alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 13.1

Certification of Chief Executive Officer
Pursuant to
18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
As Enacted Pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002







Cream Minerals Ltd. (the Company) is filing with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, its annual report on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended March 31, 2009 (the Report).



I, Michael OConnor, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as enacted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:



(i)

the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(ii)

the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.















/s/ Michael OConnor

Michael OConnor

Chief Executive Officer



September 29, 2009

































---
San Luis Obispo County APCD 205-1 11/5/91

RULE 205. ACTION ON APPLICATIONS - TIME LIMITS

(Adopted 8/2/76;Revised 11/5/91)

A. Except as otherwise provided in these Rules and Reg ulations the Air Pollution Control Officer shall act within 30 days from receipt there of on each application for a Permit to Operate, Sell or Rent and shall notify the applican t in writing of his approval, conditional approval or denial. The Air Pollution Control Offi cer may at any time request further information, plans or specifications from the appli cant. The 30-day time limit may be extended by written agreement executed by the Air P ollution Control Officer and the applicant. If the Air Pollution Control Officer sh all fail to act within the said 30 days, or any extension thereof by written agreement, the app licant may at his option deem the application denied for the purpose of appeal.

B. If the Air Pollution Control Officer determines an application to be incomplete the applicant shall be notified in writing of his decis ion and the additional information that is required. The applicant will have 90 calendar days to submit the requested information. Upon receipt of all the requested information, the District shall have 30 days to determine completeness. If no data is submitted or the applic ation is still incomplete, the Air Pollution Control Officer may cancel the applicatio n with written notification to the applicant. Upon determination that the application is complete, the Air Pollution Control Officer shall notify the applicant in writing. The reafter only supplemental information may be requested.
#### Ausman, Respondent, vs. Mlaker, Appellant.

For the appellant: *John E. Megna*of Milwaukee.

For the respondent: *Norman S. Kupper*and *Lines, Spooner & Quarles,*attorneys, and *James T. Guy*of counsel, all of Milwaukee.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of R.H. Donnelley
Corporation (the "Company") for the year ending December 31, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), the
undersigned hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such
officer's knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
             15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
             material respects, the financial condition and results of
             operations of the Company as of the dates and for the periods
             expressed in the Report.

/s/ Steven M. Blondy

Steven M. Blondy
Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
March 17, 2003

                                        2
Exhibit
32.2













CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO






SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002










In
connection with the Annual Report of American Community Properties Trust (the
“Company”) on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2007, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Cynthia L. Hedrick, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to my
knowledge, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.
Section 1350), that:








1.
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and


2.
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.














/s/
      Cynthia L. HedrickCynthia
      L. HedrickChief
      Financial OfficerMarch
      20, 2008
#### MASON PARKER *vs.*JOHN DUNN.

A covenant for quiet enjoyment of land is broken, if the covenantee is entered upon and dispossessed by one having superior title, though this entry is not made under process.

ActioN of covenant, tried before his Honor Judge Pailey, at the Spring Term, 1855, of Montgomery Superior Court.

Bartholomew Dunn was seized of a tract of land containing 640 acres, of which he conveyed 300 to his son Thomas, by deed, dated ljtli December, 1841; and 300 to his son John, by deed, bearing date 23d of February, 1842.

It turns out that the deed to Thomas, includes 22 acres of the land described in John’s deed.

John sold to the plaintiff, by deed of bargain and sale, dated 24th February, 1842, according to the description in Iris father’s deed to him; of course including the same 22 acres covered by Thomas’ deed, with the usual covenant for quiet enjoyment.

Neither party had been in possession of the lapped part until after the plaintiff entered ; then Thomas took possession of the lappage, and commenced cultivating it; upon which entry this action was brought.

Upon this state of the facts, his Honor instructed the jury *204that the plaintiff was entitléd to recover. Defendant excepted. Verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment and appeal.

No counsel appeared for the plaintiff.

Kelly, for the defendant.

Nasu, O. J.

