Opinion issued March 28, 2024

In The 

## Court of Appeals
For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 23
- 00533
- CR

——————————— ROBERT RAYMOND COX , Appella nt

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appell e e

On Appea l from the 10th District Court Galveston County, T e x as Trial Court Ca se No. 22
- CR
- 0983

MEMORANDU M OPINION Appellant Robert Raymond Cox was convicted by a jury of the second

degree felony of possession of a controlled substance in an amount of four gram s
or more but less tha n 200 grams

. Based on enh anceme nts from t wo prior convictions, t he jury assessed a sentence of twenty

- five years ’ incarceration

.2

In a single issue, Cox argues t h e evid ence is legally insufficient to sustain
his c onviction. Finding no reversible error, we affirm. Background
On March 2 9, 2022, Cox was dri ving a truck in Galveston County , Texas when a police officer pulled him over for having a n expired registration and expired i n suranc e. Cox and the of ficer drove o nto a public driveway and pulled

over. Cox told the officer he had severa l unpaid tickets issued by the League City Police Department

. The officer dir ected Co x to s tep out of his truck w hil e he
checked to see if there w e re outstanding warrants for C ox ’ s a rrest

. Cox g ot out of
his truck and st ood near the front of the police c ar
. After learning Cox had seve ral outs tanding warr ants for his arrest , t he
officer arrested Cox and put him in his patrol car. Between the time the officer
drove o nto the driv eway behind Cox and the time Cox was arrested fo r outstan ding

warrants , handcuf

fed, and placed in the back o f the police car , a baggie of methamphe t amines appeared under the front of the police car

. O nly Co x and the
officer were in front of the police car between the t ime the y arrived on the driveway and the time the officer found t he narcotics

. Cox was eventually in d icted fo r possession of a controlle d substance

. The indictment alleged that “ on or about the 29 th day of March, 2022 , ” Cox “ did then
and there intentionally and knowingly possess a controlled substanc e, namely3

methamp hetamine, i n an am ou nt of four grams or more bu t less than 200 gra ms. ”
C ox pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to a jury trial.
The Trial
T wo wit ness es testified during the guilt

- innocence phase of t rial.
A. Officer Stephen Pe rez League City Police Off

icer Step he n Perez testified t hat o n March 29, 2022,
he c on du c ted a traffic stop, pulling ove r a pickup truck that had expired license plates and insura nce. Cox was the only occupant of the truck. 1 C ox told Officer
P erez h e ha d some unpaid tickets from t he L eague City Police D e partment. 2
Officer Perez told Cox to get out of th e truck and to move to the front of the police

car
. A short time later , Cox was handcuffed and taken into custody because there

were thre e a ctive warrants for hi s arrest

. Accordi ng to Officer Perez, Cox told Officer Perez he w as a handyman.
Officer Perez told Cox he co uld call a f riend to retrieve C ox ’ s tools from his truck
before it was towed. 3 Officer P erez conducted an inventory of Cox ’ s truck at the
site. After conducting t he inventory 4 and helpi ng Cox ’ s frie nd take Cox ’ s i tems

1 Cox told the officer the truck belonged to a friend but he was planning to buy it.
2 The outstand ing t ickets were for traffic violations

. 3 Officer Perez t estified that police policy requires officers to inventory a v eh icle bef ore having it towed.
4 During the inven tory of Cox’s truck, Off ic er Perez found a pool cue c ase that had a “little cellophane bag and it ha d a single rock in that

— inside that bag there was a4

out of the truck, Officer Perez found a bagg ie co ntaining a “ white crystal

- like
substance ” under the front of his patrol car
. He identified it as being similar to methamphetamine. Of

f icer P e rez ’s da shcam video sh ows that the baggie was not
there when he firs t drove onto the public d riveway behind Cox

. T he white baggie
is first visible on Officer Perez ’s bodycam video a pproximately ten minutes after
he and Cox pull into the driveway

. 5 When first see n on the bod ycam video , t he baggie is under Officer Perez ’ s front lice nse plate.
Offic er Per ez did not notice the baggie until his fifteenth or sixteenth time walking from Cox ’ s truck to his police car
. When Officer Perez recovered the baggie, the ba ggi e wa s on the ground in front of the driv er ’ s side of his police car

. The da shcam video shows that no on e oth er tha n Officer Perez or Cox walked directly in front of the police car or stood in front of it before Officer P erez discovered the baggie

