### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Marc h 16 , 200 4 S es sio n DA NIEL LEE STEV ENS ON v. TR AC Y D AWN STEV ENS ON
Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Rutherford Coun ty

No. 45250 J. S. Daniel, Jud ge

No. M2002- 02970-COA-R 3-CV - F iled April 14, 2004
This appea l arises fr om the trial court’ s awa rd of primary

residential c ustody

of the pa rties’ minor c hil dr e n to the ir

fathe r. We a ff

irm. Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t heCi r c uit

Co ur t A ffirm e d; and Rem anded
D AVI D R. F ARMER , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io n o f th e c o u rt, inw h ic h W. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined. Robert D. Masse y , Pulaski, Tennessee , for the a ppellant, Tra cy

Dawn Steve nson. J on S. J ablonski, Nashville, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, D aniel L ee Steve nson. OP IN ION
Da n ie l L e e St e v e n s o n ( M r . St e v e n s o n ) a n d T r a c y D a w n St e v e n s o n ( M s . St e v e nson) wer e marrie d inOc tob e r 1 99 2 a ndse pa rate d inJuly

20 01 . M r. Steve ns on fi le d f or div or c e in A ug us t 2001. The trial c ourt, sitting without a jury , decla red the parties divorc ed on Nove mber 19, 2002, and aw arde d Mr. Stevenson primary residential c ustody

of the parties’ two minor children. Mother appea ls onlythe awa

rd of primary

residential c ustody

of the c hildren to Mr. Stevenson. Sta nda rd of Re v ie w Ap pe llate re vie w o f the tria l cou rt 's fi nd ing s o f f a c t is de novo with a pre sumption of c or re c tne ss. Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; Berryhill v. Rhode s , 21 S.W .3d 188, 190 (Tenn.2000) . We may not reve rse the trial court' s fac tual finding s unless they are contr ary

to the preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. Id. We a ff

or d th e tr ial court

wi de dis c re tio n inmatte rs of c hil d c us tod y

a ndre vie w i ts determinatio n u n d er an abuse of discretion standa rd. He rre ra v . H

e rre ra , 944 S.W .2d 379, 385 (T e nn . Ct . A pp . 1 99 6) . Thi s Co urt wi ll n ot i nte rf e rewi th the tria l c ou rt ’s de te rm inatio n a bs e nt a palpable a

buse of discretion or unless the judgme nt is ag ainst the g reat w eig ht of the evidenc e. Id.T h e sta tute p ro v id e s tha t t h e trial c o u rt m u st c o n sid e r: 1
(1 ) T h e lo v e , affe c tio n a n d e m o tio n a l t ie s e x isting b e tw e e n the p a re n ts a n d c h ild ; ( 2) T he d i sp o si t i o n o f

t he pare nt s t o provi de t he chi l d wi t h f oo d, cl ot hi ng , medi cal ca r e, ed ucat i o n and other necess ary care and t he d egree t o whi ch a p arent has been t he p ri m ary caregi ver;

( 3) T he i mp ort anc e of cont i nu i t y i n t he chi l d' s l i fe and t he l eng t h of t i me t he chi l d h as l i ved in a sta b le , sa tisf a c to ry e n v iro n m e n t;

...

(4 ) T h e sta b ili ty o f t h e fam ily u n it o f t h e p a re n ts; (5 ) T h e m e n ta l an d p h ysic a l he a lth o f t h e p a re n ts; (6 ) T h e ho m e , sc h o o l an d c o m m u n ity re c o rd o f t h e c h ild ; (7 ) T h e re a so n a b le p re fer e n c e o f t h e c h ild if twe lve (1 2 ) ye a rs o f ag e o r o ld e r. . . . ( 8) Evi dence of

phy s i cal or emo t i onal abus e t o t he chi l d, t o t he ot her pare nt or t o any ot her p e rs o n ; . . . .

( 9) T h e ch ar ac t er a n d be h av i or of an y ot h er per s on wh o re s i des i n or f r equ en t s t h e h ome of a par en t a n d s u ch pe r s on ' s i n t er ac t i on s w i t h t h e ch i l d; a n d

(1 0 ) E ac h p are nt' s p ast and p o t en t i al fo r future p erfo rm an ce o f p are nti ng resp o nsib i l i t i es, i ncl ud i ng t he wi l l i ngness and ab i l i t y of each o f t he p arent s t o f aci l i t ate a n d e nco urage a cl o se and co nti nu i ng p are nt- ch i l d relati o nship b etwe en t he c hil d a nd the o t he r p are nt, c o nsist en t w i t h the b est inte re st o f t h e c h ild

. T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 6

- 6

- 1 0 6 (20 0 1 ).

