# Jornal Oficial C 236/2016

| | ISSN 1977-1010 |
| --- | --- |
| Jornal Oficial
  da União Europeia | C 236 |
| | |
| Edição em língua portuguesa | Comunicações e Informações | 59.° ano30 de junho de 2016 |

ISSN 1977-1010

Jornal Oficial

da União Europeia

C 236

Edição em língua portuguesa

Comunicações e Informações

59.° ano30 de junho de 2016

---

| Número de informação | Índice | Página |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Comunicações |
| | COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2016/C 236/01 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/02 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/03 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2016/C 236/04 | Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Número de informação

Índice

Página

II   Comunicações

COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

2016/C 236/01

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/02

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/03

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  )

1

2

2016/C 236/04

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada (Processo M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  )

1

2

---

| | IV   Informações |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2016/C 236/05 | Taxas de câmbio do euro | 3 |
| 2016/C 236/06 | Nova face nacional de moedas de euro destinadas à circulação | 4 |
| | Tribunal de Contas |
| 2016/C 236/07 | Relatório Especial n.o 14/2016 — Iniciativas políticas e apoio financeiro da UE para a integração dos ciganos: realizaram-se progressos significativos na última década, mas são necessários mais esforços no terreno | 5 |
| | INFORMAÇÕES DOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS |
| 2016/C 236/08 | Atualização da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) | 6 |
| 2016/C 236/09 | Atualização dos modelos de cartões emitidos pelos Ministérios dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos Estados-Membros aos membros acreditados das missões diplomáticas e das representações consulares e suas famílias, tal como referido no artigo 20.o, n.o 2, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) | 11 |
| | INFORMAÇÕES RELATIVAS AO ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU |
| | Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA |
| 2016/C 236/10 | Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do Protocolo n.o 3, Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA, relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, em matéria de auxílios estatais | 21 |
| 2016/C 236/11 | Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos do artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, sobre as questões suscitadas acerca do potencial auxílio concedido à Hurtigruten ASA no âmbito do acordo costeiro relativo aos Hurtingen Maritime Services para o período 2012-2019 | 29 |
| 2016/C 236/12 | Anúncio da Noruega relativo à Diretiva 94/22/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa às condições de concessão e de utilização das autorizações de prospeção, pesquisa e produção de hidrocarbonetos — Anúncio de convite à apresentação de pedidos de licença de produção de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa — Awards in Predefined Areas 2016 | 45 |

IV   Informações

INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

2016/C 236/05

Taxas de câmbio do euro

3

2016/C 236/06

Nova face nacional de moedas de euro destinadas à circulação

4

Tribunal de Contas

2016/C 236/07

Relatório Especial n.o 14/2016 — Iniciativas políticas e apoio financeiro da UE para a integração dos ciganos: realizaram-se progressos significativos na última década, mas são necessários mais esforços no terreno

o

5

INFORMAÇÕES DOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS

2016/C 236/08

Atualização da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen)

o

o

6

2016/C 236/09

Atualização dos modelos de cartões emitidos pelos Ministérios dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos Estados-Membros aos membros acreditados das missões diplomáticas e das representações consulares e suas famílias, tal como referido no artigo 20.o, n.o 2, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen)

o

o

11

INFORMAÇÕES RELATIVAS AO ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU

Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA

2016/C 236/10

Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do Protocolo n.o 3, Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA, relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, em matéria de auxílios estatais

o

o

o

21

2016/C 236/11

Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos do artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, sobre as questões suscitadas acerca do potencial auxílio concedido à Hurtigruten ASA no âmbito do acordo costeiro relativo aos Hurtingen Maritime Services para o período 2012-2019

o

o

o

29

2016/C 236/12

Anúncio da Noruega relativo à Diretiva 94/22/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa às condições de concessão e de utilização das autorizações de prospeção, pesquisa e produção de hidrocarbonetos — Anúncio de convite à apresentação de pedidos de licença de produção de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa — Awards in Predefined Areas 2016

