Filed 3/27/15 Soleimani v. Brian J. Kramer , P.C. CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or 

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purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MAHSHID SOLEIMANI,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BRIAN J. KRAMER, P.C.

Defendant and Respondent.

B251216

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC492123)

APPEAL from a judgment and order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Yvette M. Palazuelos, Judge. Affirmed.

Law Office of Amy Ghosh and Amy Ghosh for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Portugal Law Office, APC and Natt Portugal; Brian J. Kramer, P.C. and Brian J. 

Kramer for Defendant and Respondent.

_________________________
2

After becoming dissatisfied with her attorney’s representation, plaintiff Mahshid 

Soleimani initiated nonbinding fee arbitration under the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Act 

(MFAA), Business and Professions Code, sections 6200 et seq. The arbitrators found in 

favor of attorney Brian J. Kramer1on all issues, and Soleimani sought a trial de novo. 

Kramer then petitioned to compel binding arbitration of Soleimani’s claims under the 

arbitration provision of Kramer’s retainer agreement, and the trial court granted the 

petition. After a hearing, the arbitrator found in Kramer’s favor, awarding Kramer all of 

his fees, plus interest, and the trial court confirmed the award.

Soleimani appeals, contending that the trial court erred in compelling arbitration 

and confirming the arbitration award because her claims against Kramer were not within 

the terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement, among other things. We conclude that 

Soleimani has waived each of her appellate arguments by failing to raise them in the trial 

court, and in any event they are without merit. We thus affirm the judgment and order 

confirming the arbitration award. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Background

In September 2010, Soleimani retained Kramer, a family law attorney, to represent 

her in her marital dissolution action. Soleimani initially retained Kramer solely to oppose 

a motion to enforce a settlement agreement entered into in the dissolution action, but she 

later broadened the scope of Kramer’s engagement to include other matters, including the 

preparation of a request for an order to show cause against her former husband. Six 

months later, in March 2011, Soleimani terminated Kramer’s engagement and substituted 

herself in as counsel of record.

The retainer agreement between Soleimani and Kramer provided for mediation 

and arbitration of disputes, as follows:

 

1

Throughout this opinion, we refer to Brian J. Kramer and/or his professional 

corporation as Kramer.
3

“13. Resolving Disputes Between Client and Law Firm:

“(a) Notice and Negotiation: If any dispute between Client and Attorney arises 

under this agreement, both Attorney and Client agree to meet and confer within 10 days 

of written notice by either Client or Attorney that the dispute exists. The purpose of this 

meeting and conference will be to negotiate a solution short of further dispute resolution 

proceedings.

“(b) Mediation: If the dispute is not resolved through negotiation, Client and 

Attorney shall attempt, within 15 days of failed negotiations, to agree on a neutral 

mediator whose role will be to facilitate further negotiations within 15 days. If Attorney 

and Client cannot agree on a neutral mediator, they shall request that the local bar 

association or community-based nonprofit mediation center select a mediator. The 

mediation shall occur within 15 days after the mediator is selected. Attorney and Client 

shall share the costs of mediation, provided that the payment of costs and any attorney 

fees may be mediated. Nothing in this provision shall constitute a waiver of Client’s 

rights to State Bar arbitration or a trial de novo after a State Bar fee arbitration.

“(c) Fee Arbitration: If Client and the Law Firm have a dispute involving 

attorney’s fees and costs under California law, Client has a right to request that the 

dispute be determined first by non-binding arbitration administered by a local bar 

association, including the Beverly Hills and the Los Angeles County Bar Associations. If

non-binding arbitration is selected and either of us is unhappy with the result, the dispute 

shall be adjudicated by way of mandatory and final arbitration by a retired judicial officer 

who presided over a family law trial court, under either (a) the Commercial Rules of the 

American Arbitration Association (‘AAA’), in Los Angeles, California, or (b) with the 

then existing Rules of Practice and Procedure of Advantage Arbitration and Mediation 

Services, LLC (‘AAMS’) in Los Angeles, California. The party first in time to file and 

serve any arbitration [demand] may elect to proceed either before the AAA or the 

AAMS. The arbitration Judgment on the Award may be entered in any court having 

jurisdiction. If we both agree that the local bar association arbitration shall be binding, 

then any award made by the arbitrator(s) will be binding on both of us. Judgment on the 
4

Award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction. The arbitration dispute provision 

is a waiver by each of us to a trial in a court of law and by a jury trial. This agreement to 

arbitrate is not intended to abrogate your right to require non-binding fee arbitration 

pursuant to California Business and Professions Code section 6200-06.” (Emphasis 

omitted.)

