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Matter of Blanca Eloisa PANGAN-SIS, Respondent

Decided October 6, 2017

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

An alien seeking to qualify for the exception to inadmissibility in section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) 

of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(ii) (2012), must satisfy 

all three subclauses of that section, including the requirement that the alien be “a VAWA 

self-petitioner.”

FOR RESPONDENT: Lauren D. Cusitello, Esquire, San Diego, California 

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Sarah L. Martin, Associate 

Legal Advisor

BEFORE: Board Panel: MALPHRUS, MULLANE, and CREPPY, Board Members.

MULLANE, Board Member:

In a decision dated December 17, 2015, an Immigration Judge terminated 

the removal proceedings against the respondent. The Department of 

Homeland Security (“DHS”) has appealed from that decision. The appeal 

will be sustained, the removal proceedings will be reinstated, and the record 

will be remanded to the Immigration Judge.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The respondent was initially charged with, and conceded, removability 

under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) (2012), as an alien who is not in possession of 

a valid immigrant visa or entry document. On November 5, 2014, the DHS 

withdrew this charge and charged the respondent with removability under

section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Act, for being present in the United States 

without being admitted or paroled. On December 17, 2015, the respondent 

conceded removability on the amended charge. The Immigration Judge 

terminated proceedings, because he concluded that the respondent qualifies 

for the exception to this ground of removability under section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) 

of the Act. 
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II. ANALYSIS

Section 212(a)(6)(A) of the Act provides as follows: 

(i) In General

An alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who 

arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the 

Attorney General, is inadmissible.

(ii) Exception for Certain Battered Women and Children

Clause (i) shall not apply to an alien who demonstrates that—

(I) the alien is a VAWA self-petitioner;

(II) (a) the alien has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a spouse 

or parent, or by a member of the spouse’s or parent’s family residing in the same 

household as the alien and the spouse or parent consented or acquiesced to such 

battery or cruelty, or

(b) the alien’s child has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by a 

spouse or parent of the alien (without the active participation of the alien in the 

battery or cruelty) or by a member of the spouse’s or parent’s family residing in 

the same household as the alien when the spouse or parent consented to or 

acquiesced in such battery or cruelty and the alien did not actively participate in 

such battery or cruelty, and

(III) there was a substantial connection between the battery or cruelty described 

in subclause (I) or (II) and the alien’s unlawful entry into the United States.

The issue presented in this case is whether an alien who seeks to qualify 

for the exception to inadmissibility under section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act 

must satisfy all three subclauses of the exception, including the requirement 

that the alien be a VAWA self-petitioner.1

 We review this question of law 

de novo. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii) (2017).

The Immigration Judge concluded that the language of section 

212(a)(6)(A)(ii)(III), which references subclauses (I) and (II) in the 

disjunctive, indicates that Congress intended that aliens need only satisfy 

either subclauses (I) or (III), or subclauses (II) and (III). He concluded that 

even though the respondent is not a VAWA self-petitioner and thus cannot 

satisfy subclause (I), she was “fleeing from an extended period of domestic 

 1 “VAWA” is the short title for the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, which was 

enacted as Title IV of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. 

L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902. To qualify as a “VAWA self-petitioner,” an alien 

is generally required to show that his or her abuser is a spouse or parent who is either a 

United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident. See section 101(a)(51) of the Act, 

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(51) (2012) (also including certain applicants under the Nicaraguan 

Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193;

the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161; and the 

Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 

2681-538).
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violence” in Guatemala at the hands of her Guatemalan citizen spouse, 

satisfying subclauses (II) and (III), and entitling her to the exception to the 

ground of removability.

The DHS argues that the respondent must satisfy all three subclauses of 

section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act and that because the respondent is not a 

VAWA self-petitioner as required under subclause (I), she does not qualify 

for this exception. The respondent agrees with the Immigration Judge’s 

interpretation of the statute. She contends that the statute is ambiguous, 

given the lack of a conjunction after subclause (I) and the disjunctive in 

subclause III. The respondent argues that because subclause (III) requires a 

“substantial connection” between the battery or cruelty described in 

subclause (I) or (II), an alien need only satisfy either (I) or (II), but not both. 

A. Statutory Language

In interpreting section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act, we look first to the 

plain meaning of its statutory language and give effect to that meaning 

when possible. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340–41 (1997); 

Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2004). Moreover, in 

“ascertaining the plain meaning of the statute, [we] must look to the 

particular statutory language at issue,” its context, and “the language and 

design of the statute as a whole.” Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 

1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281,

291 (1988)); see also Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341; Matter of Richmond, 

26 I&N Dec. 779, 783 (BIA 2016).

As a general matter, the placement of the word “and” at the end of the 

second to last subclause in a statute indicates that all subclauses of the statute 

must be satisfied. See generally 1A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie 

Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 21:14 (7th ed.), 

Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2016) (“Where two or more requirements 

are provided in a section and it is the legislative intent that all the 

requirements be fulfilled in order to comply with the statute, the conjunctive 

‘and’ should be used.”). Thus, the most natural reading of section 

212(a)(6)(A)(ii) is that the respondent must satisfy subclauses (I), (II), and 

(III) of that section, but subclause (III) may be satisfied two different ways. 

