COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ROBERT EDWARD WHITE 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 2601-95-3 CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON 

 MARCH 25, 1997 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG 

Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge 

 Vanessa E. Hicks, Assistant Public Defender 

(Office of the Public Defender, on brief), 

for appellant. 

 John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney 

General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney 

General, on brief), for appellee. 

 Robert Edward White appeals his conviction of possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-248. White contends that the trial court erred: (1) in 

admitting evidence obtained in a search of his car; and (2) in 

finding that the evidence was sufficient beyond a reasonable 

doubt to convict him. Because the search of the passenger 

compartment and trunk of White's vehicle was a valid search 

pursuant to a lawful custodial arrest, and because the evidence 

was sufficient to support the finding that White possessed 

cocaine with intent to distribute, we affirm. 

 At approximately 4:00 a.m., on April 27, 1995, Officer 

Murphy of the Lynchburg Police Department cited White for driving 

on a suspended operator's license. At approximately 11:30 p.m., 

Murphy noticed White sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle 
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which was parked on the wrong side of traffic. As Murphy drove 

past, White pulled out and fell in behind Murphy's vehicle. 

Murphy turned off, circled, and fell in behind White. As White 

continued down the street, he entered oncoming traffic, 

accelerated, and turned into the driveway of his home. Murphy 

activated his emergency lights and pulled in behind White. White 

quickly exited his vehicle and began walking rapidly away from 

his car. Murphy ordered White back to the vehicle. After 

hesitating for a moment, White complied, returning to his car. 

 Murphy then arrested White for driving on a suspended 

operator's license and proceeded to search the passenger 

compartment of the car. During the search, White asked, "what 

are you doing to my car?" Between the driver and passenger 

seats, Murphy discovered a brown paper bag which would have been 

visible to anyone sitting in the driver's seat. In the bag, 

Murphy discovered a plastic bag containing two "large white 

chunks" of crack cocaine. Subsequent to the discovery of the 

drugs in the vehicle, officers searched the trunk of White's car 

and therein discovered $2,691 in mixed denominations. A search 

of White's person produced a pager and $131 in cash. 

 White moved to suppress the physical evidence and the 

statement he made while his vehicle was being searched. White 

argued that because "[he] had already pulled his car into his 

driveway and had gotten out of the car and was headed toward his 

house" before being apprehended, the vehicle should not have been 

searched because it was not in his general vicinity. 
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Search of the Vehicle

 In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), the United 

States Supreme Court held that a lawful arrest justifies a 

contemporaneous warrantless search of the individual arrested and 

of the immediately surrounding area. "Such searches have long 

been considered valid because of the need `to remove any weapons 

that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest 

or effect his escape' and the need to prevent the concealment or 

destruction of evidence." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 

(1981) (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 

 However, in New York v. Belton, the Court found that 

"[w]hile the Chimel case established that a search incident to an 

arrest may not stray beyond the area within the immediate control 

of the arrestee, courts have found no workable definition of `the 

area within the immediate control of the arrestee' when that area 

arguably includes the interior of an automobile and the arrestee 

is its recent occupant." 453 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added). 

Recognizing that "the protection of the Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendments `can only be realized if the police are acting under a 

set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach 

a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of 

privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement,'" id. at 

458 (citations omitted), the Court held "that when a policeman 

has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 

automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, 
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search the passenger compartment of that automobile." Id. at 

460. 

 In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the Supreme Court 

stated that its ruling in Belton applies even where the arrestee 

voluntarily exits the vehicle prior to being arrested. In Long, 

after swerving into a ditch, Long exited his vehicle and met the 

investigating officers near the rear of his vehicle. Suspecting 

that Long was under the influence of alcohol, the police frisked 

him for weapons. An officer also noticed a hunting knife lying 

on the floorboard of the car. Searching for other weapons in the 

car, the officers discovered an open pouch which contained 

marijuana. A subsequent search of the trunk produced seventyfive pounds of marijuana. While ultimately finding the search of 

the passenger compartment valid under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 

(1968), the Court noted that "[i]t is clear that if the officers 

had arrested Long . . . they could have searched the passenger 

compartment under New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and 

the trunk under United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)." 

Long, 463 U.S. at 1036 n.1. 

 The Supreme Court's ruling in Belton is readily applicable 

to the facts in this case. Here, the record indicates that White 

became aware that he was being followed by the police. Upon 

fleeing his vehicle he was immediately stopped and arrested for 

driving a motor vehicle with a suspended operator's license. 

