alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

1102 

KAH 12-01771 

PRESENT: FAHEY, J.P., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ. 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK EX REL. 

WILLIE WILLIAMS, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

ROBERT A. KIRKPATRICK, SUPERINTENDENT, WENDE 

CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, AND ANDREA W. EVANS, 

CHAIRWOMAN, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF PAROLE,

RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

ALAN BIRNHOLZ, EAST AMHERST, FOR PETITIONER-APPELLANT. 

ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (OWEN DEMUTH OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENTS-RESPONDENTS. 

 

Appeal from a judgment (denominated memorandum and order) of the

Supreme Court, Erie County (John L. Michalski, A.J.), dated June 12,

2012 in a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78. The judgment denied

the petition. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding

alleging that he is entitled to immediate release from prison pursuant

to Executive Law former § 259-j (3-a), which has since been replaced

by Correction Law § 205 (4). According to petitioner, his sentence of

20 years to life should be terminated because, from 1994 to 1997, he

had “three years of unrevoked presumptive release or parole” (§ 205

[4]). We reject that contention. As a threshold matter, we note that

section 205 (4) applies only to prisoners serving sentences for

qualifying drug felonies, and defendant is serving a sentence for

attempted murder in the second degree. In any event, petitioner is

not entitled to relief under the statute because he violated parole

several times after his three years of unrevoked release and before

the effective date of Executive Law § 259-j (3-a) (see Matter of

Rosario v New York State Div. of Parole, 84 AD3d 1665, 1666; Matter of

Murphy v Ewald, 77 AD3d 778, 779, lv denied 16 NY3d 701). 

To the extent that the petition further alleged that petitioner

was deprived of a final revocation hearing when his parole was revoked

in 2009 upon his conviction of a new drug felony, we conclude that

Supreme Court properly converted the habeas corpus petition to a CPLR

article 78 petition and then denied the petition. “Upon petitioner’s
-2- 1102 

KAH 12-01771 

conviction of a felony committed while under parole supervision,

petitioner’s parole was revoked by operation of law” (People ex rel.

Stevenson v Beaver, 309 AD2d 1171, 1172, lv denied 1 NY3d 506). Thus,

contrary to petitioner’s contention, a parole revocation hearing was

not required (see Executive Law § 259-i [3] [d] [iii]; People ex rel.

Harris v Sullivan, 74 NY2d 305, 308; People ex rel. Ward v Russi, 219

AD2d 862, 862, lv denied 87 NY2d 803). 

Entered: November 8, 2013 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 772

To amend section 8339(p) of title 5, United States Code, to clarify the

computations of certain civil service retirement system annuities based

on part-time service, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 13, 1999

Mr. ROBB introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to

the Committee on Governmental Affairs

A BILL

To amend section 8339(p) of title 5, United States Code,

to clarify the computations of certain civil service retirement system annuities based on part-time service, and

for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT SYSTEM ANNUITY

4 COMPUTATIONS BASED ON PART-TIME SERV5 ICE.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 8339(p) of title 5, United

7 States Code, is amended by adding at the end the fol8 lowing new paragraph:
2

•S 772 IS

1 ‘‘(3) In the administration of paragraph (1)—

2 ‘‘(A) subparagraph (A) of such paragraph

3 shall apply to any service performed on a part4 time basis before, on, or after April 7, 1986;

5 ‘‘(B) subparagraph (B) of such paragraph

6 shall apply to all service performed on a part7 time or full-time basis on or after April 7,

8 1986; and

9 ‘‘(C) any service performed on a part-time

10 basis before April 7, 1986, shall be credited as

11 service performed on a full-time basis.’’.

12 (b) APPLICATION.—

13 (1) IN GENERAL.—Subject to paragraph (2),

14 the amendment made under subsection (a) shall

15 apply to the computation of any annuity with a date

16 of commencement on or after April 7, 1986.

17 (2) ANNUITY PAYMENTS.—The computation of

18 an annuity based on the amendment made under

19 subsection (a) shall apply only with respect to annu20 ity payments made on or after the first day of the

21 first applicable pay period beginning 90 days after

22 the date of enactment of this Act.

Æ
Public Interest

Please also consider the public interest as it pertains to fuel emissions. Additionally the UAS runs on 

battery power and does not emit fumes or run on gases are potentially harmful to the environment. 

The operation of this UAS removes human exposure to these situations as it pertains to full size 

helicopters that may be used for photography or videography. If a UAS such as the Inspire 1 does lose 

control and crashes there is no flammable gas that may explode. 

Equivalent Level of Safety

An equivalent level of safety will be obtained by the operator per the Operator Manual and User Guide. 

A data log will supplement safety along with automatic tracking of flight time and distances to gauge 

when maintenance will be required. The operator will make sure all systems are functioning properly 

prior to all flights. 

