Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

People v. Sweet, 2017 IL App (3d) 140434

Appellate Court 

Caption

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 

DEREK I. SWEET, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. Third District

Docket Nos. 3-14-0434, 3-16-0346 cons.

Filed

Rehearing denied

September 8, 2017

October 2, 2017

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of McDonough County, No. 

01-CF-141; the Hon. Dwayne Morrison, and the Hon. Richard 

Gambrell, Judges, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael J. Pelletier, Peter A. Carusona, and Dimitrios G. Golfis, of 

State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Matthew P. Kwacala, State’s Attorney, of Macomb (Patrick Delfino, 

Lawrence M. Bauer, and Mark A. Austill, of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

Panel JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 Defendant, Derek I. Sweet, appeals the denial of his postconviction petition after a 

third-stage evidentiary hearing. On appeal, defendant argues this court should reverse the trial 

court’s denial of his postconviction petition because he was denied the reasonable assistance of 

postconviction counsel where his postconviction counsel failed to present any evidence in 

support of his claim that his trial counsel, Gayle Carper, was operating under a per se conflict 

of interest at the time of defendant’s guilty plea. Defendant also appeals the dismissal of his 

petition for relief from judgment filed pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012)), arguing that (1) the trial court 

erroneously dismissed the section 2-1401 petition and (2) the trial court abused its discretion 

by denying defendant’s request for counsel to be appointed for representation on his section 

2-1401 petition. We affirm both the denial of defendant’s postconviction petition and the 

dismissal of his petition for relief from judgment. 

¶ 2 FACTS 

¶ 3 A. Background 

¶ 4 On September 10, 2001, at the age of 25, defendant was charged with first-degree murder 

of two-year-old Faith Hamann. The charging instrument was subsequently amended, alleging 

that defendant had “without lawful justification, bent Faith Hamann backwards, bending her 

back, causing a separation of the vertebrae and a torn aorta, knowing such acts created a strong 

probability of great bodily harm to Faith Hamann, thereby causing the death of Faith 

Hamann.” Defendant was represented by John Carter, a public defender. 

¶ 5 On October 1, 2001, after a preliminary hearing, defendant pled not guilty. On August 5, 

2002, Carter withdrew as counsel for defendant due to a conflict of interest. The trial court 

appointed Gayle Carper as defendant’s new counsel. 

¶ 6 On December 3, 2002, defendant’s jury trial began. On the first day of trial, the State’s 

evidence showed that defendant and his girlfriend, Sarah, were living together with Sarah’s 

two children—seven-year-old Logan and two-year-old Faith. On the evening of Faith’s death, 

Sarah had gone out to run errands, leaving the children with defendant. Twenty minutes later 

defendant called 9-1-1 because Faith was not breathing. Upon arrival at the home, the police 

chief observed Faith lying on the kitchen counter, unresponsive, and defendant standing next 

to her. Defendant appeared panicked and upset. Defendant initially indicated that Faith was in 

bed when he heard a thud, he found her facedown, and she was not breathing. An autopsy 

showed Faith had a torn aorta, which caused her to bleed to death internally, and she had an 

abnormal separation of the vertebrae caused by a forced hyperextension of her body 

backwards. A medical doctor opined that a massive amount of force was required to cause the 

injuries to Faith and death would come within minutes of the injuries. Defendant informed an 

investigator that he had picked up Faith while she was facedown, with her feet in one hand and 

her head in his other hand, and he bent her up so that her feet touched her head until he heard 

her back snap. 

¶ 7 On the second day of trial, the prosecutor indicated that he would be calling one more 

witness to testify. The trial court announced it had been informed that defendant wished to 

withdraw his plea of not guilty and, instead, enter a plea of guilty. The trial court admonished 
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defendant in relation to his guilty plea and the sentencing range for the murder charge. The trial 

judge asked defendant if he understood that the charge against him carried a penalty range of 

20 to 100 years of imprisonment, to which defendant responded, “Yes, sir.” The trial judge 

asked defendant if he was telling the court that on September 7, 2001, he had bent Faith 

Hamann back, causing a fracture to the spine and a torn aorta, without lawful justification, 

knowing that action created a strong probability of causing her death, and that he committed 

the alleged offense. Defendant responded, “Yes, sir.” The trial court accepted defendant’s plea 

of guilty. 

