Filed 4/19/16 P. v. Brown CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LANCE BROWN,

 Defendant and Appellant.

2d Crim. No. B267126

(Super. Ct. No. 2008046598)

(Ventura County)

 Lance Brown appeals from a judgment after an order revoking his 

postrelease community supervision (PRCS). (Pen. Code, § 3450 et seq.)1 He contends 

the revocation process violated his right to due process because: he was not provided 

with counsel at his probable cause hearing before the supervising agency; was not 

brought before the court for arraignment within 10 days of arrest; did not have a probable 

cause hearing before the court within 15 days of arrest; a probation officer asked him to 

waive his rights before the revocation petition was filed; and a probation officer (rather 

than a judicial officer) served as the probable cause hearing officer. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 2010, Brown was convicted after a plea of guilty to being an accessory 

after a murder. (§ 32.) Brown admitted a prior felony conviction for robbery on behalf 

 

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2

of a gang. (§§ 211, 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced Brown to a prison 

term. 

Brown was released in 2013 under PRCS following realignment. The 

Ventura County Probation Department is his supervising agency. As a condition of 

release, he agreed to be searched without a warrant and not to possess any drug 

paraphernalia or any knife with a blade longer than two inches. He also agreed the 

probation department could, without a court hearing, order “flash incarceration” in a 

county jail for up to 10 days if he violated the conditions of his release. (§ 3453, subd. 

(q).) 

Probation officers searched Brown and his property on July 20, 2015. The 

officers found a folding knife with a three-inch blade and a marijuana pipe. They 

arrested him. 

Two days after his arrest, Senior Deputy Probation Officer Venessa Meza 

met with Brown. Meza advised Brown in writing that he had the right to written notice 

of the alleged violations, the right to an administrative hearing within two days, and the 

right at that hearing to speak on his own behalf and present letters and documents. 

Simultaneously, Meza conducted an administrative probable cause hearing, at which 

Meza concluded there was probable cause to believe that Brown violated the terms of 

release by possessing the knife and drug paraphernalia, among other things. Brown 

acknowledged receipt of a “PROS Hold” form that identified the alleged violations. It 

gave notice of a court hearing set for 17 days after Brown’s arrest. Meza advised Brown 

of his right to a formal revocation hearing at which he would have the right to be 

represented by an attorney, the right to call and confront witnesses, and the right to testify 

or remain silent. The advisement was memorialized in a “Postrelease Community 

Supervision Waivers of Rights and Admission Form.” Brown acknowledged receipt of 

the form and refused to waive his rights.

Nine days after Brown’s arrest, the probation department filed a revocation 

petition. Consistent with the PROS Hold form, the hearing was set for 17 days after 

Brown’s arrest. 
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On the day of the hearing, Brown moved (through counsel) to dismiss the 

petition for revocation and release him based upon an alleged violation of due process. 

He argued he was entitled to arraignment before a court within 10 days of arrest and a 

probable cause hearing before a court within 15 days of arrest. 

The trial court denied Brown’s motion to dismiss and heard the revocation 

petition. Brown submitted on the probation officer’s report. The trial court found him in 

violation of PRCS and ordered him to serve a jail sentence. 

DISCUSSION

Statutory Framework for Revocation

The Legislature created PRCS in 2011 as part of its realignment of the 

criminal justice system. (§ 3450 et seq. [Postrelease Community Supervision Act of 

2011].) PRCS shifts responsibility for postrelease supervision of certain felons from the 

state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to county agencies, such as the 

Ventura County Probation Department. (Ibid.) Conditions of release under PRCS 

include waiver of the right to any court hearing before imposition of a flash incarceration 

in jail for up to 10 days. (§ 3453, subd. (q).) 

A person under PRCS is subject to arrest without a warrant at the direction 

of the supervising agency whenever a peace officer has probable cause to believe the 

person has violated the conditions of release. (§ 3453, subd. (s).) The peace officer may 

“arrest the person and bring him or her before the supervising county agency.” (§ 3455, 

subd. (b)(1).) The supervising agency may “order appropriate responses to alleged 

violations,” including “intermediate sanctions,” such as flash incarceration for up to 10 

days. (§ 3454, subd. (b).) If the supervising agency determines that intermediate 

sanctions are not appropriate, it “shall petition the court pursuant to [s]ection 1203.2 to 

revoke, modify, or terminate” PRCS. (§ 3455, subd. (a).) “The revocation hearing shall 

be held within a reasonable time after filing of the revocation petition.” (Id., subd. (c).) 

Due Process Requirements

Revocation of supervised release deprives a person of a conditional liberty 

interest, and may only be had with due process protections. (Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 
4

408 U.S. 471, 482 (Morrissey) [parole revocation]; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 

451, 458 (Vickers) [probation revocation].) 

To conform to due process, revocation of conditional release requires a 

two-step process: (1) an initial determination of probable cause to justify temporary 

detention; and (2) a formal revocation hearing to determine whether the facts warrant 

revocation. (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 485; Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 456.)

(1) The Probable Cause Hearing

The probable cause determination is a “minimal inquiry,” made near the 

place of arrest “as promptly as convenient after arrest.” (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 

485.) It need not be made by a judicial officer; it may be made by any qualified person 

“not directly involved in the case.” (Id. at pp. 485-486 [probable cause determination for 

parole revocation may be made by a parole officer other than the officer who reports the 

violation or recommends revocation]; Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 456-457.) To 

conform to due process, the probable cause determination must be preceded by notice of 

the hearing and the alleged violations, and must provide an opportunity for the supervised 

person to speak on his own behalf, present evidence, and question adverse witnesses. 

