United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-20073

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Ann Nwoko Sheperd, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:16-CR-258-2

Before Smith, Willett, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Don R. Willett, Circuit Judge:

“The Sixth Amendment is the heartland of constitutional criminal 

procedure.”1 One of four amendments in the Bill of Rights that guarantees 

basic protectionsto the criminally accused,2 the Sixth Amendment enshrines 

a cluster of rights to ensure the fairness, accuracy, and legitimacy of “all 

1 Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641, 641 

(1996).

2 See U.S. Const. amends. IV, V, VI, VIII.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 8, 2022

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

criminal prosecutions.”3 This case concerns the Amendment’s final clause: 

“Assistance of Counsel.” But “[t]his last right is a big one,” as the right to 

counsel, perhaps the central feature of our adversarial system, helps make 

real the Constitution’s other criminal procedure promises.4

Ann Sheperd, the owner of a home-health agency, lawyered up after 

being indicted for Medicare fraud. But there was a tiny problem: 

Unbeknownst to Sheperd, her pretrial lawyer—who represented her until 

days before trial—also represented one of the Government’s star witnesses.

Oops. Sheperd retained new counsel, was convicted (and sentenced to 30 

years), and now appeals on various grounds related to her attorney’s conflict 

of interest. We agree with Sheperd that “Assistance of Counsel” necessarily 

means effective assistance, and effective assistance demands conflict-free 

representation. This is certainly no less true during the pretrial phase,5

particularly today, when roughly 97.8 percent of federal criminal convictions 

are obtained not through a constitutionally prescribed jury trial but through 

plea bargaining.

6

For the reasons below, we REMAND for an evidentiary hearing on 

whether Sheperd’s lawyer’s conflict of interest adversely affected his

representation, but reject Sheperd’s other grounds for reversal.

3 Id. amend. VI.

4 Amar, supra note 1, at 705.

5 See Anaya v. Lumpkin, 976 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The Sixth Amendment 

right to counsel extends to the plea-bargaining process, where defendants are ‘entitled to 

the effective assistance of competent counsel.’” (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 

162 (2012))).

6 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 2020 Sourcebook of Federal 

Sentencing Statistics 56 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/

research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2020/2020-Annual-Reportand-Sourcebook.pdf.

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I

A

Ann Sheperd owned and operated a home-health agency. In June 

2016, a grand jury indicted her (and several others) with conspiracy to 

commit healthcare fraud. Sheperd retained counsel. The district court set

trial for August 2016. A month later, Sheperd replaced her counsel, and the 

district court declared the case “complex.” The court also pushed back the 

trial date about six months. The district court continued the trial three more 

times at the request of various defendants. Sheperd made only one of these 

requests. Sheperd replaced her counsel again in February 2018 with an 

attorney named Bassey Akpaffiong.

Two months after entering his appearance as Sheperd’s counsel, 

Akpaffiong met with FBI agents and a federal prosecutor to discuss 

Sheperd’s trial. But he was not there acting on Sheperd’s behalf. Akpaffiong 

was there to act on another client’s behalf—Okechukwu Okpara. Akpaffiong 

had helped Okpara secure a plea deal related to healthcare fraud in a different 

district court almost a year before. So why did Okpara need Akpaffiong at the 

meeting? Because Okpara was Sheperd’s friend and business associate—a 

relationship the Government wanted to exploit by calling Okpara as a witness 

against Sheperd.

If representing both Sheperd and Okpara at the same time sounds zany

to you, then you wouldn’t be alone. The Government thought it sounded 

zany, too. In fact, it even pointed out to Akpaffiong that he had an obvious

conflict. Akpaffiong replied that he hadn’t noticed.7 Even so, the meeting 

continued since, according to Akpaffiong, “Sheperd wanted to plead guilty 

7 According to Akpaffiong, the oversight came from Okpara referring to Sheperd 

by a different name—“Nwoko,” her middle name.

