alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3266 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3266

 To amend the Delta Development Act to expand the area covered by the 
Lower Mississippi Delta Development Commission to include Natchitoches 
                           Parish, Louisiana.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

            October 31 (legislative day, September 22), 2000

  Mr. Breaux introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Delta Development Act to expand the area covered by the 
Lower Mississippi Delta Development Commission to include Natchitoches 
                           Parish, Louisiana.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AREA COVERED BY LOWER MISSISSIPPI DELTA DEVELOPMENT 
              COMMISSION.

    (a) In General.--Section 4(2)(D) of the Delta Development Act (42 
U.S.C. 3121 note; 102 Stat. 2246) is amended by inserting 
``Natchitoches,'' after ``Winn,''.
    (b) Conforming Amendment.--The matter under the heading ``salaries 
and expenses'' under the heading ``Farmers Home Administration'' in 
title II of Public Law 100-460 (102 Stat. 2246) is amended in the 
fourth proviso by striking ``carry out'' and all that follows through 
``bills are hereby'' and inserting ``carry out S. 2836, the Delta 
Development Act, as introduced in the Senate on September 27, 1988, and 
that bill is''.
                                 <all>
```
Order entered December 2, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-08-01460-CV

DECO-DENCE LLC, JUSTIN BURGESS, AND MARK MCCAY, Appellants

V.

JOHN CARNEY, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 07-14769-E

ORDER

The Court REINSTATES the appeal.

On June 29, 2009, the Court abated the appeal due to the filing of bankruptcy by 

appellant . On January 4, 2010, appellant Deco-Dence, LLC also filed a suggestion of 

bankruptcy. In response to our inquiry about the status of the bankruptcy proceedings, appellee 

filed a motion to reinstate the appeal and a motion to dismiss the appeal. In the motion to 

reinstate the appeal, appellee states that the bankruptcy proceedings have been closed. Attached 

to the motion is the bankruptcy court’s order closing the proceeding. In the motion to dismiss 

the appeal, appellee states the parties have settled and compromised all claims and no longer 

desire to pursue the appeal.
Accordingly, we GRANT the motion to reinstate. We will dispose of the motion to 

dismiss in due course. 

/s/ ELIZABETH LANG-MIERS 

JUSTICE
#### JOHN A. AVERITT *v.*ELIJAH MURRELL, JR.

Eor one, clearing a new ground, to let fire escape into his wood-land, whereby an extensive and injurious burning of the woods ensues, it is not such a setting fire to his own woods as is contemplated in the Act of Assembly. Revised Code, ch. 16.

AotioN of debt, for a penalty commenced by a warrant, and brought to the Superior Court of Onslow County by appeal, where it was tried before Bailet, J., at the Spring Term, 1857.

The action was brought for the penalty of $50, given by the Act of Assembly, Revised Code, ch. 16, for unlawfully setting fire to woods. The warrant alleges that the defendant “ did set fire to a certain piece of his own woods, in the said County, adjoining the wood-lands of complainant and others, in said County, without giving two day’s notice to the owners of the adjoining wood-lands, contrary to our Act of Assembly,” &c.

The facts were, the defendant had fenced in a portion of his own wood-land, and was engaged in clearing it about the time of the alleged wrong; to this end, he had had the timber cut down and piled up for burning ; the nearest of these log-heaps was twenty-five or thirty yards from the wood-land of the defendant, and several hundred yards from that of the plaintiff. On the day charged in the warrant, the defendant ordered his slaves to set fire to these log-heaps, and to burn them up. They raked the trash away from the log-piles carefully, and in the morning, while the weather was calm, did set fire to *323the logs. Afterwards, the wind blew with great violence, and carried the sparks to the neighboring wood-land, whereby the woods took fire, and the flames. reached the plaintiff's wood-land, and burnt his cultivated turpentine trees, and did him considerable damage. . .

Upon these facts, his Honor intimated an opinion that the plaintiff could not recover, whereupon he submitted to a non-suit and appealed.

No counsel appeared for the plaintilf.

*Wm. A. Wright,*for defendant.

Battle, J.

"We cannot imagine how, in'any proper sense, the burning of log-heaps in one’s own enclosed field, can be called burning his woods. The term “ woods,” as used in the statute, (see Bev. Stat., ch. 16 ; Bev. Code, ch. 16, sec. 1) means forest lands in their natural state, and is used in contradistinction to lands cleared and enclosed for cultivation. The. statute is a penal one, and must, therefore, be construed strictly ; but, whether construed strictly or liberally, we are clearly of opinion that the facts proved do not bring the defendant either within the letter or spirit of it. The judgment must be affirmed.

