### F OR P UBLICATION



## UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

J O S E P H 

### A. P A

K O O T A S 

### , an individual and enrolled member of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation; D O N A L D 

### R. M I C H E L 

### , an individual and enrolled member of the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation; C O N F E D E R

A T E D 

### T R

I B E S O F T H E 

### C O L V I L L E 

### R E S E R

V A T I O N 

### , Plaintiffs-Appellees
,

S T A T E O F 

### W A S H I

N G T O N 

### , Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v.

T E C K 

### C O M I

N C O 

### M E T A L S 

### , L T D 

### ., a Canadian corporation,

Defendant-Appellant. No. 15-35228

D.C. No. 2:04-cv-00256-L RS

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of W a shing ton L onny R. Suko, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted April 6, 2016 Seattle, W a shing ton

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### . T E C K 

### C O M I N C O 

### M E T A L S 

### 2

F iled J uly 27, 2016

B efore: Michael Daly Hawkins, J ohnnie B . Rawlinson, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by

J udg e Hawkins

SUMMARY *



### Environm ental Law

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a smelter owner-operator’s motion to dismiss claims broug h t ag ainst it

u n d e r t h e C o m p r e h e n sive Environmental Respo n s e, Compensation, and L iability Act.

The panel held that the owner-operator could not be said
to have a rrang ed for the “disposal” of haz ardous subst a nces that were e mitted by the smelter i n t o t h e air, a nd contaminated land and water downwind. The owner-operator therefore could not be held liable for cleanup costs a nd natural r esource damag es under 42 U.S.C. § 9 607(a)(3). The panel found persuasive Center for Commun i ty Action & Environmental Justice v. BNSF Railway Co.
, 764 F .3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2014), which h eld that emitting diesel p articulate
matter into the air a

nd allowing it to be “ transported by wind and air curr en t s onto the land and water” did not constitute “disposal” of waste within the meaning o f the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. I n additio n , t he panel was

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.

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### 3

bound by the interpretation o f t h e terms “deposit” a nd

“ d isposal” in Carson Harbor Vill Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.
, 2 7 0 F .3d 863 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (addressing former owner li ab i l ity under § 9607(a)(2), rather than arrang er liability under § 9607(a)(3)).

The p anel remanded the cas e to the district court for the processing of plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

COUNSEL

Kevin M. F ong ( arg u e d ), Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman L L P, San F rancisco, Cali f o rnia; Christopher J

. McNevin, Pillsbury W inthrop Shaw Pittm a n L L P, Austin, Tex as; for Defendant-Appellant.

Paul J

. D ay

ton (arg ued) and B r ian S. Epley
, Short Cressman & B urg ess PL L C, Se attle, W ashing ton, for PlaintiffsAppellees.

Andrew A. F itz (arg

ued), Senior Counsel ; Robert W. F erg uson, A ttorney General of W ashing ton; W ashing ton State Attorney General’s O ffice, Oly mpia, W ashing ton, for I ntervenor-Plaintiff-Appellee.

Harold G. B ailey
, J r., Eldon V. C. Greenberg
, a nd Richard A

. W e g man; G arvey Schubert B arer, P.C., W ashing ton, D.C.; Malcolm Sey

mour I I I
, New Yor k
, N ew York; Matthew B eg bie and Dean Sherrat t , Department of F oreig n Affairs, Trade and Development, Ottawa, On t a rio, Canada; for Amicus Curiae Government of Canada.

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### . T E C K 

### C O M I N C O 

### M E T A L S 

### 4

W illiam M. J a

y , Micha e l S

. Giannotto and Andrew Kim, Goodwin Proc t e r L L P, W a shing ton, D.C.; J aime A. Santos, Goodwin Procter L L P, B oston, Massachusetts; L eslie A

. Hu l s e, American Chemistry Council, W ashing ton, D.C.; Tawny A. B r i d g eford, National Mining Association, W a shing ton, D .C.; Steven P. L ehotsky and Sheldon B

. Gilbert, U.S. Chamber L itig a tion Center, W ashing ton, D.C.; Quentin Rieg el, Manufacturers’ Center for L e g al Action, W a shing ton, D.C.; for Amici Curiae Na t i onal Mining Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United States o f America, National A ssociation of Manufacturers a nd American Chemistry

Council.

David S. Gua l t ieri (arg ued); J ohn C. Cruden, Assistant Attorney General; Environment and Natural Resources Division, United States D epartment of J ust i c e, Washing ton, D.C., for Amicus Curiae United States of America.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General o f Cali f o rnia; Sally Mag n ani, S enior Assistant Attorney General; Marg arita Padilla, Supervising Deputy Attorney G eneral; Timothy E. Sullivan and D ennis L

. B eck, J r., Deputy Attorney s General; Office of the California Attorney General, Sacramento, California; for A micus Curia e California Department o f Tox ic Substances Control.

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OP INION

HAW KI NS, Circuit J udg e:

W hen a smelter emits lead, arsenic, cadmium, a n d
mercury c ompound s throug h a smokestack and those

c ompounds contaminate land or water downwind, can th e owner-operator of the smelter be held liable for cleanup costs and natural resource damag e s under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and L iability Act (“CERCL A”), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)? All parties ag ree the

answer turns on whether the sme l t e r o wner-operator c an be

s a i d to have arrang ed for the “disposal” of those haz ardous substanc es within the meaning of CERCL A. B ound by a previous en b anc case’s interpretation of “deposit”—the only theory of “disposal” urg e d b y P l a i ntiffs in this interlocutory appeal—as not including the g radual spread of contaminants without human intervention, we must answer no.

