alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>


                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.3




                              CERTIFICATE OF TRUST
                                       OF
                          INDEPENDENT CAPITAL TRUST III

     This Certificate of Trust is being executed as of October 30, 2001 for the
purposes of organizing a business trust pursuant to the Delaware Business Trust
Act, 12 Del. A. ss.ss. 3801 ET SEQ. (the "Act").

     The undersigned hereby certifies as follows:

     1. NAME. The name of the business trust is "Independent Capital Trust III"
(the "Trust").

     2. DELAWARE TRUSTEE. The name and business address of the Delaware trustee
of the Trust meeting the requirements of Section 3807 of the Act are as follows:

        The Bank of New York (Delaware)
        White Clay Center
        Route 273
        Newark, Delaware  19711

     3. EFFECTIVE. This Certificate of Trust shall be effective immediately upon
filing in the Office of the Secretary of State of the State of Delaware.

     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned being all of the trustees of the Trust,
have duly executed this Certificate of Trust as of the day and year first above
written.

                         THE BANK OF NEW YORK (DELAWARE)
                         as Delaware Trustee

                         By: /s/ Michael Santino
                         Name: Michael Santino
                         Title: Senior Vice President

                         ADMINISTRATIVE TRUSTEE

                         /S/ EDWARD H. SEKSAY
                         ----------------------------
                         Name: Edward H. Seksay


                         ADMINISTRATIVE TRUSTEE

                         /S/ ANTHONY W. DIROBBIO
                         ----------------------------
                         Name: Anthony W. DiRobbio

                         ADMINISTRATIVE TRUSTEE

                         /S/ DENIS K. SHEAHAN
                         ----------------------------
                         Name: Denis K. Sheahan
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-2397

CATHERINE DENISE RANDOLPH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES; NEW TECHNOLOGY HOME-BROADCASTING BUSINESS,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District 

Judge. (1:14-cv-03609-JFM)

Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: March 19, 2015

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Catherine Denise Randolph, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Catherine Denise Randolph appeals the district court’s 

order dismissing her complaint as frivolous and for failing to 

state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). We have 

reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, 

we dismiss the appeal for the reasons stated by the district 

court. Randolph v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-03609-JFM (D. Md. 

Dec. 12, 2014). We dispense with oral argument because the 

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

DISMISSED
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 698 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 698

 To review the suitability and feasibility of recovering costs of high 
 altitude rescues at Denali National Park and Preserve in the state of 
                    Alaska, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 24, 1999

