United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued October 18, 2021 Decided September 6, 2022

No. 21-7018

DANA MARIE BERNHARDT, ET AL.,

APPELLANTS

v.

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:18-cv-02739)

Randy Singer argued the cause for appellants. With him on 

the briefs were Kevin A. Hoffman and Rosalyn Singer.

Andrew J. Pincus argued the cause for appellees. With him 

on the brief were Mark G. Hanchet and Robert W. Hamburg.

Before: WILKINS and RAO, Circuit Judges, and 

RANDOLPH, Senior Circuit Judge.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge RAO.

Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by 

Circuit Judge WILKINS.
2

RAO, Circuit Judge: An al-Qaeda suicide bomber killed 

nine people at Camp Chapman, a secret CIA base in 

Afghanistan. Dana Bernhardt and other family members of the 

bombing victims (“Bernhardt”) sued HSBC Holdings PLC and 

several of its foreign and domestic affiliates under the 

Antiterrorism Act. Bernhardt alleges that HSBC helped foreign 

banks evade U.S. sanctions and thereby provided material 

support to al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities. Bernhardt claims that

HSBC is liable for aiding and abetting and conspiring to bring 

about al-Qaeda’s terrorist attack on Camp Chapman.

The district court dismissed the claims against the foreign 

HSBC defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction and

dismissed Bernhardt’s aiding and abetting and conspiracy 

claims for failure to state a claim. We affirm.

I.

A.

Bernhardt’s claims arise under the Antiterrorism Act of 

1990 (“ATA”), Pub. L. No. 101-519, 104 Stat. 2250, as 

amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 

(“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 4, 130 Stat. 852, 854

(2016) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)). A plaintiff injured by 

“an act of international terrorism committed, planned, or 

authorized by” a designated foreign terrorist organization can 

assert liability against those who aided and abetted the act of 

terrorism, or who conspired with the person who committed the 

act of terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).

1 This liability extends 

1 The full text provides:
3

to those who “provided material support, directly or indirectly” 

to terrorists or terrorist organizations. JASTA § 2(b), 130 Stat. 

at 853.

2

B.

Since Bernhardt appeals the district court’s dismissal of 

her claims, “we accept as true all of the complaint’s factual 

allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiffs.” Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 272

In an action under subsection (a) for an injury 

arising from an act of international terrorism 

committed, planned, or authorized by an 

organization that had been designated as a foreign 

terrorist organization under section 219 of the 

Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), as 

of the date on which such act of international 

terrorism was committed, planned, or authorized, 

liability may be asserted as to any person who aids 

and abets, by knowingly providing substantial 

assistance, or who conspires with the person who 

committed such an act of international terrorism.

18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2).

2 JASTA substantially expanded civil remedies for victims of 

international terrorism. Initially, the ATA created a civil cause of 

action for the victims of international terrorism. See ATA, § 132(b), 

104 Stat. at 2251 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)). The 

ATA established principal liability for defendants who proximately 

caused a plaintiff’s injury, but not secondary liability for those who 

facilitated or aided, yet did not themselves commit, terrorist acts. 

Owens v. BNP Paribas, S.A., 897 F.3d 266, 270, 276–78 (D.C. Cir. 

2018).
4

(D.C. Cir. 2018). The following facts are drawn from the 

amended complaint unless otherwise noted.

On December 30, 2009, al-Qaeda operative Humam Khalil 

al-Balawi detonated more than thirty pounds of C-4 explosives 

and shrapnel strapped to his chest shortly after entering Camp 

Chapman, a secret CIA base in Afghanistan. In the months 

leading up to the attack, Balawi had been captured and agreed 

to infiltrate al-Qaeda and become an informant for the CIA.

The CIA planned to meet with Balawi at Camp Chapman to 

strategize about locating and killing al-Qaeda leadership.

Unbeknownst to the CIA, Balawi had continued his allegiance 

to al-Qaeda and was feeding information to the CIA while 

training to execute the attack. At the direction of al-Qaeda and

donning an al-Qaeda-made suicide vest, Balawi took the lives 

of nine people at Camp Chapman, including private security 

officers Dane Paresi and Jeremy Wise.

Paresi and Wise were survived by Dana Bernhardt and the 

other plaintiffs, who sued under the ATA. Bernhardt alleged 

that four HSBC-affiliated financial institutions3 (“HSBC”)

violated U.S. sanctions and thereby provided material support 

to al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities. These sanctions restrict the

flow of money to individuals, entities, and countries on the 

3 The defendants include HSBC Holdings PLC (“HSBC Holdings”), 

a company incorporated in the United Kingdom that owns the U.K.-

based HSBC Bank PLC (“HSBC Bank UK”) and indirectly owns 

HSBC North American Holdings Inc. (“HSBC Holdings NA”). 

HSBC Holdings NA indirectly owns and controls the fourth 

defendant, the U.S.-based HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (“HSBC Bank 

US”). Although Bernhardt also named the Islamic Republic of Iran 

as a defendant, the claims against Iran are still pending before the 

district court and therefore are not before us. See FED. R. CIV. P.

54(b).
5

Office of Foreign Assets Control’s (“OFAC”) list of “specially 

designated nationals and blocked persons.” The OFAC list 

includes state sponsors of terrorism like Iran and “specially 

designated global terrorists,” such as al-Qaeda. The list also 

includes entities who finance terrorism-related organizations.

4

U.S. financial institutions must use this “OFAC filter” to 

identify and block financial transactions involving sanctioned 

parties. See Exec. Order No. 13,224, §§ 1, 5–7, 66 Fed. Reg. 

49,079, 49,079–81 (Sept. 25, 2001) (authorizing the 

Department of the Treasury to regulate and designate who 

should be sanctioned).

Bernhardt alleges that HSBC evaded the OFAC filter

beginning in the early 1990s and continuing through 2009. 

HSBC Bank UK implemented procedures to help sanctioned 

entities access and benefit from U.S. financial services. For 

instance, such entities would include a “cautionary note” in 

their transactions, such as “care sanctioned country,” “do not 

mention our name in NY,” or “do not mention Iran.” Based on 

these notes, HSBC Bank UK would manually scrub all 

references to Iran or a sanctioned entity, which would allow 

otherwise illegal transactions to pass through to HSBC Bank 

US. This system allowed HSBC Bank US to “process[] 

thousands of ‘repaired’ transactions worth billions of dollars.”

HSBC Bank UK would also use “cover payments,” or bank-tobank transfers, to avoid disclosing the identity of its customers. 

Moreover, HSBC Holdings and HSBC Bank US understaffed 

their compliance group and failed to “conduct due diligence on 

4 See U.S. Dep’t of State, Terrorism Designations FAQs (Feb. 27, 

2018), https://2017-2021.state.gov/terrorism-designations-faqs/

index.html.
6

HSBC affiliates.” HSBC continued these practices, 

“mesmerized by the potential profits.”

Facing a series of federal investigations, HSBC Bank US 

hired an outside auditor, who discovered over 25,000 deceptive 

transactions involving Iran that moved more than $19.4 billion 

through U.S. financial institutions. HSBC Holdings eventually 

settled with the Department of the Treasury for almost $900 

million in penalties and admitted it had processed over $164 

million “for the benefit of Iran and/or persons in Iran, through 

a financial institution located in the United States in apparent 

violation of [U.S. sanctions].”5 HSBC also admitted that its 

actions had “undermined U.S. national security, foreign policy, 

and other objectives of U.S. sanctions programs.” In a separate

deferred prosecution agreement with the Department of Justice, 

HSBC Holdings and HSBC Bank US agreed to forfeit over $1

billion dollars and admitted that their conduct caused U.S.

financial institutions “to process payments that otherwise 

should have been held for investigation, rejected, or blocked 

pursuant to sanctions regulations administered by OFAC.”6

According to Bernhardt, HSBC’s evasion of sanctions

benefitted several HSBC customers with terrorism ties: Bank 

5 See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Department Reaches 

Landmark Settlement with HSBC (Dec. 11, 2012), 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/tg1799.

6 The deferred prosecution agreement focused on drug money 

transfers but also mentioned the facilitation of terrorism. See U.S.

Dep’t of Justice, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. 

Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations (Dec. 11, 

2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hsbc-holdings-plc-and-hsbcbank-usa-na-admit-anti-money-laundering-and-sanctionsviolations.
7

Melli, Bank Saderat, and Al Rajhi Bank. Bank Melli, a bank 

operated and controlled by the government of Iran, was placed

on OFAC’s list for providing banking services to groups in 

Iran’s military that supported “terrorist organizations like 

Hezbollah and al-Qaeda.” Bank Saderat is also an Iranian 

nationalized bank, listed since 2007 as a specially designated 

global terrorist for “facilitat[ing] Iran’s transfer of hundreds of 

millions of dollars to Hezbollah and other terrorist 

organizations each year.”

