alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.2

                 OFFICER'S CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Fantatech, Inc. (the
"Company")  for  the  quarterly  period  ended  June  30, 2006 as filed with the
Securities  and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Quarterly Report"),
the  undersigned,  in  the  capacity  and  on  the  date indicated below, hereby
certifies,  pursuant  to  18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section
906  of  the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  of  2002,  that to the best of his knowledge:

(1)  The  Quarterly Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or  15(d)  of  the  Securities  Exchange  Act  of  1934;  and

(2)  The  information  contained in the Quarterly Report fairly presents, in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and results of operations of the
Company.


Date:  August 12, 2006                            By: /s/ GARY LUI
                                                  ---------------------------
                                                  Gary Lui
                                                  Chief Financial Officer


A  signed  original  of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document  authenticating, acknowledging or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears  in  typed  form within the electronic version of this written statement
required  by  Section 906, has been provided to the Company and will be retained
by  the  Company  and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its
staff  upon  request.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

October 4, 2018

No. 04-18-00574-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF H.N.H. AND H.J.H., CHILDREN,

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15-179CCL

Honorable Bill R. Palmer, Judge Presiding

ORDER

The reporter’s record is due October 25, 2018. On August 27, 2018, however, the court 

reporter responsible for the reporter’s record in this appeal filed a notification of late record, 

stating the record will not be filed because appellant has not paid or made arrangements to pay 

the reporter’s fee to prepare the record and that appellant is not entitled to the record without 

paying the fee. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(b), 35.3(b). 

We therefore ORDER appellant to provide written proof to this court on or before 

October 15, 2018 that either (1) the reporter’s fee has been paid or arrangements satisfactory to 

the reporter have been made to pay the reporter’s fee, or (2) appellant is entitled to the record 

without prepayment of the reporter’s fee. See id. R. 35.3(b). If appellant fails to respond within 

the time provided, appellant’s brief will be due November 5, 2018, and the court will only 

consider those issues or points raised in appellant’s brief that do not require a reporter’s record 

for a decision. See id. R. 37.3(c).

We order the clerk of this court to serve a copy of this order on all counsel and the court 

reporter. 

_________________________________

Marialyn Barnard, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 4th day of October, 2018.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
**Exhibit 32.1**

**CERTIFICATION**

Theundersigned officer of Albany Molecular Research, Inc. (the “Company”)hereby certifies that to his knowledge the Company’s annual report on Form 10-Kto which this certification is attached (the “Report”), as filed with the Securitiesand Exchange Commission on the date hereof, fully complies with therequirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), and that theinformation contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. Thiscertification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 andItem 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-K (“Item 601(b)(32)”) promulgated underthe Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), and the ExchangeAct. In accordance with clause (ii) of Item 601(b)(32), thiscertification (A) shall not be deemed “filed” for purposes of Section 18of the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section, and(B) shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any filingunder the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that theCompany specifically incorporates it by reference.
| Date: March 16, 2006 |   |     |                                                                      |
|---------------------------|--------|----------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                      |   |     | /s/ THOMAS E. D’AMBRA, PH.D.                                         |
|                      | Name:  |     | Thomas E. D’Ambra, Ph.D.                                             |
|                      | Title: | * * | *Chairman of the Board, President, Chief Executive  Officer and Director* |

 

----
Moorb y v. Heller , 507

- 8

- 16 Wncv (Teachout, J. , Jan. 17, 201 8 ).

[The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the

accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.]

STATE OF VERMONT

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL DIVISION

Washington Unit Docket No. 507

- 8

- 16 Wncv

JAMIE MOORBY

v.

JOAN HELLER

Plaintiff’s Amended Motion to Compel Discovery , filed November 27, 2017 (MPR #5)

Plaintiff Jamie Moorby claims that she was injure d when Defendant Jo a n Heller, operator

of the car in which they were traveling, drove off the side of the road and crashed the car. She

claims that the circumstances entitle her to punitive as well as compe nsatory damages. In

connection wit h her punitive damages claim , she sought discovery regarding Ms. Heller’s

wealth. Ms. Heller has resisted those efforts , causing Ms. Moorby to file this motion

.

The parties di spute whether Plaintiff should be required to make a threshold showing of a

ba sis for punitive damages before being able to conduct wealth discovery. The y further dispute

, if she is required to do so, whether the Plaintiff’s evidence sh ould meet any required threshold

.

Some courts require a threshold showing before permitting wea lth discovery for punitive

damages purposes; some do not. See, e.g., 1 Punitive Damages: Law and Practice 2d § 9:9 (2017

ed.); 2 Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 21:52 (2d ed.); 1 Stein on Personal Injury

Damages Treatise § 4:57 (3d ed.); and A nnotation, 32 A.L.R. 4th 432, Necessity of

determination or showing of liability for punitive damages before discovery or reception of

evidence of defendant’s wealth.

