alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
CIA otatesville Bn'c 

: r ~id.~cY C r ~ ^ ifii?~~i~L4~"..-:~ II~►t/~~wle .l .~.4.1: L. ✓~ w~~~Y ~ ~ ~w ~~~ » EaB/~Iww 

:~f ~ i i ~ ~ ~ ~ _ Lr, ~ t 

 ~ "~li'~ ' a~~i~re~i~r~ ~.'_ t~ #~ f a~ ~ffm , ww ~ ff~~ Vti t' 

__n~ • ~ y -/zi z/~li~ri ~~zi~riC~~~i~ir~~ •ci3!it<< iJ f z c• ~~~ t /lC 

April 18, 2013 

Alex Cristafaro, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 

David Rostker, U.S. Small Busitiess Administration, Office of Advocacy 

Cortney Higgins, U.S. Office of Manaacment and Budget 

Dear Mr. Cristafaro, Mr. Rostker, and Ms. Hibgins: 

I am writing, today as the CItairman of the Board & C.E.O. of a smalI brick manufacturing company 

that has the potential to be significantly impacted by the upcoming MACT standard for major sources 

in the brick and structural clay processing industry. We are a formal Small Entity Representative 

(SER) in the current i-eview panel being conducted under the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 

Fairness Act (SBREFA). A11 of our industry is working together with the BIA on this critical 

rulemaking and they are kccping us appriscd of thc activities on this rule. We consider thein to be 

speaking on all industry's behalf as they work witll you. 

On another note we think it is iniportant that for over thirty (30) yeai -s Statesville Brick Company has 

spcnt a lot of money on capital eduipment and upkeep to work towai -ds perfecting a process that 

allows us to fire our kilns with a renewable eiieray source wllich we believe sigiiificantly reduces our 

carbon footprint and adds to our countrv's attempt to be inore enerby independent. We believe this to 

be a breat accoinplislinient that we feel should be recognized and given much consideration before 

asking us to further spend large amounts of capital as well as increasinb our prodtiction procedures 

wlhich mav cause us to abandon our process. We are a sniall, locally owned business that has operated 

and survived for over 100 years, but feel we could not continue our business if additional costs of this 

niagnitude were imposed. A forced closinQ of our business would result in nearly one liundred (100) 

job losses inipacting individuals aiid families in and around Iredell County ;North Carolina. 

Thank vou for your consideration. 

Sincerely, 

~ ~•~d~'-~ii 

Micliael B. Foster 

Chairman of the Board & C.E.O. 

Cc: Con;resswoman Virginia Foxx—North Carolina's 5' ~ ' District 

P. 0. Box 471 Statesville, NC 28687-0471 

Phone: 704-872-4123 Fax: 704-872-4125 Toll Free: 800-522-4716 

www.statesvillebrick.com
---

---

Exhibit 15.1

|
|
|

# CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM

We hereby consent to the
incorporation by reference into the Registration Statements on Form S-8 (Registration Nos.
333-09840, 333-12146, 333-14238, 333-109874 and 333-118930) of our report dated July 2,
2008, relating to the consolidated financial statements and the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting of Retalix Ltd., which appears in this Annual Report on
Form 20-F

Kesselman & Kesselman
A member of PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited
Tel-Aviv, Israel
July 2, 2008



---

---
#### L. D. TRIPLETT and wife v. W. P. WITHERSPOON and others.

A deed cannot be used to support a title until the same is proved and' registered; and if a deed be lost, which has never been proved- and registered, no legal title vests in the grantee.

Equity will not interfere to enforce a contract founded in fraud; cer* tainly not against a purchaser for value, but will leave the parties to, their legal rights.

*{Hiatt*v. *Wade,*8 Ired. 340; *Triplett*v. *Wiihenpoon,*70 N. C. Rep. 589 j *Wi'son*v. *Sparlcs,*13 N. C. Rep. 208; and *Hogan*v. *Strayhorn,*65 N. C. Rep. 279, cited and approved.)

Civil Action-, in the nature of *Ljcctment,*tried before Furohes, *J.,*at Fall Term, 1875, of the Superior Court of Caldwell county.

The case was before this court at January, 1874, and the-facts are fully reported in 70 N. C. Rep., 589.

*476There was a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ■and the defendants appealed.

*O. N. Folk.,*for the appellants.

*li. F. Armfield*and *Johnstone*Jones, contra.

Reade, J.

If the plaintiffs’ deed had not been lost, and had been registered, their title would have been perfect; for although their deed was fraudulent, as against creditors, and although Witherspoon, the defendants’ intestate, was a purchaser for value, yet, as he purchased *with knowledge*of the fraudulent conveyance to the plaintiffs, he is bound by it. And this is under our statute of 1840, altering 27th Elizabeth. *Hiatt v. Wade,*8 Ired., 340; *Triplett*v. *Witherspoon, 70*N. C. Rep., 589.

But as the plaintiffs’ deed is lost, and has not been registered, the legal title has not vested in them. Bat. Rev., chap. 35, sec. 1. *Wilson*v. *Sparks,*72 N. C. Rep., 208; *Hogan*v. Strayhorn. 65 N. C. Rep., 279.

One of two things is necessary to be done before the legal title' can vest in the plaintiffs: set up the lost deed and register a copy, or declare the defendants trustees for them, and compel a conveyance of the legal title. This involves the aid ■ of a Court of Equity. Equity will not interfere to set up any transaction founded in fraud ; certainly not against a purchaser for value, but will leave the parties to their *legal*rights..

There is error. This will be certified.

Pee CueiaM. Judgment accordingly.
Order filed November 1, 2016 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-16-00789-CV

____________

BRAZORIA COUNTY FORD, LP AND KIRK L. BRANNAN, Appellants

V.

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, MARK WIGGINS FORD MERCURY, INC., 

AND MARK WIGGINS, INDIVIDUALLY, Appellees

On Appeal from the 23rd District Court

Brazoria County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 30601

ORDER

On October 25, 2016, appellant Kirk L. Brannan filed an affidavit of indigence 

in this court. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1(b)(1) provides that when a 

statement of inability to afford payment of costs was filed in the trial court, the 

party’s indigence status in the trial court carries forward on appeal. The exception to 

this rule is when the party files a motion alleging the party’s financial circumstances 
have materially changed since the date of the trial court’s order. Tex. R. App. P. 

20.1(3). 

The clerk’s record has not been filed in this appeal. This court has not been 

advised whether appellant filed a statement of inability to afford payment of costs in 

the trial court, whether the statement was contested, or the ruling on any contest, if 

any. To determine appellant’s indigent status, we issue the following order for a 

partial clerk’s record.

We order the Brazoria County District Clerk to file a partial clerk’s record 

with the clerk of this court on or before November 16, 2016 (15 days). The partial 

clerk’s record shall contain (1) the judgment being appealed; (2) any motion for 

new trial, other post-judgment motion, or request for findings of fact and conclusions 

of law; and (3) the notice of appeal. In addition, the partial clerk’s record shall 

contain: (4) appellant’s statement of inability to afford payment of costs; (5) the 

contest(s) to the statement, if any; (6) the trial court’s order ruling on any contest; 

and (7) any other documents pertaining to the claim of indigence and the contests 

thereto. 

PER CURIAM
## NUMBER 13 - 14 - 00 629 - CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN RE STATE FARM LLOYDS , RICHARD FREYMANN,

AND RONALD CASTILLO

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam 1
Relator s , State Farm Lloyds, Rich ard Freymann, and Ronald Castillo , filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct respondent, the Honorable Rose Guerra Reyna, Presiding Judge of the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, to withdraw her order denying relators ’ verified plea in abatement and to enter an order abating the suit for damages brought agai nst relator s by the real part ies in i nterest, Homero Gra cia and Maria Gracia, u ntil sixty days after they provide relator s with a notice

1 See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(d) ( “ When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. ” ); T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.4 (distingu ishing opinions and memorandum opinions).2

letter for t he i r claim stating the specific, sepa rate amounts for the claimed damages and attorney’s fees. See T EX

. I NS

. C ODE A NN . § 541.154 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Prior Notice of Action”); id. § 541.155 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Abatement”); T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.1 (“Commencement” of Original Proceedings). In addition, relator s request that this Court iss ue immediate temporary relief staying respondent’s order denying the plea in abatement. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.10 (“Temporary Relief”).
T he Court, having examined and fully considered th e petition for writ of mandamus and the applicable law, is of the o pinion that th e petition for writ of mandamus should be denied for the reasons expressed in our opinion in In re State Farm Lloyds, Richard Freymann, and Nathan Burris , No . 13

- 14

- 00347

- CV, 2014 WL 4243701 , at ** 4

– 9 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op ). Accordingly, the Court DENIES the petit ion for writ of mandamus and request for immediate temporary relief

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 52.8( d ).