 Mr. Murkowski introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
       referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To review the suitability and feasibility of recovering costs of high 
 altitude rescues at Denali National Park and Preserve in the state of 
                    Alaska, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That no later than nine 
months after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Interior 
(hereinafter referred to as the ``Secretary'') shall complete a report 
on the suitability and feasibility of recovering the costs of high 
altitude rescues on Mt. McKinley, within Denali National Park and 
Preserve. The Secretary shall also report on the suitability and 
feasibility of requiring climbers to provide proof of medical insurance 
prior to the issuance of a climbing permit by the National Park 
Service. The report shall also review the amount of fees charged for a 
climbing permit and make such recommendations for changing the fee 
structure as the Secretary deems appropriate. Upon completion, the 
report shall be submitted to the Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources of the Senate, and the Committee on Resources of the House of 
Representatives.
                                 <all>
```
# United States Court **of Appeals**  **f or the Fifth Circuit** 

**____________** No. 23
- 50499 Summary Calendar

**____________ United States of America,**  Plaintiff

— Appellee **,** versus **Grace Hope York,** Defendant

— Appellant **.**

**______________________________** Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 4:23
- CR
- 39 - 1

**_______________________ _______**  Before **Smith, Higginson,** and **Engelhardt,** Circuit Judges **. Per Curiam**  **:** ***** The attorney appointed to represent Grace Hope York has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores , 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). York has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the rele vant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s

**_____________________** * This opinion is not designated for publication. See **5th Cir .**  **R .**  47.5. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

### FILED February 8, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce Clerk Case: 23-50499 Document: 00517059836 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/08/2024No. 23
- 50499

2 assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is **GRANTED** , counsel is excused from further respon sibilities herein, and the appeal is **DISMISSED** . See **5th Cir. R.** 42.2 . Case: 23-50499 Document: 00517059836 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/08/2024
No. 1101, Misc.

*A. Kenneth Pye*for petitioner. *Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Miller, Beatrice Rosenberg*and *Theodore George Gilinsky*for the United States.

#### Gordan *v.*United States.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Certiorari denied.
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C., SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Arkona,  Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-QSB  for the  quarterly  period  ended  December  31,  2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"),  I, Leland
H. Boardman,  Chief Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.,  Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(1)      The Report fully  complies  with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


/s/ Leland H. Boardman
----------------------------

Chief Financial Officer
February 21, 2006
EXHIBIT 32.01



Certification of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350

and Securities Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(b)



In connection with the Annual Report of Concur Technologies, Inc.
(Concur) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, S. Steven Singh, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the
Board of Concur, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and Securities Exchange Act Rule 13a-14(b), that to my knowledge:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Concur.
| | --- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|       |  |                   |  |  |  |    |  |                                                                  
|------ |  | ----------------- |  |  |  | -- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: |  | December 14, 2005 |  |  |  | By |  | /s/    S. STEVEN SINGH                                           
|       |  |                   |  |  |  |    |  | S. Steven Singh Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board



This certification accompanies this
report pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not be deemed to be filed by Concur for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
#### JNO. M. JONES and HENRY G. SKINNER, Partners, &c., v. JOHN M. WILSON and JOSIAH MIZZELL, Partners, &c.

*Appeal*— Motion *to Dismiss*— Excuse *for Failing to file Undertaking in Time.*

Where, *upon amotion to*dismiss an appeal on the ground that the undertaking was not filed in time, it appears that the appeal was taken in good faith, and the failure to file the undertaking in time was caused by the Clerk of the Superior Court being absent front his office, the motion will be denied.

This was a MOTION, before this Court, to dismiss the appeal from the Superior Court of ChowaN County.

*Messrs. J. B. Batchelor*and *Jno. Devereuz, Jr., for*the plaintiffs appellees.

*Mr. W. D. Pruden,*for the defendants appellants.

Merrimon, J.

The appellees moved, at the present term, to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the undertaking upon appeal was not filed within the time prescribed by law, nor within thirty days next after the term of the Court at which the judgment appealed from was given, the time within which it was agreed by the parties the appeal might be perfected.

We are satisfied, from affidavits produced, that the appeal was taken in good faith. It was taken at once, upon the entry of the judgment appealed from by counsel, the appellants having left the Court and gone to their homes, infa county adjoining that in which the case was tried. At once the counsel sent them an undertaking upon appeal, to be executed by them; they executed and returned the same promptly, and in apt time, to their counsel, to be filed'; the latter promptly went to the Clerk’s office to file it, butjfound the Clerk was absent, and he continued absent for several days, at a distant point, and they could not then file it; they went for the like purpose a second time, and the Clerk was not at *14his office; he was sent for, came, and. the undertaking was filed within a few days after the lapse of the time within which it was agreed by the parties the appeal might be perfected.

It appears that the appellants themselves were diligent in respect to the undertaking, and their counsel made reasonable effort to file it in apt time. They failed to do so because of the absence of the Clerk from his office, and the fault was largely, if not altogether, his. The appellees suffered no substantial harm, by the delay of a few days to file the undertaking, and there seems to have been reasonable excuse, certainly on the part of the appellants, for such failure. We think the case came fairly within the statute cited and interpreted in *Harrison*v. *Hoff,*decided at the present term. That case is substantially like the present one, and must govern it. The motion to dismiss the -appeal must be denied.

Motion denied.
#### CITY NATIONAL BANK v. D. E. BRIDGERS et al.

*Practice*— Injunction—Receiver.

1. Upon an application for an injunction and receiver it is not necessary for the Judge to “find the facts” further than to examine the affidavits and determine whether sufficient cause is shown for the ancillary relief.

2. Where the insolvency of a trustee in a deed of assignment was questioned and it was positively alleged bv the plaintiff, and the defend*382ants simply allege their belief that he was not insolvent; and, upon being required to give bond, the trustee refused so to do: *Held,*that it is proper to appoint a receiver'to take charge of the assigned estate pending the litigation.

At? August Term, 1893, of NokthaMutoN Superior Court, liits Honor *Bynum, J.,*upon the failure of the trustee to give the bond required, appointed a receiver to take charge of the assigned estate pending an action to set aside the deed for fraud. From this order the defendants appealed.

*Messrs. W. II. Day, Alexander Stronach*and *J.*IE. *IRnsdale,*for plaintiff.

*Mr. II. B. Peebles,*for defendants (appellants).

MacUae, 1.:

