F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L , L L C, Plaintiff-Appellant

,

v

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I N T E R N A T I O N A L L O N G S H O R

E A N D W A R E H O U S E U

N I O N ; K A N E A H U N A , an individual; J A S O N A N D R E W S , an individual; J E S U S A R A N G O , an individual; M I K

E A Y E R S , an individual; B R

I A N B A N T A , an individual; K E

N B A N T A , an individual; K E I T H B A N T A , an individual; A N D R

E B A R B E R , an individual; C R

Y S T A L B A R

N E S , an individual; C R

A I G B I T Z , an individual; L I S A B L

A N C H A R D , an individual; R A

N D Y B O O K

E R , an individual; B R

A D B O Y D , an individual; L A R

R Y B R O A D I E , an individual; F E L I X B R O W N , an individual; J I M M

Y B R O W N , an individual; J O N B U D I S E L I C , an individual; W I L L I A M B U R R I S , an individual; D O U G L

A S C A R E Y , an individual; G R

E G C A R S E , an individual; A N T H O N

Y C E R R U T T I , an individual; H U G H C O L S O N , an individual; T I M C O P P , an individual; N o. 20-35037

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-02177- J R

ORDER AND OPI NI ONC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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E. C O T U R

E N , an individual; S T E V E N C O X , an individual; R Y A N C R A N S T O N , an individual; J A M E S D A W , an individual; A D A M D A Y , an individual; J A M E S D E G M A N , an individual; T O R

R A E D E L A C R U Z , an individual; F R

A N K D E L A R O S A , an individual; T H O M

A S D E M U T H , an individual; J A M E S D I N S M O R E , an individual; B R

I A N D I R C K S E N , an individual; T E R

E N C E D O D S O N , an individual; G A R

Y D O T S O N , an individual; O L I V E R E D E , an individual; R A

Y E L W O O D , an individual; T O D D E N G L E R T , an individual; C H R

I S E U B A N K S , an individual; D A

V I D F A M B R

O , an individual; L A R

R Y F A S T , an individual; J A M E S F I

N C H , an individual; G R

E G F L A N N E R Y , an individual; M I K

E G A R D N E R , an individual; B R

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D , an individual; R I C H A R

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A P , an individual; T E D G R

A Y , an individual; K U R T I S H A N S O N , an individual; M I K E H A R M S , an individual; R A N D Y H A R P E R , an individual; T E R R Y H I C K M A N , an individual; J A M E S H O L L A N D , an individual; B R U C E H O L T E , an individual; R O N A L D H U S E M A N , an individual; N A T H A N H Y D E R , an individual; T R O Y J A M E S , an individual; S A M J A U R O N , anC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

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individual; A N T H O N

Y J E F F R I E S , an individual; K E V I

N J O H N S O N , an individual; P A T J O H

N S O N , an individual; T E R

R Y J O H N S O N , an individual; T I M J O N E S , an individual; J O N J U L I A

N , an individual; L E R O Y K A D O W , an individual; G E O R G E K E L L Y , an individual; E R

I C K I N G , an individual; W A

Y N E K I N G , Esquire, an individual; K E V I

N K N O T H , an individual; K E

N N E T H K Y T L E , an individual; M I K

E L A C H A P E L L E , an individual; J I M M

Y L A I , an individual; T O M L A N G M A N , an individual; T Y L E R L A

U T E N S C H L A G E R , an individual; J A C K L E E , an individual; K E N L E E , an individual; D A N L E S S A R D , an individual; S H A N T I L E W A L L E N , an individual; D A

N N Y L O K E , an individual; T H O M A S L O V E , an individual; W I L F R E D L U C H , an individual; K A R

L L U N D E , an individual; C R

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N , an individual; M I K

E M A H E R , an individual; J A S O N M A L A C H I , an individual; L E V I M A

N N I N G , an individual; R I C K

I E M A N N I N G , an individual; J A

Y M A N T E I , an individual; P A T M A R O N A Y , an individual; A. M A R

T I N , an individual; G A R

R Y M A T S O N , an individual; P A T M C C L A I N , an individual; M. M C M A H O N , anC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

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individual; M I K

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T R E Y , an individual; D O N

A L D M E H

N E R , an individual; C U R

T I S M E U L E R , an individual; K A R

L M I N I C H , an individual; J O S H M O R R I S , an individual; J O H

N M U L C A

H Y , an individual; T O M N E I T L I N G , an individual; M A R

T I N N E L S O N , an individual; G R

E G N E M Y R E , an individual; R I A

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N , an individual; C H R

I S O V E R B Y , an individual; K E

N O V I A T T , an individual; T H O M

A S O W E N S , an individual; J O H

N P E A K , an individual; S H

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R Y , an individual; J O H

N P E R R Y , an individual; A R

N O L D P E T E R S O N , an individual; T E R

R Y P L A Y E R , an individual; J A M E S P O P H A M , an individual; D A

V I D P O R T E R , an individual; M I K

E R A P A C Z , an individual; J O H

N R I N T A , an individual; W I L L I A M R O B E R T S , an individual; J O S E P H R O B I N S O N , an individual; M A R

K R O B I N S O N , an individual; C H R

I S S C H E F F E L , an individual; T H E O D O R E S C H U H , an individual; M I K

E S E X T O N , an individual; M A R

K S I E G E L , an individual; C O U R

T N E Y S M I T H , an individual; J E F F S M I T H , an individual; M I K

E S M I T H , anC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

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individual; S C O T T S T E I N , an individual; D O N

A L D S T Y K

E L , an individual; M I K

E S U H R , an individual; L E A L S U

N D E T , an individual; L A W

R E N C E T H I B E D E A

U , an individual; M A

R K T H O R S F E L D T , an individual; S H A

W N T H O R S T A D , an individual; J A M E S T H O R U D , an individual; D A

V I D T R A C H S E L , an individual; W I L L I A M U N D E R W O O D , an individual; J A S O N V A N C E , an individual; D A

V I D V A R N O N , an individual; P A

N V A R N O N , an individual; M I K

E W A L K E R , Esquire, Attorney , an individual; D W A Y N E W A M S H E R ; E U G E

N E W E B B , an individual; M I K

E W E H A G E , an individual; K E V I

N W E L D O

N , an individual; S P E

N C E R W H I T E , an individual; R I C H A R

D W I D L E , an individual; N U R

A L W I L L I S , an individual; R O N

A L D W O O D S , an individual; M A R

K W R I G H T , an individual; C A R

O L W U R D I N G E R , an individual; J E R

R Y Y L O N E N , an individual; P. Y O C I T I M , an individual; R I C H A R

D Z A T T E R

B E R G , an individual; F R

E D Z O S K

E , an individual; J A M E S C O T H R E N , an individual; B O B B Y C R A N S T O N , an individual; T E R

E K J O H N S O N , an individual; A N G E L

A M A R T I N , Esquire, an individual; P A T R I C KC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

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M C C L A I N , an individual; M A T T H E W M C M A H O N , an individual; S H A N N P E D E R S O N , an individual; M I C H A E L S E X T O N , an individual; J E F F R E Y S M I T H , an individual; L A U R E N C E T H U B E D E A

U , an individual; P A

U L Y O C H I M , an individual,

Defendants-Appellees

.

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oreg on Michael H. Simon, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted October 26, 2020

Portland, Oreg on

F iled J a nuary 5, 2022

B efore: Susan P. Graber, Richard R. Clifton, and Sandra S. I kuta, Circuit J udg es.

Order; Opinion by J udg e Clifton; Dissent by

J udg e I k uta Dissent from Order by J udg e B ennettC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

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SUMMARY *

R ICO / Labor Law

The panel filed (1) an order withdrawing an opinion a

nd dissent and deny ing

, on be h a l f of the c ourt, a petition for rehearing en b anc; and (2) a n ew opinion and dissent. I n the

new opinion, the panel affirmed the district court’s d ismissal of an action broug ht by Columbia Ex port Terminal u nder the Racketeer I nfluenced and Corrupt Org aniz ations Act ag ainst the I nternational L o ng shore and W arehouse U n i on a nd individual union workers.

The panel concluded that Colu m b ia Ex port Terminal’s RI CO claims alleg ing overbilling via fraudulent t i m e sheets required interpretation o f the collective barg aining ag reement (“CB A”) under which the workers w ere employ ed, a n d the CB A provided a p rocess for arbitration of d isp u t e s

. The panel concluded that the CB A ’s arbitration provision a pplied
to the RI CO claims. A ccording ly

, § 301 o f t h e L abor Manag ement Relations A ct precluded adjudication of the RI CO claims before the arbi tration process was ex hausted.

The panel ag reed with the district court that Hubbard v

. United Airlines, I

n c

. , 9 27 F .2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1991), remained g o o d law, a nd the panel found p ersuasive Hubbard ’s holding t h a t the Railway L abor Act preempted a fraud claim under RI CO. T he panel held that a RI CO claim is precluded by § 3 01 o f t h e L MRA w hen the rig ht or duty

u pon which the claim is based is created by a C BA o r

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o p art o f th e o pin io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 8

resolution of the claim substantially depends on analy sis of a CB A.

Dissenting

, J udg e I kuta w rote that the majority er r e d in h olding that any federal claim that is r elated to a C BA i s preempted o r pre c luded by § 301 of L MRA and must automatically be d i smissed by the district c ourt and sent for arbitration. The majority also e r r ed in apply ing a presumpti o n of arbitrability and in d e termining that the CB A’s arbitration p rovision encompassed the RI CO cla i m s at issue.

Disse n ting from the denial of rehearing en banc, J udg e B ennett, joined by J udg e s I k uta, R. N elson, B u matay , a nd VanDy ke, wrote that, whether calle d p reemption o r preclusion, the L MRA does not bar a federal statutory claim broug ht in federal c ourt. J u dg e B ennett w rote that a footnote in Alaska Airlines Inc. v. S churke

, 898 F. 3 d 904, 920 n.10 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc), erroneously sug g ested that § 301 “precludes” f

ederal statutory claims in the sam e w a y it preempts state law claims, and the court should h ave r eheard this case en banc to e x cise this erroneous preclusion notion from its jurisprudence. J udg e B ennett wrote that preclusion of federal claims is i n consistent with the purpose o f § 301, and a statute passed by

Cong ress to help maintain a uniform body o f federal labor law does not s o m e h o w nullify a different statute passed by Cong ress to, among other objectives, eradicate org aniz ed attempts to defraud throug h a pattern o f racketeering activity

. J u d g e B ennett wrote that the panel als o e rred in apply ing a presumption of arbitrability contrary to Supre me Court precedent and created an ag reement to arbitrate RI CO claims, even thoug h the parties never sig ned such an ag

reement.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

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COUNSEL

Christopher F

. McCr a c ken ( arg ued) and J a cqueline M. Damm, Og letree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., Portland, Oreg on; Thomas A. L idbur y , Og letree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart P.C., Chicag o , I llinois; for PlaintiffAppellant.

Darin M. Dalmat ( arg ued) and Ro b er t H. L avitt, B arnard I g litz in & L avitt L L P, Seattle, W ashing ton, for DefendantsAppellees.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 10

ORDER

The opinion and dissent filed on J une 28, 2 0 21 (Docket Entry No. 3 1), and published a t 2 F

. 4th 1243 (9th Cir. 2 021)

are withdrawn. A new opinio n an d dissent a re filed concurrently

with this order.

Plaintiff-Appellant has fil ed a p etition for rehearing en banc (Docket Entry

No. 34). J udg e Graber votes to deny the petition for reh e aring en b a n c, and J udg e Clifton so recommends. J udg e I kuta votes to g rant the petition for rehearing en banc.

The full c o urt has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc. A judg e of the court requested a vote on en banc rehearing

. The matter failed to recei v e a majority o f
votes o f non-recused active judg es in favor of en banc consideration. F ed. R. App. P. 35.

The p etition for rehearing e n banc is DENIED

. No f urther petitions for rehearing or r ehear i n g e n banc will be entertained.

OP INION

CL I F TON, Circuit J udg e :

Co l u mbia Ex port Terminal (“CET”) broug ht an action under the Racketeer I nfluenced a n d Corrupt Org aniz ations Ac t (“RI CO”) ag ainst the I nternational L ong shore a nd W a r ehouse Union ( “I L WU”) and 154 individual I L W U workers employ e d by CET. The district c ourt concluded that CET’s RI CO claims could not p roperly procee d i n c ourt atC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 11

this time and dismissed the c a s e without prejudice. I t reasoned tha t t he claims required interpretation of the collective barg ai n i n g ag r eement (“CB A”) under which the workers were employ ed, that the CB A provided a process for arb i t r a tion of disputes, and that the L abor Manag ement Relations Act (“L MRA”) precluded court adjudication of the RI CO claims b efore t h e arbitration process had been

ex h austed. CET appeals the dismissal.