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and would do so by [the next month, in] May.” Turns out, the meeting was 

a success . . . for Okpara. Afterward, the Government amended Okpara’s 

plea deal to include “5K1 consideration.” That is, in exchange for Okpara 

having provided the Government with “substantial assistance in the 

investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an 

offense,” the Government agreed to permit Okpara to receive a reduced 

sentence.8

Months went by. Nobody told Sheperd about Akpaffiong’s conflict. 

Nobody told the district court about it either. But that time was not wasted. 

The Government used it to bring six more counts of healthcare fraud against 

Sheperd. The grand jury returned a superseding indictment that charged 

Sheperd with all six counts. Akpaffiong, for his part, continued to receive 

Government-provided discovery. Not until August—with trial looming—

did Akpaffiong start trying to address his conflict. He approached a former 

state Assistant Attorney General with experience prosecuting healthcarefraud cases—Oyesanmi Alonge—about taking over Sheperd’s defense. 

Akpaffiong had worked with Alonge before, and Alonge “got involved,” in 

his words, on August 14.

Days later, on August 20, Akpaffiong finally revealed to Sheperd his 

conflict and proposed solution.9 But Sheperd felt burned. She claims her 

experience with Akpaffiong made her “extremely distrustful of lawyers.”

Two days later, on August 22, Sheperd told Alonge not to represent her.

8 U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1.

9 There is some disagreement on the exact date Sheperd was informed that Alonge 

was taking over. Sheperd told the district court that she did not hear about Akpaffiong’s 

conflict and Alonge taking over until August 20. But Alonge’s motion for continuance 

asserted that she knew the same day he first got involved in the case on August 14. If the 

precise date Sheperd found out about Alonge’s involvement has any relevance, we leave it 

to the district court to resolve this factual discrepancy on remand.

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Alonge conveyed this information to the Government. The Government 

conveyed it to the district court. The district court set a status conference.

The status conference took place on August 27, 2018. Alonge was not 

present. Akpaffiong assured the court that Alonge would be prepared for trial 

two weeks later. That same day, Sheperd changed her mind about Alonge. 

She agreed to let him represent her, and Akpaffiong then withdrew as 

counsel. 

A few days later Sheperd’s case was transferred to a new judge. The 

new judge held a pretrial conference on September 4. At the conference the 

judge asked the parties if they could move up the trial date. All parties 

represented they could not, pointing, in part, to Alonge’s recent appearance 

in the case. Counsel for defendants also flagged the conflict issue for the

district court, but suggested that the trial could proceed so long as Okpara 

did not testify. After discussing the conflict, the judge stated that after “32 

years on the federal side plus 8 on the state side, I have not seen th[is]” type 

of conflict. The district court then, to the surprise of all parties, moved the 

trial date up by three days—to Friday, September 7.

On September 6, the day before trial, Alonge moved for a continuance, 

arguing, “The unfortunate circumstances surrounding the status of Ms. 

Shepherd’s [sic] counsel ha[d] denied [him] significant trial preparation 

time.” He had “only worked meaningfully on [the] case for approximately 

one week,” despite having been involved for three. Alternatively, Alonge 

moved to withdraw. That same day, all defendants also filed a joint motion, 

asking the court to, among other things, continue the trial and exclude 

Okpara’s testimony. The court did not rule on the motions. Trial began the 

next day.

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B

A few days into trial, the Government called Okpara as a witness. That 

brought the conflict-of-interest issue to a head. Defense counsel collectively 

reasserted the arguments from their pretrial motion: (1) Akpaffiong could 

have provided Okpara with privileged information to enhance Okpara’s 

efforts to cooperate with the Government; (2) if Okpara testified, he could 

share self-incriminating statements that Sheperd shared with Akpaffiong; 

and (3) the current indictment could have been based on tainted information 

from Okpara. Akpaffiong and Sheperd took the stand. The district court 

ultimately excluded Okpara from testifying.

