alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-30250

Summary Calendar

 

STEPHEN A. KLAIMON

 Plaintiff - Appellant

 versus

CIGNA COMPANIES, ET AL

 Defendants

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

 Defendant - Appellee

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

STEPHEN A. KLAIMON

 Plaintiff - Appellant

 versus

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

 Defendant - Appellee

 

No. 97-30375 

Summary Calendar

 

STEPHEN A. KLAIMON

 Plaintiff - Appellant

 versus

CIGNA COMPANIES, ET AL
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

2

 Defendants

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

 Defendant - Appellee

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

STEPHEN A. KLAIMON

 Plaintiff - Appellant

 versus

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA

 Defendant - Appellee

 

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

(95-CV-3597-J & 96-CV-3457-J)

 

February 19, 1998

 

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Stephen A. Klaimon appeals from summary judgment orders

entered against him on his Title VII and negligent and intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims, as well as from an adverse

jury verdict on a defamation claim. We affirm.

The district court properly entered summary judgment against

Klaimon on his Title VII claim. As we have long stressed, the
3

filing of a charge with the EEOC is a prerequisite to instituting

a Title VII action in federal court. See National Ass’n of Govern.

Emp. v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 711 (5th Cir. 1994).

Klaimon makes conclusory allegations that he pursued relief

administratively, yet he produced no record evidence to that

effect. Nor has he demonstrated an equitable entitlement to relief

from the administrative exhaustion requirement. Accordingly, his

Title VII claim is barred.

Likewise, the district court properly granted summary judgment

against Klaimon on his intentional and negligent infliction of

emotional distress claims. Klaimon’s complaint did not allege so

egregious a course of conduct on the part of the defendant to

satisfy Louisiana’s strict standards for employment-related

intentional infliction of emotional distress claims. See Booth v.

Intertrans Corp., 1995 WL 324631, at *17 (E.D. La. May 26, 1995).

Similarly, Klaimon has failed to demonstrate how his negligent

infliction of emotional distress claim is not barred by Louisiana’s

workers’ compensation scheme. See La. R.S. 23:1032.

Finally, Klaimon raises a number of challenges to the district

court’s discovery rulings and the outcome of the trial. We find

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in making its

discovery orders. See Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d

1435, 1441 (5th Cir. 1993). Klaimon’s complaints about the jury

verdict are largely unsupported by record evidence or legal
4

argument and accordingly are without merit. See Yohey v. Collins,

985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993).

AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>
 
                                                                   EXHIBIT 11
                                                                                

                               OPEN MARKET, INC.
                       COMPUTATION OF EARNINGS PER SHARE
                     (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER SHARE DATA)



<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                THREE MONTHS ENDED               NINE MONTHS ENDED
                                                  SEPTEMBER 30,                    SEPTEMBER 30,
                                          ---------------------------     -----------------------------
                                               1997           1996             1997             1996
                                          -----------    ------------     ------------    -------------
<S>                                      <C>            <C>              <C>             <C>
Net loss.............................      $(6,372)       $(5,870)         $(55,026)       $(19,396)
                                          ===========    ============     ============    =============
 
WEIGHTED AVERAGE NUMBER OF
 SHARES OUTSTANDING
 
Weighted average common shares
 outstanding.........................       30,832         28,186            30,225          18,379
 
Shares to be issued (other
 equity).............................          644              -               573               -
 
Weighted average shares to
 reflect common stock options
 issued after March 31, 1996,
 pursuant to the treasury stock
 method..............................           -               -                -            1,896
 
Weighted average shares to
 reflect the conversion of
 Series A, B and C Preferred
 Stock...............................           -               -                -            7,038
                                          -----------    ------------    -------------    -------------
Pro forma weighted average
 number of common and common
 equivalent shares outstanding.......       31,476         28,186            30,798          27,313
                                          ===========    ============     ============    =============
 
Pro forma net loss per common
 and common equivalent share.........      $ (0.20)       $ (0.21)         $  (1.79)         $(0.71)
                                          ===========    ============     ============    =============
</TABLE>

                                      -1-
----

**Exhibit 32.1**

Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,    as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB of Envirokare Tech, Inc. (the "Company") for the year ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, I, George E. Kazantzis, President (President and Principal Financial Officer) and Louis F. Savelli (Chief Executive Officer) of the Company, hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,

That the report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this Certificate on this 31st day of March 2008.

/s/ George E. Kazantzis    Name: George E. Kazantzis    Title: President (Principal Financial Officer)/s/ Louis F. Savelli    Name: Louis F. Savelli    Title: Chief Executive Officer (Chief Executive Officer)
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 207 (Friday, October 25, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 85274-85275]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-24894]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration #20558 and #20559; NEBRASKA Disaster Number NE-
20003]


Presidential Declaration Amendment of a Major Disaster for Public 
Assistance Only for the State of Nebraska

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 1.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for Public Assistance Only for the State of Nebraska 
(FEMA--4808-DR), dated August 20, 2024.
    Incident: Severe Storms, Straight-Line Winds, Tornadoes, and 
Flooding.
    Incident Period: May 20, 2024, through June 3, 2024.

