alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



EXHIBIT 10.10.2
 
 Amendment
    Paragraph 4.1 of the Existing Agreement
  Paragraph 4.3 of the Existing Agreement




---



##### 



provided, however
 Paragraph 4.8 of the Existing Agreement
  Paragraph 5.4 (b) of the Existing Agreement
  Miscellaneous




---



##### 



LEAP WIRELESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.By:
    
    /s/ Leonard StephensName:
    
    Leonard StephensTitle:
    
    Senior Vice President, Human ResourcesCRICKET COMMUNICATIONS, INC.By:
    
    /s/ Leonard StephensName:
    
    Leonard StephensTitle:
    
    Senior Vice President, Human ResourcesEXECUTIVE/s/ S. Douglas HutchesonS. Douglas Hutcheson
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 

WASHINGTON DC 

Friends of the East Hampton Airport, Inc. eta!., 

Complainants, 

FAA Docket No. 16-15-02 

v. 

Town of East Hampton, NY 

Respondent. 

ORDER 

On March 18,2015, counsel for Respondent, Town of East Hampton, New York, filed a 

Motion pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 16.11, requesting an extension of time to May I, 2015 to 

file its Response in the above-captioned matter. 

Counsel advised that the Respondent needs the additional time in order to adequately 

respond to the Complainant's allegations, and allow the Town adequate time to prepare 

its pleadings. The Motion adds that the extension will promote the efficient and just 

resolution of the case by providing the FAA with a complete factual record. Counsel 

further advised that the Respondent does not oppose this request for an extension of time. 

Part 16 is intended to expedite substantially the handling and disposition of airportrelated complaints. [See, Rules of Practice for Federally-Assisted Airport Enforcement 

Proceedings, Final Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 53998 (October 16, 1996).] The rule provides that 

an extension of time may be granted where necessary or appropriate for a fair and 

complete consideration of matters before the agency. See 14 C.P.R. § 16.ll(a). 

An extension of time is reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, Respondent, 

Town of East Hampton, New York, is hereby granted an extension of time in which to 

file its pleading. The Town's response to the Complaint is due by May I, 2015. 

Randall S. Fiertz 

/ 

I~ 

Director, Office of Airport 

Compliance and Management Analysis 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on March 27,2015, I caused to be placed in the United States mail 

(first class, postage paid) or personally delivered a true copy of the foregoing Order addressed 

to: 

Counsel for Respondent 

Elizabeth Vail 

Town Attorney 

Town of East Hampton 

159 Pantigo Road 

East Hampton, NY 11937 

EVail@EHamptonNY.Gov 

Counsel for Complainant 

Leonard D. Kirsch 

McBreen & Kopko 

500 North Broadway 

Jericho, NY 11753 

lkirsch@mklawnyc.com 

Hand-Delivered to: 

W. Eric Pilsk 

Peter J. Kirsch 

Catherine van Heuven 

Kaplan Kirsch & Rockwell LLP 

1001 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 800 

Washington, D.C. 20036 

epilsk@kaplankirsch.com 

pkirsch@kaplankirsch.com 

cvanheuven@kaplankirsch.com 

Telephone: (202) 955-5600 

Facsimile: (202) 955-5616 

FAA Part 16 Airport Proceedings Docket (AGC-600) 

FAA Office of Airport Compliance and Management Analysis, AC0-1 00 

I 

/;/! / ~'', / 

·i _/'\ I 

/ l-~~~Ro!Urts~ Office of Airport Compliance and 

Management Analysis
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS FOR THE SIX MONTH PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1999, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                         206,798
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  142,953
<ALLOWANCES>                                    90,721
<INVENTORY>                                    194,748
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               498,945
<PP&E>                                       3,326,129
<DEPRECIATION>                                 486,485
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               3,534,322
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,526,677
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          1
<COMMON>                                        17,239
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,990,225
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 3,534,322
<SALES>                                         52,339
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               287,950
<CGS>                                           80,677
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                2,981,323
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              16,643
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,680,546)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,680,546)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,680,546)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Era Club, Inc., Appellant, vs. Rupp, Respondent.

