UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4001

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JULIET NANETTE LITTLEJOHN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:10-cr-00273-RJC-1)

Submitted: August 8, 2023 Decided: August 24, 2023

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: John G. Baker, Federal Public Defender, Megan C. Hoffman, Assistant 

Federal Public Defender, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH 

CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States 

Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE 

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:

Juliet Nanette Littlejohn appeals the 18-month sentence imposed following the 

revocation of her supervised release. On appeal, Littlejohn contends that the Government 

breached the parties’ agreement to jointly recommend a six-month sentence. In addition, 

she claims that the district court failed to address several of her nonfrivolous sentencing 

arguments. Finally, Littlejohn asserts that the court relied on an impermissible sentencing 

factor. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

As Littlejohn concedes, she did not raise her breach argument in the district court. 

Consequently, plain error review applies. United States v. Edgell, 914 F.3d 281, 286, (4th 

Cir. 2019). “Under that standard, [Littlejohn] must show that the [G]overnment plainly 

breached its . . . agreement with h[er] and that the breach both affected h[er] substantial 

rights and called into question the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Id. at 286-87.1

Littlejohn faults the Government for not directly stating that it was recommending 

a six-month sentence. But the Government never disputed Littlejohn’s representation that 

the parties were making a joint recommendation, and the district court clearly understood 

that the recommendation was coming from both sides. Thus, we are unpersuaded by this 

argument.

1 For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that the contract law 

principles underlying the enforcement of plea agreements, see Edgell, 914 F.3d at 287, 

apply with equal force to joint sentencing recommendations between the Government and 

criminal defendants.

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Littlejohn also complains that the Government’s remarks at sentencing focused on 

her criminal history and proclivity for shoplifting, thereby undermining the agreed-upon 

recommendation. But by the time the Government began its argument, the district court 

had clearly signaled its skepticism over the parties’ recommendation, emphasizing 

Littlejohn’s “troubling criminal history” and, in the words of the probation officer, her 

“willingness to habitually commit offenses against the community with little to no regard 

for the law or the Court.” (J.A.2 38). With these comments in mind, the Government could 

not persuasively advocate for a six-month sentence without addressing the negative aspects 

of Littlejohn’s record. So, far from undermining the parties’ agreement, the Government 

wisely engaged with the court’s concerns in an attempt to salvage the joint 

recommendation. We therefore discern no breach of the joint recommendation.

Next, Littlejohn takes issue with the district court’s treatment of her sentencing 

arguments. “A district court has broad . . . discretion in fashioning a sentence upon 

revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 

202, 206 (4th Cir. 2017). “We will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory 

maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

“To consider whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first must 

determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. Even 

if a revocation sentence is unreasonable, we will reverse only if it is “plainly so.” Id. at 

208 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2 “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.

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Where a defendant “presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a sentence outside 

the [policy statement range], the sentencing [court] must address or consider those 

arguments and explain why [it] has rejected them.” United States v. Powers, 40 F.4th 129, 

137 (4th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Critically, though, “[a]ppellate 

review is not a game of ‘Gotcha!’ where we tally up the number of distinguishable 

arguments a defendant mentioned in the district court and then comb the sentencing 

transcript for proof the district court mentioned each one by name.” Id. “Rather, when a 

district court addresses a defendant’s central thesis, it need not address separately every 

specific claim made in support.” Id. (cleaned up).

Littlejohn highlights three primary nonfrivolous arguments that, in her view, the 

district court failed to address. First, she maintains that the court ignored her rehabilitation 

evidence. True, the court did not mention by name Littlejohn’s sobriety, her stable 

residence, her long-term employment, or any of her other points about rehabilitation. But 

the court undoubtedly rejected Littlejohn’s central thesis, underscoring that Littlejohn’s 

supervision violations arose from the same pattern of conduct for which she was initially 

prosecuted. Thus, even though Littlejohn had taken some positive steps in her life, the 

court clearly did not find her to be rehabilitated.

Second, Littlejohn asserts that the district court neglected her serious medical issues. 

However, Littlejohn’s health-related argument was not presented as a basis for mitigation; 

rather, it was expressly advanced to support her request for voluntary surrender. And, 

notably, the court granted this request, thereby demonstrating its consideration of this 

argument.

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Third, Littlejohn claims that the district court failed to address the possibility that, 

if given a short sentence, she might be able to keep her job. But this argument necessarily 

relates back to Littlejohn’s broader claim that her steady employment was evidence of 

rehabilitation. And since the court was unpersuaded by the latter argument, it seems clear 

why the court was likewise unmoved by the suggestion that it impose a substantial 

downward variance just so Littlejohn could potentially retain a job that, so far, had not kept 

her from reoffending. See United States v. Lester, 985 F.3d 377, 386 (4th Cir. 2021) (“We 

will not vacate a sentence simply because the court did not spell out what the context of its 

explanation made patently obvious: namely, that a shorter prison term was inappropriate 

under the circumstances.” (cleaned up)). 

Finally, Littlejohn contends that the district court erred by basing its sentencing 

decision on the need to promote respect for the law. Littlejohn is correct that promoting 

respect for the law—an appropriate factor for consideration when imposing an original 

sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)—is not among the § 3553(a) sentencing factors 

listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the statute governing the revocation of supervised release. 

However, we have previously held that § 3583(e) “does not expressly prohibit a court from 

referencing” the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 641 (4th 

Cir. 2013). Indeed, so long as a revocation sentence is not “based predominately on” the 

§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors, “mere reference to such considerations does not render a 

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revocation sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are relevant to, and 

considered in conjunction with, the enumerated § 3553(a) factors.” Id. at 642.3

Here, while the district court did discuss the need to promote respect for the law, the 

court explicitly stated that its primary concern was the need to protect the public from 

further crimes that Littlejohn might commit. Thus, we reject Littlejohn’s claim that the 

court relied too heavily on the need to promote respect for the law.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral 

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

3 Littlejohn questions the viability of Webb, claiming that the Supreme Court’s 

recent decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389 (2022), abrogated Webb

based on the following statement: “[I]n determining whether to include a term of 

supervised release, and the length of any such term, Congress has expressly precluded 

district courts from considering the need for retribution.” Id. at 2400 (citing 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(c); Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011)). We cannot agree. For one, 

the statement from Concepcion dealt with § 3583(c), which is not at issue here. And 

second, the Concepcion statement did not announce a new rule; rather, it merely cited

another case, Tapia, that was decided two years before our decision in Webb.

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