An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 

with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA13-301

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 7 January 2014

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

v.

Robeson County

No. 08 CRS 53464

CHRISTOPHER LEE LOCKLEAR

Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 13 July 2012 by 

Judge James G. Bell in Robeson County Superior Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 27 August 2013.

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 

General John H. Watters, for the State.

Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 

Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for Defendant.

ERVIN, Judge.

Defendant Christopher Lee Locklear appeals from judgments

sentencing him to life imprisonment without the possibility of 

parole based upon his conviction for first degree murder and to 

51 to 71 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for

robbery with a dangerous weapon. On appeal, Defendant argues 

that the trial court committed prejudicial error by ordering

that Defendant and his co-defendants wear “stun vests” operated 
-2-

by uniformed officers seated behind them during the trial and by 

instructing the jury that evidence of Defendant’s flight could 

be considered for the purpose of showing a consciousness of 

guilt on his part. After careful consideration of Defendant’s 

challenges to the trial court’s judgments in light of the record 

and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court’s 

judgments should remain undisturbed.

I. Factual Background

A. Substantive Facts

On 31 March 2008, Antonio Locklear went to the home of his 

cousin, Larry Wayne Locklear, for the purpose of purchasing

marijuana. At the time, Mr. Locklear lived with his girlfriend, 

Jessica Cahoon, and her parents in Fayetteville, while Larry 

Wayne Locklear lived in a mobile home on Tonya Locklear Road in 

Robeson County. Mr. Locklear usually went to Robeson County 

every second or third day to buy marijuana from Larry Wayne

Locklear for the purpose of resale.

1

At approximately 8:00 p.m. on 31 March 2008, Ms. Cahoon

drove Mr. Locklear to Larry Wayne Locklear’s house in her Honda 

Civic. At that location, Mr. Locklear purchased thirteen 

 

1In addition to acknowledging that he was a drug dealer, Mr. 

Locklear was serving a federal sentence at the time of 

Defendant’s trial and admitted that his federal sentence might 

be reduced based upon his cooperation with the State in 

connection with Defendant’s trial.
-3-

packages of marijuana that had each been compressed into the 

shape of an automobile license plate. Upon returning to 

Fayetteville, Mr. Locklear discovered that each package of 

marijuana weighed less than the agreed-upon amount. In light of 

that discovery, Ms. Cahoon drove Mr. Locklear back to Larry 

Wayne Locklear’s house in order to obtain the additional amount 

of marijuana to which Mr. Locklear was entitled.

As Ms. Cahoon and Mr. Locklear approached Larry Wayne

Locklear’s residence, they noticed that they were being followed 

by an older, brown two-door Cadillac. Mr. Locklear had never 

seen the two-door Cadillac before that night. While Ms. Cahoon

pulled into the driveway at Larry Wayne Locklear’s house, the 

Cadillac continued down the road, turned around, and slowly 

drove by Larry Wayne Locklear’s house a second time.

Ms. Cahoon waited in the car while Mr. Locklear went inside 

to get the additional marijuana from Larry Wayne Locklear. At 

approximately 11:55 p.m., Mr. Locklear returned to Ms. Cahoon’s 

vehicle carrying the additional marijuana that he had obtained 

from Larry Wayne Locklear in a plastic trash bag. Upon entering 

Ms. Cahoon’s Honda, Mr. Locklear placed the bag of marijuana on 

the floorboard. As the return trip to Fayetteville began, Mr. 

Locklear noticed the brown Cadillac that had followed them 
-4-

earlier parked beside the road at an intersection. Mr. Locklear

could not tell how many people were in the Cadillac.

At the time that Ms. Cahoon’s Honda passed the Cadillac, 

the Cadillac pulled in behind them. After accelerating rapidly, 

the Cadillac pulled alongside Ms. Cahoon’s Honda. As Ms. Cahoon

asked, “What’s going on, baby?,” Mr. Locklear observed that

someone was hanging out of the Cadillac’s passenger side and saw

that person fire three shots at the Honda using a rifle. After 

the shots were fired, Ms. Cahoon’s head hit the steering wheel. 

Mr. Locklear threw up his arms in an attempt to protect himself 

and put the back of his car seat all the way down so that his 

head was below the level of the window.

As the Honda slowed to a stop with its engine still 

running, the Cadillac cut in front of the Honda. Ms. Cahoon was

motionless and slumped over the steering wheel. According to 

Mr. Locklear, two men, one of whom wore a hoodie and carried a 

shotgun or rifle and the other of whom wore a long white shirt 

and carried a black gun, emerged from the Cadillac. Mr. 

