PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ALLAN BROUGHMAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LARRY S. CARVER, Industry  No. 09-2095

Operations Investigator, Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and

Explosives,

Defendant-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

Samuel G. Wilson, District Judge.

(7:08-cv-00548-sgw-mfu)

Argued: September 23, 2010

Decided: November 15, 2010

Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and

Richard L. VOORHEES, United States District Judge

for the Western District of North Carolina,

sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Agee wrote the opinion, in which Judge Gregory and Judge Voorhees joined.
COUNSEL

ARGUED: Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas Linn Eckert, OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES ATTORNEY, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee. ON

BRIEF: Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.

OPINION

AGEE, Circuit Judge:

Allan Broughman operated a gun shop pursuant to a dealer’s license issued by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives ("ATF"). After performing a routine

inspection of Broughman’s shop in 2006, ATF investigator

Larry Carver issued a report of violations concluding, among

other things, that in order to lawfully conduct his business

Broughman needed to obtain a manufacturer’s license from

ATF. Although Broughman administratively challenged Carver’s finding, it was upheld by Carver’s supervisor. 

Broughman subsequently filed suit in the United States

District Court for the Western District of Virginia, seeking a

declaratory ruling that he is a "dealer," not a "manufacturer,"

within the meaning of the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("GCA"

or "the Act"). Concluding that Broughman met the GCA’s

definition of a firearms "manufacturer," the district court

granted summary judgment in favor of ATF. For the reasons

set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.

We begin with a brief summary of the facts and procedural

history of this case. Broughman operates a gun shop out of the

basement of his home in Covington, Virginia. Rather than

2 BROUGHMAN v. CARVER
maintain an inventory of firearms, Broughman’s business is

typically comprised of both repairing firearms and marketing

and selling custom order firearms that he constructs. As the

district court noted, "[e]ven by his own words, Broughman

‘build[s] custom bolt action rifles’ by assembling the component parts of a firearm." Broughman v. Carver, No. 7:08-CV0548, 2009 WL 2511949, at *2 (W.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2009). 

The parties agree that in constructing such firearms

"Broughman purchases complete firearms actions (frames or

receivers with internal parts) from other licensees, and purchases rifled barrels from other sources. He threads and chambers the barrels to fit the actions, blues the actions, and makes

wooden stocks which he fits to the actions and barrels." Joint

Appendix ("J.A.") at 6.

During his inspection of Broughman’s shop, Carver

observed Broughman assemble a barrel, receiver, and stock

for a customer. Carver’s subsequent conversation with

Broughman confirmed that he "assembled . . . firearms and

sold them for several thousand dollars" a piece. Id. at 43. Subsequently, Carver issued a report of violations that charged

Broughman with "manufacturing" firearms without a manufacturer’s license. Broughman’s counsel sent a letter to ATF

requesting the violation be removed on the grounds that

Broughman did "not manufacture firearms," id. at 45, but Carver’s supervisor declined this request because it was "ATF’s

long standing position that the business activities" in which

Broughman engaged were "considered to be manufacturing

activities, necessitating a manufacturer’s license." Id. at 47.

In order to continue operating his business, Broughman

obtained a manufacturer’s license from ATF.1 He then filed

1As the district court explained, 

there are differences between the obligations that accompany a

manufacturer’s license and a dealer’s license. For example, the

BROUGHMAN v. CARVER 3
suit in federal district court seeking declaratory relief and

judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. See

28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) & 5 U.S.C. § 702. Broughman’s complaint requested the district court (1) declare that he is a

"dealer," not a "manufacturer" under the GCA, (2) set aside

ATF’s determination that his business activities required a

manufacturer’s license, and (3) award such other relief,

including costs and attorney’s fees, as the court deemed

appropriate.

The parties subsequently filed competing motions for summary judgment. After considering the parties’ submissions,

the district court rejected the proposition that Broughman

could not "be both a manufacturer of firearms and a dealer of

firearms" under the GCA, turned to the "ordinary meaning" of

the word "manufacturing," and concluded that "assembling

the component parts of a firearm" came within the ordinary

meaning of that term. Broughman, 2009 WL 2511949, at *2.

