Filed 8/31/20; Certified for Publication 9/17/20 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RODRIGO DECASAS,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B301297

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. ZM010896)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, William C. Ryan, Judge. Affirmed. 

Jackie Lacey, District Attorney, Phyllis C. Asayama and 

Matthew Brown, Deputy District Attorneys for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Robert S. Gerstein, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

____________________________
2

Thirteen years after the People filed a petition to have 

Rodrigo DeCasas civilly committed under the Sexually Violent 

Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 6600 et seq.), the 

trial court granted DeCasas’s motion to dismiss the petition on 

the ground that he had been deprived of his due process right to 

a speedy trial. The People appealed. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Background

In 1994, DeCasas pleaded guilty to one count of a 

forcible lewd act with a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, 

subd. (b)), three counts of lewd acts with children under 14 years 

(Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), and one count of continuous sexual 

abuse of a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288.5). The court 

sentenced him to 20 years in prison.

On November 2, 2006, the Los Angeles County District 

Attorney filed a petition under the SVPA to have DeCasas 

committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP).2 The petition 

1 Unless otherwise specified, subsequent statutory 

references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

2 At the time the original petition was filed against 

DeCasas, a sexually violent predator was defined as “a person 

who has been convicted of a [statutorily defined] sexually violent 

offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed 

mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health 

and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will 

engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (Former § 6600, 

subd. (a)(1).) By the time the People filed an amended petition 

in September 2007, the electorate had expanded the definition to 

require a conviction of a sexually violent offense against only one
3

was supported by evaluations from Thomas MacSpeiden, Ph.D., 

and Bruce Yanofsky, Ph.D., who diagnosed DeCasas with 

pedophilia and schizophrenia, primarily because of his qualifying 

offenses, which predisposed him to commit sexually violent 

predatory offenses.

The court appointed the Los Angeles County Public 

Defender to represent DeCasas. Deputy Public Defender Craig 

Osaki represented DeCasas at an initial review hearing held 

on November 16, 2006 with DeCasas present in court. Osaki 

waived DeCasas’s right to a probable cause hearing and 

the court ordered DeCasas to “remain in custody in a secure 

facility” pending trial. DeCasas waived his right to be present 

at subsequent hearings pending trial.

During Osaki’s tenure as DeCasas’s counsel, the court 

held pretrial conferences in January, April, July, and September 

2007.3 Osaki was present at each and, according to minute 

orders, DeCasas’s presence was waived. At each hearing, the 

court continued the conference pursuant to the stipulation of 

counsel.

In late 2007, Deputy Public Defender David Santiago began 

representing DeCasas. According to Santiago, “not a lot had been 

done” on the case prior to the assignment to him.

or more victims and added violations of Penal Code section 269 

to the definition of sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2006, § 24, 

pp. A-320 to A-321 [Proposition 83].)

3 At the September 6, 2007 conference, the People filed an 

amended petition adding an additional underlying charge, which 

DeCasas’s counsel referred to as a clerical correction.
4

Santiago first appeared for DeCasas at a pretrial 

conference on December 11, 2007.4 The court continued the 

conference to April 8, 2008. On that date, the court continued 

the conference to June 26 pursuant to the stipulation of counsel.

At the June 26, 2007 conference, Santiago stated that he 

had cases that were older than DeCasas’s case and he did not 

“anticipate being ready to go to trial on this matter in 2008,” 

but “hope[d] to proceed on it sometime [in 2009].” The conference 

was continued to October 28, 2007, and on that date, to February 

23, 2009. At the February conference, the prosecutor told the 

court that “[w]e’re early in the hunt on this case” and “things 

[are] moving along.” Pursuant to counsel’s stipulation, the court 

continued the conference to July 27, 2009.

On July 27, 2009, Santiago told the court that he had not 

been in contact with DeCasas because DeCasas had been 

returned to prison for parole violations. Santiago anticipated 

DeCasas would be released in January 2010. The court 

continued the case to February 19, 2010. The court asked 

Santiago to bring to the conference a “waiver of time” from 

DeCasas. Santiago said that doing so would “be difficult.”

Santiago directed his paralegals to meet with DeCasas to 

have him sign waivers of his right to appear and to a speedy trial, 

but DeCasas never signed one. Santiago did not know whether 

anyone had advised DeCasas of his speedy trial rights and our 

record does not disclose why DeCasas did not sign a waiver.

4 A reporter’s transcript states that Santiago appeared for 

DeCasas at the December 11, 2007 pretrial conference. A minute 

order for the same conference states that Osaki appeared for 

DeCasas.
5

At the next conference, in February 19, 2010, the court 

asked Santiago if he had obtained “a declaration of time waiver 

[and] nonappearance” from DeCasas. Santiago said, “[A]ny sort 

of waivers information that I had for [DeCasas] have expired.” 

He explained that he has had “difficulties in communicating with 

[DeCasas] and is “just trying to reinstitute contact with [him].” 

The court continued the hearing to April 29, 2010 and told 

Santiago to “get the declaration then.” Santiago said he will 

“make attempts to do so.” At the April 29 conference, Santiago 

explained that he was still having “difficulty getting [DeCasas] 

to cooperate” and he was “still working on” getting a time and 

appearance waiver.

B. The Ronje decision and the probable cause 

hearing

In November 2009, the Fourth District of the Court of 

Appeal decided In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509 (Ronje), 

disapproved in Reilly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, 

655. Ronje held that a particular standardized assessment 

protocol used by SVP evaluators prior to 2008 was invalid and 

its use “constitute[d] an error or irregularity in the SVPA 

proceedings.” (Ronje, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.) The 

court held that “the proper remedy” is for the trial court “to 

(1) order new evaluations of [the alleged SVP] using a valid 

assessment protocol, and (2) conduct another probable cause 

hearing . . . based on those new evaluations.” (Id. at p. 519.) 

After Ronje, the SVP unit of the Los Angeles County 

Public Defender’s Office “filed a significant number” of “Ronje

motions,” which resulted in a backlog of probable cause hearings 

in the superior court resulting in delays of one or two years.
6

On August 17, 2010, Santiago filed a Ronje motion on 

behalf of DeCasas requesting a probable cause hearing based 

on new evaluations. The prosecution stipulated to the relief and 

the court promptly granted the motion. The court’s order 

required the state’s evaluators to conduct further interviews of 

DeCasas and prepare new evaluations.

At a hearing held in October 2010, the prosecutor had 

only one of the state’s two required evaluations ready. The 

court asked Santiago if DeCasas was willing to waive time, 

and Santiago answered, “Yes.” When Santiago was asked about 

this answer at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, Santiago 

testified that he “was waiving time on [DeCasas’s] behalf . . . 

[without] his permission.”

By December 15, 2010, Santiago had received the second 

of the state’s evaluations. During a hearing held on that date, 

the court asked Santiago if DeCasas was willing to waive time, 

and Santiago answered, “Yes.” Santiago informed the court that 

there were mathematical errors in the evaluations and that 

he would need to consult with the defense expert. The court 

continued the hearing at Santiago’s request to March 17, 2011. 

