Filed 6/9/16 In re C.H. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b) . This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re C.H. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. C.H., Defendant and Appellant. G052977 (Super. Ct. Nos. DP021038

- 003 & DP025419

- 001 )

O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed.

Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, and Karen L. Christensen and Debbie
To rrez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minors.2 C.H. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order made at the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing (all further statutory references are to the
W elf. & Inst. Code ) terminating her parental rights to four

- ye ar

- old C.H. and
23

- month

- old M.R. and freeing them for adoption. Mother argues the co urt erred by not applying the parental benefi t exception

. 1 We disagree and affirm the order.
FACTS
Detent ion
In its detention report dated September 11, 2014, Orange County Social
Servi ces Agency (SSA ), stated that two days earlier C.H. and M.R. were taken into protective custody and placed at Orangewood Children and Family Center (Orangewood)
because Mother and M.R.’s father (Father) 2 repeatedly exposed the children to d omestic
violence. SSA said that despite a temp orary restraining order (TRO) forbidding Father
from having any contact with Mother, she became pregnant with his child and they
communicate d through calls and texts.

SSA filed a petition alleging C.H. and M.R. were children as described in
section 300, subdivisions (b), failure to protect, and (j) , abuse of sibling

. With respect to section 300, subdivision (b), the petition stated the following: Mother and Father had an ongoing problem with domestic violence, some of which caused injuries to Mother and
some of wh ich occurred in the children’s presence; from July 2013 to May 2014, law enforcement officers responded to Mother’s home 14 times for reports of domestic
vio lence or court order violations ; in August 2014, Father physically assaulted Mother

a nd when C.H. told Father to let Mother go , Father spanked C.H., which led to an

1 Neither C.H.’s father nor M.R.’s father appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights.

2 C.H.’s father’s whereabouts were unknown and the circumstances that gave rise to the peti tion did not involve him. Thus, we will refer to M.R.’s father, who is M.R. Sr., as Father for ease of reference and with the understanding he is not C.H.’s father.3

emergency protective order (EPO) for t he children; after the August 2014 incident, Mother failed to obtain a permanent restraining order and resisted participating in a domestic violence program ; despite the TRO, Father’s physical assaults, and Mother’s belief Father was using methamphetamine, Mother called, texted, saw, lived with, and engaged in sexual relations with Father, resulting in her pregnancy; Mother allowed Father to have contact with the children knowing Father was violent and suspecting he was abusing methamphetamine; Mother had a history of substance abuse problems, including methamphetamine; at the time of C.H.’s birth, Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana, and C.H. teste d positive for methamphetamine; Mother had a lengthy criminal history and had to register as a controlled substance offender ; and Father had an unresolved substance abuse problem with methamphetamine and marijuana , and he h ad a lengthy criminal history

.

With respect to section 300, subdivision (j), the petition stated the following: On April 26, 2011, C.H. was declared a dependent child when Mother tested positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana and C.H. tested positive for methamphetamine upon her birth; Mother used methamphetamine two days before C.H. was born; in May 2011, C.H. was placed in Mother’s care under a family maintenance plan; a supplemental petition was sustained in April 2012 after Mother violated the family maintenance plan when she was arrested for shoplifting while C.H. was present;
after Mother was admitted to the Prototypes program in April 2011, she had to restart the initial phase of the program because she violated the program’s terms; in November 2011, Mother left C.H. unattended upstairs on the bed while she went outside to smoke;
C.H. was aga in placed in Mother’s care under a family maintenance plan; and the prior
2011 dependency proceedings were terminated in March 2013.

