alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-60108

Summary Calendar

 

NORMA A. SMITH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF

SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

(4:95-CV-9-L-S)

 

September 25, 1998

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Norma Smith appeals from a judgment affirming the decision of

the Commissioner of Social Security that denied her claim for

disability insurance and supplemental security benefits. She

argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) erred in not finding

her subjective complaints of pain credible and also in holding that

she is capable of a reduced range of sedentary work. She further

argues that the ALJ erred in relying on the Medical-Vocational

Guidelines and the testimony of the Vocational Expert in
2

determining that jobs exist in the national economy for individuals

with her limitations.

We find that there exists substantial evidence to support the

ALJ’s findings. Given the evidence of Smith’s daily activities and

her present course of medical treatment, the ALJ was entitled to

find her complaints of debilitating pain overstated. See Ripley v.

Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 556 (5th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, contrary to

Smith’s suggestion, the ALJ did not improperly rely solely on the

“grids” in the Medical Vocational Guidelines in finding that jobs

exist in the national economy for someone of Smith’s limitations.

Rather, the ALJ used the grids only as a framework, premising his

conclusion primarily upon the individualized testimony of the

Vocational Expert. Because (considering the objective medical

evidence in the record) the ALJ was entitled to disbelieve Smith’s

complaints of debilitating pain, see Carrier v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d

243, 247 (5th Cir. 1991), the ALJ was free to disregard the

Vocational Expert’s statement that Smith would be unable to work if

her complaints were true. Accordingly, the decision of the

district court is AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 15





LETTER RE: UNAUDITED INTERIM FINANCIAL INFORMATION





Cintech Solutions, Inc. (Debtor-In-Possession):



We have made a review, in accordance with standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of the unaudited condensed interim financial information of Cintech Solutions, Inc. for the periods ended March 31, 2003 and 2002, as indicated in our report dated June 30, 2003; because we did not perform an audit, we expressed no opinion on that information.



We are aware that our report referred to above, which is included in your Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the quarter ended March 31, 2003, is incorporated by reference in Registration Statement Nos. 33-95366 and 333-94661 on Form S-8.



We also are aware that the aforementioned report, pursuant to Rule 436(c) under the Securities Act of 1933, is not considered a part of the Registration Statement prepared or certified by an accountant or a report prepared or certified by an accountant within the meaning of Sections 7 and 11 of that Act.



/s/ Deloitte & Touche LLP



Cincinnati, Ohio

July 24, 2003
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 18

- 00597

- CR

Louis A. MURPHY

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 175th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR3342A

Honorable Catherine Torres

- Stahl, Judge Presiding

BEFORE JUSTICE ALVAREZ

, JUSTICE CHAPA , AND JUSTICE RIOS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s judgment is

AFFIRMED.

SIGNED August 7, 2019.

_____________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

RYAN COULTER NEWMAN,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D21-3882

September 30, 2022

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Laura E. 

Ward, Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard P. Albertine, 

Jr., Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

MORRIS, C.J., and CASANUEVA and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.
EXHIBIT 12.1
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>


                            STEEL HEDDLE GROUP, INC.

                COMPUTATION OF RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES




                                                    FISCAL YEAR ENDED
                               -------------------------------------------------------------

                                    January 2, 1999
                               --------------------------
                               (SUCCESSOR)   (PREDECESSOR)
                                 32 WEEKS     20 WEEKS
                                  ENDED         ENDED
                                 JANUARY 2,    MAY 25,
                                    1998        1998      1997     1996     1995     1994
                               -----------------------------------------------------------
<S>                               <C>           <C>     <C>      <C>      <C>      <C>
Earnings (losses) from
  continuing operations
   before income taxes             $(10,054)    $5,209  $11,482  $ 4,237  $ 3,613  $ 3,836

Add:
   Net interest expense excluding
     capitalized interest            10,299      1,499    5,154    5,849    6,330    7,098
   Amortization of debt
     expense                            291         50      130      105      105      105
                                    -------     ------  -------   ------   ------   ------
       Total earnings              $ 10,590     $6,758  $16,766  $10,191  $10,048  $11,039
                                    =======     ======   ======   ======   ======   ======