The district court accordingly held that Broughman’s activities constitute firearms "manufacturing" and entered summary

judgment in favor of ATF.

licensing fees are slightly more expensive in the long-term for

manufacturers, compare 18 U.S.C. § 923(a)(1)(B) (manufacturers

of firearms other than destructive devices must pay a licensing

fee of fifty dollars per year) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.42(a)(2) (same)

with 18 U.S.C. § 923(a)(3)(B) (dealers in firearms other than

destructive devices must pay a two hundred dollar licensing fee

for the first three years, with a ninety dollar renewal fee every

three years thereafter) and 27 C.F.R. § 478.42(c)(2) (same); manufacturers have additional record keeping obligations, compare

27 C.F.R. § 478.123 (record keeping obligations specific to manufacturers) with 27 C.F.R. § 478.124 (firearms transaction record

required for all licensed importers, manufacturers, and dealers)

and 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.124a, .125(e) (firearms receipt and disposition records for dealers); and manufacturers must engrave each

manufactured firearm with a serial number, see 18 U.S.C.

§ 923(i); 27 C.F.R. § 478.92, although ATF regulations permit

manufacturers to apply for a variance, 27 C.F.R. § 748.92(a)(4).

Broughman, 2009 WL 2511949, at *1 n.3. 

4 BROUGHMAN v. CARVER
Broughman noted a timely appeal over which we have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 

II.

On appeal, Broughman contends that he meets the GCA’s

definition of a firearms "dealer" contained in 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(11)(B), i.e., that he is a person "engaged in the business of . . . making or fitting special barrels, stocks, or trigger

mechanisms to firearms." This specific definition of a

"dealer," in Broughman’s view, renders the GCA’s firearms

"manufacturer" provision inapplicable because the GCA does

not define a firearms "manufacturer." See 18 U.S.C.

§ 921(a)(10) (referring merely to those "engaged in the business of manufacturing firearms or ammunition for purposes of

sale or distribution"). 

Because the GCA’s terms regarding a firearms "dealer" are

more precise, Broughman maintains the canon of statutory

construction stating "the specific governs the general" should

apply. Under this rule of construction, "[s]pecific terms prevail over the general in the same or another statute which

otherwise might be controlling." Opening Brief at 6-7 (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222,

228-29 (1957)). Broughman suggests that, in light of this rule,

"however inclusive may be the definition of ‘manufacturer’

[under § 921(a)(1], that definition cannot be held to apply to

a person whose activities meet [§ 921(a)(11)(B)’s] definition

of ‘dealer.’" Id. at 7.

ATF responds that "Broughman’s argument is premised on

the false assumption th[at] he [cannot] be both a firearms

‘manufacturer’ under § 921(a)(10) and a firearms ‘dealer’

under § 921(a)(11)." Response Brief at 7. "[T]he GCA and the

regulatory framework promulgated by ATF for implementation of the GCA," in ATF’s view, "compel the conclusion that

Congress recognized that a person could be both a firearms

‘dealer’ and a ‘manufacturer.’" Id. As such, ATF would have

BROUGHMAN v. CARVER 5
us apply the ordinary meaning of the term "manufacturing"

and conclude, based on "Broughman’s admissions to Carver,

Carver’s observations of what Broughman was doing in his

gun shop[,] and Broughman’s own description of his acts in

his amended complaint," that Broughman is engaged in the

business of "manufacturing" firearms and must obtain a manufacturer’s license. Id. at 8. 

III.

Whether Broughman is a firearms "manufacturer" within

the meaning of the GCA is "a question of statutory interpretation, a quintessential question of law, which we review de

novo." United States v. Joshua, 607 F.3d 379, 382 (4th Cir.

2010) (quotation omitted). Our objective in all cases of statutory interpretation is "to ascertain and implement the intent of

Congress." Scott v. United States, 328 F.3d 132, 138 (4th Cir.

2003). Because Congress’ intent "can most easily be seen in

the text of the Acts it promulgates," we begin with an examination of the statute’s "plain text." United States v. Wills, 234

F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2000). 

The GCA’s licensing requirement states: "No person shall

engage in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms, or importing or manufacturing ammunition,

until he has filed an application with and received a license

to do so from the Attorney General." 18 U.S.C. § 923(a); see

also 27 C.F.R. § 478.41. In this case, the parties do not dispute that Broughman’s bolt-action rifles meet the GCA’s definition of a "firearm," or that Broughman satisfies the statute’s

"engaged in the business" requirement. See 18 U.S.C.

§§ 921(a)(3) & 921(a)(21)(A). Their disagreement solely concerns the GCA’s distinction between "manufacturing" and

"dealing" firearms.

Under the GCA, a firearms "manufacturer" is defined as

"any person engaged in the business of manufacturing firearms or ammunition for purposes of sale or distribution." Id.