-2- at 386. This de fer ential revie w is pr emised on the assumption that the trial court fir st considere d the best interests of the children in making the custody determination and did not act ar bitrarily

. Id. Anal y sis The we lfareand nee ds of the childre n are the par amount conce rns in the determination of child custody

. Id. Th e true te st f or thea wa rdof c us tod y is t o arri ve a t th e po int

of de c idi ng wi th whom to p l ac e t h e child in prepa ration for a ca ring and produc tive adult life. Id. I n m ak i n g a c us tod y de te rm inatio n, thetria l c ou rt mus t e ng a g e in a

c omp arativ e fi tne ss ana ly sis of thepa re nts

. Ga sk ill v . G as k ill , 936 S.W .2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Ct. A p p . 1996). In so doing, it must consider the fac tors outlined by

the leg islature as c odified at Te nn. Code Ann. § 36-6- 106. Id

. C u stody 1 determinations are thus bas ed o n a combination of subtle fa ctors, and r equire a fa ctually based inquiry

. Id. The trial court is in the best position to weig h the fac ts presente d to it, and to assess the cre dibilit y

of the pa rties. Id. at 631.
I n its November 2002 or der, the trial court state d: The Court finds that the main issue of this t ri al reg ards who is to be the primary residential p ar ent. That after listening to the fac ts of this case, the Court finds the following afte r applying the fac tors enumer ated in T.C.A.§ 36-6- 404(b).

a . Th e C o u rtf

i n d s t h a tb o t h p art i e s w e r e e q u a l ly responsible for

the ca re g iving of

the childre n. The-3- Court specifica lly

discounts any

testim o n yto the c o n tr ar y. b. The Court also finds that both parties g enuinely love t h e c h i l d re n an d ar e i n t er es t ed i n t h ei r w el l b ei n g. c. The Court finds that the fa ctors that we igh mor e favor ably for the P l aint iff, DAN I EL L EE STEVENSON would be the em otional and phy sical fitness of the parties, also the continuity of the life of thec hil dr e n andthesatis fa c tory liv ing e nv ir on me nt. Ba sed upon the a

bove conc lusions, thi s Court finds that t h e Father, DA NIEL LEE STEVENSON, shall be named the primary residential pa

rent. Ha vin g re vie we d the re c or d in this ca se , we c a nn ot s a y thee vid e nc e pr e po nd e rate s a g a ins t the determination of the trial court, or that the court abused its discretion in awa rding primary re sid e nti a l c us tod y

to M r. Ste ve ns on . Th e re po rt of thesp e c ia l ma ste r, a do pte d b y thetria l c ou rt

in September 2001, indicates t hat t hese parties appear to have had a difficult relationship throug hout their marriag e. The master’ s report clearly indicates that a lthough M s . S tevenson is an e x cellent pare nt, her menta l health, including being suicidal in the wee ks prec eding the report and taking seven differ ent medications, caused the c ourt “c once rn[] about her emotional stability .” Althoug h, the specia l master stated that Mr. Stevenson contributed to th eme n ta l health problems of Ms. Stevenson, ref used to g o to marriag e counse ling whe n asked to by Ms. Stevenson, and wa s “not very truthful with reg ard to a brief relationship he had with Defe ndant’s friend in September of 1999,” the maste r nevertheless re commended it wa s best for the c hildren to reside primarily wi t h M r. S tevenson, at least “during this tempora ry time.”
I n their briefs to this Court, Mr. S tevenson and Ms. Stevenson both cite to the deposition of Dr. Gle nn Yank, a

psy chiat ris t w h o treate d Ms. Stevenson at Vande rbilt Hospital, where she re ceive d in-patient treatment. Mr. Stevenson cites to Dr. Yank’ s testimonyreg arding Ms. Stevenson’s mental illness to support the proposition t hat he is the more fit pare n t

. M s . Stevenson cites Dr . Yank a s testify ing that she is in “g ood remission,” and that neither he r illness nor medications would int erf ere with her a bilityto work or pa

rent the c hildren. Clearly , this is a case wher ein the court was fac ed with two pa rents who g enuinely

love and car e for their childre n. Further, the c ourt found that both Mr. Steve n son and Ms. Stevenson wer e responsible for the car e g iving of their childre n. Howeve r, a pa rent see king c ustody

need not pr ove that the other p ar en t i s unfit, and a c hild custody determination is nota mec hanism to punish or rew ard pa rents. Ga sk ill , 936 S.W .2d at 630-31. Instead, the tria l court m u s t s ee k t o further the children’ s best interests by placing t h em i n the environme nt that will best meet their phy sical and emotional needs. Id. at 631. The evidence in this case doe s not preponder ate a g ainst the finding of the trial court that Mr. Stevenson is emotionally and phy sically more fit to have primary residential custody

.-4- Holdin g Th e tria l c ou rt

re a c he d it s c us tod y de te rm ina tio n b a se d u po n th e c omp arativ e fi tne ss ana ly sis presc ribed by

the Tenne ssee Code, and we cannot s ay this determination was a n abuse of discretion in lig ht of the re c or d. We af fi rm the jud g me nt of the tria l cou rt

. Cos ts of thi s app e a l ar e ta xedto t h e A p p e l l a n t , T r a c y D a w n S t e v e n s o n , a n d h e r s u r e t y, f o r w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVID R. FARMER, J UDGE