At the detention hearing on this petition , the juvenile court concluded a prima facie case had been made and ordered C.H. an d M.R. detained (§§ 319, 300).4

Jurisdiction/Disposition

SSA filed the jurisdiction/disposition report on October 9, 2014, and an
ad dendum report two weeks later. In the jurisdiction/disposition repo rt, social worker Laura Parsley recommended the juven ile court sustain the dependency petition and order
reunification services for Mother and Father. The children w ere placed with foster parents. Parsley reported C.H. and M.R. were taken into protective custody on September 9, 2014, because Mother and Fat her engaged in domestic violence. Mother
and Father admit ted to violating the TRO, which resulted in Fathe r’s arrest on a few
occasions. Mother admitted to using methamph etamine and marijuana but claimed she
had been sober sin ce April 2011. Father dispu ted Mother’s sobriety, stating she used marijuana as recently as August 2014 and she possessed methamphetamine. Father admitted to abusing methamphetamine and marijuana as recently as July 2014. Both Mother and Father had significant criminal histories.

Parsley explained Mother admitted Father a ssaulted her in the children’s
presence

. Mot her also admitted the EPO prohibited Father from having contact with the
children but she did not obtain a TRO and the E PO expired. Mother denied Father, who

was incarcerated, lived with her for a couple months

. Mother offered a myriad of reasons why neither she nor C.H. were participating in services, in cluding that she was pregnant.
Mother had also failed to move or change the locks. Mother could not understan d why
her children were taken from her. She could not control Father’s behavior, and she called the police when he violated the TRO. Mother als o stated she was pregnant and Father
was th e only person to help her.

Parsley interviewed Mother on September 25, 2014. Mother stated she could not protect herself or her children because Father broke into her house. Mother called the police when Father assaulted her but not when she saw him outside the house
or at the store. Mother did not renew her lease a nd she and the children would be moving5

soon

. As relevant here, Mother admitted th e allegations in the petition. However, Mother stated Father spanked C.H. not because of domestic violence but instead because

“ [C.H.] only had underwear on.” She also denied Father lived with her.

Twenty

- seven

- year old Mother stated she first us ed methamphetamine
when she was 13 years old and mariju ana when she was 14 years old. She admitted “using substances daily for [10] years” but claimed she ha d been sober since April 2011. She spent six months in jail but w as not on probation or parole. Mother was willing to participate in any serv ices to get her children back.

Parsley reported C.H. stated she would like to live with Mother

. Parsley
stated Mother had two hou r visit s three times per week. Mother was scheduled to have a interview/visit on September 16, 2014, but she did not attend and resc heduled for the following day. The next day, she arrived one hour late and had her two

- hour interview
but was unable to have her visit. A mo nitored visit two days later went well. C.H. was happy to see Moth er, but she was upset when she left a nd wanted go home with Mother. Parsley recommended Mother participate in the Personal Empowerment Program (PEP), attend individual counseling and parenting class, and subm it to randomized drug testing.

In the addendum repor t, Parsley reported Mother gave birth to a stillborn
child and that sh e subsequently learned Mother admitted to police using methamphetamine two times during her pregnancy and that she relapsed after delivering
her stillborn child

. Mother tested positive for amphetamine at the time of the birth. Parsley advised Mother to b egin the perinatal drug progra m and attend 12

- step meetings. Mother was to begin drug t esting on October 17, 2014.

The court held a combined jurisdiction/disposition hearing on October 28,
2014. Mother and Fat her submitted to the petition. The cou rt fo und the allegations true, sustained the petition, and declared C.H . and M.R. dependent children. The court set a
six

- month rev iew hearing for April 4, 2015.6

Six

- Month Review

SSA filed the six

- month status review report on April 1, 2015, follo wed by
thre e addendum reports. In the six

- month status review report , social worker Susan Houn recommended continuing reunification services for Mother but terminating services for
Father ; the children were with the same foster parents

.

Houn reported Mother lived with relatives outside the county, did not work,
and r eceived supplemental benefits. Mother was accepted to Heritage House, but she did
not enter because she believed the area was in an area known for drug use. Mother stated
that if she was able to reuni fy, she would like to enter a residentia l home for women and
children.
Houn stated C.H. was reported to be “bos sy, demanding, and directive.” C.H. was diagnosed with “disruptive behavior disorder NOS, neglect of child, and posttraumati c stress disorder. ” C .H. requested Mother live with the foster parents or that she remain with the foster parents and Mother could visit. C.H. had been having night mares about Mother and Father. M.R. wa s reported to be a happy child.