. Accor ding to Officer Perez, the bodycam v ideo shows Cox , who “ kind of
b lades his body. And with his right hand, he h as in h is pocket ; and with his left, I
don ’ t see what he ’ s doing down there . A n d he just turns around and puts his back towards me, and looks l ike he ’ s do ing some kind of motion with his foot or with
brown

- rock

- like substance.” T he bag field

- tested posi tive f or m ethamphetamine. C ox told Officer P erez he did not know anythi ng about the substance in the bag. The substance was not tested by the Department of Public Safety ’ s lab and was not part of the charge against Cox.
5 The baggi e is visi ble on the bodyc a m vi deo for nearly thirty minutes before Officer Perez sees it

.5

his leg , and he turns to the front and does that same m otion

. ” Officer Perez
testified he di d not see C ox take an ything from his pocket and throw it down

. Officer Perez field test ed the substance in the baggie. I t presumptively
tested positive for 8.12 grams of methamphetam ine s
. H e did not find methamphetamine s on Cox.
Officer Perez testified that it was windy th e day he arrested Cox

. The
dash cam video sho ws what appears to be a p iece of paper blowing out of Cox ’s
truck and across the d riveway

. The vide o s do not show the baggie being blown
under or around the car.
O fficer Pere z took Cox to the League City Jail. After he was releas ed to the jail staff, Officer Perez took the whi te pow der in the ba ggi e to the evidence r oom

“ to get it teste d, weighed, sealed, and packaged. ” The bag gie was n ot fingerprinted
or tested for DNA

. B. Steven Holonich
S teven Holonich wo rks for the Departmen t of P u blic Safety in its Tyler Crime Laboratory. He tested t h e drugs found in the baggie und e r Officer Perez ’ s police c ar and determined the baggie contained 8. 0 6 grams of met hampheta mine

. He testified that to his knowledge , the baggi e was not test ed for fingerprints or in

an y way that could “ tie it to a n y individual

. ”6

The jury convicted Cox , found tw o enhance ments from prior convictions
true, and assessed his punishment at twenty

- fi ve years ’ incarceration. This appeal
ensued.
S tandard of Rev iew We apply the legal s ufficiency standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia , 4 43 U.S. 307 (1979) in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Brooks v. State , 323 S.W.3d 893 , 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We review the legal su fficiency of th e evidence by determining “ whether, after viewing the
evidence i n the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential el ements of the crime b eyond a reasonable doubt. ”
S a nders v. State , 119 S.W .3d 818, 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)

. Under a legal sufficiency review, “our ro le is not to become a thirteenth juror. This Court may

not re

- evaluate the weight and credibility of th e record e vidence and ther eby substitute our judgme nt for that of the f act

- finder.” Williams v. State , 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quot i ng Dewberry v. State , 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) )

. Our role in thi s review is to act as a “due pro cess safegu ard, ” requiring us to “ensure that the evidence pr ese nted actually supports a
conclusion that the defendant committed” the offense o f which he is accused.7

Malbrough v. State , 612 S.W.3d 537, 559 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [1st Dist.] 2020,

p et. ref’d) ( citing Wi lliams , 235 S.W.3d at 750 )

. We may consider both d ire ct and circumstantial evide nce in our le gal sufficiency analysis, as well as a ny rea s ona b l e inferences that may be d rawn from
the evidence. Id

. “ [ C ] ircumstan t ial evidence alone can be suffic ient to est ablish guilt. ” Clayton v. Sta te , 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

. Evidence may be sufficient to sustain the conviction even if the State does not “ disprove all
reasonable alternative hypotheses that a re inconsistent with a defendant ’ s guilt. ” Malbrough , 612 S.W .3d at 559 ; see also Tate v. St ate , 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) ( “ [ T] he State ’ s burden does not require it to disprove every
conceivable alternative to a defendant ’ s guilt

. ”)

. “ R ather, a court conside rs only
wh ether the i nferences necessary to establi sh guilt are reasona ble based upon the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to
the verdict. ” Wise v. State , 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex. Crim . App. 2012)

. A n alysis
Cox was convicted of intentio nally or knowingly possessing a controlle d

s ubstance, namely methamphe tamine, in an amount of more than 4 g r ams but less
than 200 grams. Methamphetamines are in penalty group 1. T EX