W e previously reached a c o nclusion similar to that reached by the d i s t ri c t court reg a rding a labor contract g overned by the Railway L abor Act ( “RL A ”). H u b b a r d v

. United Airlines, Inc.
, 9 27 F .2d 1094 (9th Cir. 1991). The district c ourt relied on that p r ecedent, rejec t ing a n arg ument by CET that Hubbard had b een overruled. W e ag ree with the district c ourt that Hubbard remains alive and persuasive. Our conclusion that the same result is requir ed for a contract g overned by the L MRA i s a log ical ex tension of our precedents. We take that step here and affirm the judg ment o f the district court.

I. Background

CET operates a g rain ex port terminal in the Port o f P o r tland and employ s w orkers w ho are members of th e I L W U. CET alleg es that th e I L W U a nd the 154 named individual defendants consp i r ed to fraudulently furnish timesheets reporting hours that were not a ctually worked and, as a result, overbilled CET by more than $5.3 million.

CET filed this action alleg ing seven claims under RI CO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68. I n response, the I L W U filed a motion
to d ismiss c ontending

, among other thing s, that CET’s c laims

were preempted u n der § 301 of the L MRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185,C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 12

because resolution o f the claims r equired interpretation o f the underly ing CB A, which requires ex hau s t ion o f the
ag reement’s g rievance procedure s

. The individual defendants joined the u n ion’s motion. The d istrict c ourt ag reed with the I L W U and dismissed the case without prejudice. CET appeals.

II. Discussion

The central dispute on appeal is whether CET’s claims, which it sty led as RI CO claims, are preempted o r p re cluded by § 3 01 of the L MRA. W e review the di s t r i c t c o urt’s interpretation o f the statutes de novo

. Alaska Airlines I nc. v

. Schurke , 898 F .3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc).

A. The two-step p reclusion andp reemption under LMRA § 301.

The L MRA, sometimes d e scribed as the Taft-Hartl ey Act,

was enacted in 1947 to “promote the full flow of commerce” b y “provid[ ing ] orderly and peaceful procedures f o r preventing [ ] interference by [ e mploy ees or employ ers] with the leg itimate rig hts of the o ther.” 29 U.S.C. §141(b). To that end, L MRA § 301(a) p rovides that “ [ s] uits for violation o f
contracts between a n employ er a n d a labor org aniz ation

. . . may be broug h t in any

district court.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).

On i t s face, § 301 reads as a jurisdictional statute, and it “contains n o e x press lang uag e of p reemption, [ but] the Supreme Court has long interpreted the [ provisi o n ] a s authoriz ing f

ederal courts to create a uniform body of federal

common law to adjudicate disputes that arise out of l abor contracts.” Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc. , 913 F .3d 1146, 1151C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 13

(9th Cir. 2019); Textile W orkers Union v. Lincoln Mills

, 353 U.S. 448, 450–51, 457 (1957).

Consistent w ith this p urpose, the Supreme Court concluded that § 301 impliedly preempted state law in order
to g ive effect to the cong ressional intent that “doctrines o f federal labor law uniformly [] prevail over inconsistent local rules.” Teamsters v. Luc a s F l our Co.
, 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962). Therefore, any “ union a g reement made pursuant to [ a federal la b o r law] has [ ] the imprimatur of the federal law
upon it and, by force of the Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Constitution, could not be [ ] vitiated by any provision of the laws of a S t a te.” California v. Taylor

, 353 U .S. 553, 561 (1957) (quoting R

y. E mp. Dept. v. Hanson
, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956)).

F ederal c ourts have developed common law to g overn labor disputes and have concluded that a “c e n tral tenet o f federal labor-contract law under § 301 [ is that] the arbitrator,

n ot the court, [ ] has the r esponsibility to interpret the labor
contract in the first instance.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck

, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985). As we ex plained in A laska Airlines and reiterated last y ear in C u r t i s , preserving the role of the CB A’s g rievance process is important for three reasons:

F ir s t , a [ CB A] is more than just a contract; it is an effort to erect a sy stem of industrial selfg overnment. Thus, a CB A i s p a rt of the continuous collective b a rg aining process. Second, because the CB A is d e sig ned to g overn the entire employ ment relationship, including disputes which the drafters may not have anticipated, it calls into b eing a new

co m m on law—the c ommon law of aC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 14

particular industry or of a particular plant. According ly

, the labor a

rbitrator is usually the appropriate adjudicator f or CB A disputes because he was ch osen due to the parties’ confidenc e in his knowledg e of the common law of the shop and their trust in his personal judg men t t o bring to bear considerations which are n o t ex pressed in the contract a s criteria for judg ment. Third, grievance a nd

a r b i t r a t i o n p r o c e d u r e s p r o v i d e c e r t a i n procedural benefits, including a more prompt and orderly settlement of CB A d i s putes than that offered by the ordinary judicial process.

Curtis
, 913 F .3d at 1152 ( internal quotation marks a nd citations omitted).

F or more than six ty y ears, the Supreme Court has interpreted § 301 to require the specif i c p e rformance o f promises to arbitrate g r ievances in col lective barg aining
ag reements. Lincoln Mills , 353 U.S. at 451.

W e have thus applied the preemptive effect of § 301 to all “state law claims g rounded in the provisions of a CB A o r requiring interpretation of a C BA.” Kobold v. Good Sama r i t a n Reg’l Med. Ctr.
, 832 F .3d 1 024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). W e have distilled the relevant Supreme Court cases into a two-part test:

The essential inquiry is this: [ 1] Do es the

c l a i m seek purely to vindicate a rig ht or dut y

c reated by the CB A itself? I f so, then the claim is preempted, a

nd the ana l y sis ends there.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 15

[ 2] B ut if not, we proceed to the second step a nd ask whether a plaintiff’s state law rig ht is substantially dependent on analy sis o f the CB A, which tu rns on whether the claim
cannot be resolved by simpl y l ooking to versus interpreting

the CB A.

Curtis
, 9 13 F .3d at 1152–53 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 1

CET arg u es that t h is preemption approach properly
ap p lies only to claims arising under state law, not to claims,

s u c h a s the RI CO claims alleg ed h ere, arising under federal law. I nstead, CET contends that we should apply a preclusion
test that asks whether the two federal statutes necess a rily conflict, and if so, favors the statute passed later in time. CET
arg ues that because the RI CO statute was e n a c ted a fter the L MRA, if there is a

n irreconcilable conflict between the two federal statutes, the older one, the L MRA, must b e d eemed to have been repealed or amended by the later leg islation.

W e recog niz e, as CET arg ues, that a conflict between two federal l aws implicates different c onsiderations than a conflict between a state and a federal law. The Six th Circuit considered this issue in the contex t o f an A m e r i c a n s with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) cl a im b roug ht by a union employ e e. I n permitting the ADA claim to proceed, the court

ex p lained t h a t “Cong ress’s power to p reempt state law is

r o o t e d in the Supremacy Clause o f the United States

1 A v ariatio n o f th e test ask s: (1 ) w he t h er th e claim asserted ex ists in d ep en den tly o f th e CB A
, an d if so (2 ) w h eth er th e reso lu t i o n o f th e claim n o n eth eless su

b stan tially d ep en d s o n an aly sis o f th e CB A

. Ko b o ld

, 8 3 2 F.3 d at 1 03 2 . B o th

v ersio n s o f

th e test are u sed in terch an g eab ly

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 16

Constitution.” W

atts v. U nited P arcel S

e rv., Inc.
, 701 F .3d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 2 012). “B ecause [the plaintiff’s ] claim is based o n a f

ederal cause o f act i o n and is in federal court, t h e re is no dang er of diverg ent application o f a C BA ’s provisions by state c ourt s ; t hus, the motivating p urpose o f § 301 preemption simply

does not apply .” Id. at 191–92.

W e ag ree, but that is not the only purpose of § 301 preemption. C r u c ially

, § 301 preemption also is desig ned to

ensure “specific performan c e of promises to a rbitrate
g rievances u nder collective barg aining ag reements.” Lincoln Mills

, 353 U.S. a t 451. As the Supreme Court ex plained in Lueck

,

I f respondent had broug ht a contract claim under § 301, he would have h ad to attempt to take the clai m throug h the arbitration procedure established in the col lectivebarg a ining ag reement be f ore b ring ing suit in
court. Perhaps the most h armful aspect of the W isconsin decision [ that permitte d the state law tort claim to p roceed] is that it would allow e ssentially the same suit to be brou ght directly in state court without f irst ex hausting the g rievance proced

ures established in the barg a ining ag reement. Th e need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration was one of the central reasons that underlay t he Court’s holding in [ Lucas Flour

, 369 U .S. at 105.] The p a rties here have a g reed that a n e u t ral arbitrator w ill be responsible, in the f irst instance, for interpreting the meaning of their
contract. Unless this suit is pre-empted, theirC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 17

federal rig ht to decide who is to resolve contract disputes will be lost.

471 U.S. at 219.

This p r inciple—that claims which are, in substance, labor dis p utes subject to the CB A must not be evaded by artful pleading —applies with eq u a l force to federal statutory claims, 2 “althoug h they mig ht b e b etter described a s ‘precluded.’ ” A l a s ka Airlines

, 8 98 F .3d at 920 n.10. The L MRA g uarantees a “federal rig ht to decide who is to resolve
contract d isputes.” Lueck

, 4 71 U.S. at 21. Therefore, w hen a claim sty led as a federal statutory c laim turns in substance on the provisions of t h e CB A rather than on an independent statutory rig ht, the federal court must direct the clai m to the
proper adjudicator. Cf. Vadino v. A

. V a l e y Engineers
, 903 F .2d 253, 266 (3d Cir. 1990) (“I n short, while claims r esting

on [ the F a ir L abor Standards Act (“F L SA” ) ] a r e clearly

2 Wa t t s s e e m e d t o r e c o g n i z e t h i s p rin cip le as w ell. T h e Six t h Circu it d id n ot rest its h o l d in g so lely o n th e in ap p licab ility o f p reem p tio n d o ctrin e as b etw een tw o f

ed eral law s. T h e co u rt f

u rth er ex p lain ed th at “ th e rig h t t o b e f

ree f ro m d isab ility d iscrim in atio n th at W atts seek s t o v in d icate in th is actio n d

o es n o t a rise fro m th e CBA or f ro m state l a w ; rath er, it is f o u n d ed o n th e A DA .” Wa tts , 70 1 F.3 d at 1 9 2 (em p h asis ad d ed ). Mo reo v er, th e W

a tts co u rt reco g n ized th at th e o u tco m e m ig h t h av e b een d iffe r e n t h ad th e em

p lo y er “ arg u ed t

h at [th e em

p lo y ee] w as s u b

j ect to a

ma n d a to ry a rb itra tio n a g reemen t un der t h e CBA th at sh e f

ailed to ex h au st b ef o re b rin g in g h er A D A

claim in f ed eral co u rt.” Id

. (em

ph asis ad d ed ).

T h u s, th e W

a tts co u rt ack

n o w led g ed th e d istin ctio n b etw een f

ed eral rig h ts th at arise in d ep en d en tly f ro m th e CB A an d rig h ts th at ex ist o n ly b ecau se o f th e C B A

. T h is is p recisely th e d i stin ctio n th e preclu sio n

an aly sis aim s to sif

t th ro u g h

, an d th e L MRA req u i r e s d isp u tes arisin g f ro m th e C B A t o b e f

u n n eled

, if so req u ired by th e C B A
, to arb i tratio n

. A cco rd i n g ly , o u r h o ld in g h ere is en tirely co n s o n an t w ith W

a tts

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 18

cog niz able under that section, we believe that claims which
rest on interpretations o f the underly ing collective barg aining
ag reement must be r esolved p ursuant to the procedures

co n t emplated under the L MRA, specifically g rievance, arbitration, and, when permissible, suit in federal court under section 301.”).

