# Gazzetta ufficiale C 236/2016

| | ISSN 1977-0944 |
| --- | --- |
| Gazzetta ufficiale
  dell'Unione europea | C 236 |
| | |
| Edizione in lingua italiana | Comunicazioni e informazioni | 59° anno30 giugno 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0944

Gazzetta ufficiale

dell'Unione europea

C 236

Edizione in lingua italiana

Comunicazioni e informazioni

59° anno30 giugno 2016

---

| Numero d'informazione | Sommario | pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicazioni |
| | COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2016/C 236/01 | Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/02 | Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/03 | Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2016/C 236/04 | Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Numero d'informazione

Sommario

pagina

II   Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

2016/C 236/01

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/02

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/03

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  )

1

2

2016/C 236/04

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata (Caso M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  )

1

2

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| | IV   Informazioni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2016/C 236/05 | Tassi di cambio dell'euro | 3 |
| 2016/C 236/06 | Nuova faccia nazionale delle monete in euro destinate alla circolazione | 4 |
| | Corte dei conti |
| 2016/C 236/07 | Relazione speciale n. 14/2016 — Iniziative politiche dell’UE e sostegno finanziario a favore dell’integrazione dei Rom: nonostante i progressi significativi conseguiti negli ultimi dieci anni, occorre compiere ulteriori sforzi sul campo | 5 |
| | INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DAGLI STATI MEMBRI |
| 2016/C 236/08 | Aggiornamento dell’elenco dei valichi di frontiera di cui all’articolo 2, paragrafo 8, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen) | 6 |
| 2016/C 236/09 | Aggiornamento dei modelli di tessere rilasciate dai Ministeri degli Affari esteri degli Stati membri ai membri accreditati delle missioni diplomatiche e delle rappresentanze consolari nonché alle loro famiglie, a norma dell’articolo 20, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen) | 11 |
| | INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO |
| | Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| 2016/C 236/10 | Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in materia di aiuti di Stato | 21 |
| 2016/C 236/11 | Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, in materia di aiuti di Stato, con riferimento ad un potenziale aiuto a Hurtigruten ASA nel quadro dell’accordo per il servizio marittimo di Hurtigruten 2012-2019 | 29 |
| 2016/C 236/12 | Avviso della Norvegia in merito alla direttiva 94/22/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativa alle condizioni di rilascio e di esercizio delle autorizzazioni alla prospezione, ricerca e coltivazione di idrocarburi — Avviso dell’invito a presentare domande di autorizzazione alla produzione di petrolio sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese — Aggiudicazioni 2016 nelle aree prestabilite | 45 |

IV   Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

2016/C 236/05

Tassi di cambio dell'euro

3

2016/C 236/06

Nuova faccia nazionale delle monete in euro destinate alla circolazione

4

Corte dei conti

2016/C 236/07

Relazione speciale n. 14/2016 — Iniziative politiche dell’UE e sostegno finanziario a favore dell’integrazione dei Rom: nonostante i progressi significativi conseguiti negli ultimi dieci anni, occorre compiere ulteriori sforzi sul campo

5

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DAGLI STATI MEMBRI

2016/C 236/08

Aggiornamento dell’elenco dei valichi di frontiera di cui all’articolo 2, paragrafo 8, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen)

6

2016/C 236/09

Aggiornamento dei modelli di tessere rilasciate dai Ministeri degli Affari esteri degli Stati membri ai membri accreditati delle missioni diplomatiche e delle rappresentanze consolari nonché alle loro famiglie, a norma dell’articolo 20, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen)

11

INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

2016/C 236/10

Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in materia di aiuti di Stato

21

2016/C 236/11

Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, in materia di aiuti di Stato, con riferimento ad un potenziale aiuto a Hurtigruten ASA nel quadro dell’accordo per il servizio marittimo di Hurtigruten 2012-2019

29

2016/C 236/12

Avviso della Norvegia in merito alla direttiva 94/22/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativa alle condizioni di rilascio e di esercizio delle autorizzazioni alla prospezione, ricerca e coltivazione di idrocarburi — Avviso dell’invito a presentare domande di autorizzazione alla produzione di petrolio sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese — Aggiudicazioni 2016 nelle aree prestabilite

45

---

| | V   Avvisi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2016/C 236/13 | Invito a presentare proposte nell’ambito del programma di lavoro pluriennale per la concessione di sovvenzioni nel settore delle infrastrutture energetiche transeuropee nel quadro del meccanismo per collegare l’Europa per il periodo 2014-2020 [Decisione C(2016) 1587 della Commissione] | 47 |
| | PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA |
| | Commissione europea |
| 2016/C 236/14 | Notifica preventiva di concentrazione (Caso M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Caso ammissibile alla procedura semplificata (
  1
  ) | 48 |

V   Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI

Commissione europea

2016/C 236/13

Invito a presentare proposte nell’ambito del programma di lavoro pluriennale per la concessione di sovvenzioni nel settore delle infrastrutture energetiche transeuropee nel quadro del meccanismo per collegare l’Europa per il periodo 2014-2020 [Decisione C(2016) 1587 della Commissione]

47

PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione europea

2016/C 236/14

Notifica preventiva di concentrazione (Caso M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Caso ammissibile alla procedura semplificata (
  1
  )

1

48

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE |

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(1)   Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE

1

| IT | |
| --- | --- |

IT

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II Comunicazioni

COMUNICAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/1

---

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

(2016/C 236/01)

Il 22 giugno 2016 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato interno. La presente decisione si basa sull’articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8039. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8039. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

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(1)  GU L 24 del 29.1.2004, pag. 1.

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| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/1

---

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

(2016/C 236/02)

Il 23 giugno 2016 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato interno. La presente decisione si basa sull’articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8049. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8049. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

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(1)  GU L 24 del 29.1.2004, pag. 1.

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| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/2

---

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

(2016/C 236/03)

Il 23 giugno 2016 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato interno. La presente decisione si basa sull’articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8041. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8041. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

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(1)  GU L 24 del 29.1.2004, pag. 1.

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| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/2

---

Non opposizione ad un’operazione di concentrazione notificata

(Caso M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest)

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

(2016/C 236/04)

Il 24 giugno 2016 la Commissione ha deciso di non opporsi alla suddetta operazione di concentrazione notificata e di dichiararla compatibile con il mercato interno. La presente decisione si basa sull’articolo 6, paragrafo 1, lettera b) del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Il testo integrale della decisione è disponibile unicamente in lingua inglese e verrà reso pubblico dopo che gli eventuali segreti aziendali in esso contenuti saranno stati espunti. Il testo della decisione sarà disponibile:

| — | sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore, |
| --- | --- |

—

sul sito Internet della Commissione europea dedicato alla concorrenza, nella sezione relativa alle concentrazioni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Il sito offre varie modalità per la ricerca delle singole decisioni, tra cui indici per impresa, per numero del caso, per data e per settore,

| — | in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8054. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario. |
| --- | --- |

—

in formato elettronico sul sito EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=it) con il numero di riferimento 32016M8054. EUR-Lex è il sistema di accesso in rete al diritto comunitario.

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(1)  GU L 24 del 29.1.2004, pag. 1.

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IV Informazioni

INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DALLE ISTITUZIONI, DAGLI ORGANI E DAGLI ORGANISMI DELL'UNIONE EUROPEA

Commissione europea

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/3

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Tassi di cambio dell'euro (1)

29 giugno 2016

(2016/C 236/05)

1 euro =

| | Moneta | Tasso di cambio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dollari USA | 1,1090 |
| JPY | yen giapponesi | 113,85 |
| DKK | corone danesi | 7,4376 |
| GBP | sterline inglesi | 0,82550 |
| SEK | corone svedesi | 9,4311 |
| CHF | franchi svizzeri | 1,0854 |
| ISK | corone islandesi | |
| NOK | corone norvegesi | 9,3065 |
| BGN | lev bulgari | 1,9558 |
| CZK | corone ceche | 27,114 |
| HUF | fiorini ungheresi | 316,95 |
| PLN | zloty polacchi | 4,4261 |
| RON | leu rumeni | 4,5253 |
| TRY | lire turche | 3,2157 |
| AUD | dollari australiani | 1,4911 |
| CAD | dollari canadesi | 1,4407 |
| HKD | dollari di Hong Kong | 8,6041 |
| NZD | dollari neozelandesi | 1,5565 |
| SGD | dollari di Singapore | 1,4951 |
| KRW | won sudcoreani | 1 283,15 |
| ZAR | rand sudafricani | 16,6016 |
| CNY | renminbi Yuan cinese | 7,3680 |
| HRK | kuna croata | 7,5273 |
| IDR | rupia indonesiana | 14 577,25 |
| MYR | ringgit malese | 4,4594 |
| PHP | peso filippino | 52,106 |
| RUB | rublo russo | 71,0452 |
| THB | baht thailandese | 39,028 |
| BRL | real brasiliano | 3,6216 |
| MXN | peso messicano | 20,7331 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 74,9693 |

Moneta

Tasso di cambio

USD

dollari USA

1,1090

JPY

yen giapponesi

113,85

DKK

corone danesi

7,4376

GBP

sterline inglesi

0,82550

SEK

corone svedesi

9,4311

CHF

franchi svizzeri

1,0854

ISK

corone islandesi

NOK

corone norvegesi

9,3065

BGN

lev bulgari

1,9558

CZK

corone ceche

27,114

HUF

fiorini ungheresi

316,95

PLN

zloty polacchi

4,4261

RON

leu rumeni

4,5253

TRY

lire turche

3,2157

AUD

dollari australiani

1,4911

CAD

dollari canadesi

1,4407

HKD

dollari di Hong Kong

8,6041

NZD

dollari neozelandesi

1,5565

SGD

dollari di Singapore

1,4951

KRW

won sudcoreani

1 283,15

ZAR

rand sudafricani

16,6016

CNY

renminbi Yuan cinese

7,3680

HRK

kuna croata

7,5273

IDR

rupia indonesiana

14 577,25

MYR

ringgit malese

4,4594

PHP

peso filippino

52,106

RUB

rublo russo

71,0452

THB

baht thailandese

39,028

BRL

real brasiliano

3,6216

MXN

peso messicano

20,7331

INR

rupia indiana

74,9693

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(1)  Fonte: tassi di cambio di riferimento pubblicati dalla Banca centrale europea.

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| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/4

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Nuova faccia nazionale delle monete in euro destinate alla circolazione

(2016/C 236/06)

Le monete in euro destinate alla circolazione hanno corso legale in tutta l’area dell’euro. Per informare i cittadini e quanti si ritrovano a maneggiare monete, la Commissione pubblica le caratteristiche dei disegni di tutte le nuove monete in euro (1). Conformemente alle conclusioni adottate dal Consiglio il 10 febbraio 2009 (2), gli Stati membri dell’area dell’euro e i paesi che hanno concluso con l’Unione europea un accordo monetario relativo all’emissione di monete in euro sono autorizzati a emettere monete commemorative in euro destinate alla circolazione a determinate condizioni, in particolare che si tratti unicamente di monete da 2 euro. Tali monete presentano le stesse caratteristiche tecniche delle altre monete da 2 euro, ma recano sulla faccia nazionale un disegno commemorativo di alta rilevanza simbolica a livello nazionale o europeo.

Paese di emissione
  : Spagna

Oggetto della commemorazione
  : siti del patrimonio culturale e naturale mondiale dell’Unesco – chiese del Regno delle Asturie

Descrizione del disegno
  : Il disegno raffigura in primo piano la chiesa di Santa Maria del Naranco. Nella parte superiore del cerchio interno, in senso circolare, figura il nome del paese di emissione «ESPAÑA», al di sotto del quale è indicato, a destra, l’anno di emissione «2017». Nella parte sinistra del cerchio interno figura il marchio della zecca.

Sull’anello esterno della moneta figurano le 12 stelle della bandiera dell’Unione europea.

