NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GUETATCHEW FIKROU, 

Plaintiff-counterdefendant-Appellant, 

 v. 

FIRST AMERICAN TRUSTEE 

SERVICING SOLUTIONS, LLC; 

RESIDENTIAL CREDIT SOLUTIONS, 

INC., 

Defendants-Appellees, 

THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, 

FKA The Bank of New York, as Trustee for 

the Certificate Holders of CWMBC, Inc., 

CHL Mortgage Pass-Through Trust 2007-J2 

Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 

2007-J2, 

Defendant-counter-claimantAppellee, 

and 

SUNRIDGE HEIGHTS, 

Counter-defendant.

No. 17-16940 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00908-JCMGWF 

MEMORANDUM*

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 24 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-16940 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 15, 2018**

Before: SILVERMAN, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Guetatchew Fikrou appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment 

dismissing his diversity action alleging quiet title and declaratory relief claims. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of 

discretion. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 2002) (dismissal for 

failure to comply with a court order); see also Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 

779, 786 (9th Cir. 2011) (entry of default judgment). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Fikrou’s action 

because Fikrou failed to comply with the district court’s orders to file a joint 

pretrial order in compliance with the local rules after the district court warned him

that continued failure to comply would result in dismissal. See Pagtalunan, 291 

F.3d at 642-43 (discussing the five factors to consider in determining whether to 

dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order); 

Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (although dismissal is a 

harsh penalty, the district court’s dismissal should not be disturbed absent “a 

 

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
3 17-16940 

definite and firm conviction” that it “committed a clear error of judgment” (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted)). 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment 

against Fikrou on Bank of New York Mellon’s counterclaim because the factors 

supported entry of default as a sanction for Fikrou’s failure to prosecute and 

comply with the court’s orders. See Dreith v. Nu Image, Inc., 648 F.3d 779, 786

(9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and factors to consider before 

declaring a default).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fikrou’s motion for 

reconsideration because Fikrou failed to set forth any basis for relief from the 

judgment. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 

1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and grounds for 

relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) or 60(b)).

We reject as unsupported by the record Fikrou’s contentions regarding

judicial bias or fraud by opposing counsel.

In light of our disposition, we do not consider the underlying merits of 

Fikrou’s quiet title claim. See Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1386 (9th Cir. 

1996) (“[I]nterlocutory orders, generally appealable after final judgment, are not 

appealable after a dismissal for failure to prosecute, whether the failure to 

prosecute is purposeful or is a result of negligence or mistake.” (citation and 
4 17-16940 

internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.