45

---

| | V   Avisos |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2016/C 236/13 | Convite à apresentação de propostas no âmbito do programa de trabalho plurianual para a concessão de apoio financeiro no domínio das infraestruturas energéticas transeuropeias, ao abrigo do Mecanismo Interligar a Europa, para o período de 2014-2020 [Decisão C(2016) 1587 da Comissão] | 47 |
| | PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA |
| | Comissão Europeia |
| 2016/C 236/14 | Notificação prévia de uma concentração (Processo M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Processo suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento simplificado (
  1
  ) | 48 |

V   Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comissão Europeia

2016/C 236/13

Convite à apresentação de propostas no âmbito do programa de trabalho plurianual para a concessão de apoio financeiro no domínio das infraestruturas energéticas transeuropeias, ao abrigo do Mecanismo Interligar a Europa, para o período de 2014-2020 [Decisão C(2016) 1587 da Comissão]

47

PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA

Comissão Europeia

2016/C 236/14

Notificação prévia de uma concentração (Processo M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Processo suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento simplificado (
  1
  )

1

48

---

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE |

---

(1)   Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE

1

| PT | |
| --- | --- |

PT

---

II Comunicações

COMUNICAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/1

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2016/C 236/01)

Em 22 de junho de 2016, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado interno. Esta decisão baseia-se no artigo 6.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1). O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua inglesa e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência, (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade; |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência, (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade;

| — | em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8039. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8039.

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/1

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2016/C 236/02)

Em 23 de junho de 2016, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado interno. Esta decisão baseia-se no artigo 6.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1). O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua inglesa e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade, |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade,

| — | em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8049. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8049.

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/2

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2016/C 236/03)

Em 23 de junho de 2016, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado interno. Esta decisão baseia-se no artigo 6.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1). O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua inglesa e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade, |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade,

| — | em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8041. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8041.

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/2

---

Não oposição a uma concentração notificada

(Processo M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest)

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2016/C 236/04)

Em 24 de junho de 2016, a Comissão decidiu não se opor à concentração notificada e declará-la compatível com o mercado interno. Esta decisão baseia-se no artigo 6.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1). O texto integral da decisão apenas está disponível na língua inglesa e será tornado público após terem sido suprimidos quaisquer segredos comerciais que possa conter. Poderá ser consultado:

| — | no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade, |
| --- | --- |

—

no sítio web Concorrência da Comissão, na secção consagrada à política da concorrência (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Este sítio permite aceder às decisões respeitantes às operações de concentração a partir da denominação da empresa, do número do processo, da data e do setor de atividade,

| — | em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8054. |
| --- | --- |

—

em formato eletrónico, no sítio EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=pt), que proporciona o acesso em linha ao direito comunitário, através do número do documento 32016M8054.

---

(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

IV Informações

INFORMAÇÕES DAS INSTITUIÇÕES, ÓRGÃOS E ORGANISMOS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA

Comissão Europeia

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/3

---

Taxas de câmbio do euro (1)

29 de junho de 2016

(2016/C 236/05)

1 euro =

| | Moeda | Taxas de câmbio |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | dólar dos Estados Unidos | 1,1090 |
| JPY | iene | 113,85 |
| DKK | coroa dinamarquesa | 7,4376 |
| GBP | libra esterlina | 0,82550 |
| SEK | coroa sueca | 9,4311 |
| CHF | franco suíço | 1,0854 |
| ISK | coroa islandesa | |
| NOK | coroa norueguesa | 9,3065 |
| BGN | lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | coroa checa | 27,114 |
| HUF | forint | 316,95 |
| PLN | zlóti | 4,4261 |
| RON | leu romeno | 4,5253 |
| TRY | lira turca | 3,2157 |
| AUD | dólar australiano | 1,4911 |
| CAD | dólar canadiano | 1,4407 |
| HKD | dólar de Hong Kong | 8,6041 |
| NZD | dólar neozelandês | 1,5565 |
| SGD | dólar singapurense | 1,4951 |
| KRW | won sul-coreano | 1 283,15 |
| ZAR | rand | 16,6016 |
| CNY | iuane | 7,3680 |
| HRK | kuna | 7,5273 |
| IDR | rupia indonésia | 14 577,25 |
| MYR | ringgit | 4,4594 |
| PHP | peso filipino | 52,106 |
| RUB | rublo | 71,0452 |
| THB | baht | 39,028 |
| BRL | real | 3,6216 |
| MXN | peso mexicano | 20,7331 |
| INR | rupia indiana | 74,9693 |