W h ether called “preemption” or “ preclusion,” the same two-step a

pproach applies whether the conflicting statute is

a federal or state provision. I n H ubbard

, for instance, we h eld that the RL A, w h i ch also preceded the enactment of RI CO, preempted a f

raud claim under RI CO. 927 F .2d at 1099; see also Long v. F

lyi n g T i g er Line, Inc.
, 994 F

. 2d 692 (9th Cir. 1993) ( RL A preclu des ERI SA claims). Similar conclusions have been reached by

circuit courts across the country

. 3

Althoug h the Supreme Court has never directly passed on that precise question, we are g u ided b y i t s holding that “[ s] ection 301(a) g overns claims f ounded d i r ectly on rig hts created by collective-barg aining ag reements, and also c laims

3 Oth er circu its h av e ap p lied t h e “ p reem

p t io n ” o r “ p reclu sio n ” test

w h en co n sid erin g f

ed eral claim s in th e co n tex t o f lab o r d isp u tes, w ith o u t

r e fe r e n cin g t

h e d ates of p assag e of each f ed eral act. L ik e ou r co u rt , t h e Se v e n t h Circu it h as also h eld th at th e RL A p reclu d es RICO claim s. Un d erwo o d v. Ven a n g o River Co rp ., 9 9 5 F

. 2 d 6 77 (7 th Cir. 19 9 3)

n a rro wed b

y W estb ro ok v. S

ky Ch efs, In c. , 3 5 F.3 d 3 16
, 3 1 7 –1 8 (7 th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ) (RL A p reclu d es RICO claim s u n less cau ses o f actio n ar e in d ep en den t of th e CB A ). Sim ilarly

, at least tw o circu its h av e h eld th at th e L MRA preclu d es FL SA claim s. Va d i n o , 9 0 3 F.2 d 2 5 3 ; Ma rtin v. L a ke Cn ty. S ewer Co

., In c. , 2 6 9 F.3 d 6 7 3 (6 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ). A t least f ou r circu its h av e h eld t h a t t h e RL A preclu d es ERISA claim s. d e la Ro sa S

an ch ez v. E. Airlin es, In c ., 5 7 4 F.2 d 2 9 (1 st Cir. 1 9 7 8 ) ; Ba llew v. Co n t ’ l A i rlin es, In c ., 6 6 8 F .3 d 77 7 (5 th C ir. 2 0 12 ); Ha stin g s v. W ilso n , 5 1 6 F.3 d 1 0 5 5 (8 th Cir. 2 00 8 ); O a key v. U.S

. Airwa ys Pilo ts Disa b ility In co me Pla n , 7 2 3 F.3 d 2 2 7 (D.C. Cir. 2 0 1 3 ).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 19

‘substantially dependent on analy sis of a collectiv ebarg a ining ag reement.’” Caterpillar, I nc. v. W

illiams

, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (emphasis a dded) (quot i n g I n t’l Bhd. of Elec. W

orkers v

. H

echler

, 481 U.S. 851, 859 n.3 (1987)). The Supreme Court has enforced arbit r a tion requirements in § 3 01 cas e s w hen resolution of the c laims required interpretation of the CB A, r eg ardless of the form o f the claim. See, e.g. , Lueck

, 471 U.S. a t 219 (“Since nearly any alleg ed willful breach of c o n tract ca n b e r e s tated as a tort claim for breach of a g o od-faith oblig ation under a c ontract, the arbitrator’s role in every case could be by

passed easily if § 301 is not understood to pre-empt such claims.”)

Thus, in Hub b a r d

, we ex plained that “federal labor law

was intended to provide the e x clusive remedy for g eneric fraud claims relating to rig ht s u n d e r a CB A. I f the same predicate acts were the basis of state claims for fraud

. . . they would be preempted

. . . [ so plaintiffs] cann o t evade preemption throug h ‘ artful pleading ’ of the claims as RI CO claims.” 927 F .2d at 1098. I f the court h e l d otherwise, any plaintiff could avoid arbitration by con v e r t ing a g ardenvariety contract dispute into a case of federal racketeering

. Thoug h in Hubbard we considered a labor contract under the RL A and reserved for another day the question of whether L MRA precludes RI CO claims, that day has come. W e hold that a RI CO claim is p recluded b y § 301 of the L MRA when the rig h t or duty

upon which the claim is based is created by

a CB A or resolution of the claim substantially d e p e n d s on analy sis of a CB A.

W e have prev i o u sly sug g ested this ex tension. Notably

, two y ears ag o our c ourt, sitting en b a n c, observed that “the RL A a nd L MRA § 301 preemption standards are ‘ v irtuallyC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 20

identical’ in p urpose and f unction, [and] they are, for the most part, analy

z ed under a sing le test and a sing le, c ohesive body of case law.” A laska Airlines

, 8 9 8 F .3d at 913 n.1 (quoting Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
, 5 12 U.S. 246, 2 6 0 (1994)). After discussing the d e v elopment of the two-step test apply ing to claims under state law that r e quire interpretation of a CB A, we ex plained that “[ t] he same principle applies to federal law claims, althoug h they mig ht be better d escribed a s ‘p recluded.’” Id

. at 9 20 n .10. The labor contract at issue in Alaska Airlines, like the contract involved in H ubbard

, was g overned by the RL A. T h e fact that the p laintiff had asserted

a claim under a federal statute rather than a state law did not alter the o utcome. T he c laim could not proceed, reg ardless o f whether it was described as precluded or preempted.

B. CET’s RICO claims require analysis of the CBA.

Apply ing the two-step t est, we conclude that CET’s RI CO claims are precluded by § 301 because resolution of the claims is substantially dependent o n i nterpretation of the CB A. CET’s RI CO claims a re premised on alleg a tions t h at timesheets sub mitted b y I L W U workers were inflated. T o prove its case, CET m u st demonstrate that I L W U workers committed the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud b y knowing ly o verbil l i ng CET for time not worked. However, I L W U contends that the billed hours were e x pressly authoriz ed b y CET and charg ed in accordance with the CB A

.

There are a host of CB A p rovisions that c ould ex cuse the workers from being present a t t he time of work reported on the timesheets or could ex plain why workers a re compensated for time not actually worked. F or instance

, ¶ 4-1 g uarantees

a m i n i m u m of 8 hours of pay f or employ ees who arrive at

w o rk and are put to work even if released before the 8-h o u rC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 21

shift concludes. Parag raph 4 -5 g uarantees a minimum 4 hours of pay for those sent h ome upon arrival. F urther, Section X I I of the CB A details special rules for “ steady ” e m p l o y ees: ¶ 12-3 g uarantees 40 hours’ work per week, a nd ¶ 12-4 s e t s

max imum durations for lay

- off periods. F inally

, ¶ 8-1 of the CB A lists paid holiday s, ¶ 9-1 alludes to paid vacation time,

a n d ¶ 6-4 provides f

or paid meal periods with minimu m durations.

Resolution of the RI CO claims will also req u i re interpretation o f the CB A t o determine how it applies, if it does, to an issue which its ex press terms do n o t appear to d i scuss: whether e mploy ees can claim all of their compensable hours in the ir weekly timesheets, or whether they must simply li s t t i m e actually worked and await a forensic recalculation of their pay

.

These issues are not, as the dissent sug g ests, at 38–39, merely “speculative” or “ hy p othetical.” R ather, they a re intrinsic to CET’s claims as pleaded and arg ued to the district
court a nd to us. Permitting the district c ourt to proceed before the g rievance process has been ex h austed would “eviscerate a central tenet of federal labor-contract law under § 301 that it is the arbitrator, not the court, who has the responsibility to interpret the labor cont r act in the f irst instance.” Lueck

, 471 U.S. at 220.

Notably

, CET has not a

rg ued that its claims are unrelated
to the CB A. That is not surprising

, for the subject of its c laim, the number of hours for which its e mploy ees a re e ntitled to claim pay ment, is at the core of an employ ment relationship and is something a CB A could be ex pecte d t o g overn. I nstead, CET contends that the CB A is unambig uous. T hat isC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 22

an arg ument that CET can make within the g rievance process. The claims cannot be resolved by mere reference to the CB A

.

W e thus conclude that CET’s RI CO claims substantially depend on interpretation of t h e CB A. The L MRA thus precludes t h e m and requires that federal courts ensure “specific performance of promises to arbitrate g rievances under collective barg aining ag r eements.” Lincoln Mills

, 353 U.S. at 4 51. According ly

, w e turn nex t t o what, ex actly

, the CB A promises.

C. The CBA’s arbitration provision applie s to R I CO claims.

CET arg u e s that ev e n i f § 301 could preclude its RI CO cl a ims, it should have no preclusive effect in this instance b e c a u s e t h e CB A’s arbitration provision does not contempl a t e RI CO claims and does n ot bind CET with reg ard to the I L W U

or the individually -named defendants. CET arg ues that the CB A’s a rbitration provision should be interpreted to ex clude
any statutory claims or a ny disputes bet w e e n t he employ er and the I L W U umbrella org aniz ati o n , o r between the employ e r and the 154 individually -named defendants. These
arg uments fail for several reasons.

CET’s preferred reading of the arbit r a t ion provision directly c ontradicts the plain t e x t of the CB A. B y its o wn te rms, the CB A’s arbitration provision applies to “any
controver s y o r d isag reement o r dispute

. . . as to the interpretation, application, o r violation” o f “any ” of its provisions. ¶ 16-2. I t t h e n sets f orth a process for the resolution of “ all g rievances.” ¶ 16-4. The tex t of the CB A d o e s not say , as it could, that RI CO—or any other statutory claim—is ex c luded f

rom the gr i e v a n ce process, e ven if itC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 23

involves “the interpretation, application, or violation” of the CB A.

Rather, the CB A ex plicitly contemplates a dispute resolution mechanism covering the e x act conduct alleg ed as the basis of CET’s current c laims. F or ex ample, Section XI V lay s o ut the standard of work ex pec t ed of individual employ e es ( e .g ., “not leaving their work station in advance o f the d esig nated quitting time”) a nd g o es on to state that “[ a] n y Employ er may file with the union a c omplaint in writing
ag ainst any member of the g rai n s e c tion of the Union” a nd allows the ag g rieved employ er t o p r o ceed before the J oint L ab or Relations Committee if it does not receiv e a satisfactory

response.

F urther, the I L W U is a sig natory to the ag reement and is capable of enforcing the ag reement on its own behalf, and the employ e es, throug h their barg aining representatives, are also treated as parties to the ag reement.

At most, CET’s preferred interpretation c o u l d c r e ate some doubt a s to the scope of the CB A’s g r ievance pro ce d u re s

. Even so, “[ t] he party c o ntesting arbitrability bears the burden of demonstrating how the lang u ag e in t he collective barg a ining ag reem e nt ex cludes a particular dispute from arbitration.” Standard Concrete P r o ds., Inc. v. Gen. Truck Drivers, Office, F

ood & W

a r e h o use Union, Local 952
, 353 F .3d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Phx. Newspaper, Inc. v. Phx. Mailers Union Local 7 52
, 989 F .2d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir. 1993)). Any “[ d] oubts should be resolved in favor o f
coverag e.” Id. at 674 (citations omitted). CET, a s t h e party refuting the plain reading of the CB A’s scope, has not met its burden of persuasion.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 24

The dissent reaches a d ifferent conclusion i n larg e because it disreg ards the presumption in favor of a r b itration under f e d e r a l l aw. I t contends, at 3 9, that the p arties must “ex p r e ssly c onsent” to a

r bitrate RI CO claims, citing Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Brothe r hood of Teamsters
, 561 U.S. 287, 298 n.6, 297 (2010). B u t it does not consider or a cc o u n t for what else Granite Rock

say s.

L ike this case, G r a n i t e Rock was a dispute between an employ e r and a union. The CB A g overning the relationship between the parties ex pired in April 2004. Id

. at 292. W h en neg otiations for a new CB A reached an impasse, the union workers initiated a strike in J une 2004. I d

. Granite Rock a

nd the union ultimately reached an ag reement on a new CB A on J uly 2. Id. at 292–93. However, the new CB A did not include

a provision to hold the union and its memb e r s h armless for
any strike-related damag es that the e m p loy er may have incurred in the interi m. Id. at 2 93. I n a n effort to secure the waiver of liability

, the local union, under the instruction of its parent, the I nternational B r otherhood of Teamsters (“I B T”), resumed the strike even thoug h the new CB A contained a nostrike provision. Id. Granite Ro ck broug ht a § 301 action in federal court seeking an injunction ag a inst the ong oing strike, and seeking damag es ag ainst both the local u n ion and I B T. Id. at 294. The strike ultimately ended in September, but Granite Rock continued to seek damag es. Id. at 294–95.

During the litig ation, a factual dispute arose as to the date that the new CB A became effective, with Granite Rock claiming that the ag reement was ratified by union m e m b e rs

on J uly 2, and the union claiming that it was ratified later, on Aug ust 22. Id. at 295. T h e d i s t r ict court held that the issue

was for a c ourt to decide

, a n d s u b mitted the question to a jury

, which reached a u n a n i m o u s verdict that the local h adC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 25

ratified the CB A on J uly 2. I d. at 295. The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the parties’ d ispute was g overned b y t he CB A’s arbitration clause, which covered strike-rela t e d claims. Id.