¶ 8 On March 7, 2003, the trial court sentenced defendant, who was then 27 years old, to 50 

years of imprisonment. Carper filed a motion, on defendant’s behalf, for the trial court to 

reconsider the sentence 

¶ 9 Prior to a hearing on the motion to reconsider sentence filed by Carper, defendant filed a 

pro se motion to reconsider the sentence and a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 

alleging that Carper had failed to investigate his defense and had coerced him into pleading 

guilty by telling him he would get a 20-year sentence if he pled guilty and a life sentence if he 

did not plead guilty. In support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, defendant claimed 

that he received inadequate representation of counsel because Carper should have presented a 

defense but, instead, “she did not say anything whatsoever to counter balance the States 

Attorney’s unfounded evidence, for this crime [he] did not commit.” Defendant further 

claimed that he was coerced into pleading guilty by Carper, who told defendant that the judge 

felt sorry for him, felt he had shown enough remorse, looked at defendant as if he were his own 

son sitting in defendant’s chair, felt defendant was not involved in Faith’s death, and felt that 

even if defendant were involved in Faith’s death, it was an accident and not intentional. 

Defendant also argued that Carper told him that if he refused to enter an open plea of guilty, he 

was going to get a life sentence. Defendant further claimed that a thorough investigation of the 

crime was not completed. 

¶ 10 In his motion for reduction of sentence, defendant indicated that his sentence should be 

reduced because, among other things, (1) his attorney “should have presented a defense 

period” and his attorney “didn’t say anything whatsoever to counter balance the State 

Attorney’s unfounded evidence”; (2) a thorough investigation had not been done, over 200 

names were given and no one checked them out, and “no full or any defense investigation 

period”; and (3) his attorney had guaranteed him “an easy and short 20 year sentence” and he 

feels his counsel violated his rights and “took prime advantage of [him] not knowing the law or 

laws of the nature of [the] crime committed.”

¶ 11 On April 21, 2003, Carper filed a motion to withdraw as defendant’s counsel. In the 

motion, Carper indicated that defendant’s pro se motions contained false allegations regarding 

her representation and that her continued representation of defendant “would violate several 

Rules of Professional Conduct,” with Carper citing to Rules 1.16, 2.1, and 6.2 of the Illinois 

Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 (Ill. R. Prof’l Conduct (2010) Rs. 1.16, 2.1, 6.1 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2010)). Carper indicated that Rule 6.2 provided that a lawyer should not seek to avoid 

the appointment to represent a person, except for good cause, such as when representing the 

client will likely violate the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct or when “the client or the 

cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or 

lawyer’s ability to represent the client.” 
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¶ 12 The hearing on Carper’s motion to withdraw took place on June 6, 2003. Carper indicated 

that on the day she came to court to argue the motion to reconsider sentence she had filed, she 

was informed that defendant had filed several pro se motions. Carper further indicated that that 

bulk of defendant’s allegations in his pro se motions pertained to her representation. She 

stated, “because I consider those allegations in his motions to be false, I feel that it would be, it 

would be requiring me to violate a number of rules of professional conduct to continue to 

represent him,” and she referenced Rules of Professional Conduct 1.16, 2.1, and 6.2. The trial 

court asked defendant if he objected to Carper withdrawing as his counsel. Defendant stated, “I 

have no problem with that, sir.” The trial court appointed Heidi Benson as defendant’s new 

counsel. Benson filed posttrial motions on behalf of defendant, which the trial court denied. 

¶ 13 Defendant appealed, arguing that his guilty plea should be vacated as having been entered 

unknowingly and involuntarily due to the trial court’s failure to admonish him properly. He 

also argued that the requirement for those convicted of first degree murder of a child to register 

as a sex offender was unconstitutional. Defendant’s conviction and sentence were affirmed, 

with this court rejecting his argument that his plea was unknowing and involuntary and 

rejecting his constitutional challenge to the sex offender registration requirement. People v. 

Sweet, No. 3-03-0837 (2005) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). 