On that date, Santiago informed the court that he was “doing 

further work on the case.” He requested, and the court granted,

a continuance to June 16, 2011.

At a hearing on June 16, 2011, Santiago waived DeCasas’s 

appearance and stated that DeCasas “does want to be present 

by video for another setting.” The court then continued the 

hearing to September 12, 2011.

On September 12, 2011, DeCasas appeared by video. After 

setting the post-Ronje probable cause hearing for dates in June 

2012, court and counsel agreed on December 7, 2011 for a status 
7

conference. The court asked DeCasas if he would like to be 

present by video on that date. DeCasas said he would. No one 

asked DeCasas whether he was asserting or willing to waive 

his due process right to a speedy trial.

At the December 7, 2011 status conference, Santiago 

informed the court that DeCasas was not present and “refused 

to appear on video.”

In May 2012, Santiago filed a motion to continue the 

probable cause hearing on the ground that there was uncertainty 

as to whether the state’s evaluators would “be on the panel after 

June 30, 2012,” and, if they were to be replaced, Santiago “would 

lose his ability to cross-examine any subsequent evaluators.” The 

prosecutor did not oppose the continuance.

During the May 15, 20125 hearing on the motion to 

continue the probable cause hearing, the court inquired about 

DeCasas “waiving his rights to have his probable cause hearing 

next month.” The court told Santiago that it could hold a video 

conference with DeCasas within the next few days to get his 

waiver, allow Santiago to obtain a written waiver, or allow 

Santiago to waive time on DeCasas’s behalf if Santiago had the 

authority to do so. Santiago responded: “I don't believe I do. My

paralegal did speak to him last week, filled him in on what the 

situation was and felt he was amenable[.] [A]lthough he . . . is 

not happy with delays, . . . he does understand the reason why. 

So[,] on that basis, I believe that I do have the authority.” The 

court set a date six days thence for a video conference. 

5 The transcript of this proceeding states that the 

date is May 15, 2011. The year appears to be a typographical 

error.
8

At the subsequent hearing on May 21, 2012, DeCasas 

did not appear, by video or otherwise, and Santiago announced 

that DeCasas had “waived his presence.” The minute order 

for the proceeding states that Santiago “inform[ed] the [c]ourt 

that has [sic] not requested to have a speedy trial.” The court 

then vacated the June 2012 probable cause hearing dates 

“per stipulation” of counsel, and set the hearing for dates in 

August 2013. 

At a status conference on August 13, 2012, Santiago said 

that he was waiving DeCasas’s appearance and that DeCasas 

“decided not to appear via video.” Further conferences were 

held on May 23, and August 1, 2013, which, for purposes of this 

appeal, were without substance.

On July 31, 2013, Santiago received updated reports from 

the state’s evaluators.

The court held the probable cause hearing during two days 

in August 2013. DeCasas was present via video on each day. 

After testimony from the state’s two evaluators and argument 

from counsel, the court found that there was probable cause 

to believe that DeCasas is likely to engage in sexually violent 

predatory criminal behavior upon his release. The court ordered 

DeCasas to remain in custody in a secure facility pending trial.

At some point after the probable cause hearing, Santiago 

met with DeCasas in person for the first time. According 

to Santiago, DeCasas presented with a “flat affect” and 

appeared to be heavily medicated. Their meetings were short 

because DeCasas was “very non-communicative” and “fairly 

nonresponsive.” The meetings were thus “not all that productive” 

or beneficial to preparing his defense.
9

On October 17, 2013, the court held a pretrial conference 

and DeCasas appeared via video. Santiago said that he is “in the 

process of obtaining an expert” and “in discussions with one at 

this time.” The court continued the conference to December 6, 

2013. DeCasas was asked if he would like to be present via video 

on that date. He said his “lawyer may” appear for him.

At a pretrial conference on December 6, 2013, Santiago 

said his “possible expert [was] still mulling over the materials” 

he had given her and he hoped to hear from her within the next 

couple of weeks to see whether she will accept the case. The 

court continued the matter to January 14, 2014.

At the January 14, 2014 conference, Santiago said that 

his prospective expert informed him “a few days ago” that “they 

would no longer like to work in Los Angeles County because 

their fees kept getting cut.” The court reminded Santiago that 

“this is a 2006 case” and “[w]e need to get this matter moving 

toward trial.” Santiago responded that he would “need a few 

more weeks” to find an expert. The prosecutor stated that he 

is “ready to go to trial.” The court continued the conference to 

February 11, 2014.

At the February 11, 2014 conference, Santiago submitted 

a request for the appointment of Brian Abbott, Ph.D., an expert, 

which the court approved. Santiago requested that the status 

conference be continued to late April “to see how close I am to 

being ready” for trial. The court continued the conference to 

May 2, 2014. 

At the May 2, 2014 conference, Santiago informed the court 

that his expert would meet with DeCasas in June. He requested 

a further status conference in July and said that “DeCasas would 
10

like to appear.” The court continued the conference to July 23, 

2014.

During the July 23, 2014 conference, Santiago stated that 

DeCasas had been scheduled to appear by video, but “has decided 

[he] does not want to participate.” Santiago further stated that 

he was researching an issue that “could possibly be dispositive.” 

The court set October 6, 2014 for a pretrial conference and a 

hearing on Santiago’s unspecified motion. At that time, Santiago 

said he was waiting for a “defense report,” and requested to 

“trail this matter” to November 24, 2014. With the prosecutor’s 

acquiescence, the court granted the request.

C. 2014 SVP Unit Staffing Cuts

In late 2013, the chief deputy public defender and the 

assistant public defender asked Michael Suzuki—then the head 

deputy of the Long Beach branch—for Suzuki’s assessment 

as to whether the SVP unit could absorb a decrease in staffing 

to allow for the transfer of lawyers to other divisions. At that 

time, the SVP unit had 20 attorneys and 20 paralegals. Suzuki 

reviewed statistics showing a decrease in new SVP cases and 

the unit’s progress in resolving older cases. He was also aware 

that the state had decided to discontinue its funding of SVP 

litigation and that other “divisions of the [public defender’s] office 

were significantly understaffed and . . . were looking for felony 

lawyers.” Suzuki concluded that the unit could absorb a decrease

in staffing.

In 2014, the public defender’s office undertook two rounds

of SVP unit staffing cuts, which together reduced the number of 

lawyers in the SVP unit by about 50 percent; from approximately 

20 attorneys to approximately 10. The number of paralegals 

was also reduced. After the reduction in staff, attorneys had an 
11

average caseload of 12 cases. According to Suzuki, the public 

defender’s office conducted a post-reduction assessment of the 

workloads and concluded they were “reasonable.”

Osaki, who was the deputy-in-charge of the SVP unit 

in 2014, expressed his concerns about the staff reduction in 

two memos to senior management within the public defender’s 

office. In a memo sent in April 2014, Osaki stated that the 

then-proposed cuts and resulting increase in workloads would 

cause the remaining attorneys to be “less efficient in handling 

their cases” and “the competency of their practice may be 

challenged. In other words, no lawyer can be competent with 

such an added workload in such a short period of time.” Osaki 

proposed a gradual reduction in staff that would correspond to 

reductions in SVP cases.

