Filed 4/14/21 P. v. Quiros CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on 

opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 

8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for 

purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MONICA QUIROS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B299444

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BA470044)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Michael Garcia, Judge. Affirmed. 

Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nancy L. Ladner, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
2

Defendant and appellant Monica Quiros (defendant) 

appeals her conviction, following a jury trial, of assault with a 

deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)).

1 The jury found

that defendant personally inflicted great bodily injury on the 

victim, Corey Moses. (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) The trial court 

suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on three 

years of formal probation. 

We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In the mid-afternoon on July 29, 2018, defendant and her 

girlfriend Sydney Sanford were near the intersection of 

Hollywood Boulevard and Vine Street. They encountered Moses, 

loudly expressing frustration at passersby. Moses is six feet two 

inches tall and weighs 170 pounds. Defendant and Sanford are 

both approximately five feet three inches tall and weigh 108 

pounds. Defendant and Sanford looked at each other and shook 

their heads. Moses said, “Mind your fucking business. I’m not 

talking to you,” and walked away. 

Sanford called Moses a “fucking bum.” Moses turned 

around and said, “I’m not confused about my sexuality. [You] 

don’t know if you are a man or a woman.” Moses and Sanford 

cursed at each other, and a physical altercation ensued.

Moses testified that Sanford punched him in the face. He 

responded by punching Sanford in the face. Defendant 

intervened and she and Moses began shoving each other. Moses 

testified that he shoved defendant to the other side of an adjacent

city bench. Defendant paused for a few seconds, then “came back 

around” and stabbed Moses on his left side, near the ribcage. 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3

Moses lifted his shirt and saw blood. Defendant said, “Yeah,

nigger,” and fled with Sanford. 

Defendant testified that she and Sanford were trying to get 

away from Moses when she noticed Sanford was no longer by her 

side. Defendant turned around and saw Sanford and Moses 

facing each other approximately three feet behind defendant. 

Moses was yelling at Sanford. Defendant yelled, “Get away from 

her,” stepped between Moses and Sanford, and placed her hand 

on Moses’s chest. Moses responded by punching Sanford in the 

eye. He then hit defendant twice – once across her mouth and 

the second time on the left side of her jaw. Defendant fell to the 

ground. When she stood up again, Moses raised his fists and 

approached. Defendant then pulled out her pocketknife and 

stabbed Moses in self-defense. 

Ramiro Lopez witnessed the altercation while stopped in 

his car at a red light. He testified that he saw defendant, 

Sanford, and Moses engaged in a physical altercation. Lopez 

described the altercation as follows: “They were on the sidewalk. 

There was an altercation. They were standing. I saw a lot of 

tugging, pulling, shoving that kind of altercation.” Lopez 

testified that he did not at any time see Moses strike, punch, or 

hit either defendant or Sanford. Lopez described the altercation 

as a “scuffle.” He saw defendant and Sanford run away. He then 

saw Moses raise his shirt, and blood running down Moses’s side. 

After defendant and Sanford fled from the scene, they 

crouched by a gate and called a rideshare vehicle. They were 

arrested shortly thereafter. 

Neither defendant nor Sanford had any visible injuries. 

After her arrest, defendant declined medical attention. Police

officers recovered a Swiss Army style pocketknife with blood 
4

residue in the backseat of the rideshare car. Defendant 

stipulated at trial that the knife belonged to her. 

Moses suffered a stab wound in his left torso. He

underwent surgery the following day to repair a damaged 

diaphragm.

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

Defendant contends the judgment must be reversed for the 

following reasons:

I. The trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte,

on self-defense pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3471 and by failing to 

modify CALCRIM No. 3472 to include a self-defense instruction.

II. The trial court violated defendant’s right to confrontation of 

witnesses by limiting cross-examination of Moses about past 

incidents of domestic violence and by excluding a witness who 

could testify concerning Moses’s past domestic violence.

III. The prosecutor committed misconduct by allowing Moses to 

testify falsely about his domestic violence history and by making 

false statements about Moses’s domestic violence history during 

closing argument.

IV. Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s verdict.

V. To the extent defendant is found to have waived any of her 

appellate challenges, she was denied effective assistance of 

counsel.

VI. The cumulative effect of the errors below warrant reversal of 

the judgment.
5

DISCUSSION

I. Alleged instructional error

We review de novo defendant’s claim of instructional error. 

(People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) In doing 

so, we consider the jury instructions as a whole, and in context 

with other instructions, to determine whether there was a 

reasonable likelihood the jury misapplied the court’s instructions. 

(People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803.) 

