellate 

court deems appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, remand of 

the matter to the lower court so that the omitted procedural step may be 

taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 902 (emphasis added). Here, it is obvious from Ransome’s 

appellate brief, as well as the criminal docketing statement indicating that he 

is challenging the June 1, 2021 denial of post-conviction relief (and that much 

has been admitted by counsel in his responses to our Court), that he is seeking 

to appeal the denial of his PCRA petition. Therefore, we decline to quash the 

instant appeal. See Commonwealth v. Lahoud, 488 A.2d 307 (Pa. Super. 

1985) (where incorrect date listed on order in notice of appeal, because appeal 

otherwise proper, our Court treated defect as harmless and considered merits 

of appeal).
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On October 5, 2021, counsel filed a Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter 

seeking to withdraw on appeal. In his accompanying brief, counsel raises the 

following issue for our consideration:

[Whether t]he PCRA court abused its discretion, and/or ma[d]e a 

mistake and/or error of law when it denied [Ransome] an 

evidentiary hearing and then post-conviction collateral relief on 

his claim alleging that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

of counsel by failing to call as defense witnesses[,] during 

[Ransome’s] trial[,] Shirley Ransome[,] Donald Hamilton, and 

Probation Officer James Smith for the reasons set forth in 

[Ransome’s] PCRA petition and counsel’s amended petition?

Turner/Finley Brief, 10/5/21, at 5.

Before we address the merits of Ransome’s issue on appeal, we must 

first review counsel’s application to withdraw. With regard to withdrawal from 

PCRA representation, our Supreme Court has stated that independent review 

of the record by competent counsel is required before withdrawal is permitted. 

Such independent review requires proof of: (1) a “no-merit” letter by PCRA 

counsel detailing the nature and extent of his review; (2) the “no-merit” letter 

by PCRA counsel listing each issue the petitioner wished to have reviewed; (3) 

PCRA counsel’s explanation, in the “no-merit” letter, as to why the petitioner’s 

issues are meritless; (4) independent review of the record by the PCRA or 

appellate court; and (5) agreement by the PCRA or appellate court that the 

petition was meritless. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1184 (Pa. 

Super. 2012).
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In Commonwealth v. Friend, 896 A.2d 607 (Pa. Super. 2006),5this 

Court imposed an additional requirement for counsel seeking to withdraw from 

collateral proceedings:

PCRA counsel who seeks to withdraw must 

contemporaneously serve a copy on the petitioner of 

counsel’s application to withdraw as counsel, and must 

supply to the petitioner both a copy of the “no-merit” 

letter and a statement advising the petitioner that, in the 

event that the court grants the application of counsel to 

withdraw, he or she has the right to proceed pro se or 

with the assistance of privately retained counsel.

Id. at 614.

After determining that counsel has satisfied the above technical 

requirements, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of the record to 

ascertain if there appears on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that 

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.” Commonwealth v. 

Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

Here, counsel has substantially complied with the Turner/Finley and 

Friend requirements. Counsel has detailed the nature and extent of his 

review, served a copy of his petition to withdraw and brief upon Ransome and 

informed Ransome of his right to proceed pro se or with privately retained 

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5 This Court’s holding in Friend was subsequently overruled on other grounds 

by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Pitts, 981 A.2d 875, 876 n.1 

(Pa. 2009). However, the additional requirement that counsel provide copies 

of the relevant documentation to the petitioner remains intact. 

Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 818 (Pa. Super. 2011). 
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counsel,6raised Ransome’s issues in the form of a brief, and explained why 

Ransome’s claims are meritless. We now turn to an independent review of 

the record to determine whether Ransome’s claims merit relief.

