II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 693

To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan, and for other

purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 24, 1999

Mr. HELMS (for himself and Mr. TORRICELLI) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To assist in the enhancement of the security of Taiwan,

and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Taiwan Security En5 hancement Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

7 Congress makes the following findings:

8 (1) Since 1949, the close relationship between

9 the United States and Taiwan has been of enormous

10 benefit to both societies.
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1 (2) In recent years, Taiwan has undergone a

2 major political transformation, and Taiwan is today

3 a true multiparty democracy with a political system

4 separate from and totally unlike that of the People’s

5 Republic of China.

6 (3) The economy of Taiwan is based upon free

7 market principles and is separate and distinct from

8 the People’s Republic of China.

9 (4) Although on January 1, 1979, the United

10 States Government withdrew diplomatic recognition

11 of the government on Taiwan as the legitimate gov12 ernment of China, neither at that time nor since has

13 the United States Government adopted a formal po14 sition as to the ultimate status of Taiwan other than

15 to state that status must be decided by peaceful

16 means. Any determination of the ultimate status of

17 Taiwan must have the express consent of the people

18 on Taiwan.

19 (5) The government on Taiwan no longer

20 claims to be the sole legitimate government of all of

21 China.

22 (6) The Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96–

23 8) states that—

24 (A) peace and stability in the Taiwan

25 Strait area are in the political, security, and
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1 economic interests of the United States and are

2 of international concern;

3 (B) the decision of the United States to es4 tablish diplomatic relations with the People’s

5 Republic of China rests upon the expectation

6 that the future of Taiwan will be determined by

7 peaceful means;

8 (C) the United States would consider any

9 effort to determine the future of Taiwan by

10 other than peaceful means, including boycotts

11 or embargoes, a threat to the peace and secu12 rity of the Western Pacific region and of grave

13 concern to the United States;

14 (D) the United States will maintain the ca15 pacity to resist any form of coercion that jeop16 ardizes the security, or the social or the eco17 nomic system, of the people on Taiwan; and

18 (E) the preservation and enhancement of

19 the human rights of all the people on Taiwan

20 are objectives of the United States.

21 (7) On the basis of these provisions, the Taiwan

22 Relations Act establishes on the part of the United

23 States a continuing connection with and concern for

24 Taiwan, its people, and their ability to maintain

25 themselves free of coercion and free of the use of
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1 force against them. The maintenance by Taiwan of

2 forces adequate for defense and deterrence is in the

3 interest of the United States in that it helps to

4 maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait area.

5 (8) Since 1954, when the United States and

6 Taiwan signed the Mutual Defense Treaty, the

7 United States and Taiwan have maintained a de8 fense and security relationship that has contributed

9 greatly to freedom, peace, and stability in Taiwan

10 and the East Asia and Pacific regions.

11 (9) The United States and Taiwan no longer

12 conduct joint training missions, have no direct mili13 tary lines of communication, and have only limited

14 military-to-military contacts. This lack of commu15 nication and interoperation between the United

16 States and Taiwan hinders planning for the defense

17 of Taiwan and could prove detrimental in the event

18 of future aggression against Taiwan.

19 (10) Since 1979, the United States has contin20 ued to sell defensive weapons to Taiwan in accord21 ance with the Taiwan Relations Act, and such sales

22 have helped Taiwan maintain its autonomy and free23 dom in the face of persistent hostility from the Peo24 ple’s Republic of China. However, pressures to delay,

25 deny, and reduce arms sales to Taiwan have been
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1 prevalent since the signing of the August 17, 1982,

2 communique with the People’s Republic of China.

3 Over time, such delays, denials, and reductions could

4 prevent Taiwan from maintaining a sufficient capa5 bility for self-defense.

6 (11) As has been affirmed on several occasions

7 by the executive branch of Government, the provi8 sions of the Taiwan Relations Act take legal prece9 dence over any communique with the People’s Re10 public of China.

11 (12) The People’s Republic of China has con12 sistently refused to renounce the use of force against

13 Taiwan and has repeatedly threatened force against

14 Taiwan, including implied threats by unnamed Peo15 ple’s Republic of China officials on January 10,

16 1999, who warned Taiwan not to participate in the

17 development of theater missile defense capabilities

18 with the United States.