Osaki sent his second memo in August 2014, after the 

first round of cuts and before a proposed second round. He 

stated that “[t]he attorney staff has been significantly impacted 

as a result of the staff reductions” and that “each attorney has 

had difficulty with their increased workload.” “As a result of 

the increases in their workload,” Osaki continued, “the staff 

has expressed concerns over their ability to effectively and 

competently represent their clients on what are ostensibly life 

cases.” The cuts, he concluded, “has placed the SVP [b]ranch 

in an untenable situation of being ineffective. Any further cuts 

could lead to legal liabilities.” Osaki later testified that he used 

this language to implicate their clients’ federal constitutional 

rights to the effective assistance of counsel.

Other attorneys within the SVP unit wrote an anonymous 

memo to the public defender on April 24, 2014. The 

then-prospective 50 percent reduction of staff, the attorneys 
12

stated, would “be devastating to [their] ability to effectively 

represent [their] clients” and “result in the ineffective and 

incompetent representation of [their] clients.” Santiago testified 

that he was among the attorneys who drafted this memo.

In September 2014, SVP unit attorneys wrote anonymously 

to the members of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors 

and the State Bar of California. Santiago was involved in 

the drafting of these letters. To the Board of Supervisors, 

the attorneys stated that the staffing cuts will result in their 

abandonment of some clients, who would then “have a viable 

lawsuit against the county.” The letter to the State Bar accused 

the public defender and the assistant public defender of 

“jeopardizing the representation of [their] clients . . . and placing 

the lawyers in the untenable position of either [violating their 

clients’ rights to effective assistance of counsel] or effectively 

abandoning their clients.” As a result of the staffing cuts, the 

“remaining lawyers do not have adequate resources to properly 

handle the cases” and must either abandon “the client or risk 

being ineffective.” The lawyers further asserted that the public 

defender and “the chief deputy” “have failed to properly discharge 

their responsibilities and in turn they have placed the lawyers 

in their charge at risk for claims of ineffective assistance of 

counsel.” The lawyers accused the public defender of “repeatedly 

violat[ing] [r]ule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 

by failing to ensure that the lawyers have appropriate resources 

so that they are able to competently represent their clients.”6

6 Former rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct 

provided: “A member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or 

repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.”
13

In June 2015, attorneys again wrote to the Board of 

Supervisors, stating that “the conditions at the public defender’s 

office continue to deteriorate under the chaotic management 

of [the public defender and chief deputy],” and that their 

“improvident management style . . . continues to expose the 

county to liability.”

Santiago testified that the fact that public defenders were 

delaying their cases as a result of the staffing cuts was not a 

“secret. It was very, very open and it was said in open court 

repeatedly by many, many public defenders.” Personally, he was 

assigned “five or six new cases” as a result of the staffing cuts, 

and became “overwhelmed.” Cases “kept popping up,” he 

testified, and his “work schedule did not allow for [him] to 

get [DeCasas’s] trial in motion.”

At a conference held in DeCasas’s case on November 24, 

2014, Santiago stated: “[M]y caseload has had a significant 

change since the last time we appeared in court. I’m trying to 

make d[o] with what I can, trying to triage what I can do based 

on my office’s lack of resources.” Santiago further reported that 

he was still waiting for a defense report. The court continued the 

conference to January 21, 2015.

At the January 21, 2015 hearing, Santiago informed the 

court that he could be ready for trial in late summer or early fall 

2015. The court continued the conference to April 17, 2015. At 

that time, the prosecutor said that he will get updated reports. 

At the next conference on June 15, Santiago stated that he is 

awaiting the prosecutor’s updated reports.

At an August 24, 2015 conference, Santiago stated that 

he was still awaiting updated reports from the People and, when 

he receives them, he will “respond accordingly.” The prosecutor 
14

apologized for not having the updated reports and said he could 

get them within 60 days. The court continued the conference 

to December 7, 2015. At the December 7, 2015 conference, the 

prosecution had still not obtained the updated reports.

At the next conference on March 2, 2016, Deputy District 

Attorney Stacie Gravely appeared for the first time on behalf of 

the People. Santiago reported that he had just received the 

updated reports.

On June 28, 2016, Santiago reported that he was in the 

process of scheduling depositions of the People’s experts and 

waiting for his expert’s report. On October 6, 2016, Santiago told 

the court that he is awaiting his expert’s report and that “this is 

a case that could and should be tried in 2017.” The conference 

was continued to January 24, 2017, and, on that date, continued 

to April 27, 2017.

In late 2016, Santiago was assigned to represent George 

Vasquez in another SVPA proceeding which was set for trial 

in January 2017. During his only court appearance in that 

proceeding, Santiago informed the court that he could not be 

prepared in time for the trial. Santiago also informed his “head 

deputy” in an email that he was concerned about his ability to 

competently represent Vasquez and that the case was affecting 

his ability to assist DeCasas. The head deputy then relieved him 

of work on the Vasquez case, but immediately assigned to him 

another, “very complex” SVPA case.

Santiago left the SVP unit in early 2017. Deputy Public 

Defender Christina Behle took over DeCasas’s case in March 

2017. Behle was new to the SVP unit at that time and had 

received no training in SVP litigation.
15

In transferring the case to Behle, Santiago informed her 

that DeCasas’s “refusal to speak with [him] made it difficult to 

do anything with his case for several years,” which led Santiago 

“to prioritize other cases with other legal issues to litigate.” He 

further informed Behle that in 2014 he had started to research 

“issues concerning clients with immigration holds,” but he “had 

to temporarily shelve the motion” when the 2014 staffing cuts 

occurred and his “caseload doubled.”7 He was “overworked,” he 

said, “carrying 14 cases at one point.”

According to Behle, Santiago had not given her any 

indication that DeCasas “wanted his trial immediately.” In 

her review of the file, however, she found “[p]aralegal notes” 

indicating that, “[f]rom 2010 on,” DeCasas had told the paralegal, 

“ ‘I want out of here. I want to go home.’ ”

Behle testified that she met with DeCasas once during 

the year she represented him and saw him by video several 

times. DeCasas had complained to her that his prior attorneys 

had not done work on his case while it dragged on for years. 

On April 17, 2017, Behle appeared on behalf of DeCasas 

and requested a continuance, which the court granted, to 

June 22, 2017. On June 22, 2017, DeCasas appeared via video, 

but, so far as our record shows, did not speak. The conference 

was continued to September 19, 2017.

DeCasas appeared by video on September 19, 2017. 

The prosecutor stated that she would need to order updated 

reports to prepare for trial. The conference was continued 

to December 5, 2017. The court told DeCasas: “Take care, 

7 Behle researched the “immigration issue” that Santiago 

had been considering and determined that it did not support “a 

viable motion.”
16

Mr. DeCasas. Your attorneys are working hard to get everything 

ready.” The record does not reflect that DeCasas made any 

response. 

DeCasas appeared by video at the December 5, 2017 

conference. Behle requested the conference be continued to 

February 6, 2018, which the court granted. DeCasas was silent.