Even if instructional error is established, reversal is not 

required unless it is reasonably probable the defendant would 

have obtained a more favorable result if the omitted instruction 

had been given. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)

A. CALCRIM No. 3471

A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on a 

defense “‘only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a 

defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a 

defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant’s 

theory of the case.’” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 

157, quoting People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716.) The 

trial court here found, in ruling on defendant’s posttrial motion to 

dismiss, that the evidence did not support a duty to instruct 

pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3471.2

The CALCRIM No. 3471 instruction applies to initial 

aggressors and mutual combatants and specifies the 

circumstances under which such persons may assert a limited 

right of self-defense. Mutual combatants are those who do not 

2 The record does not support defendant’s contention that the 

trial court denied her motion because the instruction was 

inconsistent with the defense theory of the case. 
6

merely engage in a reciprocal exchange of blows, but who do so 

pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding 

the initiation of hostilities. (People v. Ross (2007) 155 

Cal.App.4th 1033, 1044-1045.) CALCRIM No. 3471 states that a

defendant who was an initial aggressor or mutual combatant may 

assert a limited right of self-defense when the defendant (1) 

actually and in good faith tried to stop fighting; (2) made the 

opponent aware that the defendant wanted to stop fighting; and 

(3) made the opponent aware the defendant had stopped 

fighting.3 (CALCRIM No. 3471.)

3 CALCRIM No. 3471 provides: “A person who (engages in 

mutual combat/[or who] starts a fight) has a right to self-defense 

only if: 1. (He/She) actually and in good faith tried to stop 

fighting; [AND] 2. (He/She) indicated, by word or by conduct, to 

(his/her) opponent, in a way that a reasonable person would 

understand, that (he/she) wanted to stop fighting and that 

(he/she) had stopped fighting(;/.) <Give element 3 in cases of 

mutual combat.> [AND 3. (He/She) gave (his/her) opponent a 

chance to stop fighting.]

“If the defendant meets these requirements, (he/she) then 

had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to fight.

“[However, if the defendant used only non-deadly force, and 

the opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that 

the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the 

defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself) with deadly 

force and was not required to try to stop fighting(,/or) 

communicate the desire to stop to the opponent[, or give the 

opponent a chance to stop fighting].]

“[A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by 

mutual consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly 

stated or implied and must occur before the claim to self-defense 

arose.]”
7

There was no evidence that defendant was either the initial 

aggressor or a mutual combatant at the time she intervened 

between Moses and Sanford. Defendant testified that she urged 

Moses to “get away” and attempted to physically separate Moses 

and Sanford by placing herself between them.

Defendant maintains the jury could have concluded she 

was the initial aggressor because she either placed her hand on 

Moses’s chest (according to defendant’s testimony) or shoved him 

(according to Moses) at the time she intervened and because the 

jury was instructed, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 3470, that the 

slightest touching can be unlawful.4

There was no evidence, however, that defendant attempted 

to stop the fight after she and Moses began either shoving or 

hitting each other. There was also no evidence that Moses 

responded to defendant’s unlawful touching with sudden and 

deadly force. The trial court did not err by concluding the 

evidence did not support application of CALCRIM No. 3471.

People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, on which 

defendant relies, is inapposite. The court in that case reversed 

an attempted murder conviction because although the trial court 

instructed the jury that a mutual combatant has a right of selfdefense if attempting to stop the fight, the trial court failed to 

instruct that the mutual combatant has a right to self-defense if 

the opponent responds with sudden deadly force. (Id. at pp. 300-

302.) Here, there was no evidence that defendant and Moses 

4 The relevant language in CALCRIM No. 3470 states: “The 

slightest touching can be unlawful if it is done in a rude or angry 

way. Making contact with another person, including through his 

or her clothing, is enough. The touching does not have to cause 

pain or injury of any kind.” 
8

were engaged in mutual combat when she intervened, and there 

is no evidence that Moses responded to defendant’s intervention 

with deadly force. Although Moses either shoved or punched 

defendant, there was no evidence that his response constituted 

deadly force.

The trial court’s failure to instruct the jury with CALCRIM 

No. 3471 did not negate defendant’s self-defense theory. The trial 

court gave several self-defense instructions, including CALCRIM 

Nos. 3470, 3472, and 3474. The record discloses no instructional 

error.

