alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### R V. HIX *vs.*ALLEN FISHER.

The Superior Court has no jurisdiction to decide whether a deposition be regularly taken,'except on appeal from the Clerk's dacision, in pursuance of *see.*63, *eh, 81,-*Rev. Code, or when it is offered to be read ia evidence on á trial; therefore, an. appeal un ier ch. 4, sec. 23, of Rev. Code, from the decision of a Judge on that question, does not lie to tha Supreme Court, unless the record shows that *the Judge*had acquired jurisdiction in one of these two 'ways.

The case is stated in the opinion of the Court.

*Merrimon*for the plaintiff»

*W. H. Bailey*for the défendant.

Battle, J.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order, made in the Superior Court of Haywood county,' by Readé, Judge. In the argument here it was said," by the counsel, that the order was made in a proceeding to review the decision of the Clerk in passing upon the sufficiency of a deposition, as prescribed in the Rev. Code, ch. 31/feee. 63., But the record does not show that the Clerk had passed upon the, deposition at all, and of course does mot show that there was any' appeal from any order made by him. The order of the Judge does not appear to have been made on the trial of the cause, for, so far as the record shows, there was no jury impanneled to try it. All that appears from the record, is, that the deposition was brought to the notice of the Court, preparatory to the trial, and the question was submitted to the presiding Judge, whether it was taken under such circumstances as would allow of its being read on the trial,-and he decided *85against its admissibility. Sucb being tbe-ease, be bad n« jurisdiction to'make tbe order, and there haring been no cause before tbe Court, there could be no appeal under the 23d section of the 4th chapter of the Revised Code. The consequence is that the appeal must be dismissed as haviug been improvidently granted. Whether, if the record had shown’ an appeal from the decision óf the clerk to the Court, the Judge might have decided on the appeal, before the jury was impahncled in the :cause, and allowed an appeal from his order to this Court, or whether it was necessary to offer the deposition on the trial, and let its admission or rejection form an item in a bill of exceptions, is an interesting question of practice, which wé will not undertake to decide until it is properly brought before us.

The appeal must be dismissed at the cost* of the appellant.
CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Timeshare Holdings, Inc.  (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2008 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Frederick Conte, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.




May
      28, 2008
            
            /s/
      Frederick ConteFrederick
      ConteChief
      Financial Officer
#### ANDERSON DULA *vs.*J. AND C. COWLES.

Where a person who had contracted to sell and deliver a certain quantity of jork, delivers a part and refuses to deliver the remainder, he cannot recover for the part delivered.

AotioN of debt commenced before a justice of the peace for a balance due for pork sold and delivered, tried before Manly, Judge, at the last term of Wilkes Superior Court.

The plaintiff agreed to deliver to the defendants 1500 lbs. of pork by tile 1st January, 1853, at 6 cents per pound, to be paid for in demands which defendants already held against the plaintiff, and the balance, if any, one half goods the other cash.

No pork was delivered at the time stipulated, but on 6th and 24th of January of that year, two parcels were delivered, making together 1033 lbs., which were received by the defendants and appropriated by them.

Some short time afterwards, an attempt was made to ascertain and settle the balance due, when it was admitted $18 49 was due to the plaintiff for the pork delivered after deducting all the claims which defendants held against him, except a small judgment of two or three dollars, that was out in the hands of a constable: plaintiff was willing that this should be deducted from the $18 49, and to tak& an order for it, and demanded a settlement of the residue, saying that he was entitled to have the balance in cash, as he had taken up sufficient goods after the bargain was made.

The defendants refused to settle unless pork was delivered to make up the 1500 lbs., •whereupon the plaintiff brought suit.

*455It appeared that the judgment for two or three dollars was afterwards paid off by the plaintiff.

His Honor instructed the jury that if *the obstacle to the settlement*was the demand for full 1500 lbs. of pork, made as stated above, the plaintiff was entitled to recover his $18 49 (admitted to be due) in cash. Defendants excepted;

Verdict for plaintiff and judgment. •

The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.

No counsel appeared for the plaintiff

Mitchell, for the defendants.

Battle, J.

Eor the reasons given and upon the authorities cited, in the case of *White*v. Brown, ante 403, decided at the present term, the plaintiff cannot recover. He' made a contract to sell and deliver to the defendants a certain quantity of pork for which he was to be paid in a particular manner. After performing part of his contract, he refused to perform, the residue against the consent of the defendants and without any .default on their part. The judgment must be set aside and a new trial granted.