HSBC also did substantial business with Al Rajhi Bank, 

“one of the largest banks in Saudi Arabia” with over “500 

branches and assets totaling $59 billion.” It is primarily owned 

by the Al Rajhi family, one member of which was a key 

financial contributor to al-Qaeda. In 2003, the CIA reported 

that “Islamic extremists have used [Al Rajhi Bank] since at 

least the mid-1990s as a conduit for terrorist transactions,” and 

“[s]enior Al Rajhi family members have long supported 

Islamic extremists and probably know that terrorists use their 

bank.” HSBC Holdings ended its relationship with Al Rajhi 

Bank in 2005 due to Al Rajhi’s connections with the September 

11 and other terrorist attacks, but HSBC Bank US reestablished 

relations a year later. A database that HSBC Bank US relied on 

for its due diligence “identified Al Rajhi Bank’s most senior 

official as having links to terrorism.” HSBC Bank US 

nonetheless provided “nearly one billion in US dollars” to Al 

Rajhi Bank from 2006 to 2010 and “allowed Al Rajhi Bank to 

raise funds and launder money for terrorist organizations.” Al 

Rajhi Bank also oversaw the accounts of al-Qaeda charity 

fronts.

In sum, Bernhardt maintains the Camp Chapman bombing 

was orchestrated, authorized, and executed by al-Qaeda, and 

that HSBC aided and abetted the attack “by providing 
8

substantial assistance to al-Qaeda through the countries, 

institutions, and entities that formed part of a terrorism 

financing and support network.” In addition, HSBC joined a 

“group of conspirators” providing material support to a 

conspiracy between al-Qaeda, Iran, and others aimed at 

harming the United States through terrorist acts.

C.

The district court dismissed the suit. Bernhardt v. Islamic 

Republic of Iran, No. 18-2739, 2020 WL 6743066 (D.D.C. 

Nov. 16, 2020). It held there was no specific personal 

jurisdiction over the foreign HSBC defendants because

Bernhardt’s injuries from the Camp Chapman bombing did not 

sufficiently arise out of or relate to the evasion of sanctions. 

Bernhardt failed to link HSBC’s financial malfeasance to alQaeda’s suicide attack on Camp Chapman. The district court 

also dismissed the ATA claims against HSBC for failure to 

state a claim. As to aiding and abetting, Bernhardt had not 

adequately alleged that HSBC was “aware [it was] supporting 

al-Qaeda, much less ‘assuming a role’ in al-Qaeda’s violent 

activities.” Id. at *5. Because HSBC had no “direct relationship 

with al-Qaeda or Balawi” and was merely “mesmerized by the 

potential profits,” the court could not plausibly infer the 

necessary substantial assistance either. Id. at *6. The district 

court also held that Bernhardt failed to state a claim for

conspiracy. Bernhardt had alleged at most that HSBC 

conspired to evade the OFAC filter, not that it had conspired 

with al-Qaeda to perpetuate terrorist acts. Bernhardt appealed.

II.

We first consider whether the district court could exercise

personal jurisdiction over the foreign HSBC defendants. A

dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. 
9

Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., 22 F.4th 204, 214 (D.C. Cir. 

2022).

Bernhardt alleges only specific personal jurisdiction over 

the foreign HSBC defendants based on Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 4(k)(2).

7 Such jurisdiction requires: (1) the 

defendant has either been served a summons or waived service;

(2) the claim “arises under federal law”; (3) “the defendant is 

not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general 

jurisdiction”; and (4) “exercising jurisdiction is consistent with 

the United States Constitution and laws.” FED. R. CIV. P.

4(k)(2); see also Mwani v. bin Laden, 417 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C. Cir. 

2005). The parties do not dispute that the first three 

requirements are met. HSBC Holdings and HSBC Bank UK 

were properly served, Bernhardt’s claims arise under the ATA,

and the foreign HSBC defendants are not subject to any state 

court’s jurisdiction. The only dispute is whether exercising 

jurisdiction would be consistent with the Constitution, namely 

whether the foreign HSBC defendants have “sufficient contacts 

with the United States as a whole to justify the exercise of 

personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 

Amendment.” Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11.

Pleading specific personal jurisdiction under Rule 4(k)(2) 

requires demonstrating a close nexus between the United 

States, the foreign defendant’s conduct, and the plaintiff’s 

claim. The plaintiff must show that the foreign defendant “has 

7 Bernhardt has not alleged general personal jurisdiction over the 

foreign HSBC defendants, which would require demonstrating that 

the defendants’ contacts “are so continuous and systematic as to 

render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Goodyear 

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) 

(cleaned up).
10

purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum,” 

and that the alleged injuries “arise out of or relate to those 

activities.” Id. at 12 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 

471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)) (cleaned up); see also Int’l Shoe Co. 

v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). This test ensures that 

a district court exercises specific personal jurisdiction only 

over those foreign defendants who had “fair warning that a 

particular activity may subject them” to U.S. jurisdiction.

Mwani, 417 F.3d at 11 (cleaned up). The Supreme Court 

recently explained it is not necessary to demonstrate “a strict 

causal relationship between the defendant’s [domestic] activity 

and the litigation.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. 

Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1026 (2021). Because it is sufficient for 

the injuries to “relate to” the defendant’s activities, “some 

relationships will support jurisdiction without a causal 

showing.” Id. (cleaned up). 

Bernhardt alleges the foreign HSBC defendants

purposefully directed their conduct at U.S. markets by 

coordinating with HSBC domestic affiliates to evade the 

OFAC filter and to facilitate financial transactions in violation 

of U.S. sanctions. We assume that was enough for the first 

prong of the specific personal jurisdiction inquiry. 

Bernhardt’s allegations do not, however, support an 

inference that the injuries from the Camp Chapman bombing 

arose out of or related to the foreign HSBC defendants’ 

sanctions evasion. See Atchley, 22 F.4th at 233 (a plaintiff must 

allege a “relatedness between the contacts and the claim”). As 

we further explain below, see infra Part III.A, Bernhardt tries 

to connect the Camp Chapman bombing to HSBC’s sanctions 

evasion on behalf of several intermediary banks. For Banks 

Melli and Saderat, Bernhardt primarily relies on their OFAC 

designations and affiliation with Iran. The complaint alleges 
11

that Bank Melli was listed as a specially designated national 

and blocked person in October 2007 because it provided “a 

variety of financial services” to a special division of an Iranian 

military group “that promotes terrorism abroad.” Bank Saderat 

was similarly listed as a specially designated global terrorist 

because of its “transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to 

Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations each year.” These 

allegations show possible connections between Banks Melli 

and Saderat and terrorism generally, yet they are not enough to 

allow us to infer the necessary connection to al-Qaeda 

specifically, or that the foreign HSBC defendants’ conduct was 

related to Bernhardt’s injuries at al-Qaeda’s hand.

The dissent tries to close this gap by emphasizing the 

banks’ ties to Iran and Iran’s ties to al-Qaeda. See Dissenting 

Op. 3. But neither Iran’s ownership of Bank Melli and Bank 

Saderat nor the HSBC transactions connected to Iran and its 

entities are enough to connect HSBC’s conduct to Bernhardt’s 

injuries. We have made clear in a similar context that “when an 

intermediary is a sovereign state with many legitimate 

agencies, operations, and programs,” the country’s designation 

as a “state sponsor of terrorism does not reduce the need for 

evidence of a substantial connection between the defendant and 

a terrorist act or organization.” Owens, 897 F.3d at 276 

(cleaned up). Pleading Iran’s involvement does not support an 

inference that Bernhardt’s injuries sufficiently related to 

HSBC’s conduct because aid to Iran could just as plausibly 

benefit its otherwise legitimate operations rather than alQaeda.

8

8 The dissent emphasizes that Ford treated ‘“isolated or sporadic 

transactions differently from continuous ones’ for personal 

jurisdiction purposes.” Dissenting Op. 3 (quoting 141 S. Ct. at 1028 
12

The allegations tying Al Rajhi Bank to al-Qaeda are also 

insufficient. Bernhardt alleges that Al Rajhi Bank’s founder 

was one of al-Qaeda’s key financial contributors and that the 

bank maintained accounts for al-Qaeda’s charity fronts. These 

connections show some connection between Al Rajhi Bank and 

al-Qaeda. But the bank’s vast and otherwise legitimate 

operations make it impossible to infer that HSBC’s conduct 

was connected to al-Qaeda’s attack on Camp Chapman through 

Al Rajhi Bank. And as we explain below, Bernhardt fails to 

allege any aid flowing indirectly through these intermediary 

banks to al-Qaeda, further undercutting the necessary

inference. See infra Part III.A.2.