Fixed charges:
  Net interest expense
    including capitalized
      interest                     $ 10,299     $1,499  $ 5,154  $ 5,849  $ 6,330  $ 7,098

   Amortization of debt
     expense                            291         50      130      105      105      105
                                    -------     ------  -------   ------   ------   ------
     Total fixed charges           $ 10,590     $1,549  $ 5,284  $ 5,954  $ 6,435  $ 7,203
                                    =======     ======   ======   ======   ======   ======

Ratio of earnings to fixed
  charges                              --          4.4      3.2      1.7      1.6      1.5
                                    =======     ======   ======   ======   ======   ======
Deficiency in  the coverage
  of  fixed charges                $(10,054)    $   --  $    --  $    --  $    --  $    --
                                    =======     ======   ======   ======   ======   ======

</TABLE>

For purposes of these computations, the ratio of earnings to fixed charges has
been calculated by dividing pretax earnings by fixed charges. Earnings, as used
to compute the ratio, equals the sum of income before income taxes and fixed
charges excluding capitalized interest. Fixed charges are the total interest
expenses including capitalized interest and amortization of debt expenses. The
interest factor on operating leases is insignificant.
**Exhibit 32.2**

**CERTIFICATION**

Theundersigned officer of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. (the “Company”)hereby certifies that the Company’s annual report on Form 10-K to whichthis certification is attached (the “Report”), as filed with the Securities andExchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Actof 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that the information contained inthe Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial conditionand results of operations of the Company. This certification is provided solelypursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and Item 601(b)(32) ofRegulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”) promulgated under the Securities Act of1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the Exchange Act. In accordancewith clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), this certification (A) shallnot be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act, orotherwise subject to the liability of that section, and (B) shall not bedeemed to be incorporated by reference into any filing under the Securities Actor the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specificallyincorporates it by reference.
| Date: March 15, 2005 |   |                                     |
|---------------------------|--------|------------------------------------------|
|                      |   | /s/  MARK T. FROST                       |   |
|                      | Name:  | Mark T. Frost                            |   |
|                      | Title: | *Chief Financial Officer and  Treasurer* |   |

 

1

----
A TTACHMENT II

– REQUIREMENT LIST

**Outstanding Product**  **Chemistry And Acute Toxicity**  **Data:** 830.1550 Product ident ity an d composition 830.1600 Description of materials used to produce the product 830.1620 Description of production process 830.1650 Description of formulat i on process 830.1670 Discussion of formation of imp urities 830.1700 Preliminary

analy sis 830
. 1750 Certified l imits 830
. 1800 Enforcement analy t ic al method 830.6302 Color 830.6303 Phy sical state 830.6304 Odor 830.6313 Stability

to norma l and elevated temperatures, metals , and metal ions 830.6314 Oxidizing or reducing a c tion 830.6315 F l ammabi l ity 830.6316 Explodability 830.63 1 7 Storage stability 830
. 6319 Miscibility 830
. 6320 Corrosion characteristics 830
. 6321 Dielectric breakdown vo l tage 830.7000 pH 830.7050 UV/V isible absorpt ion 830.7100 Viscosity 830.7200 Melti n g point/melting range 830.7220 Boiling point/

boiling range 830.7300 Density

/relative density 830
. 7370 Dissociation constants in wat e r 830. 7550 Partition coefficient (n

