*

 After examining the briefs and record, we conclude that oral argument is

unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See Fed.

R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 29, 2005*

Decided July 8, 2005

Before

Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge

Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3864

NONA FARRAR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MUHAMMAD ELDIBANY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 04 C 3371

James B. Moran, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Nona Farrar sued a number of parties including her landlord, her building’s

management company, the City of Chicago and several unidentified building

inspectors for their role in her apartment building’s loss of heat and hot water for

three or four days while the building’s boiler was replaced. In her eleven-count

complaint, Farrar claims that the defendants violated her constitutional rights by

leaving her without heat and hot water and later threatening her with eviction

should she decide to withhold rent. Farrar also claims that her landlord and

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3864 Page 2

management agency retaliated against her in violation of the Fair Housing Act, 42

U.S.C. §§ 3601-31, by increasing her rent and attempting to collect a $700 debt

after she complained about the conditions in the building.

In a thorough decision that analyzes each of Farrar’s claims, the district

court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 

The court first rejected Farrar’s constitutional claims, noting that the Constitution

does not guarantee access to heat and hot water in a building owned and operated

by private parties. The court then dismissed Farrar’s claim under the Fair Housing

Act, reasoning that the Act is limited in scope to discrimination related to the

acquisition, not the maintenance, of housing, and that Farrar’s complaint

establishes that every tenant in her building was equally affected by the boiler

replacement. After dismissing the federal claims, the district court declined to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Farrar’s state-law claims.

The district court was correct. Farrar has no constitutional right to

continuous heat and hot water in her privately owned and managed apartment. 

See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“[T]he Constitution does not provide

judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in

that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular

quality . . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing

and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial,

functions.”). Thus, even accepting as true Farrar’s allegation of a conspiracy

between her landlord and the building inspectors, no federal right is implicated. 

See, e.g., Hill v. Shobe, 93 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[T]here is no

constitutional violation in conspiring to cover up an action which does not itself

violate the constitution.”).

Farrar’s claim under the Fair Housing Act similarly lacks merit. Even

assuming that interference with an individual’s enjoyment of a dwelling may

support a claim under section 3617 of the Act, see Halprin v. Single Family Homes

of Dearborn Park Ass’n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing 24 C.F.R.

§ 100.400(c)(2)), the interference must constitute more than a simple landlordtenant dispute; it must constitute a “pattern of harassment, invidiously motivated.” 

Id. Farrar’s only allegation to support her claim is that she is African-American

while the owner of her building is “non-Black” and the representative of her

building’s management company is white. The mere fact that Farrar has a dispute

over rent or services with the “non-Black” owner and manager of her building does

not establish a claim under the Fair Housing Act. Id.; see also Maki v. Laakko, 88

F.3d 361, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that increase in rent combined with

friction between tenant and landlord does not establish claim under Fair Housing

Act). As this appeal is frivolous, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
No. 04-3864 Page 3

Furthermore, a review of Farrar’s litigation history reveals that this is not

her first frivolous appeal. Farrar has filed at least eight other lawsuits in the

Northern District of Illinois as well as three appeals and three petitions for writ of

mandamus. Farrar v. City of Chicago, No. 82 C 6771 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 1997);

Farrar v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 96 C 8062 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1999);

Farrar v. Glantz, No. 00 C 275 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2000); Farrar v. Nelson, No. 00 C

1675 (N.D. Ill. June 18, 2000), aff’d, 61 Fed. Appx. 967 (7th Cir. 2003); Farrar v.

Davis, No. 97 C 6433 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2000); Farrar v. City of Chicago, Nos. 02-

1454 & 02-1484 (7th Cir. Mar. 11, 2002); Farrar v. Castillo, No. 03-1760 (7th Cir.

Apr. 4, 2003); Farrar v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 2914 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 2003),

aff’d, 83 Fed. Appx. 840 (7th Cir. 2003); Farrar v. Bracamondes, No. 03 C 5530

(N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2004); Farrar v. Grochowiak, No. 03 C 6193 (N.D. Ill. May 4,

2005). Most of these lawsuits have been filed against the City of Chicago, including

the lawsuits that gave rise to Farrar’s first two appeals to this court. In those

actions, Farrar claimed that city officials conspired to retaliate for her previous

lawsuits by using police and firefighters to spy on her constantly. Farrar alleged

that the defendants used sirens and lights on city emergency vehicles to let her

know she was being watched. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 authorizes

sanctions against an appellant who files a frivolous appeal. Accordingly, Farrar is

cautioned against filing future frivolous lawsuits or appeals, as they may result in

an award of just damages, including a filing bar. See Support Systems Int’l v.

Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).