# Den Europæiske Unions C 236/2016

| | ISSN 1977-0871 |
| --- | --- |
| Den Europæiske Unions
  Tidende | C 236 |
| | |
| Dansk udgave | Meddelelser og oplysninger | 59. årgang30. juni 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0871

Den Europæiske Unions

Tidende

C 236

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

59. årgang30. juni 2016

---

| Informationsnummer | Indhold | Side |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Meddelelser |
| | MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2016/C 236/01 | Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/02 | Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/03 | Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2016/C 236/04 | Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Informationsnummer

Indhold

Side

II   Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2016/C 236/01

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/02

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/03

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  )

1

2

2016/C 236/04

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  )

1

2

---

| | IV   Oplysninger |
| --- | --- |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2016/C 236/05 | Euroens vekselkurs | 3 |
| 2016/C 236/06 | Ny national side af euromønter bestemt til at blive sat i omløb | 4 |
| | Revisionsretten |
| 2016/C 236/07 | Særberetning nr. 14/2016 — EU's politiske initiativer og finansielle støtte til integration af romaerne: Der er gjort betydelige fremskridt i de sidste ti år, men der er brug for en yderligere praktisk indsats | 5 |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE |
| 2016/C 236/08 | Ajourføring af listen over grænseovergangssteder som omhandlet i artikel 2, nr. 8, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks) | 6 |
| 2016/C 236/09 | Ajourføring af modellerne til de kort, der udstedes af medlemsstaternes udenrigsministerier til akkrediterede medlemmer af diplomatiske og konsulære repræsentationer og deres familiemedlemmer, jf. artikel 20, stk. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks) | 11 |
| | OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE |
| | EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| 2016/C 236/10 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger, jf. artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol, til statsstøttespørgsmål | 21 |
| 2016/C 236/11 | Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende spørgsmålet om statsstøtte i forbindelse med potentiel støtte til Hurtigruten ASA i henhold til den aftale om Hurtigrutens drift af kystruten, der er indgået for perioden 2012-2019 | 29 |
| 2016/C 236/12 | Meddelelse fra Norge vedrørende Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 94/22/EF om betingelser for tildeling og udnyttelse af tilladelser til prospektering, efterforskning og produktion af kulbrinter — Meddelelse om indkaldelse af ansøgninger om oliekoncessioner på den norske kontinentalsokkel — Tildelinger i forhåndsdefinerede områder 2016 | 45 |

IV   Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2016/C 236/05

Euroens vekselkurs

3

2016/C 236/06

Ny national side af euromønter bestemt til at blive sat i omløb

4

Revisionsretten

2016/C 236/07

Særberetning nr. 14/2016 — EU's politiske initiativer og finansielle støtte til integration af romaerne: Der er gjort betydelige fremskridt i de sidste ti år, men der er brug for en yderligere praktisk indsats

5

OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE

2016/C 236/08

Ajourføring af listen over grænseovergangssteder som omhandlet i artikel 2, nr. 8, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks)

6

2016/C 236/09

Ajourføring af modellerne til de kort, der udstedes af medlemsstaternes udenrigsministerier til akkrediterede medlemmer af diplomatiske og konsulære repræsentationer og deres familiemedlemmer, jf. artikel 20, stk. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks)

11

OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

2016/C 236/10

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger, jf. artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol, til statsstøttespørgsmål

21

2016/C 236/11

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende spørgsmålet om statsstøtte i forbindelse med potentiel støtte til Hurtigruten ASA i henhold til den aftale om Hurtigrutens drift af kystruten, der er indgået for perioden 2012-2019

29

2016/C 236/12

Meddelelse fra Norge vedrørende Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 94/22/EF om betingelser for tildeling og udnyttelse af tilladelser til prospektering, efterforskning og produktion af kulbrinter — Meddelelse om indkaldelse af ansøgninger om oliekoncessioner på den norske kontinentalsokkel — Tildelinger i forhåndsdefinerede områder 2016

45

---

| | V   Øvrige meddelelser |
| --- | --- |
| | ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2016/C 236/13 | Indkaldelse af forslag under det flerårige arbejdsprogram for tildeling af finansiel støtte inden for transeuropæisk energiinfrastruktur under Connecting Europe-faciliteten i perioden 2014-2020 (Kommissionens afgørelse (C(2016) 1587)) | 47 |
| | PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2016/C 236/14 | Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure (
  1
  ) | 48 |

V   Øvrige meddelelser

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2016/C 236/13

Indkaldelse af forslag under det flerårige arbejdsprogram for tildeling af finansiel støtte inden for transeuropæisk energiinfrastruktur under Connecting Europe-faciliteten i perioden 2014-2020 (Kommissionens afgørelse (C(2016) 1587))

47

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

2016/C 236/14

Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion (Sag M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure (
  1
  )

1

48

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   EØS-relevant tekst |

---

(1)   EØS-relevant tekst

1

| DA | |
| --- | --- |

DA

---

II Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/1

---

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2016/C 236/01)

Den 22. juni 2016 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med det indre marked. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1). Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8039. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8039. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten.

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/1

---

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2016/C 236/02)

Den 23. juni 2016 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med det indre marked. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1). Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8049. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8049. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten.

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/2

---

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2016/C 236/03)

Den 23. juni 2016 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med det indre marked. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1). Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8041. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8041. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten.

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/2

---

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2016/C 236/04)

Den 24. juni 2016 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med det indre marked. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1). Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8054. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=da) under dokumentnummer 32016M8054. EUR-Lex giver onlineadgang til EU-retten.

---

(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

---

IV Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/3

---

Euroens vekselkurs (1)

29. juni 2016

(2016/C 236/05)

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | amerikanske dollar | 1,1090 |
| JPY | japanske yen | 113,85 |
| DKK | danske kroner | 7,4376 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,82550 |
| SEK | svenske kroner | 9,4311 |
| CHF | schweiziske franc | 1,0854 |
| ISK | islandske kroner | |
| NOK | norske kroner | 9,3065 |
| BGN | bulgarske lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjekkiske koruna | 27,114 |
| HUF | ungarske forint | 316,95 |
| PLN | polske zloty | 4,4261 |
| RON | rumænske leu | 4,5253 |
| TRY | tyrkiske lira | 3,2157 |
| AUD | australske dollar | 1,4911 |
| CAD | canadiske dollar | 1,4407 |
| HKD | hongkongske dollar | 8,6041 |
| NZD | newzealandske dollar | 1,5565 |
| SGD | singaporeanske dollar | 1,4951 |
| KRW | sydkoreanske won | 1 283,15 |
| ZAR | sydafrikanske rand | 16,6016 |
| CNY | kinesiske renminbi yuan | 7,3680 |
| HRK | kroatiske kuna | 7,5273 |
| IDR | indonesiske rupiah | 14 577,25 |
| MYR | malaysiske ringgit | 4,4594 |
| PHP | filippinske pesos | 52,106 |
| RUB | russiske rubler | 71,0452 |
| THB | thailandske bath | 39,028 |
| BRL | brasilianske real | 3,6216 |
| MXN | mexicanske pesos | 20,7331 |
| INR | indiske rupee | 74,9693 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

amerikanske dollar

1,1090

JPY

japanske yen

113,85

DKK

danske kroner

7,4376

GBP

pund sterling

0,82550

SEK

svenske kroner

9,4311

CHF

schweiziske franc

1,0854

ISK

islandske kroner

NOK

norske kroner

9,3065

BGN

bulgarske lev

1,9558

CZK

tjekkiske koruna

27,114

HUF

ungarske forint

316,95

PLN

polske zloty

4,4261

RON

rumænske leu

4,5253

TRY

tyrkiske lira

3,2157

AUD

australske dollar

1,4911

CAD

canadiske dollar

1,4407

HKD

hongkongske dollar

8,6041

NZD

newzealandske dollar

1,5565

SGD

singaporeanske dollar

1,4951

KRW

sydkoreanske won

1 283,15

ZAR

sydafrikanske rand

16,6016

CNY

kinesiske renminbi yuan

7,3680

HRK

kroatiske kuna

7,5273

IDR

indonesiske rupiah

14 577,25

MYR

malaysiske ringgit

4,4594

PHP

filippinske pesos

52,106

RUB

russiske rubler

71,0452

THB

thailandske bath

39,028

BRL

brasilianske real

3,6216

MXN

mexicanske pesos

20,7331

INR

indiske rupee

74,9693

---

(1)  Kilde: Referencekurs offentliggjort af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

---

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/4

---

Ny national side af euromønter bestemt til at blive sat i omløb

(2016/C 236/06)

Euromønter i omløb har status som lovligt betalingsmiddel i hele euroområdet. For at informere den brede offentlighed og alle, der professionelt beskæftiger sig med mønter, offentliggør Kommissionen alle de nye euromønters design (1). I overensstemmelse med Rådets konklusioner af 10. februar 2009 (2) kan medlemsstaterne i euroområdet og lande, som har indgået monetære aftaler med Den Europæiske Union om udstedelse af euromønter, på visse betingelser udstede et vist antal euroerindringsmønter bestemt til at blive sat i omløb. Der må således kun anvendes 2-euromønter. Disse mønter skal have samme tekniske karakteristika som de normale 2-euromønter, men bærer på den nationale side et særligt motiv af stor symbolsk betydning i national eller europæisk henseende.

Udstedende stat
  : Spanien

Anledning til erindringsmønten
  : UNESCO's verdensarvsliste — kirker i Asturien

Beskrivelse af designet
  : I forgrunden ses kirken Santa Maria del Naranco. Øverst i omskrift står navnet på den udstedende stat, »ESPAÑA«, og nedenunder til højre står udstedelsesåret »2017«. Møntmærket ses på venstre side i den indre cirkel.

På møntens ydre ring ses EU-flagets tolv stjerner.

Antal udstedte mønter
  :

Udstedelsesdato
  :

---

(1)  Jf. EFT C 373 af 28.12.2001, s. 1, hvor man kan se de nationale sider af alle de mønter, der blev udstedt i 2002.

(2)  Jf. konklusionerne fra Rådets møde (økonomi og finans) den 10. februar 2009 og Kommissionens henstilling af 19. december 2008 om fælles retningslinjer for de nationale sider og udstedelsen af euromønter, som er bestemt til at sættes i omløb (EUT L 9 af 14.1.2009, s. 52).

---

Revisionsretten

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/5

---

Særberetning nr. 14/2016

»EU's politiske initiativer og finansielle støtte til integration af romaerne: Der er gjort betydelige fremskridt i de sidste ti år, men der er brug for en yderligere praktisk indsats«

(2016/C 236/07)

Den Europæiske Revisionsrets særberetning nr. 14/2016 »EU's politiske initiativer og finansielle støtte til integration af romaerne: Der er gjort betydelige fremskridt i de sidste ti år, men der er brug for en yderligere praktisk indsats« er netop blevet offentliggjort.

Beretningen kan læses på eller downloades fra Den Europæiske Revisionsrets websted: http://eca.europa.eu eller EU Bookshop: https://bookshop.europa.eu

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OPLYSNINGER FRA MEDLEMSSTATERNE

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/6

---

Ajourføring af listen over grænseovergangssteder som omhandlet i artikel 2, nr. 8, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks) (1)

(2016/C 236/08)

Offentliggørelsen af listen over grænseovergangssteder som omhandlet i artikel 2, nr. 8 i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 af 9. marts 2016 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks), er baseret på de oplysninger, medlemsstaterne indberetter til Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 39 i Schengengrænsekodeksen.