Houn reported Mother had made minima l progress with her case plan

. Mother completed the following: two out of five counseling sessions; eight out of
10 PEP classes ; and two out of nine parenting education cla sses . From October 2014 to March 2015, Mother drug tested negative 27 times. Dur ing that time, she missed two drug tests and one test was voided because the tamper seal was not intact. Mother attributed her difficulty completing services due to transportation problems. Mother had not participate d in a substance abuse program but was scheduled to begin one March 31,
2015

. Houn expl ained that despite a TRO that expired in 2017, s he suspected
Mother and Father were in contact. On two occasions, Mother and Father drug tested at
the same location, one time their samples were collected at the same time and the other7

time 30 minutes apart. Mother denied seeing Father at the testing location but Father
admitt ed seeing Mother.

Houn reported that in February 2015, the maternal grandmother called the children. When C.H. asked to speak with Mother, the maternal grandmo ther said Mother
was not home. When that call ended, C.H. called Mother. Mother told C.H. she was at the maternal grandmother’s hou se. C.H. was “very confused.”

Houn stated Mother had six hours of supervised visits per wee k. Mother
arrived 30 to 60 minutes late for visits and/or left early, and three hour visits were
sometimes two hours. Mother cancel led five visits, including the Christmas visit.
Mother cited transportation issues as the reason for her untimeliness. Mo ther made promises to the children, for example to buy lunch or toys, bu t did not follow through. Initially, Mother struggled to supervise both children simultaneously. Mothe r often lost sight of one child, and the foster parent had to intervene to super vise the other child. Houn advised Mother she had to be the primary caregiver, and she agreed . Over time
Mother did a better job and the visits improved. Despite Mother’s claim oth erwise, Houn
stated Mother did not call the child ren every day and when s he did call it was late and the children were asleep. Houn said C.H. had a book with Mother’s voice and one evening
she had the book and cried for Mother. When C.H. telephoned Mother, M other “did not say very much.”

Houn reported Mother wanted to reunif y with her children and needed help
with and would like additional services. Houn said C.H. had anxiety over where she
would live , wanting to live with both the foster parents and Mother.

In the first addendum report, dated five weeks after the six

- mont h status review report, H oun changed her recommendation. Houn now recommended terminating
reunification services for both children and schedu ling a section 366.26 hearing. Houn explained a paternal aunt, Marina de la Cruz (Marina) , and her wife, Vanessa de la Cruz (Vanessa) , wanted to provide pla cement and adopt

.8 Houn reported Mother missed a random drug test on April 16, 2015, and a
week later she had a drug patch applied. Houn explained Mother was terminated from her substance abuse program because sh e did not attend meetings or counseling sessions

. However, Mother did complete her domestic violence program.

Houn reported the foster parents had concerns Moth er was “oversharing”
with C.H. Mother showed C.H. a picture of the stillborn baby. C.H. late r had a nightmare about her dead brother. Mother also shared with C.H. the discomfort of her menstrual cycle. C.H. subsequently thought she would start bleeding. When Mother tried to discuss court proceedings with C.H., the foster parents redirected the conversation. Houn stated generally the visits went well, Mother was on time except

once when she was 20 minutes late , Mother was able to supervise both children, and she brought sn acks and sometimes activities.

Houn reported Mother made minima l progres s with her case plan. Based on Mother’s failure to attend substance abuse classes and counseling sessions despite her repeated assurances she would attend, Houn concluded there was insufficient evidence Mother would complete her service s if given another six months.

In a second addendum report , Houn reported that in May 2015, law enforcement were called to Father’s house three times because Mother was disturbing the peace. She was outside the residence yelling and she caused property damage, kicking a
g ate and breaking a window.