Moeda

Taxas de câmbio

USD

dólar dos Estados Unidos

1,1090

JPY

iene

113,85

DKK

coroa dinamarquesa

7,4376

GBP

libra esterlina

0,82550

SEK

coroa sueca

9,4311

CHF

franco suíço

1,0854

ISK

coroa islandesa

NOK

coroa norueguesa

9,3065

BGN

lev

1,9558

CZK

coroa checa

27,114

HUF

forint

316,95

PLN

zlóti

4,4261

RON

leu romeno

4,5253

TRY

lira turca

3,2157

AUD

dólar australiano

1,4911

CAD

dólar canadiano

1,4407

HKD

dólar de Hong Kong

8,6041

NZD

dólar neozelandês

1,5565

SGD

dólar singapurense

1,4951

KRW

won sul-coreano

1 283,15

ZAR

rand

16,6016

CNY

iuane

7,3680

HRK

kuna

7,5273

IDR

rupia indonésia

14 577,25

MYR

ringgit

4,4594

PHP

peso filipino

52,106

RUB

rublo

71,0452

THB

baht

39,028

BRL

real

3,6216

MXN

peso mexicano

20,7331

INR

rupia indiana

74,9693

---

(1)  Fonte: Taxas de câmbio de referência publicadas pelo Banco Central Europeu.

---

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/4

---

Nova face nacional de moedas de euro destinadas à circulação

(2016/C 236/06)

As moedas em euros destinadas a circulação têm curso legal em toda a área do euro. Com o objetivo de informar o público e todas as partes que manipulam as moedas, a Comissão publica uma descrição dos desenhos de todas as novas moedas (1). Em conformidade com as conclusões do Conselho de 10 de fevereiro de 2009 (2), os Estados-Membros da área do euro e os países que tiverem celebrado um acordo monetário com a União Europeia que preveja a emissão de moedas de euros estão autorizados a emitir moedas de euros comemorativas destinadas à circulação, sob certas condições, designadamente a de só poderem ser utilizadas moedas com o valor facial de 2 euros. Estas moedas têm características técnicas idênticas às das outras moedas de 2 euros, mas a sua face nacional apresenta um desenho comemorativo altamente simbólico em termos nacionais ou europeus.

País emissor
  : Espanha

Tema da comemoração
  : Sítios do património mundial, cultural e natural da UNESCO — Igrejas do Reino das Astúrias

Descrição do desenho
  : O desenho representa a fachada da igreja de Santa María del Naranco. Na parte superior do círculo interior e em arco figura o nome do país emissor, «ESPAÑA», e, por baixo, à direita, o ano da emissão, «2017». No lado esquerdo do círculo interior, figura o símbolo da casa da moeda.

No anel exterior da moeda, estão representadas as 12 estrelas da bandeira europeia.

Número de moedas a emitir
  : 4 milhões

Data de emissão
  :

---

(1)  Cf. JO C 373 de 28.12.2001, p. 1, para as faces nacionais de todas as moedas emitidas em 2002.

(2)  Cf. Conclusões do Conselho «Assuntos Económicos e Financeiros», de 10 de fevereiro de 2009, e Recomendação da Comissão, de 19 de dezembro de 2008, relativa a orientações comuns para as faces nacionais das moedas em euros destinadas à circulação (JO L 9 de 14.1.2009, p. 52).

---

Tribunal de Contas

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/5

---

Relatório Especial n.o 14/2016

«Iniciativas políticas e apoio financeiro da UE para a integração dos ciganos: realizaram-se progressos significativos na última década, mas são necessários mais esforços no terreno»

(2016/C 236/07)

O Tribunal de Contas Europeu informa que acaba de ser publicado o seu Relatório Especial n.o 14/2016 «Iniciativas políticas e apoio financeiro da UE para a integração dos ciganos: realizaram-se progressos significativos na última década, mas são necessários mais esforços no terreno».