Shortly after the parties briefed this matter, Ms. Heller filed a partial summary judgment

motion addressing Ms. Moorby’s entitlement to punitive damages. The motion is not ripe but

soon will be. The court then will determine whether there is any triable issue on punitive

damages. The result will be helpful i n ruling on this motion. At this time, the court declines to

adopt any particular “rule” or perceived best practice regarding threshold showings.

The court therefore de nies the motion to compel at this time . It may be renewed after the

court rules on Ms. Heller’s summary judgment motion. The s cheduling order may be modified at

that time to extend time for wealth discovery if appropriate

.

Dated at Montpelier, Vermont this ____ day of January 201 8

.

_____________________________ Mary Miles Teachout

Superior Judge
----

----

**CERTIFICATION          PURSUANT TO**

**18          U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION          906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

| *Date:   June                  14, 2007* | *Signed:* |  /s/                  *Richard                  Pomije                                     * |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                    |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |
|                                                    | *Name:*   | *Richard                  Pomije*                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          |
|                                                    | *Title:*  | *Chief                  Executive Officer and principal *financial                  officer**                                                                                                                                                                                              |
|                                                    |      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       |

----
Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Quarterly Report of ARKONA, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-QSB for the quarterly  period ended  September 30, 2004 as filed with
the Securities  and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the  "Report"),  I,
Stephen L. Russo, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to
18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

         (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
         15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         (2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all
         material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
         the Company.


/s/ Stephen L. Russo
---------------------------
Chief Financial Officer
November 15, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       2,702,510
<SECURITIES>                                    10,997
<RECEIVABLES>                                  183,411
<ALLOWANCES>                                    11,000
<INVENTORY>                                    177,748
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             3,145,251
<PP&E>                                         632,336
<DEPRECIATION>                                  75,396
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,859,344
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          851,443
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  3,681,444
<COMMON>                                        21,045
<OTHER-SE>                                     272,541
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,859,344
<SALES>                                        383,108
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               383,108
<CGS>                                          220,597
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               218,834
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,995
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (3,210,528)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (3,210,528)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (3,210,528)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.31)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.31)



</TABLE>
#### The State v. Finch.

1. Larceny: value: competency op witness. In a prosecution for the larceny of a seal-skin overcoat, *held*that the testimony of a witness as to the value of the coat was not inadmissible, though he testified that he had never seen such a coat bought or sold, and did not show that he had any knowledge of the value of such an article, except such as any man of ordinary intelligence might be presumed to have.

2. -: -: instruction: verdict. Where'the cowt instructed the jury to find the market value of the stolen goods, and they simply found their *ttlue, held*that, on appeal, it must be presumed that such value was the market value.

*317
      *Appeal from Olayton District Oourt.*

Tuesday, December 14.

The defendant was convicted of the larceny of a seal-skin overcoat of the value of $50, and sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the period of two years. He appeals to this court.

No appearance for appellant.

*A. J.*Balter, *Attorney-general,*for the State.

Adams, Ch. J.

I. It was insisted below that there was no legal proof of the value of the overcoat. The only wit- , petency o?1’ witness. ness who testified to the value of the overcoat was one Arnold. He showed that he had never geen a geaPskjn overcoat bought or sold, and did not show that he had any knowledge of the value of such an article, except such as any man of ordinary intelligence might be presumed to have. We do not think, however, that we should be justified in wholly discarding his testimony. He might not be a very accurate judge of the value of such an article, but we think that, having seen and examined the coat, he might form some opinion about it. He doubtless could judge with considerable accuracy of the value of such overcoats as are in common use, and he could judge, we think, though perhaps not as accurately, how this compared in value with the best of such coats. We think that his testimony was not inadmissible, and, if not, the verdict was not without support.

II. The court instructed “the jury that the value referred to is the market value; that is, what the coat would bring in 2._:-: verdíotí1011' the usual course of trade.” The j nry merely found that the coat was worth $50. We are justified in presuming that, under the instruction, they found that as the market value.

*318III. The court instructed the jury to state the value of the coat or property, as they should find it. It was insisted that they should have been instructed to state the market value. But the jury was expressly told that the value referred to was the market value. We think that the defendant had no good ground for complaint. The instructions upon this point as a whole appear to be quite as favorable to the defendant as he was entitled to. It was claimed that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, but we think otherwise.

We have examined the entire record, and find no error.

AFFIRMED.
#### J. W. CONLY, Admr., and others *against*JOHN KINCAID and others.

A testator gives to his wife real and personal property for life, and directs that at her death it should al!, real and personal, be sold, and the money equally diyided amoTg his children. By the direction to sell, the land is converted into personalty.

One of the daughters of the testator died after the testator, in the lifetime of his widow, leaving a husband surviving. As her administra* • tor, he is entitled to one-seventh of the money arising from thé sale of the property given to the widow for lile.

The case of Powell vs. Powell, 6 Ired. Eq. SO, cited and approved..