PER CURIAM

D elivered and filed the 29th day of October , 2014.
To:
    
    Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Collateral TrusteeRe:
    
    Second Priority Collateral Trust Agreement, dated as of November 30,
2006, (as the same may be amended, supplemented or otherwise modified,
the SPCTA) among Satélites Mexicanos, S.A. de C.V., a corporation
(sociedad anónima de capital variable)organized under the laws of the
United Mexican States (Satmex), Wells Fargo Bank, National
Association, as Collateral Trustee thereunder (in such capacity,
together with any successor appointed hereunder, the Collateral
Trustee) and, Wells Fargo Bank, National Association, as Trustee
under the Second Priority Indenture described therein (in such
capacity, together with any successor appointed thereunder, the
Indenture Trustee).
    ALTERNATV INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONBy:
    /s/ LUIS FERNANDO STEIN VELASCOName:
    Luis Fernando Stein VelascoTitle:
    CFO & TreasurerBy:
    /s/ VERÓNICA GUTIÉRREZ ZAMORA GARCÍAName:
    Verónica Gutiérrez Zamora GarcíaTitle:
    VP Legal Affairs
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-60753

Summary Calendar

_____________________

DANA MICHELE RANDOLPH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WAL-MART STORES, INC.; HARVEY MOHESKY,

individually and in his official capacity,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

(3:97-CV-183-BB)

_________________________________________________________________

May 5, 1999

Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Dana Michele Randolph appeals the summary judgment dismissing

her claims against her former employer, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., and

regional manager Harvey Mohesky, for violations of Title VII, 42

U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206,

and the dismissal without prejudice of her state law claims for

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and

tortious interference with a business relationship. Randolph

contends that she presented evidence establishing material fact

issues regarding whether the defendants treated similarly situated
- 2 -

males differently and whether Wal-Mart’s stated reason for

discharging her was pretextual. (Assuming summary judgment was

proper, Randolph does not contest the dismissal without prejudice

of her state law claims.)

Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56, and viewing the summary judgment

evidence in the light most favorable to Randolph, there is no

material fact issue regarding whether Randolph was discharged on

the basis of her sex, or whether she received less pay than

similarly situated male employees. Accordingly, granting summary

judgment for the defendants on the Title VII and Equal Pay Act

claims was proper, essentially for the reasons stated by the

district court. Randolph v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:97-CV183-B-A (N.D. Miss. Oct. 30, 1998) (unpublished).

AFFIRMED
**EXHIBIT 13.1**

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE U.S. SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

     In connection with the Annual Report of TELE LESTE CELULAR PARTICIPAÇÕES S.A. (the “Company”) on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2002, as filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Francisco José Azevedo Padinha, acting Chief Executive Officer, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

|   |   | (i) | the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|--------|--------|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |   |   |                                                                                                                                                 |
|--------|--------|--------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |   | (ii)   | the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |

Date April 15, 2005

| By:    | /s/ Francisco José Azevedo        Padinha |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                  |
|   | Name:                                            | Francisco José Azevedo        Padinha |
|   | Title:                                           | Chief Executive Officer |

 

----
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 574

AN ACT

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to make corrections

to a map relating to the Coastal Barrier Resources System.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 574ES

1 SECTION 1. CORRECTIONS TO MAP.

2 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 30 days after the

3 date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior

4 shall make such corrections to the map described in sub5 section (b) as are necessary to move on that map the

6 boundary of the otherwise protected area (as defined in

7 section 12 of the Coastal Barrier Improvement Act of

8 1990 (16 U.S.C. 3503 note; Public Law 101–591)) to the

9 Cape Henlopen State Park boundary to the extent

10 necessary—

11 (1) to exclude from the otherwise protected area

12 the adjacent property leased, as of the date of enact13 ment of this Act, by the Barcroft Company and

14 Cape Shores Associates (which are privately held

15 corporations under the law of the State of Dela16 ware); and

17 (2) to include in the otherwise protected area

18 the northwestern corner of Cape Henlopen State

19 Park seaward of the Lewes and Rehoboth Canal.

20 (b) MAP DESCRIBED.—The map described in this

21 subsection is the map that is included in a set of maps

22 entitled ‘‘Coastal Barrier Resources System’’, dated Octo23 ber 24, 1990, as revised October 15, 1992, and that re-
3

S 574ES

1 lates to the unit of the Coastal Barrier Resources System

2 entitled ‘‘Cape Henlopen Unit DE–03P’’.

Passed the Senate April 22, 1999.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 574

AN ACT

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to make corResources System. rections to a map relating to the Coastal Barrier
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

WALTER DIAZ, AKA Waiter Diaz, AKA 

Walter Diaz-Estupinan, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 19-50298 

D.C. No. 