II. Soleimani’s Demand for Mediation and Non-Binding Fee Arbitration

In November 2011, Soleimani filed a demand for mediation and non-binding fee 

arbitration with the Los Angeles County Bar Association (LACBA). Mediation was not 

successful, and in July 2012, the parties participated in a one-day hearing before a threemember LACBA arbitration panel. Kramer requested unpaid fees of $7,802.18; 

Soleimani objected to Kramer’s fees, challenging “the quantity of the work expended by 

[Kramer] and the charges therefor.” The arbitrators described the matters placed at issue 

as follows: “1. [Kramer’s] lack of knowledge of a court error that he had no reason to 

know about. [¶] 2. The actual time expended by [Kramer] prior to being discharged by 

[Soleimani]. [¶] 3. Whether [Kramer] acknowledged all payments made by 

[Soleimani].”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the arbitrators found that the services rendered by 

Kramer were “consistent with the fee agreement and were reasonably necessary” and that 

“[Soleimani]’s complaint that [Kramer was] not acting soon enough after a court error is 

misplaced and not determinative in this matter.” The arbitrators awarded Kramer all of 

his unpaid fees, plus interest.

III. Soleimani’s Complaint and Kramer’s Arbitration Petition 

Soleimani filed the present action against Kramer on September 17, 2012. The 

complaint alleges that in late October 2010, Soleimani’s former husband lodged a 

proposed order that, if signed by the court, would allow the court clerk to sign deeds to 

transfer properties on Soleimani’s behalf. Soleimani did not want the clerk to sign deeds 

on her behalf, and so on November 1, 2010, she and her former husband stipulated to an 

agreement requiring deeds to be held, not recorded. The stipulation was signed by the 

parties and filed with the court on November 1. However, on November 19, without 
5

Soleimani’s knowledge, the court signed the proposed order. Soleimani contended that 

Kramer was aware that the proposed order had been signed but intentionally kept this 

information from her. Thereafter, “[f]rom the period between November 1, 2010 to 

February 15, 2011, [Kramer] proceeded to misrepresent the facts of the case to Plaintiff 

and to provide unnecessary legal services to Plaintiff, claiming that the services were 

necessary to enforce the terms of the then moot Stipulation. [¶] . . . [¶] By the time 

Plaintiff was notified by [Kramer] that the [proposed order] had been entered as an order 

of the Court, Plaintiff had expended copious amounts of monetary and other resources to 

compel unnecessary action by Spouse, in reliance on the misrepresentations of 

[Kramer].” Soleimani alleged these actions gave rise to four causes of action: fraud, 

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of legal fee agreement, and breach of the covenant of 

good faith and fair dealing.

On October 16, 2012, Kramer filed and served a Demand for Arbitration before 

AAMS. The following day, Kramer petitioned the superior court to compel arbitration of 

the matters set forth in Soleimani’s complaint. The petition asserted that all of 

Soleimani’s claims came within the agreement to arbitrate, noting that Soleimani did not 

allege any malpractice claims and, in any event, any such claims would be time-barred.

Soleimani filed opposition and a motion to strike the petition to compel 

arbitration. She contended that the petition must be denied because her fraud claims fell 

outside the purview of the arbitration agreement: “[T]he Fee Arbitration clearly states 

that ‘if Client and Law Firm have a dispute involving attorney’s fees and costs (emphasis 

added)’ that they will then be allowed to seek arbitration. The current dispute arises not 

from a fee dispute but rather [from] the intentional misrepresentation by [Kramer] in 

order to procure further monetary gain from Plaintiff.”