If any issues arise the UAS will immediately land where it is able to do so safely. The ability to land in 

otherwise difficult or impossible areas where a helicopter may be unable to land will create less risk 

than a traditional rotorcraft which performs the same operation.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<CIK> 0000926287
<NAME> SANGUINE CORPORATION

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                              3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-2000
<CASH>                                            6363
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  6363
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    6363
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           820027
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         24559
<OTHER-SE>                                     (838223)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      6363
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                334320
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               21940
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (356260)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (356260)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.02)


</TABLE>
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 206 (Thursday, October 24, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 84863]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-24752]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Foreign-Trade Zones Board

[Order No. 2169]


Activation Limit Increase Under Alternative Site Framework; 
Foreign-Trade Zone 75; Phoenix, Arizona

    Pursuant to its authority under the Foreign-Trade Zones Act of June 
18, 1934, as amended (19 U.S.C. 81a-81u), the Foreign-Trade Zones Board 
(the Board) adopts the following Order:
    Whereas, the Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZ) Act provides for ``. . . the 
establishment . . . of foreign-trade zones in ports of entry of the 
United States, to expedite and encourage foreign commerce, and for 
other purposes,'' and authorizes the Board to grant to qualified 
corporations the privilege of establishing foreign-trade zones in or 
adjacent to U.S. Customs and Border Protection ports of entry;
    Whereas, the Board adopted the alternative site framework (ASF) (15 
CFR 400.2(c)) as an option for the establishment or reorganization of 
zones;
    Whereas, the City of Phoenix, grantee of Foreign-Trade Zone 75, 
submitted an application to the Board (FTZ Docket B-25-2024, docketed 
April 19, 2024) for authority to increase the activation limit of the 
zone under the ASF to 3,000 acres;
    Whereas, the application has been processed pursuant to the FTZ Act 
and the Board's regulations; and,
    Whereas, the Board adopts the findings and recommendations of the 
examiners' report, and finds that the requirements of the FTZ Act and 
the Board's regulations are satisfied;
    Now, therefore, the Board hereby orders:
    The application to increase the activation limit of the zone under 
the ASF to 3,000 acres is approved, subject to the FTZ Act and the 
Board's regulations, including section 400.13.

    Dated: October 18, 2024.
Dawn Shackleford,
Executive Director of Trade Agreements Policy & Negotiations, Alternate 
Chairman, Foreign-Trade Zones Board.
[FR Doc. 2024-24752 Filed 10-23-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P
```

[Congressional Record Volume 154, Number 160 (Thursday, October 2, 2008)]
[Senate]
[Page S10422]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]

                    LEO J. RYAN POST OFFICE BUILDING

  The bill (H.R. 6982) to designate the facility of the United States 
Postal Service located at 210 South Ellsworth Avenue in San Mateo, 
California, as the ``Leo J. Ryan Post Office Building,'' was 
considered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and 
passed.

                          ____________________
```
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A17D0370. WESLEY B. WILLIAMS v. JULIA F. WILLIAMS.

We dismissedWesleyB. Williams’s pro se application for discretionary appeal

because it appeared that he was still represented by counsel and therefore his pro se

application was a nullity. On motion for reconsideration, however, Williams

maintains that his counsel withdrew from representation on March 17, 2017. 

Accordingly, we GRANT the motion for reconsideration and VACATE our previous

order dismissing the application, which is hereby REINSTATED. 

Upon consideration of the merits, however, the application for discretionary

appeal is DENIED. 

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

May 17, 2017

05/17/2017
**Exhibit 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION**
I, Timothy R. Yost, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of The Corporate Executive Board Company; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) and internal control over financial reporting (as defined in Exchange Act Rules13a-15(f) and 15(d)-15(f)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  Designed such disclosure controls andprocedures, or caused such disclosurecontrols and procedures to be designed underour supervision, to ensure that materialinformation relating to the registrant,including its consolidated subsidiaries, ismade known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period inwhich this report is being prepared;  b)  Designed such internal control overfinancial reporting, or caused such internalcontrol over financial reporting to bedesigned under our supervision, to providereasonable assurance regarding thereliability of financial reporting and thepreparation of financial statements forexternal purposes in accordance withgenerally accepted accounting principles;  c)  Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report ourconclusions about the effectiveness of thedisclosure controls and procedures, as ofthe end of the period covered by this reportbased on such evaluation; and  d)  Disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during theregistrant’s fourth fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likelyto materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting;and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 a)  All significant deficiencies and materialweaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adverselyaffect the registrant’s ability to record,process, summarize and report financialinformation; and  b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, thatinvolves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.
Date: February 28,2005
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-7209
WILLIS R. STOLLINGS, Petitioner - Appellant, versus WILLIAM DUNCIL, Warden, Respondent - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge. (CA-97-446-2) Submitted: October 31, 1997 Decided: November 12, 1997 Before MURNAGHAN, ERVIN, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Willis R. Stollings, Appellant Pro Se. Dar rell V. McGraw, Jr., Victor Shawn Woods, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1997). We have reviewed the record and the district court's opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate ofappealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. Stollings v. Duncil , No. CA-97-446-2 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 13, 1997). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Presidential Documents

Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 213 / Monday, November 4, 2024 / Presidential Documents 87463 

Memorandum of October 21, 2024 

Delegation of Authority Under Section 614(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

Memorandum for the Secretary of State 

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the 

laws of the United States of America, including section 621 of the Foreign 

Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), I hereby delegate to the Secretary of State 

the authority under section 614(a)(1) of the FAA to determine whether 

it is important to the security interests of the United States to furnish 

up to $64 million in assistance to Ukraine without regard to any provision 

of law within the purview of section 614(a)(1) of the FAA. 

You are authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal 

Register. 

THE WHITE HOUSE, 

Washington, October 21, 2024 

[FR Doc. 2024–25686 

Filed 11–1–24; 8:45 am] 

Billing code 4710–10–P 


lotter on DSK11XQN23PROD with FR_PREZDOC1BIDEN.EPS</GPH>
Exhibit 10.23



GUARANTEE

The undersigned, Interstate Business Corporation, a Delaware corporation ("Guarantor"), hereby guarantees to pay upon demand the obligations of Equus Gaming Company L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, Equus Entertainment Corporation, a Puerto Rico corporation, Housing Development Associates S.E., and Equus Management Company, a Delaware corporation (collectively "Equus") to American Community Properties Trust, a Maryland business trust ("ACPT"), including a receivable of Equus due to ACPT in the amount of $153,837 at December 31, 2001.

This is a continuing guarantee and shall not be amended nor terminated except by written statement signed by ACPT, authorized by a majority of the independent trustees of ACPT.

The undersigned acknowledges that it together with its affiliates own a majority of the outstanding equity securities of Equus and ACPT, and that ACPT would not have extended credit to Equus in the past, nor will it extend credit to Equus in the future, without this guarantee.

Guarantor waives notice of acceptance of this guarantee and of any extensions thereof and protest and notice of dishonor or default.

This is a guarantee of payment and not of collection, and Guarantor waives any right to require that any action be brought against Equus or any other person or that resort be had to any security or credit on the books of ACPT in favor of any other person.

No delay on the part of ACPT in exercising any rights hereunder or failure to exercise of the same shall operate as a waiver of such rights against the undersigned.

This guarantee shall be deemed to be a contract entered into in and pursuant to the laws of the State of Maryland and shall in all respects be governed, construed, applied and enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of Maryland.  The undersigned agrees to submit to personal jurisdiction in the State of Maryland in any action arising out of this guarantee, and in any such action or proceeding service may be served upon the undersigned by registered mail to or by personal service at the last known address of the undersigned whether within or without the jurisdiction of any such court.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this guarantee as of this 25th day of March 2002.

|                  | INTERSTATE BUSINESS CORPORATION
|----------------- | -------------------------------
|                  |                                
|                  |                                
|                  | By:                            
|                  |                                
|                  |                                
|WITNESS:          |                                
|                  |                                
|/s/ Martha Colson |
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-6513

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

ANTONIO NAVARRO HOWIE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., District Judge. (3:06-cr-00050-RCJ-1; 3:11-cv-00290-RJC)

Submitted: August 17, 2015 Decided: August 19, 2015

Before KING and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Antonio Navarro Howie, Appellant Pro Se. William Michael Miller, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Kevin Zolot, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina; Amy Elizabeth 

Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Antonio Navarro Howie seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The 

order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues 

a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)

(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a 

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies 

relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by 

demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the 

district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is 

debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 

(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). 

When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the 

prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural 

ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable 

claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. 

at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that 

Howie has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny 

a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

LESHAWN WASHINGTON

, §

§ No. 182, 2014

Defendant Below, §

Appellant, § Court Below:

§

v. § Superior Court of the

§ State of Delaware, in and for

STATE OF DELAWARE, § New Castle County

§

Plaintiff Below, § C.R. I.D. No. 1012007994

Appellee. §

Submitted: November 1 2, 2014

Decided: November 13 , 2014

Before HOLLAND

, RIDGELY , and VALIHURA , Justices.

O R D E R

This 13 th day of November 2014, the Court, upon consideration of the

parties’ briefs and the record in this case, has concluded that this appeal should be

affirmed on the basis of and for the reasons assigned by the S uperior Court in its

Order of March 21, 2014;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the judgment of the

Superior Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Karen L. Valihura

Justice