O relatório está acessível para consulta ou download no sítio Internet do Tribunal de Contas Europeu: http://eca.europa.eu ou na EU-Bookshop: https://bookshop.europa.eu

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INFORMAÇÕES DOS ESTADOS-MEMBROS

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/6

---

Atualização da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) (1)

(2016/C 236/08)

A publicação da lista de pontos de passagem de fronteira referidos no artigo 2.o, n.o 8, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 9 de março de 2016, que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen), baseia-se nas informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros à Comissão, em conformidade com o artigo 39.o do Código das Fronteiras Schengen.

Além da publicação no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia, é feita uma atualização regular no sítio web da Direção-Geral dos Assuntos Internos.

FRANÇA

Alteração das informações publicadas no JO C 229 de 14.7.2015

LISTA DOS PONTOS DE PASSAGEM DAS FRONTEIRAS

Fronteiras aéreas

| (1) | Abbeville |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Abbeville

| (2) | Agen-la Garenne |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Agen-la Garenne

| (3) | Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro

| (4) | Albert-Bray |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Albert-Bray

| (5) | Amiens-Glisy |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Amiens-Glisy

| (6) | Angers-Marcé |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Angers-Marcé

| (7) | Angoulême-Brie-Champniers |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Angoulême-Brie-Champniers

| (8) | Annecy-Methet |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Annecy-Methet

| (9) | Annemasse |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Annemasse

| (10) | Auxerre-Branches |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Auxerre-Branches

| (11) | Avignon-Caumont |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Avignon-Caumont

| (12) | Bâle-Mulhouse |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Bâle-Mulhouse

| (13) | Bastia-Poretta |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Bastia-Poretta

| (14) | Beauvais-Tillé |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Beauvais-Tillé

| (15) | Bergerac-Roumanière |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Bergerac-Roumanière

| (16) | Besançon-la Vèze |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Besançon-la Vèze

| (17) | Béziers-Vias |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Béziers-Vias

| (18) | Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet

| (19) | Bordeaux-Mérignac |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Bordeaux-Mérignac

| (20) | Brest-Guipavas |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Brest-Guipavas

| (21) | Brive-Souillac |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Brive-Souillac

| (22) | Caen-Carpiquet |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Caen-Carpiquet

| (23) | Calais-Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Calais-Dunkerque

| (24) | Calvi-Sainte-Catherine |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Calvi-Sainte-Catherine

| (25) | Cannes-Mandelieu |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Cannes-Mandelieu

| (26) | Carcassonne-Salvaza |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Carcassonne-Salvaza

| (27) | Châlons-Vatry |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Châlons-Vatry

| (28) | Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains

| (29) | Châteauroux-Déols |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Châteauroux-Déols

| (30) | Cherbourg-Mauperthus |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Cherbourg-Mauperthus

| (31) | Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat

| (32) | Colmar-Houssen |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Colmar-Houssen

| (33) | Deauville-Saint-Gatien |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Deauville-Saint-Gatien

| (34) | Dijon-Longvic |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Dijon-Longvic

| (35) | Dinard-Pleurtuit |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Dinard-Pleurtuit

| (36) | Dôle-Tavaux |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Dôle-Tavaux

| (37) | Epinal-Mirecourt |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Epinal-Mirecourt

| (38) | Figari-Sud Corse |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Figari-Sud Corse

| (39) | Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs

| (40) | Hyères-le Palivestre |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Hyères-le Palivestre

| (41) | Issy-les-Moulineaux |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Issy-les-Moulineaux

| (42) | La Môle |
| --- | --- |

(42)

La Môle

| (43) | Lannion |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Lannion

| (44) | La Rochelle-Laleu |
| --- | --- |

(44)

