IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2021-NCSC-25

Nos. 248A20 and 249A20

Filed 19 March 2021

IN THE MATTER OF: G.G.M., S.M.

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from orders entered on 9 March 

2020 by Judge Christy E. Wilhelm in District Court, Cabarrus County. This matter 

was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 11 February 2021 but 

determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 

the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Seth B. Weinshenker for petitioner-appellees.

Ashley A. Crowder for respondent-appellant father.

EARLS, Justice.

¶ 1 Respondent, the father of G.G.M. (George) and S.M. (Sarah)1, appeals from the 

trial court’s orders terminating his parental rights on the grounds of neglect and 

willful abandonment. Because we hold the trial court did not err in concluding that 

grounds existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on willful 

abandonment and that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests, we affirm the trial court’s orders. 

¶ 2 Petitioners are the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather of George and 

1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the juveniles’ identities and for ease of reading. 
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Sarah. Respondent and the children’s mother met in high school. They were living 

together when George was born in May 2008 but they were never married. The 

parents’ relationship ended in February 2009, and the mother and George moved in 

with petitioners. The mother was pregnant with Sarah at the time. 

¶ 3 The parents initiated a Chapter 50 custody action, and in an order filed on 6 

April 2010, the mother was granted primary custody of George with respondent 

having scheduled visitation. In a Temporary Order Modifying Visitation filed on 20 

August 2010, the trial court modified respondent’s visitation to allow only for 

supervised visits. 

¶ 4 The mother moved out of petitioners’ home with the children in October 2010. 

However, the mother had financial issues, and in October 2011 the children went to 

live with petitioners until the mother could improve her situation. The children have 

resided with petitioners ever since. 

¶ 5 On 17 March 2011, the mother filed a petition to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights to George. In an order filed on 9 December 2011, the trial court found 

grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on neglect and his willful 

failure to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for George but did not find that 

it was in George’s best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. 

Accordingly, the trial court did not terminate his parental rights at that time. 

¶ 6 In November 2013, shots were fired into respondent’s home while he was inside 
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with his now fiancée. No one was injured, and the perpetrator was never caught. On 

the morning of 27 December 2013, respondent was shot multiple times while on his 

way to work. The perpetrators were never identified. After he was released from the 

hospital, respondent lived with his aunt in Atlanta, Georgia, for a few months before 

coming back to North Carolina, where he has remained. 

¶ 7 Respondent did not have any contact with the children after he was released 

from the hospital in late December 2013 until 30 June 2019 when he came to 

petitioners’ home with two police officers without any prior arrangement or notice 

that he was coming. The reason for his visit on 30 June 2019 was that he learned that 

the Cabarrus County Department of Human Services (“DHS”) had opened an 

investigation of the mother for alleged physical abuse of George and Sarah. George 

came outside of the home, gave his father a hug, and spoke with him briefly, but 

petitioners did not allow respondent to take either child with him. In response to 

respondent’s unannounced visit, petitioners obtained an Ex Parte Custody Order on 

3 July 2019 which maintained physical custody with petitioners and ordered 

respondent to have no contact with the children. 

¶ 8 Approximately one week after his 30 June 2019 visit, respondent again came 

to petitioners’ home with a law enforcement officer and sought to take the children. 

Petitioners showed the officer the Ex Parte Custody Order, and respondent left the 

home without seeing either child. 
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¶ 9 On 16 July 2019, petitioners filed petitions seeking to terminate respondent’s 

parental rights to George and Sarah on the grounds of neglect and willful 

abandonment. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (7) (2019). On 15 August 2019, 

respondent filed an answer opposing the termination of his parental rights. Following 

a hearing held on 10 February 2020, the trial court entered orders on 9 March 2020 

concluding that respondent’s parental rights were subject to termination on both 

grounds alleged in the petitions and that termination of respondent’s parental rights 

was in George’s and Sarah’s best interests. Accordingly, the trial court terminated 

respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appealed from both orders. On 9 June 2020, 

respondent filed a motion seeking to consolidate the appeals from the trial court’s 

orders terminating his parental rights. We allowed the motion on 10 June 2020 and 

consolidated the cases for appeal. 