Robert Kincaid by his will gave real and personal property to bis wife for life or widowhood, tbe real property being land owned in fee by tbe testator, and made divers dispositions thereof to take effect after tbe death or second marriage of his'widow. Afterwards in 3836, be made a codicil by which ,he gave to his wife a-negro girl named Adeline, during her life, and at her death,- Adeline and her offspring together with Alfred and the plantation left to his wife are to .be sold for the most that can be got for them at public sale “ and equally divided between my seven children named in this will.” And further I Svill and bequeath to my wife during her life, my negro woman Sue, and at her death, said woman Sue to he §old and the money divided- equally between my children aforesaid.” Patsey, the deceased wife of the plaintiff John Conly, was a child of the testator and one of the seven named in the will. She died after the testator, in the lifetime of the testator’s widow, and her husband is her administrator.

*45
      *Merriman*for the plaintiff.

No counsel for the defendant in this court.

Battue, J.

The direction in the will of Robert Ivincaid, that upon the death of his wife the land and negroes which lie had given to her for life, should be sold and tne proceeds equally divide^ among his seven named children, had the effect to convert the real estate into personalty, and in the events which -have happened, the plaintiff J. "W. Conly, is entitled to one share as the representative of his first wife Patsey. Powell vs. Powell, 6 Ired. Eq. 50. Adams Eq. 150. Patsey had a vested interest in the property given to her mother for Ufe, which upon her death in the lifetime of her mother, belonged to her husband as her administrator.

This doctrine is so well settled that it is unnecessary to enter into a further discussion of it.'
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 651

To amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to modify the

provisions relating to citations and penalties.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 17, 1999

Mr. WELLSTONE (for himself and Mr. KENNEDY) introduced the following

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

A BILL

To amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970

to modify the provisions relating to citations and penalties.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Wrongful Death

5 Accountability Act’’.

6 SEC. 2. OSHA CRIMINAL PENALTIES.

7 Section 17 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act

8 of 1970 (29 U.S.C. 666) is amended—

9 (1) in subsection (e)—
2

•S 651 IS

1 (A) by striking ‘‘fine of not more than

2 $10,000’’ and inserting ‘‘fine in accordance

3 with section 3571 of title 18, United States

4 Code,’’;

5 (B) by striking ‘‘six months’’ and inserting

6 ‘‘10 years’’;

7 (C) by striking ‘‘fine of not more than

8 $20,000’’ and inserting ‘‘fine in accordance

9 with section 3571 of title 18, United States

10 Code,’’;

11 (D) by striking ‘‘one year’’ and inserting

12 ‘‘20 years’’; and

13 (E) by inserting ‘‘under this subsection or

14 subsection (i)’’ after ‘‘first conviction of such

15 person’’;

16 (2) in subsection (f), by striking ‘‘fine of not

17 more than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more

18 than six months,’’ and inserting ‘‘fine in accordance

19 with section 3571 of title 18, United States Code, or

20 by imprisonment for not more than 2 years,’’; and

21 (3) in subsection (g), by striking ‘‘fine of not

22 more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not

23 more than six months,’’ and inserting ‘‘fine in ac24 cordance with section 3571 of title 18, United States
3

•S 651 IS

1 Code, or by imprisonment for not more than 1

2 year,’’.

Æ
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 14, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-21267

Summary Calendar

 

DESTRY E. THOMAS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KELVIN P. MCFARLAND; LANGSTON M. GEORGE-SMART;

RONALD V. WINGO,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-00-CV-2305

--------------------

Before JONES, BENAVIDES, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Destry E. Thomas, TDCJ-ID # 654261, has filed a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal. By moving for IFP

status, Thomas is challenging the district court’s certification

that his appeal is not taken in good faith. See Baugh v. Taylor,

117 F.3d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c)(3); FED.

R. APP. P. 24(a). Following a two-day jury trial and verdict for

the defendants, the district court found that Thomas’s 42 U.S.C.
No. 02-21267

-2-

§ 1983 complaint was frivolous because his “testimony was

contradictory and inconsistent with the physical evidence.”

Thomas asserts that he presented testimony and evidence to

prove that defendant McFarland used excessive force. Thomas also

asserts that the district court did not provide proper notice of

a change in trial dates, held him to the same standards as a

licensed attorney, and refused to allow him to present certain

witnesses and evidence. Based upon our review of the record, we

conclude that none of these issues presents a non-frivolous issue

for appeal. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir.

1983). Therefore, we uphold the district court’s order

certifying that the appeal was not taken in good faith. We also

conclude that the instant appeal is without arguable merit and is

frivolous. Thomas’s motion to proceed IFP is DENIED, and his

appeal is DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. See Baugh, 117 F.3d at 202 and

n.24; 5TH CIR. R. 42.2. 

The dismissal of Thomas’s appeal as frivolous counts as a

“strike” for the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba

v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 1996). We caution Thomas

that once he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed IFP in

any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or

detained in any facility unless he is under imminent danger of

serious physical injury. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).