alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of the Estate of John H. Johnston, Deceased.

(No. 1.)*

Surrogate’s Court, Kings County,

September 28, 1937.

*Jack G. Lieberman,*for the petitioner Estelle Bloomfield, executrix named in the will.

*Lieberman & Gar ajóla,*for the objectants Edward H. Johnston, Martina M. Peters and Irene M. Mareno, three of the children of decedent.

*

 See *Matter of Johnston, No. 2*(164 Misc. 469).

Wingate, S.

This is a petition for letters by the executrix named in the will which has been duly admitted to probate. Prior to such probate the executrix renounced. Thereafter she filed a document in this court purporting to retract such renunciation.

Certain of the statutory distributees of the decedent oppose the application for letters on the ground that such renunciation was made pursuant to an agreement between all interested parties that a contemplated contest of the will should be withheld provided such renunciation was made and certain other enumerated acts performed by the present petitioner and other persons. It is further averred that pursuant to such arrangement the renunciation was filed in this court and that subsequent thereto the other parties consented to the probate of the will.

*413Section 158 of the Surrogate’s Court Act provides in substance that a renunciation of letters may be retracted prior to the issuance of any letters upon the estate, or thereafter, if the office of fiduciary becomes vacant, and thereupon continues that “ where a retraction is so made, letters testamentary may, in the discretion of the surrogate, be issued to the person making it.”

Consonantly with express language of the section, it has been held that an application for letters under such circumstances is addressed to the discretion of the court *(Matter of Cornell,*17 Misc. 468, 471; *Matter of Haug,*29 id. 36, 39; *Matter of Tredwell,*37 id. 584, 585; revd. on other grounds, 77 App. Div. 155), with the exercise of which an appellate tribunal will not interfere in the absence of a demonstration of manifest abuse. *(Matter of Baldwin,*27 App. Div. 506, 509; appeal dismissed, 158 N. Y. 713.)

If the facts as alleged in the answer are true, there is precedent for the denial of the present application in the case last cited which would be a substantially four-square authority on the facts. This the court would follow, since it would be disinclined to intrust the administration of the estate to one so insensible to obligation as the petitioner would be demonstrated to be if it were established that she had attempted to act in direct contravention of her express agreement.

It is, however, a familiar fact that allegation and demonstration frequently fail to coincide. The allegation in the answer must, of course, be deemed traversed which raises a triable issue as to the existence of the alleged agreement. This may not be determined in the absence of a hearing, for which purpose the matter may be set down by either party on usual notice.

Proceed in conformity herewith.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.2


                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statement on 
Form S-1 (No. 333-56799) and in the related Prospectus, of our report, dated 
February 7, 1997, relating to the financial statements of Clark/Bardes, Inc. 
(the predecessor to Clark/Bardes Holdings, Inc.). included in the Annual Report 
on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 1998.



                                        LANE GORMAN TRUBITT, L.L.P.


Dallas, Texas
March 29, 1999
<Page>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.1

                                  CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, the undersigned officer of ING Insurance
Company of America (the "Company") hereby certifies that, to the officer's
knowledge, the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended
March 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the requirements of Section
13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.


May 12, 2005                By    /s/ David A. Wheat
------------                    ---------------------------------------------
     (Date)                           David A. Wheat
                                      Director, Senior Vice President, and
                                         Chief Financial Officer
##### 



Exhibit 32.1 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 In connection with the annual report of Electric City Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-K for
the period ended December 31, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the
date hereof (the Report), I, John P. Mitola, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:  1.
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and2.
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the
financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Date: March 31, 2005 /s/ John P. MitolaJohn P. MitolaChief Executive Officer
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form
within the electronic version of this written statement required by Section 906, has been provided
to Electric City Corp. and will be retained by Electric City Corp. and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. 49
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Postal Service

# AGENCY:

                        Postal ServiceTM.                    

# ACTION:

Notice.

# SUMMARY:

The Postal Service gives notice of filing a request with the Postal Regulatory Commission to add a domestic shipping services contract to the list of Negotiated Service Agreements in the Mail Classification Schedule's Competitive Products List.

# DATES:

*Date of required notice:*                         October 24, 2024.                    

# FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Sean C. Robinson, 202-268-8405.

# SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

                    The United States Postal Service® hereby gives notice that, pursuant to 39 U.S.C. 3642 and 3632(b)(3), on October 15, 2024, it filed with the Postal Regulatory Commission a                     *USPS Request to Add Priority Mail Express, Priority Mail & USPS Ground Advantage® Contract 477 to Competitive Product List.*                     Documents are available at                     *www.prc.gov,*                     Docket Nos. MC2025-81, K2025-79.                

