NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC 

SECURITY (RACHEL DENICE WOLFORD), 

Petitioners/Appellees, 

v.

ALEXANDER GURULE, Respondent/Appellant.

STATE OF ARIZONA ex rel. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC 

SECURITY (MONICA MARIE CARAVALHO), Petitioners/Appellees,

v.

ALEXANDER GURULE, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0298 FC

No. 1 CA-CV 15-0345 FC 

(Consolidated) 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. FC2010-002771, FC2010-000893 

The Honorable Steven K. Holding, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix 

By JoAnn Falgout 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee ADES 
2

The Murray Law Offices, Scottsdale 

By Stanley D. Murray 

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant Gurule 

The Harrian Law Firm PLC, Glendale 

By Daniel S. Riley 

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Wolford

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined. 

J O N E S, Judge: 

¶1 Alexander Gurule appeals the trial court’s orders reducing his 

monthly child support obligations for three children-in-common with 

Rachel Wolford and Monica Caravalho, and awarding all future tax 

exemptions to Wolford and Caravalho. For the following reasons, we 

affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In May 2014, Gurule filed petitions to modify parenting time 

and child support regarding his child-in-common with Wolford and his 

two children-in-common with Caravalho. At that time, Gurule was 

responsible for monthly child support payments of $244.50 to Wolford and 

$489.00 to Caravalho. In his petitions, Gurule sought to reduce his monthly 

child support obligations to $290.75 to Caravalho and to $191.64 to Wolford, 

and requested he be allowed to claim the federal tax exemptions for the 

children “every three out of four years.” He is also the custodial parent of 

one child-in-common with his current wife and recently legally adopted her 

four other children, and he is currently ordered to provide $474.00 and 

$244.00 per month to the mothers of his two other children. Thus, Gurule 

is legally responsible for seven other children who are not subject to the 

modification orders at issue here. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (A.R.S.) § 25-501(A)1

 

1 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s 

current version. 
WOLFORD v. GURULE 

Decision of the Court 

3

(“[E]very person has the duty to provide all reasonable support for that 

person’s natural and adopted minor, unemancipated children . . . .”).

¶3 A joint hearing on the petitions was held in February 2015. 

See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 5(A) (authorizing the family court to consolidate 

actions or hold a joint hearing in cases where “actions within the scope of 

these rules involving a common child, common parties, or a common 

question of law or fact, are pending before the court”). At the hearing, 

Gurule admitted he owed over $10,000 in back child support to Caravalho 

and did not dispute he owed $5,000 in back child support to Wolford. 

Counsel for the State explained that, under strict application of the Arizona 

Child Support Guidelines and the self-support reserve test, A.R.S. § 25-320 

app. § 15 (Guidelines), Gurule was financially unable to pay any child 

support and “maintain at least a minimum standard of living;” therefore, 

his calculated child support obligations to Wolford and Caravalho were 

zero. However, both mothers testified regarding their financial situations 

and requested Gurule’s child support obligation remain the same.

¶4 Noting the difficulty of fashioning orders which would treat 

all of Gurule’s children fairly without the participation of all affected 

parties,2 the trial court entered orders reducing Gurule’s monthly child 

support obligations to $350.00 and $175.00 to Caravalho and Wolford 

respectively, effective March 1, 2015.3 The orders also awarded all future 

tax exemptions to the mothers, subject to future petitions to modify. 

¶5 Gurule filed a motion for new trial in each case, and both 

motions were denied. Gurule timely appealed, and the appeals were 

 

2 One of the child support orders not subject to the trial court’s 

modification order originated in Maricopa County, and the other in Pinal 

County. Had Gurule filed petitions to modify all the child support orders 

simultaneously, and the mother in Pinal County agreed to proceed in 

Maricopa County, see A.R.S. § 12-405 (“A superior court may, upon written 

consent of the parties or their attorneys . . . transfer the action for trial to the 

superior court of another county.”), the court could have consolidated the 

cases, and the outcome would have likely been more manageable, 

comprehensive, and equitable with respect to all ten children, see Ariz. R. 