The opinion of the Court in *Coble*v. *Wellborn, 2*Dev. Rep. 388, is decisive of the question raised in this case; A disturbance of the possession is a breach of a covenant for quiet enjoyment, if made by a person holding the superior title. Such a covenant does not guarantee the title— that a superior one is not in another, but that if it is, he will not disturb the covenantee’s possession. The case referred to, expressly states that an eviction may be with or without legal process; no matter how made, if made under a superior title, it is sufficient. In the present case, the brothers, Thomas and John Dunn, claimed title under their father, who was the owner of the whole tract, of which the portions conveyed to the brothers were component parts. Thomas’ conveyance was the elder ; that to John lapped over that of Thomas, covering about twenty acres. Each brother took possession of the portion conveyed to him, but neither was in the actual possession of the lappage. John conveyed to the plaintiff, with a covenant for quiet enjoyment. Subsequently, Thomas Dunn took actual possession of the part covered by both deeds. This was an eviction for which an ejectment might have been brought by the present plaintiff against Thomas Dunn. It was, therefore, a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, it being an actual disturbance of the possession of the present plaintiff; and we have seen from the case of *Goble*that the eviction need not be under legal process. Why bring an action in which the plaintiff knows lie must be defeated? Why unnecessarily increase costs ? It is sufficient if, upon the trial of the action upon the covenant, he is able to show that the eviction was under a superior title. Hero Thomas Dunn had the superior title.

Pee Cueiam. Judgment affirmed.
#### D. D. DUPREE v. MARY B. TUTEN et als.

*Appeal.*

Unless errors are assigned in the record expressly or by necessary implication, the judgment will be affirmed.

*{Meekins*v. *Tcttem,*79 N. C., 546; *Paschal v. Bullock,*80 N. 0., 8; *Bank*v. *Its*Creditors, Ibid., 9; *Mott*v. *Ramsay.*90 N. C., 29; *Pleasants v. The Railroad,*95 N. 0., 195; cited and approved).

Appeal from an order, made by the clerk, in a Special Proceeding, heard by *Oudger, Judge,*at February Term, 1886, of Beaufort Superior Court.

The point on which the case goes off in this Court renders it unnecessary to state the facts.

No counsel for the plaintiff.

*Mr. W. B. Rodman, Jr.,*for the defendants.

*95Merrimon, J.

It does not appear from the record that any exception was taken to the rulings of the Court, nor are errors assigned either in terms or by reasonable implication.

There is nothing in the record that shows the slightest dissatisfaction on the part of the appellants, except simply the fact that they took the appeal.

It is the well settled rule applicable in such cases, that the judgment must be affirmed. *Meekins*v. *Tatem,*79 N. C., 546; *Paschal*v. *Bullock,*80 N. C., 8; *Bank*v. *Creditors,*Ibid., 9; *Mott*v. *Ramsay,*90 N. C., 29; *Pleasants*v. *The Railroad Co.,*95 N.C., 195.

The judgment must therefore be affirmed.

No error. Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 9
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMERY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AND THE CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME FILED AS
PART OF THE ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-K.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                             915
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                               0
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                  4839
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                      14037
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                         109197
<ALLOWANCE>                                       1109
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  144022
<DEPOSITS>                                      122267
<SHORT-TERM>                                      5753
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                                634
<LONG-TERM>                                       8701
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           511
<OTHER-SE>                                        6156
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                  144022
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                   7078
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                  877
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                   302
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                  8256
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                                3988
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                4767
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                             3489
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                      648
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   0
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                   2720
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    815
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                         815
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       533
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.06
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                       0
<LOANS-NON>                                          0
<LOANS-PAST>                                         0
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                     0
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                        0
<RECOVERIES>                                         0
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                    0
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                                 0
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0
        

</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 10.7

Agreement with E-Vision Technologies, LLC.

<PAGE>

                                        e
                                     VISION

                           E-Vision Technologies, LLC

November 2, 1999

Mr. John Thatch, President/CEO
New Millennium Media, Inc.
101 Philippe Parkway Suite 300
Safety Harbor, FL  34695

Dear John:

This letter is to confirm our recent  discussions  regarding LED display boards.
E-Vision is please to enter into a  strategic  partnership  with New  Millennium
Media, Inc. to provide LED display board systems at our production cost.