La Rochelle-Laleu

| (45) | Laval-Entrammes |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Laval-Entrammes

| (46) | Le Castelet |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Le Castelet

| (47) | Le Havre-Octeville |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Le Havre-Octeville

| (48) | Le Mans-Arnage |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Le Mans-Arnage

| (49) | Le Touquet-Paris-Plage |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Le Touquet-Paris-Plage

| (50) | Lille-Lesquin |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Lille-Lesquin

| (51) | Limoges-Bellegarde |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Limoges-Bellegarde

| (52) | Lognes-Emerainville |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Lognes-Emerainville

| (53) | Lorient-Lann-Bihoué |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Lorient-Lann-Bihoué

| (54) | Lyon-Bron |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Lyon-Bron

| (55) | Lyon-Saint-Exupéry |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Lyon-Saint-Exupéry

| (56) | Marseille-Provence |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Marseille-Provence

| (57) | Metz-Nancy-Lorraine |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Metz-Nancy-Lorraine

| (58) | Monaco-Héliport |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Monaco-Héliport

| (59) | Montbéliard-Courcelles |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Montbéliard-Courcelles

| (60) | Montpellier-Méditérranée |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Montpellier-Méditérranée

| (61) | Nantes-Atlantique |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Nantes-Atlantique

| (62) | Nevers-Fourchambault |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Nevers-Fourchambault

| (63) | Nice-Côte d’Azur |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Nice-Côte d’Azur

| (64) | Nîmes-Garons |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Nîmes-Garons

| (65) | Orléans-Bricy |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Orléans-Bricy

| (66) | Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel

| (67) | Paris-Charles de Gaulle |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Paris-Charles de Gaulle

| (68) | Paris-le Bourget |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Paris-le Bourget

| (69) | Paris-Orly |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Paris-Orly

| (70) | Pau-Pyrénées |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Pau-Pyrénées

| (71) | Perpignan-Rivesaltes |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Perpignan-Rivesaltes

| (72) | Poitiers-Biard |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Poitiers-Biard

| (73) | Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, numa base temporária:






  — | De quarta-feira, 10 de junho, até domingo, 14 de junho de 2015, das 10h00 às 15h30
  Esta abertura temporária vigorará durante o Salão Internacional da Aeronáutica e do Espaço em Bourget, que requer o desvio dos voos provenientes do exterior do espaço de Schengen para o aeródromo de Pontoise. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(73)

Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, numa base temporária:

—

De quarta-feira, 10 de junho, até domingo, 14 de junho de 2015, das 10h00 às 15h30

Esta abertura temporária vigorará durante o Salão Internacional da Aeronáutica e do Espaço em Bourget, que requer o desvio dos voos provenientes do exterior do espaço de Schengen para o aeródromo de Pontoise.

| — | De segunda-feira, 15 de junho, até domingo, 21 de junho de 2015, das 06h00 às 16h30.
  Esta abertura temporária vigorará durante o período em que é explorada uma rota sazonal fora do espaço de Schengen (Quimper-Londres). |
| --- | --- |

—

De segunda-feira, 15 de junho, até domingo, 21 de junho de 2015, das 06h00 às 16h30.

Esta abertura temporária vigorará durante o período em que é explorada uma rota sazonal fora do espaço de Schengen (Quimper-Londres).

| (74) | Quimper-Cornouailles, a título temporário, de 19 de maio a 4 de setembro de 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Quimper-Cornouailles, a título temporário, de 19 de maio a 4 de setembro de 2016.

| (75) | Rennes Saint-Jacques |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Rennes Saint-Jacques

| (76) | Rodez-Marcillac |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Rodez-Marcillac

| (77) | Rouen-Vallée de Seine |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Rouen-Vallée de Seine

| (78) | Saint-Brieuc-Armor |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Saint-Brieuc-Armor

| (79) | Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon

| (80) | Saint-Nazaire-Montoir |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Saint-Nazaire-Montoir

| (81) | Strasbourg-Entzheim |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Strasbourg-Entzheim

| (82) | Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes

| (83) | Toulouse-Blagnac |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Toulouse-Blagnac

| (84) | Tours-Saint-Symphorien |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Tours-Saint-Symphorien

| (85) | Troyes-Barberey |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Troyes-Barberey

| (86) | Vichy-Charmeil |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Vichy-Charmeil