I. Adjudication Stage Issues

¶ 10 Respondent argues the trial court erred by concluding that grounds existed to 

terminate his parental rights based on neglect and willful abandonment. We review 

a trial court’s adjudication that grounds exist to terminate parental rights “to 

determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and convincing 

evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 

392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). “Findings of fact not 

challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent evidence and are 
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binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (citing Koufman v. 

Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991)). “Moreover, we review only those findings necessary 

to support the trial court’s determination that grounds existed to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. at 407 (citing In re Moore, 306 

N.C. 394, 404 (1982)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewable de novo on 

appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). “[A] finding of only one ground is 

necessary to support a termination of parental rights . . . .” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 

194 (2019).

¶ 11 A trial court may terminate a parent’s parental rights when “[t]he parent has 

willfully abandoned the juvenile for at least six consecutive months immediately 

preceding the filing of the petition or motion.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 

“Abandonment implies conduct on the part of the parent which manifests a willful 

determination to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the 

child.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 251 (1997) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 

N.C. App. 273, 275 (1986)). “[I]f a parent withholds his presence, his love, his care, 

the opportunity to display filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and 

maintenance, such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the child.” 

Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501 (1962). 

¶ 12 “Whether a biological parent has a willful intent to abandon his child is a 

question of fact to be determined from the evidence.” In re B.C.B., 374 N.C. 32, 35 
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(2020) (quoting In re Adoption of Searle, 82 N.C. App. at 276). “[A]lthough the trial 

court may consider a parent’s conduct outside the six-month window in evaluating a 

parent’s credibility and intentions, the ‘determinative’ period for adjudicating willful 

abandonment is the six consecutive months preceding the filing of the petition.” In re 

N.D.A., 373 N.C. 71, 77 (2019) (quoting In re D.E.M., 257 N.C. App. 618, 619 (2018)).

¶ 13 In this case respondent’s relevant conduct is essentially the same as it relates 

to each child. The trial court’s findings of fact supporting its adjudications are 

essentially identical in each termination order, other than the juvenile’s name. To 

examine the relevant matters pertaining to the adjudication of grounds involving 

both children, the discussion below refers to the findings of fact and conclusions of 

law as enumerated in the trial court’s termination order entered in George’s case but 

is equally applicable to Sarah.

¶ 14 Respondent first challenges finding of fact 16 as not being supported by the 

evidence. In finding of fact 16, the trial court found:

Pursuant to [N.C.G.S. §] 7B-1111(a)(7), the Respondent 

has willfully abandoned the minor child . . . for a period of 

time of at least six months prior to the filing of Petitioners’ 

Petition to Terminate the Parental Rights of the 

Respondent on July 16, 2019. The Findings of Fact above 

show that Respondent has willfully neglected and refused 

to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental 

care, support and maintenance for the minor child. The 

Findings of Fact above show that Respondent has willfully 

withheld his presence, his love, his care for the minor child, 

and the opportunity to display filial affection. The Findings 

of Fact above show that Respondent has shown a purpose 
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and deliberation in his intent to abandon the minor child.

The Findings of Fact above show that Respondent has 

willfully abdicated his parental role to the Petitioners since 

October 2011. This finding of willful abandonment is made 

by clear, cogent and convincing evidence.

¶ 15 Respondent acknowledges that he had no contact with the children from late 

December 2013 until 30 June 2019. However, respondent argues that his actions do 

not amount to willful abandonment because he “had neither the deliberate intent nor 

purpose to abandon the minor children.” Respondent points to his testimony that his 

lack of contact with the children during the five and one-half year period was due to 

his fear for his safety and the safety of his children after he was injured in an unsolved 

shooting in December 2013. Respondent argues that he had a reasonable belief that 

the mother and her associates were the perpetrators of the shooting “given the tense 

nature of the relationship between [the m]other and [respondent]” and that the 

shooting was in “direct retaliation for his seeking to modify the Temporary Custody 

Order for the minor children.” He argues that it was due to this “grave concern” that 

he did not seek visitation with the children following his release from the hospital. 

