[Cite as Ranazzi v. Fire Recovery USA, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-3281.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LUCAS COUNTY

Andrew Ranazzi Court of Appeals No. L-23-1024

Appellant Trial Court No. CVE 2210031

 

v.

Fire Recovery USA, LLC DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellee Decided: September 15, 2023

* * * * *

Andrew Ranazzi, Pro se.

Taylor R. Ward, for appellee.

* * * * *

OSOWIK, J.

{¶ 1} This is an appeal of a January 30, 2023 judgment of the Sylvania Municipal 

Court, Lucas County, Ohio, granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment, and 

denying appellant’s motion to strike the summary judgment supporting affidavits. 

Appellant filed no brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for summary judgment. For 

the reasons set forth below, this court affirms the judgment of the trial court. 
2.

{¶ 2} This case arises from an October 5, 2021 motor vehicle accident between

appellant and another vehicle in Pittsfield Township, Michigan (“Pittsfield”). Following

the accident, State Farm, appellant’s insurer, received a $435 emergency services cost 

recovery claim from Pittsfield for reimbursement of the costs of fire department services

incurred by Pittsfield as a result of the collision. State Farm allowed $250 of the $435 

claim, and tendered payment in that amount. This appeal centers upon the $185 residual 

balance following the insurance payment. 

{¶ 3} Pro se appellant, Andrew Ranazzi, sets forth the following three assignments 

of error:

I. The Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary 

judgment without allowing appellant to respond or file his opposition to it.

II. The Trial Court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary 

judgment [given] Judge Bonfiglio’s prior decision [].

III. The Trial Court erred in denying appellant’s motion to strike [].

{¶ 4} The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. On October 5, 

2021, appellant backed his motor vehicle out of a driveway in Pittsfield and into the path 

of oncoming traffic, resulting in an accident. 

{¶ 5} A Pittsfield fire department crew was dispatched to the accident scene to 

secure it, evaluate and furnish any needed medical care, evaluate and furnish any needed 

site cleanup, and conduct an investigation. The report generated by the fire department
3.

reflects that, upon arrival at the accident scene, they attempted to examine appellant for 

medical injuries. Appellant refused to undergo a medical examination or treatment. In 

response, a refusal form was provided to appellant and executed by him. In addition, the

fire department performed a site assessment to determine if any hazardous materials or 

liquids had spilled during the collision that needed to be cleaned up. It was determined

that no such spillage occurred.

{¶ 6} On October 14, 2021, in conformity with a Pittsfield ordinance, State Farm

received a $435 claim on behalf of Pittsfield. State Farm allowed the claim, and tendered 

a payment of $250 to Pittsfield. Appellant later received a statement requesting payment 

of the $185 remaining balance from appellee, Pittsfield’s third-party billing administrator.

{¶ 7} The record reflects that appellant denied financial responsibility and refused 

to tender payment. On April 13, 2022, appellee sent a demand letter to appellant. On 

April 28, 2022, in response to the demand letter, appellant filed a complaint in Sylvania 

Municipal Court, alleging that he sustained $6,000 in damages as a result of appellee’s

pursuit of the $185 balance. 

{¶ 8} In the complaint, appellant alleged that, “[N]o Pittsfield fire department 

personnel appeared to be on the scene nor did they render assistance to anyone.” 

However, the record irrefutably reflects that fire department personnel were dispatched to 

the scene, secured the scene, offered medical assistance, obtained an executed refusal 

form from appellant, and performed a site assessment regarding cleanup. The fire 
4.

department crash report reflected that, “[Fire Department truck] T10-1 parked to protect 

the scene and went to check for injuries and hazards * * * crew members obtained signed 

refusal [from appellant] * * * T10-1 blocked traffic until released by Pittsfield Police, 

returning to in-service at that time. At fault information, according to police: 

[Appellant].”

{¶ 9} Appellant alleged that as a result of appellee’s demand for payment of the 

$185 balance he, “suffered damages in the form of having increased insurance costs, as 

well as a threat to his credit rating.” The record is devoid of evidence demonstrative of 

these claims. 

{¶ 10} On May 6, 2022, appellee’s CFO submitted correspondence to the trial 

court requesting that the case be dismissed. Given that a motion to dismiss had not been 

properly filed, as conceded by appellee, the case was not dismissed. 

{¶ 11} On November 14, 2022, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. In 

support of the motion for summary judgment, appellee attached the supporting affidavits 

of Lt. Yurkunas (“Yurkunas”), the fire department member who was dispatched to the

accident scene and offered assistance to appellant, and the affidavit of his superior, Fire 

Chief Gleason (“Gleason”). Appellee emphasized in support of summary judgment that 

appellant’s principal claim in the complaint, that the fire department did not respond to 

the scene or provide services, was contrary to the record of evidence, including the crash 

report, photographs, and supporting affidavits. 
5.

{¶ 12} Appellant did not file a brief in opposition to appellee’s motion for 

summary judgment. Rather, appellant filed a motion for an extension of time, 

accompanied by a motion to strike, setting forth unsupported claims that the two

affidavits submitted by the above-referenced fire department members were not based 

upon their personal knowledge and were, therefore, improper. The trial court was not 

persuaded. 

{¶ 13} On January 30, 2023, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to strike and

granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court determined in relevant 

part, 

There is no credible evidence that * * * Pittsfield Fire Department did not 

appear at the scene of plaintiff’s accident to render aid. Plaintiff’s claim to 

that effect is totally without merit. Plaintiff presents no evidence * * * that 

the charge of $185 for services rendered is excessive. Plaintiff’s motion to 

strike the affidavits [of Lt. Yurkunas and Chief Gleason] is found not well

taken * * * [D]efendant’s motion for summary judgment is granted. 

