# Publicatieblad C 236/2016

| | ISSN 1977-0995 |
| --- | --- |
| Publicatieblad
  van de Europese Unie | C 236 |
| | |
| Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal | Mededelingen en bekendmakingen | 59e jaargang30 juni 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0995

Publicatieblad

van de Europese Unie

C 236

Uitgave in de Nederlandse taal

Mededelingen en bekendmakingen

59e jaargang30 juni 2016

---

| Nummer | Inhoud | Bladzijde |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Mededelingen |
| | MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2016/C 236/01 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/02 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/03 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2016/C 236/04 | Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Nummer

Inhoud

Bladzijde

II   Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

2016/C 236/01

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/02

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/03

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  )

1

2

2016/C 236/04

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie (Zaak M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  )

1

2

---

| | IV   Informatie |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2016/C 236/05 | Wisselkoersen van de euro | 3 |
| 2016/C 236/06 | Nieuwe nationale zijde van voor circulatie bestemde euromuntstukken | 4 |
| | Rekenkamer |
| 2016/C 236/07 | Speciaal verslag nr. 14/2016 — EU-beleidsinitiatieven en financiële steun voor de integratie van de Roma: het afgelopen decennium is er aanzienlijke vooruitgang geboekt, maar ter plaatse zijn extra inspanningen nodig | 5 |
| | INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN |
| 2016/C 236/08 | Bijwerking van de lijst van grensdoorlaatposten bedoeld in artikel 2, punt 8, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode) | 6 |
| 2016/C 236/09 | Bijwerking van de modellen van de kaarten die door de ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken van de lidstaten worden afgegeven aan geaccrediteerde leden van diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordigingen, alsmede hun familieleden, zoals bedoeld in artikel 20, lid 2, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode) | 11 |
| | INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE |
| | Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA |
| 2016/C 236/10 | Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken | 21 |
| 2016/C 236/11 | Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunkwesties in verband met mogelijke staatssteun aan Hurtigruten ASA in het kader van het contract voor Hurtigruten-kustvervoersdiensten voor de periode 2012-2019 | 29 |
| 2016/C 236/12 | Mededeling van Noorwegen in verband met Richtlijn 94/22/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende de voorwaarden voor het verlenen en het gebruikmaken van vergunningen voor de prospectie, de exploratie en de productie van koolwaterstoffen — Bekendmaking van een uitnodiging tot het indienen van aanvragen voor vergunningen voor oliewinning op het Noors continentaal plat — Vergunningsronde in van tevoren afgebakende gebieden (Awards in Predefined Areas) 2016 | 45 |

IV   Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

2016/C 236/05

Wisselkoersen van de euro

3

2016/C 236/06

Nieuwe nationale zijde van voor circulatie bestemde euromuntstukken

4

Rekenkamer

2016/C 236/07

Speciaal verslag nr. 14/2016 — EU-beleidsinitiatieven en financiële steun voor de integratie van de Roma: het afgelopen decennium is er aanzienlijke vooruitgang geboekt, maar ter plaatse zijn extra inspanningen nodig

5

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN

2016/C 236/08

Bijwerking van de lijst van grensdoorlaatposten bedoeld in artikel 2, punt 8, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode)

6

2016/C 236/09

Bijwerking van de modellen van de kaarten die door de ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken van de lidstaten worden afgegeven aan geaccrediteerde leden van diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordigingen, alsmede hun familieleden, zoals bedoeld in artikel 20, lid 2, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode)

11

INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

2016/C 236/10

Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

21

2016/C 236/11

Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunkwesties in verband met mogelijke staatssteun aan Hurtigruten ASA in het kader van het contract voor Hurtigruten-kustvervoersdiensten voor de periode 2012-2019

29

2016/C 236/12

Mededeling van Noorwegen in verband met Richtlijn 94/22/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende de voorwaarden voor het verlenen en het gebruikmaken van vergunningen voor de prospectie, de exploratie en de productie van koolwaterstoffen — Bekendmaking van een uitnodiging tot het indienen van aanvragen voor vergunningen voor oliewinning op het Noors continentaal plat — Vergunningsronde in van tevoren afgebakende gebieden (Awards in Predefined Areas) 2016

45

---

| | V   Bekendmakingen |
| --- | --- |
| | BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2016/C 236/13 | Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen in het kader van het meerjarig werkprogramma voor het verlenen van financiële steun op het gebied van de trans-Europese energie-infrastructuur in het kader van de Connecting Europe Facility voor de periode 2014-2020 (Besluit C(2016) 1587 van de Commissie) | 47 |
| | PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID |
| | Europese Commissie |
| 2016/C 236/14 | Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie (Zaak M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak (
  1
  ) | 48 |

V   Bekendmakingen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Europese Commissie

2016/C 236/13

Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen in het kader van het meerjarig werkprogramma voor het verlenen van financiële steun op het gebied van de trans-Europese energie-infrastructuur in het kader van de Connecting Europe Facility voor de periode 2014-2020 (Besluit C(2016) 1587 van de Commissie)

47

PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

2016/C 236/14

Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie (Zaak M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak (
  1
  )

1

48

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst |

---

(1)   Voor de EER relevante tekst

1

| NL | |
| --- | --- |

NL

---

II Mededelingen

MEDEDELINGEN VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/1

---

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2016/C 236/01)

Op 22 juni 2016 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de interne markt te verklaren. Dit besluit is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (1). De volledige tekst van het besluit is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector, |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector,

| — | in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8039. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8039. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

---

(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/1

---

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2016/C 236/02)

Op 23 juni 2016 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de interne markt te verklaren. Dit besluit is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (1). De volledige tekst van het besluit is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector; |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector;

| — | in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8049. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8049. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

---

(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/2

---

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2016/C 236/03)

Op 23 juni 2016 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de interne markt te verklaren. Dit besluit is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (1). De volledige tekst van het besluit is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector; |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector;

| — | in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8041. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8041. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

---

(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/2

---

Besluit om geen bezwaar aan te tekenen tegen een aangemelde concentratie

(Zaak M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest)

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2016/C 236/04)

Op 24 juni 2016 heeft de Commissie besloten zich niet te verzetten tegen bovenvermelde aangemelde concentratie en deze verenigbaar met de interne markt te verklaren. Dit besluit is gebaseerd op artikel 6, lid 1, onder b), van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (1). De volledige tekst van het besluit is slechts beschikbaar in het Engels en zal openbaar worden gemaakt na verwijdering van eventuele bedrijfsgeheimen. De tekst is beschikbaar:

| — | op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector; |
| --- | --- |

—

op de website Concurrentie van de Commissie, afdeling Fusies (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Deze website biedt verschillende hulpmiddelen om individuele concentratiebesluiten op te zoeken, onder meer op: naam van de onderneming, nummer van de zaak, datum en sector;

| — | in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8054. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving. |
| --- | --- |

—

in elektronische vorm op de EUR-Lex-website (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=nl) onder document nr. 32016M8054. EUR-Lex biedt onlinetoegang tot de communautaire wetgeving.

---

(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1.

---

IV Informatie

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE INSTELLINGEN, ORGANEN EN INSTANTIES VAN DE EUROPESE UNIE

Europese Commissie

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/3

---

Wisselkoersen van de euro (1)

29 juni 2016

(2016/C 236/05)

1 euro =

| | Munteenheid | Koers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | US-dollar | 1,1090 |
| JPY | Japanse yen | 113,85 |
| DKK | Deense kroon | 7,4376 |
| GBP | Pond sterling | 0,82550 |
| SEK | Zweedse kroon | 9,4311 |
| CHF | Zwitserse frank | 1,0854 |
| ISK | IJslandse kroon | |
| NOK | Noorse kroon | 9,3065 |
| BGN | Bulgaarse lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tsjechische koruna | 27,114 |
| HUF | Hongaarse forint | 316,95 |
| PLN | Poolse zloty | 4,4261 |
| RON | Roemeense leu | 4,5253 |
| TRY | Turkse lira | 3,2157 |
| AUD | Australische dollar | 1,4911 |
| CAD | Canadese dollar | 1,4407 |
| HKD | Hongkongse dollar | 8,6041 |
| NZD | Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar | 1,5565 |
| SGD | Singaporese dollar | 1,4951 |
| KRW | Zuid-Koreaanse won | 1 283,15 |
| ZAR | Zuid-Afrikaanse rand | 16,6016 |
| CNY | Chinese yuan renminbi | 7,3680 |
| HRK | Kroatische kuna | 7,5273 |
| IDR | Indonesische roepia | 14 577,25 |
| MYR | Maleisische ringgit | 4,4594 |
| PHP | Filipijnse peso | 52,106 |
| RUB | Russische roebel | 71,0452 |
| THB | Thaise baht | 39,028 |
| BRL | Braziliaanse real | 3,6216 |
| MXN | Mexicaanse peso | 20,7331 |
| INR | Indiase roepie | 74,9693 |

Munteenheid

Koers

USD

US-dollar

1,1090

JPY

Japanse yen

113,85

DKK

Deense kroon

7,4376

GBP

Pond sterling

0,82550

SEK

Zweedse kroon

9,4311

CHF

Zwitserse frank

1,0854

ISK

IJslandse kroon

NOK

Noorse kroon

9,3065

BGN

Bulgaarse lev

1,9558

CZK

Tsjechische koruna

27,114

HUF

Hongaarse forint

316,95

PLN

Poolse zloty

4,4261

RON

Roemeense leu

4,5253

TRY

Turkse lira

3,2157

AUD

Australische dollar

1,4911

CAD

Canadese dollar

1,4407

HKD

Hongkongse dollar

8,6041

NZD

Nieuw-Zeelandse dollar

1,5565

SGD

Singaporese dollar

1,4951

KRW

Zuid-Koreaanse won

1 283,15

ZAR

Zuid-Afrikaanse rand

16,6016

CNY

Chinese yuan renminbi

7,3680

HRK

Kroatische kuna

7,5273

IDR

Indonesische roepia

14 577,25

MYR

Maleisische ringgit

4,4594

PHP

Filipijnse peso

52,106

RUB

Russische roebel

71,0452

THB

Thaise baht

39,028

BRL

Braziliaanse real

3,6216

MXN

Mexicaanse peso

20,7331

INR

Indiase roepie

74,9693

---

(1)  Bron: door de Europese Centrale Bank gepubliceerde referentiekoers.

---

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/4

---

Nieuwe nationale zijde van voor circulatie bestemde euromuntstukken

(2016/C 236/06)

Voor circulatie bestemde euromunten hebben in de gehele eurozone de status van wettig betaalmiddel. Om zowel degenen die beroepsmatig met euromunten omgaan als het grote publiek op de hoogte te houden, publiceert de Commissie alle nieuwe ontwerpen van euromunten (1). Volgens de conclusies van de Raad van 10 februari 2009 (2) is het de lidstaten van de eurozone en de landen die met de Europese Unie een monetaire overeenkomst hebben gesloten volgens welke zij euromuntstukken mogen uitgeven, toegestaan een bepaalde hoeveelheid voor circulatie bestemde euroherdenkingsmunten uit te geven, en dat onder bepaalde voorwaarden, met name dat alleen het muntstuk van twee euro wordt gebruikt. Deze munten hebben dezelfde technische kenmerken als gewone voor circulatie bestemde munten van twee euro, maar hebben aan de nationale zijde een speciale herdenkingsafbeelding met een grote nationale of Europese symboolwaarde.

Uitgevende staat
  : Spanje

Onderwerp van de herdenkingsmunt
  : Door de Unesco aangewezen cultureel en natuurlijk werelderfgoed — Kerken van het koninkrijk Asturias

Beschrijving van het ontwerp
  : Op de voorgrond is de kerk Santa Maria del Naranco afgebeeld. Bovenaan in het binnenste gedeelte staan de naam van het uitgevende land „ESPAÑA” in boogvorm en daaronder aan de rechterkant het jaar van uitgifte „2017” vermeld. Aan de linkerkant van het binnenste gedeelte staat het muntteken.

Op de buitenrand van de munt zijn de twaalf sterren van de Europese vlag afgebeeld.