The Supreme Court g ranted certiorari, and reversed, viewing the case as an opportunity to “reemphasiz e the
proper framework for deciding when disputes are arbitrable.” Id. at 297. The Court beg an with the proposition that “ [ i] t is well settled in both commercial a nd labor cases that whether parties have ag reed to submit a p ar t icular d ispute to arbitration is ty

pically an issue for judicial determination.” Id

. at 2 9 6 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). More specifically

, “where the dispute at issue concerns contract formation, the dispute is g enerally f or courts to decide.” Id. B ut where, as here, the formation a nd validity of the contract is not at issue, and the parties “ have ag reed to arbitrate some matters pursuant to a

n arbitration clause, the law’s permissive policies in respect to arbitration coun s e l that any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.” Id. at 298 (internal quotation marks a nd emphasis o mitted). I n such cases, reviewing courts must proceed by :

(1) a pply ing the p re sumption of arbitrability only w h e r e a validly formed a nd enforceable arbitration ag reement is am b i g uous about wh e t h e r it covers the dispute at hand; a nd (2) a dhering to the presumption and ordering arbitration only

where the presumption is not rebutted.

Id . at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 26

The parties in our case do n ot d ispute that there is a valid CB A and that the CB A includes a g rievance provision under which they have ag reed to arbitrate some matters. The dissent does not contend otherwise. Rather, there is only a dispute a s to whether the ag reement’s scope covers CET’s RI CO claims. Granite Rock directs u s, therefore, to resolve any doubts concerning the scope of issues to be referred to arbitration in favor of arbitration. That is the process that the district court followed to reach the conclusion that we affirm.

W e do not hold, as the dissent sug g ests, at 45, that RI CO claims are p r eempted by the L MRA and subject to arbitration in e v ery instance, simply by virtue of being an “employmentrelated d ispute.” L ike state-law fraud claim s , R I CO c laims

are not preempted or p r e c l u d ed b y § 301 unless they a re (1) based on a rig ht or duty created by the CB A, or (2) require interpretation of the CB A. See, e. g

. , Operating Eng’rs Pension Tr. v

. W

ilson

, 915 F

. 2d 535, 537–39 ( 9th Cir. 1 990) (holding that § 301 does not preempt s t a t e t ort claim for fraud in the inducement of a CB A ). 4 E v e n t hen, reviewing
courts must still look to the scope o f t h e CB A’s arbitration provision to determine if those claims a re arbitrable under the framework established in G ranite Rock

.

The d issent’s arg ument that there i s no presumption in favor of arbitration, such that it must be established that t he parties a gr e ed to each specific ty pe of claim, is simply in c o n s i stent w ith Granite Rock

, the authority it purports to rely on, and decades of caselaw. See, e

. g ., United Steelworkers o

f Am. v

. W

arrior & Gulf Navigatio n C o

. ,

4 Sim i larly

, w e h a v e alread y h eld th at f ed eral lab o r law d o es n o t p reclu d e crim in al R I CO actio n

. S ee, e.g

. , Un ited S t

a tes v. Th o rd

a rso n , 6 4 6 F.2 d 1 3 2 3 , 1 3 3 1 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 1 ).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 27

363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960) (“[ Under § 301, a n] order to arbitrate the particular g rievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive a s s u r a n ce that the arbitration clause is no t s usceptible of an interpretation that c overs the asserted dispute. Doubts sh o u l d be resolved in favor o f
coverag e.”) 5

F inally

, we note that CET is not permanently barred from pursuing its claims. The dismissal by t h e district court was without prejudice and properly so. CET is simply required to

ex h aust the g rievance process to which it ag reed in the CB A before it can proceed in federal court with those claims.

D. The Buell exception does not apply.

W e address one final point. CET argu e s that another precedent, Atchison, Topeka & San t a Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell

, 480 U.S. 557 (1987), should control. W e disag r ee.

I n Buell

, the Supreme Court held tha t a n e mploy ee’s claims under an independent federal statute, t h e F ederal Employ ers L iability A ct, were not precluded by the RL A. Id.
at 565– 6 7

. I n that decision, h owever, the Supreme Court reiterated the g en e r al rule in favor of c o mpelling arbitration in labor disputes

, w h ile recog niz ing an ex ception for c laims based on federal stat u t e s that c ontain specific substantive
g uarantees for workers. Id. at 5 6 5 (“[ N] otwithstanding the

5 S ee a lso Ga tewa

y Co a l C o

. v. Un ited Min e W

o rkers

, 41 4 U.S. 3 6 8
, 3 7 7

– 7 8 (1 9 7 4 ); No ld

e Bro s. v. Ba kery & Co n

f ectio n ery W

o r kers Un io n , 4 3 0 U.S. 2 4 3
, 2 5 4

– 5 5 (1 9 77 ); AT& T Tech s. v. Co mmu n s. W o rkers o f Am.
, 4 7 5 U.S. 6 43
, 6 5 0 (1 9 8 6 ); In la n d b o a t men s U n i o n o f th e Pa c. v. Du t

ra Grp

. , 2 7 9 F.3 d 1 0 7 5
, 1 0 7 8 (9 th Cir. 20 0 2 ); SEIU v. S t. Vin cen t Med

. Ctr.
, 3 4 4 F.3 d 9 7 7, 9 85 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 3); In t’l All. o f Th ea trica l S ta g e Emp le. v. In syn c S h o w Pro d s., In c. , 8 01 F.3 d 1 0 33 , 1 0 4 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 28

s t r o n g p o l i c i e s e n c o u r a g i n g a r b i t r a t i o n , ‘ d i f f e r e n t considerations apply where the employ ee’s claim is based on rig hts arising out of a statute d e s i gned to provide minimum substantive g uarantees to individual w orkers.’” (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, I nc. , 450 U

. S. 728, 7 37 ( 1981))); see a lso id. (citing McDonald v. W est Branch

, 466 U.S. 2 84 (1984) (CB A a rbitration decision does
not preclude § 1983 claims); Barrentine
, 450 U.S. 728 (CB A arbit ration d ecision d oes not preclude F L SA c laims); Alexander v. G ardner-Denver Co.
, 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (CB A arbitration decision does not preclude Title VI I claims)).

This r eading of Buell is consistent with decisions that have stressed that “§ 301 cannot be read broadly to pre-empt nonneg o t i a

b l e r i g h t s c o n ferred o n individual employ ees [ even under] state law.” Livadas v. Brads h a w , 512 U.S. 107, 123 (1994). “Setting minimum wag es, r eg ulating work h ours a nd
pay periods, requiring paid and unpa i d l eave, protecting worker safety

, prohibiting d iscrimination in employ ment, a nd establishing other worker rig hts remains well within the traditional police p ower of the states.” Alaska Airlines

, 898 F .3d at 919. Therefore, “claims a l l e gi ng violations o f

s uch p rotections will not necessarily be preempted, e v e n when the plaintiff is covered by a CB A.” Cu r t i s , 913 F .3d at 1152.

W e have consistently observed this ex c eption. See, e.g. , Felt v

. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
, 60 F. 3 d 1 4 16 (9th Cir. 1995) ( RL A does not preclude Title VI I c l a i m s ); Saridakis v. United A irlines

, 166 F .3d 1272 (9th Cir. 1 999) (RL A does not preclude ADA claims).

The e x ception does not apply here, however. The current claims have been broug ht by a n e m ploy er, and the federalC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 29

statute at issue, RI CO, does not establish substantive
g uarantees for workers.

III. Conclusion

W e affirm the dismissal of this action without prejudice by the district court. CET’s RI CO claims are subject to the CB A’s arbitration provis i o n, and are precluded b y L MRA § 301.

AF F IRMED.

I KUTA, Circuit J udg e, dissenting :

The majority today makes two serious errors that w i l l throw our L abor Manag ement Relations A ct (L MRA) jurisprudence in t o disarray

. F irst, it holds that any federal claim that is related to a collective-barg a ining ag reement (CB A) is preempted or precluded by § 301 of L MRA a n d
must automatically be dismissed by the district court and sent f o r a rbitration. Majority at 22. This ruling mistakenly

a p plies our jurisprudence developed for Railway L abor A ct (RL A) claims to L MRA claims. Second, the m a j o r i ty contradicts itself b y holding that even if a federal claim is “pre c l u d ed,” a court “must still look to the scope of the CB A’s arbitration provision to determine if those claims are arbitr ab le.” Majority at 2 6. Here, the majority e rrs b y apply ing a p resumption of arbit ra bility

, even thoug h the Supreme Court has made c lear that such a p resumption does
not apply w h e re the a

rbitration provision is unambig uous. Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l B rotherhood of Teamsters
, 5 6 1 U.S. 287, 301 ( 2010). I n lig ht of these and other errors, I dissent.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 30

I

The primary purpose of § 301 of L MRA is to ensure that federal cour t s ca n apply federal common law to CB A disputes even when a clai m is p leaded as a state-law c laim. On its face, § 301 g ives f e d e r a l courts jurisdiction over “[ s] uits for violation of contracts between an employ er and a labor org aniz ation representing employ ees in an industry affecting commerce.” 29 U.S

. C

. § 185(a). 1 The Supreme Court has interprete d t h i s section as directing federal courts to create and apply a federal co mmon law for interpreting CB As, see Textile W

orkers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala.

, 353 U.S. 448, 4 56 (1957), so as to ensure that uniform federal labor law prevails over inconsistent interpretations of CB A s by state courts, s e e L o c. 174, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, W arehousemen & Helpers v. L u c a s F lour Co.
, 369 U.S. 95, 104–05 (1962). W e refer to state claims covered by § 301 o f L MRA as “preempted” and federal c laims covered by § 301 of L MRA as “precluded.” Alaska Airline s , I n c

. v. S churke

, 898 F .3d 904, 920 n.10 ( 9th Cir. 2018) (en b a n c). These
terms d o not mean “ty pical conflict p reemption” o r preclusion, id. at 922, b u t merely refer to c lai m s that, pursuant to § 301 of L MRA, must be decided in federal court under federal labor law.

1 Sectio n 3 0 1 o f L MRA , 2 9 U.S.C. § 1 8 5 (a), states in f u ll:

Su its f o r v io latio n o f co n tracts b etw een an em p l o y e r

an d a lab o r o rg an i zatio n rep resen t in g em p lo y ees in an in d u s try af

f ectin g co m

m erce as d ef

in ed in th is ch ap ter,

o r b etw een an y s u ch l a b o r o rg an izatio n s, m ay b e b ro u g h t in an

y d i strict co u rt o f th e Un ited States h av in g j u risd ictio n o f th e p arties, w i th ou t resp ect to th e am o u n t in co n tro v ersy or w i th ou t reg ard to th e citizen sh ip of th e p arties.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 31

I f a plaintiff bring s a state-law claim in state court, courts apply a two-part inquiry

, asking whether (1) the claim alleg e s

a breach of a CB A or (2) requires the interpretation of the C BA

. See, e .g. , Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, I n c

. , 4 8 6 U.S. 399, 405–07 (1988); S c h urke

, 898 F .3d at 920

. I f
t he court finds that § 301 o f L MRA applies under thi s t w o

part test, then the d efendants may r emove the case to federal
court throug h the jurisd ictional doctrine of “complete preemption,” w hich is “an ex c eption to the well -pleaded complaint rule.” Schurke

, 898 F .3d at 923 n.15. O n ce the federal court determines that removal under § 301 of L MRA

was proper, the jurisdictional inquiry for preemption is over. B y contrast, when a federal claim is broug ht in federal court in t h e first instance, no jurisdictional inquiry under § 301 o f L MRA is necessary

. Therefore, in t h i s contex t, § 301 has little work to do. 2

Once a claim (state or f

ederal) is properly in federal court, the court’s inquiry

under L MRA is, at its core, a q uestion o f
contract interpretation. See id. at 918 n.7. 3 I f t h e claim

2 In deed

, g iv en th e lim ited n atu re o f L MRA ’ s im p act in th is co n t ex t,

a sister circu it h as co n clu d e d t h a t “th e m o t iv atin g p u rp o se o f § 3 0 1
p r e e m p tio n sim ply d o es n ot ap p ly ” to f

ed eral claim s. W

a t t s v. Un ite d Pa rcel Serv., In c. , 7 0 1 F.3 d 1 8 8
, 1 90

– 9 3 ( 6 t h Cir. 2 0 1 2 ). W e h av e n o t d irectly ru led o n th i s p o in t. Cf. S

ch u rke , 8 9 8 F.3 d at 9 2 0 & n .1 0

.