DATES: Issued on October 15, 2024.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: November 14, 2024.

[[Page 85275]]

    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: May 20, 
2025.

ADDRESSES: Visit the MySBA Loan Portal at https://lending.sba.gov to 
apply for a disaster assistance loan.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Recovery & Resilience, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd 
Street SW, Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for Private Non-Profit organizations in the State of 
Nebraska, dated August 20, 2024, is hereby amended to extend the 
deadline for filing applications for physical damages as a result of 
this disaster to November 14, 2024. This notice is further amended to 
include the following areas as adversely affected by the disaster.

Primary Counties:
    Lincoln, Sarpy.

    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

Rafaela Monchek,
Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Disaster Recovery & 
Resilience.
[FR Doc. 2024-24894 Filed 10-24-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8026-09-P
#### State of Iowa v. J. B. Daniels, Appellant.

Defective Indictment: False Pretenses. An indictment for ob-taming a signature by false pretenses, must aver that it was obtained with intent to defraud, and the objection that there is no such averment may be raised on appeal, for the first time.

*Appeal from Harrison District Court.*— Hon. Scott M. Ladd, Judge.

Tuesday, May 8, 1894.

Indictment for designedly and by false pretenses securing tbe signature of another to a written instrument. There was a verdict of guilty and a judgment, from which the defendant *appealed.*

Reversed.

*492
      *S. JEL. Cochran*for appellant.

*John T. Stone,*Attorney General, and *Thomas A. Cheshire*for the state.

GteaNGee, C. J.

The section of the Code under which the indictment is found is 4073, and it provides that “if any person designedly or by false pretenses, * * * and with intent to defraud, * * obtain the signature of any person to a written instrument, * * * he shall be punished,” etc. The indictment in this case charges the obtaining of the signature of one D. A. Bendon to a promissory note, but it does not charge that the signature was obtained with intent to defraud, and it is urged that the indictment is fatally defective. It is clearly so, and that fact is not questioned in argument, but it is said that no objection of any kind was made to the indictment below, nor was there a motion in arrest of judgment, and that the objection can not be first raised in this court. That rule obtains in civil, but not in criminal, cases. The law requires the supreme court, on appeal in criminal cases, to examine the record and, without regard to technical errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties, render such judgments on the record as the law demands. Code, section 4538. In *State v. Potter,*28 Iowa, 554, the above language is quoted, and it is then said: “We would not, in a criminal case, affirm a judgment when it appears that the defendant is charged with no offense against the laws, though he should in no stage of the proceedings, either in this court or the court below, object on that ground.” By the failure of the indictment to charge that the signature was obtained with intent to defraud, no offense is stated, and there can be no legal conviction under it. The judgment is REVERSED.
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A18A0690. LATONYA BURKS v. STEPHON BURKS.

StephonBurksfiled a petition for contempt against his ex-wife,Latonya Burks,

alleging that she had violated certain provisions of the parties’ divorce decree. The

trial court entered an order finding Latonya Burks in contempt for failing to provide

Stephon Burks with medical information concerning their minor child. Latonya

Burks then appealed directly to this Court. We lack jurisdiction.

Where, as here, the underlying action involves rights and obligations arising

out of a divorce decree, the case is a domestic relations matter within the meaning of

OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2). See Walker v. Estate of Mays, 279 Ga. 652, 653 (1) (619

SE2d 679) (2005). Appeals in such matters must be initiated by filing an application

for discretionary review. See OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (2), (b); accord Voyles v. Voyles,

301 Ga. 44, 47 (799 SE2d 160) (2017) (an appeal in a domestic relations case in

which child custody is not at issue must be brought by discretionary application). 

“[C]ompliance with the discretionary appeals procedure is jurisdictional.” Fabe v.

Floyd, 199 Ga. App. 322, 332 (1) (405 SE2d 265) (1991). Latonya Burks’s failure 

December 01, 2017
to follow the discretionary review procedure deprives us of jurisdiction over this

appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED. See id.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

12/01/2017
Order filed April 10, 20 12

.

In The 

## Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________ NO. 14

- 12

- 000 2 0

- CV

____________ GILBERT GILES , Appellant

V.

SHUNDA GILES , Appellee

On Appeal from the 247th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 1997

- 47863



### O R D E R
According to the notice of appeal, t his is an appeal from a dismissal order signed November 10, 2011

. The clerk ’ s record was filed April 3, 2012

.
Our review has determined that a relevant item has been omitt ed from the clerk ’ s record. See Tex. R. App . P. 34.5(c). The record does not contain the dismissal order signed November 10, 2011.

