### In The C ou rt o f A p p ea ls Si x t h Appe l l at e Di st r i c t o f Te x as a t Te x ar ka na

______________________________ No . 0 6- 07 -0 01 22 -C V

______________________________ CHARL ES T. MERREL L , SR., AS WR ONGF UL DEATH B E N E F IC IA RY O F C H A R LE S T H O M A S M E R R E LL, II, DECEASED AND A S REP RESENTATI VE OF THE ESTATE OF CHA RL ES THOMAS MERREL L , I I , DECEASED, AND JANE CER

VE RN Y, AS WR ON GF UL DE AT H B EN EF I CI AR

Y OF CH AR L ES T HO MA S ME RRE L L , I I , D ECE ASE D, Ap pe lla nts V. WAL -MART STORES, I NC., Appellee
On Appea l from the 336th J udicial District Court

Fa nnin County , Texas Trial Court No. 38243

B e f o r e M o r r i s s , C
. J. , C a

rt e r an d M o s e l e y , JJ. Opinion by

J ustice Carte rMerr ell broug ht suit i n his capa city as a w rong ful death benef iciary of Charle s Thomas 1 Merr ell, I I , dece ased, a

nd as re prese ntative of the Estate of Char les Thomas Merr ell, I I , dece ased. J ane Ce rver

ny broug ht suit i n her c apac ity as wrong ful death benef iciary of Charle s Thomas Merr ell, I I , dece ased. The Pare nts also broug ht suit aga inst the Holmes Group, a ma nufa c tu r e r o f h a log en torc hiere 2 lamps, and Wilm a Pear ce, the landlord. The Par ents alleg ed that Pear ce f ailed to equip the residence with a s moke detector. I n addition, Wal-Mart brought a cross-c laim for indemnity and contr ibution ag ainst Pearc e for

failing to install a smoke d etector. The Par ents' claims ag ainst Wal-Mart wer e sever ed fro m the re st of the ca se af ter the tria l court g rante d Wal-Mart' s motion for summary judgme nt. 2 O P I N I O N Charles T. Me rre ll, Sr., and J ane Cerver ny (collec tively

the Pare nts) bring this appeal of the 1 trial court' s order

g ranting Wal-Mart, I nc., summary judgme nt. This is a produc ts liabili ty suit based 2 on an alleg edly

defe ctive ha l o g en torc hiere lamp which may have c aused the wrong ful death of Charles Thomas Me rre ll, I I (Charle s I I ), Merr ell and Cerver ny ' s son. Charles I I had just g raduated from Austin College and had be en hire d as a stockbr oker f or A.G. Edw ards' Paris, Texas, office . The house Charle s I Irente d caug ht fire a nd burned, killing Charles I I and his g irlfriend, L atosha Gibson. The fire originated near the recliner in the l iving room. The fire re port indicated the cause of the fir e was unknown. The haloge n torchier e lamp, which the Parents alleg e wa s the ca use of the f

ire, wa s l o ca t ed n ex t t o the re cliner. Wal-Ma rt denied the lamp was the c ause of the fire . An alter

native
cause of the fir e, which Wal-Mart allege s was more likely the cause, was that a droppe d marihuana joi nt o r c ig a re tte c a

us e d th e fi re . B oth

vic tim s h a d ma

ri hu ana in t he ir sy ste ms at th e tim e of

the ir3

deaths. The trial court g rante d Wal-Mart' s no-evidenc e and tr aditional mot i o n s fo r sum mary judgme nt. The Pa r e n ts c o mp la in o n a

p p e a l th a t th e tr ia l c o u rt e r r e d in g r an ti n g Wa l- M art' s summary jud g me nt m oti on . Wal -M art ra ise s a cou nte r- iss ue a lle g ing the tr ia l cou rt e rr e d in a dmi tti ngso me of the su mma

ry jud gment e vid e nc e . We c on c lud e the tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in ad m i t t i n g t h e s u m m ary

j u d gm en tev i d en ce . T h e t ri al co u rt , t h o u gh , d i d err i ngra n t i n g W al -M ar t 's motion for summary

judgme nt. The P are nts presente d more than a scintilla of evidenc e conc erning
eac h element c halleng ed by Wal-Mart, and Wal-Mart did not establish it was entitled to judgme nt
a s a ma tte r o f l aw. We r e ve rs e the jud g me nt o f t he tr ia l c ourt
. F acts Whe n Ch arl e s I Ig ra du a te d w ithho no rs fr om Aus tin Col le g e , h e a c c e pte d a

po sit ion a s a stockbroker

with A.G. Edwa

rds in Paris, Texas. Charles I Iand Gibson re nted a home in Honey Grove , Texas, near

Paris, Texas. I n October 2000, Charles I I beg an a nine-we ek course to prepa re for the stockbroker ' s examination and asked Merr ell to "g o and buy a floor lamp so he could study be c a us e the lig hti ngwa s so bad in that hous e ." Th e tw o w e nt t og e the r t o p ur c ha se the lamp at Wa lMart. A l though Me rre ll could not remember the spec ific Wal-Mart store at which the lamp was purcha sed, Merr ell testified he was positive the lamp was purcha sed at a Wal-Mar t store bec ause he "ne ver shoppe d any

wher e but Wal-Mart." Charles I Iselec ted a lamp whic h may have be en a ha loge nMe rr e ll t e sti fi e d th e lamp w a s a da rk c olo r. He be liev e d th e lamp w a s b la c k, bu t it c ou ld 3 have be en dar

k blue or da

rk g ree n. 4 tor c h i e r e l a mp . M e r

r e l l p a i d ar o u n d $ 3 0
. 0 0 f o r t h e l a mp . B e c a

u s e t h e l a mp w a s a

f l o o r mod e l, 3 Merr ell did not rec eive a box, any of the a ccompa

ny ing w arning s, or instructions for saf e oper ation. Even thoug h the Unit ed States Consumer Product Safe ty Commi ssion (the Commis sion) require d

a ll r e ta ile rs to m ake a va ila ble a fr e e wi re me sh g ua

rd fo r a ll h a log e n to rc hie re lamps , Wa l- Mart did not provide a w ire mesh guard w ith the lamp. Merre ll testified there was a wa rning sticker on the cord, but c ould not remember what the sticke r said. Charle s I Itook the l amp hom e and pla ced it by his recliner

in the living room. Duri ngthe e a

rl y mor nin g ho ur s o f D e c e mbe r 2 , 2 00 0, a fi re sta rt e d in t he liv ingro om w hil e C h ar l es I Iand Gibson we re slee ping. T he fire eng ulfed the e ntire house. Ne ither Charle s I Inor Gibson were able to esc ape, a nd both died of smoke inhalation. The tox i co l o g y repor t detecte d
canna binoids in t he blood of both victims at the time of their de aths. I t is uncontested that the fire orig inated in the g ener al vicinity of the re cliner. The rec liner wa s completely consumed in the fir e and was more extensively consumed by

the fire than any

other piec e of f

urniture. The fire bur

ned throug h the ce iling appr ox imately two fee t from the re cliner. The f ir e in s p e c to r s c o n c lu d e d th e " e xa c t c a

u s e o f th e f ir e c o u ld n o t b e d e termined." Although photog raphs o f t h e fire wer e pre serve d, the lamp was ina dverte ntly disposed of and ha sAf te r t he fi re , th e burn e d la

mp w a s d isp os e d o f. Aft er sear c hin g a numbe r o f d

ump ste rs , 4 Merr ell offe red a

rew ard f or the lamp. J oe Willi ams, who had be en hire d to cover the windows of the house with ply

wood, and Roy ce " Stoney " Ma ckey prese nted Merr ell with a destroy ed lamp and collecte d the re war d. J ohn L entini, Wal-Mart' s expert, discovere d trac es of g asoline on the lamp. I n addition, the lamp prese nted by Wil liams only

contained two tubular

vertica l p iece s while the ph oto g ra pha t th e sc e ne sh ow ed the lamp c on ta ine d thre e pie c e s. I n h is d e po sit ion , Wil liams admitted they burned another lamp and mi srepr esente d that it was from the fire. Wil liams admitted to h a vin g a

c ri min a l r e c or d. Wal -M art e mph a size s th is f

ra ud , but the re is n o e vid e nc e Me rr e ll participated in the dec eption. Th e off ic e rs c oll e c te d th e c and le ho lde rs and oth e r e vid e nc e , b ut a

numbe r o f t

he ite ms 5 c oll e c te d a

re no w mis sin g , inc lud ing the c and le ho lde rs . Th e vid e ota pe take n a t the sc e ne and

so me of the photog raphs a

re a lso miss ing. A smoking de vice. 6 Although there is no evidenc e Charles I I smoked cig are ttes, there is some evidenc e t hat 7 Gi bs on smo ke d c ig are tte s. 5 not been r ecove red. I n the fire repor t, the fire inspe ctors noted that the vic tims were known to lea ve 4

can d le s u n a tt e n d e d

. M ic k e y H o lm e s , th e c h ie f o f p o li c e f o r H o n e y G r o v e , te s ti f

ie d the re w ere candle holders located on a small ta ble betwee n the lamp and the sofa. The lamp ha d been w arpe d 5 from the heat, but was upright and plugg ed in. Holmes estimated the he ight of the lamp would be approximately

six fee t. H olmes testified that a bong and ashtray s wer e found in the house. One 6 7 of the a shtray s was on the small table with the candleholders. L arr y Phill ips, a lieutena

nt with the Honey Grove Police Depa

rtment, testified they

found " quite a bit " of drugpara pherna lia. The police found a bong , sever al pipes, and sever al joints located in a shtray s. Phil lips could not reca ll if any of the pip e s w e re fo un d in

the liv ingro om. Phi lli ps te sti fi e d th e joi nts and blu nts we re fo un d in ashtray s. Although se vera l of the ashtra y s were collec ted and pr eser ved as e vidence , the ashtra y6