Tiratura
  : 4 milioni

Data di emissione
  :

o

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(1)  Cfr. GU C 373 del 28.12.2001, pag. 1, dove sono riportate le facce nazionali di tutte le monete emesse nel 2002.

(2)  Cfr. le conclusioni del Consiglio «Economia e finanza» del 10 febbraio 2009 e la raccomandazione della Commissione, del 19 dicembre 2008, su orientamenti comuni per l’emissione di monete in euro destinate alla circolazione e loro relativa faccia nazionale (GU L 9 del 14.1.2009, pag. 52).

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Corte dei conti

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/5

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Relazione speciale n. 14/2016

«Iniziative politiche dell’UE e sostegno finanziario a favore dell’integrazione dei Rom: nonostante i progressi significativi conseguiti negli ultimi dieci anni, occorre compiere ulteriori sforzi sul campo»

(2016/C 236/07)

La Corte dei conti europea informa che è stata pubblicata la relazione speciale n. 14/2016 «Iniziative politiche dell’UE e sostegno finanziario a favore dell’integrazione dei Rom: nonostante i progressi significativi conseguiti negli ultimi dieci anni, occorre compiere ulteriori sforzi sul campo».

La relazione è disponibile, per essere consultata o scaricata, sul sito Internet della Corte dei conti europea: http://eca.europa.eu oppure su EU-Bookshop https://bookshop.europa.eu

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INFORMAZIONI PROVENIENTI DAGLI STATI MEMBRI

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/6

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Aggiornamento dell’elenco dei valichi di frontiera di cui all’articolo 2, paragrafo 8, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen) (1)

(2016/C 236/08)

La pubblicazione dell’elenco dei valichi di frontiera di cui all’articolo 2, paragrafo 8, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 9 marzo 2016, che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen) si basa sulle informazioni comunicate dagli Stati membri alla Commissione in conformità con l’articolo 39 del codice frontiere Schengen.

Oltre alle pubblicazioni nella Gazzetta ufficiale, sul sito web della direzione generale Affari interni è possibile consultare un aggiornamento mensile.

FRANCIA

Sostituisce l’elenco pubblicato nella GU C 229 del 14 luglio 2015

ELENCO DEI VALICHI DI FRONTIERA

Frontiere aeree

| 1) | Abbeville |
| --- | --- |

1)

Abbeville

| 2) | Agen-la Garenne |
| --- | --- |

2)

Agen-la Garenne

| 3) | Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro |
| --- | --- |

3)

Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro

| 4) | Albert-Bray |
| --- | --- |

4)

Albert-Bray

| 5) | Amiens-Glisy |
| --- | --- |

5)

Amiens-Glisy

| 6) | Angers-Marcé |
| --- | --- |

6)

Angers-Marcé

| 7) | Angoulême-Brie-Champniers |
| --- | --- |

7)

Angoulême-Brie-Champniers

| 8) | Annecy-Methet |
| --- | --- |

8)

Annecy-Methet

| 9) | Annemasse |
| --- | --- |

9)

Annemasse

| 10) | Auxerre-Branches |
| --- | --- |

10)

Auxerre-Branches

| 11) | Avignon-Caumont |
| --- | --- |

11)

Avignon-Caumont

| 12) | Bâle-Mulhouse |
| --- | --- |

12)

Bâle-Mulhouse

| 13) | Bastia-Poretta |
| --- | --- |

13)

Bastia-Poretta

| 14) | Beauvais-Tillé |
| --- | --- |

14)

Beauvais-Tillé

| 15) | Bergerac-Roumanière |
| --- | --- |

15)

Bergerac-Roumanière

| 16) | Besançon-la Vèze |
| --- | --- |

16)

Besançon-la Vèze

| 17) | Béziers-Vias |
| --- | --- |

17)

Béziers-Vias

| 18) | Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet |
| --- | --- |

18)

Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet

| 19) | Bordeaux-Mérignac |
| --- | --- |

19)

Bordeaux-Mérignac

| 20) | Brest-Guipavas |
| --- | --- |

20)

Brest-Guipavas

| 21) | Brive-Souillac |
| --- | --- |

21)

Brive-Souillac

| 22) | Caen-Carpiquet |
| --- | --- |

22)

Caen-Carpiquet

| 23) | Calais-Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

23)

Calais-Dunkerque

| 24) | Calvi-Sainte-Catherine |
| --- | --- |

24)

Calvi-Sainte-Catherine

| 25) | Cannes-Mandelieu |
| --- | --- |

25)

Cannes-Mandelieu

| 26) | Carcassonne-Salvaza |
| --- | --- |

26)

Carcassonne-Salvaza

| 27) | Châlons-Vatry |
| --- | --- |

27)

Châlons-Vatry

| 28) | Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains |
| --- | --- |

28)

Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains

| 29) | Châteauroux-Déols |
| --- | --- |

29)

Châteauroux-Déols

| 30) | Cherbourg-Mauperthus |
| --- | --- |

30)

Cherbourg-Mauperthus

| 31) | Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat |
| --- | --- |

31)

Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat

| 32) | Colmar-Houssen |
| --- | --- |

32)

Colmar-Houssen

| 33) | Deauville-Saint-Gatien |
| --- | --- |

33)

Deauville-Saint-Gatien

| 34) | Dijon-Longvic |
| --- | --- |

34)

Dijon-Longvic

| 35) | Dinard-Pleurtuit |
| --- | --- |

35)

Dinard-Pleurtuit

| 36) | Dôle-Tavaux |
| --- | --- |

36)

Dôle-Tavaux

| 37) | Epinal-Mirecourt |
| --- | --- |

37)

Epinal-Mirecourt

| 38) | Figari-Sud Corse |
| --- | --- |

38)

Figari-Sud Corse

| 39) | Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs |
| --- | --- |

39)

Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs

| 40) | Hyères-le Palivestre |
| --- | --- |

40)

Hyères-le Palivestre

| 41) | Issy-les-Moulineaux |
| --- | --- |

41)

Issy-les-Moulineaux

| 42) | La Môle |
| --- | --- |

42)

La Môle

| 43) | Lannion |
| --- | --- |

43)

Lannion

| 44) | La Rochelle-Laleu |
| --- | --- |

44)

La Rochelle-Laleu

| 45) | Laval-Entrammes |
| --- | --- |

45)

Laval-Entrammes

| 46) | Le Castelet |
| --- | --- |

46)

Le Castelet

| 47) | Le Havre-Octeville |
| --- | --- |

47)

Le Havre-Octeville

| 48) | Le Mans-Arnage |
| --- | --- |

48)

Le Mans-Arnage

| 49) | Le Touquet-Paris-Plage |
| --- | --- |

49)

Le Touquet-Paris-Plage

| 50) | Lille-Lesquin |
| --- | --- |

50)

Lille-Lesquin

| 51) | Limoges-Bellegarde |
| --- | --- |

51)

Limoges-Bellegarde

| 52) | Lognes-Emerainville |
| --- | --- |

52)

Lognes-Emerainville

| 53) | Lorient-Lann-Bihoué |
| --- | --- |

53)

Lorient-Lann-Bihoué

| 54) | Lyon-Bron |
| --- | --- |

54)

Lyon-Bron

| 55) | Lyon-Saint-Exupéry |
| --- | --- |

55)

Lyon-Saint-Exupéry

| 56) | Marseille-Provence |
| --- | --- |

56)

Marseille-Provence

| 57) | Metz-Nancy-Lorraine |
| --- | --- |

57)

Metz-Nancy-Lorraine

| 58) | Monaco-Héliport |
| --- | --- |

58)

Monaco-Héliport

| 59) | Montbéliard-Courcelles |
| --- | --- |

59)

Montbéliard-Courcelles

| 60) | Montpellier-Méditérranée |
| --- | --- |

60)

Montpellier-Méditérranée

| 61) | Nantes-Atlantique |
| --- | --- |

61)

Nantes-Atlantique

| 62) | Nevers-Fourchambault |
| --- | --- |

62)

Nevers-Fourchambault

| 63) | Nice-Côte d’Azur |
| --- | --- |

63)

Nice-Côte d’Azur

| 64) | Nîmes-Garons |
| --- | --- |

64)

Nîmes-Garons

| 65) | Orléans-Bricy |
| --- | --- |

65)

Orléans-Bricy

| 66) | Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel |
| --- | --- |

66)

Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel

| 67) | Paris-Charles de Gaulle |
| --- | --- |

67)

Paris-Charles de Gaulle

| 68) | Paris-le Bourget |
| --- | --- |

68)

Paris-le Bourget

| 69) | Paris-Orly |
| --- | --- |

69)

Paris-Orly

| 70) | Pau-Pyrénées |
| --- | --- |

70)

Pau-Pyrénées

| 71) | Perpignan-Rivesaltes |
| --- | --- |

71)

Perpignan-Rivesaltes

| 72) | Poitiers-Biard |
| --- | --- |

72)

Poitiers-Biard

| 73) | Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, a titolo temporaneo:






  — | Da mercoledì 10 a domenica 14 giugno 2015 dalle 10:00 alle 15:30.
  Questa apertura temporanea ha effetto durante il Salone internazionale dell’Aeronautica e dello Spazio di Le Bourget, che impone un alleggerimento dei voli extra-Schengen verso l’aerodromo di Pontoise. |
| --- | --- | --- |

73)

Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, a titolo temporaneo:

—

Da mercoledì 10 a domenica 14 giugno 2015 dalle 10:00 alle 15:30.

Questa apertura temporanea ha effetto durante il Salone internazionale dell’Aeronautica e dello Spazio di Le Bourget, che impone un alleggerimento dei voli extra-Schengen verso l’aerodromo di Pontoise.

| — | Da lunedì 15 a domenica 21 giugno 2015 dalle 06:00 alle 16:30.
  Questa apertura temporanea ha effetto per un periodo in cui è predisposta una linea stagionale extra-Schengen (Quimper-Londra). |
| --- | --- |

—

Da lunedì 15 a domenica 21 giugno 2015 dalle 06:00 alle 16:30.

Questa apertura temporanea ha effetto per un periodo in cui è predisposta una linea stagionale extra-Schengen (Quimper-Londra).

| 74) | Quimper-Cornouailles, a titolo temporaneo dal 19 maggio al 4 settembre 2016. |
| --- | --- |

74)

Quimper-Cornouailles, a titolo temporaneo dal 19 maggio al 4 settembre 2016.

| 75) | Rennes Saint-Jacques |
| --- | --- |

75)

Rennes Saint-Jacques

| 76) | Rodez-Marcillac |
| --- | --- |

76)

Rodez-Marcillac

| 77) | Rouen-Vallée de Seine |
| --- | --- |

77)

Rouen-Vallée de Seine

| 78) | Saint-Brieuc-Armor |
| --- | --- |

78)

Saint-Brieuc-Armor

| 79) | Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon |
| --- | --- |

79)

Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon

| 80) | Saint-Nazaire-Montoir |
| --- | --- |

80)

Saint-Nazaire-Montoir

| 81) | Strasbourg-Entzheim |
| --- | --- |

81)

Strasbourg-Entzheim

| 82) | Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes |
| --- | --- |

82)

Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes

| 83) | Toulouse-Blagnac |
| --- | --- |

83)

Toulouse-Blagnac

| 84) | Tours-Saint-Symphorien |
| --- | --- |

84)

Tours-Saint-Symphorien

| 85) | Troyes-Barberey |
| --- | --- |

85)

Troyes-Barberey

| 86) | Vichy-Charmeil |
| --- | --- |

86)

Vichy-Charmeil

Frontiere marittime

| 1) | Ajaccio |
| --- | --- |

1)

Ajaccio

| 2) | Bastia |
| --- | --- |

2)

Bastia

| 3) | Bayonne |
| --- | --- |

3)

Bayonne

| 4) | Bonifacio |
| --- | --- |

4)