The allegations here thus stand in stark contrast to those in 

Atchley, where we found personal jurisdiction over foreign 

corporations. The defendants in that case had allegedly 

provided goods to a terrorist group that had overrun the Iraqi 

Ministry of Health, and the plaintiffs’ injuries directly related 

to the monetization of those goods to promote acts of terrorism.

22 F.4th at 234–36; see also id. at 237 (explaining that the 

n.4). But Ford did not hold that any pattern of repeated transactions 

in the forum is sufficient to establish specific personal jurisdiction: 

rather, the repeated transactions must also relate to the specific claim 

at issue. In other words, the relatedness inquiry under Ford “does not 

mean anything goes.” 141 S. Ct. at 1026. “In the sphere of specific 

jurisdiction, the phrase ‘relate to’ incorporates real limits, as it must 

to adequately protect defendants foreign to a forum.” Id. Such limits 

are necessary to preserve the distinction between specific and general 

jurisdiction “since, as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, 

everything is related to everything else.” Cal. Div. of Lab. Standards 

Enf’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (Scalia, J., 

concurring).
13

goods “used to bribe Jaysh al-Mahdi[] were an instrument to 

achieve the very wrong alleged”) (cleaned up).

We agree with Bernhardt that she did not need to allege 

the OFAC filter evasion caused the Camp Chapman bombing. 

See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1026. Nor was she required to identify 

specific dollars spent on the terrorist attack.9 Nonetheless, she 

was required to allege some relation between the sanctions

evasion by the foreign defendants and the injuries suffered in 

the terrorist attack. But no such inference is supported by the 

complaint. And without allegations supporting a closer 

connection between the sanctions evasion and al-Qaeda’s 

activities, allowing Bernhardt to sue the foreign HSBC 

defendants would collapse the core distinction between general 

and specific personal jurisdiction. See Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 

1024–25.

The dissent speculates that if the foreign HSBC defendants 

“had properly observed the sanctions ... it would have 

significantly hindered al-Qaeda’s ability to successfully carry 

out terrorist attacks like the Camp Chapman bombing.” 

Dissenting Op. 5. Yet Bernhardt does not allege that al-Qaeda’s 

funding for terrorism depended on transactions with specific

foreign banks who would then work with HSBC to evade U.S. 

sanctions. The fact that money is fungible works in both 

directions. Given the allegations of al-Qaeda’s extensive access 

to foreign banks, a more reasonable inference is that al-Qaeda 

9 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[m]oney is fungible” and 

that foreign terrorist organizations “do not maintain legitimate 

financial firewalls between those funds raised for civil, nonviolent 

activities, and those ultimately used to support violent, terrorist 

operations.” Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31 

(2010) (cleaned up). 
14

could have secured terrorism funding from another avenue, 

irrespective of whether HSBC evaded U.S. sanctions. Certainly 

nothing in the complaint supports the dissent’s conjecture.

Because it would exceed the limits of specific personal 

jurisdiction to conclude the foreign HSBC defendants had “fair 

warning” that evading the OFAC filter would subject them to

liability under the ATA for aiding and abetting or conspiring 

with al-Qaeda to bomb a secret CIA base in Afghanistan,

Mwani, 417 F.3d at 12, we affirm the district court’s dismissal 

of claims against the foreign HSBC defendants for lack of 

personal jurisdiction.

III.

The district court also dismissed Bernhardt’s ATA aiding 

and abetting and conspiracy claims against the remaining 

HSBC defendants for failure to state a claim. We review the 

district court’s dismissal de novo. Atchley, 22 F.4th at 214. 

Assuming the truth of Bernhardt’s factual allegations, we 

consider whether she has stated a “plausible claim”—that is, 

whether the allegations lead to “the reasonable inference that 

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Owens, 897 

F.3d at 272 (cleaned up). A plaintiff’s claim must rise “above 

the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 

544, 555 (2007). A claim cannot survive a motion to dismiss if 

based on inferences “unsupported by facts” or legal 

conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Owens, 897 F.3d 

at 272 (cleaned up). We affirm the dismissal of both claims.

A.

To adequately plead an ATA aiding and abetting claim, a 

plaintiff must allege: (1) “an injury arising from an act of 

international terrorism”; (2) the act was “committed, planned,
15

or authorized by” a designated foreign terrorist organization;

and (3) the defendant “aid[ed] and abet[ted], by knowingly 

providing substantial assistance” to an “act of international 

terrorism. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2); see also Atchley, 22 F.4th at 

216. The parties do not dispute that the Camp Chapman 

bombing was an act of international terrorism; that Bernhardt 

and the other plaintiffs were injured by the bombing; or that alQaeda, a designated foreign terrorist organization, was 

responsible for the attack.

10 Therefore, we evaluate whether 

Bernhardt’s allegations demonstrate that HSBC aided and 

abetted the bombing by providing substantial assistance to alQaeda.

The ATA does not provide a definition of aiding and 

abetting liability, but instead incorporates the analysis in 

Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983), as 

“provid[ing] the proper legal framework for how such liability 

should function.” JASTA § 2(a)(5), 130 Stat. at 852.

Halberstam stated that aiding and abetting includes three 

elements: “(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform 

a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be 

generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or 

tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; 

[and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist 

the principal violation.” 705 F.2d at 477. It is undisputed that 

the Camp Chapman bombing caused Bernhardt’s injuries. We 

consider whether the allegations in the complaint allow us to 

infer that HSBC was generally aware it played a role in al10 Although Balawi detonated the suicide vest, no one disputes he 

was acting as an agent of al-Qaeda and that al-Qaeda is “the person 

who committed” the Camp Chapman bombing. See Atchley, 22 F.4th 

at 217 (explaining that a foreign terrorist organization often “stands 

behind the fighters who pull the trigger or detonate the device”).
16

Qaeda’s terrorist activities and that HSBC knowingly and 

substantially assisted those activities.

1.

In the ATA context, aiding and abetting liability requires 

a defendant be “generally aware of its role in an overall illegal 

activity from which an act of international terrorism was a 

foreseeable risk.” Atchley, 22 F.4th at 220 (cleaned up). To 

allege that defendants had such awareness, plaintiffs “must 

plead ... allegations of the facts or events they claim give rise 

to an inference that defendants acted with the requisite mental 

state.” Id. at 220–21 (cleaned up). Knowledge and other mental 

states may be alleged generally but must at least support a 

plausible inference of general awareness. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 9(b)). 

Because there is rarely direct evidence of a defendant’s mental 

state, the fact finder often must draw inferences from 

circumstantial evidence.11 See Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 486 

(inferring knowledge absent direct evidence because “it 

defie[d] credulity that [the defendant] did not know that 

something illegal was afoot”); see also Huddleston v. United 

States, 485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988) (explaining that “[e]xtrinsic 

acts evidence may be critical to the establishment of” a 

defendant’s mental state).

Bernhardt alleges HSBC aided and abetted the Camp 

Chapman bombing through its relationship with intermediary 

banks that facilitated al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities. When a 

plaintiff’s ATA aiding and abetting claim depends on aid 

11 We reject Bernhardt’s argument that “extreme recklessness” 

satisfies the standard. Because actual awareness is required, the 

inquiry is not whether a defendant should have been aware of its role.
17

flowing through an intermediary, the general awareness 

requirement is satisfied if (1) the defendant was aware of the 

intermediary’s connection to the terrorist organization, and (2) 

the intermediary is “so closely intertwined” with the terrorist 

organization’s illegal activities as to give rise to an inference

that the defendant was generally aware of its role in the 

organization’s terrorist activities.12 Honickman v. BLOM Bank 

SAL, 6 F.4th 487, 501 (2d Cir. 2021). 

Applying these standards, Bernhardt fails to plausibly 

allege HSBC was generally aware that its financial dealings

with intermediary banks supported al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts. 

With respect to Bank Melli and Bank Saderat, Bernhardt

alleges neither that HSBC was aware of their connections to alQaeda nor that these banks were so closely intertwined with alQaeda to infer HSBC’s general awareness. The complaint 

focuses on the fact that these banks were on OFAC’s list of 

sanctioned entities. But that alone is insufficient. “[A]iding and 

abetting an act of international terrorism requires more than the 

provision of material support to a designated terrorist 

organization.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 329 (2d 

Cir. 2018); see also Honickman, 6 F.4th at 491–92, 501

(finding no general awareness despite defendant bank having 

clients who were specially designated global terrorists). 