Subsequent to his custodial arrest, the passenger compartment of 

the vehicle of which he had been a "recent occupant" was 
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searched, producing a plastic bag containing crack cocaine. The 

search conducted was performed pursuant to a lawful custodial 

arrest and was contemporaneous with the arrest. We find this 

search indistinguishable from the type of search deemed valid by 

Belton. Accordingly, we hold the search of the passenger 

compartment of White's vehicle was valid. 

 We also hold that the subsequent search of the trunk of 

White's vehicle was valid. In United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 

798 (1982), the Supreme Court found that "[i]f probable cause 

justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies 

the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may 

conceal the object of the search." Id. at 825. Here, the 

discovery of crack cocaine, pursuant to a valid search incident 

to a custodial arrest, provided the police with probable cause to 

believe that the vehicle might contain additional controlled 

substances. 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 White argues the evidence was insufficient to prove that he 

either possessed or had the intent to distribute drugs. 

 On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). 

 In proving possession of a controlled substance, the 

Commonwealth may prove either actual or constructive possession. 

Pemberton v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 651, 440 S.E.2d 420 
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(1994). "`To support a conviction based on constructive 

possession, the Commonwealth must point to evidence of acts, 

statements, or conduct of the accused or other facts or 

circumstances which tend to show that the defendant was aware of 

both the presence and character of the substance and that it was 

subject to his dominion and control.'" McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 

Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1987) (quoting Drew v. 

Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338 S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986) 

(citations omitted)). 

 Here, the evidence is sufficient to support the trial 

court's finding that White was aware of and had control over the 

crack cocaine discovered in his vehicle and that he had the 

intent to distribute the cocaine. The bag containing the drugs 

was found between the driver and passenger seats and would have 

been plainly visible to anyone sitting in the driver's seat. We 

have consistently recognized proximity to a controlled substance 

as "a factor to consider when determining whether the accused 

constructively possessed drugs." Brown v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. 

App. 1, 9, 421 S.E.2d 877, 882 (1992)(en banc). In addition, 

White's mother, the owner of the vehicle, testified that she did 

not own the drugs and that White had been the only person to 

operate the vehicle the day of his arrest. 

 White also possessed significant sums of cash and a beeper, 

evidence which supports a finding of both possession and intent 

to distribute. See McGee, 4 Va. App. at 322, 357 S.E.2d at 740. 

 Investigator Dantz testified that area drug dealers often kept a 
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relatively small amount of cash on their person, while hiding the 

bulk of their receipts elsewhere. Here, officers discovered $131 

in cash in White's personal possession and an additional $2,691, 

in mixed denominations, in the trunk of his vehicle.1

 Considered 

with other factors, possession of currency by a defendant may be 

considered in determining whether he or she possessed drugs with 

an intent to distribute. See Colbert v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1, 

44 S.E.2d 748 (1978). In addition, White possessed a beeper, an 

item routinely classified as a tool of the drug trade. See

Wilkins v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 293, 443 S.E.2d 440 (1994) 

(en banc). 

 Further, the drugs found in White's vehicle were packaged in 

a manner consistent with distribution. Investigator Dantz 

testified that the packaging of the drugs discovered in White's 

vehicle conformed to the practices of area crack dealers. Expert 

testimony, usually that of a police officer familiar with 

narcotics, is routinely offered to prove the significance of the 

weight and packaging of drugs, regarding whether possession is 

for personal use or for distribution. See Hetmeyer v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 103, 448 S.E.2d 894 (1994); Rodriguez 

v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 277, 443 S.E.2d 419 (1994); 

 

 1 White admitted the money found in the trunk belonged to 

him, but claimed he had won the money gambling. The fact finder 

was not required to believe him nor to give any weight to his 

testimony. It is for the trier of fact to ascertain a witness' 

credibility and it is within the fact finder's discretion to 

accept or reject any of the testimony offered. Bridgeman v. 

Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). 
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Poindexter v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 730, 432 S.E.2d 527 

(1993). 

 The totality of the facts and circumstances was sufficient 

to prove that a drug operation was being conducted from White's 

vehicle. White had possession of the car for the entirety of the 

day on which he was arrested. He had on his person a beeper and 

a small amount of cash. He admitted to owning the $2,691 found 

in the trunk of the vehicle. The bag of drugs found in the 

vehicle was within the reach and sight of the driver of the 

vehicle. These facts and circumstances were sufficient to 

exclude any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and to prove that 

White both possessed cocaine and had the intent to distribute it. 

 Accordingly, the trial court's decision is affirmed. 

 Affirmed.