SECOND DI VI SI ON M I LLER, P. J. , M A RKLE and LA ND, JJ.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a lly r

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June 21, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 06 5. TROUPE v

. STA TE.
L A N D , J u d ge.
I n Ap ril 2023, M ic hael Tro u p e w as c harged w ith f elo ny o f f enses w hile serv ing

a first o f fend er p ro bated s entenc e u nd e r OCGA § 42- 8- 6 0

. I n ad d itio n to p ursu ing the

new charges, the State f

iled a p etitio n f

o r an ad ju d ic atio n o f gu ilt and resentenc ing in
the f irst o f f end er c ase. See OCGA § 42- 8- 60 (d ) (1 ) an d ( d ) ( 2 ) ( au tho riz ing trial

c o u rts to enter an ad j u d ic atio n o f gu ilt a nd resentenc e a first o f fend er pro batio ner w ho
has v io lated the t erms o f his p ro batio n and /o r been c o nv ic ted o f ano ther crime d u ring
the p erio d o f his f

irst o f f e nd er sentenc e). T ro u p e entered into a nego tiated p lea w ith
the State to reso lv e the new c harges and their resu lting imp ac t o n his f irst o f f end er
p ro batio n. Sp ec if

ic ally, the p a rties agreed that Tro u p e w o u ld p lead gu ilty to the newc harges a nd be sentenc e d t o a to tal o f six years to serv e p lu s a t erm o f p ro batio n to be

d etermined by the trial c o u rt, w ith that sentenc e to ru n c o nc u rrently w ith a six year

rev o c atio n o f

his p r o batio n in the f

irst o f f end er c ase. The trial c o u rt c o nsid ered t h e p arties’ agreement and rej ec ted it, as it w as

e n t i t l e d to d o . A t the s ame time it a nno u nc ed its rej ec tio n o f the gu ilty p lea, and

w itho u t the benef

it of a f u ll hearing o n the p etitio n in the f irst o f f end er c ase, the trial

c o u rt p ro c eed ed to resentenc e Tro u p e to 25 years to serv e in that c ase. W hen ask ed

to exp lain the b asis f

o r the r esentenc ing, t he trial c o u rt u nequ iv o c ally stated that its
d ec isio n t o resentenc e T ro u p e to serv e mo re than f o u r times t he amo u nt o f time the
p arties agreed to w a s b a s ed o n the f ac t that T ro u p e w as a f

irst o f f end er who “ has
ad mitted his gu ilt w ith regard to [the new c ase] d u ring the c o u rse o f this hearing. ” I n

o ther w o rd s, the trial c o u rt u sed Tro up e’ s rej ec ted p l e a a greement and its

c o rresp o nd ing ad missio n o f gu ilt as the b asis f o r resentenc ing in the first o f f end er

c ase. The qu estio n b e f

o re us is w hether the trial c ou rt w as au tho r iz ed to d o that. We

c o nc lu d e that it w as no t and theref o re rev erse the trial c o u rt’ s sentenc ing o rd er. We a g r e e wi t h T r o u p e that his resentenc ing w as fu nd amentally u nf a ir u n d e r t h e

c irc umstanc es o f

this c ase, that the trial c o u rt erred by using his nego tiated p lea and

2its c o rresp o nd ing ad missio n o f gu ilt a s the b asis f o r that resentenc ing, a nd that the trial

c o u rt’ s o rd er w as su p p o rted by insu f fic ient ev id enc e. I n t his regard , the rec o rd sho w s that in Ap ril 2021 , Tro u p e p led gu ilty to o ne c o u nt o f mak ing terro ristic threats as a
lesser- inc lu d ed o f

f ense o f aggrav ated assau lt and one c o u nt o f a Street Gang
Terro rism and Prev entio n A ct v io latio n. Tro u p e w as s entenc ed as a f irst o f f end er to