I. Background

Th e h i s t ory of leg al disputes over damag e caused in the State of W ashing ton b y emissions of tox ic chemicals from Defendant Teck Cominco Metals, L td.’s (“Teck’s”) smelter, located ten miles north o f the U.S.-Canada border in T r ail, B ritish Columbia, stretches back almost 100 y ears. 1 

### The emissions-based claim in this lawsuit is only the latest chapter in the sag a.

1 S ee Mich ael J

. Ro b i n so n

- D o rn , Th e T ra il S melter: Is W

h a t’s P a st Pro lo g u e? EPA Bla zes a New Tra il fo r CERCLA
, 1 4 N.Y.U. En v tl. L .J

. 2 3 3 (2 00 6 ).

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This particular lawsuit initially focused o n a different form of wast e d i s posal: Teck’s dumping of slag into the Columbia River. The early proc e d u r a l history of the “river pathway ” claims in this lawsuit was recounted in p r i o r appeals and is not r epeated here. Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.
, 6 46 F .3d 1 214, 1 216 (9th Cir. 2011) (“ Pakootas II ”); Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, Ltd.
, 452 F .3d 1066, 1069–71 (9th Cir. 2006) (“ Pakootas I

”). S i nce our last published opinion in this c a se, some issues relevant to the river pathway claims have procee d ed to trial in the district court (“Phase I ”), 2 

### w hile other issues remain to be tried.

W h ile Phase I was ong oing
, Plaintiff the Confederated Tri b e s o f the Colville Reservation and Plaintiff-I ntervenor the State of W ashing ton (collectively , “Plaintiffs”) soug ht leave
to file a third amended com plaint to add a new CERCL A claim, alleg ing that, in addition to dumping haz ardous substances into the r iver, Teck also emi t t e d haz ardous substances into the air. Those substances were carried by air
currents to the Upper Columbia River Site (“UCR S i te”), including “upland” areas of the UCR Site. 3 

### The district court

2 A t t h e P h ase I trial, T eck st i p ul a t e d t h at i t h ad d u m p ed slag in to th e Co lu m b ia Riv er in Can ad a, th at s o m e o f th e slag cam e to b e lo cated in th e Un i ted States, w

h ere it h as leach ed an d co n tin u es to leach h azard o u s

su b stan ces i n t o t h e w ater an d sed im en t o f th e Co lu m b i a Riv er an d L ak e Ro o s ev e l t i n th e Un ited States, cau sin g th e T rib es an d th e S tate t o in cu r at least $ 1 each i n resp o n s e co sts. A f ter th e P h ase I trial, th e d istrict co u rt f o u n d T eck liab l e as an “ arran g er” b ecau se it h ad in ten tio n ally d isp o s ed

o f w aste in to th e Co lu m

b i a Riv er k

n o w in g th at at least so m e o f it w ou ld f lo w acro ss th e b ord er.

3 T h e UCR Site is th e “ areal ex ten t of co n tam in atio n in t h e Un ited States

asso ciated w i th th e Up p er Co lu m b i a R iv er.” Pa ko o ta s I

, 4 5 2 F .3 d at 1 0 6 9

n .3

. T h e air p ath w ay

an d in j u ry to th e u plan d areas o f

th e UCR Site h ad

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### 7

initially d enied t h e motion as untimely

. However, after the Phase I trial was completed, the d i s t r i c t c ourt chang ed its position and allowed Plaintiffs to amend their complaints to add claims for cost r ec o v ery and natural resource damag e s resulting from Teck’s aerial emissions.

Plaintiffs’ fourth amended complaints alleg e:

F rom approx imately 1906 to the present time, Teck C o minco emitted certain haz ardous substances, including
, but not limited to, lead compounds, arsenic c ompounds, cadmium compounds and mercury compounds into the atmosphere throug h the stacks at the Cominco S m e l t e r

. T h e h a z a r d o u s s u b s t a n c e s , discharg ed into the atm o sphere by the Cominco Smelter travelled throug h th e air into the United States resulting in the deposition o f airborne haz ardous substances into the Upper Columbia River Site.

The environmental impact of the air emissions are described thus:

Over time sig nific ant v olumes o f Teck Cominco’s slag
, liquid waste and air emissions, a

nd the h az a rdous substances contained therein, have come to be located in, and cause continuing impacts t o , the surface
water a nd g round water, sediments, upland

ap p aren t ly b eco m e a f

o cu s o f T eck ’ s rem ed ial in v estig atio n /f easib ility
stu d y f o r th e En v iro n m en tal P ro tectio n A g en cy

.

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### 8

a re a s , and biolog ical resources which comprise the Upper Columbia River Site.

. . . .

Evidence shows that the phy s i c al a nd chemical decay of slag
, the settling of metal s associated w ith liquid waste, the d eposition o f air emissions, an d the subsequent release o f elements including
, but not limited to, a rsenic, cadmium
, c o p p er, z inc, and lead, is an ong oing process in the buried slag
, sediment and soils of the Upper Columbia River Site.

. . . .

Humans are ex posed to slag a nd contaminated sediment by direct contact with slag on the beaches of the Upper Columbia River a nd L ake Rooseve l t, contact with contaminated sediment during l o w draw down periods, inhalation o f airborne particles, dermal
conta ct, and ing estion. I n addition, humans

are ex posed from ing estion of w ater from the Upper Columbia River or L ake Roosevelt a nd
t h r o u g h c o n s u m p t i o n o f f i s h, aquatic
resources, native plants, and ag ricultural
crops.

