Filed 6/10/15 In re S.W. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re S.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SAN DIEGO COUN TY HUMAN AND HEALTH SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. S.M., Defendant and Appellant. D067074
(Super. Ct. No. EJ3639)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of San Diego County, Laura Birkmeyer, Judge. Affirmed. Neil R. Trop, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Dana C. Shoffner, Senior De puty County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 In this appeal, S.M. (Mother) challenges an order denying her petitions to modify dependency orders terminating services to re unify with her daughter, S.W. (Child), and placing Child with the caretaker with whom Child had been living for one and one-half years. Mother sought to modify the orders so that Child woul d be placed with Mother, or alternatively that Child would be placed with Mo ther's friend. Mother challenges the trial court's finding that she had not made a prima facie showing in support of modification, and accordingly argues the c ourt erred by summarily denyi ng her modification petitions without holding a full ev identiary hearing. We reject this contention and affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND This dependency case ar ose from Mother's contin ued failure to end her relationship with her boyfriend (R.H.), who had engaged in numerous acts of domestic violence against Mother. 1 As we shall detail below, after a substantial period of reunification services and another incident of serious domestic violence, the court terminated reunification services. The c ourt found that notw ithstanding extensive therapeutic intervention, Mother was still caught in a cy cle of domestic violence; she had not yet been able to end her relationship with R.H.; and Moth er could not provide a safe home for Child. A. Detention and Jurisdiction On October 9, 2012, the child abuse hotline for the Sa n Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agenc y) received a report of violen ce perpetrated by R.H. at

1 R.H. is not Child's father. Ch ild's biological father is unknown.3 the home of Child's maternal grandmother (Maternal Grandmother) where Mother and Child were residing. During this incide nt, R.H. threw an object through a bedroom window and then called Mother and threaten ed to kill her. Moth er acknowledged the incident occurred. She reported that R.H. ha d engaged in other acts of domestic violence during their six-month relationship and had threatened to kill her on many occasions. In July 2012 he slapped her and sp it on her; in August 2012 he took her to a secluded place where he punched her in the face and chok ed her until she lost consciousness; and on another occasion he had prostitutes beat her. Mother explained R.H.'s violence starte d after he began to have juvenile court proceedings with the mother of one of his children; R.H. would "take his anger out on" Mother; and "one of the worst beatings she got" from R.H. was after one of his court hearings. She stated R.H. had "talked her into prostituti on while they maintained an intimate relationship"; Mother was three months pregnant; and R.H. was the suspected father of her unborn child. Mother said she wa s afraid of R.H.; she did not know what he was capable of; and she did not know if he would have some one else hurt her. Mother agreed to enter in to a confidential domestic violence shelter, to have no contact with R.H., to obtain a restraining order against R.H., and to participate in a voluntary case with the Agency and sign a sa fety plan. On Octo ber 11, 2012, Mother signed a safety plan stating she would file a restraining order against R.H. by October 12, 2012. However, on October 26, 2012, Maternal Grandmother reported that Mother was still seeing R.H. and communicati ng with him, stating that on October 23 Mother sneaked out of Maternal Grandmother's home to see R.H. Mother denied this occurred.4 On October 26, 2012, w ith the Agency's assistan ce, Mother moved to a confidential domestic violence shelter, where she participated in domestic violence groups and therapy sessions. On November 14, 2012, Mother told an Ag ency worker that she was not having contact with R.H. However, Mother later ad mitted to the social worker that on weekends R.H. would come and spend time with her and Child at the beach, and the Agency was conc erned Mother disclosed the location of the confidential shelter to R.H., although she denied this. On December 9, 2012, Mother moved out of the domestic violence shelter two days befo re her time expired and she declined a placement in transitional housing and returned to Maternal Grandmother's home. During a December 11, 2012 home visit, Mother told the Agency work er that she was not having any contact with R.H.; R.H. was " 'really sick' " and she understood the risk he posed to her and Child; and she had learned about the cycles of domestic violence while in the battered women's sh elter. Mother declined to pa rticipate in services offered by the Agency, but agreed to in form the Agency