Fam. L.P. 5(A). 

3 In each order, the trial court additionally assessed monthly arrearage 

payments of $50.00 and monthly clearinghouse fee payments of $5.00. 
WOLFORD v. GURULE 

Decision of the Court 

4

consolidated. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 

-2101(A)(1) and (A)(5)(a). 

DISCUSSION 

¶6 On appeal, Gurule argues: (1) the trial court abused its 

discretion in deviating from the child support guidelines, (2) the court erred 

in awarding all future tax exemptions for the children to Caravalho and 

Wolford, and (3) the court’s effective date for the modification order was 

legally invalid. We review an order setting child support obligations for an 

abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Berger, 140 Ariz. 156, 167 (App. 1983) 

(citing Bender v. Bender, 123 Ariz. 90, 92 (App. 1979)). A trial court abuses 

its discretion when it commits an error of law in reaching a discretionary 

conclusion. In re Marriage of Robinson & Thiel, 201 Ariz. 328, 331, ¶ 5 (App. 

2001) (quoting Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co., 133 Ariz. 434, 456 (1982)). 

I. Deviation from the Child Support Guidelines 

¶7 Gurule first argues the trial court improperly deviated from 

the Guidelines because application of the self-support reserve test shows he 

is unable to pay Wolford and Caravalho child support while maintaining a 

minimum standard of living. Gurule’s current position is inconsistent with 

the position he took with the trial court, and he is thus judicially estopped 

from asserting a different position on appeal. See State v. Towery, 186 Ariz. 

168, 182 (1996) (noting judicial estoppel “is invoked to protect the integrity 

of the judicial process by preventing a litigant from using the courts to gain 

an unfair advantage”) (citations omitted). 

¶8 To apply judicial estoppel: “(1) the parties must be the same, 

(2) the question involved must be the same, and (3) the party asserting the 

inconsistent position must have been successful in the prior judicial 

proceeding.” Id. (citing Standage Ventures, Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 483-84 

(1977)). For purposes of judicial estoppel, success means, “the party gained 

judicial relief as a result of asserting the particular position in the first 

proceeding.” Id. at 183 (citing Standage, 114 Ariz. at 484, and State Farm Auto 

Ins. v. Civil Serv. Emps. Ins., 19 Ariz. App. 594, 600 (1973)). 

¶9 Here, the parties to the appeal were also parties to the 

proceeding at the trial court, and the question regarding the applicability of 

the Guidelines is the same question the court addressed in its modification 

order, satisfying the first two requirements of the judicial estoppel doctrine. 

As to the third requirement, Gurule obtained judicial relief by successfully 

obtaining a downward modification of his child support obligation, albeit 

less than the reduction he requested. 
WOLFORD v. GURULE 

Decision of the Court 

5

¶10 Indeed, the record reflects Gurule effectively argued against 

applying the self-support reserve test by asserting in his petition, and at 

trial, that his child support obligations be reduced to $290.75 and $191.64. 

Gurule never asserted that the self-support reserve test be used to calculate 

his child support obligations, nor that his child support obligations to 

Caravalho and Wolford be reduced to zero. Even after the State explained 

its calculation under the self-support reserve test would result in Gurule 

having no child support obligations to Caravalho and Wolford, when the 

court thereafter asked Gurule how much child support he thought the 

children should receive in light of that calculation, Gurule said he was 

willing to pay $150.00 per child. We therefore conclude Gurule is judicially 

estopped from arguing on appeal that the trial court improperly 

disregarded the self-support reserve test. 

¶11 Furthermore, although a court is obligated to perform the 

self-support reserve test “to verify that the noncustodial parent is 

financially able both to pay the child support order and to maintain at least 

a minimum standard of living,” Guidelines § 15, the trial court is also 

obligated to deviate from the amount calculated pursuant to the Guidelines 

if, after considering all relevant factors and applicable case law, all the 

following criteria are met: 

1. Application of the guidelines is inappropriate or unjust in 

the particular case, 

2. The court has considered the best interests of the child in 

determining the amount of a deviation. . . . 