tw o co nc u rrent f

iv e - y ea r t erms o f p ro b atio n. The trial c o urt’ s sentenc ing o rd er
sp ec if ic ally no ted that “ [ u ]p o n v io latio n o f t he terms of p r o batio n . . . the Co u rt may

enter an ad ju d ic atio n o f gu ilt and p ro c eed t o sentenc e t he D ef end ant to the maximu m

sentenc e as p ro v id ed by law

. ”
I n A p r i l 2 0 2 3 , the State f iled a p etitio n f

o r an ad j u d ic atio n o f gu ilt and

resentenc ing in the f

irst o f fend e r c a s e , a lleging that Tro u p e had c o mmitted sev eral

new f e lo ny o f f enses in J anu ary 2023. The State later amend ed its petitio n to allege that
Tro u p e had also c o mmitted ad d itio nal f elo ny o f f enses in M ay 2022.
The State entered into a nego tiated p lea agreement w ith T ro u p e to reso lv e the

new c harges arising f

ro m the M ay 2022 of

f enses; if ap p r o v ed b y the t rial c o u rt, this
agreement w o u ld hav e also reso lv ed the resentenc ing petitio n filed b y the State in the

3f

irst o f f end er c ase. 1 T he parties’ agreement sp e cif ied t hat Tro up e w ou ld p lead gu ilty

to the new c harges and be sentenc ed to s ix years t o se r v e , f o llo w ed b y a term o f

p ro batio n to be d etermined by t he trial co u rt, w hile at the same time hav ing six years

o f his p ro batio n rev o k ed in t he f irst o f f e nd er c as e , w i t h that p erio d o f rev o catio n to

ru n co nc u rrently w ith the six year sentenc e in the new c ase. I n o ther w o r ds, Tro u p e agreed to ad mit his gu ilt and ac c ep t resp o nsibility f or the M ay 2022 o f

f enses in retu rn f o r a sentenc e o f six years to serv e f o llo w ed by a p erio d o f pro batio n to b e d etermined by the trial c o u rt. The terms o f the p l ea a greement w ere rec o r d ed o n an

ac k no w led gment a n d wa i v e r - o f- rights f o rm, w hic h w as signed by Tro u p e, his c o u nsel,
and the State. T his f

o rm mak es it c lear that Tro u p e’ s gu ilty p lea and c o rresp o nd ing
ad missio n o f gu ilt w ere based entirely o n the p arties’ agreement to reso lv e t hese tw o matters p u r su ant to the terms d esc ribed abo v e. The trial co u rt held a hearing o n M a y 4, 2023, a t w hic h Tro u p e ap p e ared v ia

v id e o c o nf

erenc e. A t t he beginni n g o f t h e h e a r i n g , T r o u p e’ s p ro batio n of f ic er o u tlined
the basis f o r the State’ s p o sitio n w ith resp ec t to the f irst o f f end er c ase and requ ested
that the trial c o u rt rev o k e the balanc e of Tro u p e’ s pro batio n. W hile giv ing the trial

1 This agreement d id no t seek to reso lv e the J anu a ry 2023 c harges.

4c o u rt a su mmary o f the exp ec ted e v i d e n c e, t he p ro batio n of f ic er stated that tw o d ep u ties had b e en su bp o enaed t o testif y at the hearing. These d ep u ties nev e r t estif ied , and no o ther ev id enc e o f Tro u p e’ s alleged gu i l t w a s ad mitted f o r the trial c o u rt’ s

c o nsid eratio n.
A f ter hearing f

ro m the p ro batio n o f

f ic er, the t r ial c o urt tu rned its attentio n to the p arties’ p lea agreement and c o nd u c ted a Bo yki n 2 c ollo qu y w i t h T r o u p e . D u ring
this co llo qu y, Tro u p e ad m itted that he had signed the nego tiated plea agreement f o rm and und ersto o d its c o ntents. The trial c o urt ask ed the State to pro v id e a f ac tu al basis
f o r the new c harges, and the State did so . Tro u p e’ s c o unsel d i d no t o bj e c t to the
f ac tu al basis f