Bonifacio

| 5) | Bordeaux |
| --- | --- |

5)

Bordeaux

| 6) | Boulogne |
| --- | --- |

6)

Boulogne

| 7) | Brest |
| --- | --- |

7)

Brest

| 8) | Caen-Ouistreham |
| --- | --- |

8)

Caen-Ouistreham

| 9) | Calais |
| --- | --- |

9)

Calais

| 10) | Calvi |
| --- | --- |

10)

Calvi

| 11) | Cannes-Vieux Port |
| --- | --- |

11)

Cannes-Vieux Port

| 12) | Carteret |
| --- | --- |

12)

Carteret

| 13) | Cherbourg |
| --- | --- |

13)

Cherbourg

| 14) | Dieppe |
| --- | --- |

14)

Dieppe

| 15) | Douvres |
| --- | --- |

15)

Douvres

| 16) | Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

16)

Dunkerque

| 17) | Granville |
| --- | --- |

17)

Granville

| 18) | Honfleur |
| --- | --- |

18)

Honfleur

| 19) | La Rochelle-La Pallice |
| --- | --- |

19)

La Rochelle-La Pallice

| 20) | Le Havre |
| --- | --- |

20)

Le Havre

| 21) | Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port |
| --- | --- |

21)

Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port

| 22) | L’Ile-Rousse |
| --- | --- |

22)

L’Ile-Rousse

| 23) | Lorient |
| --- | --- |

23)

Lorient

| 24) | Marseille |
| --- | --- |

24)

Marseille

| 25) | Monaco-Port de la Condamine |
| --- | --- |

25)

Monaco-Port de la Condamine

| 26) | Nantes-Saint-Nazaire |
| --- | --- |

26)

Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

| 27) | Nice |
| --- | --- |

27)

Nice

| 28) | Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis |
| --- | --- |

28)

Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis

| 29) | Port-la-Nouvelle |
| --- | --- |

29)

Port-la-Nouvelle

| 30) | Porto-Vecchio |
| --- | --- |

30)

Porto-Vecchio

| 31) | Port-Vendres |
| --- | --- |

31)

Port-Vendres

| 32) | Roscoff |
| --- | --- |

32)

Roscoff

| 33) | Rouen |
| --- | --- |

33)

Rouen

| 34) | Saint-Brieuc (maritime) |
| --- | --- |

34)

Saint-Brieuc (maritime)

| 35) | Saint-Malo |
| --- | --- |

35)

Saint-Malo

| 36) | Sète |
| --- | --- |

36)

Sète

| 37) | Toulon |
| --- | --- |

37)

Toulon

Frontiere terrestri

con il REGNO UNITO

(collegamento fisso sotto la Manica)

| 1) | Gare d’Ashford International |
| --- | --- |

1)

Gare d’Ashford International

| 2) | Gare d’Avignon-Centre |
| --- | --- |

2)

Gare d’Avignon-Centre

| 3) | Cheriton/Coquelles |
| --- | --- |

3)

Cheriton/Coquelles

| 4) | Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée |
| --- | --- |

4)

Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée

| 5) | Gare de Fréthun |
| --- | --- |

5)

Gare de Fréthun

| 6) | Gare de Lille-Europe |
| --- | --- |

6)

Gare de Lille-Europe

| 7) | Gare de Paris-Nord |
| --- | --- |

7)

Gare de Paris-Nord

| 8) | Gare de St-Pancras International |
| --- | --- |

8)

Gare de St-Pancras International

| 9) | Gare d’Ebbsfleet International |
| --- | --- |

9)

Gare d’Ebbsfleet International

| 10) | Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, il 1o luglio 2016. |
| --- | --- |

10)

Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, il 1o luglio 2016.

con ANDORRA

| 1) | Pas de la Case |
| --- | --- |

1)

Pas de la Case

Elenco delle precedenti pubblicazioni

| | GU C 316 del 28.12.2007, pag. 1 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 316 del 28.12.2007, pag. 1

| | GU C 134 del 31.5.2008, pag. 16 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 134 del 31.5.2008, pag. 16

| | GU C 177 del 12.7.2008, pag. 9 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 177 del 12.7.2008, pag. 9

| | GU C 200 del 6.8.2008, pag. 10 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 200 del 6.8.2008, pag. 10

| | GU C 331 del 31.12.2008, pag. 13 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 331 del 31.12.2008, pag. 13

| | GU C 3 dell’8.1.2009, pag. 10 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 3 dell’8.1.2009, pag. 10

| | GU C 37 del 14.2.2009, pag. 10 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 37 del 14.2.2009, pag. 10

| | GU C 64 del 19.3.2009, pag. 20 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 64 del 19.3.2009, pag. 20

| | GU C 99 del 30.4.2009, pag. 7 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 99 del 30.4.2009, pag. 7

| | GU C 229 del 23.9.2009, pag. 28 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 229 del 23.9.2009, pag. 28

| | GU C 263 del 5.11.2009, pag. 22 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 263 del 5.11.2009, pag. 22

| | GU C 298 dell’8.12.2009, pag. 17 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 298 dell’8.12.2009, pag. 17

| | GU C 74 del 24.3.2010, pag. 13 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 74 del 24.3.2010, pag. 13

| | GU C 326 del 3.12.2010, pag. 17 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 326 del 3.12.2010, pag. 17

| | GU C 355 del 29.12.2010, pag. 34 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 355 del 29.12.2010, pag. 34

| | GU C 22 del 22.1.2011, pag. 22 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 22 del 22.1.2011, pag. 22

| | GU C 37 del 5.2.2011, pag. 12 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 37 del 5.2.2011, pag. 12

| | GU C 149 del 20.5.2011, pag. 8 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 149 del 20.5.2011, pag. 8

| | GU C 190 del 30.6.2011, pag. 17 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 190 del 30.6.2011, pag. 17

| | GU C 203 del 9.7.2011, pag. 14 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 203 del 9.7.2011, pag. 14

| | GU C 210 del 16.7.2011, pag. 30 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 210 del 16.7.2011, pag. 30

| | GU C 271 del 14.9.2011, pag. 18 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 271 del 14.9.2011, pag. 18

| | GU C 356 del 6.12.2011, pag. 12 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 356 del 6.12.2011, pag. 12

| | GU C 111 del 18.4.2012, pag. 3 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 111 del 18.4.2012, pag. 3

| | GU C 183 del 23.6.2012, pag. 7 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 183 del 23.6.2012, pag. 7

| | GU C 313 del 17.10.2012, pag. 11 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 313 del 17.10.2012, pag. 11

| | GU C 394 del 20.12.2012, pag. 22 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 394 del 20.12.2012, pag. 22

| | GU C 51 del 22.2.2013, pag. 9 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 51 del 22.2.2013, pag. 9

| | GU C 167 del 13.6.2013, pag. 9 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 167 del 13.6.2013, pag. 9

| | GU C 242 del 23.8.2013, pag. 2 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 242 del 23.8.2013, pag. 2

| | GU C 275 del 24.9.2013, pag. 7 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 275 del 24.9.2013, pag. 7

| | GU C 314 del 29.10.2013, pag. 5 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 314 del 29.10.2013, pag. 5

| | GU C 324 del 9.11.2013, pag. 6 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 324 del 9.11.2013, pag. 6

| | GU C 57 del 28.2.2014, pag. 4 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 57 del 28.2.2014, pag. 4

| | GU C 167 del 4.6.2014, pag. 9 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 167 del 4.6.2014, pag. 9

| | GU C 244 del 26.7.2014, pag. 22 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 244 del 26.7.2014, pag. 22

| | GU C 332 del 24.9.2014, pag. 12 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 332 del 24.9.2014, pag. 12

| | GU C 420 del 22.11.2014, pag. 9 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 420 del 22.11.2014, pag. 9

| | GU C 72 del 28.2.2015, pag. 17 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 72 del 28.2.2015, pag. 17

| | GU C 126 del 18.4.2015, pag. 10 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 126 del 18.4.2015, pag. 10

| | GU C 229 del 14.7.2015, pag. 5 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 229 del 14.7.2015, pag. 5

| | GU C 341 del 16.10.2015, pag. 19 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 341 del 16.10.2015, pag. 19

| | GU C 84 del 4.3.2016, pag. 2. |
| --- | --- |

GU C 84 del 4.3.2016, pag. 2.

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(1)  Cfr. l’elenco delle pubblicazioni precedenti alla fine di tale aggiornamento.

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| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/11

---

Aggiornamento dei modelli di tessere rilasciate dai Ministeri degli Affari esteri degli Stati membri ai membri accreditati delle missioni diplomatiche e delle rappresentanze consolari nonché alle loro famiglie, a norma dell’articolo 20, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen) (1)

(2016/C 236/09)

La pubblicazione dei modelli di tessere rilasciate dai Ministeri degli Affari esteri degli Stati membri ai membri accreditati delle missioni diplomatiche e delle rappresentanze consolari nonché alle loro famiglie, a norma dell’articolo 20, paragrafo 2, del regolamento (UE) 2016/399 del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 9 marzo 2016, che istituisce un codice unionale relativo al regime di attraversamento delle frontiere da parte delle persone (codice frontiere Schengen) si basa sulle informazioni comunicate dagli Stati membri alla Commissione in conformità con l’articolo 39 del codice frontiere Schengen (codificazione).

Oltre alle pubblicazioni nella Gazzetta ufficiale, sul sito web della Direzione generale Affari interni è possibile consultare un aggiornamento mensile.

SVIZZERA

Sostituisce l’elenco pubblicato nella GU C 133 dell’1.5.2014

TITOLI DI SOGGIORNO SPECIALI RILASCIATI DAL MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI:

Carte di legittimazione (titoli di soggiorno) del Dipartimento federale degli affari esteri:

| — | Carte de légitimation «B» (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «B» (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «B» (a banda rosa): capimissione di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari superiori di organizzazioni internazionali e loro familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Carte de légitimation «B» (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «B» (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «B» (a banda rosa): capimissione di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari superiori di organizzazioni internazionali e loro familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «C» (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «C» (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «C» (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, alti funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «C» (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «C» (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «C» (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, alti funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «D» (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «D» (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «D» (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «D» (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «D» (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «D» (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «D» (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «D» (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «D» (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «D» (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «D» (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «D» (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «E» (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte «E» (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «E» (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «E» (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte «E» (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «E» (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «F» (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte «F» (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione «F» (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali; |
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Carte de légitimation «F» (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte «F» (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione «F» (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali;

| — | Carte de légitimation «G» (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail «court terme») et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte «G» (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «G» (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «G» (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail «court terme») et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte «G» (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «G» (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «H» (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales. / Legitimationskarte «H» (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione «H» (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali; |
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Carte de légitimation «H» (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales. / Legitimationskarte «H» (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione «H» (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali;

| — | Carte de légitimation «I» (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationska rte «I» (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «I» (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «I» (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationska rte «I» (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «I» (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera, funzionari consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera, funzionari consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari; |
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Carte de légitimation «K» (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte «K» (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione «K» (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari;

| — | Carte de légitimation «L» (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «L» (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «L» (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Carte de légitimation «L» (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «L» (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «L» (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carte de légitimation «P» (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «P» (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «P» (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto. |
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Carte de légitimation «P» (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «P» (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione «P» (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.

| — | Carte de légitimation «R» (à bande grise) : membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «R» (mit grauem Streifen) : Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione «R» (a banda grigia) : membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto. |
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Carte de légitimation «R» (à bande grise) : membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte «R» (mit grauem Streifen) : Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione «R» (a banda grigia) : membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.

| — | Carte de légitimation «S» (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte «S» (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione «S» (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali. |
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Carte de légitimation «S» (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte «S» (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione «S» (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali.