Oplage
  : 4 miljoen

Datum van uitgifte
  :

---

(1)  Voor een overzicht van alle nationale zijden die in 2002 zijn uitgegeven, zie PB C 373 van 28.12.2001, blz. 1.

(2)  Zie de conclusies van de Raad Economische en Financiële Zaken van 10 februari 2009 en de aanbeveling van de Commissie van 19 december 2008 betreffende gemeenschappelijke richtsnoeren voor de nationale zijde en de uitgifte van voor circulatie bestemde euromuntstukken (PB L 9 van 14.1.2009, blz. 52).

---

Rekenkamer

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/5

---

Speciaal verslag nr. 14/2016

„EU-beleidsinitiatieven en financiële steun voor de integratie van de Roma: het afgelopen decennium is er aanzienlijke vooruitgang geboekt, maar ter plaatse zijn extra inspanningen nodig”

(2016/C 236/07)

De Europese Rekenkamer deelt u mede dat Speciaal verslag nr. 14/2016 „EU-beleidsinitiatieven en financiële steun voor de integratie van de Roma: het afgelopen decennium is er aanzienlijke vooruitgang geboekt, maar ter plaatse zijn extra inspanningen nodig” zojuist gepubliceerd is.

Het verslag kan worden ingezien op of gedownload van de website van de Europese Rekenkamer: http://eca.europa.eu of van EU Bookshop: https://bookshop.europa.eu

---

INFORMATIE AFKOMSTIG VAN DE LIDSTATEN

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/6

---

Bijwerking van de lijst van grensdoorlaatposten bedoeld in artikel 2, punt 8, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode) (1)

(2016/C 236/08)

De publicatie van de lijst van grensdoorlaatposten bedoeld in artikel 2, punt 8, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 9 maart 2016 betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode) is gebaseerd op de informatie die door de lidstaten aan de Commissie wordt verstrekt overeenkomstig artikel 39 van de Schengengrenscode.

Naast de publicatie in het Publicatieblad wordt de lijst regelmatig bijgewerkt op de website van het directoraat-generaal Binnenlandse Zaken.

FRANKRIJK

Vervanging van de informatie die is gepubliceerd in PB C 229 van 14.7.2015

LIJST VAN GRENSDOORLAATPOSTEN

Luchthavens

| (1) | Abbeville |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Abbeville

| (2) | Agen-la Garenne |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Agen-la Garenne

| (3) | Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro

| (4) | Albert-Bray |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Albert-Bray

| (5) | Amiens-Glisy |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Amiens-Glisy

| (6) | Angers-Marcé |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Angers-Marcé

| (7) | Angoulême-Brie-Champniers |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Angoulême-Brie-Champniers

| (8) | Annecy-Methet |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Annecy-Methet

| (9) | Annemasse |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Annemasse

| (10) | Auxerre-Branches |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Auxerre-Branches

| (11) | Avignon-Caumont |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Avignon-Caumont

| (12) | Bâle-Mulhouse |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Bâle-Mulhouse

| (13) | Bastia-Poretta |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Bastia-Poretta

| (14) | Beauvais-Tillé |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Beauvais-Tillé

| (15) | Bergerac-Roumanière |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Bergerac-Roumanière

| (16) | Besançon-la Vèze |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Besançon-la Vèze

| (17) | Béziers-Vias |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Béziers-Vias

| (18) | Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet

| (19) | Bordeaux-Mérignac |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Bordeaux-Mérignac

| (20) | Brest-Guipavas |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Brest-Guipavas

| (21) | Brive-Souillac |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Brive-Souillac

| (22) | Caen-Carpiquet |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Caen-Carpiquet

| (23) | Calais-Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Calais-Dunkerque

| (24) | Calvi-Sainte-Catherine |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Calvi-Sainte-Catherine

| (25) | Cannes-Mandelieu |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Cannes-Mandelieu

| (26) | Carcassonne-Salvaza |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Carcassonne-Salvaza

| (27) | Châlons-Vatry |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Châlons-Vatry

| (28) | Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains

| (29) | Châteauroux-Déols |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Châteauroux-Déols

| (30) | Cherbourg-Mauperthus |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Cherbourg-Mauperthus

| (31) | Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat

| (32) | Colmar-Houssen |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Colmar-Houssen

| (33) | Deauville-Saint-Gatien |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Deauville-Saint-Gatien

| (34) | Dijon-Longvic |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Dijon-Longvic

| (35) | Dinard-Pleurtuit |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Dinard-Pleurtuit

| (36) | Dôle-Tavaux |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Dôle-Tavaux

| (37) | Epinal-Mirecourt |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Epinal-Mirecourt

| (38) | Figari-Sud Corse |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Figari-Sud Corse

| (39) | Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs

| (40) | Hyères-le Palivestre |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Hyères-le Palivestre

| (41) | Issy-les-Moulineaux |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Issy-les-Moulineaux

| (42) | La Môle |
| --- | --- |

(42)

La Môle

| (43) | Lannion |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Lannion

| (44) | La Rochelle-Laleu |
| --- | --- |

(44)

La Rochelle-Laleu

| (45) | Laval-Entrammes |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Laval-Entrammes

| (46) | Le Castelet |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Le Castelet

| (47) | Le Havre-Octeville |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Le Havre-Octeville

| (48) | Le Mans-Arnage |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Le Mans-Arnage

| (49) | Le Touquet-Paris-Plage |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Le Touquet-Paris-Plage

| (50) | Lille-Lesquin |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Lille-Lesquin

| (51) | Limoges-Bellegarde |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Limoges-Bellegarde

| (52) | Lognes-Emerainville |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Lognes-Emerainville

| (53) | Lorient-Lann-Bihoué |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Lorient-Lann-Bihoué

| (54) | Lyon-Bron |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Lyon-Bron

| (55) | Lyon-Saint-Exupéry |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Lyon-Saint-Exupéry

| (56) | Marseille-Provence |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Marseille-Provence

| (57) | Metz-Nancy-Lorraine |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Metz-Nancy-Lorraine

| (58) | Monaco-Héliport |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Monaco-Héliport

| (59) | Montbéliard-Courcelles |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Montbéliard-Courcelles

| (60) | Montpellier-Méditérranée |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Montpellier-Méditérranée

| (61) | Nantes-Atlantique |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Nantes-Atlantique

| (62) | Nevers-Fourchambault |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Nevers-Fourchambault

| (63) | Nice-Côte d’Azur |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Nice-Côte d’Azur

| (64) | Nîmes-Garons |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Nîmes-Garons

| (65) | Orléans-Bricy |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Orléans-Bricy

| (66) | Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel

| (67) | Paris-Charles de Gaulle |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Paris-Charles de Gaulle

| (68) | Paris-le Bourget |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Paris-le Bourget

| (69) | Paris-Orly |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Paris-Orly

| (70) | Pau-Pyrénées |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Pau-Pyrénées

| (71) | Perpignan-Rivesaltes |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Perpignan-Rivesaltes

| (72) | Poitiers-Biard |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Poitiers-Biard

| (73) | Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, tijdelijk:






  — | Van woensdag 10 tot en met zondag 14 juni 2015 van 10.00 tot 15.30 uur.
  Deze tijdelijke openstelling vangt aan tijdens het internationale lucht- en ruimtevaartsalon van Bourget, dat tot een omleiding noopt naar het vliegveld van Pontoise van extra-Schengenvluchten. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(73)

Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, tijdelijk:

—

Van woensdag 10 tot en met zondag 14 juni 2015 van 10.00 tot 15.30 uur.

Deze tijdelijke openstelling vangt aan tijdens het internationale lucht- en ruimtevaartsalon van Bourget, dat tot een omleiding noopt naar het vliegveld van Pontoise van extra-Schengenvluchten.

| — | Van woensdag 15 tot en met zondag 21 juni 2015 van 6.00 tot 16.30 uur.
  Tijdens deze tijdelijke openstelling wordt met extra-Schengenvluchten een seizoensverbinding onderhouden (Quimper-Londen). |
| --- | --- |

—

Van woensdag 15 tot en met zondag 21 juni 2015 van 6.00 tot 16.30 uur.

Tijdens deze tijdelijke openstelling wordt met extra-Schengenvluchten een seizoensverbinding onderhouden (Quimper-Londen).

| (74) | Quimper-Cornouailles, tijdelijk, van 19 mei tot en met 4 september 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Quimper-Cornouailles, tijdelijk, van 19 mei tot en met 4 september 2016.

| (75) | Rennes Saint-Jacques |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Rennes Saint-Jacques

| (76) | Rodez-Marcillac |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Rodez-Marcillac

| (77) | Rouen-Vallée de Seine |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Rouen-Vallée de Seine

| (78) | Saint-Brieuc-Armor |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Saint-Brieuc-Armor

| (79) | Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon

| (80) | Saint-Nazaire-Montoir |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Saint-Nazaire-Montoir

| (81) | Strasbourg-Entzheim |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Strasbourg-Entzheim

| (82) | Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes

| (83) | Toulouse-Blagnac |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Toulouse-Blagnac

| (84) | Tours-Saint-Symphorien |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Tours-Saint-Symphorien

| (85) | Troyes-Barberey |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Troyes-Barberey

| (86) | Vichy-Charmeil |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Vichy-Charmeil

Zeegrenzen

| (1) | Ajaccio |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ajaccio

| (2) | Bastia |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Bastia

| (3) | Bayonne |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Bayonne

| (4) | Bonifacio |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Bonifacio

| (5) | Bordeaux |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Bordeaux

| (6) | Boulogne |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Boulogne

| (7) | Brest |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Brest

| (8) | Caen-Ouistreham |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Caen-Ouistreham

| (9) | Calais |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Calais

| (10) | Calvi |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Calvi

| (11) | Cannes-Vieux Port |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Cannes-Vieux Port

| (12) | Carteret |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Carteret

| (13) | Cherbourg |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Cherbourg

| (14) | Dieppe |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Dieppe

| (15) | Douvres |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Douvres

| (16) | Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Dunkerque

| (17) | Granville |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Granville

| (18) | Honfleur |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Honfleur

| (19) | La Rochelle-La Pallice |
| --- | --- |

(19)

La Rochelle-La Pallice

| (20) | Le Havre |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Le Havre

| (21) | Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port

| (22) | L’Ile-Rousse |
| --- | --- |

(22)

L’Ile-Rousse

| (23) | Lorient |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Lorient

| (24) | Marseille |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Marseille

| (25) | Monaco-Port de la Condamine |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Monaco-Port de la Condamine

| (26) | Nantes-Saint-Nazaire |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

| (27) | Nice |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Nice

| (28) | Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis

| (29) | Port-la-Nouvelle |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Port-la-Nouvelle

| (30) | Porto-Vecchio |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Porto-Vecchio

| (31) | Port-Vendres |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Port-Vendres

| (32) | Roscoff |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Roscoff

| (33) | Rouen |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Rouen

| (34) | Saint-Brieuc (maritime) |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Saint-Brieuc (maritime)

| (35) | Saint-Malo |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Saint-Malo

| (36) | Sète |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Sète

| (37) | Toulon |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Toulon

Landgrenzen

Met het VERENIGD KONINKRIJK

(vaste verbinding onder het Kanaal)

| (1) | Gare d’Ashford International |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Gare d’Ashford International

| (2) | Gare d’Avignon-Centre |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Gare d’Avignon-Centre

| (3) | Cheriton/Coquelles |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Cheriton/Coquelles

| (4) | Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée

| (5) | Gare de Fréthun |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Gare de Fréthun

| (6) | Gare de Lille-Europe |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Gare de Lille-Europe

| (7) | Gare de Paris-Nord |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Gare de Paris-Nord

| (8) | Gare de St-Pancras International |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Gare de St-Pancras International

| (9) | Gare d’Ebbsfleet International |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Gare d’Ebbsfleet International

| (10) | Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, op 1 juli 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, op 1 juli 2016.