According to the complaint, Bank Melli was listed in 2007 for 

providing banking services to a terrorist-affiliated group of 

12 There is no requirement of specific intent, and a defendant does 

not have to “wish[] to bring about” an act of terrorism or “kn[ow] of 

the specific attacks at issue.” Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 882 F.3d 314, 

329 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Atchley, 22 F.4th at 220. Contrary to 

Bernhardt’s contentions, the district court applied the correct 

standard and did not require a heightened standard of specific intent.
18

Iran’s military. Bank Saderat was designated for “facilitat[ing] 

Iran’s transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah 

and other terrorist organizations.” These allegations connect 

the intermediary banks to terrorism generally but fail to support 

an inference that HSBC had general awareness it was playing 

a role in al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts.13

Bernhardt also relies on the fact that Bank Melli and Bank 

Saderat are nationalized Iranian banks and that Iran has 

historically supported terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. But

as explained above, sovereign nations invariably maintain 

legitimate government activities. Iran’s support for terrorism is 

not enough to demonstrate HSBC’s general awareness that its 

transactions with Iranian banks would support al-Qaeda’s 

terrorist acts without some “additional allegations” more 

closely connecting these intermediary banks to the “terrorist act 

or organization.” Owens, 897 F.3d at 276.

Bernhardt’s allegations regarding Al Rajhi Bank come 

closer to demonstrating general awareness but still fall short.

Bernhardt alleges that Al Rajhi Bank was founded by a key 

financial contributor to al-Qaeda; “maintained accounts for 

many of al-Qaeda’s charity fronts”; advertised the existence of

those accounts to provide al-Qaeda a fundraising mechanism; 

and facilitated transactions for terrorists who “provided the alQaeda cell of 9/11 hijackers with financial and logistical 

support.” Bernhardt also alleged that members of the Al Rajhi 

13 For the same reasons, Bernhardt’s vague allegation that HSBC 

Bank US “supplied U.S. dollars to ... Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. 

and Social Islami Bank, despite evidence linking those banks to 

terrorism” is not enough to connect HSBC to al-Qaeda. Nor is the 

allegation of Al Rajhi Bank smuggling money to Chechnian 

extremists relevant to HSBC’s al-Qaeda connections.
19

family were aware their bank served as a conduit for al-Qaeda 

to move its money around. Taken together, we can plausibly 

infer that Al Rajhi Bank maintained connections to al-Qaeda. 

Nevertheless, the complaint falls short because Bernhardt

does not allege that HSBC was aware of these connections. The 

complaint states that an HSBC senior manager in 2002 

expressed concern that “Al Rajhi Bank’s account may have 

been used by terrorists,” and that HSBC Bank US in 2006 

flagged “Al Rajhi Bank’s most senior official as having links 

to terrorism.” These statements are not sufficient to show 

HSBC’s awareness because they express only the possibility of

a terrorist connection, say nothing about al-Qaeda specifically, 

and focus on conduct occurring years before the bombing.

Therefore, they cannot support the dissent’s inference that 

HSBC “had actual knowledge” of any connection between Al 

Rajhi Bank and al-Qaeda. Dissenting Op. 8. 

Even if we could infer that HSBC was aware of Al Rajhi 

Bank’s connections to al-Qaeda, Bernhardt fails to allege that 

those connections were so close that HSBC had to be aware it 

was assuming a role in al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities by 

working with Al Rajhi Bank. See Honickman, 6 F.4th at 501; 

see also Siegel, 933 F.3d at 224 (explaining that even when 

defendants were “aware that [Al Rajhi Bank] was believed by 

some to have links to [al-Qaeda] and other terrorist 

organizations,” plaintiffs still had to allege defendants’

awareness that they were “assuming a role in terrorist 

activities”) (cleaned up). As the complaint notes, Al Rajhi 

Bank has substantial operations and “is one of the largest banks 

in Saudi Arabia, with more than 8,400 employees, 500 

branches and assets totaling $59 billion.”
20

Given the extensive legitimate operations of Al Rajhi 

Bank—with assets totaling $59 billion—and the absence of any 

allegation that a substantial part of these operations involved 

al-Qaeda, “HSBC had little reason to suspect that it was 

assuming a role in [al-Qaeda’s] terrorist activities.” Siegel, 933 

F.3d at 224; cf. Kemper v. Deutsche Bank AG, 911 F.3d 383, 

390 (7th Cir. 2018) (“While giving fungible dollars to a 

terrorist organization may be dangerous to human life, doing 

business with companies and countries that have significant 

legitimate operations is not necessarily so. That these business 

dealings may violate U.S. sanctions does not convert them into 

terrorist acts.”) (cleaned up). The pleadings do not adequately 

allege that Al Rajhi Bank was so closely intertwined with alQaeda that we can infer HSBC was aware it was assuming a 

role in al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities simply by doing business 

with Al Rajhi Bank.14

Bernhardt’s allegations also fall far short of what we have 

previously found adequate in the ATA context. In Atchley, for 

instance, the plaintiffs alleged the defendants knew the Iraqi 

Ministry of Health was “notoriously corrupt” and “under the 

control of a terrorist group.” 22 F.4th at 221. Aside from

ubiquitous media reports, the defendants finalized deals with 

the Ministry in offices where “armed terrorist fighters 

circulated openly and anyone who entered could see [the 

14 This conclusion is not affected by the fact that Al Rajhi Bank 

publicly advertised its connections to Al-Qaeda charity fronts. Cf.

Dissenting Op. 9. The question of HSBC’s general awareness is

context dependent and turns on the identity of Al Rajhi Bank 

considered in the round. Bernhardt alleges some public connection 

between Al Rajhi Bank and Al-Qaeda, but her allegations are not 

sufficient to demonstrate that Al Rajhi Bank’s transactions with AlQaeda were so pervasive that HSBC should have known that by 

doing business with Al Rajhi Bank it was financing terrorism.
21

terrorist group’s] distinctive flag, weapons, Sadr posters, and 

‘Death to America’ slogans on display.” Id. We inferred 

general awareness by the defendants because the plaintiffs

plausibly alleged the Ministry was controlled by the terrorist 

group and so closely intertwined with it that they were 

effectively the same entity. Id. at 224.

Finding general awareness on the facts here would mark 

an extension of aiding and abetting liability not supported by 

the ATA or our precedent. The general awareness element is 

particularly important in indirect aiding and abetting claims to

“avoid subjecting ... incidental participants to harsh penalties 

or damages.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 485 n.14. Under the 

ATA, liability is cabined to defendants who aid and abet “an 

act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). HSBC 

had client banks with ties to terrorist organizations and has 

admitted to helping those banks evade U.S. sanctions. But that 

is not sufficient for aiding and abetting liability under the ATA.

While the amendments to the ATA expanded liability for 

indirect aid to terrorism, they did not equate the evasion of 

sanctions with terrorism liability.15 Bernhardt’s allegations 

failed to make the necessary connection to support an inference 

that HSBC was generally aware it was playing a role in alQaeda’s terrorist activities.

15 Under the dissent’s expansive interpretation, virtually any bank 

that violates U.S. sanctions against an entity with some ties to 

terrorism will be liable under the ATA for any subsequent acts of 

terrorism. The government has already prosecuted HSBC for 

evading sanctions in its transactions with banks having terrorist ties. 

But simply alleging knowledge of a bank’s ties to terrorism is not 

sufficient to make out liability under the ATA.
22

2.

Bernhardt’s aiding and abetting claim also fails because 

she did not plausibly allege that HSBC “knowingly and 

substantially assist[ed] the principal violation.” Halberstam, 

705 F.2d at 477. 

The ATA states that a defendant “aids and abets” by 

“knowingly providing substantial assistance.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2333(d)(2) (emphasis added). There is significant overlap

between the requirement that the assistance be “knowing” and 

the general awareness required by Halberstam. A defendant 

who lacks general awareness cannot be said to have knowingly 

assisted a foreign terrorist organization. See Honickman, 6 

F.4th at 500 (explaining that a defendant need not “know 

anything more ... than what she knew for the general 

awareness element”). Thus, having failed to allege the requisite

general awareness, Bernhardt’s complaint also fails to allege 

knowing assistance. Because HSBC’s assistance must be 

knowing and substantial, lack of knowing assistance is 

sufficient to dismiss Bernhardt’s claim.

It is an independent and alternative ground for affirming 

the dismissal that Bernhardt also failed to allege that HSBC 

provided “substantial assistance.” Six factors are relevant in 

determining substantiality: (1) “the nature of the act 

encouraged”; (2) “the amount and kind of assistance given”;

(3) “the defendant’s absence or presence at the time of the tort”;

(4) the defendant’s “relationship to the tortious actor”; (5) “the 

defendant’s state of mind”; and (6) the “length of time an 

alleged aider-abettor has been involved.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d

at 483–84 (cleaned up); see also Atchley, 22 F.4th at 221. “No 

factor alone is dispositive, and the weight of each varies with 

the circumstances of the particular claim. What is required is 
23

that, on balance, the relevant considerations show that 

defendants substantially assisted the acts of terrorism.” 

Atchley, 22 F.4th at 221. Taken together, these factors lead us 

to conclude that Bernhardt failed to adequately plead that 

HSBC substantially assisted al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts.