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «B» del DFAE

| — | Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: capimissione |
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Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: capimissione

| — | Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari superiori



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit du statut diplomatique

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dello statuto diplomatico |
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Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari superiori

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit du statut diplomatique

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus

Il titolare di questa carta gode dello statuto diplomatico

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «C» del DFAE

| — | Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: personale diplomatico |
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Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: personale diplomatico

| — | Organizzazioni internazionali: alti funzionari



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit du statut diplomatique

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dello statuto diplomatico |
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Organizzazioni internazionali: alti funzionari

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit du statut diplomatique

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus

Il titolare di questa carta gode dello statuto diplomatico

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «D» del DFAE

| — | Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: personale amministrativo e tecnico (AT)



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit du statut diplomatique, à l’exception de l’immunité de juridiction civile et administrative qui ne sont accordées que dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus, Immunität von der Zivil- und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit hat er jedoch nur für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dello statuto diplomatico, ad eccezione dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione civile e amministrativa, che è concessa solo nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
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Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: personale amministrativo e tecnico (AT)

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit du statut diplomatique, à l’exception de l’immunité de juridiction civile et administrative qui ne sont accordées que dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus, Immunität von der Zivil- und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit hat er jedoch nur für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dello statuto diplomatico, ad eccezione dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione civile e amministrativa, che è concessa solo nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

| — | Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
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Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «E» del DFAE

| — | Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: personale di servizio e personale assunto localmente |
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Ambasciate e missioni permanenti: personale di servizio e personale assunto localmente

| — | Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari dei servizi generali



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
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Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari dei servizi generali

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «F» del DFAE

| — | Ambasciate, missioni permanenti e organizzazioni internazionali: domestici privati di un membro del personale



  Le titulaire de cette carte ne jouit pas de l’immunité de juridiction

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

  Il titolare di questa carta non gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione |
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Ambasciate, missioni permanenti e organizzazioni internazionali: domestici privati di un membro del personale

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte ne jouit pas de l’immunité de juridiction

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

Il titolare di questa carta non gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «G» del DFAE

| — | Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari temporanei (contratto a durata determinata) e personale distaccato



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
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Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionari temporanei (contratto a durata determinata) e personale distaccato

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «H» del DFAE

| — | Ambasciate, consolati, missioni permanenti e organizzazioni internazionali: persone senza privilegi e immunità



  Le titulaire de cette carte ne jouit pas de l’immunité de juridiction et n’a pas accès au marché suisse du travail

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit und keinen Zugang zum schweizerischen Arbeitsmarkt

  Il titolare di questa carta non gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione e non ha accesso al mercato svizzero del lavoro |
| --- | --- |

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Ambasciate, consolati, missioni permanenti e organizzazioni internazionali: persone senza privilegi e immunità

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte ne jouit pas de l’immunité de juridiction et n’a pas accès au marché suisse du travail

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit und keinen Zugang zum schweizerischen Arbeitsmarkt

Il titolare di questa carta non gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione e non ha accesso al mercato svizzero del lavoro

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «I» del DFAE

| — | Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa (CICR): collaboratori del CICR



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Il n’a pas de privilèges douaniers

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni. Non gode di privilegi doganali |
| --- | --- |

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Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa (CICR): collaboratori del CICR

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Il n’a pas de privilèges douaniers

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni. Non gode di privilegi doganali

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «K» del DFAE

| — | Consolati — carta K rossa: capiposto di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
| --- | --- |

—

Consolati — carta K rossa: capiposto di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

| — | Consolati — carta K blu: impiegati consolari di carriera



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
| --- | --- |

—

Consolati — carta K blu: impiegati consolari di carriera

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

| — | Consolati — carta K viola: personale di servizio e personale assunto localmente



  Le titulaire de cette carte ne jouit pas de l’immunité de juridiction

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

  Il titolare di questa carta non gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione |
| --- | --- |

—

Consolati — carta K viola: personale di servizio e personale assunto localmente

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte ne jouit pas de l’immunité de juridiction

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

Il titolare di questa carta non gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione

| — | Consolati — carta K bianca: capiposto onorari



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction exclusivement pour les fonctions consulaires

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit lediglich für konsularische Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione esclusivamente per le funzioni consolari |
| --- | --- |

—

Consolati — carta K bianca: capiposto onorari

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction exclusivement pour les fonctions consulaires

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit lediglich für konsularische Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione esclusivamente per le funzioni consolari

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «L» del DFAE

| — | Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa (FISCR): collaboratore della FISCR



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Il n’a pas de privilèges douaniers

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni. Non gode di privilegi doganali |
| --- | --- |

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Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa (FISCR): collaboratore della FISCR

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions. Il n’a pas de privilèges douaniers

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni. Non gode di privilegi doganali

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «P» del DFAE

| — | Organizzazione Europea per la Ricerca Nucleare (CERN): personale scientifico del CERN



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazione Europea per la Ricerca Nucleare (CERN): personale scientifico del CERN

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «R» del DFAE

| — | Membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.



  Il titolare della carta non gode dell’immunità di giurisdizione. |
| --- | --- |

—

Membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.

Image

Il titolare della carta non gode dell’immunità di giurisdizione.

Carta di legittimazione di tipo «S» del DFAE

Il personale di nazionalità svizzera, indipendentemente dalla funzione che occupa in seno alla rappresentanza estera o all’organizzazione internazionale, riceve in linea di principio una carta di legittimazione di tipo «S». Il personale svizzero assunto localmente dalle ambasciate e i consolati non riceve alcuna carta. I funzionari temporanei svizzeri (contratto a durata determinata) delle organizzazioni internazionali non ricevono alcuna carta.

| — | Ambasciate e consolati: personale di carriera di nazionalità svizzera |
| --- | --- |

—

Ambasciate e consolati: personale di carriera di nazionalità svizzera

| — | Missioni permanenti: personale di nazionalità svizzera |
| --- | --- |

—

Missioni permanenti: personale di nazionalità svizzera

| — | Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionario/collaboratore di nazionalità svizzera



  Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

  Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni |
| --- | --- |

—

Organizzazioni internazionali: funzionario/collaboratore di nazionalità svizzera

Image

Le titulaire de cette carte jouit de l’immunité de juridiction dans l’exercice de ses fonctions

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Il titolare di questa carta gode dell’immunità dalla giurisdizione nell’esercizio delle sue funzioni

Elenco delle precedenti pubblicazioni

| | GU C 247 del 13.10.2006, pag. 85 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 247 del 13.10.2006, pag. 85

| | GU C 153 del 6.7.2007, pag. 15 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 153 del 6.7.2007, pag. 15

| | GU C 64 del 19.3.2009, pag. 18 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 64 del 19.3.2009, pag. 18

| | GU C 239 del 6.10.2009, pag. 7 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 239 del 6.10.2009, pag. 7

| | GU C 304 del 10.11.2010, pag. 6 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 304 del 10.11.2010, pag. 6

| | GU C 273 del 16.09.2011, pag. 11 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 273 del 16.09.2011, pag. 11

| | GU C 357 del 7.12.2011, pag. 3; |
| --- | --- |

GU C 357 del 7.12.2011, pag. 3;

| | GU C 88 del 24.3.2012, pag. 12 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 88 del 24.3.2012, pag. 12

| | GU C 120 del 25.4.2012, pag. 4 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 120 del 25.4.2012, pag. 4

| | GU C 182 del 22.6.2012, pag. 10 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 182 del 22.6.2012, pag. 10

| | GU C 214 del 20.7.2012, pag. 4 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 214 del 20.7.2012, pag. 4

| | GU C 238 del 8.8.2012, pag. 5 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 238 del 8.8.2012, pag. 5

| | GU C 255 del 24.8.2012, pag. 2 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 255 del 24.8.2012, pag. 2

| | GU C 242 del 23.8.2013, pag. 13 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 242 del 23.8.2013, pag. 13

| | GU C 38 del 8.2.2014, pag. 16 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 38 del 8.2.2014, pag. 16

| | GU C 133 del 1.5.2014, pag. 2 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 133 del 1.5.2014, pag. 2

| | GU C 360 del 11.10.2014, pag. 5 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 360 del 11.10.2014, pag. 5

| | GU C 397 del 12.11.2014, pag. 6 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 397 del 12.11.2014, pag. 6

| | GU C 77 del 27.2.2016, pag. 5 |
| --- | --- |

GU C 77 del 27.2.2016, pag. 5

| | GU C 174 del 14.5.2016, pag. 12. |
| --- | --- |

GU C 174 del 14.5.2016, pag. 12.

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(1)  Cfr. l'elenco delle pubblicazioni precedenti alla fine di tale aggiornamento.

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INFORMAZIONI RELATIVE ALLO SPAZIO ECONOMICO EUROPEO

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/21

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Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in materia di aiuti di Stato

(2016/C 236/10)

Per mezzo della decisione n. 489/15/COL, riprodotta nella lingua facente fede nelle pagine che seguono la presente sintesi, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha informato le autorità norvegesi della sua decisione di avviare un procedimento ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia in relazione alla misura in oggetto.

Le parti interessate possono presentare osservazioni sulla misura in oggetto entro un mese dalla data di pubblicazione al seguente indirizzo:

| Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

Registro

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Le osservazioni saranno comunicate alle autorità norvegesi. Su richiesta scritta e motivata degli autori delle osservazioni, la loro identità non sarà rivelata.

SINTESI

Procedura

Con lettera del 13 marzo 2014 (1), le autorità norvegesi hanno notificato il regime di differenziazione regionale degli oneri di sicurezza sociale 2014-2020 ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 3, della parte I del protocollo 3. Sulla base di tale notifica e delle informazioni presentate in seguito (2), l’Autorità ha approvato il regime di aiuti notificato con decisione n. 225/14/COL del 18 giugno 2014.

Con sentenza del 23 settembre 2015 nella causa Kimek Offshore AS/ESA
   (3), la Corte EFTA ha annullato in parte la decisione dell’Autorità.

Con lettera del 15 ottobre 2015 (4), l’Autorità ha chiesto informazioni alle autorità norvegesi. Con lettera del 6 novembre 2015 (5), le autorità norvegesi hanno risposto alla richiesta di informazioni.

Descrizione della misura

L’obiettivo del regime generale di differenziazione degli oneri di sicurezza sociale mira a ridurre o prevenire lo spopolamento delle regioni meno popolate in Norvegia, stimolando l’occupazione. Il regime di aiuti al funzionamento compensa il costo del lavoro riducendo le aliquote dei contributi di previdenza sociale in determinate aree geografiche. In linea di massima, le intensità di aiuto variano in funzione della zona geografica in cui l’unità aziendale è registrata. Il diritto norvegese prevede che le imprese registrino le sottounità per ogni singola attività commerciale svolta (6). Se un’impresa svolge diversi tipi di attività commerciale, occorre registrare le singole sottounità. Inoltre, bisogna registrare unità separate se le attività sono svolte in diverse aree geografiche.

In deroga alla regola principale sulla registrazione, il regime si applica anche alle imprese registrate al di fuori della zona ammissibile se impiegano lavoratori per lavorare in questa zona e se questi sono impiegati in attività «mobili» all’interno della stessa (ai fini della presente decisione, tali attività sono definite «servizi ambulanti»). Questa è la deroga oggetto della presente decisione. La base giuridica nazionale del regime è la sezione 23-2 della legge sulle assicurazioni sociali (7), mentre la base giuridica nazionale della deroga è la sezione 1(4) della decisione n. 1482 del Parlamento norvegese, del 5 dicembre 2013, sulla determinazione delle aliquote fiscali ecc. nel quadro della legge sulle assicurazioni sociali.

La deroga si applica solo quando il lavoratore trascorre la metà o più dei suoi giorni lavorativi nella zona ammissibile. Inoltre, l’aliquota ridotta è applicabile soltanto per la parte del lavoro effettuata in tale zona.