Ud over de oplysninger, der offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende, findes der på webstedet for Generaldirektoratet for Indre Anliggender oplysninger, der ajourføres hver måned.

FRANKRIG

Ændrer de oplysninger, der er offentliggjort i EUT C 229 af 14.7.2015

LISTE OVER GRÆNSEOVERGANGSSTEDER

Luftgrænser

| (1) | Abbeville |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Abbeville

| (2) | Agen-la Garenne |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Agen-la Garenne

| (3) | Ajaccio-Campo dell'Oro |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Ajaccio-Campo dell'Oro

| (4) | Albert-Bray |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Albert-Bray

| (5) | Amiens-Glisy |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Amiens-Glisy

| (6) | Angers-Marcé |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Angers-Marcé

| (7) | Angoulême-Brie-Champniers |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Angoulême-Brie-Champniers

| (8) | Annecy-Methet |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Annecy-Methet

| (9) | Annemasse |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Annemasse

| (10) | Auxerre-Branches |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Auxerre-Branches

| (11) | Avignon-Caumont |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Avignon-Caumont

| (12) | Bâle-Mulhouse |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Bâle-Mulhouse

| (13) | Bastia-Poretta |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Bastia-Poretta

| (14) | Beauvais-Tillé |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Beauvais-Tillé

| (15) | Bergerac-Roumanière |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Bergerac-Roumanière

| (16) | Besançon-la Vèze |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Besançon-la Vèze

| (17) | Béziers-Vias |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Béziers-Vias

| (18) | Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet

| (19) | Bordeaux-Mérignac |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Bordeaux-Mérignac

| (20) | Brest-Guipavas |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Brest-Guipavas

| (21) | Brive-Souillac |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Brive-Souillac

| (22) | Caen-Carpiquet |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Caen-Carpiquet

| (23) | Calais-Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Calais-Dunkerque

| (24) | Calvi-Sainte-Catherine |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Calvi-Sainte-Catherine

| (25) | Cannes-Mandelieu |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Cannes-Mandelieu

| (26) | Carcassonne-Salvaza |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Carcassonne-Salvaza

| (27) | Châlons-Vatry |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Châlons-Vatry

| (28) | Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains

| (29) | Châteauroux-Déols |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Châteauroux-Déols

| (30) | Cherbourg-Mauperthus |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Cherbourg-Mauperthus

| (31) | Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat

| (32) | Colmar-Houssen |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Colmar-Houssen

| (33) | Deauville-Saint-Gatien |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Deauville-Saint-Gatien

| (34) | Dijon-Longvic |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Dijon-Longvic

| (35) | Dinard-Pleurtuit |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Dinard-Pleurtuit

| (36) | Dôle-Tavaux |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Dôle-Tavaux

| (37) | Epinal-Mirecourt |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Epinal-Mirecourt

| (38) | Figari-Sud Corse |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Figari-Sud Corse

| (39) | Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs

| (40) | Hyères-le Palivestre |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Hyères-le Palivestre

| (41) | Issy-les-Moulineaux |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Issy-les-Moulineaux

| (42) | La Môle |
| --- | --- |

(42)

La Môle

| (43) | Lannion |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Lannion

| (44) | La Rochelle-Laleu |
| --- | --- |

(44)

La Rochelle-Laleu

| (45) | Laval-Entrammes |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Laval-Entrammes

| (46) | Le Castelet |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Le Castelet

| (47) | Le Havre-Octeville |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Le Havre-Octeville

| (48) | Le Mans-Arnage |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Le Mans-Arnage

| (49) | Le Touquet-Paris-Plage |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Le Touquet-Paris-Plage

| (50) | Lille-Lesquin |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Lille-Lesquin

| (51) | Limoges-Bellegarde |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Limoges-Bellegarde

| (52) | Lognes-Emerainville |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Lognes-Emerainville

| (53) | Lorient-Lann-Bihoué |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Lorient-Lann-Bihoué

| (54) | Lyon-Bron |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Lyon-Bron

| (55) | Lyon-Saint-Exupéry |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Lyon-Saint-Exupéry

| (56) | Marseille-Provence |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Marseille-Provence

| (57) | Metz-Nancy-Lorraine |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Metz-Nancy-Lorraine

| (58) | Monaco-Héliport |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Monaco-Héliport

| (59) | Montbéliard-Courcelles |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Montbéliard-Courcelles

| (60) | Montpellier-Méditérranée |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Montpellier-Méditérranée

| (61) | Nantes-Atlantique |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Nantes-Atlantique

| (62) | Nevers-Fourchambault |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Nevers-Fourchambault

| (63) | Nice-Côte d'Azur |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Nice-Côte d'Azur

| (64) | Nîmes-Garons |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Nîmes-Garons

| (65) | Orléans-Bricy |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Orléans-Bricy

| (66) | Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l'Hôtel |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l'Hôtel

| (67) | Paris-Charles de Gaulle |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Paris-Charles de Gaulle

| (68) | Paris-le Bourget |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Paris-le Bourget

| (69) | Paris-Orly |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Paris-Orly

| (70) | Pau-Pyrénées |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Pau-Pyrénées

| (71) | Perpignan-Rivesaltes |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Perpignan-Rivesaltes

| (72) | Poitiers-Biard |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Poitiers-Biard

| (73) | Pontoise-Cormeilles-en-Vexin vil være midlertidigt åben:






  — | fra onsdag den 10. juni til søndag den 14. juni 2015, kl. 10.00-15.30.
  Denne midlertidige åbningstid gælder under den internationale flyveopvisning i Le Bourget, hvor det bliver nødvendigt at foretage en omdirigering af flyforbindelser fra lande uden for Schengenområdet til lufthavnen i Pontoise. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(73)

Pontoise-Cormeilles-en-Vexin vil være midlertidigt åben:

—

fra onsdag den 10. juni til søndag den 14. juni 2015, kl. 10.00-15.30.

Denne midlertidige åbningstid gælder under den internationale flyveopvisning i Le Bourget, hvor det bliver nødvendigt at foretage en omdirigering af flyforbindelser fra lande uden for Schengenområdet til lufthavnen i Pontoise.

| — | fra mandag den 15. juni til søndag den 21. juni 2015, kl. 6.00-16.30.
  Denne midlertidige åbningstid gælder i en periode, hvor en sæsonbestemt rute med destination uden for Schengenområdet (Quimper-London) etableres. |
| --- | --- |

—

fra mandag den 15. juni til søndag den 21. juni 2015, kl. 6.00-16.30.

Denne midlertidige åbningstid gælder i en periode, hvor en sæsonbestemt rute med destination uden for Schengenområdet (Quimper-London) etableres.

| (74) | Quimper-Cornouailles, midlertidigt fra den 19. maj til den 4. september 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Quimper-Cornouailles, midlertidigt fra den 19. maj til den 4. september 2016.

| (75) | Rennes Saint-Jacques |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Rennes Saint-Jacques

| (76) | Rodez-Marcillac |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Rodez-Marcillac

| (77) | Rouen-Vallée de Seine |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Rouen-Vallée de Seine

| (78) | Saint-Brieuc-Armor |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Saint-Brieuc-Armor

| (79) | Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon

| (80) | Saint-Nazaire-Montoir |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Saint-Nazaire-Montoir

| (81) | Strasbourg-Entzheim |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Strasbourg-Entzheim

| (82) | Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes

| (83) | Toulouse-Blagnac |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Toulouse-Blagnac

| (84) | Tours-Saint-Symphorien |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Tours-Saint-Symphorien

| (85) | Troyes-Barberey |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Troyes-Barberey

| (86) | Vichy-Charmeil |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Vichy-Charmeil

Søgrænser

| (1) | Ajaccio |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ajaccio

| (2) | Bastia |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Bastia

| (3) | Bayonne |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Bayonne

| (4) | Bonifacio |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Bonifacio

| (5) | Bordeaux |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Bordeaux

| (6) | Boulogne |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Boulogne

| (7) | Brest |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Brest

| (8) | Caen-Ouistreham |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Caen-Ouistreham

| (9) | Calais |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Calais

| (10) | Calvi |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Calvi

| (11) | Cannes-Vieux Port |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Cannes-Vieux Port

| (12) | Carteret |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Carteret

| (13) | Cherbourg |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Cherbourg

| (14) | Dieppe |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Dieppe

| (15) | Douvres |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Douvres

| (16) | Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Dunkerque

| (17) | Granville |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Granville

| (18) | Honfleur |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Honfleur

| (19) | La Rochelle-La Pallice |
| --- | --- |

(19)

La Rochelle-La Pallice

| (20) | Le Havre |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Le Havre

| (21) | Les Sables-d'Olonne-Port |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Les Sables-d'Olonne-Port

| (22) | L'Ile-Rousse |
| --- | --- |

(22)

L'Ile-Rousse

| (23) | Lorient |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Lorient

| (24) | Marseille |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Marseille

| (25) | Monaco-Port de la Condamine |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Monaco-Port de la Condamine

| (26) | Nantes-Saint-Nazaire |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

| (27) | Nice |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Nice

| (28) | Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis

| (29) | Port-la-Nouvelle |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Port-la-Nouvelle

| (30) | Porto-Vecchio |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Porto-Vecchio

| (31) | Port-Vendres |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Port-Vendres

| (32) | Roscoff |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Roscoff

| (33) | Rouen |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Rouen

| (34) | Saint-Brieuc (maritime) |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Saint-Brieuc (maritime)

| (35) | Saint-Malo |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Saint-Malo

| (36) | Sète |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Sète

| (37) | Toulon |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Toulon

Landgrænser

Med DET FORENEDE KONGERIGE:

(fast forbindelse under Kanalen)

| (1) | Gare d’Ashford International |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Gare d’Ashford International

| (2) | Gare d'Avignon-Centre |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Gare d'Avignon-Centre

| (3) | Cheriton/Coquelles |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Cheriton/Coquelles

| (4) | Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée

| (5) | Gare de Fréthun |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Gare de Fréthun

| (6) | Gare de Lille-Europe |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Gare de Lille-Europe

| (7) | Gare de Paris-Nord |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Gare de Paris-Nord

| (8) | Gare de St-Pancras International |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Gare de St-Pancras International

| (9) | Gare d’Ebbsfleet International |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Gare d’Ebbsfleet International

| (10) | Gare TGV Haute- Picardie, den 1. juli 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Gare TGV Haute- Picardie, den 1. juli 2016.

