Interim Decision #1343 

Me nn or KINNEY 

In DEPORTATION Proceedings 

A-5585866 

Decided by Begird May 20, 1064 

Respondent's conviction of obtaining goods under false pretenses in violation 

of section 8 General Statutes of Connecticut, 1949 Revision (C.G.S.A. 

section 58-382), is not a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

Cmiu 

Order: Act of 1952—Section 241(a) (4) (8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (4)]—Two crimes 

after entry: breaking and entering (three counts) and larceny (three 

counts) (1957) ; obtaining goods under false pretenses (1958). 

This is an appeal by the trial attorney from the decision of the 

special inquiry officer holding that the respondent was not deportable 

upon the ground stated above. The question presented on the appeal 

is whether respondent's conviction for obtaining goods under false 

pretenses is a crime involving moral turpitude. The appeal will be 

dismissed. 

The respondent, a 38-year-old single male, native and citizen of 

Canada, was admitted to the United States for permanent residence 

on October 8, 1942, he last entered the United States about the summer 

of 1947 after a brief visit to Canada. His deportation is sought on 

the ground that he had been convicted of two crimes after entry. In 

1957 he was convicted on three counts of breaking and entering and on 

three counts of larceny, all, the special inquiry officer found, arising 

out of a single scheme. Respondent was fined $72. 

On June 23, 1958 respondent was convicted at Manchester, Connecticut for obtaining goods under +al% pretenses in violation of section 

8698, General Statutes of Connecticut, 1949 Revision (C.G.S.A., Section 53-362). The special inquiry officer held that the crime defined 

did not involve moral turpitude because intent to defraud was not an 

element; the Service contends the special inquiry officer is in error. 

Section 8698, General Statutes, reads as follows: Any person who 

knowingly makes or causes to be made, either directly or indirectly 

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or through any agency, any false statement in writing, with intent that 

it shall be relied upon, concerning the financial condition or means or 

ability to pay of himself or of any other person for whom he is acting 

or of any firm or corporation in which he is interested or for which he 

is acting, for the purpose of procuring, for his own benefit or for 

the benefit of such person, firm or corporation, the delivery of personal 

property, the payment of cash, the marring of a loan or credit, the 

extension of a credit, the discount of an account receivable or the making, acceptance, discount, sale or endorsement of a bill of exchange 

or promissory note, or who, knowing that a false statement in writing 

concerning the financial condition or means or ability to pay of himself 

or of any such person, firm or corporation has been made, procures, 

upon the faith thereof, for his own benefit or for the benefit of such 

person, firm or corporation, any such delivery, payment, loan, credit, 

extension, discount, making, acceptance, sale or endorsement, shall be 

fined not more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than 

five years or both. 

The special inquiry officer, pointing out that Connecticut has a "false 

pretense" statute (section 8696, 1949 Rev.; C.G.S.A.-53-360) in 

which an "intent to defraud" is expressly made an essential element, 

and that the "intent to defraud" is neither an expressed element of section 8698, nor one the courts have found there by implication, concluded that the crime could be committed without an intent to defraud 

(one could obtain goods by false representation and yet intend to pay 

for them) and held therefore that moral turpitude was noninvolved. - 

The trial attorney believes that since section 8698 requires the false 

statement to be made with intent that it be relied upon; the crime is one 

involving moral turpitude. The intent to which moral turpitude 

adheres, is the intent to do evil or work fraud —this intent is absent 

in section 8698. The intent that the false statement be relied upon is 

not necessarily an intent to do evil or work fraud because as the 

special inquiry officer has pointed out, one who intends that there be 

reliance upon his false statement may nevertheless also intend to pay 

for the goods he is attempting to obtain (Natter of 5—, 2 L & N. Dec. 

353, 357-362; see, State v. Taylor,183N.W. 998 (Sup. Ct. S.D. 1921) ). 

The fact that a person convicted under section 8698, intended to commit 

fraud, does not make a conviction under the section one involving 

moral turpitude. It is well settled that if a crime, as defined, does not 

inherently involve moral turpitude, then no matter how immoral the 

alien may have been in the particular instance, he cannot be deemed to 

have been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. "It is the 

moral obliquity of the crime and not of the individual that is the test 

under the law" (Matter of E—, 2I. & N. Dec. 134, 145). The Service 

cases do not establish that an intent to defraud is an essential element 

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of a conviction under section 8698: State v. Penley, 27 Conn. 587 

(1858) involved a law which required an intent to defraud; Sallies v. 

Janson, 85 Conn. 77 (1911) was a civil action to recover damages for 

fraud. Other cases cited are not pertinent. 

Since the Service has failed to establish that the conviction in question involves moral turpitude, the appeal of the trial attorney must be 

dismissed. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal of the trial attorney be and 

the same is hereby dismissed. 

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