located in the living room was not pre serve d. Phill ips remember ed a pole lamp with a bowl on top, but could not rec all whether it was a ha loge n or inca

ndesce nt lamp. C l i n t o nD
. W i l l i a m s , t h e f i r e m ar s h a l l , c o n d

u c t e d h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o na

p p r o x i m a t e l y f

o u r d a ys afte r the fire. Although he did not find any candle holders during his inve stigat i o n o f t h e f ire, Wil li a ms te s ti f

ie d h e h a d b e e n a d v is e d " th e s u b je c ts th a t li v e d in th e h o u s e d id b u rn ca ndles." Wil liams testified the table "was charr ed heaviest on the s ide t hat would have been up a g ainst the chair ." Williams opined the candle s were not a likely cause of the fir e base d on the cha rringof the table. When aske d whether bulb frag ments from an e x ploding ha loge n lamp could have cause d a smoldering fire in the re cl i ner, the fire ma rshall stated, " Could be a possibilit y . Ihaven' t seen
any thi ngthat wo uld dis c ount or pr ov e e ith e r wa y ." Th e fi re mars ha ll te sti fi e d a dr op pe d c ig a re tte bu tt, joi nt, or a sh e s cou ld h a ve c a us e d a smo lde ri ng

fi re , a nd he c ou ld n ot r

ule ou t sm ok ingma te ri a ls

a s a po te nti a l c a

us e of the fi re . I n the fi re mars ha ll' s op ini on , th e c ha ir lik e ly smo lde re d f

or a c ou ple of hours be fore it ignited into flames. The fire ma rshall base d this opin i o n o n "t h e patter ns, the Sheetroc k, and the wood a nd the cha

rring " a s well as the bur

n-throug h in th e ce i ling a bove the
re c lin ingc ha ir . T he lamp h a d b e e n d isa sse mbl ed by the tim e the fi re mars ha ll c on du c te d h is investigation. The piece s of the lamp we re le aning ag ainst t h e wa l l. The fire marshall did not investigate whethe r the lamp was a h alogen lamp or what the wattag e of the bulb was. The f ire marshall could not re call whe ther he examined the bowl of the lamp.This conclusion has not been briefe d, and we do not express an opinion as to whethe r the 8 c on c lus ion

re a c he d b y

bo th s ide s is c or

re c t. 7 Wal -M art re ta ine d tw o f

ir e e xpe rt s: Ric ha

rd Dy e r, the F ir e Chi e f fo r K ans a s Ci ty , M iss ouri , and L en ti n i. T h e Pa

r e n ts o r ig in a ll y h ir e d D a v id D a ll a s a s an e xp e rt. Sh o rtl y b e f o r e summary jud g me nt, the Pare nts re ta in ed Dr. Cr aig B e y le r a s an e xpe rt and re mov e d D a lla s' name a s a testify ing e x pert. B oth sides ag ree Dallas' testimony is no long er a dmissibl e, since Dallas ha d been delisted, and should not be considere d by this Court. Beca

use both sides stipulate Dallas' deposition te sti mony is i na dmi ssi ble , w e wi ll a ssume the de po sit ion te sti mony

is i na dmi ssi ble fo r t

he purp os e of this appea l. About the only thing the experts could agr ee on was that the fire investigation was 8 not very thoroug h. Discussion The Pare nts br o u gh t s uit for neg lige nce, g ross neg lige nce, br eac h of wa rra nty , and strict pr od uc ts l ia bil ity . T he Pare nts ' c la ims fo r n e g lig e nc e , g ro ss n e g lig e nc e , a nd br e a c h o f w arr a nty inv olv e the same un de rl y ingc on du c t a s th e str ic t pr od uc ts l ia bil ity c la im. At

tr ia l and on a pp e a l, Wal-Mart did not challeng e any eleme n t s unique to neg lige nce, g ross neg lige nce, or brea ch of
war ranty . Her e, the only

alleg ed neg lige nce w as the selling of a defec tive product. I n that instance, the plaintiff must prove that the injury resulted from a defe ct in the product. Toshiba Int'l Corp. v. He nr y , 1 5 2 S
. W
. 3 d

7 7 4 , 7 8 4

– 8 5 (T ex . Ap p . — T ex ar k an a 2 0 0 4 , n o p et
. ) ( ci t i n g Simms v. Sw. Tex. Methodist Hosp. , 5 35 S.W. 2d 19 2, 19 7 (T e x. Civ . App .— San A nto nio 19 76 , w ri t r e f' d n .r .e .) . In it s order g ranting Wal-Mart' s motion, t he trial c ourt stated " all claims and c auses of ac tion asserted by8

Plaintiffs ag ainst Wal-Mart shall be DI SMI SSED with prejudice ." Be cause all of the Parents' cause s of a c tio n a re ba se d o n a pr od

uc t de fe c t and the pa

rt ie s have on ly

br ie fe d s tr ic t pr od

uc ts l ia bil ity , th is opinion will focus exclusi vely on strict products liability

. Th e Te xas S up re me Court ha s a do pte d th e Se c on d Re state me nt' s s tand ard fo r p ro du c ts liability

. See Bostrom Seating, Inc. v . Crane Carrier Co. , 140 S.W. 3d 68 1 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez , 977 S.W .2d 328, 335 (Tex. 1998). The Sec ond Restatement pr ov ide s: (1) One who sells any product in a def ective c ondition unreasonably dang erous to the user or

con s u m er o r t o his property is subject to liabilit y

for phy sical har

m the re by c a us e d to the ult imate us e r o r c on su me r, or to h is p ro pe rt

y , if (a) the seller is e ng ag ed in the business of se lling such a product, a

nd ( b ) it i s e xp e c te d to an d d o e s r e a c h th e u s e r o r c o n s u me r without substantial chang e in the condition in which it is sold. R E S TA TE ME NT (S EC OND ) O F T O RT S § 402A (1965). The four elements for a products liability action

are : (a) the produc t must be defec tive; (b) the pr oduct must reac h the consumer without substantial chang e f

ro m t h e time it leaves the possession and c ontrol of the manufa cture r or se ller; (c) the def ective c ondition of the produc t must render the product unre asonably

dang erous; and ( d) the unreas o n ably dang erous c ondition of the produc t must be the cause of the injury to the user. Toshiba , 152 S.W .3d at 778. Strict products liability

require s proof of pr oducing cause . Producing cause is a ca use that is a substantial fac tor in bring ing a bout an injury

and without which the injury would not have
occur red. Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma , 242 S.W .3d 32, 45 (T ex . 2 0 07) (r ejec ting de finition that9

producingcause is "a

n eff icient, exciting, or c ontributing c ause that, in a natura l sequenc e, produc es the incident in question")

. I n other words, the essential c omponents of produc ing c ause a re " (1) the
cause must be a substantial ca use of the event in issue and (2) it must be a but- for c ause, na mely one wi th ou t w hi ch t he ev ent wou ldno t h ave o ccurred. " Id. I. The Par ents' Summ ary Judgm ent Evidence Wa s A dm iss ible Be fore we turn to the merits of this a ppeal, we are fac ed with the question of whethe r the trial court e rre d in admitting all of the summar y judgme nt evidence. T h e admission or exclusion of summary judgme nt evidence rests with the sound discre ti o n of the trial c ourt. Ne w Brau nfe ls Fa c tor yOu tle t Ctr ., In c . v . I

HO P Re alt yCor p ., 872 S.W .2d 303, 310 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, no
wr it) . Wa l- Mart

argue s th e tr ia l c ourt a

bu se d its dis c re tio n in ov e rr uli ng Wal -M art ' s o bje c tio ns to some of the summary

judgme nt evidence

. A. The Tr ialCo ur t E r r e d in A dm it ti ng J ayWhi tl oc k's U nswor n Affida vit for Al l P urposes Wal -M art argue s th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti ng the a ff ida vit of Whit loc k. I n th is a ff

ida vit , Whit lock, who was Charles I I ' s neig hbor, st ated he noticed the living room lamp was still on when he left his house "late Fr iday night to g o play car ds," i.e ., the nig ht of the fire . The a ffidavit, thoug h, is not sworn. Be cause the af fidavit is not swo rn , W al -M ar t argues the a ffidavit is incompetent evidenc e. B y

statute, an a ffidavit must be " signe d by the party making it, sworn to bef ore a n office r aut ho ri z ed t o ad mi ni st er oa th s, andoff ici all y cert if ied to by th e off ice r un der h is seal of o ffi ce." See T EX . G OV ' T C ODE ANN . § 312.011(1) (Vernon 2005) . An unsworn a ffidavit is incompetent summaryTo obtain a rever sal of t he judgment, appellant must first show that the t rial cour t did in fact 9 c omm it e rr or , a

nd se c on d th a t th e e rr or

wa s r e a so na

bly c a lc ulate d to c a

us e and pr ob a bly did c a us e the re ndition of an improper ve rdict. Gee v. L iberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 7 6 5 S. W. 2 d 3 9 4 , 3 9 6 ( T e x. 1989). Ther e is no reve rsible err or if the e vidence in question is cumulative or is not controlling on a mate r ia l is s u e d is p o s it iv e o f th e c a se. Id. ; S a nders v. She lton , 9 7 0 S. W. 2 d 7 2 1 , 7 2 7 ( T e x. App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) . This error would not be re versible. Summary judgme nt evidence must establish the witness' qua lifications as an e x pert. Ha ll 10 v . H uff , 957 S.W .2d 90, 99–102 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana

1997, pet. denied) . The summary judgme nt e vid ence in di cat e s D r. B e y le r i s q ua lif ie d a s an e xpe rt . D r. B e y le r h a s b a c he lor ' s d e g re e s in c ivi l eng ineer ing a

nd fire pr otection eng ineer ing, ma ster' s deg ree s in mechanic al enginee ring and fire sa fe ty e ng ine e ri ng , a

nd a Ph. D. in en g ine e ri ng sc ie nc e . I n ad dit ion , D r. B e y le r l ist s a pp ro xima te ly three pag es of published a rticles and ha s over twe nty -five y ear s of experienc e in the fie ld.