3. The court makes written findings regarding 1. and 2. 

above in the Child Support Order, Minute Entry or Child 

Support Worksheet, 

4. The court shows what the order would have been without 

the deviation, and 

5. The court shows what the order is after deviating. 
WOLFORD v. GURULE 

Decision of the Court 

6

Guidelines § 20(A). Our review reveals the trial court made the required 

findings in its modification orders and, given the unique circumstances 

presented in this case, did not abuse its discretion.4

II. Allocation of Federal Tax Exemptions 

¶12 Gurule also argues the trial court erred in allocating all future 

tax exemptions to Wolford and Caravalho. We disagree. When a history 

of nonpayment of child support exists, “[t]he court may deny the right to a 

present or future tax exemption.” Guidelines § 27. At the hearing, Gurule 

admitted he owed over $10,000 in back child support to Caravalho and did 

not dispute owing approximately $5,000 in back child support to Wolford. 

It was therefore within the court’s discretion to award future tax 

exemptions, subject to future petitions to modify, to Wolford and 

Caravalho, and we find no error. 

III. Effective Date of the Modification Order 

¶13 Finally, Gurule argues the trial court erred in setting the 

effective date of its modification order as March 1, 2015 — the month 

following the hearing and order — and the effective date should have been 

June 1, 2014 under A.R.S. §§ 25-327(A) and -503(E). These statutes direct 

that modifications and terminations “are effective on the first day of the 

month following notice of the petition for modification or termination 

unless the court, for good cause shown, orders the change to become 

effective at a different date.” A.R.S. §§ 25-327(A), -503(E). 

¶14 Following the presentation of evidence at the hearing, the trial 

court announced on the record, “My orders are going to take place in the 

equity situation March 1 of this year.” The record reflects the court was 

cognizant of the hardship a retroactive reduction of child support payments 

 

4 Our review reveals the trial court’s calculation of Gurule’s child 

support obligation to Caravalho included credit given to Gurule for 

$1,207.00 in monthly court-ordered child support paid to other 

relationships. However, he was only entitled to credit for $962.50. Giving 

Gurule proper credit results in a finding that, after applying the selfsupport reserve test, Gurule was able to pay $200.30 — as opposed to zero 

— in child support payments to Caravalho while maintaining a minimum 

standard of living. The court’s miscalculation was harmless error; using the 

correct figure would have only reduced the amount of the court’s deviation 

from the Guidelines rather than change the amounts ordered. 
WOLFORD v. GURULE 

Decision of the Court 

7

would place upon Caravalho and Wolford, each of whom have low 

incomes. It is also apparent the court was balancing the necessary reduction 

of Gurule’s child support obligations with the best interests of the three 

children affected by its modification order, the $718.00 Gurule was ordered 

to provide for just two of his other children, and the fact that the five 

children in Gurule’s home would benefit from the balance of Gurule’s 

income and assets. The court specifically articulated its concern that it 

would be unfair to “use one child against another child to penalize a child 

outside [Gurule’s] house.” 

¶15 The court determined equity required that it not make the 

modification order retroactive but, rather, allow it to begin on the first day 

of the following month. Our review of the record reveals the trial court had 

good cause to do so and did not abuse its discretion. 

CONCLUSION 

¶16 The orders of the trial court reducing Gurule’s child support 

obligation to Wolford and Caravalho are affirmed. 

¶17 Wolford requests an award of attorneys’ fees and costs 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324. After considering the financial resources of the 

parties and the reasonableness of each party’s position pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 25-324, we decline to award attorneys’ fees. As the prevailing parties, 

however, Wolford and Caravalho are entitled to recover their costs on 

appeal upon compliance with ARCAP 21(b). See A.R.S. § 12-341.