Therefore, he argues that finding of fact 16 was not supported by clear, cogent, and 

convincing evidence, and as a result, the trial court erred in concluding that grounds 

existed based on willful abandonment. 

¶ 16 The trial court’s findings of fact establish that respondent “made no attempt 

whatsoever to contact” the children or to participate in the children’s lives from late 
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December 2013 through 30 June 2019, a period of over five years. The trial court 

found that respondent did not send any cards or letters to the children or petitioners, 

did not send any gifts, did not purchase clothing or other items for the children, and 

did not provide any financial assistance to petitioners for the children’s benefit. The 

trial court found that respondent knew where petitioners lived but did not attempt to 

see the children from late December 2013 to 30 June 2019. The trial court also found 

that petitioners maintained the same phone number and email address since 2013; 

however, respondent never asked them for this information in order to contact the 

children. The trial court’s findings indicate that, from December 2013 until the filing 

of the petition to terminate his parental rights in July 2019, respondent failed to 

provide support and maintenance, did not write or call his children, did not send them 

gifts, and did not otherwise act as a parent. These findings demonstrate that 

respondent “willfully withheld his love, care, and affection from [the children] and 

that his conduct during the determinative six-month period constituted willful 

abandonment.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 23. 

¶ 17 Respondent contends that his lack of contact for the five and one-half year 

period following the December 2013 shooting was not “wholly inconsistent with a 

desire to maintain custody of the minor children.” He argues that he “had neither the 

deliberate intent nor purpose to abandon the minor children” but rather “made a 

choice, albeit a very difficult and sacrificial choice, to keep his children safe and free 
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from the fear of harm.” Respondent relies on his testimony that he did not seek 

custody or visitation after being released from the hospital following the December 

2013 shooting due to his fear for his safety and the safety of the children. He contends 

the trial court “did not doubt the veracity or credibility” of his testimony. Thus, he 

argues the evidence did not demonstrate that he willfully abandoned the children. 

¶ 18 However, in reviewing a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate 

parental rights, our review is limited to “whether the findings are supported by clear, 

cogent and convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In 

re C.B.C., 373 N.C. at 19 (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 111). It is the trial 

court’s “responsibility to ‘pass[ ] upon the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

to be given their testimony and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.’ ” 

In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 196 (alteration in original) (quoting In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. 

835, 843 (2016)). Because “the trial court is uniquely situated to make this credibility 

determination . . . appellate courts may not reweigh the underlying evidence 

presented at trial.” In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 11 (2019). 

¶ 19 Here, the trial court weighed the evidence and ultimately determined that 

respondent’s conduct during the determinative period showed his willful intention to 

abandon the children. See In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53 (2020) (“The willfulness of a 

parent’s actions is a question of fact for the trial court.”). The trial court made specific 

findings regarding the two shootings in November and December 2013. Specifically, 
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regarding the December shooting, the trial court found that 

[o]n December 27, 2013 the Respondent was shot with a 

firearm several times while on his way to work at 

approximately 7:00 a.m. The unidentified perpetrators 

were never caught. After getting out of the hospital, 

Respondent went to live with his Aunt in Atlanta, Georgia 

for a few months in 2014, and then came back to North 

Carolina. However, the Respondent did not attempt to 

contact the minor child[ren], or to re-establish his 

relationship with the minor child[ren] upon his return from 

Georgia.

This finding, along with the trial court’s other findings, demonstrates that the trial 

court acknowledged that respondent had been injured in an unsolved shooting but 

ultimately determined that his failure to contact the minor children upon his return 

to North Carolina was willful and that his conduct during the determinative period 

constituted willful abandonment. 

¶ 20 We hold the trial court’s findings of fact support its ultimate finding and 

conclusion that respondent willfully abandoned the children. The trial court’s 

findings demonstrate that respondent had no contact with the children for a period 

of over five years prior to the filing of the termination petition on 16 July 2019, with 

the exception of one brief interaction with one of the children. The trial court’s 

findings also demonstrate that respondent provided no support to the children and 

withheld his love, care, and affection from the children. The trial court was entitled 

to consider respondent’s years-long absence from the children’s lives when 

determining respondent’s credibility and intent to abandon his children during the 
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six months preceding the filing of the petition. See In re N.D.A., 373 N.C. at 77. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err by concluding that grounds existed to terminate 

respondent’s parental rights pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(7). 