However, since the language in subclause (III) refers to “subclauses (I) or 

(II)” in the disjunctive, we agree with the respondent that the language of

section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act is ambiguous. 
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B. Legislative History

“Where the statutory language is unclear, we consider legislative history 

to help discern congressional intent.” Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516, 

518 (BIA 2015). The statutory language at issue in this case was added by 

section 301(c)(1) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 

Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 

110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-578. The legislative history of the IIRIRA does 

not contain any explicit consideration of the statutory language in question 

and thus is of limited assistance in interpreting Congress’ intent. However, 

a review of the legislative history of the VAWA and the reasons for its 

enactment are instructive in discerning congressional intent for this 

provision. See United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 228–29 (9th Cir. 1995) 

(“Particular phrases must be construed in light of the overall purpose and 

structure of the whole statutory scheme.”). 

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163, 

aliens who married United States citizens or lawful permanent residents were 

granted immediate lawful permanent resident status. Concerns about 

marriage fraud under such a framework prompted Congress to pass the 

Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 

100 Stat. 3537, which created a 2-year conditional period before lawful 

permanent resident status could be granted to the alien spouse. See section 

216 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (2012); see also Matter of Munroe, 26 I&N 

Dec. 428, 430 (BIA 2014). However, because the United States citizen or 

lawful permanent resident spouse’s consent and cooperation were required 

to file a joint petition to remove the conditional status, these amendments 

resulted in giving the United States citizen or lawful permanent resident 

spouse considerable leverage over their foreign national spouse. In turn, this 

created a situation in which abused alien spouses were reluctant to leave their 

United States citizen or lawful permanent resident abuser for fear of losing 

their potential to adjust their status. William A. Kandel, Cong. Research 

Serv., R42477, Immigration Provisions of the Violence Against Women Act 

(VAWA) 21–22 (2012). 

Congress sought to remedy this situation by creating the battered spouse

waiver, which was included in the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 

101-649, § 701(a)(4), 104 Stat. 4978, 5085, and which is codified in section 

216(c)(4)(C) of the Act. This provision waives the requirement to submit a 

petition and appear for an interview to remove conditional resident status for 

aliens who entered their marriage in good faith, but who (or whose child)

was battered or suffered extreme cruelty by the United States citizen or 

lawful permanent resident spouse (or parent). According to the House 

Judiciary Committee Report related to this provision, its purpose “is to 
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ensure that when the U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse or parent 

engages in battering or cruelty against a spouse or child, neither the spouse 

nor child should be entrapped in the abusive relationship by the threat of 

losing their legal resident status.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 78 (1990), 

reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6758.

To further expand protection for battered alien spouses of United States 

citizens and lawful permanent residents, Congress passed the VAWA in 

1994, which included provisions allowing an alien who is battered or subject 

to extreme cruelty at the hands of a United States citizen or lawful permanent 

resident spouse to adjust his or her status through the self-petitioning process. 

The House Judiciary Committee Report accompanying the legislation 

explained its purpose as follows: 

Domestic battery problems can become terribly exacerbated in marriages where 

one spouse is not a citizen, and the non-citizens [sic] legal status depends on his or 

her marriage to the abuser. Current law fosters domestic violence in such situations 

by placing full and complete control of the alien spouse’s ability to gain permanent 

legal status in the hands of the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. . . .

. . . .

. . . The purpose of permitting self-petitioning is to prevent the citizen or resident 

from using the petitioning process as a means to control or abuse an alien spouse.

H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26, 37 (1993), 1993 WL 484760; see also 140 

Cong. Rec. H10,693, H10,693 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. 

Schumer), 1994 WL 545675, at *H10,693-01 (stating that the VAWA 

“permits immigrant spouses of United States citizens to escape from their 

abusive spouses without risking deportation”). 

This legislative history makes clear that in enacting these laws, Congress 

intended to protect vulnerable aliens from domestic abuse at the hands of a 

United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse. The Violence 

Against Women Act of 2000 (“VAWA 2000”), Division B of Pub. L. No. 

106-386, 114 Stat. 1491, which reauthorized the 1994 VAWA and contained 

the Battered Immigrant Women Protection Act of 2000, id. § 1501, 114 Stat. 

at 1518, reflects Congress’ continued focus on the status of the abuser as a 

United States citizen or lawful permanent resident. The House Conference 

Report also states that the VAWA 2000 is “designed to improve on efforts 

made in VAWA 1994 to prevent immigration law from being used by an 

abusive citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse as a tool to prevent an 

abused immigrant spouse from reporting abuse or leaving the abusive 

relationship.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-939, at 111 (2000) (Conf. Rep.) (Joint 

Explanatory Statement), 2000 WL 1479163, at *111; see also Matter of 

A-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 66, 74–75 (BIA 2009).
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C. Scope of Section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act