3 A lth o u g h th e m aj o rity claim s th at oth er circu its ap p l y a

“ preem p tio n ” o r “ p reclu sio n ” test t o co n sid er f ed eral claim s in t

h e co n tex t

o f lab o r d isp u

t es, Maj o r ity at 1 8 n .3
, th e L MRA cases cited by th e

m aj o rity m erely d eterm in ed th at an em p lo y ee’ s F air L ab o r Stan d ard s A ct claim s req u ired an in terp retatio n o f th e CB A , an d th eref o re w ere su

b j ect to L MRA ’ s statu te of lim itatio n s. S e e Va d in o v. A. Va ley En g’rs
, 9 0 3 F.2 d 2 5 3 , 2 6 6 (3 d Cir. 1 9 9 0 ); Ma rtin v. La ke Cn ty. S ewer Co

. , 2 6 9 F.3 d 6 7 3
, 6 7 9 (6 th Cir. 2 0 0 1 )

. T h ese cases d o n o t af f ect th e co n clu sio n t

h at, af ter f ed eral j u risd i ctio n ex ists, w e are task e d o n ly w ith d ecid i n g aC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 32

alleg es a b reach of the CB A or requires interpretation of the CB A, then the federal court need onl y r e ad

, apply

, a nd enforce the CB A, i n cluding any applicable arbitration
pr o v i s i o n. There is no “presumption that labor disputes a re arbitrable whenever they are not ex pressly ex cluded f rom an arbitration clause.” Granite R o ck

, 561 U.S. at 301 n.8. I f the C B A or labor contract does not require that the dis p u t e b e resolv ed by arbitration, then the court must resolve the dispute itsel f by apply ing the terms of the CB A pursuant to federal c ommon labor law. See, e.g. , P ainting & Decorating Co ntractors Ass’n v. Painters & Decorators Joint Comm.
, 707 F .2d 1067, 1070–72 (9th Cir. 1983).

This cont r actual focus differentiates L MRA from the RL A, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151– 6 5
, which c overs the railroad a nd airline industries. The standard f or determining when a statelaw c laim is preempted by the RL A is “virtually identical to the pre-em

p tion standard the Court employ s in cases involving § 301 of the L MRA.” Hawaiia n A i r l i nes, Inc. v

. Norris
, 512 U.S. 246, 260 (1994). B ut if the RL A’s d isputeresolution provisions apply to a claim, then the sta t u t e itself “requires submission o f such dispute s t o internal d isputeresolution processes and then t o a d ivision of the National Adjustment B oard or an a rbitration b oard selected by t h e parties.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska A irlines, I nc. , 553 F .3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2009). B ecause the tex t of the RL A mandates arbitration of any c overed claim, it provides no g uidan c e i n determining whether a claim precluded b y L MRA must be arbitrated. Cf. H ubbard v. United Airlines,

q u estio n o f co n tract in terp retatio n to determ in e w h eth er th e f

ed eral claim s

m u st b e arb itrated

. S

ee Gra n i te Ro ck , 5 6 1 U.S. at 3 1 0

– 1 1

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 33

I n c

. , 927 F

. 2d 1094, 1097–98 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated i n part , Norris , 512 U.S. at 263 n.9. 4

He re, Columbia Ex port Terminal (CET) broug ht federal claims in f

ederal court, so no jurisdictional inquiry is r equired
to ensure the propriety o f removing the case from state court. And because § 301 of L MRA applies, ra t h e r than the RL A
, this case presents only a question of contract interpretation,

see Grani t e R o c k

, 561 U.S. at 311, and we must determine whether CET’ s c laims a s pleaded are subject to the CB A ’s
g rievance and arbitration p r oc e d u r es. I n short, the only question at issue h e r e is w hether CET’s complaint raises claims that the parties intended to be decided in the ar b i t ra l forum e stablished by the CB A among the parties. 5 According ly

, to the ex tent the majority holds that if a federal claim is “g rounded in the provisions of a C BA or requiring interpretation of a CB A,” Majority at 14, then t h e c laim is

4 T h u s, th e m aj o rity ’ s relian ce o n RL A cases th at req u ired f ed eral RICO claim s to g o to RL A

- m an d ated ad j u stm en t b o ard s, Maj o rity at 1 8 & n .3
, i s in ap p o site, as th e s e c a s es d o n o t p ro v id e g u id an ce o n th e q u estio n w

h eth er L MRA c a n “ p reclu d e” CET ’ s RICO claim s. Cf. Un d erwo o d v. Ven a n g o River Co rp

. , 9 95 F.2 d 6 7 7 , 6 8 5 (7 th Cir. 1 9 9 3 ),

o verru l ed in p a rt , W

estb ro o k v. S

ky Ch efs, In c. , 3 5 F.3 d 3 1 6
, 3 1 7

– 1 8 (7 th Cir. 1 99 4 ). A n d th e m aj o rity ’ s relian ce o n ERISA cases in v olv in g RL A

m an d ated arb itratio n pro v es ev en less p ersu asiv e, b ecau se ERISA i t s e l f d isclaim s an y

ef f ect o n o r co n f lict w i th earlier en acted f

ed eral law s

. S

ee 2 9 U.S.C. § 1 1 4 4 (d ).

5 T h e m aj o rity im

p l icitly ack

n o w led g es th at th e o n l y q u estio n h ere is

w h eth er th e p arties ag reed to arb itrate t h e ty p es o f claim s raised i n CET ’ s

co m plain t. T h u s, th e m aj ority ex p lain s th at th e “ L MRA req u ires d isp u tes arisin g f ro m th e CB A to be f

u n n eled

, if so r e q u ired b y th e CBA
, to arb itratio n ,” Maj o rity at 1 7 n .2
, an d th e m aj o rity ' s “ p reclu sio n ” an aly s is is m erely in ten d ed to “d i r e c t t h e [f ed eral statu to ry claim ] to t h e pro per ad j u d icato r,” Maj o rity

at 1 7

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 34

preclud e d b y § 301 of L MRA and must be dismissed by the district court for arbitration, Majority at 22, it is wrong

.

I I

After consuming multiple pag es with its theory that RI CO claims are “preclud e d b y § 301” a nd subject to the two-part test for preemption, Majority at 1 2–22, the majority suddenly shifts g ear and indicates that this conclusion is irrelevant, because, even after the two-step preemption test, “reviewing
courts must still look to t h e s c o pe of the CB A’s arbitration provision to determine if those claims a r e arbitrable under the framework e stablished i n G ranite Rock .” Majority at 26. Althoug h this conclusion is correct (and makes the majority ’s leng thy preclusion an a l y s i s mere dicta), the majority errs b y

m i s u nderstanding Granite Rock ’s a naly sis of how cou

r t s m u s t determine whether an arbitration p rovision in a CB A covers the claim at issue.

A

I n Granite Rock

, the Ninth Circuit made the same mistake the majority makes here: it applied the presumption that “any d oubts concerning the scope of arbitral issues should b e resolved in favor of arbitration,” and erroneously held that a L MRA dispute was g overned b y a CB A’s arbitration clause. 561 U.S. at 298. The Supreme Court reversed. A s Granite Ro c k ex plained, the Supreme Court has never “ held that
courts may use policy considerations as a substitute for party ag reement,” id. at 3 03, or “ held that this policy overrides the principle that a court may submit to arbitratio n ‘only those disputes

. . . that the parties have ag reed to submit,’” id.
at 302 (quoting First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan

, 5 1 4 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)). Rather, a court must apply “the p r operC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 35

framework for deciding when d isputes are arbitrable.” Id. at 297.

Under the Granite R ock f

r amework, a court must first use ord i nary principles of contract interpretation to determine if the arbitration provision is “best construed to e ncompass the dispute.” I

d. a t 3 03. “ [ A] court may order arbitration o f a particula r d i s pute only where the court is satisfied that the
pa rt i e s ag reed to arbitrate that dispute

. ” Id. at 297

. This

means that a court must first “resolve a ny issue that calls into
qu estion the formation or a p p licability of the specific arbitra t i o n c l ause that a party seeks to have the court enforce.” Id.

Then, only “ where a validly formed and enforceable arbitration ag reement is ambig uous about w h e ther it covers the dispute at hand,” may a court a p p ly “the pre s u m p t i o n o f arbitrability ” and ask whether the arbitratio n p r ovision is reasonably construed as covering the asser t e d d i spute. Id. at 301. E ven if the court concludes the arbitration provision is susceptible to such an interpreta t ion, and therefore the
pr e s u m p tion o f arbitrability applies, a court may order arbitration “only where the p r esumption is not rebutted.” Id.

B

Apply ing this framework h ere, we beg in b y const r u i n g the tex t of the CB A, using ord inary principles of contract interpretation, to determine which claims must be decided b y the CB A’s g rieva n c e a nd arbitration procedures. Section XVI of the CB A provides “procedures for handling
g rievances and disputes.” The CB A defines a g rieva n c e a s follows:C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 36

A g rievance shall be define d as any controversy or disag reement or dispu t e between the applicable I L W U L oc a l Union and the Employ er for the particular g rain

e l evator(s) involved as to the interpretation

, application, or violat i o n of any provision o f this Ag reement.

The CB A p rovides that all g riev a n ce s between the local unions and CET must be resolved pursuant to the procedures in Section XVI

of the CB A. Under Section XVI , the parties must attempt to resolve the g rievance informally

. I f it is not resolved, it must be r eferred to a “ J oint L abor Relations Committee” compri s ed of representatives from “the applicable I L W U L ocal Union” and “the appli c able Employ er.” The c ommittee has “ t h e power and duty to investig ate a

nd adjudicate all g rievances or disag reements o r disputes arising u nder this Ag reement.” I f the committee is unable to resolve the d ispute, then the committee defines “the question or questions in dispute,” and either p arty may refer the question “to an impartial arbitrator.” T h e CB A then outlines the procedure for condu c t i n g arbitration. F inally

, CET “shall also have the rig h t to file a gr i e v ance and to follow the above g riev a nce procedure in an effort to resolve it.”

C

After r eviewing the r elevant provisio n s of the CB A
reg arding which claims are subject to its g r ievance a nd arbitration procedures, we nex t c onsider the nature of CET’s claims, b eg inning with an a c curate description of CE T ’s claims “as pleaded.” See Schurke , 898 F .3d at 924 (holding that, in determining whether a state law claim requires t heC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 37

interpretation of a CB A, a f ederal court must consider th e claim “as pleaded”). According to t h e o perative complaint, CET employ s union -r ep resented workers to load g r ain for international shipping at a terminal in Portland, O r egon (Terminal 5). CET sued the I nternational L ong shore a nd W a r ehouse Union (I L W U) and approx imately 160 individual hourly workers who are members of two local l a bor
org aniz ations chartere d b y I L W U. According to the complaint, the defendants, “with spec i f i c intent to defraud, jointly en t er ed into a conspiracy and scheme” to “routinely and sy s t e m at i cally

, over a period of more than four y ears,” under-staff jobs and submit time sheets “indicating time worked for employ

ees who did not work, and were not even

a t T er minal 5, for some or all of the indicated time.” T h e complaint alleg ed that workers “bi lled hours and received unearned pay

ment” for time c l ai m e d on their time sheets when they were not present a t Ter m i n a l 5

. Among other practices, workers split shifts “with one working the first half and the other working the second half, y e t submitting time sheets indicating falsely that both had worked the full shift.” Another practice involved workers w ho were present at the terminal submi t ting time sheets showing that an absent worker, who had not showed up, “wor k e d a full shift.” The complaint alleg ed that throug h the se fraudulent practices, workers illeg a lly

obtained over $5 million from CET.

B a sed o n these f

actual alleg ations, the complaint broug ht

se v e n R I CO claims. 6 The complaint alleg ed that e ach

6 T h ese cla i m s in clu d e alleg atio n s th at th e d ef en d an ts in v ested in co m e d eriv ed f ro m a pattern o f rack eteerin g activ ity in v i o l a t io n o f 1 8 U.S.C. § 19 6 2 (a), th at IL W U acq u i red an in d irect in terest in an d i n direct co n tro l

o f CET th ro u g h a p attern o f rack eteerin g activ i ty in v io latio n of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 6 2 (b ), th at th e d ef

en d an t s p articip ate d in th e co n d u ct o f th e l o calC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 38

submission of a fraudulent time sheet constituted a predicate
act of mail or wire fraud under 18 U .S.C. § 1341 and § 1343, and tha t t h e defendants eng ag ed in a pattern of racketeering activity

.

D

The key q u e s t ion is whether CET’s claims, as pleaded,
must b e arbitrated u nd e r the CB A. To make this determination, we apply p rinciples of contract interpretation,

as informed by the common law o f federal labo r l a w a nd labor a rbitration precedents. See Standard Concrete Prods., Inc. v. Gen. Truck Drivers, Office, F ood & W a rehouse Union, Loc. 952
, 353 F .3d 668, 673–75 (9th Cir. 200 3 ) ; s e e also M & G Polymers USA, LLC v

. T a c k e tt , 574 U.S. 4 27, 435 (2015); Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 298 n.6.