19 (13) The missile firings by the People’s Repub20 lic of China near Taiwan in August 1995 and March

21 1996 clearly demonstrate the willingness of the Peo22 ple’s Republic of China to use forceful tactics to

23 limit the freedom of the people on Taiwan.
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1 (14) As most nations in East Asia reduce mili2 tary spending, the People’s Republic of China con3 tinues a major and comprehensive military buildup.

4 (15) This military buildup includes the develop5 ment of advanced ballistic and cruise missiles that

6 will incorporate precision guidance capability and

7 the construction of new imaging, radar, navigation,

8 and electronic intelligence satellites that will help

9 target and guide ballistic and cruise missiles. Ac10 cording to the Department of Defense report enti11 tled ‘‘The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait’’,

12 submitted to Congress in February 1999, the size of

13 the missile force of the People’s Republic of China

14 is expected to grow substantially and, by 2005, the

15 People’s Republic of China will possess an ‘‘over16 whelming advantage’’ in offensive missiles vis-a-vis

17 Taiwan. The Department of Defense has also noted

18 that the People’s Republic of China may already

19 possess the capability to damage satellite optical sen20 sors with lasers, is researching advanced anti-sat21 ellite lasers that could blind United States intel22 ligence satellites, and is procuring radio frequency

23 weapons that disable electronic equipment. These

24 missile and anti-satellite capabilities pose a grave

25 threat to Taiwan.
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1 (16) This military buildup also includes the

2 construction or procurement from abroad of ad3 vanced naval systems, including Russian Kilo sub4 marines that are difficult to detect, Russian tech5 nology to assist the development of new nuclear-pow6 ered attack submarines, Russian Sovremenny class

7 destroyers armed with supersonic SS–N–22 Sunburn

8 anti-ship missiles, a new long-range, all-weather

9 naval attack aircraft called the JH–7, and new in10 digenous land-attack cruise missiles that could be

11 launched from submarines, ships, and naval attack

12 aircraft. These naval capabilities pose a grave threat

13 of blockade to Taiwan.

14 (17) This military buildup also includes the im15 provement of air combat capabilities by procuring

16 and co-producing hundreds of Russian Sukhoi Su–

17 27 fighters, seeking to purchase Russian Su–30 all18 weather attack aircraft, arming these aircraft with

19 advanced air-to-air missiles such as the Russian R–

20 77 missile and other precision guided munitions,

21 constructing the indigenously designed J–10 fighter,

22 and seeking advanced airborne warning and control

23 systems from abroad. These capabilities pose a grave

24 airborne threat to Taiwan.
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1 (18) Because of the introduction of advanced

2 submarines into the Taiwan Strait area by the Peo3 ple’s Republic of China and the increasing capability

4 of the People’s Republic of China to blockade Tai5 wan, Taiwan needs to acquire diesel-powered sub6 marines in order to maintain a capability to counter

7 a blockade, to conduct antisubmarine warfare train8 ing, and for other purposes.

9 (19) Because of the democratic form of govern10 ment on Taiwan and the historically nonaggressive

11 foreign policy of Taiwan, it is highly unlikely that

12 Taiwan would use submarines in an offensive man13 ner.

14 (20) The current defense relationship between

15 the United States and Taiwan is deficient in terms

16 of its capacity over the long term to counter and

17 deter potential aggression against Taiwan by the

18 People’s Republic of China.

19 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

20 It is the sense of Congress that—

21 (1) the Secretary of Defense and the Secre22 taries of the military departments should make every

23 effort to reserve additional positions for Taiwan offi24 cers at the National Defense University, the senior

25 war colleges, and the military academies; and
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1 (2) the Secretary of State should, when consid2 ering foreign military sales to Taiwan—

3 (A) take into account the special status of

4 Taiwan; and

5 (B) make every effort to ensure that Tai6 wan has full and timely access to price and

7 availability data for defense articles and defense

8 services.