The first factor identifies the “nature of the act 

encouraged” and “dictates what aid might matter.” 

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 483, 484. Greater access to capital—

the alleged aid—is important to al-Qaeda’s terrorist efforts, 

which depend on depositing, transferring, and expending 

money. See Gonzalez v. Google LLC, 2 F.4th 871, 905 (9th Cir. 

2021) (“Financial support is indisputably important to the 

operation of a terrorist organization, and any money provided 

to the organization may aid its unlawful goals.”) (cleaned up).

This factor weighs in favor of finding substantial assistance. 

The second factor is “significant” and requires considering 

the quantity and quality of aid. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484. A

plaintiff need not allege that a defendant assisted a foreign 

terrorist organization directly. See JASTA § 2(b), 130 Stat. at 

853; Atchley, 22 F.4th at 225 (“The statute imposes no 

directness requirement.”). It is enough to provide “[f]actual 

allegations that permit a reasonable inference that the 

defendant recognized the money it transferred to its customers 

would be received by the [foreign terrorist organization].” 

Honickman, 6 F.4th at 500. The district court thus erred in 

requiring Bernhardt to allege that assistance was directed to the 

Camp Chapman attack or that HSBC was involved in

transactions that directly benefitted al-Qaeda. See Bernhardt, 

2020 WL 6743066, at *6.

The district court’s error was harmless, however, because 

even applying the correct standard, the aid was not significant.
24

Bernhardt alleged that HSBC facilitated over $19 billion in 

transactions with Iranian institutions and provided almost $1 

billion in currency sales to Al Rajhi Bank. Yet she fails to 

allege how much (if any) of that money indirectly flowed to alQaeda. Cf. Siegel, 933 F.3d at 225 (although plaintiffs alleged 

the provision of “hundreds of millions of dollars” to an 

intermediary, “they did not advance any non-conclusory 

allegation that [al-Qaeda] received any of those funds”); 

Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 907 (explaining that the substantiality of 

assistance is indeterminable when a complaint is “devoid of 

any allegations about how much assistance [the defendant] 

provided”). In light of Bernhardt’s failure to allege a close 

connection between the foreign banks and al-Qaeda, we cannot 

reasonably infer that HSBC provided any aid to al-Qaeda.16

This factor thus severely undermines a finding of 

substantiality.

The third factor looks at the defendant’s presence at the 

time of the plaintiff’s injury. Halberstam focused on a person’s 

16 We are in accord with the dissent regarding the proper legal 

standard, although we disagree about whether Bernhardt’s 

allegations were sufficient. See Dissenting Op. 11 (citing 

Honickman). Bernhardt had to allege “[f]actual allegations that 

permit a reasonable inference” that the “money ... transferred to [an 

intermediary] would be received by” al-Qaeda. Honickman, 6 F.4th 

at 500; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2) (requiring a plaintiff to show 

a defendant, in fact, “provid[ed] substantial assistance” to a terrorist 

organization). “[A]lleg[ing] the general awareness element” can 

support that inference, but only if a plaintiff alleges that the 

intermediary was “so closely intertwined” with a terrorist 

organization that doing business with one was like doing business 

with the other. Honickman, 6 F.4th at 499, 500. Bernhardt has not 

alleged this closeness or any other form of aid “received by” alQaeda, and thus this factor weighs against Bernhardt.
25

physical presence in the murder and burglary context. See 

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488. HSBC was not physically present 

at the terrorist attack on Camp Chapman, which may be 

sufficient for this factor to weigh against Bernhardt. See 

Atchley, 22 F.4th at 223. 

Other courts, however, have read Halberstam’s presence 

requirement more broadly in light of the ATA’s context, which 

attaches liability to all “persons,” including “corporations, 

companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and 

joint stock companies.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(1); 1 U.S.C. § 1. 

These entities cannot be physically present for an act of 

international terrorism, and so presence may be understood in 

a transactional sense, such as a bank’s business relations with 

a terrorist organization. See Siegel, 933 F.3d at 225 (finding 

“presence” to cut against liability when the defendant banks

had cut ties with the intermediary bank ten months before the 

relevant terrorist attack). Even from a transactional 

perspective, however, we are unable to infer from Bernhardt’s 

complaint any HSBC involvement with al-Qaeda before and 

leading up to the Camp Chapman bombing.

The fourth factor considers the closeness of any 

relationship between the defendant and the terrorist

organization. Bernhardt does not allege a connection between 

the foreign banks and al-Qaeda sufficient to infer any 

relationship, much less a close one, between HSBC and alQaeda. Cf. Brill v. Chevron Corp., 804 F. App’x 630, 632 (9th 

Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (no relationship where Chevron had 

only “a contractual relationship with a third party that sold Iraqi 

crude oil on the open market,” but did not know “its kickbacks 

would be used to provide financial support to the terrorist 

organization perpetrating the terrorist activity in Israel”). This

factor also cuts against finding substantiality.
26

The fifth factor looks to the defendant’s state of mind, 

which requires “[k]nowledge of one’s own actions and general 

awareness of their foreseeable results.” Atchley, 22 F.4th at 

223. While “this factor more powerfully supports aiding-andabetting liability of defendants who share the same goals as the 

principal or specifically intend the principal’s tort, ... such 

intent is not required.” Id. The district court thus erred in 

requiring Bernhardt to show that HSBC and al-Qaeda were 

“one in spirit.” Bernhardt, 2020 WL 6743066, at *6; see also 

Atchley, 22 F.4th at 223–224 (explaining that a specific intent 

or “one in spirit” requirement is contrary to Halberstam). Even 

applying the correct standard, however, this factor cuts against 

Bernhardt because, as already discussed, Bernhardt fails to 

allege that HSBC provided knowing assistance or was 

generally aware that acts of terrorism were the foreseeable 

result of its actions.

The final factor looks to the duration of a defendant’s 

assistance, which can influence the quality and quantity of aid 

and “may afford evidence of the defendant’s state of mind.” 

Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484. Bernhardt alleges a years-long 

relationship between HSBC and the foreign banks. But a 

lengthy financial relationship does not terrorism assistance

make. Cf. Siegel, 933 F.3d at 225. Because the foreign banks 

are global financial institutions with legitimate operations and

uncertain ties to al-Qaeda, we cannot infer substantial 

assistance to al-Qaeda from HSBC’s lengthy business 

relationships with the foreign banks.

Considering the relevant factors, only the type of monetary 

aid alleged supports Bernhardt’s claims, and therefore, “on 

balance,” Bernhardt did not adequately plead that HSBC 

substantially assisted al-Qaeda’s terrorist acts. Atchley, 22 

F.4th at 221.
27

* * *

While Bernhardt alleges financial wrongdoing and serious 

violations of U.S. sanctions, she fails to plausibly allege that 

HSBC was generally aware of its role in, or knowingly and 

substantially assisted, al-Qaeda’s overall terrorist activities. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of 

Bernhardt’s aiding and abetting claim.

B.

We next analyze the sufficiency of Bernhardt’s ATA 

conspiracy claim. To plead a civil conspiracy, a plaintiff must 

allege: “(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to 

participate in an unlawful act”; “(3) an injury caused by an 

unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the

agreement; (4) which overt act was done pursuant to and in 

furtherance of the common scheme.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 

477. Bernhardt’s conspiracy claim fails because she has not 

adequately alleged an agreement between HSBC and al-Qaeda, 

nor a relevant overt act.

An “agreement” in the context of an ATA conspiracy

requires that the defendant “conspire[] with the person who 

committed” the terrorist act. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(d)(2). 

Therefore, Bernhardt had to allege that HSBC was “pursuing 

the same object” as al-Qaeda. Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 487; cf. 

United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1392 (D.C. Cir. 

1988) (proving a conspiracy requires evidence “each 

conspirator had the specific intent to further the common 

unlawful objective”). The shared objective can be “inferred 

from circumstantial evidence,” but the inference must still 

“reveal[] a common intent.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 480. 
28

Bernhardt alleges no common objective between HSBC 

and al-Qaeda. The complaint states that HSBC was trying to 

make “substantial profits” by evading sanctions, whereas alQaeda sought to “terrorize the U.S. into retreating from the 

world stage”; “use long wars to financially bleed the U.S. while 

inflaming anti-American sentiment”; “defend the rights of 

Muslims”; and “obtain global domination through a violent 

Islamic caliphate.” These objectives are wholly orthogonal to 

one another. Bernhardt’s allegations similarly do not support 

an inference that HSBC evaded sanctions with the object of 

funding terrorism. In the absence of any alleged concordance

between HSBC’s and al-Qaeda’s objectives, Bernhardt’s 

conspiracy claim is inadequate. Cf. Gonzalez, 2 F.4th at 881–

82, 907 (rejecting conspiracy claim absent allegations that 

“Google tacitly agreed to commit homicidal terrorist acts with 

ISIS”).

