SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-4074-16T2

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSEPH M. DOYLE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Submitted May 17, 2018 – Decided June 26, 2018

Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment 

No. 16-05-0556.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Michele E. Friedman, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and the 

brief).

Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County 

Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nicole 

Handy, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and 

on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Joseph Doyle appeals from an April 6, 2017 judgment 

of conviction for third-degree possession of cocaine with intent 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-4074-16T2

to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(2). Defendant moved 

to suppress evidence seized without a warrant, which formed the 

evidential basis for the charge. After his motion was denied, 

defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea and was sentenced to a 

five-year term of special probation in drug court, with an 

alternative sentence of four years' imprisonment, with a one-year 

period of parole ineligibility, if defendant violated probation. 

On appeal, as permitted under Rule 3:5-7(d), defendant 

challenges the denial of his suppression motion, raising the 

following single point for our consideration:

THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT 

COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE 

ITS CLAIM THAT THE WIRETAP TEXT 

MESSAGES AND PHONE CALLS ON WHICH 

POLICE RELIED WERE OBJECTIVELY 

EMBEDDED WITH "DRUG CODE." WITHOUT 

THIS MISSING LINK, THE COURT 

COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 

FINDING THAT POLICE HAD REASONABLE 

SUSPICION TO STOP [DEFENDANT] IN 

CONNECTION WITH A NARCOTICS 

INVESTIGATION. 

Having considered the argument and applicable law, we affirm.

After defendant filed his suppression motion, the parties 

agreed that no testimonial hearing was required pursuant to Rule

3:5-7(c); stipulated to the facts in their written submissions;

and requested that the motion judge, Judge Philip E. Haines, review 

the police motor vehicle recording of the stop provided in 
3 A-4074-16T2

discovery. Accordingly, in his written decision rendered on 

January 17, 2017, Judge Haines made factual findings from the 

undisputed facts, which we incorporate by reference and summarize 

to lend context to the judge's decision. 

Briefly, the Burlington County Guns, Gangs, and Narcotics 

Task Force (GGNTF) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conducted 

an undercover investigation of Dante Fox, which led to an arranged 

drug transaction with Fox and a confidential source in September 

2015; the issuance of a communications data warrant (CDW) for 

Fox's phone in October 2015; and the issuance of a wiretap order 

to intercept Fox' telephone communications for twenty days from

December 14, 2015. As a result, police intercepted a number of 

telephone conversations and text messages they believed referred 

to drug vernacular for cocaine and drug transactions. 

Two of the intercepted conversations, which occurred on 

December 15 and 16, 2015, involved a request between Fox and an 

individual later identified as defendant for "4 vizzles," which 

police believed was coded language for a drug transaction. In 

subsequent conversations on December 29 and 30, 2015, defendant 

arranged a time to meet Fox at Fox's house. 

On the morning of December 30, 2015, police observed a man

later identified as defendant enter Fox's home carrying a black 

backpack, exit ten minutes later, and drive off in a white Ford 
4 A-4074-16T2

Crown Victoria. One of the GGNTF officers conducted a motor 

vehicle stop and advised defendant he was being stopped for having 

tinted windows.1 Thereafter, the officers removed defendant from 

the vehicle, handcuffed him, conducted a pat down, and placed him 

in the back seat of a police car. During the pat down, the 

officers removed $585 in currency from defendant's pockets. 

Approximately one minute after the stop, a K-9 unit arrived 

at the scene to perform an exterior sniff of defendant's vehicle. 

The K-9 officer gave a positive hit, indicating the presence of 

narcotics at the trunk and passenger side of the Crown Victoria. 

Thereafter, the officers transported defendant and his vehicle to 

police headquarters, after which a search warrant was obtained for 

the vehicle. The resulting search of the trunk of the vehicle 

uncovered a black backpack containing one ounce of cocaine. 

In upholding the stop of defendant's vehicle, Judge Haines 

initially recognized that defendant "was stopped as a part of a 

GGNTF investigation, . . . a specialized unit with particularized 

knowledge about the drug trade." After acknowledging "the training 

and experience of the officers involved," and the propriety of the 

officers "consider[ing] the conversation that took place between 

 

1 Before the motion judge and on appeal, the State abandoned any

argument that the stop was justified based on a violation of the 

tinted-windows statute, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74. 
5 A-4074-16T2

. . . [d]efendant and . . . Fox several weeks prior to the 

challenged car stop," Judge Haines concluded that "the police had 

a 'particularized suspicion' that [defendant] was 'engaged in 

wrongdoing' which justified the stop of his motor vehicle." To 

support his decision, the judge relied "on the information obtained 

from the wiretap, from the [CDW], the surveillance of [defendant]

arriving at and departing from the home of . . . Fox, and the 

specialized knowledge of the [GGNTF]."