Valutazione della misura

L’Autorità deve valutare se il regime di deroga è compatibile con il funzionamento dell’accordo SEE sulla base dell’articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), in linea con gli orientamenti dell’Autorità in materia di aiuti di Stato a finalità regionale 2014-2020 (in appresso «gli orientamenti») (8).

Gli aiuti a finalità regionale possono contribuire allo sviluppo economico nelle zone svantaggiate solo se sono tesi a stimolare investimenti o attività economiche supplementari in quelle zone (9). Gli aiuti a finalità regionale possono rientrare nel campo di applicazione dell’articolo 61, paragrafo 3, lettera c), dell’accordo SEE solo se sono concessi per compensare svantaggi specifici o permanenti riscontrati dalle imprese nelle regioni svantaggiate (10).

Non vi è alcun dubbio che l’ambito geografico del regime è limitato alle regioni svantaggiate. L’ambito di applicazione della presente decisione è limitato al regime di deroga. Resta da appurare se tale deroga, secondo la quale le imprese registrate al di fuori delle regioni svantaggiate coperte dal regime possono beneficiare di aiuti nell’ambito del regime nella misura in cui svolgono attività economiche nelle regioni svantaggiate, sia compatibile con le norme sugli aiuti di Stato. In altri termini, bisogna valutare se la deroga consente di compensare svantaggi specifici o permanenti riscontrati dalle imprese nelle regioni svantaggiate.

Spetta alle autorità norvegesi dimostrare il rischio di spopolamento in assenza della deroga (11). Le autorità norvegesi hanno sottolineato i benefici della deroga per le imprese locali, le quali possono accedere, a un costo inferiore, alla manodopera specializzata che altrimenti non sarebbe disponibile. Inoltre, la deroga stimola una maggiore concorrenza tra servizi ambulanti nelle zone ammissibili, il che ancora una volta è vantaggioso per le imprese locali (diverse da quelle che forniscono servizi ambulanti) in quanto i minori costi per i servizi ambulanti fanno sì che sia più interessante e redditizio gestire un’impresa nella zona ammissibile. Il ricorso all’aiuto nell’ambito del regime è uno strumento indiretto, nel senso che è utilizzato per ridurre il costo dell’assunzione dei lavoratori come misura per ridurre o prevenire lo spopolamento. L’idea è che il mercato del lavoro costituisce il fattore più importante che incide sul luogo in cui vivono le persone.

Le autorità norvegesi hanno inoltre affermato che le imprese registrate al di fuori dalla zona ammissibile assumeranno occasionalmente lavoratori nelle zone ammissibili. Le imprese forniranno in tal modo posti di lavoro che, pur essendo di natura temporanea, contribuiranno ad accrescere i redditi salariali nelle regioni ammissibili, con effetti positivi sull’attività economica. Le autorità norvegesi sostengono inoltre che i lavoratori che soggiornano temporaneamente nella zona ammissibile acquisteranno beni e servizi locali e contribuiranno quindi all’economia locale. Ciò vale in particolare per i lavoratori che si recano in questi luoghi soprattutto a breve o medio termine, in quanto è probabile che soggiornino in albergo, mangino al ristorante, e così via. Le autorità norvegesi hanno stimato che l’importo dell’aiuto risultante dalla deroga è pari al 2 % dell’aiuto totale per il 2015, una stima che sottolineano essere incerta. Il 2 % equivale all’incirca a 19 milioni di EUR (12). L’Autorità invita le autorità norvegesi a fornire informazioni più precise sugli effetti finanziari della deroga.

A prescindere dalle osservazioni di carattere generale, le autorità norvegesi non hanno dimostrato il rischio di spopolamento che correrebbe la zona interessata se non ci fosse la deroga. L’Autorità ritiene che, per soddisfare i requisiti degli orientamenti, una misura deve produrre effetti che vanno al di là di un aumento marginale delle possibilità di occupazione temporanea e di spesa nella zona ammissibile. Su questa base, l’Autorità invita le autorità norvegesi a fornire ulteriori informazioni per dimostrare il rischio di spopolamento in assenza della deroga.

Per quanto riguarda gli effetti della deroga sulla concorrenza e sugli scambi, le autorità norvegesi sostengono che essa crea condizioni di parità per tutte le imprese che operano nelle zone svantaggiate in quanto si applica indistintamente a qualsiasi impresa con sede nel SEE. Di conseguenza garantisce che siano evitati gli effetti negativi indebiti sulla concorrenza. L’Autorità ritiene che si tratti di un elemento positivo alla luce dei punti 3 e 53 degli orientamenti. Tuttavia, le imprese registrate nella zona ammissibile possono, in generale, incontrare maggiori difficoltà permanenti rispetto a quelle che si limitano ad inviare i loro dipendenti a lavorare nella zona su base non permanente. Le autorità norvegesi sostengono che le imprese registrate al di fuori della zona ammissibile possono avere uno svantaggio competitivo rispetto alle imprese locali a causa, tra l’altro, dei costi di trasporto e di alloggio del personale. Le autorità norvegesi non hanno presentato nessun elemento o argomentazione a sostegno di questa ipotesi. L’Autorità invita le autorità norvegesi a chiarire ulteriormente il motivo per cui si presume che la deroga non abbia indebiti effetti negativi sulla concorrenza e a presentare ulteriori informazioni per dimostrarlo.

Le autorità norvegesi hanno sottolineato che è evidente che la deroga avrà un effetto di incentivazione. Non si può semplicemente presumere l’effetto di incentivazione di un aiuto. Anche se non è necessario fornire singole prove per dimostrare che l’aiuto nell’ambito di un regime fornisce a ciascun beneficiario l’incentivo, su base individuale, di svolgere un’attività che altrimenti non avrebbe svolto, l’effetto di incentivazione deve, almeno, essere basato su una solida teoria economica. Non è sufficiente fare unicamente riferimento ad una presunta ovvietà. Se è vero che la deroga per le imprese registrate al di fuori delle zone ammissibili riduce i costi del lavoro per i servizi ambulanti nelle zone ammissibili, le autorità norvegesi non hanno fornito prove o argomentazioni per dimostrare che, in assenza di aiuto, il livello di attività economica nella zona risulterebbe probabilmente notevolmente ridotto a causa dei problemi che l’aiuto è destinato a risolvere (13).

Le autorità norvegesi hanno spiegato che le imprese che effettuano servizi ambulanti possono in una certa misura registrare sottounità nella zona ammissibile. Inoltre, esse sono tenute a farlo quando almeno un dipendente lavora per l’unità madre in una zona distinta e l’impresa può essere visitata in questo luogo.

Le autorità norvegesi sostengono che senza la deroga per i servizi ambulanti nell’area ammissibile, vi sarebbe una disparità di trattamento ingiustificata a seconda del fatto che l’impresa fornitrice di servizi abbia stabilito una sottounità nell’area ammissibile.

Inoltre, non è chiaro per l’Autorità cosa comporti l’affermazione secondo cui almeno un dipendente lavora per l’unità madre in una zona distinta e l’impresa può essere visitata in questo luogo. L ‘Autorità invita pertanto le autorità norvegesi a chiarire questo punto.

In secondo luogo, il principio della parità di trattamento è un principio generale del diritto del SEE. Tuttavia, esso non può di per sé costituire una base per giustificare la deroga, che deve essere compatibile con il funzionamento dell’accordo SEE.

In conclusione, come sopra descritto, a causa della mancanza di informazioni pertinenti, l’Autorità nutre dubbi in merito alla compatibilità del regime di deroga con il funzionamento dell’accordo SEE.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 489/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening a formal investigation into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020

(Norway)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014.

| (2) | By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision.

| (3) | By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The scheme as such is not the subject of the formal investigation

| (4) | By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled. |
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(4)

By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled.

3.   The scheme

3.1   
  Objective

| (5) | The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below. |
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(5)

The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below.

3.2   
  National legal basis

| (6) | The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme. |
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(6)

The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme.

| (7) | For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL. |
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(7)

For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

3.3   
  Rules on registration

| (8) | As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered. |
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(8)

As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered.

| (9) | Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations. |
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(9)

Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations.

| (10) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area. |
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(10)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area.

3.4   
  Ambulant services – the measure under scrutiny

| (11) | By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. |
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(11)

By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014.

| (12) | The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month. |
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(12)

The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month.

| (13) | This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo. |
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(13)

This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo.

4.   The judgment of the EFTA Court

| (14) | The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21). |
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(14)

The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21).

5.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (15) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22). |
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(15)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22).

| (16) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates. |
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(16)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates.

| (17) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme. |
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(17)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme.

| (18) | Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
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(18)

Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (19) | The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. |
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(19)

The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel.

| (20) | In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services. |
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(20)

In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services.

| (21) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. |
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(21)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (22) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
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(22)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (23) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition. |
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(23)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition.

| (24) | In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition. |
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(24)

In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (25) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
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(25)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful. |
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(26)

The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (27) | The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG. |
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(27)

The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG.

| (28) | The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas. |
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(28)

The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas.

| (29) | Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25). |
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(29)

Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25).

| (30) | There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions? |
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(30)

There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions?

| (31) | It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live. |
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(31)

It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live.

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule. |
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(32)

The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule.

| (33) | Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule. |
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(33)

Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule.

| (34) | In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up. |
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(34)

In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up.

| (35) | The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28). |
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(35)

The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28).

| (36) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there.

| (37) | The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (38) | Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this.

| (39) | Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (40) | In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (41) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (43) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules.

| (44) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 10 January 2016.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 10 January 2016, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, on 9 December 2015

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  Documenti n. 702438-702440, 702442 e 702443.

1

(2)  Cfr. il paragrafo 2 della decisione n. 225/14/COL, disponibile online all’indirizzo: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

2

(3)  Non ancora pubblicata.

3

(4)  Documento n. 776348.

4

(5)  Documenti n. 779603 e n. 779604.

5

(6)  Legge sul coordinamento del registro delle entità giuridiche (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

6

(7)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

7

(8)  GU L 166 del 5.6.2014, pag. 44 e supplemento SEE n. 33 del 5.6.2014, pag. 1.

8

(9)  Punto 6 degli orientamenti.

9

(10)  Punto 16 degli orientamenti.

10

(11)  Punto 43 degli orientamenti.

11

(12)  Sulla base del bilancio notificato per il 2013, cfr. il punto 49 della decisione n. 225/14/COL dell’Autorità.

12

(13)  Punto 71 degli orientamenti.

13

(14)  Documents No 702438-702440, 702442 and 702443.

14

(15)  See paragraph 2 of Decision No 225/14/COL, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

15

(16)  Not yet reported.

16

(17)  Document No 776348.

17

(18)  Documents No 779603 and 779604.

18

(19)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

19

(20)  The Act on the Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

20

(21)  See Order of the EFTA Court of 23.11.2015 in Case E-23/14 INT Kimek Offshore AS v ESA (not yet reported).

21

Kimek Offshore AS

ESA

(22)  OJ L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 and EEA Supplement No 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

22

(23)  The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014 (OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61) at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

23

(24)  Para. 6 of the RAG.

24

(25)  Para. 16 of the RAG.

25

(26)  Para. 43 of the RAG.

26

(27)  Based on the notified 2013 budget, see para. 49 of the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

27

(28)  Para. 71 of the RAG.

28

---

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/29

---

Invito a presentare osservazioni ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia, in materia di aiuti di Stato, con riferimento ad un potenziale aiuto a Hurtigruten ASA nel quadro dell’accordo per il servizio marittimo di Hurtigruten 2012-2019

(2016/C 236/11)

Con decisione n. 490/15/COL del 9 dicembre 2015, riprodotta nella lingua facente fede nelle pagine che seguono la presente sintesi, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA ha avviato un procedimento ai sensi dell’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, della parte I del protocollo 3 dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia. Le autorità norvegesi sono state informate mediante invio di una copia della suddetta decisione.