Met ANDORRA

| (1) | Pas de la Case-Porta |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pas de la Case-Porta

Lijst van eerdere publicaties

| | PB C 316 van 28.12.2007, blz. 1 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 316 van 28.12.2007, blz. 1

| | PB C 134 van 31.5.2008, blz. 16 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 134 van 31.5.2008, blz. 16

| | PB C 177 van 12.7.2008, blz. 9 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 177 van 12.7.2008, blz. 9

| | PB C 200 van 6.8.2008, blz. 10 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 200 van 6.8.2008, blz. 10

| | PB C 331 van 31.12.2008, blz. 13 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 331 van 31.12.2008, blz. 13

| | PB C 3 van 8.1.2009, blz. 10 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 3 van 8.1.2009, blz. 10

| | PB C 37 van 14.2.2009, blz. 10 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 37 van 14.2.2009, blz. 10

| | PB C 64 van 19.3.2009, blz. 20 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 64 van 19.3.2009, blz. 20

| | PB C 99 van 30.4.2009, blz. 7 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 99 van 30.4.2009, blz. 7

| | PB C 229 van 23.9.2009, blz. 28 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 229 van 23.9.2009, blz. 28

| | PB C 263 van 5.11.2009, blz. 22 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 263 van 5.11.2009, blz. 22

| | PB C 298 van 8.12.2009, blz. 17 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 298 van 8.12.2009, blz. 17

| | PB C 74 van 24.3.2010, blz. 13 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 74 van 24.3.2010, blz. 13

| | PB C 326 van 3.12.2010, blz. 17 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 326 van 3.12.2010, blz. 17

| | PB C 355 van 29.12.2010, blz. 34 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 355 van 29.12.2010, blz. 34

| | PB C 22 van 22.1.2011, blz. 22 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 22 van 22.1.2011, blz. 22

| | PB C 37 van 5.2.2011, blz. 12 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 37 van 5.2.2011, blz. 12

| | PB C 149 van 20.5.2011, blz. 8 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 149 van 20.5.2011, blz. 8

| | PB C 190 van 30.6.2011, blz. 17 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 190 van 30.6.2011, blz. 17

| | PB C 203 van 9.7.2011, blz. 14 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 203 van 9.7.2011, blz. 14

| | PB C 210 van 16.7.2011, blz. 30 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 210 van 16.7.2011, blz. 30

| | PB C 271 van 14.9.2011, blz. 18 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 271 van 14.9.2011, blz. 18

| | PB C 356 van 6.12.2011, blz. 12 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 356 van 6.12.2011, blz. 12

| | PB C 111 van 18.4.2012, blz. 3 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 111 van 18.4.2012, blz. 3

| | PB C 183 van 23.6.2012, blz. 7 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 183 van 23.6.2012, blz. 7

| | PB C 313 van 17.10.2012, blz. 11 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 313 van 17.10.2012, blz. 11

| | PB C 394 van 20.12.2012, blz. 22 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 394 van 20.12.2012, blz. 22

| | PB C 51 van 22.2.2013, blz. 9 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 51 van 22.2.2013, blz. 9

| | PB C 167 van 13.6.2013, blz. 9 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 167 van 13.6.2013, blz. 9

| | PB C 242 van 23.8.2013, blz. 2 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 242 van 23.8.2013, blz. 2

| | PB C 275 van 24.9.2013, blz. 7 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 275 van 24.9.2013, blz. 7

| | PB C 314 van 29.10.2013, blz. 5 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 314 van 29.10.2013, blz. 5

| | PB C 324 van 9.11.2013, blz. 6 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 324 van 9.11.2013, blz. 6

| | PB C 57 van 28.2.2014, blz. 4 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 57 van 28.2.2014, blz. 4

| | PB C 167 van 4.6.2014, blz. 9 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 167 van 4.6.2014, blz. 9

| | PB C 244 van 26.7.2014, blz. 22 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 244 van 26.7.2014, blz. 22

| | PB C 332 van 24.9.2014, blz. 12 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 332 van 24.9.2014, blz. 12

| | PB C 420 van 22.11.2014, blz. 9 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 420 van 22.11.2014, blz. 9

| | PB C 72 van 28.2.2015, blz. 17 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 72 van 28.2.2015, blz. 17

| | PB C 126 van 18.4.2015, blz. 10 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 126 van 18.4.2015, blz. 10

| | PB C 229 van 14.7.2015, blz. 5 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 229 van 14.7.2015, blz. 5

| | PB C 341 van 16.10.2015, blz. 19 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 341 van 16.10.2015, blz. 19

| | PB C 84 van 4.3.2016, blz. 2. |
| --- | --- |

PB C 84 van 4.3.2016, blz. 2.

---

(1)  Zie de lijst van eerdere publicaties aan het eind van deze bijwerking.

---

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/11

---

Bijwerking van de modellen van de kaarten die door de ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken van de lidstaten worden afgegeven aan geaccrediteerde leden van diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordigingen, alsmede hun familieleden, zoals bedoeld in artikel 20, lid 2, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode) (1)

(2016/C 236/09)

De publicatie van de modellen van de kaarten die door de ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken van de lidstaten worden afgegeven aan geaccrediteerde leden van diplomatieke en consulaire vertegenwoordigingen, alsmede hun familieleden, zoals bedoeld in artikel 20, lid 2, van Verordening (EU) 2016/399 van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 9 maart 2016 betreffende een Uniecode voor de overschrijding van de grenzen door personen (Schengengrenscode) (codificatie) is gebaseerd op de informatie die door de lidstaten aan de Commissie wordt verstrekt overeenkomstig artikel 39 van de Schengengrenscode.

Naast de publicatie in het PB wordt de lijst maandelijks bijgewerkt op de website van het directoraat-generaal Binnenlandse Zaken.

ZWITSERLAND

Vervanging van de informatie die is gepubliceerd in PB C 133 van 1.5.2014

DOOR HET MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN AFGEGEVEN BIJZONDERE VERBLIJFSTITELS

Legitimatiekaarten (verblijfsvergunningen) van het Zwitserse departement van Buitenlandse Zaken:

| — | Carte de légitimation « B « (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / (Legitimatiekaart type B (met roze strook): hoofden van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, bestuurders van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « B « (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / (Legitimatiekaart type B (met roze strook): hoofden van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, bestuurders van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « C « (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type C (met roze strook): leden van het diplomatieke personeel van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, ambtenaren van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « C « (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type C (met roze strook): leden van het diplomatieke personeel van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, ambtenaren van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « D « (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type D (met blauwe strook): leden van het administratief en technisch personeel van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « D « (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type D (met blauwe strook): leden van het administratief en technisch personeel van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « D « (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type D (met bruine strook): ambtenaren van de categorie beroepspersoneel van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « D « (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type D (met bruine strook): ambtenaren van de categorie beroepspersoneel van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « E « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type E (met paarse strook): leden van het dienstpersoneel van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, ambtenaren van de algemene diensten van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « E « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type E (met paarse strook): leden van het dienstpersoneel van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, ambtenaren van de algemene diensten van internationale organisaties en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « F « (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali / (Legitimatiekaart type F (met gele strook): huishoudelijk personeel van leden van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies en consulaire beroepsposten, alsmede huishoudelijk personeel van ambtenaren van internationale organisaties); |
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Carte de légitimation « F « (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali / (Legitimatiekaart type F (met gele strook): huishoudelijk personeel van leden van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies en consulaire beroepsposten, alsmede huishoudelijk personeel van ambtenaren van internationale organisaties);

| — | Carte de légitimation « G « (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme «) et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type G (met turquoise strook): ambtenaren van internationale organisaties met een arbeidsovereenkomst van beperkte duur en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « G « (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme «) et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type G (met turquoise strook): ambtenaren van internationale organisaties met een arbeidsovereenkomst van beperkte duur en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « H « (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali / (Legitimatiekaart type H (met witte strook): medewerkers zonder ambtenarenstatus van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, consulaten en internationale organisaties, alsmede personen zonder voorrechten en immuniteiten die gemachtigd zijn om leden van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, consulaten en internationale organisaties te begeleiden); |
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Carte de légitimation « H « (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali / (Legitimatiekaart type H (met witte strook): medewerkers zonder ambtenarenstatus van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, consulaten en internationale organisaties, alsmede personen zonder voorrechten en immuniteiten die gemachtigd zijn om leden van permanente of bijzondere diplomatieke missies, consulaten en internationale organisaties te begeleiden);

| — | Carte de légitimation « I « (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type I (met olijfkleurige strook): niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van het Internationaal Comité van het Rode Kruis en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « I « (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type I (met olijfkleurige strook): niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van het Internationaal Comité van het Rode Kruis en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met roze strook): hoofden van consulaire beroepsposten en consulaire beroepsfunctionarissen, alsmede hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met roze strook): hoofden van consulaire beroepsposten en consulaire beroepsfunctionarissen, alsmede hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met blauwe strook): beroepspersoneelsleden van consulaten en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met blauwe strook): beroepspersoneelsleden van consulaten en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met paarse strook): leden van het dienstpersoneel van consulaire beroepsposten en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met paarse strook): leden van het dienstpersoneel van consulaire beroepsposten en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met witte strook): hoofden van honoraire consulaire posten); |
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Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari / (Legitimatiekaart type K (met witte strook): hoofden van honoraire consulaire posten);

| — | Carte de légitimation « L « (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type L (met zandkleurige strook): niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van de Internationale Federatie van Rode Kruis- en Rode Halve Maanverenigingen en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « L « (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type L (met zandkleurige strook): niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van de Internationale Federatie van Rode Kruis- en Rode Halve Maanverenigingen en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « P « (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « P « (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « P « (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type P (met blauwe strook): niet-Zwitserse leden van het wetenschappelijk personeel van het CERN en hun familieleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « P « (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « P « (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « P « (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiekaart type P (met blauwe strook): niet-Zwitserse leden van het wetenschappelijk personeel van het CERN en hun familieleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « R « (à bande grise): membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « R « (mit grauem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « R « (a banda grigia): membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiebewijs type R (met grijze band): niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van internationale quasigouvernementele organisaties of andere internationale organisaties, en hun gezinsleden met dezelfde status); |
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Carte de légitimation « R « (à bande grise): membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « R « (mit grauem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « R « (a banda grigia): membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / (Legitimatiebewijs type R (met grijze band): niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van internationale quasigouvernementele organisaties of andere internationale organisaties, en hun gezinsleden met dezelfde status);

| — | Carte de légitimation « S « (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali / (Legitimatiekaart type S (met groene strook): Zwitserse personeelsleden van permanente en bijzondere diplomatieke missies, Zwitserse ambtenaren van internationale organisaties). |
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Carte de légitimation « S « (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali / (Legitimatiekaart type S (met groene strook): Zwitserse personeelsleden van permanente en bijzondere diplomatieke missies, Zwitserse ambtenaren van internationale organisaties).