10 judgme nt evidence

. See Clende nnen v. W illiams , 896 S.W .2d 257, 260 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 19 95 , n o w ri t) ; se e als o R esid e nti al D y na mi c s, LLC v . Lo v e le

ss , 1 8 6 S. W. 3 d 1 9 2 , 1 9 6 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2006, no pet.); Bernsen v . Live Oak I ns. Agency

, Inc
. , 5 2 S. W. 3 d 3 0 6 , 3 1 0 ( T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 01 , n o p e t.) . T he tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in a dmi tti ngWhit loc k' s a ff ida vit fo r a ll purp os e s. Ho we ve r, a s d isc us se d be low , Whit loc k' s a ff ida vit wa s a dmi ssi ble fo r a

lim ite d p ur

po se 9 as information reasona

bly relied upon by

Dr. B eyler. B. Dr. Beyle r's Aff

idavit Was Admissible Su m m ary Judgm ent Evidence Wal-Mart adva

nces two r easons f

or excluding D r. B eyler' s aff idavit. First, Wal-Mar

t arg ues t h e a ff i d av i ts h o u l d

h av e b ee nex cl u d edb ec au s e i tre l i es o ni n ad m i s s i b l e ev i d en ce , i

. e. , W h i t l o ck 's
a ff ida vit

. Se c on d, Wal -M art a

rgue s Dr
. B e y le r' s te sti mon y sh ou ld no t have be e n a dmi tte d b e c a us e it was scientifica lly

unreliable

. Wal-Mart does not challeng e Dr. Be y ler' s qualifications as an e x pert wi tne ss. 1011 1. Dr. Beyle r's Aff

idavit Is Not Inval id B ecause ItRelied on Hearsay Wal-Mar t a r g u e s D r . B e y le r ' s a f

f id a v it is in a d mi s s ib le b e c a

u s e it r e li e s u p o nth e u nsworn aff idavit of Whit lock. The Par ents argue Dr. Be y ler could rea sonably rely on the statement unde r Rule 703 of the Te x as Rules of Evidenc e. Th e Te xas R

ule s of Ev id ence we re a do pte d o ve r t we nty y e ars a g o to pe rm it e xpe rt s to consider ina dmissibl e evide nce. T raditionally , an expert could not r ely upon statements of third parties that we re not prope rly admitted into evidence

. See M oore v. G rantham , 599 S.W .2d 287, 289 (Tex. 1980). Althoug h Mo or e has not bee n overr uled, bot h this Court and the Texas Supreme Court have note d it was effe ctively overr uled by the adoption of the Te x as Civil Rules of Evidenc e (now the Texas Rules of Evidence ). See E.I. du Pont de N emours & Co. v. Robinson , 923 S.W .2d 549, 56 2– 63 (T e x. 19 95 ); Stam v. Mack , 984 S.W .2d 747, 750 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Baylor Me d. Plaza Servs. Corp. v. Kidd , 834 S .W .2 d 6 9, 76 (T e x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 19 92 , w ri t denied)

. Rule 703 expressly

permits an expert to base his or he r opinion upon fac ts or data " perc eived by , revi ewed by , or made kno wn to th e ex pert at o r bef ore t he h eari ng." T EX . R. E V ID . 70 3; see I n
re Chr istus Sp oh n H

os p. Kle be rg , 22 2 S.W. 3d 43 4, 44 0 ( Te x. 20 07 ) ( or ig . p ro c e e din g ); Kidd , 834 S.W .2d at 76. " I f of a

ty pe re asonably

relied upon by

experts in the particular field in forming op in io ns or in feren ces up on th e su bj ect , th e fact s o r dat a need no t b e adm is si bl e in evi den ce." T EX . R. E V ID . 703. "T his chang e wa s d es i gn ed t o b ro aden the basis for e x pert opinions and to bring12

courtroom pr actice in line with the prac tice of e x perts themselve s when they are not in co u rt ." Robinson , 923 S.W .2d at 563. Wal-Mart cites 1 M C C OR MI C K ON E VI DENCE § 15 (6th ed. 2006) ( Westlaw throug h 2008), f o r th e p r o p o s it io nth a t a

ne xp e rt s h o u ld

n o t h a v e r e a s o n a

b ly r e li e d u p o nWh it lo c k ' s s tate me n t. We disag ree that the treatise provides support for Wal-Mar t's a rg ument. This is not an "e x treme c ase" wher e a judg e should " have a residual power to sec ond g uess the customar y prac tice" and dec lare
a sourc e untrustworthy

. Se e id

. The hy potheticals in M C C O RMI C K ON E VI DENCE are c le a rl y distinguishable f

rom this case. Whitlock is not an unknown by stander, nor does the stateme nt repe at
a rumor. See id . at n. 10 . T he ve ra c ity of Whit loc k' s st a te me nt c an b e ve ri fi e d, and Wal -M art

c ou ld prese nt c ontrary evidenc e if the state ment is incorre ct. An expert is not require d to have pe rsonal knowledg e of the fac ts upon which he or she bases his or her opinion a nd can rea sonably

rely upon the fa ctual stateme nts of ey ewitnesses. See Sosa v . Koshy , 9 6 1 S. W. 2 d 4 2 0 , 4 2 7 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 97 , p e t. d e nie d) (e xpe rt c ou ld r e ly on state me nts by e y e wi tne ss)

. Wal

Mart ' s e xpe rt s a lso re ly

on wi tne ss s ta te me nts which were no t in tr od uc e d in to t

he re c or d in admissible form (or e ven introduce d at all). B eca use the trial c ourt co u l d re asonably conclude Whi t l ock' s statement was of the nature rea sonably

relied upon by

experts, the trial court did not abuse its discre tion in admitt ing D r. B eyler' s aff idavit.The trial c ourt must make a thre shold determination of the a dmissibi lity of expert testimony 11 u n d e r Rule 702. T EX . R. E V ID . 70 2; Robinson , 9 23 S.W. 2d a t 55 6. To be re lia

ble , th e sc ie nti fi c techniques or

principles under ly ing the expert' s testimony must be well g rounded in the me thods and proce dures of scienc e. Robinson , 9 2 3 S
. W
. 2 d at 5 5 7
. I nd et er m i n i n g t h e r el i ab i l i t y o f a nex p er t 's te sti mony , a

tr ia l c ourt

may c on sid e r the fo llo wi ng no ne xha us tiv e lis t of

fa c tor s: ( 1) the e xten t to wh i ch t h e theory

has bee n or ca

n be tested; (2) the extent to which the techniques r ely on the subjective interpr etation of the expert; (3) whether the theories have bee n subjected to pe er r eview and/or publication; (4) the technique s' potential rate of er ror; (5) whether

the underly ing the ories or techniques ha

ve bee n g ener ally

acc epted as valid by the rele vant scientific c ommunity ; and (6) the nonjudicial uses which ha ve bee n made of

the theorie s or technique s. Id. The Te x as Supreme Court h as n o t ed the fa ctors listed in Robinson d o n o t a p p ly w it h e qu a l f o r c e to a ll ty

p e s o f s c ie n ti f

ic or technica l evidence

. See G ammill v. Jac k W illiams C hevrole t, Inc. , 9 72 S.W .2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998). We reviewthe trial cour

t's de cision on a Robinson challeng e for an abuse of discre tion. Robinson , 92 3 S. W.2 d at 55 8; Tucker's Bev erages, Inc. v. Fopay , 145 S.W .3d 765, 767 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.). Wal-M ar t objected to Dr . Be y ler' s aff idavit in its "O bjections to Summ ary J udg ment 12 Ev ide nc e in Sup po rt of Pla int if fs ' Re sp on se ." Wal -M art c omp la ine d that Dr
. B e y le r' s af fi davit contained he arsa

y , was spec ulative, and wa s conclusory

. Wal-Mart, t houg h, did not complain about the scientific r eli ab i l i t y o f the a ffidavit and did not cite Da ub e rt , Robinson , or their pr og eny . See Daubert v. M

errell Dow Pharm., Inc

. , 5 09 U. S. 5 79 , 5 90 (1 99 3) ; Robinson , 923 S.W .3d 549. 13 2. Dr. Beyle r's Aff

idavit Is Not Incom petent Evidence Wal -M art claims Dr . B e y le r' s a ff ida vit is s pe c ulativ e , c on c lus or y , a nd sc ie nti fi c a lly unreliable . We note that Wal-Mart fa iled to make a Robinson challeng e to Dr. B eyler in the trial 11 court. The Texas Supreme Court has held that a n objection is require d "w hen a c halleng e to expert 12 testimony question s t h e u n d erlying me thodology , technique, or foundational data used by the wi tn ess ." Coa sta l Tra ns

p. Co. v . Cro wn C

e nt. Pe tro le um Cor

p ., 136 S.W .3d 227, 229 (Tex. 2004);

se e Ma r. Ov e rse as Cor

p. v . E lli s , 971 S.W .2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998) (to "pr eser ve a complaint that14

sc ie n ti f ic e v id e n c e is u n r e li a

b le

. . . a p arty mu s t o b

je c t to th e e v id e n c e b e f

o r e tr ia l o r w h en the evidenc e is offe red" ). The Te x as Supreme Court, in Co a s ta l T r a n s p o r ta tion , expli citly

ref used to overr

ule Maritime Ove rseas and explained its holding in Ma rit im e Ov e rse as a s f oll ow s: We co nc lud e d tha t exam inatio n of the e xpe rt ' s und e rl y ingme tho do log y wa s a ta sk for the tr ial court in its ro l e as gat ek eeper, a nd was not an a

naly sis that should be undertaken for the first time on appea l. Id. a t 41 2. Th is r ule a llo ws the tr ia l c ourt

to e xer c ise its dis c re tio n in m a kin g a de te rm inatio n o f w he the r t he e xpe rt te sti mony

is sufficie ntly

reliable

. Id. I t also ensure s that a full rec ord will be develope d, and that appellate courts will be able to evaluate the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the evidenc e without looking be y ond the appe llate re cord. Id. Coa sta l Tra ns

p ., 136 S.W .3d at 233. The c ourt rea ffirme d "that when a r eliability challeng e re quires the c ourt to e va luate the un de rl y ingme tho do log y , te c hn iqu e , o r f ound atio na l data

us e d b y the e xpe rt , an objec tion must be ti mely made so that the tria l court has the oppor tunity to conduct this analy sis." Id . B y fa ili ngto r a ise the iss ue in t he tr ia l cou rt , W al- Mart h a s f a ile d to pr e se rv e its c omp la int s
a bo ut t he me tho do log y

fo r review

. B e c a

us e e rr or is n ot p re se rv e d, we de c lin e to a dd re ss t he se arguments. We note Coastal T ransportati on held a party may challeng e " [o] pinion testim ony that is conclusory

or speculative" for the f

irst time on appeal be cause such testimony was " incompetent evi den ce." Id. at 232. We will address Wal-Mar t's c omplaints that Dr. Be y ler 's testimony was speculative and conc lusory