o r the p lea and ask ed the trial c o u rt to ac c e pt the “nego tiated reso lu tio n

o f this c ase. ”
The trial c o u rt rej ec ted the p lea agreement and anno u nc ed , w itho ut the benef it

o f a f u ll hearing o n the f

irst of f end er p ro batio n matter, that it w as resentenc ing Tro u p e in that c ase to 30 years to serv e. A f ter b eing to l d that this s entenc e exc eed ed the

statu to ry maximu m f

or the c harges, the trial c o u rt p ro c eed ed t o sentenc e Tro u p e to the statu to ry maximu m, 25 years to serv e. W hile the trial c o urt c o rrec tly rec o gniz ed

2 Bo yki n v . Ala b a ma , 39 5 U. S. 238 (89 SCt 1 7 09 , 23 LE2d 7 4) (1 9 6 9 ).
5that its rej ec t io n of the p lea agreement meant that Tro u p e w as “ witho u t any so rt o f

c o mmitment o r ad missio n o f g u ilt in tha t ca s e ” and that his “ right to a j ury trial o n tha t cha rge [w as] resto r ed , ” it no netheless u sed that rej ec ted p lea agreement and its

c o rresp o nd ing ad missio n of gu ilt as the so le basis f o r r esentenc ing Tro u p e in the f irst

o f f end e r c as e . The rec ord s ho w s that when a sk e d f o r the “ f ac tu al basis f

o r the

resentenc ing,” the trial c o urt resp o nd ed that the “ f ac tu al basis is he’ s a first o f f end er, and [Tro u p e] has ad mitted his gu ilt w ith regard t o [the new c harges] d u ring the c o u r se

o f this hearing. ”
Tro u p e argu es that his resentenc ing w as “ f u nd amentally u nf

air” und er the

c irc umstanc es o f

this c ase, that the trial c o u rt erred by using his nego tiated p lea and
its c o rresp o nd ing a d missio n o f gu ilt as t he basis fo r that r e sentenc ing, and that the trial

c o u rt’ s o rd er w as su p p o rted by insu f f ic ient ev id enc e. W e agree.
A s a general ru le, “ [t]his c o u r t w ill no t interf ere w ith a [p ro batio n] r ev o c atio n

u nless t h e r e h a s b een a m anif est abu se of d isc retio n o n the part o f the trial c o u rt. ” (Pu nc tu a tio n and fo o t n o t e o m itted

. ) D u gger v. S ta te , 26 0 Ga. A p p . 843, 843 (581 SE2d
6 55) (2003). The s ame is tru e o f resentenc ing o f f irst o f f end ers w ho hav e v io lated the

terms o f their p ro batio n. W ri ght v . S ta te , 2 7 9 G a . A p p . 29 9 , 29 9 (6 30 SE2d 7 7 4)

6(2006 ) (same s tand ard o f rev iew ap p lies in p ro batio n r e v o c atio n and f irst o f f end er

rev o c atio n ap p eals); C

ama ro n v . S ta te , 246 Ga. A p p . 80, 82 (1 ) (539 SE2d 57 7 ) (2000) (resentenc ing of f

irst of fend er w ho has v io l a t ed terms o f p ro batio n is “ within the

s o u n d d isc retio n o f the trial c o u rt” ). H o w ev er, “ t he lo ss o f liberty entailed by a
p ro batio n rev o catio n p ro c eed ing [o r a resentenc ing of a f irst o f fend er p ro b atio ner] is

a serio us d ep riv atio n requ iring that the pro batio ner be ac c o r d ed d u e pro c ess. ” (Citatio n, pu nc tu atio n, and f o o tno te o mitted