wo rker of any potential changes in her living accommodations. On January 11, 2013, th e child abuse hotline receive d another referral alleging violence at Maternal Grandmother's home. Wh en contacted, Mother stated she had not been at Maternal Grandmother's home since January 2, 2013. When the Agency worker went to speak with Mother at the home where she was staying, the worker discovered that Mother was staying at R.H.'s cousin's hom e, and R.H. was with Mother and Child. Because Mother had not separated herself a nd Child from R.H., that same day (January 11, 2013) the Agency removed Child from Mother's custody and placed her in a5 confidential foster home. On January 15, 2013, the Agen cy filed a de pendency petition alleging Mother had failed to protect Child (age 16 months). In its detention report, the Agency stated that, contrary to her agreement, Mother had not filed a restraining or der against R.H.; she had been dishonest about her ongoing contact with R.H.; and she was continuously putting herself and Child at risk. The Agency noted R.H. had an exte nsive criminal history, including a felony conviction for attempted murder; he has had multiple restrain ing orders against him; he was known to the Agency as "having extrem ely violent relationships with the women he pimps out as prostitutes"; and he was currently involved in a juvenile cour t case concerning his child and the child's mother fo r similar circumstances. At a January 25, 2013 team decision mee ting with the Agency, Mother at first denied contact with R.H. since Child's removal on January 11; however, she later admitted she had been interac ting with R.H., explaining that when he was released from jail on or about January 22, he called her and sa id "a lot of nice things [she] wanted to hear," and she believed him and wanted to be with him and not be a single mother raising two children. During the team meeting, the persons in attendance (including members of Mother's family and Mother's friends) stated they be lieved Mother had never stopped interacting with R.H. and they expressed grea t concern for Mother's and Child's safety. By the conclusion of the meeti ng, Mother agreed not to have contact with R.H. and to participate in reunification services. In its Fe bruary 2013 report, the Agency stated that it anticipated reunification as Mother progressed in services. In its February 11, 2013 jurisdictional ruling, the court adjudged Child to be a dependent of the court, ordered6 liberal supervised visitation for Mother, and gave the Agency discretion to place Child with an approved relative or nonrelated ex tended family member. However, the court ordered no unsupervised visitation without court approval and in formation regarding Mother's progress in domestic violence treatm ent and an update as to whether there was a restraining order against R.H. B. Six-month Review In February 2013, Mother began residing at a maternity shelter program, and in May 2013, she gave birth to he r second child (Second Child). In July 2013, the Agency reported that Mother had regular visitation with Child; she began weekly individual therapy in Marc h 2013; and she started participating in a domestic violence group in May 2013. Mother's individual therapist reported Mother had "vowed to keep her ch ildren safe," stating she will stay away from R.H. for the sake of her children and she "is finished with her past life style that placed herself and her children at risk." Further, Mother had expre ssed an understanding of the high probability that R.H. will again be violent if he ha s not received treatment, of the damage she suffered as a child from witne ssing domestic violence, and of the same pattern repeating in her life and that the cycle must stop with her for the sake of the children. Mother's group facilitator said she app eared to grasp some of the di scussion topics; she seemed to be "slightly increasing her insight rega rding power and control dynamics" she experienced with R.H.; and she was able to identify and exam ine some characteristics of an offender and relate that information to her relationship. Mother told the Agency worker that she had learned a lot about domestic violence cy cles and now realized there7 were cycles in her relationship with R.H.; she realized R.H. need ed help but did not believe he would get it; and she knew they could not be together. During this time, Mother claimed she had not interacted with R.H. However, the Agency discovered otherwise. The maternity shelter social worker reported that Mother was spending an increasing amount of time with R.H.'s family and appeared to have lost her motivation to participate in on-site serv ices. The Agency work er received a phone call from Mother's friend who sa id Mother had been seeing R. H., and Mother was afraid to return to the shelter because R.H. had threatened to hurt her and he knew the location of the shelter. Jail records showed Mother had visited R.H. in jail on three occasions in April 2013. In its July 2013 report, the Agency stated notwithsta nding Mother's progress and participation in services, she had continuously disregarded her safety plan and interacted with R.H. and exposed Child to him; she would claim that sh e does not interact with R.H. but then admit to the contrary after being confronted with evidence; and because of Mother's continued contact w ith R.H., Child need ed to remain in foster care. The Agency recommended that Mother continue with visitation an d reunification services. On August 5, 2013, Mother told the Agen cy worker that she wanted to move from the maternity shelter residen ce to live with R.H. 