JPee Oueiam. Judgment affirmed.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, May 30, 2017. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia
ATLANTA, May 30, 2017 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A17D0426. WINSTON GREEN, JR. v. DEUTSCHE BANK, NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY.
Upon consideration of the Application for Discretionary Appeal, it is ordered that it be hereby DENIED.
LC NUMBERS: 2015SUCV1618
CERTIFICATE OF TRUST

                                       OF

                               XL CAPITAL TRUST II


     THIS CERTIFICATE OF TRUST of XL CAPITAL TRUST II (the "Trust"), dated
October 19, 2001, is being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as
trustees, to form a business trust under the Business Trust Act (12 Del. Code
Section 3801 et seq.).

     1. Name. The name of the business trust being formed hereby is XL Capital
Trust II.

     2. Delaware Trustee. The name and business address of the trustee of the
Trust with a principal place of business in the State of Delaware is First Union
Trust Company, One Rodney Square, 920 King Street, Suite 102, Wilmington,
Delaware 19801.

     3. Effective Date. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective as of its
filing.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being the trustees of the Trust, have
executed this Certificate of Trust as of the date first above written.


                              /s/ Brian M. O'Hara
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              Brian M. O'Hara, as Regular Trustee


                              /s/ Jerry de St. Paer
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              Jerry de St. Paer, as Regular Trustee


                              /s/ Paul S. Giordano
                              --------------------------------------------------
                              Paul S. Giordano, as Regular Trustee

<PAGE>
                                      -2-

                              FIRST UNION TRUST COMPANY,
                                 as Delaware Trustee


                              By:  /s/    Stephen J. Kaba
                                   ---------------------------------------------
                                   Name:  Stephen J. Kaba
                                   Title: Authorized Signatory
----- Forwarded by Brian Shrager/RTP/USEPA/US on 02/18/2011 03:15 PM

-----

From: Jim Eddinger/RTP/USEPA/US

To: cortney_higgins@omb.eop.gov

Cc: Brian Shrager/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, RobertJ

 Wayland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 01/31/2011 12:30 PM

Subject: Tune-up References

Cortney,

Here are two references that the 1% energy savings estimate is based on.

One indicates 1 to 5%, the other shows % based on years since last

tune-up.

(See attached file: Boiler Efficiency Program USI.pdf)(See attached

file: Tuneup - Servicing Your Boiler.pdf)

Jim

_______________

James A. Eddinger

Energy Strategies Group

Sector Policies and Programs Division

919-541-5426
#### Estate of Karlson: Pearson, Appellant, vs. Carlson and others, Respondents.

*668For the appellant: *Maynard Berglund,*attorney, and *A. Walter Dahl*of counsel, both of Superior.

For the respondents : *Harry E. Larsen*of Superior.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.1


                              LIST OF SUBSIDIARIES


1.   API Electronics, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary
     of the Company, doing business as API.

2.   IL Canada, Inc., an Ontario corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of
     the Company, doing business as InvestorLinks.com.

3.   IL Data Corporation, Inc., a Nevada corporation and a wholly owned
     subsidiary of IL Canada, Inc., doing business as InvestorLinks.com.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.34


                              AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO
                             EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


         This Amendment No. 2, dated as of February 27, 2001, amends the
Employment Agreement, dated as of September 28, 1998, by and between R.H.
Donnelley Corporation (the "Company") and Frank M. Colarusso (the "Executive"),
as amended by Amendment No. 1, dated as of July 27, 2000 (as so amended, the
"Existing Agreement", and as amended hereby, the "Agreement").

         WHEREAS, the Company considers it essential and in the best interests
of its shareholders to foster the continued employment of its senior management
personnel, and the Executive is an important member of the Company's senior
management; and

         WHEREAS, the initial term of the Existing Agreement expires on June 30,
2001, although the Existing Agreement automatically renews for successive
one-year terms, unless either party gives 90 day's written notice prior to the
renewal date;

         WHEREAS, the Company wishes to clarify the ramifications of a decision
by the Company not to renew Executive's employment as of June 30, 2001 or during
any subsequent renewal term; and

         WHEREAS, the Compensation and Benefits Committee of the Board of
Directors has approved the following amendment to the Existing Agreement;

         NOW, THEREFORE, the parties agree that the Existing Agreement is hereby
amended as follows:

         1. Paragraph 1 of the Existing Agreement is amended by inserting the
following sentence at the end thereof:

                  "Any such non-renewal of this Agreement by the Company shall
                  be treated as a termination of Executive's employment without
                  Cause, as hereinafter defined."