F ederal c ommon law p ro v i d es important g uidance for interpreting the key terms in the CB A. Under federal

common law, we construe the word “interpretation” narrowly

as meaning “something more than ‘ cons i d e r ,’ ‘refer to,’ o r ‘apply .’” Schurke

, 898 F .3d at 921 (quoting Bal c o r ta v

. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.
, 208 F .3d 1002, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000)). B ecause a plaintiff’s c laim, “as pleaded,” drives the analy sis, there must be an “active dispu t e” a s to the interpretation of a CB A provision and not s i m p l y a

“‘ hypothetical connection between the claim and the terms o f the CB A.’” Schurke

, 8 98 F .3d a t 9 2 1 (quoting Cramer v

. Consol. Freightways, Inc.
, 255 F .3d 683, 691 (9th Cir. 2 001) (en banc)). A court must w a i t until an active dispute arises;

u n io n s th ro u g h a p attern o f rack eteerin g activ ity in v i o latio n of 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 6 2(c), an d th at t h e def en d an ts co n sp i red t o v io late th e p rio r th ree sectio n s in

v i o latio n o f 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 62 (d ).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 39

i t c a nnot rely on the “speculative possibility ” of a n interpretive dispute or the “possibility that thing s could chang e down the road.” McCray v. Marriott Hote l Servs., Inc.
, 902 F .3d 1005, 1 0 13 (9th Cir. 2018). Nor does an interpretive dispute ex ist merely because a defendant rel i e s

on CB A provisions a s a defense to a plaintiff’s clai m

. See,
e.g. , W a rd v. Circus Circus Casinos, Inc.
, 473 F .3d 994, 997–99 ( 9 t h Cir. 2007); Detabali v. St. Luke’s H osp. , 482 F .3d 1199, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2007); Matson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 840 F .3d 1126, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 2016).

Usin g o rdinary principles of contract interpretation, it is immediately apparent that the arbitration provision in the CB A d oes not c o v e r CET’s claims ag ainst I L W U. The CB A’s interpretation of “g rievance ” i s limited to controversies, disag reemen t s , o r d isputes “between the applicable I L WU L ocal U nion and the Emplo y e r for the particular g rain elevator(s).” Therefore, it is una m b ig uous that CET’s claims a g ainst I L W U f alls outsi de the definition of a g rievance. See, e.g. , Standard Concrete
, 353 F .3d at 674–75. According ly , CET has no oblig ation to arbitrate its claims ag ainst I L W U. The majority e rrs in holding otherwise. Majority

at 22–27.

Second, it is immediately a pparent that the parties did not ag ree to a rbitrate federal statutory claims in g eneral, or RI CO claims i n p ar t icular. The p arties to the CB A could have
ag reed to do so, because court s will enforce ag reements to

a r b i t r ate federal statutory claims, see 1 4 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett
, 556 U .S. 247, 263–64 (2009). B ut, for s u c h an ag reement to be enforceable, the parties must e x p ressly
consent to such a provision, see id. ; Gran i t e R ock

, 561 U.S.
at 300, and any CB A requi r e ment to a rbitrate such c laims “must be p articularly clear,” W right v. Universal Mar. Serv.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 40

Corp.
, 525 U.S. 70, 79–80 (1998). The CB A’s g rievance a nd arbitration provisions here do n ot ex p ressly ag ree to a rbitrate RI CO c l a i m s, or any other statutory claims, or a uthoriz e the arbitrators to resolve such claims.

Therefore, unless the CBA ’ s a r bitration provision is ambig uous, it would apply to CET’s claims only if the CB A ’s definition of “gr i e v ance” is best construed as covering the claims. The word “g r ievance” is defined in the CB A as “any controversy or disag r eement or dispute ” i n volving “the interpretation, application, or violation of any p r o v i sion o f this Ag reement.” Under federal labor law, a dispute over “the interpretation or application” of a CB A refer s to “a claim arising o ut of a CB A.” Norris
, 5 1 2 U

. S

. a t 254. B ecause C ET d oes not alleg e a violation of the CB A, and there i s n o dispute over how a CB A provision applies to CET’s claims, the key q u estion is w hether liti gating CET’s RI CO claim “requires interpretation of a CB A.” S churke

, 898 F .3d at 921. As noted above, under federal common labor l a w , “‘interpretation’ is construed narrowly

, ” and covers c laims only “to the ex tent there is an active disput e o v e r ‘the meaning of contract terms.’” Id. ( quoting Livadas v

. Bradshaw , 512 U.S. 107, 124 (1994)).

B a sed on a straig htforward a p plication o f ordinary
cont r a ct interpretation principles, resolving CET’s RI CO claims does not require int e r p retation of the CB A. The compla i n t simply alleg es that the individual workers submitted fraudulent time sheets claiming hours worked at Terminal 5 during periods in which they were not phy sically present at the terminal. P r oving the elements of mail a nd wire fraud here requires only a factual in q u i r y into whether employ e es claimed they were working w h en they were not phy sically on site. “The need f o r a ‘purely factual inquiryC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 41

that does not turn on the meaning of any provision of a collective-barg aining ag r eement,’ h owever, is not cause for preemption under section 301,” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp. , 491 F .3d 1053, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lingle

, 486 U .S. at 407) (cleaned up), meaning that a purely fact u al inquiry does not require an interpretation of a CB A under our two-part test.

The defendants’ arg uments to the contrary fail. B ecause it is not possible to ex plain how CET’s claims, “as pleaded,” require construing the CB A, Sc h u rke

, 8 98 F .3d at 924, the defendants take th e e a sier route of recharacteriz ing the complaint. W hile CET’s c omplain t a lleg es that defendants conspired to defraud CET by making false claims about their
presence for work at Terminal 5, the defendants reinvent the complaint as alleg ing instead that CET overpaid the individual defendants for not working hard enoug h while on site. The majority follows this same ap p r o a c h

, pretending that CET is merely disputing whether d efendants billed hours
t h a t w ere or were n o t “ex pressly a u thoriz ed by CET a

nd charg ed in accordance with the CB A.” Majority at 20.

Having recharacteriz ed CET’s complaint in this w ay , the defendants t h en a

r g ue that interpretation of the CB A is

ne ce s s a ry to address their defense that the CB A’s pay g uarantees, minimum staffing lev e l s, long standing industry practices, a

nd the parties’ barg aining discussions ju s t i fy the employ e es’ wag e claims, because employ ees are entitled to compensation for certain time not wor ked. The majority
ag ain echoes this approach, identify ing hy pothetical defenses that t h e defendants could raise to “ex cuse the workers from being present at the time of work reported on the timesheets”

or t o “ex plain why workers a re compensated for time not actually worked.” Majority at 20. I ndeed, the majority g oesC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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. I L W U 42

so far as to sug g est there c o u ld be an interpretive dispute over whether defendants w e r e entitled to compensation for p aid holiday s. 7 Majorit y at 21. The majority concludes that the

mere ex istence of these hy pothetical defenses in t h e C BA

means that adjudication of CET’s r e-imag ined claims will substantially depend on interpretation of the CB A. Majority at 20–22.

These a rg uments are meritless. We must consider CET’s claims “as pleaded,” and those c laims a l l e g e only that defendants eng ag ed in fraud by claiming they were present at Terminal 5 when th e y were not. No c ontract terms in the CB A a uthoriz e that sort of fraud, so interpretation o f the CB A is not required. The defendants’ possible future defenses do
not turn CET’s claims into “g rieva n ce s ” as defined in the CB A. The Supreme Court has made clear that a party cannot manufacture a CB A dispute throug h r a i sing a defense. See Caterpillar, Inc v. W

illiams

, 482 U.S. 3 8 6
, 398–99 ( 1 987); Schurke

, 898 F .3d at 9 21. W hile defendants may d efend themselves on the g round that CET’s a lleg ations are f actually

erroneous (for instance, because w orkers arrived at t he terminal but then were released f rom work as permitted under the CB A, because w eather prevented work, because workers
g et a paid holiday for Christmas Day , or because CET could
not provide suffi c i en t w ork), such f actual questions o r

ex c u ses d o not create any disputes about the interpretation o f C BA p r o v isions at this stag e of the litig ation. Nor does t h e defendants’ defense that the a lleg ed fraud d id n ot result in overbilling raise an interpretive dispute. As our en banc court has ex plained, a defendant’s alleg ation of “a hy pothetical

7 Giv en t h at th e CB A

h elp f u lly d ef in es Ch ristm as Day

as Decem

ber 2 5
, th ere is u

n l ik e l y t o b e an in t erp retiv e d isp u te o v er th e d ef en d an ts’

en titlem en t to p ay

m en t f or th i s h o lid ay

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 43

connection between the claim and the terms of the CB A is not enoug h” to conclude that the claim “c a n n ot be resolved without interpreting the a

pplicable CB A .” Cramer
, 255 F .3d at 691.

The majori t y ’ s further arg uments that CET’s c laims a re g rievances under the CB A are meritless. F irst, t h e majority places w eig ht on CET’s alle g e d f a ilure to arg ue “that its claims are u n r elated to the CB A.” Majority at 21. I t then
arg ues that CET’s claims are related to the CB A because “the

su b j ec t o f its claim, the number o f hours for which its employ e es are entitled to claim pay ment, is a t the core of an employ ment relationship.” Major i t y a t 21. F actually

, o f
course, the majority is wrong : C ET a r gu e d on appeal that “the district court e rred in finding that C E T ’ s RI CO claim required substantial analy sis of th e C BA,” because “CET’s complaint makes no reference to t h e C BA ,” “ does n ot rely on” the CB A, and the complaint “allege s s i m ply that the I L W U and Members submitted fraudulent t i m e c a r d s c laiming they worked time that they d id not w o rk

. ” B ut more important, for purposes of determining whether CET’s c laims

are “g rievances” subject to resolution under the CB A
, the

ex istence of a

n employ ment relationship between CET a nd the defendants is not dispositive. A s the Supreme Court has

ex p lained, “not e v ery dispute concerning employ ment, o r tang entially involving a provision of a collective-barg aining
ag reement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Caterpillar

, 4 82 U .S. at 396 n.10 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck

, 471 U.S. 202, 211 ( 1 9 8 5)). CET must only arg ue (as it did p ersuasively ) that resolving its RI CO claims d o e s not require resolving any active interpretive dispute a s to the particular meaning o f CB A provisions. Our t a s k

, in turn, is merely to consider whether CET’s claims are “g

rievances” for purposes of the CB A.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 44

Second, the majority a rg ues that CET’s cl a ims a re “g rievances” cov e red by the CB A because the CB A provisions “could ex cuse” workers from being present o r “could ex plain” compensation f or time not worked. Majority
at 20. B ut t h e C BA d o es not define a “g rievance” a s including p ossible defenses that may be raised by a def e n d a n t

. The majority ’s ruling is contrary to federal

common labor law, which holds that unless ther e is a currently ex isting

, active di s pute requiring interpretation o f the CB A, such a claim does n ot r e q uire interpretation of the CB A. See Cramer
, 255 F .3d at 691–92. Rather, “we have held that a CB A provision does not trig g er preemption when it is only potentially relevant to the state law claims, without
any g uarantee that interpretation or d irect reliance on t h e CB A terms will occu r .” Humble v

. Boeing Co.
, 305 F .3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Dent v. Nat’l Football League
, 9 0 2 F .3d 1 109, 1 116–17 (9th Cir. 2 0 1 8 ) ( s ame). I f C E T b r oadens its theory of liability later in litig ation, the d e fendants may ag ain raise an arg ument under § 301 o f L MRA, and the court ca n then decide whether to refer interpretive disputes to the CB A’s arbitration procedures at that time. See McCray
, 9 02 F .3d at 1013 & n.3. L ikewise, if disputes arise in the calculat ion of damag es, then relevant interpretive disputes may be referred to the CB A’s arbitration procedures. See, e.g. , Lingle

, 486 U.S. at 413 n .12; S churke

, 898 F .3d at 922 & n.1 4

. But b ecause no active interpretive dispute ex ists at this time as CET’s claims are pleaded, these claims a re n ot s u b

j e ct to resolution under the CB A. 8 Nor

8 T h eref o re, th e m aj o rity h as it b ack w ard in say in g th at CET m u st f irst “ ex h au st th e g riev an ce p ro cess” an d th en retu rn to f ed eral co u rt w i th its claim s. Maj o rity at 2 7

. Mo reo v er, th e m aj o rity ’ s p ro m ise t h a t C ET

can retu rn to f

ed eral co u rt af

ter arb itratio n is an em

p ty on e. T h is p ro m ise

w o u ld m ak e sen se if

th e m aj o rity

h eld it w as n ecessary f

o r arb itratio n toC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 45

would analog ous state law claims be removable under § 301 of L MRA if CET had raised the claims in state court.

B e cause CET’s RI CO claims are not a “dispute . . . as to the interpretation, application, or violation of any provision of” the CB A, there is no “g rievance,” as defined in the CB A

. The a rbitration ag reement i s n o t “ambig uous about whether it covers the dispute at hand,” Granite Rock

, 561 U.S. at 310, because the CB A is n ot susceptible to an i n terpretation that C ET’s RI CO claims require an interpretation of the C BA

. There i s no ambig u ity that would g ive rise to a presumption of arbitrability

. B ecause “a court may su b mit to arbitration only those d isputes that the parties have ag reed to submit,” id.
at 302 (clea n e d up), the majority errs in holding that CET’s claims are subject to the CB A’s g rievance and arbitration procedure.