B. Modification of CALCRIM No. 3472

Defendant contends the trial court should have modified 

CALCRIM No. 34725 to instruct the jury that an initial aggressor 

has a right of self-defense if the opponent responds to the initial 

provocation with excessive or deadly force. Defendant provides 

no authority supporting the proposition that the court had a sua 

sponte duty to modify the instruction in this manner. To the 

extent defendant believed the instructions were incomplete or 

needed elaboration, it was her obligation to request additional or 

clarifying instructions. (People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 

514.) Her failure to do so forfeits the claim on appeal. (Ibid.)

Moreover, for reasons discussed in section IA above, the 

evidence did not support modification of CALCRIM No. 3472. 

There was no evidence that defendant attempted to stop the fight 

after she and Moses began shoving or hitting each other. There 

was also no evidence that Moses responded to defendant’s 

unlawful touching with sudden and deadly force.

5 The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM 

No. 3472, which states: “A person does not have the right to selfdefense if he or she provokes a fight or quarrel.” 
9

C. No prejudicial error

Even assuming the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury 

with CALCRIM No. 3471 and to modify CALCRIM No. 3472

constituted error, defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice. 

(People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The ultimate issue 

for the jury was whether defendant used unreasonable force by 

stabbing Moses with a pocketknife during the altercation.

The record shows the jury was instructed on self-defense.

The jury was given CALCRIM Nos. 3470 (Right to Self-Defense 

or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)), 3472 (Right to SelfDefense: May Not Be Contrived), and 3474 (Danger No Longer 

Exists or Attacker Disabled). CALCRIM No. 3470 explained that 

the People had “the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 

that the defendant did not act in lawful self-defense.” The jury 

was also instructed that self-defense was a legal defense to the 

charge of assault with a deadly weapon. The record shows the 

jury considered defendant’s self-defense theory but rejected it.

The jury instructions given did not result in a miscarriage 

of justice. Defendant’s conduct in stabbing Moses after he shoved 

her away negates her claim that she acted in self-defense. Both 

the driver of a rideshare vehicle and defendant entered after the 

assault and arresting officers observed no defensive wounds on 

defendant. Defendant’s use of the pocketknife to stab Moses, and 

Moses’s need for surgery the following day to repair damage 

caused by the stab wound, constitute substantial evidence that 

defendant used unreasonable force. Defendant has not 

demonstrated that she would have obtained a more favorable 

result had CALCRIM No. 3471 or a modified CALCRIM No. 3472 

been given. She fails to establish that prejudicial error occurred.
10

II. Confrontation of witness

A. Applicable law and standard of review

The constitutional right of confrontation of witnesses 

includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses on matters 

reflecting on their credibility. (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th 

166, 214.) Not every restriction on a defendant’s crossexamination, however, violates the Constitution. “The trial court 

retains wide latitude to restrict repetitive, prejudicial, confusing, 

or marginally relevant cross-examination. Unless the defendant 

can show that the prohibited cross-examination would have 

created a significantly different impression of the witness’s 

credibility, the trial court’s exercise of discretion to restrict crossexamination does not violate the constitutional right of 

confrontation.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 450-

451.)

A trial court also has broad discretion under Evidence Code 

section 352 to determine whether the probative value of evidence 

is outweighed by concerns of undue prejudice, confusion, or 

consumption of time. (People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 374-

375.) We review for abuse of discretion defendant’s claim that 

the trial court’s restriction of the scope of cross-examination 

violated her rights under the confrontation clause. (People v. 

Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 765.)

B. Evidentiary rulings 

At a pretrial evidentiary hearing, defendant’s trial counsel 

expressed his intent to present evidence of Moses’s history of 

domestic violence. Moses was arrested in 2008 for misdemeanor 

domestic battery. Moses’s then girlfriend (who is also the mother 

of his child) subsequently filed a request for a restraining order, 

accompanied by a declaration referring to Moses’s alleged acts of 
11

violence in 2009 and 2010. Defense counsel sought to call 

Moses’s former girlfriend to testify about the contents of the 

declaration as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 

1103. The prosecutor argued in response that the 2009 and 2010 

alleged incidents did not result in convictions or a restraining 

order; the incidents occurred ten years ago and involved domestic 

violence against Moses’s former girlfriend; whereas the 

circumstances of this case involved violence against strangers. 

The trial court ruled that the defense could ask Moses 

about the facts concerning the 2008 incident. The court 

precluded, under Evidence Code section 352, reference to any 

other past allegedly violent conduct by Moses. The trial court 

deferred ruling, until after Moses’s testimony, on whether 

Moses’s former girlfriend could be called by defendant to testify 

as a witness. 

Moses testified on direct examination that he was arrested 

in 2008 and charged with domestic violence. He said he was not 

convicted in connection with that arrest but attended classes. 