. The Te x as S upreme Court has held that a speculative or conclusory statement of an expert wi t n es s i s insufficient to cr eate a question of f act to def eat summary

judgme nt. S

e e I H S C e d a rs15

Treatment Ctr. of Desoto, T ex., I nc. v. M ason , 1 43 S.W. 3d

79 4, 80 3 ( Te x. 20 04 ); Coastal T ransp. , 136 S.W .3d at 232. A nake d and unsupported opinion of a witnes s is incompetent evidenc e. See Coastal T ransp. Co. , 136 S.W .3d at 232. " An expert opinion is conclusory when it offe rs an opinion with no fact u al s ubstantiation. . . . . The expert must ex plain how he r eac hed his conc lusion." Sp ar k s v . B oo th , 2 32 S .W. 3d

85 3, 86 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 2 00 7, no pe t.) (c itatio ns omi tte d) ; see Paradigm Oil, Inc. v . Retamc o Operating, Inc ., 242 S.W .3d 67, 74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pe t. d e nie d) ; Beaumont v . Basham , 205 S.W .3d 608, 621 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denie d). I n his re p o rt , Dr
. Be y l er

s t at es , "O nt h e b as i s o f t h e e y ew i t n es s o b s er v at i o n , p h y s i ca l ev idence

and ana ly sis of

the fi re , th e fi re wa s c a

us e d by the ha log e n tor c hie re lamp. " Wal -M art argue s th is conclusion demonstrates that Dr. B eyler' s opinion is m ere ly u n s u p p o r te d s p e c u la ti o n . I n Volkswagen of America, I

nc. v. R amirez , the Texas Supreme Court held an expert' s opinion was conc lusory when the expert based his opinion on the " laws of phy sics." 159 S.W.3d 897, 911 (Tex. 2004). When a party challeng es the c onclusory nature of an e x pert opinion, appe llate cour ts look to t he entire rec ord, not to statements in isol ation. Un ite d S e rv s. Au to. As s'n v . Cr oft , 1 7 5 S.W.3d 457, 464 ( T e x. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). Although Dr. Beyler' s statement, when considere d in isolation, m ight appea r similar to the " laws of phy sics" statement in Volkswagen , c on sid e ra tio n o f t he e nti re a ff

ida vit and supporting attachme nts demonstrates that Dr . Be y ler' s opinion h as co n siderably more fa ctual substantiation than the expert in Volkswagen

.16

Dr . Be y le r' s af

fi davit sp e c if

ic a lly inc or

po ra te s his re po rt , whi c h wa s att a c he d to th e a ff ida vit

. Th e a ff ida vit state s, " [t]he ba sis of

my op ini on s e xpre sse d h e re in a nd in my re po rt

are mor e fu lly d ev el o p ed an d are contained in my repor t dated F ebrua

ry 8, 2007, attache d here to." When we consider D r. B eyler' s aff

idavi t i n co nnection with the attac hed re port, there is sufficient fa ctual
su bs tanti a tio n o f D r. B e y le r' s o pin ion s. Dr. Be y ler used numerous published article s to establish g ener al causation, i.e., the fac t that ha log e n la

mps c an c a

us e fi re s. Dr . Be y le r list e d an e xten siv e lis t of ar tic le s and g ov e rnme nt r e po rt s
o nw h i c h h e r e l i e d

. D r . B e y l e r r e l i e d u p o n r e s e a r c h c o n d u c t e d b y U n d e r

w r i t e r s La

b o r a t o r i e s ( U L)
conce rning halog en lamp temper ature s. Dr. B eyler a lso relied upon six teen a rticles, many

of which have be e n p ub lis he d in sc ie nti fi c jou

rn a ls. Th e sc ie nti fi c literat ur e e sta bli sh e d f our m a in mecha nisms by which halog en lamps ca n cause fires a s documented by scienti fic literature: 1) ig nit ion

of c omb us tib le s in clo se pr oximi ty , 2 ) i g nit ion of c omb us tib le s b y

e xplod inglamp fra g ments, 3) elec trical short c ircuits, and 4) tip-ove r of the lamp resultin g i n i gn i t i o n of
c omb us tib le s. Dr . B e y le r a sse rt s th a t ha log e n lamps op e ra te a t ve ry hig h te mpe ra

tur e s a nd g e ne rate sufficie nt heat t o al low ordinary combustibles to be ignited w ithout direct bulb contac t. Using scientific studies, he illustrated t h at combustibles within two or three inche s from the bulb pose a serious ri sk of ig niting. L og ically , if the bulb itself, or fr ag ments, come into direc t contact with a combustible, the risk of ig niting would be e ven g reater.17

Dr . B e y le r e sta

bli sh e d spe c if

ic c a us a tio n, i.e ., that Charl e s I I ' s hal og e n la mp w a s th e c a

us e of the fir e, by

elimination of other possible c auses of the fir e and e valuating the statements of the fac t wi tne sse s a lon g wi th t

he e vid e nc e c oll e c te d at th e sc e ne . D r. Bey ler c on c lud e d th e " mos t li ke ly mecha nism" wa s "' nonpassive failure ' of the lamp ig niting the r ecliner below." Nonpassive f

ailure involves an exploding bulb ca using hot g lass, capa

ble of ig niting ordina

ry combu s t i b l es like furniture , to ignite. Dr . Be y ler' s repor t contains an extensive r ecitation of the fac ts, inc luding that the lamp lacked a wire mesh g uard, w as located adjac ent to the re cliner, a nd the ce iling had be en pe ne tr a te d b y

the fi re in t

he are a of the re c lin e r. Th e re po rt a lso no te d that Whit loc k state d th e lamp was still on whe n he left his house around midnight the night of the fire. Dr. B eyler noted the sofa and small table we re both damag ed more extensively on the side closest to the lamp, and the halog en lamp was e x tensively

damag ed. Wal- Mart argue s D r. B e y le r f

a ile d to e xclu de oth e r p ote nti a l c a us e s. B ut D r. B e y le r d id examine and exclude the alter native causes. Dr. B eyler c onsidered the se possibilit ies, but rejec ted the ca ndle theory

beca use of the dispa

rity betwee n the damag e to th e re cl i n er and the sofa . The pic tur e s o f t

he sc e ne sh ow e d th e re c lin e r w a s c omp le te ly c on su me d, bu t the so fa wa s o nly pa rt ia lly
c on su me d. Dr . B e y le r c on c lud e d th e dis pa ri ty dem on st rat ed th e fi re did no t or ig inate a t th e ta

ble beca use the sofa

was c loser to the table. D r. B eyler a lso states the ca ndle wax would not have
surv ive d the fi re if the c and le s we re the po int of or ig in. Th e c on c lus ion that smo kin g mat e ri a ls caused t h e fi re was incorrec t acc ording to Dr. B eyler. Dr . Be y ler states that there is no evide nceDr. Be y ler' s testimony is " post hoc " only in that he proposes seve ral hy potheses, and the n 13 examines eac h in turn. This is not i nadmissible rea soning; this is the scientific method. Ga mm ill , 9 7 2 S
. W
. 2 d

at 7 2 6 (ap p l y i n g Robinson to technica l rather than scientific e x pert 14 te sti mony ); Havne r , 9 5 3 S
. W
. 2 d at 7 1 2 ( a p p l y i n g Robinson in the context of epidemiologic al stu die s) ; Robinson , 9 23 S.W. 2d a t 55 6; W

o l f s o n v . B i c Cor

p ., 9 5 S. W. 3 d

5 2 7 , 5 3 2 ( T e x. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, writ denied) . Wal-Mart also cites two f eder al ca ses. These case s do not rely u p o n Texas case law and ha ve mar g inal, if any , persua sive value. See B ryte v . Am. Household, Inc ., 42 9 F .3 d 4 69 (4 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; Lan za v . P or e tti , 537 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. Pa. 1982)

. 18 smoking mate rials ca

used t he fire and that " [t ]he condition of the rec liner af ter the f ire is in no way indicative of ig n it io n o f th e r e c li n e r b y a c ig ar e tt e . " F u rth e r , D r . B e y le r f o u n d n o e v id e n c e of elec trical a ctivities or other indicators of an e lectric al ca use of the f

ire. W a l

- M artar g u e s D r . B e y l e r 's re as o n i n g i s i n a d m i s s i b l e p o s th o c r e a s o n i n g . InMerre ll Dow 13 Pharmace uticals v. Havne r , th e Te xas S up re me Court state d " [p]os t ho c , sp e c ulativ e te sti mony wi ll not suffice ." 953 S.W.2d 706, 719 (Tex. 1997) (announc ing r equire ments fo r epide miologica l studies to prove ca

usation in tox ic tort ca se). As note d by the Fir st District, the temporal seque nce of the rea soning is not nece ssarily fata l. See Coastal Tankships, U.S.A., Inc. v . Anderson , 87 S.W .3d 591 , 6 1 3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) . The F irst District noted such "r easoningis sometimes corre ct, sometimes fallac ious" a nd emphasized the spec ulative nature of the testimony as the re levant inquiry

