THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Sheena Brannon, Shane Stencil, Tina Sullivan, and 

Brandon Beaty, Appellants, 

v. 

Henry Dargan McMaster, in his official capacity as 

Governor of the State of South Carolina, and G. Daniel 

Ellzey, in his official capacity as the Director of the 

South Carolina Department of Employment and 

Workforce, Respondents. 

Appellate Case No. 2021-000883 

Appeal from Richland County 

R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 28065 

Heard October 4, 2021 – Filed October 13, 2021 

AFFIRMED 

Adam Protheroe and Susan B. Berkowitz, of South 

Carolina Appleseed Legal Justice Center; and John D. 

Kassel, of Kassel McVey, all of Columbia, for Appellants. 

Rebecca Laffitte, Robert E. Tyson, Jr., and Vordman 

Carlisle Traywick, III, of Robinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, 

LLC, all of Columbia, for Respondents Henry Dargan 

McMaster and G. Daniel Ellzey; Todd Timmons and 

Steven Jordan Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent G. 

Daniel Ellzey; and Michael G. Shedd, Thomas A. 
 

Limehouse, Jr., and William Grayson Lambert, all of 

Columbia, for Respondent Henry Dargan McMaster. 

Jack E. Cohoon, of Burnette Shutt & McDaniel, P.A., of 

Columbia, for amici curiae South Carolina Small Business 

Chamber of Commerce, American Sustainable Business 

Council, Shriver Center on Poverty Law, National 

Employment Law Project, Economic Policy Institute, and 

William E. Spriggs. 

Christopher E. Mills, of Spero Law, LLC, of Charleston, 

for amici curiae South Carolina Chamber of Commerce, 

South Carolina Restaurant and Lodging Association, 

Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, 

and National Federation of Independent Business Small 

Business Legal Center. 

PER CURIAM: Respondent Governor Henry McMaster instructed Respondent G. 

Daniel Ellzey, Director of the South Carolina Department of Employment and 

Workforce (DEW), to end South Carolina's participation in federal unemployment 

insurance programs created under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 

Security (CARES) Act.1

 Appellants brought this action challenging the legality of 

the Governor's decision and moved for a preliminary injunction requiring 

Respondents to reenroll in the programs. Respondents moved to dismiss the action 

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion 

and denied Appellants' motion for injunctive relief. We affirm the circuit court. 

As part of the CARES Act it enacted in March 2020 in response to the 

pandemic, Congress created various temporary economic benefits, including new 

unemployment insurance programs. Three of those programs are at issue in the 

present case: (1) Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA), 15 U.S.C. § 9021; (2) 

Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Compensation (PEUC), 15 U.S.C. § 9025; 

and (3) Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation (FPUC), 15 U.S.C. § 9023 

(collectively, Programs). Participation in the Programs is discretionary, and states 

may withdraw from the Programs with at least thirty days' advanced notice to the 

Department of Labor. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 9023(a) & 9025(a)(1). In contrast to 

1

 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9141. 
 

state unemployment insurance programs, the federal government provides the funds 

from the general fund of the United States Treasury for paying benefits to claimants 

under the Programs. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 9023(d)(3). 

South Carolina agreed to participate in and accept federal funds available 

pursuant to the Programs. However, on May 6, 2021, Governor McMaster ordered 

the director of DEW to withdraw from the Programs effective June 30, 2021. 

Appellants argue Governor McMaster did not have the authority to do so because 

section 41-29-230(1) of the South Carolina Code (2021) provides that DEW shall 

cooperate with the Secretary of Labor in a manner that required the State to accept 

and disburse funds from the Programs until they expired. Section 41-29-230(1) 

provides: 

In the administration of Chapters 27 through 41 of this 

title, [DEW] must cooperate with the United States 

Secretary of Labor to the fullest extent consistent with the 

provisions of these chapters, and act, through the 

promulgation of appropriate rules, regulations, 

administrative methods and standards, as necessary to 

secure to this State and its citizens all advantages 

available under the provisions of the Social Security Act 

that relate to unemployment compensation, the Federal 

Unemployment Tax Act, the Wagner-Peyser Act, and the 

Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation 

Act of 1970. 

(emphasis added). 

Appellants contend benefits paid under the Programs are "advantages 

available under" the Social Security Act (SSA).2

 Therefore, Appellants argue, DEW 

must continue to participate in the Programs until the Programs expire. Respondents 

claim benefits paid pursuant to the Programs are not "advantages available under" 

the SSA. In granting Respondents' motion to dismiss, the circuit court found, 

The benefits provided under the CARES Act are new 

benefits, never previously available to unemployed 

workers, and are provided by legislation separate and apart 

2

 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397. 
 

 

from the [SSA]. Although the federal government chose 

to use the funding mechanisms available through the 

Social Security Administration, that does not mean these 

new benefits fall under the [SSA]. It simply shows 

Congress used an existing mechanism to put [the 

Programs] into place quickly. 

We affirm the circuit court. Section 41-29-230(1) is unambiguous and clear 

on its face. The only connection the Programs have to the SSA is that the funds to 

be distributed to recipients pass through bank accounts of the Social Security 

Administration. This is not sufficient to render benefits paid under the Programs to 

be "advantages available under the provisions of the [SSA]." To construe section 

41-29-230(1) otherwise would be to expand the scope of an unambiguous statute 

beyond the manifest intent of the legislature.3 See Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts, 

393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (2011) (explaining that under the plain 

meaning rule, this Court has no right to search for or impose another meaning or 

resort to subtle or forced construction to change the scope of a clear and 

unambiguous statute); see also S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Calhoun Cnty. Council, 432 

S.C. 492, 497, 854 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2021) (noting the primary rule of statutory 

construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly). 

AFFIRMED. 

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur. 

3

 Based on our holding that section 41-29-230(1) is inapplicable to the CARES Act, 

we deny Appellants' motion to supplement the record as moot. Further, because we 

hold the Programs do not fall within the ambit of section 41-29-230(1), we do not 

reach the question of whether the Governor would have had discretion under the 

CARES Act to withdraw the state from participation if the Programs did fall within 

the ambit of this section.