Sean C. Robinson,

Attorney, Corporate and Postal Business Law. 

[FR Doc. 2024-24601 Filed 10-23-24; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7710-12-P
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 437

AN ACT

To designate the United States courthouse under construction at 333 Las Vegas Boulevard South in Las Vegas,

Nevada, as the ‘‘Lloyd D. George United States Courthouse’’.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 437 ES

1 SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF LLOYD D. GEORGE UNITED

2 STATES COURTHOUSE.

3 The United States courthouse under construction at

4 333 Las Vegas Boulevard South in Las Vegas, Nevada,

5 shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Lloyd D. George

6 United States Courthouse’’.

7 SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

8 Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document,

9 paper, or other record of the United States to the United

10 States courthouse referred to in section 1 shall be deemed

11 to be a reference to the ‘‘Lloyd D. George United States

12 Courthouse’’.

Passed the Senate March 23, 1999.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 437

AN ACT

To designate the United States courthouse under

United States Courthouse’’.in Las Vegas, Nevada, as the ‘‘Lloyd D. Georgeconstruction at 333 Las Vegas Boulevard South
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Derrick Walker, Appellant.

[774 NYS2d 721]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Rooney, J.), rendered April 15, 2002, convicting him of attempted criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree, upon his plea of guilty, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

We have reviewed the record and agree with the defendant’s assigned counsel that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on appeal. Counsel’s application for leave to withdraw as counsel is granted *(see Anders v California,*386 US 738 [1967]; *People v Paige,*54 AD2d 631 [1976]; *cf. People v Gonzalez,*47 NY2d 606 [1979]).

The defendant has not raised any nonfrivolous issues in his supplemental pro se brief. Altman, J.P., Krausman, Goldstein and Mastro, JJ., concur.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 10.8

                       ADVANCED ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
                       ---------------------------------

                               FIRST AMENDMENT TO
                               ------------------
                            2000 STOCK INCENTIVE PLAN
                            -------------------------

     The 2000 Stock Option Plan previously approved and implemented by the Board
of Directors of Advanced Engine Technologies, Inc. (AET), pursuant to unanimous
vote of the Board of Directors at a Special Meeting of the Board of Directors,
is hereby amended as follows:

     Paragraph 3 of the "2000 Stock Incentive Plan" is hereby deleted in its
entirety, and the following substituted paragraph 3 is hereby inserted and
substituted in its place as though fully set forth, from inception, in the "2000
Stock Incentive Plan":

          "3. Stock Subject to the Plan. Subject to the provisions of
              -------------------------
          Section 13 of the Plan, the maximum aggregate number of
          Shares which may be issued under the Plan will be Ten
          Million (10,000,000) Shares of Common Stock. The Shares may
          be authorized, but unissued, or reacquired Common Stock.

          If an Option expires or becomes unexercisable without having
          been exercised in full, or is surrendered pursuant to an
          Option Exchange Program, or if a Stock Award shall be
          cancelled or surrendered or expire for any reason without
          having been received in full, the Shares that were not
          purchased or received which were subject thereto will become
          available for future grant or sale under the Plan (unless
          the Plan has terminated). If the Company reacquires Shares
          which were issued pursuant to the exercise of an Option or
          grant of a Stock Award, however, those reacquired Shares
          will not be available for future grant under the Plan."

     The undersigned, as Secretary of AET, hereby certifies by his signature set
forth below that this Amendment was approved and adopted by the full Board of
Directors of AET, as the "Administrator" of the "2000 Stock Incentive Plan", at
the properly noticed and held Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of AET
which took place on March 22, 2001, at the corporate headquarters of AET located
at 11150 W. Olympic Boulevard, Suite 1050, Los Angeles, California.

DATED: March 23, 2001                   ADVANCED ENGINE TECHNOLOGIES, INC.



                                        By: /s/ M. Neil Cummings
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           M. Neil Cummings, Secretary

                                 -47-
#### J. T. PETTEWAY, and JOHN W. HINSDALE, Adm’r., *v.*JOHN DAWSON.

A motion to strike out the name of a plaintiff, made by the attorney for-the defendant, by virtue of a power of attorney to that end given by one of the plaintiff's, will be refused where the attorney for the plain-’ tiff produces a letter from him of a dace later than that of the power, authorizing the suit to go on.