D. The Vasquez Ruling and DeCasas’s Motion 

to Dismiss

On January 8, 2018, the Los Angeles Superior Court issued 

an order in the SVPA case against George Vasquez (People v. 

Vasquez (Super. Ct. L.A. County, 2018, No. ZM004075)) granting 

a motion to dismiss that proceeding based on the denial of the 

respondent’s due process right to a speedy trial. According 

to Behle, as a result of that ruling, SVP unit attorneys reviewed 

their files and prepared “a chronology of what happened.”

In the instant case, the court held a pretrial conference on 

February 6, 2018. Behle said she could be ready for trial at the 

end of May 2018. The court set the trial date for May 1, 2018, 

over the prosecutor’s objection that she could not be ready on 

that date. The court informed counsel that they are “going to be 

pushed to try cases,” and if counsel desired a continuance they 

would need to file a written motion.

In late February 2018, the supervising judge of the superior 

court’s criminal division ordered the reassignment of “all 101 

SVP post-probable cause and pre-trial cases to a single judge for 

all purposes.”

At a pretrial conference on March 19, 2018, Deputy District 

Attorney Michael Derose announced that he had just taken over 

the case. Behle informed the court that the public defender’s 

office will probably have to declare a conflict. DeCasas, who was 
17

appearing by video, said, “I’m not understanding.” The court 

explained to him: “Your lawyer may have a conflict that would 

prevent her from representing you. If that’s the case, . . . I will 

have to appoint a new lawyer for you, in which case your trial 

will not go forward [on] May 1st.”

DeCasas responded, “So then when?”

The court stated, “I don’t know yet because the new lawyer 

will need time to prepare. From your body language, I get the 

impression you are not happy about this.”

DeCasas told the court that he “was told by the paralegal 

in May this was going to take place.” The court explained that 

“circumstances have changed,” and it is not unusual for a lawyer 

to declare a conflict that prevents the lawyer from representing 

the client. The court “will appoint a new lawyer [who] will have 

to consult with your old lawyer, look at where the case is now, 

and then they will be able to tell [the court] when they can go 

forward with the trial.”

DeCasas asked, “It is no longer going to be this attorney?” 

The court responded, “Correct.”

The court then vacated the May 1 trial date and set a 

further conference for April 2.

The court told DeCasas: “You will come back and see me 

on April 2nd. That is about two weeks from now. Hopefully 

we will know who your new lawyer is then.” DeCasas responded, 

“Okay.”

On April 2, 2018, DeCasas declined to appear by video. The 

court relieved the public defender and appointed Mary Masi, bar 

panel counsel, to represent DeCasas. At the next conference, on 

May 7, Masi informed the court that she intended to file a motion 
18

to dismiss, noting that DeCasas’s situation is procedurally 

similar to the respondent in Vasquez.

On September 12, 2018, Division Seven of this court 

issued its opinion in People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 

27 Cal.App.5th 36 (Vasquez), upholding the trial court’s dismissal 

of the SVPA proceeding against Vasquez based on a violation 

of his due process right to a speedy trial. The 17-year delay in 

bringing the case to trial, the Court of Appeal explained, was 

caused in part by a “systemic breakdown in the public defender 

system” (id. at p. 74), which resulted from “dramatic staffing 

cuts in the office” of the Los Angeles County Public Defender 

(id. at p. 72). The court also faulted the trial court for failing to 

take “meaningful action to set deadlines or otherwise control the 

proceedings and protect Vasquez’s right to a timely trial.” (Id. at

p. 75.)

On April 17, 2019, Masi filed a motion to dismiss the 

petition based on Vasquez. An evidentiary hearing on the motion

was heard on May 28 and 29, 2019. In addition to voluminous 

evidence concerning the history of the case, summarized above, 

and testimony at the hearing, the motion was supported by the 

declaration of two court-appointed psychologists who opined that 

DeCasas did not have a diagnosed mental disorder within the 

meaning of the SVPA. One of the psychologists also stated that 

DeCasas “was most likely not competent to comprehend issues 

of speedy trial through counsel, or to assist or meaningfully 

authorize counsel to handle legal proceedings on his behalf.” 

The psychologist qualified this opinion, however, by stating that 

“DeCasas was most likely to have been intermittently competent 

over the years. When he appeared on video before the court, 

he may well have been competent if there was an inquiry of him 
19

by the [c]ourt of counsel regarding whether he understood the 

proceedings at that time.”

E. The Trial Court’s Ruling

On August 19, 2019, the court granted DeCasas’s motion 

to dismiss. The trial court found that the length of the delay 

between DeCasas’s arraignment in 2006 and the [motion to 

dismiss]—13 years—was “presumptively prejudicial” and “caused 

an oppressive period of pretrial confinement.” Although the court 

found that DeCasas had not asserted his right to a speedy trial, 

he had been “forced to acquiesce to his counsel’s demand for more 

time and forced to choose between proceeding to trial without 

prepared counsel or giving up his right to a speedy trial.” The 

court therefore did not “give significant weight to [DeCasas’s] 

failure to assert his right to a speedy trial.)

The “pivotal question” for the court was “who caused 

the delay.” Based on Santiago’s actions and DeCasas lack of 

cooperation with his counsel, the court attributed the delays 

occurring “during the first eight years” of the case—from 2006 

to 2014—to DeCasas. Based on the 50 percent reduction in 

SVP staff in 2014 staffing cuts, which occurred “[d]espite the 

pleas from the SVP attorneys on the ground and from at least 

one middle management member,” the court concluded that the 

“[e]vidence supports the conclusion that a systemic breakdown 

within [the public defender’s] office caused Mr. Santiago’s 

inability to bring [DeCasas’s] case to trial.” That “systemic 

breakdown,” the court concluded, “caused the delay from 2014 

forward.”

The court also attributed the delay in part to the courts, 

and thus to the state, based on: (1) the court’s failure to consider 

whether good cause existed for the numerous requests for 
20

continuances between 2006 and 2018; (2) the court’s failure to 

inquire of DeCasas during his video appearances whether “he 

wished to waive his right to a speedy trial”; (3) the court’s failure 

to address the SVP unit’s staffing problems, which “was a 

well-known fact in the courthouse”; (4) the failure to consider 

removing the public defender’s office until 2018; and (5) failing to 

allocate court resources for probable cause hearings after Ronje.

The court attributed “a small portion of the responsibility 

for the delay” to the prosecution based on the prosecutor’s delay 

in obtaining updated evaluations in 2015 and 2016.

The court noted that, if not for the Vasquez decision, it 

would have ordered the matter to trial. Because it is bound by 

Vasquez, however, the court concluded that “the proper remedy 

is the dismissal of the [p]etition.”

The People timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

We review a trial court’s ruling granting a motion to 

dismiss for prejudicial pretrial delay for abuse of discretion. 

(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 55; U.S. v. Sears, 

Roebuck and Co., Inc. (9th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 734, 739.) 

Under this standard, we review the trial court’s findings of 

fact for substantial evidence and its conclusions of law de novo. 

(People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 922; Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 55.) 