Bernhardt also fails to allege an overt act in furtherance of 

a conspiracy. Under the ATA, the overt act must be the act of 

international terrorism that injures the plaintiff. See 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2333(d)(2) (providing a cause of action “for an injury arising 

from an act of international terrorism”); Halberstam, 705 F.2d 

at 477 (explaining that civil conspiracy liability requires “an 

unlawful overt act” to have “produced an injury and 

damages”). Bernhardt’s injury arose from the Camp Chapman 

bombing, and therefore Bernhardt had to allege the bombing 

was the overt act that furthered a conspiracy between HSBC 

and al-Qaeda. But Bernhardt makes no such allegation, nor is 

it plausible to infer that an attack on a secret CIA base in 

Afghanistan would further HSBC’s alleged objective of

maximizing profits through the evasion of U.S. sanctions. Cf.

Adams v. Alcolac, Inc., 974 F.3d 540, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2020) 

(per curiam) (plaintiffs failed to allege a conspiracy where the 

overt act—the use of mustard gas—was not done in furtherance 
29

of a broader conspiracy to evade U.S. export controls for a 

profit motive). Instead, Bernhardt’s complaint consistently 

identifies HSBC’s sanctions evasion as the relevant overt acts. 

That conduct is not, however, an overt act of international 

terrorism or the source of Bernhardt’s injury under the ATA. 

Because Bernhardt fails to allege an agreement between 

HSBC and al-Qaeda or an overt act in furtherance thereof, we 

affirm the dismissal of Bernhardt’s ATA conspiracy claim.17

* * *

Bernhardt and the other plaintiffs lost family members in 

an al-Qaeda suicide bombing. They seek to recover damages 

from HSBC, which has admitted to evading sanctions to benefit 

foreign banks with ties to terrorist organizations. While the 

ATA creates liability for those who materially assist acts of 

terrorism, a successful claim requires a plausible connection 

between HSBC and al-Qaeda. We cannot infer from the

complaint the necessary connection to maintain the ATA 

aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims. Therefore, we 

affirm the decision of the district court.

So ordered.

17 Bernhardt’s arguments that a jury should have the opportunity to 

identify single or multiple conspiracies is beside the point. The 

burden of pleading a plausible conspiracy rests squarely on 

Bernhardt, and that burden is not met here. Claims “shy of a plausible 

entitlement to relief” cannot avoid dismissal simply because a jury 

could rely on evidence deduced at later stages of trial. Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 559.
WILKINS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting 

in part: Although I concur in the dismissal of the conspiracy 

claim,1I respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of 

the dismissal of the foreign HSBC defendants for lack of 

personal jurisdiction as well as the dismissal of the aiding-andabetting claim. When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint 

under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we must

“accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint 

as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those 

allegations in the plaintiff’s favor.” Banneker Ventures, LLC 

v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The 

majority acts in contravention of this standard by failing to 

grapple sufficiently with all of the facts alleged in the 

complaint, which support exercising personal jurisdiction over 

the foreign HSBC defendants and upholding the aiding-andabetting claim. 

I.

Turning first to the issue of personal jurisdiction over the 

foreign HSBC defendants, the essential foundation of specific 

jurisdiction is a “relationship among the defendant, the forum, 

and the litigation.” Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. 

Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1028 (2021) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Such a relationship is present here. The 

majority seems to acknowledge that the Plaintiffs adequately 

pled that “the foreign HSBC defendants purposefully directed 

their conduct at U.S. markets by coordinating with HSBC 

domestic affiliates to evade the OFAC filter and to facilitate 

financial transactions in violation of U.S. sanctions.” Maj. Slip 

Op. at 10–11. Yet the majority opines that the Plaintiffs failed 

to allege that this conduct related to al-Qaeda’s terrorist 

activities. Nor did they, in the majority’s view, allege that this 

1

In my view, because the Plaintiffs have not adequately pled an 

unlawful agreement, we need not decide whether the Plaintiffs 

adequately pled an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
2

sanction evasion “benefited or even impacted al-Qaeda.” Id. at 

11. This contention ignores specific facts that were alleged in 

the Amended Complaint. 

Specifically, the Plaintiffs pled that Bank Saderat, Bank 

Melli, and Al Rajhi Bank were all subject to strict economic 

sanctions due to their ties to terrorism and their provision of 

financial support to terrorist organizations. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

102–26. For example, the U.S. Under-Secretary for Terrorism 

and Financial Intelligence found in 2006 that Bank Saderat was 

responsible for facilitating Iran’s transfer of hundreds of 

millions of dollars to terrorist organizations each year and 

announced sanctions against Bank Saderat, which was also 

designated as a specially designed global terrorist. Id. ¶¶ 103–

04. Accordingly, the U.S. Under-Secretary announced that the 

U.S. would “no longer allow a bank like Saderat to do business 

in the American financial system, even indirectly.” Id. ¶ 103

(internal quotation marks omitted). Likewise, the Amended 

Complaint provides that Bank Melli was designated as a 

Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons after 

being found to have provided financial services to terrorist 

groups in Iran. Id. ¶ 109. “From 2002 to 2006, Bank Melli was 

used [by terrorist organizations] to send at least $100 million 

to the [Iranian-based terrorist organizations].” Id. 

The Plaintiffs further allege that the founder of Al Rajhi 

Bank was identified as a key financial contributor to al-Qaeda 

in the “Golden Chain Document,” an authenticated al-Qaeda 

document that identifies al-Qaeda’s most important financial 

benefactors. Id. ¶¶ 115–19. Al Rajhi Bank maintained 

accounts for many of al-Qaeda’s charity fronts and as early as 

2003, the CIA warned that Al Rajhi Bank served as a conduit 

for terrorist transactions. Id. ¶¶ 119–23. Indeed, HSBC’s 

internal compliance officials raised concerns about Al Rajhi 

Bank being used by terrorists and this prompted HSBC to 
3

temporarily end its relationship with Al Rajhi Bank. Id. ¶¶ 

175–77. All in all, the HSBC Defendants conducted nearly 

25,000 transactions with Iran and Iranian entities (including 

Bank Melli and Bank Saderat) valued at approximately $19.4 

billion. Id. ¶ 161. Additionally, one of the HSBC Defendants’ 

largest Banknotes’ customers was Al Rajhi Bank, whom the 

HSBC Defendants provided with nearly $1 billion U.S. dollars. 

Id. ¶¶ 172, 182.

Drawing all reasonable inferences from the allegations in 

the Plaintiffs’ favor, they are sufficient to show that the 

activities of the HSBC Defendants related to al-Qaeda and 

benefited al-Qaeda. Iran is cited by the State Department as 

the most active state sponsor of terrorism in the world, and 

since the 1990s “has been operating under an alliance with al 

Qaeda . . . by which Iran provides material support for 

terrorism including financing, facilitation of travel, training, 

safe havens and operational support.” Id. ¶¶ 98–100. Under 

this alliance, Iran is a “critical transit point for funding” alQaeda activities and Iran’s network “serves as the core pipeline 

through which [al-Qaeda] moves money.” Id. ¶ 95; see also id.

¶ 93 (letter from Osama bin Laden, founder of al-Qaeda, 

describing Iran as al-Qaeda’s “main artery for funds”). The 

majority contends these allegations are insufficient to show 

relatedness, “because aid to Iran could just as plausibly benefit 

its otherwise legitimate operations rather than al-Qaeda.” Maj. 

Slip Op. at 11. In so ruling, the majority effectively backtracks 

from its concession that Ford does not equate relatedness with 

causation, and it ignores Ford’s admonition that “[w]e have 

long treated isolated or sporadic transactions differently from 

continuous ones” for personal jurisdiction purposes. 141 S. Ct. 

at 1028 n.4.

Additionally, according to a report from the Treasury 

Department, the terrorist who engineered the Camp Chapman 
4

attack was al-Qaeda’s emissary in Iran, was provided safe 

haven in Iran, and was allowed to travel freely in and out of the 

country with the permission of Iranian officials. Id. ¶ 96–97. 

Balawi, the al-Qaeda agent who committed the Camp 

Chapman suicide bombing, trained for his mission at a training 

camp in Pakistan, which “existed, in large part, through the 

funding and material support provided by Iran.” Id. ¶ 229–31; 

see also generally id. ¶¶ 65–101 (describing the various ways 

Iran has materially supported al-Qaeda). Additionally, and 

perhaps most importantly, Al Rajhi Bank has documented ties 

with al-Qaeda and the HSBC Defendants were aware of these 

ties. Id. ¶¶ 115–26, 175–77.