(Morrissey, at pp. 485-486; Vickers, at pp. 456-457.) The officer who determines 

probable cause must summarize what occurs at the hearing, but need not make formal 

findings of fact and law. (Morrissey, at p. 487; Vickers, at p. 457.) 

Officer Meza conducted a Morrissey-compliant administrative probable 

cause hearing. Two days after arrest, she gave Brown written notice of the claimed 

violations and an opportunity to be heard. Brown “declined to make a statement.” Meza 

summarized the hearing and set forth her probable cause determination on an 

“Administrative Probable Cause Hearing” form. Meza was sufficiently “neutral and 

detached” to make the determination because she was not “directly involved in the case.” 

(Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at pp. 485-486.) Another probation officer prepared the 

report in support of revocation, and other probation officers made the arrest. 

Brown was not entitled to counsel at the probable cause hearing because it 

was a summary proceeding, not a formal proceeding. (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 
5

461-462.) Under Vickers, a probationer is entitled to counsel for “formal proceedings for 

the revocation of probation,” although Vickers also states that counsel is required “at all 

revocation proceedings other than at summary proceedings had while probationer 

remains at liberty after absconding.” (Id. at p. 461.) In Vickers, all proceedings were 

court proceedings following the initiation of a petition to revoke probation in contrast to 

proceedings before the “supervising agency” during the statutorily authorized “flash 

incarceration” period. Moreover, the record reveals that Brown was provided with 

counsel at the first court proceeding on August 6, 2015. There is no requirement that 

counsel be provided at the administrative probable cause hearing. 

(2) The Formal Revocation Hearing

The formal revocation hearing is the “final evaluation of any contested 

relevant facts” to determine whether revocation is warranted, and it must be held “within 

a reasonable time” after arrest. (Morrissey, supra, 408 U.S. at p. 488.) In Morrissey, the 

court held due process requires these minimum safeguards at a formal parole revocation 

hearing: “(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the 

parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present 

witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 

witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing 

confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole 

board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written 

statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.” 

(Id. at pp. 488-489.) In Vickers, the California Supreme Court extended equivalent 

safeguards to probation revocation proceedings, and held that the supervised person is 

entitled to counsel “at formal proceedings for the revocation of probation, or following 

such summary revocation in appropriate cases.” (Vickers, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 461-

462.) These safeguards apply in PRCS revocation proceedings. In enacting a uniform 

supervision revocation process for probation, PRCS, and parole, the Legislature declared 

its intent to “simultaneously incorporate the procedural due process protections held to 

apply to probation revocation procedures under Morrissey . . . [,] Vickers . . . and their 
6

progeny.” (Stats. 2012, ch. 43, § 2, subd. (b).) It is undisputed that the formal revocation 

hearing complied with Morrissey and Vickers in this case. 

Williams v. Superior Court Does Not Apply to PRCS Revocations

In Williams v. Superior Court (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 636 (Williams), the 

court applied the Morrissey and Vickers safeguards to the post-realignment statutory 

framework for parole revocation. It concluded that revocation of parole conforms to due 

process if the parolee is arraigned within 10 days of arrest and afforded a judicial 

probable cause hearing within 15 days of arrest and a formal revocation hearing within 45 

days of arrest. (Williams, at p. 643.) But its decision was guided by statutes that do not 

apply to PRCS. (Id. at pp. 657-658, 662; §§ 3000.08, 3044.) Section 3000.08, 

subdivision (c) provides that an officer with probable cause to believe “a parolee” is 

violating a condition of release may arrest the person and “bring him or her before the 

court.” In contrast, section 3455, subdivision (b)(1) provides that an officer with 

probable cause to believe a person subject to PRCS is violating a condition of release 

may arrest the person and “bring him or her before the supervising county agency.” 

Section 3044, subdivision (a)(1) and (2) provides that the “parolee shall be entitled to a 

probable cause hearing no later than 15 days following his or her arrest for violation of 

parole,” and a formal revocation hearing no later than 45 days after arrest. There are no 

corresponding requirements for persons arrested for violation of PRCS. Section 3455 

provides that a person arrested for violating PRCS shall be brought “before the 

supervising agency,” and any petition for revocation must be heard “within a reasonable 

time.” 

Brown Has Failed to Demonstrate Prejudice

Brown argues that his due process rights were violated in many respects, 

including those assertions addressed above. But the underlying problem with his appeal 

is this: No matter what due process violation is claimed, he has made no showing of 

prejudice at the formal revocation hearing, when he was ordered to serve the jail sentence 

(which he has now served).
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The denial of Brown’s due process rights, if any, does not warrant reversal 

unless the violation results in prejudice at the revocation hearing. (In re La Croix (1974) 

12 Cal.3d 146, 154-155.) But Brown makes no showing that any due process defect 

prejudiced him or affected the outcome of the PRCS revocation hearing. (In re Moore

(1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 285, 294; In re Winn (1975) 13 Cal.3d 694, 698 [defendant has 

burden of showing prejudice].) Because he was found in violation and has served the 

custodial sanction “there is nothing for us to remedy, even if we were disposed to do so.” 

(Spencer v. Kemna (1998) 523 U.S. 1, 18.) 

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

TANGEMAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J.

PERREN, J.
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David R. Worley, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Jolene Larimore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. 

Roadarmel, Jr., Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Connie H. Kan, Deputy 

Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.