Med ANDORRA

| (1) | Pas de la Case-Porta |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pas de la Case-Porta

Fortegnelse over tidligere publikationer

| | EUT C 316 af 28.12.2007, s. 1 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 316 af 28.12.2007, s. 1

| | EUT C 134 af 31.5.2008, s. 16 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 134 af 31.5.2008, s. 16

| | EUT C 177 af 12.7.2008, s. 9 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 177 af 12.7.2008, s. 9

| | EUT C 200 af 6.8.2008, s. 10 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 200 af 6.8.2008, s. 10

| | EUT C 331 af 31.12.2008, s. 13 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 331 af 31.12.2008, s. 13

| | EUT C 3 af 8.1.2009, s. 10 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 3 af 8.1.2009, s. 10

| | EUT C 37 af 14.2.2009, s. 10 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 37 af 14.2.2009, s. 10

| | EUT C 64 af 19.3.2009, s. 20 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 64 af 19.3.2009, s. 20

| | EUT C 99 af 30.4.2009, s. 7 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 99 af 30.4.2009, s. 7

| | EUT C 229 af 23.9.2009, s. 28 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 229 af 23.9.2009, s. 28

| | EUT C 263 af 5.11.2009, s. 22 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 263 af 5.11.2009, s. 22

| | EUT C 298 af 8.12.2009, s. 17 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 298 af 8.12.2009, s. 17

| | EUT C 74 af 24.3.2010, s. 13 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 74 af 24.3.2010, s. 13

| | EUT C 326 af 3.12.2010, s. 17 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 326 af 3.12.2010, s. 17

| | EUT C 355 af 29.12.2010, s. 34 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 355 af 29.12.2010, s. 34

| | EUT C 22 af 22.1.2011, s. 22 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 22 af 22.1.2011, s. 22

| | EUT C 37 af 5.2.2011, s. 12 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 37 af 5.2.2011, s. 12

| | EUT C 149 af 20.5.2011, s. 8 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 149 af 20.5.2011, s. 8

| | EUT C 190 af 30.6.2011, s. 17 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 190 af 30.6.2011, s. 17

| | EUT C 203 af 9.7.2011, s. 14 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 203 af 9.7.2011, s. 14

| | EUT C 210 af 16.7.2011, s. 30 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 210 af 16.7.2011, s. 30

| | EUT C 271 af 14.9.2011, s. 18 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 271 af 14.9.2011, s. 18

| | EUT C 356 af 6.12.2011, s. 12 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 356 af 6.12.2011, s. 12

| | EUT C 111 af 18.4.2012, s. 3 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 111 af 18.4.2012, s. 3

| | EUT C 183 af 23.6.2012, s. 7 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 183 af 23.6.2012, s. 7

| | EUT C 313 af 17.10.2012, s. 11 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 313 af 17.10.2012, s. 11

| | EUT C 394 af 20.12.2012, s. 22 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 394 af 20.12.2012, s. 22

| | EUT C 51 af 22.2.2013, s. 9 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 51 af 22.2.2013, s. 9

| | EUT C 167 af 13.6.2013, s. 9 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 167 af 13.6.2013, s. 9

| | EUT C 242 af 23.8.2013, s. 2 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 242 af 23.8.2013, s. 2

| | EUT C 275 af 24.9.2013, s. 7 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 275 af 24.9.2013, s. 7

| | EUT C 314 af 29.10.2013, s. 5 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 314 af 29.10.2013, s. 5

| | EUT C 324 af 9.11.2013, s. 6 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 324 af 9.11.2013, s. 6

| | EUT C 57 af 28.2.2014, s. 4 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 57 af 28.2.2014, s. 4

| | EUT C 167 af 4.6.2014, s. 9 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 167 af 4.6.2014, s. 9

| | EUT C 244 af 26.7.2014, s. 22 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 244 af 26.7.2014, s. 22

| | EUT C 332 af 24.9.2014, s. 12 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 332 af 24.9.2014, s. 12

| | EUT C 420 af 22.11.2014, s. 9 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 420 af 22.11.2014, s. 9

| | EUT C 72 af 28.2.2015, s. 17 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 72 af 28.2.2015, s. 17

| | EUT C 126 af 18.4.2015, s. 10 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 126 af 18.4.2015, s. 10

| | EUT C 229 af 14.7.2015, s. 5 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 229 af 14.7.2015, s. 5

| | EUT C 341 af 16.10.2015, s. 19 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 341 af 16.10.2015, s. 19

| | EUT C 84 af 4.3.2016, s. 2. |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 84 af 4.3.2016, s. 2.

---

(1)  Se listen over oplysninger, der tidligere er offentliggjort, nederst i denne ajourføring.

---

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/11

---

Ajourføring af modellerne til de kort, der udstedes af medlemsstaternes udenrigsministerier til akkrediterede medlemmer af diplomatiske og konsulære repræsentationer og deres familiemedlemmer, jf. artikel 20, stk. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks) (1)

(2016/C 236/09)

Offentliggørelsen af modellerne til de kort, der udstedes af medlemsstaternes udenrigsministerier til akkrediterede medlemmer af diplomatiske og konsulære repræsentationer og deres familiemedlemmer, jf. artikel 20, stk. 2, i Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forordning (EU) 2016/399 af 9. marts 2016 om indførelse af en EU-kodeks for personers grænsepassage (Schengengrænsekodeks), er baseret på de oplysninger, medlemsstaterne indberetter til Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 39 i Schengengrænsekodeksen.

Ud over de oplysninger, der offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende, findes der på webstedet for Generaldirektoratet for Indre Anliggender oplysninger, der ajourføres hver måned.

SCHWEIZ

Erstatter de oplysninger, der er offentliggjort i EUT C 133 af 1.5.2014

SÆRLIGE OPHOLDSTILLADELSER UDSTEDT AF DET SCHWEIZISKE UDENRIGSMINISTERIUM

Legitimationskort (opholdstilladelse) udstedt af forbundsudenrigsministeriet:

| — | Carte de légitimation »B« (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »B« (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »B« (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskort »B« (med lyserød stribe): chefer for diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, højtstående tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »B« (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »B« (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »B« (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskort »B« (med lyserød stribe): chefer for diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, højtstående tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »C« (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »C« (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »C« (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »C« (med lyserød stribe): medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationers diplomatiske personale, tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »C« (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »C« (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »C« (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »C« (med lyserød stribe): medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationers diplomatiske personale, tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »D« (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »D« (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »D« (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort D (med blå stribe): medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationers administrative og tekniske personale og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »D« (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »D« (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »D« (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort D (med blå stribe): medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationers administrative og tekniske personale og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »D« (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »D« (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »D« (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »D« (med brun stribe): tjenestemænd med særlige fagområder ansat ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »D« (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »D« (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »D« (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »D« (med brun stribe): tjenestemænd med særlige fagområder ansat ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »E« (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »E« (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »E« (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »E« (med violet stribe): tjenestepersonale ved diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, andre tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »E« (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »E« (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »E« (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »E« (med violet stribe): tjenestepersonale ved diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, andre tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »F« (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte »F« (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione »F« (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali / Legitimationskort »F« (med gul stribe): private tjenestefolk ansat hos medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer og konsulære repræsentationer samt private tjenestefolk ansat hos tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer |
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Carte de légitimation »F« (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte »F« (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione »F« (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali / Legitimationskort »F« (med gul stribe): private tjenestefolk ansat hos medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer og konsulære repræsentationer samt private tjenestefolk ansat hos tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer

| — | Carte de légitimation »G« (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail »court terme«) et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »G« (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »G« (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »G« (med turkisfarvet stribe): tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer med en tidsbegrænset arbejdskontrakt og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »G« (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail »court terme«) et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »G« (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »G« (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »G« (med turkisfarvet stribe): tjenestemænd ved internationale organisationer med en tidsbegrænset arbejdskontrakt og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »H« (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte »H« (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten / Carta di legittimazione »H« (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali / Legitimationskort »H« (med hvid stribe): ikke-tjenestemandsansatte medarbejdere ved diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, konsulater og internationale organisationer samt personer uden privilegier og immuniteter, der har ret til at ledsage medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, konsulater og internationale organisationer |
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Carte de légitimation »H« (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte »H« (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten / Carta di legittimazione »H« (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali / Legitimationskort »H« (med hvid stribe): ikke-tjenestemandsansatte medarbejdere ved diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, konsulater og internationale organisationer samt personer uden privilegier og immuniteter, der har ret til at ledsage medlemmer af diplomatiske, faste eller særlige repræsentationer, konsulater og internationale organisationer

| — | Carte de légitimation »I« (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »I« (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »I« (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »I« (med olivenfarvet stribe): personale, der ikke har schweizisk statsborgerskab, og som er ansat ved Den Internationale Røde Kors Komité, og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »I« (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »I« (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »I« (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »I« (med olivenfarvet stribe): personale, der ikke har schweizisk statsborgerskab, og som er ansat ved Den Internationale Røde Kors Komité, og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »K« (med lyserød stribe): konsuler, konsulatsembedsmænd og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »K« (med lyserød stribe): konsuler, konsulatsembedsmænd og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »K« (med blå stribe): konsulatsansatte og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »K« (med blå stribe): konsulatsansatte og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »K« (med violet stribe): tjenestepersonale ved konsulære repræsentationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »K« (med violet stribe): tjenestepersonale ved konsulære repræsentationer og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari / Legitimationskort »K« (med hvid stribe): honorære konsuler ved de konsulære repræsentationer |
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Carte de légitimation »K« (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte »K« (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione »K« (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari / Legitimationskort »K« (med hvid stribe): honorære konsuler ved de konsulære repræsentationer

| — | Carte de légitimation »L« (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »L« (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »L« (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »L« (med sandfarvet stribe): personale, der ikke har schweizisk statsborgerskab, og som er ansat ved Det Internationale Forbund af Røde Kors- og Røde Halvmåne-selskaber, og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »L« (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »L« (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione »L« (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »L« (med sandfarvet stribe): personale, der ikke har schweizisk statsborgerskab, og som er ansat ved Det Internationale Forbund af Røde Kors- og Røde Halvmåne-selskaber, og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »P« (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »P« (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione »P« (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »P« (med blå stribe): videnskabeligt personale ved CERN, der ikke har schweizisk statsborgerskab, samt familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »P« (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »P« (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione »P« (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »P« (med blå stribe): videnskabeligt personale ved CERN, der ikke har schweizisk statsborgerskab, samt familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »R« (à bande grise): membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »R« (mit grauem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione »R« (a banda grigia): membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »R« (med grå stribe): personale ved internationale halvstatslige organisationer eller andre internationale organer, som ikke er schweiziske statsborgere, og familiemedlemmer med samme status |
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Carte de légitimation »R« (à bande grise): membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte »R« (mit grauem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione »R« (a banda grigia): membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Legitimationskort »R« (med grå stribe): personale ved internationale halvstatslige organisationer eller andre internationale organer, som ikke er schweiziske statsborgere, og familiemedlemmer med samme status

| — | Carte de légitimation »S« (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte »S« (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione »S« (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali / Legitimationskort »S« (med grøn stribe): personale med schweizisk statsborgerskab ansat ved diplomatiske, faste og særlige repræsentationer, tjenestemænd med schweizisk statsborgerskab ansat ved internationale organisationer |
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Carte de légitimation »S« (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte »S« (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione »S« (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali / Legitimationskort »S« (med grøn stribe): personale med schweizisk statsborgerskab ansat ved diplomatiske, faste og særlige repræsentationer, tjenestemænd med schweizisk statsborgerskab ansat ved internationale organisationer

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type B

| — | Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: repræsentationschef |
| --- | --- |

