* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be

published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5.4.

1 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-60117

Summary Calendar

ROBERT P. JARRELL,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

F-S PRESTRESS, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(2:97-CV-108-PG)

December 8, 1998

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Chief Judge: *

Robert P. Jarrell appeals an adverse summary judgment in his age

discrimination 1 claim against his former employer, F-S Pr estress, Inc. For the

reasons assigned, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Prior to his termination at age 53, Jarre ll served as plant manager for the2

Hattiesburg, MS branch of F-S Prestress. In 1993, after becoming the company’s

general manager, Mark Fairchild met wi th Jarrell and informed him of the

disappointing performance by the Hattiesburg branch and of the possibility of layoffs, or even sale or closure of the plant. In the fall of 1994, after no substantial

i mprovement in the operations’ profitability, F-S Prestress cut costs by reducing the

salaries of the three on-site manager s, each of whom were above the age of 40.

Over the next year, the operations did not improve to the satisfaction of F-S

Prestress management. Believing that the plant manager played a critical role in

the performance of the company, F-S Prestress terminated Jarrell in February 1996.

That same month, F-S Prestress retained Gary Johnson as its new plant manager.

Johnson, who is older than Jarrell, became responsible for all of the duties

previously shouldered by Jarrell. Because a week or two passed between the time

of Jarrell’s termination and Johnson’s retention, Fairchild and another manager,

both of whom were younger than Jarrell, temp o rarily assumed the duties previously

performed by Jarrell.

Jarrell sued F-S Prestress under both federal and state law, alleging that its

decision to fire him was based upon his age. Seeking to establish a discriminatory

motive, Jarrell described statements made by its employees, such as “We are not

doing it the old way anymore,” “We feel sorry for you older people,” and “You are

past your prime.” F-S Prestress moved for summary judgment. In considering

Jarrell’s ADEA claim, the district court determined that neither the stray remarks

nor the decrease in Jarre l l’s salary constituted direct evidence of age2 Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc. , 5 F.3d 955 (5 th Cir. 1993).

3 F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56(c).

4 Bodenheimer , 5 F.3d at 956.

5 Id.

6 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 631.

7 Harrington v. Harris , 118 F.3d 359 (5 th Cir.), cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 603 (1997).

3 discrimination. The district court applied a modified M cDonnell Douglas test to

determine whether Jarrell established a prima facie case of discrimination. The

district court found that Jarrell had not established the essential element that he was

replaced by one outside the pr o tected class or by one substantially younger than

himself, and dismissed the ADEA claim. The state law claims were dismissed

without prejudice. Jarrell timely appealed.

ANALYSIS

In employment discrimination cases, we review summary judgments d e novo

,

applying the same standard as the district court. 2 Federal rules provide for

summary judgment when there exists no genuine issue of material fact. 3 A dispute

concerning a materia l fact is “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. 4 In making this determination,

the court must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 5

The ADEA protects those at least 40 years of age from discharge because of

t heir age, and it provides them with a private cause of action. 6 ADEA plaintiffs

may prove age discrimination by direct or circumstantial evidence. 7

Jarrell contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment8 Portis v. First Nat’l Bank of New Albany, MS

, 34 F.3d 325 (5 th Cir. 1994) (Title VII

context); Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass’n , 989 F.2d 858 (5 th Cir. 1993) (same).

9 Armendariz v. Pinkerton Tobacco Co.

, 58 F.3d 144 (5 th Cir. 1995) (finding too remote

and vague to evidence age discriminationagainst plaintiff comments that a younger coworker was “getting old” and “losing her memory”); Atkin v. Lincoln Property Co. , 991

F.2d 268 (5 th Cir. 1993) (fi nding too remote and vague to evidence age discrimination a

comment tha t plaintiff was “getting up there in years” when made one year prior to

termination).

4 because he maintains that he established discriminatory motiv e directly through the

aforementioned statements and through the reduction in salaries of Jarrell and two

other managers who were over 40 years of age. We first consider the above-quoted

statements. Direct evidence is any statement revealing a discriminatory motive on

its face without resort to inference. 8 In the alleged comment “not doing it the old

way,” the term “old” modifies “way.” Any link to Jarrell’s age would have to be

inferred, but direct evidence must reveal discriminatory motive on its face, not by

inference.

Nor do the other alleged statements constitute direct evidence of

discriminatory motive; they are more accurately described as stray remarks. The

statement about “feel[ing] sorry for you older people” merely reflects recognition

of one’s age, not disc riminatory motive. Additionally this statement, like the

statement about “[being] past your prime,” was made in 1993 or 1994, which is too

remote in time

– and too vague in substance

– to be probative of the a lleged age

discrimination in 1996. 9 In sum, we conclude that the comments cited by Jarrell

do not constitute direct evidence of age discrimination.

Nor may the reduction in salary of the three manag ers in the Hattiesburg5

plant when plant operations did no t meet the demands of higher management be

deemed dispositive proof of discriminatory motive based on age. The summary

judgment record reflects that non-management employees over 40 years of age did

not have their pay reduced. We are not persuaded that the reductions in salary

evidence an age-discrimination motive by F-S Prestress.

The summary jud gment record does not support the essential finding that

Jarrell was replaced by someone substantially younger than himself. This failure

eviscerates th e prima facie case of discrimination and requires dismissal of the

ADEA claim.

The judgment appealed is AFFIRMED.