¶ 14 B. Postconviction Petition

¶ 15 On March 2, 2006, defendant filed a postconviction petition, alleging Carper had coerced 

him into pleading guilty when she knew the State’s evidence against him was weak, she had 

plenty of evidence to put on an overwhelming defense, and she mislead him into entering a 

“blind plea.” He further alleged that Carper neglected to ensure a proper defense investigation 

was conducted by the assigned private investigator and medical expert to “clear up the charges 

and to clearly see what was going on.” He claimed that, at trial, the credibility of the State’s 

medical expert regarding Faith’s autopsy and the credibility of other witnesses could have been 

called into question, evidence could have been presented that his confession was coerced, 

evidence that Faith had died prior to defendant arriving home could have been presented, 

evidence that Faith’s mother had a background of abuse and neglect and involvement with the 

Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) could have been presented, and the 

manner in which the police investigation was conducted could have been called into question. 

He claimed that that he was not given Miranda warnings prior to speaking with police and the 

coroner. Defendant also claimed that his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for 

failing to present additional issues on appeal. 

¶ 16 More specific to Carper’s representation, defendant alleged that Carper “never believed in 

[his] innocence,” and she had been assigned to his case only four months prior to trial. He 

alleged that Carper did not investigate any of his claims, did not have key defense witnesses 

interviewed, and did not file any pretrial motions. Defendant alleged that Carper “never 

intended to present a defense” and had him “plea out for no apparent good reason.” He claimed 

that as soon as he “spoke out about [Carper’s] poor representation,” Carper filed a motion to 

withdraw as his counsel. Defendant claimed that Carper prejudiced the court against him when 

she, in presenting her motion to withdraw, indicated to the court that defendant’s allegations of 

ineffective assistance were false and that she found defendant’s case to be “morally offensive” 

and him and his cause “too repugnant,” at a time when defendant had a pending motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea on file. According to defendant, Carper’s actions and statements made 
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it impossible for the trial judge to hear his motion to withdraw his guilty plea with an open and 

unbiased mind. Defendant claimed that Carper’s view of the nature of his case, as “morally 

offensive” or “too repugnant,” was the view that she held “all along” and rather than Carper 

withdrawing as defendant’s counsel, she, perhaps, stayed on the case “long enough to sell 

[him] up the river.” Defendant alleged that Carper had no intention of providing him with a 

defense and failed to investigate his claims of innocence, improper police conduct, police 

brutality, an illegal and tainted crime scene, and coerced statements. He also claimed that 

Carper was ineffective for failing to go to trial, failing to seek a jury instruction on the lesser 

charge of manslaughter, failing to seek an outright acquittal, and, instead, coercing him into 

entering a blind plea at a point in the trial when only the State’s witnesses were heard and no 

defense or rebuttal for defendant had been presented. 

¶ 17 Defendant’s postconviction petition was stricken as premature because defendant’s 

petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was still pending. Defendant’s 

petition for leave to appeal was subsequently denied. On October 6, 2010, the trial court 

reinstated defendant’s postconviction petition and, subsequently, docketed defendant’s 

postconviction petition for second-stage consideration and appointed postconviction counsel. 

On May 4, 2011, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s pro se postconviction petition.

¶ 18 On February 3, 2014, postconviction counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Illinois 

Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2012), certifying that he read the trial transcript, 

reviewed the entire circuit court file and the appellate court filings, corresponded with 

defendant by mail to ascertain his contentions of constitutional violations, reviewed all 

correspondence from defendant, investigated the legality of defendant’s allegations by way of 

extensive legal research, and determined that “[d]efendant’s pro se filing was legally sufficient 

on its face and did not require any amendments.” At the second-stage hearing on the State’s 

motion to dismiss the postconviction petition, postconviction counsel confirmed that the 

constitutional issue that had been raised in the petition was the lack of effective assistance of 

counsel and there were no other issues he was raising. The trial court found the petition was 

sufficient to raise the constitutional issue of lack of effective assistance of counsel and denied 

the State’s motion to dismiss. 