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Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: repræsentationschef

| — | Internationale organisationer: højtstående tjenestemand



  Indehaveren af dette kort har diplomatstatus |
| --- | --- |

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Internationale organisationer: højtstående tjenestemand

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har diplomatstatus

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type C

| — | Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: medlem af det diplomatiske personale |
| --- | --- |

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Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: medlem af det diplomatiske personale

| — | Internationale organisationer: tjenestemand



  Indehaveren af dette kort har diplomatstatus |
| --- | --- |

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Internationale organisationer: tjenestemand

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har diplomatstatus

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type D

| — | Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: medlem af det administrative og tekniske personale (AT)



  Indehaveren af dette kort har diplomatstatus; dog har indehaveren kun immunitet i civile og administrative sager under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: medlem af det administrative og tekniske personale (AT)

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Indehaveren af dette kort har diplomatstatus; dog har indehaveren kun immunitet i civile og administrative sager under udførelsen af sine opgaver

| — | Internationale organisationer: tjenestemand med særligt fagområde



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Internationale organisationer: tjenestemand med særligt fagområde

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type E

| — | Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: medlem af tjenestepersonalet og medlem af det lokalt ansatte personale |
| --- | --- |

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Ambassader og faste repræsentationer: medlem af tjenestepersonalet og medlem af det lokalt ansatte personale

| — | Internationale organisationer: anden tjenestemand



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Internationale organisationer: anden tjenestemand

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type F

| — | Ambassader, faste repræsentationer og internationale organisationer: private tjenestefolk ansat hos et medlem af personalet



  Indehaveren af dette kort har ikke immunitet |
| --- | --- |

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Ambassader, faste repræsentationer og internationale organisationer: private tjenestefolk ansat hos et medlem af personalet

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har ikke immunitet

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type G

| — | Internationale organisationer: tjenestemand med en tidsbegrænset arbejdskontrakt og udsendt medlem af personalet



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Internationale organisationer: tjenestemand med en tidsbegrænset arbejdskontrakt og udsendt medlem af personalet

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Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type H

| — | Ambassader, konsulater, faste repræsentationer og internationale organisationer: personer uden privilegier og immuniteter



  Indehaveren af dette kort har ikke immunitet og har ikke adgang til det schweiziske arbejdsmarked |
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Ambassader, konsulater, faste repræsentationer og internationale organisationer: personer uden privilegier og immuniteter

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har ikke immunitet og har ikke adgang til det schweiziske arbejdsmarked

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type I

| — | Den Internationale Røde Kors Komité: medarbejder ved ICRC



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver. Vedkommende har ingen toldprivilegier |
| --- | --- |

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Den Internationale Røde Kors Komité: medarbejder ved ICRC

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Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver. Vedkommende har ingen toldprivilegier

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type K

| — | Konsulater — rødt K-kort: konsul og konsulatsembedsmand



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulater — rødt K-kort: konsul og konsulatsembedsmand

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Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

| — | Konsulater — blåt K-kort: konsulatsansat



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulater — blåt K-kort: konsulatsansat

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Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

| — | Konsulater — violet K-kort: medlem af tjenestepersonalet og medlem af det lokalt ansatte personale



  Indehaveren af dette kort har ikke immunitet |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulater — violet K-kort: medlem af tjenestepersonalet og medlem af det lokalt ansatte personale

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har ikke immunitet

| — | Konsulater — hvidt K-kort: honorær konsul



  Indehaveren af dette kort har udelukkende immunitet under udførelsen af sine konsulære opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulater — hvidt K-kort: honorær konsul

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Indehaveren af dette kort har udelukkende immunitet under udførelsen af sine konsulære opgaver

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type L

| — | Det Internationale Forbund af Røde Kors- og Røde Halvmåne-selskaber (IFRC): medarbejder ved IFRC



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver. Vedkommende har ingen toldprivilegier |
| --- | --- |

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Det Internationale Forbund af Røde Kors- og Røde Halvmåne-selskaber (IFRC): medarbejder ved IFRC

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Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver. Vedkommende har ingen toldprivilegier

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type P

| — | Det Europæiske Atomforskningscenter (CERN): medlem af det videnskabelige personale ved CERN



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
| --- | --- |

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Det Europæiske Atomforskningscenter (CERN): medlem af det videnskabelige personale ved CERN

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Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type R

| — | Personale ved internationale halvstatslige organisationer eller andre internationale organer, som ikke er schweiziske statsborgere, og familiemedlemmer med samme status



  Indehaveren af dette kort er ikke omfattet af immunitet. |
| --- | --- |

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Personale ved internationale halvstatslige organisationer eller andre internationale organer, som ikke er schweiziske statsborgere, og familiemedlemmer med samme status

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort er ikke omfattet af immunitet.

Legitimationskort udstedt af Forbundsudenrigsministeriet af type S

Et medlem af personalet med schweizisk statsborgerskab, uanset hvilken stilling han har i den udenlandske repræsentation eller den internationale organisation, modtager i princippet et legitimationskort af type S. Schweiziske personalemedlemmer, der er ansat lokalt af ambassaderne og konsulaterne, modtager ikke noget kort. Schweiziske tjenestemænd med en tidsbegrænset arbejdskontrakt ved internationale organisationer modtager ikke noget kort.

| — | Ambassader og konsulater: konsulatsansat, der er schweizisk statsborger |
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Ambassader og konsulater: konsulatsansat, der er schweizisk statsborger

| — | Faste repræsentationer: medarbejder, der er schweizisk statsborger |
| --- | --- |

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Faste repræsentationer: medarbejder, der er schweizisk statsborger

| — | Internationale organisationer: embedsmand/medarbejder, der er schweizisk statsborger



  Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver |
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Internationale organisationer: embedsmand/medarbejder, der er schweizisk statsborger

Image

Indehaveren af dette kort har immunitet under udførelsen af sine opgaver

Fortegnelse over tidligere publikationer

| | EUT C 247 af 13.10.2006, s. 85 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 247 af 13.10.2006, s. 85

| | EUT C 153 af 6.7.2007, s. 15 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 153 af 6.7.2007, s. 15

| | EUT C 64 af 19.3.2009, s. 18 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 64 af 19.3.2009, s. 18

| | EUT C 239 af 6.10.2009, s. 7 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 239 af 6.10.2009, s. 7

| | EUT C 304 af 10.11.2010, s. 6 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 304 af 10.11.2010, s. 6

| | EUT C 273 af 16.9.2011, s. 11 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 273 af 16.9.2011, s. 11

| | EUT C 357 af 7.12.2011, s. 3 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 357 af 7.12.2011, s. 3

| | EUT C 88 af 24.3.2012, s. 12 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 88 af 24.3.2012, s. 12

| | EUT C 120 af 25.4.2012, s. 4 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 120 af 25.4.2012, s. 4

| | EUT C 182 af 22.6.2012, s. 10 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 182 af 22.6.2012, s. 10

| | EUT C 214 af 20.7.2012, s. 4 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 214 af 20.7.2012, s. 4

| | EUT C 238 af 8.8.2012, s. 5 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 238 af 8.8.2012, s. 5

| | EUT C 255 af 24.8.2012, s. 2 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 255 af 24.8.2012, s. 2

| | EUT C 242 af 23.8.2013, s. 13 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 242 af 23.8.2013, s. 13

| | EUT C 38 af 8.2.2014, s. 16 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 38 af 8.2.2014, s. 16

| | EUT C 133 af 1.5.2014, s. 2 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 133 af 1.5.2014, s. 2

| | EUT C 360 af 11.10.2014, s. 5 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 360 af 11.10.2014, s. 5

| | EUT C 397 af 12.11.2014, s. 6 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 397 af 12.11.2014, s. 6

| | EUT C 77 af 27.2.2016, s. 5 |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 77 af 27.2.2016, s. 5

| | EUT C 174 af 14.5.2016, s. 12. |
| --- | --- |

EUT C 174 af 14.5.2016, s. 12.

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(1)  Se listen over oplysninger, der tidligere er offentliggjort, nederst i denne ajourføring.

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OPLYSNINGER VEDRØRENDE DET EUROPÆISKE ØKONOMISKE SAMARBEJDSOMRÅDE

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/21

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Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger, jf. artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol, til statsstøttespørgsmål

(2016/C 236/10)

Ved beslutning nr. 489/15/KOL, der er gengivet på det autentiske sprog efter dette resumé, har EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden (»Tilsynsmyndigheden«) meddelt de norske myndigheder, at den har besluttet at indlede proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende ovennævnte foranstaltning.

Interesserede parter kan senest én måned efter datoen for offentliggørelsen sende deres bemærkninger til den pågældende foranstaltning til:

| EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden |
| --- |
| Registreringskontoret |
| Rue Belliard 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden

Registreringskontoret

Rue Belliard 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

Disse bemærkninger vil blive videresendt til de norske myndigheder. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

RESUMÉ

Sagsforløb

Ved brev af 13. marts 2014 (1) anmeldte de norske myndigheder ordningen om regionalt differentierede socialsikringsbidrag for perioden 2014-2020 i henhold til artikel 1, stk. 3, i del I i protokol 3. På grundlag af denne anmeldelse og de efterfølgende indsendte oplysninger (2) godkendte Tilsynsmyndigheden ved beslutning nr. 225/14/KOL af 18. juni 2014 den anmeldte støtteordning.

EFTA-Domstolen annullerede ved sin dom af 23. september 2015 i sag E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS mod EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden (3) delvis Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning.

Ved brev af 15. oktober 2015 (4) anmodede Tilsynsmyndigheden de norske myndigheder om yderligere oplysninger. De norske myndigheder svarede på anmodningen om oplysninger ved brev af 6. november 2015 (5).

Beskrivelse af foranstaltningen

Formålet med den generelle ordning om differentierede socialsikringsbidrag er at mindske eller forhindre affolkningen i de tyndest befolkede regioner i Norge ved at fremme beskæftigelsen. Gennem driftsstøtteordningen ydes kompensation for personaleomkostninger ved at sænke satserne for socialsikringsbidrag i visse geografiske områder. Som hovedregel varierer støtteintensiteten alt efter det geografiske område, hvor forretningsenheden er registreret. Efter norsk ret skal virksomheder registrere underenheder for hver særskilt forretningsaktivitet (6). Hvis en virksomhed har flere forskellige forretningsaktiviteter, skal der registreres særskilte underenheder. Derudover skal der registreres særskilte enheder, hvis aktiviteterne udføres i forskellige geografiske områder.

Som undtagelse fra hovedreglen om registrering gælder ordningen også for virksomheder, der er registreret uden for det støtteberettigede område, hvis de stiller arbejdstagere til rådighed i det støtteberettigede område, og hvis deres ansatte er beskæftiget i mobile aktiviteter inden for det støtteberettigede område (i denne beslutning benævnes dette »ambulante tjenesteydelser«). Det er denne fritagelse, der undersøges i den foreliggende beslutning. Det nationale retsgrundlag for ordningen er § 23-2 i den norske socialsikringslov (7). Det nationale retsgrundlag for fritagelsen findes i § 1, afsnit 4, i det norske stortings afgørelse nr. 1482 af 5. december 2013 om fastsættelse af afgiftssatser mv. under loven om national sikring.