Locklear identified Defendant, whom he had previously seen, as 

the man in the white shirt.2 After the man with the hoodie went 

to the passenger’s side of the Honda and said, “Give it up, you 

M-F’er,” Mr. Locklear got out of the Honda, crawled around to 

 

2Mr. Locklear initially described the individual in the 

white shirt as African American.
-5-

the rear of the vehicle, and crouched behind the passenger side 

corner. Upon hearing two guns fire repeatedly into the Honda,

Mr. Locklear threw up his hands and yelled that the occupants of 

the Cadillac should not kill him. However, Mr. Locklear did not 

think that the assailants could see him or hear him over the 

sound of the gunfire. As a result, Mr. Locklear ran across the 

road and jumped into a drainage ditch full of water and trash

that ran alongside the road.

After he surfaced, Mr. Locklear heard more gunshots and saw 

vehicle lights approaching from the direction of Fayetteville.

Once the man in the white shirt had reached into the passenger 

door of the Honda and grabbed the bag of marijuana from the 

floorboard, the two men reentered the passenger side of the 

Cadillac, which drove off in the direction of Fayetteville. An 

examination of the scene indicated that at least ten shots were 

fired into the Honda and that a shotgun, a rifle, and two nine 

millimeter firearms were used during the shooting.

Although Mr. Locklear tried to flag down the approaching 

car after getting out of the drainage ditch, the vehicle swerved 

around him without stopping. As he began running to Larry Wayne

Locklear’s house to get help, Mr. Locklear tried without success
-6-

to flag down a second passing car.

3 After Mr. Locklear reached

Larry Wayne Locklear’s house, Larry Wayne Locklear’s girlfriend, 

India Rose Locklear, called 911.

About a week after the shooting, Mr. Locklear received a 

voicemail from a person who identified himself as Isaac in which 

the caller denied having had anything to do with the shooting. 

Mr. Locklear subsequently identified a man named Isaac Nesby as 

the man in the hoodie after viewing a photographic lineup. 

Although Mr. Nesby was arrested and charged with involvement in 

the shootings, the charges against him were subsequently

dismissed. At trial, Mr. Locklear testified that Mr. Nesby’s 

nephew, Decario Whitfield, who allegedly resembled Mr. Nesby in 

appearance, was actually the man wearing the hoodie at the time 

of the shootings. After being charged with the murder of Ms.

Cahoon along with Defendant, Kenryn McMillian, and Cheyenne 

Woods, Mr. Whitfield was allowed to plead guilty to conspiracy 

to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and testified on 

behalf of the State.

4

 

3Connie Cummings, who drove one of the cars that travelled 

past the scene of the shooting, testified that she saw Mr. 

Locklear jump out of the ditch and try to wave her down, that 

she saw Kenryn McMillian and another dark-skinned person at the 

scene, and that, rather than stopping to render assistance, she 

swerved around Mr. Locklear and kept going.

4Mr. Whitfield initially refused to make a statement to 

investigating officers and only provided the account reflected 
-7-

Mr. Whitfield testified that, on 31 March 2008, he 

accompanied his uncle, Mr. Nesby, to the home of Mr. Woods’ 

mother so that Mr. Nesby could purchase a Cadillac. At the time 

of their arrival at the residence of Mr. Woods’ mother, 

Defendant, Mr. Woods, and Mr. McMillian were present. After Mr. 

Whitfield asked Mr. Nesby if he could borrow the Cadillac to go 

get something to eat, Mr. Whitfield, Mr. McMillian, Mr. Woods, 

and Defendant left the premises in the Cadillac with Mr. 

McMillian driving, Defendant riding in the front passenger seat, 

Mr. Whitfield riding in the rear passenger-side seat, and Mr. 

Woods riding in the rear driver’s-side seat. At the time of 

their departure, Mr. Whitfield, who was wearing a hoodie, had a 

black shotgun with a pistol grip; Defendant had a black 

automatic rifle; and Mr. Woods had a nine millimeter handgun.

After traveling for some distance down a road with which 

Mr. Whitfield was unfamiliar, Mr. McMillian turned around and 

drove past a particular trailer at a very slow rate of speed. 

Upon leaving that location, Mr. McMillian drove through an 

intersection, stopped on the side of the road, and remained 

there for some period of time. Once a vehicle that had been at 

the trailer which they had previously observed passed through 

the intersection, Mr. McMillian began following it.

