IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI N O. 2017-CP-00842-COA MAURICE GRAY APPELLANT

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/19/2017 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ALBERT B. SMITH III COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: BOLIVAR COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MAURICE GRAY (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: KAYLYN HAVRILLA MCCLINTON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POSTCONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED: 03/26/2019 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED: EN BANC. TINDELL, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. M a u r i c e G r a y appeals the judgm ent of the Bolivar County Circuit Court, Secon d Judicial District, w hich denied his “Petition f or Conditional Release.” Finding no error, we af f irm

. FACTS ¶2. In J une 1999, a j ury convicted G ray , who was then eighteen y ears old, of m u rder and aggravated assault. G ray v. S tate , 846 So. 2d 260, 261 (¶1) ( Miss. Ct. App. 2 0 0 2 )

. The circuit court sentenced Gray to concurrent sentences of lif e im prisonme n t f

or m urder and twenty y e ars f

o r aggravated assault, both i n the custody of t he M ississippi De p a rtm ent ofCorrections (MDOC). Id. In Novem ber 2002, this Court af

f irm ed Gray ’ s convictions and
sentences on direct appeal. Id. Af ter r eceiv i n g p e r m ission f rom the Mississippi Suprem e Court, Gray f

i led a m o tion f

or postconviction relief (PCR) and asserted an i n e f f e c tiveassistance-of

- counsel claim

. G ray v. S tate , 13 So. 3d 307, 308 (¶1) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). Af ter an e videntiary hearing, the circuit court denied Gray ’ s m otion. Id. On appeal, this Court af f i rm ed the denial of

Gray ’s PCR m otion. Id. ¶3. In 2011, Gray sought leave f rom the suprem e court t o f ile a s e cond PCR m otion. The
suprem e court entered an order dism issing Gray ’s a pplication a s successive-writ barred. The
suprem e court f

u rther warned Gray t hat “any f uture f rivolous f ilings” m ight subject him to sanctions under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(a). ¶4. On January 20, 2 0 17, Gray f i led a “Petition f

o r C o n d i t i o n al Release” in the circuit
court. Rely ing on Mississippi Code Annotated section 47-5-139(1)(a) (Rev. 20 1 5 ) , Gray argued he should be eligible f or conditional release on h i s s entence of lif e im prisonm ent. Sec t i o n 47-5-139(1)(a) provides that an inm ate is ineligible f o r earned-tim e allowance if “[ t]he inm ate was sentenced to l if e im prisonm ent

. . . .” The statute f u rther states, however, that “an inm ate, except an i nm a te sentenced to l if e i m p risonm ent f

or capital m

urder, who has reached the age of sixty -f

ive (65) o r older and who has served at l east f if t een (15) y ears m ay petition the sentencing court f o r conditional release

. . . . ” Id. Although acknowledging he f ailed to m eet s ection 47-5-139(1)(a)’s age requirem ent, Gray claim ed that he should still be eligible f or conditional release because he had s erved eighteen y ears of his lif e sentence. Gray f urther asserted that to deny him conditional release because he was not y et sixty -f ive

2y ears old v iolated his right to equal protection under the law without a rational relationship

to a legitim ate state interest. ¶5. On May 1 8, 2017, the circuit court entered an order deny ing Gray ’s petition. Despite the title of G ray ’ s petition, t h e c i r c u i t court treated his f iling as a PCR petition. Ackno w l e d g i n g Gray ’s own a dm ission that h e f ailed to m e et s ection 4 7-5-139(1)(a)’s age requirem ent f

or conditional release, the circuit court concluded that G ray ’s petition lacked
any b asis under the statute. T he circuit court also cited Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2 015) and f ound t hat Gray ’s petition f a iled to m eet any of the statute’s identif ied exceptions to a successive writ. Although t he c ircuit court concluded Gray ’s f iling

was f ri v o lous, t he court withheld sanctions “in the hope that [ Gray would]

. . . heed this warning . . . and ref

rain f rom wasting” f

urther judicial resources. ¶6. A g g r i e ved b y the c ircuit court’s denial of his petition, Gray appeals

. F o l l o w i n g Gray ’s f iling of his appeal, the State m oved to dis mi ss f or lack of jurisdiction. The State argued the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider Gray ’ s petition because Gray f ailed
to f irst obtain the suprem e court’s l eave to f ile the petition under Mississippi Code Annotated section 9 9-39

- 7 ( R e v . 2015). T he State f urther contended that the c i rcuit court’s lack of jurisdiction over Gray ’s petition deprived this Court of jurisdiction o ver Gray ’s a ppeal. The
suprem e court ordered t h a t t h e S t ate’s m otion be passed f or consideration along with the

m erits of Gray ’s appeal. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶7. “W hen reviewing a tria l c o u r t ’ s denial or dism issal of a PCR m o tion, we will only

3disturb the trial court’s decision if it i s clearly erroneous . . . .” Patrickson v. State , 242 So.