         2. Except as amended hereby, the Existing Agreement shall remain in
full force and effect in accordance with its terms.

         3. This Amendment No. 2 shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York.

         4. This Amendment No. 2 may be signed in counterparts, each of which
shall be an original, with the same effect as if the signatures thereto and
hereto were upon the same instrument.

<PAGE>   2

         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this Amendment No. 2
as of the day and year first above written.


                                            Executive


                                            /s/ Frank M. Colarusso
                                            ----------------------
                                            Signature of Frank M. Colarusso


                                            R.H. DONNELLEY CORPORATION


                                            By:/s/ Frank R. Noonan
                                            ----------------------
                                                  Name: Frank R. Noonan
                                                  Title: Chairman & CEO


                                       2
EXHIBIT 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                 Pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 1350


      The undersigned hereby certifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
for the quarter ended September 30, 2004 of Nanobac Pharmaceuticals,
Incorporated (the "Company") filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
on the date hereof fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the
information contained in such report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


                                            /s/  John D Stanton
                                            -----------------------------------
                                                 John D Stanton
                                                 Chief Financial Officer
November 11, 2004



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Nanobac Pharmaceuticals, Incorporated and will be retained by it and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### Elizabeth Scrafield v. Henry Sheeler.

1. Officer’s return.—While the officer’s return can not he contradicted so as to defeat jurisdiction, it may be done to excuse a default.

2. Affidavits.—Where affidavits in support of a motion to set aside a default show a defense to the action upon the merits with all the certainty practicable in such a proceeding, the hearing of counter-affidavits is a vicious practice, and in such case such counter-affidavits will not ordinarily affect the question of abuse of discretion on the part of the court.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Sidney Smith, Judge, presiding.

Opinion filed April 28, 1886.

Mr. D. L. Carmichael, for appellant.

Mr. John D. Gill, for appellee.

McAllister, J.

At the September term, 1885, of the court below, the appellee, Sheeler, took a judgment by default against the appellant, Scrafield, for the sum of three hundred sixty-three dollars and fifty cents, which the defendant at the same term moved the court to set aside.

The motion was supported by affidavits excusing the default by showing that, in point of fact, the defendant had not been served with summons. She stated positively in her affidavit that she was not served; that she was not at home when the deputy sheriff came there, and was corroborated by a disinterested witness, who saw the officer go to her house, fail to get *508in, and go away without seeing the defendant or any member of the family. A clear case was made of want of service of notice. We hold that while the officer’s return can not be contradicted so as to defeat jurisdiction, yet it may be done to excuse a default. The prevention of fraud and promotion of justice require us to so hold.

The affidavits in support of the motion show a defense to the action upon the merits, with all the certainty practicable in such a proceeding. The court heard affidavits in opposition to the' motion, and it is now urged that there was no such abuse of discretion in overruling it as would justify the interference of this court. The hearing counter-affidavits in such cases is a vicious practice: Kalkaska Co. v. Thomas, 17 Bradwell, 235; and where allowed, if the affidavits of the applicant excuse the default and show merits, with distinctness, such counter-affidavits will not ordinarily affect the question of abuse of discretion on the part of the court.

The order appealed from will be reversed and the cause remanded to the court below, with directions to set aside the judgment and give the defendant leave to plead to the action.

Judgment reversed.
*March 11, 1941.*

#### Dziewior, Appellant, vs. Roth and others, Respondents.

For 'the appellant: *Frank H. Hanson*of Mauston, and *Hill, Miller & Hill*of Baraboo.

For the respondents: *Curran & Curran*of Mauston, and *George H. Gordon, Law & Brody*of La Crosse.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
#### SARAH G. WADDELL *v.*D. B. WOOD, Adm’r., *&c.*

Failure to attend a term of Court because the party knew nothing personally about the cause of action and expected that a witness who had been duly summoned would attend,- — is hot “ excusable neglect ” (C. C. P. s. 133) so as to justify a Judge at a subsequent term in setting aside a judgment rendered against him in the absence of such witness.

*Semble,*that the'defendant had no right to appeal from the order of the Judge refusing to set aside the judgment.

*(Dick*v. *Dixon,*63 N. C., 488, and *Davis*v. *Shaver,*Phil. 18, approved.)

