### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00336- CV

Ja m e s M ar sh, App e lla nt

v.
State Board for Edu catorCer tification, Ap pellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 353RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. GN103656 , HO NORAB LE MARGARET A. COO P ER, JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
I n this appeal fr om the revoc ation of a te achingcer tificate, w e must determine whether the district court’s judgme nt a ffirming an administrative orde r wa s supported by substantial evidenc e. Appe llant J am es Mar sh argues that the a ppellee State B oard f

or Educator Certification de nie d h im “ su

bs tanti ve ” du e pro cess by (i ) a rb itr ari ly de te rm ini ngthat hi s p a st a c ts m a de him
curr ently “unwor thy to instruc t the y outh of Texas” and (ii) failing to f ollow its own rule stating that the B oa rd ha d th e burd e n o f p ro vin g his “ un wo rt h[in e ss]” in t

he he ari ngpr oc e ss. Al te rn a tiv e ly , if the burde n-shifting was a

ppropriate , Marsh a

rg ues that the B oard de nied him due proce ss by failing t o gi v e h i m n o t i ce t h at h e w o u l d b ea r t h e b u rd en o f p ro v i n g h i s re h ab i l i t at i o nat t h e h ea ri n g. Be cause we c onclude that Ma rsh’s alleg ations of arbitrariness, im proper burden- shifting, a nd lackI n her f indings of f

act, the a dminist rative la

w judg e stated that the records of the se x ual 1 a ssa ult pr oc e e din g a g a ins t Jame s Mars h we re se a le d. Our re c or d do e s no t dis c los e wh y Mars h’ s c a se wo uld have be e n r e fe rr e d to a

juv e nil e c ourt
. 2 of notice a

re without mer it a

nd that substantial e vidence supports the district c ourt’s judgme nt, we
a ff ir m.
BACK GR OUND

The State Of

fice of Ad m i nistrative Hea ring s (“SOAH” ) consider ed this matter pursuant to an a g ree ment with the Boa rd. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2003.021 (West Supp. 2005). B e fo re the a dmi nis tr a tiv e he ari ng , the pa rt ie s pre se nte d th e a dmi nis tr a tiv e law j ud g e (“ AL J”) wi th
s t i p u l at edfa ct s , i n cl u d i n g t h e f o l l o wi n g:

• Marsh wa s arr ested on the char g e of se x ual assault on a c hild [ his stepdaug hter, R. F.] in S arp y

County , Nebr aska on July 3, 1979. The c ase w as re fer red to a juvenile cour

t, wher e Mar sh rec eived de fer red a djudication for the c harg e and 1 wa s o rd er edt o u n d er go p s y ch i at ri c c o u n s el i n g.

• Duri ngtha

t ti me , M ars h w a s R. F .’ s st e pf a ther. Mar sh was a

ma jor in t he Ai r For ce, a nd the family

lived on the Off

ut Air For ce ba se in Nebr aska.

• The Air For ce conducte d an investig ation into Marsh’s abuse of R.F. Dur ing that investigation, the Air For ce c onfiscate d a diar y in w hich Marsh rec orded some of the in cid ent s of a

bu se of R.F . T he tr ans c ri pt o f t

he dia ry is i nc lud e d in

the Ai r For ce r ecor ds and included in Exhibit D o f P etitioner’s Exhibit L ist as Bates st am p n umbers 0000034-37. The transcr ipt of the diary acc urate ly

depicts the events to the best of Mar sh’s rec ollection and ac curately depicts his frame of mind at the time the diar

y was made
.

• Marsh holds a Te x as Tea cher Certificate, which h e rece ived on September 6, 1989. His active cer

tification is a Mid-Mana g ement Administrator (G rade s PK12 ) c e rt if ic a te . D ur inghis ini tia l a

pp lic a tio n pr oc e ss, Ma

rs h w a s n ot a sk e d n or

did he volunteer

to the Texas Education Ag ency (“TE A”) that he had been arr ested on the c ha rg e of se xua l a ssa

ult on a chi ld. A t th a t ti me , T EAwa s n ot l e g a lly3 ob lig a te d to re vie w the c ri min a l hi sto ri e s o f a pp lic ants , n or

we re a pp lic ants re qu ir e d to re ve a l su c h h ist or ie s. Whe n TE A i ssu e d M ars h’ s te a c he r c e rt if ic a te s, it had no rea son to believe that he had sexually abused a minor.

