IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

July 21, 2020 Session

IN RE M.L.S.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County

No. 2018-CH-233 Douglas T. Jenkins, Chancellor

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No. E2019-01794-COA-R9-CV

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This appeal involves a petition to enforce a visitation order after the entry of a final decree 

of adoption. The adoptive parents filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted 

in part and denied in part. The trial court ordered the parties to participate in depositions 

to address the issue of “acquiescence” and determine “if an enforceable right of visitation 

with the minor Child was acquired by the Petitioners being allowed to visit after the 

adoption of the minor Child was finalized.” The adoptive parents sought and were granted 

permission to file an interlocutory appeal, challenging the denial in part of their motion to 

dismiss. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Tenn. R. App. P. 9 Interlocutory Appeal; Judgment of the Chancery Court 

Reversed and Remanded

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J. STEVEN 

STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

Phillip L. Boyd, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Renee G. and Danny G.

Rachel Ratliff, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellees, Penny T. and Jerry T.

OPINION

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The child at issue in this proceeding, M.L.S.,1 was born in 2013. Her biological 

parents died in 2014. Although the record before us is sparse, it reflects that the Tennessee 

Department of Children’s Services became involved and filed some sort of petition with 

 

1 We refer to the minor child and other parties by initials to protect the child’s privacy.

10/16/2020
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regard to the child in the juvenile court of Hawkins County. After a hearing, the juvenile 

court entered an order awarding temporary legal custody of the child to her maternal 

grandmother and step-grandfather (“Grandparents”). According to the order, “[DCS] 

reported that [Grandparents] were appropriate caregivers for the minor child and that 

[DCS] would be releasing custody of the minor child to [Grandparents].” The child’s 

paternal great-aunt and great-uncle (“Aunt and Uncle”) also appeared at the hearing. 

According to the order, “[DCS] reported that the parties had worked out a visitation 

schedule prior to the hearing and that [Aunt and Uncle] would be entitled to a minimum of 

every other weekend visitation with the minor child.” The court went on to find that 

Grandparents were “appropriate custodians of the minor child.” The order states that the 

trial judge “advised all parties to work together to help raise [the child.]” In conclusion, 

the order stated that the child was “placed in the temporary legal custody of [Grandparents] 

with authority to consent to any ordinary or necessary medical, surgical, hospital, 

educational, institutional, psychiatric, or psychological care.” The order states that the 

matter was “hereby closed” and that no further hearings were scheduled.

On May 18, 2015, the chancery court for Hawkins County entered a final decree of 

adoption permitting Grandparents to adopt the child. The decree recites that the child’s 

parents were deceased, that Grandparents had “actual physical and legal care of the child,” 

and that they had been awarded custody pursuant to the order of the juvenile court in the 

aforementioned matter. The order also states that all parties entitled to notice were served 

and that all necessary parties were before the court. The adoption decree provided that “the 

relationship of parent and child is hereby established with all rights and privileges incident 

thereto,” and it stated that Grandparents, as adoptive parents, would “have exclusive care, 

custody and control of the said child, free from the claims or hindrances of all others[.]”

On September 26, 2018, Aunt and Uncle filed a “Petition to Enforce Visitation” in 

chancery court. The petition stated that Aunt and Uncle had been awarded every other 

weekend visitation by the juvenile court in 2014 pursuant to the same order that granted 

temporary legal custody to Grandparents. The petition stated that Aunt and Uncle believed 

that Grandparents had adopted the child sometime in 2015. However, Aunt and Uncle 

stated that they had continued to have regular visitation with the child until June 2018 when 

Grandparents “abruptly ended” their visitation. Aunt and Uncle alleged that a significant 

bond existed between them and the minor child and that severance of the relationship 

would cause emotional harm to the child. They also asserted that it was in the best interest 

of the child for them to continue having a relationship with her. Thus, Aunt and Uncle

asked the court to “enter an Order to Enforce the Visitation previously Ordered between 

the Plaintiffs and the minor Child.” They attached to the petition a copy of the 2014 

juvenile court order.

