UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4673

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CATRINA COLLEEN EVERHART,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, 

District Judge. (3:14-cr-00004-GMG-RWT-2)

Submitted: February 20, 2015 Decided: March 3, 2015

Before AGEE, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

William T. Rice, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. 

Jarod James Douglas, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Catrina Colleen Everhart appeals her conviction and the 

sixty-month sentence imposed following her guilty plea to 

conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to 

distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). 

On appeal, Everhart’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court fully complied with Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 11 in accepting Everhart’s guilty plea and whether the 

sentence is reasonable. Everhart was advised of her right to 

file a pro se supplemental brief but did not file one. Finding 

no meritorious grounds for appeal, we affirm. 

Everhart first questions whether the district court erred 

in accepting her guilty plea. Our review of the plea hearing 

reveals that the district court substantially complied with 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in conducting the plea 

colloquy and committed no error warranting correction on plain 

error review. See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 532 

(4th Cir. 2002). Thus, the court did not err in accepting 

Everhart’s knowing and voluntary guilty plea.
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Everhart next questions the reasonableness of the sentence.*

In reviewing a sentence, we must first ensure that the district 

court did not commit any “significant procedural error,” such as 

failing to properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, 

failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or 

failing to adequately explain the sentence. Gall v. United 

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Once we have determined that 

there is no procedural error, we must consider the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the 

totality of the circumstances.” Id. If the sentence imposed is 

within the appropriate Guidelines range, we consider it 

presumptively reasonable. United States v. Yooho Weon, 722 F.3d 

583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013). The presumption may be rebutted by a 

showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when measured against 

the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 

F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Upon review, we conclude that the district court 

committed no procedural or substantive error in imposing the 

sixty-month sentence. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 577

(4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard of review); United States v. 

 * We decline to sua sponte enforce Everhart’s waiver of 

appellate rights in the plea agreement. See United States v. 

Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008) (a statutory 

mandatory minimum sentence is “per se reasonable”).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 

appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Everhart, in writing, of 

her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Everhart requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Everhart. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal conclusions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED