Present: All the Justices 

NORTH RIDGE APARTMENTS 

 OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 

v. Record No. 981100 April 16, 1999 

ALICE RUFFIN 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

T. J. Markow, Judge 

 The question presented in this unlawful detainer action is 

whether the trial court erred in finding that the lessee had 

been constructively evicted from the demised premises. 

 Appellant C. G. II L.C., trading as North Ridge Apartments, 

the lessor, filed this action against appellee Alice Ruffin, the 

lessee, seeking judgment for possession of the leased premises, 

for unpaid rent, and for damages arising from a written lease 

between the parties. Following a bench trial, the court entered 

judgment in favor of the lessee. The lessor appeals. 

 The facts are undisputed and are set forth in a Rule 5:11 

written statement. The lessee entered into an "Apartment Lease" 

with the lessor for a term beginning August 1, 1996 and ending 

July 31, 1997 for designated premises in the City of Richmond. 

The lessee failed to pay rent for June 1997 and this action was 

filed. 

 At trial, the court heard testimony from the lessee and a 

representative of the lessor. The lessee testified "she desired 

to terminate her lease . . . due to her fear of crime and 
because she did not feel safe in the premises." She stated 

that, during the tenancy, "she became aware of drug sales and 

criminal activity in and around the apartment building." She 

said her "car was vandalized and broken into while parked on 

plaintiff's premises provided for tenant parking." 

 In addition, she testified that "[o]ther tenants were 

unruly and threatening, and left trash in hallways which were 

common areas" of the three-floor, six-apartment building. Also, 

she said "[d]og litter was . . . found in the hallways." She 

complained that "[o]ther tenants regularly propped open the 

[building's] security door, allowing unauthorized persons into 

the common hallways." 

 The lessee further testified that she had made verbal 

complaints to the lessor about the conditions. She admitted, 

however, that she had not put those complaints in writing as 

required by the apartment rules and regulations that were 

incorporated in her lease. She said "she was fearful that 

written complaints would result in retaliation from the 

offending tenants." 

 The lessor's rental manager testified that each time the 

tenant made verbal complaints, "she or her staff acted to 

address and rectify the situations." Stating she was aware of 

the security doors being propped open, the manager said that 

apartment staff closed the doors when they found them open. 

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Also, she said that notices were sent to residents who left the 

doors open, advising them of the necessity to leave the doors 

closed and locked. 

 The manager also testified that the lessor employed 

security patrols, which "came to the premises at random times 

and walked and drove through the grounds. They specifically 

looked for open front doors and would close those doors when and 

if they were discovered open." 

 In ruling for the lessee Ruffin, the trial court stated "it 

appeared that plaintiff had responded to Ruffin's complaints; 

however, due to the criminal activity on the grounds and 

Ruffin's fear of retaliation, Ruffin was constructively 

evicted." This ruling was erroneous. 

 Ordinarily, to constitute constructive eviction there must 

be intentional conduct by the lessor that permanently deprives 

the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of the demised premises, 

and the lessee must completely abandon the premises within a 

reasonable time after the lessor's conduct. Cavalier Square 

Ltd. Partnership v. Virginia ABC Board, 246 Va. 227, 231, 435 

S.E.2d 392, 395 (1993). The burden of proving the affirmative 

defense of constructive eviction rests upon the lessee. Id.

 The evidence in the present case fails to support a finding 

that the lessor was guilty of any intentional conduct that 

permanently deprived the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of 

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the leased premises. Generally, a lessor has no common-law duty 

to protect the lessee from a criminal act by an unknown third 

party. Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 

448, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987); Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 

215 Va. 155, 159, 207 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1974). 

 And the record fails to show that the lessee claimed, or 

that the trial court ruled, there was a statutory duty upon the 

lessor regarding third-party acts under these circumstances. 

Thus, we do not consider whether the provisions of the Virginia 

Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Code §§ 55-248.2 to -

248.40, require the lessor to protect the lessee from 

foreseeable criminal acts. 

 Therefore, because there was no duty on the lessor in this 

case to control third parties' criminal conduct, the failure of 

the lessor to protect the lessee from such conduct cannot be 

deemed an intentional act of omission. 

 In addition, the lessee's evidence regarding the noncriminal acts suffers from the same deficiency on the issue of 

intentional conduct as her other evidence. The record shows 

that the lessee's complaints about unruly tenants, trash in the 

hallways, and open security doors all were promptly addressed by 

the lessor. Indeed, the trial court said "it appeared that 

plaintiff had responded to Ruffin's complaints." 

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 Consequently, because the trial court erred in holding that 

the lessee had been constructively evicted, we will reverse the 

judgment below and enter final judgment here in favor of the 

lessor. 

Reversed and final judgment. 

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