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Filed 3/21/24 P. v. Hall CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been 

certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ELIJAH MATTHEW HALL,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A168888

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. SCR 6020801)

Defendant Elijah Matthew Hall appeals from postconviction orders 

denying his motion for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.75 

(former section 1171.1), as well as his motion under section 1465.9 to vacate 

fines and fees included in his judgment of conviction.2 His appellate counsel 

filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), 

requesting that we exercise our discretion to independently review the record. 

Defendant was advised of his right to file a supplemental brief, and has done

so, raising various arguments unrelated to the rulings from which he has 

1 Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Penal Code. 

In June 2022, section 1171.1 was renumbered as section 1172.75 without 

substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 12.) We refer to the statute by its 

current designation. 

2 Defendant filed two notices of appeal designating the orders denying 

his two motions. Our disposition covers both appeals. 
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appealed. 

Because neither the order denying defendant’s section 1172.75 motion,

nor the order denying his section 1465.9 motion is appealable, we dismiss the 

appeals taken from those orders. 

BACKGROUND3

In 2013, a jury found defendant guilty of two counts of first degree 

robbery (§ 211; counts I and II) and battery resulting in serious bodily injury 

(§ 243, subd. (d); count III). It also found true that defendant personally 

inflicted great bodily injury in the commission of count II (§ 12022.7, 

subd. (a)). After a bifurcated trial, the jury found true the allegations that 

defendant had suffered two prior serious or violent felony convictions (§ 667, 

subd. (a)(1)), including an attempted robbery in 1996, and had served a prior 

prison term (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). (People v. Hall, supra, A139691.) 

Defendant was sentenced under the “Three Strikes” law to a prison 

term of 25 years to life for counts I and II, plus 13 years for the great bodily 

injury enhancement and the two prior convictions. The trial court imposed 

but stayed execution of the sentence on count III, as well as a one-year prior 

prison term enhancement. (People v. Hall, supra, A139691.) 

The trial court also imposed the following fines and assessments: a 

$1,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a second $1,000 restitution fine to 

be suspended unless parole was revoked (§ 1202.45); a $380.59 victim 

restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)); a $120 court operations assessment

(§ 1465.8); and a $90 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). 

3 We granted defendant’s request to take judicial notice of our prior 

opinion in People v. Hall (Mar. 27, 2018, A139691) (nonpub. opn.), the 

California Supreme Court’s denial of his petition for review (People v. Hall, 

S248548, Supreme Ct. Mins., July 11, 2018), and this court’s remittitur 

issued on July 11, 2018. 
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In March 2018, this court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Hall, 

supra, A139691.) And in July 2018, our Supreme Court denied defendant’s 

petition for review. (People v. Hall, supra, S248548.) 

On July 24, 2023, years after his judgment became final, defendant in 

propria persona filed two motions. In one motion, he asked the trial court to 

“to vacate all of the court-imposed costs (Fines/Restitution)” pursuant to 

section 1465.9—a provision enacted by Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 

Reg. Sess.), and amended by Assembly Bill No. 177 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) 

and Assembly Bill No. 199 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.). (Stats. 2020, ch. 92, § 62; 

Stats. 2021, ch. 257, § 35; Stats. 2022, ch. 57, § 21.) Section 1465.9 provides 

that the balance of any of the enumerated court-imposed costs or fines is 

unenforceable and uncollectible, and that the portions of any judgment

imposing such costs or fines must be vacated. (§ 1465.9, subds. (a)–(c).) 

Defendant’s other motion was brought under section 1172.75. Effective 

January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), amended 

section 667.5, subdivision (b) to eliminate sentence enhancements for prison 

priors unless the prior term was for a sexually violent offense. (Stats. 2019, 

ch. 590, § 1.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. 

Sess.), added what is now section 1172.75, which makes Senate Bill No. 136’s 

changes retroactive to all persons currently incarcerated in jail or prison. 

(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3.) In his motion, defendant asked the court to strike 

his prior prison term enhancement (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)), great bodily 

injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and enhancements based on his

two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)). 

On August 15, 2023, the trial court denied both motions in separate 

orders. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s 

request for resentencing under section 1172.75. (See People v. Burgess (2022) 
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86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess); accord, People v. Escobedo (2023) 

95 Cal.App.5th 440, 448–449; People v. Newell (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 265, 

268.) The court added that defendant’s challenges to the great bodily injury 

and prior conviction enhancements that were included in the section 1172.25 

motion were not properly before it, as section 1172.75 does not provide for 

relief for either of those enhancements. 