B. The Due Process Right to a Speedy Trial in 

SVPA Cases

Under the SVPA, “the state can civilly commit individuals 

found to be SVPs after they conclude their prison terms.” (Reilly, 
21

supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 646.) A petition for an SVPA commitment 

must be supported by evaluations by two mental health experts 

appointed by the director of the California Department of State 

Hospitals. (§ 6601, subd. (d); Reilly, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 647.) 

After the filing of a SVPA petition, the court must hold a hearing 

to “determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 

individual named in the petition is likely to engage in sexually 

violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release.” 

(§ 6602, subd. (a).) If the court finds such probable cause, the 

alleged SVP is entitled to a trial by jury and the assistance of 

counsel. (§ 6603, subd. (a).) At trial, the People must prove that 

the individual is an SVP beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 6604.)

To establish that one is an SVP, the People must show, 

among other elements, that the person has “a currently 

diagnosed mental disorder.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3).) Because 

of this requirement, the People are entitled to obtain updated 

evaluations of the alleged SVP when existing evaluations have 

become “stale.” (People v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1, 25

(Landau); see Albertson v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 

796, 802–803.) The alleged SVP is entitled to retain experts 

(§ 6603, subd. (a)) who may independently evaluate the alleged 

SVP and respond to the People’s evaluations. 

After the determination of probable cause and prior to the 

completion of the trial, the alleged SVP shall “remain in custody 

in a secure facility.” (§ 6602, subd. (a).) 

The SVPA does not specify a time within which a trial must 

be held after the court makes a probable cause finding. (Vasquez, 

supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 57) The constitutional requirement of 

due process, however, applies to SVPA commitment proceedings 

and requires “a trial within a ‘ “meaningful time.” ’ ” (Landau, 
22

supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 31.) Courts have analyzed an 

alleged deprivation of due process arising from delays in SVPA 

proceedings in two ways: (1) under the framework establish in 

Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 530 (Barker) for assessing 

a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial; 

and (2) under the framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge

(1976) 424 U.S. 319, 334–335 (Mathews) for assessing denials 

of the constitutional right to due process. (See, e.g., Vasquez, 

supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 60–82; People v. Litmon (2008) 

162 Cal.App.4th 383, 399–406 (Litmon); Landau, supra, 

214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 33–44.)

Under Barker, a criminal defendant’s claim that his or 

her speedy trial right has been violated is analyzed by weighing

four factors: “Length of delay, the reason for the delay,

the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the 

defendant.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 530; accord, People v. 

Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 234 (Williams).) These factors 

are “related . . . and must be considered together with such other 

circumstances as may be relevant.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 

p. 533.) 

Under Mathews, an analysis of “due process generally 

requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the 

private interest that will be affected by the official action; 

second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 

through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, 

of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, 

the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function involved 

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional 

or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” (Mathews, 

supra, 424 U.S. at p. 335.)
23

Because of its factually similarity, the Vasquez decision is 

instructive. In that case, the People filed a petition in September 

2000 to commit Vasquez as an SVP and the court appointed 

the Los Angeles County Public Defender’s Office to represent 

him. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 44.) From the time 

of the first probable cause hearing in February 2002 until May 

2007, “ ‘it appears that little progress, if any, was made towards 

moving the case to trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 45.) In May 2007, a second 

deputy public defender began representing Vasquez. (Id. at

p. 46.) After numerous continuances, the court set a trial date 

for March 2010. (Ibid.) Before trial took place, Ronje was 

decided and the court set a new probable cause hearing. (Id. at 

p. 47.) It is not clear from the Vasquez opinion when the probable

cause hearing occurred, although it appears to have taken place 

prior to May 20, 2014. 

A third deputy public defender, Terry Shenkman, began 

representing Vasquez in 2012. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 47.) At a hearing in June 2013, the court informed Vasquez 

that he has “ ‘a right to have a speedy probable cause hearing, 

and we’re putting this matter over for many, many months into 

April of 2014 at your attorney’s request. Is that what you would 

like to do, sir?’ Vasquez responded, ‘That would be fine.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 48.) 

In October 2014, Shenkman explained her failure to confer 

with a defense expert by stating, “ ‘[A]s the court knows, my

department staff has been reduced by 50 [percent] and the

workload has increased, and I have explained that to . . . 

Vasquez, who understands.’ ” (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 48.) At a hearing in December 2014, where the court raised 

the status of the trial preparation, Shenkman stated, “ ‘[M]y 
24

office suffered a staff reduction of 50 percent of the lawyers. 

Then we suffered an additional reduction in the paralegals. 

And I have currently lost my paralegal and don’t have a 

paralegal assigned on the case. [¶] So in addition to having my

workload greatly increased, I also have cases in which I don’t 

have assistance on, and I am currently engaged in two probable 

cause hearings, and I have a restoration of sanity hearing that’s 

supposed to begin. . . . I have explained my situation to . . . 

Vasquez, and . . . Vasquez advised me he understood and he

wants me to be prepared, and he is willing to give me whatever 

time that I need in order to prepare for his trial.’ ” (Id. at 

pp. 48-49.) At a subsequent hearing on a defense motion to 

continue the trial date, Shenkman again referred to the effect 

of her caseload on her ability to prepare for trial, stating, “ ‘I 

know I will not be prepared by April 27th due to the amount 

of work that needs to be done, not only on this case but on other 

cases. And it’s not as if I can drop work on all my other cases in

order to focus on this.’ ” (Id. at p. 49.) Shenkman made similar 

comments to the court at subsequent conferences held in 2015 

and 2016. (Id. at pp. 49–50.) At some point, the court set the 

trial for January 23, 2017. (Id. at p. 50.)

In October 2016, the public defender’s office transferred 

Shenkman to another branch. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 53.) Shenkman later testified that she was “eager to go to 

trial” and would have been ready on January 23, 2017. (Ibid.)

At a hearing in November 2016, David Santiago—

Vasquez’s fourth attorney—appeared on Vasquez’s behalf and 

informed the court that “ ‘it appears’ ” that he will represent 

Vasquez going forward. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 50.) Santiago informed that court that he could not be ready 
25

for trial on the date the trial was then set, in January 2017. 

(Ibid.) When the court asked Vasquez if he was willing to 

postpone the trial so that his counsel can be prepared, Vasquez 

stated, “ ‘Your Honor, I am not willing to waive my right to have 

a trial in a timely manner, nor am I willing to waive my right to 

have prepared counsel. These constant changes of counsels have 

denied me both. Enough is enough.’ ” (Ibid.)

At a hearing in December 2016, a fifth deputy public 

defender appeared for Vasquez and informed the court that she 

was not prepared to go to trial in January 2017. (Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 51.) After Vasquez complained that he did 

not want the new attorney representing him, the court ultimately 

relieved the public defender as Vasquez’s counsel and appointed 

counsel from the bar panel. (Ibid.) Eight months later, the newly 

appointed counsel filed a motion to dismiss based on the denial 

of Vasquez’s due process right to a speedy trial. (Id. at p. 52.) 

By then, it had been 17 years since the SVPA petition was filed. 