's mother. The Ag ency worker told Mother this was not appropriate because R.H. would have access to Mother and Second Child if and when R.H. was re leased from jail and Mother wo uld not be able to reunite8 with Child. 2 On August 22, 2013, the maternity sh elter gave Mother notice that she had to leave the shelter because, cont rary to her agreements at in take, she had interacted with and disclosed shelter locations to R.H. and/or his relatives, ha d failed to file a restraining order against R.H., was spending four nights per week at the home of R.H.'s mother, and showed little or no desire to participate in services. Meanwhile, on March 16, 2013, Child wa s placed with a nonrelated extended family member (M.J.). Ho wever, after about one month she was removed from this home at M.J.'s request because of "communica tion differences" between Mother and M.J. Child was returned to her initial foster placement for 10 days, and on April 28, 2013— when Child was one year, eight months old—she was placed in the foster home of E.W. E.W. stated Child had adjust ed well and was exhibiting no si gns of emotional distress. In a September 9, 2013 order, the court fou nd Child would be at risk if returned to Mother at this time; Mother had made so me progress with her case plan and it was expected she would reunite with Child by the 12-month review date; and sibling visitation between Child and S econd Child should occur provided R.H. was not present. C. 12-Month Review and Termina tion of Reunification Services On January 22, 2014, the Agency recommended that Moth er continue to receive services to the 18-month date. The Agency reported Mother had custody of Second

2 On May 1, 2013, R.H. was extradited to North Carolina where he was being held on charges of assault, strangul ation and kidnapping, and the Ag ency was told he might be released by the North Carolina authorities becau se the witness was not cooperating. The North Carolina authorities therea fter informed the Agency that R.H. would be released from custody on September 4, 2013.9 Child and was living with a frie nd; Mother claimed she had not had contact with R.H. for "a long time"; and Mother's roommate conf irmed that R.H. had not been to their residence. Mother was continuing to par ticipate in her domestic violence group and individual therapy, and Mother told the Agency work er that she "has learned things such as red flags that can lead to an abusive relationship." 3 The domestic violence group facilitator reported that Mother had been a ttending the group regula rly, was speaking out more, and was making good progress. Moth er continued to visit with Child, and although there were some problems with canc ellations and tardiness, Child's caretaker reported the visits went well, Mother was very engaging with Child, and Child really enjoyed seeing Mother. The Agency stated it would be detrimental to return Child to Mother at this time, and Mother needed to continue her domestic violence treatment so she could have a better understanding of the risks of continuing to associate with R. H. At a hearing on February 3, 2014, the court granted Mother short, unsupervised visitation with Child under strict conditions, including that Mother not allow Child to ha ve any contact with R.H. and Mother immediately inform the Ag ency if R.H. tried to contact her. On February 26, 2014, Mother comple ted her domestic viol ence victims group program. The case was scheduled for a 12 -month review hearing on March 26, 2014,

3 Mother was allowed to take a few weeks off therapy after Second Child's birth in May 2013, and she resumed therapy with a di fferent therapist on December 19, 2013. The therapist said Mother had been consistently attending her weekly session but did not submit a report because therapy ha d only recently started.10 with a pretrial conference set for March 4. At the March 4 pretrial hearing, Mother stated she would be requesting that Child be returned to her. 1. March 17, 2014 Domestic Violence Incident The case changed dramatically, causing the Agency to recommend termination of reunification services, when there was anothe r incident of domestic violence on March 17, 2014. The Agency report ed that in early March 2014, Mother moved into her own apartment. On March 17, 2014 , while at this apartment, R.H. punched Mother several times in the face, slammed her against the wa ll, and choked her to the point of losing consciousness. When Mother regained consciousness, R.M. wa s kicking her in the legs. Mother escaped out a window and called 911. Because of this incident, Second Child