[Cite as State v. Lauck, 2023-Ohio-1433.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

HANCOCK COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

CASE NO. 5-22-07

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

 v.

RONALD DEAN LAUCK, O P I N I O N

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from Hancock County Common Pleas Court

Trial Court No. 2021-CR-00249

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: May 1, 2023

APPEARANCES:

Karin L. Coble for Appellant

Phillip A. Riegle for Appellee
Case No. 5-22-07

-2-

WILLAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant Ronald D. Lauck (“Lauck”) brings this appeal 

from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock County convicting 

him of one count of intimidation. On appeal, Lauck claims that the judgment is not 

supported by sufficient evidence and is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

For the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.

{¶2} On August 23, 2020, officers were dispatched to Lauck’s home after a 

report of an altercation between Lauck’s son, Jase, and his girlfriend. Deputy Justin 

Ritter (“Ritter”) was the first on the scene and after speaking with Lauck and the 

victim, began to look for Jase. At that time, Lauck was “very cordial”. Tr. 114. 

Ritter was informed that Jase had run into the cornfield. Multiple officers began 

searching the area for Jase and Ritter returned to the area to speak with the alleged 

victim and to see if Jase returned.

{¶3} While conducting the investigation, Ritter noticed that Lauck had 

become intoxicated and more argumentative. The interactions between the two 

became more hostile which resulted in Ritter telling Lauck to stay back and to stop 

interrupting the investigation. At one point, Lauck told his daughter to get rid of 

Ritter. Lauck went to the garage and came out on an ATV, driving it at a “rapid 

speed” towards where Ritter was standing. Ritter interpreted this as a possible 

threat, stepped closer to the tree, and “dropped the hood retention of [his] holster.” 
Case No. 5-22-07

-3-

Tr. 129. Ritter instructed Lauck to get off the ATV and Lauck complied. Ritter 

then instructed Lauck to stay on the front porch to not interrupt the investigation. 

{¶4} A few minutes later, Ritter heard a noise inside the garage and saw 

Lauck standing towards the rear of it. Ritter started walking to the garage to see 

what Lauck was doing. As he approached, Ritter saw that Lauck was holding a 

shotgun. Ritter reported that Lauck had a firearm and then sought cover. While 

moving towards cover, Ritter heard the shotgun being racked. Then Ritter heard the 

shotgun being fired. Both Ritter and Deputy Kris Otto (“Otto”) reported “shots 

fired”. Once Ritter was in a position of cover, he pulled his duty weapon and aimed 

towards the garage. Ritter saw Lauck with the shotgun and heard him racking the 

shotgun again. Ritter saw that Lauck had the gun in a “high-ready position”, and, 

fearing for his life, fired two shots towards Lauck. Ritter then reported that Lauck 

had fired one shot and he had fired two shots. Once Ritter had fired towards Lauck, 

Lauck dropped the shotgun and Ritter commanded him to walk towards him. 

{¶5} By this time Otto had arrived on the scene and saw Lauck standing in 

the drive with his hands up and the shotgun lying on the ground. Otto also began 

yelling commands for Lauck to turn away, keep his hands up, and get on the ground. 

Otto then tackled Lauck to the ground. Lauck kept repeating that he did not mean 

to shoot the gun. Otto noted that Lauck appeared intoxicated and Lauck admitted 

to having been drinking. 
Case No. 5-22-07

-4-

{¶6} On July 6, 2021, the Hancock County Grand Jury indicted Lauck on 

one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), a felony of the 

first degree, and one count of intimidation in violation of R.C. 2921.03(A), a felony 

of the third degree. Both counts contained firearm specifications. A bench trial was 

held from February 14-16, 2022. On March 2, 2022, the trial court held a hearing 

to announce the verdicts. The trial court found Lauck not guilty of the felonious 

assault and the firearm specification. The trial court found Lauck guilty of 

intimidation and the firearm specification. 

{¶7} On March 29, 2022, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The 

trial court then sentenced Lauck to a three-year mandatory prison term for the 

firearm specification and a twenty-four month prison term to be served consecutive 

to the mandatory term.1 An appeal was filed from this judgment. Doc. 117. On 

appeal, Lauck raises the following assignment of error.

[Lauck’s] conviction for intimidation is unsupported by sufficient 

evidence in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the U.S. 

Constitution and the Ohio Constitution and is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Lauck argues that his conviction is 

unsupported by sufficient evidence.