Grandparents filed a motion to dismiss the petition to enforce visitation, asserting 

that it failed to state a claim. Grandparents confirmed that they had in fact adopted M.L.S. 

in 2015. They attached the adoption order to their motion. Thus, Grandparents pointed 
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out that they had become the child’s adoptive parents. Grandparents argued that “any prior 

Order granting temporary visitation is moot and not enforceable.” They further argued that 

Aunt and Uncle had no standing to seek visitation with their adopted child.

While this case was pending, Aunt and Uncle filed a separate petition to set aside 

the adoption order, also in chancery court. On February 20, 2019, the trial court held a 

hearing to jointly address both matters. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge 

announced that the separate petition to set aside the adoption order was dismissed.

2

Regarding the petition to enforce visitation, the trial judge announced that he intended to 

take the matter under advisement in order to research whether the visitation order 

“survive[d] the adoption.”

On May 9, 2019, the trial court entered an order on Grandparents’ motion to dismiss 

the petition to enforce visitation. The trial court partially granted the motion to dismiss, 

“pursuant to T.C.A. § 36-1-121(f).” At the time of the adoption proceeding, that subsection

provided:

(f) The adoptive parents of a child shall not be required by any order of the 

adoption court to permit visitation by any other person, nor shall the order of 

the adoption court place any conditions on the adoption of the child by the 

adoptive parents. Any provision in an order of the court or in any written 

agreement or contract between the parent or guardian of the child and the 

adoptive parents requiring visitation or otherwise placing any conditions on 

the adoption shall be void and of no effect whatsoever; provided, that nothing 

under this part shall be construed to prohibit “open adoptions” where the 

adoptive parents permit, in their sole discretion, the parent or guardian of the 

child who surrendered the child or whose rights to the child were otherwise 

terminated, or the siblings or other persons related to the adopted child, to 

visit or otherwise continue or maintain a relationship with the adopted child; 

and provided further, that the permission or agreement to permit visitation or 

contact shall not, in any manner whatsoever, establish any enforceable rights 

in the parent or guardian, the siblings or other related persons.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121(f) (2015). Citing this section, the trial court “partially 

dismissed” the petition to enforce visitation. Although the trial court’s order did not 

elaborate further on its reasoning, we interpret the order as holding that the juvenile court’s 

order did not survive the adoption proceeding.

However, the trial court excluded one issue from its dismissal and ruled that the 

parties must participate in depositions regarding whether “acquiescence” occurred. 

 

2

In a related appeal, In re Adoption of M.L.S., No. E2019-01918-COA-R3-CV, this Court affirmed 

the trial court’s dismissal of the petition to set aside the adoption.
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Specifically, the trial court ordered depositions to determine when visitation began and 

ended “and if an enforceable right of visitation with the minor Child was acquired by [Aunt 

and Uncle] being allowed to visit after the adoption of the minor Child was finalized.” The 

order stated that an additional hearing would be conducted after the completion of 

depositions on this remaining issue of “acquired visitation rights through visitation after 

the adoption of the minor Child.”

Grandparents filed a motion asking the trial court to amend its order regarding 

depositions and grant their motion to dismiss in its entirety. They pointed to the final 

sentence of Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-121(f), which provided that adoptive 

parents’ “permission or agreement to permit visitation or contact shall not, in any manner 

whatsoever, establish any enforceable rights in the parent or guardian, the siblings or other 

related persons.” Due to this language, Grandparents insisted that Aunt and Uncle had not 

acquired any enforceable right to visitation.

Aunt and Uncle filed a response, asserting that they could potentially have acquired 

an enforceable right to visitation due to acquiescence and the unique facts of this case. 

After an additional hearing, the trial court declined to alter its original ruling but indicated 

that it would be inclined to grant Grandparents permission to seek an interlocutory appeal 

should they choose to pursue one. The order further stated that Aunt and Uncle would also 

be given the opportunity to pursue an interlocutory appeal if they chose to pursue one.

Thereafter, Grandparents filed a written motion for permission to seek an 

interlocutory appeal to this Court regarding the partial denial of their motion to dismiss.

Grandparents maintained that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-121(f) barred Aunt 

and Uncle from claiming any enforceable right to visitation on the basis of acquiescence. 