II. Disposition Stage Issues

¶ 21 Respondent also challenges the trial court’s conclusions that it was in George’s 

and Sarah’s best interests to terminate his parental rights. 

¶ 22 At the dispositional stage of a termination proceeding, the trial court must 

“determine whether terminating the parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” 

N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). In doing so, the trial court 

may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as 

defined in [N.C.G.S. §] 8C-1, Rule 801, that the court finds 

to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the 

best interests of the juvenile. In each case, the court shall

consider the following criteria and make written findings 

regarding the following that are relevant:

(1) The age of the juvenile.

(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.

(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in 

the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the 

juvenile.

(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.

(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and 

the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or 

other permanent placement.

(6) Any relevant consideration.
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Id. Although the trial court must consider each of the factors in N.C.G.S. § 7B1110(a), written findings of fact are required only “if there is conflicting evidence 

concerning the factor, such that it is placed in issue by virtue of the evidence 

presented before the district court.” In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 199 (cleaned up) (quoting 

In re H.D., 239 N.C. App. 318, 327 (2015)).

¶ 23 “The trial court’s dispositional findings are binding on appeal if supported by 

any competent evidence. The trial court’s determination of a child’s best interests 

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.” In re J.S., 374 

N.C. 811, 822 (2020) (citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion is a decision 

manifestly unsupported by reason or one so arbitrary that it could not have been the 

result of a reasoned decision.” In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. at 57.

¶ 24 Respondent does not challenge the trial court’s findings regarding the 

children’s ages and concedes that subsection (a)(3) is not applicable in this case 

because DHS is not involved and, therefore, there is no permanent plan for the 

children. Respondent does challenge the trial court’s other dispositional findings of 

fact as not being supported by competent evidence. 

¶ 25 Respondent first challenges finding of fact 18(2) regarding the children’s 

likelihood of adoption. In both orders the trial court found the following: “Though 

there was no testimony regarding adoption, the [c]ourt takes judicial notice that there 

is a pending custody action by the Petitioners, in which they are seeking custody of 
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the two minor children, [George and Sarah], from both the Respondent and the 

biological mother . . . .” Respondent contends this finding is not supported by 

competent evidence because there is no evidence in the record that petitioners are 

seeking adoption and “nothing in the record to support any likelihood of adoption of 

either minor child.” However, the trial court did not find that there was a likelihood 

of adoption. Rather, the trial court recognized that no evidence was presented 

regarding adoption and took judicial notice of the pending civil custody action filed 

by petitioners seeking custody of the children. This finding is supported by competent 

evidence. The trial court is not required to find a likelihood of adoption in order for 

termination to be in a child’s best interests. See In re M.M., 200 N.C. App. 248, 258 

(2009), (“[N]othing within [N.C.G.S.] § 7B-1110 . . . requires that termination lead to 

adoption in order for termination to be in a child’s best interests.”), disc. review 

denied, 364 N.C. 241 (2010). 

¶ 26 Respondent next argues that finding of fact 18(4) regarding the children’s bond 

with respondent is not supported by competent evidence. Respondent argues the 

finding is “solely a recital of the children’s therapist[’s] testimony” which was “clearly 

hearsay and does not fall within any exception.” We disagree. Contrary to 

respondent’s assertion, finding of fact 18(4) does not recite the therapist’s testimony. 

The trial court specifically found that Sarah has no memory of respondent and that 

he is a stranger to her, and that George has some memory of respondent but does not 
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have a bond with him. The trial court further found that the guardian ad litem (GAL) 

and the therapist “provided testimony in this regard,” and that it found “such 

testimony to be credible.” The finding demonstrates that the trial court considered 

the testimony of the GAL and the therapist, determined their testimony was credible, 

and made an independent finding regarding the children’s bond with respondent 

based on that testimony. See In re D.L.W., 368 N.C. at 843 (stating that it is the trial

court’s duty to consider all of the evidence, pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, 

and determine the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom). Moreover, N.C.G.S. 