 

in his trial testimony after having reached a plea agreement 

with the prosecution.
-8-

Although Mr. McMillian flashed the Cadillac’s headlights at 

the other vehicle in an attempt to get it to stop, the other 

vehicle sped up instead. After pulling up alongside the other 

vehicle, Mr. McMillian stated that the group should stop the car 

by shooting out its tires. As he hung outside the front 

passenger side window, Defendant fired two shots at the car with 

the rifle. The other car gradually came to a stop after the 

firing of the second shot, allowing Mr. McMillian to pull the 

Cadillac in front of the other car.

As soon as both cars had stopped, the occupants of the 

Cadillac got out of that vehicle. Once the group had exited 

the Cadillac, Mr. Whitfield fired the shotgun over the roof of 

the other car. The nine millimeter handgun held by Mr. Woods 

was fired at some point during this event as well.

After Mr. Whitfield fired the shotgun, the passenger door

of the other car opened and a male occupant stepped out. 

Although Mr. Whitfield fired again, the man made it to the rear

of the other car, at which point he was no longer visible. As 

Mr. Whitfield walked to the other side of the car in order to 

look for the man, he could see through the front windshield that 

another occupant of the car had been shot. In the meantime, 

Defendant went to the passenger side of the other vehicle and 

retrieved a plastic bag full of drugs.
-9-

As the occupants of the Cadillac saw other cars

approaching, they reentered the Cadillac and drove away for the 

purpose of disposing of their weapons, eventually reaching a 

dirt road where Mr. Woods disposed of the rifle and the handgun. 

The group then went to the residence of Mr. Woods’ mother, where 

they left the shotgun, retrieved Defendant’s van, took the 

Cadillac and the van to another dirt road, and set fire to the 

Cadillac. After burning the Cadillac, the group left in 

Defendant’s van and dropped Mr. Whitfield, who took a portion of 

the stolen marijuana with him, off at his father’s house.

On 3 April 2008, Agent Ricky Williams of the Robeson County 

Sheriff’s Department was part of a team assigned to conduct 

surveillance at the Motel 6 in Lumberton in an effort to locate

a gray Chevrolet Astro van and Defendant, Mr. Woods, and Mr. 

McMillian. During the surveillance process, Agent Williams 

observed Defendant emerge from a room in the Motel 6, put some 

shoes into the gray van, and return to the room. When the van

subsequently left the motel, Agent Williams followed the vehicle 

and eventually stopped it for driving left of center.

At the time of this traffic stop, a woman was driving the 

van, with Defendant and Mr. Woods occupying the rear seat. In 

the process of conducting a consent search of the van, Agent

Williams discovered three packages of marijuana in a black trash 
-10-

bag in the back of the van. The packages of marijuana that 

Agent Williams found in the van were compressed into the shape 

of license plates, a configuration which Agent Williams had 

never seen before.

On 24 April 2008, Sergeant Lee Wilkerson of the Parkton 

Police Department stopped a vehicle in which Mr. Woods was a 

passenger. After giving Sergeant Wilkerson a false name and 

date of birth, Mr. Woods fled on foot after being asked to step 

out of the vehicle. Shotgun shells recovered at the scene of 

the shooting had been fired from a shotgun which Sergeant

Wilkerson seized during a search of the vehicle in which Mr. 

Woods was riding.

Mr. Locklear sustained gunshot wounds in the upper left 

arm, the back of his right forearm, and his upper right shoulder 

at the time of the shooting. Ms. Cahoon was pronounced dead at 

the scene of the shooting as a result of her injuries. 

According to Dr. John Butts, Ms. Cahoon died from a highvelocity gunshot wound to the head, with the nature of Ms. 

Cahoon’s injuries being more consistent with those typically

inflicted by a rifle compared with those inflicted by a handgun.

B. Procedural History

On 23 May 2008, a warrant for arrest charging Defendant 

with murder, shooting into an occupied vehicle, and robbery with 
-11-

a dangerous weapon was issued. On 16 February 2009, the Robeson 

County grand jury returned a bill of indictment charging 

Defendant with first degree murder, shooting into an occupied 

vehicle, and robbery with a dangerous weapon. The charges 

against Defendant, along with similar charges that had been 

lodged against Mr. McMillian and Mr. Woods, came on for trial

before the trial court and a jury at the 25 June 2012 criminal 

session of Robeson County Superior Court. On 12 July 2012, the 

jury returned a verdict convicting Defendant of robbery with a 

dangerous weapon, discharging a firearm into occupied property,

and first degree murder on the basis of the felony murder rule 

using shooting into an occupied vehicle as the predicate felony 

and on the basis of lying in wait.

5 At the conclusion of the 

ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court arrested judgment on 

the discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle conviction, 

entered judgment sentencing Defendant to 51 to 71 months 

imprisonment based upon his conviction for robbery with a 

dangerous weapon, and entered judgment sentencing Defendant to a 

consecutive term of life imprisonment without parole based upon 

his conviction for first degree murder. Defendant noted an 

appeal to this Court from the trial court’s judgments.