• R.F. filed a

complaint with the Board, alleg ing that Marsh sexually abused he r from 1977-79, w hen she w as 13 to 15 y ear s old. Du ri n g t h at time, Marsh wa s R.F.’s stepf

ather . Marsh wa s a major in the Air For ce, and the family lived on the Offut Air For ce ba se in Nebr aska.

• Mars h h a s be e n e mpl oy e d a s a te a c he r o r s c ho ol a dmi nis tr a tor c ontin uo us ly wi th va ri ou s sc ho ol d istri c ts s inc e he re c e ive d h is t e a c hin g c e rt if ic a te . T he on ly complaint that the B oard, or its predec essor, TEA , rec eived reg arding Marsh wa s R.F.’s, filed on Ma

y 11, 1999, which is the subject of the cur rent litigation.
Ba sed on R.F.’ s complaint, SOAH held a hear ing on May 8, 2001. Only

Marsh a nd R.F. testified at the hear ing. C o rroborating the stipulated fac ts, R.F. testified that Marsh’ s ina pp ro pr ia te c on du c t w a s n ot a n is olate d in c ide nt. She re c a lle d th a t Ma rs h

• “fr equently ” wa lked in on her a nd o p ened the shower c urtain while she w as s h o we ri n g;

• e n g a g e d in s e xu a ll y in a p p r o p r iate c o n v e r s a ti o n s w it h h e r , te ll in g h e r th a t he wa nte d to “ te a c h” he r c e rt a in s e xua l te c hn iqu e s;

• sug g ested that she touc h her boy friends sex ually , allow t hem to do the same to he r, and re po rt the de ta ils of

tho se e nc ounte rs to h im;

• touched h er in a sexually inappropriate manner

on a re g ular ba sis, including pe ne tr a tin g he r s e xua l or g an w ithhis fi ng e rs on tw o o c c a sio ns ;

• of fe re d to buy

a tr uc k fo r he r if sh e wo uld a g re e to h a ve se xua l in te rc ours e wi th him a specifie d number of times; and

• g ave a back r ub to a fourteen or

fiftee n-y ear -old fema le frie nd of R.F.’ s while the friend w as cla d only

in underwe ar.4

R.F . sta te d th a t Ma

rs h n e ve r a

po log ize d f

or the a c ts h e c omm itt e d a g a ins t he r a nd that sh e sti ll strug g les with the eff

ects of his sexual abuse. She a lso testifie d that, afte r Mar sh beca me an educator, she followe d his care er a s much as she c ould and ca lled Marsh’s employ ers to inform them that he w a s a c o n f

e s s e d c h il d a

b u s e r . Sh e s a id th a t th e s e r e p o rts u s u a ll y c a u s e d h im to le a v e the
sc ho ols
. Mars h te sti fi e d th a t he wa s n ot a wa re that R.F . wa s the ind ivi du a l pla c ingthe c a lls to his employ ers. Althoug h he soug ht other employ ment afte r R.F.’ s calls, he s t ated that he was
ne ve r f i r e d f r o m a n y j o b o r a s k e d t o r e s i g n . M ar s h d e n i e d b e i n g c o n v i c t e d , t r i e d , o r f o rm a lly char g ed with any

crime a s a re sult of his arre st for sexually assau lting R.F. H e also de nied being lis te d a s a

se x off e nd e r at any

tim e . M ars h st ate d th a t he a tte nd e d a bo ut s ixty

the ra py se ssi on s,
co mp l et i n g h i s co u rt -o rd er ed t h er ap y i n 1 9 8 0 , b u t h e de n i ed u n d er go i n g an y ad d i t i o n al co u n s el i n g. He fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t he ha s unr e str ic te d v isi ta tio n r ig hts wi th h is two min or da ug hte rs . After hear ing both pa

rties’ testimony , the AL J issued a proposal fo r d ec i sion, including f

indings of f

act a nd conclusions of law
. The finding s of fa ct in the proposal f or dec ision included the pa