. Id. All of the case s cited by Wal-Mart are distinguishable from the fac ts in this case. A numbe r of the ca ses involved re views of Robinson challeng es, which as discussed above was not pre serve d fo r o ur re vie w, and are of marg ina l re le va nc e . Th e re ma ini ngc a se s c ite d b y Wal -M art

are fa c tua lly 1419

distinguishable. Bo rg-W

ar ne r conce rned the level of proof require d in tox ic tort ca ses to show that the exposure was a ' ' substantial f actor ' ' in br inging about the plaintiff' s injury and has little rele vance to this case. See B org-W

arner Corp. v. Flores , 232 S.W .3d 765 (Tex. 2007). I n Ridgway , the expert witness only

testified he " suspect[ed]" the ele ctrica l sy stem cause d the fire and fa iled to exclude other possible ca

uses. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d 598, 601 (Tex. 2004)

. The Tyler Court of Appea ls in De Gratec on c luded th e e xpe rt fa ile d to pr ov ide any

ba sis of su pp or t f or his opinion the candle s wer e defe ctively desig ned. See D eGrate v . Exe cutive I mprints, Inc ., 261 S.W .3d 402, 411 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 2008, no pe t.). I n Gonzales v. Shing W ai B rass & Metal W

ares Factory, Ltd. , th e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e " e xp la in [i n g ] ho w th e la mp w a s d e f

e c ti v e . " 1 9 0 S. W. 3 d

7 4 2 , 7 4 6 ( T e x. App.—San Antonio 2005, no pet.). At oral arg ument, Wal-Mart arg ued there was no distinction betwee n this case and our r ece nt opinion in Driskill v. Ford Motor Co. , N o . 0 6

- 0 7
- 0 0 1 1 9

- CV , 2 0 0 8 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 79 1 0 ( T e x. App.—Texarkana

Oct. 17, 2008, no pet.). We believe the distinctions betwee n this case a nd Dr isk ill
are profound. I n Dr isk

ill , the plaintiff' s expert witness was disqualified a nd there was no e x pert testimony "br idgingthe ana ly

tical g ap betwe en the or igin of a fire in the left re ar are a of an e ng ine compar tment and the conc lusion that the [ speed c ontrol deact i v at i o n s wi tch] in t hat ar ea w as the
caus e-i n-f actof t he fi re." Id . T his c a se do e s n ot c on ta in t he " ana ly tic a l g a p" wh ic h p ro ve d f

a ta l in Dr isk ill . Dr. B eyler' s aff

idavit provides expert testimony bridg i n g t he ana ly

tical g ap betwe en the20

orig in of the fire in the g ener al ar ea of the lamp and the c onclusion that the halog en lamp wa s the
cause -in-fa ct of the f

ire. The re is more than a sc intill a of e vidence bridg ing the analy tical g ap. I t i s c le ar th a t Wa l- M art' s e xp e rts d is a g r e e w it h th e c o n c lu s io n s r e a c h e d b y D r. B ey ler. Conc lu s o r

y e v id e n c e la c k s p r o b a ti v e v a lu e d u e to in s u f

f ic ie n t f a c tu a l s u b s ta n ti a ti o n

— n o t f r om "di fferi ng con clu si on s as to th e un derl y in g factu al s ituat io n. " See B randt v. Surber , 194 S.W .3d 108, 132 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied)

. The fac t that a n expert witness may

have ma de
erro rs d oes no t cr eat e an i mp erm is si bl e "anal y ti cal gap." See SA S & As s o cs. v. Home Mk tg. Servic ing , 1 68 S.W. 3d

29 6, 30 0 (T e x. Ap p. —D a lla s 20 05 , pe t. d e nie d) . Wh ile Dr . B e y le r' s ana ly sis i s n o ti rr ef

u t ab l e, Dr
. Be y l er

d i d p ro v i d e f

ac tu al s u b s t an t i at i o nfo r h i s o p i n i o n s . Dr
. Be y l er 's opinions were ba sed on his know ledg e, training , and experience as an expert in fire scie nce a nd fire investigation, his review of the pictures of the sce ne, the state ments of the fa ct wi t n es s es , and numerous publi shed articles. The evidence is not speculative or c onclusory and does not c ontain an impermissible "a

naly tical g ap" betwee n the data a nd the conc lusions. Dr . Be y ler' s testimony is not incompetent evide nce. C. Time liness an d Sp ec i f i city of Self -Authentication of Wal-Mart D ocum ents Wal-Mart cla ims the Parents' exhibi ts 4 and 14 throug h 17 we re n o t competent summary jud g me nt e vid e nc e be c a

us e the y we re no t a

uth e nti c a te d. I n it s a

pp e lle e ' s b ri e f a

nd its ob je c tio ns to the Pare nts' summar

y judgme nt evidence , Wal-Mart ar g ued to the trial court that it did not rece ive the te n d ay s' no tic e re qu ir e d f or se lf -a uth e nti c a tio n b y

Rul e 19 3. 7 o f t

he Te xas R

ule s o f C ivi l21

Procedur e. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 193.7. The Paren t s responde d that the exhibit s were self-a uthenticated unde r the rule by a notice pr ovided seve nt ee n m o n t h s befor e the summary jud g me nt. Th e Parent s fi led a do c ume nt t itl e d " No tic e of Se lf Authe nti c a tio n Purs ua

nt t o Ru le 19 3. 7, Te x. R. C iv. P., " wh ic h p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art : Ple a se take no tic e tha

t th e do c ume nts y ou pr od

uc e d in re sp on se to a ll p art ie s' Re qu e st fo r P ro du c tio n o f D oc ument s are a uth e nti c a te d p ur su a

nt t o Ru le 19 3. 7, TE X. R. CI V. P., and will be used by Plaintiff at any

trial or hea

ring

. Clearly , Wal-Mart re ceive d more than te n day s' notice. I n their re sponse to the Parents' reply brief, Wal-Ma

rt states it was re prese nted by differ ent counsel at the time of the notice and was not a war e of the above notice . Wal-Mart, in the alter native, argues the a

bove notice la cked suf

ficient s p ec i fi ci t y under the rule. Ac cordingto Wal-Mart, the notice must list every

document to be used by the document's ti tle, etc. Such a re quirement is not f o u n d i nt h e t e x to f

t h e r u l e . R u l e 1 9 3
. 7 p r o v i d e s i n

i t s e n t i r e t y: A par ty ' s production of a document in response to written di scover y authenticates the document for

use ag ainst that party in any pretria l proce eding or at trial unless—within t en d ay s o r a long er or shorter time orde red by

the cour t, after the pr od uc ingpa rt y ha s a c tua l no tic e that the do c ume nt w ill be us e d— the pa rt y ob je c ts to the authenticity

of the doc ument, or any

part of it, stating the spec ific basis for objection. An objection must be either on the rec ord or in wr iting and must have a g ood faith fa ctual and le g al basis. An objection made to the authenticity of only part of a doc ument does not a ffe ct the authenticity of the rema inder. I f objection is made, the pa rt y a tte mpt ing to us e the do c ume nt s ho uld be g ive n a

re a so na ble op po rt

un ity t o e s t a b l i s h i t s a u t h e n t i c i t y. T EX . R. C IV . P. 19 3. 7. Wal -M art pr op os es tw o argum ents a s to wh y we sh ou ld i nf

e r a sp e c if ic ity require ment into the rule.22

F ir st, Wal -M art

argue s th e sn a

p- ba c k p ro vis ion s o f R

ule 1 9 3
. 3 ( d ) r e q

u ir e su c h a

re qu ir e me nt. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 193.3(d). W al-Mar t argues the notice of intent to use the docume nt "a lso trigg ers the ability to ' snap bac k' an inadve rtently produce d privileg ed docume nt." Sec ond, Wal-Mart ar g ues the comments to the rule indicate the notice must spec ify the document by

title. The only

comment
re fe re nc ingRul e 19 3. 7 is a s f oll ow s: 7. Th e se lf

-a uth e nti c a tin g pr ov isi on

is n e w. Authe nti c a tio n is , o f c ours e , b ut a condition prec edent to admissibility and does not establish admissi bility

. See T EX . R. E V ID . 901(a) . The ten- day period a llowed for o b

j ection to authenticity

(which period may

be alter ed by the court in appropr iate circumstance s) does not run from the pr od uc tio n o f t

he ma te ri a l or inf

or ma tio n b ut f

ro m th e pa

rt y ' s a c tua l awa

re ne ss that the document will be used. To avoid complications at trial, a party may identify prior to trial the documents intended to be offe red, the reby trig g eringthe obligation to object to authenticity . A trial c ourt may also order

this procedur e. An objec tion to authenticity

must be made in g ood faith. T EX . R. C IV . P. 19 3 c mt. 7. W al- Ma rt c la ims the langua g e " may ide nti fy " c re a te s a

sp e c if ic ity require ment that require s a par ty to list the spec ific docume nt he or she intends to use. Assuming, without dec iding, the r ule contains a

speci fi cit y

require ment, Wal-Mart has waived a ny err or. The Par ents filed the notice of self- authentication appro x i m ately sevente en
mon ths be fo re su mma

ry jud g me nt. I f Wa l- Ma

rt ha d a ny c omp la int s c on c e rn ingthe no tic e , it sh ou ld have r aised those c omplaints in t he trial co u rt at a time whe n any defic iency

could have been
re me die d. Wal -M art

did no t r a ise its sp e c if

ic ity c omp la int un til it f

ile d it s r e sp on se to t

he Pare nts ' reply brief. " Silence or ina ction, for so long a per iod as to sho w an i n t en t i o n t o y ield the known rig ht," may

be suff icient to establish a wa iver of that rig ht. Tenneco I nc. v. E nter. Prods. Co. , 92523