The Plaintiffs have also pled allegations plausibly 

demonstrating that al-Qaeda’s ability to secure funding 

impacted the success of its terrorist attacks. Specifically, the 

Plaintiffs allege that al-Qaeda’s ability to plan and commit 

terrorist attacks required the use of a “global financing and 

logistics infrastructure,” and that the Camp Chapman bombing

in particular was a sophisticated attack requiring significant 

amounts of time, money, and logistics in order to be successful. 

Id. ¶¶ 50–53. The U.S. Under-Secretary of Terrorism and 

Financial Intelligence stated: 

The maintenance of those terrorist 

networks, like al Qaeda, which threaten our 

national security, is expensive – even if a 

particular attack does not cost much to carry 

out. As the 9/11 Commission explained, groups 

like al Qaeda must spend money for many 

purposes – to recruit, train, plan operations and 

bribe corrupt officials for example. If we can 

eliminate or even reduce their sources and 

conduits of money, we can degrade their ability 
5

to do all of these things, and thus can make them 

less dangerous. Id. ¶ 54. 

As the majority concedes—a point which bears 

repeating—the Plaintiffs are not “required to identify specific 

dollars spent on the [Camp Chapman] terrorist attack.” Maj. 

Slip Op. at 13. Nor could they. Because as the majority notes, 

“‘[m]oney is fungible[,]’” Maj. Slip Op. at 13 n.9 (quoting 

Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31 (2010)), and 

“there is reason to believe that foreign terrorist organizations 

do not maintain legitimate financial firewalls between those 

funds raised for civil, nonviolent activities, and those 

ultimately used to support violent, terrorist operations.” 

Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. at 31 (internal quotation 

marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). 

Simply put, the Plaintiffs’ factual allegations are entitled 

to a reasonable inference that there is a sufficient relatedness 

between the foreign HSBC Defendants’ contacts with the 

United States and the Camp Chapman terrorist attack. If the 

foreign HSBC Defendants had properly observed the sanctions 

against these banks, it would have significantly hindered alQaeda’s ability to successfully carry out terrorist attacks like 

the Camp Chapman bombing. Let this sink in for a moment: 

the majority holds that where HSBC regularly did business 

with a bank founded and run by one of al-Qaeda’s largest 

financial supporters, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 114-120, and where the 

9/11 Commission found that al-Qaeda hijackers used this same 

bank to facilitate their terrorist attacks, id. ¶ 121, and where this 

bank advertised how people could deposit funds into al-Qaedafront charity accounts held at the bank, id. ¶ 120, we cannot 

conclude that doing business with this bank “relates to” any of

al-Qaeda’s subsequent terrorist acts, including at Camp 

Chapman. Maj. Op. at 11-12. This is supposedly because the 

bank has “vast and otherwise legitimate operations,” id. at 12, 
6

but this reasoning ignores the conceded fungibility of money,

the role that financial support and access to U.S. banknotes play 

in supporting terrorist activities, and this bank’s specific record 

of funneling money to al-Qaeda. 

As such, the foreign HSBC Defendants indeed had “fair 

warning” that evading U.S. sanctions and allowing sanctioned 

entities that funded terrorist organizations to access the U.S. 

financial markets and procure funds to carry out terrorist 

attacks would subject them to liability in the United States for 

attacks committed against its citizens. Mwani v. bin Ladin, 417

F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

Accordingly, I would find that the Plaintiffs sufficiently 

pled a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over the foreign 

HSBC Defendants. 

II.

Now turning to the ATA aiding-and-abetting claim, the 

only relevant issues in dispute are whether the complaint would

allow us to infer that the HSBC Defendants were generally 

aware that they played a role in al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities 

and that the HSBC Defendants knowingly and substantially 

assisted those activities. I would find that it does. 

In Atchley v. AstraZeneca UK Ltd., we explained that a 

“‘defendant need not be generally aware of its role in the 

specific act that caused the plaintiff's injury; instead, it must be

generally aware of its role in an overall illegal activity from 

which the act that caused the plaintiff's injury 

was foreseeable.’” 22 F.4th 204, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting 

Honickman v. BLOM Bank SAL, 6 F.4th 487, 496 (2d Cir. 

2021)). “[B]ear[ing] in mind the challenges of establishing a 
7

defendant’s state of mind without the benefit of discovery[,]” 

Atchley, 22 F.4th at 220, the Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled

allegations that give rise to an inference that the HSBC 

Defendants were generally aware of their role in al-Qaeda’s 

terrorist activities. 

It cannot be disputed that the complaint sufficiently pleads 

that at least one of the sanctioned entities, Al Rajhi Bank, had 

extensive, documented ties to al-Qaeda. The Final Report of 

the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 

States (“9/11 Commission Report”), which was published in 

2004,2revealed the existence of a “Golden Chain” document 

that identified al-Qaeda’s most important financial benefactors, 

one of which was Sulaiman bin Abdulaziz Al Rajhi

(“Sulaiman”), a founder of Al Rajhi Bank and former Chief 

Executive Officer and Chairman of the Board. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 

114–18. Under the leadership of Sulaiman, Al Rajhi Bank 

“maintained accounts for many of al-Qaeda’s charity fronts” 

thereby “providing a mechanism for al-Qaeda supporters to 

deposit funds directly into those accounts.” Id. ¶¶ 119–20; see 

also id. ¶ 122 (CIA detailing Sulaiman’s control over “the 

bank’s most important decisions”). The complaint went on to 

allege specific examples of Al Rajhi Bank funneling money to 

members of al-Qaeda that committed terrorist attacks: 

2 While the complaint does not contain this publication date, we may 

take judicial notice of such date pursuant to FED. R. EVID. 201. See 

Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 909 F.3d 446, 

464 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (“Among the information a court may consider 

on a motion to dismiss are public records subject to judicial notice.”)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also National 

Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 

Commission Report (2004), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtuallibrary/abstracts/911-commission-report (last visited July 11, 2022). 
8

For example, money was funneled through Al 

Rajhi Bank to an al-Qaeda cell in Hamburg, 

Germany, through businessmen Mahmood 

Darkazanli and Abdul Fattah Zammar, who in 

turn provided the al-Qaeda cell of 9/11 hijackers 

with financial and logistical support. One of the 

9/11 hijackers, Abdul Aziz al Omari, utilized a 

credit card drawn on Al Rajhi Bank when 

planning the attacks and, just four days before 

the attacks, received a wire transfer from Al 

Rajhi Bank into a SunTrust bank account.

Id. ¶ 121. The majority concedes that these allegations allow 

us to “plausibly infer that Al Rajhi Bank maintained 

connections to al-Qaeda,” yet holds that the complaint does not 

allege that the HSBC Defendants were aware of these 

connections. Maj. Slip Op. at 18. This contention ignores 

altogether the allegations in the complaint from which we can 

reasonably infer that the HSBC Defendants had actual 

knowledge of these connections. For instance, the Golden 

Chain document, which established Al Rajhi Bank’s ties to alQaeda, became public in 2004. Further information about 

these ties came to light in the 9/11 Commission Report and 

Congressional hearings. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 174–77. We can infer 

that the HSBC Defendants were aware of this information 

because “public sources such as media articles . . . plausibly 

suggest a defendant’s knowledge which can be confirmed 

during discovery.” Honickman, 6 F.4th at 502 n.18. 

Undaunted by these allegations, the majority maintains 

that even if the HSBC Defendants were aware of these 

connections, the Plaintiffs “fail[] to allege that those 

connections were so close that HSBC had to be aware it was 

assuming a role in al-Qaeda’s terrorist activities by working 

with Al Rajhi Bank.” Maj. Slip Op. at 19. In the majority’s 
9

view, because Al Rajhi Bank engaged in “extensive legitimate 

operations,” the Plaintiffs had to allege “that a substantial part 

of these operations involved al-Qaeda” and that “Al Rajhi Bank 

was so closely intertwined with al-Qaeda that we can infer 

HSBC was aware it was assuming a role in al-Qaeda’s terrorist 

activities simply by doing business with Al Rajhi Bank.” Id. at 

20. The Plaintiffs alleged that “Al Rajhi Bank advertised the 

existence and numerical designation of the accounts it 

maintained for [al-Qaeda-front charities] throughout the 

Muslim world, providing a mechanism for al-Qaeda supporters 

to deposit funds directly into those accounts.” Am. Compl. ¶

120. The majority therefore holds that a bank that literally 

advertises how members of the public can give money to alQaeda (and enables them to do so) is not sufficiently “closely 

intertwined” with al-Qaeda to satisfy the general awareness 

requirement. The majority’s reasoning appears to be that the 

HSBC defendants were only generally aware that its customer, 

Al Rahji Bank, supported al-Qaeda’s “legitimate” charitable 

activities, rather than al-Qaeda’s terrorism. As we have said in 

a different context, “[t]his finding is quite extraordinary, 

because it totally defies both logic and common sense.” 