Environmental ef

fects of slag include both chemical ( i n creased metal loads, potential bioaccumulation, tox ic i ty problems in biota) and p h y s i cal (scouring of plants and animals

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in substrates, severe erosion of fish g ills, smothering of habitat) components.

(Parag raph numbers omitted.).

Teck mo v ed to strike or dismiss these claims on the
g round that CERCL A imposes no liability when haz ardous substances travel throug h the air and then “into or on any land

or water” (as opposed to when h a z a rdous substances a re directly dep o s ited into or on land or water and are then emitted into the air). The d istrict court reje c t ed T eck’s
arg ument and denied the motion.

One mont h l a t e r, the Ninth Circuit issued Center for Community A ction & Environm e n t a l J u stice v. BNSF Railway Co.
, 764 F .3d 1019, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2014), which held that emitting diesel particulate matter into the air and allowing it
to b e “transported b y wind and air currents onto the land a nd water” did n ot constitute “ disposal” of waste within the meaning of the Resource Conservation and Recovery A ct (“RCRA”). Teck filed a motion for reconsideration, arg uing that Center for Community Action f oreclosed Plaintiffs’ air pathway claims because CERCL A cross-references RCRA’s definition of “disposal.” T h e d istrict court denied the motion

on the g round that the actionable CERCL A “disposal” in this

case occurred when the haz ardous substance s em i tted b y Teck entered the land or water at the UCR Site, not when the substances w ere initially r ele as ed into the air. However,
recog niz ing that “[ i] n over 30 y ears of CERCL A jurisprudence, no c ourt has impliedly o r ex pressly addressed the issue of w hether aerial emissions leading t o d i s posal o f haz a rdous substances ‘into or on any land or water’ a re actionable under CERCL A,” t h e district court certified the

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question for interlocutory appeal. W e g ranted permission to appeal and now reverse and remand.

II. Standard of

Review

A district court’s denia l o f a F ederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion t o dismiss is reviewed de novo. D unn v. Castro
, 621 F .3d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 0 ). “Similarly
, the district court’s interpretation of a stat u t e is a question of law which we review de novo.” Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v

. Unocal Corp.
, 270 F .3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2 001) (en banc) (alteration, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Discussion

A. P rinciples of

Statutory Interpretation

Statutory interpretation beg ins with the tex t of the statute. Unless a statute provides an ex plicit definition, we g enerally
g ive words “t h e ir ordinary
, contemporary , common meaning .” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc.
, 710 F .3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 20 1 3 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). I f the meaning of the tex t is un am b i gu o u s, the
statute must be enforced a c cording to its te r m s

. “[ W ] h en deciding whether the lang uag e is plain, we must read the words i n t h e i r contex t and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” King v. B urwell
, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Reviewing the whole statutory scheme is particularly important for a law such as CERCL A, which is a complex reg ulatory statute with

‘ a web

. . . of sections, subsections, definitions, ex cep t i o n s , defenses, a

nd administrative provisions.’” Chubb Cu stom , 710 F .3d at 958 (quoting Carson Harbor , 270 F .3d at 880).

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B. CERCLA: Statutory Text and F ram ew ork

“CERCL A sets forth a compr e h e nsive scheme for the cleanup of haz ardous w aste sites

. . . .” P akootas I
, 452 F .3d
at 1072. The statute has two p rimary g o als: “(1) to ensure the prompt and effective c lea n u p of waste disposal sites, a nd (2) to assure that parties responsible for haz ardous substances bear the cost of remedy ing the conditions they created.” Chubb Custom
, 710 F .3d at 968 ( alteration omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. S

an Pedro Boat W

orks
, 635 F .3d 440, 447 (9th Cir. 2011)).

CERCL A does n o t s et forth its own definition o f “disposal,” the key word at issue in this case. Rather, i t cross-references RCRA’s. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29) (“The t e r m [] ‘disposal’

. . . shall have the meaning p rovided in [ 42 U .S.C. § 6903] .”). RCRA defines “disposal” as

the discharg e , depo s i t, injection, dumping
, spilling
, leaking
, or placing of any solid waste

or h a z a r d ous waste into or on any land o r water so that such s olid w aste or haz ardous
waste or any c onstituent thereof may enter the environment or be emi t ted into the air o r discharg ed into any waters, including g round
waters.

Id. § 6903(3).

T h e w o r d “disposal” a

nd derivations thereof (“dis p o s i n g , ” “disposed”) appear in several places in CERCL A. I n order to prevail in a private action u nder CERCL A for r esponse costs

or n atural resource damag es, a plaintiff must prove the following elements, among others:

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### 12

(1) the site on which the haz ardous substances

are f ound is a “facility ” within the meaning o f CERCL A, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9);

(2) a “release” or “ t hreatened release” of any “haz ardous substance” f

r om the facility has occurred, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); and

(3) the defendant is within on e of the four broad clas ses of “potentially responsible
par t i es” (“PRPs”) listed in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4).

3550 Stevens Creek Assocs. v. Barclays Bank of Cal.
, 915 F .2d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1990). 4



### A “facility ” is defined in relevant p art as “any site or area where a h az ardous substance h as been deposited, stored, disposed of

, or placed, or otherwise c o m e to be located.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (emphasis added).