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type B

| — | Ambassades en permanente missies: hoofd van de missie |
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Ambassades en permanente missies: hoofd van de missie

| — | Internationale organisaties: bestuurders



  De houder van deze kaart heeft de diplomatenstatus |
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Internationale organisaties: bestuurders

Image

De houder van deze kaart heeft de diplomatenstatus

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type C

| — | Ambassades en permanente missies: lid van het diplomatieke personeel |
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Ambassades en permanente missies: lid van het diplomatieke personeel

| — | Internationale organisaties: hoge ambtenaar



  De houder van deze kaart heeft de diplomatenstatus |
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Internationale organisaties: hoge ambtenaar

Image

De houder van deze kaart heeft de diplomatenstatus

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type D

| — | Ambassades en permanente missies: lid van het administratief en technisch personeel



  De houder van deze kaart heeft de diplomatenstatus, met uitzondering van de vrijstelling van burgerlijke en administratieve rechtsvervolging, die slechts wordt toegekend in het kader van de uitvoering van zijn taken |
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Ambassades en permanente missies: lid van het administratief en technisch personeel

Image

De houder van deze kaart heeft de diplomatenstatus, met uitzondering van de vrijstelling van burgerlijke en administratieve rechtsvervolging, die slechts wordt toegekend in het kader van de uitvoering van zijn taken

| — | Internationale organisaties: beroepsambtenaar



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Internationale organisaties: beroepsambtenaar

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type E

| — | Ambassades en permanente missies: lid van het dienstpersoneel en lid van het plaatselijk aangeworven personeel |
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Ambassades en permanente missies: lid van het dienstpersoneel en lid van het plaatselijk aangeworven personeel

| — | Internationale organisaties: ambtenaar van de algemene diensten



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Internationale organisaties: ambtenaar van de algemene diensten

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type F

| — | Ambassades, permanente missies en internationale organisaties: lid van het huispersoneel van een personeelslid



  De houder van deze kaart is niet vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging |
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Ambassades, permanente missies en internationale organisaties: lid van het huispersoneel van een personeelslid

Image

De houder van deze kaart is niet vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type G

| — | Internationale organisaties: tijdelijke functionaris (met een arbeidsovereenkomst van beperkte duur) en lid van het gedetacheerd personeel



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Internationale organisaties: tijdelijke functionaris (met een arbeidsovereenkomst van beperkte duur) en lid van het gedetacheerd personeel

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type H

| — | Ambassades, consulaten, permanente missies en internationale organisaties: persoon zonder voorrechten en immuniteiten



  De houder van deze kaart is niet vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging en heeft geen toegang tot de Zwitserse arbeidsmarkt |
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Ambassades, consulaten, permanente missies en internationale organisaties: persoon zonder voorrechten en immuniteiten

Image

De houder van deze kaart is niet vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging en heeft geen toegang tot de Zwitserse arbeidsmarkt

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type I

| — | Internationaal Comité van het Rode Kruis: medewerker



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken, maar heeft geen douanevoorrechten |
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Internationaal Comité van het Rode Kruis: medewerker

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken, maar heeft geen douanevoorrechten

Legitimatiekaarten van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type K

| — | Consulaten — rode K-kaart: hoofd van een consulaire beroepspost en consulair beroepsambtenaar



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Consulaten — rode K-kaart: hoofd van een consulaire beroepspost en consulair beroepsambtenaar

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

| — | Consulaten — blauwe K-kaart: consulair beroepsmedewerker



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Consulaten — blauwe K-kaart: consulair beroepsmedewerker

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

| — | Consulaten — paarse K-kaart: lid van het dienstpersoneel en plaatselijk aangeworven personeelslid



  De houder van deze kaart is niet vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging |
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Consulaten — paarse K-kaart: lid van het dienstpersoneel en plaatselijk aangeworven personeelslid

Image

De houder van deze kaart is niet vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging

| — | Consulaten — witte K-kaart: hoofd honoraire post



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging, maar uitsluitend bij de uitoefening van consulaire taken |
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Consulaten — witte K-kaart: hoofd honoraire post

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging, maar uitsluitend bij de uitoefening van consulaire taken

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type L

| — | Internationale Federatie van Rode Kruis- en Rode Halve Maanverenigingen: medewerker



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken, maar heeft geen douanevoorrechten |
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Internationale Federatie van Rode Kruis- en Rode Halve Maanverenigingen: medewerker

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken, maar heeft geen douanevoorrechten

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type P

| — | Europese Organisatie voor kernfysisch onderzoek (CERN): lid van het wetenschappelijk personeel van CERN



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Europese Organisatie voor kernfysisch onderzoek (CERN): lid van het wetenschappelijk personeel van CERN

Image

De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type R

| — | Niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van internationale quasigouvernementele organisaties of andere internationale organisaties, en hun gezinsleden met dezelfde status



  De houder van deze kaart geniet geen immuniteit ten aanzien van de rechtsmacht |
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Niet-Zwitserse personeelsleden van internationale quasigouvernementele organisaties of andere internationale organisaties, en hun gezinsleden met dezelfde status

Image

De houder van deze kaart geniet geen immuniteit ten aanzien van de rechtsmacht

Legitimatiekaart van het departement van Buitenlandse Zaken type S

Een Zwitsers personeelslid krijgt in beginsel, ongeacht de functie die hij in de buitenlandse vertegenwoordiging of internationale organisatie uitoefent, een legitimatiekaart type S. Zwitserse personeelsleden die door ambassades en consulaten plaatselijk zijn aangeworven, krijgen geen kaart. Zwitserse tijdelijke functionarissen (met een arbeidsovereenkomst van beperkte duur) van internationale organisaties krijgen geen kaart.

| — | Ambassades en consulaten: lid van het beroepspersoneel met de Zwitserse nationaliteit |
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Ambassades en consulaten: lid van het beroepspersoneel met de Zwitserse nationaliteit

| — | Permanente missies: personeelslid met de Zwitserse nationaliteit |
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Permanente missies: personeelslid met de Zwitserse nationaliteit

| — | Internationale organisaties: functionaris/medewerker met de Zwitserse nationaliteit



  De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken |
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Internationale organisaties: functionaris/medewerker met de Zwitserse nationaliteit

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De houder van deze kaart is vrijgesteld van rechtsvervolging bij de uitoefening van zijn taken

Lijst van eerdere publicaties

| | PB C 247 van 13.10.2006, blz. 85 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 247 van 13.10.2006, blz. 85

| | PB C 153 van 6.7.2007, blz. 15 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 153 van 6.7.2007, blz. 15

| | PB C 64 van 19.3.2009, blz. 18 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 64 van 19.3.2009, blz. 18

| | PB C 239 van 6.10.2009, blz. 7 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 239 van 6.10.2009, blz. 7

| | PB C 304 van 10.11.2010, blz. 6 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 304 van 10.11.2010, blz. 6

| | PB C 273 van 16.9.2011, blz. 11 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 273 van 16.9.2011, blz. 11

| | PB C 357 van 7.12.2011, blz. 3 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 357 van 7.12.2011, blz. 3

| | PB C 88 van 24.3.2012, blz. 12 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 88 van 24.3.2012, blz. 12

| | PB C 120 van 25.4.2012, blz. 4 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 120 van 25.4.2012, blz. 4

| | PB C 182 van 22.6.2012, blz. 10 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 182 van 22.6.2012, blz. 10

| | PB C 214 van 20.7.2012, blz. 4 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 214 van 20.7.2012, blz. 4

| | PB C 238 van 8.8.2012, blz. 5 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 238 van 8.8.2012, blz. 5

| | PB C 255 van 24.8.2012, blz. 2 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 255 van 24.8.2012, blz. 2

| | PB C 242 van 23.8.2013, blz. 13 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 242 van 23.8.2013, blz. 13

| | PB C 38 van 8.2.2014, blz. 16 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 38 van 8.2.2014, blz. 16

| | PB C 133 van 1.5.2014, blz. 2 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 133 van 1.5.2014, blz. 2

| | PB C 360 van 11.10.2014, blz. 5 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 360 van 11.10.2014, blz. 5

| | PB C 397 van 12.11.2014, blz. 6 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 397 van 12.11.2014, blz. 6

| | PB C 77 van 27.2.2016, blz. 5 |
| --- | --- |

PB C 77 van 27.2.2016, blz. 5

| | PB C 174 van 14.5.2016, blz. 12. |
| --- | --- |

PB C 174 van 14.5.2016, blz. 12.

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(1)  Zie de lijst van eerdere publicaties aan het eind van deze bijwerking.

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INFORMATIE OVER DE EUROPESE ECONOMISCHE RUIMTE

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/21

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Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunvraagstukken

(2016/C 236/10)

Door middel van Besluit nr. 489/15/COL, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, heeft de Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA de Noorse autoriteiten in kennis gesteld van haar besluit tot inleiding van de procedure van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie ten aanzien van de bovengenoemde steunmaatregel.

Belanghebbenden kunnen hun opmerkingen over de betrokken maatregel binnen één maand vanaf de datum van de bekendmaking indienen bij:

| Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA |
| --- |
| Griffie |
| Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

Griffie

Belliardstraat 35

1040 Brussel

BELGIË

De opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van de Noorse autoriteiten worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

SAMENVATTING

Procedure

De Noorse autoriteiten hebben de regeling inzake regionaal gedifferentieerde socialezekerheidsbijdragen 2014-2020 overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 3, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij brief van 13 maart 2014 aangemeld (1). Op basis van die aanmelding en de daarna verstrekte informatie (2) heeft de Autoriteit de aangemelde steunregeling bij Besluit nr. 225/14/COL van 18 juni 2014 goedgekeurd.

In zijn arrest van 23 september 2015 in zaak E-23/14, Kimek Offshore AS/ESA (3), heeft het EVA-Hof het besluit van de Autoriteit (gedeeltelijk) nietig verklaard.

Bij brief van 15 oktober 2015 (4) heeft de Autoriteit de Noorse autoriteiten om informatie verzocht. Bij brief van 6 november 2015 (5) hebben de Noorse autoriteiten op het verzoek om informatie geantwoord.

Beschrijving van de maatregel

Het doel van de algemene regeling inzake gedifferentieerde socialezekerheidsbijdragen als zodanig is om de ontvolking van de minst bevolkte regio’s in Noorwegen af te remmen of te voorkomen door de werkgelegenheid te stimuleren. De regeling voor exploitatiesteun compenseert de arbeidskosten door de tarieven voor de socialezekerheidsbijdragen in bepaalde geografische gebieden te verlagen. In de regel varieert de steunintensiteit naargelang van het geografische gebied waar de bedrijfseenheid is geregistreerd. Volgens de Noorse wet moeten ondernemingen subeenheden registreren voor elke aparte bedrijfsactiviteit die wordt uitgeoefend (6). Als een onderneming verschillende soorten bedrijfsactiviteiten uitoefent, moeten aparte subeenheden geregistreerd worden. Bovendien moeten aparte eenheden geregistreerd worden als de activiteiten op verschillende geografische locaties uitgeoefend worden.

Als uitzondering op de algemene regel inzake registratie is de regeling ook van toepassing op ondernemingen die buiten het in aanmerking komende gebied geregistreerd zijn als zij werknemers ter beschikking stellen in het in aanmerking komende gebied en als hun werknemers binnen het in aanmerking komende gebied mobiele activiteiten verrichten (voor de toepassing van dit besluit worden dit „ambulante diensten” genoemd). Dit is de vrijstellingsregeling die in dit besluit wordt onderzocht. De nationale rechtsgrond voor de regeling als zodanig is punt 23-2 van de nationale wet op de sociale verzekering (7). De nationale rechtsgrond voor de vrijstelling wordt gevormd door deel 1, lid 4, van het besluit nr. 1482 van het Noorse parlement van 5 december 2013 inzake de vaststelling van het belastingtarief e.d. in het kader van de nationale wet op de sociale verzekering.

De vrijstelling is alleen van toepassing wanneer de werknemer de helft of meer van zijn of haar werkdagen in het in aanmerking komende gebied werkt. Voorts is het verlaagde tarief alleen geldig voor het gedeelte van het werk dat daar wordt verricht.

Beoordeling van de maatregel

De Autoriteit moet nagaan of de vrijstellingsregeling verenigbaar is met de werking van de EER-overeenkomst op grond van artikel 61, lid 3, onder c), in overeenstemming met de richtsnoeren van de Autoriteit inzake regionale steunmaatregelen 2014-2020 (hierna de „richtsnoeren regionale steun” genoemd) (8).

Regionale steun kan alleen daadwerkelijk bijdragen aan de economische ontwikkeling van achterstandsgebieden indien deze wordt toegekend om aan te zetten tot aanvullende investeringen of economische activiteiten in die gebieden (9). Regionale exploitatiesteun kan alleen onder artikel 61, lid 3, onder c), van de EER-overeenkomst vallen indien deze wordt verleend om specifieke of blijvende handicaps aan te pakken waarmee ondernemingen in achterstandsgebieden te kampen hebben (10).

Het lijdt geen twijfel dat het geografische toepassingsgebied van de regeling als zodanig beperkt is tot achterstandsgebieden. De werkingssfeer van dit besluit is beperkt tot de vrijstellingsregeling. Het is de vraag of die regeling, die inhoudt dat ondernemingen die buiten de achterstandsgebieden geregistreerd zijn en onder de regeling vallen, in aanmerking kunnen komen voor steun in het kader van de regeling voor zover zij in de achterstandsgebieden economische activiteiten verrichten, verenigbaar is met de staatssteunregels. Met andere woorden: worden met de vrijstellingsregeling specifieke of blijvende handicaps aangepakt waarmee ondernemingen in achterstandsgebieden te kampen hebben?