. H EALTH &
S AFETY C OD E § 481.1 02 (6). Knowi ng or inte ntional p os session of a controlled
sub sta nce from penal ty gro up 1 i s a felony of the second d egree if the amount8

possessed is grater than four grams and less than 200 grams. Id. § 481.115 (a), (d).
“Possession” is defined a s “ actual care, custod y, control , or manage ment. ” Id. § 481.002 (38). Cox argues the ev iden ce “ is insufficient to affirmatively connect him ” to the
controlled substanc e, which Officer Perez “ found in a public place. ” He posits that

o n the day he was arrested , it was a wi ndy day , and “ there were other items that

w ere blow i ng around, ” 6 although not hing was found u nde r the police car except for
the baggie containing the drugs

. C o x argues th at Officer Perez ’ s video footage

“ demonstrates that a baggie was being blown across a driveway where [he] was stopped on a very windy d a y. ” 7 Co x also says the re cov ered baggie “can first be
seen several feet awa y from where it was recovered. ” 8 He argues, “ Appellant was convicted of poss essing a plastic baggie that was being blown across the driveway where he was pu l led over for no insurance and no registration. ”

6 Of ficer Perez ’ s dash cam shows what appears to be a piece of pape r blowing out of Cox ’s truck

. The video footage confirms it was a windy day.
7 The video footage d oes not support this s tate ment. A review of the dash cam and the bodycam videos do es not show the baggie “being blow n acro ss [the] driveway. ”
8 Ther e is no i ndication a nyo ne measured the distances between the place the baggie was first seen and the place where it was rec overed , an d a review of the video foo ta ge indicates it could have bee n a difference of less than “ several feet

. ” Cox argued in his closi ng t he baggie was found “ about two feet in front ” of the police car , but the footage does not necessari ly support that. Agai n, a ppa rently no measurement was taken , and it appears the baggie could have been discovere d less than a foot in front o f the police car

.9

Cox also argues Of

ficer Perez testified he did not see him reach into his pocket, grab something, and throw it on the ground , and that he never saw Cox
with th e drugs

. Co x ack nowledge s, however, tha t Officer Perez testified he

“ thought he saw Appellant make a kicking motion with his foot. ” Cox argues t he baggie containing the drugs was not fingerprinted or subject to DNA testing , so
there is no direct evide nce li nking Cox to the baggie

. T he State argues there was sufficient evidence for the jury to co nclude Cox knowingly or intentionally possessed the drugs. T he dash cam video showed there

w as no bagg ie on the driveway when Of ficer Perez and C ox first pulled into the driveway

. The bagg ie was first visible after Cox was told to stand in front of the

po lice car , where he was “ fidgeting, pulling things out of his pockets ” and

“ shuffling

. ” A lthough the drugs were fo und in a public pl ace, testimony and video
evidence sho wed that only Cox and Officer Perez were in front of the poli ce car between the time th ey arrived on the driveway and the time Cox was taken into custody

. And n either the dash cam nor the body cam video showed that anyth ing
blew un der the police car

. 9

9 The parti es differ on what the video footage shows. Cox argues the v ideos do not show him kicking anything. The S tate ar gues the jury saw footage of Cox ’s “furtive gesture to conceal the left side of his body, Cox kicking under the p atrol car several times and be nding over as if to look under the front of the patrol car. ”10

A. Th e “ Affirmative Links ” Rule Cox argues he never had exclusive control of the area near the patr ol car under which the baggie of methamphetamines was found. H e ar gues that because
he was not found wit h any narcoti cs or paraphernali a on him , “the law requires
sufficient affirmative links to the narcotics to sustain a convictio n. ”
Cox c orrec tly ar gues that to prevail in prosecuting a defendant for

pos session of a controlled substance, the State must pr ove the defend ant ex erc ised

cont rol, man agement, or care over the substance, and the defendant knew the
substance was contraband

. See Tat e , 50 0 S.W.3d at 413; s ee also Evans v. State , 202 S.W.3d 158, 16 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006 ) ( “ Regardless of whether the
evidence is di rect or circumstan tial, it must establish that the defendant ’ s connection with the drug was more than fortuitous

. ” ). As t he Co ur t of Criminal Appea ls has explained:
This is the so

- called “affirmative links” rule which protects the innocent b ystander

— a relative, friend, or even st ranger t o the actual possessor

— from conviction merely because of his fortuitous proximity to som eone els e ’ s drugs. Mere presence at the location where drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish act ual care, custody, or control of those drugs. However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circ umstanti al (e.g., “links”), may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt.11

Id. at 161

– 62 (internal citations om itted). Affirma tive lin ks “ are established by the totality of the circumstances. ” Beall v. State , 237 S.W.3d 841, 850 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2007, no pet.)