S.W .2d 640, 643 (Tex. 1996). Wal-Mart had se ventee n months in t he trial c ourt to complain about the no tic e of

se lf -a uth e nti c a tio n. Wal -M art

wa ive d a ny c omp la int s b y

no t ob je c tin g to t

he sp e c if ic ity of the no tic e in t

he tr ia l c ourt
. II. The Trial Court Erred in Gr anting the No-Evidence Motion Wal-Mart ar g ues there are numerous defic iencies in the Parents' evidenc e. " A produc t may be u nrea so nab ly

dan gerous becau se o f a defe ct i n m anu fact uri ng, d esi gn, o r m arke ti ng." Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. , 9 77 S.W. 2d a t 33 5. Wal -M art

c la ims the re is n o e vidence th e lamp wa s a ha log e n la

mp, no e vid e nc e the lamp w as pu rcha sed at a Wal -M a rt sto re , n o e vid e nc e the lamp contained a

desig n defe ct, and no e vidence of a ma rketing defe ct. A no-e vidence summary

judgme nt is e ssentially a pretria l dir ecte d verdic t. We, ther efor e,
a pp ly the same le g a l su ff

ic ie nc y sta nd ard in r e vie wi nga

no -e vid e nc e su mma

ry jud g me nt as we a

pp ly in review ing a

direc ted ver dict. W

al-Mart Stores, Inc. v . Rodriguez , 9 2 S.W .3d 502, 5 0 6 ( T e x. 20 02 ). We m

us t de te rm ine wh e the r t

he no nmo va

nt p ro du c e d a

ny e vid e nc e of

pr ob a tiv e fo rce t o raise a fac t issue on the mater ial questions presente d. Id. ; Vial v. Gas Solutions, L td. , 187 S.W .3d 220, 228 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.). A no- evidenc e motion for summary judgme nt must be g rante d if: (1) the moving party asser ts that there i s n o evidenc e of one or more spe cified e lements of a c laim or defe nse on which the a dverse party would have the burde n o f proof at trial; and (2) the responde nt pro d u ce s n o summary judgme nt evidence raising a g enuine issue of ma te ri a l f a c t on tho se e le me nts
. Sudan v. Sudan , 1 99 S.W. 3d 29 1, 29 2 ( Te x. 20 06 ); see T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a(i).24

A n on movan t w il l d efeat a no -evi den ce su mm ary ju dgmen t m ot io n i f t he n on mov a nt p re se nts more than a

scintil la of probative evidenc e on ea ch ele ment of his or her claim. DR Partners v. Floyd , 2 28 S.W. 3d

49 3 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 07 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Pr ic e v . D iv ita , 224 S.W .3d 331, 33 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 06 , p e t. d e nie d) . T he fi na l te st f or le g a l suf fi c ie nc y mus t alway s be whe ther the e vidence at trial would ena ble re asonable and fa ir-minded people to rea ch the verdic t under re view. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 82 7 (T ex . 2 0 0 5 ). More than a scintilla of ev i d ence exist s when the e vidence "r ises to a level that would e nable r easona ble and fai r-m in dedpeo pl e to di ffer i n t hei r con clu si on s. " Havne r , 9 53 S.W. 2d at 71 1. " L e ss t

ha n a sc int ill a of evide nce e x ists when the evidenc e is ' so weak as to do no more than c reate a m er e s u rm i s e or
su sp ic ion ' of a fa c t. " K

i n g R a n ch, Inc . v. Chapman , 118 S.W .3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc. , 650 S.W .2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). A. T h er e I s S o me E v i d en ce th e L a mp W a s a H a l o g en L a mp Wal -M art argue s th e re is no evi de nc e the lamp p ur c ha se d b y Me rr e ll f

or his so n w a s a halog en lamp. A ha loge n lamp uses " halog en g as in the bulb as a med i a fo r produc ing the light." An inc and e sc e nt b ulb c on sis ts o f a se a le d v a c uum. T he pr oo f o f t his fa c t is c ri tic a l to t

he Pare nts '
case . Wit hout evidence the lamp was a halog en lamp, ther e i s n o ev i d en ce of a produc t defe ct or
causation. Merr ell provided some e vidence that the lam p wa s ac t u ally a halog en lamp. Dur ing the de po sit ion , M e rr e ll t e sti fi e d th e lamp h e purc ha se d f or his so n wa s a hal og e n la mp a nd fr e qu e ntl y25

ref err ed to th e l am p as a halog en lamp. Mer rell also testified he could distinguish the diffe renc e be tw e e n a

n in c and e sc e nt b ulb a nd

a ha log e n b ulb . M e rr e ll d e sc ri be d th e bu lb i n th e lam p as a "r ound cylinder l ooking bulb"—" [n] ot like a reg ular li g ht bulb." Acc ording to Merr ell, a halog en bulb is normally

cylindrical, and a

n incande scent bulb is normally round. Merr ell, though, te stified he did not know the wattag e of the bulb. Merre ll testified he had se en the lamp in that location about
a mo nt h b efor e th e fi re, a nd"it was li ke l oo ki ng at t he s un ." J . M. Be rshirs, who had be en hire d by the l andlord to remove items from the burned house, testified t hat t he bulb on the l amp he remove d from the living room wa s "more flat on the surf ace and then round at the back." Be rshirs testified the bulb wa s simil ar to a flood lamp. Be rshirs later identified a dr awingof a bulb a s simil ar to the bulb in the lamp. B ershirs testified he was not sure whether the bulb was a

halog en or inc andesc ent bulb. The e vidence that the lamp at issue wa s a halog en lamp i s m o re than a mer e suspicion or surmise. Merr ell' s tes t i m o n y is more than a sc intill a of e vidence the lamp at issue wa s a halog en la mp . T h e d e s c r ip ti o no f

th e b u lb by Be rs h ir s a ls o s u g g e s ts th e la mp w a s a h a lo g e nla

mp . We conclude there is more than a sc intill a of e vidence the lamp at issue wa s a halog en lamp. B. There Is Som e Evidence the Halogen Lam p Was Purc hased at Wal-Mart Wal-Mart argues there is no evidence that the lamp was pur chase d at Wal-Mart be cause the Parents do not have any

document esta

blishing the purc hase. Me rre ll testified that he pur chase d theWal-Mart ar g ues the Appe llants' br ief lac ks sufficie nt citations to authority

. An appe llant 15 can waive an issue by

failing to provide ade quate c itations to authority

. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1; Sa v e Ou r S

pr ing s A lli an c e, I

nc . v . La zy Nin e Mu n. Ut il. Di

st . , 1 9 8 S
. W
. 3 d 3 0 0 , 3 1 4 n . 9 ( T e x. Ap p. —T e xar

ka na 20 06 , pe t. de nie d)

. Whe the r a pa rt y ha s p ro vid e d a de qu a te c itatio ns to a uth or ity is not judged by the quantity of case s cited. What c onstitut es adequate citations to authority depends on the issue ra ised. For some issues, citing a single case may

be ade quate br iefing

. See Sav e Our Springs , 198 S.W .3d at 324 (op. on re h' g ). F or complex issues or issues wher e the law is unsettled, nume ro us case s alo ngwi th e xten siv e dis c us sio n o f t ho se c a se s ma

y be re qu ir e d in

or de r t o adequately brief the issue. See id. The P are nts provided a dequate authority for the a rg uments raised. Whil e the authority cited by the Appellants' brief could have been more extensive, the brief is not inadequate. A m o v an t m u s t est ablish his or her e ntitlement to a summary judgme nt on the issues 16 expressly prese nted to the trial cour t. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589 S.W .2d 671 (Tex. 1979). Wal-Mart, thoug h, did expressly prese nt this issue to the t rial court in its m otion for su mma ry jud g me nt. Wal -M art ' s mo tio n c on ta ins thr e e ma in co mpl a int s: 1 ) n o e vid e nc e the lamp wa s p ur c ha se d at Wa l- Mart ; 2) no e vid e nc e the lamp w a s " de fe c tiv e and /or un reas on a

bly dang erous" ; and 3) no e vidence a product defe ct caused t he inj ury . Wal-Mart arg ued there wa s no evidenc e of a

product de fec t be cause a product defe ct cannot be inferr ed, and "a n inhere nt r isk (such as a h i gh t em p er at u re b u l b )" i s n o tev i d en c e t h e p ro d u ct i s u n re as o n ab l y

d an ger o u s . W al -M ar t 's c ha lle ng e to t

he de sig n d e fe c t is pr e se rv e d, bu t Wa l- Ma rt is l imi ted to t

he g ro un ds a lle g e d in

its motion. 26 lamp at a Wal-Mart store even though he did not remember the location. Mer

rell' s testimony

that he purc hased the lamp at Wal-Mart is suffic ient to cre ate a fac t issue. C. There Is Som e Evidence of a Design Defect Wal-Mart ar g ues there is no evidence of a desig n defe ct. W e note Wal-Mar t also argues the Parents wa ived this issue by failing to provide thi s Court with an adequate br ief. We also note the 15 Pare nts c la im Wa l- Mart

wa ive d th is i ssu e by

no t r a isi ngit i n th e tr ia l c ourt
. 16 A desig n defe ct exist s when a condition of t he produc t rende rs it "' unrea sonably dang erous
as d es i gn ed , t a k i n g i n t o co n s i d er at i o nt h e u t i l i t y o f t h e p ro d

u ct an d t h e r i s k i n v o l v edi ni t s u s e. '"Wal -M art did no t argue the re wa s n o e vid e nc e of a sa fe r a lte rn a tiv e de sig n, no r d id Wa l- 17 Mart arg ue its evidenc e conc lusively established ther e wa s no safe r alter native desig n. Summary judgme nt cannot be g rante d except on the g rounds expressly prese nted in the m otion. Johnson v. Br e we r &Pr itc ha rd