 

5The jury did not find Defendant guilty of first degree 

murder based on malice, premeditation, and deliberation or the 

felony murder rule using robbery with a dangerous weapon as the 

predicate felony.
-12-

II. Substantive Legal Analysis

A. Use of Restraints at Trial

In his initial challenge to the trial court’s judgments, 

Defendant argues that the trial court, by requiring Defendant to 

wear a “stun vest” underneath his clothing and operated by a 

uniformed officer seated on the row behind Defendant during the 

trial violated, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1031 and his state and 

federal constitutional rights to a fair trial. Although

Defendant is correct in noting that the trial court had an 

inadequate basis for requiring Defendant to wear the “stun vest” 

and that the trial court failed to comply with the requirements 

of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1031 at the time that the restraints in 

question were approved, we conclude that the trial court’s 

errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As a result, 

Defendant is not entitled to relief from the trial court’s 

judgments based upon this argument.

1. Applicable Legal Principles

As a general proposition, “a defendant in a criminal case 

is entitled to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles 

except in extraordinary instances.” State v. Tolley, 290 N.C. 

349, 365, 226 S.E.2d 353, 366 (1976). However, the trial court

“may order a defendant [] subjected to physical restraint in the 

courtroom when the judge finds the restraint to be reasonably 
-13-

necessary to maintain order, prevent the defendant’s escape, or 

provide for the safety of persons.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1031 

(2013). “‘What is forbidden - by the due process and fair trial 

guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 

Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 19 of the North Carolina 

Constitution - is physical restraint that improperly deprives a 

defendant of a fair trial.’” State v. Simpson, 153 N.C. App. 

807, 809, 571 S.E.2d 274, 276 (2002) (quoting State v. Wright, 

82 N.C. App. 450, 451, 346 S.E.2d 510, 511 (1986)). When a 

challenge to a trial court’s decision to restrain a criminal 

defendant is advanced before an appellate court, “the test on 

appeal is whether, under all of the circumstances, the trial 

court abused its discretion.” Tolley, 290 N.C. at 369, 226 

S.E.2d at 369.

According to Tolley and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1031, a trial 

judge must follow the proper procedures in determining that a 

defendant should remain shackled or be otherwise restrained

during trial. State v. Lee, __ N.C. App. __, __, 720 S.E.2d 

884, 890, disc. review improvidently granted, 366 N.C. 329, 734 

S.E.2d 571 (2012). As part of this process, the trial court 

must enunciate, in the presence of the defendant and out of the 

presence of the jury, the particular reasons underlying the

decision to place the defendant under restraint and afford the 
-14-

defendant an opportunity to object or otherwise be heard. 

Tolley, 290 N.C. at 368, 226 S.E.2d at 368; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 

15A–1031(1) and (2). In addition, unless the defendant 

expressly requests to the contrary, the trial court must 

instruct the jurors to refrain from considering the existence of 

the restraint in weighing the evidence or determining the issue 

of the defendant’s guilt. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1031(3). If

the defendant objects to the use of restraints, the trial judge 

should conduct a full evidentiary hearing and make formal 

findings of fact. Tolley, 290 N.C. at 368, 226 S.E.2d at 368; 

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1031. In considering whether a defendant 

should be restrained, the trial court should consider, among 

other things:

[T]he seriousness of the present charge 

against the defendant; defendant’s 

temperament and character; his age and 

physical attributes; his past record; past 

escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence 

of a present plan to escape; threats to harm 

others or cause a disturbance; selfdestructive tendencies; the risk of mob 

violence or of attempted revenge by others; 

the possibility of rescue by other offenders 

still at large; the size and mood of the 

audience; the nature and physical security 

of the courtroom; and the adequacy and 

availability of alternative remedies.

Tolley, 290 N.C. at 368, 226 S.E.2d at 368. As this Court has 

emphasized, “[s]hould the trial judge, in his sound discretion, 

decide shackling is a necessary means for a safe and orderly 
-15-

trial in his or her courtroom, the determination must be

supported by adequate findings.” State v. Jackson, 162 N.C. 

App. 695, 700, 592 S.E.2d 575, 578 (2004) (emphasis added).