The Harris County District Clerk is directed to file a supplemental clerk ’ s record within 14 days of the date of this order , containing the dismissal order signed November 10, 2011.2

If the omitted item is not part of the case file, the district clerk is directed to file a supplemental clerk ’ s record containing a certified statement that the omitted item is not a part of the ca se file.

PER CURIAM
Exhibit 32.2:

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Quarterly Report of Hudson Technologies, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, James R. Buscemi, as Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                               
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|    |                                                                                                                                                     
|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







|s/ James R. Buscemi    
|-----------------------
|James R. Buscemi       
|Chief Financial Officer
|                       
|November 1, 2006
#### Hynds v. Fay Bros. & Co. et al.

1. Justices’ Courts: jurisdiction: hoee than $100: Reduction- by PETITION FILED AFTER DEMURRER: APPEARANCE. Where in an action before a justice of the peace the notice claims more than $100, the justice has no jurisdiction, and he is not given jurisdiction by the filing of a petition, after a demurrer to the jurisdiction has been filed, claiming less than $100. Hor does the appearance of the defendant, in such a case, to object to the jurisdiction, confer jurisdiction on the court.

*Appeal from the Superior Court of Cedar Rapids.*

Saturday, December 18.

, This action was brought before a justice of the peace to recover tbe possession of personal property alleged to be worth $19 dollars, and to recover $94 damages for the wrongful detention of the same. The justice issued a notice in the usual form, and the defendants filed a demurrer upon the ground that the justice had no jurisdiction. Before the time set for trial the plaintiff filed a petition, claiming the possession of the property, and $75 as damages. The justice, however, sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the case. On writ of error, the superior court affirmed the ruling of the justice, and the plaintiff appeals.

*J. F. Rioe*and *Geo. W. Wilson,*for appellant.

*J. C. Leonard*and *J. A. Reed,*for appellee.

Adams, Oh. J.

-The case comes to us upon a certificate. In it the court sets out, in substance, the facts above stated, and the question is whether, under the circumstances, the plea to the jurisdiction of the justice was properly sustained. In answering the question, we have to say that we think it was. "Where the notice, as in this case, shows that the claim is for more than $100, and that the justice has no jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the defendant might properly disregard it. Nothing could be done by the plaintiff after-*434wards, in that action, by which the justice could, acquire jurisdiction. It is true, another notice might be served of a different character, and of a kind which would give the court jurisdiction, but that would be virtually the commencing of a new action.

The fact that the defendants appeared in this case, and demurred to the jurisdiction, did not give the court jurisdiction. The *status*of the case was not changed. The court should have taken notice, of its own motion, that he had no jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. Appearance never confers jurisdiction, where the subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction of the court. Nor could the plaintiff, in this case, properly claim that he subsequently gave the court jurisdiction of the subject-matter by the petition subsequently filed, and that the court had already jurisdiction of the person by appearance, because the appearance was made when the court lacked jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and when, virtually, there was nothing before the court.

We think that the case was rightly dismissed.

AFFIRMED.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

 v.

JOSE LUIS FLORES-GONZALES,

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 12-50593

D.C. No. 3:12-cr-03727-LAB

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2013** 

Before: GOODWIN, WALLACE, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.

Jose Luis Flores-Gonzales appeals from the district court’s judgment and

challenges the 42-month sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for

being a removed alien found in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

FILED

DEC 30 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
 Flores-Gonzales contends that the district court procedurally erred by (1)

failing to expressly consider U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, a policy statement concerning

“departures based on inadequacy of criminal history;” and (2) using FloresGonzales’s previous sentence for illegal reentry rather than the relevant Guidelines

range as a starting point for sentencing. We review for plain error, see United

States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. 

The district court used the Guidelines range as the starting point in the sentencing

process, and adequately explained the sentence with reference to the 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th

Cir. 2008) (en banc).

Flores-Gonzales also contends that his sentence is substantively

unreasonable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing FloresGonzales’s sentence. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The

above-Guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the section

3553(a) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances, including FloresGonzales’s repeated immigration violations and his failure to be deterred by prior

sentences. See id.

AFFIRMED.

2 12-50593
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
 
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                          33,111
<SECURITIES>                                     8,683
<RECEIVABLES>                                   14,717
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,399
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                59,310
<PP&E>                                          17,298
<DEPRECIATION>                                   5,136
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  81,446
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           34,980
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            31
<OTHER-SE>                                      46,346
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    81,446
<SALES>                                         33,348
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                42,623
<CGS>                                            1,973
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    8,788
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                89,858
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 557
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (54,442)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       584
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (55,026)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (55,026)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (1.79)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (1.79)
        

</TABLE>
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Respondent 

 v. 

RICHARD TRUMPER, JR., 

 Petitioner 

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 926 MAL 2015 

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court 

ORDER 

PER CURIAM 

AND NOW, this 24th day of May, 2016, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED. 

Justice Wecht did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.