, P .C. , 7 3 S
. W
. 3 d

1 9 3 , 2 0 4 ( T e x. 2 0 0 2) ; Sci. Spec trum, Inc. v . Martinez , 941 S.W. 2d 91 0, 91 2 ( Te x. 19 97 ); Mc Con ne ll v . S ou ths ideIn de

p. Sc h. Di st. , 8 5 8 S. W. 2 d

3 3 7 , 3 4 2 ( T e x. 19 93 ); AIG Life Ins. Co. v. Fe derated Mut. I ns. Co. , 200 S.W .3d 280, 284 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, pe t. d e nie d) ; Thomas v

. Omar Inv s., Inc ., 156 S.W .3d 681, 685 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pe t.). Ru le 1 66 a(i ) pr ov id es "[ t] he m ot io n mu st st ate th e ele men ts as t o wh ich th ere i s n o ev id ence. " T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a(i). " A motion for summ ary judgme nt must itself expressly prese nt the g rounds upon whi ch i t i s mad e, an d m us t s tan d o r fal l o n t hes e groun ds alo ne. " Martinez , 941 S.W .2d at 912 (q u o t i n g Mc Con ne ll , 858 S.W .2d at 341). The appellate court is not permitted to " rea d betwee n the lines, infer or g lean from the pleading s or the proof " a ny g rounds for g ranting summary judgme nt other than those g rounds ex pressly set forth in the motion for summary judgme nt. Mc Con ne ll , 858 S.W. 2d a t 34 3; Mott v. Red's Safe &Lock Serv s., Inc. , 2 49 S.W. 3d

90 , 9 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (motion which a lleg ed ther e wa s no evidenc e the pr oduct " was unfit for the purposes for which it wa s intended

. . . ." w as insufficie nt to challeng e existence of pr oduct def ect 27 Hernande z v. To ka i Corp. , 2 S.W. 3d 25 1, 25 8 ( Te x. 19 99 ) ( qu oti ngjur y ins tr uc tio n c on ta ine d in Turner v. Gen. M

otors Corp. , 584 S.W .2d 844, 847 n.1 (Tex. 1979) ). " ' The infe renc e of de fec t may
no t b e dra wn . . . fro m t he m ere fact o f a p rod uct -rel ate d acci den t. '" Ridgway , 135 S.W .3d at 602 (q uo tin g Re state me nt ( Th ir d) of To rt s: Pr od

uc ts L ia bil ity § 3 re po rt e rs ' no te to c mt. d ( 19 98 )) ; see Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Me ndez , 204 S.W .3d 797, 807 (Tex. 2006). We note a desig n defe ct also re quires proof of a sa fer alternative desig n. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C ODE ANN . § 8 2. 00 5 ( Ve rn on 20 05 ); Mende

z , 2 04 S.W. 3d

a t 80 7; se e J

aim es v . F ie sta Ma rt, Inc ., 21 S.W. 3d 30 1, 30 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Hernande z , 2 S.W .3d at 256 (noting "Sec tion 82.005 does not attempt to state all the ele ments of a pr oduct liability action for desig n defe ct" ). Wal-Mart, thoug h, did not challeng e the e vidence conce rning a saf er a lternative desig n. 17or unrea sonably dang erous condition). Be cause Wal-Mart failed to c halleng e the e v i d ence

conce rning a saf

er a lternative design in its summary judgme nt motion, summary judgme nt could not be g rante d on that basis. Fur ther, we note Dr. B eyler stated inca ndesce nt and floure scent bulbs do not g ener ate temperatures as high a s halog en bulbs. L entini and Philli ps both testified simil ar lamps with incandesc ent bulbs were available

. 28

1. There Is Som e Evidence of a Pr oduct Defect Ac c or din g to D r. B e y le r, a ll h a log e n l a m p s a r e d e f e c t i v e a n d u nr e a s o n a b l y da ng e ro us be c a

us e ty pical " lamp envelope " te mperatures ar e betwe en 500 and 600 de g ree s Celsius (932 and 1,112 deg ree s Fa

hrenhe it). There are four main mecha nisms by which halog en lamps ca

n cause fires a s documented by

scientific literature: 1) i gn i t i o n of combustibles in close proximi ty ; 2) ig nition of
c omb us tib le s b y

e xplod inglamp f

ra g me nts ; 3) e le c tr ic a l sh or t c ir c uit s; and 4) tip -o ve r of the lamp
re su lti ngin i g nit ion

of c omb us tib le s. Th e re is more tha n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e that th e lamp contained a

product de fec t. 2. The r e Is Som e Evi de nc e Hal og e n Lam ps A r e Unr e as ona bly Da nge r ous Wal -M art c ha lle ng e s th e e vid e nc e that ha log e n la mps are un re a so na

bly da ng e ro us . Dr. B eyler' s aff

idavit contains some evidenc e of this eleme nt. The Pare nts introduced numer ous article s showing ha loge n lamps produce high le vels of heat. A memorandum fr om the Commi ssion lists t hese da

ng ers. The memorandum wa s the result of 260 r eporte d inci d ents involving ha loge n tor c hie re fl oo r l a mps . T he stu dy inc lud e d 23 2 fi re s c a

us e d b y ha log e n to rc hie re -s tyle fl oo r l a mps , of which twe lve re sulted in deaths.29

The unre asonably

dang erous c oncept is similar t o t h e s afer alter native desig n discussion above, but ha s a slightly

differ ent focus. Even thoug h a produc t may have a safe r alter

native desig n, the produc t may

not be unre asonably

dang erous ba sed on a r isk-utilit y analy sis. See H

er nandez , 2 S.W .3d at 256. The r isk-utilit y analy sis employ ed by

Texas courts i nvolves consider ation of
s ev er al fa ct o rs , i n cl u d i n g: (1 ) t he uti lity of the pr od uc t to the us e r an d to the pu bli c a s a w ho le we ig he d a g a ins t the g ra vit y and li ke lih oo d o f i nju

ry fr om i ts u se ; ( 2) the a va ila bil ity of a su bs tit ute pr od uc t w hich w ou ld m e e t th e same ne e d a nd no t be un sa fe or

un re a so na

bly expensive; (3) the manuf actur er' s abili t y t o eli minate the unsaf e cha rac ter of the p r o d u c t w i t h o u t s e r i o u s l y i mp a i r i n g i t s u s e f u l n e s s o r s i g n i f

i c an t l y i n c r e a sin g its costs; (4) the use r' s anticipated a war eness of

the dang ers inher ent in the product and their avoidabilit y

beca use of the g ener al public knowledg e of the obvious condition of the produc t, or of the e x istence o f s u i t ab l e wa rning s or instructions, and (5) the expectations of the ordina ry consumer. Id. (c i t i n g Am . To ba c c o Co . v . G rin ne ll , 951 S.W .2d 420, 432 (Tex. 1997)). Wal -M art argue s th at th e P are nts ' pr oo f, wh ic h o nly a tta c ks ha log e n to rc hie re lamps in g ener al, does not establish that the product is unrea sonably dang erous. Wal-Mar

t claims the model sold must be unreasona

b l y d ang erous in compa

rison to other halog en torc hiere lamps. A rational juror could c on cl ude that an inc andesc ent torchie re lamp is an adequate substitute for a ha loge n torchier e lamp and de termine, using the above fac tors, that the utility of halog en lig hts does not outweig h its dang ers. The re is some e vidence of unre asonable dang er.30 3. There Is Som e Evidence of Causation Wal-Mart claims there is no evidence the lamp in dispute cause d the fire . Wal-Mart ar g ues the P are nts cannot prove causation without producing the actual lamp. Whil e we ag ree the missing la mp m a k e s t h e P ar e n t s ' c a s e m u c h m o r e d i f f i c u l tt o p r o v e , i t s a

b s e n c e d o e s n o tm a k e t h e c a se imp os sib le to p ro ve . We have pr e vio us ly dis c us se d the te sti mony of Dr . B e y le r s up po rt ingthe c la im that the halog en lamp wa s the ca use of the f

ire. As dis c us se d ab ov e , Dr . Be y le r opi ne d the fi re wa s most lik e ly c a us e d b y the ha log e n la

mp
and su bs tanti a te d h is o pin ion

wi th a n a na ly sis of the fi re , p hy sic a l e vid e nc e , a nd ob se rv a tions

. Dr. B eyler used nume rous published article s to e stablish that ha loge n lamps can c ause f ires. B ased
on the data and statistics c ontained in the published article s, Dr. Be y ler conclude d "ha loge n lamps g ener a te s u f

f ic ie n t h e a t t o a ll o w o r d in ar y c o mb u s ti b le s to b e ig n it e d w it h o u t d ir e c t b u lb c o n ta c t." Dr. B eyler c oncluded the most likely mecha nism is "' nonpassive fa ilure' of t h e l am p i gn iting the
rec liner below." He r eac hed this conclusion by eliminating the other possible c auses of the fire and

an a ly zi n g th e s tatemen ts o f

th e f a c t w it n e s s e s a lo n g w it

h th e e v id e n c e g a th e r e d

a t t h e s c e n e . We further note the ceiling burn-throug h was not direc tly over the rec liner, but rathe r appr ox imately two fee t from the re cliner. Dr. Beyler' s testimony was based on the condition of the re cliner, sof a, and table af ter the f ire. The Pare nts were not require d to marshal all of the ir eviden ce at t h e summary judgme nt stag e. See T EX . R. C IV . P. 166a (c mt.). The Pare nts only had to pr o d u ce a scintilla of evidenc e.31