3:18-cr-01550-BTM-1 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Barry Ted Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 9, 2021

Resubmitted July 9, 2024

Pasadena, California

Before: MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and BOGGS**and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

The government challenges the district court’s grant of “safety valve” relief 

to Walter Diaz and appeals Diaz’s eight-year sentence for possessing cocaine with 

intent to distribute aboard a vessel in violation of 46 U.S.C. § 70503. We have 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

JUL 11 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We previously stayed the proceedings 

in this case pending the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer v. 

United States, 601 U.S. 127, 128 (2024). In light of that decision, we reverse and 

remand for resentencing.

Although Diaz was subject to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence

under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1) due to the amount of cocaine he possessed, the district 

court concluded that Diaz was eligible for safety valve relief pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(f). The safety valve allows a district court to sentence a criminal defendant 

below the mandatory minimum sentence for certain drug offenses if the defendant 

meets various criteria. Pulsifer, 601 U.S. at 128. At issue here is whether Diaz 

meets the criteria specified in § 3553(f)(1), which requires a defendant to prove 

that they do “not have—(A) more than 4 criminal history points . . . (B) a prior 3-

point offense . . . and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense.” The parties agree that 

Diaz has (A) five criminal history points, and (B) a prior 3-point offense, but he 

does not have (C) a prior 2-point violent offense.

The district court construed § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” to be conjunctive, 

permitting the court to impose a sentence below the mandatory minimum because 

Diaz did not have all three criteria. Because Pulsifer rejected the conjunctive

construction of § 3553(f)(1), we reverse and remand for resentencing.

REVERSED and REMANDED.
**Exhibit
31.1 -** **CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 302**
 
 I, John
D. Stanton, certify that:
 
 1. I have
reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Nanobac Pharmaceuticals,
Incorporated;
 
 2. Based on
my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not
misleading with respect to the period covered by this quarterly
report;
 
 3. Based on
my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included
in this quarterly report, fairly present in all material respects the financial
condition, results of operations and cash flows of the Registrant as of, and
for, the periods presented in this quarterly report;
 
 4. The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and
maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Registrant and have:
 
 (a)
    Designed
      such disclosure controls and procedures or caused such disclosure controls
      and procedures to be designed under my supervision, to ensure that
      material information relating to the Registrant including its consolidated
      subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within these entities,
      particularly during the period in which this report is being
      prepared;
 
 (b)
    Evaluated
      the effectiveness of the Registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures
      and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
      the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period
      covered by this report based on such evaluation; and
 
 (c)
    Disclosed
      in this report any change in the Registrant’s internal control over
      financial reporting that occurred during the Registrant’s most recent
      fiscal quarter (the Registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
      annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to
      materially affect, the Registrant’s internal control over financial
      reporting; and
 
 5. The
Registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most
recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the
Registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the Registrant’s board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions);
 
 (a)
    All
      significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal controls
      over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect
      the Registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report
      financial data information; and
 
 (b)
    Any
      fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
      employees who have a significant role in the Registrant’s internal
      controls over financial reporting.
 Date: May 12, 2005
    By:
    /s/ John D.
  StantonJohn D. Stanton
      Chief Executive
Officer
#### ALEX. MITCHELL and others v. ORLANDO HUBBS, Sheriff, &c.

(For the Syllabus, see the next preceding case of *Mitchell*and others v. *Kittmrn,*Treasurer, &c,)

This was a Special PboceemNG, instituted under the pro ■ visions of the act of March 3, 1875, heard by *Seym&ur, J.,*at Chambers, in CeaveN county, October 16th, 1875.

The plaintiffs filed an affidavit that they had made diligent inquiry as to the sufficiency of the official bond of the defendant, who is sheriff of' the county of Craven, and that they verily believed said bond to be insufficient, in the ability of the sureties thereto.

Upon this affidavit the court issued an order to the defendant to appear on the 9th of October and justify said bond by evidence other than that of the defendant or his sureties.

*485.The case was continued until October 16tb, wlien all tlie parties being present, the defendant moved the court to dismiss the proceeding, on the ground that the act of March 3d, 1875, was unconstitutional. The motion was overruled and the defendant appealed.

*Green, Stevenson*and Lehman, for the appellant.

*HvMard,*contra.

ByNüm J.

This is a proceeding under chap. 120 of the Acts of 1874-75, to cause the defendant to justify his bonds as Sheriff of Craven county. The facts and the judgment of the court below, are the same as in the case of *Mitchell et al.,*v. *Kilburn,*decided at this term. The opinion of the court in that case applies to this.

There is no error.

Per Curiam. Appeal dismissed.