9 SEC. 4. DETERMINATIONS OF DEFENSE NEEDS OF TAIWAN.

10 (a) INCREASE IN TECHNICAL STAFF OF THE AMER11 ICAN INSTITUTE IN TAIWAN.—Upon the request of the

12 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the President shall

13 use funds available to the Department of Defense under

14 the Arms Export Control Act for the assignment or detail

15 of additional technical staff to the American Institute in

16 Taiwan.

17 (b) ANNUAL REPORTS.—Beginning 60 days after the

18 next round of arms talks between the United States and

19 Taiwan, and annually thereafter, the President shall sub20 mit a report to Congress—

21 (1) detailing each of Taiwan’s requests for pur22 chase of defense articles and defense services during

23 the one-year period ending on the date of the report;

24 (2) describing the defense needs asserted by

25 Taiwan as justification for those requests; and
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1 (3) describing any decision to reject, postpone,

2 or modify any such request that was made during

3 the one-year period ending on the date of the report,

4 the level at which the final decision was made, and

5 a justification for the decision.

6 SEC. 5. STRENGTHENING THE DEFENSE OF TAIWAN.

7 (a) MAINTENANCE OF SUFFICIENT SELF-DEFENSE

8 CAPABILITIES OF TAIWAN.—Congress finds that any de9 termination of the nature or quantity of defense articles

10 or defense services to be made available to Taiwan that

11 is made on any basis other than the defense needs of Tai12 wan, whether pursuant to the August 17, 1982, Commu13 nique signed with the People’s Republic of China, or any

14 similar executive agreement, order, or policy would violate

15 the intent of Congress in the enactment of section 3(b)

16 of the Taiwan Relations Act (22 U.S.C. 3302(b)).

17 (b) PLAN.—

18 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Defense, in

19 consultation with the Secretary of State, shall de20 velop a plan for the enhancement of programs and

21 arrangements for operational training and exchanges

22 of personnel between the armed forces of the United

23 States and Taiwan for work in threat analysis, doc24 trine, force planning, operational methods, and other

25 areas. The plan shall provide for exchanges of offi-
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1 cers up to and including general and flag officers in

2 the grade of O–10.

3 (2) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after

4 the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of

5 Defense shall submit a report to Congress, in classi6 fied or unclassified form, containing the plan re7 quired under paragraph (1).

8 (3) IMPLEMENTATION.—Not later than 30 days

9 after the date on which the report described in para10 graph (2) is submitted or required to be submitted,

11 the Secretary of Defense shall implement the plan

12 contained in the report.

13 (c) COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES

14 AND TAIWAN MILITARY COMMANDS.—Not later than 180

15 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

16 of Defense shall establish secure direct communications

17 between the United States Pacific military command and

18 the Taiwan military command.

19 (d) MISSILE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.—Subject to sub20 section (h), the President is authorized to make available

21 for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, theater missile de22 fense equipment and related items, including—

23 (1) ground-based and naval-based missile de24 fense systems; and
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1 (2) reconnaissance and communications sys2 tems, as may be necessary to target and cue missile

3 defense systems sold to Taiwan.

4 (e) SATELLITE EARLY WARNING DATA.—Subject to

5 subsection (h), the President is authorized to make avail6 able for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, satellite early

7 warning data.

8 (f) AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT.—Subject to sub9 section (h), the President is authorized to make available

10 for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, modern air-defense

11 equipment, including the following:

12 (1) AIM–120 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles.

13 (2) Additional advanced fighters and airborne

14 warning and control systems (AWACS).

15 (3) Equipment to better defend airfields from

16 air and missile attack.

17 (4) Communications infrastructure that enables

18 coordinated joint-force air defense of Taiwan.

19 (g) NAVAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS.—Subject to sub20 section (h), the President is authorized to make available

21 for sale to Taiwan, at reasonable cost, defensive systems

22 that counter the development by the People’s Republic of

23 China of new naval capabilities, including defense systems

24 such as—

25 (1) diesel-powered submarines;
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1 (2) anti-submarine systems, including airborne

2 systems, capable of detecting new Kilo and advanced

3 Chinese nuclear submarines;

4 (3) naval anti-missile systems, including Aegis

5 destroyers, capable of defeating Russian supersonic

6 anti-ship missiles; and

7 (4) communications systems that better enable

8 Taiwan to conduct joint-force naval defense oper9 ations.

10 (h) RELATION TO ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT.—

11 Nothing in this section supersedes or modifies the applica12 tion of section 36 of the Arms Export Control Act to the

13 sale of any defense article or defense service under this

14 section.

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