Supersession by the Ethics in Government Act

of Other Financial Disclosure Requirements

Section 207(c) o f the E th ics in G o v ern m en t A ct has superseded th e public financial

rep o rtin g requirem ents o f four environm ental law s adopted before its passage.

April 11, 1980

MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE DEPUTY GENERAL 

COUNSEL, ENVIRONM ENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

This is in response to your request for our opinion on the question 

whether § 207(c) of the Ethics in Government Act (Ethics Act), 5 

U.S.C. App., has eliminated the public financial reporting requirements 

of the following statutory provisions: § 26(e) of the Toxic Substances 

Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 2625(e); § 1007 of the-Solid Waste Disposal 

Act, 42 U.S.C. §6906; §318 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7618, 

and § 12 of the Environmental Research, Development and Demonstration Authorization Act of 1978, P.L. 95-155, 91 Stat. 1263. These 

statutory requirements are substantially similar in their language and 

effect, and all were adopted by Congress before the passage of the 

Ethics Act. They oblige policymaking officials who work in their 

respective areas of application to report certain personal financial interests for public disclosure and they authorize criminal prosecution for a 

failure to comply.

Section 207(c) of the Ethics Act reads as follows in pertinent part:

The provisions of this title requiring the reporting of 

information shall supersede any general requirement under 

any other provision of law or regulation with respect to 

the reporting of information required for purposes of preventing conflicts of interest or apparent conflicts of 

interest.

For the reasons advanced below, we have concluded that § 207(c) 

has displaced the four cited provisions of law and brought the provisions of Title II of the Ethics Act into play in their stead.

The language of § 207(c) lays down only two prerequisites for the 

supersession by Title II of a statutory or regulatory reporting requirement. The first is that a “general” requirement must be involved and 

the second is that the requirement be aimed at real or apparent conflicts

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of interest. Applying these prerequisites in reverse order, we first join 

in your conclusion, derived in part from legislative history, that the 

subject statutory provisions were indeed intended to prevent conflicts 

of interest. As for the other prerequisite, since each statutory reporting 

provision is applicable to the occupants of positions in your Agency 

that are categorized by the provision in general terms (§ 26(e) of the 

Toxic Substances Control Act is also applicable in the Department of 

Health, Education and Welfare), each in our opinion is unquestionably 

a general requirement within the meaning of § 207(c). Cf. H.R. Rep. 

No. 95-642, Part 1, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 51 (1977), where the 

Committee on Post Office and Civil Service cited the financial reporting system created for employees of the Department of Energy by P.L. 

95-91, §§ 603 and 604, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7213 and 7214, as an example of a 

requirement intended for supersession by what is now § 207(c) of the 

Ethics Act.

It should be noted also that our answer to your inquiry is strongly 

supported by the obvious congressional purpose of establishing uniform 

financial reporting requirements and procedures throughout the Executive Branch by means of § 207(c).

To repeat, we are of the opinion that § 207(c) has made a dead letter 

of the four financial reporting enactments you called to our attention 

and has made Title II of the Ethics Act operative in their stead.

J o h n M. H a r m o n

Assistant Attorney General

Office o f Legal Counsel

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