J-S15012-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES FRANKLIN HOLMES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 340 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 16, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-15-CR-0002480-2016

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED JULY 27, 2022

Appellant James Franklin Holmes appeals pro se from the order denying 

his timely first Post Conviction Relief Act1 (PCRA) petition. Appellant raises 

numerous claims of trial court error and allegations of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. We affirm. 

The PCRA court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history 

of this case as follows:

On May 7, 2019, [Appellant] was convicted by a jury of 477 counts 

of possession of child pornography[2]following a sex-trafficking 

investigation. On June 12, 2020, [Appellant] was sentenced to 20 

to 40 years of incarceration. The judgment of sentence was

affirmed on appeal by the Superior Court on February 21, 2021. 

Commonwealth v. Holmes, [1397 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 652368

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 6312(d).
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(Pa. Super. filed Feb. 19, 2021) (unpublished mem.)]. No petition 

for allowance of appeal was filed with the Supreme Court. 

On August 2, 2021, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition. On 

August 3, 2021, C. Curtis Norcini, Esquire was appointed as 

[Appellant’s] counsel. Counsel [filed a Turner/Finley3 no-merit 

letter and] sought permission to withdraw from the matter 

concerning [Appellant’s] pro se PCRA petition. Appointed counsel 

provided a copy of his no-merit letter to the court thoroughly 

detailing steps he had taken to review the matter, with an 

itemized list of issues [Appellant] sought to [have] reviewed, 

conclusions of law explaining the finding of “no merit,” and 

demonstrating a laudable understanding of the underlying matter. 

Having found the first three requirements of [Turner/Finley]

met, the court conducted its own independent review of the 

record. We agreed with counsel’s conclusion the petition was 

meritless. Accordingly, the court granted counsel’s motion to 

withdraw. 

On October 26, 2021, following a review of [counsel’s 

Turner/]Finley letter, as well as the aforementioned independent 

review, the court stated the reasons for the proposed dismissal of 

[Appellant’s] PCRA petition. The court also gave [Appellant] the 

mandatory twenty-day notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA

[petition]. [Appellant] filed a response to the notice, which was 

filed of record on November 8, 2021. After a review of the

response, the court, by order dated November 16, 2021, 

dismissed [Appellant’s PCRA] petition and advised [Appellant] that 

he had thirty (30) days in which to file an appeal. 

PCRA Ct. Op., 1/28/22, at 1-2.

On November 30, 2021, Appellant filed a pro se motion for 

reconsideration, which the PCRA court denied. Thereafter, Appellant filed an 

appeal that was docketed on December 29, 2021.

Before we proceed with our disposition, we must first determine whether 

Appellant’s appeal was timely. We note that the timeliness of an appeal is a 

____________________________________________

3 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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jurisdictional question which this Court may raise sua sponte. 

Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1034 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

“Jurisdiction is vested in the Superior Court upon the filing of a timely notice 

of appeal.” Commonwealth v. Green, 862 A.2d 613, 615 (Pa. Super. 2004) 

(en banc).

It is well settled that a notice of appeal shall be filed within thirty days 

after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken. Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

Here, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA petition on November 16, 2021, 

and Appellant had until December 16, 2021, to file a timely appeal. The

appeal period may only be tolled if the PCRA court enters an order “expressly 

granting reconsideration” within the thirty-day period. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1701(b)(3). However, the filing of a motion for reconsideration alone, in the 

absence of an order from the PCRA court expressly granting reconsideration, 

does not toll the appeal period. Commonwealth v. Moir, 766 A.2d 1253, 

1254 (Pa. Super. 2000). 

Here, although Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, the PCRA 

court denied the motion. See Order, 12/17/21. Therefore, the appeal period 

was not tolled, and Appellant’s appeal was due on or before December 16, 

2021. As stated, Appellant’s appeal was docketed on December 29, 2021, 

and it is, therefore, facially untimely. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). 

On March 22, 2022, this Court filed a rule to show cause why this appeal 

should not be quashed as untimely. Appellant filed a response and claimed 
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that he initially deposited his appeal in the prison mail on December 15, 2021.

4

However, Appellant asserted that he was required to correct an administrative 

issue concerning the number of copies of cash slips which caused him to 

deposit his appeal in the prison mailbox a second time on December 17, 2021. 

Response to Rule, 4/1/22, at 3 (unpaginated).

The record reveals that Appellant attached two copies of a prison cash 

slip to his notice of appeal. Notice of Appeal, 12/29/21 (unnumbered 

attachment 1 and 2).