4 T o o b tain resp o n s e co s ts, a p l ain tif f m u st also sh o w t

h at th e release or th reaten ed release o f th e h azard o u s su b stan ces cau sed t

h e p lain tif

f to in cu r

r e sp o n se co s ts t

h at w ere “ n ecessary ” an d “ co n sisten t w ith th e n atio n a l

co n tin g en cy p lan .” 4 2 U.S.C. § 9 6 0 7 (a)(4 ); 3 5 5 0 S teven s Creek
, 9 1 5 F.2 d
at 1 3 5 8. T o w in n atu ral reso u rce dam ag es , a p lain tif f n eed n o t in cu r resp on s e co sts, b u t m

u st sh o w th at “ n atu ral reso u rces w ith i n t h e [ p l a in tif f ’ s] tru steesh i p

. . . h av e b een in j u red ” an d “ th at th e in

j u r y t o

n atu ral reso u

rces ‘ resu lted f

ro m ’ a release o f a h azard o u s su b stan ce.” Co eu r D’Alen e T

r i b e v

. Asa rco In c. , 2 8 0 F. Su p p

. 2 d 1 09 4
, 1 1 0 2 (D. Id ah o 2 0 03 ) (f

o otn o te o m i tted ). CER C LA a l so allo w s reco v ery o f “ th e

c o s ts o f an y h ealth assessm en t o r h ealth ef f ects stu d y carried o u t u n d e r 4 2 U.S.C. § 9 60 4 (i)
, ” 4 2 U.S.C. § 96 0 7 (a)(4 )(D), b u t th ere i s n o su ch claim in th is case.

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### 13

A “release” is defined as

any spi lling
, leaking
, pumping
, pouring
, emitting
, empty ing
, d ischarg ing
, injecting
, e s c a p i n g , l e a ching
, d

umping
, or disposing int o the e nvironment (including the abandonment

or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles c o ntaining any haz ardous substance or pollutant or contaminant) . . . .

Id. § 9601(22) (emphasis added).

The four PRP classes are:

(1) the owner and operator of a v e s s e l or a facility
, (2) a ny person w ho at t h e time of disposal o f
any haz ardous substa n c e owned or operated
any facility at which such haz ardous substances were disposed of
, (3) any person who by contract, ag reement, o r otherwise arrang ed for disposal or treatment,

or a rrang ed with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, o f h a z a r d ous substances owned or possessed by such person, by a n y other party or entity
, at any facility o r incineration vessel owned or operated b y another party or entity a nd containi n g such haz ardous substances, and

(4) any person who accept s or accepted any haz ardous substances for transport to disposal

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or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by

such person . . . .

Id. § 9607(a) (emphases added).

CERCL A a llows a number of affirmative defenses. Two of them, the “innocent landowner defense” and the “bona fide prospective p urchaser defense,” protect facility owners 5 

### from liability if they can prove, inter alia
, that they did not acquire the facility u ntil after the “disposal” of haz ardous substances at the facility

. 6

5 T h ere is a circu it sp lit o n w h eth er th e in n ocen t lan d o w n er d e fe n s e ap p lies to f

o rm er as w ell as cu rren t f acility o w

n ers. Co mp a re Un ited S ta tes v. C

DMG Rea lty Co

. , 9 6 F .3 d 7 0 6
, 7 1 6 (3 d Cir. 1 99 6 ) (ref errin g to

“ [t]h e i n n o cen t o w

n er d ef en s e’ s ap p aren t lim itatio n to cu rren t o w n ers”) with ABB In d

u s. S ys., In c. v. Prime Tech

., In c. , 1 20 F.3 d 35 1
, 3 5 8 (2 d Cir. 1 9 9 7 ) (th e d ef

en se is av ailab l e to b oth cu rren t an d p ast o w n ers). Ou r Circu it h as n o t d ecid ed

. Ca rso n Ha rb o r , 2 7 0 F.3 d at 8 8 3 n .1 0.

6 T h e tex tu a l b a s i s f

or th ese def

en ses is so m ew

h at co n v o lu ted

. 4 2 U.S.C. § 9 6 0 7 (b )(3 ) estab lish es th e th i rd

- p arty d ef en se. It allo w s an y P RP to escap e liab ility if th e release o r th reaten ed release w as (1 ) “ cau s ed

so lely b y ” (2 ) a t

h ird p arty , (3 ) th e th ird p arty is n o t an em p lo y ee o r ag en t

o f th e P R P o r in a d irect o r i n d i rect co n tractu al relatio n sh i p w ith th e P RP
, (4 ) th e P RP ex erc i s e d d ue care w ith resp ect t o th e h azard o u s s u b stan ce

an d (5 ) th e P RP “ to o k p recau tio n s ag ain s t f o reseeab l e ac t s o r o m issio n s

o f an y su ch th ird p arty an d th e co n s eq u en ces th at co u ld f o reseeab ly resu l t f ro m su ch acts o r o m i ssio n s .” In 1 9 8 6
, Co n g ress p assed th e S u p erf u n d A m en d m en ts an d Reau th o rizatio n A ct, w h ich ad d ed th e so

- called

“ i n n o cen t lan do w

n er” d ef en se b y d ef

in in g th e p rev io u sly u n d ef in ed term

“ co n tractu al relatio n sh ip ,” P u b

. L. N o. 9 9- 4 99
, § 1 0 1
, 1 0 0 Stat. 1 6 1 3
, 1 6 1 6

– 1 7

. T h e n ew d ef

in i tio n o f “ co n tractu al relatio n sh ip ” ex em p ted f ro m liab ility a d ef en d an t w h o can p ro v e, in ter a lia , th at “ th e real p ro p erty o n

w h ich th e f acility co n cern ed is lo cated w as acq u ired b y t h e d ef en dan t af ter th e d isp osal o r p lacem en t o f th e h azard o u s s u b stan ce o n , in
, o r a t t h e f acility ” an d “ [a]t th e t im e th e d ef en dan t acq u ired th e f

acility th e d ef en d an t d i d n o t k

n o w an d h ad n o reaso n to k n o w th at an y h azard o u s

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### 15

I n sum, the word “disposal” appears in the definitions of “facility ” and “release,” the d ef i n i t ions of three of the four PRP classes, and t he innocent landowner and bona fide prospective purchaser d efenses. Our interpretatio n o f “disposal” for purposes of determining w hether Teck can be held liable for a

rrang ing the d isposal of haz ardous substances “has ripple e ffe cts” throug hout the rest of the statute, even thoug h the o nly provision technic al l y in dispute is § 9607(a)(3). See Carson Harbor , 270 F .3d at 880.