*January 18*

February *15, 1944.*

*William A. Nathenson*of Madison, for the appellant.

For the respondent there was a brief by *Lee & Becker*of Madison, and oral argument by *Stuart H. Becker.*

Fairchild, J.

When the motion for nonsuit was made the evidence showed that plaintiff by reason of its acts had become a tenant holding over its term under sec. 348.11, Stats., and that the landlord had a right of re-entry. Peaceable entry having been made and the tenant’s goods removed and stored subject to the tenant’s orders, the order for non-suit was properly granted. However, as no judgment was entered and because the order is not an appealable order, the appeal must be dismissed.

*By the Court.*— Appeal dismissed.
<PAGE>


                                  Exhibit 21.1

                                  SUBSIDIARIES

1)       Resource Bank, a Virginia corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of
         Resource Bankshares Corporation.

2)       Resource Service Corporation, a Virginia corporation, is a wholly
         owned subsidiary of Resource Bank.
                  (a)      Financial Planners Mortgage, L.L.P., is a Virginia
                           general partnership registered as a limited liability
                           partnership, in which Resource Service Corporation
                           owns a 49% interest.

3)       Resource Capital Trust I, a Delaware business trust, is a wholly-owned
         subsidiary of Resource Bankshares Corporation.

4)       CW and Company of Virginia, a Virginia corporation, is a wholly-owned
         subsidiary of Resource Bank.

5)       PRC Title LLC, a Virginia limited liability company, is a wholly-owned
         subsidiary of Resource Bank.

6)       Resource Capital Trust II, a Delaware business trust, is a
         wholly-owned subsidiary of Resource Bankshares Corporation
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Richard Bonner, Appellant.

[772 NYS2d 598]

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), rendered July 29, 1998, convicting him of attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first degree (three counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and reckless endangerment in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s objection to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is only partially preserved for appellate review. In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution *(see People v Contes,*60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, resolution of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence presented, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses *(see People v Gaimari,*176 NY 84, 94 [1903]). Its determination should be ac*501corded great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record *(see People v Garafolo,*44 AD2d 86, 88 [1974]). Upon the exercise of our factual power of review, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]).

In addition, the imposition of consecutive terms of incarceration in this case was authorized (see Penal Law § 70.25 [1]; *People v Salcedo,*92 NY2d 1019, 1021 [1998]; *People v Ramirez,*89 NY2d 444, 451, 455 [1996]; *People v Davis,*286 AD2d 774, 775 [2001]; *cf.*Penal Law § 70.25 [2]; *People v Laureano,*87 NY2d 640 [1996]). Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the fact that the sentence imposed was greater than that offered during plea negotiations does not establish that the defendant was punished for exercising his right to proceed to trial (see *People v Carillo,*297 AD2d 288, 289 [2002]). Moreover, the sentence imposed was not excessive (see *People v Suitte,*90 AD2d 80 [1982]).

The defendant’s remaining contention is without merit. Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.
## SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 

## Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

**1343 KA 10-00384** 
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., FAHEY, LINDLEY, SCONIERS, AND WHALEN, JJ.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

CHAZERAE M. BURNICE, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

TIMOTHY P. DONAHER, PUBLIC DEFENDER, ROCHESTER (JANE I. YOON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (AMANDA L. DREHER OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Patricia D. Marks, J.), rendered September 14, 2009. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of assault in the second degree.

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously reversed on the law, the plea is vacated, that part of the motion seeking to suppress showup identification testimony with respect to defendant is granted and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him, upon a guilty plea, of assault in the second degree (Penal Law § 120.05 [2]), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress showup identification testimony with respect to him. We agree. “Showup identifications are disfavored, since they are suggestive by their very nature” ( People v Ortiz , 90 NY2d 533, 537; see People v Johnson , 81 NY2d 828, 831). Here, the showup identification procedure was conducted in the parking lot of a police station, approximately 90 minutes after the occurrence of the crime, while defendant was handcuffed and while uniformed police officers and ambulance personnel were in the parking lot. The totality of the circumstances of this showup identification procedure presses judicial tolerance beyond its limits ( cf. People v Duuvon , 77 NY2d 541, 545; People v Hunt , 277 AD2d 911, 911-912), and we conclude under the facts and circumstances of this case that the showup identification procedure was infirm ( cf. Duuvon , 77 NY2d at 544).