5

 The cash slips requested checks for $90.25 and $71.00 

to pay for mailing his notice of appeal. Id. Subsequently, two checks from 

the State Correctional Institution inmate account, which were made payable 

to “the Prothonotary of the Court,” and the checks, one in the amount of 

$90.25 and one for $71.00, were dated December 22, 2021. Id. (at 

unnumbered attachment 4 and 5). As noted above, Appellant’s notice of 

appeal was docketed on December 29, 2021.

Both the PCRA court and the Commonwealth assert that Appellant has 

not satisfied the requirements of the prisoner mailbox rule and contend that 

this appeal should be quashed. See PCRA Ct. Op., 1/28/22, at 2-4; 

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. We disagree.

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4

In his response, Appellant references the prisoner mailbox rule. Response 

to Rule, 4/1/22, at 1 (unpaginated). The prisoner mailbox rule provides that 

a prisoner’s a pro se filing is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison 

authorities for mailing. Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1132, 

n.8 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 121.

5

It appears that Appellant filed two copies of the same cash slip, and the cash 

slip bore two amounts for payment of his appeal filing.
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Although Appellant’s notice of appeal was not docketed until December 

29, 2021, the prison cash slips attached to Appellant’s notice of appeal are

dated December 14, 2021. As noted, under the prisoner mailbox rule, a 

prisoner’s pro se filing is deemed filed on the date he delivers it to prison 

authorities for mailing. Kennedy, 266 A.3d at 1132. A properly executed 

cash slip may be considered sufficient evidence to establish mailing under the 

mailbox rule. Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423, 426 (Pa.1997); see 

also Pa.R.A.P. 121(f). Additionally, Appellant’s notice of appeal includes an 

undated and unsigned form, apparently from prison authorities, indicating that 

Appellant was directed to file “2 cash slips for each amount.” See Notice of 

Appeal, 12/29/21 (unnumbered attachment 3). 

The Department of Corrections (DOC) policy DC-ADM 803 concerning 

inmate mail provides that, unless otherwise provided in the policy, an inmate 

must file an approved cash slip for mailing items through certified mail. The 

record reflects that Appellant’s December 14, 2021 cash slips requested the 

appeal to be filed via certified mail. See Notice of Appeal, 12/29/21 

(unnumbered attachment 1 and 2). Upon review, it appears that Appellant 

submitted two cash slips, each requesting two separate amounts, and that the 

administrative DOC form concerning the number of required copies for inmate 

certified mail directed Appellant to file two separate copies for each separate 

amount requested. See id. (at unnumbered attachment 3). Although each 

DOC facility is permitted to establish its own procedures in cooperation with 

the local Postmaster for the processing of certified and registered mail, see
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DC-ADM 803(K)(1), it is clear on this record that Appellant filed cash slips for 

mailing his appeal prior to the expiration of the appeal period, and that 

Appellant “presented the documents for mailing” before the expiration of the 

appeal period. 

Although it appears that Appellant did not properly comply with DOC 

policy concerning the number of copies of cash slips, under the circumstances 

presented here, we decline to find that the policy requires overriding 

Appellant’s rule-based right to appeal and state constitutional right to appeal.6 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 910; see also Pa. Const. Art. 5, § 9. The record supports 

the conclusion that Appellant submitted cash slips on December 14, 2021, 

requesting postage for his appeal prior to the expiration of the appeal period 

on December 16, 2021.7 

On this record, we decline to conclude that the DOC policy concerning 

the required number of cash slip copies for inmate certified mail mandates 

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6 Regarding rights under the DOC policy, DC-ADM 803 provides: “This policy 

does not create rights in any person nor should it be interpreted or applied in 

such a manner as to abridge the rights of any individual. This policy should be 

interpreted to have sufficient flexibility to be consistent with law and to permit 

the accomplishment of the purpose(s) of the policies of the Department of 

Corrections.” DC-ADM 803 VI (Rights Under this Policy).

7 We point out that there is no indication Appellant provided incorrect postage 

or lacked sufficient funds to accomplish filing his appeal by certified mail. Cf. 

Shea v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 898 A.2d 31 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) (holding that the date on which an appeal is mailed but 

later returned due to incorrect postage cannot be the filing date because “but 

for affixing the correct postage, the envelope containing the appeal would 

never be received ... and filed”). 
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that this Court terminate Appellant’s right to appeal. Under the circumstances

presented here, we deem Appellant’s appeal timely pursuant to the prisoner 

mailbox rule and will address the merits of Appellant’s claims of error. 