Given Congress’ consistent focus on preventing United States citizens 

and lawful permanent residents from using their status to abuse and control 

their alien spouses and children, the most reasonable interpretation of the 

exception in section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act is that an alien must satisfy 

subclauses (I), (II), and (III) of that provision. The disjunctive language in 

subclauses (II) and (III) does not contravene this interpretation. Consistent 

with the overall legislative purpose of the VAWA, subclause (II) reflects a 

desire by Congress to expand the protection for abused aliens to cover abuse

committed not only by United States citizen and lawful permanent resident 

spouses and parents but also by members of the household where the abuser 

is acting at the direction of the United States citizen and lawful permanent 

resident. Subclause (III) also expands eligibility for the exception by only

requiring that abuse suffered either under subclause (I) (in connection with 

an alien’s VAWA self-petitioner status) or under subclause (II) be 

substantially connected to the unlawful entry. The practical effect of this 

interpretation is that a spouse of a United States citizen or lawful permanent 

resident who suffers abuse is covered. However, coverage is not extended to 

aliens who are married to non-United States citizens and non-lawful 

permanent residents, because such persons lack “immigration leverage” over 

their spouses.

The respondent’s contention that interpreting section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) this 

way effectively renders subclause (II) superfluous is not persuasive. While 

subclauses (I) and (II) overlap, there are important differences between the

subclauses that cannot be overlooked. For example, subclause (II) covers 

abuse that the alien may suffer after attaining VAWA self-petitioner status. 

As discussed above, it also covers abuse committed by members of a 

spouse’s or parent’s household. Consistent with the legislative history of the 

VAWA, that provision still requires that such abuse be connected to a United 

States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse or parent who is directing 

the abuse. Although subclauses (I) and (II) may overlap in certain 

circumstances, this overlap reflects Congress’ intent to ensure that there 

would not be a gap in coverage for aliens who are abused by, or with the 

consent of, United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouses or

parents. 

The Immigration Judge’s interpretation, on the other hand, would vastly 

expand the reach of this provision. Allowing an alien to qualify for the 

exception in section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act by satisfying only subclauses 

(II) and (III) would effectively remove the connection to a United States 
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citizen or lawful permanent resident abuser.2 It would thus apply to any

domestic abuse situation in the world. The respondent’s case illustrates this 

expansive interpretation because she alleges that she was abused by her 

Guatemalan spouse, who is not a United States citizen or lawful permanent

resident. Congress was concerned with “placing full and complete control 

of the alien spouse’s ability to gain permanent legal status in the hands of the 

citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse,” not with creating an exception 

to a ground of inadmissibility for domestic abuse of an alien that takes place 

outside the United States. H.R. Rep. No. 103-395, at 26. It is unlikely that 

Congress intended to create such a sweepingly broad exception to this very 

common ground of inadmissibility.

Furthermore, interpreting the exception to only require satisfaction of 

subclauses (II) and (III) would leave this respondent in an unusual situation, 

because she would not be removable for entering the United States without 

inspection, yet she would have no legal status in the United States. Congress 

could not have intended such a result. Examining the VAWA framework as 

a whole, it is clear that Congress intended to remove obstacles for a 

vulnerable subset of abused aliens seeking to adjust their status through the 

VAWA. Thus, we agree with the DHS that it is more reasonable to conclude 

that Congress enacted the exception to prevent the ground of inadmissibility 

from being used to disqualify a VAWA self-petitioner from adjusting her 

status. See section 245(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012). 

Accordingly, all three subclauses, including subclause (I) requiring 

VAWA self-petitioner status, must be satisfied to qualify for the exception 

under section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act.3

 2 Although the VAWA self-petitioning provisions can apply to abuse committed abroad,

a connection to a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident abuser is still required. 

See sections 204(a)(1)(A)(v), (B)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(v), (B)(iv) 

(2012). 3 Our interpretation of the section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) exception does not leave aliens such 

as the respondent without a possible remedy under the immigration laws. Aliens who

suffer battery or extreme cruelty from a non-lawful permanent resident or non-United 

States citizen spouse, who are not VAWA self-petitioners may apply for asylum, 

withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other 

Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted and opened for signature 

Dec. 10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. 

A/RES/39/708 (1984) (entered into force June 26, 1987; for the United States Apr. 18, 

1988). See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). Moreover, they would not 

be prohibited from contesting the ground or grounds of removability.
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III. CONCLUSION

Considering the language of the statute, the legislative history and overall 

purpose of the VAWA, and the policy considerations raised by the DHS, we 

hold that an alien who seeks to qualify for the exception to inadmissibility 

under section 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) of the Act must satisfy all three subclauses of 

that section, including the requirement that the alien be a VAWA 

self-petitioner. Because the respondent is not a VAWA self-petitioner, she 

has not established her eligibility for the exception to inadmissibility. 

Therefore, the Immigration Judge improperly terminated proceedings. 

Accordingly, the DHS’s appeal will be sustained, the removal proceedings 

will be reinstated, and the record will be remanded to give the respondent an 

opportunity to pursue any form of relief for which she may be eligible.

ORDER: The appeal of the Department of Homeland Security is 

sustained, the decision of the Immigration Judge is vacated, and the removal 

proceedings are reinstated. 

FURTHER ORDER: The record is remanded to the Immigration 

Judge for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing opinion and for 

the entry of a new decision.