- octano l /water) shake flask method 830
. 7570 Partition coefficient (n

- octano l/wate r) , est im ation by li qu id chromatograph y 830.7840 Water solubility : Column elution method, shake flask method 830
. 7860 Water solubility , generat or co l umn method 830.7950 Vapor pressure 870
. 1100 Acute Or al Toxicity 870.1200 Acute dermal toxicity 870.1300 Acute inhalation toxicity 870
. 2400 Acute eye irritation 870.2500 Acute dermal irritation 870.2600 Skin sensitization
Exhibit 23CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMWe hereby consent to the incorporation by referencein the Registration Statements on Form S-1/S-3(No. 333-126246) and on Form S-8 (Nos. 333-127669 and 333-125909) of Leap Wireless International,Inc. of our report dated February 28, 2007 relating to the financial statements, management’sassessment of the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting and the effectivenessof internal control over financial reporting, and our report dated May 16, 2005 relating to thefinancial statements, which appear in this Form 10-K./s/ PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPPricewaterhouseCoopers LLPSan Diego, California
#### CAROLINA CENTRAL RAILWAY CO. *v.*COMMISSIONERS OF RICHMOND COUNTY.

{Same *syllabus*as in the next preceding case of *Wade*v. *The Commissioners of Craven,*which is cited and approved.)

This was an appear from the decision of the defendant, the Board of Commissioners of Richmond county, heard before *84bis Honor, Judge *Buxton,*at Fall Term, 1875, of the Superior Court of Richmond county.

As the case was decided in this court upon a question of law, it is unnecessary to report the facts.

The ground upon which the appeal was based was, an excessive valuation of the-property of the plaintiff for taxation. No error in matter of law was alleged as ground for the appeal.

Upon the hearing, his Honor, upon motion of the defendant’s counsel, dismissed the proceeding on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction thereof. From’this judgment'the plaintiff appealed. ■.

*Steele &■ Walker, Strange*and *Busbee*c& *Busbee,*for the .appellant.

*Shaw*and Hinsdale, contra.

Ssttle, J.

The only points presented by this record are decided- in *Wade*v. *Commissioners of Craven county,*at this term.

We refer to that decision for the reasons which induce us-to:. declare,,, that the judgment of Iiis Honor in this case is affirmed.

Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.
#### William Solomon *et al.,*plaintiffs in error, *vs.*Martin J. Hinton *et al.,*defendants in error.

The 4th and 29th sections of the Act of 1856, prescribing that after seven years, without an entry, etc., a judgment shall not be enforced, but shall be presumed to be satisfied, and also that where a *bona fide*purchaser has been in the possession of real property for four years, it shall be discharged of the lien of any judgment against the person from whom he purchased, were parts of a statute of limitations in force on the 30th of November, 1860, and were, by the terms, spirit and intention of.the Act of that date, suspended, and by the various Acts from 1860 to 1865, the suspension was continued until the close of the war.

Statute of limitations. Judgment. Land. Before Judge .Hopkins. Fulton Superior Court. October Term, 1872.

For the facts of this case, see the decision,

*164Hill & Candler, for plaintiffs in error.

L. E. Bleckley, for defendants.

Warner, Chief Justice.

The only question made in this case is, whether the execution under which the land was sold and purchased by the defendants, was dormant at the time of the sale, and that depends on the fact whether the statute limiting the time within which judgments should be enforced by executions issued thereon is a statute of limitations, and was suspended during the wa.r. If it is a statute of limitations, and was suspended during the war, then the judgment and execution under which the land was sold was not dormant at the time of the sale. The Court charged the jury that the execution was dormant if, at the time the levy was made on the land, there was no entry made thereon by an officer authorized to execute and return the same within seven years next before said levy; to which charge the defendants excepted. The judgment was obtained on the 23d day of April, 1859, and execution issued thereon 6th of May, 1859, and was levied on the land 5th of March, 1867.

In view of the facts disclosed in the record, this charge of the Court was error. In the case of *Akin vs.*Freeman, 49 *Georgia Reports,*page 51, this Court held and decided that the 8th and 29th sections of the Act of 1856, prescribing that, after seven years without an entry, etc., a judgment shall not be enforced, but shall be presumed to be satisfied, and also that where a *bona fide*purchaser has been in the possession of real property for four years, it shall be discharged of the lien of any judgment against the person from whom he purchased, were parts of a statute of limitations in force on the 30th of November, 1860, and were, by the terms, spirit and intention of the Act of that date, suspended, and by the various Acts from 1860 to 1865, the suspension was continued until the close of the war.