rties’ stipulations. The AL J ’s conc lusions of law number 4- 8 stated:
4. B a se d o n F ind ing s o f F a c t N os . 4 -7 and 12 , Re sp on de nt h a s e ng a g e d in intentional, r epre hensible sexual a ssault of a child and such misconduct resulted in severe actua l phy sical or menta l harm to a c hild. 5. A decision-maker may consider the ty pe and severity

of har m that was inflicted by the misconduct of a cer

tificate holder upon a student, the intentional nature of the mis c on du c t, t

he ty pe of misc on du c t it se lf

, a nd oth e r r e le va

nt f a c tor s in decidingwhether

the offe nding c ertificate holder should be di s ci plined by the Boa rd. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 249.17(c).5

6. Ba sed on F indings of F act Nos. 4-12 and Conclusions of L aw Nos. 4 a nd 5, and purs ua nt t o 1 9 T e x. Ad

min . Co de § 2 49 .1 5( c)(2 ), Resp on de nt i s unw or thy to ins tr uc t th e y ou th o f T e xas. 7
. B a s e d o nF i n d i n g s o f

F a c tN o s . 9

- 1 1 an d

1 3 , R e s p o n d e n tf

a i l e d t o p r o v e b y a preponde ranc e of e vidence that he has be en re habilitated and should be a llowed to retain his teac hing c ertificate. 8. Ba sed on the for eg oing f i n d i n gs and conc lusions, the Boar d should revoke Re s p o n d e n t’ s T e xa s T e a c h e r Ce rti f ic a te N o . [].
I n acc ordanc e with the AL J ’s re commendation, the Bo ar d en tere d a fina l order revokingMarsh’s te aching cer tificate on Aug ust 29, 2001. The B oard de nied Marsh’ s motion for
re he ari ng , and he a

pp e a le d to the Tr a vis County Di str ic t Co ur

t. T he c ourt

he ld a he ari ngwi tho ut a
rec ord on Mar ch 22, 2005, and issued its take- nothing judgment aga inst Marsh on April 20, 2005. M ar s h ap p ea l s , s ee k i n g re v er s al o f t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s j u d gm en tan d a n ew ad m i n i s t ra t i v e h ea ri n g.
DI SCU SSIO N The B oard ove rsee s standards of conduct of

public school educ ators and pr oposes rules that provide for dis ci p linary proce eding s, “including the suspension or re vocation of a n educator ce rtificate , as provided by chapte r 2001 of the g overnme nt c ode [Admi nistrative Proce dure Act].” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.031, .041 (b )( 7 ) (West 2006). As par t of its discipli nary authority , the B oard ma

y revoke or ca

ncel a person’ s teac hi ng cer

tificate ba sed on “satisfactory
e v id e n c e ” th a t t

h e p e r s o nis “ u n w o rthy

to in s tr u c t o r to s u p e r v is e th e y o u th o f

th is s tate
. ” 1 9 T e x. Admin. Code § 249.15(a) (5), ( c)( 2) (2006)
.

Marsh’s issues on a

ppeal a re that the district co u rt er red in affirming the
a dmi nis tr a tiv e or de r b e c a us e the B oa

rd de nie d h im “ su

bs tanti ve ” du e pr oc e ss b y (i ) ar bit ra ri ly6

de te rm ini ngthat hi s p a st a c ts ma de him c ur re ntl y “ un wo rt

hy to ins tr uc t the y ou th of Te xas” and (i i) failing to follow its rule stating t hat t he Board had t he burden of proving his “unwor th[ iness]” at the hear ing. A lternatively , if the burden-shifting w as appr opriate, Ma rsh ar g ues that the B oard de nied h i m d u e p r o c e s s b y f

a i l i n g t o g i v e h i m n o t i c e t h a t h e w o u l d b e ar t h e b u r d e n o f p r o vin g his
re h ab i l i t at i o nat t h e h ea ri n g.
Stand ard of review

Our inquiry

on appeal i s whether

the B oard’ s decision is rea sonably supported by substantial evidence in view of the r eliable a nd probative e vidence in the rec o rd as a w hole. See Public Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. G ulf States Util s. Co. , 809 S
. W
. 2 d 2 0 1, 211 (Tex. 1991). “Substantial evidenc e does not mea n a lar g e or c onsiderable amount of evide nce , but rather such rele vant evidenc e as a rea sonable mind mig ht a cce pt as ade quate to support a c onclusion of fa ct.” Gran e k v . Te x as State Bd