6 BROUGHMAN v. CARVER
§ 921(a)(10). The statute does not further define the term

"manufacturing firearms." In contrast, the GCA defines a firearms "dealer" in three distinct ways.2

See id. § 921(a)(11).

The pertinent part of the statutory definition at issue here

states that a "dealer" is "any person engaged in the business

of repairing firearms or of making or fitting special barrels,

stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms." Id.

§ 921(a)(11)(B).

"Absent explicit legislative intent to the contrary," we give

the words of a statute their "plain and ordinary meaning."

Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124, 1133 (4th Cir.

1996). The plain and ordinary meaning of the word "manufacture" is "to make into a product suitable for use." MerriamWebster Online Dictionary (2010); see also id. (listing as

related words "assemble, build, construct . . . refashion, [and]

remake"). We therefore conclude that manufacturing firearms

under § 923(a) entails assembling a firearm’s individual components so as to render the firearm "suitable for use."3

 The

2

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(11) provides as follows: 

The term "dealer" means (A) any person engaged in the business

of selling firearms at wholesale or retail, (B) any person engaged

in the business of repairing firearms or of making or fitting special barrels, stocks, or trigger mechanisms to firearms, or (C) any

person who is a pawnbroker. The term "licensed dealer" means

any dealer who is licensed under the provisions of this chapter.

While subsections A and C may also apply to some of Broughman’s business activities, subsection B is the only provision relevant to the issue in

this case. 

3We reject Broughman’s contention that "manufacture," in context of

the GCA, should be defined as the "creat[ion] [of] items ‘from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations.’" Reply Brief at 5 n.2 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers,

Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1931)). American Fruit Growers considered whether a certain process for rendering fruit resistant to decay constituted a "manufactured article" within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 31.

283 U.S. at 11. Given the patent-law context in which that case was

decided, it is unsurprising the Supreme Court chose to utilize a definition

BROUGHMAN v. CARVER 7
manner in which Broughman conducts his gun business; i.e.,

"build[ing] custom bolt action rifles" by threading and chambering barrels to fit firearms actions, bluing the actions, and

making and fitting stocks to the actions and barrels; undoubtedly places him within the statutory category of a firearms

"manufacturer."

To circumvent the conclusion that he is "engaged in the

business of manufacturing firearms" within the meaning of

the GCA, Broughman points us to the well known canon of

construction that "the specific governs the general." Varity

Corp v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 511 (1996). "Canons of construction, however, are simply rules of thumb which will

sometimes help courts determine the meaning of legislation."

Id. (quotations omitted). We have characterized the canon in

question as merely "a warning against applying a general provision when doing so would undermine limitations created by

a more specific provision." Id. Section 921(a)(11)(B)’s definition of a firearms "dealer" does not, however, impose any

clear limitations that would be undermined by adhering to the

plain text of § 921(a)(10). Moreover, Congress knows how to

carve out firearms "dealers" from firearms "manufacturers"

when it wishes to prevent any overlap of the two categories.

Congress did so in the National Firearms Act of 1934 when

it enacted mutually exclusive definitions of a firearms "manufacturer" and a firearms "dealer." See 26 U.S.C. § 5845(k)

(stating that a "dealer" within the meaning of the National

of "manufacture" that focused on the originality of the resulting product.

See Ambrosia Chocolate Co. v. Ambrosia Cake Bakery, 165 F.2d 693, 697

(4th Cir. 1948) ("Only upon a clear showing of novelty and originality . . .

is a patent granted . . . ."). Here, we are not concerned with whether

Broughman’s rifles were sufficiently original to warrant patent protection,

but with whether they were "manufactured" within the meaning of the

GCA. A more general definition of "manufacture," which is more suited

to this context, therefore applies. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson

Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (recognizing that "we must be

guided to a degree by common sense"). 

8 BROUGHMAN v. CARVER
Firearms Act of 1934 is "any person, not a manufacturer or

importer, engaged in the business of selling, renting, leasing,

or loaning firearms") (emphasis added). Congress has not

similarly worded the GCA. 

Broughman argues "the district court’s holding makes the

definition of ‘dealer’ at issue here a complete nullity, with no

effect whatever because any person who meets that definition

would nonetheless be considered a manufacturer." Opening

Brief at 8. We disagree. Circumstances certainly exist in

which an individual would meet § 921(a)(11)(B)’s definition

of a firearms "dealer" without qualifying as a firearms "manufacturer" under § 921(a)(10). Firearms "dealers" under

§ 921(a)(11)(A) and (C) are not firearms "manufacturers" and

the same is true of many "dealers" under subsection (B). Certainly if Broughman only repaired firearms, fitted new stocks

on rifles, or interchanged choke barrels, he would fit the definition of § 921(a)(11)(B) "dealer" but not that of a

§ 921(a)(10) "manufacturer." 