¶ 19 On April 16, 2014, the trial court conducted a third-stage evidentiary hearing on 

defendant’s postconviction petition. Defendant testified that he and his trial counsel, Carper, 

had not discussed a guilty plea until the morning of the second day of trial and the State had not 

offered any plea deal. Sweet testified that on the morning of December 4, 2002, he was rushed 

from the jail to the courthouse earlier than he was originally scheduled to appear because 

Carper wanted to meet with him. Carper told him that the judge wanted to sentence him to 20 

years of imprisonment and the State would not offer any plea bargain because the prosecutor 

wanted defendant to get a life sentence. Carper told defendant that the judge felt sorry for him. 

Defendant indicated that Carper did not indicate anything about an “open plea.” Defendant 

testified:

“I decided to plead guilty because she basically told me there was no defense in my, in 

my case, and there is. *** I sat there and argued and told her, ‘Yes, we do.’ ‘Call these 

witnesses and these witnesses.’ ‘We have a defense.’ ”

¶ 20 Defendant testified that he “vaguely” understood that his opportunity at trial to put on 

evidence had not yet occurred. He did not understand what the judge had meant when he asked 

defendant whether he had been threatened or promised anything in relation to entering a guilty 
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plea. He had only read the written guilty plea to where his name was stated and then he was 

rushed into the courtroom and did not read the remainder of the document before signing it in 

front of the trial judge. During the guilty plea hearing, defendant was under the impression that 

he was pleading guilty in return for a 20-year sentence. He did not understand the judge’s 

question about promises made in relation to his guilty plea, and he did not say anything 

because Carper told him “to keep it hush-hush and just go along with the Court, keep [his] 

mouth shut, and everything would be all right.” He went along with what Carper told him to do 

because she gave him the impression that she would not put on a defense for him at trial and if 

he did not plead guilty, then he would likely get a life sentence. He tried to tell Carper that he 

had a defense because he did not do anything wrong, but Carper responded, “Well, I’m not 

gonna do it” and just threw her hands up, leaned back, and stared at him. Defendant 

acknowledged that he had responded, “Yes, sir” to the trial court question of whether he 

committed the offense and understood the sentencing range because Carper had instructed him 

to just go along with the trial court. He did not learn that he did not have an agreement for a 

20-year sentence until the trial court sentenced him to 50 years of imprisonment. 

¶ 21 Defendant also testified as to his claim of a lack of investigation into his case. He indicated 

he did not know the timing for or procedures of the investigator and had relied on Carper to 

facilitate the investigation. Defendant was not questioned about his allegations that Carper had 

found him and his case “too repugnant” to be able to provide effective assistance of counsel. 

¶ 22 Carper testified that she and defendant had discussed the evidence and had discussed 

“everything about the case for many hours and numerous times.” According to Carper, after 

the first day of trial, the evidence against defendant was “pretty overwhelming,” and defendant 

“decided to end the jury trial” and enter an “open plea.” She explained to defendant what an 

open plea meant numerous times. She testified that she did not tell defendant the judge had 

promised him a 20-year sentence or that there was a tacit understanding to that effect with the 

judge, indicating “there is no way that that existed and no way that I told that to him.” She did 

not tell defendant that if he refused to plead guilty, he would get life in prison. Carper testified 

that she would have put on a defense if the trial had continued and she “had been preparing for 

that for four months.” She felt prepared for trial. According to Carper, she and defendant had 

even sat down to prepare a statement in allocution, but he threw it away when he was about to 

give it. Carper also testified that she did not promise defendant a specific sentence or threaten 

him. She indicated that during her representation of defendant, “[h]e was willing to not only 

ask questions but to argue about the issues in the case.” She indicated that she did not coerce 

defendant into pleading guilty and stated that it was hard for her to get him to take her advice 

and she doubted that she could have coerced defendant into doing anything. 

¶ 23 Carper further testified that she did not review the court file prior to the postconviction 

evidentiary hearing because “it was so big.” The part that she did read about the “accusations 

and lies told about [her] personally” was “so offensive” to her that she did not want to read any 

more. Carper indicated, “[y]ou have to understand that this has also been the subject of appeals 

and an ARDC complaint that was unfounded where the same lies and insults were said, so I am 

really not interested in reading the whole court file again.” 