As for defendant’s motion under section 1465.9, the trial court assumed 

for purposes of the motion “that a defendant subject to one of the enumerated 

court-imposed costs/civil assessments may file a motion for an order vacating 

the portion of a judgment which includes such costs/civil assessments.” The 

court found, however, that defendant “fail[ed] to demonstrate that his 

judgment includes any court-imposed costs/civil assessments enumerated

in . . . section 1465.9.” The court thus denied the motion. 

DISCUSSION

Where, as here, appointed counsel finds no arguable issues in an appeal 

from the denial of a postconviction request for relief, rather than a first 

appeal as of right from a conviction, we are not required to conduct an 

independent review of the record in the manner prescribed in People v. Wende

(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. (See Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 226–228.) We 

give the defendant the opportunity to file his or her own supplemental brief 

and we then evaluate any specific arguments raised. (Id. at pp. 231–232.)

Defendant has filed a four-page, handwritten supplemental brief, 

raising various arguments unrelated to the August 15, 2023 orders 

designated in his notices of appeal. As now explained, we conclude that those 

orders are not appealable, and even if they were, we would lack jurisdiction 

to consider the arguments raised in his supplemental brief. 

We start with the denial of the motion for resentencing under 
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section 1172.75. As noted, section 1172.75 declares that certain one-year 

sentence enhancements based on prior prison terms served for offenses other 

than a sexually violent offense became legally invalid. (Burgess, supra, 

86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 379–380.) Section 1172.75 also provides a mechanism 

for resentencing individuals serving judgments that includes such 

enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subds. (b)–(d).) It directs the California 

Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to identify affected 

defendants and provide their information to the sentencing court. (§ 1172.75, 

subd. (b).) The trial court is, thereafter, instructed to review the information 

and, where warranted, “recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) 

Like the trial court, we lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s request 

to strike his prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section 1172.75. A 

defendant may appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the 

substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).) “A trial court order 

denying relief that the court has no jurisdiction to grant does not affect a 

defendant’s substantial rights and is therefore not appealable . . . .” 

(People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629, 639 (King).) Generally, subject to 

certain statutory exceptions, “ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of 

the sentence has begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or 

modify the sentence.’ ” (Id. at p. 634.) Section 1172.75 is an exception to that 

general rule, permitting notification from the CDCR to vest the trial court 

with jurisdiction to review the judgment and recall and resentence defendant. 

(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) However, a defendant who files a motion without 

statutory permission does not vest the sentencing court with jurisdiction to 

resentence him. (See Burgess, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp. 381–382.) 

Accordingly, the trial court here correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction to 
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entertain defendant’s resentencing motion. (Ibid.) It follows that its order 

denying defendant’s request to strike his prior prison term enhancement 

under section 1172.75 is not appealable, in turn leaving us without 

jurisdiction to consider the appeal from that ruling. (Burgess, at pp. 381–382; 

accord, People v. Escobedo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 448–449; People v. 

Newell, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 268.) 

To the extent defendant, in his section 1172.75 motion, additionally 

asked the trial court to strike the great bodily injury enhancement 

(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and the two prior conviction enhancements (§ 667, 

subd. (a)(1)), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule on those requests as 

well. As it noted, section 1172.75 “only pertains to Penal Code 

section 667.5(b) enhancements and provides no relief from other types of 

enhancements.” Because the trial court could not have granted those 

requests, its denial of those requests could not have affected defendant’s 

substantial rights. Thus, that aspect of its order is also not appealable. 

(King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639.) 

Nor is the order denying the section 1465.9 motion to vacate fines and 

fees appealable. A defendant may appeal “[f]rom any order made after 

judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party” (§ 1237, subd. (b)), but 

it is long established that this does not include the right to appeal the denial 

of a motion that “merely asked the court to repeat or overrule a former ruling 

on the same facts.” (People v. Rick (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 410, 412.) Here, as 

the trial court observed, there is no indication that the law has changed in a 

way that would allow defendant to seek a reduction or reversal of any of the 

fines and fees imposed on him. 

Section 1465.9, upon which defendant’s motion is based, provides relief 

from certain costs and fees imposed on criminal defendants (see People v. 
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Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 259–260), but does not abolish parole 

revocation fines (§ 1202.45); victim restitution fines (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)); court 

operations assessments (§ 1465.8); or criminal conviction assessments

(Gov. Code, § 70373). 

Section 1465.9 also does not render invalid restitution fines under 

section 1202.4. Assembly Bill No. 177 amended section 1465.9 to provide 

that “[o]n and after January 1, 2022 the balance of any court-imposed costs 

pursuant to [s]ection . . . 1202.4 . . . as [that] section[ ] read[s] on December 

31, 2021, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and any portion of a 

judgment imposing those costs shall be vacated.” (§ 1465.9, subd. (b).) 