There is some evidence the lamp was a substantial f actor in br inging about an injury and without the lamp, the injury

would not have oc curr ed. D. There Is Som e Evidence of a Marketing Defect A ' ' marke ting de fec t'' exis ts if the manufa cture r or s el l er fa ils to warn of a dang erous
c ha ra c te ri sti c of

the pr od uc t. Amark e tin g de fe c t may e xist e ve n tho ug h the pr od uc t is no t ot

he rw ise flawe d. Munoz v. Gulf Oil Co. , 7 32 S.W. 2d 62 , 65 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 19 87 , w ri t
re f' d n .r .e .) . Amark e tin g de fe c t c on sis ts o f f ive e le me nts : (1) a risk of har

m that is inherent in the produc t or that may arise from the intende d or re a so na bly anti c ipate d u se of

the pr od uc t mu st e xist; ( 2) the pr od uc t su pp lie r m us t a c tua lly kn owor re a so na bly fo re se e the ri sk

of ha rm at th e time t

he pr od uc t is marke ted; (3) the product must possess a marke ting defe ct; (4) the abse n ce o f t he war ning and/or i nstructions must rende r t he product unrea sonably dang erous to the ultimate user or c onsumer of the product; and ( 5) the fa ilure to war n and/or instruct m u s tc o n s t i tu t e a

c a u s a t i v e n e x u s i nt h e p r o d

u c tu s e r ' s i n

j u r y. Goodye ar Tire & Rubber Co. v. Rios , 1 43 S .W .3 d 10 7, 11 6 ( Te x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 04 , p e t. denied)

. As discussed above , the re cord contains ample evidence halog en lamps are def ective. T here is some evidence establishing that Wal-Mart was a war e of the risk of h ar m . T h e record conta ins
sever al memora

ndums and other doc uments c o n c e r n in g Wa l- M a r t' s im p le me nta ti o n o f a require ment imp os e d b y

the Com mis sio n th a t all re ta ile rs make a va ila ble wi tho ut c os t, a

wi re me shg ua

rd fo r a ll halog en torc hiere l am p s. Howeve r, Wal-Mart did not provide a wire me sh g uard w ith the lamp. Me rr e ll t e sti fi e d Wa l- Mart so ld t he lamp w ith ou t a

bo x or a de qu a te wa

rn ing s. A ratio na l juro r c ou ld32

conclude a ca

usative nexus ex isted betwee n the fa ilure to war n and/or instruct a

nd Charles I I ' s death. Th e re is m or e tha

n a sc int ill a of e vid e nc e e sta

bli sh inga mark e tin g de fe c t. III . The Tr ialCo ur t E r r e d in G r ant ing th e Tr adi ti ona l M ot ion for Sum m ar y J udgm e nt Wal -M art ' s mo tio n w a s b oth a no -e vid e nc e a

nd a tr a dit ion a l motio n for su mma ry jud g me nt. The Pare nts arg ue that Wal-Mar t failed to conc lusively es t ab l ish that the lamp was not purc hased at W al-Mar

t, that the lamp was a

n incande scent lamp, or that smoking mater ials were the ca use of the fi re . We a g re e the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in g ra nti ngthe tr a dit ion a l mo tio n f or su mma ry jud g me nt. When review ing a

traditional motion for summary judgme nt, summary

judgme nt is proper whe n th e mov ant e sta

bli sh e s th a t th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue of ma te ri a l f

a c t and tha t he or sh e is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 5 89 S.W. 2d 67 1; see T EX . R. C IV . P. 1 6 6 a( c) . The de fenda

nt must conclusively

neg ate at least one e lement of e ach of the plaintiff's theories of

rec overy or plea d and conc lusively establish eac h element of an af fi rm at i ve def

ense. Martinez , 941 S.W .2d at 9 1 1
. Be cause the movant bea rs the burde n of proof

, all conflicts in the
e vid e nc e are dis re g ard e d, e vid e nc e fa vo ra ble to t he no nmo va

nt i s ta ke n a s tr ue , a nd a ll d ou bts a s to the g enuine issues of mater ial fac t are resolved in f avor of the nonmovant. Nix on v . M r. Pr op . M gm t. Co. , 6 90 S.W. 2d

54 6 ( Te x. 19 85 ); se e Lim esto ne Pr od s. Di str ibu tio n, In c . v . M

c Nam ara , 71 S.W .3d 30 8, 31 1 ( Te x. 20 02 ); Rhone-P oulenc, I nc. v. Ste el , 997 S.W .2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999).33

A. Wa l- M ar t D id N otCo nc lusi ve ly N e ga te That th e Lam p Wa s P ur c has e d atWa lMart Wal -M art int ro du c e d a n a ff ida vit of Jim Sc antl in, the Di re c tor of Data Ma na g e me nt fo r Wa lMart. Scantlin sea

rche d Wal-Mart' s rec ords for a rec ord of Merre ll's purc hase. Sca ntlin testi fied he review ed 9 5 , 0 0 0 sales re cords f rom the three locations in question and could not find a sa le that matched Me rre ll's de scription. A j ury would not be required to find all of S cantlin' s testimony to be
c re dib le . A s a

Wal -M art

e mpl oy ee, S cant lin wa s a n in te re ste d w itn e ss. I n a dd iti on , Sc a ntl in
re str ic te d h is s e arc h to sp e c if ic date s, pr od

uc t f e a tur e s, and

oth e r c ri te ri a . M e rr e ll' s p ur c ha se c ou ld have be en outside these da tes or the other

sear ch limit at i o n s . T h e Pare nts arg ue a pur chase on October 8 could have been the purcha se of the l amp i n question. This date wa s outside the sear ch dates used by Scantlin. L ast, Merr ell testified he purchase d the lamp at Wal-Mar t. Whi le Wal-Mart ha s p e rs ua siv e e vid e nc e , it ha s n ot c on c lus ive ly

e sta bli sh e d th e lamp w a s n o t

p u rc ha se d at Wa l- Mart
. Th e re are g e nu ine iss ue s of ma te ri a l fa c t c on c e rn ing wh e the r the lamp wa s p ur c ha se d at Wa l- Mart
. B . W a l -M a rt Di d No t C o n cl u s i v el y Ne g a te T h a t t h e L a mp W a s a H a l o g en L a mp Both L entini and Dy er te stified the lamp was a n incande scent lamp. L entini testified the two photogr aphs of the lamp were of an inc andesc ent fixt ure, not a halo gen fixture. Fr om the descr iptions of the lamp and the photog raphs, Dy er co n cl u ded the lamp indicated was a n inc and e sc e nt, rathe r t

ha n a ha log e n, lamp. Dy e r t e sti fi e d th e sh a pe of the bo wl ind ic a te s th e lamp
was a n in ca n d es cent lamp. The rec ord, thoug h, contains evide nce c ontradicting the conc lusions
rea ched by

L entini a nd Dy er. In its summ ary

judgme nt motion, W al-Mar t admits the photogra

phs34

of the lamp a

re " blurry " a

nd "f uzz y ." Phill ips te stified a person could buy both incandesc ent lamps

and ha log e n la

mps si mi lar to t

he a pp e ara nc e of the lamp i n d isp ute . A s d isc us se d a bo ve , M e rr e ll testified the lamp was a halog en lamp. Wal-Mart admitted selling halog en lamps. The te stimony of an e x pert witness usually does not establish any fac t as a matter of law

. See U niroyal Goodrich Tire Co. , 977 S.W .2d at 338. Wal-Mart fa iled to conclus i v el y es t ablish the lamp was a n incande scent lamp. C. Wa l- M ar t D id N otCo nc lusi ve ly E st abl ish t he M arih u ana Jo int s C aus e d t he F ire Wal-Mart ar g ues throug hout its brief that the marihua na joi nts or ciga

rettes caused the fire. Wal -M art , tho ug h, ha s no t c on c lus ive ly e sta bli sh e d thi s fa c t. L e nti ni c on c lud e d th e mos t pr ob a ble
cause of the fir e wa s car eless disposal of smoking materia ls. Dy er te stified t h e cause of the f ire could not be dete rmined due to the lack of a thoroug h fire inve stigation and the sig nificant amount of missing e lements of key evidenc e. The pre sence of smoking materials is not conclusive e vidence they wer e the c ause of

the fire

. Neither is the prese nce of canna binoids in the blood of the victims. Dr. Be y ler disag ree d with the conclusion that marihua

na joints or ot her smoking m ater ials cause d the fire. Whil e L entini opined t h e f i re wa s ca u s edb y

s m o k i n g m at er i al s , s u c h t e s t i m o n y o n l y cr ea t es a f

ac ti s s u e f

o r a j u ry 's consideration. I n other wor ds, Wal-Mart' s evidenc e cr eate s a fa ct issue—not conclusive pr oof.35

Conclusion T h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d

n o terr i nad m i t t i n g al l th e s u m m ary j u d gm en t

ev i d en ce . Al t h o u gh W h i t l o ck 's af

fi d av i twa s n o tad m i s s i b l e f o r a l l p u rp o s es , Dr
. Be y l er co u l d re l y u p o nW h i t l o ck 's statement in his affidavit. Dr
. Be y l er's a ffidavit wa s not speculative or conclusory . Be cause the Parents introduce d more than a scintilla of evidenc e on ea ch cha lleng ed ele ment of their c ause of

a c tio n, the tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in g ra nti ngWal -M art ' s n o- e vid e nc e mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt. F ur the r, Wal -M art

fa ile d to e sta

bli sh it wa s ent itl e d to a tra dit ion a l summa ry jud g me nt. We r e ve rs e the or de r o f the tr ia l court g ra nti ngWal -M art ' s summa

ry jud g me nt m oti on

and re mand thi s c a se to the trial cour

t for fur ther proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.

J ack Ca rter J ustice Date Submitted: October 29, 2008 Date D ecide d: Dec ember 16, 2008