E

The majori t y o pinion is b oth erroneous and internally inconsistent. F irst, it presents an erroneous theory of L MRA preclusion. U n der the majority ’s new rule, almost any employ m e n t -related dispute between p arties covered by a CB A is precluded and sent to a rbitration, even thoug h the Supreme Court has ex pressly d isclaimed this approach and, unlike the RL A, L MRA itself does not require arbitration of

reso l v e a k ey issu e in CET ’ s RICO claim s, an d th en CET co u ld l i tig ate th e

rem ain der. Cf. S

c h u r k e , 8 98 F.3 d at 9 2 2 & n .1 4

. B u t b ecau se th e

m aj o rity d o e s n ot an d can n ot d o so —b ecau se th ere is n o su ch k ey issu e—its p ro m i s e is em

p ty

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 46

every precluded c l a i m

. See Schurke

, 8 9 8 F .3d at 918 n.7. 9 Second, even thoug h the majority g o es on to h o l d that it remains necessary to d etermine whether CET’s claims a re covered by the arbitration p r o vision, the majority fails to apply the Granite Rock f ram ework correctly

, and instead holds that the CB A a

pp l i es based on meritless, hy pothetical

c onnections to CB A provisions. Cf. Schurke

, 898 F .3 d
at 921; C

r a m e r , 2 55 F .3d at 691–92. This approach is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s labor ar b i t r a tion
p r ecedents, which prevent a court from compelling a rbitr a t i o n of disputes that the parties have not ag reed to arbitrate.

The majority offers the reassurance that workers, at least, will not b e compelled to arbitrate all their d i sputes, because

our cas e s allow workers to litig a te claims based on statutes that provide “substantive g uarantees for workers.” Majority

a t 2 7–28. Under this rationale, only employ ers will have t o arbitrate their c laims without their consent. B ut the Supreme Court’s labor arbitration precedent doe s n ot permit this l opsided interpretation of L MRA. I f the CB A ex pressly requires the arbitration o f a federal s t a t utory c laim, the worker is bound to arbitration, reg a rdless of any “ substantive
g uarantee.” See Penn Plaza

, 556 U.S. at 2 5 6 n.5, 263–64. And by the same token, if the employ er did n o t c o n s ent to arbitrate a f

ederal statutory claim, then no l a b o r p olicy considerations can r equire the employ er to do so. See Granite Rock, 561 U.S. at 299, 303.

9 T h e m aj ority

d isp u tes th is ch aracterizatio n , Maj o rity at 2 6

– 2 7
, b u t th e m aj o rity p o in ts to n o b asis f o r i ts co n clu sio n th at CET ’ s RICO claim s

are “ su bstan t ially d ep en d en t o n in te r p r etatio n o f th e CB A ” (Maj o rity
at 2 0 ) o th er th an its reaso n in g t h at t h e d ef en d an ts w h o alleg ed ly d ef

rau ded CET w ere p arties to a CB A an d c a n n ow m an u f actu re C BA

- b ased d ef en ses to co m

p el arb itratio n

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 47

Taken tog ether, the majority ’s many misstatements of law upend the carefully limited scope of § 301 of L MRA that our circuit has so consistently upheld a nd g ive future defendants
new, p reviously reject ed, way s of depriving CB A -covered plaintiffs of their rig hts to a judicial forum and to vindication of independent statutory

rig hts. I therefore dissent.

B ENNETT, Circuit J udg e, joined by I KUTA, R. NEL SON, B UMATAY, and VANDYKE, Circuit J u d g es, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

Our L abor Manag ement Relations A ct (“L MRA”) § 301 preemption doctrine developed to p r event state courts from interpreting collective barg aining ag reem e n ts (“CB As”) inconsistently u nder state law. Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.
, 369 U.S. 9 5
, 104 (1962) (“[ I ] n enacting [§] 3 01 [ of the L M R A, ] Cong ress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly to prevail over inconsistent local rules .” (emphasis added)). W e have never applied that reasoning to preempt (or “preclude”) a federal statutory claim. B u t in Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke

, we erroneously sug g ested in a footnote that § 301 “precludes” federal statutory claims in the same way it preempts state law claims. 898 F

. 3d 904, 920 n.10 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (“The same principle [ of L MRA preemption] applies to federal law claims, althoug h they mig h t better be d e scribed as ‘precluded.’”). L ed astray by this footnote, t h e panel entrenches the p osition that § 301 can preclude federal statutory claims.

B u t the footnote was wrong , and the panel is wrong

. “W h e ther c alled ‘preemption’ or ‘ preclus ion,’” Op. 18, the L MRA d oes not bar a federal statutory claim broug ht inC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 48

federal c ourt. Today

, the ba r r e d c laim is a Racketeer I nfluenced and Corrupt Org aniz ations Act (“RI CO”) claim alleg ing a $5.3 million mail and wire fraud r ac k e teering scheme. Tomorrow, the b a rred claim may be based on the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or Title VI I of the Civil Rig hts Act of 1964. W e should have reheard this case

en banc to ex cise t h is e r

roneous preclusion notion from our jurisprud e n c e , and I respectfully dissent from our failure to do so.

I start with what oug ht to b e a very straig htforward premise—preclusion of federal claims is in c onsistent with the
purpose o f § 301, which is p rimaril y a jurisdictional statute intended to e nsure the uniform interpretation of CB As. A nd because preclusion of federal statutory c laims is so divorced from the purpose of § 301, the pane l ’ s idea of preclusion
creates a bsurd and confusing results, as this case shows. B ut the most fundamental problem is the most obvious. A statute p a s s ed by Cong ress to help maintain a uniform body o f federal labor law does not somehow nullify a different statute passed by Cong ress to, among other objectives

, e radicate
org aniz ed attempts to d efraud th r o u gh a pattern o f racketeering activity

. Cf

. A lexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
, 415 U.S. 36, 49–50 ( 1974) ( “I n sub m i tting his g r ievance to arbitration, an employ ee seeks to vindicate his contractual rig ht u nder a c o l lective-barg aining ag reement. B y contrast, in fili n g a lawsuit under T itle V I I
, an employ ee asserts independent statutory

rig hts accorded by

Cong ress.”).

Thoug h this is t h e panel’s most fundamental error, it is
not t h e only one. The panel a pplies a presumption o f arbitrability c ontrary to Supreme Court precedent and creates

an ag reement to arbitrate RI CO claims

, e ven thoug h theC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 49

parties never signed such an ag r eement. 1 B y doing so, the panel invents a new r u l e

. Absent an ex plicit arbitration exclusion clause, every issue that could relate to a CB A must be arbitrated—even if the parties never specifically ag r e ed to arbitrate that issue. Contra Granite Rock Co. v. I nt’l Bhd. of Teamsters
, 561 U .S. 287, 297 (2010) (“[ A] court may order arbitration of a pa r t i c ular dispute only where the court is satisf i e d that the parties ag r e e d to a rbitrate that dispute .”). The panel als o does n ot p rovide any c oherent principle that limits its n ew rule. I f alleg ed fraud must be arbitrated as the panel claims, w hich other RI CO p redicate acts and federal statutory claims must be arbitrated? W e should have r eheard this case en banc to correct all these errors.

I

.

The purpose of L MRA preemption of state law claims is
to p revent diverg ent interpretations of a CB A. “The interests in interpretive uniformity and predictability that require that labor-contract disputes be resolved by r eference to federal law a lso require that the meaning g iv e n a c o n tract p hrase o r term be subject to uniform federa l i nterpretation.” AllisChalmers Corp. v. Lueck

, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985). And our test for § 301 preemption reflects that purpose: state law claims are preemp t ed if they are “founded directly on rig hts created by co l l ective-barg aining ag reements” or a re “substantially dependent on analy sis of a [ C B A]

. ” Ca t e r p i llar Inc. v

. W

illiams

, 4 82 U.S. 386, 394 (1987)

1 Ev en if p lain tif

f Co lu m b ia Ex p o rt T erm in al, L L C (“ CET ”) an d th e In tern atio n al L on g sh o re an d W areh o u se Un io n (“ IL W U”) h ad co n tracted
to arb itrate su ch a d isp u te, w h ich t h ey d id n o t, CET ’ s RICO claim w ou ld still n o t b e preclu d

ed

.C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 50

(quotation marks omitted); see also, e

. g. , McCray v. M arriott Hotel Servs., Inc. , 902 F .3d 1005, 1010 (9th Cir. 2018).

W h en a plaintiff bring s federal c laims in federal c ourt, the need for L MRA p reemption di s a p pears. The supposed preclusion inquiry is whether the application of a f ed e r al
statute would be pl a i n l y inconsistent with or f rustrate the
purpose of another federal statute. S e e U n i t e d States v. Est. of Romani
, 523 U. S

. 517, 5 33 (1998). B ut how c an a ny federal claim ( much less a RI CO claim) broug ht in federal
court cause interpretations or a p p lications of a CB A that conflict with § 301 ? A federal claim b r oug ht in federal court will necessarily b e consistent with § 301’s jurisdictional rule. And even if adjudicating a federal c laim requires interpretation of a CB A, the c ourt would simply apply federal

common law, thus eliminating the risk of d i v erg ent interpretations of the CB A. S ee Tex t i l e W

o rkers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. , 353 U.S. 448, 451, 456 (1957). As J udg e I kuta noted in her dissent, “§ 301 h as little work to do” here. Dissent, 31.

The panel conflates L MRA and Railway L abor A ct (“RL A”) preemption 2 in an attempt to justify the untenable position that “[ w] hether called ‘preemption’ or ‘preclusion,’ [ this] approach a p p l ies whether the conflicting statute is a federal or s t a t e provision.” Op. 18. The panel claims that “[ i] n Hubbard [ v. United Airlines, Inc.
, 927 F .2d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ) ]

. . . we held that the RL A, which

. . . preceded the enactment o f RI CO, preem p t ed a fraud claim under RI CO.” Op. 18. The panel also claims that Atchison,

2 “ T h e R L A e s t a blish es a co m p reh en siv e sch em e g ov ern in g l ab or relatio n s o n railro ad s an d airlin es.” Ba rth elemy v. Air Lin es Pilo ts Ass’n
, 8 9 7 F.2 d 9 9 9 , 1 00 7 (9 th

Cir. 1 9 9 0 ) (p er cu riam ).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 51

Topeka & Santa F

e R ai l w a y Co. v. Buell

, 480 U.S. 557 (1987), “reiterated the g eneral ru l e in favor o f compelling arbitra t i o n i n labor disputes.” Op. 27 ( quoting 480 U.S. at 565–67).

B u t there is no basis to the panel’s claim that preemption under the RL A and L MRA is the same, or its claim that this incorrec t p remise somehow a llows the L MRA to preclude federal statutory claims. A lthoug h both “RL A and L MRA § 3 0 1 p r eemption are, in effect, a kind of ‘forum’ preemption,” Alaska Airlines

, 898 F .3d at 922
, t h e two statutes are very different. I n the RL A, Cong ress e stablished

a mandatory arbitral f

orum superintended by the National Railroad Adj u s t m e nt B oard for disputes relating to the formation, interpretation, or application of relevant C B As. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris
, 512 U.S. 246, 252 ( 1 994); Union P a c

. R

. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of

Adjustment

, 5 58 U.S. 67, 74 (2009). Thus, some federal c laims b roug h t in federal court that involve the interpretation of such CB As ar e i n the wrong forum. See H

ubbard , 927 F .2d at 1098.