was removed from Mother's custody, a de pendency case was commenced for Second Child, and on March 20, 2014, Second Child was placed in the same foster home as Child. Although Mother had visible bruises on her face and several witnesses said Mother was hurt and reported that her boyfri end had choked her, Mother later denied the March 17 assault occurred. She claimed she did not want R.H. at her apartment and she told the police that she was assaulted so they would come sooner and because this was the only way she knew to get R. H. to leave. Mother clai med she had no contact with R.H. before March 17. However, the propert y managers at Mother's apartment reported that a male fitting R.H.'s desc ription frequented Mother's apar tment and Mother told them that she was "working on her re lationship with her boyfriend."11 The Agency assessed Mother had failed to comply with her agreements not to have contact with R.H. and to notify the Ag ency if R.H. attempted to contact her, and Mother put herself and her children in danger by continuing to keep in contact with R.H. On April 15, 2014, th e Agency recommended th at Mother's services be terminated and
that a Welfare and Institutions Code secti on 366.26 permanency pl anning hearing be set. 4 On May 22, 2014, Child's foster parent was granted de facto parent status. 2. Termination of Reunification Services At a rescheduled 12-month review hear ing held on May 27, 2014, the Agency stated Child had been in th e system for one year, four months, and the May 17, 2014 domestic violence incident put Mother "back to square one with respect to her services" and reflected that she was not willing or able to separate herself from R.H. notwithstanding all the services she had rece ived. The Agen cy noted that according to information in the police report, R.H. had not "barged" into her ho me and attacked her, but rather had come over to visit, she let hi m into the apartment, and the attack occurred when they were arguing about him seeing other women. Mother's counsel noted that Mother currently had a rest raining order against R.H., and asked for six months of additional services so she could prove to the Agency that she could provide a safe place for Child. Maternal Grandmot her testified at the hearing that if Mother was given six more months of serv ices, she would assist her if Mother stayed away from R.H.

4 Subsequent statutory re ferences are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.12 When making its ruling terminating reuni fication services, the court recognized that it was very hard for a domestic violence victim "to leave the clutches of an abuser" and it often "takes multiple times to leave" ; however, the court al so recognized that exposure to domestic violence has "long-las ting consequences" on children. The court stated that although Mother had made some progress in services and had positive visitations with Child, she allowed R.H. back into her life notwithstanding an extended reunification period and multiple opportunitie s to separate from R.H., and she had not been truthful about the fact she was reestablishing her rela tionship with R.H. The court noted that the most recent domestic violence did not occur when R.H. "hunted [Mother] down" and then abused her, but rather occurred after she "cle arly invited" him back and then, as he had done before, he "went cr azy" on her during a dispute. The court concluded Mother had "a long ways to go and . . . has significant work to do before she's able to internalize what has been explained and what has been offered," and she was "still caught in a very significant domestic violen ce cycle" in which she continued "cycling back to" R.H. The court found Mother could not at this time provide a safe home for Child; there was a substantial risk of detriment if Child was returned to Mother 's custody; and there was no substantial probability Child would be re turned to Mother by the 18-month date. The court ordered that Child re main in foster placement and that reunification services be terminated. The court set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for September 22, 2014.13 D. Denial of Mother's Re quests for Modification and Order Terminating Parental Rights On September 8, 2014, th e Agency recommended that Mother's parental rights be terminated and that Child's permanent plan be adoption. The Agency reported that during supervised visits in August, Septem ber, and October 2014, Child treated Mother like a familiar adult or ex tended family member who Child was comfortable playing with, but there was no parent-child bond betw een Child and Mother, and Child looked to her caretaker as her sole maternal figure and primary source of love and comfort. For example, Child called her caregiver " 'Mommy' " and hugged and held on to her. While playing with toys, Child inte rmittently approached her care giver to ask for hugs; when the caretaker left the room Child asked " 'W here's mommy?' "; and when the caretaker returned Child ran to her for a hug. During a visit in August, Child declined to sit on Mother's lap and ignored Mother's attempts