On appeal, Appellant raises the following issues:

1. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s 

claim #1 that the search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient 

probable cause due to only establishing a remote connection to 

the crimes alleged on the warrant?

2. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s 

claim #2 that the affidavit lacked specificity and was overly 

broad?

3. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s 

claim #3 that the search warrant was anticipatory and 

executed prematurely?

4. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s 

claim #4 that the search warrant contained errors, omissions, 

and falsities sufficient enough to violate due process?

5. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s 

claim #6 that the state withheld significant exculpatory 

evidence that was favorable to the defense?

6. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s

claim #7 that judicial and structural errors, both procedural 

and constitutional, occurred denying [A]ppellant due process 

of law?

7. Did the PCRA court err[]] in finding “no merit” to Appellant’s

claim #8 that the weight of evidence did not support the verdict 

of not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt?

8. Did the PCRA court err[] in finding “no merit” [to] Appellant’s 

claim #5 of ineffective assi[s]tance of counsel[] during pretrial, trial, and/or post-trial phases?

9. Was PCRA counsel’s assistance ineffective in properly pursuing 

Appellant’s PCRA claims by failing to depose witnesses provided 

by Appellant, spending sufficient time to examine court records

and relevant document[s], conferring with previously assigned 
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counsel, and conferring with Appellant to obtain clarity of

positions and facts known to Appellant in order to amend and 

resubmit Appellant’s filing? 

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6 (some formatting altered).

8

Our standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition “is limited to 

examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by the 

evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. 

Ousley, 21 A.3d 1238, 1242 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). “The PCRA 

court’s credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are binding 

on this Court; however, we apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA 

court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 105 A.3d 1257, 

1265 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted). This Court “may affirm a decision of the 

[PCRA] court if there is any basis on the record to support the [PCRA] court’s 

actions, even if we rely on a different basis.” Commonwealth v. Moser, 999 

A.2d 602, 606 n.5 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).

“To be entitled to PCRA relief, [the petitioner] must establish, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from 

one or more of the circumstances enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2), 

and that the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or waived.” 

Mitchell, 105 A.3d at 1265-66 (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9543(a)(3) (stating that in order to eligible for relief, the petitioner must plead 

and prove “the allegation of error has not been previously litigated or 

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8 The PCRA court did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 
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waived”). A claim is waived for the purposes of the PCRA when “the petitioner 

could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial . . . [or] on appeal 

or in a prior state postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). 

“Generally, an appellant may not raise allegations of error in an appeal from 

the denial of PCRA relief as if he were presenting the claims on direct appeal.” 

Commonwealth v. Price, 876 A.2d 988, 995 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 

780 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that “[a]t the PCRA stage, claims of trial court 

error are either previously litigated (if raised on direct appeal) or waived (if 

not)” (citation omitted)).

Additionally, we point out that counsel is presumed to be effective. 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal 

denied, 242 A.3d 908 (Pa. 2020).

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the 

following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 

(2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of 

counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa. Super. 2019), 

appeal denied, 216 A.3d 1029 (Pa. 2019) (some formatting altered). The 
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failure to satisfy any prong of the test for ineffectiveness will cause the claim 

to fail. Id. at 1044. 

Appellant’s Issues 1-4

In his first four issues, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred in 

denying PCRA relief concerning challenges to the Commonwealth’s application 

for a search warrant during the criminal investigation underlying Appellant’s 

arrest and convictions. Appellant’s Brief at 14-24. Appellant claims that 

search warrant affidavit lacked sufficient probable cause, was overly broad, 

was anticipatory and executed prematurely, and it contained errors and 

omissions which violated Appellant’s rights. See id.

The Commonwealth responds that Appellant is not eligible for relief on 

these claims of error. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8. The Commonwealth 

asserts that Appellant’s first four issues were either previously litigated or 

waived. Id. at 8-12. After careful review, we agree.

On direct appeal, this Court addressed Appellant’s claim that the search 

warrant was overbroad and lacked probable cause. See Holmes, 2021 WL 

652368 at *4. Moreover, because Appellant’s challenges concerning the 

allegedly anticipatory nature of the warrant and violation of due process could 

have been raised on direct appeal but were not, these claims are waived. See 

Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780; 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). For these 
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reasons, we conclude that Appellant is ineligible for relief on his challenges to 

the search warrant in his first four issues.

