United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 20-30348

Summary Calendar

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Cory Darnell Johnson, 

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC No. 3:19-CR-89-1

Before Davis, Stewart, and Dennis, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

The district court conducted a bench trial and convicted Cory Darnell 

Johnson of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony, see

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and sentenced him to a 63-month prison term and a 

three-year term of supervised release. Johnson appeals, arguing that the 

* Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this 

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited 

circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 5, 2021

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized as the 

result of a search that he maintains was illegal. Because we conclude that the 

district court did not err in its determination that Johnson lacks standing to 

challenge the warrantless, nonconsensual search, we affirm. See United 

States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347 (5th Cir.), opinion modified on denial of reh’g, 

622 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2010).

Suspecting a traffic violation, an on-duty Louisiana police officer 

stopped a Honda Accord driven by Benniesha Brown. Upon searching the 

vehicle, the officer found a Smith and Wesson 9 mm handgun in a backpack 

on the floorboard near Johnson, who occupied the front passenger seat and 

who admitted that the weapon was his. Johnson moved to suppress all 

evidence resulting from the search, arguing that the search was 

unconstitutional because he had not consented to it, no probable cause for 

the search existed, and the officer had no warrant authorizing the search. 

Johnson and the officer were the only witnesses at the suppression 

hearing. The officer testified that Brown was the registered owner of the 

vehicle. Johnson testified that he had a property or possessory interest in the 

vehicle because of his long-term unmarried domestic relationship with 

Brown and because he had contributed $2,000 to the purchase price and 

helped to pick out the vehicle. Noting that Johnson failed to produce 

corroborating evidence to support his testimony, the district court declined 

to credit that testimony. Additionally, the district court determined that 

Johnson failed to establish an actual, subjective expectation of privacy with 

respect to the Accord that society would recognize as objectively reasonable. 

Consequently, the court determined that Johnson had failed to establish 

standing to contest the search. Before trial, the parties stipulated to the 

existence of facts sufficient to establish a violation of § 922(g)(1), assuming 

the search of the vehicle was legal. See Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 

2194 (2019); United States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 885 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000).

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The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be free of 

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A police 

stop of a vehicle and the detention of its occupants constitutes a seizure under 

the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th 

Cir. 2004) (en banc); see Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007). But 

one aggrieved by an illegal search or seizure solely though the introduction of 

evidence obtained by an invasion of a third person’s property has not had his 

Fourth Amendment rights violated. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 

(1978). Johnson does not argue that his person was illegally seized by virtue 

of the stop alone, and he does not claim that anything was taken from his 

person. Therefore, to succeed in his challenge to the stop and search of the 

Accord, Johnson must first establish that he had either “a property or 

possessory interest in the vehicle.” United States v. Riazco, 91 F.3d 752, 754 

(5th Cir. 1996); see United States v. Kelley, 981 F.2d 1464, 1467 (5th Cir. 1993).

Johnson does not satisfy his burden. See Riazco, 91 F.3d at 754. The 

district court’s assessment of Johnson’s testimony carries great weight on 

appeal. See United States v. Santiago, 410 F.3d 193, 197 (5th Cir. 2005). 

Johnson’s conclusory assertions about social conventions and shared 

automobiles and what the Constitution protects are insufficient to reverse the 

district court’s ruling. See Garrido-Morato v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 319, 321 n.1 

(5th Cir. 2007). Because the assessment of the pertinent evidence and the 

rejection of Johnson’s conclusory assertions by the district court together 

provide a reasonable basis for upholding the suppression ruling, that ruling 

will not be disturbed. See United States v. Michelletti, 13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th 

Cir. 1994) (en banc).

AFFIRMED.

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