The trial court entered an order granting Grandparents permission to seek an interlocutory 

appeal in this Court. Upon consideration of the application for permission to appeal 

Grandparents filed before this Court, we entered an order granting interlocutory review of 

the trial court’s order.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

This Court’s order granting review framed the following issues to be reviewed on 

appeal:

(1) Whether [Aunt and Uncle] have standing to proceed with a suit to enforce 

visitation with the subject minor child under the version of Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 36-1-121 in effect at the time of entry of the Final Decree of 

Adoption.

(2) Whether [Aunt and Uncle] have standing to proceed with a suit to enforce

visitation with the subject minor child based upon other grounds.
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However, these issues must be read in light of the procedural posture of this case. In their 

brief on appeal, Aunt and Uncle raise a host of arguments regarding a wide range of issues. 

For instance, in apparent relation to their separate petition to set aside the adoption, they 

argue that they were guardians of the child and “had a legal interest in the child that would 

have had to be terminated in order to complete the adoption.” They also argue that the 

juvenile court’s order awarding them visitation rights should be construed as a 

“grandparent visitation” order that would survive the adoption. However, we must bear in 

mind that this is a Rule 9 appeal in which the only parties who filed an application for 

permission to appeal were Grandparents. The limited ruling challenged by Grandparents 

was the partial denial of their motion to dismiss based on the issue of acquiescence. 

Therefore, the limited issue properly before us in this interlocutory appeal is whether the 

trial court erred in partially denying Grandparents’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Aunt 

and Uncle may have acquired some enforceable visitation right by acquiescence. 

III. DISCUSSION

“Tennessee law recognizes no legal distinction between a biological parent and an 

adoptive parent.” Brown v. Farley, No. E2018-01144-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 993122, at 

*4 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2019). 

The signing of a final order of adoption . . . establishes from that date the 

relationship of parent and child between the adoptive parent or parents and 

the adopted child as if the adopted child had been born to the adoptive parent 

or parents and the adopted child shall be deemed the lawful child of such 

parent or parents, the same as if the child had been born to the parent or 

parents, for all legal consequences and incidents of the biological relation of 

parents and children.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121(a). “Thus, the adoptive parents acquire all parental rights and 

responsibilities[.]” In re Montana R.T., No. E2011-00755-COA-R3-PT, 2012 WL 

2499498, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 29, 2012).

At the time of the adoption in this case, and through the date of the hearing on 

Grandparents’ motion to dismiss, the statute further provided:

(f) The adoptive parents of a child shall not be required by any order of the 

adoption court to permit visitation by any other person, nor shall the order of 

the adoption court place any conditions on the adoption of the child by the 

adoptive parents. Any provision in an order of the court or in any written 

agreement or contract between the parent or guardian of the child and the 

adoptive parents requiring visitation or otherwise placing any conditions on 

the adoption shall be void and of no effect whatsoever; provided, that nothing 

under this part shall be construed to prohibit “open adoptions” where the 
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adoptive parents permit, in their sole discretion, the parent or guardian of the 

child who surrendered the child or whose rights to the child were otherwise 

terminated, or the siblings or other persons related to the adopted child, to 

visit or otherwise continue or maintain a relationship with the adopted child; 

and provided further, that the permission or agreement to permit visitation 

or contact shall not, in any manner whatsoever, establish any enforceable 

rights in the parent or guardian, the siblings or other related persons.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121 (2015) (emphasis added). 

Grandparents relied on the italicized portion of the statute in support of their position 

that Aunt and Uncle could not acquire any enforceable right to visitation through 

“acquiescence.” The trial court rejected their argument and ordered the parties to conduct 

discovery to determine “if an enforceable right of visitation with the minor Child was 

acquired by the Petitioners being allowed to visit after the adoption of the minor Child was 

finalized.” We respectfully disagree with the trial judge’s conclusion that Aunt and Uncle 

could potentially acquire an enforceable visitation right by “being allowed to visit after the 

adoption.” At the time of the adoption decree, throughout the subsequent period of 

visitation, and at the time of the hearing below, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-

121(f) (2015) provided that the adoptive parents’ permission or agreement to permit 

visitation would not in any manner whatsoever establish enforceable rights in the related 

person permitted to visit. See, e.g., In re M.E.W., No. M2003-01739-COA-R3-PT, 2004 

WL 865840, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2004) (recognizing that a biological mother 

“would have no enforceable right” to visitation after adoption “if the adoptive parents 

changed their minds”).