9

Brady Claim

In his fifth issue, Appellant alleges that the PCRA court erred in finding

that there was no merit to Appellant’s claim that the Commonwealth withheld 

exculpatory evidence at trial. Appellant’s Brief at 25. In Brady v. Maryland, 

373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the 

prosecution has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor's 

possession to the defendants. However, similar to Appellant’s first four issues, 

we conclude that this issue is waived because Appellant could have raised it 

on direct appeal but did not. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).

Evidence of Appellant’s Prior Conviction

In his sixth issue, Appellant alleges that the PCRA court erred when it 

found no merit to Appellant’s claim that the trial court abused its discretion

when it permitted the Commonwealth to introduce evidence of Appellant’s 

prior conviction over counsel’s objection. Appellant’s Brief at 29. Again, we 

conclude that this issue is waived because Appellant could have raised it on 

direct appeal but failed to do so. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b).

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9 We note that, although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials 

filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the 

appellant. Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 497-98 (Pa. Super. 

2005) (citation omitted). Rather, “any person choosing to represent himself 

in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent, assume that his lack of 

expertise and legal training will be his undoing.” Id. at 498.
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Weight of Evidence Claim 

Appellant next presents a challenge to the weight of the evidence at his 

trial. Appellant’s Brief at 31. In disposing of Appellant’s direct appeal, this 

Court addressed this issue and concluded that Appellant was entitled to no 

relief on his challenge to the weight of the evidence. See Holmes, 2021 WL 

652368 at *6. Accordingly, this issue was previously litigated, and Appellant 

is ineligible for relief on this claim. See Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d at 780; 

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3).

Claims of Ineffectiveness of Counsel

In his eighth issue, Appellant contends that the PCRA court erred when 

it found no merit to Appellant’s claims that all prior counsel were ineffective. 

Appellant’s Brief at 34. In his brief, Appellant makes broad and sweeping 

assertions that the attorneys who represented him before trial, during trial, 

and after trial were all ineffective because they spent an insufficient amount 

of time with him, failed to pursue pre-trial motions, engaged in plea 

negotiations, and failed to challenge evidence linking Appellant to the criminal 

acts. See id. at 35-44. Appellant also claims that counsel was ineffective in 

challenging the search warrant, argues entrapment, asserts that the evidence 

was insufficient, and claims trial counsel was not prepared for trial. See id.

at 45-51. 

Upon review, despite his numerous claims of ineffectiveness, we 

conclude that Appellant merely asserts bald unsupported accusations of 
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ineffectiveness and has not adequately developed his arguments. He fails to 

explain or support how any of these claims satisfy the three-pronged test to 

establish ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) the underlying claim is of 

arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her 

action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there 

is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have 

been different. Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043. Accordingly, Appellant’s claims 

of ineffectiveness fail, and he is entitled to no relief. Id. at 1044. 

Ineffectiveness of PCRA Counsel

In his final issue on appeal, Appellant alleges that PCRA counsel was 

ineffective. Appellant’s Brief at 51. As noted, PCRA counsel was permitted to 

withdraw after filing a no-merit letter pursuant to Turner/Finley. Appellant 

claims that PCRA counsel failed to investigate police and prosecution records, 

and Appellant argues the boilerplate assertion that if PCRA counsel had 

scrutinized documents and transcripts, he would have uncovered meritorious 

issues. Id. at 52-53. 

Here, again, Appellant has failed to establish how any of his accusations 

satisfy the necessary elements to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. See 

Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043. Accordingly, no relief is due. Id. at 1044. 

Conclusion

For these reasons, we discern no merit nor support for Appellant’s claims 

on appeal and conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the PCRA 
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court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and further, its conclusions 

are supported by the record. Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.10

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/27/2022

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10 During the pendency of this appeal, Appellant has filed four meritless pro 

se applications for relief. On April 21, 2022, Appellant filed an application for 

correction of the original record in which he seeks to include information 

concerning his criminal convictions in a separate matter from Lycoming 

County. However, Appellant fails to provide any factual basis or legal authority 

supporting this motion. On April 25, 2022, Appellant filed an application to 

postpone review pending decisions in his outstanding motions. Then, on May 

18, 2022, Appellant filed a motion to “expand the court record” and again 

requests this Court to add the record from his Lycoming County convictions 

and to supplement the trial court record with the Lycoming County case. 

Appellant provides no relevant authority for his request. On June 8, 2022, 

Appellant filed a motion renewing all previously filed motions. Appellant’s 

motions are unsupported by relevant legal authority and provide no basis for 

relief. Accordingly, Appellant’s motions are DENIED.