. ) Mea do ws v . S ettles , 2 7 4 Ga. 858, 86 0 (3) (56 1 SE2d 1 05) (2002).
A ltho u gh su c h liberty is no t the equ iv a lent o f that enj oyed by an o rd inary

c itiz en, it is greater than that enj o yed by o n e i nc arc e r ated f o r a crime. H o w ev er this liberty may be restric ted , it may no t be t e r minated w itho u t the ru diments o f p ro c ed ural d u e p ro c ess. W hat is at stak e is no t simp ly t ec h n i c a l legal no tio ns o f w hat step s mu st be f o llo w e d in a rev o c a tio n hearing. I nstead , there is inv o lv ed a p ro f ou nd attitu d e o f f

airness betw een man and m an, a nd mo re p artic u larly betw een the ind iv id u al a nd go v ernment. (Citatio n and p u nc t u atio n o mitted

. ) I d

. W e rev iew de no v o the qu estio n o f w hether

su c h a p r oc eed ing af

f o rd ed the d ef

end ant d u e p ro c ess. D a v e v . Sta te , 36 5 G a. A p p . 1 , 5 (3) (87 6 SE2d 882) (2022).

7“ T he requ irements o f d u e p ro c ess are f lexible a nd c all f

o r s u c h pro c ed u ral
p ro tec tio ns as the p artic u lar situ atio n d e mand s,” (c itatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted )
D a v e , 36 5 Ga. Ap p . at 5 (3), and “ [i]t is w ell- settled t hat a p ro batio ner f ac ing

rev o c atio n is no t entitled to the fu ll p ano p ly o f co nstitu tio nal d u e p ro cess r ights w hic h

attac h to an a c c u sed in a c riminal p ro sec u tio n. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. )
Mu rphy v . Sta te , 37 0 Ga. A p p . 7 38, 7 46 (2) (89 9 SE2d 307 ) ( 2 02 4 ). B u t “w here a
p ro batio ner c a rries the b urd e n of ad d u c ing ind ep e nd e nt ev id e nc e that ref lec ts that his

o r her ad missio n o f p ro batio n v io latio ns was no t k no w ing and vo lu ntary, a r ev iew ing

c o u rt may d etermin e w hether f u nd amental f

airness requ ires the r e v e r sal o f the
p ro batio n rev o c a tio n. ” Mea do ws , 27 4 Ga. at 86 2 (3).
The c ritic a l f

ac t in this case is that the trial c o u rt based its resentenc ing entirely

o n Tro up e’ s ad missio ns mad e in c o nnec tio n w ith his nego t iated gu ilty p lea that w as rej ec ted by the trial c o u rt and su bsequ ently w ithd raw n by Tro u p e.

“ It is w ell established in G eo rgia that the end resu lt o f a nego t iated p lea agreement is, in essenc e, a c o ntrac t betw een a d ef end ant and t he State. A s s u c h , i n many c irc u mstanc es it is ap p ro p riate to v iew the f inal nego tiated p lea agreement as a pac kage d eal, t he terms of w hic h sho u ld

no t be t reated in iso latio n f ro m o n e a n o ther bu t rather as a c o hesiv e
w ho le. ”

8(Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) Arn o ld v . S ta te , 352 G a. A p p . 7 7 7 , 780 (835 SE2d

7 59 ) (201 9 ). “ [A ] trial j u d ge has w id e d isc retio n to ac c ep t or rej ec t a nego tiated p lea. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu a tio n o mitted

. ) To rres - To ledo v . Sta te , 36 6 G a. Ap p . 526 , 527 (1 ) (883 SE2d 545) (2023). If , ho w ev er, a trial c ou rt i n t end s to rej ec t a nego tiated p lea,
it is requ ired u nd er Unif

o rm Su perio r Co u rt Ru le 33. 1 0 “ to inf o rm the def

end ant that [he] thu s has the r ight to w ithd raw [his] p lea[ , ] ” w i t h the end r esu lt being that the rej ec ted a nd su bsequ ently withd raw n p lea c anno t be u sed against the d ef end ant in the

ensu ing trial o r o ther j u d ic ial p ro c eed ing.
Ou r c o u rts hav e lo ng held that if a nego tiated plea agreement is rej e c t e d o r

w ithd r aw n, any ad mi ss i o n o f g u i lt mad e a s p art of the a greement c anno t be u sed as

ev id enc e against the d ef

end ant at trial. See C

o rthra n v . Sta te , 26 8 Ga. 443, 443 (49 1
SE2d 6 6 ) (1 9 9 7) (v id eo tap ed s tatement mad e as p art o f a nego tiated p lea bargain
agreement was inad m issible w here gu ilty p lea w as later w ithd raw n); W i lli ams v . S ta te , 2 39 Ga. 327 , 327