1 The trial court noted that it was aware of this court’s “holding in State v. Wolfe, 2022-Ohio-96, but 

respectfully disagrees with its conclusion and application of O.R.C. §2929.13(F)(8).” The trial court then 

determined that the 24 month prison term was not a mandatory term.” 
Case No. 5-22-07

-5-

A sufficiency analysis “‘determine[s] whether the case may go to the 

jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury 

verdict as a matter of law.’ ” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1433 

(6th Ed.1990). If the state fails to present sufficient evidence on every 

element of an offense, then convicting a defendant for that offense 

violates the defendant's right to due process of law. Id. at 386-387, 

678 N.E.2d 541; see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 

S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

State v. Messenger, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-4562, ¶ 13. The question of 

whether the evidence presented at trial is legally sufficient to support a verdict is a 

question of law and basically questions the adequacy of the evidence. State v. 

Hulbert, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-19-07, 2021-Ohio-2298, ¶ 5.

An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the 

evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if 

believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. * * * Accordingly, “[t]he relevant inquiry 

is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential 

elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” * * * “In 

deciding if the evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary 

conflicts nor assess the credibility of witnesses, as both are functions 

reserved for the trier of fact.”

State v. Adkins, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-19-71, 2020-Ohio-6799, ¶ 37 subsequently 

reversed on reconsideration on other grounds (citations omitted).

{¶9} In this case, the trial court convicted Lauck of intimidation.

A) No person, knowingly and by force, by unlawful threat of harm to 

any person or property, * * * shall attempt to influence, intimidate, or 

hinder a public servant, a party official, or an attorney or witness 

involved in a civil action or proceeding in the discharge of the 
Case No. 5-22-07

-6-

person’s * * * duties of the public servant, party official, attorney, or 

witness.

R.C. 2921.03(A). Lauck argues that the State failed to present evidence that Lauck 

made an “unlawful threat of harm.” The Supreme Court of Ohio has addressed the 

question of what satisfies the “unlawful threat of harm” requirement in State v. 

Cress. 112 Ohio St.3d 72, 2006-Ohio-6501, 858 N.E.2d 341. In Cress, the 

defendant was convicted of intimidation because he threatened a witness that if she 

did not recant her statements, he would take several actions. The Court determined 

that Cress made the following threats.

[A] jury could conclude that [the list Cress made] indicated that Cress 

would (1) show child-protection authorities incriminating 

photographs of [the witness] using illicit drugs and/or depicting her 

nude, (2) provide access to [the witness’] basement to an appliancerental company, apparently to recover a washing machine and dryer 

that were, by implication, [in the witness’] possession improperly, (3) 

provide unspecified information to another rental company about [the 

witness’] stereo and computer, (4) make her get rid of her pet dog and 

live-in babysitter because they were not permitted by the terms of the 

lease, (5) reveal to one of [the witness’] family members that his 

girlfriend was having an affair, and (6) no longer permit her to use his 

motor vehicle.

Id. at ¶ 10. The Court held that these actions were not sufficient to support a 

conviction for intimidation of a witness. “[T]he statutory language in R.C. 

2921.04(B), proscribing intimidation by an ‘unlawful threat of harm,’ is satisfied 

only when the very making of the threat is itself unlawful because it violates 

established criminal or civil law.” Id. at ¶ 42. For the State to obtain a conviction 

under the statute, the State must introduce evidence demonstrating the elements of 
Case No. 5-22-07

-7-

a predicate offense. Id. at ¶ 43. The Court then reversed the conviction because 

although Cress was charged with extortion, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. 

Id. at footnote 2. 

{¶10} Lauck argues on his appeal that the State in this case failed to present 

a predicate offense for the intimidation charge as he was found not guilty of the 

felonious assault charge and no other charges were presented to the trial court. 

However, this argument does not take into consideration that the Court in Cress did 

not require the predicate offense to be identified in the indictment or even specified 

by the State. See State v. Armstrong, 9th Dist. Summit No. 24479, 2009-Ohio-5941, 

¶ 21 and State v. Ott, 11th Dist. Portage No 2007-P-0093, 2008-Ohio-4049, ¶ 26. 

The determination as to whether a threat is unlawful is left to the trial court, serving 

as the trier of fact, to determine. Ott, supra.

{¶11} In this case, the State did not specify what the predicate offense for the 

intimidation charge was. It may have been the felonious assault, but since there was 

a finding of not guilty, that cannot support the conviction for the intimidation

charge. A review of the record does show that there was evidence presented of other 

offenses for which Lauck could have been charged. For example, R.C. 2923.15

provides that “no person, while under the influence of alcohol * * *, shall carry or 

use any firearm or dangerous ordnance.” Anyone who uses a weapon while 

intoxicated could be convicted of a misdemeanor of the first degree. R.C. 

2923.15(B). The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, also shows 
Case No. 5-22-07

-8-

that Lauck acted in a manner to hamper the ability of Ritter to conduct his 

investigation on multiple occasions and resulted in Ritter telling him to stay by the 

porch because of his interference. This could be construed as obstructing official 

business, a violation of R.C. 2921.31. Since the evidence, viewed in a light most 

favorable to the State, supports potential predicate offenses, the State met its burden 

of demonstrating the elements of the predicate offense.