§ 7B-1110(a) specifically allows the consideration of hearsay evidence in determining 

a child’s best interests. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). Therefore, the trial court’s finding is 

supported by competent evidence. 

¶ 27 Respondent next challenges the portions of finding of fact 18(5) stating that he 

willfully abdicated his parenting role to petitioners since October 2011. Respondent 

argues he did not make “a conscious and intentional decision to avoid his parental 

role” but rather that “he made the very difficult decision to put the safety of the minor 

children first before all other things.” Therefore, he argues, this finding is not 

supported. However, as discussed previously, the trial court’s findings demonstrate 

that respondent had no contact with the children for five and one-half years despite 

having the ability to do so. The trial court weighed the credibility of respondent’s 

testimony and ultimately found that respondent willfully abandoned the children. 
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Based on the evidence presented, the trial court made the reasonable inference that 

respondent abdicated his parenting role to petitioners by having no contact or 

involvement in the children’s lives for over five years. We conclude that this finding 

is sufficiently supported by competent evidence. 

¶ 28 Lastly, respondent challenges finding of fact 18(6) as not supported by 

competent evidence because the trial court relied heavily on the GAL’s report and 

testimony. Respondent argues the GAL “did little to investigate [respondent],” did 

not visit his home or speak to his fiancée, and relied heavily on the therapist’s opinion 

in writing her report. Respondent’s challenge to the finding raises the question of 

whether the GAL had a sufficient basis for her testimony and is a challenge to the 

GAL’s credibility as a witness. However, it is the duty of the trial court to determine 

the weight and credibility of the evidence. In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 196. The trial 

court specifically found the testimony of the GAL and the therapist to be credible. 

Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient competent evidence in the record to 

support this finding. 

¶ 29 Respondent further contends the trial court abused its discretion in 

determining that termination of his parental rights was in the children’s best 

interests. He argues that the findings of fact in this case are “almost identical” to the 

findings of fact found in Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C. App. 1 (1994), where the 

Court of Appeals determined the trial court abused its discretion in terminating the 
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respondent-father’s parental rights.

¶ 30 In Bost, the trial court concluded that

[g]iven that the children are thriving under their present 

circumstances, the presence of a complete family structure 

able to meet the emotional and economic needs of the 

children, the expressed desire of the children not to see 

their father, their desire to be adopted by Jim Bost and the 

pain and disruption involved with any attempt at 

reestablishing a relationship, the [c]ourt finds as a fact that 

it would not be in the best interest of the children to follow 

the Guardian Ad Litem’s reccommendations [sic] and 

furthermore that termination is in their best interest.

Id. at 8 (alterations in original).

¶ 31 Respondent argues that here, similarly, the trial court found that Sarah 

expressed that she “wants no relationship whatsoever with the Respondent”; that 

George “later expressed fears and concerns for having his place of residence and way 

of life changed in any way because of the Respondent”; that the children have a close 

and loving relationship with petitioners “who have provided for all of the child[ren’s]

educational, emotional, physical and financial needs, with little to no contribution 

from either parent, since October 2011”; and that the therapist testified the children 

were concerned about their placement with petitioners being disrupted. He argues 

that these findings “were found to be insufficient by the Court [of Appeals] in Bost

and the decision to terminate ‘in light of the paramount rights of the natural parent 

to help raise and support his children’ was found to be an abuse of discretion,” quoting 

Bost, 117 N.C. App. at 13. Thus, he contends the same standard should apply in this 
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case.