Pee OueiaM. Judgment reversed.
##### 



Exhibit 99.1

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Each of the undersigned hereby certifies, in his capacity as an officer of The
Corporate Executive Board Company (the Company), for purposes of 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of his knowledge:



| |  |  | The Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K/A for the annual
period ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | - |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
| |  |  | The information contained in such report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
the Company.                                                   

|                                                                                                                    
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|/s/ James J. McGonigleJames J. McGonigle
Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief
Executive Officer
July 3, 2003
|                                                                                                                    
|/s/ Timothy R. YostTimothy R. Yost
Chief Financial Officer
July 3, 2003
#### P. D. BROADWELL v. C. B. RAY.

*Certiorari*— Appeal—Dismissal.

Where a *certiorari*has been granted to an appellant to complete the record by supplying material evidence that had been omitted from the case as settled, but the Clerk of the Superior Court returns that appellant failed to perfect his appeal, or to pay fees for a transcript of the record, though demanded, the appeaL will be dismissed. .

ActioN by P. D. Broadwell against C. B. Ray. From the judgment defendant appealed, and, material evidence *192having been omitted from the case as settled, he was granted a *certiorari*to complete the record. To this the Clerk returns that defendant failed to perfect his appeal or to pay fees for a transcript of the record.

For prior report, see 111 N. C., 457.

*Mr. W. H. Pace,*for petitioner.

*Mr. 8. G. Ryan,*for respondent.

Per Curiam :

A *certiorari*was granted in this case, 111 N. C., 457. To this the Clerk of Wake Superior Court returns that the defendant failed to perfect his appeal or to pay fees for a transcript of the record, though demanded.

The appeal must be dismissed. *Bailey*v. *Brown,*105 N. C., 127; *State*v. *Nash,*109 N. C., 822.

Appeal Dismissed.
### Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,
Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h Marilyn Kell y Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathawa y Mary Beth Kell y Brian K. Zahra,

J ustices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk May 21, 2012

h0514 

# Order

May 21, 2012

144558

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 144558 COA: 306948 Livingston CC: 07-016357-FH KIRK ALAN JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.

_____________ _______________ _____________
On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal the January 3, 2012 order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.
**EXHIBIT
      32.2**







**CERTIFICATION
      OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER**


**PURSUANT
      TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**


**SECTION
      906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**








I, **Richard
      Goldenberg** ,
      certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
      906
      of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:




(i) the
      Annual Report of EVCI Career Colleges Holding Corp. on Form 10-K/A for the
      year
      ended December 31, 2006 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
      or
      15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934* and




(ii)
      information contained in such report fairly presents in all material respects
      the financial condition and results of operations of EVCI Career Colleges
      Holding Corp.








Dated:
                May 1, 2007
            
            
            
            /s**/**Richard
                GoldenbergRichard
                Goldenberg
              Chief
                Financial Officer





*
      Except that Part III will be
      filed by amendment.
### Exhibit 32.1

### 

### 

### CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002







In connection with the Annual Report of American Community Properties Trust (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period ending December 31, 2005, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, J. Michael Wilson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify to my knowledge, pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. Section 1350), that:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.









|/s/ J. Michael Wilson               
|------------------------------------
|J. Michael Wilson                   
|Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
|March 30, 2006
<PAGE>

                                                                     Exhibit 4.4

                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST
                                       OF
                             MARKEL CAPITAL TRUST II

         THIS CERTIFICATE OF TRUST of Markel Capital Trust II (the "Trust"), is
being duly executed and filed by the undersigned, as trustee, to form a business
trust under the Delaware Business Trust Act (12 Del. C. (S)3801, et seq.).

         I.       Name.  The name of the business trust formed hereby is Markel
                  ----
Capital Trust II.

         II.      Delaware Trustee.  The name and business address of the
                  ----------------
trustee of the Trust with a principal place of business in the State of Delaware
is Chase Manhattan Bank USA, National Association, 1201 Market Street,
Wilmington, Delaware 19801.


         IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned trustee of the Trust has executed
this Certificate of Trust as of October 15, 2001.

                  CHASE MANHATTAN BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
                              not in its individual capacity
                              but solely as trustee of the Trust


                              By:   /s/ Michael B McCarthy
                                   ----------------------------
                                   Name:  Michael B. McCarthy
                                   Title: Vice President
#### O’Brien and wife, Appellants, vs. Dane County, Respondent.

For the appellants : *Rooney & Hillyer*of Madison.

For the respondent: *Norris E. Maloney,*district attorney, and *Walter M. Bjork,*deputy district attorney.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                                   AS ADDED BY
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

            In connection with the Quarterly Report of Provident Community
  Bancshares, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30,
  2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I,
  Dwight V. Neese, President and Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
  certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as added by Section 906 of the
  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:


          (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
               or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

          (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
               material respects, the financial condition and results of
               operations of the Company as of and for the period covered by the
               Report.



