alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                      31,675,250
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                               17,184,792
<ALLOWANCES>                                   347,405
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                            93,496,019
<PP&E>                                     130,862,795
<DEPRECIATION>                              41,355,258
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             392,421,314
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                       35,409,758
<BONDS>                                    376,327,217
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       712,500
<OTHER-SE>                                (20,135,665)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               392,421,314
<SALES>                                     67,702,627
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            67,702,627
<CGS>                                       41,878,247
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               41,878,247
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                            45,926,265
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                          25,906,382
<INCOME-PRETAX>                           (40,071,885)
<INCOME-TAX>                               (1,271,000)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                       (38,800,885)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                    (699,447)
<NET-INCOME>                              (39,500,332)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (.554)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
*December 19, 1944.*

#### Jencks, Plaintiff and Respondent, vs. Schlagel, Defendant and Respondent: Bye and another, Appellants.

For the appellants: *Stafford & Stafford*of Chippewa Falls.

For the respondent C. E. Jencks : *La Vern G. Kostner,*attorney, and *Nathan Comstock*of counsel, both of Arcadia.

For the respondent A. R. Schlagel: *Albert V. A. Peterson*of Blair.

*By the Court.*

Judgment affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 67 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 67

To designate the headquarters building of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development in Washington, District of Columbia, as the ``Robert 
                     C. Weaver Federal Building''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 19, 1999

    Mr. Moynihan (for himself, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Robb, Mr. 
Schumer, and Mr. Kennedy) introduced the following bill; which was read 
  twice and referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To designate the headquarters building of the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development in Washington, District of Columbia, as the ``Robert 
                     C. Weaver Federal Building''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. DESIGNATION OF ROBERT C. WEAVER FEDERAL BUILDING.

    In honor of the first Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 
the headquarters building of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development located at 451 Seventh Street, SW., in Washington, District 
of Columbia, shall be known and designated as the ``Robert C. Weaver 
Federal Building''.

SEC. 2. REFERENCES.

    Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, paper, or other 
record of the United States to the building referred to in section 1 
shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Robert C. Weaver Federal 
Building''.
                                 <all>
```
NO. 07-06-0253-CR

	IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

	FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

	AT AMARILLO

	PANEL B

	JULY 27, 2006

	______________________________

	RICARTE G. GONZALEZ, APPELLANT

	V.

	THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

	_________________________________

	FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

	NO. 2001-436822; HONORABLE BRADLEY S. UNDERWOOD, JUDGE

	_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

	MEMORANDUM OPINION

	Appellant, Ricarte G. Gonzalez, appeals his conviction for indecency with a child and sentence of incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for a period of 15 years, and fine of $3,000.  We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

	Following jury trial, appellant was convicted of indecency with a child and sentence was imposed on March 22, 2006.  Appellant timely filed a Motion for New Trial on April 21, 2006.  As such, appellant’s notice of appeal was due by June 20, 2006.  See Tex. R. App. P. 26.2.  Appellant filed his notice of appeal on June 23, 2006.  Appellant has not filed a motion for extension of time to file notice of appeal in this cause.

	Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.2 requires a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after sentence is imposed unless the defendant timely files a motion for new trial.  Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a).  If the defendant timely files a motion for new trial, the notice of appeal is due within 90 days of the imposition of sentence.  Id.  While the Rules of Appellate Procedure do not establish the jurisdiction of courts of appeals, the Rules do provide procedures which must be followed to invoke a court’s jurisdiction over a particular appeal.  Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).  If the jurisdiction of a court of appeals is not properly invoked, the power of the appellate court to act is as absent as if it did not exist and the appeal will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  See State v. Riewe, 13 S.W.3d 408, 413-14 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 523.  An untimely notice of appeal is insufficient to invoke an appellate court’s jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and the court can take no action other than to dismiss the appeal.  Slaton v. State, 981 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).

	As appellant’s notice of appeal was untimely, this court’s jurisdiction has not been invoked.  Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

							Mackey K. Hancock

							         Justice

 Do not publish.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                      5
<MULTIPLIER>               1,000

<S>                              <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                    3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      MAR-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                           JUN-30-1999
<CASH>                                            3638
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     4508
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                      53843
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 67630
<PP&E>                                           57613
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<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  124761
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            18165
<BONDS>                                          27827
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            92
<OTHER-SE>                                       74158
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    124761
<SALES>                                          58154
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 58154
<CGS>                                            32665
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    32665
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 25348
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 702
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                   (520)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (209)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                               (311)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                      (311)
<EPS-BASIC>                                    (0.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.03)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.1

      CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT
                TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Patch International Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-KSB for the year ending May 31,  2004,  as filed with the  Securities
and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I, David  Stadnyk,
President and  Treasurer  (Principal  Executive  and  Financial  Officer) of the
Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section 1350, as adopted  pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1)      The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)      The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


/s/ DAVID STADNYK
-----------------------------------------
David Stadnyk, President and Treasurer
#### J. B. WILLIAMSON et al. v. E. J. D. BOYKIN et al.

*Rt-s jvdicata*— Vacating *Judgments*— “Excusable *Neglect*”— *Certiorari.*

Where it appeared, upon a motion made in the Supreme Court to set aside a judgment therein rendered, refusing to grant the writ of *certiorari,*that the facts upon which the motion was based were known, or might, with reasonable diligence, have been ascertained, upon the hearing of the petition for the *certiorari,*the motion to vacate was denied.

At February Term, 1888, of the Supreme Court, the defendants filed a petition for a writ of *certiorari*to bring up for review the judgment rendered in this action against them in the Superior Court of Wilson County. (See,99 N. C., 238.)

That petition having been dismissed, they now move to set aside the judgment dismissing it, with a view to a reconsideration of the matter.

In support of the present motion, they offered affidavits tending to show that the sum referred to in the affidavits of respondents and in the opinion of this Court on the hearing of the petition, as being paid by way of compromise, were not, in fact, so paid, but for an entirely different purpose, and that the defendants had no knowledge that such judgments were intended to be, or had been, so applied, until after the dismissal of the petition, and, therefore, they had no opportunity to combat that contention.

The plaintiffs filed affidavits denying these allegations.

*Messrs.-F. A. Woodard*and *George Rountree,*for the plaintiffs.

Messrs. *George V. Strong*and *H. F. Murray,*for the defend-, ants.

*101Avery, J.

If this Court has the power to vacate such a judgment at all, on the ground of surprise or excusable neglect (as the petitioners contend it has), the petitioner has not, even if the allegations of his petition be admitted, shown such facts as would justify the exercise of the right in this case. The proposition, upon its face, to first annul the order disallowing the motion for a writ of *certiorari,*and then rehear the petition, with such supporting affidavits as might be offered by the defendants, is certainly a novel one.

It is not necessary that we should determine whether we. could grant such relief in any case. It is sufficient to state that, conceding the power to exist, the petitioners have failed to show, in any view, such merit as ought to induce us to exercise it. Both petitioners and respondents were before this Court, arid had the opportunity to present affidavits of all persons who were cognizant of any material facts, and, from the nature of the case, they must have known the persons who were consulted or had knowdedge of any agreement in reference to the right of appeal, made while the parties were imparling as to a compromise.

To hold that the losing party might have the controversy re-opened now to strengthen his case, by the use of greater diligence in procuring affidavits, would be to make a precedent calculated to subvert the old maxim, *“Interest*republicsr, *ut sit finis litis.*

Petition dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>             
<PERIOD-TYPE>                  3-MOS            
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>           DEC-31-1997       