Con la presente comunicazione, l’Autorità di vigilanza EFTA invita gli Stati EFTA, gli Stati membri dell’UE e le parti interessate a inviare eventuali osservazioni sulla misura in oggetto, entro un mese dalla data di pubblicazione, al seguente indirizzo:

| Autorità di vigilanza EFTA |
| --- |
| Registro |
| Rue Belliard, 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Autorità di vigilanza EFTA

Registro

Rue Belliard, 35/Belliardstraat 35

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Le osservazioni saranno comunicate alle autorità norvegesi. Su richiesta scritta e motivata degli autori delle osservazioni, la loro identità non sarà rivelata.

SINTESI

Contesto

La società Hurtigruten ASA («Hurtigruten») opera servizi di trasporto combinato di persone e merci lungo la costa norvegese tra Bergen e Kirkenes.

A seguito di una procedura di gara, il 13 aprile 2011 è stato firmato con Hurtigruten un accordo per la fornitura di servizi («l’accordo») riguardante la tratta costiera Bergen-Kirkenes per il periodo dal 1o gennaio 2012 al 31 dicembre 2019. Nell’ambito di tale accordo, Hurtigruten si impegna ad effettuare collegamenti giornalieri tutto l’anno con scali in 32 porti intermedi tra Bergen e Kirkenes. Hurtigruten garantisce inoltre il trasporto di merci sulle rotte Tromsø–Kirkenes e Kirkenes–Tromsø. Come previsto nel contratto, i servizi devono rispettare determinati requisiti in termini di navi e di capacità. Le navi utilizzate sulla linea costiera devono avere almeno una capacità passeggeri pari a 320, una capacità di posti letto in cabina pari a 120 passeggeri e una capacità di trasporto delle merci in stiva pari a 150 pallet EUR con una normale altezza di carico. Le navi devono inoltre soddisfare i requisiti giuridici e tecnici indicati nella sezione 4.4 del capitolato d’oneri.

Per i servizi coperti dall’accordo, le autorità norvegesi versano una compensazione totale di 5 120 milioni di NOK per gli otto anni di durata dell’accordo.

Valutazione delle compensazioni concesse sotto il profilo degli aiuti di Stato

L’unico criterio della nozione di aiuto di Stato che è di applicazione consiste nell’appurare se il contratto abbia conferito un indebito vantaggio economico selettivo a Hurtigruten.

Vantaggio economico selettivo a favore di Hurtigruten

L’Autorità ha valutato le quattro condizioni della sentenza Altmark (1) e ha concluso che, in questa fase, nessuna di esse sembra essere soddisfatta e che quindi a Hurtigruten è stato conferito un vantaggio selettivo ai sensi dell’articolo 61, paragrafo 1, dell’accordo SEE.

Per quanto riguarda la prima condizione relativa alla definizione chiara di un obbligo di servizio pubblico, l’Autorità dubita che il requisito della capacità di riserva di cui alla sezione 4-2 dell’accordo possa essere classificato dalla Norvegia come un servizio di interesse economico generale (SIEG) e invita le autorità norvegesi a fornire una giustificazione oggettiva per quanto riguarda la necessità di un obbligo di servizio pubblico (OSP), tenuto conto delle fluttuazioni stagionali del trasporto commerciale di passeggeri.

Per quanto riguarda la seconda condizione e il fatto che i parametri sulla base dei quali viene calcolata la compensazione debbano essere previamente definiti in modo obiettivo e trasparente, l’Autorità dubita in questa fase che il requisito della capacità di riserva sia collegato al numero effettivo di passeggeri trasportati nel quadro dell’OSP. Non vi è stata, ad esempio, una metodologia obiettiva e trasparente per calcolare in anticipo il costo per passeggero/chilometro. Hurtigruten ha stilato un bilancio separato comprendente tutti i costi e i ricavi imputabili alle rotte assoggettate a OSP. Tuttavia questa contabilità separata non mira a stabilire in anticipo i parametri della compensazione, che sono direttamente connessi alle perdite e ai costi effettivi (costi in termini di capacità e di passeggeri) sostenuti da Hurtigruten.

Per quanto riguarda la terza condizione, l’Autorità esprime dubbi sul fatto che le autorità norvegesi abbiano assicurato che la compensazione concessa non ecceda quanto necessario per coprire la totalità o una parte dei costi originati dall’assolvimento dell’OSP, tenendo conto dei relativi introiti e di un margine di utile ragionevole per l’adempimento di detti obblighi.

In questa fase l’Autorità non può escludere che Hurtigruten abbia ricevuto una sovracompensazione per la fornitura del servizio pubblico. Per giungere a tale conclusione preliminare, l’Autorità ha valutato i seguenti elementi:

| i) | Hurtigruten non dispone di una capacità di riserva per i passeggeri trasportati in virtù dell’obbligo di servizio pubblico, ma al contrario vende la capacità ai passeggeri di navi da crociera, mantenendo la compensazione del servizio pubblico allo stesso livello; |
| --- | --- |

i)

Hurtigruten non dispone di una capacità di riserva per i passeggeri trasportati in virtù dell’obbligo di servizio pubblico, ma al contrario vende la capacità ai passeggeri di navi da crociera, mantenendo la compensazione del servizio pubblico allo stesso livello;

| ii) | la compensazione per la fornitura del servizio pubblico è notevolmente aumentata rispetto al precedente periodo contrattuale; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

la compensazione per la fornitura del servizio pubblico è notevolmente aumentata rispetto al precedente periodo contrattuale;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continua a ricevere una compensazione per servizi che non ha prestato; |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continua a ricevere una compensazione per servizi che non ha prestato;

| iv) | Hurtigruten cerca inoltre di ottenere tasse portuali meno onerose, mantenendo la compensazione del servizio pubblico allo stesso livello. |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten cerca inoltre di ottenere tasse portuali meno onerose, mantenendo la compensazione del servizio pubblico allo stesso livello.

Infine, per quanto riguarda la quarta condizione, che richiede l’avvio di una procedura di gara d’appalto o la realizzazione di un’analisi comparativa con un operatore efficiente, l’Autorità, in riferimento alla procedura di gara svolta e risultante in un’unica offerta (quella di Hurtigruten), dubita in questa fase che una siffatta procedura di gara possa essere ritenuta sufficiente per garantire il minor costo per la collettività. Ciò è particolarmente vero in quanto Hurtigruten disponeva di un notevole vantaggio competitivo, che ha rafforzato la sua posizione nella procedura di gara, in quanto aveva già in suo possesso navi adatte ai requisiti del capitolato d’oneri.

Inoltre, secondo il capitolato d’oneri, l’incarico di svolgere l’OSP è stato pubblicato sotto tre diverse forme, il che indicherebbe l’esistenza di ulteriori informazioni e/o di criteri di ponderazione. Poiché tali informazioni non erano incluse nei documenti di gara, l’Autorità dubita che l’offerta, così come concepita, abbia fornito ad altri potenziali offerenti, a parte Hurtigruten, l’incentivo di presentare offerte in conformità con i requisiti delle tre diverse pubblicazioni e per una pubblicazione diversa da quella effettivamente scelta.

Le autorità norvegesi non hanno presentato nessuna informazione sull’esercizio di analisi comparativa con un operatore efficiente.

Valutazione della compatibilità

La compatibilità della compensazione degli obblighi di servizio pubblico per il trasporto marittimo è valutata sulla base dell’articolo 59, paragrafo 2, dell’accordo SEE in combinato disposto con la disciplina relativa agli aiuti di Stato concessi sotto forma di compensazione degli obblighi di servizio pubblico («la disciplina») (2).

I principi esposti nella disciplina si applicano alle compensazioni degli obblighi di servizio pubblico soltanto nella misura in cui queste costituiscono aiuti di Stato che non rientrano nel campo di applicazione della decisione 2012/21/UE della Commissione riguardante l’applicazione delle disposizioni dell’articolo 106, paragrafo 2, del trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea agli aiuti di Stato sotto forma di compensazione degli obblighi di servizio pubblico, concessi a determinate imprese incaricate della gestione di servizi di interesse economico generale (decisione SIEG) (3).

L’Autorità non ha ricevuto nessuna informazione dalle autorità norvegesi per quanto concerne considerazioni relative alla compatibilità e in questa fase nutre dubbi in merito al fatto che l’accordo sia compatibile con il funzionamento dell’accordo SEE.

Conclusione

Alla luce delle considerazioni di cui sopra, l’Autorità ha deciso di avviare il procedimento di indagine formale di cui all’articolo 1, paragrafo 2, parte I, protocollo 3, dell’accordo tra gli Stati EFTA sull’istituzione di un’Autorità di vigilanza e di una Corte di giustizia. Le parti interessate sono invitate a presentare le loro osservazioni entro un mese dalla pubblicazione della presente comunicazione nella Gazzetta ufficiale dell’Unione europea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 490/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening the formal investigation procedure on the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019

(Norway)

[NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION]

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 59(2) and 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019.

| (2) | A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text.

| (3) | By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015.

2.   Background – the Hurtigruten Agreement

| (4) | Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

  Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route

| (5) | The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid.

| (6) | The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5) |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5)

| (7) | Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications.

| (8) | The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities.

| (9) | For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport.

| (10) | For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

  Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA







  2012 | NOK 700 million |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | NOK 683 million |
| 2014 | NOK 666 million |
| 2015 | NOK 649 million |
| 2016 | NOK 631 million |
| 2017 | NOK 614 million |
| 2018 | NOK 597 million |
| 2019 | NOK 580 million |

(10)

For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA

2012

NOK 700 million

2013

NOK 683 million

2014

NOK 666 million

2015

NOK 649 million

2016

NOK 631 million

2017

NOK 614 million

2018

NOK 597 million

2019

NOK 580 million

| (11) | According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route.

3.   The complaints
   (8)

| (12) | Both complainants have requested confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Both complainants have requested confidential treatment.

| (13) | The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:






  1. | The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:

1.

The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period.

| 2. | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:






  a. | Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:

a.

Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services.

| b. | Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.
  The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.
  In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions. |
| --- | --- |

b.

Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.

The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.

In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions.

| 3. | Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level.

| 4. | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities
   (10)

| (14) | On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes.

| (15) | Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million.

| (16) | Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013).

| (17) | As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions.

| (18) | Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12).

| (19) | In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo.

| (20) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing.

| (21) | As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis.

| (22) | The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices.

| (23) | It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction.

| (24) | In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service.

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand.

| (26) | For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge.

4.1   
  The BDO report

   (14)

| (27) | The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services).

| (28) | In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers.

| (29) | [...] |
| --- | --- |

(29)

[...]

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

1.1   
  The concept of state aid

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (31) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.2   
  State resources

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources.

1.3   
  Impact on trade and distortion of competition

| (33) | The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

| (34) | According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States.

| (35) | The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten.

1.4   
  Selective economic advantage on Hurtigruten

| (36) | The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (37) | It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  i. | ‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

i.

‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined;

| ii. | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...]; |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...];

| iii. | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;

| iv. | Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19) |
| --- | --- |

iv.

Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19)

1.4.1   The first Altmark condition

| (38) | The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel.

| (39) | Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20).

| (40) | In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21).

| (41) | However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23).

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service.

| (43) | Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower.

| (44) | For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation.

| (45) | The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged.

| (46) | In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA.

| (47) | The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation.

| (48) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met.