On November 13, 2012, the trial court granted Kramer’s petition to compel 

binding arbitration. In pertinent part, the court’s written order said: “The dispute 

between the parties involves attorneys’ fees and is embraced in their agreement to refer 

such disputes to binding arbitration. Plaintiff’s argument that [her] allegations of fraud 

take the dispute outside the parties’ agreement is not persuasive. Regardless of [her] 
6

defenses and allegations, the dispute involves attorneys’ fees and is therefore subject to 

the parties’ agreement to arbitrate. . . . [¶] The court therefore orders the parties to 

binding arbitration in accordance with their agreement and removes this case from its 

civil active list unless and until either side moves to confirm or to vacate the arbitration 

award.”

IV. Arbitration Award

Following an arbitration hearing, arbitrator Keith Clemens issued an award on 

April 22, 2013, which was superseded by an amended award on April 24. The arbitrator 

found that Kramer was entitled to recover the unpaid balance of his legal services bills in 

the amount of $7,802.18, plus interest ($1,641.67) and costs of $4,863.18. The arbitrator 

said the award covered all issues relating to attorney fees and costs arising out of 

Kramer’s representation of Soleimani, “including all defenses which could be raised by 

Soleimani against Kramer’s claims . . . for unpaid attorney fees and costs. These issues 

include the claims asserted by Kramer in the Demand for Arbitration for unpaid attorney 

fees allegedly owed by Soleimani to Kramer and filed by Kramer before AAMS . . . and 

the claims asserted by Soleimani in the Complaint filed on September 17, 2012, . . . 

which claims would, if affirmed, provide either a partial or total defense to Kramer’s 

claims for unpaid attorney fees and costs and would entitle Soleimani to affirmative 

relief.”

2

The arbitrator noted that Soleimani had many specific objections and complaints 

about Kramer’s conduct, but concluded “by a preponderance of the evidence that none of 

them are valid or constitute either a basis for rejecting some or all of Kramer’s charges 

for legal services or for recovery of some or all of the fees previously paid to Kramer by 

Soleimani on the grounds of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the legal fee 

 

2

The arbitrator noted, however, that it “is not ruling on whether this binding 

arbitration award effectively ends the Civil Case. That is beyond the scope of the issues 

submitted to binding Arbitration. The court in the Civil Case, not the Arbitrator, has the 

power to determine the effect of this Award of Arbitrator in Binding Arbitration on the 

Civil Case.”
7

agreement between Kramer and Soleimani, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, or any other legal ground.” Further, while the arbitrator found that Soleimani 

had grounds “for feeling aggrieved by what apparently happened in the courthouse 

starting on November 1, 2010, . . . Kramer [was] not responsible for what transpired.” In 

support, the arbitrator made the following findings of fact:

“24. . . . The question for the Arbitrator is whether Kramer bears any 

responsibility for [the trial court’s premature signing of the proposed order in the family 

law case] . . . . If Kramer does not bear any responsibility for these events, either because 

of action on his part or failure to act when Kramer should have acted, that would affect 

both Kramer’s claim for the unpaid balance of his fees and Soleimani’s claim for a refund 

of some or all of the fees she actually paid and other damages.

“25. Soleimani contends that Kramer knew that the court had signed the 

Proposed Order [o]n November 19, 2010 or at least he knew that before he notified 

Soleimani on February 15, 2011, that the court had in fact signed and entered the 

Proposed Order on November 19, 2010. Soleimani contends that as a consequence of 

Kramer withholding that knowledge from Soleimani, Kramer proceeded to provide 

unnecessary legal services to Soleimani. Soleimani contends that Kramer had assured 

Soleimani from November 1, 2010, until about February 15, 2011, that the November 1, 

2010, Stipulation and Order was the operative order. Soleimani contends that Kramer’s 

conduct constituted fraud, a breach of his fiduciary duty to Soleimani, a breach of the 

parties’ written fee agreement, and a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing. Soleimani contends she is entitled to a refund of the fees she paid Kramer at 

least from soon after November 1, 2010, and that she does not owe additional fees to 

Kramer.