to talk to her. During a visit in September, Child appeared "more sociable " with Mother and sat on Mo ther's lap while reading a story; however, Child chose to lie on the floor when she was tired a nd declined Mother's invitation to lie with her. During this Sept ember visit Child asked " 'Where did mommy go?' "; Mother responded " 'What do you m ean? I'm your mommy . . . you look just like me!"; and Child said, "No not you, I want my mommy E . . . ! Why did she leave?' " During another September visit, when the care taker left the room, Child said to Mother, " 'I want my mommy! You're not my mommy[ —]I want mommy E . . . .' " During these visits, Child had no adverse reaction when separating from Mother and "happily waved goodbye" when leaving with the caretaker.14 1. Mother's Modification Motions Due to a change in Mother's counsel , the permanency planning hearing was rescheduled for November 18, 2014. On November 4, 2014, Mother filed two modification motions. In her first modification motion, Mother asked the court to change its May 27, 2014 order terminating her reunification serv ices and to instead order that Child be placed in her care. As a ch anged circumstance, Mother st ated she started attending a domestic violence group on May 30, 2014; sh e started individual therapy (with a new therapist) on July 18 , 2014; and R.H. had been convict ed of domestic violence and sentenced to four to eight years in prison. Mother claimed she had resolved the safety issues that brought Child into dependency and it would be in Child's best interest to be raised by her biological mother if Mo ther can properly en sure her safety. In support of her motion, Mother s ubmitted reports from the facilitator of her domestic violence group and her i ndividual therapist. The gr oup facilitator stated Mother had attended 18 out of 22 group sessions , and her projected completion date was November 21, 2014. The facilitator repor ted that Mother seemed to hold R.H. accountable for his actions and to take respon sibility for her action of not protecting her children when she allowed R.H. back into her home, and Mo ther's understanding of the cycle of abuse seemed to have increased. In a report dated October 3, 2014, the facilitator commented that as Mother "enhances her knowledge " of the consequences of domestic violence on children, she will "likely be better able to protect herself and her children from additional domestic violence dynamics."15 In a report dated October 10 , 2014, Mother's individual therapist stated she had attended 11 sessions and missed one, and classified Mother's various treatment goals as "In Progress." The therapist reported Mother wa s able to describe her previous process of viewing her relationship as prim ary rather than viewing her children and their safety as primary; Mother and the therapist had disc ussed ideas related to children needing a violence-free home more than a complete fam ily unit; Mother appeared to have taken responsibility for the removal of her children due to her nonprotec tion; she had gained insight into the "red flags" within her relationship and the factors that led her into a domestic violence relationship and influenced her to stay; and she appeared "open to processing her [domestic violence] experiences" and to "work on her [domestic violence] related treatment goals." If the court declined her first motion that Child be placed in her care, Mother requested in her second motion that the cour t change its February 11, 2013 order placing Child in a foster home. Mo ther stated the changed circ umstance was that her friend (M.W.) had come forward and was willing to ha ve Child placed in her care. Supported by a declaration from M.W., Mother stated M.W. was Mother's longtime friend; M.W. was willing to adopt Child; and placing Child in M.W.'s care would ensure that Child had contact with Mother if Child was adopted. M.W. stated sh e had spent time with Mother and Child when they would come to her home when Child was one year old; she had two children ages seven and 10; she had no Child Pr otective Services or criminal history; and she had been employed as a child development assistant fo r the school district since 2008.16 2. Trial Court's Finding of No Pr ima Facie Showing for Modification At a hearing on November 7, 2014, the court ruled that Moth er had not made a prima facie showing to support her request s for modification, and accordingly denied Mother's modification petitions without holding a full evidentia ry hearing. As to the request that Child be return ed to Mother, the court stat ed the case involved serious domestic violence; Mother had a history of failing to disengage from R.H.; R.H. had previously been incarcerated and Mother main tained contact with him and was untruthful about this; and another "very lethal type" domestic violence incident occurred in March 2014 when R.H. was visiting at her home. The court again recognized that it typi cally takes multiple occasions for someone to leave an abuser, but fo und that Mother had prolon ged services and multiple opportunities to do so; she at times