“We review the denial of PCRA relief to decide whether the PCRA court’s 

factual determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 196 A.3d 130, 150 (Pa. 2018). Moreover, 

[w]hen raising a claim of ineffectiveness for the failure to call a 

potential witness, a petitioner satisfies the performance and 

prejudice requirements of the [ineffectiveness] test by 

establishing that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was 

available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should 

have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was 

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6

In response to counsel’s request to withdraw, Ransome filed an application 

requesting that this Court remand the record to the trial court “to develop a 

record regarding Attorney Belli’s improper request to withdraw his 

representation in this matter . . . and to analyze whether counsel’s request 

to withdraw is improper.” Application for Relief, 11/3/21, at 2. Specifically, 

Ransome alleges that because this is his first PCRA petition, he is entitled to 

effective assistance of counsel “during the entirety of the proceedings” and 

because counsel is seeking to withdraw prior to “receiving a [Rule 1925(a)] 

opinion from Judge Woelpper . . . to determine whether the PCRA [c]ourt’s 

rationale was free of legal or factual error . . . [counsel] has ignored clear and 

convincing evidence that supports [Ransome’s] claims.” Id. at 3-4.

While we look with disfavor upon the court’s failure to file a Rule 1925(a) 

opinion in this appeal, we find that counsel has diligently and conscientiously 

examined the record and correctly determined that Ransome’s issue lacks

merit. Moreover, we note that in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.3d 381 

(Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court recently abandoned the Rule 907 approach to 

preservation of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness claims and held that a 

petitioner may, after a PCRA court denies relief and after obtaining new 

counsel or acting pro se, raise claims of PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness at the 

first opportunity to do so, even if on appeal. Therefore, Ransome’s reliance 

on Pitts, supra, is misplaced, where Pitts’ approach was “abandon[ed]” in 

Bradley. Bradley, 261 A.3d at 401. Thus, we deny Ransome’s application 

for remand. 
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willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the 

testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the 

defendant a fair trial. To demonstrate [] prejudice, a petitioner 

must show how the uncalled witnesses’ testimony would have 

been beneficial under the circumstances of the case. Thus, 

counsel will not be found ineffective for failing to call a witness 

unless the petitioner can show that the witness’s testimony would 

have been helpful to the defense. A failure to call a witness is not 

per se ineffective assistance of counsel[,] for such decision usually 

involves matters of trial strategy.

Commonwealth v. Sneed, 45 A.3d 1096, 1108-09 (Pa. 2012) (citations and 

quotations omitted).

Instantly, the trial court stated in its Rule 907 notice that it intended to 

dismiss Ransome’s petition, within twenty days, based on the fact that the 

petition lacked merit for the following reasons:

Petitioner claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call the 

following witnesses: (1) Shirley Ransome, (2) Donald Hamilton, 

and (3) Probation Officer James Smither. Petitioner has failed to 

establish that he was prejudiced by the absence of the witnesses’ 

testimony. Furthermore, as to Probation Officer James Smith, 

Petitioner has failed to identify the “other material facts” he would 

have provided.

Rule 907 Notice, 3/25/21. Moreover, even if Ransome was paying the rent 

for the victim’s residence at the time of the incident, Ransome conceded that 

he did not have a key to the residence and that, at the time of the incident, 

he was temporarily living with his mother. Additionally, Ransome never 

testified that he resided with the victim or that he had the right to enter her 

residence without her permission. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(b) (defense to 

burglary if “actor is licensed or privileged to enter”). Finally, even if Ransome’s 

mother and the victim’s landlord were to testify that Ransome paid rent on 
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the victim’s residence, it would not change the fact that he broke down the 

door to the residence, entered it without the victim’s permission, and struck 

her in the head with a gun. Accordingly, we agree with the PCRA court that 

Ransome could not succeed on an ineffectiveness claim for counsel’s failure to 

call Ransome’s mother and the victim’s landlord where: (1) the victims’ 

testimony would not have been beneficial under the circumstances of the case, 

and (2) Ransome cannot show that the witnesses’ testimony would have been 

helpful to the defense. Sneed, supra.

Finally, with regard to Probation Officer Smith, Ransome contends that 

the officer knew of “[e]vidence of the alleged victim’s prior attempts to have 

[Ransome] falsely accused of crimes.” Pro Se PCRA Petition, 5/4/20, at 5. 

Even if Probation Officer Smith would have testified that the victim had falsely

accused Ransome of crimes in the past, it would not have been helpful to his 

current defense[,] where Ransome denied attacking the victim or even being 

in the vicinity of her residence at the relevant time. Again, this ineffectiveness 

claim fails. Id.

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/27/2022