. of Me d. Ex am ’r s, , 172 S.W .3d 761, 778 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no p et
. ) ( qu o t i n g Lau de rd

alev . Te x as De p’ t of Ag ric ., 923 S.W .2d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ)). Ag ency

decisions t hat are not supported by substantial evidence are deeme d arbitra ry
an d c a pricious. Gulf States , 8 09 S.W. 2d a t 21 1; Un ite d I

nd e p. Sc h. Di

st. v . W hit e ha wk , No. 03-04-00662- CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEX I S 2058, at *15 (Te x . App.—Austin, Marc h 17, 2006, no pet.) (me m. op.). An age ncy decision i s arbitra ry when its final order denies parties due proce ss of law or f ails to de monstrate a connec tion between the ag ency decision and the fac tors that are made
re l ev an t t o that decision by the applica

ble statutes and r eg ulations. W hit e ha wk, 2 0 0 6 T e x. A p p. L E XIS 2 0 5 8 , at * 1 5 (c i t i n g Reliant Energy, I nc. v. Public Util. Comm’n , 1 5 3 S. W. 3 d 1 7 4 , 1 8 4 ( T e x.Th e Te xas d ue c ours e of law g ua

ra nte e , wh ic h is ne arl y ide nti c a l to the fe de ra l du e pr oc e ss 2 clause , is in Article I , Section 19 of the Te x as Constitut ion. University of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than , 9 01 S.W. 2d

92 6, 92 9 ( Te x. 19 95 ); see also U.S. Const. amend. XI V; Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 19. Mars h d oe s n ot s ug g e st that th e re is a ny ma te ri a l di sti nc tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o p ro vis ion s. 7 App.—Austin 2004, no pet.)). The ult imate test of due pr ocess of law in an a dminist rative he aring is the prese nce or

absenc e of r

udiments of fair pla

y . State v. Crank , 666 S.W .2d 91, 94 (Tex. 1984). A court revie wing a decision for arbitra riness should c onsider all rele vant fac tor s an d m ay not
s u b s t i tu t e i t s j u d g m e n tf

o r t h a to f t h e a g e n c y. W

hit e ha wk, 2006 Tex. App. L E XIS 2058, at *15 (citing Gu lf States , 809 S.W .2d at 211). I f the B oard f ailed to follow the c lear , unambig uous lang uag e of its own regulation, we must reve rse its ac tion as arbitra ry and ca pricious. Gulf States , 809 S.W .2d at 207.
“Subs ta nt ive ” due pr oc e ss Subs tan tia l e v ide nc eof

c urr e nt unwo rthi

ne ss I n h is fir st issu e , Mar sh argue s tha t the B oa rd de nie d him “s ub sta

nti ve ” du e pr oc e ss
un d e r t h e f

e d e r a l o r s t a t e c o n s t i tu t i o n s b y ar b i t r ar i l y d e t e r

m i n i n g t h a t h i s p a s t a c t s m a de him
curr e n tl y “ u n w o r thy to in s tr u c t t h e y o u th o f T e xa s . ” Sp e c if

ic a ll y , h e c o n te n d s th a t t h e B o a rd’s deter mination of his unworthiness to instruct was arbitra ry beca use, at the hea

ring , it neither off

ere d
e vid e nc e of

his c ur re nt u nw or thi ne ss n or

c on tr adi cte d th e e vid e nc e of his te a c hin g su c c e ss. There fore , Marsh c ontends that “ther e is no substantial evidenc e of c urre nt unwo rt h i n ess t o teac h the y outh of the state, in violation of t he Tex as C onstitut ion, Article I , Section 13.” See U. S. Co ns t. amend. XIV; Tex. Cons t. art. I , § 13. 2

The S tate counte rs that the AL J considere d and re jected Ma

rsh’s re habilitation testimony , including his tea ching succe ss, offer ed in s u p p o rt o f his worthiness to instruct Texas8

y outh. See Granek, 172 S.W .3d at 779 (AL J is sole judge of witness’s cre dibilit y and may acc ept
o r r e je c t a n y w it n e s s ’ s te s ti mo n y