Het is aan de Noorse autoriteiten om aan te tonen dat zonder de vrijstellingsregeling het risico op ontvolking bestaat (11). De Noorse autoriteiten hebben de voordelen van de vrijstellingsregeling voor lokale ondernemingen benadrukt. Zij krijgen, tegen lagere kosten, toegang tot gespecialiseerde arbeidskrachten die anders niet beschikbaar zouden zijn. Bovendien leidt de vrijstellingsregeling tot meer concurrentie tussen ambulante diensten in de in aanmerking komende gebieden, wat ook gunstig is voor lokale ondernemingen (andere dan de ondernemingen die ambulante diensten verlenen), omdat het door de lagere kosten voor ambulante diensten aantrekkelijker en rendabeler wordt om in het in aanmerking komende gebied een bedrijf te runnen. Het gebruik van steun in het kader van de regeling is een indirect instrument in de zin dat het wordt gebruikt om de kosten voor de tewerkstelling van werknemers te verlagen als maatregel om de ontvolking af te remmen of te voorkomen. Het idee is dat de arbeidsmarkt de voornaamste bepalende factor is voor waar mensen wonen.

De Noorse autoriteiten hebben voorts betoogd dat de ondernemingen die buiten het in aanmerking komende gebied zijn geregistreerd, af en toe werknemers in de in aanmerking komende gebieden tewerkstellen. In dat geval zorgen de ondernemingen voor banen die, hoewel ze van meer tijdelijke aard zijn, toch bijdragen aan een stijging van het looninkomen in de in aanmerking komende gebieden. Dit stimuleert ook de economische activiteit. Voorts halen de Noorse autoriteiten aan dat werknemers die tijdelijk in het in aanmerking komende gebied verblijven, lokale goederen en diensten kopen en zo bijdragen aan de plaatselijke economie. Dit geldt met name voor werknemers die voor een korte of middellange periode op die plaats verblijven, omdat zij waarschijnlijk in hotels overnachten, in restaurants eten enz. De Noorse autoriteiten ramen dat het steunbedrag dat uit de vrijstellingsregeling voortvloeit twee procent van de totale steun voor 2015 bedraagt, maar zij benadrukken dat dit een onzekere raming is. Twee procent komt overeen met ongeveer 19 miljoen EUR (12). De Autoriteit verzoekt de Noorse autoriteiten om preciezere informatie over het financiële effect van de regeling.

Afgezien van de bovenstaande algemene opmerkingen hebben de Noorse autoriteiten niet aangetoond dat in het gebied in kwestie zonder de vrijstellingsregeling het risico op ontvolking bestaat. De Autoriteit is van mening dat de effecten van een maatregel meer moeten inhouden dan een kleine stijging van de tijdelijke werkgelegenheid en de uitgaven in het in aanmerking komende gebied om te voldoen aan de vereisten van de richtsnoeren regionale steun. Op basis hiervan verzoekt de Autoriteit de Noorse autoriteiten om meer inlichtingen te verstrekken en zo aan te tonen dat zonder de vrijstellingsregeling het risico op ontvolking bestaat.

Wat betreft de effecten op de mededinging en het handelsverkeer van de vrijstellingsregeling betogen de Noorse autoriteiten dat die vrijstellingsregeling een gelijk speelveld creëert voor alle ondernemingen die actief zijn in de achterstandsgebieden, omdat ze in gelijke mate van toepassing is op alle in de EER gevestigde ondernemingen. Daardoor garandeert ze dat ongerechtvaardigde negatieve gevolgen voor de mededinging worden vermeden. De Autoriteit is van mening dat dit een positief element is in het licht van de punten 3 en 53 van de richtsnoeren regionale steun. De ondernemingen die in het in aanmerking komende gebied zijn geregistreerd, kunnen echter in het algemeen meer structurele moeilijkheden ondervinden dan de ondernemingen die louter op niet-permanente basis werknemers naar dat gebied sturen om er te werken. De Noorse autoriteiten voeren aan dat ondernemingen die buiten het in aanmerking komende gebied geregistreerd zijn, een concurrentienadeel kunnen ondervinden ten opzichte van plaatselijke ondernemingen, onder meer door de kosten voor vervoer en logies van personeel. De Noorse autoriteiten hebben geen gegevens of verdere argumenten verstrekt ter staving van deze veronderstelling. De Autoriteit verzoekt de Noorse autoriteiten om verder te verduidelijken waarom de vrijstellingsregeling geen ongerechtvaardigde negatieve gevolgen voor de mededinging heeft en om meer informatie in te dienen om dit te staven.

De Noorse autoriteiten hebben benadrukt dat het duidelijk is dat de vrijstellingsregeling een stimulerend effect heeft. Het stimulerende effect van steun kan niet louter worden verondersteld. Hoewel het niet nodig is afzonderlijke bewijsstukken te verstrekken van het feit dat steun in het kader van een regeling voor elke begunstigde op individuele basis een stimulans vormt om een activiteit uit te oefenen die hij anders niet zou hebben verricht, moet het stimulerende effect ten minste gebaseerd zijn op gefundeerde economische theorieën. Het is niet voldoende om enkel te verwijzen naar een vermeende evidentie. Het is weliswaar juist dat de vrijstellingsregeling voor ondernemingen die buiten de in aanmerking komende gebieden geregistreerd zijn, de arbeidskosten voor ambulante diensten in de in aanmerking komende gebieden vermindert, maar de Noorse autoriteiten hebben geen bewijsmateriaal of argumenten aangebracht voor het feit dat mag worden verwacht dat, zonder de steun, het niveau van de economische activiteit in het betrokken gebied of de betrokken regio aanzienlijk zou zijn afgenomen als gevolg van de problemen die de steun moet aanpakken (13).

De Noorse autoriteiten hebben uitgelegd dat ondernemingen die ambulante diensten verlenen tot op zekere hoogte subeenheden kunnen registreren in het in aanmerking komende gebied. Meer nog, zij zijn verplicht dat te doen als ten minste één werknemer in een ander gebied voor de moedereenheid werkt en de onderneming daar kan worden bezocht.

De Noorse autoriteiten voeren aan dat er zonder de vrijstellingsregeling voor ambulante diensten in het in aanmerking komende gebied een ongerechtvaardigd verschil in behandeling zou zijn naargelang de dienstverrichter al dan niet een subeenheid in het in aanmerking komende gebied heeft.

Ten eerste is het de Autoriteit niet duidelijk wat het vereiste dat „ten minste één werknemer in een ander gebied voor de moedereenheid werkt en de onderneming daar kan worden bezocht”, inhoudt. De Autoriteit verzoekt de Noorse autoriteiten daarom om dit te verduidelijken.

Ten tweede is het beginsel van gelijke behandeling een algemeen beginsel van het EER-recht. Dit kan echter niet op zichzelf als grondslag dienen om de vrijstellingsregeling te rechtvaardigen. De vrijstellingsregeling moet zelf verenigbaar zijn met de werking van de EER-overeenkomst.

Conclusie: door het gebrek aan relevante informatie, zoals hierboven beschreven, heeft de Autoriteit twijfels over de verenigbaarheid van de vrijstellingsregeling met de werking van de EER-overeenkomst.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 489/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening a formal investigation into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020

(Norway)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014. |
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(1)

The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014.

| (2) | By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision.

| (3) | By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
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(3)

By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The scheme as such is not the subject of the formal investigation

| (4) | By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled. |
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(4)

By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled.

3.   The scheme

3.1   
  Objective

| (5) | The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below. |
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(5)

The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below.

3.2   
  National legal basis

| (6) | The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme.

| (7) | For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

3.3   
  Rules on registration

| (8) | As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered. |
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(8)

As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered.

| (9) | Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations. |
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(9)

Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations.

| (10) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area. |
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(10)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area.

3.4   
  Ambulant services – the measure under scrutiny

| (11) | By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. |
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(11)

By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014.

| (12) | The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month. |
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(12)

The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month.

| (13) | This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo. |
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(13)

This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo.

4.   The judgment of the EFTA Court

| (14) | The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21). |
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(14)

The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21).

5.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (15) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22). |
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(15)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22).

| (16) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates. |
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(16)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates.

| (17) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme. |
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(17)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme.

| (18) | Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (19) | The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel.

| (20) | In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services. |
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(20)

In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services.

| (21) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. |
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(21)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (22) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (23) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition.

| (24) | In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (25) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful. |
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(26)

The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (27) | The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG.

| (28) | The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas.

| (29) | Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25).

| (30) | There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions? |
| --- | --- |

(30)

There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions?

| (31) | It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live.

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule.

| (33) | Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule.

| (34) | In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up.

| (35) | The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28).

| (36) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there.

| (37) | The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (38) | Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this.

| (39) | Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (40) | In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (41) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (43) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules.

| (44) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 10 January 2016.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 10 January 2016, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, on 9 December 2015

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  Documenten nrs. 702438-702440, 702442 en 702443.

1

(2)  Zie punt 2 van Besluit nr. 225/14/COL, online beschikbaar op: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

2

(3)  Nog niet gepubliceerd.

3

(4)  Document nr. 776348.

4

(5)  Documenten nrs. 779603 en 779604.

5

(6)  Wet inzake het coördinerende register voor rechtspersonen (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

6

(7)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

7

(8)  PB L 166 van 5.6.2014, blz. 44 en EER-supplement nr. 33 van 5.6.2014, blz. 1.

8

(9)  Punt 6 van de richtsnoeren regionale steun.

9

(10)  Punt 16 van de richtsnoeren regionale steun.

10

(11)  Punt 43 van de richtsnoeren regionale steun.

11

(12)  Op basis van de aangemelde begroting 2013, zie punt 49 van Besluit nr. 225/14/COL van de Autoriteit.

12

(13)  Punt 71 van de richtsnoeren regionale steun.

13

(14)  Documents No 702438-702440, 702442 and 702443.

14

(15)  See paragraph 2 of Decision No 225/14/COL, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

15

(16)  Not yet reported.

16

(17)  Document No 776348.

17

(18)  Documents No 779603 and 779604.

18

(19)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

19

(20)  The Act on the Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

20

(21)  See Order of the EFTA Court of 23.11.2015 in Case E-23/14 INT Kimek Offshore AS v ESA (not yet reported).

21

Kimek Offshore AS

ESA

(22)  OJ L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 and EEA Supplement No 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

22

(23)  The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014 (OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61) at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

23

(24)  Para. 6 of the RAG.

24

(25)  Para. 16 of the RAG.

25

(26)  Para. 43 of the RAG.

26

(27)  Based on the notified 2013 budget, see para. 49 of the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

27

(28)  Para. 71 of the RAG.

28

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| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/29

---

Uitnodiging om opmerkingen te maken overeenkomstig artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie over staatssteunkwesties in verband met mogelijke staatssteun aan Hurtigruten ASA in het kader van het contract voor Hurtigruten-kustvervoersdiensten voor de periode 2012-2019

(2016/C 236/11)

Door middel van Besluit nr. 490/15/COL van 9 december 2015, dat na deze samenvatting in de authentieke taal is weergegeven, heeft de Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA de procedure ingeleid van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie. De Noorse autoriteiten zijn hiervan door middel van een afschrift van de betrokken beschikking in kennis gesteld.

De Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA verzoekt bij dezen de EVA-staten, de EU-lidstaten en belanghebbenden hun opmerkingen over de betrokken maatregel in te dienen door deze binnen één maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking te zenden aan:

| Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA |
| --- |
| Griffie |
| Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

Toezichthoudende Autoriteit van de EVA

Griffie

Belliardstraat 35

1040 Brussel

BELGIË

Deze opmerkingen zullen ter kennis van de Noorse autoriteiten worden gebracht. Een belanghebbende die opmerkingen maakt, kan, met opgave van redenen, schriftelijk verzoeken om vertrouwelijke behandeling van zijn identiteit.

SAMENVATTING

Achtergrond

Hurtigruten ASA (hierna „Hurtigruten” genoemd) verricht zeevervoersdiensten in de vorm van gecombineerd vervoer van personen en goederen langs de Noorse kustlijn, van Bergen tot Kirkenes.