In a third a ddendum report, Houn reported Mother admitted she had not been attending counseling or outpatient programs and was late to her visit in May 2015

. Mother was not compliant with her drug patch. Mother denied t he inci dent at Father’s
house. Houn reported that on April 8, 2015, Mother went to Father’s residence and asked him to help her with something. Because of the TRO, Father left the area and called law enforcement. While Father spoke with an officer, Mother ca lled Father at least9

20 times and texted him 22 times. When the officer answered the cell phone and tried to speak with Mother, she would not answer.

Hound reported that on May 13, 2015, Father was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia. Officers arrested him after seeing him and a female arguing on the side of the road and Father throw an object. The female drove away in a green car. Officers recovered a broken methamphetamine pipe. Father, who appeared to be under
the influence of a stimulan t, told officers he argued with his girlfriend over th eir remaining methamphetamine.

Houn concluded Mother was not addressing the allegations in the petition
and she continued to violate the TRO. Houn stated that although officers did not identify
the wo man involved in the May 13, 2015, incident, Mother w as known to drive a green

car. Houn stated Mother was not participating in services, and although she completed the domestic violence program, she would need to complete the program again b ecause she vio lated the TRO. Mother stated she was overwhelmed and had not followed through on her assurances to participate in services. Houn c oncluded four

- year

- old C.H. and

one

- year

- old M.R. “are in need of permanency and stability.” Houn said that because of
thei r young age and their parents lack of progress in their case plans, violations of the TRO, and lack of insight, Houn opined it was in the children’s best interests to ter minate
reunification services.

At the six

- month status review hearing where Mother wa s not present , the

court concluded there was a substantial danger to C.H. and M.R. if returned home and reasonable services had been provided to Mother. The court terminated reunification
services for Mother and Father and scheduled a section 366.26 heari ng for September 29,
2015.
Section 366.26

In the interim report filed on July 2, 2015, social worker Lupie Janos reported the children continued to live with t he same foster parents but that Marina and10

Vanessa had visits with the children. Janos stated M arina and Vanessa’ s home in Bakersfield had been approved.

SSA filed a section 366.26 rep ort on September 18 , 2015, a nd an ad dendum report six weeks later. In the section 366.26 report, Janos stated the children were adoptable and termination of paren tal rights was not detrimental, and she recommended

re ferral for adoption placement. Janos reported the children were placed with Marina and
Vanessa ; C.H. wanted her and M.R. to live with them

.

Janos reported M.R. had a smooth t ransition to his aunts’ house. Janos said M.R. participated in activit ies with C.H., and C.H. “appear[ed] connected to [ M.R. ]” Janos stated C.H. “appear[ed] distressed over her long

- te rm care[]” and after she visited with Mother, C.H. sought reassurance sh e would live with her aunts. C.H. told Janos “she wanted to live with her ‘aunts’, did not want to live with the [M]other, and wanted
to still be able t o visit [the foster parents].”

Janos reported that on July 9, 2015, when she tried to speak with C. H. about visits with Mother, C. H. crawled underneath her bed. C.H. stated she lo ved visits with her aunts and would like a “sleepover” but she wanted to live with Mother ; C.H. told her therapist the same thing

. When Janos told her that might not happen, she said she
liked her foster parents and aunts. Janos reported that on August 10, 2015, she met with
C.H. and asked her how she felt a bout moving in with her aunts. C.H. replied she was moving soon and wanted to live with her aunts. C.H. told Janos she did not want to talk
about Mother. Janos met with Mother on August 20, 2015; she had a bruise on her left temple and a cut on the bridge of her nose. Mother told Janos that she suffered the injuries the previous night during a fight with Fathe r.

Janos reported Mother was incarcerated from June 5, 2015, to June 12,
2015 ; Mother missed two visits during this time

. One evening after Mother was released, the foster parent told C.H. she had to cal l Mother. C.H. responded, “‘[W] ho’s mommy, you’re my mommy’. ” Three weeks later, there was a supervised visit at the park.11

Mother fed the children and played with M.R. However, “[t]here was minimal conversation between the [M]other and either child[,]” and C.H. ran t o the foster parent
and Janos. Three weeks la ter, C.H. told the foster parent “she d[id] not want three

mom mies, and only want[ed] one bed.” Mother was admitted to Her itage House on August 6, 2015.