2. “Stun Vests”

As we have already noted, the trial court ordered Defendant 

and his co-defendants to wear “stun vests” underneath their 

clothing during trial. The “stun vests” in question were 

operated by uniformed officers, who sat behind each defendant

and were instructed to activate the vests only in the event that 

such an action was necessary to prevent one or more of the 

restrained individuals from engaging in violent outbursts or 

attacking someone. After the trial court gave Defendant the 

opportunity to object to the use of the “stun vest,” Defendant 

argued that he had not exhibited any behavior which justified 

the imposition of this sort of restraint, that there were no 

extraordinary circumstances which justified the imposition of 

the proposed restraint, and that the placement of uniformed 

officers behind Defendant created a presumption of dangerousness 

and guilt. On the other hand, the State argued that the 

recommendation that the “stun vests” be used had been made by 

jail personnel on the basis of a perception that the use of 

these devices was necessary to preserve courtroom safety in 

light of certain unspecified incidents which had taken place in 
-16-

the jail involving “defendants.” After hearing the arguments of 

counsel, the trial court, without making any findings of fact or 

providing any explanation for its decision, approved the use of 

the “stun vests” and the seating of the uniformed officers

behind the table at which Defendant and his co-defendants were

seated. No similar law enforcement presence was apparent 

anywhere else in the courtroom.

As an initial matter, we note that nothing presented to the 

trial court provided any particular basis for restraining 

Defendant. Although the unsworn information presented to the 

trial court suggested that Mr. McMillian had posed significant 

problems for the jail staff during his time in pretrial 

detention and that “defendants” had created certain unspecified 

problems in the jail, the record contains no suggestion that 

there was any basis for believing that Defendant posed any 

escape risk or threat to others of the type that has 

traditionally been utilized to justify the use of shackles or 

other restraints. As a result, given that Mr. McMillian’s prior 

conduct does not justify placing Defendant under restraint;

given that the fact that the jury could not see the “stun vest” 

which Defendant and his co-defendants were required to wear has 

no bearing on the extent to which the trial court’s decision to 

restrain Defendant was erroneous, Jackson, 162 N.C. App. at 701, 
-17-

592 S.E.2d at 579 (stating that the “obligation [to refrain from 

ordering that a defendant be shackled or otherwise restrained in 

the absence of compliance with applicable legal requirements] is 

not excused when attempts are made to conceal from the jury the 

fact that the defendant is shackled” on the theory that “the 

concerns that shackling interferes with the defendant’s thought 

processes and communications with counsel, and affronts the 

dignity of the trial process, are not cured by mere concealment 

from the jury”); and given that the record developed before the 

trial court shows no additional support for placing Defendant 

under restraint other than a generalized expression of concern 

by the jail staff, Lee, __ N.C. App. at __, 720 S.E.2d at 891

(holding that “the trial court’s sole reason for denying 

defendant’s request to remove his shackles during trial was that 

defendant was financially unable to make bond and therefore 

required to remain in shackles pursuant to jail policy” and that 

“requiring defendant to remain in shackles during trial in the 

presence of the jury under these conditions is inherently 

prejudicial”), we conclude that the trial court lacked a 

sufficient basis to justify requiring Defendant to wear a “stun 

vest” during the trial.

In addition, the trial court failed to comply with the 

requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1031 in deciding that 
-18-

Defendant should be restrained. More specifically, the trial 

court did not provide any explanation for its decision to 

subject Defendant to the restraints in question or make findings

of fact in support of its determination. Furthermore, the 

record contains no indication that the trial court ever

instructed the jury to refrain from considering the fact that 

Defendant had been restrained in weighing the evidence or 

determining his guilt or ever obtained Defendant’s approval of a 

decision to refrain from delivering such an instruction. 

Finally, even though Defendant objected to the restraints to 

which he was subjected, the trial court simply heard the 

argument of counsel concerning the validity of Defendant’s 

objections to the use of the restraints in question and never 

heard any evidence directed toward the criteria enunciated in 

Tolley.

6 As a result, the trial court failed to comply with the

requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1031 in the course of 

determining that Defendant should be required to wear a “stun 

vest” during the trial.

 

6Admittedly, the record does not reflect that Defendant ever 

requested that such a hearing be held. However, we need not 

determine whether Defendant’s failure to request that such a 

hearing be held excuses the fact that the trial court did not 

hear evidence concerning the appropriateness of requiring 

Defendant and his co-defendants to wear “stun vests” given our 

determination that any errors committed by the trial court were 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
-19-

Neither an erroneous decision to shackle or otherwise 

restrain a defendant nor a violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A1031 requires us to award a new trial or other appellate relief

in the absence of a showing of prejudice. Simpson, 153 N.C. 