C. Whether Teck Arranged f or “Disposal”

P l a intiffs arg ue that they have properly alleg ed t h e

“ deposit” of h az ardous substances into the land or water at the UCR S i t e, 7 

### o ne of the verbs used to define “disposal.” 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3).

Plaintiffs’ “aerial deposition” theory appear s t o depend on Teck allowing haz ardous substances to be “deposit[ ed] ” a t t h e UCR Site by the wind, as opposed to Teck directly depositing

su b s t an ce w

h ich is th e su

b j ect o f th e release o r th reaten ed release w as d isp osed o f o n , in
, o r at th e f acility .” 42 U .S.C. § 9 6 0 1 (3 5 )( A) ( i )

. In 2 0 0 2 , Co n g ress am en d ed CERCL A ag ain

. S ee Sm all B u sin ess L iab ility Relief an d B ro w

n f ield s Rev i talizatio n A ct, P u b. L

. No

. 1 0 7

- 1 1 8
, 1 1 5 Stat. 2 3 5 6 (2 0 0 2 )

. T h i s tim e, it ad d ed a “ b o n a f id e p ro sp ectiv e p u rch aser” d ef en se w h ich ex em

p t ed cu rren t lan d o w

n ers f ro m liab ility if th ey co u ld sh o w , i n ter a lia
, th at th ey ac q u i r ed th e lan d af ter J an u ary 2 0 0 2 an d th at

“ [a]ll d isp o sal o f h azard o u s su b stan ces at th e f

acility occu rred b ef

o re th e p erso n acq u ired th e f

acility .” S

ee i d

. sec. 2 2 2 (co dif

ie d at 4 2 U.S.C. § § 9 6 01 (4 0 ), 9 6 0 7 (r)).

7 P lain tif f s d o n o t arg u e th at T eck “ d isch arg e[d ],

. . . in j e c t [ e d ]
, d u m p [ed ], sp ill[ed ], leak [ed ], o r p lac[ed ]” h azard o u s su b stan ces in to o r on

an y lan d o r w ater. W e th eref ore lim i t o u r an aly s is to th e term “ d ep o sit.”

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haz a rdous substances there. 8 

### The dictionary definitions cited by Plaintiffs all refer to natural f orces slowly depositing lay ers of dirt or m u d o ver time. F or ex ample, American Heritag e Dictionary defines “ deposit,” in relevant part, a s

“ [ t] o put or set down; p lace” or “[ t] o lay down or le a v e behind by a natural proce s s : layers of sediment that were deposited on the oc ea n f l oor; glaciers that deposited their debris a s they melted

. ” Deposit
, The Amer i c a n Heritag e Dictionary
, https : / / w w w.ahdictionary .com/ (search for “deposit”) ( last visited Mar. 2 4, 2 016). Merriam-W ebster defines “deposit” as “to lay down” or “to let f all (as sediment),” as in “lay ers of mud deposited by flood waters.” D e p o s i t , M e r

r i a m

- We b s t e r , h

t t p : / / w w w

. m e r r i a m

- w e b s t e r

. c o m (search for “ d e p o sit”) (last visited Mar. 24, 2016). Ox ford Dictionaries defines “ d e p osit” as “(Of water, the wind,

or other natural ag e ncy ) lay d o w n ( matter) g radually

as a la y e r o r covering ,” as in “ beds where salt is deposited by the tide .” D eposit
, Ox ford D ictionaries, http://www.ox forddictionaries.com/us/d e f i n i t i o n / a merican_
eng lish/deposit (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).

Plaintiffs’ interpretation appears a reasonable enoug h construction of § 9607(a)(3), and if we we r e wr iting on a

8 W e n o te th at, if th e statu te im p o s ed l iab ility o n so m eo n e w h o

“ disp o s ed ” as o p p o sed t o s o m eo n e w h o “ arran g ed f

o r d isp o sal,” 4 2 U.S.C. § 96 0 7 (a)(3 ), it w o u ld be dif f icu lt t o f it t h e f act p attern in th is case in to th e

w o rd “ d ep o sit.” W h en th e su b j ect d ep o sitin g so m eth in g is a p erso n , th e actio n o f “ dep o s itin g ” se e m s t o b e m o re d iscrete an d th e o b j ect b ein g d ep o sited s eem s to b e m ore co n crete an d sp ecif ic, e.g ., “ Plea s e d

ep osit
y o u r th in g s in y o u r r o o m

. . . .” o r “ T h e tax i dep o sited u s at th e train statio n .” Dep osit
, Merriam

- W eb ster, h t t p ://w w w .m erriam

- w eb ster.co m (search f o r “ d ep o sit”) (last v isited Mar. 2 4, 2 0 1 6 ). T h e “ arran ged f or d isp osal” lan g u ag e, th ou g h
, a r g u ab ly allo w s a m o re in d irect f o rm of d ep o sit.

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blank slate, we mig ht be persuaded to adopt it. However, we do not write on a blank slate. Ou r en banc court in Carson Harbor and a prio r p a n e l in Center for Community A ction earlier interpreted the term s “ d e p osit” and “disposal.” I n Carson Harbor
, the majority held that the term “deposit,” a s used in CERCL A , “is akin to ‘putting down,’ or placement” by someone and that “[ n] othing in the c ontex t o f t h e statute

or the term ‘disposal’ sug g ests that Cong ress meant to include chemical or g eolog ic p rocesses or passive mig ration,” i.e., the
g radual spread of contaminants without human intervention. 270 F

. 3d at 879 & n .7. I t r e as o ned, “where Cong ress intended such a meaning
, it employ ed specific t e r m inolog y , such as ‘leaching .’” Id. a t 879 n.7.

Center for Community Action
, w hich involved essentially the same f

acts as this case, see 764 F .3d at 1021 ( a l l e g ing emission of haz ardous substances into the air, some of which

was directly inhaled b efore they tou ched the g r o und, a nd

some of which touched the g round before being re-entrained into the air by air currents), interpreted 4 2 U.S.C. § 6903(3)

as requiring solid or haz ardous wast e to “ first [ be] placed ‘into or on any

land or water’ and [ ] thereafter [be] ‘emitted into the air.’” Id. a t 1024

. I t observed that Cong ress knew how to use the word “emit” w hen it wanted to. I d

. at 1 0 2 4 –25. The “disposal” definition itself uses the term “emitted” in the second half of the sentence, but not the f irst. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3). RCRA’s definition of “release” uses the
term “emitting ” along with “ disp o sing .” Id. § 6991(8). CERCL A’s definition o f “release” is similar. Id. § 9601(22). These sug g e st that Cong ress did not imag ine “emis s i o n ” a s “dispo s a l
, ” althoug h it did allow that haz ardous substances could escape into the e n vironment throug h emission a fter they w ere d isposed o f

, such a s if a container of g a s beg an to leak.

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Plaintiffs have offered n o persuasive argument to disting uish either Carson Harbor or Center f o r Community Action

. W e ag ree with Plaintiffs that Center for Community Ac t ion ’s interpretation of “disposal” f or RCRA purposes does
not a b s olutely foreclose a different interpretation o f “disposal” for CERCL A purposes, 9 

### but the reasoning behind

9 T h e Su p rem e Co u rt teach es th at, ev en w h en th e sam e w o rd is u s ed in d if f eren t p ro v isi o n s o f th e sam e s tatu te, th e w o rd d o es n o t n ecessarily h av e t o b e i n terp reted id en tically

. En vtl. Def. v. Du ke En erg y Co rp

. , 5 4 9 U .S. 5 61
, 5 7 5

– 7 6 (2 0 0 7 ). R a t h e r , “ th e p resu m p tio n o f co n sisten t

u sag e ‘ read i ly y ield s’ to co n tex t , an d a statu to ry term —ev en o n e d ef

in ed in th e s tatu te—‘ m ay t ak e o n d istin ct ch aracters fr o m asso ciatio n w i th d istin ct statu to ry ob

j ects callin g f

o r d if f eren t im p lem en tatio n strateg ies.’ ” Util. Air Reg u la to ry Grp

. v. EPA
, 1 3 4 S. Ct. 2 4 2 7
, 2 4 4 1 (2 0 1 4) (q u o tin g Du ke En erg

y Co rp

. , 5 49 U .S. at 5 7 4 ). Here, w h ere th e sam e w o rd is u s ed i n d i f f eren t statu tes em

plo y in g d if

f eren t strateg ies f

o r p ro tectin g th e

en v iro n m en t, “ [c]o n tex t [also ] co u n ts.” Du ke En erg y Co rp

. , 5 49 U.S. at 5 7 6

. A s th e Su

p rem e Co u

rt an d t h is co u rt h av e m ad e clear, CERCL A an d RCRA b o t

h ad d ress ha z a rd o u s w aste d isp o sal b u t in d if f eren t w ay s. RCRA reg u lates th e g en eratio n o f h azard ou s w aste p rim arily b y req u irin g g en e r a to rs to co m

p ly w i th h an d l in g , reco rd

- k eep in g , sto rag e, an d

m o n ito rin g req u irem en t s. City of Ch ica g o v. En vtl. Def. Fu nd , 5 1 1 U.S. 3 2 8
, 33 2 ( 1 9 9 4 ). CERCL A
, on th e o th er h an d
, “ is n o t a reg u lato ry statu te.” Pa ko o ta s I

, 45 2 F .3 d at 1 0 7 3

. Rath er, it is co n cern ed w i th

m ak in g w aste g en erato rs pay f o r clean u p , ev en w h en th e actu al g en eratio n

o f w aste is o th erw ise leg al u n der RCRA o r oth er statu tes. S ee i d. at 1 0 7 8

. T h e statu tes p ro v id e d if

f eren t rem ed ies. B o th RCRA an d CERCL A

can b e u s ed to co m

p el p ro sp ectiv e clean

u p ; h o w ev er, o n ly CERCL A allo w s

reco v ery o f clean u

p co sts alread y i n cu rred
, Meg h rig v. K FC W

., In c. , 5 1 6 U .S. 4 7 9
, 4 8 4

– 8 5 (1 99 6 ), a u n i q u e m ech an ism th at f

acilitates p ro m

p t clean u p b y th e g o v ern m en t o r an y o f sev eral P RP s, w ith co s t allo catio n issu es to be reso lv ed later. A lso
, CERCL A
, b u t n o t RCRA
, allo w s f ed eral

an d state g o v ern m en ts an d trib es to b e co m p en sated f

o r th e l ost u se v alu e

o f n atu ral reso u rces d a m a g e d b y th e co n tam in atio n an d th e co st of assessin g d am ag es. S

ee 4 2 U.S.C. § 6 9 7 2 (a); Meg h ri g , 5 1 6 U.S. at 4 8 4

– 8 5 ; Ab reu v. Un ited

S ta tes , 4 6 8 F.3 d 2 0
, 3 2 (1 st Cir. 2 0 0 6 ) (RCRA d o es n o t au t

h o rize su its f

o r co m pen sato ry d am ag es). Sin ce liab i lity u n der th ese tw o statu tes is n o t co