E-Vision maintains  exclusive marketing rights to the leading edge technology in
electronic display boards from Asian manufacturers.

We believe that this unique  marketing  arrangement  with New Millennium  Media,
Inc. will provide your company an incredible  advantage over the other companies
entering the realm of full digital display LED advertising.

We look forward to a long and mutually satisfying relationship.

Sincerely,

E-VISION TECHNOLOGIES, LLC

/s/ W.H. Simon, Jr.
W. H. Simon, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer

WHS:bjs
Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed December 

15, 2011.

In The

 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-11-01027-CV

IN RE MARIA JESUS YRIGOYEN, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

309th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-64716

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

On December 1, 2011, relator Maria Jesus Yrigoyen filed a petition for writ of 

mandamus in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. 

In the petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Sherri Y. Dean, presiding 

judge of the 309th District Court of Harris County to conduct a hearing on interim 

attorney’s fees and reinstate the agreed temporary orders issued on June 30, 2011. 

This is a divorce case in which the parties entered into a mediated settlement 

agreement. The trial court issued temporary orders on June 30, 2011. As part of those 

orders relator was entitled to spousal support. The mediated settlement agreement 

provided for contractual spousal support to begin on September 1, 2011. The agreement 

disposed of all community property, but a dispute arose over the value and disposition of 
2

the husband’s medical practice. Therefore, the valuation and disposition of the medical 

practice has been set for trial in January, 2012. 

At a status conference on November 2, 2011, the trial court determined that the 

husband was no longer obligated to pay relator temporary spousal support, but was 

obligated to pay support under the mediated settlement agreement. The court did not 

vacate the temporary orders, but acknowledged that the husband was obligated by the 

support provision in the mediated settlement agreement, not the temporary orders. At the 

conclusion of the status conference, relator’s attorney requested a hearing on interim 

attorney’s fees. The trial court responded, “Right now, Counsel, I’m not considering that. 

Y’all are excused.”

In her petition for writ of mandamus, relator asks this court to compel the trial 

court to reinstate the temporary orders and to hold a hearing on interim attorney’s fees. 

However, the record does not reflect that the court rescinded the temporary orders; it 

merely ordered the husband to comply with the support provision in the mediated 

settlement agreement, not the temporary support provision. Relator further asks this 

court to compel the trial court to hold a hearing on interim attorney’s fees. However, the 

trial court has not refused to hold such a hearing, nor is there an order in the record 

denying fees. See Tex. R. App. P. 53.2.

Relator has not established entitlement to the extraordinary relief of a writ of 

mandamus. Accordingly, we deny relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Seymore, and Jamison.
**EXHIBIT 23.02**

 

**INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ CONSENT**

 

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-91146) pertaining to the 1998Equity Incentive Plan, the 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, and the 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-68590) pertaining to the 1998 Equity Incentive Plan, the 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, andthe 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-90029) pertaining to the Concur Technologies, Inc. 401(k) plan, in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-70455) pertaining to the 1998 Equity IncentivePlan, the 1998 Directors Stock Option Plan, the 1998 Employee Stock Purchase Plan, the 1994 Stock Option Plan, and the 1997 Stock Option Plan of 7Software, Inc. and in the Registration Statement (Form S-8 No. 333-31190) pertaining to the 1998Employee Stock Purchase Plan, the 1998 Equity Incentive Plan, and the 1999 Stock Incentive Plan of Concur Technologies, Inc. of our reports dated November 5, 2002 with respect to the consolidated financial statements and schedule of ConcurTechnologies, Inc. as of September 30, 2002, and for each of the two years in the period ended September 30, 2002 included in the Annual Report (Form 10-K) for the year ended September 30, 2003. 