A few days later, Jano s reported C.H. had been ending visits one hour early
for about three weeks

. C.H. ignored Mother more and more and refused her telephone
calls. When C.H. did speak with her, she says, “‘Mom. I love you. That’s it.’”

At a visit on A ugust 10, 2015, C.H. completely ignored Mother and interacted only with the foster parent and play ed on the playground

. Mother told the foster parent she did not want to participate in the treatment program and just wanted her
children back. Father called Mother three times during the vis it and Mother answered the calls. C.H. rolled her eyes at Moth er and mimicked her.

Ten days later, there was a visit at a McDonalds restaurant where Mother
fed the children. When the foster parent began to change M.R.’s diaper, Mother offered to change his diaper. C.H. did not speak to Mother duri ng the time Janos was present.

The following week there was a visit at Heritage House where C.H. showed
affection towards Moth er and Mother gave her a doll. Near the end of the visit, Mother needed to be reminded to change M.R.’s diaper. When Mother asked C.H. whether s he liked living at Heritage House, C.H. stated she wanted to live with her aunt. When Mother suggested C.H. could live at He ritage House, C.H. was silent.

At a visit at Heritage House the following day, C .H. told Mother she loved
her. Mother w anted the children to watch television. When the childcare coordinator refused, Mot her said, “‘I don’t play with my children for [three] hours. ’ ” The coordinator suggested Mother use toys to play with the children, she said, “‘I don’t want
to.’” Mother also said, “‘I’m going nut [ sic ] in here for [three] hours.’” Mother told staff
and Janos she co uld not do a three hour visit.12 At a visit a few days later at the Heritage House, C.H. told Mother she
loved her. Mother played with the children, read to them, and to ok them to lunch. Mother said it was difficult to play w ith two kids at the same time. Mother ended the
vi sit 20 minutes early.

There was a visit the follow ing day at the Heritage House. Mother played with the children and took them to lunch. During t he visit M.R. challenged Mother’s authority by throwing toys and coloring on the door. When Mother said the visit was over, C.H. said she did not want to leave. Mother replied, “‘I know you don’t want to but your brother get [ sic ] on my last nerve.’”

Janos reported Mother’s drug patch testing referral had been terminated because she missed her appointment to have the patch changed. Janos stated that in May and June 2015, Mother was convicted of theft and drug offenses and she was the victim
of domesti c violence by Father i n July and August 2015.

Janos requested the juvenile court appoint Marina and Vanessa de facto parent status. Janos opined t he permanence and stability of the children far outweighed the detriment of terminating parental rights. Ja nos requested parental rights be terminated and the children be freed for adoption

.

In the addendum report, Janos reported that as of late October 2015, the children appeared comfor table with Marina and Vanessa. Janos stated there w as a visit on Septem ber 16, 2015 , that Marina described as “good.” However, Marina stated Mother did not participate in the entire six hour visit. Marina stated the following: “‘[Mother] was taking a lot of cigarette breaks; [four t o five] times during the visit,
10 minute s every time. She left the kid s with [Marina and Vanessa].’” Janos stated that as of October 1, 2015, Mother could not leave the treatment facility for an offsite visit
because she h ad not completed her homework. The children had one visit with Mother a t the treatmen t facility about a week later. Janos reported that on October 14, 2015, Mother entered a new treatment program and could not l eave the facility for 30 days.13 On the day of the section 366.26 hearing, Mother filed a section 388 petition suppo rted by her declaration. Mother requested the court return her children to her or alternatively to order addi tional reunification services.

At the hearing, the juvenile court denied M other’s section 388 petition.
The court concluded Mother had not estab lished changed circumstances or that the
propose d change was in the children’s best interests. W ith respect to the section 366.26 hearing, Mother’s counsel argued the parental benefit exception ap plied. The court disagreed, finding none of section 366.26 ’s statutory ex ceptions applied. The court
terminated parental r ights as to both C.H. and M.R.
DISCUSSION Mother contends the juvenile court erred by not applying the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights. We find no error.