Fritagelsen finder kun anvendelse, hvis arbejdstageren tilbringer halvdelen eller flere af sine arbejdsdage i det støtteberettigede område. Derudover gælder den nedsatte sats kun for den del af arbejdet, der udføres dér.

Vurdering af foranstaltningen

Tilsynsmyndigheden skal vurdere, om fritagelsen er forenelig med EØS-aftalen på grundlag af aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), i overensstemmelse med Tilsynsmyndighedens retningslinjer for statsstøtte med regionalt sigte for 2014-2020 (»regionalstøtteretningslinjerne«) (8).

Den økonomiske udvikling i ugunstigt stillede områder kan kun fremmes effektivt gennem regionalstøtte, hvis den ydes for at tilskynde til ydereligere investeringer eller økonomisk aktivitet i disse områder (9). Regional driftsstøtte henhører kun under EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 3, litra c), hvis den ydes for at afhjælpe specifikke eller permanente ulemper, som virksomheder i ugunstigt stillede områder står over for (10).

Der er ingen tvivl om, at ordningens geografiske anvendelsesområde som sådan er begrænset til ugunstigt stillede områder. Denne beslutnings anvendelsesområde er begrænset til fritagelsen. Spørgsmålet er, om den pågældende fritagelse er forenelig med statsstøttereglerne, eftersom den indebærer, at virksomheder registreret uden for de ugunstigt stillede områder, som er omfattet af ordningen, kan modtage støtte under ordningen, i det omfang de udøver økonomiske aktiviteter i de ugunstigt stillede regioner. Med andre ord: Afhjælper fritagelsen specifikke eller permanente ulemper, som virksomheder i ugunstigt stillede regioner står over for?

Det er op til de norske myndigheder at godtgøre, at der uden fritagelsen er risiko for affolkning (11). De norske myndigheder understreger fordelene ved fritagelsen for lokale virksomheder. De kan for færre omkostninger få adgang til specialiseret arbejdskraft, som ellers ikke ville være til rådighed. Derudover medfører fritagelsen øget konkurrence mellem ambulante tjenesteydelser i de støtteberettigede områder, hvilket igen er til gavn for lokale virksomheder (andre end dem, der yder ambulante tjenester), eftersom lavere omkostninger til ambulante tjenesteydelser gør det mere tiltrækkende og rentabelt at drive virksomhed i det støtteberettigede område. Støtten gennem ordningen er et indirekte værktøj, i den forstand at den anvendes til at nedbringe omkostningerne til ansættelse af arbejdstagere med henblik på at mindske eller forhindre affolkning. Tanken bag er, at arbejdsmarkedet er den vigtigste faktor, der påvirker, hvor folk bor.

De norske myndigheder hævder desuden, at de virksomheder, der er registreret uden for de støtteberettigede områder, lejlighedsvis vil ansætte arbejdstagere i de støtteberettigede områder. Dermed vil virksomhederne skabe arbejdspladser, om end af mere midlertidig karakter, hvilket ikke desto mindre vil bidrage til øget lønindkomst i de støtteberettigede regioner. Dette stimulerer også den økonomiske aktivitet. De norske myndigheder fremfører endvidere, at arbejdstagere, der opholder sig midlertidigt i det støtteberettigede område, vil købe lokale varer og tjenester og dermed bidrage til den lokale økonomi. Det gælder især for medarbejdere, der pendler til lokaliteten, særlig på kort eller mellemlang sigt, da de sandsynligvis vil opholde sig på hoteller, spise på restauranter osv. De norske myndigheder anslår de støttebeløb, der følger af fritagelsen, til to procent af den samlede støtte i 2015, hvilket de understreger er et usikkert skøn. To procent beløber sig til ca. 19 mio. EUR (12). Tilsynsmyndigheden opfordrer de norske myndigheder til at fremsende mere nøjagtige oplysninger om fritagelsens finansielle virkning.

Ud over de ovennævnte bemærkninger, der er af generel karakter, har de norske myndigheder ikke påvist, at der uden fritagelsesreglen er risiko for affolkning af det pågældende område. Det er Tilsynsmyndighedens opfattelse, at en foranstaltning for at opfylde kravene i regionalstøtteretningslinjerne skal have en virkning ud over en marginal stigning i de midlertidige beskæftigelsesmuligheder og forbruget i det støtteberettigede område. På denne baggrund opfordrer Tilsynsmyndigheden de norske myndigheder til at fremsende flere oplysninger, der påviser risikoen for affolkning uden fritagelsen.

Hvad angår fritagelsens indvirkning på konkurrencen og samhandelen, gør de norske myndigheder gældende, at fritagelsen skaber lige vilkår for alle virksomheder i de ugunstigt stillede områder, da den gælder ligeligt for enhver EØS-baseret virksomhed. Hermed sikres, at unødige skadelige virkninger på konkurrencen undgås. Det er Tilsynsmyndighedens opfattelse, at dette er et positivt træk i lyset af regionalstøtteretningslinjernes punkt 3 og 53. De virksomheder, der er registreret i det støtteberettigede område, kan dog generelt opleve mere permanente vanskeligheder end de virksomheder, der blot sender deres medarbejdere til at arbejde i området på midlertidig basis. De norske myndigheder gør gældende, at virksomheder, der er registreret uden for det støtteberettigede område, kan have en konkurrencemæssig ulempe i forhold til lokale virksomheder på grund af bl.a. udgifter til transport og indkvartering af personale. De norske myndigheder har ikke fremlagt data eller yderligere begrundelser til støtte for denne antagelse. Tilsynsmyndigheden opfordrer de norske myndigheder til at redegøre yderligere for, hvorfor fritagelsen ikke har unødige skadelige virkninger på konkurrencen, og indsende yderligere oplysninger, der kan underbygge dette.

De norske myndigheder har understreger, at det er indlysende, at fritagelsen har en tilskyndelsesvirkning. En støttes tilskyndelsesvirkning kan ikke blot tages for givet. Skønt det er ikke nødvendigt at fremlægge individuel dokumentation for, at støtte under en ordning tilskynder hver støttemodtager til på et individuelt grundlag at udføre en aktivitet, der ellers ikke ville være blevet foretaget, skal tilskyndelsesvirkningen i det mindste være baseret på en sund økonomisk tankegang. Det er ikke tilstrækkeligt blot at henvise til en påstået åbenlyshed. Selv om det er korrekt, at fritagelsen for virksomheder, der er registreret uden for de støtteberettigede områder, nedbringer lønomkostningerne for ambulante tjenesteydelser i de støtteberettigede områder, har de norske myndigheder ikke fremlagt beviser eller argumenter for, at det er sandsynligt, at der uden støtten ville ske en væsentlig reduktion af den økonomiske aktivitet i området på grund af de problemer, som støtten skal afhjælpe (13).

De norske myndigheder forklarer, at virksomheder, der leverer ambulante tjenesteydelser til en vis grad kan registrere underenheder i det støtteberettigede område. De er endvidere forpligtet til at gøre det, hvis mindst én medarbejder udfører arbejde for moderenheden i et særskilt område, og der kan gennemføres besøg på virksomheden dér.

De norske myndigheder fremfører, at der uden fritagelsen for ambulante tjenesteydelser i det støtteberettigede område ville ske en uberettiget forskelsbehandling, alt efter om den virksomhed, der leverer tjenesteydelser, har oprettet en underenhed i det støtteberettigede område eller ej.

For det første er det ikke klart for Tilsynsmyndigheden, hvad der ligger i kravet om, at »mindst én medarbejder udfører arbejde for moderenheden i et særskilt område, og der kan gennemføres besøg på virksomheden dér«. Tilsynsmyndigheden opfordrer derfor de norske myndigheder til at redegøre for dette.

For det andet er princippet om ligebehandling et generelt princip i EØS-retten. Dette kan imidlertid ikke i sig selv danne grundlag for at berettige en fritagelse. Fritagelsen skal i sig selv være forenelig med EØS-aftalen.

Det konkluderes, at der mangler relevante oplysninger, som beskrevet ovenfor, hvilket får Tilsynsmyndigheden til at nære tvivl om fritagelsens forenelighed med EØS-aftalen.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 489/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening a formal investigation into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020

(Norway)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014. |
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(1)

The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014.

| (2) | By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision.

| (3) | By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
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(3)

By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The scheme as such is not the subject of the formal investigation

| (4) | By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled. |
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(4)

By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled.

3.   The scheme

3.1   
  Objective

| (5) | The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below.

3.2   
  National legal basis

| (6) | The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme.

| (7) | For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

3.3   
  Rules on registration

| (8) | As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered. |
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(8)

As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered.

| (9) | Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations. |
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(9)

Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations.

| (10) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area. |
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(10)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area.

3.4   
  Ambulant services – the measure under scrutiny

| (11) | By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. |
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(11)

By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014.

| (12) | The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month. |
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(12)

The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month.

| (13) | This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo. |
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(13)

This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo.

4.   The judgment of the EFTA Court

| (14) | The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21).

5.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (15) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22). |
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(15)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22).

| (16) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates. |
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(16)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates.

| (17) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme. |
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(17)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme.

| (18) | Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (19) | The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel.

| (20) | In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services. |
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(20)

In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services.

| (21) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. |
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(21)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (22) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
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(22)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (23) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition. |
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(23)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition.

| (24) | In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (25) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
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(25)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful. |
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(26)

The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (27) | The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG. |
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(27)

The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG.

| (28) | The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas.

| (29) | Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25). |
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(29)

Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25).

| (30) | There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions? |
| --- | --- |

(30)

There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions?

| (31) | It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live.

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule. |
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(32)

The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule.

| (33) | Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule.

| (34) | In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up.

| (35) | The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28).

| (36) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there.

| (37) | The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (38) | Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this.

| (39) | Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (40) | In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (41) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (43) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules.

| (44) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 10 January 2016.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 10 January 2016, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, on 9 December 2015

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  Dokumentnr. 702438-702440, 702442 og 702443.

1

(2)  Jf. betragtning 2 i beslutning nr. 225/14/KOL, som er tilgængelig online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf.

2

(3)  Endnu ikke offentliggjort.

3

(4)  Dokumentnr. 776348

4

(5)  Dokumentnr. 779603 og 779604.

5

(6)  Lov om enhedsregisteret (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

6

(7)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

7

(8)  EUT L 166 af 5.6.2014, s. 44, og EØS-tillæg nr. 33 af 5.6.2014, s. 1.

8

(9)  Punkt 6 i regionalstøtteretningslinjerne.

9

(10)  Punkt 16 i regionalstøtteretningslinjerne.

10

(11)  Punkt 43 i regionalstøtteretningslinjerne.

11

(12)  Baseret på det anmeldte 2013-budget, jf. betragtning 49 i Tilsynsmyndighedens beslutning nr. 225/14/KOL.

12

(13)  Punkt 71 i regionalstøtteretningslinjerne.

13

(14)  Documents No 702438-702440, 702442 and 702443.

14

(15)  See paragraph 2 of Decision No 225/14/COL, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

15

(16)  Not yet reported.

16

(17)  Document No 776348.

17

(18)  Documents No 779603 and 779604.

18

(19)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

19

(20)  The Act on the Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

20

(21)  See Order of the EFTA Court of 23.11.2015 in Case E-23/14 INT Kimek Offshore AS v ESA (not yet reported).