App. at 808, 571 S.E.2d at 275 (stating that, “[w]hile we agree 

with defendant that the trial court did not fully comply with 

the requirements of [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 15A-1031, he has not 

shown prejudice requiring a new trial”); Wright, 82 N.C. App. at 

452, 346 S.E.2d at 511 (stating that “new trials are granted 

only for errors that are prejudicial”). In determining whether 

the trial court’s decision to require Defendant to wear a “stun 

vest” and its failure to comply with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1031 

necessitate an award of appellate relief, we will attempt to 

ascertain whether the trial court’s errors were harmless beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Wright, 82 N.C. App. at 452, 346 S.E.2d at 

511 (evaluating whether a defendant was entitled to a new trial 

as the result of an allegedly erroneous decision to restrain the

defendant utilizing the “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” 

standard enunciated in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1443(b)). We are 

unable to avoid the conclusion that the trial court’s errors in 

this case were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

A careful review of the record provides no indication that 

the jury was affected by, or even aware of, the fact that 
-20-

Defendant was wearing the “stun vest.” As this Court has

previously noted, “where the record fails to disclose that a 

defendant’s shackles were visible to the jury, ‘the risk is 

negligible that the restraint undermined the dignity of the 

trial process or created prejudice in the minds of the jurors,’

and the defendant will not be entitled to a new trial on that 

basis.” Simpson, 153 N.C. App. at 809-10, 571 S.E.2d at 276 

(quoting State v. Holmes, 355 N.C. 719, 729, 565 S.E.2d 154, 

163, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1010, 123 S. Ct. 478, 154 L. Ed. 2d 

412 (2002)). Although Defendant argues that he was prejudiced

because the trial court required him to wear the “stun vest” on 

the theory that the vest “interfered with [his] thought 

processes, his ability to stay focused on the proceedings, and 

the ease of his communication with counsel,” the record contains 

no support for this assertion other than a reference to the fact 

that the vests were uncomfortable and distracting.

The compelling evidence of Defendant’s guilt provides 

additional support for our conclusion that the trial court’s 

errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 

Thomas, 134 N.C. App. 560, 570, 518 S.E.2d 222, 229 (finding no 

prejudice when Defendant appeared before the jury in shackles 

due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt), 

disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 119, 541 S.E.2d 468 (1999); Lee,
-21-

__ N.C. App. at __, 720 S.E.2d 884, 891-92 (concluding that,

even though the trial court failed to follow the statutorily 

required procedures or to consider factors relevant to a 

restraint-related decision, this Court “fail[ed] to see how 

defendant’s shackling contributed to his convictions” in light 

of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt). As even a cursory 

perusal of the record shows, Defendant was identified as one of 

the principal perpetrators of the assault on Ms. Cahoon and Mr. 

Locklear by the surviving victim. In addition, one of the 

participants in the commission of these crimes described his 

participation, and that of Defendant, in the murder, shooting, 

and robbery in chilling detail. Although there were admittedly 

grounds for challenging the testimony of these witnesses based 

on their criminal histories and interests in the proceeding, the 

record provides no basis for an inference that Mr. Locklear and 

Mr. Whitfield had colluded to develop their essentially 

identical accounts of Defendant’s involvement in the shooting 

and robbery. Finally, what appears to have been the stolen 

marijuana was seized from Defendant’s van, providing an even 

stronger justification for a finding of guilt. Thus, given that 

the jury did not ever learn that Defendant was wearing a “stun 

vest” and the overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt, we 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would not have 
-22-

reached a different verdict if Defendant had not been forced to 

wear a “stun vest” during his trial.

3. Uniformed Security Personnel

Secondly, Defendant argues that, even if the jury was 

unable to see the “stun vests” which he and his co-defendants 

were required to wear, its members could see the uniformed 

officers who were seated directly behind them and that the 

presence of these uniformed officers suggested to the jury that 

they were dangerous and were, for that reason, probably guilty 

in violation of his right to receive a fair trial. We do not 

believe that Defendant’s argument is meritorious.

In Holbrook v. Flynn, the United States Supreme Court 

considered the extent to which the presence of identifiable 

security personnel during a defendant’s trial deprived the 

defendant of a fair trial and concluded that a case-by-case 

approach should be utilized in examining such issues. Holbrook 

v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L. Ed. 2d 

525, 535 (1986) (cited in State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 281, 

677 S.E.2d 796, 809 (2009), cert denied, 559 U.S. 1052, 130 S. 

Ct. 2349, 176 L. Ed. 2d 568 (2010)). In Holbrook, four 

uniformed state troopers sat in the first row behind the 

defendants at trial. Id. at 562-63, 106 S. Ct. at 1342-43, 89 

L. Ed. 2d at 530. In response to an argument that this 
-23-

substantial law enforcement presence deprived the defendants of 

a fair trial, Id. at 570, 106 S. Ct. at 1346, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 

535, the Supreme Court “simply [could not] find an unacceptable 

risk of prejudice in the spectacle of four such officers quietly 

sitting in the first row of a courtroom’s spectator section.” 