Na een aanbestedingsprocedure heeft Hurtigruten op 13 april 2011 een contract voor het verrichten van diensten op de kustroute Bergen-Kirkeness gesloten voor de periode van 1 januari 2012 tot en met 31 december 2019 (hierna „het contract” genoemd). Volgens dit contract moet Hurtigruten het hele jaar door dagelijks afvaarten verzorgen, waarbij wordt aangemeerd in 32 specifieke havens op de route tussen Bergen en Kirkenes. Op de routes Tromsø-Kirkenes en Kirkenes-Tromsø moet ook vrachtvervoer worden verzorgd. De diensten moeten worden verricht volgens bepaalde capaciteits- en vaartuigcriteria die in het contract zijn vastgesteld. Op de kustroute ingezette vaartuigen moeten een minimale passagierscapaciteit hebben van 320 passagiers, kajuiten voor 120 passagiers en vrachtcapaciteit voor 150 europaletten bij bevrachting met normale laadhoogte. Zij moeten ook voldoen aan juridische en technische voorwaarden uit deel 4.4 van het bestek.

Voor de diensten die onder het contract vallen, betalen de Noorse autoriteiten een totale compensatie van 5 120 miljoen NOK voor de acht jaar dat het contract loopt.

Staatssteunrechtelijke beoordeling van de compensatie

Het enige criterium van het begrip „staatssteun” dat aan de orde is, is de vraag of met de maatregel aan Hurtigruten een onterecht selectief economisch voordeel wordt verschaft.

Selectief economisch voordeel voor Hurtigruten

De Autoriteit heeft de maatregel aan de vier criteria van het Altmark-arrest (1) getoetst en is, in dit stadium, tot de bevinding gekomen dat geen van deze criteria lijkt te zijn vervuld en dat dus een selectief voordeel aan Hurtigruten is verleend in de zin van artikel 61, lid 1, van de EER-overeenkomst.

Wat betreft het eerste criterium van een duidelijk omschreven openbaredienstverplichting, betwijfelt de Autoriteit of het vereiste inzake capaciteitsreserve van punt 4-2 van het contract door Noorwegen als een dienst van algemeen economisch belang (DAEB) kan worden aangemerkt. Zij verzoekt de Noorse autoriteiten een objectieve rechtvaardiging te verschaffen ten aanzien van de noodzaak van een openbaredienstverplichting, rekening houdende met de seizoensfluctuaties in het commerciële reizigersvervoer.

Wat betreft het tweede criterium en het feit dat de parameters op grond waarvan de compensatie wordt berekend, vooraf objectief en transparant moeten zijn vastgesteld, betwijfelt de Autoriteit in dit stadium of het vereiste inzake capaciteitsreserve verband houdt met de daadwerkelijke passagiersaantallen van de openbaredienstverplichting. Zo was er bijvoorbeeld geen objectieve en transparante methodiek om vooraf de kosten per passagier/kilometer te berekenen. Hurtigruten heeft een afzonderlijk budget opgesteld waarin alle aan de routes met openbaredienstverplichtingen toe te rekenen kosten en baten zijn opgenomen. Deze gescheiden boekhouding dient echter niet om vooraf de parameters voor compensatie te bepalen, die rechtstreeks verband moeten houden met de daadwerkelijke verliezen en kosten (capaciteit en passagierskosten) die Hurtigruten moet maken.

Ten aanzien van het derde criterium betwijfelt de Autoriteit of de Noorse autoriteiten ervoor hebben gezorgd dat de toegekende compensatie niet hoger uitkomt dan hetgeen nodig is om geheel of gedeeltelijk de kosten te dekken die bij het uitvoeren van de openbaredienstverplichtingen worden gemaakt, rekening houdende met de betrokken opbrengsten en een redelijke winst voor het verrichten van die verplichtingen.

In dit stadium kan de Autoriteit niet uitsluiten dat Hurtigruten werd „overgecompenseerd” voor het verrichten van de openbare dienst. Om tot deze voorlopige bevinding te komen, heeft de Autoriteit de volgende factoren meegewogen:

| i) | Hurtigruten reserveert geen capaciteit voor passagiers in de openbare dienst, maar verkoopt deze capaciteit aan cruisepassagiers, terwijl zij toch een even hoge compensatie voor de openbare dienst behoudt; |
| --- | --- |

i)

Hurtigruten reserveert geen capaciteit voor passagiers in de openbare dienst, maar verkoopt deze capaciteit aan cruisepassagiers, terwijl zij toch een even hoge compensatie voor de openbare dienst behoudt;

| ii) | de compensatie voor het verrichten van de openbare dienst is aanzienlijk toegenomen ten opzichte van de voorgaande contractperiode; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

de compensatie voor het verrichten van de openbare dienst is aanzienlijk toegenomen ten opzichte van de voorgaande contractperiode;

| iii) | Hurtigruten blijft compensatie ontvangen voor diensten die niet worden verricht, en |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten blijft compensatie ontvangen voor diensten die niet worden verricht, en

| iv) | Hurtigruten probeert nog steeds lagere tarieven te krijgen voor de havengelden, terwijl zij een even hoge compensatie voor de openbare dienst behoudt. |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten probeert nog steeds lagere tarieven te krijgen voor de havengelden, terwijl zij een even hoge compensatie voor de openbare dienst behoudt.

Wat ten slotte het vierde criterium betreft, waarbij een aanbestedingsprocedure moet worden uitgeschreven of benchmarking met een doelmatige exploitant moet plaatsvinden, heeft de Autoriteit, ten aanzien van de aanbestedingsprocedure die slecht één bod opleverde (dat van Hurtigruten), in dit stadium twijfel of een aanbesteding zoals die in deze zaak geacht kan worden, „de laagste kosten voor de gemeenschap” garandeert. Dit komt met name doordat Hurtigruten een aanzienlijk concurrentievoordeel had dat haar positie in de aanbestedingsprocedure versterkte, omdat zij al over vaartuigen beschikte die waren aangepast aan de voorwaarden van het bestek.

Bovendien kon volgens het bestek de opdracht voor het uitvoeren van de openbaredienstverplichting op drie verschillende wijzen worden uitgevoerd. Dit zou een aanwijzing zijn dat bij deze alternatieven verdere informatie en/of wegingscriteria speelden. Aangezien dit soort informatie niet in de aanbestedingsdocumenten was opgenomen, betwijfelt de Autoriteit of de aanbesteding was vormgegeven om prikkels te geven aan kandidaat-inschrijvers niet zijnde Hurtigruten, die bereid zouden zijn een bod uit te brengen in overeenstemming met de voorwaarden van de drie verschillende alternatieven en voor een ander alternatief dan dat waarvoor daadwerkelijk is gekozen.

De Noorse autoriteiten hebben geen informatie verschaft over de benchmarking met een doelmatige exploitant.

De beoordeling van de verenigbaarheid

De verenigbaarheid van de compensatie voor de openbare dienst in het zeevervoer wordt beoordeeld op grond van artikel 59, lid 2, van de EER-overeenkomst, in samenhang met de kaderregeling inzake staatssteun in de vorm van compensatie voor de openbare dienst (hierna „het steunkader” genoemd) (2).

De beginselen uit het steunkader gelden alleen voor compensatie voor de openbare dienst voor zover deze staatssteun vormt die niet valt onder Besluit 2012/21/EU van de Commissie betreffende de toepassing van artikel 106, lid 2, van het Verdrag betreffende de werking van de Europese Unie op staatssteun in de vorm van compensatie voor de openbare dienst, verleend aan bepaalde met het beheer van diensten van algemeen economisch belang belaste ondernemingen (3) („het DAEB-besluit”).

De Autoriteit heeft van de Noorse autoriteiten geen informatie ontvangen ten aanzien van verenigbaarheidsoverwegingen en heeft in dit stadium twijfel of het contract verenigbaar is met de werking van de EER-overeenkomst.

Conclusie

Gelet op het bovenstaande heeft de Autoriteit besloten de formele onderzoeksprocedure van artikel 1, lid 2, van deel I van Protocol nr. 3 bij de Overeenkomst tussen de EVA-staten betreffende de oprichting van een Toezichthoudende Autoriteit en een Hof van Justitie in te leiden. Belanghebbenden wordt verzocht hun opmerkingen te maken binnen één maand vanaf de datum van deze bekendmaking in het Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 490/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening the formal investigation procedure on the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019

(Norway)

[NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION]

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 59(2) and 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019.

| (2) | A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text.

| (3) | By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015.

2.   Background – the Hurtigruten Agreement

| (4) | Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

  Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route

| (5) | The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid.

| (6) | The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5) |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5)

| (7) | Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications.

| (8) | The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities.

| (9) | For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport.

| (10) | For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

  Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA







  2012 | NOK 700 million |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | NOK 683 million |
| 2014 | NOK 666 million |
| 2015 | NOK 649 million |
| 2016 | NOK 631 million |
| 2017 | NOK 614 million |
| 2018 | NOK 597 million |
| 2019 | NOK 580 million |

(10)

For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA

2012

NOK 700 million

2013

NOK 683 million

2014

NOK 666 million

2015

NOK 649 million

2016

NOK 631 million

2017

NOK 614 million

2018

NOK 597 million

2019

NOK 580 million

| (11) | According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route.

3.   The complaints
   (8)

| (12) | Both complainants have requested confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Both complainants have requested confidential treatment.

| (13) | The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:






  1. | The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:

1.

The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period.

| 2. | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:






  a. | Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:

a.

Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services.

| b. | Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.
  The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.
  In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions. |
| --- | --- |

b.

Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.

The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.

In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions.

| 3. | Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level.

| 4. | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities
   (10)

| (14) | On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes.

| (15) | Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million.

| (16) | Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013).

| (17) | As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions.

| (18) | Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12).

| (19) | In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo.

| (20) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing.

| (21) | As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis.

| (22) | The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices.

| (23) | It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction.

| (24) | In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service.

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand.

| (26) | For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge.

4.1   
  The BDO report

   (14)

| (27) | The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services).

| (28) | In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers.

| (29) | [...] |
| --- | --- |

(29)

[...]

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

1.1   
  The concept of state aid

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (31) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.2   
  State resources

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources.

1.3   
  Impact on trade and distortion of competition

| (33) | The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

| (34) | According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States.

| (35) | The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten.

1.4   
  Selective economic advantage on Hurtigruten

| (36) | The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (37) | It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  i. | ‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

i.

‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined;

| ii. | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...]; |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...];

| iii. | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;

| iv. | Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19) |
| --- | --- |

iv.

Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19)

1.4.1   The first Altmark condition

| (38) | The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel.

| (39) | Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20).

| (40) | In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21).

| (41) | However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23).

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service.

| (43) | Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower.

| (44) | For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation.

| (45) | The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged.

| (46) | In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA.

| (47) | The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation.

| (48) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met.

1.4.2   The second Altmark condition

| (49) | The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations.

| (50) | Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’.

| (51) | It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

  Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service







  A: | Total revenues distance passengers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| B: | Passengers cost distance passengers |
| C: | Net passenger revenues (A+B) |
| D: | Revenues from on board sales |
| E: | Net revenues from goods and cars |
| F: | Other revenues |
| G: | Total own revenues (C+D+E+F) |
| H: | Government procurement of service |
| I: | Total revenue (G+H) |
| J: | Safety crew |
| K: | Oil and fuel |
| L: | Repairs and maintenance |
| M: | Port costs |
| N: | Insurance costs |
| O: | Depreciation own vessels/bareboat |
| P: | Net financial costs |
| Q: | Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P) |
| R: | Cost of goods sold |
| S: | Crew not included in the safety crew |
| T: | Marketing costs and sales provision |
| U: | Administration costs |
| V: | Other costs |
| W: | Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V) |
| X: | Total costs public service (Q+W) |
| Y: | Net result before taxes (I-X) |

(51)

It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service

A:

Total revenues distance passengers

B:

Passengers cost distance passengers

C:

Net passenger revenues (A+B)

D:

Revenues from on board sales

E:

Net revenues from goods and cars

F:

Other revenues

G:

Total own revenues (C+D+E+F)

H:

Government procurement of service

I:

Total revenue (G+H)

J:

Safety crew

K:

Oil and fuel

L:

Repairs and maintenance

M:

Port costs

N:

Insurance costs

O:

Depreciation own vessels/bareboat

P:

Net financial costs

Q:

Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P)

R:

Cost of goods sold

S:

Crew not included in the safety crew

T:

Marketing costs and sales provision

U:

Administration costs

V:

Other costs

W:

Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V)

X:

Total costs public service (Q+W)

Y:

Net result before taxes (I-X)

| (52) | In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers.

| (54) | At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre.

| (55) | Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs).

| (56) | In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26).

| (57) | In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27).

| (58) | In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn).

| (59) | The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service.

| (60) | Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition.

| (61) | As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled.