Inasmuch as the witness who identified defendant at the showup identification procedure did not testify at the Wade hearing, the People did not establish that such witness had an independent basis for his in-court identification of defendant ( see People v Hill , 53 AD3d 1151, 1151). We thus conclude that defendant is entitled to a

new Wade hearing on that issue ( see id. at 1151-1152; see generally**-2- 1343 KA 10-00384** 

People v Burts , 78 NY2d 20, 22-23). We therefore reverse the judgment and, because the motion was made by defendant and his codefendant, we grant only that part of the motion with respect to defendant and remit the matter to County Court for further proceedings, including a new Wade hearing on the issue whether the witness has an independent basis for his in-court identification of defendant, if the People are so advised. In light of our determination, we do not address defendant’s remaining contention.

Entered: January 3, 2014 Frances E. Cafarell Clerk of the Court
#### Fred Herrman, Appellee, v. Marty O’Connor et al., Appellants.

No. 40018.

November 21, 1929.

Rehearing Denied March 21, 1930.

*1278*Strode, Cunningham, Sloan & Herrick,*for appellants.

*Sennejf, Bliss, Witwer*& *Senneff,*for appellee.

Faville, J.

The motion for a new trial was sustained generally. We need to consider only one ground of said motion. The jury found in favor of the appellee, and assessed the amount of damages at $1.00. Under the evidence, it was obvious that a verdict in said sum was very inadequate, and this was made a ground of the motion for a new trial. If appellee was entitled to recover at all, as found by the jury, the amount of recovery should necessarily have been much greater than that fixed by the jury. It is a thoroughly established rule of this court that the question of granting a new trial rests largely in the discretion of the trial court. Under the record in this case, there was no abuse of such discretion shown. See *Utseth v. Pratt-Mallory Co.,*208 Iowa 1324, and cases cited therein.

Other questions are argued, but we do not deem it essential to pass upon them at this time. A new trial has been granted, and we cannot anticipate that there may be no change in the record upon such retrial. We therefore limit our holding to the one question that the granting of a new trial on the ground of the inadequacy of the verdict was not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, and said order *is*— Affirmed.

Albert, C. J., and Evans, De Grakf, and Kindig, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

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<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
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<PERIOD-START>                                 JUL-01-1999
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<CASH>                                              44,506
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      472,846
<ALLOWANCES>                                        50,000
<INVENTORY>                                        994,605
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 1,748,234
<PP&E>                                             295,581
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<CGS>                                            1,032,246
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    1,032,246
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 1,978,097
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  42,410
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<EPS-BASIC>                                        (0.28)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        (0.28)



</TABLE>
# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 178/2016

| | ISSN 1977-0987 |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 178 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5918 ta' Mejju 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0987

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 178

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5918 ta' Mejju 2016

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Rettifika |
| 2016/C 178/01 | Rettifika tal-Pożizzjoni (UE) Nru 1/2016 tal-Kunsill fl-ewwel qari bil-ħsieb li jiġi adottat Regolament tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Ferroviji u li jħassar ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2004 — Adottat mill-Kunsill fl-10 ta' Diċembru 2015( ĠU C 56, 12.2.2016 ) | 1 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

Rettifika

2016/C 178/01

Rettifika tal-Pożizzjoni (UE) Nru 1/2016 tal-Kunsill fl-ewwel qari bil-ħsieb li jiġi adottat Regolament tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Ferroviji u li jħassar ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2004 — Adottat mill-Kunsill fl-10 ta' Diċembru 2015( ĠU C 56, 12.2.2016 )

( ĠU C 56, 12.2.2016 )

1

---

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

---

Rettifika

| 18.5.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 178/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