made progress but ultimat ely allowed R.H. to return to her life; R.H. would be released fro m prison in the future; and under these circumstances Mother's showing of 11 new therapy sessions and participation in a domestic violence group were not sufficient to show changed circumstances concerning Mother's ability to protect Ch ild. The court stated it recognized that the prima facie showing was a "very low" threshold, but conc luded the threshold had not "been crossed," finding that given Mother's history of "cyc l[ing] back" to R.H. she had shown "not a changed circumstance, but at best a changi ng circumstance," and there was no prima facie showing that Mother had resolved the sa fety issues that made Child a dependent of the court. Also, the court stated Mother had not discussed Child's needs "at this point in17 time," and concluded there was no prima fa cie showing that it was in Child's best interests to be raised by her biological mo ther if Mother can en sure her safety. As to Mother's second motion, the court noted that at one point Child had been placed with a nonrelated extend ed family member at Mother's request, but this placement ended when the person had problems with Moth er's "engagement or interference." In any event, the court stated that assuming the availability of Mother's friend was a changed circumstance, there was no prima facie showing that a change in placement would be in Child's best interest. The court stated th e friend appeared to be competent to be a caregiver, but there was no evidence the friend ha d a relationship with Child or that Child would recognize her. Further, Ch ild was currently in a stab le, loving placement and the current caretaker was open to maintaining co ntact with Mother an d with Second Child should Second Child return to Mother. 3. Termination of Parental Rights Thereafter, at the permanen cy planning hearing on November 18, 2014, the court terminated Mother's parental rights and ordere d that Child's permanen t plan be adoption. DISCUSSION Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion and violated her due process rights by summarily denying he r section 388 modification mo tions without affording her a full evidentiary hearing. I. Governing Law The dependency statutes are designed to balance numerous competing interests, including the interest in preserving a family unit, the parents' intere st in the custody and18 care of their children, and the child's interest in a stable, permanent relationship with a fully-committed caretaker. ( In re Zacharia D . (1993) 6 Cal.4th 4 35, 446.) Under the statutory scheme, a parent's interest in reuni fication is given precedence over a child's need for stability and perman ency up until the time reunifica tion services are ordered terminated and the case is se t for a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing. ( Id. at p. 447.) Once parental " 'reunification services are ordered terminated , the focus shifts to the needs of the child for pe rmanency and stability.' " ( Ibid .) " 'A court hearing a motion for change of placement at [the permanency planning] stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.' " ( In re J.C . (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527.) As an " ' "escape mechanism" ' " to a llow the court to cons ider new information even after termination of reunification se rvices, a parent may file a motion for modification of the court's orders. ( In re Zacharia D., supra , 6 Cal.4th at p. 447; § 388.) Section 388 allows a parent to file a modification petition ba sed on "change of circumstances or new evidence" (§ 388, subd. (a)(1)) and instructs the court to hold a hearing "[i]f it appears that the best interest s of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order . . . ." (§ 388, subd. (d)). To obtain modification, the parent has the burden to establish that (1 ) new evidence or changed circ umstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child. ( In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 806.) The section 388 pe tition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing to consid er the parent's request, and the parent need only make a prima facie showing of the required elements to trigger the right to proceed by way of a19 full hearing. ( In re Marilyn H . (1993) 5 Cal.4t h 295, 309-310; In re Zachary G., supra , at p. 806.) A prima facie showing " 'is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.' " ( Kojababian v. Genuine Home Loans, Inc . (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 408, 417; In re Zachary G., supra , 77 Cal.App.4th at p. 806 .) The showing may consist of " 'slight evidence which creates a reasonable inference of fact sought to be established but need not eliminate all c ontrary inferences.' " ( Krinsky v. Doe 6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1172, fn. 14 .) To be entitled to a hear ing, the petitioner need not establish a probability of prevailing, but need only present evidence that might warrant a change in the court's order. ( In re Aljamie D . (2000) 84 Cal.App. 4th 424, 432-433; In re Angel B . (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 4 54, 461.) In determini ng whether the petition makes the necessary showing, the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. ( In re Justice P . (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 189.) If the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not make a prim a facie showing, the c ourt need not order a full evidentiary hearin g on the petition. ( In re Zachary G., supra , at p. 806.) On appeal, we review the court's findi ng of no prima facie showing for abuse of discretion. ( In re Brittany K . (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1505.) We must uphold the order unless the court's determination was arb itrary, capricious or patently absurd. ( In re Mary G . (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 205.) II. Analysis The record supports the trial court's fi nding that Mother had not made a prima facie showing to require a fu ll evidentiary hearing. Rega rding Mother's request that20 Child be placed with he r, Mother showed that in May 20 14 she resumed participation in a domestic violence group and in July 2014 she st arted individual therapy with a different therapist, and her group fac ilitator and therapist assessed she was making progress and gaining insight that would assist her in staying away from R.H. and protecting her children from the dangers of domestic violence. Liberally construing this evidence to mean Mother was making substantial progr ess in therapy, th is evidence cannot reasonably support a finding of a changed circumstance. Th e record is replete with information that Mother recei ved therapeutic services, sh e claimed she understood the dynamics of domestic violence and was not seeing R.H., a nd her counselors reported she was making progress and gaining insight. Notw ithstanding these services and indications she was staying away from R.H ., Mother continued to mainta in contact with him and to be untruthful about this, whic h culminated in the highly vi olent incident in March 2014. For example, when Mother was at th e domestic violence shelter starting in October 2012, she received services and stat ed she understood the cycles of domestic violence, and yet she continued to see R.H ., which caused Child's removal in January 2013. When she was at the maternity shelter starting in February 2013, she initially participated in services, but then started spending time with R.H.'s family and stopped participating in the shelter services. Du ring this same time period, she commenced individual therapy in March 2013 and joined a domestic violence gr oup in May 2013 as part of her reunification plan for Child; sh e received favorable reports and claimed insight; and yet she continued her contact with R.H., even when he was in jail. She completed her domestic violence group pr ogram on February 26, 2014, and less than21 three weeks later—when the Ma rch 17 domestic violence incident occurred that caused the Agency to recommend termination of services—it was discovered that she had resumed her relationship with R.H. Also, the fact that R.H. was serving a f our- to eight-year prison term at the time of Mother's modification motion does not show sh e would stay away from him when he was released. Given Mother's history of con tinually returning to R.H. notwithstanding extensive services, Mother's resumption of therapeutic serv ices and R.H.'s incarceration cannot reasonably support a finding of a cha nged circumstance reflecting that Mother might now be ready to provide a safe home for Child. Further, as noted by the tria l court, Mother presented no evidence to support that it might be in Child's best interests to be removed from her caretaker and returned to Mother. At the time of the modification moti on, Child had been removed from Mother's custody for almost two years; Child had been living with her current caretaker for about one and one-half years; she was three years old; she was bonded w ith the caretaker and viewed the caretaker (not Moth er) as her mother; and the caret aker wanted to adopt her. The case was at the permanen cy planning stage which required the court to give paramount consideration to Child's need fo r permanency and stab ility, and Mother was still in the process of undergoi ng therapeutic services that in the recent past had been unsuccessful in separating her from her abuser. For the same reasons, the record support s that there was no prima facie showing that it might be in Child's best interests to place Child with Mother's friend. There were no facts that could support a reasonable conclu sion that Child's comp elling need to stay22 with the caretaker who she now viewed as her mother could be outweighed by a placement that might facilitate Child's ongoing contact with her biological mother who was not yet ready to reunify. There was no abuse of discretion or vi olation of due process arising from the court's denial of a full evidentiary heari ng concerning Mother's modification motions. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

HALLER, J. WE CONCUR:

M C CONNELL, P. J.

NARES, J.