3d 939, 9 40-41 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). However, we review q uestions of law de novo. W illiams v. State , 248 So. 3d 910, 913 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). DISCUSSION ¶8. Upon review, we f ind Gray ’s p etition p resented not s o m uch an attem

p t to collaterally attack his convictions and sentences but som ething m ore closely resem bling a challenge to his parole-eligi b ility status. O ur caselaw establishes that a PCR m o tion provides a proper

avenue f o r challenging a determ ination of parole eligibil i ty

. Keys v. State , 67 S o. 3d 758, 759-60 (¶¶6-9) (Miss. 2011); Sinko v. State , 1 92 So. 3 d 1069, 1 072-73 (¶9) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). As previously discussed, the circuit c o urt did in f act treat G ray ’s petition as one f or PCR. B ecause this Court previous l y a f f i rm e d Gray ’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal, statutory l aw requires Gray to obtain the suprem e court’s perm i ssion b ef ore f iling a PCR petition in the c ircuit court. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-7. As the State correctly pointed out in its m otion to dism iss, though, Gray never obtained such perm ission bef ore f iling his latest p etition. Even so , we deny the State’s m otion to d ism iss. W hile the circuit court lacked authority t o grant the conditional rel e a s e Gray requested in his petition, the court

c l e a rly r etained jurisdiction over his challenge to the constitutionality of section 47

- 5

- 139(1)(a)’s age requirem ent. See Peterson v. S tate , 119 So. 3d 1068, 1070 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) ( recognizing that “the grant or denial o f p arole is entirely at t he discretion of the Parole Board” but that the circuit court m ay assert jurisdiction over claims t h a t r a i s e constitutional issues).

4¶9. According to G ray ’ s argum ent on appeal, section 4 7-5-139(1)(a)’s age requirem ent

denies him equal protection under the law because it treats “sim ilarly situated inm ates dif f erently without a rational relationship to a legitim ate state i nterest.” Gray theref ore asks this C ourt to r everse the circuit c ourt’s judgm e n t and to allow him to p r o c e e d w ith his petition in circuit court. 1 ¶10. D e s p i te G ray ’ s contentions, Mississippi p recedent clear l y e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t “ t h e statutory requirem ents of section 47-5-139(1)(a) d o n o t constitute a violation of

. . . [ a d e f e n d a n t ’ s ] constitutional r ights.” Peterson , 119 So. 3d at 1069 (¶7). In Peterson , this Court addressed an alm ost identical argum ent to Gray ’s claim

. Peterson f iled a p etition f

or parole or conditional release f rom prison on the basis of section 47-5-139(1)(a). P eterson , 119 So. 3d at 1 069 (¶2). Peterson contended the statute’s a ge requirem ent, w hich m ade h im ineligible f

or parole or conditional release, “ v iolate[ d] his constitutional rights under the Fif th, Eighth, and Fourteenth Am endm ents o f the United States C onstitution and the

com parative portions of t

h e M i s s i s s i p p i C o n s t i t

ution” because t he statute “ unf airly require[ d]

a y ounger prisoner t o serve a longer sentence than an older prisoner.” Id. at (¶¶2, 5). Citing prior Mississippi cases that concluded otherwise, this Court af f irm e d t h e circuit court’s denial of Peterson’s petition. Id. at (¶¶6-7). CONCLUSION ¶11. Because Mississippi caselaw holds that section 47-5-139(1)(a)’s requirem e nts f ail to

1 G ray also f

iled a su p p lem en tal ap p e llate b rief arg u in g t h a t h e is en titled to a n ew sen ten cin g h earin g b ased u p o n th e ru lin g o f C ru z v
. U n ited S ta tes , N o . 1 1

- C V

- 7 8 7 (JC H ), 2 0 1 8 WL 1 5 4 1 8 9 8 ( D

. C o n n . M ar. 2 9 , 2 0 1 8 ). H o w e v er, sin ce G ray h im self ack n o w led g es th at C r u z is n o t b in d in g u p o n th is C o u rt, w e d eclin e to f u rth er ad d r ess th is arg u m en t. 5violate a def endant’s constitutional rights, we f ind no error in the circuit c o ur t ’ s d enial of Gray ’s petition. W e theref ore af f irm the circuit c ourt’s judgm ent. 2 In so doing, we deny the State’s m otion to dism iss. ¶12. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., C ARLTON AND J. WILSON, P.JJ., GREENLEE, WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY A N D C . W ILSON, JJ., CONCUR.

2 S ee D a vis v. C ity o

f Ja c kso n , 2 4 0 S o . 3 d 3 8 1 , 3 8 4 (¶1 3 ) (M iss. 2 0 1 8 ) (“[ A ] n ap p ellate co u rt m ay af

f irm a trial co u rt if th e co rrect resu lt is reach ed , ev en i f th e trial co u rt reach ed th e resu lt f

o r a d if f e ren t reaso n .”). 6