¶ 24 Carper testified that defendant had wanted to bring in witnesses to testify about the prior 

DCFS complaints that had been made against Faith’s mother. Carper’s decision was that those 

witnesses had no relevance to defendant’s murder trial, “so those witnesses were not gonna be 

called.” Carper contemplated calling a medical expert but decided against doing so because 
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“the testimony would have been very damaging.” Carper’s defense for defendant at the point 

the trial stopped consisted of her cross-examining the State’s witnesses, with the defense’s 

case-in-chief depending on how the State had finished with their evidence. 

¶ 25 On May 9, 2014, the trial court issued its decision and denied defendant’s postconviction 

petition. The trial court found that defendant failed to sustain his burden of demonstrating that 

his plea had been coerced, that he was promised a 20-year sentence in exchange for a guilty 

plea, or that Carper refused to put on a defense for him. The trial court found Carper to be 

credible and found defendant not credible. The trial court found that defendant failed to make a 

substantial showing that Carper provided ineffective assistance. Defendant appealed the denial 

of his postconviction petition. 

¶ 26 C. Section 2-1401 Petition for Relief From Judgment 

¶ 27 Subsequently, on March 3, 2016, defendant filed a pro se section 2-1401 petition for relief 

from judgment. In the petition, defendant alleged that Carper had coerced him into pleading 

guilty by telling him that he would get a life sentence if he did not plead guilty and would 

receive a 20-year term of imprisonment if he did plead guilty. Defendant further alleged that 

Carper had written him a letter on January 5, 2003, and he had requested his postconviction 

counsel to submit the letter as evidence during postconviction proceedings but his 

postconviction counsel failed to do so. In the letter she sent to defendant, Carper had stated: 

“Remember that Judge Henderson has promised that there will be no life sentence. 

That makes me believe that he will fashion a sentence that will someday allow you to 

resume a positive life.” 

¶ 28 In the section 2-1401 petition, defendant alleged that he did not receive a reasonable level 

assistance from his postconviction counsel because his postconviction counsel did not use the 

letter as evidence, nor did his postconviction counsel use the letter to impeach Carper’s 

testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Defendant also alleged that Carper 

committed perjury during the postconviction evidentiary hearing and if the circuit court had 

known of the letter, his postconviction petition would not have been denied. Defendant 

requested the appointment of counsel and attached an affidavit attesting to the truth of the 

statements in “the foregoing petition for a successive post conviction petition.” The trial court 

denied defendant’s request for the appointment of counsel, stating in its written ruling, “[t]here 

is no statutory basis for appointment of counsel in a 2-1401 motion proceeding.” Also in its 

written ruling, the trial court acknowledged that the State had not responded to defendant’s 

section 2-1401 petition, indicated that a trial court may dismiss a section 2-1401 petition 

sua sponte if the facts alleged failed to state a legal basis for relief, noted that a section 2-1401 

proceeding was not an appropriate forum for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 

and summarily dismissed the section 2-1401 petition because it was alleging the ineffective 

assistance of postconviction counsel. Defendant appealed. 

¶ 29 Defendant’s two appeals have been consolidated by this court. 

¶ 30 ANALYSIS 

¶ 31 A. Denial of Defendant’s Postconviction Petition

¶ 32 On appeal, defendant argues this court should reverse the denial of his postconviction 

petition and remand for further proceedings because his postconviction counsel did not 
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provide a reasonable level of assistance. According to the defendant, his postconviction 

counsel failed to present any evidence regarding his postconviction claim that his trial counsel, 

Carper, was ineffective at the time defendant entered his guilty plea in that Carper was 

harboring a per se conflict of interest. The State argues that the record shows that 

postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance and postconviction counsel was not 

required to advance defendant’s frivolous claim that Carper had represented defendant while 

operating under a per se conflict of interest. 

¶ 33 A criminal defendant’s sixth amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 

includes the right to representation that is conflict-free. People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134, 

142 (2008). However, there is no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel in 

postconviction proceedings; the right to counsel is wholly statutory, and petitioners are only 

entitled to the level of assistance provided for by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act), which 

is a reasonable level of assistance. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2012); People v. Suarez, 

224 Ill. 2d 37, 42 (2007). Trial counsel and postconviction counsel serve different roles—a 

defendant in postconviction proceedings already has been stripped of the presumption of 

innocence and, therefore, the right to counsel in postconviction proceedings is not 

constitutionally required. People v. Owens, 139 Ill. 2d 351, 364-65 (1990). 