- term in ou s, w e h esitate to assu m e th at Cen ter

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Center for Community Action ’s tex tual analy sis is persuasive. Similarly
, Carson Har b or addressed former owner liability under § 9607(a)(2) a n d n ot arrang er liability under § 9607(a)(3), but Plaintiffs offer no compelling reaso n t o interpret “deposit” diff

e rently for purposes of those two subsections of CERCL A

.

I f interpreting “ deposit” a s not including Teck’s conduct “would th w ar t t he overall statutory scheme or lead to an absurd result,” Chubb Custom
, 7 1 0 F .3d at 958, in some way not considered by

those cases, there mig

ht be some basis for deviating from them. However, the only inconsistencies with the statutory scheme that Plaintiff s have pointed o ut is that CERCL A ha s a broad remedial purpose and that T eck’s interpretation mig ht render CERCL A ’ s “federally p ermitted release” e x ception surplusag e. W ith reg ard to the first
arg ument, it is ax iomatic that CERCL A should be construed liberally to effectuate its remedial p urpose, b u t statutory interpretation must still be “g rounded in the statute’s tex t a nd structure.” CTS Corp. v. W aldburger
, 134 S. Ct. 2 175, 2185 (2014). As for the second a rg u ment, the “federally p ermitted release” ex ception, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9 6 01(10)(H), 9607(j), and the leg islative history behind it 1 0 

### hint that Cong ress mig ht

fo r Co mmu n ity Actio n ’ s co n stru ctio n o f “ d isp o sal” in th e RCRA

co n tex t

co n t r o l s th e co n stru ctio n o f “ d isp o sal” in th e CERCL A co n tex t in all
cases, alth ou g h w e see n o co m p ellin g reaso n to o v errid e th e p resu m p tio n

o f co n sisten t u sag e in th is case.

10 Sen ato r Ran d o l p h
, o n e o f th e k ey p lay ers w h o in tro d u ced t he f

in al

v ersio n o f th e b ill th at b ecam e CERCL A , stated o n th e Sen ate f

l o o r:

Co n g ress h as n ev er said o r su g g ested th at a Fed eral
p erm i t a m o u nt s to a licen se to create th reats to pu b l ic h ealth or th e en v iro n m en t w ith l eg al im m u n i ty

.

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have in tended CERCL A to apply to emissions of haz ardous substances up to the point where it r an into the Clean Air Act. H o wever, the federally p ermitted “release” ex ception co u l d also be read as addressing emissions as releases a n d not emissions a s a form of d isposal. I n contrast, Plaint i f fs’ interpretation o f “deposit” seems to be inconsistent with the
rest of CERCL A in the same way identified as problematic b y Carson H

a r bor

— if “aerial depositions” are accepted a s “disposal s , ” “disposal” would be a never-ending process, essentially eliminating the innocent landowner defense. 270 F .3d at 882–83.

G i v e n that the lang uag e of CERCL A is not a mode l o f precise crafting
, id. at 883 ( “[ N ] e i t her a log ician nor a g rammarian will find c o mfort in the world of CERCL A.”),

we ordinarily would refer to leg islative history to h elp us interpret the statutory lang uag e. Tides v. The Boeing Co.
,

Ho w ev er, in v iew

o f th e larg e su

m s o f m o n ey sp en t to

co m ply w ith sp ecif ic reg u lato ry p ro g ram s, liab ility f or f ed erally p erm itted releases o u g h t to b e d eterm in ed b ased o n th e f

acts o f each in d iv i d u al case. T h eref o re, th e Staf f o rd

- Ran do lp h su

b s titu te [b ill] au th o rizes
resp o n s e to f

ed erally p erm itted releases, b u t req u i res

co s ts to b e assessed ag ain st th e p erm it h o ld er u n d er th e liab ility p ro v isio n s o f

o th er law s, n o t th is b ill.

. . . .

W h i l e th e ex em

p tio n s f ro m liab ility f

o r f ed erally
p erm i tted releases are p ro v id ed to g iv e reg u lated p arties cla r i t y in th eir leg al d u

ties an d resp o n sib ilities, th ese

ex em p tio n s are n o t

to o p erate to create g ap s in actio n s

n ecessary to p ro t ect th e p u

b lic o r th e en v iro n m en t.

1 2 6 Co n g

. Rec. 3 0 ,8 9 7
, 3 0 ,9 3 2

– 3 3 (No v

. 2 4
, 1 9 8 0 ) (statem en t o f S en

. Ran d o l p h ).