Section 921(a)(11)(B) is thus not rendered superfluous by

construing a "manufacturer" under § 921(a)(10), as both we

and the district court have done, in accordance with its plain

text. That the totality of Broughman’s custom rifle building

may fall under the "dealer" definition does not exclude him

from being a "manufacturer" within the meaning of the Act

because he meets that classification as well. Broughman’s

business consists of combining the essential parts of a firearm

in order to make that firearm "ready for use," in the first

instance, and that clearly qualifies him as a "manufacturer"

under the GCA.4

4We recognize that the GCA defines a "firearm" not only as "any

weapon . . . which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to

expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," but also as "the frame or

receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3). But this fact does

not support Broughman’s argument that he cannot be a firearms "manufacturer" because he does not create "the frame or receiver" used to fashion the bolt-action rifles in question. That Broughman manufactures

"firearms" within the meaning of one statutory definition rather than

another does not render him any less a manufacturer of "firearms" within

the meaning of the Act. 

BROUGHMAN v. CARVER 9
In upholding the vitality of both the GCA’s "dealing" and

"manufacturing" provisions, we remain true to "our duty to

give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute."

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)

(quotation omitted). Adopting Broughman’s position, in contrast, would go a long way towards reading the GCA’s "manufacturing" provisions out of the Act. See id. at 539 (refusing

to adopt an interpretation of a statute that would "emasculate

an entire section" of the act). This result cannot be squared

with Congress’ intent in implementing the GCA. 

We must "construe the details of [every statute] in conformity with its dominating general purpose . . . and . . . interpret

the text so far as the meaning of the words fairly permits so

as to carry out in particular cases [Congress’] generally

expressed legislative policy." SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing

Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1943). In this case, the "regulatory goals" of the GCA are clear: "the Act ensure[s] that

weapons [are] distributed through regular channels and in a

traceable manner," thus making "possible the prevention of

sales to undesirable customers and the detection of the origin

of particular firearms." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,

713 (1987) (quotation omitted). Severely limiting the application of the GCA’s "manufacturing" provisions would be

inconsistent with these goals and would serve to "undermine

the congressional policies" underlying the Act.5 Custer v.

5We note that requiring Broughman to engrave his identifying information on the bolt-action rifles he creates is consistent with the existing regulatory scheme, which requires a "firearm frame or receiver that is not a

component part of a complete weapon at the time it is sold [to be] identified as required by" 27 C.F.R. § 478.92(a)(1)(ii). 27 C.F.R. § 478.92(a)(2);

see also id. § 478.92(a)(1)(ii) (instituting an engraving requirement

encompassing a firearm’s model and caliber, as well as the manufacturer’s

name and the city and state of the manufacturer’s business). As the district

court correctly noted, firearms manufacturers may apply to ATF for a variance allowing them to use "other means of identification," provided "such

other identification is reasonable and will not hinder the effective administration" of the regulatory scheme. 27 C.F.R. § 478.92(a)(4)(i). 

10 BROUGHMAN v. CARVER
Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996); see also RSM,

Inc. v. Buckles, 254 F.3d 61, 63 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining

that, pursuant to the GCA, ATF "operates a firearms tracing

system" that allows it to "track[ ] the movement of [a] weapon

through the chain of distribution to the federal firearms

licensee . . . who ultimately sold the firearm to the retail purchaser").

We therefore conclude based on the GCA’s plain language,

"the specific context in which that language is used, and the

broader context of the statute as a whole," Robinson v. Shell

Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997), that Broughman is a "manufacturer" of firearms within the meaning of the Act. Section

923(a) thus requires Broughman to maintain a manufacturer’s

license.6 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of ATF. 

AFFIRMED 

6Under the existing regulatory scheme, Broughman’s manufacturer’s

license entitles him to sell the bolt-action rifles he creates without separately obtaining a dealer’s license. See 27 C.F.R. § 478.41(b) ("[I]t shall

not be necessary for . . . a licensed manufacturer to also obtain a dealer’s

license in order to engage in business on the licensed premises as a dealer

in the same type of firearms authorized by the license to be . . . manufactured.") 

BROUGHMAN v. CARVER 11