At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child, which may include: (1) adoption (requiring termination of parental rights); (2) guardianship ; or (3) long

- term foster care. (§ 36 6.26, subd. (c)(1), (c) (4)(A).) “If the dependent child is adoptable, there is strong preference for adoption over alternative p ermanency plans.” ( In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297.)

To avoid termination of parental rights and adoption, a parent has the
burden of sho wing one or more of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subd ivision (c)(1)(A) or (B) apply. ( In re Scott B. (2 010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469.) The exceptions permit the court, “in exceptional
circumstanc es ,” “to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.” ( In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 .)

The so

- called parental benefit exception applies when there is “a compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] w ould be
detr imental to the child due to . . . the following circumstances: [¶] The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit fro m14

continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) “The ‘benefit’ necessary to trigger this exception has been judicially construed to mean, ‘the relationship promotes
the well

- being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well

- being the child would gain in a permanent h ome with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would conf er. If severing the natural parent/child relationship woul d deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’ s rights are not termi nated.’ [Citations.]” ( In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528

- 529 ( J.C. ); see also In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 ( Autumn ) .) “A parent asserting the parental benefit exception has the burden of establishing that exception by a preponderance of the evidence. [Citation.] It is not enough to show that the parent and child have a fr iendly and loving relationship. [Citation.] ‘ “Interaction between [a] natural parent and child will always confer some
inc idental benefit to the child . . . .”’ [Citation.] For the exception to apply, ‘a par enta l relationship is necessary[.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “While friendships are important, a c hild needs at least one parent. Where a biological parent . . . is incapable of functioning in that role, the child should be given every opportunity to bond with an indiv idual who wil l assume the role of a parent.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” ( J.C., supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.)

We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination

wou ld be detrimental to the child. ( J.C., supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530

- 531.) The latter determination “calls for the juvenile cour t to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have15

on the child and to weigh that against the bene fit to the chil d of adoption . . . .” ( J.C.,

supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 531.) I. The First Prong

- Visitation

The regular visitation and contact element of the beneficial relationship exception “is somewhat self

- explanatory.” (Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2014) Permanency Planning Procedures, § 2.1 71[5] [b][ i i][A], pp. 2

- 590 to 2

- 591 .) It does not require the parent to have “‘maintained day

- to

- day contact’” ( In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 124), but it does require the parent to have “maintained regular visitation and contact” (§ 366.26, sub d. (c)(1)(B)(i), italics added).
H ere, neither Mother nor SSA devote much time to disc ussing visitation. Nevertheless, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s implied finding Mother’s visitation was not regular and consistent. During this year long dependency proceeding, Mother had six hours of monitored visi ts per week . There were times Mother visited consistently and for a time Mother’s performance during visits improved to the point she was bringing food and activities to visits and sup ervising both children during the visit

. But we cannot conclude the visits were regular.

From the beginning, Mother cancelled visits and arrived late and/or left early . During Fall 2014 , Mother cancelled five visits, including a Christmas visit. Additionally , during Winter 2014 to 2015 , Mother was regularly late to visits and/or left early from visits resulting in two

- hour visits instead of the allotted three hours. Mother missed a couple visits while she was incarcerated in June 2015. Although the duration of Mother’s visits impr oved while she was at Heritage H ouse, Mother was late to a visit in June 2015, she was on her cell phone with Father three times during a visit in August 2015, and she repeatedly took smoke breaks during a visit in Septe mber 2015. Based on this evidence, the court could reasonably conclude Mother’s visitation was not regular16

and consistent and she was not making a priority the goal of maintaining stable relationships with her children.
II. The Second P rong
- Weighing the Benefits

“[A] successful parental benefit exception claim rests not on whether the parent

- child contacts ‘“confer some incidental benefit to the child . . . .”’ [Citation.]” ( J.C., supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 532.) Here, substantial evidence also sup ports the court’s finding the benefit of adoption outweighed maintaining the parent

- child relationship. Mother relies on the following evidence, which she contends compels a finding the par ental benefit exception applies. C.H. was emotional at the end of visits and Mother reassured her. C.H. was melancholy after listening to the book with Mother’s voice. C.H. asked Mother to live with her and the foster parents. C.H. stated she wanted to live with Mother. C.H. expressed affection for Mother. C.H. did not want to leave a visit at Heritage House. Mother provided food and played with C.H. at visits.