At the close of trial, Alonge renewed the defendants’ joint pretrial 

motion, asking the district court to dismiss the case because of the conflict of 

interest. The district court denied the motion. The jury found Sheperd guilty 

on all counts. The district court sentenced her to 30 years in prison. Sheperd 

timely appealed, alleging several grounds to reverse based on Akpaffiong’s 

conflict of interest.

II

Sheperd mainly argues that Akpaffiong’s conflict violated her Sixth 

Amendment right to conflict-free counsel. We review ineffective-assistanceof-counsel claims, like this one, as a mixed question of law and fact subject to 

de novo review.10 Because the district court did not find, one way or the 

other, whether Akpaffiong’s conflict adversely affected his representation of 

Sheperd, we REMAND for a limited evidentiary hearing on this issue. 

10 United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 391 (5th Cir. 2005).

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A

The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a fair 

trial. The Supreme Court has explained that one of the safeguards making

trials fair is the right to counsel.11 “In all criminal prosecutions,” the Sixth 

Amendment declares, “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 

Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”12 That’s no hollow guarantee. The 

Counsel Clause does not countenance empty suits; it requires “effective

assistance of counsel”13—the presence of competence and absence of 

conflicts.

Unfortunately, not all representations meet that standard. At times a 

representation may suffer from “actual ineffectiveness”—one that “so 

undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 

cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”14 That standard is 

satisfied when the defendant can show that (1) her “counsel’s representation 

fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,”15 and (2) that the 

“deficiencies in counsel’s performance [were] prejudicial to the defense.”16

That two-pronged test has a special application when a defendant 

argues that her representation was infected with a conflict of interest. One of 

the most indispensable duties that any counsel owes his client is the duty of 

loyalty. Counsel breaches that duty when he labors under an actual conflict 

11 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–86 (1984).

12 U.S. Const. amend. VI.

13 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 

n.14 (1970)) (emphasis added).

14 Id.

15 Id. at 688.

16 Id. at 692.

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of interest. And if he breaches the bedrock duty of loyalty, then his 

representation will fall below the objective standard of reasonableness that 

the Constitution requires.17

But what about prejudice? Defendants still need to show it in actualconflict cases. They show it, though, in a special way—by showing that their 

case is subject to a limited presumption of prejudice. Whether it applies boils 

down to one question: Did the conflict “adversely affect[]” counsel’s 

performance?18 That’s a lighter lift for defendants. Proving prejudice directly 

means showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 

different.”19 On the other hand, the limited presumption of prejudice in 

actual-conflict cases turns on whether the conflict adversely affected the 

representation itself.

20 One way defendants can answer that mixed question 

of law and fact is through “evidence that counsel’s judgment was actually 

fettered by concern over the effect of certain trial decisions on other 

clients.”21

17 Id.

18 Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)); see also Infante, 404 

F.3d at 390–91 (explaining that a defendant “must show that his trial attorney was acting 

under the influence of an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance 

at trial”).

19 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The Supreme Court in Strickland also explained that 

“[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Id.

20 See Infante, 404 F.3d at 391.

21 Id. at 393 (quoting Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 807 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal 

quotation marks omitted)).

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B

The Government concedes “[t]here is no dispute that Akpaffiong 

operated under a conflict of interest.” It also concedes that both it and 

Akpaffiong “were obligated by rules of ethics to bring the conflict to the 

court’s attention.”22 Still, that’s only the first half of Sheperd’s burden. She 

still must prove that Akpaffiong’s conflict adversely affected his 

performance. And on that question, on this record, we can’t tell one way or 

the other. 

For instance, Sheperd argues that Akpaffiong was not “proactive” in 

seeking a plea deal for her. Rather, in Sheperd’s words, “he persuaded her 

that the Government’s case was weak and that she should go to trial where 

she would prevail.” That seems to square with Akpaffiong’s testimony at a 

midtrial hearing on his conflict: “I never try to get my clients to plea.” But it 

also strays from his pretrial representations to the Government—when it 

realized Akpaffiong was conflicted—that Sheperd wanted to plead out. All to 

say, questions abound about what advice Akpaffiong gave or did not give 

Sheperd, and what he did or did not do on her behalf.

