### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00443- CV

Er ik Le ona r d, A ppe lla nt

v. Gr eg Abbott, At torney G eneral of Texas; the Harr is Coun ty-Houston Sp orts Authority;

Harris County; and the City of Hou ston, Appellees

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 200TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN300-2 69, H ONO RAB LE DARLENE B Y RNE, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N Appellant Erik L eonar d ap p ea l s t h e orde rs of the tria l court dec laring L eonar d a vexatious l itigant a

nd dismiss ing his law suit after he fa i l ed t o furnish cour t-order ed sec urity
. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 11.001-.055 (West 2002)
. I n six issues, L eonar d co n tends that the trial cour

t violated his rights to due pr ocess, e qual protec ti o n , an d open cour ts, and that appellee s failed to mee t their burden of proof unde r the ve x atious liti g ant statute. We will affirm the
or de rs . BACK GR OUND

L eonar d has a long history of fili ng lawsuits and appeals t o contest t he issuance and approva l of bonds in Harr is County related to the construction of new sports are nas in that locale
. I n Aug ust 1998, L eonar d filed a pro se decla ratory judgme nt action in Travis County District Court2

a g a i n s tt h e A t t o r

n e y G e n e r a l o f T e x a s , t h e C i t y o f H o u s t o n , H ar r i s C o u n t y, an d

t h e H ar r i s C o u n t yHouston Sports Authority . The suit, cause n u m ber 98- 09828, challeng ed the August 1998 bond issue for the c onstruction of the ba seball stadium now kno wn as M inute Maid Park, the home of major lea g ue base ball’s Houston Astros. A fter the district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction, L eonar d appea led to this Court, and we af firmed. See Leonard v

. Cornyn , 47 S.W. 3d 52 4 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 19 99 , pe t. de nie d)
. L e on ard the n u ns ucce ssf ull y petitioned the United States Supreme Court f or ce rtiorar i. See Leonard v. Cornyn , 531 U.S. 1081 (2001). I n Marc h 2000, L eonar d filed another suit in Travis County district c ourt ag ainst the same de fenda

nts. This suit , cause number GN0-00717, reque sted decla ratory and injunctive relief
re la te d to the bo nd

iss ue fo r t he c on str uc tio n o f t he fo otb a ll s ta dium nowkn ow n a s Re lia nt S ta dium, the home of the National Football L eague’s Houston Texans and the Houston L ivestock Show and Rodeo. On May

18, 2000, the district court dismissed L eonar d’s suit for wa nt of jurisdiction. On May 24 , 2 00 0, in c a

us e numbe r

GN 00 15 16 , L e on ard

fi le d a vir tua lly ide nti c a l su it ag ainst the same pa

rties in the same c ourt. On June 8, 2000, the di strict court signed an order stating that “ g ive n a

se c on d o pp or

tun ity to co ns ide r i ts j ur isd ic tio n, ” it w a s “ sti ll o f t he op ini on ” that it la c ke d s ub

je c t- ma tte r j ur isd ic tio n o ver L eon ard ’s laws uit . L e on ard a pp e a le d th e Ma

y 18 or de r t o thi s c ourt
. We no te d that L e on ard ’s “ re qu e st f or de c la ra tor y jud g me nt i n th is c a se inv olv e s th e same 1996 elec tion, the same 1997 leg islation, and the same contention that voter a pproval of the bonds
a uth or ize d p ur su ant t o th e 19 96 e le c tio n is re qu ir ed. Th is s uit sim ply a tta c ks a dif fe re nt s po rt s
ve nu e .” B e c a

us e the iss ue s L e on ard

ra ise d h a d a lr e a dy be e n d e c ide d, we a ff ir me d th e jud g me nt.3

See Leonard v . Cornyn , 2001 Tex. App. L EXI S 5356 (Tex. App.—Austin 20 01, pet. denied) ; Le on ar d , 47 S.W. 3d

a t 52 4. L e on ard

a g a in u ns uc c e ssf ull y pe tit ion e d th e Un ite d St a te s Su pr e me Co u rt f o r c e rti o rar i. S

ee L eonard v. Cornyn , 123 S.Ct . 608 (2002). He then filed a motion for rehe aringwith the Supreme Court, which w as denie d in J anuar y 2003. I n Dec ember

2000, L eonar d filed ca

use number 00- 12-07633-CV in Mont g omery County dis tr ic t c ourt

a g a ins t the c ha ir

man of the Ha

rr is County -H ou sto n Spor ts Au tho ri ty , th is t ime attackingthe financ i n g o f a ne w baske tball are na. That lawsuit requeste d a “de clar ation that the 20 00 are na

re fe re nd um s e t by th e Harris County -H ou sto n Sp or ts Auth or ity

wh ic h a sk e d v ote rs to authorize construction of a new are na be decla red void.” On May 24, 2001, the district court g rante d
a plea to the jurisdiction and dismiss ed L eonar d’s suit. L eonar d appea led to the B eaumont Court of Appea ls, which aff

irmed the judg ment. See Le o n a r d v. B u rge , 7 4 S. W. 3 d 1 3 5 ( T e x. App.—B eaumont 2002, pet. de nied).

I n Marc h 2002, L eonar d filed sui t ag ainst the Attorney Gene ral of T exas, the City of Houston, Har

ris County , and the Har

ris County -Houston Sports Authority in Travis County

district court; ca use number G

N201013. L eonar d ag ain cha lleng ed the Attorne y Ge n er al’s approval of bo nd s r e la te d to c on str

uc tio n o f s po rt s are na s in

Ha rr is C ounty . T he dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d a ple a to th e ju r is d ic ti o n , an d L e o n ar d a g a in a p p e a le d to th is Co u rt. We d e te r mi n e d th a t L e o n ar d d id not timely file his notice of a

ppeal, a nd dismiss ed the a

ppeal for wa

nt of jurisdiction. See Leonard v

. Ab bo tt , 2002 Tex. App. L EXI S 8766 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied).

This appea l ar i ses from two more suits that L eonar d filed in J anuar y 2003, which
wer e consolidate d below. These suits named the same defenda nts as hi s previous sui ts and re latedThe amount of $80,000 was re quested by appellee s, an d d er i v ed fr om the amount of 1 a tto rn e y s’ fe e s th e y

ha d s pe nt d e fe nd ingL e on ard ’s pr ior laws uit s. F ro m Jul y 20 00 thr ou g h Apr il 2003, the S ports Authority alone incurred bills in excess of $190,000 i n defe nding a g ainst L eonar d’s laws uit s. 4 to the same claims. I n fac t, L eonar d admits in his ple ading s that his “same r equest for relief has bee n included in one lawsuit or another continuously from Aug ust 31, 1998 throug h J anuary 2 7 , 2 0 0 3. Th e re ha s b e e n n o s ig nif

ic ant d e ve lop me nt b e tw e e n J anu ary 27 , 200 3, and Janu ary 28 , 2 00 3, the date of this filing.” Appellee s filed a j o i n t m o t ion reque sting that the district c ourt dec lare L eonar d a vexatious l itigant a

nd require secur ity

as a c ondition for him to continue prosecutingthe suit. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Co de Ann
. §§ 11 .0 51 -. 05 5. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt fo un d th a t L e on ard

wa s a vexatious l itigant, or dere d him to furnish security in the amount of $80,000 within one month, and enter ed a pr efiling order

prohibiting L eonar d from filing , pr o s e , new litigation in st ate c ourt without permission of the loca l administrative judge
. Se e id . §§ 11.055, .101. L eonar d failed to fur nish the 1
secur ity
. I n acc ordanc e with statutory require ments, the district court dismissed his lawsuit. See id
. § 11.056. L eonar d appea ls both the order f in d ing him a ve x atious liti g ant and limiting future lawsuits and the orde r dismissing his lawsuit.
DI SCU SSIO N I n chapte r 11 of the c ivil practice and re medies code, the leg islature struck a balanc e betwee n Texans’ rig ht of ac cess to their courts and the public inter est in protectingdefe ndants from those who abuse our civil justice sy stem. See id . §§ 11.001-.055. Unde r cha pter 11, a trial court may place limit ations on the litigation activities of a person deter mined by the cour t to be a “ve x atious litigant.” Se e id . § 11.101. The court may deter mine that the plaintiff is a ve x atious liti g ant if theL e on ard ’s du e pr oc e ss c la im is pr e dic a te d on his the or y that th e statut e is unc on sti tut ion a lly 2 vag ue. The vag ueness doc trine is a compone nt of the Consti t u t i o n’s due pr ocess guara ntee. 5 defe ndant demonstrate s that there is not a rea sonable proba bility that the plaintiff will preva il in the litigation ag ainst the defe ndant and that the plaintiff, in the se ven-y ear period immediately

prec eding the date the defe ndant makes the motion under Section 11.051, has commenc ed, prose cuted, or maintained in propria persona at least five litigation s , o t h er than in small claims court, that have been finally deter

mined adver sely

to the plaintiff. Se e id . § 11 .0 54 ; Pease v. Principal Residential Mortg., Inc. , No. 03-02-00491-CV, 2004 Tex. App. L EXI S 4279, at *14 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (me m. op.). I f the c ourt deter mines, b as ed o n evidenc e pre sented at a hea ring , that the defe ndant is a vexatious litiga nt, it must order

the plaintiff to furnish sec urity for the be nefit of the moving de fenda

nt in an amount related to the costs and attorney s’ fe es t h e d ef endant anticipates incurringin defe nding the litigation. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 1 1
. 0 5 5 (a ). I f the pla int if f fa ils to furn ish the c ourt -o rd e re d sec ur ity by the tim e se t in the or de r, the c ourt mus t di smi ss the suit. Se e id . § 11.056. The court may also, on its own motion or the motion of any party , enter a pr ef i l i n g o rd er

p ro h i b i t i n g a p l ai n t i ff

fr o m fi l i n g, pr o s e , a new lawsuit in state court without leave of the loca l administrative judge
. Se e id . § 11.101.
Constitutionali ty of the vexatious litigant statute

I n his first a

nd fourth issues, L eonar d attacks both the f inding that he is a vexatious l i t i gan t and the or der r equiring him to seek permission befor e filing new pro se lawsuits. See id
. §§ 11 .0 54 , . 10 1. L e on ard argue s th a t th e statut e s a re un c on sti tut io nal ly va g ue and vio la te his constitutional rights to due proce ss, equal protec tion, a nd acc ess to the courts. He also argues that 2 3Commission for L awyer Discipline v . Benton , 980 S.W .2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998).

L e o n ar d s u mm ar il y

r e c it e s th a t t

h e r e “ w a s n o in qu ir

y in to th e qu e s ti o no f

w h e th e r [h e] 3 abused the judicial sy stem in a ny way .” B ut he ac knowledg es that the “ statute does not re quire such inquiry ” and that “appe llees did not call for such inquiry ,” and alleg es only th at h i s co nstitut ional rig hts were violated. 6 the statut e s ar e un c on sti tut ion a lly va g ue be c a

us e the y do no t pr ov ide a

me tho d f or de te rm ini nghis probability of succ ess in his lawsuit. See id . § 11 .0 54 . Wh ile no t bi nd ingpr e c e de nt o n th is C ourt , a Te x as fe dera l district court has dete rmined that the ve x atious liti gan t s t at ute is not unconstitutionally

vag ue. See Liptak v. B anner , No. 3:01-CV-0953-M, 2002 U .S. Dist. L EXI S 940, at *13 (N.D . T ex . J an . 18, 2002). Howe ver, L eonar d claims that the statute is vague bec ause he
c ou ld n ot h a ve de te rmin e d, be fo re fi lin g the un de rl y inglaws uit , th a t th e re wa s n o r e a so na ble probability

that he would pre vail in the underly ing c ase. See id
. W e c o n s t ru e Le o n ar d ’ s ar g u m e n tr e g a r d i n g t h e v a g u e n e s s o f

t h e s t a tu t e a s a c h al l en ge to the constitutionalit y

of cha pter 11 a s applied. See id . §§ 11.001-11.102. A statute pr ohibiting conduct that is not sufficie ntly define d is void for vagueness. In re Fisher , N o . 0 4

- 0 1 1 2 , 2 0 0 5 T e x. L EX I S 39 4, a t *5 2 ( Te x. 20 05 ); se e Gray ne d v . Ci ty of R oc k for d , 408 U. S
. 1 0 4 , 1 08 (1972); Commission for L awyer Discipline v . Benton , 980 S.W .2d 425, 437 (Tex. 1998). Howe ver, a s the Liptak court obser

ved, “a ny person of re asonable intelligenc e would be a ble to discern that if he we re to file five law suits in seve n y ear s, all of which wer e decide d in favor of the opposing party , wer e deter mined to be frivolous, or m et a series of other standards, he may be subj ect to beinglabeled a
v e x a t i o u s l i t i g an t
. T h e r e i s n o o t h e r p r a c t i c a l r e a d i n g o f t h e s u b j e c t s t a tu t e . ” 2 0 0 2 U
. S
. D i s t
. LE X IS 940, at *13. We ag ree . Chapter 11 suff iciently ou tlines a standar d of conduc t, and a c ore of7

prohibited ac tivity

is well defined the rein. Id .; see M argaret S. v. Edwards , 794 F .2 d 994 , 997 (5 th Cir. 1986). Moreove r, L eonar d’s own plea dings be lie his c laim that he could not have known he
wa s at ris k o f

b e i n g h e l d

t o b e a v e xat i o u s l i t i g an t
. H e a c kn o w l e d g e s t h a th i s u n d e r l y i n g l a w su it
asser ts the “same r equest for relief has been included in one lawsuit or another c ontinuously from Aug ust 31, 1998 t h ro u gh J anuar y 27, 2003.” With the knowledg e that ea ch of the se pre vious laws uit s h as been dis mis se d, L e on ard no ne the le ss f

ile d th e same ple a din g a g a in. L e on ard sh ou ld have know n that there was no “reasonable probability ” of suc cess a nd that he wa s inviti ng the application of the vexatious l itigant statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 11.054, .101. We hold that the vexatious litigant statute is not unconstitutionally vag ue. Next, L eonar d argues that the stat u t es permitting the order s unrea sonably restric t
a c c e ss t o th e jud ic ia l sy ste m in vio la tio n of the op e n c ourt s p ro vis ion and dis c ri min a te a g a ins t pr o
se litigants and “ the Davids who sue Goliaths.” See Tex. Cons t. art. 1 § 13. Article I , section 13 of the Texas Constit ution provides in part that “a ll c ourts shall be open, and eve ry person f or an injury done him , in his lands, g oods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of la w.” Id .; Howell v. Texas W

orkers’ Co mp . Comm’n , 1 43 S.W. 3d 41 6, 44 4 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 04 , p e t. de nie d) . “ Th e op e n c ourt s p ro vis ion inc lud e s at le a st thr e e se pa ra te g ua ra nte e s: (1) c ourt s mu st
ac tu al l y b e o p er at i n g an d

av ai l ab l e; (2 ) t h e Legi s l at u re ca n n o ti mp ed e a cc es s t o t h e co u rt s t h ro u gh
unrea sonable fina

ncial bar riers; a nd (3) mea

ningf ul re m ed i es must be aff orded, ‘ so that the le g isl a tur e may

no t a br og a te the ri g ht to a sse rt a we ll- e sta bli sh e d c omm on law c a

us e of a c tio n unle ss the re ason for

its action outweig hs the litigants’ c onstitut ional rig ht of redr ess.’” H owe ll , 1 438

S
. W
. 3 d at 4 4 4 (q u o t i n g Te

x as W or k e rs’ Com p. Com m’n v . G ar c ia , 8 9 3 S. W. 2 d 5 0 4 , 5 2 0 ( T e x. 1995)) ( internal c itations omi tted). A claim of unconstitutionalit y under the open courts provision will only succe ed if the c laimant (1) has a cognizable common-law cause of a ction being restric ted by a statut e , a nd (2 ) t he re str ic tio n is un re a so na ble or arb itr ary wh e n ba lanc e d a g a ins t th e purp os e and basis of the statute. Rose v. D octors Hosp. , 801 S.W. 2d 84 1, 84 3 ( Te x. 19 90 ); Sax v. V otteler , 648 S.W .2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983). I n applying this test, we co n s i d er both the statute’s g ener al purp os e and

the e xten t to wh ic h th e c la ima nt’ s r ig ht t o b ri nga

c omm on -l aw cause of

a c tio n is aff ecte d. Ho we ll , 1 43 S.W. 3d a t 44 4; see Sax , 648 S.W .2d at 666. Assuming without dec iding that L eo n ar d had a c og nizable common-law c ause of action restricted by the vex atious litigant st atute, these restric tions are not unre asonable or ar bitrary wh e n b a lanc e d a g a ins t th e purp os e a nd ba sis of the statut e . T he pu rpo se of c ha pte r e le ve n is to restric t frivolous and vexatious lit iga tion. Se e De v oll

v . S tat e , 1 5 5 S. W. 3 d

4 9 8 , 5 01 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2004, no pet.) (statute “provide s a fr amewor k for c ourts and attorne y s to curb
ve xati ou s li tig a tio n” ). I t do e s n ot a uthori z e court s to a c t arb itr ari ly , b ut p e rm its the m to re str ic t a plaintiff’s ac cess to the courts only afte r first making specific finding s that the plaintiff is a ve x atious lit ig ant b a se d o n f

a c tor s th a t are c los e ly

tie d to the lik e lih oo d th a t th e inc ide nt l iti g a tio n is fr ivo lou s. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. C od e Ann. § 1 1. 05 4; Liptak , 2002 U.S. Dist
. L E XIS 9 4 0 , at *12-13. Although L eonar d was found to be a vex atious litigant, chapter 11 and the trial court’s order did not cate g orica lly

bar him fr om prosecuting his lawsuit, but mer ely require d him to post secur ity to cover
a pp e llees’ antic ipate d e xpe ns e s to de fe nd wh a t th e c ir c ums tanc e s w ou ld r e a so na bly su g g e st i s aL eonar d acknow ledg es in his brief that the statute protec ts defenda nts by req u i ring 4 pla int if fs to f ur nis h s e c ur ity

fo r d e fe nd ants ’ e xpe ns e s.

9 frivolous lawsuit. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.055. Add i t i o n al l y , t he pre filing 4 order does not prec lude L eonar d from filing new law suits; he is m ere ly require d to obtain permission from the loca l administrative judge befor e filing
. See id
. §§ 11.101, .102. The re strictions are not
unrea sonable wh en b alanced with the sig nificant c osts of defe nding L eonar d’s likely frivolous lawsuits in the future.

Mo re ov e r, the statut e do e s n ot d isc ri min a te a g a ins t pro se litigants or “ the Davids wh o s ue Go liaths .” L e on ard c omp la ins that be c a

us e on ly pro se lit ig ants , a

nd no t ot he r i nd ivi du a ls such as attorney s are subjected to the ve x atious liti g ant statute, his equal pr otection rig hts were violated. An equal protec tion claim is not l imited to members of a la rg e cla ss, but can be br oug ht by a “cla ss of one,” wher e the plaintiff alleg es that he has be en intentionally treated diffe rently

from others similarly

situated and that ther e is no rational basis for the differ ence in treatment. See V illage

o f W illow brook v. O lech , 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); s e e a ls o A ll e g h e n y P it ts b u r

g h Co a l Co. v. Cou nty Com mi

ssi on of W

e bs te r Co un ty , 488 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1989) . “‘The purpose of the equa l protec tion cl au s e o f t he F ourtee nth Amendment is to secure ever y person within the State’s jur isd ic tio n a g a ins t in te nti on a l and arb itr ary disc ri min a tio n, wh e the r o c c a sio ne d b y e xpre ss t e rm s of a statute or by its im proper execution throug h duly

constituted ag ents.’” Olech , 528 U.S. at 564 (q u o t i n g Sioux City

Br idge Co. v . D ak

ota Cou nty , 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923) ( quoting Sunday Lake Ir on Co. v . To wns hip of W ak e fie ld , 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)). A s s u m i n g wi thout deciding that L eonar d could bring an equal pr otection claim bec ause he is within a class of pro se lit ig ants , o r i n10

a c la s s b y h im s e lf

, w e f in d th a t th e s tatute d o e s n o t im p li c a te h is c o n s ti tuti o n a l r ig ht to equal protec tion. Attorney s are subject to sa nctions in va

rious forms, including monetary s anctions pursuant to rule 13. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 13. S imilarly , pro se litigants are subject to cha pter 11 of the civil prac tice and r emedies c ode. L eonar d alleg es that he w as found to b e a vexatious litigant and his rig ht to e qual protec tion wa s violated bec ause unlike a ppellees, he does not have financ ial or political resour ces. To the co n t ra ry , t he re cord de monstrates that L eonar d was a djudicated a vexatious l itigant be cause the trial court found that he met the statutory require ments under c hapter 11 of the c ivi l pra c tic e and re me die s cod e . Cha pte r 1 1 d oe s n ot u

nla wf ull y dis c ri min a te a g a ins t pr o
se lit ig ants or vio la te L e on ard ’s c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t o e qu a l pr ote c tio n. We o ve rr ule L e on ard ’s fi rs t
and fo ur th i ssu e s.
Vexat ious l itigant order

I n L eonar d’s s econd issue, he arg ues t hat t here is insufficient evidence that he filed five law suits that were f

inally deter mined adver sely

to him, as require d by

section 1 1 .054(1), or , alternatively , that he re peate dly relitigat ed o r attempted to re litigate, pr o s e , prior litigation, as require d by

section 11.054(2)
. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.054. Under chapte r 11 of the c ivil practice and reme dies code, as previously noted, a tria l
c ourt “ may find a plaintiff a

vexatious l itigant” if ce rtain statutory elements a

re me t. Tex. C iv. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 11.054 (empha sis added)
. The legislature ’s us e of the t erm “may ” denote s that t h e c o u rth a s d i s c r e t i o n , o n c e i th a s m a d e t h e r e qu i r e d s t a t u t o r y f i n d i n g s , t o d e c l ar e a

p a rt y a vexatious l itigant. Se e De v oll ,155 S.W .3d at 502 (re viewing chapte r eleven i ssues under a buse of dis c re tio n s tand ard ); see also Tex. Go v ’t Code Ann. § 311.016 (West 2005) (“ may ” cr eate s11

discretionar

y authority or g rants per

mission or a power” ); cf. Bocque t v. Herring , 972 S.W .2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998) (dec laratory judgme nt act g ives trial cour t discretion i n ultimate decision of whe ther to awar d attorney

fee s). Acc ording ly , we r eview th e tr ial court’s ultimate de termination that L eonar d is a vexatious litiga

nt unde r an abuse of

discretion standa

rd. Se e De v oll ,155 S.W .3d at 502. I t is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to rule arbitra rily , unrea sonably , without reg ard to guiding leg al principles, or w ithout supporting evidenc e. See B ocquet , 972 S.W .2d at 20.

H o w e v e r , b e c a

u s e a t r i a l c o u rtm ay

e x e r c i s e i t s d i s c r e t i o nt o d e c l a r e a p a r t y a vexatious litiga

nt only if it f

irst makes presc ribed statutory evidentiar y finding s, we also revie w the trial court’ s subsidiary finding s under chapte r 11 for leg al and f actua l sufficienc y . Cf. Bocquet , 972 S.W. 2d a t 21 (a dd

re ssi ngana log ou s is su e un de r d e c larator y jud g me nt a c t) ; T e x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m. Cod e Ann. § 1 1. 05 4. L e on ard a tt acks on ly th is a sp e c t of the tr ia l c ourt ’s fi nd ingthat he wa s a vexatious l itigant. In revie wing a leg al suffic iency challeng e, the no- evidenc e cha lleng e fa ils if there is more than a sc intill a of e vidence to support the finding
. See BMC S o f t ware Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand , 8 3 S. W.3 d 7 89 , 7 95 (T e x. 20 02 ); Tempest Broadcasting Co r p. v. Im lay , 150 S.W .3d 861, 868 (Tex. A

pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, no pet.). In revie wing a fa ctual suff iciency challeng e,
we se t aside the trial court’s decision only if its ruling is so contra ry to the overw helming w eig ht of the evidence as to be clearly wrongand manife stly unjust. See Cai n v . B ain , 709 S.W .2d 175, 176 (T e x. 19 86 ); Imlay , 150 S.W .3d at 868.

As detailed in the b ac k gro u n d s ec t i o n , i nt h e s ev en -y ear

period immediately

prec eding appellee s’ April 14, 2003 motion, L eonar d has commenc ed, prose cuted, a nd maintained in pr op ria persona at least five litigations, other than in a small claims court, that have bee n finally deter mined adver sely to him. Although L eonar d argues t hat one lawsuit should not be included a s one of f iveF ur the rm or e , be c a

us e the “ e le c tio n la

ws uit ” wa s p ro pe rl y

inc lud e d, L e on ard ’s du e pr oc e ss 5 rig hts, if any , wer e not “violated by the t rial court’s not timely ruling on [hi s] m otion not to count one of the lawsuits.” 12 litigations that was f

inally deter mined adver se to his interests bec ause it wa s an ele ction contest, we dis a g re e . Are vie w o f L e on ard ’s ple a din g s in that c a se , a

c e rt if ie d c op y of wh ic h wa s att ach e d to appellee s’ motion, revea ls that he reque sted a de clar ation that the re fer endum authoriz ing construction of a

new a rena be declare d void. I n any event, the statute only excludes liti g ation filed in s ma ll c la ims c ourt , n ot e le c tio n c on te sts fi le d in a dis tr ic t c ourt
. See Te x. Civ . Pr a c . & Re m.

5 Cod e Ann. § 11 .0 54 (a ) ( Wes t 20 02 ). Ce rt if ie d c op ie s o f t

he ple a din g s and

or de rs we re a tta c he d to
a pp e lle e s’ mot ion

to d e c lare L e on ard a ve xati ou s litig ant. Th e fi ve laws uit s a re the fo llo wi ngc a

us e numbers: (1) 98- 09828, dismis s ed b y the district court for

lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and aff irmed on appea l by this Court; (2) GN0-00717, dismissed for la ck of subjec t-matter jurisdiction; (3) GN 00151 6, dismiss ed by the district court for

lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and aff

irmed
on a pp e a l by thi s Co ur

t; ( 4) 00 -1 2- 07 63 3- CV , d ism iss e d b y the dis tr ic t c ourt

fo r l a c k o f s ub

je c tmatter jurisdiction and a ffirme d on appea l by the Be aumont Court of Appea ls; and (5) GN 201013, dismiss ed by

the district court for

lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and d i smissed for wa nt of jurisdiction by

this Court on appeal. Afte r filing these five suits, all of which we re dismissed on jur isd ic tio na l g ro un ds and fi na lly de te rm ine d a dv e rs e to h im, L e on ard fi le d the tw o und e rl y ingsu its in t his c a se on

the ve ry same g ro un ds , a s he a dmi ts in his pe tit ion s. Th e re is m or e tha n a sc int ill a of evidenc e to suppor

t the finding that L eonar d met the re quirements of se ction 11.054(1), a nd that finding is not so contrary to the overw helming w eight o f t h e ev idence as to be c lear ly wrongand
un jus t. We ho ld t

hat th e re wa s f

a c tua lly and le g a lly su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e that

a pp e lle e s me t th e irWe do not r eac h the issue of whe ther a ppellees me t their burden unde r anothe r sec tion of 6 the statute. See Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.054(2) ( West 2002). The bonds ar e “valid and incontestibl e in a court or ot her form and ar e binding obligations 7 for a ll purposes ac cordingto their terms: (1) a fter the public secur ity is approved by t h e attorne y g ener al and reg istered by the comptroll er; and (2) on issuance of the public sec urity .” Te x . Gov’t Code Ann. § 1202.006 (West 2000) . Appellee s argue that, under this section, L eonar d’s claims ar e moo t. B e c a

us e the ve xati ou s litig ant fi nd ing wi ll af fe c t L e on ard in the futur e , w e a dd re ss t he me ri ts of this issue. 13 burden of proof a nd that the trial cour

t did not abuse its discretion. Se e id
. § 1 1
. 054(a) (1)
. We 6
overr ule L eonar d’s sec ond issue.
No r e as ona ble pr oba bili tyth atLe ona r d would p r e va il

I n his t h i rd i s s u e, L eonar d argues that appe llees fa iled to show there w as no
rea sonable proba

bility that he would preva il in this law suit. We disa g ree . Ag ain, L eonar d admitted in hi s p le a d in g s th a t th is la w s u it c o n ta in s th e “ s a me r e qu e s t f o r r e li e f h a s b e e n in c lu d e d in one lawsuit or an o t h er co n t i nuously from August 31, 1998 through January 27, 2003.” With the knowledg e that ea ch of the se pre vious la wsuits ha s been dismiss ed on jurisdictional g rounds, that
a pp e lle e s are g e ne ra lly e nti tle d to so ve re ig n immun ity , and that the bo nd s are g e ne ra lly inc on te sti ble at this point, L eonar d filed the same pleadingag ain. Appellees met their burde n of showing that 7 t h er e wa s no rea sonable proba bility that L eonar d would preva il. Se e id
. § 1 1
. 0 5 4
. W e o v e r r ule L eonar d’s third issue.
L i mi ta ti o n o n o ra l a rg u men t t i me

I n his fifth is sue, L eonar d complains that the trial cour t violated his right to due proce ss by

limit ing his time to prese nt oral argument at the hear ing on his moti on for e x tension of14

time to furnish secur ity and appellee s’ motion to dismiss
. Both motions we re hear d o n J u n e 19, 2003. The trial court has wide discretion in f ix ing the time a llowed for oral a rg ument and g ranting motions for an extension of time. See A ultman v. Dallas Ry. &Terminal Co. , 260 S.W .2d 596, 600 ( T e x. 1953); Siddiqui v. Y ellow Freight Sys., Inc. , N o . 0 3

- 9 8

- 0 0 5 1 7
- C V , 2 0 0 0 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 6 5 6 8 , a t* 2 0

- 2 1 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s t i n2 0 0 0 , p e t
. d e n i e d ) ( n o td e s i g n a t e d f o r p u b l i c a tio n) ; see also Carpenter v. Cimarr o n Hy drocarbons Corp. , 98 S.W .3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2002). I n his moti on for extension of tim e, L eonar d argued that he c ould not a ffor d to f urnish the sec urity

and would “be too busy challeng ing the order

to furnish t he sec urity

to raise money

soon.” Howe ver, the trial court
a ll o w e d L e o n ar d to p r e s e n t o r a l ar g u me n t th a t u lt im a te ly c o n s ti tute d s ix p a g e s o f th e tr an s c r ip t. We hold that, under the circ umstances prese nted in this case , the trial court did not abuse its discre tion by limit ing the time for ora l argument or deny ing th e m o t i on for e x tension of time for f urnish the
secur ity . We overrule L eonar d’s fifth issue.
Dism issal w ith prejudice

I n h is s ixth i ssu e , L e on ard argue s th at hi s su it s ho uld no t ha ve be e n d ism iss e d w ith pr e jud ic e . H ow e ve r, the e rr or in d ism iss inga

c a se wi th pr e

jud ic e c ann ot b e ra ise d f

or the fi rs t ti me
on appea l a

nd must be prese nted to the trial cour t. See B ird v. Kornman , 1 5 2 S. W. 3 d 1 5 4 , 1 6 1 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2004, no pe t.); A n d r ew s v. ABJ

Adjusters, Inc. , 8 0 0 S. W. 2 d 5 6 7 , 5 6 8

- 6 9 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1 990, writ denied) . To complain about a n err or in the judg ment rende red, L eonar d was required to pre sent the er ror to the tria l court in a timely post-judgme nt mot i on such as a

motion to alter or cor

rec t the judgme nt or a motion for ne w trial. See A rthur’s Garage, Inc . v. Rac al-Chubb Sec. Sy s., Inc. , 997 S.W .2d 803, 816 (T ex . App.—Dallas 1999, noL eonar d’s orig inal motion for new tria l was filed in May 2003 in response to the ve x atious 8 lit ig ant or de r, a month b e fo re the tr ia l c ourt dis mis se d h is c la ims wi th p re jud ic e a ft e r L e on ard

did n o tf u r n i s h t h e r e qu i r e d

s e c u r i t y. 15 pet. )
. T h e f

in a l ju d g me n t d is mi s s in g L e o n ar d ’ s c la im s w it h p r e ju d ic e w a s s ig n e d Ju n e 19, 2003. On July 23 , 20 03 , L e on ard fi le d a F ir st Sup ple me nta l Mo tio n fo r Ne w H e ari ng , a rguin g fo r t

he fi rs t time that the case should h av e been dismissed without prejudice
. The supplementa l motion, 8 howeve r, wa s not timely filed wit hin thirty day s of the judg ment and ther efor e ca nnot be consider ed. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 329b; Ba nk of T e x ., N.A . v . M

e x ia , 135 S
. W
. 3 d 3 5 6 , 359 (Tex. App.—Dallas 20 04 , pe t. de nie d)
. Al tho ug h L eon ard a pp ears pr o s e , he must comply with the rele vant rules of proce dural a

nd substantive law. Se e Fa re tta v . Ca lif or nia , 4 22 U. S. 80 6, 83 4 n .4 6 ( 19 75 ); Strange v. Continental Cas. Co. , 1 26 S.W. 3d 67 6, 67 7- 78 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 4, pe t. d e nie d) . B e c a us e the iss ue wa s n ot t ime ly

pr e se nte d to the tr ia l c ourt , it wa s w a ive d. We o ve rr

ule L e on ard ’s sixth issue.
CO NC LU SION

Ha vin g ov e rr

ule d a ll o f L e on ard ’s iss ue s, we a ff ir m th e or de rs of

the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: Jul y

21, 2005