)
. T h e St a te e mp h a s iz e s th a t M ar s h o f f e r e d n o r e habilitation evidence—beside s his own word—to rebut the B oard’ s evidenc e of his unwor thiness to inst ruct Texas y outh. I t further

contends that the de cision to revoke Ma rsh’s ce rtificate is not arbitr ary
mere ly beca use the AL J did not acce pt Marsh’s unc orrobor ated testimony as sufficie nt e vidence of his re ha bil itatio n a

nd wo rt hin e ss t o in str

uc t. W e m ay n o ts u b s t i tu t e o u r j u d g m e n t a

b o u t a w i t n e s s ’ s c r e d i b i l i t y f o r t h a t o f t h e A L J. Id. at 779. Marsh’ s situ at i o n i s s i milar to that of the re spondent in Texas Education Age ncy v . Barber , who di d not deny sexually assaulting his 14 y ear -old former stepdaug hter but relied upon his ow n a sse rt ion

of wo rt hin e ss to sup po rt the re te nti on of his te a c hin g c re de nti a ls. No . 1 64 -T TC191, 1991 TX Educ. A g ency L EXI S 233, at *3 (1991). Revoking his teachingcer tificate, the Boa

rd
rea soned that Apar t from his belief, Respondent prese nted no evidenc e or gua rante e that such a

n e g re g iou s b re a c h o f t

ru st w ou ld n ot r e oc c ur . . . . Pos se ssi ng or e xhibi tin g an in te re st in c hil dr e n a s ob

je c ts o f s e xua l g ra

tif ic a tio n is no t to be pe rm itt e d o r t ole rate d w ith in the ra nks of teac hing pr ofes s i onals of this state. Commiss ion of such conduc t as e xec ute d by Re sp on de nt de pr ive s a tea c hin g pr of e ssi on a l of the c on fi de nc e and tr us t with our schoolchildre n.
The fa ct that Marsh se x ually assaulted his stepdaug hter some t i m e ag o does not diminish t he rele vance of his behavior

to an eva luation of his fitness as an educator. As stated in Texas Education Agenc y v. D uke ,
pa rt ic ula r t y pe s o f c ri me s, su c h a s se xua l c ri me s a g a ins t mi no rs or a ssa ult s a g a ins t minors, are so heinous an d o f s u ch sensitivity that they may more e asily

raise a9

pr e su mp t i o n w i t h i n t h e e d u c a t i o n a l f

i e l d t h a t t h e p e r

p e t r a t o r o f t h e a c t i s n o t fi t to enter t h e environs of the tea ching profe ssion. Such crimes will alway s be re levant in assessing an applica

nt’s char acte r deve lopment and pre sent fit n ess t o teac h, no matter how r emote the date of c riminal occur renc e.
No . 1 08 -T TC- 39 0 ( 19 90 ); see also Texas Educ . Agenc y v. J ackson , No. 199-TTC-391 ( 1993). Her e, the r ecor d shows that the AL J considere d Marsh’s

• failure to underg o any counseling bey ond that order ed by the cour t in 1980;

• vo lun tary di sch arg e fr om t he Ai r F or c e du e to u

nf itn e ss a nd un a c c e pta

ble c on du c t;

• e mpl oy

me nt a s an a ssi sta

nt p ri nc ipa l, w or

kin g wi th c hil dr e n wh o w e re the same ag e that R.F. w as whe n he abuse d her; a nd

• belated e x pression of his remorse to R.F., whic h occur red f or the fir st tim e during t h e h ea ri n g.
This is evidenc e from which the Boa rd could conclude that Marsh de nies a ne ed for treatment, works at a job whe re he is surrounded by minors over whom he h as authorit y , and lac ks remorse
. Reasonable minds mi g ht acc ept these f acts a s adequate to support the conc lusion that Marsh is not reha bilitated and is unworthy to instruct Texas y outh. See Granek, 17 2 S.W. 3d a t 77 8; Lau de rd