Let the judgment of the Court below be reversed.
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed January 12, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ No. 3D20-373 Lower Tribunal No. 16-30377

________________ Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company,

Appellant,
vs. Guillermo B. Quintero, et al.,

Appellees. An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Jennifer D. Bailey, Judge. Russo Appellate Firm, P.A., and Paulo R. Lima, for appellant. Giasi Law, P.A. and Melissa A. Giasi and Erin M. Berger (Tampa), for appellees. Before EMAS, LOGUE and SCALES, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed. See Vargas v. Safepoint Ins. Co., No. 3D19-1656, at *2 (Fla. 3d DCA Jan. 12, 2022) (examining the “Concealment or Fraud” provision of a homeowner’s insurance policy and concluding that “the term ‘false statement’ in the post-loss context includes an element of intent to mislead”); Anchor Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Trif, 322 So. 3d 663, 675 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) (concluding that, “in the post-loss context, the term ‘false statement’ in the ‘Concealment or Fraud’ exclusion [of a homeowner’s insurance policy] should be interpreted as including an element of intent”).
#### Mantin Brothers, Inc., Appellant, vs. Van Heuklon and another, Respondents.

For the appellant: *Eherlein & Eberlein*of Shawano.

For the respondents: *Edward J. Byrne,*attorney, and' *Robert L. Spanagel*of counsel, both of Appleton.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
#### Village of Shorewood, Appellant, vs. Public Service Commission and another, Respondents.

*December 8, 1942*

January *12, 1943.*

*Hubert O. Wo'lfe*of Milwaukee, for the appellant.

For the respondent Public Service Commission there was a brief by the *Attorney General*and *H. T. Ferguson,*assistant attorney general, and oral argument by *Mr. Ferguson.*

For the respondent city of Milwaukee there was a brief by *Walter J. Mattison,*city attorney, and *Ronold A. Drechsler,*assistant city attorney, and oral argument by *Mr. Drechsler.*

*A*brief *amicus curia*was filed by *John C. Doerfer,*city attorney of West Allis.

Fairchild, J.

The facts involved in this case are similar to those in the case of *Fox Point v. Public Service Comm., ante,*p. 97, 7 N. W. (2d) 571, and are governed by the same principles. The order appealed from is affirmed.'

*By the Court.*— Order affirmed.