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss and 

the People filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court. 

(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 54.) The Court of Appeal 

applied the speedy trial factors under Barker and the due 

process analysis under Mathews. Under the Barker analysis, 

the court explained that “the cause of the delay is the pivotal 

question for our due process inquiry.” (Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 64.) The prosecution, the court concluded, 

had no responsibility for the delay. (Ibid.) Although delays 

caused by defense counsel are ordinarily attributable to the 

defendant, the court explained that during the period from 

October 2014 through December 2016, when “Shenkman was 

hampered in her preparation for trial by the dramatic staffing 
26

cuts in the office” (id. at p. 72), there had been a “systemic 

breakdown in the public defender system that caused the final 

two- to three-year delay in bringing Vasquez’s matter to trial” 

(id. at p. 74). The court agreed with the trial court that, based 

on “ ‘[t]he dysfunctional manner in which the [p]ublic [d]efender’s 

[o]ffice handled . . . Vasquez’s case,’ ” the delay after October 

2014 was attributable to the state. (Id. at p. 73.)

The Vasquez court also held that “the trial court must 

share responsibility for some of the delay” and, to that extent, 

the delay is “attributable to the state.” (Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 74.) For the first 14 years of the case, the 

Court of Appeal observed, the trial court allowed hearings and 

conferences to be continued over 50 times without indicating 

whether the continuances were for good cause and failed to 

take “meaningful action to set deadlines or otherwise control 

the proceedings and protect Vasquez’s right to a timely trial.” 

(Id. at p. 75.) The court was “particularly troubled” by the delay 

that occurred after Shenkman first reported on the effect of the 

2014 staffing cuts on her workload. (Ibid.) “[B]y early 2015 it 

became clear the case was proceeding slowly because of dramatic 

staffing cuts in the public defender’s office. While we have found 

this breakdown in the public defender system is attributed to 

the state, the trial court failed Vasquez as well. We recognize the 

challenge facing a well-intentioned trial court in seeking to move 

an SVPA petition to trial while protecting the individual’s right 

to competent counsel. However, the trial court should have 

considered whether to remove the public defender’s office so that

an attorney with adequate time to prepare the case could assume 

Vasquez’s representation. Indeed, the trial court ultimately took

this action, but not until almost two years had passed, when
27

Vasquez spoke up and declared, ‘Enough is enough.’ ” (Id. at 

p. 77.) 

The Vasquez court also held that Vasquez’s due process 

rights were violated under the Mathews analysis. Vasquez’s 

“confinement for 17 years awaiting trial caused a significant 

deprivation of liberty,” and “there was a ‘risk of an erroneous 

deprivation of [Vasquez’s liberty] interest’ ” because “the outcome 

of a jury trial was not certain.” (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 81.) As to the state’s interest in the delayed proceedings, 

the court stated that “ ‘[t]he burden in going to trial in year two 

as opposed to going to trial in year 17 involves no additional 

administrative or fiscal burdens.’ ” (Id. at p. 82.) 

Lastly, the court rejected the People’s argument that, 

if there was a denial of due process, the remedy is to direct the 

case to trial forthwith. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 82.) 

“[I]n light of the violation of Vasquez’s Fourteenth Amendment 

due process right to a timely trial,” the court concluded, “the 

proper remedy was dismissal of the petition.” (Id. at p. 83.)

We now turn to the instant case.

C. Barker Analysis

1. Length of the delay

“The first Barker factor, the length of the delay, 

encompasses a ‘double enquiry.’ [Citation.] ‘Simply to trigger a 

speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval 

between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing 

ordinary from “presumptively prejudicial” delay, [citation] . . . . If 

the accused makes this showing, the court must then consider . . . 

the extent to which the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum 
28

needed to trigger judicial examination of the claim.’ ” (Williams,

supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 234.) 

The People citing Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 61, 

concede that the 13-year delay in this case was sufficient to 

trigger the Barker analysis, and we conclude that this 

extraordinary delay weighs against the People.

2. DeCasa’s assertion of the right

“The defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right . . . 

is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether 

the defendant is being deprived of the right,” and a “failure to 

assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove 

that he was denied a speedy trial.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 

pp. 531–532.)

“ ‘The issue is not simply the number of times the accused 

acquiesced or objected; rather, the focus is on the surrounding 

circumstances, such as the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity 

of the objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether 

the accused was represented by counsel, the accused’s pretrial 

conduct (as that conduct bears on the speedy trial right), and so 

forth. [Citation.] The totality of the accused’s responses to the 

delay is indicative of whether he or she actually wanted a speedy 

trial.’ ” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 238.)

Here, the People point out that, unlike the alleged SVP 

in Vasquez, DeCasas never exclaimed, “enough is enough,” 

or otherwise verbally informed the court of his dissatisfaction 

with the speed of his case. The absence of such an utterance, 

however, is not determinative. In Vasquez, the court explained 

that Vasquez’s failure to assert his speedy trial right prior to his 

statement that “enough is enough,” could not “be weighed against 

him” because, in part, “Vasquez’s ability to assert his speedy trial 
29

right was hindered by the fact that from February 2002 to 

February 2012 he never appeared in court” and “could not 

realistically have asserted his due process rights during [that] 

10-year period.” (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 62.) 

Similarly here, after his appearance shortly after the petition 

was filed in 2006, DeCasas did not appear in court or by 

video until September 2011, and not again until the probable 

cause hearing in August 2013. He thereafter appeared only 

sporadically and, when he did appear, neither the court nor his 

counsel inquired of him whether he was insisting upon a speedy 

trial or agreed to waive that right.

The Vasquez court also explained that Vasquez’s failure to 

expressly assert his right to a speedy trial earlier in his case was 

attributable to his knowledge that continuances were required 

“to enable his attorney to be prepared for trial.” (Vasquez, 

supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 62.) Vasquez was thus faced with a 

Hobson’s choice “ ‘between proceeding to trial with an unprepared 

attorney, or giving up his right to a speedy trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 63.) 

The court thus agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that 

“ ‘[u]nder these circumstances, it is unfair to give significant 

weight to . . . Vasquez’s failure to assert his right to a speedy 

trial.’ ” (Ibid.) Here, there is evidence of a similar Hobson’s 

choice. In May 2012, Santiago moved to continue the probable 

cause hearing—then set for June 2012—on the ground that 

proceeding with the hearing at that time could impair his ability 

to prepare for trial. When the court asked Santiago whether 

DeCasas was willing to waive his rights to having his probable 

cause hearing as scheduled, Santiago responded that DeCasas 

had recently told a paralegal that he “is not happy with delays, 

but he does understand the reason why.” This supports the trial 
30

court’s conclusion in this case that DeCasas “was forced to 

acquiesce to his counsel’s demand for more time and forced to 

choose between proceeding to trial without prepared counsel or 

giving up his right to a speedy trial.”

Under the circumstances in this case, we agree with 

the trial court’s determination that it could not “give significant 

weight to [DeCasas’s] failure to assert his right to a speedy trial.”