Just as problematically, even if we knew with precision what 

Akpaffiong did or did not do for Sheperd, this record sheds little light on his 

motives for doing or not doing it. If Akpaffiong’s motives arose from a mind 

fettered with concern for Okpara, then Sheperd might be correct that her 

right to counsel was violated. Indeed, some circumstantial evidence already 

points that way. The Government agreed to a reduced sentence for Okpara 

based on his cooperation in prosecuting Sheperd. And that deal was enabled, 

through and through, by Akpaffiong.

22 See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 265 (5th Cir. 1976) (discussing ethical 

prohibitions on “representing parties with adverse interests”).

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Though the district court held a midtrial hearing on Akpaffiong’s 

conflict, its limited scope left the record too underdeveloped for us to 

meaningfully review troubling questions about Akpaffiong’s representation.

Where an actual conflict existed, but the record is too “spars[e]” for us to 

review adverse effect, it is appropriate for us to allow the district court to 

more-fully develop the record with an evidentiary hearing.23 Therefore, we 

must REMAND for the district court to do just that.24

III

Sheperd advances two other grounds for reversing the district court. 

First, she argues that it abused its discretion by denying Alonge’s 

continuance. Second, she contends that Akpaffiong’s conflict violated her 

rights to due process and against self-incrimination. Because Sheperd’s due 

process ground is derivative of her Sixth Amendment issue, we cannot decide 

23 See United States v. Salado, 339 F.3d 285, 291–92 (5th Cir. 2003) (remanding for 

an evidentiary hearing on actual conflict and adverse effect in the joint-representation 

context due, in part, to the “sparsity of the record”); Infante, 404 F.3d at 393 (remanding 

for an evidentiary hearing on adverse effect because the record was not “sufficiently 

developed”). 

24 But the scope of our remand is limited. Sheperd also urges that she was adversely 

affected because the lateness of Akpaffiong’s withdrawal left her trial counsel with only 

days to prepare for trial. The Supreme Court, though, has already clarified that what 

matters in actual-conflict cases, like this one, is whether the conflicted attorney’s

representation was adversely affected—not a subsequent attorney’s. See Mickens v. Taylor, 

535 U.S. 162, 172 n.5 (2002); see also id. at 173 (“[A] judge [can] avoid all possibility of 

reversal by either seeking waiver [of the conflict] or replacing a conflicted attorney.” 

(emphasis added)). Therefore, the district court need not inquire into any collateral effect 

that Akpaffiong’s conflict may have had on Alonge’s representation. Further, if Sheperd is 

raising a separate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim against Alonge, we cannot review 

it on this record since it was not presented to the district court. See United States v. Wallace, 

32 F.3d 921, 930 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

“cannot be resolved on direct appeal unless adequately raised in the district court”).

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it until after remand to the district court. We otherwise reject Sheperd’s 

additional grounds for the reasons below.

A

Sheperd claims that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

rule on her motion for a continuance given the conflict of interest.25 She says

that the district court “rushed forward to trial in reaction to the case 

previously having been continued and out of a general predisposition for 

expeditious litigation, which was so extreme as to be troubling.” 

We will “reverse a denial [of a motion for a continuance] only when 

the district court has abused its discretion and the defendant can establish 

that he suffered serious prejudice.”26 And “[w]hether a continuance was 

properly denied depends on the circumstances of the case.”27 Even so, not 

every “harsh” denial of a continuance is reversible.

28 To decide whether the 

district court reversibly abused its discretion, we look to the totality of the 

circumstances. We often find certain factors helpful in reviewing them:

(1) “the amount of time available”; (2) “the defendant’s role in shortening 

the time needed”; (3) “the likelihood of prejudice from denial”; (4) “the 

availability of discovery from the prosecution”; (5) “the complexity of the 

case”; (6) “the adequacy of the defense actually provided at trial”; (7) “the 

25 Although the court did not rule on Sheperd’s motion for a continuance, the 

motion was implicitly denied. Snider v. L-3 Commc’ns Vertex Aerospace, L.L.C., 946 F.3d 

660, 667 (5th Cir. 2019) (explaining that when a district court “enters a final judgment, it 

has implicitly denied any outstanding motions, even if the court does not explicitly deny a 

particular motion” (footnote omitted)).