. The Court of Criminal Appeals has ad opted a “ non
- exclusive list of fourteen
factors ” that “ may i ndicate a link con necting the defendant to the knowing

possess ion of contraband. ” Tate , 500 S.W. 3d at 414. T h ose factors are : (1) the defendant ’ s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the d efendant ’ s proxi mity to and the ac cessibil ity of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arreste d; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant mad e inc riminating state ments when arreste d; (7) w hether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whe ther t here was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whet her t he defenda nt own ed or had the righ t to pos sess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclo sed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defen dant indic ated a consciousness of guilt.
Id. ( quoting Evans , 202 S.W.3d at 162 n. 12 )

. “ It is

. . . not the number of links that is dispo s itive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and
circumstantial. ” Evans , 202 S

. W. 3d at 162 ; see also Robi nson v
. State , 174
S.W.3 d 320, 3 2 6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref ’ d) ( “[ T] he number of factors actually supporte d by the evidence is not as important as the ‘ logical12

force ’ they collectively create to prove that a crime has be en co mmitted. ”)

. 10
Wh ile the factors ar e intend ed to help guide the court ’s anal y sis, the ultimate inquiry is whether , “[b] ased on the combine d and cumulative force of the evidence and any reasonable infere nces therefrom, ” the jury was “ rationally justifie d in finding gui lt beyond a rea sonable doubt? ” T ate , S. W

. 3d at 415 (citing Jackson , 443 U.S. at 318

– 19 ).
B. Analysis of the “ Affirmative L i nk s ” Factors Cox argues the lack of affirmative links and the probative force of the existing links demons trates the evidence i s insufficie nt to sust ain h is conviction.
The S t a te , q uoti ng our opinion in James v. State , 264 S.W. 3d 215, 219 (Tex. App.

— Hous t on [1st Dist.] 200 8, pet. ref ’ d) , responds that the “ absence of various
affirmative link s doe s not cons titute evidence of innocence to be weigh ed agains t
the af firmative links present. ”
Ba sed on o ur review of the evid ence , we conclude that three of t he fourteen

a ffirmative l ink fa c tors establish a con necti on b etween C o x a nd the methamphetamines. The second factor, whether the contra band was in plain view, is implicated. The contr aban d was not in p lain vie w w hen O fficer P erez first pulled onto t he driv e way, bu t it is seen in pla in view on the officer ’s dashcam

10 The affirmative links are “si mply so me fac tors which may circumst antially establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence to prove a knowing ‘ possession. ’ They are not a l it mus t est. ” Evans v. State , 202 S.W.3d 158, 16 2 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006 )

.13

video a ppro ximately ten minutes after h e and Cox pull into the driveway

. The third factor, which con siders Cox ’s pro xi mity and acce ssibility to the dru gs, a lso is

pr esent

. C ox stood directly in f ront of the patrol c ar, where the baggie was f irst captured on Officer Perez ’s bodycam video , and no one other than C o x and Officer
Perez stood or walked there before Officer Pere z saw the baggie

. F i nall y, t he eighth factor , whic h co ntem pl ates furtive ge s tures , 11 is satisfied

. T he officer ’ s dashcam v ideo shows Cox appear ing to reach for his back left pocket, fid geting, shuffling his feet unde r or toward the police car , bend ing forward as if to look
under the police car , and moving his fee t again under or t oward the police car. Although the dashcam do es no t expl ic it ly show Cox kic king his feet , he is clearly moving his f

oot or feet toward the pol ice car

. Thus, factors 2, 3, and 8 establish
affirmative links b etween Cox and the baggie. 12

11 See Gill v. State , No. 06

- 11

- 00 213

- CR, 2012 WL 2 127504, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.

— Texarkana June 13, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for pu b lication) (noting “ f urt ive ” is defined as “ surreptitious, underhanded, or by stealth. ”) (citing M ERRIAM

- W EBST ER ’ S C OLLEGIATE D ICTIONARY 509 (11 th ed. 2006) ) ; se e also Lopez v. State , 267 S.W.3d 85, 94 n. 26 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi

- Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (same)

. 12 As Cox poi nts out, t he fifth factor, whether the defendant possessed other cont raband or narcotics when arrested , is not satisfied

. Althou gh the “ br own
- rock

like substance ” found in a pool cu e case in Cox ’ s truck field tested positive for meth a mphetamine , the substance was not tested by the DPS lab

.14

As noted , the numbe r of affi r mative links is not dispositive. Evans , 2 02
S

. W. 3d at 162

. 13 The analysis must turn on the “ logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial

. ” Id. ; see also Satch ell v. State , 321 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 20 10, pet. r ef ’ d) (“The absence of
various links does not constitute ev id ence of innocen ce to be weighed against the links present.”) ; Ferguson v. State , 313 S.W.3d 419, 426 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ( “ [I] t is well established that the ab sence of c ertain links do[es] not weigh against thos e th at are presen t. ” )

. 14
The State relie s on three cases where drugs were found after a defendant occupied or passed through an open area
. In Hall v. State , the defendant was convicted of unlawful possess ion of a c ontrolled substance found on the ground
where he h ad been s tanding. No. 13

- 11

- 00102

- CR, 2012 WL 1573019, at *2 (Tex.

13 See, e. g., Foster v
. State , No. 08

- 22

- 00181

- CR, 2023 WL 5732 718, at *5 (Tex. App.

— El Pas o Sept. 5, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( finding two aff

irmative link factor s sufficient to sustain j ury ’s convictio n) ; Hardaway v. State , No. 13

- 15

- 00507

- CR, 2017 WL 3431827, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Cor pus Christi

– Edinburg Aug. 10 , 2017, pe t. ref ’ d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) ( finding three factor s sufficient to sustain j ury ’s convictio n ) ; Beall v. State , 237 S.W .3d 841, 850 (Tex. A p p.

— F o rt Worth 2 007, no pet.) ( finding

“ direct and compel ling evidence ” of only one f actor b ut also finding circumstantial evidence “ that does not fit neatly ” into l ist of fourteen factors sufficient to sustain jury ’ s conviction )

. 14 See also Lari os v. St ate , No. 13

- 15

- 00022

- CR, 2015 WL 9487107, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Corpus Chr isti

– Edinbu rg Dec. 29, 2015 , no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication ) ( “ [A] j ury was free to interpret the absence of these [affirmative ] links either as signs of innoc ence or simply as signs that Larios was careful and c ollected in the way she purs ued her task

. ”)

.15

App.

— Corpus Christi

– Edinburg May 3, 2 012, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not
d esignated for p ublication). T he arresting officer d i d not see Hall throw or drop
anyt hing b ut he f

ound a ba g of co caine on the public street where Hall had been standing when he was placed in the officer ’ s patrol car. Id

. at * 5. The court noted
that Hall resisted when the officers tried to move him, and w hen h e did move, the drugs were found. Id. H is resist an ce to m ovement was described as a “ furt ive
gest ure ” that, along with t he officer ’ s observations, affirmatively linked him to the

co cai ne. Id. The court held that Hall ’ s conduc t, the officer ’ s obse r vatio ns, “ and
the fact that Hall had a pending arrest w a r r a nt fo r dealin g cocaine ” when the
cocaine was found “ constituted enough independent facts and circumstances to
affirm atively link him to the contraband and allow a j ury to find the essential
elemen t s of the charged offense b eyond a reas on able d oubt. ” I d

. In Les ter v. State , a motorcycle rider was pulled over and arrested for driving
with a s uspended license. No. 02

- 16

- 00288

- CR, 2018 WL 3763897, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Aug. 9, 2 018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not design ated for publicat io n). A police officer saw a bag filled with what he believed to be methamphetamine on the ground after the defendant w alked by. Id. The officer saw a second baggie containing a similar s ubstance f a ll out of the defendan t ’ s pants leg. I

d. Amo ng other th ings, t he defendant argue d th e baggie found on the ground “ m ust have blown in at the last second from some other locat ion. ” Id. at16

*4. The appellate court noted that the eviden ce showed “ nothing w a s on the ground betwee n the curb and p atrol ca r prior t o [the defendant ] walking through;
after [the defendant ] reached the car, [the officer] found the ground baggie where [the defendant ] had walked. The jury was within its ri ghts to affirmatively link the ground baggie t o [th e defendant ] and to infer that no interv ening so urce poss es sed
it. ” Id. However, the court noted other factors also ti ed th e defendant to the baggie

. For examp le, h e possess ed other narcotics that fell out of his pants leg in
front of one of the office r s , dr ug paraphernali a was found in his motorcyc le, and h e
carried a large amount o f c as h. Id. at *5. The court stated , “T he jury appropriately
considered all these factors wh en it determin e d that [the defendant ] was affirmatively linked to the methamphe tamine. ” Id. Finally, the S t ate relies on Ras ool v. S tate , in wh ich a driver was pulled ove r
for speeding

. No. 06

- 05

- 00209

- CR, 2006 WL 3111344, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Tex arkana Nov. 3, 2006, no pet.) ( mem. op., not designated for p ublication)

. After
the drive r was taken into custody, pol ice foun d a baggi e containing a white
substance on the g r ound where Ras ool had been standing. Id. No o ne saw Rasool drop the baggie. Id

. Ras ool gave his correct n ame, admitted his license was suspend ed, ackno wled g e d speedin g, and did not make any furti ve gestu res. Id. a t
*2. Rasool argued the baggi e could have c ome from any of the “ large number of
vehicles [that] come down the highway daily [ .] ” Id. The court held that while that17

was possible, “ we also recognize that ther e was evidence to show it had be en on
the ground ve ry briefly, and the jury could reasonably c onclude it was highly unlikely that Rasool would stand on the precise place where some passerby threw

out a baggie of cocaine. ” Id. The jury convicted Rasoo l in a “ classic example of a jury being allowe d to form a conclusion based on circumstanti al evidence

. ” Id. at
*3. The court observed that the “ most important link between Rasool and the
substance is that the substance was located on a roadside at the ve ry p lace Rasool
had been stan ding minutes be fo re . This is strong evidence of the presenc e, proximity, and accessibility links. ” Id. The court noted that another bag gie with

c ontraband was found inside the car Rasool was dri ving. Id.
Each of these cases is d istinguishable from this case in some aspe ct . In Hall , the c ou rt cited the defendant ’ s pendi ng arrest warrant for dealing cocaine as one of
th e circumstances that could have allowed the j ury “ to find the essential elements of the charged offense b eyon d a reason able doubt. ” 2012 WL 1573019 at *5. In
Le ster , the jury he ar d testimony that other narcotics fell out of the defendant ’ s pants, dr ug paraphernali a was found in his motorcycle, an d he carried a large

amount o f c as h. 2018 WL 3763897 at *5. And in R asool , a second baggie with a
controlled s ubstance was found inside the car the defendant was driving. 2006 WL
3111344 at *3.18

Despite some distinguishing facts, we f ind Rasool instructive. Like the
present case, Rasool st emmed from a traffic st op. 2 006 WL 3111344 at * 1

. After
Rasool was taken into custody, a baggie containing a wh ite substance was found
where Ras ool had been standing. I d. Rasool , like Cox, 15 was cooperative , but told
authorities the baggie c ould have come from a nother vehicle on th e hi ghway. Id.
at *2. The court concluded th e most imp ortant lin k was that the drug s were

recov ered “ at the very place Rasool had been standing minutes be fore. ” I d. at *3.
The court held that fact was “ strong ev idence of the presenc e, proximity, and

ac cess ibility links. ” I

d

. S i milarly, the baggi e in the present case was initially see n on Officer Perez ’ s
bod ycam in the area where Cox was sta nding while Officer Perez communicated

w ith the police about Cox ’ s tickets and warrants

. T he jury, which also sa w o n the
dashcam video that nothing was on the dri veway when Officer Perez and Cox first

arr ived , could reasonably h ave concluded bas ed on Cox ’ s furt i ve gestures that he dropped the baggie onto the ground and shuffled it under the police car. The j ury

was fr ee t o disbelieve that Cox was merely acting “ squir [r]ely , ” as his counsel argued, fi dgeting “ because maybe s tanding ten minutes i n o ne place is a little bit
much. ”

15 Off

icer Perez told another officer at the scene that Cox ha d bee n “ nothing but hospitable ” in their interaction

.19

In a circumstantial evidence case such as this , “ it is not necessary f or every
f act to poi nt directly or indirectly to the defendant ’ s guilt. It is sufficient if the
combined and cumulative effec t of all the inc riminating circumstances point to the
defendant ’ s guilt. ” Sosa v. State , 845 S.W.2d 479, 483 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 1st Dist.] 1993, pet . ref’d) (citing Ru ssell v. State , 665 S.W.2d 771, 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983 ))

. Viewing the evidence in t he l ight mo s t fa vorable to the ju ry ’ s verdict, as we must, we cannot conclude the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury ’ s fi nding t hat Cox was guilty of the charged of fense.
We overrule Cox ’s sole issue.
C oncl usion
We affirm the trial cou rt ’ s ju dgmen t.

Ve r o ni c a Ri va s
- M oll o y Ju st i c e
Pan el co ns is t s o f Ju sti c e s K elly, Co unt i ss, and Ri v as
- Moll o y
. Do not p u b l i sh. T E X

. R

. A P P

. P

. 47. 2( b).