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644 F .3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2 011) (“I f the statutory lang uag e is ambig uous

. . . we may refer to leg islative history to d i scern cong ressional intent.”). However, the leg islat i v e history of CERCL A is not par t i c u l a rly helpful in this c ase. Althoug h th a t h istory makes clear that CERCL A was intended to be construed ex pansively
, see United S ta tes v

. W .R. G race & Co.
, 429 F .3d 1224, 1240–41 (9th Cir. 2005), it sheds no lig h t on the question before us because Cong ress did not appear to consider a fact pattern like this one. 1 1



### Nor have we b e e n presented with an ag ency interpretation of “deposit” to which we mig ht o we Chevron deference. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v

. Brand X Internet Servs.
, 545 U.S. 967, 982–86 (2005) ( Chevron deference may be d ue to a reasonable ag ency interpretation of an ambig uous statute

even if it conflicts with a prior circuit court interpretation). The EPA does not appear to have a n y reg u lations or subreg ulatory

g uidance interpreting

“disposal” or “deposit.” 1 2

11 P lain tif f s of f er a c o u p le sn ip p ets o f leg islativ e h isto ry p u rp o rted ly sh o w in g Co n g ress’ s in t en t io n f o r CERCL A to co v e r em issio n s of h a z a r d o u s s u

b stan ces. 1 2 6 Co n g

. Rec. 30 ,8 9 7
, 3 0 ,9 41 (No v

. 2 4
, 19 8 0) (statem en t o f Sen

. Mitch ell); id

. at 3 0,9 4 8 (statem en t o f Sen

. Co h en ). Ho w ev er, as T eck p o in ts o u t, th ose sn ip p ets seem to ref er to em i ssio n s of h azard ou s su

b stan ces released f

ro m f acilities, n o t em issio n s as a f o rm of d isp osal.

1 2 N e i t h er P lain tif

f s n o r am icu s cu riae th e Un ited States arg u ed th a t d ef eren ce w as d u e in th eir b rief s. A f ter o ral arg u m en t, th e U n ited States f iled a Fed eral Ru le o f A

pp ellate Pro ced u re 2 8 (

j ) l e t t er of su

p p l em en t al

au th orities arg u in g th at Skid mo r e def eren ce m ay b e d u e t o th e EP A ’ s

co n stru ctio n o f “ d isp osal” as en co m p assin g “ aerial d ep ositio n s” in
p rev io u s co n sen t o rd ers i n v o lv in g f a cto ries th at, l ik e T eck
, em i tted h a z a rd o u s su

bstan ces t h ro u g h th eir sm o k estack s w h ich co n tam in ated a larg e area o f lan d aro u n d th e f acto ry

. S ee Th e W ild ern ess S o ciety v. U

.S

. Fish & W ild life S erv. , 3 5 3 F .3 d 1 0 5 1
, 1 0 6 8

– 6 9 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 3 ) (en b an c)

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Neither has inter v e ning en banc or Supreme Court authority cast the reasoning behind Center f o r Community Action or Carson Harbor in d oub t

. I n this situation, “[ a] n appellate panel simply cannot modify an En banc decision,” Osband v. W

oodford
, 290 F .3 d 1 0 3 6
, 1 043 (9th Cir. 2 002) (quoting Ewing v. W

illiams
, 596 F.2d 391, 397 (9th Cir. 1979)), and there is no compelling reason to abandon a prior panel’s construction, see M i l l e r v

. Gammie
, 335 F .3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (a three-judg e panel or d inarily
cannot overrule a prior panel’s holding unless its reasoning is inconsistent with the reasoning beh ind an intervening decision by

a court of last resort).

IV. Conclusion

W h ile Plaintiffs present an arg uably plausible construction of “deposit” and “d i sposal,” Carson Harbor compels us to hold oth e r wise, and while Center for Community Action does not totally f oreclos e Plaintiffs’

(o p in i o n letters reg ard in g a sp e c i f ic case an d n o t in ten d ed to h av e th e g en eral f o rce o f law are n o t d u e Ch evro n d ef eren ce , b u t m a y b e du e S kid mo r e d ef eren ce, d ep en d in g o n th eir th o ro u g h n ess, ratio n al v alid i ty , co n sisten cy w ith p rio r an d su b seq u en t in terp retatio n s, th e “ ex p ertn ess” of th e ag en cy ’ s in t erp retatio n , an d t h e care an d f

o rm ality u sed in reach in g its

co n clu sio n ). A rg u m en ts raised f o r t h e f irst t im e in 2 8 (j ) letters are

o rd in arily co n s i d e r ed w aiv ed

. U n ited S ta tes v. McEn ry , 6 5 9 F.3 d 8 9 3
, 9 0 2 (9 th Cir

. 2 0 1 1 ). T h e m erit o f th at p rin cip l e is ev id en t h ere, w h ere,

ev en if S kid mo re d ef eren ce w as du e to th e EP A ’ s co n sen t o r d e r s , w e

w o u ld h av e to d eterm in e w h e t h e r an ag en cy in terp retatio n th at is du e S kid mo re d ef eren ce b u t n ot Ch evro n d ef eren ce can tru m

p a p r e v i o u s j u d icial in terp retatio n , a qu estio n lef t o p en af ter Bra n d X

. J

. L y n En trik in G o erin g , T

a i lo rin g Deferen ce to Va riety with a W in k a nd a No d t o Ch ev ro n : Th e Ro b e r t

s Co u rt a n d th e Amo rp h o u s Do ctrin e o f Ju d i cia l Review o f Ag en cy In terp r eta tio n s o

f La w , 3 6 J

. L eg is. 1 8
, 64 (2 0 1 0 ). W e d eclin e to reach su ch a co m p lex issu e o n

less th an f u ll b rief in g

.

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interpretation of CERCL A, its tex tual a n a ly sis of 4 2 U .S.C. § 6903(3) is persuasive. Thus, we reverse the district court’s orders deny ing Teck’s m o t i o n to strike and/or dismiss a nd motion for reconsideration, and r emand for the processing o f Plaintiffs’ remaining claims.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.