Id. at 571, 106 S. Ct. at 1347, 89 L. Ed. 2d at 536. According 

to the Supreme Court, even if the members of the jury been aware 

that the troopers had been deployed for security-related 

purposes and that the presence of this many security officers

was not consistent with routine practice, there was no reason to 

believe that the troopers’ presence tended to brand the 

defendants in the jury’s eyes “with an unmistakable mark of 

guilt” or that the jury was likely to treat the presence of 

these troopers as anything other than the level of security 

necessary to permit the trial to proceed. Id. As a result, the 

United States Supreme Court declined to provide any relief on 

appeal.

We are unable to distinguish the facts of this case from 

those present in Holbrook in any meaningful way. As in 

Holbrook, uniformed officers sat in the row behind the 

defendants during the trial. Although the officers in question

were positioned near Defendant and his co-defendants for the 

purpose of operating the “stun vests,” nothing in the record in 
-24-

any way tends to indicate that the jurors knew that Defendant 

and his co-defendants were wearing “stun vests,” much less that 

the officers were positioned as they were in order to operate 

such pieces of equipment. During its preliminary remarks, the 

trial court told the jury that “[w]e also have three other 

bailiffs sitting in the courtroom” and that “their position in 

the courtroom is to separate the audience, the folks in the 

audience from the folks sitting at the defense table.” In light 

of our belief that the jury was unlikely to view the presence 

and positioning of the officers “as a sign of anything other 

than a normal official concern for the safety and order of the 

proceedings,” Holbrook at 571, 106 S. Ct. at 1347, 89 L. Ed. 2d 

at 536, we cannot agree with Defendant that the presence of the 

officers deprived him of a fair trial. As a result, the trial 

court did not err by allowing the officers operating the “stun 

vests” to sit in the row behind Defendant at trial. Thus, 

neither of Defendant’s challenges to the security measures 

approved by the trial court for use during Defendant’s trial 

have merit.

B. Flight Instruction

Finally, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by 

instructing the jury that it was entitled to consider

Defendant’s flight as evidence that he was conscious of his own
-25-

guilt. In support of this contention, Defendant argues that the 

record evidence did not support an inference that Defendant fled 

for the purpose of avoiding apprehension. We do not find 

Defendant’s contention persuasive.

1. Standard of Review

“[Arguments] challenging the trial court’s decisions 

regarding jury instructions are reviewed de novo by this Court.”

State v. Osorio, 196 N.C. App. 458, 466, 675 S.E.2d 144, 149 

(2009). “‘Under a de novo review, the court considers the 

matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment’ for that of 

the lower tribunal.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632-33, 

669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (quoting In re Greens of Pine Glen, 

Ltd. P’ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003)). 

“[A] trial judge should not give instructions to the jury which 

are not supported by the evidence produced at the trial.” State 

v. Cameron, 284 N.C. 165, 171, 200 S.E.2d 186, 191 (1973), cert. 

denied, 418 U.S. 905, 94 S. Ct. 3195, 41 L.Ed.2d 1153 (1974). 

“[A]n error in jury instructions is prejudicial and requires a 

new trial only if ‘there is a reasonable possibility that, had 

the error in question not been committed, a different result 

would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal 

arises.’” State v. Castaneda, 196 N.C. App. 109, 116, 674 
-26-

S.E.2d 707, 712 (2009) (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1443(a) 

(2007)).

2. Appropriateness of Flight Instruction

“Evidence of a defendant’s flight following the commission

of a crime may properly be considered by a jury as evidence of 

guilt or consciousness of guilt.” State v. King, 343 N.C. 29, 

38, 468 S.E.2d 232, 238 (1996). However, “a trial court may not 

instruct a jury on defendant’s flight unless ‘there is some 

evidence in the record reasonably supporting the theory that 

defendant fled after commission of the crime charged.’” State 

v. Levan, 326 N.C. 155, 164-65, 388 S.E.2d 429, 433-34 (1990) 

(quoting State v. Irick, 291 N.C. 480, 494, 231 S.E.2d 833, 842 

(1977)). “Mere evidence that defendant left the scene of the 

crime is not enough to support an instruction on flight;” 

instead, “[t]here must also be some evidence that defendant took 

steps to avoid apprehension,” State v. Thompson, 328 N.C. 477, 

490, 402 S.E.2d 386, 392 (1991), with the record evidence to be 

considered in the light most favorable to the State in making 

this determination. See State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 80, 540 

S.E.2d 713, 732 (2000) (holding that “[t]hese facts, taken in 

the light most favorable to the State, permit an inference that 

defendant had a consciousness of guilt and took steps, albeit 
-27-

unsuccessful, to avoid apprehension”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 

838, 122 S. Ct. 93, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001).