Manifest Weight of the Evidence

{¶12} Lauck’s second issue raised in the brief is that the conviction is against 

the manifest weight of the evidence.

When reviewing a judgment to determine if it is against the manifest 

weight of the evidence, an appellate court “review[s] the entire record, 

weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the 

credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts 

in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a 

manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed 

and a new trial ordered.” State v. Mendoza, 137 Ohio App.3d 336, 738 

N.E.2d 822 (2000). See, also, State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 

387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). A new trial should be granted only in the 

exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against

conviction. Thompkins at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541. Although the 

appellate court acts as a “thirteenth juror,” due deference to the 

findings made by the fact-finder must still be given. State v. Moorer, 

3d Dist. 13–12–22, 2013-Ohio-650, 2013 WL 684735, ¶ 29.

Hulbert, supra at ¶ 23.

{¶13} Here, the record shows that the uncontradicted evidence was that for 

some reason, Lauck went from cordial and cooperative with Ritter to hostile and 

wanting Ritter to leave. The testimony of Ritter and Otto both indicated that Lauck
Case No. 5-22-07

-9-

was intoxicated. Detective Sergeant Jason Seem (“Seem”) testified that when he 

searched the home, he recovered an almost empty bottle of Jack Daniels and that he 

knew Lauck had been drinking that night. Seem also testified that Ritter had 

reported that Lauck was “highly 24” meaning that Lauck was very intoxicated 

before he was observed with the gun. The only person to testify who was present 

was Ritter. His testimony, as shown above, indicated that he repeatedly told Lauck 

not to interfere with the investigation and Lauck was not happy. No reasonable 

explanation was provided as to why Lauck went to the gunsafe, removed the gun, 

and was carrying it around. Otto testified that Lauck kept saying he did not mean 

to shoot the gun. The statute only requires that a threat be made, not that the 

defendant attempt to follow through on the threat. Thus, the fact that Lauck 

retrieved the firearm combined with the other activities, such as driving the ATV at 

high rate of speed towards Ritter in a threatening manner, provides evidence that 

Lauck was trying to intimidate Ritter into leaving the home. Likewise, the firing of 

the gun is not necessary for the firearm specification as the mere brandishing of the 

weapon is all that is necessary. The evidence in this case does not weigh heavily 

against conviction or indicate that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred. Thus, 

the conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Intent

{¶14} Finally, Lauck argues that the State failed to prove his intent to 

intimidate. The statute requires the State to prove that Lauck acted knowingly. 
Case No. 5-22-07

-10-

(B) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person 

is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result 

or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of 

circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances 

probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact 

is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person 

subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence 

and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid 

learning the fact.

R.C. 2901.22(B). 

{¶15} Lauck argues that he did not act knowingly because he was intoxicated 

and because he did not intend to fire the weapon. “Voluntary intoxication is not a 

defense, but where specific intent is a necessary element of the crime charged, the 

fact of intoxication may be shown to negate this element if the intoxication is such 

as to preclude the formation of such intent.” State v. Otte, 74 Ohio St.3d 555, 564, 

1996-Ohio-108, 660 N.E.2d 711. However, it only negates the intent if the 

defendant is “so intoxicated as to be mentally unable to intend anything”. State v. 

Jackson, 32 Ohio St.2d 203, 206, 291 N.E.2d 432 (1972).

{¶16} Here, no evidence was presented to show Lauck was incapable of 

forming any intent or as to his actual level of intoxication. Lauck was capable of 

forming the intent to drive the ATV towards Ritter and to follow through with that 

action. He formed the intent to leave the porch where he was told to remain and 

followed through with that action. He formed the intent to enter the garage and to 

open the gun safe and followed through with that action. Even if we were to accept 

that he had no intent to fire the weapon, he clearly intended to retrieve it and carry 
Case No. 5-22-07

-11-

it out of the garage, which he did. Given the evidence before us, the record does 

not support a conclusion that Lauck was so intoxicated as to be unable to form intent.

{¶17} Lauck also argues that he had no intent to fire the shotgun and it was 

an accidental discharge. As discussed above, the firing of the shotgun is not a 

required element for an intimidation charge. The mere brandishing of the weapon 

was enough to constitute an unlawful threat given the situation. Thus, even if we 

were to agree that the discharge was accidental, the conviction for intimidation and 

the firearm specification would still be supported by the evidence. 

{¶18} For the reasons set forth above, the assignment of error is overruled. 

Having found no errors prejudicial to the appellant in the particulars assigned and 

argued, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Hancock County is affirmed.

Judgment Affirmed

WALDICK and ZIMMERMAN, J.J., concur.

/hls