21

Kimek Offshore AS

ESA

(22)  OJ L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 and EEA Supplement No 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

22

(23)  The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014 (OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61) at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

23

(24)  Para. 6 of the RAG.

24

(25)  Para. 16 of the RAG.

25

(26)  Para. 43 of the RAG.

26

(27)  Based on the notified 2013 budget, see para. 49 of the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

27

(28)  Para. 71 of the RAG.

28

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| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/29

---

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol vedrørende spørgsmålet om statsstøtte i forbindelse med potentiel støtte til Hurtigruten ASA i henhold til den aftale om Hurtigrutens drift af kystruten, der er indgået for perioden 2012-2019

(2016/C 236/11)

Ved beslutning nr. 490/15/KOL af 9. december 2015, der er gengivet på det autentiske sprog efter dette resumé, har EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden indledt proceduren efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. De norske myndigheder er underrettet ved fremsendelse af en kopi af denne beslutning.

EFTA-Tilsynsmyndigheden giver hermed EFTA-staterne, EU-medlemsstaterne og interesserede parter en frist på en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse til at fremsende deres bemærkninger til den pågældende foranstaltning til:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

Disse bemærkninger vil blive videresendt til de norske myndigheder. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navne hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

RESUMÉ

Baggrund

Hurtigruten ASA (Hurtigruten) tilbyder transporttjenester i form af kombineret transport af personer og varer langs den norske kyst fra Bergen til Kirkenes.

Efter en udbudsprocedure blev der den 13. april 2011 undertegnet en aftale med Hurtigruten om tjenester på kystruten Bergen–Kirkenes for perioden 1. januar 2012 til 31. december 2019 (i det følgende benævnt »aftalen med Hurtigruten«). Ifølge denne aftale skal Hurtigruten tilbyde daglig færgefart året rundt med anløb i 32 fastsatte havne mellem Bergen og Kirkenes. For ruterne Tromsø–Kirkenes og Kirkenes–Tromsø skal der også tilbydes godstransport. Tjenesterne skal tilbydes i overensstemmelse med visse krav til kapacitet og skibe, der er fastsat i kontrakten. De skibe, der anvendes på kystruten, skal mindst have en passagerkapacitet på 320 passagerer, kahytter med liggeplads til 120 passagerer og en godskapacitet på 150 EUR-paller i et lastrum med normal læssehøjde. De skal også opfylde de retlige og tekniske krav, der er angivet i afsnit 4.4 i udbudsbetingelserne.

For de tjenester, der er omfattet af aftalen med Hurtigruten, betaler de norske myndigheder en samlet kompensation på 5 120 mio. NOK for de otte år, som aftalen varer.

Statsstøttevurdering af den ydede kompensation

Det eneste element i statsstøttebegrebet, der skal undersøges nærmere, er, om kontrakten har givet Hurtigruten en selektiv og uretmæssig økonomisk fordel.

Hurtigruten har haft en selektiv økonomisk fordel

Tilsynsmyndigheden har vurderet de fire betingelser i Altmark-dommen (1) og finder, at ingen af dem på nuværende tidspunkt synes opfyldt, og at Hurtigruten derfor har haft en selektiv fordel, jf. EØS-aftalens artikel 61, stk. 1.

Hvad angår den første betingelse om en klart defineret forpligtelse til offentlig tjeneste, er Tilsynsmyndigheden i tvivl om, hvorvidt kravet om reservering af kapacitet i paragraf 4-2 i aftalen med Hurtigruten kan klassificeres af Norge som en tjenesteydelse af almindelig økonomisk interesse, og opfordrer de norske myndigheder til at give en objektiv begrundelse vedrørende behovet for en forpligtelse til offentlig tjeneste (i det følgende benævnt »PSO«), idet der tages hensyn til sæsonudsvingene i antallet af betalende passagerer, der transporteres.

Hvad angår den anden betingelse og det forhold, at de kriterier, der er grundlaget for beregningen af kompensationen, skal være fastlagt på forhånd på en objektiv og gennemsigtig måde, er Tilsynsmyndigheden på nuværende tidspunkt i tvivl om, hvorvidt kravet om reservering af kapacitet er knyttet til de faktiske PSO-passagertal. Der har f.eks. ikke været en objektiv og gennemsigtig metode til forudberegning af omkostningerne pr. passager/kilometer. Hurtigruten har oprettet et særskilt budget, der omfatter alle udgifter og indtægter, som kan henføres til PSO-ruterne. Dette særskilte regnskab tilstræber dog ikke på forhånd at fastsætte de kompensationsparametre, der vil være direkte forbundet med de faktiske tab og omkostninger (kapacitets- og passageromkostninger), som er afholdt af Hurtigruten.

Hvad angår den tredje betingelse, er Tilsynsmyndigheden i tvivl om, hvorvidt de norske myndigheder har sikret, at den tildelte kompensation ikke overstiger, hvad der er nødvendigt for helt eller delvis at dække de udgifter, der er afholdt ved opfyldelsen af forpligtelsen til offentlig tjeneste, idet der skal tages hensyn til de hermed forbundne indtægter og til en rimelig fortjeneste ved opfyldelsen af forpligtelsen.

Tilsynsmyndigheden kan ikke på nuværende tidspunkt udelukke, at Hurtigruten er blevet overkompenseret for at tilbyde den offentlige tjeneste. For at nå frem til denne foreløbige konklusion har Tilsynsmyndigheden vurderet følgende:

| i) | Hurtigruten reserverer ikke kapacitet til PSO-passagerer, men sælger derimod kapaciteten til krydstogtpassagerer, samtidig med at kompensationen for offentlig tjeneste fastholdes på samme niveau |
| --- | --- |

i)

Hurtigruten reserverer ikke kapacitet til PSO-passagerer, men sælger derimod kapaciteten til krydstogtpassagerer, samtidig med at kompensationen for offentlig tjeneste fastholdes på samme niveau

| ii) | kompensationen for at tilbyde den offentlige tjeneste er steget betydeligt i forhold til den foregående kontraktperiode |
| --- | --- |

ii)

kompensationen for at tilbyde den offentlige tjeneste er steget betydeligt i forhold til den foregående kontraktperiode

| iii) | Hurtigruten modtager fortsat kompensation for tjenester, der ikke ydes, og |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten modtager fortsat kompensation for tjenester, der ikke ydes, og

| iv) | Hurtigruten forsøger desuden at få nedsat havneafgifterne, samtidig med at kompensationen for offentlig tjeneste fastholdes på samme niveau. |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten forsøger desuden at få nedsat havneafgifterne, samtidig med at kompensationen for offentlig tjeneste fastholdes på samme niveau.

Hvad angår den fjerde betingelse, som kræver, at der gennemføres en udbudsprocedure eller en benchmarking med en effektiv udbyder, er Tilsynsmyndigheden, under henvisning til at den udbudsprocedure, der blev gennemført, kun resulterede i ét bud (Hurtigrutens), på nuværende tidspunkt i tvivl om, hvorvidt en udbudsprocedure som den omhandlede kan anses for at være tilstrækkelig til at sikre »de laveste omkostninger for samfundet«. Denne tvivl skyldes især, at Hurtigruten havde en betydelig konkurrencefordel, der konsoliderede selskabets position i udbudsproceduren, eftersom det allerede var i besiddelse af skibe, der var tilpasset til kravene i udbudsbetingelserne.

Ifølge udbudsbetingelserne var PSO-opgaven angivet i form af tre alternativer. Det tyder på, at der findes yderligere oplysninger og/eller kriterier til vægtning af de pågældende alternativer. I betragtning af at disse oplysninger ikke var inkluderet i udbudsmaterialet, er Tilsynsmyndigheden i tvivl om, hvorvidt udbuddets udformning har tilskyndet potentielle tilbudsgivere (bortset fra Hurtigruten) til at afgive tilbud i overensstemmelse med kravene for de tre forskellige alternativer og at byde på et andet alternativ end det, der reelt blev valgt.

De norske myndigheder har ikke fremsendt nogen oplysninger om en benchmarking med en effektiv udbyder.

Vurdering af foreneligheden

Foreneligheden af kompensation for offentlig tjeneste i form af søtransport skal vurderes på grundlag af EØS-aftalens artikel 59, stk. 2, sammenholdt med Tilsynsmyndighedens rammebestemmelser for statsstøtte i form af kompensation for offentlig tjeneste (i det følgende benævnt »rammebestemmelserne«) (2).

De principper, der er fastsat i rammebestemmelserne, finder kun anvendelse på kompensation for offentlig tjeneste, i det omfang kompensationen udgør statsstøtte, der ikke er omfattet af Kommissionens afgørelse 2012/21/EU om anvendelse af bestemmelserne i artikel 106, stk. 2, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde på statsstøtte i form af kompensation for offentlig tjeneste ydet til visse virksomheder, der har fået overdraget at udføre tjenesteydelser af almindelig økonomisk interesse (3).

Tilsynsmyndigheden har ikke modtaget nogen oplysninger fra de norske myndigheder med hensyn til foreneligheden og er på nuværende tidspunkt i tvivl om, hvorvidt aftalen med Hurtigruten er forenelig med EØS-aftalen.

Konklusion

På baggrund af det ovenstående har Tilsynsmyndigheden besluttet at indlede den formelle undersøgelsesprocedure efter artikel 1, stk. 2, i del I i protokol 3 til aftalen mellem EFTA-staterne om oprettelse af en tilsynsmyndighed og en domstol. Interesserede parter opfordres til at fremsætte deres bemærkninger senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 490/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening the formal investigation procedure on the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019

(Norway)

[NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION]

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 59(2) and 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019.

| (2) | A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text.

| (3) | By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015.

2.   Background – the Hurtigruten Agreement

| (4) | Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

  Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route

| (5) | The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid.

| (6) | The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5) |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5)

| (7) | Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications.

| (8) | The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities.

| (9) | For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport.

| (10) | For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

  Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA







  2012 | NOK 700 million |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | NOK 683 million |
| 2014 | NOK 666 million |
| 2015 | NOK 649 million |
| 2016 | NOK 631 million |
| 2017 | NOK 614 million |
| 2018 | NOK 597 million |
| 2019 | NOK 580 million |

(10)

For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA

2012

NOK 700 million

2013

NOK 683 million

2014

NOK 666 million

2015

NOK 649 million

2016

NOK 631 million

2017

NOK 614 million

2018

NOK 597 million

2019

NOK 580 million

| (11) | According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route.

3.   The complaints
   (8)

| (12) | Both complainants have requested confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Both complainants have requested confidential treatment.

| (13) | The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:






  1. | The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:

1.

The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period.

| 2. | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:






  a. | Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:

a.

Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services.

| b. | Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.
  The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.
  In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions. |
| --- | --- |

b.

Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.

The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.

In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions.

| 3. | Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level.

| 4. | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities
   (10)

| (14) | On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes.

| (15) | Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million.

| (16) | Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013).

| (17) | As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions.

| (18) | Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12).

| (19) | In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo.

| (20) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing.

| (21) | As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis.

| (22) | The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices.

| (23) | It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction.

| (24) | In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service.

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand.

| (26) | For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge.

4.1   
  The BDO report

   (14)

| (27) | The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services).

| (28) | In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers.

| (29) | [...] |
| --- | --- |

(29)

[...]