26 United States v. Rounds, 749 F.3d 326, 336 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States 

v. Castro, 15 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

27 United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 217 (5th Cir. 1990).

28 United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 1998).

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experience of the attorney with the accused”;29 and (8) the timeliness of the 

motion.30

(1)

The first factor—the time available—weighs against finding an abuse 

of discretion. Sheperd repeatedly contends that Alonge had less than two 

weeks to prepare since he did not file his notice to appear until August 28, 

2018—the day after Akpaffiong withdrew. But we mark the time differently. 

Again, Alonge got involved in Sheperd’s case as early as August 14. He also

attended a proffer session with the Government three days later, on August 

17. Since trial did not begin until September 7, that gave Alonge about threeand-a-half weeks to get ready for trial. We have upheld denial of a motion for 

continuance before in a case involving “ten defendants, even more witnesses, 

and voluminous discovery” where counsel was appointed only a week-anda-half before trial.31 On these facts, then, Alonge had ample time to prepare 

for trial.

(2)

The second factor—the defendant’s role in shortening the time 

needed—weighs weakly in favor of finding an abuse of discretion. Sheperd 

did not create Akpaffiong’s conflict. And, as the Government concedes, it 

was Akpaffiong who delayed informing Sheperd and the district court about 

29 United States v. Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 439 (5th Cir. 2009). 

30 See United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420, 1435–36 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Denial of an 

eleventh hour . . . motion for a continuance—even when an attorney unfamiliar with the 

case must take over representation of a defendant—is not an abuse of discretion.”). The 

parties only weakly dispute what factors we should consider in determining whether the 

district court abused its discretion. As Sheperd concedes, the factors they propose “are 

essentially substantively similar and relevant.”

31 United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 387 (5th Cir. 2007).

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it. Even so, Sheperd contributed to Alonge’s time crunch. As a reminder, she 

told Alonge on August 22 not to represent her, and did not rehire him until 

August 27. So this factor does not weigh as far in Sheperd’s favor as it 

otherwise could.

(3)

The third factor—the likelihood of prejudice from denial—is neutral. 

On the one hand, perhaps Akpaffiong’s conflict adversely affected his 

representation of Sheperd. That is why we are sending part of this case back 

to the district court. On the other hand, and as we detail more below in the 

sixth factor, Alonge competently defended Sheperd at trial. With facts 

pointing both ways, the most we can conclude is that the third factor is 

neutral.

(4)

The fourth factor—the availability of discovery from the 

prosecution—favors finding an abuse of discretion. Sheperd contends that 

Alonge “never received six of fourteen discovery discs.” And of the discs he 

did receive, Akpaffiong did not send Alonge the passwords for five of them 

until 10:00 pm the night before trial. Nor does the Government contend that 

it provided discovery to Alonge directly. So the fourth factor weighs in favor 

of finding an abuse of discretion.

(5)

The fifth factor—the complexity of the case—is neutral. The 

Government admits that this was a “complex” case. At the same time, 

though, Alonge represented to the jury that he formerly worked as an 

Assistant Attorney General, and that he had prosecuted healthcare-fraud 

cases before. Alonge’s experience mitigates the case’s complexity.