Moses further testified that since the 2008 arrest, he had not 

been arrested or convicted of any crimes involving violence or 

assault. 

On cross-examination, Moses described his relationship 

with his former girlfriend and the circumstances leading to his 

2008 arrest. Moses testified that his then girlfriend “would beat 

on me, and I wouldn’t put my hands on her. I would never put 

my hands on her. But after awhile, as a human being, you can’t 

be nobody’s punching bag, man, woman. . . . [¶] . . . The cops 

came, one of us has to go. Me being a man, hey.” 

The following exchange between defense counsel and Moses 

then occurred:
12

“[Defense counsel]: One of the thin[g]s you told us earlier 

on direct examination was that since that arrest in 2008, you 

haven’t had any domestic violence incidents, is that correct?

“[Moses]: Right.

“[Defense counsel]: That is not true at all, is it, sir?”

The prosecutor objected that defense counsel’s question exceeded 

the scope of the trial court’s ruling limiting inquiry into Moses’s 

domestic violence history. The trial court sustained the objection. 

The defense subsequently rested without seeking to call Moses’s 

former girlfriend as a witness. 

C. No abuse of discretion

Defendant fails to establish any abuse of discretion. The 

record shows that defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine 

Moses about his 2008 arrest for domestic violence. The trial 

court precluded cross-examination about other alleged but 

unproven incidents of domestic violence against Moses’s 

girlfriend in 2009 and 2010. The trial court offered to revisit the 

issue of whether Moses’s former girlfriend could testify for 

purposes of impeaching Moses’s testimony; however, the defense 

never sought to present her as a witness. 

“The court will allow the cross-examination as to the 

incident in 2008. The court, on [Evidence Code section] 352 

analysis, the court will preclude any reference to any further 

conduct. [¶] I will review whatever brief is filed by the parties as 

to whether or not any external extrinsic evidence is admissible on 

those.” The record discloses no brief filed or any further effort to 

call a witness on this point before defendant rested her case. 

At oral argument defendant took the position that People v. 

Castain (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 138 (Castain) controlled. We find 

that Castain does not support defendant’s argument that 
13

excluding evidence concerning the 2009 and 2010 domestic 

violence incidents was an abuse of discretion. The defendant in 

Castain argued that he could not be convicted of battery on a 

police officer and resisting arrest because the arresting officer, 

Revak, had used excessive force. (Id. at p. 142.) He sought to 

introduce testimony by two other individuals who claimed Revak 

had used excessive force on other occasions, but the trial court 

excluded the proffered testimony under Evidence Code section 

352. The Court of Appeal held that exclusion of such testimony 

was an abuse of discretion. The court reasoned that the 

testimony was “highly probative” to show that Revak had a 

propensity to use excessive force against persons he arrested or 

detained or a pattern of behavior in this regard. (Id. at p. 143.) 

The court in Castain further reasoned that “[a] jury, hearing 

evidence of only one other violent confrontation involving the 

officer, might conclude it was an isolated aberration” but “would 

be much less likely to reach that conclusion if it had heard 

evidence of two such incidents.” (Ibid.) Unlike Castain, Moses’s 

history of domestic violence against his longtime girlfriend and 

mother of the child was not “highly probative” to show a 

propensity to initiate violent contact with strangers on a public 

street or a pattern of behavior toward such strangers. 

The record discloses no abuse of discretion. “[T]he 

Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective 

cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in 

whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” 

(Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20.) A trial court’s 

exercise of its discretion to limit cross-examination does not 

violate the Sixth Amendment unless the defendant can show that 

the prohibited examination would have produced “‘a significantly 
14

different impression’” of the witness’s credibility. (People v. 

Hamilton (2009) 45 Cal.4th 863, 943.) Defendant fails to make 

such a showing.

III. Alleged prosecutorial misconduct

Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct 

by eliciting false testimony from Moses that since his 2008 arrest, 

he had not been arrested or convicted of any crimes involving 

violence or assault, by not correcting that allegedly false 

testimony, and by stating during closing argument that Moses 

had not been involved in any incidents of violence since 2008. 

During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: “There is the 

2008 misdemeanor arrest for the domestic violence incident that 

he [Moses] even admitted to that he didn’t suffer a conviction for. 

He does not have any arrest or conviction or anything involving 

violence or assault, anything like that since then, over 10 years 

ago.” 

Defendant forfeited her claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

by failing to object to the allegedly improper questioning, Moses’s 

response, and the prosecutor’s allegedly false or misleading 

closing argument. “‘A defendant may not complain on appeal of 

prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion, and on the 

same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also 

requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived 

impropriety.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 

966.)