- 328 (1 ) (236 SE2d 6 7 2) (1 97 7 ) (rev ersing d ef end ant’ s c onv ic ti o n

w hen he c o nf

essed to a c r ime as p art of a later- rej ec ted plea agre e m e n t bec au se “ a

c o nf essio n ind u c ed by the slightest ho pe o f benef it o r remo t e s t f

ear o f inj u ry may no t be u sed against a d e f

end ant” ). Fo r the same reaso n , su c h ad missio ns s ho uld no t be

9u sed a gainst the d ef end ant in a p ro b a t io n r e v oc atio n o r f irst o f f end er resentenc ing
p ro c eed ing. To ho ld o therw ise w o u ld be f u nd amentally unf

air to d ef end ants who seek

to a c cep t resp o nsibility and reso lv e c riminal c harges, w o u ld u nd uly chill nego tiatio ns betw een d ef

end ants and pro sec u to r s, and wo u ld be c o ntrary to well- ac c ep t ed Geo rgia
law

. OCGA § 24- 4- 41 0 exp ressly p ro vid es that, su b j e c t to c ertain ex c e p ti o ns no t
ap p lic able here, a d missio ns o f gu ilt mad e in t he c o ntext o f w ithd r aw n gu ilty p leas are inad missible no t o nly at trial bu t “ in a n y j ud ic ial o r ad min i s t r a t i v e p ro c eed ing. ” (Emp hasis su p plied

. ) This ru le o f ev id enc e ap p lies in p ro batio n rev o c atio n and f irst

o f f end e r resentenc ing p ro c eed ings. See Gri mes v . S t a t e , 3 6 4 G a . A p p . 51 8, 521 n. 3 (87 5 SE2 d 5 00 ) (2022) (“ Geo rgia Ru les o f Ev id enc e ap p ly in p ro batio n r ev o c atio n hearings. ” ). See also OCGA § 24- 1

- 2 (b) ( “The ru les o f e v id enc e shall ap p ly generally

to all no nj u ry trials and o ther f a ct- f ind ing p ro c eed ings” su b j ec t to c e r tain exc ep tio ns

no t ap p lic able here).
There is ano ther reaso n w h y a d missio ns mad e in c o nnec tio n w ith rej ec ted
gu ilty pleas sho u ld no t be u sed against the d e f e n d a n t in a su bsequ e nt trial o r o ther j u d ic ial p ro c e ed ing. Sp e c if ic ally, i n o r d e r t o b e a d m i s s ible, co nf essio ns mu st be “ mad e

10v o lu ntarily, w itho u t being ind uc ed by ano ther by the slightest ho p e o f benef it o r

remo test f

ear o f inj ury. ” OCGA § 24- 8- 824. “ T he ‘ slightest ho p e of benef it’ ref e rs

to p ro mises related to red u ced c riminal p u n i sh m e nt

– a sho rter sentenc e, lesser

c harges, o r no c harges at all. ” (Citatio n, p u nc tu atio n and e m p hasis omi t t e d