I n c ontrast, § 301 was enacted to ensure “speci fi c performance of promises to arbitrate g rievance s under [ CB As] .” Lincoln Mills

, 353 U.S. at 451; see id. at 452 (“Once parties have made a colle c tive barg aining c ontract, the e nf orcement of that contract should be left to the usual
processes of the law a

nd not to the National L abor Relations B oard.” (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 5 10, 80th C o n g. , 1st Sess., p.42)). That is, the L MRA itself does not prescribe theC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 52

arbitra tion mechanism that parties must use, but merely facilitates the enforcement of CB A s throug h federal courts. 3

Unlike t h e R L A
, the L MRA “ does not mandate arb i t r a t i o n , nor does it prescribe the ty p es of disputes to be submitted t o arbitration under barg aining ag reements.” Hawaiian Airlines , 512 U.S. at 263 n.9. So even thoug h we

use the same test to d etermine p reemption under the RL A a nd the L MRA, the res u lts a re different. W hen a claim is preempted under the RL A
, the plaintiff’s claim is sent to the RL A’s mandatory a rbitration p rocess. See Hawaiian Airlines

, 512 U.S. at 252–53. B u t when a state law claim is preempted under the L MRA, it “mu s t either be treated as a § 301 claim” unde r t h e complete preemption doctrine “or dismissed as p re-empted by federal labor-contract law,” thus

ex ting uishing the state law claim. Allis-Chalmers , 471 U.S.
at 220. I f the claim is treated a s a federal common law

c ontract claim, we mig ht dismiss it “for failure to m a k e u s e of the g rievance procedure established i n the collectivebargaining agreement .” Id. at 220–21 ( emphasis added). 4 B ut there is no basis for p recluding a federal statutory claim

un d e r t h e L MRA or RL A. I n deed, contrary to the panel’s

3 Of co u rse, a f

ed eral co u

rt m ay b e u

n ab le to d ecid e a fed eral claim i f t h e p arties h av e ag reed to arb itrate it. B u t an ag reem en t to arb itrate a

c l a i m d o es n o t m ean th e claim is p reem p ted o r p reclu d ed

. A p ar t y , fo r

ex am p le, can n ot b ri n g an y claim th at th e p arty h as released o r th at is b arred b y issu e o r claim p reclu s io n

. S ee, e.g

. , Lu cky B ra n d D u n g a rees, In c. v. Ma rcel Fa sh io n s Grp

., In c. , 1 4 0 S. Ct. 1 5 89
, 1 5 94 (2 0 20 ). B u t th at d o esn ’ t m ean th e claim

is “ p reclu d ed ,” as th e p an el u ses th e term

.

4 “ A s a g en e r a l r u l e in cases to w h ich f ed eral law ap p lies, f

ed eral lab o r po licy req u ires th at in d iv id u al em p lo y ees w ish in g to assert co n t ract g riev an ces m

u st attem p t u se of th e co n tract g riev an ce p ro ced u r e a g r eed

u p o n b y em

p lo y er an d u n io n as t h e m o d e o f red ress.” Rep u b lic Steel Co rp . v. Ma d

d o x , 3 7 9 U.S. 6 5 0 , 6 5 2 (1 9 65 ) (em p h asis ad d ed ).C O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 53

position, Buell held that “[ t] he fact t h a t a n injury otherwise compensable u n d e r the [ F ederal Employ ers’ L iability A ct ( “ FE L A”)] was caused by conduct that may have b e e n subject to arbitration under the RL A does not depr i v e an employ e e of his opportunity to b ring an F EL A action.” 480 U.S. at 564.

Be cause the panel’s erroneous ex tension of L MRA preemption to federal law cl a i ms contravenes long standing Supreme Court caselaw, the panel o pinion creates a circuit split. The Six th Circuit has correctly recog niz e d that, when

a claim is “based on a federal cause of action and is in federal court, there is no dang er of diverg ent application of a CB A ’s
p r o visions by state courts; thus, the motivating purpose o f § 301 preemption simply does not a p p l y

. ” W atts v. United Parcel S erv., Inc
., 701 F .3d 188, 192 (6th Cir. 2 01 2 )

. T he Six th Circuit declined to ex tend § 3 01’s preemption analy sis
to plaintiff’s ADA claim and instead concluded that “§ 301 o f the L MRA does not preempt a claim broug ht in federal court under the ADA.” Id. at 193. I t is unc lear how the panel believes that “[ its] holding h ere is entirely consonant with W atts ,” Op. 17 n.2, w hile a l s o acknowledg ing W atts ’s holding that “the motivating purpose of § 301 preem p t i on

s i m p ly does not apply ” when a federal statutory claim i s broug ht in federal court, Op. 16.

The p anel c laims that “at least two circuits have held that the L MRA precludes F L S A [ F air L abor Standards Act] claims,” Op. at 18 n.3, citing Martin v. Lake County Sewer Co., Inc.
, 269 F .3d 673 (6th Cir. 2001), and the case it relied
on, Vadino v. A. Valey Engineers
, 903 F .2d 253 ( 3 d C i r. 1990). B ut those cases applied the National L abor Relations Act’s (“N L R A”) six -month statute o f limitations to a particular class of claims bro u gh t under the L MRA a ndC O L U M B I A E X P O R

T T E R M I N A L V

. I L W U 54

F L SA. Althoug h apply ing the NL RA’s statute of limitations

m a y lead to the dismissal of a late-filed F L SA claim, th at result is assuredly

not § 301 preclusion.

The panel opinion claims th a t § 301 both preempts state law claims a nd sub silentio precludes federal law claims. I n

an attempt to justify this position, the p anel conflates L MRA and RL A preemption. Be ca u s e there is no basis for confl a t ing preemption under the L MRA and RL A, or for

ex tending that preemption to preclude f ederal law claims, the panel opinion needlessly

creates a circuit split.

I I

.

The panel creates a presumption of a rbitrability contrary to Supreme Court precedent and, in d o i n g so, rewrites the CB A to require a

rbi t r a t ion of RI CO c laims—despite conceding that “[ r ] esolution of the RI CO c l a ims will

. . . require interpretation of the CB A to determine how it a pplies, if it does, to an issue which its express terms d o not appear to discuss .” Op. 21 ( emphasis a d ded). Bu t G r a nite R o ck h eld that the presumption applies “only where a v alidly formed and enforceable arbitration ag reement is ambiguous about

w h e ther it covers the dispute at hand.” 561 U.S. at 3 0 1 (emphasis added). As I d iscuss b e l o w , t h e CB A h e re is not ambig uous—its arbitration p rovision does n ot cover CET’s RI CO claims. Thus, the pres umption does not apply

.

T h e p a n el sug g ests that the presumption in favor of arbitration applies whenever the parties h av e ag reed to arbitrate some matters under a CB A a nd dispute only whether the CB A covers the cla i m s a lleg e d. Op. 26. B ut Granite Ro ck specifically r ejected such an a rg ument. “ Althoug h [ United S

teelw o r k ers of America v. W

arrior & GulfC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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Navigation Co.
, 363 U.S. 574 (1960)] contains lang u ag e that mig ht in isolation be misconstru ed as establishing a presumption that labor disputes are arbitrable whenever they

are not e x pressly ex cluded from an arbitration clause

. . . the opinion elsewhere emphasiz es that ev en in L MRA cases, ‘courts’ must construe arbitration c lauses because ‘a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not ag r eed so to submit.’” Granite Rock , 561 U.S. at 301 n.8.

Perhaps recog niz i n g the difficulty of apply ing the presumption to the CB A at issue, the panel attempts t o

r e w rite it. Under the CB A here, “g rievances” must be arbitrated. The CB A defines a g rievance as any dispute about the “interpretation, application, or violation” of the CB A a nd the panel claims that interpretation and application of the CB A are involved here. Op. 20–27. B ut CET’s dispute with the defendants concerns the a lleg ed submission of fraudulent timesheets, a

nd proof of such f

raud doe s n o t require any interpretation or application of the CB A. That is especially

so because CET’s complaint alleg e s that some employ ees did “not show[ ] u p at a ll and y et those who did show up submit[ ted] time sheets indica ting that the absent employ ee worked a full shift.”

The panel points to various provisions of t h e C B A that require an employ e e w h o is sent home early to be paid f or a half or full shift, as well as provisions that require paid meal periods, pai d h o l i d ay s, and paid vacation time. Op. 20–22. These hy pothetical d efenses may e x plain why emp loy ees may r eceive p ay for time they do not wo rk

, b u t these hy pothetical defenses do not authoriz e an employ ee to submit

a timesheet on behalf of a n a b s e n t employ ee. Nor do the provisions of t h e CB A ex plain why a n employ e e mig htC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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submit a timesheet claiming hours that we re not actually worked— e s p ecially if that employ ee did not show u p to work.

The panel states that a

n issue may be “whether employ ees

c a n c l aim all of their compensable hours in their weekly timesheets, or whether they must simply list time a c t u ally worked.” Op. 21. B ut, in the p anel’s o wn words, the CB A ’s “ex p r e ss terms do not appear t o d iscuss” this issue, id

., thus admitting that CET’s RI CO claims likely depend on an issue that the CB A does not discu s s

. T h is is not merely a dispute

o ver the hours that a

n employ ee worked and log g ed on a timesheet, b ut an alleg ation of a $ 5

. 3 million fraudulent scheme ex ecuted by a

pprox imately 150 employ ees over four
y ears. As J u dg e I kuta’s dissent states, “[ p] roving the el ements of mail and wire fraud here r equires only a f actual inquiry into whether employ ees claimed they were w orking when they w ere not phy sically on site.” Diss e n t , 4 0. That inquiry does not require interpretation of the CB A

. The panel

errs both in apply ing a presumption in favor of arbitration a nd in finding that the CB A requires arbi t r a t ion of CET’s RI CO claims.

I I I

.

The p anel’s c reation of a p resumption in favor o f arbitration and an ag reement to arbitrate where n o ne ex ists is
not only leg ally erroneous, b ut a lso practically harmful. F irst,

as plaintiff points out, the panel opinion “creates a new standard under which statuto ry claims are subject to arbitration unless a CB A ex p ressly excludes statutory c laims from the CB A’s arbitration pro c e d u r e s .” PF REB 3. The

no t i o n that any claim that is not ex pressly ex cluded is arbitrable larg ely defeats the point of neg otiating a CB A; theC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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scope of arbitration would become comprehensive no matter what th e CB A say s, unless it ex plicitly ex cludes from arbitration a laundry list of claims. A nd ty pical CB As (those without a laundry list of ex c lusions) will prove n o less troublesome in litig ation, forcing courts to deduce parties’ arbitration intent from what they didn’t say , rather than read the written ag reement to d e t ermine what they specifically
ag reed to arbitrate. The panel’s opinion will lead to a mass of arbitrations never contemplated by a CB A.

Second, there would be no objectively discernible rule to decide w hich federal statutory claims must b e s ent to arbitration and which can proceed in court. T he panel arg ues that CET tri e d to circumvent arbitration by presenting

“ claims which are, in substance, labor disputes” as fe d e ra l statutory claims. Op. 1 7. B ut the panel fails to ex p lain how “I ndividual Defendants n ot showing up at a ll and y et those who did show up submitting time sheets i n d i c a t ing that the absent employ ee worked a full shift,” is a cont r a c tual claim that w as “artful[ ly ] plead[ ed] ” as a RI C O c l a im. Op. 17. CET’s claim describes precisely the kind o f a ctivity that RI CO prohibits: “I t shall be u nlawful for an y person employ e d by

. . . any enter p r i s e eng ag ed in, or the activities of w hich affect, interstate or foreig n c ommerce, to conduct o r participate

. . . in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs throug h a pattern o f r ac keteering activity .” 18 U .S.C. § 1962(c). I f fraud of this nature must be sent t o ar b i tration in the panel’s view, a CB A’s arbitrability scop e w o u l d be almost limitless, as almost any claim would rela t e t o theC O L U M B I A E X P O R

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C BA

. I f there is any limiting principle as to which c lai m must be arbitrated, I don’t discern it. 5

I V.

Section 3 01 o f the L MRA is a far-reaching provision that affects every CB A in “an industry a f fecting commerce.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). U ntil now, we have consistently a pplied § 301 p r e e mption to further the statute’s purpose o f promoting uniform interpretations of CB A provisions. Today

, the panel wrong ly strips federal courts of jurisdiction
to hear federal claims u n d er the g uise of “preclusion.” The panel’s error is mag nified by the lack of a limiting p r i n ciple that ex plains which claims must be arbitrated and which can proceed to litig ation, and by the panel’s misconception o f how to determine w hen a CBA m a n d ates arbitration. The actual standard requires a court to submit to arbitration only disputes that the parties h ave specifically ag reed to submit. See Granite Rock

, 561 U.S. at 302. B ec a u s e of the panel opinion, the standard in our Circuit will require us to submit
to arbitration any claims that were not ex pressly ex cluded,

even if there was no ag reement to arbitrate such claims. This erroneous chang e will harm both labor and manag ement.

F or all these r easons, I respectful l y dissent from our decision not to rehear this case en banc.

5 T h is case in v o lv ed alleg ed m ail an d w ire f rau d

. B u t crim es su ch as

arso n , b rib ery , ex to rtio n , th ef t, em b ezzlem en t, o b stru ctio n o f j u stice, an d

w itn ess tam

p erin g can also b e p red icate acts u n d er 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 9 6 1 (1 ). It tak es little im ag in atio n to f o resee h o w each o f th ese p red icate crim in al
acts b y m an ag em en t o r lab o r co u ld b e rela ted t o a CB A

. It also tak es little im ag in atio n to see h o w a v ast n u m b er o f o th er f

ed eral statu to ry claim s b ro u g h t b y

lab o r o r m an ag em en t co u ld also b e rela ted to a CB A

.