Motion to set aside a judgment given at Fall Term 1869, heard by Mitchell, *J.,*at Spring Term 1870, of Iredell Court.

Tbe facts appear in tbe Opinion.

His Honor refused to make tbe desired order, and tbe defendant appealed.

*Boyden & Bailey,*for tbe appellant.

*Furches, contra.*

1. Tbe power given in O. C. P. s. 133, to set aside a judgment, is discretionary, and so cannot be reviewed by appeal: *Simonton*v. *Ghipley, ante,*152.

2. Tbe defendant ought to have been present, to see what became of bis case: *Staples*v. *Moring,*4: Ire. 218.

Eeade, J.

Tbe defendant seeks to vacate a judgment rendered against him at a former term of tbe Court, on tbe ground of excusable neglect, in this: be expected bis witness, who bad been summoned and bad attended a former term, would attend at tbe trial, and be did not think it necessary to attend in person, because bis counsel knew of bis defence. Every suitor ought to be present at tbe trial of bis case, either in person or by an attorney in fact, and wilful *625absence is not “ excusable neglect.” The fact that he has .counsel present does not alter the case, for it is no part of the duty of counsel to get up the evidence, or to make affidavit for a continuance. If the defendant had been present he could have made affidavit, and his Honor, in his discretion, might have continued the case : but it is not to be tolerated, even in the most liberal practice, that a party is Jo lie by until a judgment passes, and then at a subsequent term move to vacate it.

What we have said is upon the supposition that we have the power to review his Honor upon the motion to vacate. Suppose the defendant had been present at the time of trial, and had filed an affidavit for a continuance of the case, and his Honor had ■ refused to continue, could the defendant have appealed ? It is settled that he could not. Or, suppose that after judgment had passed, the defendant had, at the same term, moved to set it aside and continue the case, on account of the absence of the witness, and his Honor had refused to vacate or continue, could the defendant appeal ? It would seem that he would have no more right to appeal from that than from a refusal to continue. How does it alter the case, except to make it worse for the defendant, to wait and make the motion at a subsequent term ?

But a decision upon this point is not indispensable, as we agree with his Honor that the defendant’s absence was not *u*excusable neglect:” *Dick*v. *Dixon,*63 N. C., 488; *Davis*v. *Shaver,*Phil. 18.

No error.

Per Curiam. Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

                      KEY COMPONENTS, LLC AND SUBSIDIARIES


Atlantic Guest, Inc.

B.W. Elliott Manufacturing Co., LLC

ESP Lock Products, LLC

Gits Manufacturing Company, LLC

Gits MFG (Thailand) Co., LTD

Guest Building, LLC

Hudson Lock, LLC

KCLLC Holdings, Inc.

Key Components, LLC

Key Components Finance Corp.

Marine Industries Company, LLC

Turner Electric, LLC

VFC Acquisition Company, Inc.

Acme Electric Corporation

Acme Electric De Mexico, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.

Acme Electric Mexico Holdings I, Inc

Acme Electric Mexico Holdings II, Inc.

Servicos Acme De Mexico, S. DE R.L. DE C.V.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 803 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 803

  To make the International Olympic Committee subject to the Foreign 
         Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 14, 1999

 Mr. McCain (for himself and Mr. Wyden) introduced the following bill; 
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, 
                           and Urban Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To make the International Olympic Committee subject to the Foreign 
         Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT.

    Section 104(h)(2)(B) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 
(15 U.S.C. 78dd-2(h)(2)(B)) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as clauses (ii) 
        and (iii), respectively; and
            (2) by inserting before clause (ii), as redesignated, the 
        following:
                            ``(i) the International Olympic 
                        Committee;''.

SEC. 2. CERTAIN PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES NOT AVAILABLE.

    Section 2 of the International Organizations Immunities Act (22 
U.S.C. 288a) is amended--
            (1) by inserting after ``International organizations'' in 
        subdivision (b) the following: ``(other than the International 
        Olympic Committee)'';
            (2) by inserting after ``organizations'' each place it 
        appears in subdivisions (c) and (d) the following: ``(other 
        than the International Olympic Committee)''.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS.

    The Congress finds that currently the International Olympic 
Committee embargoes the minutes of its general session meetings for 10 
years and its executive session meetings for 20 years. It is the sense 
of the Congress that the Internationl Olympic Committee should make 
every effort--
            (1) to open its meetings; and
            (2) to release the minutes of its meetings in a timely 
        fashion.
                                 <all>
```