Fronteiras marítimas

| (1) | Ajaccio |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ajaccio

| (2) | Bastia |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Bastia

| (3) | Bayonne |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Bayonne

| (4) | Bonifacio |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Bonifacio

| (5) | Bordeaux |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Bordeaux

| (6) | Boulogne |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Boulogne

| (7) | Brest |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Brest

| (8) | Caen-Ouistreham |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Caen-Ouistreham

| (9) | Calais |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Calais

| (10) | Calvi |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Calvi

| (11) | Cannes-Vieux Port |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Cannes-Vieux Port

| (12) | Carteret |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Carteret

| (13) | Cherbourg |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Cherbourg

| (14) | Dieppe |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Dieppe

| (15) | Douvres |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Douvres

| (16) | Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Dunkerque

| (17) | Granville |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Granville

| (18) | Honfleur |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Honfleur

| (19) | La Rochelle-La Pallice |
| --- | --- |

(19)

La Rochelle-La Pallice

| (20) | Le Havre |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Le Havre

| (21) | Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port

| (22) | L’Ile-Rousse |
| --- | --- |

(22)

L’Ile-Rousse

| (23) | Lorient |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Lorient

| (24) | Marseille |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Marseille

| (25) | Monaco-Port de la Condamine |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Monaco-Port de la Condamine

| (26) | Nantes-Saint-Nazaire |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

| (27) | Nice |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Nice

| (28) | Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis

| (29) | Port-la-Nouvelle |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Port-la-Nouvelle

| (30) | Porto-Vecchio |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Porto-Vecchio

| (31) | Port-Vendres |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Port-Vendres

| (32) | Roscoff |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Roscoff

| (33) | Rouen |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Rouen

| (34) | Saint-Brieuc (maritime) |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Saint-Brieuc (maritime)

| (35) | Saint-Malo |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Saint-Malo

| (36) | Sète |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Sète

| (37) | Toulon |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Toulon

Fronteiras terrestres

Com O REINO UNIDO

(ligação pelo túnel sob a Mancha)

| (1) | Gare d’Ashford International |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Gare d’Ashford International

| (2) | Gare d’Avignon-Centre |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Gare d’Avignon-Centre

| (3) | Cheriton/Coquelles |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Cheriton/Coquelles

| (4) | Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée

| (5) | Gare de Fréthun |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Gare de Fréthun

| (6) | Gare de Lille-Europe |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Gare de Lille-Europe

| (7) | Gare de Paris-Nord |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Gare de Paris-Nord

| (8) | Gare de St-Pancras International |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Gare de St-Pancras International

| (9) | Gare d’Ebbsfleet International |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Gare d’Ebbsfleet International

| (10) | Gare TGV Haute-Picardie em 1 de julho de 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Gare TGV Haute-Picardie em 1 de julho de 2016.

Com ANDORRA

| (1) | Pas de la Case-Porta |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pas de la Case-Porta

Lista das publicações anteriores

| | JO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 316 de 28.12.2007, p. 1

| | JO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 134 de 31.5.2008, p. 16

| | JO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 177 de 12.7.2008, p. 9

| | JO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 200 de 6.8.2008, p. 10

| | JO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 331 de 31.12.2008, p. 13

| | JO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 3 de 8.1.2009, p. 10

| | JO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 37 de 14.2.2009, p. 10

| | JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 20

| | JO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 99 de 30.4.2009, p. 7

| | JO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 229 de 23.9.2009, p. 28

| | JO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 263 de 5.11.2009, p. 22

| | JO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 298 de 8.12.2009, p. 17

| | JO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 74 de 24.3.2010, p. 13

| | JO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 326 de 3.12.2010, p. 17

| | JO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 355 de 29.12.2010, p. 34

| | JO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 22 de 22.1.2011, p. 22

| | JO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 37 de 5.2.2011, p. 12

| | JO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 149 de 20.5.2011, p. 8

| | JO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 190 de 30.6.2011, p. 17

| | JO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 203 de 9.7.2011, p. 14

| | JO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 210 de 16.7.2011, p. 30

| | JO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 271 de 14.9.2011, p. 18

| | JO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 356 de 6.12.2011, p. 12