¶ 32 However, Bost is distinguishable from the present case. First, the Court of 

Appeals in Bost stated that “a finding that the children are well settled in their new 

family unit . . . does not alone support a finding that it is in the best interest of the 

children to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” Bost, 117 N.C. App. at 8 

(emphasis added). Here, however, the finding that the children were doing well with 

petitioners was not the sole support for the trial court’s conclusion that termination 

was in the children’s best interests. Second, while the respondent-father in Bost once 

had been unable to maintain employment or relationships with the children because 

he was an alcoholic, the evidence also showed that the respondent-father had ceased 

using alcohol a couple of years before the petition to terminate his parental rights 

was filed, had paid large sums of back child support, and had begun to visit the 

children. Id. at 5–6. In contrast, here respondent had not had any contact with the 

children, had not provided any support for the children, and had not shown any desire 

to be a part of the children’s lives from December 2013 until two weeks before the 

filing of the petition to terminate parental rights on 16 July 2019. Finally, in Bost,

the GAL and the court-appointed psychologist thought it in the best interests of the 

children to not terminate the respondent-father’s parental rights. Id. at 9. In the 

present case, the GAL recommended that it would be in in the children’s best 

interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. These are all significant 
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distinctions that explain why the ultimate conclusion by the trial court in this case is 

not an abuse of discretion.

¶ 33 The trial court’s findings demonstrate that it considered the relevant factors 

under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) and made a reasoned decision based on those findings. 

Specifically, the trial court made findings regarding the children’s ages; the pending 

civil custody action filed by petitioners; the children’s lack of a bond with respondent 

after his five and one-half year absence; the children’s “close and loving relationship” 

with petitioners “who have provided for all of the child[ren’s] education, emotional, 

physical and financial needs”; and the negative psychological impact on the children 

from respondent’s sudden return into their lives. These findings, along with the trial 

court’s other findings of fact, support its conclusion that termination of respondent’s 

parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

¶ 34 Lastly, respondent contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the 

termination hearing. Respondent argues his trial counsel was ineffective because she 

failed to make any objections during the termination hearing and failed to introduce 

any evidence of petitioners’ “retaliatory seeking [of] an Ex Parte Custody Order 

against [respondent]” or of DHS’s investigation of the mother. Specifically, 

respondent argues his counsel failed to object to the introduction of the temporary 

custody order into evidence and failed to make any hearsay objections, most notably 
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during the testimony of the children’s therapist. Respondent asserts that “[g]iven the 

constitutionally protected rights at issue, [he] was denied a fair hearing as a result of 

his trial counsel’s failure to perform at an objectively reasonable standard.” 

¶ 35 “Parents have a right to counsel in all proceedings dedicated to the termination 

of parental rights.” In re L.C., 181 N.C. App. 278, 282 (cleaned up) (quoting In re 

Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 436 (1996)), disc. review denied, 361 N.C. 354 

(2007); see also N.C.G.S. § 7B-1101.1 (2019). “Counsel necessarily must provide 

effective assistance, as the alternative would render any statutory right to counsel 

potentially meaningless.” In re T.N.C., 375 N.C. 849, 854 (2020). “To prevail on a 

claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, respondent must show that counsel’s 

performance was deficient and the deficiency was so serious as to deprive [him] of a 

fair hearing.” Id. at 33 (cleaned up) (quoting In re Bishop, 92 N.C. App. 662, 664 

(1989)). “To make the latter showing, the respondent must prove that ‘there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, there would have been a different 

result in the proceedings.’ ” In re T.N.C., 375 N.C. at 854 (quoting State v. Braswell, 

312 N.C. 553, 563 (1985)); see also In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525, 531 (“A parent 

must also establish he suffered prejudice in order to show that he was denied a fair 

hearing.”), appeal dismissed, 363 N.C. 654 (2009). Respondent has made no showing 

that he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel’s alleged deficient performance. See 

In re Dj.L., 184 N.C. App. 76, 87 (2007) (an ineffective assistance claim is meritless 
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when “[i]t is difficult to see a defense on which respondent could have prevailed, and 

respondent cites no such theory on appeal.”). In this case, respondent has failed to 

show that any of the alleged deficiencies in his counsel’s performance or conduct, 

whether taken alone or collectively, would have resulted in a different outcome. 

Therefore, respondent cannot prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 36 The trial court did not err in concluding that respondent’s parental rights were 

subject to termination based on willful abandonment; nor did the trial court abuse its 

discretion by concluding that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests. Respondent also failed to show he received ineffective 

assistance of counsel at the termination hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s orders terminating his parental rights to George and Sarah.

AFFIRMED.