ale , 92 3 S. W.2 d at 83 6. B e c a

us e su bs tanti a l e vid e nc e su

pp or ts the B oa rd ’s de te rm inatio n that Ma rs h is
un wo rt hy to i ns tr uc t th e y ou th of Te xas, we c on c lud e that it did no t a c t arb itr ari ly

or c a pr ic iou sly in making that deter

mination and that the district court did not err in affir ming the B oard’ s order
. Shi fting bu rden of proof Wit hin his first issue, Marsh also argues t hat the B oard de prived him of “substantive” du e pr oc e ss b y

fa ili ngto f

oll owits ru le statin gthat th e B oa rd ha d t he bu rden of pro vin g his10

“ un worth [ine ss] t o in str

uc t th e y ou th o f T e xas” a t th e he ari ng . H e no te s th a t th e AL J’s s e ve nth conclusion of law

states that he fa i l ed “t o p ro ve by a pre pondera

nce of evidenc e that he ha d been reha bilitated and should be allowe d to retain his teac hing c ertificate.” Marsh urg es that this finding evidenc es that t he B oard imprope rly shifted the burde n to him to prove his rehabilitation and
wo rt hin e ss, rathe r tha

n fol low ingits ow n r

ule and pr ov inghis un wo rt

hin e ss. He c on te nd s th a t th is alleg ed burde n-shifting denied him “substantive” due process, was arbitra ry and in violation of the Boa rd’s own r eg ulation: (b) The pe titioner in a co n tested ca se proc eedingunder this cha pter a nd 1 Texas Ad min istrativ e Cod e , Ch a

pte r 15 5 (r e la

tin g to Rul e s of Pr oc e dure ) is the pa rt y in a conteste d case seekingrelief from the de cision maker a nd re q u esting an adjudicative he aringwith the office . The pe titioner shall have the bur den of proof to show by

a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e entitlement to such re lief.
19 Tex. Admin. C ode § 249.22(b) (2006).

Th e B oa rd re sp on ds that it

ha d th e burd e n of pr ov ing that Ma rs h wa s “ un wo rt

hy to instruct the y outh of Texas” and that the finding ref lects only that Marsh failed to a dduce e vidence rebutting the evidenc e the B oard pr esente d of his unworthiness. At the hea ring , the B oard pr esente d evidenc e that Mar sh committed acts that constituted sexual a buse of a minor. The AL J deter mined that this evidence was suffi cient to show that Mar sh is “unworthy to instruct the y outh of Texas.” Af te r the B oa

rd pr ov e d it s pr im a fa c ie case to the AL J , the burden proper ly shifted to Marsh to re but the B oard’ s evidenc e. See Keeton v. T exas Racing Comm’n , No. 03-03-00049- CV, 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 6925, at *22 (Tex. App.—Austin, Augu s t 14, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.) ( holding that11

once Commission presented prima facie evidenc e of rac ehorse ’s positive te st result for prohibited drug , burden shifte d to challeng er to re but such proof)
.

We conclude that the Board did not deny due process t o Marsh by improperly

shifting th e b u r d e no f

p r o o f to h im an d th a t t h e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id

n o t e r r in a f f ir mi n gth e B o ar d ’ s o r d e r . We
overr ule Marsh’ s first issue.
Notice Alternatively , in his second issue, Marsh a sserts that if the burden-shifting was appropr iate, the Boa

rd denied him due proce ss by failing to g ive him notice that he would bea r the burden of proving his rehabilitation at the hea ring . This argument i s p re d i cate d upon Marsh’s
asser tion, which we ha

ve found to be wi t h o u t m erit, that the B oard imprope rly shifted the burde n to him to prove his rehabilitation and worth i n es s to instruct Texas y outh. We also hold that the Boa rd satisfied due proce ss with reg ard to the pr ocedur es employ ed at the he aring
.