It is true C.H. was upset at the end of a few visits but one of the visits was immediately after she was removed from Mother’s care and the other visit C.H. was in the process of baking cookies and ultimately did not have any difficulty separating from Mother. As to the book incident, it occurred on January 6, 2015, near the beginning of these proceedings and not long after Mother cancelled her Ch ristmas visit. In July 2015,
C.H. did state she wanted to live with Mother but the following month, and thereafter,
said she wanted to live with her aunts. C.H. did express affection for Mother, saying she loved her, but also stated, “‘That’s it.’” C.H. was clearly frustrated Mother could not consistently and timely attend visits and provide care for her and her brother.

Lastly, but most importantly, were the quality of the visits, i.e., whether and
how Mother performed . Mother cites to the fac t that a t a number of visits she brought food and played with the children. A complete understanding of those visits , and others, paints a different picture. In the beginning, Mother was not able to supervise both17

children and the foster parent had to intervene. On other occasions, it was the foster parent who would start to chan ge a diaper before Mother would intervene

. Additionally, Mother demonstrated questionable judgment by showing C.H. a photograph of the
stillborn child and sharing with her the pain of h er menstrual cycle.

Mother suggests she did as much as she could considering her visits were monitored. We disagree. Houn advi sed Mother early on she had to be the primary caregiver, and Mother agreed. Yet she did not assume a parental role.

As to the visits Mothe r cites to as demonstrating she cared for her children , her statements during those visits compel a contrary result. On August 28, 2015, Mother told the childcare coordinator, “‘I don’t play with my children for [three] hours.” Mother later repeated to the children she could not “‘do this for [three] hours.’” At another visit four days later Mother said it was difficult playing with two children . At another visit the following day, Mother told C.H. that M.R. got on her “‘last nerve.’” Mother’s inability, and apparent unwillingness, to supervise and play wi th her children for even a brief time compels the conclusion the parent

- child relationship did not promot e the children’s best
interests

. Finally, Mother’s continuous contact with F ather, despite th e TRO, did not promote the well

- being of C.H. and M.R. Based on all the evidence , the court could reasonably conclude the parent

- child relationship did not pr omote the children’s best
interests to such a degree a s to outweigh the benefit of being placed in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.

Mother relies on a number of cases to suppor t her claim she demonstrated the benefit of the parent

- child relationship outweighed children’s well

- being from being placed with Marina and Vaness a. But based on the above evidence Mother failed to overcome the high hurdle required to demonstrate there was a strong attachment between
her and C.H. ( In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349

- 1350 [balancing flexible but parent must establish termination of parenta l rights detrimental to child];18

In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51 [ adoption ordered unless exceptional circumstances of strong and beneficial parent

- child relationship ]; Autum n, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575 [ adult’s attention to child’s needs demonstrating significant
attachment ].) Thus, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by not applying the parental benefit exception to termination of parental rights.

Finally, Mother states that if we agr ee the parental benefit exception applies, we should reverse the order terminating her parental rights to M.R. and remand the matter for the juvenile court to determine whether the siblin g benefit exception applies

. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Below, t he court found none of section 366.26, subdivision ( c)(1)(B)’s exceptions applied. On appeal, Mother does not prov ide any argument explaining how the court erred by concluding the sibling benefit exception did not apply. Mother forfeited this claim. ( Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784

- 785 [contentions waived when there is failure to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority].)
DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

O’LEARY, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

FYBEL, J.