“26. Kramer, by contrast, contended that the signing of the Proposed Order on 

November 19, 2010, was a ‘court error.’ More critically, Kramer contended that he did 

not learn that the court had signed and filed the Proposed Order on November 19, 2010, 

until he received an email from [opposing counsel] on February 15, 2011.
8

“27. The Arbitrator finds that Kramer did not know that the court had signed and 

filed the Proposed Order on November 19, 2010, until Kramer received an email on 

February 15, 2011, from [opposing counsel]. The Arbitrator finds that Kramer had no

reason to believe that the Proposed Order would be signed and filed by the court and was 

surprised to learn that it had been signed and filed. The Arbitrator therefore finds that 

Kramer did not fail to notify Soleimani of the fact that the court had signed and filed the 

Proposed Order on November 19, 2010, immediately upon his learning of that fact, and 

Kramer did not delay notifying Soleimani of that fact once Kramer knew that fact.

“28. The Arbitrator finds no professional conduct by Kramer in the [family law 

case] that appears to be below the standard of care expected of a family law attorney 

practicing in the Central District of Los Angeles. The Arbitrator finds no basis for 

blaming Kramer or holding Kramer liable for not discovering what had transpired in the 

[family law case] after November 1, 2010, with the signing and filing of the Proposed 

Order on November 19, 2010, or the signing of deeds and other documents by the clerk 

on behalf of Soleimani. 

“29. The Arbitrator finds that the services provided by Kramer to Soleimani 

from the inception of the attorney-client relationship until it was terminated on March 

15, 2011 were reasonably necessary and were within the scope of the parties’ written fee 

agreement and expansion of the scope of services after the initial signing of the fee 

agreement. The Arbitrator finds that the reasonable value of his legal services, including 

costs, was $36,802.18.

“30. The Arbitrator finds that Soleimani has claimed that certain pleadings, 

either were not filed or are missing from the court file . . . . The Arbitrator has found in 

the exhibits and documents provided to the Arbitrator conformed copies of the pleadings, 

showing them to have been filed as represented by Kramer. . . . 

“31. The Arbitrator is perfectly prepared to believe Soleimani’s claims that 

various pleadings are not to be found in the court file or that the case summary doesn’t 

show all pleadings. The Arbitrator finds that all of that is a shameful and endemic 

problem for which the court bears responsibility, not Kramer.”
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V. Petitions to Confirm and Vacate Arbitration Award

Kramer filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award on April 26, 2013, to 

which Soleimani did not file any opposition. Soleimani filed petitions to vacate the 

arbitration award on May 13, and again on June 17, 2013; Kramer filed opposition on 

July 26, 2013.

On August 8, 2013, the trial court granted the petition to confirm the arbitration 

award and denied the petitions to vacate the arbitration award. Judgment was entered 

August 22, 2013, and notice of entry of judgment was served August 29, 2013. 

Soleimani timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. Soleimani Forfeited Her Appellate Claims by Failing to Raise Them in the 

Trial Court

Soleimani makes at least five separate arguments on appeal—(1) her causes of 

action were beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement, (2) the trial court’s reasoning 

was erroneous, (3) Soleimani was substantially prejudiced by the arbitrator’s failure to 

consider material evidence and to postpone the hearing, (4) the court’s judgment is 

“facially incorrect,” and (5) the trial court’s record “is rife with errors, and demonstrates 

that the proceedings were improperly convened such that Soleimani did not receive due 

process.” Soleimani raised none of these arguments in the trial court in support of her 

petition to vacate. Indeed, in the trial court Soleimani did not urge any legal basis for 

vacating the arbitration award. Instead, she reargued the facts of the case, urging as 

follows: “Soleimani respectfully rejects the findings of the Arbitrator. . . . The question 

becomes what did in fact Kramer kn[o]w? Why the family law attorney, who the 

Arbitrator has found to be entitled to receive tens of thousands [of] dollars for his 

services, has failed to know the correct order of the court? as it is claimed by him? 