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

1.1   
  The concept of state aid

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (31) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.2   
  State resources

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources.

1.3   
  Impact on trade and distortion of competition

| (33) | The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

| (34) | According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States.

| (35) | The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten.

1.4   
  Selective economic advantage on Hurtigruten

| (36) | The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (37) | It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  i. | ‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

i.

‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined;

| ii. | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...]; |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...];

| iii. | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;

| iv. | Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19) |
| --- | --- |

iv.

Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19)

1.4.1   The first Altmark condition

| (38) | The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel.

| (39) | Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20).

| (40) | In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21).

| (41) | However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23).

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service.

| (43) | Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower.

| (44) | For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation.

| (45) | The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged.

| (46) | In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA.

| (47) | The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation.

| (48) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met.

1.4.2   The second Altmark condition

| (49) | The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations.

| (50) | Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’.

| (51) | It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

  Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service







  A: | Total revenues distance passengers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| B: | Passengers cost distance passengers |
| C: | Net passenger revenues (A+B) |
| D: | Revenues from on board sales |
| E: | Net revenues from goods and cars |
| F: | Other revenues |
| G: | Total own revenues (C+D+E+F) |
| H: | Government procurement of service |
| I: | Total revenue (G+H) |
| J: | Safety crew |
| K: | Oil and fuel |
| L: | Repairs and maintenance |
| M: | Port costs |
| N: | Insurance costs |
| O: | Depreciation own vessels/bareboat |
| P: | Net financial costs |
| Q: | Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P) |
| R: | Cost of goods sold |
| S: | Crew not included in the safety crew |
| T: | Marketing costs and sales provision |
| U: | Administration costs |
| V: | Other costs |
| W: | Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V) |
| X: | Total costs public service (Q+W) |
| Y: | Net result before taxes (I-X) |

(51)

It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service

A:

Total revenues distance passengers

B:

Passengers cost distance passengers

C:

Net passenger revenues (A+B)

D:

Revenues from on board sales

E:

Net revenues from goods and cars

F:

Other revenues

G:

Total own revenues (C+D+E+F)

H:

Government procurement of service

I:

Total revenue (G+H)

J:

Safety crew

K:

Oil and fuel

L:

Repairs and maintenance

M:

Port costs

N:

Insurance costs

O:

Depreciation own vessels/bareboat

P:

Net financial costs

Q:

Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P)

R:

Cost of goods sold

S:

Crew not included in the safety crew

T:

Marketing costs and sales provision

U:

Administration costs

V:

Other costs

W:

Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V)

X:

Total costs public service (Q+W)

Y:

Net result before taxes (I-X)

| (52) | In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers.

| (54) | At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre.

| (55) | Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs).

| (56) | In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26).

| (57) | In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27).

| (58) | In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn).

| (59) | The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service.

| (60) | Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition.

| (61) | As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled.

1.4.3   The third Altmark condition

| (62) | When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (63) | In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28).

| (64) | Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:






  i) | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:

i)

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| ii) | The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly

| iv) | Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| (65) | As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation.

| (66) | The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year.

| (67) | The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers.

| (68) | Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120.

| (69) | In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded.

| (70) | Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation.

| (71) | On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions.

| (72) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted.

| (73) | Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided.

| (75) | Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period.

| (76) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled.

1.4.4   The fourth Altmark condition

| (77) | Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013).

| (78) | Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below.

| (79) | Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications.

| (80) | Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:








  i. | : | Alternative 1 | : | Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ii. | : | Alternative 2 | : | Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and |
| iii. | : | Alternative 3 | : | Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports. |

(80)

Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:

i.

:

Alternative 1

:

Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports;

ii.

:

Alternative 2

:

Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and

iii.

:

Alternative 3

:

Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports.

| (81) | However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1).

| (82) | The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped.

| (83) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met.

1.4.5   Conclusion on the Altmark conditions

| (84) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations.

2.   Conclusion on the presence of aid

| (85) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (86) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (87) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1   
  The legal framework

| (88) | The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33).

| (89) | The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34).

| (90) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility.

4.2   
  Applicability of Decision 2012/21/EU

| (91) | The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

| (92) | There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:







  ‘(d) | compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:

‘(d)

compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’;

| (93) | The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers.

| (94) | In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit.

| (95) | The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with.

4.3   
  Applicability of the Framework

| (96) | On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’.

| (97) | Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36) |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36)

| (98) | On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service.

| (99) | The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:
  a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;
  b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;
  c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;
  d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;
  e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;
  f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;
  g.   Paragraph 60: transparency. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:

a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;

b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;

c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;

d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;

e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;

f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;

g.   Paragraph 60: transparency.

| (100) | The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (101) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (102) | The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (103) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (104) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules.

| (105) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten.

| (106) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. They are further requested to provide, also within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 4

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, on 9 December 2015.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Svedman

President

Helga Jónsdóttir

College Member

---

(1)  Domstolens dom af 24. juli 2003, Altmark og Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg, C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, præmis 87-93.

1

(2)  Kan ses her: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

2

(3)  EUT L 7 af 11.1.2012, s. 3, indarbejdet under punkt 1h i bilag XV til EØS-aftalen.

3

(4)  OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1. See also Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, upholding the Authority's Decision.

4

Hurtigruten

(5)  See www.doffin.no.

5

(6)  If Statistics Norway's cost index is unavailable, Statistics Norway's Consumer Price Index would be used.

6

(7)  As mentioned in the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL ‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’, section 1.2.

7

‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’,

(8)  Doc Nos 748323 and 715314.

8

(9)  The complainants point to the fact that in the call for tender for the 2005-2012 contract period force majeure as a result of extreme weather conditions was defined as wind speeds over 25 m/s (full storm). However, in the current HA, ‘extreme weather conditions’ are defined as ‘conditions where ocean and/or wind conditions are such that the ship's captain judges it to be unsafe to continue the sailing and/or arrive at a specific port’. This, according to the complainants, has resulted in the majority of the cancellations during the period 2012-2013 in select ports to have occurred at wind conditions below 15 m/s.

9

force majeure

(10)  Doc Nos 723002 and 742652.

10

(11)  The Norwegian authorities submit that according to Hurtigruten's reports, ships were out of production for 171 operating days in 2012 and 186.7 operating days in 2013 due to maintenance and unforeseen operational disturbances, for 5 operating days in 2012 and 12.8 operating days in 2013 due to the ships being used for cultural or similar activities, and finally for 87 operating days in 2012 and 99.8 operating days in 2013 due to extraordinary weather conditions.

11

(12)  On 12 December 2014, Hurtigruten paid back to the Norwegian authorities the amount of NOK [24 – 32] million due to cancellations in 2012 and 2013.

12

(13)  The previous NPA of 1984 distinguished between port fees and service charges. There were several different port fees, e.g. quay fees covering quay costs, approach fees covering costs of keeping the fairway and port approach open and safe, passenger fees covering costs of special passenger facilities etc. Ports could additionally levy service charges for services they sold, which were not covered by the port fees.

13

(14)  BDO Memo, ‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’, Oslo 14 January 2015, p. 7.

14

‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’

(15)  Judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11; judgment in Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41; and judgment in Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 75.

15

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7).

16

(17)  The maritime cabotage regulation was incorporated at point 53a in Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 30, 5.2.1998, p. 42).

17

(18)  Norwegian Cruise Line, MSC Cruises, Royal Caribbean, Holland America Line, etc.

18

(19)  Paragraphs 87-93.

19

(20)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15132&1=1.

20

(21)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

21

(22)  Judgment in Alanir and others, C-205/1999, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 34.

22

Alanir and others

(23)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions updating and rectifying the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), COM(2003) 595 final, 22.12.2003, section 5.2.

23

(24)  BDO Memo, page 7.

24

(25)  Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraph 117.

25

Hurtigruten

(26)  Ibid, paragraphs 128-129.

26

(27)  Ibid, paragraph 127.

27

(28)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, judgment in Enirisorse, C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, paragraphs 37-40.

28

Enirisorse

(29)  Section 2.

29

(30)  See footnote 11.

30

(31)  Paragraph 68, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

31

(32)  For background information on the Hurtigruten Agreement, see Decision No 205/11/COL on the Supplementary Agreement on the Hurtigruten service, section 2, OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1.

32

(33)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

33

(34)  OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporated at point 1h of Annex XV of the EEA Agreement.

34

(35)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

35

Italy

Commission

(36)  See also paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Framework for alternative calculation methods.

36

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| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/45

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Meddelelse fra Norge vedrørende Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 94/22/EF om betingelser for tildeling og udnyttelse af tilladelser til prospektering, efterforskning og produktion af kulbrinter

Meddelelse om indkaldelse af ansøgninger om oliekoncessioner på den norske kontinentalsokkel — Tildelinger i forhåndsdefinerede områder 2016

(2016/C 236/12)

Olje- og energidepartementet indkalder hermed ansøgninger om oliekoncessioner i overensstemmelse med Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets direktiv 94/22/EF af 30. maj 1994 om betingelser for tildeling og udnyttelse af tilladelser til prospektering, efterforskning og produktion af kulbrinter (1), jf. artikel 3, stk. 2, litra a).

Oliekoncessionerne vil kun blive tildelt aktieselskaber, som er registreret i Norge eller i en anden stat, der er part i aftalen om Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (EØS-aftalen), eller til fysiske personer, som har hjemsted i en stat, der er part i EØS-aftalen.

Selskaber, der ikke er koncessionshavere på den norske kontinentalsokkel, kan tildeles oliekoncessioner, hvis de er prækvalificerede som koncessionshavere på den norske kontinentalsokkel.

Individuelle selskaber og selskaber, der ansøger som del af en gruppe, vil blive behandlet på lige fod af Olje- og energidepartementet. Ansøgere, der indsender en individuel ansøgning, og ansøgere, som er en del af en gruppe, der indsender en fælles ansøgning, vil alle blive betragtet som ansøgere til en oliekoncession. Olje- og energidepartementet kan på grundlag af ansøgninger, der indsendes af grupper eller individuelle ansøgere, sammensætte koncessionsgrupper, der tildeles en ny oliekoncession, herunder fjerne ansøgere fra en fælles ansøgning og tilføje individuelle ansøgere, og udpege operatøren for sådanne grupper.

Tildeling af en andel af en oliekoncession vil forudsætte, at koncessionshaverne indgår en aftale om olieaktiviteter, herunder en fælles driftsaftale og en regnskabsaftale. Hvis oliekoncessionen deles stratigrafisk, er indehaverne af de to stratigrafisk opdelte koncessioner også forpligtede til at indgå en særlig fælles driftsaftale, som regulerer forholdet mellem dem i denne forbindelse.

Ved de nævnte aftalers undertegnelse indgår koncessionshaverne i et joint venture, hvor størrelsen af deres andel til enhver tid vil være identisk med deres andel af oliekoncessionen.

Koncessionsdokumenterne vil hovedsagelig være baseret på relevante dokumenter fra tildelingerne i forhåndsdefinerede områder 2015. Målet er, at hovedelementerne i eventuelle tilpasninger af rammerne skal være tilgængelige for industrien forud for ansøgningstidspunktet.

