Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano, Justices

Order 

November 7, 2014

149219

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149219

COA: 313602

Saginaw CC: 11-036498-FH

JOHN ANDREW BEEMER,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the March 11, 2014 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not 

persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

MARKMAN, J. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would reverse. Defendant 

struck another vehicle while intoxicated, and the occupant of the other vehicle suffered a 

fracture to his wrist. On this basis, defendant was convicted of “operating while 

intoxicated causing serious impairment of a body function of another person.” MCL 

257.625(5). The Michigan Vehicle Code provides that “ ‘[s]erious impairment of a body 

function’ includes” the “[l]oss of a limb or loss of use of a limb,” the “[l]oss of a foot, 

hand, finger, or thumb or loss of use of a foot, hand, finger, or thumb,” the “[l]oss or 

substantial impairment of a bodily function,” or a “skull fracture or other serious bone 

fracture.” MCL 257.58c(a), (b), (d), and (h). The same term appears, and has been 

defined, in the no-fault act. MCL 500.3135(5) (“ ‘[S]erious impairment of body 

function’ means an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that 

affects the person’s general ability to lead his or her normal life.”).

Although “serious impairment of a body function” has not been defined in the 

vehicle code in a manner exactly equivalent to the definition in the no-fault act, this Court 

should nonetheless seek to interpret that term with some degree of consistency in its 

separate contexts, at least to the point of making clear that the Legislature intended in 

both places to communicate that an impairment must be of a particularly serious

character. Here, the victim missed a single day of work and was cleared to resume 
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 November 7, 2014

h1104

2

Clerk

participating in ice hockey shortly after his cast was removed following three months of 

intermittently wearing it. Moreover, medical testimony indicated that the victim retained 

good strength, extension, and flexion in his fingers after the fracture and that the injury 

was of the sort that heals well. I do not believe that the instant injury can reasonably be 

characterized as involving the “serious impairment of a body function,” particularly in 

light of interpretations that have been given to this term in the no-fault context. See, e.g., 

McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180 (2010), overruling Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109 

(2004). Defendant should be held to full account for his impaired driving and for the 

injuries he caused, but in my judgment, his criminal conduct was not aggravated by the 

infliction of a “serious impairment of a body function.”