3. The reasons for the delay

As the People assert, “the ‘all-important question’ is who

is to blame for this presumptively prejudicial delay.” Under the 

Barker analysis, it is, as our state and federal Supreme Courts 

have stated, “the ‘flag all litigants seek to capture.’ ” (Williams, 

supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 239, quoting United States v. Loud Hawk

(1986) 474 U.S. 302, 315.)

In examining the reason for the delay, the court asks 

“ ‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more 

to blame for th[e] delay.’ ” (Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 

81, 90 (Brillon).) “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order

to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the

government.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 531.) “In contrast, 

delay caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.” 

(Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 90.) 

In Brillon, the United States Supreme Court held 

that delays caused by appointed counsel should ordinarily 

be attributed to the defendant. “Because ‘the attorney is the 

[defendant’s] agent when acting, or failing to act, in furtherance 

of the litigation,’ ” the court explained, “delay caused by the 

defendant’s counsel is . . . charged against the defendant.” 

(Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. at pp. 90–91.) This is true regardless 

of “whether counsel is privately retained or publicly assigned.” 
31

(Id. at p. 91.) Thus, although appointed counsel are paid by 

the state, they “generally are not state actors for purposes of a 

speedy-trial claim.” (Id. at p. 92.) This rule, however, “is not 

absolute. Delay resulting from a systemic ‘breakdown in the 

public defender system,’ [citation], could be charged to the 

[s]tate.” (Id. at p. 94.) 

Here, the parties do not challenge the trial court’s finding 

that the delays in DeCasas’s case between 2006 and 2014, most 

of which resulted from continuances that DeCasas’s counsel 

requested or stipulated to, are generally attributable to DeCasas. 

The focus of the People’s argument is its challenge to the court’s 

finding that the SVP unit staff reductions in 2014 constitute a 

systemic breakdown such that the resulting delays should be 

attributable to the state. 

As our state Supreme Court observed in Williams, 

the Brillon court “did not define what constitutes a ‘systemic

“breakdown in the public defender system.” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 

58 Cal.4th at p. 248.) In conjunction with that phrase, the 

Brillon court referred to “ ‘institutional problems’ [citation], 

presumably in contrast to problems with individual attorneys” 

(ibid.), but this does little to shed light on the meaning of a 

systemic breakdown. 

According to the People, a systemic breakdown, “could 

include a failure of the state to provide adequate funding and 

staffing for a defendant’s defense. . . . But where the state fulfills 

its obligations, but an attorney (or his or her office) does not 

properly use those resources, the fault does not lie with the 

state.” The People cite no authority for this point and courts 

have not viewed the scope of a systemic breakdown so narrowly.
32

In Williams, our state Supreme Court held that although 

“several of defendant’s [eight] attorneys appeared to make little 

or no progress in preparing his case for trial,” there was no 

evidence of institutional problems that would indicate a systemic 

breakdown. (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 248.) The court, 

however, suggested the kind of evidence that might indicate such 

problems, including “a flaw in the public defender’s mechanism 

for identifying and avoiding conflicts,” “problems in the criminal 

defense panel’s assignment system,” “unreasonable resource 

constraints, misallocated resources, [or] inadequate monitoring 

or supervision.” (Id. at p. 249, italics added.) In Litmon, the 

Court of Appeal identified the following as examples of a systemic 

breakdown: “understaffed public prosecutor or public defender 

offices facing heavy caseloads, underdeveloped expert witness 

pools, or insufficient judges or facilities to handle overcrowded 

trial dockets.” (Litmon, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 403, italics 

added.) As the italicized language illustrates, a systemic 

breakdown is not limited to situations where the state has failed 

to provide adequate funding for defense counsel. 

More on point, of course, is Vasquez, which addressed the 

same reduction of the SVP unit staff and corresponding increase 

in attorney caseloads that is involved in this case. In Vasquez, 

the trial court concluded that “ ‘[t]he dysfunctional manner in 

which the [p]ublic [d]efender’s [o]ffice handled . . . Vasquez’s case 

was precisely the type of systemic or institutional breakdown 

contemplated by Brillon and Williams. Accordingly, the reason 

for the delay in bringing the case to trial should be attributed 

to the state, and not to . . . Vasquez.’ ” (Vasquez, supra,

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 73.) In particular, the court pointed to 

evidence that Vasquez’s appointed counsel “was hampered in
33

her preparation for trial by the dramatic staffing cuts in the 

office, which limited the time she could spend on Vasquez’s case. 

As a result, over the two-year period starting at the end of 2014, 

there was at best sluggish progress in moving Vasquez’s then 

14-year-old case to trial.” (Id. at p. 72, fn. omitted.) Although the 

court acknowledged that, generally, “the public defender’s office 

must have the flexibility to decide when it is necessary internally 

to change the assignment of an attorney” (id. at p. 73), under 

the circumstances in Vasquez’s case, that “flexibility must yield 

to the individual’s right to a timely trial.” (Id. at p. 74.)

We agree with the Vasquez court’s analysis and conclusion, 

and the instant case cannot be meaningfully distinguished. 

Although the People argue that the record in Vasquez included 

more instances of Shenkman, the deputy public defender in that 

case, complaining to the court about the staff reductions and her 

increased caseload than Santiago did in this case, the number 

of attorney complaints is not dispositive. As the court noted 

below, Santiago testified that “it was a well-known fact in the 

courthouse that staffing cuts were ongoing and that attorneys 

were delaying their cases trying to keep up.” In addition to 

transcripts of court proceedings in DeCasas’s case, “Santiago was 

present at various conversations with [superior court judges] and 

the [p]ublic [d]efender’s [o]fficer where the office informed the 

court of the problems with the caseloads and staffing.” Santiago, 

therefore, did not need to remind the court of these problems 

at each appearance. Moreover, the record in this case includes 

the memos and letters written by Osaki and other SVP unit 

attorneys, including Santiago, describing the deleterious effects 

of the staffing cuts on their ability to effectively represent their 

clients. There is thus substantial evidence to support the court’s 
34

finding that a systemic breakdown in the public defender’s office 

caused delays in SVPA cases, including DeCasas’s, beginning in 

2014. The trial court did not err, therefore, in determining that 

such delays are thus attributable to the state. 

We also agree with the trial court that the court itself 

enabled and compounded the delays resulting from the staffing 

cuts by failing to fulfill its duties “ ‘to set deadlines and to hold 

the parties strictly to those deadlines unless a continuance is 

justified by a concrete showing of good cause for the delay.’ ” 

(Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 77.) As the trial court 

observed, “there is no record of the court engaging in a 

consideration of whether good cause existed for each of the 

requests to continue between 2006 and 2018, only of it ever 

ordering the parties to appear on the next agreed-upon date.”

The trial judge, our Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘is 

the captain of the ship,’ ” and “must be vigilant in protecting 

the interests of the defendant, the prosecution, and the public 

in having a speedy trial.” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251.) 