Kriterierne for tildeling af en oliekoncession

For at fremme god ressourceforvaltning og hurtig og effektiv efterforskning og produktion af olie på den norske kontinentalsokkel, herunder sammensætning af koncessionsgrupper til sikring heraf, gælder følgende kriterier for tildeling af andele af oliekoncessioner og for udpegning af operatør:

| a) | Ansøgerens geologiske indsigt i det pågældende geografiske område, og hvorledes koncessionshaverne agter at foretage en effektiv efterforskning efter olie. |
| --- | --- |

a)

Ansøgerens geologiske indsigt i det pågældende geografiske område, og hvorledes koncessionshaverne agter at foretage en effektiv efterforskning efter olie.

| b) | Ansøgerens relevante tekniske ekspertise, og hvorledes denne ekspertise aktivt kan bidrage til en omkostningseffektiv efterforskning og i givet fald produktion af olie fra det pågældende geografiske område. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Ansøgerens relevante tekniske ekspertise, og hvorledes denne ekspertise aktivt kan bidrage til en omkostningseffektiv efterforskning og i givet fald produktion af olie fra det pågældende geografiske område.

| c) | Ansøgerens tidligere erfaringer på den norske kontinentalsokkel eller tilsvarende relevante erfaringer fra andre områder. |
| --- | --- |

c)

Ansøgerens tidligere erfaringer på den norske kontinentalsokkel eller tilsvarende relevante erfaringer fra andre områder.

| d) | Ansøgerens økonomiske evne til at foretage efterforskningen efter og i givet fald produktionen af olie i det pågældende geografiske område. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Ansøgerens økonomiske evne til at foretage efterforskningen efter og i givet fald produktionen af olie i det pågældende geografiske område.

| e) | Hvis ansøgeren er eller tidligere har været koncessionshaver, kan Olje- og energidepartementet tage hensyn til enhver form for ineffektivitet eller manglende ansvarlighed, som ansøgeren har udvist som koncessionshaver. |
| --- | --- |

e)

Hvis ansøgeren er eller tidligere har været koncessionshaver, kan Olje- og energidepartementet tage hensyn til enhver form for ineffektivitet eller manglende ansvarlighed, som ansøgeren har udvist som koncessionshaver.

| f) | Oliekoncessionerne vil fortrinsvis blive tildelt et joint venture, hvor mindst én koncessionshaver har foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller har tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel. |
| --- | --- |

f)

Oliekoncessionerne vil fortrinsvis blive tildelt et joint venture, hvor mindst én koncessionshaver har foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller har tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel.

| g) | Oliekoncessionerne vil fortrinsvis blive tildelt to eller flere koncessionshavere, hvoraf mindst én har erfaringer som nævnt under f). |
| --- | --- |

g)

Oliekoncessionerne vil fortrinsvis blive tildelt to eller flere koncessionshavere, hvoraf mindst én har erfaringer som nævnt under f).

| h) | Den udpegede operatør for oliekoncessionerne i Barentshavet skal have foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller have tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel. |
| --- | --- |

h)

Den udpegede operatør for oliekoncessionerne i Barentshavet skal have foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller have tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel.

| i) | Med hensyn til oliekoncessionerne i dybe farvande skal den udpegede operatør og mindst én anden koncessionshaver have foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller have tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel. Mindst én koncessionshaver skal have foretaget boringer i dybe farvande som operatør. |
| --- | --- |

i)

Med hensyn til oliekoncessionerne i dybe farvande skal den udpegede operatør og mindst én anden koncessionshaver have foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller have tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel. Mindst én koncessionshaver skal have foretaget boringer i dybe farvande som operatør.

| j) | Med hensyn til de oliekoncessioner, hvor undersøgelsesboringer indebærer højt tryk og/eller høje temperaturer (HTHP), skal den udpegede operatør og mindst én anden koncessionshaver have foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller have tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel. Mindst én koncessionshaver skal have foretaget en HTHP-boring som operatør. |
| --- | --- |

j)

Med hensyn til de oliekoncessioner, hvor undersøgelsesboringer indebærer højt tryk og/eller høje temperaturer (HTHP), skal den udpegede operatør og mindst én anden koncessionshaver have foretaget mindst én boring på den norske kontinentalsokkel som operatør eller have tilsvarende relevante driftsmæssige erfaringer uden for den norske kontinentalsokkel. Mindst én koncessionshaver skal have foretaget en HTHP-boring som operatør.

Blokke, der kan ansøges om

Ansøgninger om kapitalinteresser i oliekoncessioner kan indsendes for de blokke, der ikke er givet koncession på inden for det forhåndsdefinerede område, som vist på kortene udgivet af Oljedirektoratet. Det er også muligt at ansøge om arealer, der efter meddelelsens bekendtgørelse er blevet frigivet inden for det forhåndsdefinerede område i overensstemmelse med de opdaterede kort på Oljedirektoratets interaktive FactMaps, som kan findes på Oljedirektoratets websted.

Hver enkelt oliekoncession kan omfatte en eller flere blokke eller dele af blokke. Ansøgerne bedes begrænse beskrivelsen i deres ansøgning til områder, hvor de har kortlagt mulighederne for udvinding.

Meddelelsens fulde ordlyd med detaljerede kort over de pågældende områder kan findes på Oljedirektoratets websted www.npd.no/apa2016.

Ansøgninger om oliekoncessioner indgives til:

| Olje- og energidepartementet |
| --- |
| Box 8148 Dep. |
| 0033 Oslo |
| NORGE |

Olje- og energidepartementet

Box 8148 Dep.

0033 Oslo

NORGE

To kopier af ansøgningen skal fremsendes til

| Oljedirektoratet |
| --- |
| Box 600 |
| 4003 Stavanger |
| NORGE |

Oljedirektoratet

Box 600

4003 Stavanger

NORGE

Frist: 6. september 2016 kl. 12.00.

Tildelingen af oliekoncessioner i forbindelse med tildelingerne i forhåndsdefinerede områder i 2016 på den norske kontinentalsokkel skal efter planen finde sted i første kvartal af 2017.

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(1)  EUT L 164 af 30.6.1994, s. 3.

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V Øvrige meddelelser

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/47

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Indkaldelse af forslag under det flerårige arbejdsprogram for tildeling af finansiel støtte inden for transeuropæisk energiinfrastruktur under Connecting Europe-faciliteten i perioden 2014-2020

(Kommissionens afgørelse (C(2016) 1587))

(2016/C 236/13)

Europa-Kommissionens Generaldirektorat for Energi indkalder hermed forslag med henblik på at yde tilskud til projekter i overensstemmelse med de prioriteter og mål, der er fastlagt i det flerårige arbejdsprogram inden for transeuropæisk energiinfrastruktur under Connecting Europe-faciliteten i perioden 2014-2020.

Der indkaldes forslag i henhold til:

CEF-Energy-2016-2

For de forslag, der udvælges i forbindelse med denne indkaldelse, står der et vejledende beløb på 600 mio. EUR til rådighed.

Fristen for indsendelse af forslag er den 8. november 2016.

Forslagsindkaldelsens fulde ordlyd findes på følgende adresse:

https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/https%3A//ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/calls/second-2016-cef-energy-call-proposals-2016-2

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PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

| 30.6.2016 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 236/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 236/48

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Anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion

(Sag M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International)

Behandles eventuelt efter den forenklede procedure

(EØS-relevant tekst)

(2016/C 236/14)

| 1. | Den 21. juni 2016 modtog Europa-Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV (»BNPPF PE«, Belgien), Sofindev IV NV (»Sofindev«, Belgien) og DHAM NV (»Korys/Colruyt Group«, Belgien) gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver fælles kontrol, jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), over Novy International NV (»Novy«, Belgien). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Den 21. juni 2016 modtog Europa-Kommissionen i overensstemmelse med artikel 4 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1) anmeldelse af en planlagt fusion, hvorved BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV (»BNPPF PE«, Belgien), Sofindev IV NV (»Sofindev«, Belgien) og DHAM NV (»Korys/Colruyt Group«, Belgien) gennem opkøb af aktier erhverver fælles kontrol, jf. fusionsforordningens artikel 3, stk. 1, litra b), over Novy International NV (»Novy«, Belgien).

| 2. | De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:
  —   BNPPF PE: privat aktiekapital og mezzaninfinansiering. BNPPF PE's porteføljevirksomheder er aktive inden for sektorer som metal, plast og fremstilling, universitetsstartkapitalfonde, bagværksprodukter, erhvervstjenester samt fast ejendom
  —   Sofindev: investeringer i privat egenkapital i belgiske små og mellemstore virksomheder. Sofindev's porteføljevirksomheder er aktive inden for distribution af tag- og facade-materialer samt udvikling af stedbaserede softwareløsninger
  —   Korys/Colruyt Group: detail-, engros- og foodservice-markederne. Korys/Colruyt Group er også aktiv inden for softwareløsninger, projekter inden for bæredygtig/vedvarende energi samt på markedet for lægemidler og biovidenskab
  —   Novy: Design, fremstilling og markedsføring af high-end køkkenudstyr, især emhætter. |
| --- | --- |

2.

De deltagende virksomheder er aktive på følgende områder:

—   BNPPF PE: privat aktiekapital og mezzaninfinansiering. BNPPF PE's porteføljevirksomheder er aktive inden for sektorer som metal, plast og fremstilling, universitetsstartkapitalfonde, bagværksprodukter, erhvervstjenester samt fast ejendom

—   Sofindev: investeringer i privat egenkapital i belgiske små og mellemstore virksomheder. Sofindev's porteføljevirksomheder er aktive inden for distribution af tag- og facade-materialer samt udvikling af stedbaserede softwareløsninger

—   Korys/Colruyt Group: detail-, engros- og foodservice-markederne. Korys/Colruyt Group er også aktiv inden for softwareløsninger, projekter inden for bæredygtig/vedvarende energi samt på markedet for lægemidler og biovidenskab

—   Novy: Design, fremstilling og markedsføring af high-end køkkenudstyr, især emhætter.

| 3. | Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Europa-Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under fusionsforordningen. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. Det bemærkes, at denne sag eventuelt vil blive behandlet efter den forenklede procedure i overensstemmelse med meddelelse fra Kommissionen om en forenklet procedure for behandling af bestemte fusioner efter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Efter en foreløbig gennemgang af sagen finder Europa-Kommissionen, at den anmeldte fusion muligvis falder ind under fusionsforordningen. Den har dog endnu ikke taget endelig stilling hertil. Det bemærkes, at denne sag eventuelt vil blive behandlet efter den forenklede procedure i overensstemmelse med meddelelse fra Kommissionen om en forenklet procedure for behandling af bestemte fusioner efter Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (2).

| 4. | Europa-Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.
  Alle bemærkninger skal være Europa-Kommissionen i hænde senest 10 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International sendes til Europa-Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301), pr. e-mail (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:





  Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- | --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for fusioner |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

4.

Europa-Kommissionen opfordrer hermed alle interesserede til at fremsætte deres eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.

Alle bemærkninger skal være Europa-Kommissionen i hænde senest 10 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse og kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International sendes til Europa-Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301), pr. e-mail (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for fusioner

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

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(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1 (»fusionsforordningen«).

(2)  EUT C 366 af 14.12.2013, s. 5.

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