1.4.2   The second Altmark condition

| (49) | The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations.

| (50) | Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’.

| (51) | It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

  Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service







  A: | Total revenues distance passengers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| B: | Passengers cost distance passengers |
| C: | Net passenger revenues (A+B) |
| D: | Revenues from on board sales |
| E: | Net revenues from goods and cars |
| F: | Other revenues |
| G: | Total own revenues (C+D+E+F) |
| H: | Government procurement of service |
| I: | Total revenue (G+H) |
| J: | Safety crew |
| K: | Oil and fuel |
| L: | Repairs and maintenance |
| M: | Port costs |
| N: | Insurance costs |
| O: | Depreciation own vessels/bareboat |
| P: | Net financial costs |
| Q: | Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P) |
| R: | Cost of goods sold |
| S: | Crew not included in the safety crew |
| T: | Marketing costs and sales provision |
| U: | Administration costs |
| V: | Other costs |
| W: | Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V) |
| X: | Total costs public service (Q+W) |
| Y: | Net result before taxes (I-X) |

(51)

It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service

A:

Total revenues distance passengers

B:

Passengers cost distance passengers

C:

Net passenger revenues (A+B)

D:

Revenues from on board sales

E:

Net revenues from goods and cars

F:

Other revenues

G:

Total own revenues (C+D+E+F)

H:

Government procurement of service

I:

Total revenue (G+H)

J:

Safety crew

K:

Oil and fuel

L:

Repairs and maintenance

M:

Port costs

N:

Insurance costs

O:

Depreciation own vessels/bareboat

P:

Net financial costs

Q:

Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P)

R:

Cost of goods sold

S:

Crew not included in the safety crew

T:

Marketing costs and sales provision

U:

Administration costs

V:

Other costs

W:

Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V)

X:

Total costs public service (Q+W)

Y:

Net result before taxes (I-X)

| (52) | In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers.

| (54) | At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre.

| (55) | Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs).

| (56) | In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26).

| (57) | In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27).

| (58) | In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn).

| (59) | The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service.

| (60) | Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition.

| (61) | As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled.

1.4.3   The third Altmark condition

| (62) | When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (63) | In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28).

| (64) | Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:






  i) | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:

i)

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| ii) | The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly

| iv) | Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| (65) | As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation.

| (66) | The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year.

| (67) | The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers.

| (68) | Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120.

| (69) | In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded.

| (70) | Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation.

| (71) | On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions.

| (72) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted.

| (73) | Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided.

| (75) | Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period.

| (76) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled.

1.4.4   The fourth Altmark condition

| (77) | Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013).

| (78) | Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below.

| (79) | Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications.

| (80) | Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:








  i. | : | Alternative 1 | : | Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ii. | : | Alternative 2 | : | Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and |
| iii. | : | Alternative 3 | : | Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports. |

(80)

Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:

i.

:

Alternative 1

:

Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports;

ii.

:

Alternative 2

:

Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and

iii.

:

Alternative 3

:

Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports.

| (81) | However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1).

| (82) | The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped.

| (83) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met.

1.4.5   Conclusion on the Altmark conditions

| (84) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations.

2.   Conclusion on the presence of aid

| (85) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (86) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (87) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1   
  The legal framework

| (88) | The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33).

| (89) | The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34).

| (90) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility.

4.2   
  Applicability of Decision 2012/21/EU

| (91) | The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

| (92) | There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:







  ‘(d) | compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:

‘(d)

compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’;

| (93) | The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers.

| (94) | In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit.

| (95) | The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with.

4.3   
  Applicability of the Framework

| (96) | On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’.

| (97) | Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36) |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36)

| (98) | On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service.

| (99) | The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:
  a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;
  b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;
  c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;
  d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;
  e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;
  f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;
  g.   Paragraph 60: transparency. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:

a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;

b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;

c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;

d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;

e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;

f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;

g.   Paragraph 60: transparency.

| (100) | The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (101) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (102) | The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (103) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (104) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules.

| (105) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten.

| (106) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. They are further requested to provide, also within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 4

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, on 9 December 2015.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Svedman

President

Helga Jónsdóttir

College Member

---

(1)  Sentenza Altmark Trans GmbH e Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg/Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, punti 87-93.

1

Altmark Trans GmbH e Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg/Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(2)  Disponibile al seguente indirizzo http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf

2

(3)  GU L 7 dell’11.1.2012, pag. 3, integrata al punto 1 h dell’allegato XV dell’accordo SEE.

3

(4)  OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1. See also Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, upholding the Authority's Decision.

4

Hurtigruten

(5)  See www.doffin.no.

5

(6)  If Statistics Norway's cost index is unavailable, Statistics Norway's Consumer Price Index would be used.

6

(7)  As mentioned in the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL ‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’, section 1.2.

7

‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’,

(8)  Doc Nos 748323 and 715314.

8

(9)  The complainants point to the fact that in the call for tender for the 2005-2012 contract period force majeure as a result of extreme weather conditions was defined as wind speeds over 25 m/s (full storm). However, in the current HA, ‘extreme weather conditions’ are defined as ‘conditions where ocean and/or wind conditions are such that the ship's captain judges it to be unsafe to continue the sailing and/or arrive at a specific port’. This, according to the complainants, has resulted in the majority of the cancellations during the period 2012-2013 in select ports to have occurred at wind conditions below 15 m/s.

9

force majeure

(10)  Doc Nos 723002 and 742652.

10

(11)  The Norwegian authorities submit that according to Hurtigruten's reports, ships were out of production for 171 operating days in 2012 and 186.7 operating days in 2013 due to maintenance and unforeseen operational disturbances, for 5 operating days in 2012 and 12.8 operating days in 2013 due to the ships being used for cultural or similar activities, and finally for 87 operating days in 2012 and 99.8 operating days in 2013 due to extraordinary weather conditions.

11

(12)  On 12 December 2014, Hurtigruten paid back to the Norwegian authorities the amount of NOK [24 – 32] million due to cancellations in 2012 and 2013.

12

(13)  The previous NPA of 1984 distinguished between port fees and service charges. There were several different port fees, e.g. quay fees covering quay costs, approach fees covering costs of keeping the fairway and port approach open and safe, passenger fees covering costs of special passenger facilities etc. Ports could additionally levy service charges for services they sold, which were not covered by the port fees.

13

(14)  BDO Memo, ‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’, Oslo 14 January 2015, p. 7.

14

‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’

(15)  Judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11; judgment in Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41; and judgment in Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 75.

15

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7).

16

(17)  The maritime cabotage regulation was incorporated at point 53a in Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 30, 5.2.1998, p. 42).

17

(18)  Norwegian Cruise Line, MSC Cruises, Royal Caribbean, Holland America Line, etc.

18

(19)  Paragraphs 87-93.

19

(20)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15132&1=1.

20

(21)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

21

(22)  Judgment in Alanir and others, C-205/1999, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 34.

22

Alanir and others

(23)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions updating and rectifying the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), COM(2003) 595 final, 22.12.2003, section 5.2.

23

(24)  BDO Memo, page 7.

24

(25)  Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraph 117.

25

Hurtigruten

(26)  Ibid, paragraphs 128-129.

26

(27)  Ibid, paragraph 127.

27

(28)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, judgment in Enirisorse, C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, paragraphs 37-40.

28

Enirisorse

(29)  Section 2.

29

(30)  See footnote 11.

30

(31)  Paragraph 68, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

31

(32)  For background information on the Hurtigruten Agreement, see Decision No 205/11/COL on the Supplementary Agreement on the Hurtigruten service, section 2, OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1.

32

(33)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

33

(34)  OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporated at point 1h of Annex XV of the EEA Agreement.

34

(35)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

35

Italy

Commission

(36)  See also paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Framework for alternative calculation methods.

36

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| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/45 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/45

---

Avviso della Norvegia in merito alla direttiva 94/22/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio relativa alle condizioni di rilascio e di esercizio delle autorizzazioni alla prospezione, ricerca e coltivazione di idrocarburi

Avviso dell’invito a presentare domande di autorizzazione alla produzione di petrolio sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese – Aggiudicazioni 2016 nelle aree prestabilite

(2016/C 236/12)

Il ministero norvegese del Petrolio e dell’energia bandisce un invito a presentare domande di autorizzazione alla produzione di petrolio, a norma dell’articolo 3, paragrafo 2, lettera a), della direttiva 94/22/CE del Parlamento europeo e del Consiglio, del 30 maggio 1994, relativa alle condizioni di rilascio e di esercizio delle autorizzazioni alla prospezione, ricerca e coltivazione di idrocarburi (1).

Le autorizzazioni alla produzione saranno concesse a società per azioni registrate in Norvegia o in un altro Stato parte contraente dell’accordo sullo Spazio economico europeo (accordo SEE) o a persone fisiche domiciliate in uno Stato parte contraente dell’accordo SEE.

Possono ottenere autorizzazioni alla produzione le società che non sono licenziatarie sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese, se sono state preselezionate come licenziatarie sulla suddetta piattaforma.

Le società individuali e quelle che presentano domanda come componenti di un gruppo saranno trattate dal ministero alle stesse condizioni. Ai fini della domanda di autorizzazione alla produzione, saranno equiparati i richiedenti che presentano domande individuali e quelli che presentano domande congiunte nell’ambito di un gruppo. Sulla base delle domande presentate da gruppi o di quelle individuali, il ministero può stabilire la composizione dei gruppi aggiudicatari a cui verrà concessa un’autorizzazione alla produzione, anche rimuovendo da un gruppo alcuni richiedenti che ne fanno parte e aggiungendo richiedenti individuali, e designare l’operatore per tali gruppi.

Per aggiudicarsi una partecipazione in un’autorizzazione alla produzione, il licenziatario deve sottoscrivere un accordo sulle attività petrolifere, comprendente un accordo operativo comune e un accordo contabile. Se l’autorizzazione alla produzione è suddivisa in modo stratigrafico, i licenziatari delle due autorizzazioni suddivise in modo stratigrafico dovranno anche sottoscrivere uno specifico accordo operativo comune che disciplini i reciproci rapporti sotto questo aspetto.

Una volta firmati i suddetti accordi, i licenziatari costituiranno un’impresa comune nella quale l’entità della loro partecipazione sarà sempre identica alla partecipazione che detengono nell’autorizzazione alla produzione.

I documenti di autorizzazione saranno basati prevalentemente sui documenti pertinenti delle aggiudicazioni 2015 nelle aree prestabilite. L’obiettivo è quello di rendere noti all’industria gli aspetti fondamentali di eventuali adeguamenti del quadro, prima della presentazione della domanda.

Criteri per il rilascio di un’autorizzazione alla produzione

Nell’intento di promuovere una buona gestione delle risorse e una rapida ed efficiente ricerca e produzione di petrolio sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese, ivi compresa la composizione dei gruppi a tal fine, la concessione di partecipazioni nelle autorizzazioni alla produzione e la nomina dell’operatore sono subordinate al rispetto dei seguenti criteri:

| a) | la conoscenza da parte del richiedente delle caratteristiche geologiche della zona geografica in questione e le modalità con cui il licenziatario intende effettuare una ricerca efficace di petrolio; |
| --- | --- |

a)

la conoscenza da parte del richiedente delle caratteristiche geologiche della zona geografica in questione e le modalità con cui il licenziatario intende effettuare una ricerca efficace di petrolio;

| b) | la competenza tecnica del richiedente nel settore e le modalità in cui tale competenza può attivamente contribuire a una ricerca economicamente efficiente e, se del caso, alla produzione di petrolio nella zona geografica in questione; |
| --- | --- |

b)

la competenza tecnica del richiedente nel settore e le modalità in cui tale competenza può attivamente contribuire a una ricerca economicamente efficiente e, se del caso, alla produzione di petrolio nella zona geografica in questione;

| c) | l’esperienza del richiedente sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese o una pertinente esperienza equivalente in altre zone; |
| --- | --- |

c)

l’esperienza del richiedente sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese o una pertinente esperienza equivalente in altre zone;

| d) | capacità finanziaria sufficiente del richiedente per condurre attività di ricerca e, se del caso, produrre petrolio nella zona geografica in questione; |
| --- | --- |

d)

capacità finanziaria sufficiente del richiedente per condurre attività di ricerca e, se del caso, produrre petrolio nella zona geografica in questione;