. )
Hen ders on v. S t

a te , 31 0 Ga. 7 08, 7 1 2 (2) (854 SE2d 523) (2021 ). H ere, it is u nd isp u ted
that Tro u p e’ s ad missio n o f gu ilt w as mad e w ith the ho p e, and f o r the exp ress pu rp o se,

o f rec e iv ing a benef

it in the f o rm o f red u c ed c r iminal pu nishment, i. e. , th e s i x y e a r

sentenc e agreed to by the p arties. W hile the t r ial c o u rt w a s c ertainly au t ho riz ed to rej ec t the p arties’ a greement, it w as no t a utho riz ed to u se Tro u p e’ s ad missio ns mad e in c o nnec tio n w ith that agreement as the basis f or resentenc ing.
W e also rej e c t t he State’ s argu ment that its p ro f f er mad e in c onnec tio n w ith the rej ec ted gu ilty p lea su p p o rts the resentenc ing. First, it is c lear t h a t t h e t r i al c o urt d id no t resentenc e Tro u p e b ased o n this
p ro f f er. Rather, as d isc ussed a bo v e, the imp ro p er basis f or the r esentenc ing c o nsisted

o f Tro u p e’ s ad missio ns o f gu ilt mad e in c o nnec tio n w ith the r ej e c ted and w ithd raw n
p lea agreement.

11Sec o nd , the p ro f f er u p o n w hic h the State relies w as no t ev id e nc e s u bmitted in

c o nnec tio n w ith a hearing o n the merits of the State’ s p etitio n to resentenc e Tro u p e i n the f irst o f f e nd e r case. Rather, it w as simp ly the State’ s rec itatio n o f the f ac tu al
basis f o r the gu ilty p lea o n t h e new c harges, as w as requ ired b y Unif orm Su p erio r Co u rt Ru le 33. 9

. See S ta te v. Ev a n s , 26 5 Ga. 332, 333 (454 SE2d 46 8) (1 9 9 5). W hile
Tro u p e d id no t o bj ec t to the stated f ac tu a l basis f

o r the p lea, there w as no reaso n f o r him to do so . H is interests mirro red the State’ s interest in o btaining c o u r t a p p r o v al

o f the p ro p o sed p lea agreement.
Third , ev en if

, fo r the sak e o f argu ment, w e w ere to c o nsid er the State’ s f ac tu al
basis f o r the gu ilty p lea as ev id enc e in the f irst o f f end er resentenc ing c ase, the rec o rd
p lainly sho w s t hat the trial co u rt nev er c o nd u cted a f u ll hearing in that matter. Tro u p e

w as no t giv en the op p o rtu nity to testif y o r p resent ev id enc e in the f irst o f f e nd er c ase, and he nev er c o nsented to the rev o c atio n o f any po rtio n o f his pro batio n ou tsid e the

terms of his nego tiated agreement w ith the State. Absent an ad missible ad missio n o f

a p ro batio n v io latio n or a f u ll hearing w ith ev id enc e o f su c h a v io latio n, the trial c o urt

w as no t p ermitted to rev o k e Tro u p e’ s p ro batio n or a d j u d ic ate him gu i l t y a nd

resentenc e him in the f

irst o f f e nd er c ase. See OCGA § 42- 8- 34. 1 (b) (a c o u rt may no t

12“ r ev ok e any p art o f any pro bated o r su sp end ed sentenc e u nless the d e f end ant ad mits
the v io l a t i o n as a lleged o r unless the ev id enc e p ro d u c ed at the rev o catio n hearing
establishes by a p rep o nd eranc e o f the ev id enc e the v io latio n o r vio latio ns alleged ” );
E va n s v . S ta te , 1 8 5 G a . A p p . 805, 805 (355 SE2d 16 5) (1 9 88) ( ap p lying same

ev id entiary stand ard i n f i r st of f end e r terminatio n and r esentenc ing c a se as that
stand ard u sed in o ther p ro batio n rev o c atio n p ro c eed ings).
Fo r these reaso ns, the State’ s relianc e o n the p r o f fer mad e by the State in

c o nnec tio n w it h t h e r ej ec ted gu ilty p lea is misp lac ed , and the trial c o u rt’ s

resentenc ing o r d er is rev ersed . See Mea do ws , 27 4 Ga. at 86 2 (3).
Ju dgmen t rev ers ed. Mi

ller, P. J. , a n d Ma rkle, J. , co n cu r .

13