Motion, to strike out the name of one of the plaintiffs,, made before *Buxton, J.,*at Spring Term 1870, of Cumberland Court.

The facts appear in the Opinion.

His Honor refused to strike out, and the plaintiff Pette-way appealed.

*Bowie & Badger,*for the appellant.

*Hinsdale, contra.*

Beade, J.

There are two plaintiffs of record. The defendant’s attorney produced a power of attorney from the plaintiff Petteway, to dismiss the suit. The plaintiffs’ attorney thereupon produced a letter from said Petteway, dated since the power of attorney, authorizing him to prosecute the suit. His Honor refused the motion of the defendant’s attorney to dismiss the suit, and the defendant’s attorney prayed an appeal for the plaintiff Petteway, and signed a bond as surety for him to secure the defendant his costs.. These proceedings are certainly *u*of the first impression.”

The only question presented at the bar was, whether the letter to the plaintiffs’ attorney revoked the power of attorney to the defendant’s attorney. This is too plain for discussion. We suppose that the defendant’s attorney did not mean to appear, and that His Honor would not have allowed him to appear, on both sides,- and that the production of the *451power of attorney was only in the nature of a demand upon tire plaintiffs’ attorney for Iris authority to prosecute for the plaintiffs. As soon as the plaintiffs’ attorney produced the letter, that demand was answered, and the suit ought to have proceeded. The letter was ample for that purpose.

The interlocutory order being in favor of the plaintiffs, and .as it appears of record that the plaintiff Petteway appealed therefrom, there being no error, the said Petteway must pay ■the costs of the appeal.

There is no error. Let this be certified, &c.

Pee Curiam:. Affirmed.
#### STATE v. ELIJAH McCOURY.

*Appeal la Forma Pauperis*— The *Code,*§ 1235.

[See head-note to State *v.*Tow, *ante,*p. 850.]

MotioN, by the Attorney General in this Court, to dismiss the appeal.

The defendant was allowed to appeal *in forma pauperis*by an order made by *Clark, J.,*at the Fall Term, 1888, of Yakcey Superior Court.

*Attorney General,*for the State.

No counsel for the defendant.

Smith, C. J.

The conviction and judgment in this case was upon an indictment for carrying a pistol concealed about the person of the defendant, and leave to appeal was given without security, upon an affidavit in which appears the-same fatal defect as that of *State*v. *Tow.*It must be disposed of in the same manner.

Appeal dismissed.
#### CHESTER & LENOIR RAILROAD COMPANY v. J. M. RICHARDSON.

*Appeal*— Practice.

1. An appeal does not lie from the refusal of a judge to dismiss an action. ,

2. Where, on an appeal from a justice of the peace to the superior court, the appellee moved to dismiss for want of notice of appeal, and the judge denied the motion and ordered notice of such appeal to he then issued; *Held,*that such order did not “affect a substantial right” within the meaning of the code, § 299, so as to give a right of appeal.

*(Mitchellv. Kilburn, It*N. C., 433; *Crawley*v. Woodfln, 78 N. O., 4; *McBryde*v. *Patterson, Id.,*412 ; *Marsh*v. *Cohen,*6S N. C., 283 ; *Sutton*v. *Schonwald,*80 N. C., 20, cited and approved.)

MotioN to dismiss an Appeal from a justice’s court, heard at Fall Term, 1879, of LincolN Superior Court, before *Bux-ton, J.*

The motion was refused and the defendant appealed.

The plaintiff was not represented in this court.

*Mr. John D. Shaw,*for defendant.

*344Smith, C. J.

On the trial before a justice of the peace on .the 1st day of December, 1876, both parties being present, judgment was rendered for defendant. On the 8th day of the month the appeal was taken by the plaintiff, written notice thereof left with the justice, and an undertaking entered into for the stay of execution. No notice of the appeal, written or verbal, was given to the defendant. Upon the calling of the cause in the superior court at fall term, 1879, the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s appeal for want of notice, as required by Bat. Rev., ch. 63, § 54. The motion was denied and notice ordered to issue of such appeal, and from this ruling the defendant appeals.

It has been too often adjudged in this court to need further discussion, that an appeal does not lie from the refusal of the judge to dismiss the action; and if taken,the appeal will be dismissed. The proper course is to proceed with the trial “ leaving the parties to save their rights by exception ” or to retain the cause until the trial can be properly had. *Mitchell*v. *Kilburn,*74 N. C., 483; *Crawley*v. *Woodfin,*78 N. C., 4; *McBryde*v. *Patterson, Id.,*412.