The present record contains ample evidentiary support for 

the trial court’s flight instruction. After the shooting and 

robbery, Defendant and his co-defendants left the scene after 

seeing the headlights of an approaching vehicle, drove down a 

dirt road in order to dispose of certain of their weapons, and

set fire to the Cadillac in which they had been riding. 

Defendant and his co-defendants were observed and apprehended 

three days later in another municipality. This evidence, when 

taken in the light most favorable to the State, is more than 

sufficient to justify the delivery of the trial court’s flight 

instruction. See State v. Lloyd, 354 N.C. 76, 119, 552 S.E.2d 

596, 626 (2001) (holding that the trial court did not err by 

delivering a flight instruction given the presence of evidence 

tending to show that the defendant left the crime scene 

hurriedly in his car without providing medical assistance to the 

victim); State v. Reeves, 343 N.C. 111, 113, 468 S.E.2d 53, 55

(1996) (holding that evidence tending to show that the 

defendant, after shooting the victim, ran from the scene, got 

into a nearby car, and drove away was sufficient to support the 

delivery of a flight instruction). The fact that, as Defendant 

argues, the destruction of evidence is not equivalent to flight 
-28-

to avoid apprehension or that the record does not indicate that 

Defendant personally engaged in the destruction of evidence 

would not support a decision to reach a different result given 

that the record clearly reflects that Defendant left the area in 

which the shooting and robbery was committed and that Defendant

was present at and aware of the steps that were taken to conceal 

the involvement of the perpetrators in the commission of these 

crimes. As a result, when taken in the light most favorable to 

the State, the record contains ample evidence tending to show 

that Defendant’s actions following the shooting and robbery did, 

in fact, reflect flight undertaken as part of an effort to 

“avoid apprehension.” Thompson, 328 N.C. at 490, 402 S.E.2d at 

392.

In seeking to persuade us to reach a different result, 

Defendant places principal reliance on two prior decisions by 

this Court and the Supreme Court. In one of those decisions, we

found that the trial court erred by instructing the jury 

concerning the issue of the defendant’s flight in a situation in 

which the evidence showed that the defendant left the crime 

scene with his accomplices, drove to the home of one of his

accomplices, and later was driven to his girlfriend’s house. 

State v. Holland, 161 N.C. App. 326, 330, 588 S.E.2d 32, 36 

(2003). In holding that the delivery of a flight instruction 
-29-

was error in light of these facts, this Court held that 

“visiting a friend at [his or her] residence is not an act that, 

by itself, raises a reasonable inference that defendant was 

attempting to avoid apprehension.” Id. Needless to say, the 

record before us in this case reveals that Defendant did a great 

deal more than merely “visit a friend at [his] residence.” 

Instead, Defendant and his co-defendants disposed of the 

weapons, burned the car used in the commission of the offense, 

and went to another locality.

In the other decision upon which Defendant relies, the

Supreme Court held that the delivery of a flight instruction 

constituted error given that the only evidence cited in support 

of that instruction was testimony by a law enforcement officer

that he had ridden around the defendant’s neighborhood for 

several days in an attempt to locate the defendant without ever

going to his residence or making any inquiry about his

whereabouts. State v. Lee, 287 N.C. 536, 539, 215 S.E.2d 146, 

148-49 (1975). The record before us in this case demonstrates 

substantially more than that a law enforcement officer 

unsuccessfully sought to locate Defendant. Instead, the 

evidence that Defendant attempted to flee following the 

commission of the shooting and robbery for the purpose of 

attempting to avoid apprehension is considerably stronger than 
-30-

the flight-related evidence deemed insufficient in Lee. As a 

result, given that the record contains “some evidence . . .

reasonably supporting the theory that defendant fled after 

commission of the crime charged,” Levan, 326 N.C. at 164-65, 388 

S.E.2d at 434 (quotation marks and citations omitted), the trial 

court did not err by instructing the jury concerning the 

purposes for which they were entitled to consider evidence of 

Defendant’s flight.

III. Conclusion

Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 

none of Defendant’s challenges to the trial court’s judgments

have merit. As a result, the trial court’s judgments should, 

and hereby do, remain undisturbed.

NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR.

Judges McGEE and STEELMAN concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).