. . . [¶] Soleimani requests for the Arbitration Award to be vacated. The process of 

discovery is essential here. The court presently has no knowledge of what emails were 

exchanged between Slevin [Soleimani’s former husband’s attorney] and Kramer. 
10

Deposing Kramer under oath and perhaps more importantly the deposition of third 

parties, especially Slevin, is the only proper avenue to bring all the facts to light.”

“ ‘[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims 

made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the 

trial court. [Citation.]’ (Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry (1990) 

219 Cal.App.3d 9, 26; see also JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of 

America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178: ‘Appellate courts are loath to reverse a 

judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the 

trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.’) We will therefore ‘ignore 

arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court.’ (Bialo v. 

Western Mutual Ins. Co. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 68, 73.) Such arguments raised for the 

first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 

1293 & fn. 2.)” (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592.)

Although she had the opportunity to do so, Soleimani did not raise in the trial 

court any of the contentions she now makes to support her claim that the arbitration 

award should have been vacated. Accordingly, she has forfeited each of these arguments, 

and the order confirming the arbitration award and judgment must be affirmed on that 

basis. 

II. The Trial Court Properly Granted the Petitions to Compel Arbitration and to 

Confirm the Arbitration Award

Although we have concluded that Soleimani has forfeited her appellate claims, we 

address those claims briefly on the merits. None has merit.

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting Kramer’s Petition to Compel 

Arbitration 

Soleimani contends the trial court erred in compelling arbitration because her 

claims were beyond the scope of the arbitration agreement. Our review is de novo. 

(Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 82.)

The California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280 et seq.) compels the 

enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. (Armendariz v. Foundation Health 
11

Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97 (Armendariz).) Section 1281.2 states 

that, except in situations not present here, “On petition of a party to an arbitration 

agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and 

that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the 

petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an 

agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists . . . .” (Italics added.)

As the party opposing arbitration, it was Soleimani’s burden “to ‘ “ ‘demonstrate 

that [the] arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to require arbitration of the dispute.’ ” 

[Citation.] In other words, “an order to arbitrate a particular grievance should not be 

denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 

susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.” (Dryer v. Los Angeles 

Rams (1985) 40 Cal.3d 406, 414.)’ (Titolo v. Cano (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 310, 316-

317.)” (Bigler v. Harker School (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 727, 738.) “ ‘Doubts as to 

whether an arbitration clause applies to a particular dispute are to be resolved in favor of 

sending the parties to arbitration. The court should order them to arbitrate unless it is 

clear that the arbitration clause cannot be interpreted to cover the dispute.’ ” (Ibid.; see 

also United Transportation Union v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1992) 

7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808 [same].) 

Here, the arbitration agreement unquestionably required arbitration of Soleimani’s 

claims.3 The agreement provided that if Soleimani and Kramer had a dispute “involving 

 

3 Contrary to Kramer’s suggestion, Soleimani’s challenge to the order compelling 

arbitration is cognizable in this appeal from the judgment confirming the arbitration 

award. “ ‘An order to compel arbitration is an interlocutory order which is appealable 

only from the judgment confirming the arbitration award, or in certain exceptional 

situations is reviewable by writ of mandate. . . .’ . . . ‘If a trial court compels 

arbitration. . . , the party resisting arbitration may seek review of the ruling on appeal 

from an order that confirms the award. . . . If the arbitration process is found to be 

invalid, the responsibility for a waste of resources would then lie with the trial court, not 

the litigant . . . .’ . . . ‘ “The rationale of this rule is that the order compelling arbitration 

is interlocutory in nature and works no hardship on the litigant because the party who 

objects to arbitration may win at the arbitration hearing, and if he does not, the issue is 
12

attorney’s fees and costs under California law,” Soleimani had the right to request that 

the dispute “be determined first by non-binding arbitration administered by a local bar 

association, including the Beverly Hills and the Los Angeles County Bar Associations.” 

If either party was unhappy with the result of the non-binding arbitration, “the dispute 

shall be adjudicated by way of mandatory and final arbitration by a retired judicial officer 

who presided over a family law trial court.”

Under the plain language of the arbitration agreement, therefore, disputes subject 

to binding arbitration (under the California Arbitration Act) were coextensive with those 

subject to nonbinding fee arbitration under California law (as codified in the Mandatory 

Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA), Business and Professions Code, sections 6200 et seq.). 