2 The judge entered a 

memorializing order and this appeal followed.3

On appeal, defendant "exclusively" challenges the judge's 

ruling that the officers possessed the requisite suspicion to stop 

the car, arguing "the record is devoid of proof corroborating 

[the] claim" that "the intercepted text messages and phone calls 

contained language which the officers reasonably and objectively 

believed to contain 'drug code.'" We disagree. 

 

2 The wiretap application, which was not challenged by defendant, 

detailed the affiant's extensive knowledge and experience "in all 

facets of narcotics investigations" while assigned to the GGNTF,

as well as the suspected involvement in drug trafficking of 

defendant and his two brothers, described as associates of Fox, 

whose "Cadillac [was] registered to [defendant]." 

3 Because the judge found "nothing in the dash camera video nor 

in the recited facts that could lead the officers to believe that 

[defendant] was armed and dangerous," he determined that "the 

frisk of his outer clothing" and "entry into [his] pockets" were 

unlawful and suppressed the seizure of $585 in currency from 

defendant's person. That ruling is not challenged on appeal. 
6 A-4074-16T2

Our review of a motion judge's decision on a motion to 

suppress is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009). 

We review the judge's factual findings in a suppression hearing 

with great deference, State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016), 

and "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's 

decision, provided that those findings are 'supported by 

sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Boone, 232 

N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 

40 (2016)). We "disregard those findings only when a trial court's 

findings of fact are clearly mistaken." State v. Hubbard, 222 

N.J. 249, 262 (2015). We owe no deference, however, to the trial 

court's legal conclusions or interpretation of the legal 

consequences that flow from established facts. Id. at 263. Our 

review in that regard is de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 

516 (2015).

It is well settled that the police may lawfully stop a motor 

vehicle and detain the occupants on less than probable cause in 

order to investigate suspicious conduct. State v. Stovall, 170 

N.J. 346, 356 (2002). Such an "investigatory stop," also known 

as a Terry4 stop, is characterized by a detention in which the 

person approached by a police officer would not reasonably feel 

 

4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7 A-4074-16T2

free to leave, even though the encounter falls short of a formal 

arrest. Id. at 355-56. During a Terry motor vehicle stop, a 

police officer may detain an individual for a brief period, if the 

stop was "based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an 

offense . . . has been or is being committed." State v. Carty, 

170 N.J. 632, 639-40 (2002). Once a lawful stop is made, the 

subsequent reasonable detention of the occupant of the motor 

vehicle constitutes a permissible seizure. State v. Dickey, 152 

N.J. 468, 475 (1998). The burden is on the State to show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that it possessed sufficient 

information to give rise to the required level of suspicion. State 

v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004). 

"The principal components of a determination of reasonable 

suspicion . . . [are] the events which occurred leading up to the 

stop . . . , and then the decision whether these historical facts, 

viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police 

officer, amount to a reasonable suspicion . . . ." Stovall, 170 

N.J. at 357 (alteration in original) (quoting Ornelas v. United 

States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Determining whether a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion exists depends upon the 

totality of the circumstances. Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22. In 

evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Terry

stop, a reviewing court must balance "the State's interest in 
8 A-4074-16T2

effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be 

protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions." 

State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986). 

As our Supreme Court observed in Davis,

such encounters are justified only if the 

evidence, when interpreted in an objectively 

reasonable manner, shows that the encounter 

was preceded by activity that would lead a 

reasonable police officer to have an 

articulable suspicion that criminal activity 

had occurred or would shortly occur. No 

mathematical formula exists for deciding 

whether the totality of circumstances provided 

the officer with an articulable or 

particularized suspicion that the individual 

in question was involved in criminal activity. 

Such a determination can be made only through 

a sensitive appraisal of the circumstances in 

each case.

[Id. at 505.]

In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we are also 

required to "give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and 

experience' as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn 

from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the 

officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279 

(1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)). "The 

fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a 

person's actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a 

finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as 'a 
9 A-4074-16T2

reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with 

guilt.'" Id. at 279-80 (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 11).

Applying these principles, we discern no basis to disturb 

Judge Haines' reasoned decision upholding the motor vehicle stop 

that led to the seizure of a large quantity of cocaine found in 

the black backpack in the trunk of defendant's vehicle. Contrary 

to defendant's contention, the totality of all of the circumstances 

viewed through the prism of the specialized knowledge and 

experience of the members of the GGNTF in conducting narcotics

investigations clearly provided a constitutionally permissible 

reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in criminal 

activity with Fox to justify the motor vehicle stop. We are 

satisfied, as was Judge Haines, that the full mosaic of the 

circumstances provided the "reasonable and articulable suspicion 

that an offense . . . has been or is being committed" necessary 

to effectuate a motor vehicle Terry stop. Carty, 170 N.J. at 639-

40.

Affirmed.