This appeal ensued.

{¶ 14} Appellant’s first two assignments of error are premised upon the position

that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment. 

Accordingly, they will be considered simultaneously.
6.

{¶ 15} It is well-established that an appellate court reviews a disputed trial court 

summary judgment determination utilizing the same standard as that used by the trial 

court. Summary judgment will be granted if the movant demonstrates that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact, and when construing the evidence most strongly in favor 

of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Lorain Natl. Banl v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio 

App3d. 127, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist. 1989). Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶ 16} In support of the claim that the trial court erred in granting summary 

judgment to appellee, appellant alleges that, “Both affidavits * * * have impermissible 

hearsay * * * neither is germane to the proceedings nor within the personal knowledge of 

any of the affiants.” The record of evidence does not comport with appellant’s position. 

{¶ 17} Civ.R. 56(E) establishes that, “Affidavits shall be made on personal 

knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show 

affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated in the affidavit.” 

In conjunction, the Ohio Supreme Court determined in Bonacorsi v. Wheeling & Lake 

Erie Ry. Co., 95 Ohio St.3d 314, 2002-Ohio-2220, 767 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 26, “The personal 

knowledge standard requirement in Civ.R. 56(E) tracks the personal knowledge standard 

of Evid.R. 602 covering lay witness testimony at trial.” 

{¶ 18} In applying the above-discussed legal parameters for proper summary 

judgment supporting affidavits, this court held in Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Brunner, 
7.

2013-Ohio-128, 986 N.E.2d 565, ¶ 12 (6th Dist.), “The foundation for personal 

knowledge may be furnished by the witness’s own testimony. Evid.R. 602. A mere 

assertion of personal knowledge satisfies Civ.R. 56(E) if the nature of the facts in the 

affidavit, combined with the identity of the affiant, creates a reasonable inference that the 

affiant has personal knowledge of the facts.”

{¶ 19} The affidavit of Yurkunas sets forth that the affiant, in his capacity as an

on-duty fire lieutenant with Pittsfield on the day and time of appellant’s accident, was 

dispatched to the accident scene to secure it, assess it, and to provide medical and cleanup 

services. He further attests to his direct observations upon arrival at the scene, and the 

actions that he took in response to his observations. Lastly, he attests that he drafted the

crash report documenting the accident.

{¶ 20} Next, the affidavit of Gleason sets forth that the affiant, in his capacity as 

Pittsfield’s fire chief, reviewed the reports prepared by Yurkunas related to this case, and 

based upon that review, he was familiar with the actions taken by the fire department in 

response to the accident. In addition, as the Pittsfield fire chief, he further attests to his

personal knowledge of, and experience with, department policies and practices, including

the post-collision third-party administrative cost recovery billing process underlying this 

case.

{¶ 21} In accord with Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi, and Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn., as 

regards to appellant’s claim that the affidavits were not based upon personal knowledge 
8.

and were improper, we find that the nature of the facts set forth in the affidavits, 

combined with the identity of the affiants, creates a reasonable inference that the affiants 

had personal knowledge of the facts. Accordingly, the affidavits were not improper. 

{¶ 22} Based upon our de novo review, we find that reasonable minds can only 

conclude that appellee furnished credible, unrefuted evidence reflecting that Pittsfield fire 

department personnel were dispatched to, and performed emergency services at,

appellant’s crash scene. Appellant furnished no evidence of impropriety in connection to 

appellee’s emergency services cost recovery effort. The trial court did not err in granting 

summary judgment to appellee. Appellant’s first and second assignments of error are

found not well-taken.

{¶ 23} In appellant’s third assignment of error, appellant similarly contends that 

the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion to strike appellee’s summary judgment

supporting affidavits. We do not concur.

{¶ 24} As this court held in Bliss v. Johns Manville, 172 N.E. 3d 1146, 2021-

Ohio-1673, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.), “A trial court’s decision to deny a motion to strike will not 

be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Hizer, 6th Dist. Lucas 

No. L-13-1035, 2013-Ohio-4621, ¶ 16, citing State ex. rel. Mora v. Wilkinson, 105 Ohio 

St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-1509, 824 N.E.2d 1000, ¶ 10. Abuse of discretion means that the 

trial court’s attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Wilkinson at ¶ 10.” 
9.

{¶ 25} In support of the third assignment of error, appellant again asserts that, 

“[T]hese affidavits both fail because neither of the affiants have any personal knowledge 

of the accident.”

{¶ 26} As discussed in detail above, the record reflects that the nature of the facts 

set forth in the affidavits, in combination with the identity of the affiants, created a 

reasonable inference that the affiants had personal knowledge of those facts, in 

conformity with Civ.R. 56(E), Bonacorsi, and Fed. Natl. Mtge. Assn. Accordingly, no 

basis for striking the affidavits was manifest. Appellant has not demonstrated that the 

trial court’s denial of the motion to strike the affidavits was unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable. Wherefore, we find appellant’s third assignment of error not well-taken.

{¶ 27} On consideration whereof, the judgment of the Sylvania Municipal Court is 

hereby affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 

24.

Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. 

See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
10.

Andrew Ranazzi

v. Fire Recovery USA, LLC

L-23-1024

Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________

JUDGE

Gene A. Zmuda, J. 

CONCUR. ____________________________

JUDGE

Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________

CONCURS IN JUDGMENT JUDGE

ONLY.

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of

Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported

version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.