<PERIOD-END>                MAR-31-1997       
<CASH>                        1,131,000                              
<SECURITIES>                          0             
<RECEIVABLES>                 2,182,000                                    
<ALLOWANCES>                    (71,000)                                   
<INVENTORY>                   1,586,000                                    
<CURRENT-ASSETS>              5,061,000                                    
<PP&E>                        2,128,000                                    
<DEPRECIATION>                 (492,000)                                   
<TOTAL-ASSETS>               10,474,000                                    
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>         4,040,000                                    
<BONDS>                               0                                    
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>               380                                    
<PREFERRED>                           0                                    
<COMMON>                          4,000                                   
<OTHER-SE>                    5,437,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY> 10,474,000                                    
<SALES>                       3,771,000                                    
<TOTAL-REVENUES>              3,771,000                                    
<CGS>                        (2,525,000)                                   
<TOTAL-COSTS>                (1,632,000)                                   
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                 34,000                                     
<LOSS-PROVISION>                      0                                    
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>               (8,000)                                   
<INCOME-PRETAX>                (360,000)                                    
<INCOME-TAX>                     32,000          
<INCOME-CONTINUING>            (324,000)        
<DISCONTINUED>                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                       0  
<CHANGES>                             0  
<NET-INCOME>                   (324,000)        
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      (.08)            
<EPS-DILUTED>                      (.08)               
        


</TABLE>
#### Phillip I. Brust, as Executor, etc., of Nicholas Brust, Sr., Deceased, Plaintiff, *v.*Peter J. Brust and Grace M. Brust, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Orleans County,

November 10, 1937.

*]James F. Anderson,*for the plaintiff.

*Wendell V. O’Shea,*for the defendants.

Harris, J.

The plaintiff sues the defendants on contract, and the defendants answer, and in such answer set up a number of separate counterclaims as defenses to the plaintiff’s cause of action. Such answer was served on the 29th day of September, 1937, and the notice of motion is dated October 13, 1937, and made returnable on the 26th day of October, 1937. As to certain of the counterclaims, it is clear that they would be barred by the Statute of Limitations if the question of so barring them has been properly raised. The defendants claim that such question has not been raised in a proper manner. Their contention is that, although the Rules of Civil Practice provide that the notice of motion to dismiss a complaint on the ground of the running of the statute must be served within twenty days after the service of the complaint (Rule 107), there is no provision in the rules providing for the length of time within which a similar objection can be taken by motion against a counterclaim interposed in an answer. (See Rule 110.)

The defendants argue from this that, in view of the fact that no such provision is made, there does not exist the remedy of attacking *796the counterclaim by motion. I cannot agree with the defendants in this contention. Section 30 of the Civil Practice Act specifically provides that *“*The objection that the action was not commenced within the time limited can be taken by answer [or motion]. The corresponding objection to a defense or counterclaim can be taken by reply [or motion]; except where a reply is not required in order to enable the plaintiff to raise an issue of fact upon an allegation contained in the answer.”

Irrespective of whether or not the rules provide for a length of time within which the motion must be made, the section itself is controlling in reference to the motion now being discussed, as to the method of securing the relief sought. The omission of a provision by rule as to the period of time within which the objection is to be raised by motion means either that the motion must be made within a reasonable time or within twenty days, as provided in rule 107 for an attack upon a complaint; it certainly cannot mean within ten days, because rule 110 states specifically what objections to answers are to be raised within ten days. Therefore,

1 hold that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief for which he prays in his notice of motion as to such counterclaims as are clearly barred by the Statute of Limitations. The plaintiff may have an order striking from the answer the counterclaims numbered 1 and

2 and from 4 to 13, inclusive, and the first paragraph of the counterclaim numbered 20.
EXHIBIT 31.1
**CERTIFICATION**
  I, Joe K. McArthur, Chief Executive Officer of the registrant, certifythat:
1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of SouthFirstBancshares, Inc.;
2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statementof a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make thestatements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statementswere made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;
3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financialinformation included in this report, fairly present in all materialrespects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows ofthe registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;
4. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible forestablishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (asdefined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrantand have:
 a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or causedsuch disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under oursupervision, to ensure that material information relating to theregistrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made knownto us by others within those entities, particularly during theperiod in which this report is being prepared;
 b) [Paragraph omitted in accordance with SEC transitioninstructions contained in SEC Release 34-47986]
 c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosurecontrols and procedures and presented in this report our conclusionsabout the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and
 d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourthfiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and
5. The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based onour most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting,to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’sboard of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
 a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in thedesign or operation of internal control over financial reportingwhich are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and
 b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves managementor other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting.   May 14, 2004 /s/ Joe K. McArthur   Joe K. McArthur Chief Executive Officer
19
Exhibit
99.1



Securities
and Exchange Commission

100
F Street, N.E.

Washington,
DC 20549



February
7, 2017



|RE: | R.V.B.
    Holdings Ltd.
|--- | ------------------------



We
have read the statements of R.V.B. Holdings Ltd included under Item 16F of its annual report on Form 20-F for the year
ended December 31, 2015, and we agree with such statements contained therein.





|Very
    truly yours,                                                                                         | 
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | 
|                                                                                                              | 
|/s/ Brightman Almagor Zohar & Co.                                                                             | 
|                                                                                                              | 
|Brightman
Almagor Zohar & Co.                                                                                 | 
|Certified
        Public Accountants (Isr.)
        A
        member firm of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited |