alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Carmen Blas et al., Respondents, v R.M.H. Realty Corp. et al., Defendants, and City of New York, Appellant.

[772 NYS2d 606]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant City of New York appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Held, J.), dated December 13, 2002, which, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability finding it 100% at fault in the happening of the accident, and upon the granting of its motion to set aside the damage awards as excessive only to the extent of reducing the jury verdict on the issue of damages in favor of the plaintiff Carmen Bias from the sum of $444,888.33 to $250,000 for past pain and suffering, and from the sum of $400,850 to $150,000 for future pain and suffering, is in favor of that plaintiff and against it in the principal sum of $400,000.

*417Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the facts and as a matter of discretion, with costs, and a new trial is granted on the issue of damages only, unless within 30 days after service upon the plaintiffs of a copy of this decision and order, the plaintiff Carmen Bias shall serve and file with the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, a written stipulation consenting to further reduce the verdict as to damages for past pain and suffering from the sum of $250,000 to the sum of $125,000, and to further reduce the verdict as to damages for future pain and suffering from the sum of $150,000 to the sum of $75,000, and to the entry of an appropriate amended judgment accordingly; in the event that the plaintiff Carmen Bias so stipulates, then the judgment, as so further reduced and amended, is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that whether the markings on the pothole map entered into evidence gave the appellant the required prior written notice of the sidewalk defect where the injured plaintiff fell was an issue for the jury. “Where there are factual disputes regarding the precise location of the defect that allegedly caused a plaintiffs fall, and whether the alleged defect is designated on the map, the question should be resolved by a jury” *(Quinn v City of New York,*305 AD2d 570, 571 [2003]; *see Patane v City of New York,*284 AD2d 513 [2001]; *David v City of New York,*267 AD2d 419 [1999]).

The damage awards for past and future pain and suffering, as reduced by the Supreme Court, deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation to the extent indicated herein *(see*CPLR 5501 [c]); *Conte v City of New York,*300 AD2d 430 [2002]; *Stylianou v Calabrese,*297 AD2d 798 [2002]; *Jansen v Raimondo & Son Constr. Corp.,*293 AD2d 574 [2002]; *Mojica v City of New York,*199 AD2d 250 [1993]).

The appellant’s remaining contention is unpreserved for appellate review and, in any event, without merit. Santucci, J.P., Florio, Schmidt and Mastro, JJ., concur.
#### State ex rel. Attorney General, Petitioner, vs. Name-Kagon Hydro Company, Respondent. Same, Petitioner, vs. Winter Electric Light *&*Power Company, Respondent.

*April 11*

May *6, 1952.*

The *Attorney General*and *Roy G. Tulane,*assistant attorney general, for the petitioner.

*Glen H. Bell*and *Charles P. Seibold,*both of Madison, and *Douglas & Omernik*of Spooner, for the respondents.

Per Curiam :

The petition of the state in the two above-named causes asking leave of this court to commence original actions for injunctions against the construction of hydroelectric power dams in the Namekagon and Chippewa rivers is denied. This denial is in accord with the position stated by the attorney general in his brief, that the proposed original actions are unnecessary if this court should determine that administrative review is available to the parties in the cases of *Luening v. Public Service Comm.,*ante, p. 516, 53 N. W. (2d) 525, and *Muench v. Public Service Comm.,*ante, p. 492, 53 N. W. (2d) 514, which cases involve the same two proposed dams which are described in the state’s petition herein. In our decisions in said two cases we have held that administrative review is available to the parties.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

May 11, 2016

No. 04-15-00433-CV

TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY & POST OAK CLEAN 

GREEN, INC.,

Appellant

v.

GUADALUPE COUNTY GROUNDWATER CONSERVATION DISTRICT,

Appellee

From the 2nd 25th Judicial District Court, Guadalupe County, Texas

Trial Court No. 14-0863-CV

Honorable W.C. Kirkendall, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Sitting: Karen Angelini, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

The panel has considered the appellee’s motion for rehearing, and the motion is 

DENIED.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 11th day of May, 2016.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
AUGUST TERM, 1861.

#### TATHAM *v.*WILSON.

Where a husband and wife brought suit in a court of equity for the distribution of a fund limited to thorn and others by deed, as joint owners, and after an interlocutory decree for an account, but before the account was taken, the husband died, it was *held*that the wife, surviving, was entitled to the fund.

This cause was removed from Macon county.

After the hearing of the cause at a former term of the Court, and a decree for an account against the defendants, who had the fund in their possession, it was referred to Mr. Dodge, the cleric of this Court, to report the names of the children of E'aehel Wilson, and the amount of the severaljsharos to which each was entitled.

The clerk reported at large, and there was no exception taken to his report, except one, filed by W. L. love, the ad*251ministrator of William Tatham. In the report* the clerfc states that William Tatham intermarried with Isabella* on© of the children of Rachel Wilson, and joined with his wife and others in bringing the suit for the proceeds of the property, limited to them after the death ©f Rachel Wilson, and that a decree was passed declaring-the plaintiffs entitled to. an account of the fund, and' that, after-ward's, the-said William Tath-am died, and Mr. Love administered and became a party to-thesuit, and the question was made before the commissioner, whether the share of said fund belonging- originally to Isabella, the wife of said William, enured to. his representative, or whether she is entitled to the same.

The commissioner reported that Isabella Tatham, the wife, was entitled to the share aforesaid, and on this ground, the administrator excepts.

The cans© being-set down for argument, it was argued at this term by

*Henry*and *Shipp,*for Love, the administrator, and

*Gaither*and *N. W. Woodfin,*for Mrs. Tatha.m..

PearsoN, C. J.

The exception is over-ruled. It is clearly settled, that where a husband dies, after an interlocutory decree for an account, the wife surviving, becomes entitled to the amount that may be recovered by the final decree; indeed, the wife, surviving, is entitled, although the husband should not die until after final decree; for he does not actually reduce the chose into possession by a judgment or final decree ; that can only be done by execution or payment to. the husband, and the legal effect given to a judgment or decree, is to give the husband the benefit of taking, by survivorship, in case of the wife’s death ; *Nanny*v. *Martin,,*1 Eq. Ca. Ab. 68; *McCauley*v. *Phillips,*4 Ves. Jun’r. 15.

Per Curiam, Decree according to report..
*May 1, 1945.*

#### Brunner, Appellant, vs. Industrial Commission and others, Respondents.

For the appellant: *Ken Traeger*of Gresham.

For the respondent Industrial Commission: *John E. Martin,*attorney general, and *Mortimer Levitan,*assistant attorney general.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.

Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on May 1, 1945.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

18 U.S.C. Section 1350,

as Adopted Pursuant to

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the annual
report of Pretium Packaging, L.L.C. and Pretium Finance, Inc. (the Companies) on Form 10-K for the period ended September 30, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I,
George A. Abd, the Chief Executive Officer of the Companies, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Companies.
| | -- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: December 19, 2011



| |  |                        
| |  | -----------------------
| |  | /s/ George A. Abd      
| |  | George A. Abd          
| |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### Marco, Appellant, vs. Whiting, Respondent.

*January 20*

February *15, 1944.*

*622For the appellant there were briefs by *Eugene S. Colburn*of Chicago, Illinois, attorney, and *Richard C. Laus*of Oshkosh, *John E. O’Brien*of Fond du Lac, and *Leslie L. Lyons*of Chicago, Illinois, of counsel, and oral argument by *Mr. Laus, Mr. O’Brien,*and *Mr. Lyons.*

For the respondent there were briefs by *Bouck, Hilton & Dempsey*of Oshkosh, and *Bendinger, Hayes & Kluwin*of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Gerald F. Hayes.*

Fairchild, J.

The court below, on undisputed and indisputable facts, reached the opinion that appellant at the time she signed the releases was not under duress and that she acted as she did for other reasons and on sufficient consideration in accepting the settlement of the matter in dispute.

In this case the evidence placed before the circuit court on the motion for summary judgment was such that a verdict in plaintiff’s favor based on it could not be permitted to stand. The evidence is such that no conceivable facts can exist to warrant further consideration of the matter. The summary judgment is recognized as a drastic procedure and one not to be availed of except when it is apparent that there is no substantial issue to be tried. However, when a thorough consideration is made of the uncontroverted facts brought forth and it appears that such facts if established on a trial would impel a direction of a verdict by the court, no issue exists and an entry of summary judgment is properly made. *Prime Mfg. Co. v. A. F. Gallun & Sons Corp.*229 Wis. 348, 281 N. W. 697; *Petrie v. Roberts,*242 Wis. 539, 8 N. W. (2d) 355.

Appellant has retained the benefits of the settlement including the advantage of the dismissal of an action which respondent had begun against her' as well as the case begun by respondent’s children. We note, without making any deter-*623initiation upon it since it is not discussed in the briefs, a serious question whether plaintiff has any standing to affirm the contract and to sue for damages occasioned by defendant’s alleged duress. It is elementary that in cases of contract procured by fraud the defrauded party may disaffirm the contract and sue in equity for rescission and cancellation, or he may affirm the contract and sue in deceit for damages. The difficulty in duress is that there has been no clear recognition of duress as a tort. Mr. Williston in his work on Contracts (rev. ed.), vol. 5, p>. 4546, sec. 1626, discussing the effect of duress upon a contract, states:

“Save in exceptional cases referred to in the previous section, duress renders the transaction voidable. It is not necessarily a tort in itself, as is fraudulent misrepresentation, but generally only gives to the party coerced a right to rescind the transaction whether executory or executed. . .

See, however, note, 39 Harvard Law Review, 108, for the view that the law should recognize a tort of duress.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>


                                                                   EXHIBIT 32.1


          CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED
            PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of SEEC, Inc. (the
"Company") for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2003, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on August 14, 2003 (the "Report"), the
undersigned, in the capacities and dates listed below, hereby certify pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff upon request.


Date:  August 21, 2003                         /s/ RAVINDRA KOKA
                                 -----------------------------------------------
                                                 Ravindra Koka
                                 President, Chief Executive Officer and Director
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#### Barrus and others, Respondents, vs. Duxstad and another, Appellants. [Four cases.]

*October 17*

November *20, 1945.*

The cause was submitted for the appellants on the brief of Dougherty, *Grubb & Ryan*of Janesville, and for the respondents on the brief of *McGowan & Geffs*of Janesville.

Fritz, J.

The sole question involved herein is whether there was sufficient credible evidence to sustain the jury’s findings that Pearl Duxstad was guilty of negligence in respect to lookout, management and control, which proximately caused the damages sustained by plaintiffs. Upon reviewing the record, it is evident that there was sufficient evidence, which could be considered credible by the jury, to warrant its findings; that upon the ultimate facts found thereby the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, as is provided in the judgments; *648and that as defendants do not contend there was prejudicial error in any other respect the judgments must be affirmed.

*By the Court.*— Judgments affirmed.
#### Witmore et al. v. Burgan, Sheriff.

1. Appeal: question no longer material: appeal dismissed. Where it is made to appear that the only question, involved in an appeal to this court has ceased to be of any interest to either party, the appeal will be dismissed.

*Appeal from an order of the Hon. John Chaney, Judge of the Circtdt Court of the Third Judicial District*

Thursday, December 2.

The facts of the case are stated in the opinion.

*Towner c& Lucas,*for appellants.

*IT. T. Granger*and *W. 0. Mitchell,*for appellee.

Seevers, J.

An information was filed before a justice of the peace charging that the plaintiffs had conspired and confederated together for the purpose of committing a felony. There was a trial, and the justice determined that there was reasonable ground to believe that plaintiffs had committed the crime charged, and they were required to give bail to appear and answer to any indictment found by the grand jury. Failing to give the required bail, they were “committed” to the custody of the defendant, as sheriff. Thereupon they *162sued out a writ of *habeas corpus,*and upon the bearing the judge remanded them to the custody of the sheriff, and from this order the appeal was taken. Since the submission of this cause, upon the intervention of the attorney-gen eral, the court is informed that the plaintiffs have been indicted by the grand jury. Should we, therefore, affirm the order of the circuit judge, no beneficial result would be obtained, and such would be the case if we should reverse such order, for now the plaintiffs are held under the indictment, and not under the judgment of the justice, or order of the circuit judge. The appeal will therefore be dismissed, and each party must pay his own costs.

Dismissed.
----

| 1 | the      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;and |
|---|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2 | the      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company      as of the dates and for the periods explained in the    report. |
|---|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | /s/  MichaelGarin  |   | /s/  Wallace      Macmillan                                            |   |
|--------|------------------------------|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|   | Michael      Garin           |   | Wallace      Macmillan                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  |   |
|   | Chief      Executive Officer |   | Chief      Financial Officer                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            |   |
|   |                         |   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |   |
|   | July      30, 2008           |   | July      30, 2008                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      |   |

----
*October 14, 1947.*

#### Estate of Lindh : Lundgren, Respondent, vs. Lindh, Administrator, Appellant.

For the appellant: *Morris E. Yager*of Frederic.

For the respondent: *Nelton & McGinnis*of Balsam Lake.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302**

**OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I,Murray Nicol, certify that: 

 

1. I have reviewed this annualreport on Form 10-K of AmerInst Insurance Group, Ltd.; 

 

2.Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleadingwith respect to the period covered by this report; 

 

3. Based onmy knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, theperiods presented in this report; 

 

4. The registrant’sother certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

 

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, orcaused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities,particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the endof the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and 

 

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth quarter inthe case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internalcontrol over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions): 

 

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control overfinancial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significantrole in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date:April 2, 2007