 

**ERNST & YOUNGLLP                    **

 

Seattle, Washington 

December 19, 2003
Exhibit 10.28

JANUS CAPITAL GROUP INC.        OUTSIDE DIRECTOR COMPENSATION PROGRAM(1)

Annual Board cash retainer

$100,000
(2)Annual Board stock retainer grant

$100,000 immediate vestingAnnual Committee cash retainer (per Committee)

$  10,000Additional annual cash retainer for Audit Committee Chair

$  25,000Additional annual cash retainer for Compensation Committee Chair, Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Chair and
Planning and Strategy Committee Chair

$  15,000Lead or Presiding Director annual stock retainer grant

$  35,000Non-Executive Chairman: additional annual cash retainer (payable in equal quarterly installments)

$250,000Non-Executive Chairman: additional stock retainer grant

$470,000 immediate vesting
(3)Board: one-time restricted stock grant upon joining

$100,000 3-year vesting


---

Notes:



---



QuickLinks
ADDENDUM A
                                Future Carz, Inc.
                        Addendum to Consulting Agreement


     In lieu of the  initial  $10,000  (ten  thousand)  dollar  monthly  fee for
October  and  continuing  through  December  2001 fees  Company  agrees to issue
Consultant 50,000 (fifty thousand) shares of restricted  Company (FCZI) stock to
be issued  immediately.  Consultant hereby agrees to accept the 50,000 shares of
restricted  stock in lieu of the $30,000 (thirty  thousand)  dollar cash payment
for cumulative fees.

     In January 2002 Company will begin paying the $10,000 (ten thousand) dollar
monthly fee as outlined in Section 4 of the Consulting Agreement dated 10/17/01.


     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Addendum to be duly
executed.

     Accepted and agreed to as of this ____ day of October, 2001


Future Carz, Inc.                                    Gemini Capital, LLC




-------------------------                            ---------------------------
Edward C. Heisler                                    Scott Bailey/John Laurienti
President & C.O.O.                                   Managing Partners








<PAGE>
#### GEORGE R. COUNCILL v. JOHN HORTON.

*Bankruptcy.*

No debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his defalcation as a public officer (here, as sheriff) or while acting in a fiduciary capacity, shall be discharged by proceedings in bankruptcy.

*(Simpson*v. *Simpson,*80 N. C., *332; Calvert*v. *Peebles, Ib.,*324, cited and approved).

Civil ActioN commenced in a justice’s court, and tried on appeal at Spring Term, 1882, of Watauga Superior Court, before *Avery, J.*

The facts agreed upon are as follows: The defendant was sheriff of Watauga county in 1872, and gave his official bond in the sum of $16,000, conditioned for paying county and school taxes, (fee., in the several forms prescribed by law, and the plaintiff was one of his sureties thereto.

The defendant failed to perform the conditions, and an action was brought on the bond by the county commissioners against the defendant, together with the plaintiff and the other sureties, and judgment was rendered in favor of the commissioners at fall term, 1875, for $1,099.

The plaintiff paid upon this judgment the sum of $155, within one year before the 14th of May, 1881, when this action was brought.

The defendant was adjudicated a bankrupt and received his discharge after said judgment was rendered, and before this action was commenced.

The court gave judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $155, interest and costs, and the defendant appealed.

*Messrs. D. G. Fowle*and *J. F. Morphew,*for plaintiff.

No counsel for defendant.

*223Ashe, J.

The action, in which judgment was obtained against, the defendant, as sheriff, and his sureties, was for a breach of his official bond in not paying over to the county the sum due for taxes, either not collected or collected and not paid over by him.

It is declared by section 33» of the bankrupt act, “that no debt created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt, or by his *defalcation as a public officer,*or while acting in a fiduciary character, shall be discharged under this act.”

The debt upon which the judgment against the defendant and his sureties was rendered, was created by the defalcation of the defendant, as sheriff. The debt was then not discharged by the bankruptcy of the defendant. Debts created by the defalcation of a public officer, and those of a fiduciary character, are put by the act in the same class. The same principle that applies *to the*one will apply to the other; and it has been held by the supreme court of Kentucky that a discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve a guardian from his fiduciary obligations, as such, and if his surety discharges these and obtains a judgment therefor, he may levy upon the property of the bankrupt acquired after his discharge. *Carlin v. Carlin,*8 Bush, 141; approved in *Simpson*v. *Simpson,*80 N. C., 332, and *Calvert*v. *Peebles, Ib.,*334.

No error. Affirmed.