The direction that notice shall issue to supply the appellant’s omission, suggested by a remark of Rodman, J., delivering the opinion in *Marsh*v. *Cohen,*68 N. C., 283, as we suppose, does not *“*affect a substantial right,” within the meaning of the code, § 299, so as to give a right of appeal. *Sutton*v. *Schonwald,*80 N. C., 20. The appeal must therefore be dismissed and it is so ordered.

Per Curiam. Appeal dismissed.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 20, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-21302

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

VIDAL FLORES-BARRERA,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-02-CR-251-1

--------------------

Before JONES, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Vidal Flores-Barrera (“Flores”) appeals his conviction of

being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm in violation of

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Flores contends that 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g) is unconstitutional. Flores acknowledges that his

appellate argument is foreclosed by circuit precedent. 

Nevertheless, Flores seeks to preserve the issue for Supreme

Court review. 
No. 02-21302

-2-

This court has repeatedly emphasized that the

constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) is not open to question. 

See United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir.

2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1150 (2002). Because the factual

basis indicated that the firearm Flores possessed was not

manufactured in Texas, Flores’ conviction was supported by the

evidence. See United States v. Rawls, 85 F.3d 240, 242 (5th Cir.

1996). 

AFFIRMED.
#### STATE *ex rel.*W. A. SULLIVAN and wife *v.*C. F. LOWE and A. HARGRAVE.

A Clerk is not liable upon bis official bond, for a failure by bim to issue *ex officio*a notice to a guardian, to renew *Ms*bond.

*(State ex rel. Jones*v. *Biggs,*1 Jon. 361, approved.)

Civil action upon an official bond, tried before *Cloud, J.,*at Spring Term 1870, of Davidson Court.

The case was, that the defendant Lowe had been Clerk of the County Court of Davidson, and that the other defendant was one of his sureties. Whilst Lowe was Clerk, one Henderson Adams was guardian of the *feme*plaintiff, and the time for renewing his bond having come around, (August *501Term 1853,) lie failed to do so. Thereupon, it was the duty of Lowe to notify him thereof: (Eev. Code, c. 54, s. 10). He neglected to do so. Subsequently, Adams and the sureties upon his said bond failed, and the ward having suffered loss’ thereby, brought this suit, claiming that Lowe and his sureties, on account of the neglect above, were liable to indemnify him for his loss.

Under the instructions of the Court, the defendant had a verdict; and thereupon the plaintiff appealed.

*Gforrell,*for the appellant.

*Clement, contra.*

Beade, J.

The question is, whether a Clerk of a Court and his sureties, are liable upon his official bond, for the failure of the Clerk to issue *ex officio,*a notice to a guardian to renew his bond. This question was before this Court in *State ex rel. Lee*v. *Watson,*7 Ire. 289, and again in *State ex rel. Jones*v. *Biggs,*1 Jon. 364.

In the first case, it was decided by a divided Court, that he was; and in the last case, by a divided Court, that he was not liable.

It was supposed by the plaintiff’s counsel, that these conflicting decisions left it an open question, and he insisted that the first decision is the better law. We have considered it as an open question, and were attentive to Mr. G-orrell’s learned argument, but we adhere to the decision that the Clerk and his sureties are not liable. The question was so fully discussed and considered in the cases referred to, that it would be superfluous to repeat the discussion here.

There is no error.

Pee Cueiam. Judgment affirmed.

Note. — The case of W. A. Myers and wife, against the same defendants, received a similar determination at this Term.
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

   Schedule of Year-To-Date Principal and Interest Distributions
                           to
                  Certificateholders

                                                                    Ending
Class            Interest             Principal    Losses           Balance
<S>               <C>                  <C>            <C>           <C>
A1               1268607.79      26030100.32                0        28866899.68
A2                342202.92                0                0           10933000
A3                372532.38                0                0           11789000
A4                 922434.3                0                0           28209000
A5               2177309.86      60526898.11                0        43359101.88
A6               4986142.34                0                0          173001000
OC1                       0                0                0         2857146.48
OC2                       0                0                0         5250314.41
R1                        0                0                0                  0
R2                        0                0                0                  0
R3                        0                0                0                  0
R4                        0                0                0                  0
X                         0                0                0                  0
X1                        0                0                0                  0
X2                        0                0                0                  0


</TABLE>