Even absent such forfeiture, there was no evidence that 

Moses’s testimony was false or that the prosecutor made false 

statements during closing argument. There was no evidence that 

Moses was subsequently arrested or convicted of any crimes 

involving violence or assault. The unsubstantiated declaration of 
15

Moses’s former girlfriend, which was never introduced or 

admitted into evidence, does not state that Moses was arrested or 

convicted for alleged acts of domestic violence in 2009 and 2010. 

The defense did not seek to have Moses’s former girlfriend testify 

at trial, and the trial court did not preclude her from testifying as 

a witness.

People v. Daggett (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 751, on which 

defendant relies, is inapposite. The court in that case reversed 

the conviction on the ground that the trial court erroneously 

excluded evidence that the minor victim in a child molestation 

case had previously been molested by persons other than the 

defendant. (Id. at p. 757.) That error was then compounded 

when the prosecutor argued to the jury that “[i]nappropriate 

sexual behavior is not inherent in children,” and that the victim 

must have learned about oral copulation and sodomy from being 

“being exposed to it” by the defendant. The court in Daggett 

explained that “[t]he prosecutor asked the jurors to draw an 

inference they might not have drawn if they had heard the 

evidence the judge had excluded” and therefore “unfairly took 

advantage of the judge’s ruling.” (Id. at p. 758.) Here, in 

contrast, the trial court allowed evidence and cross-examination 

concerning Moses’s 2008 arrest for domestic violence. Although 

the court limited the inquiry to that incident, it did not preclude 

testimony from Moses’s former girlfriend. Rather the trial court 

reserved ruling on that issue until after Moses testified.

Defendant never sought to have Moses’s former girlfriend testify 

as a witness, and there was no evidence, excluded or otherwise,

that Moses was subsequently arrested or convicted for other 

domestic violence incidents. 
16

The record accordingly does not support defendant’s claim 

of prosecutorial misconduct. 

IV. Substantial evidence supports the verdict

We review defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence supporting her conviction under the substantial 

evidence standard. Under that standard, we review the record as 

a whole in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine 

whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of 

solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 

defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Johnson 

(1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) In doing so, we do not reweigh the 

evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the 

credibility of witnesses. (People v. Ochoa (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1199, 

1206.)

Substantial evidence supports the jury’s verdict. Moses 

testified that when defendant intervened between him and 

Sanford, Moses and defendant began shoving one another back 

and forth. After Moses shoved defendant several feet away from 

him, defendant paused, and then approached and stabbed Moses

in the side, damaging his diaphragm. 

Lopez’s testimony corroborated in part Moses’s version of 

events. Lopez testified that he saw a scuffle between defendant 

and Moses. The two were pushing and pulling at each other 

while standing on the sidewalk. Lopez did not see any punches 

or blows exchanged during the scuffle. Lopez saw defendant and 

Sanford run away. He then saw Moses lift his shirt and blood 

running down Moses’s side.

On appeal, defendant reiterates her version of the incident,

insisting that she intervened between Moses and Sanford in an 

effort to stop the fight, that she merely placed her hand on 
17

Moses’s chest, that Moses responded by punching her and 

Sanford in the face, and that stabbing Moses was in reasonable 

self-defense. The jury rejected defendant’s self-defense claim, 

and we do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate issues of 

credibility. (People v. Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1206.) 

Defendant fails to establish any grounds for overturning the 

jury’s verdict.

V. Ineffective assistance of counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel 

includes the right to the effective assistance of counsel.

(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686-694; see also 

Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) It is the defendant’s burden to 

demonstrate that trial counsel was inadequate and that prejudice 

resulted. (Strickland v. Washington, at pp. 686-694.) Prejudice is 

shown by “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different.” (Id. at p. 694.) We review an ineffective 

assistance of counsel claim de novo. (People v. Taylor (1984) 162 

Cal.App.3d 720, 725.)

Defendant fails to sustain her burden of demonstrating 

prejudice. For reasons discussed, defendant fails to establish 

that she would have obtained a more favorable result had defense 

counsel not failed to request CALCRIM No. 3471 or a modified 

CALCRIM 3472, to object to the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct, 

or to object to the exclusion of evidence concerning Moses’s past 

acts of domestic violence. 

VI. Cumulative error

Defendant fails to establish any prejudicial error in the 

trial court below. There is accordingly no cumulative error that 

warrants reversal of the judgment.
18

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

____________________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

__________________________, P. J.

LUI

__________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT