Opinion issued February 19, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-14-00021-CV

———————————

REGINA SOPHUS, Appellant

V.

HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT HOMICIDE DIVISION 

AND NEW HOPE HOUSING, Appellees

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 3

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Case No. 1036595

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Regina Sophus sued New Hope Housing1 and the Houston Police 

Department (“HPD”) Homicide Division, alleging that she was harassed by 

 1 Sophus sued “New Hope Apartments,” but the proper party name is New Hope 

Housing. 
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neighbors and that HPD police officers were unresponsive to her complaints. The 

HPD Homicide Division moved to dismiss under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 

91a on the ground that it lacked capacity to be sued, and the trial court granted the 

motion. New Hope Housing moved for summary judgment on the ground that 

Sophus’s petition did not state a claim against it, and the trial court granted the 

motion. We affirm.

Background

Sophus’s petition recounted various allegations of harassment by neighbors 

while living in a variety of apartments in the Houston area. Sophus alleged that 

she made police reports, and at one point during this time, requested an update 

regarding her reports from an officer in the HPD Homicide Division. According to 

her petition, that officer told her that the neighbors reported that she was “crazy” 

and that the neighbors were “using” her for “doing a job.” 

Sophus alleged that, after experiencing these issues, she signed a year-long 

lease agreement with New Hope Housing in October 2012. She alleged that after 

moving into New Hope, her neighbors there also harassed her and broke into her 

apartment. She reported these complaints to HPD and alleged that her complaints 

were never resolved. 

The HPD Homicide Division moved to dismiss pursuant to Texas Rule of 

Civil Procedure 91a on the ground that it lacked capacity to be sued. It argued that 
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it was created by ordinance and is a subdivision of HPD, which is in turn a 

subdivision of the City of Houston, and therefore it could not be sued separately 

and apart from the City. In the alternative, the HPD Homicide Division argued 

that even if it were a proper party, Sophus pleaded no cause of action against it for 

which governmental immunity is waived. The trial court granted the plea and 

dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

New Hope Housing moved for summary judgment, arguing that Sophus’s 

petition was too vague to put New Hope on notice of how to defend the suit. New 

Hope also argued that the pleading affirmatively demonstrated that no cause of 

action existed against New Hope, and was therefore subject to dismissal. The trial 

court granted the motion for summary judgment.

Discussion

Litigants appearing on their own behalf must comply with all applicable 

laws and rules of procedure, and they are held to the same standards as licensed 

attorneys. See Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 

1978); Kanow v. Brownshadel, 691 S.W.2d 804, 806 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 

Dist.] 1985, no writ). A pro se litigant must properly present her case on appeal, 

and we may not make allowances or apply different standards for litigants 

appearing without the advice of counsel. See Morris v. Am. Home Mortg. Serv., 

Inc., 360 S.W.3d 32, 36 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.). The Rules 
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of Appellate Procedure require appellate briefs to contain clear and concise 

arguments with appropriate citations to the record and supporting authorities. TEX.

R. APP. P. 38.1(i). As always, however, we construe briefs liberally; substantial 

compliance with the rules is sufficient. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9.

In Sophus’s appellate brief, she reiterates some of the factual allegations 

contained in her filings with the trial court and makes new allegations regarding 

additional alleged harassment. She does not present any legal argument that the 

case should not have been dismissed or that summary judgment should not have 

been granted. Nor does her brief comport with the requirements of Rule 38.1, 

which requires an appellant to state the issues presented and make a clear and 

concise argument for her contentions with appropriate citations to legal authorities 

and the record. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(f) & (i). The brief contains no citations to 

the record or to cases.

With respect to the HPD Homicide Division, Sophus does not present any 

argument that the case should not have been dismissed because the HPD Homicide 

Division lacked capacity to be sued, or that she pleaded a cause of action for which 

governmental immunity is waived. By failing to raise any legal issue related to the 

dismissal of the case against the Homicide Division, Sophus has waived any 

argument pertaining to this potential issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1.
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With respect to New Hope, Sophus does not present any legal argument 

challenging the summary judgment. A party appealing a motion for summary 

judgment must either assert (1) separate points of error attacking each of the 

independent grounds alleged in the motion, or (2) a general point of error attacking 

the summary judgment as a whole. Zapata v. ACF Indus., Inc., 43 S.W.3d 584, 

586 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Because Sophus did neither, 

we must affirm the trial court’s judgment in favor of New Hope. See id.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. All pending motions are 

dismissed as moot.

Rebeca Huddle

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Higley, and Huddle.