1.4.3   The third Altmark condition

| (62) | When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (63) | In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28).

| (64) | Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:






  i) | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:

i)

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| ii) | The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly

| iv) | Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| (65) | As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation.

| (66) | The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year.

| (67) | The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers.

| (68) | Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120.

| (69) | In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded.

| (70) | Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation.

| (71) | On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions.

| (72) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted.

| (73) | Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided.

| (75) | Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period.

| (76) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled.

1.4.4   The fourth Altmark condition

| (77) | Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013).

| (78) | Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below.

| (79) | Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications.

| (80) | Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:








  i. | : | Alternative 1 | : | Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ii. | : | Alternative 2 | : | Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and |
| iii. | : | Alternative 3 | : | Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports. |

(80)

Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:

i.

:

Alternative 1

:

Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports;

ii.

:

Alternative 2

:

Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and

iii.

:

Alternative 3

:

Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports.

| (81) | However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1).

| (82) | The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped.

| (83) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met.

1.4.5   Conclusion on the Altmark conditions

| (84) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations.

2.   Conclusion on the presence of aid

| (85) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (86) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (87) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1   
  The legal framework

| (88) | The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33).

| (89) | The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34).

| (90) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility.

4.2   
  Applicability of Decision 2012/21/EU

| (91) | The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

| (92) | There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:







  ‘(d) | compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:

‘(d)

compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’;

| (93) | The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers.

| (94) | In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit.

| (95) | The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with.

4.3   
  Applicability of the Framework

| (96) | On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’.

| (97) | Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36) |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36)

| (98) | On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service.

| (99) | The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:
  a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;
  b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;
  c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;
  d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;
  e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;
  f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;
  g.   Paragraph 60: transparency. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:

a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;

b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;

c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;

d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;

e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;

f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;

g.   Paragraph 60: transparency.

| (100) | The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (101) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (102) | The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (103) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (104) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules.

| (105) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten.

| (106) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. They are further requested to provide, also within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 4

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, on 9 December 2015.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Svedman

President

Helga Jónsdóttir

College Member

---

(1)  Arrest van het Hof van Justitie van 24 juli 2003, Altmark Trans GmbH en Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg/Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH, C-280/00, ECLI:EU:C:2003:415, punten 87-93.

1

(2)  Beschikbaar onder: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf

2

(3)  PB L 7 van 11.1.2012, blz. 3, opgenomen onder punt 1h van bijlage XV bij de EER-overeenkomst.

3

(4)  OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1. See also Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, upholding the Authority's Decision.

4

Hurtigruten

(5)  See www.doffin.no.

5

(6)  If Statistics Norway's cost index is unavailable, Statistics Norway's Consumer Price Index would be used.

6

(7)  As mentioned in the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL ‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’, section 1.2.

7

‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’,

(8)  Doc Nos 748323 and 715314.

8

(9)  The complainants point to the fact that in the call for tender for the 2005-2012 contract period force majeure as a result of extreme weather conditions was defined as wind speeds over 25 m/s (full storm). However, in the current HA, ‘extreme weather conditions’ are defined as ‘conditions where ocean and/or wind conditions are such that the ship's captain judges it to be unsafe to continue the sailing and/or arrive at a specific port’. This, according to the complainants, has resulted in the majority of the cancellations during the period 2012-2013 in select ports to have occurred at wind conditions below 15 m/s.

9

force majeure

(10)  Doc Nos 723002 and 742652.

10

(11)  The Norwegian authorities submit that according to Hurtigruten's reports, ships were out of production for 171 operating days in 2012 and 186.7 operating days in 2013 due to maintenance and unforeseen operational disturbances, for 5 operating days in 2012 and 12.8 operating days in 2013 due to the ships being used for cultural or similar activities, and finally for 87 operating days in 2012 and 99.8 operating days in 2013 due to extraordinary weather conditions.

11

(12)  On 12 December 2014, Hurtigruten paid back to the Norwegian authorities the amount of NOK [24 – 32] million due to cancellations in 2012 and 2013.

12

(13)  The previous NPA of 1984 distinguished between port fees and service charges. There were several different port fees, e.g. quay fees covering quay costs, approach fees covering costs of keeping the fairway and port approach open and safe, passenger fees covering costs of special passenger facilities etc. Ports could additionally levy service charges for services they sold, which were not covered by the port fees.

13

(14)  BDO Memo, ‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’, Oslo 14 January 2015, p. 7.

14

‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’

(15)  Judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11; judgment in Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41; and judgment in Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 75.

15

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7).

16

(17)  The maritime cabotage regulation was incorporated at point 53a in Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 30, 5.2.1998, p. 42).

17

(18)  Norwegian Cruise Line, MSC Cruises, Royal Caribbean, Holland America Line, etc.

18

(19)  Paragraphs 87-93.

19

(20)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15132&1=1.

20

(21)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

21

(22)  Judgment in Alanir and others, C-205/1999, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 34.

22

Alanir and others

(23)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions updating and rectifying the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), COM(2003) 595 final, 22.12.2003, section 5.2.

23

(24)  BDO Memo, page 7.

24

(25)  Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraph 117.

25

Hurtigruten

(26)  Ibid, paragraphs 128-129.

26

(27)  Ibid, paragraph 127.

27

(28)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, judgment in Enirisorse, C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, paragraphs 37-40.

28

Enirisorse

(29)  Section 2.

29

(30)  See footnote 11.

30

(31)  Paragraph 68, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

31

(32)  For background information on the Hurtigruten Agreement, see Decision No 205/11/COL on the Supplementary Agreement on the Hurtigruten service, section 2, OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1.

32

(33)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

33

(34)  OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporated at point 1h of Annex XV of the EEA Agreement.

34

(35)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

35

Italy

Commission

(36)  See also paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Framework for alternative calculation methods.

36

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| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/45

---

Mededeling van Noorwegen in verband met Richtlijn 94/22/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad betreffende de voorwaarden voor het verlenen en het gebruikmaken van vergunningen voor de prospectie, de exploratie en de productie van koolwaterstoffen

Bekendmaking van een uitnodiging tot het indienen van aanvragen voor vergunningen voor oliewinning op het Noors continentaal plat — Vergunningsronde in van tevoren afgebakende gebieden (Awards in Predefined Areas) 2016

(2016/C 236/12)

Het Noorse ministerie van Olie en Energie gaat hierbij over tot bekendmaking van een uitnodiging tot het indienen van aanvragen voor vergunningen voor oliewinning overeenkomstig artikel 3, lid 2, onder a), van Richtlijn 94/22/EG van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 30 mei 1994 betreffende de voorwaarden voor het verlenen en het gebruikmaken van vergunningen voor de prospectie, de exploratie en de productie van koolwaterstoffen (1).

Vergunningen voor oliewinning worden uitsluitend toegewezen aan naamloze vennootschappen die zijn geregistreerd in Noorwegen of in een andere staat die partij is bij de Overeenkomst betreffende de Europese Economische Ruimte (de EER-overeenkomst), of aan natuurlijke personen die ingezetenen zijn van een staat die partij is bij de EER-overeenkomst.

Ondernemingen die geen vergunninghouders zijn op het continentaal plat van Noorwegen, kunnen winningsvergunningen toegewezen krijgen indien zij vooraf als geschikte vergunninghouders op het Noors continentaal plat zijn erkend.

Ondernemingen die individuele aanvragen indienen en ondernemingen die als onderdeel van een groep hun aanvragen indienen, zullen door het ministerie op gelijke voet worden behandeld. Aanvragers die een individuele aanvraag indienen of aanvragers die onderdeel zijn van een groep die gezamenlijk een aanvraag indient, zullen allen worden aangemerkt als aanvragers voor een winningsvergunning. Het ministerie kan aan de hand van door groepen of door individuele aanvragers ingediende aanvragen de samenstelling van de vergunninghoudende groepen bepalen, onder meer door aanvragers in een gezamenlijke aanvraag te schrappen en individuele aanvragers toe te voegen, en de exploitant voor deze groepen aanstellen.

Voor de toekenning van een participatie in een winningsvergunning is vereist dat de vergunninghouders een overeenkomst voor aardoliewinningsactiviteiten aangaan, daarbij inbegrepen een gezamenlijke exploitatieovereenkomst en een financiële overeenkomst. Indien de winningsvergunning stratigrafisch wordt verdeeld, dienen de vergunninghouders van de twee stratigrafisch verdeelde vergunningen tevens een specifieke gezamenlijke exploitatieovereenkomst te sluiten waarin de onderlinge betrekkingen rond de verdeelsleutel worden geregeld.

De vergunninghouders vormen na de ondertekening van deze overeenkomsten een gemeenschappelijke onderneming waarin de omvang van hun participatie te allen tijde identiek is aan hun participatie in de winningsvergunning.

De vergunningsdocumenten zijn hoofdzakelijk gebaseerd op relevante stukken van de gunningsronde in van tevoren afgebakende gebieden 2015. Het doel hiervan is de voornaamste elementen van aanpassingen aan het kader beschikbaar te stellen voor de bedrijfstak, voordat de aanvragen moeten worden ingediend.

Criteria voor de toekenning van een winningsvergunning

Voor het bevorderen van een verstandig beheer van de grondstoffen en een snelle en efficiënte exploratie naar en winning van aardolie op het Noors continentaal plat, met inbegrip van de samenstelling van groepen vergunninghouders om dit te bereiken, gelden de volgende criteria bij de toekenning van participaties in winningsvergunningen en voor de aanstelling van een exploitant:

| a) | het inzicht van de aanvrager in de geologie van het betrokken geografisch gebied en hoe de vergunninghouders voorstellen een efficiënte exploratie naar olie uit te voeren; |
| --- | --- |

a)

het inzicht van de aanvrager in de geologie van het betrokken geografisch gebied en hoe de vergunninghouders voorstellen een efficiënte exploratie naar olie uit te voeren;

| b) | de relevante technische expertise van de aanvrager en hoe deze expertise actief de kosteneffectieve exploratie en, eventueel, de winning van olie in het betrokken geografische gebied kan bevorderen; |
| --- | --- |

b)

de relevante technische expertise van de aanvrager en hoe deze expertise actief de kosteneffectieve exploratie en, eventueel, de winning van olie in het betrokken geografische gebied kan bevorderen;

| c) | de opgedane ervaring van de aanvrager op het Noors continentaal plat dan wel gelijkwaardige relevante ervaring in andere gebieden; |
| --- | --- |

c)

de opgedane ervaring van de aanvrager op het Noors continentaal plat dan wel gelijkwaardige relevante ervaring in andere gebieden;

| d) | dat de aanvrager over afdoende financiële middelen beschikt om de exploratie naar en, eventueel, de winning van olie in het desbetreffende geografische gebied uit te voeren; |
| --- | --- |

d)

dat de aanvrager over afdoende financiële middelen beschikt om de exploratie naar en, eventueel, de winning van olie in het desbetreffende geografische gebied uit te voeren;

| e) | indien de aanvrager een vergunninghouder is of is geweest, kan het ministerie rekening houden met elke blijk van inefficiëntie of gebrek aan verantwoordingsplicht van de aanvrager als vergunninghouder; |
| --- | --- |

e)

indien de aanvrager een vergunninghouder is of is geweest, kan het ministerie rekening houden met elke blijk van inefficiëntie of gebrek aan verantwoordingsplicht van de aanvrager als vergunninghouder;