Re vie w o f “ pr oc e dura l” du e pr oc e ss c omp la int s li ke thi s in vo l v e s a t w o - p a rt ana ly sis : a dete rmination of whethe r the a ppellant has a

liberty or prope rty

interest th at i s en t itled to due proce ss protection, and if so, a dete rmination of what pr ocess is due. University of Tex. M ed. Sch. at Houston v. Than , 9 01 S.W. 2d 92 6, 92 9 ( Te x. 19 95 ). Th e fu nd a me nta l r e qu ir e me nt of du e pr oc e ss is the opportunity

to be hea

rd at a meaning ful time and in a m eaningf ul manner. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). I n administrative proce eding s, due proce ss r equire s that parties be a c c or de d a ful l and fai r he ari ngon dis pu te d f

a c t is su e s. Of

fic e of P ub . U

til . Co un se l v . P ub lic Util. Comm’n , 185 S.W .3d 555, 576 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. filed ). While administrative hear ings ne ed not meet judicial standa rds, they cannot be arbitra

ry or inhere ntly

unfair. Id
.12 Th e p a r t i e s a gr e e t

h a t M a rs h’ s te a c hin g c e rt if

ic a te is a n in te re st e nti tle d to du e pr oc e ss protec tion, including a formal hear ing, which he rec eived. Thus, Marsh a ppear s to arg ue that he w as not hear d “in a me an i n gfu l m anner” or pr ovided a “ fair he aring .” Se e Ma the ws , 424 U.S. at 333; Office of Pub. Util. Counsel , 185 S.W .3d at 576. Marsh state s t h at h i s ce rt ificate was re voked beca use the B oard f

ound “that he did n o t ca rr y a burde n of proof

[reg ardinghis rehabilitation] of which he w as neve r g iven notice.” But the r ecor d shows that a copy of the B oard’ s orig inal petition
c on ta ini ngthe a lle g a tio ns a g a ins t Mars h a c c omp anie d th e no tic e of he ari ngthat th e B oa

rd se nt t o him by cer tified and fir st class mail on Fe bruar y 23, 200 1
. T h e n o t i ce also explained that the “pur p o s e o f th e h e ar in g [w a s ] to d e te r mi n e w h e th e r [] M ar s h h a s v io late d T it le 19, Texas Ad min istrativ e Cod e , c h. 22 5 thro ug h 2 50 , by vir tue of his se xua lly ina

pp ro pr ia te be havio r w ithhis stepdaug hter, [] R.F..”

Ad d i t i o n al l y , t h e Bo ar d ’s t ri al b ri ef , wh i ch wa s s er v ed o nM ar s h b ef o re t h e h ea ri n g, contains multiple refe renc es to the i ssue of his reha bilitation and ar g ues that he c annot re ly on the passag e of time a

nd a satisfa ctory

teac hing r ecor d to prov e t h at h e is rehabilitated. F urthermor e, Marsh’ s o w ntr ia l b r ie f

a s s e rts th a t t

h e B o ar d “ mu s t c o n s id e r

w h e th e r , a mo n g o th e r

f a c to r s , the
re sp on de nt i s su ff

ic ie ntl y rehabilitated

to hold a cer

tificate.” His trial brief a lso emphasizes that “the likelihood of future misconduc t of a similar or r ela t ed n at u re as shown by . . . [t he] lack of rehabilitati ve motivation or potential” is a factor to be considered in determining w hether to revoke a tea ching cer

tificate. 19 Tex. Admin. Code § 249.17(c) (13)( C) (2006) ( emphasis adde d). B ased on these c onspicuous prehe aringref ere nces to re habilitation, we find s u b s ta nti a l e v id e n ce of

Marsh’s
no tic e that th e burd e n o f p ro of wo uld sh if t to him to s ho w h is r e ha

bil itatio n, a ft e r t

he B oa rd ’s prima13

fac ie showing that Mar s h wa s “u n wo rthy to instruct the y outh of Texas.” See Tex as Racing Comm’n , 2003 Tex. App. L EXI S 6925, at *22. Ba sed on this evidence , Marsh’s c omplaint that he was not g iven not ice that the burden of proof would shift to him to prove his re habilitation is wit hout
me ri t. B e c a

us e we c on c lud e that the B oa rd did no t de ny Ma rs h “ pr oc e dura l” du e pr oc e ss,
we sim ila rl y c on c lud e that th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t e rr in a ff ir min g the B oa

rd ’s or de r. We o ve rr

ule Marsh’s se cond issue.
CO NC LU SION

Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d b oth of Ma rs h’ s is su e s, we a ff

ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s jud g me nt.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop Affir med Filed: Jul y

28, 2006