The complaint and answer are used as affidavits in the case on the application for-an injunction and receiver. It -was not necessary that the Judge below should “find the facts” further than to examine the affidavits and determine whether sufficient cause was shown for the ancillary relief sought pending the action. In proceedings of the present nature this Court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction is required to pass upon the facts as well as the law. *Jones*v. *Boyd,*80 N. C., 258. A serious controversy exists between the parties to this action, involving the *bona Jules*of a deed of assignment made by defendants Garris & Bridgers to J. L>. Bottoms; the insolvency of the trustee is positively averred by plaintiff and the defendants simply allege their belief that he is not insolvent. Iiis Honor required him, for the protection of the estate, to give bond in $1,000, and upon his refusal to give such bond appointed a receiver. No questions as to exemptions were necessary to be determined in this order made for the preservation of the property or fund pending the litigation; it is now in the hands of an officer of the Court and all these matters may be determined in good time.

*383This is not ¡i case in which a specific denial of the allegations in plaintiff’s affidavit would entitle the defendants to a dissolution of the restraining order. The practice is so well settled now that it will be unnecessary to cite authorities. Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
UNAUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE 2ND QUARTER OF FISCAL 1998 CONTAINED IN
THE COMPANY'S REPORT ON FORM 10-QSB AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY
REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-24-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-26-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-26-1998
<CASH>                                       2,148,179
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                4,483,095
<ALLOWANCES>                                  (550,000)
<INVENTORY>                                  1,748,960
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,306,431
<PP&E>                                       3,478,317
<DEPRECIATION>                              (2,227,479)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              13,163,398
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,959,856
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       261,545
<OTHER-SE>                                   7,479,887
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                13,163,398
<SALES>                                      5,208,493
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            12,879,926
<CGS>                                        4,036,122
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                6,732,730
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             4,859,411
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               181,253
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             105,628
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,308,530
<INCOME-TAX>                                   550,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            758,530
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   758,530
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .19
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .18
        


</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

DOUGLASS EARL HOWARD, JR.,

Petitioner

v.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK,

Respondent :

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

: No. 136 MAL 2022

Petition for Allowance of Appeal

from the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW , this 26th day of July, 2022

, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is

DENIED

.
EPA DR #406140614061
#### Warren H. Colodner, Plaintiff, v Merrilee M. Colodner, Defendant.

Supreme Court, New York County,

November 24, 1987

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Monroe J. Korn*for plaintiff. *Michael F. Erdheim*for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Martin B. Stecher, J.

This is a motion "for an order * * * correcting, clarifying and modifying portions of the decision of the Honorable Arthur Wachtel, dated June 22, 1987.” Judge Wachtel is a Judicial Hearing Officer to whom this matrimonial proceeding was referred, on stipulation of the parties, "to hear and determine.”

While the moving papers deny that they seek "to reargue the Court’s decision on the issues of equitable distribution”, it is clear that, if this is not a motion for reargument, at the very least it is a motion to resettle an order or judgment; and *67as there seems to be neither order nor judgment, I must conclude that it is, despite the moving attorneys’ protestations to the contrary, a reargument motion.

The opposing papers give a variety of reasons why reargument should not be had, none of which will be addressed by me. On oral argument, I raised the question of whether the motion should be referred to Judge Wachtel or should be decided by me.

The powers of a Judicial Hearing Officer who has been designated to hear and determine are coextensive with the powers of a Referee to determine (CPLR 4301). That statute gives to the Judicial Hearing Officer, with exceptions not relevant to this case, "all the powers of a court”. Judgment upon the determining decision of a Judicial Hearing Officer "shall be entered by the clerk as directed” in the decision (CPLR 5016 [c]). It follows, therefore, that *review*of the decision of a Judicial Hearing Officer who has been designated to hear and determine is taken directly to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (CPLR 5701 [a]).

It thus appears that for at least two reasons this court should not entertain the motion but should refer it to Judge Wachtel:

> a. For this court to consider this motion for reargument would be in the nature of a review of the determination of the Judicial Hearing Officer, a review which may only be undertaken by the Appellate Division;

> b. The Judicial Hearing Officer who is authorized to hear and determine is, for the purposes of that case, a Justice of the Supreme Court with all of a Justice’s powers. Under such circumstances, CPLR 2221 should and does apply requiring the reargument be made "to the judge who signed the order”.

Does the Judicial Hearing Officer’s authority continue after he has made and filed his decision? In my opinion, there is for this purpose little difference between an acting Justice of the Supreme Court and a Judicial Hearing Officer; and consequently he does. *(Cf., Prudential Lines v Firemen’s Ins. Co.,*109 Misc 2d 281.)

For the foregoing reasons, this motion is respectfully referred to the Honorable Arthur Wachtel.
From: "Frey, Nathan J." <Nathan_J._Frey@omb.eop.gov>

To: Kevin Culligan/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Peter Tsirigotis/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, RobertJ

Wa yland/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Joseph Goffman/DC/USEPA/US@EPA Cc: "Mancini, Dominic J." <Dominic_J._Mancini@omb.eop.gov>, "Laity , Jim"

<James_A._Laity@omb.eop.gov> Date: 03/23/2012 08:06 PM Subject: Interagency Comments on latest draft of NSPS EGU preamble



### Attached are some additional comments for consideration on the latest draft of the EGU NSPS preamble. Please call me if fir st thing Monday if you have any questions. If you provide a time and number to reach you this weekend I am happy to discuss before hand as well. Regards, Nathan
#### Dominy (Magritz), Appellant, vs. Scandrett and others, as Trustees of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, Respondents.

For the appellant: *Rubin, Zdbel & Ruppa,*attorneys, and *Wm. B. Rubin*of counsel, all of Milwaukee.

For the respondents: *Bender, Trump & McIntyre,*attor-. neys, and *Rodger S. Trump*of counsel, all of Milwaukee.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                       1,317,733
<SECURITIES>                                 6,733,299
<RECEIVABLES>                                1,110,087
<ALLOWANCES>                                    86,086
<INVENTORY>                                     42,872
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             9,612,536
<PP&E>                                       1,037,712
<DEPRECIATION>                                 864,988
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              10,548,601
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,267,904
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                     8,999,210
<OTHER-SE>                                   (864,003)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                10,548,601
<SALES>                                      6,853,651
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             6,853,651
<CGS>                                          672,247
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,930,590
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,056,504
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              1,992,596
<INCOME-TAX>                                   464,748
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          1,527,848
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 1,527,848
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.12
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.12


</TABLE>