Protecting such interests may require the court to remove 

overburdened appointed counsel on its own motion even if the 

public defender does not seek to withdraw. (Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 78.) Here, however, the trial court, despite 

“the knowledge that the entire [SVP unit] was struggling with 

enormous caseloads, . . . did not inquire whether [DeCasas’s] 

counsel had the ability to adequately prepare for trial or whether 

[DeCasas] would rather continue with [his assigned counsel] and 

move at a slower pace or appoint new counsel and move quickly 

to trial, nor did it consider removing the [p]ublic [d]efender’s 

[o]ffice until 2018, nearly four years after first learning of the 

dramatic staffing cuts and the unit’s ensuing struggle.”
35

The court’s “affirmative constitutional obligation” 

(Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251) to protect the interests 

in a speedy trial also counteracts what the People refer to as 

the public defender’s “perverse incentive to request unreasonable 

continuances (or encourage its attorneys to do so) in the hopes 

of inducing a windfall dismissal.” By requiring good cause for 

continuances, removing overburdened deputy public defenders, 

and exercising the court’s inherent authority to order supervisors 

in the public defender’s office “to appear in court to address” 

the public defender’s staffing decisions (see Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 81), the court can determine whether delays 

are due to a systemic breakdown within the public defender’s 

office or a strategic misallocation of the public defender’s 

resources. For purposes of the Barker analysis, to the extent the 

court’s failure to fulfill its obligation as a protector of the right to 

a speedy trial caused the delay, that delay is attributable to the 

state. (Id. at p. 74; Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 41.) 

Lastly, there is substantial evidence to support the court’s 

finding that the prosecution is to blame for its unexplained 

nearly one-year delay, from early 2015 to March 2016, in 

requesting and obtaining updated reports from the People’s 

evaluators. The prosecutor promised to obtain those reports 

in April 2015, apologized without explanation for failing to have 

them in August 2015, and did not provide them to Santiago until 

March 2016.

Based on the foregoing there is substantial evidence to 

support the court’s finding that the delays in bringing DeCasas’s 

case to trial beginning in 2014 are attributable to the state.
36

4. Prejudice

Courts must assess the prejudicial effect of pretrial delay 

in light of the interests the speedy trial right was designed to 

protect. (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 235.) The Barker

court identified three such interests: (1) “to prevent oppressive 

pretrial incarceration”; (2) “to minimize anxiety and concern of 

the accused”; and (3) “to limit the possibility that the defense will 

be impaired.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.) 

Here, the People concede that “13 years without a trial 

is certainly oppressive.” They contend, however, that the 

evaluation of prejudice should take into consideration the 

fact that “DeCasas was a severely mentally ill patient housed 

in a hospital, not a prisoner languishing in jail.” There are 

at least two problems with this point. First, the “fact” that 

“DeCasas was a severely mentally ill patient” has not been 

established because there has not been a trial and, indeed, is 

disputed by two defense experts who have opined that DeCasas 

does not satisfy the criteria for diagnoses of pedophilia or 

schizophrenia, and does not have a diagnosed mental disorder 

within the meaning of the SVPA.

Second, although the People describe DeCasas’s 13-year 

confinement in a state mental hospital somewhat euphemistically 

as being “housed” (in contrast to “languishing”) “in a hospital,” 

a “commitment to a mental hospital produces ‘a massive 

curtailment of liberty,’ ” which “ ‘can engender adverse social

consequences to the individual’ . . . that . . . can have a very

significant impact on the individual.” (Vitek v. Jones (1980) 

445 U.S. 480, 491–492; accord, Litmon, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 400.) Thus, even if the delay did not impair the defense, 
37

the prejudice factor weighs in favor of finding a violation of a 

speedy trial right.

5. Barker Analysis Conclusion

Under Barker, none of the four factors—the length of the 

delay, the assertion of the right, the reasons for the delay, or 

prejudice—“is ‘either a necessary or sufficient condition to the 

finding of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial. Rather, they 

are related factors and must be considered together with such 

other circumstances as may be relevant. In sum, these factors 

have no talismanic qualities; courts must still engage in a 

difficult and sensitive balancing process.’ ” (Williams, supra, 

58 Cal.4th at p. 233.) Here, the trial court, in its 45-page ruling, 

engaged in that balancing process and concluded that “the [s]tate 

had failed [DeCasas].” Whether we review this determination 

under the abuse of discretion standard or, as the People assert, 

under a de novo standard, we find no error based on the analysis 

set forth above. 

D. Mathews Test

As the Vasquez and Litmon courts did, the trial court 

also engaged in an analysis under Mathews and concluded that 

DeCasas’s “right to be free from government restraint without 

due process of law has been violated.” We agree.

Vasquez is again instructive and not meaningfully 

distinguishable. In that case, the court explained that 

“Vasquez’s confinement for 17 years awaiting trial caused a 

significant deprivation of liberty” and, “given Vasquez’s lengthy 

commitment, there was a ‘risk of an erroneous deprivation of 

[Vasquez’s liberty] interest.’ ” (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 81.) Here, DeCasas’s confinement of 13 years, though less 
38

than Vasquez’s 17 years, constitutes a substantial interference 

with his “fundamental right . . . ‘to be free from involuntary 

confinement by his own government without due process of law.’ ” 

(Litmon, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.)

“The second Mathews factor, ‘the risk of an erroneous 

deprivation of such interest through the procedures used’ 

[citation], is considerable,” as DeCasas “has already experienced 

an extended confinement without any determination that he was 

an SVP.” (Litmon, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 400.) Moreover, 

because DeCasas had two psychologists who opined that he did 

not fulfill a requirement of being an SVP and the People had 

the burden of proving that fact beyond a reasonable doubt, the 

outcome of a jury trial was far from certain. (See Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 81.)

As for the third Mathews factor—the government’s 

interest—the “ ‘state has no interest in the involuntary civil 

confinement of persons who have no mental disorder or who 

are not dangerous to themselves or others.’ ” (Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 82.) Furthermore, “ ‘[t]he burden in going 

to trial’ ” early in the case as opposed to going to trial in year 13

“ ‘involves no additional administrative or fiscal burdens.’ ” 

(Ibid.)

E. The Remedy

The People make a cursory contention that, if we uphold 

the court’s determination that DeCasas’s right to due process 

right to a speedy trial was violated, “the case should be ordered 

to trial forthwith,” not dismissed. The statement is made without 

citation to authority and is contrary to binding precedent. As the 

Barker court stated, “[t]he amorphous quality of the [speedy trial] 

right also leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal 
39

of the indictment when the right has been deprived. This is 

indeed a serious consequence because it means that a defendant 

who may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without 

having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious than an 

exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the only 

possible remedy.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 522, fn. omitted; 

accord, Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 233; Vasquez, supra, 

27 Cal.App.5th at p. 83.) The court, therefore, did not err in 

dismissing the petition.

DISPOSITION

The August 19, 2019 order dismissing the SVPA petition 

against respondent DeCasas is affirmed. 

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur:

CHANEY, J.

BENDIX, J.
Filed 9/17/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

RODRIGO DECASAS,

Defendant and Respondent.

 B301297

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. ZM010896)

THE COURT:

The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on August 31, 2020 was 

not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For good cause, it now 

appears that the opinion should be published in the Official Reports and it is 

so ordered.

____________________________________________________________

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. CHANEY, J. BENDIX, J.