| e) | se il richiedente è o è stato licenziatario di un’autorizzazione alla produzione, il ministero può tener conto di qualsiasi forma di inefficienza o di mancanza di responsabilità dimostrata dal richiedente in quanto licenziatario; |
| --- | --- |

e)

se il richiedente è o è stato licenziatario di un’autorizzazione alla produzione, il ministero può tener conto di qualsiasi forma di inefficienza o di mancanza di responsabilità dimostrata dal richiedente in quanto licenziatario;

| f) | le autorizzazioni alla produzione saranno concesse principalmente a imprese comuni nelle quali almeno un licenziatario abbia svolto perlomeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o abbia un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma; |
| --- | --- |

f)

le autorizzazioni alla produzione saranno concesse principalmente a imprese comuni nelle quali almeno un licenziatario abbia svolto perlomeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o abbia un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma;

| g) | le autorizzazioni alla produzione saranno concesse principalmente a due o più licenziatari, dei quali almeno uno abbia l’esperienza di cui alla lettera f); |
| --- | --- |

g)

le autorizzazioni alla produzione saranno concesse principalmente a due o più licenziatari, dei quali almeno uno abbia l’esperienza di cui alla lettera f);

| h) | l’operatore designato per le autorizzazioni alla produzione nel Mare di Barents deve aver svolto almeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o avere un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma; |
| --- | --- |

h)

l’operatore designato per le autorizzazioni alla produzione nel Mare di Barents deve aver svolto almeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o avere un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma;

| i) | per le autorizzazioni alla produzione in acque profonde, l’operatore designato e almeno un altro licenziatario devono aver svolto perlomeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o devono avere un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma. Per l’autorizzazione alla produzione, almeno un licenziatario deve aver svolto un’attività di perforazione in acque profonde come operatore; |
| --- | --- |

i)

per le autorizzazioni alla produzione in acque profonde, l’operatore designato e almeno un altro licenziatario devono aver svolto perlomeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o devono avere un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma. Per l’autorizzazione alla produzione, almeno un licenziatario deve aver svolto un’attività di perforazione in acque profonde come operatore;

| j) | per le autorizzazioni alla produzione che comportino perforazioni esplorative ad alta pressione e/o a temperatura elevata (HPHT), l’operatore designato e almeno un altro licenziatario devono aver svolto perlomeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o devono avere un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma. Per l’autorizzazione alla produzione, un licenziatario deve aver svolto un’attività di perforazione ad alta pressione e/o a temperatura elevata (HPHT) come operatore. |
| --- | --- |

j)

per le autorizzazioni alla produzione che comportino perforazioni esplorative ad alta pressione e/o a temperatura elevata (HPHT), l’operatore designato e almeno un altro licenziatario devono aver svolto perlomeno un’attività di perforazione sulla piattaforma continentale norvegese come operatore o devono avere un’equivalente esperienza operativa nel settore al di fuori della suddetta piattaforma. Per l’autorizzazione alla produzione, un licenziatario deve aver svolto un’attività di perforazione ad alta pressione e/o a temperatura elevata (HPHT) come operatore.

Blocchi disponibili per le domande di autorizzazione

Si possono richiedere partecipazioni nelle autorizzazioni alla produzione per i blocchi non oggetto di autorizzazione all’interno della zona prestabilita, conformemente alle mappe pubblicate dalla Direzione norvegese per i prodotti petroliferi (NPD). È inoltre possibile richiedere una superficie abbandonata all’interno della zona prestabilita in seguito all’avviso, in linea con le mappe aggiornate nell’ambito delle Factmaps interattive della Direzione norvegese per i prodotti petroliferi, reperibili sulla pagina web della NPD.

Ogni autorizzazione alla produzione può comprendere uno o più blocchi o parti di blocchi. I richiedenti sono pregati di limitare la descrizione della domanda ad aree in cui hanno già effettuato l’indagine prospettica.

Per il testo integrale dell’avviso e le mappe dettagliate delle aree disponibili, consultare il sito della Direzione norvegese per i prodotti petroliferi www.npd.no/apa2016

Le domande di autorizzazione alla produzione di petrolio vanno inviate a:

| Ministero del Petrolio e dell’energia |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 8148 Dep. |
| N-0033 Oslo |
| NORVEGIA |

Ministero del Petrolio e dell’energia

P.O. Box 8148 Dep.

N-0033 Oslo

NORVEGIA

È necessario inviare due copie a:

| Direzione norvegese per i prodotti petroliferi |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 600 |
| N-4003 Stavanger |
| NORVEGIA |

Direzione norvegese per i prodotti petroliferi

P.O. Box 600

N-4003 Stavanger

NORVEGIA

Termine ultimo: 6 settembre 2016, ore 12:00.

Le autorizzazioni alla produzione petrolifera nel quadro delle aggiudicazioni 2016 nelle aree prestabilite della piattaforma continentale norvegese saranno rilasciate prevedibilmente nel primo trimestre del 2017.

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(1)  GU L 164 del 30.6.1994, pag. 3.

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V Avvisi

PROCEDIMENTI AMMINISTRATIVI

Commissione europea

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/47 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/47

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Invito a presentare proposte nell’ambito del programma di lavoro pluriennale per la concessione di sovvenzioni nel settore delle infrastrutture energetiche transeuropee nel quadro del meccanismo per collegare l’Europa per il periodo 2014-2020

[Decisione C(2016) 1587 della Commissione]

(2016/C 236/13)

La Commissione europea, direzione generale dell’Energia, pubblica un invito a presentare proposte al fine di concedere sovvenzioni in conformità alle priorità e agli obiettivi definiti nel programma di lavoro pluriennale nel settore delle infrastrutture energetiche transeuropee nell’ambito del meccanismo per collegare l’Europa per il periodo 2014-2020.

Si sollecitano proposte per il seguente invito:

CEF-Energy-2016-2

L’importo indicativo disponibile per le proposte selezionate nell’ambito del presente invito è di 600 milioni di EUR.

Il termine ultimo per l’inoltro delle proposte è l’8 novembre 2016.

Il testo completo dell’invito a presentare proposte è disponibile all’indirizzo:

https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/https%3A//ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/calls/second-2016-cef-energy-call-proposals-2016-2

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PROCEDIMENTI RELATIVI ALL'ATTUAZIONE DELLA POLITICA DELLA CONCORRENZA

Commissione europea

| 30.6.2016 | IT | Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea | C 236/48 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

IT

Gazzetta ufficiale dell'Unione europea

C 236/48

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Notifica preventiva di concentrazione

(Caso M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International)

Caso ammissibile alla procedura semplificata

(Testo rilevante ai fini del SEE)

(2016/C 236/14)

| 1. | In data 21 giugno 2016 è pervenuta alla Commissione la notifica di un progetto di concentrazione in conformità dell’articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Con tale operazione BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV («BNPPF PE», Belgio), Sofindev IV NV («Sofindev», Belgio) e DHAM NV («Korys/Colruyt Group», Belgio) acquisiscono, ai sensi dell’articolo 3, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento sulle concentrazioni, il controllo comune dell’insieme dell’impresa Novy International NV («Novy», Belgio) mediante l’acquisto di quote. |
| --- | --- |

1.

In data 21 giugno 2016 è pervenuta alla Commissione la notifica di un progetto di concentrazione in conformità dell’articolo 4 del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 del Consiglio (1). Con tale operazione BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV («BNPPF PE», Belgio), Sofindev IV NV («Sofindev», Belgio) e DHAM NV («Korys/Colruyt Group», Belgio) acquisiscono, ai sensi dell’articolo 3, paragrafo 1, lettera b), del regolamento sulle concentrazioni, il controllo comune dell’insieme dell’impresa Novy International NV («Novy», Belgio) mediante l’acquisto di quote.

| 2. | Le attività svolte dalle imprese interessate sono le seguenti:
  —   BNPPF PE: private equity e finanziamento mezzanino. Le società nel suo portafoglio operano in settori quali la fornitura e la produzione di metallo e plastica, i fondi di capitale di avviamento per le università, i prodotti per panetteria, la fornitura di servizi industriali e le proprietà immobiliari,
  —   Sofindev: investimenti di private equity in piccole e medie imprese belghe. Le società nel suo portafoglio operano nella distribuzione di materiali per coperture e facciate e nello sviluppo di soluzioni software basate sulla localizzazione,
  —   Korys/Colruyt Group: mercati al dettaglio, all’ingrosso e della ristorazione. Ha inoltre attività nel settore delle soluzioni software, dei progetti delle energie sostenibili/rinnovabili e nel mercato medico/delle scienze della vita,
  —   Novy: progettazione, produzione e commercializzazione di apparecchi da cucina di alta gamma, in particolare cappe aspiranti. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Le attività svolte dalle imprese interessate sono le seguenti:

—   BNPPF PE: private equity e finanziamento mezzanino. Le società nel suo portafoglio operano in settori quali la fornitura e la produzione di metallo e plastica, i fondi di capitale di avviamento per le università, i prodotti per panetteria, la fornitura di servizi industriali e le proprietà immobiliari,

—   Sofindev: investimenti di private equity in piccole e medie imprese belghe. Le società nel suo portafoglio operano nella distribuzione di materiali per coperture e facciate e nello sviluppo di soluzioni software basate sulla localizzazione,

—   Korys/Colruyt Group: mercati al dettaglio, all’ingrosso e della ristorazione. Ha inoltre attività nel settore delle soluzioni software, dei progetti delle energie sostenibili/rinnovabili e nel mercato medico/delle scienze della vita,

—   Novy: progettazione, produzione e commercializzazione di apparecchi da cucina di alta gamma, in particolare cappe aspiranti.

| 3. | A seguito di un esame preliminare la Commissione ritiene che la concentrazione notificata possa rientrare nel campo d’applicazione del regolamento sulle concentrazioni. Tuttavia si riserva la decisione definitiva al riguardo. Si rileva che, ai sensi della comunicazione della Commissione concernente una procedura semplificata per l’esame di determinate concentrazioni a norma del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 (2) del Consiglio, il presente caso potrebbe soddisfare le condizioni per l’applicazione della procedura di cui alla comunicazione stessa. |
| --- | --- |

3.

A seguito di un esame preliminare la Commissione ritiene che la concentrazione notificata possa rientrare nel campo d’applicazione del regolamento sulle concentrazioni. Tuttavia si riserva la decisione definitiva al riguardo. Si rileva che, ai sensi della comunicazione della Commissione concernente una procedura semplificata per l’esame di determinate concentrazioni a norma del regolamento (CE) n. 139/2004 (2) del Consiglio, il presente caso potrebbe soddisfare le condizioni per l’applicazione della procedura di cui alla comunicazione stessa.

| 4. | La Commissione invita i terzi interessati a presentare eventuali osservazioni sulla concentrazione proposta.
  Le osservazioni devono pervenire alla Commissione entro dieci giorni dalla data di pubblicazione della presente comunicazione. Le osservazioni possono essere trasmesse alla Commissione europea per fax (+32 22964301), per email all’indirizzo COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o per posta, indicando il riferimento M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, al seguente indirizzo:





  Commissione europea |
| --- | --- |
| Direzione generale Concorrenza |
| Protocollo Concentrazioni |
| 1049 Bruxelles |
| BELGIO |

4.

La Commissione invita i terzi interessati a presentare eventuali osservazioni sulla concentrazione proposta.

Le osservazioni devono pervenire alla Commissione entro dieci giorni dalla data di pubblicazione della presente comunicazione. Le osservazioni possono essere trasmesse alla Commissione europea per fax (+32 22964301), per email all’indirizzo COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu o per posta, indicando il riferimento M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, al seguente indirizzo:

Commissione europea

Direzione generale Concorrenza

Protocollo Concentrazioni

1049 Bruxelles

BELGIO

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(1)  GU L 24 del 29.1.2004, pag. 1 («il regolamento sulle concentrazioni»).

(2)  GU C 366 del 14.12.2013, pag. 5.

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