Section 1202.4 was repealed and re-enacted by Assembly Bill No. 177. It 

eliminated former subdivision (l), which authorized imposing “a fee to cover 

the actual administrative cost of collecting the restitution fine.” (Stats. 2021, 

ch. 257, § 2.) This repeal, however, left the rest of section 1202.4 intact. 

Consequently, there is no indication the Legislature meant to provide relief 

from defendant’s restitution fine. 

In short, the legislative enactments did not allow the trial to strike any 

of the financial obligations imposed on defendant. Because the trial court 

could not have granted defendant’s section 1465.9 motion, its order denying 

the motion is not appealable, and we must dismiss the appeal from that 

order. (See King, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 639.) As a result, none of the 

trial court’s August 15, 2023 rulings is properly before us. 

But even if we had jurisdiction to review any of those rulings, we would 

still lack jurisdiction to consider defendant’s supplemental brief arguments.

Defendant argues that he “never went to prison at all for attempted 

robbery and that should not be called a prison prior whatsoever,”—an 

argument apparently challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support 
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the jury’s finding he had served a prior prison term. Defendant also argues 

he was not “granted a fair trial because a lot was not allowed in to prove the 

fact of the matter . . . .” 

These arguments are unrelated to the section 1465.9 motion or the

section 1172.75 motion that are the subject of this appeal. Defendant’s claim 

regarding his prior prison enhancement, in particular, is essentially an 

attack on a prior factual finding. But section 1172.75 does not contain 

language suggesting it was intended to provide redress for erroneous prior 

factfinding or the possibility of proving contrary facts if given a second 

chance. A section 1172.75 motion is not the appropriate avenue for defendant 

to raise new claims of trial error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting prior factual findings. (Cf. People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 

862, 867–868 [“The problem Burns raises in his petition [for resentencing 

under section 1172.6] . . . has nothing to do with the legislative changes to 

California’s murder law” and “[h]is remedy [for the alleged error] was his 

appeal from the judgment of conviction,” not in an appeal from the denial of 

his section 1172.6 petition].) 

This case is akin to People v. Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 856 (Moore). 

In Moore, the defendant was convicted of murder and other crimes in 1997 

and was sentenced to 107 years to life in prison. He filed a petition in 2020 to 

be considered for a youth offender evidence preservation proceeding under 

People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). (Moore, at pp. 860–861.) 

The request was denied. (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant claimed that a 

five-year enhancement under section 667, subdivision (a) was unauthorized 

because the prosecution allegedly failed to comply with the pleading and 

proof requirements of section 1170.1, subdivision (e). (Moore, at p. 865.) The 

Moore court held it lacked jurisdiction to consider this claim, even though it
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had jurisdiction over an appeal from an unrelated postjudgment order. (Id.

at p. 866.) 

Moore noted the rule that an unauthorized sentence can be corrected at 

any time is an exception to the forfeiture doctrine, but not to the rule that the 

court must first have jurisdiction. (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 865, 

citing In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1129.) It then held: “Not only is 

appellant attempting to challenge his sentence more than 20 years after his 

judgment of conviction became final, but he is doing so for the first time on 

appeal from the denial of his request for a Franklin proceeding. A Franklin

proceeding, however, ‘is unrelated to the validity of the defendant’s 

sentence. . . .’ [Citation.] . . . [T]he trial court’s denial of appellant’s petition 

for a Franklin proceeding and his appeal from that denial did not confer 

jurisdiction on this court over the judgment. The unauthorized sentence 

doctrine has no application here, and we have no jurisdiction to consider 

appellant’s challenge to his sentence in this appeal.” (Moore, at p. 866.) 

Likewise here. As discussed, defendant’s claims are wholly unrelated 

to the rulings from which he appealed. His claims could and should have 

been, but were not, raised years ago in his direct appeal. Thus, while we 

would typically evaluate the merits of arguments presented in a 

supplemental brief (see Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232), we lack 

jurisdiction to consider the arguments raised in the supplemental brief filed 

by defendant here. (See Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at pp. 865–866.)

DISPOSITION

The appeal from the order denying defendant’s motion for resentencing 

under section 1172.75 is dismissed. The appeal from the order denying 

defendant’s motion under section 1465.9 to vacate fines and fees is also

dismissed. 
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_________________________

Richman, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Miller, J.

_________________________

Mayfield, J.*

A168888 (People v. Hall)

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, Mendocino County, 

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.