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(6)

The sixth factor—the adequacy of the defense provided at trial—

weighs against finding an abuse of discretion. Sheperd asserts a litany of 

complaints against Alonge: broadly, that he failed to pursue appropriate 

remedies for Akpaffiong’s conflict; that he failed to subpoena or crossexamine relevant witnesses; and that he failed to put on a defense. But for all 

Sheperd’s complaints about Alonge now on appeal, we cannot help noticing

that she did not raise an independent ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim 

against him in the district court. And from where we sit, Sheperd has little to 

complain about. Alonge was not alone in pursuing his strategy that the 

Government had failed to meet its burden. Ramirez’s counsel pursued the 

same strategy. So, too, did Nwoko’s counsel, who called only one, very-brief 

character witness. No attorney cross-examined five of the witnesses that 

Alonge declined to cross examine. Moreover, Alonge directly examined 

Sheperd at trial to help exclude Okpara’s testimony because of Akpaffiong’s 

conflict. And, at closing arguments, Alonge minimized Sheperd’s role in the 

fraud to the jury. We have found that defense counsel performed adequately 

before on similar facts.32 As a result, the sixth factor weighs against finding 

an abuse of discretion.

(7)

The seventh factor—the experience of the attorney with the 

accused—weighs against an abuse of discretion. As we already outlined 

above, Alonge had about three-and-a-half weeks to prepare for trial. He also 

32 See Lewis, 476 F.3d at 387 (holding that counsel’s performance was adequate 

where he cross-examined adverse witnesses and minimized his client’s role during opening 

and closing arguments).

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held himself out to the jury as an experienced attorney familiar with 

healthcare-fraud cases.

(8)

The eighth factor—the timeliness of the motion—weighs heavily

against an abuse of discretion. We have said before that district courts do not 

abuse their discretion when denying “eleventh hour” motions for 

continuances.33 And that includes when the continuance is filed by attorneys 

“unfamiliar with the case [that] must take over representation of a 

defendant.”34 Here, Alonge was familiar with the case and defendant. Here, 

Akpaffiong assured the district court that Alonge was ready for trial. And 

here, Alonge had weeks to prepare for trial. If he needed a continuance, then 

he should have filed it sooner than the night before jury selection.

* * *

After considering the totality of the circumstances, two factors weigh 

or weigh weakly in favor of finding an abuse of discretion, two factors are 

neutral, and four factors weigh against or heavily against finding an abuse of 

discretion. On balance, then, we cannot say on this record that the district 

court erred in denying Alonge’s motion for a continuance.

B

Finally, Sheperd contends that her Fifth Amendment rights were 

violated twice over. She first contends that Akpaffiong’s conflict violated her 

due process right to a fair trial. Because her brief argument is completely 

derivative of her Sixth Amendment’s, it will have to be resolved after this 

33 Krout, 66 F.3d at 1435.

34 Id. at 1435–36.

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case returns to the district court.35 Sheperd also spends a single paragraph 

contending that Akpaffiong’s conflict violated her Fifth Amendment right 

against self-incrimination. Because she cites no supporting authority for this 

novel argument, we will not address it.36

IV

Conflicted counsel is rarely effective counsel. Yet we cannot decide 

on this record if this case is the exception. Therefore, we REMAND for the 

district court to conduct a limited evidentiary hearing on whether 

Akpaffiong’s conflict adversely affected his representation. Only then can a 

court decide if Sheperd’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to conflict-free 

counsel were violated. This is a limited remand, however. This panel retains 

jurisdiction awaiting the district court’s findings and conclusions. Otherwise, 

we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Alonge’s eleventh-hour 

continuance, and we reject Sheperd’s additional grounds for reversal.

35 See United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1260 (5th Cir. 1978) (“We hold today 

that an accused . . . is deprived of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment right to effective 

assistance of counsel, even in the absence of a showing of prejudice, when his attorney 

operates under an actual conflict of interest.” (emphasis added)).

36 See Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A) (“The appellant’s brief must contain . . . [an] 

argument, which must contain . . . appellant’s contentions and the reasons for them, with 

citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies . . . .”); see 

also Willis v. Cleco Corp., 749 F.3d 314, 318 n.3 (5th Cir. 2014) (explaining that we will 

disregard appellate arguments where “citations are minimal, and legal analysis relating 

facts to the law is largely absent”).

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