The MFAA provides that nonbinding fee arbitration is available for disputes “concerning 

fees, costs, or both, charged for professional services by members of the State Bar.” 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6200, subd. (a).) Arbitrators acting pursuant to the MFAA may 

determine the merits of claims concerning unpaid attorney fees; they may also award the 

client “a refund of unearned fees, costs, or both previously paid to the attorney.” (Bus. & 

Prof. Code, § 6203, subd. (a).) And, although the MFAA arbitrator may not award 

clients “affirmative relief, in the form of damages or offset or otherwise, for injuries 

underlying the claim” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6203, subd. (a)), evidence relating to claims 

of professional misconduct is admissible in MFAA arbitration “to the extent that those 

claims bear upon the fees, costs, or both, to which the attorney is entitled.” (Ibid.; see 

also Liska v. The Arns Law Firm (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 275, 286.) In other words, 

although the MFAA arbitrator may not award damages for professional misconduct, he or 

she may receive evidence and make findings of fact concerning claims of professional

misconduct if such claims are relevant to the merits of an attorney fee dispute. 

In the present case, although Soleimani’s complaint alleged attorney malfeasance, 

it did so in the context of suggesting that Kramer intentionally inflated his legal bills, and 

 

reviewable on appeal from the order of confirmation.” ’ [Citation.]” (Peleg v. Neiman 

Marcus Group, Inc. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1437-1438.) 
13

thus that Soleimani should not be required to pay them. Soleimani’s allegations included 

the following: 

“From the period between November 1, 2010 to February 15, 2011, [Kramer]

proceeded to misrepresent the facts of the case to Plaintiff and to provide unnecessary 

legal services to Plaintiff, claiming that the services were necessary to enforce the terms

of the then moot Stipulation.” 

“In addition, [Kramer] prepared an Order to Show Cause and Affidavit for 

Contempt (the ‘Contempt OSC’) in order to compel Plaintiff’s Spouse to comply with the 

terms of the Stipulation. . . . [Kramer] admitted to failing to timely serve Spouse with 

this Contempt OSC, causing additional unnecessary billing by [Kramer].”

“By the time Plaintiff was notified by [Kramer] that the [proposed order] had been 

entered as an order of the Court, Plaintiff had expended copious amounts of monetary 

and other resources to compel unnecessary action by Spouse, in reliance on the 

misrepresentations of [Kramer].”

“[Kramer] knew that the [proposed order] had been made a final order of the court 

and intentionally concealed this fact from Plaintiff in order to continue billing Plaintiff 

for unnecessary legal services. . . . [Kramer] represented to Plaintiff on multiple

occasions that the work [he was] doing to enforce the terms of the Stipulation was 

necessary. . . .”

“Plaintiff, at all times relevant, was ignorant of [Kramer’s] fraudulent conduct as 

herein alleged. In reasonable reliance on said conduct, Plaintiff allowed [Kramer] to 

continue representing her.”

“[Kramer] breached [his] fiduciary duties to gain unfair advantage over Plaintiff 

by misleading Plaintiff to conclude that all or substantial part of thousands of dollars in 

attorney’s fees [he was] charging Plaintiff were necessary to enforce the Stipulation.” 

(Italics added.)

In view of these allegations, there can be no doubt that, regardless of what 

Soleimani called her causes of action, they addressed, at least in significant part, the 

parties’ competing claims about whether Kramer was entitled to be paid for the work he
14

performed on Soleimani’s behalf. Because such claims were within the plain language of 

the parties’ mandatory arbitration agreement, the trial court did not err in granting 

Kramer’s petition to compel arbitration. 

Soleimani appears to contend that, even if some of her claims were within the 

scope of the arbitration agreement, the trial court should not have granted the petition to 

compel because other claims were not. We do not agree. Even if we were to accept 

Soleimani’s factual premise that some of her claims did not come within the arbitration 

agreement, we still could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting 

the petition to compel. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1281.2, subdivision 

(c), the trial court has discretion to order arbitration of claims even if there “are other 

issues between the petitioner and the respondent which are not subject to arbitration.” 