18.5.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 178/1

---

Rettifika tal-Pożizzjoni (UE) Nru 1/2016 tal-Kunsill fl-ewwel qari bil-ħsieb li jiġi adottat Regolament tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar l-Aġenzija tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-Ferroviji u li jħassar ir-Regolament (KE) Nru 881/2004 — Adottat mill-Kunsill fl-10 ta' Diċembru 2015

(
  Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea C 56 tat-12 ta' Frar 2016
  )

(2016/C 178/01)

Fil-paġna 39, fl-Artikolu 65, paragrafu 10:

minflok:

“10.   Il-Parlament Ewropew, fuq rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill li jaġixxi b'maġġoranza kwalifikata, għandu jagħti, qabel it-30 ta' April tas-sena N + 2, kwittanza lid-Direttur Eżekuttiv fir-rigward tal-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit għas-sena N.”,

aqra:

“10.   Il-Parlament Ewropew, fuq rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kunsill li jaġixxi b'maġġoranza kwalifikata, għandu jagħti, qabel il-15 ta' Mejju tas-sena N + 2, kwittanza lid-Direttur Eżekuttiv fir-rigward tal-implimentazzjoni tal-baġit għas-sena N.”.

---
**Exhibit      32.1**

**CERTIFICATION      PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE      SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

| 1. | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2. | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:                September 24, 2007 | /s/                Jason G. Dagenais                      |
|-----------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------|
|                                    | Jason                G. Dagenais, Chief Operating Officer |
|                                    | Principal                Executive Officer                |
Joint Application of BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, DC DELTA AIR LINES, INC
. and AEROVIAS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V
.

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Docket DOT -OST -2015-0070 under 49 U .S.C
. §§ 41308 and 41309 for approval of and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements ____________________
__________

) AFFIDAVIT City ofWashington

) ) ss: District of Columbia

) MarshallS. Sinick

, being duly sworn, states under oath: 1.
I am outside counsel to Alaska Airlines, Inc., which has an interest m this proceeding. 2.
I have a need to examine certain information made available by the parties in this proceeding that is or may be deemed to be confidential. 3.
I will use the confidential information only for the purpose of participating in this proceeding. 4.
I will disclose the confidential information filed in this proceeding only to other persons who have filed a valid confidentiality affid it in Docket DOT-OST-

2 015-0070

. 'tb ,UPIT...,...... his _tl day ofMay, 2015

. My commission expires

: '''''""'''

· ''' . .a." H. Pf

... :-.'' ,. ............. **~(**
· . l **.···~t-""**"" **··t.~-**

· ·-=- ... ,.... _... ..•I -c:.A.

- ..-. :.- MY "'.
- '! ! COMMISSIUN

: **~\**IXPIAES

i **~**i 11-/Y- l7 **#~ ~··** •• U/14/1.017 **/~ ~**  .. **,,~··...**

... **~**.. ,,**~'C',.**........ O"'
,... ,,,,,OF C. ,,,.." ,,,,,... ,,,,,CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that I have this date served a copy of the foregoing Affidavit by electronic mail upon the following: Aeromexico: American Airlines: Frontier Airlines: Delta Air Lines: JetBlue: Southwest Airlines: Spirit Airlines: Sun Country Airlines: United Airlines: Virgin America: Dated: May 19,2015 LEGAL\2282

I 328 \ 1 robert.cohn@hoganlovells.com patrick.rizzi@hoganlovells.com howard.kass @ aa.com robert. wirick @ aa.com abigail.donovan
@ aa.com howard.diamond
@ flyfrontier.com slachter @ cozen.com matwood@cozen.com sascha. vanderbellen @ delta.com chris.walker@delta.com esahr @ eckertseamans. com dderco @ eckertseamans.com robert.land @ jetblue.com bob.kneisley @ wnco.com leslie.abbott @ wnco.com jyoung @ yklaw.com dkirstein @ yklaw .com thomas. ting @s uncountry .com john. fredericksen @ suncountry .com dan.weiss@united.com steve.morrissey
@ united.com gmurphy@crowell.com john. varley@virginamerica.com mlbenge@zsrlaw

.com Kenneth C. Hines