Barlow, J., took no part.
Statistical distribution of concentrations ofelements in 29 samples of FGD-Gypsum collected from sources using methods to minimize fly ashcontent of FGD-G during 2009. All elements except Hg measured at Ohio State University after acid digestion following EPA protocols (Dayton etal., 2009); Hg measured by EPRI using Milestone Hg analyzer (Gustin & Ladwig, 2009). Calculations by R.L. Chaney, USDA-ARS, Beltsville, MD.95thpercentile of US soils from Smith et al. (2005), US Geological Survey.Min 10th25th50th75th90th95thMax Mean 95thUS SoilsAl, g/kg 0.061 0.091 0.138 0.206 0.310 0.928 1.36 1.61 0.320 74.6As, mg/kg1.98 2.14 2.52 2.853.60 7.36 10.1 11.1 3.63 12.B, mg/kg <25. <25. <25. <25. <25. 104. 146. 387. 47. .Ba, mg/kg 0.91 2.66 5.11 6.4011.8 26.9 32.8 55.2 10.7 840.Be, mg/kg <0.10 <0.10 <0.10 <0.10<0.10 <0.10 <0.10 <0.10 <0.10 2.3Ca, g/kg 208. 214. 229. 240.250. 263. 265. 268. 239. 66.Cd, mg/kg 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.0690.124 0.219 0.288 0.369 0.096 0.6Co, mg/kg <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 17.6Cr, mg/kg` 0.45 0.75 1.15 2.21 2.79 8.59 8.69 14.8 2.98 70.Cu, mg/kg 0.40 0.40 0.75 0.98 1.57 2.39 2.52 3.17 1.18 30.1Fe, mg/kg 130. 277. 605. 791.1252. 1705. 1773. 1823. 876. 42.6Hg, mg/kg 0.007 0.019 0.635 0.1870.432 0.948 1.015 1.519 0.335 0.08K, mg/kg <50. <50. 102. 177. 270. 343. 475. 620. 194. 28400.Li, mg/kg <10. <10. <10. <10. <10. <10. <10. <10. <10. .Mg, mg/kg <50. 81.3 562. 1083. 1939. 2881. 3061. 5864. 1409. 18800.Mn, mg/kg <1.0 <1.0 4.3 8.8 18.8 48.7 79.1 129. 19.6 1630.Mo, mg/kg 0.02 0.11 0.28 0.520.69 2.03 2.49 3.10 0.70 2.16Na, mg/kg <10. <10. <10.023.2 64.4 327. 1200. 1299. 129. 19400.Ni, mg/kg 0.20 0.20 0.82 1.061.45 2.16 2.39 2.44 1.16 37.5P, mg/kg <5.0 10.8 22.1 33.0 48.1 126. 127. 179. 42.2 .Pb, mg/kg 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.001.00 1.00 1.00 2.04 1.04 38.0S, g/kg 163. 169. 183. 189.200. 206. 207. 208. 189. .Sb, mg/kg <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 <2.5 12.0 26.0 27.9 32.0 8.5 1.39Se, mg/kg 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.512.0 26.0 27.9 32.0 8.5 1.0Si, mg/kg 75. 75. 200. 260. 411. 553. 633. 1047. 315. .Sr, mg/kg 70.5 89.8 117. 172. 213. 349. 364. 375. 183. 458.Tl, mg/kg <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 <0.1 0.7V, mg/kg <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 <1.0 2.09 4.94 5.27 8.57 1.87 119.Zn, mg/kg 1.0 1.0 3.3 5.810.2 14.8 15.0 23.9 7.1 103.
#### R. M. Lewis v. William Simpson, Appellant.

Agency to Sell Real Estate: commissions. A broker, whose contract is to find a purchaser and sell a farm," is entitled to his commission when he finds such purchaser ready, able and willing to buy, although the owner afterwards refuses to make a written contract and revokes the agency.

*Appeal from Ciarle District Court.*— Hon. R. L. Pabish, Judge.

Tuesday, February 9, 1904.

ActioN to recover commission for sale of real property. Verdict for plaintiff, and from judgment thereon defendant *appeals.*

Affirmed.

*Temple, Hardinger & Temple*for appellant.

*Jamison & Parle*for appellee.

*664MoClaiN, J.

Tbe contract' under which plaintiff claims to have earned the commission sued for provided that plaintiff was to procure a purchaser for and sell defendant’s farm, having for a commission all he could get over $30 an acre. It is conceded that, before plaintiff’s authority was revoked by defendant, plaintiff had found a purchaser readyj willing, and able to buy defendant’s farm at $31 per acre, and that the only reason why the sale was not carried out was that, before a written contract which should be binding on defendant was prepared and signed, the defendant forbade plaintiff entering into any such contract for him, thereby revoking plaintiff’s authority. . The assignments and argument present the simple question whether, under a contract to procure a purchaser and to sell, the plaintiff became entitled to his commission when he found a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy and pay for defendant’s farm, though no binding contract of sale was entered into owing to the revocation of plaintiff’s authority after the purchaser was found, but before a written contract was signed. The contention of counsel for appellant that, under such a contract of agency, the agent must do more than find a purchaser, and must further secure a written contract of sale, valid and enforceable at law, is not sustained by the decisions of this court. We have held that, even where the contract is to find a purchaser and sell, the agent is entitled to his commission when he finds a purchaser with whom he enters into an agreement of sale, though the sale is not completed because of the termination of the agent’s authority. *Ford v. Easley;*88 Iowa, 603; *Bird v. Phillips,*115 Iowa, 703.

The judgment of the lower court is aeeiemed.