We recognize that on March 22, 2019, after the hearing was conducted in the trial 

court below, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-121(f) was amended to provide:

(f) A final order of adoption of a child cannot require the adoptive parent to 

permit visitation by any other person, nor can the final order of adoption 

place any conditions on the adoption of the child by the adoptive parent. This 

statute does not prohibit the entry of an order enforcing or modifying a 

contract for post-adoption contact pursuant to § 36-1-145.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121 (2019). However, this amendment does not alter our 

conclusion in this case. Although the specific italicized language above no longer appears 

in the current version of the statute as amended, the result is the same under the facts of 

this case. The parent-child relationship was established between Grandparents and the 

child in 2015, “the same as if the child had been born to the parent or parents, for all legal 

consequences and incidents of the biological relation of parents and children.” Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 36-1-121(a). Although we recognize that Aunt and Uncle want to have a 
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relationship with the child, we are not aware of any legal basis for them to have possibly 

acquired enforceable visitation rights based on “acquiescence” in visitation after the 

adoption.3

IV. CONCLUSION

For the aforementioned reasons, the trial court’s partial denial of the motion to 

dismiss is hereby reversed, and we remand for dismissal of the petition to enforce visitation

in its entirety. Costs of this appeal are taxed to the appellees, Penny T. and Jerry T., for 

which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

CARMA DENNIS MCGEE, JUDGE

 

3 As previously noted, Aunt and Uncle argued on appeal that the juvenile court’s 2014 order

granting them every other weekend visitation “should be considered to fall under a grant of visitation 

pursuant to the grandparent visitation statute.” Aunt and Uncle do not appear to argue that the 

“acquiescence” issue that remained pending in the trial court had anything to do with the grandparent 

visitation statute. However, to the extent that their argument could be construed in that manner, we reject 

the suggestion that they could have acquired any enforceable grandparent visitation rights. Aunt and Uncle 

claim to fall within the definition of a “grandparent” pursuant to the grandparent visitation statute because 

they “act more so in a grandparent role to the child than their actual biological role of great-uncle and -

aunt.”

“The Grandparent Visitation Statute applies only to persons who satisfy the statutory definition of 

the term ‘grandparent.’” Lovlace v. Copley, 418 S.W.3d 1, 17 (Tenn. 2013). The statute provides that “the 

word ‘grandparent’ includes, but is not limited to: (1) A biological grandparent; (2) The spouse of a 

biological grandparent; (3) A parent of an adoptive parent; or (4) A biological or adoptive great-grandparent 

or the spouse thereof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(e). In Lovlace, the Tennessee Supreme Court held 

that this definition was expansive enough to include a biological father’s adoptive parent and step-parent. 

418 S.W.3d at 18. However, the Court noted, “In reaching this holding, we have not considered the extent 

or quality of the Lovlaces’ relationship with the minor child, as this is not a relevant consideration in 

determining whether a petitioner satisfies the statutory definition of ‘grandparent.’” Id. at 19 n.7. Thus, 

we reject the contention that Aunt and Uncle should be considered grandparents within the meaning of the 

statute on the basis that they act “in a grandparent role to the child.” See In re Claire C., No. M2019-00986-

COA-R3-JV, 2020 WL 755174, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 14, 2020) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 3, 

2020) (concluding that a great uncle and great aunt did not meet the definition of a grandparent in the 

grandparent visitation statute and explaining that “the statute does not authorize a court to determine that a 

petitioner qualifies as a ‘de facto grandparent’ based upon his or her relationship with a child”); In re Dayton 

R., No. W2014-01904-COA-R3-JV, 2015 WL 1828039, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 2015) (“[T]he 

Legislature’s wording in Section 36-6-306(e)(1) indicates an intent to provide standing to lineal ancestors, 

or grandparents who are biologically related to the child.”)