NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KELLY L. YOUNG, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant - Appellee. No. 13-35904 D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01294-RAJ

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Richard A. Jones, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted July 9, 2015 Seattle, Washington Before: NGUYEN and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges and ZOUHARY, ** District Judge. Kelly L. Young appeals the district court’s judgment affirming the denial of her application for social security disability benefits. We affirm. 

# FILED

JUL 21 2015 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, Dist rict Judge for the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation.1. The Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) characterization of Young’s daily activities was supported by substantial evidence. See Burch v. Barnhart , 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005). Young’s own testimony and medical records support the ALJ’s finding that she could “attend to self-care, drive a car, go grocery shopping, organize her household, use a computer, and manage her finances.” To the extent that Young challenges the ALJ’s rejection of her testimony regarding her level of impairme nts, Young has waived this claim by not raising it in the district court. See Sandgathe v. Chater , 108 F.3d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 2. The ALJ gave clear and convincing reasons for discounting Dr. Havellana’s and Dr. Barto’s medical opini ons. The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Havellana’s opinion because it was c ontradicted by objective scores on psychological tests that she administered. See Bayliss v. Barnhart , 427 F.3d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a “dis crepancy” between a doctor’s observations and conclusion “is a clear and convinci ng reason for not relying on the doctor’s opinion”). The ALJ concluded that Dr . Barto appeared unfamiliar with the definition of “disability” within the Social Security Act, and this conclusion is confirmed by Dr. Barto’s statement that sh e expected Young’s disability to persist for only six months. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (defining a “disability” as
2being “unable to engage in any substa ntial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months ” (emphasis added)). The ALJ gave “germane reasons,” Molina v. Astrue , 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012), for discounting Nurse Practitioner Draper’s medical opinion—namely, that Draper’s own notes reflected that Young was able to partially control her anxiety using medications. Finally, the ALJ did not err in giving “significant weight” to the narrative portion of Dr. Kraft’s Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment Form. See Program Operations Manual System DI 25020.010, B.1 (“It is the narrative written by the psychiatrist or psychologist in section III . . . of [the form] that adjudicators are to use as the assessment of [res idual functional capacity].” (emphases omitted)). 3. The ALJ did not improperly manipulate the hearing process. Prior to excusing the first expert, the ALJ gave Young’s attorney an opportunity to question the expert further, but he d eclined to do so. Young cites no authority supporting her position that an ALJ is notpermitted to call a second vocational expert where, based on her experience, the ALJ observes that the first expert’s

3testimony contradicts the Dicti onary of Occupational Titles. The record does not support Young’s claim that the reason given for dismissing the first expert was pretextual. Further, Young failed to show that the second expert’s opinion that jobs exist that Young could perform was inaccurate. Contrary to Young’s claims, the heat and humidity associated with laundry folding are not occupational hazards as described in her residual functi onal capacity. And a hotel housekeeper’s occasional interaction with hotel guests does not amount to more than minimal or superficial contact with the public. See DOT 369.687-018, 1991 WL 673072; DOT 323.687-014, 1991 WL 672783. AFFIRMED.

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