                                         /s/ Dwight V. Neese
                                         -------------------
                                         Dwight V. Neese
                                         President and Chief Executive Officer


Date:   August 8, 2006
EXHIBIT 12.2

                   CERTIFICATION OF VICE-PRESIDENT, ACCOUNTING
       OF OCEAN RIG ASA PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT


I, Erling Meinich-Bache, certify that:

     1. I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Ocean Rig ASA;

     2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement
of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were
made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

     3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the
financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Company as of,
and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

     4. The Company's other certifying officer and I are responsible for
establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in
Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the Company and have:

a)   designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure
     controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure
     that material information relating to the Company, including its
     consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
     entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is
     being prepared;

b)   evaluated the effectiveness of the Company's disclosure controls and
     procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the
     effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of
     the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)   disclosed in this report any change in the Company's internal control over
     financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual
     report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially
     affect, the Company's internal control over financial reporting; and

     5. The company's other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on
our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Company's auditors and the audit committee of the Company's board of directors
(or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
     likely to adversely affect the Company's ability to record, process,
     summarize and report financial information; and

(b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the Company's internal control
     over financial reporting.


Date: June 30, 2004



/s/ Erling Meinich-Bache
-------------------------------
Erling Meinich-Bache
Vice-president, Accounting


                                      114
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<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
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<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  115,443<F1>
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<INVENTORY>                                    152,813
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               288,790
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   742,411
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<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  678,557
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              34,433
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (395)
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<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (213)
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
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<FN>
<F1>AMOUNTS PRESENTED ARE NET
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 23.1




Consent of Independent Registered Public Accounting Firm




The Board of Directors


Albany Molecular Research, Inc.:




We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements (No. 333-152169, No. 333-80477 and No. 333-91423) on Form S-8 of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. of our reports dated March 16, 2011, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. and subsidiaries as of December 31, 2010 and 2009, the related consolidated statements of operations, stockholders’ equity and comprehensive (loss) income, and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 2010, and the related financial statement schedule, and the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting as of December 31, 2010, which reports appear in the December 31, 2010, annual report on Form 10-K of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. and subsidiaries.









/s/ KPMG LLP


Albany, New York


March 16, 2011
#### *SAMUEL H. TAYLOR v. JOHN M. BROWER.

*Practice*— Appeal *to this Court.*

-On appeals to this Court, if the parties by express agreement appearing upon record extend the time allowed by law for preparing cases this Court, such agreement will be respected; but if they disagree ■ in regard to time or any material thing to be done, after the time allowed by law has expired, the rule of law governing appeals will be enforced.

*(Wade*v. *City of New Berne,*72 N. C. 498, cited and apxsroved.)

■MotioN for a Certiorari heard at' January Term, 1878, of .The Supreme Court.

The defendant filed his petition for a *certiorari*at June Term, 1877, of this Court, and upon the hearing at this term the mótion was not allowed, and the petition dismissed.

*Messrs. Gray $ Stamps,*for plaintiff.

*Messrs. Merrimon, Fuller Sf Ashe,*for defendant.

*

Smith, C. J., having been of counsel did not sit on the hearing of this case.

Faircloth, J.

The rule for perfecting appeals under C. *9•C. P. was laid down in plain terms in *Wade*v. *City of New*Berne, 72 N. C. 498, and has been since approved several times. If the parties by‘express agreement appearing on record extend, the time allowed by law for preparing the •case for this Court, their agreement will be respected; but if they disagree in regard to time or any material thing to be done after the time allowed by law has expired, the whole contention will be disregarded and the rule of law will be applied.

In the present case it was agreed, as we understand the .affidavits, that the appellant would serve his statement at Yadkin Court. If this is not true, the appellant is without any ground to. stand on, as no other time or place was designated, and the rule requiring it to be made, and copy furnished within five days from the entry of appeal, disposes of the question against him. It is admitted that no statement of the'case "was furnished the appellee at Yadkin Court, .although an attorney of each party was present until the Court adjourned on Thursday of the first week; also, that ■no copy was furnished wfithin the two weeks assigned to •said Court, although opposing counsel resided in. the same town and were there after the Court had adjourned.

It is alleged that the appellant’s counsel who was relied upon to make out the statement of the ease and serve it, went to'Greensboro on professional business and expected to attend to the matter during the second week of Yadkin -Court, but on hearing of the adjournment of Court, did not •go. Admitting all this to be true, it furnishes no sufficient •excuse to the appellant. The Court did not adjourn by accident, but as usual, only a day or two sooner than ac former terms. The case was not made up according to the agreement, nor according to law. The, motion for a *certiorari*is not allowed.

Per Curiam. Motion denied.