| f) | winningsvergunningen worden hoofdzakelijk toegekend aan een gemeenschappelijke onderneming waarvan ten minste één vergunninghouder als exploitant ten minste één boring op het Noors continentaal plat heeft uitgevoerd, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring heeft opgedaan; |
| --- | --- |

f)

winningsvergunningen worden hoofdzakelijk toegekend aan een gemeenschappelijke onderneming waarvan ten minste één vergunninghouder als exploitant ten minste één boring op het Noors continentaal plat heeft uitgevoerd, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring heeft opgedaan;

| g) | winningsvergunningen worden hoofdzakelijk toegekend aan twee of meer vergunninghouders wanneer ten minste één dezer over de onder f) genoemde ervaring beschikt; |
| --- | --- |

g)

winningsvergunningen worden hoofdzakelijk toegekend aan twee of meer vergunninghouders wanneer ten minste één dezer over de onder f) genoemde ervaring beschikt;

| h) | de voor winningsvergunningen in de Barentszzee aangestelde exploitant dient als exploitant ten minste één boring op het Noors continentaal plat te hebben verricht, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring te hebben opgedaan; |
| --- | --- |

h)

de voor winningsvergunningen in de Barentszzee aangestelde exploitant dient als exploitant ten minste één boring op het Noors continentaal plat te hebben verricht, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring te hebben opgedaan;

| i) | voor winningsvergunningen in diepe wateren dient zowel de aangestelde exploitant als ten minste één andere vergunninghouder als exploitant minstens één boring op het Noors continentaal plat te hebben verricht, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring te hebben opgedaan. Ten minste één van houders van de winningsvergunning dient als exploitant boringen in diepe wateren te hebben verricht; |
| --- | --- |

i)

voor winningsvergunningen in diepe wateren dient zowel de aangestelde exploitant als ten minste één andere vergunninghouder als exploitant minstens één boring op het Noors continentaal plat te hebben verricht, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring te hebben opgedaan. Ten minste één van houders van de winningsvergunning dient als exploitant boringen in diepe wateren te hebben verricht;

| j) | in geval van winningsvergunningen waarbij het verrichten van proefboringen naar verwachting gepaard zal gaan met hoge druk en/of hoge temperaturen (HPHT), dienen de aangestelde exploitant en ten minste één andere vergunninghouder als exploitant op het Noors continentaal plat ten minste één boring te hebben verricht, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring te hebben opgedaan. Ten minste één van de houders van de winningsvergunning dient als exploitant een HPHT-boring te hebben verricht. |
| --- | --- |

j)

in geval van winningsvergunningen waarbij het verrichten van proefboringen naar verwachting gepaard zal gaan met hoge druk en/of hoge temperaturen (HPHT), dienen de aangestelde exploitant en ten minste één andere vergunninghouder als exploitant op het Noors continentaal plat ten minste één boring te hebben verricht, dan wel buiten het Noors continentaal plat gelijkwaardige relevante operationele ervaring te hebben opgedaan. Ten minste één van de houders van de winningsvergunning dient als exploitant een HPHT-boring te hebben verricht.

Blokken waarvoor aanvragen kunnen worden ingediend

Aanvragen voor participaties in winningsvergunningen kunnen worden ingediend voor blokken waarvoor binnen het van tevoren afgebakende gebied nog geen vergunning is verleend, zoals getoond op de door het NPD (Noors Directoraat voor Aardolie) gepubliceerde kaarten. Het is ook mogelijk een aanvraag in te dienen voor blokken waarvoor na publicatie van deze mededeling binnen het afgebakende gebied nog geen vergunningen zijn afgegeven overeenkomstig de geactualiseerde kaarten op interactieve Factmaps van het NPD, die te vinden zijn op de webpagina van het NPD.

Elke winningsvergunning kan één of meerdere blokken of delen van blokken omvatten. Aanvragers wordt verzocht om de samenvatting van de aanvraag te beperken tot gebieden die zij met het oog op de toekomst in kaart hebben gebracht.

Zie voor de volledige tekst van de mededeling en gedetailleerde kaarten van de beschikbare gebieden de website van het Noorse Directoraat voor Aardolie: www.npd.no/apa2016

Aanvragen voor vergunningen voor oliewinning moeten worden ingediend bij het:

| Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Ministerie van Olie en Energie) |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 8148 Dep. |
| N-0033 Oslo |
| NOORWEGEN |

Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (Ministerie van Olie en Energie)

P.O. Box 8148 Dep.

N-0033 Oslo

NOORWEGEN

Twee kopieën moeten worden ingediend bij het:

| Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Noors Directoraat voor Aardolie) |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 600 |
| N-4003 Stavanger |
| NOORWEGEN |

Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (Noors Directoraat voor Aardolie)

P.O. Box 600

N-4003 Stavanger

NOORWEGEN

Uiterste termijn: 6 september 2016 om 12.00 uur 's nachts.

De toewijzing van vergunningen voor oliewinning in het kader van de vergunningsronde 2016 voor van tevoren afgebakende gebieden op het Noors continentaal plat zal naar planning plaatsvinden in het eerste kwartaal van 2017.

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(1)  PB L 164 van 30.6.1994, blz. 3.

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V Bekendmakingen

BESTUURLIJKE PROCEDURES

Europese Commissie

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/47

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Oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen in het kader van het meerjarig werkprogramma voor het verlenen van financiële steun op het gebied van de trans-Europese energie-infrastructuur in het kader van de Connecting Europe Facility voor de periode 2014-2020

(Besluit C(2016) 1587 van de Commissie)

(2016/C 236/13)

Het directoraat-generaal Energie van de Europese Commissie lanceert een uitnodiging tot het indienen van voorstellen met het oog op het verlenen van subsidies in overeenstemming met de prioriteiten en doelstellingen die zijn vastgesteld in het meerjarig werkprogramma op het gebied van de trans-Europese energie-infrastructuur in het kader van de Connecting Europe Facility voor de periode 2014-2020.

Er worden voorstellen ingewacht voor de volgende oproep:

CEF-Energy-2016-2

Voor de geselecteerde projecten in het kader van deze oproep is een indicatief bedrag van 600 miljoen EUR beschikbaar.

De uiterste datum voor het indienen van de voorstellen is 8 november 2016.

De volledige tekst van de oproep tot het indienen van voorstellen is beschikbaar op:

https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/https%3A//ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/calls/second-2016-cef-energy-call-proposals-2016-2

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PROCEDURES IN VERBAND MET DE UITVOERING VAN HET GEMEENSCHAPPELIJK MEDEDINGINGSBELEID

Europese Commissie

| 30.6.2016 | NL | Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie | C 236/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

NL

Publicatieblad van de Europese Unie

C 236/48

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Voorafgaande aanmelding van een concentratie

(Zaak M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International)

Voor de vereenvoudigde procedure in aanmerking komende zaak

(Voor de EER relevante tekst)

(2016/C 236/14)

| 1. | Op 21 juni 2016 heeft de Commissie een aanmelding van een voorgenomen concentratie in de zin van artikel 4 van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (1) ontvangen. Hierin is meegedeeld dat BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV („BNPPF PE”, België), Sofindev IV NV („Sofindev”, België) en DHAM NV („Korys/Colruyt Group”, België) in de zin van artikel 3, lid 1, onder b), van de concentratieverordening de gezamenlijke zeggenschap verkrijgen over Novy International NV („Novy”, België) door de verwerving van aandelen. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Op 21 juni 2016 heeft de Commissie een aanmelding van een voorgenomen concentratie in de zin van artikel 4 van Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (1) ontvangen. Hierin is meegedeeld dat BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV („BNPPF PE”, België), Sofindev IV NV („Sofindev”, België) en DHAM NV („Korys/Colruyt Group”, België) in de zin van artikel 3, lid 1, onder b), van de concentratieverordening de gezamenlijke zeggenschap verkrijgen over Novy International NV („Novy”, België) door de verwerving van aandelen.

| 2. | De activiteiten van de betrokken ondernemingen zijn:
  —   BNPPF PE: private-equity en mezzaninefinanciering. Haar portefeuilleondernemingen zijn actief in de volgende sectoren: productie en levering van metalen en kunststoffen, startkapitaalfondsen voor universiteiten, bakkerijproducten, industriële diensten en vastgoed;
  —   Sofindev: private-equity-investeringen in Belgische kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. Haar portefeuilleondernemingen houden zich bezig met de distributie van dakbedekkings- en gevelmaterialen en de ontwikkeling van locatiespecifieke softwareoplossingen;
  —   Korys/Colruyt Group: klein- en groothandel en cateringmarkten. Zij houdt zich ook bezig met softwareoplossingen, duurzame/hernieuwbare energieprojecten en de medische/biowetenschappelijke markt;
  —   Novy: ontwerp, productie en verhandeling van hoogwaardige keukentoestellen, voornamelijk afzuigkappen voor fornuizen. |
| --- | --- |

2.

De activiteiten van de betrokken ondernemingen zijn:

—   BNPPF PE: private-equity en mezzaninefinanciering. Haar portefeuilleondernemingen zijn actief in de volgende sectoren: productie en levering van metalen en kunststoffen, startkapitaalfondsen voor universiteiten, bakkerijproducten, industriële diensten en vastgoed;

—   Sofindev: private-equity-investeringen in Belgische kleine en middelgrote ondernemingen. Haar portefeuilleondernemingen houden zich bezig met de distributie van dakbedekkings- en gevelmaterialen en de ontwikkeling van locatiespecifieke softwareoplossingen;

—   Korys/Colruyt Group: klein- en groothandel en cateringmarkten. Zij houdt zich ook bezig met softwareoplossingen, duurzame/hernieuwbare energieprojecten en de medische/biowetenschappelijke markt;

—   Novy: ontwerp, productie en verhandeling van hoogwaardige keukentoestellen, voornamelijk afzuigkappen voor fornuizen.

| 3. | Op grond van een voorlopig onderzoek is de Commissie van oordeel dat de aangemelde transactie binnen het toepassingsgebied van de concentratieverordening kan vallen. Ten aanzien van dit punt wordt de definitieve beslissing echter aangehouden. Er zij op gewezen dat deze zaak in aanmerking kan komen voor de vereenvoudigde procedure zoals uiteengezet in de mededeling van de Commissie betreffende een vereenvoudigde procedure voor de behandeling van bepaalde concentraties krachtens Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (2). |
| --- | --- |

3.

Op grond van een voorlopig onderzoek is de Commissie van oordeel dat de aangemelde transactie binnen het toepassingsgebied van de concentratieverordening kan vallen. Ten aanzien van dit punt wordt de definitieve beslissing echter aangehouden. Er zij op gewezen dat deze zaak in aanmerking kan komen voor de vereenvoudigde procedure zoals uiteengezet in de mededeling van de Commissie betreffende een vereenvoudigde procedure voor de behandeling van bepaalde concentraties krachtens Verordening (EG) nr. 139/2004 van de Raad (2).

| 4. | De Commissie verzoekt belanghebbenden haar hun eventuele opmerkingen over de voorgenomen concentratie kenbaar te maken.
  Deze opmerkingen moeten de Commissie uiterlijk tien dagen na dagtekening van deze bekendmaking hebben bereikt. Zij kunnen per fax (+32 22964301), via e-mail naar COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu of per post, onder vermelding van zaaknummer M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, aan onderstaand adres worden toegezonden:





  Europese Commissie |
| --- | --- |
| Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie |
| Griffie voor concentraties |
| 1049 Brussel |
| BELGIË |

4.

De Commissie verzoekt belanghebbenden haar hun eventuele opmerkingen over de voorgenomen concentratie kenbaar te maken.

Deze opmerkingen moeten de Commissie uiterlijk tien dagen na dagtekening van deze bekendmaking hebben bereikt. Zij kunnen per fax (+32 22964301), via e-mail naar COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu of per post, onder vermelding van zaaknummer M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, aan onderstaand adres worden toegezonden:

Europese Commissie

Directoraat-generaal Concurrentie

Griffie voor concentraties

1049 Brussel

BELGIË

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(1)  PB L 24 van 29.1.2004, blz. 1 („de concentratieverordening”).

(2)  PB C 366 van 14.12.2013, blz. 5.

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