Georgetown Hotel v. N.L.R.B., 835 F.2d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 

1987). 

Turning to the last element for aiding-and-abetting 

liability, the Plaintiffs must allege that the HSBC Defendants 

knowingly provided substantial assistance to the Camp 

Chapman attack. The knowledge component is satisfied “[i]f 

the defendant knowingly—and not innocently or 

inadvertently—gave assistance, directly or indirectly.” 

Atchley, 22 F.4th at 222 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). It cannot be disputed that the HSBC Defendants 

knowingly assisted sanctioned entities Bank Melli and Bank 

Saderat in evading U.S. sanctions and providing Al Rajhi Bank 

with access to U.S. Banknotes despite its knowledge of Al 
10

Rajhi Bank’s ties to al-Qaeda. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 200–02 

(the HSBC Defendants accepting criminal responsibility for its 

conduct in the Deferred Prosecution Agreement); see also 

Honickman, 6 F.4th at 500 (noting that the “knowledge” 

component does “not require [a defendant] to ‘know’ anything 

more . . . than what she knew for the general awareness 

element”). 

The Plaintiffs have also sufficiently pled that the HSBC 

Defendants provided substantial assistance. In determining 

whether a defendant has provided substantial assistance, we 

consider six factors: “(i) the nature of the act assisted, (ii) the 

amount and kind of assistance, (iii) the defendants' presence at 

the time of the tort, (iv) the defendants’ relationship to the 

tortious actor, (v) the defendants’ state of mind, and (vi) the 

duration of assistance.” Atchley, 22 F.4th at 221. Bearing in 

mind that “[n]o factor alone is dispositive, and the weight of 

each varies with the circumstances of the particular claim[,]” 

id., I address each of these factors in turn. 

Factors 1 and 2: Nature of Act & Amount and Kind of 

Assistance. The Halberstam Court noted that “the nature of the 

act involved dictates what aid might matter, i.e., be 

substantial.” Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 484 (D.C. 

Cir. 1983) (first emphasis omitted). Therefore, a court may 

“apply a proportionality test to particularly bad or opprobrious 

acts, i.e., a defendant’s responsibility for the same amount of 

assistance increases with the blameworthiness of the tortious 

act or the seriousness of the foreseeable consequences.” Id. at 

484 n.13. “The particularly offensive nature of an underlying 

offense might also factor” on the defendant’s state of mind. Id.

The nature of the act alleged here is terrorism that resulted 

in the deaths of nine people. There can be no dispute as to the 

severity and heinous nature of terrorist attacks. See Pub. L. No. 

114-122, 130 Stat. 852 § 2(a)(1) (“International terrorism is a 
11

serious and deadly problem that threatens the vital interests of 

the United States.”). The amount and kind of assistance that 

was provided is also significant. As we already noted in 

Atchley, “[f]inancial support is indisputably important to the 

operation of a terrorist organization, and any money provided 

to the organization may aid its unlawful goals.” 22 F.4th at 222 

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As 

aforementioned, here, the Plaintiffs allege that the HSBC 

Defendants devised fraudulent schemes to evade U.S. 

sanctions and processed 25,000 deceptive transactions for 

sanctioned banks connected to Iran, valued at more than $19.4 

billion. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 148–50. The Plaintiffs also allege that 

despite actual knowledge of Al Rajhi Bank’s ties to al-Qaeda, 

the HSBC Defendants provided nearly $1 billion in U.S. 

Banknotes to Al Rajhi Bank leading up to the Camp Chapman 

attack. Id. ¶¶ 178–82. 

Nevertheless, the majority contends that these allegations 

are insufficient because the Plaintiffs failed “to allege how 

much (if any) of that money indirectly flowed to al-Qaeda.”

Maj. Slip Op. at 22. The majority’s position contradicts wellreasoned authority, including our own precedent. “[I]f a 

plaintiff plausibly alleges the general awareness element, she 

does not need to also allege the [foreign terrorist organization] 

actually received the funds.” Honickman, 6 F.4th at 500. 

Rather, “[f]actual allegations that permit a reasonable inference 

that the defendant recognized the money it transferred to its 

customers would be received by the [foreign terrorist 

organization] would suffice.” Id. As already outlined above, 

the Plaintiffs have pled that the HSBC Defendants provided Al 

Rajhi Bank—despite actual knowledge of its ties to al-Qaeda—

with nearly one billion U.S. dollars leading up to the time of 

the Camp Chapman attack. As such, the complaint plausibly 

alleges that the HSBC Defendants recognized this money 

would be used to fund, at least in part, al-Qaeda operations. 
12

Moreover, even if one considers this assistance to be 

relatively trivial, compared to the “extraordinary 

blameworthiness” of al-Qaeda’s terrorist attacks, “even 

relatively trivial aid could count as substantial.” Atchley, 22 

F.4th at 222 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 

also Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 488 (explaining the importance 

of evaluating acts of assistance “in the context of the enterprise 

they aided” rather than in isolation because although the 

defendant’s assistance “may not have been overwhelming as to 

any given” act in the “five-year life of this criminal operation,” 

such assistance “added up over time to an essential part of the 

pattern”); Restatement (Third) of Torts § 28 cmt. d (2020) 

(“[A] clear understanding of wrongdoing can make a small act 

of assistance more blameworthy than it would seem if the 

defendant’s knowledge were less certain or precise.”); id.

(“[T]he enormity of a wrong . . . or the intimacy of a 

defendant’s knowledge of it may appropriately cause such 

lesser acts to be considered aiding and abetting.”). Therefore, 

these factors support substantiality. 

Factor 3: Presence or Absence at the Time of the Tort.

Because the HSBC Defendants were not physically present at 

the scene, this factor may undermine the Plaintiffs’ position. 

See Atchley, 22 F.4th at 223 (noting that because the 

“defendants were not physically present at the attacks on 

plaintiffs[,] [t]his factor cuts against counting” the defendants’ 

assistance as substantial). However, as the majority notes, 

presence could be understood in a transactional sense and the 

HSBC Defendants were alleged to have ongoing business 

relations with sanctioned entities, particularly Al Rajhi Bank, 

before and leading up to the Camp Chapman attack. See Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 161, 182. Thus, I would find that this factor neither 

supports nor weighs against substantiality. 
13

Factor 4: Relationship to Principal. Because “there is no 

special relationship here between [the HSBC] defendants and 

the principal tortfeasors” I would also “treat this factor as 

neither supporting nor detracting from substantiality.” Atchley, 

22 F4th at 223.

Factor 5: State of Mind. This factor favors finding 

substantiality because Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that 

the HSBC Defendants provided knowing assistance and such 

assistance “evidences a deliberate long-term intention to 

participate in an ongoing illicit enterprise.” Halberstam, 705 

F.2d at 488. As we have explained, “[a]iding-and-abetting 

liability reaches actors . . . who may seek only financial gain 

but pursue it with a general awareness of aiding some type of 

tort or crime.” Atchley, 22 F.4th at 224. Here, the Plaintiffs 

allege the HSBC Defendants wanted to increase its business 

and purposefully devised a scheme to evade U.S. sanctions and 

engage in illicit transactions with entities that were sanctioned 

explicitly for their ties to terrorism. Therefore, the HSBC 

Defendants’ alleged state of mind supports a finding of 

substantiality. 

Factor 6: Duration of Assistance. The Halberstam Court 

considered this factor to be particularly “important” because 

“[t]he length of time an alleged aider-abettor has been involved 

with a tortfeasor almost certainly affects the quality and extent 

of their relationship and probably influences the amount of aid 

provided as well; additionally, it may afford evidence of the 

defendant’s state of mind.” Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 484. 

Here, the HSBC Defendants’ alleged aid spanned more than a 

decade. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31–36. Accordingly, this factor 

weighs strongly in favor of substantiality. 
14

In sum, four of the six Halberstam factors weigh strongly 

in favor of finding substantial assistance, and the majority errs 

by concluding otherwise. 

* * *

When Congress amended the ATA in 2016, its purpose 

was:

to provide civil litigants with the broadest 

possible basis, consistent with the Constitution 

of the United States, to seek relief against 

persons, entities, and foreign countries, 

wherever acting and wherever they may be 

found, that have provided material support, 

directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or 

persons that engage in terrorist activities against 

the United States.

Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-

222, § 2(b), 130 Stat. 852, 853 (2016) (Amendment). Through 

its combination of “too stingy a reading of the complaint,” 

Maljack Prods., Inc. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 52 

F.3d 373, 376 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reversing dismissal), and too 

stingy a reading of precedent and relevant authorities, the 

majority has frustrated Congress’s intent. Just as importantly, 

the majority has unfairly deprived these Plaintiffs of their 

rightful opportunity to prove their well-pleaded allegations in 

court. I respectfully dissent.