(§ 1281.2, subd. (c); Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 

959, 977.) As one court has explained: “[T]he presence of a nonarbitrable cause of 

action is not sufficient by itself to invoke the trial court’s discretion to deny arbitration 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c): ‘The mere fact that some 

claims are arbitrable and some are not is surely not the “peculiar situation” meant to be 

addressed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 1281.2[, subdivision] (c)[,] according to 

our Supreme Court.’ (RN Solution, Inc. v. Catholic Healthcare West [(2008)] 165 

Cal.App.4th [1511,] 1521.)” (Laswell v. AG Seal Beach, LLC (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 

1399, 1409.) 

In the present case, as we have said, Soleimani’s complaint unquestionably 

contained arbitrable claims. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

granting the petition to compel.4

 

4

Soleimani does not contend that the trial court should have sent certain claims to 

arbitration and reserved others for resolution by the court, and thus we do not reach that 

issue.
15

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Kramer’s Petition to Confirm the 

Arbitration Award 

In addition to urging that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the 

parties’ dispute to arbitration, Soleimani also contends that the trial court erred in 

confirming the arbitration award. For the reasons that follow, Soleimani is wrong.

Trial court’s asserted errors in reasoning: Soleimani contends that the order 

confirming the arbitration award should be vacated because the trial court’s reasoning in 

support of its order was erroneous. Even if this contention were correct (a conclusion we 

do not reach), it is immaterial, because our review of the order confirming the arbitration 

award is de novo.5 (E.g., Mave Enterprises, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2013) 

219 Cal.App.4th 1408, 1422; Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (1994) 

9 Cal.4th 362, 376, fn. 9.) Under the de novo standard of review, we “exercis[e] our 

independent judgment” and “do not review the validity of the trial court’s reasoning.” 

(Italics added.)

Arbitrator’s asserted failure to consider material evidence and postpone 

arbitration hearing: Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 1286.2, subdivision 

(a)(5), the court must vacate an arbitration award if “[t]he rights of the party were 

substantially prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon 

sufficient cause being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence 

material to the controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the 

provisions of this title.” Soleimani contends she is entitled to relief under this section, 

but she cites to no evidence or legal authority in support. She also failed, prior to the 

submission of this case on appeal, to provide us with either the transcript of the 

arbitration hearing or any admissible evidence of her alleged requests to continue. We 

therefore have no record on which to consider her claims. Her claims in this regard 

therefore are forfeited. (E.g., Niederer v. Ferreira (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1509 

 

5 We do not consider the merits of the arbitration award, however, because 

Soleimani did not assert any errors beyond those addressed in the following paragraph 

(i.e., failure to consider material evidence and to postpone the arbitration hearing).
16

[“It is an appellant’s duty to present a record from which the appellate court can 

determine whether there has been error; failure to do so results in affirmance.”].)

Errors alleged on face of judgment: Soleimani contends that the judgment entered 

by the trial court is “facially incorrect” because it identifies Kramer as a “crosscomplainant” and Soleimani as a “cross-defendant.” Soleimani cites no authority in 

support of her contention that a supposed error of this kind supports vacating the 

judgment, and we reject it.

6

Errors alleged in court’s electronic docket: Soleimani contends finally that the 

trial court’s record “was not properly maintained” and is “rife with errors”—by which 

she apparently means there are some errors in the trial court’s on-line docket. Whatever 

the merits of this factual contention, it has no bearing on the validity of the judgment 

entered in this case. 

 

6 We note, moreover, that the text of the judgment correctly reads as follows: 

“Judgment is entered in favor of Defendant Brian J. Kramer, P.C., in accordance with the 

Amended Arbitration Award following Court granting Defendant’s petition to confirm 

the arbitration award of April 24, 2013, which is attached hereto as Exhibit No. 1.”
17

DISPOSITION

 The order confirming the arbitration award and judgment are affirmed. Kramer’s 

request for sanctions is denied. Kramer is awarded his appellate costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

KITCHING, J.

ALDRICH, J.