¶ 34 In determining whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel based on an 

alleged conflict of interest, we first resolve whether counsel labored under a per se conflict. 

Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d at 142. If a per se conflict in defense counsel representation exists, 

defendant is not required to show that counsel’s actual performance was affected by the 

conflict, meaning defendant is not required to show actual prejudice. Id. at 143. Instead, a 

per se conflict is grounds for an automatic reversal. Id. 

¶ 35 A per se conflict of interest is one in which facts about a defense attorney’s status gives rise 

to a disabling conflict, such as when a defendant’s attorney has ties to a person or entity that 

would benefit from an unfavorable verdict for defendant. Id. The very nature of the per se 

conflict rule precludes inquiry into the specific facts of a case because the status of the 

defendant’s attorney itself dictates the application of the per se rule. Id. at 150. Our supreme 

court has held that a per se conflict of interest exists where defense counsel (1) has a prior or 

contemporaneous association with the victim, prosecution, or entity assisting the prosecution; 

(2) contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; or (3) was a former prosecutor who 

had been personally involved in the prosecution of the defendant. Id. at 143-44. 

¶ 36 Distinguishable from a per se conflict of interest is an actual conflict of interest. An actual 

conflict of interest exists where the defendant can point to a specific defect in his counsel’s 

strategy, tactics, or decision making that was attributable to a conflict. Id. at 144. If the trial 

court has not been apprised of the potential conflict, then a reversal of a conviction will only be 

had upon a showing that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s 

performance. People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill. 2d 1, 18 (1988). 

¶ 37 Here, defendant requests this court to, as a matter of first impression, find that a per se 

conflict of interest exists where trial counsel represented a defendant who is, or whose cause is, 

so repugnant to the attorney that the attorney-client relationship or the attorney’s ability to 

represent the defendant is likely to be impaired. This court need not address defendant’s 

contention that such a scenario creates a per se conflict because the record indicates that 

Carper was not acting either under a per se or an actual conflict of interest in regard to her 
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personal feeling about defendant or the nature of his case during her representation of 

defendant. 

¶ 38 The record indicates that Carper filed a motion to withdraw from representing defendant 

during postplea proceedings. In her motion, she indicated that she could no longer represent 

defendant because she found his allegations pertaining to her performance, as alleged in his 

pro se posttrial motions, to be so repugnant that her continued representation of him would 

violate Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 6.2(c). There is no indication of a conflict of 

interest prior to trial, during trial, or during the guilty plea hearing, and Carper withdrew as 

defendant’s counsel as soon as the conflict arose when defendant filed his pro se postplea 

motion that alleged Carper’s ineffective assistance of counsel. Consequently, defendant’s 

postconviction counsel did not provide unreasonable assistance to defendant during 

postconviction proceedings by failing to present evidence of defendant’s claim that Carper was 

ineffective for harboring a per se conflict of interest where the record shows that a conflict of 

interest did not exist. See People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 205 (2004) (providing that 

postconviction counsel is not required to advance a frivolous claim or a claim that is patently 

without merit). 

¶ 39 We also reject defendant’s claim that postconviction counsel was ineffective for initially 

adopting at the second stage of the postconviction proceeding defendant’s pro se claim of 

Carper’s ineffective assistance as his trial counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest and then 

failing to present any evidence in support of that claim during the third-stage evidentiary 

hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, Carper testified that she was prepared to represent 

defendant at trial and that her conflict in representing defendant did not arise until after 

defendant filed his pro se postplea motion of ineffective assistance of counsel containing what 

Carper felt were unfounded lies and insults toward her performance as his counsel. 

Defendant’s claim that Carper harbored strong negative feelings toward him that biased her 

against him to the point of creating a per se conflict of interest, from almost inception of her 

representation of him, was not proven. Notably, defendant does not indicate what, if any, 

evidence postconviction counsel could have or should have presented in support of 

defendant’s speculative claim that his trial counsel was operating under the alleged per se 

conflict during her representation of him. Even more notable is the fact that the record shows 

that Carper withdrew from representing defendant when the conflict arose. Under the 

circumstances of this case, we find no deficiency in postconviction counsel’s representation of 

defendant and conclude that defendant received the reasonable level of assistance afforded 

under the Act. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s postconviction

petition. 

¶ 40 B. Dismissal of Defendant’s Petition for Relief From Judgment 

¶ 41 Defendant also argues on appeal that the circuit court erred by dismissing his section 

2-1401 petition. Defendant contends that his section 2-1401 petition properly raised the 

following three claims: (1) his postconviction petition would not have been denied if the circuit 

court had known of Carper’s letter; (2) the letter indicated that Carper testified falsely at the 

postconviction evidentiary hearing regarding whether the judge made a promise regarding 

defendant’s sentence; and (3) his postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance 

where postconviction counsel was well aware of Carper’s letter but postconviction counsel 

failed to present the letter during postconviction proceedings. The State argues, among other 
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things, that defendant’s section 2-1401 petition failed to show the existence of a meritorious 

claim or defense. 

¶ 42 Section 2-1401 of the Code sets forth a statutory procedure for the vacatur of judgment that 

is more than 30 days old. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2012). Relief under section 2-1401 is 

provided where a petitioner proves by the preponderance of the evidence (1) the existence of a 

meritorious defense or claim that would have precluded the entry of a judgment in the original 

action, (2) due diligence in presenting this defense or claim in the original action, and (3) due 

diligence in filing the section 2-1401 petition for relief. Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill. 2d 209, 

220-21 (1986). For the purposes of section 2-1401, a meritorious defense involves an error of 

fact or the existence of a valid defense that was not presented to the trial court that would have 

prevented the entry of the judgment. People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 565-66 (2003). If the 

facts alleged in a section 2-1401 petition cannot state a legal basis for the relief requested, the 

petition may be challenged at any time, even on appeal. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9 

(2007). We review the dismissal of a section 2-1401 petition presenting purely legal claims

de novo. Id. at 18. 

¶ 43 We agree with the State that the content of Carper’s letter does not show the existence of a 

meritorious claim or defense. The letter merely states that the judge promised no life sentence 

and that Carper believed that the judge would “fashion a sentence that will someday allow 

[defendant] to resume a positive life.” Defendant did not receive a life sentence and the letter 

does not promise a particular sentence. Defendant was sentenced to a 50-year term of 

imprisonment. Presenting Carper’s letter at sentencing or in the postconviction proceedings 

would not have precluded the entry of the judgment, sentence, or a denial of defendant’s 

postconviction petition. 

¶ 44 Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by failing to appoint him counsel to 

represent him on his section 2-1401 petition. The trial court had discretion in appointing 

counsel but chose not to do so. See People v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 110594, ¶ 21 (while the 

appointment of counsel is not expressly prohibited in section 2-1401 proceedings, there is no 

statutory basis for the appointment of counsel in section 2-1401 proceedings and if the trial 

court is not required to, or prohibited from, taking an action, the court will be said to have 

discretion to do or not do that action). A trial court commits error when it refuses to exercise 

discretion based on the erroneous belief that it does not have the power to exercise its 

discretion. Id. 

¶ 45 Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to exercise its 

discretion because “the court failed to recognize that it had discretion to appoint counsel.” In 

denying defendant’s request for the appointment of counsel for representation on his section 

2-1401 petition, the trial court simply stated, “[t]here is no statutory basis for appointment of 

counsel in a 2-1401 motion proceeding.” The statement does not support defendant’s claim 

that the trial court did not realize it had discretion to do so but, rather, merely indicates that the 

trial court knew defendant did not have a statutory right to counsel. There is no affirmative 

indication in the record to support defendant’s claim that the trial court did not know it had the 

discretion to appoint counsel just because the trial court correctly indicated that defendant did 

not have a statutory right to counsel “in a 2-1401 motion proceeding.” See In re Jonathon C.B., 

2011 IL 107750, ¶ 72 (presuming that a trial judge knows and follows the law unless the record 

affirmatively indicates otherwise). 
- 11 - 

¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we also affirm the trial court’s dismissal of defendant’s section 

2-1401 petition for relief from judgment. 

¶ 47 CONCLUSION 

¶ 48 The judgments of the circuit court of McDonough County are affirmed. 

¶ 49 Affirmed.