| | JO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 111 de 18.4.2012, p. 3

| | JO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 183 de 23.6.2012, p. 7

| | JO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 313 de 17.10.2012, p. 11

| | JO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 394 de 20.12.2012, p. 22

| | JO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 51 de 22.2.2013, p. 9

| | JO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 167 de 13.6.2013, p. 9

| | JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 2

| | JO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 275 de 24.9.2013, p. 7

| | JO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 314 de 29.10.2013, p. 5

| | JO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 324 de 9.11.2013, p. 6

| | JO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 57 de 28.2.2014, p. 4

| | JO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 167 de 4.6.2014, p. 9

| | JO C 244 de 26.7.2014, p. 22 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 244 de 26.7.2014, p. 22

| | JO C 332 de 24.9.2014, p. 12 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 332 de 24.9.2014, p. 12

| | JO C 420 de 22.11.2014, p. 9 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 420 de 22.11.2014, p. 9

| | JO C 72 de 28.2.2015, p. 17 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 72 de 28.2.2015, p. 17

| | JO C 126 de 18.4.2015, p. 10 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 126 de 18.4.2015, p. 10

| | JO C 229 de 14.7.2015, p. 5 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 229 de 14.7.2015, p. 5

| | JO C 341 de 16.10.2015, p. 19 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 341 de 16.10.2015, p. 19

| | JO C 84 de 4.3.2016, p. 2. |
| --- | --- |

JO C 84 de 4.3.2016, p. 2.

---

(1)  Ver a lista das publicações anteriores no final da presente atualização.

---

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/11

---

Atualização dos modelos de cartões emitidos pelos Ministérios dos Negócios Estrangeiros dos Estados-Membros aos membros acreditados das missões diplomáticas e das representações consulares e suas famílias, tal como referido no artigo 20.o, n.o 2, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen) (1)

(2016/C 236/09)

A publicação dos modelos de cartões emitidos pelos Ministérios dos Negócios Estrangeiros aos membros acreditados das missões diplomáticas e das representações consulares e suas famílias, tal como referido no artigo 20.o, n.o 2, do Regulamento (UE) 2016/399 do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 9 de março de 2016, que estabelece o código da União relativo ao regime de passagem de pessoas nas fronteiras (Código das Fronteiras Schengen), baseia-se nas informações comunicadas pelos Estados-Membros à Comissão, em conformidade com o artigo 39.o do Código das Fronteiras Schengen (codificação).

Além da publicação no Jornal Oficial, está disponível uma atualização mensal no sítio web da Direção-Geral dos Assuntos Internos.

SUÍÇA

Substituição das informações publicadas no JO C 133, de 1.5.2014.

TÍTULOS DE RESIDÊNCIA ESPECIAIS EMITIDOS PELO MINISTÉRIO DOS NEGÓCIOS ESTRANGEIROS

Cartões de legitimação (títulos de residência) do Departamento Federal dos Negócios Estrangeiros:

| — | Cartão de legitimação «B» (com barra cor de rosa): chefes de missão diplomática, permanente ou especial, altos dirigentes das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « B » (à bande rose) : chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / (Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut; |
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Cartão de legitimação «B» (com barra cor de rosa): chefes de missão diplomática, permanente ou especial, altos dirigentes das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « B » (à bande rose) : chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / (Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «C» (com barra cor de rosa): pessoal diplomático das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, altos funcionários das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « C » (à bande rose) : membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «C» (com barra cor de rosa): pessoal diplomático das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, altos funcionários das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « C » (à bande rose) : membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «D» (com barra azul): pessoal administrativo e técnico das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande bleue) : membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «D» (com barra azul): pessoal administrativo e técnico das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande bleue) : membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «D» (com barra castanha): funcionários pertencentes à categoria profissional das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande brune) : fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «D» (com barra castanha): funcionários pertencentes à categoria profissional das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande brune) : fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «E» (com barra violeta): pessoal de serviço das missões diplomáticas, permanentes e especiais, funcionários dos serviços gerais das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « E » (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «E» (com barra violeta): pessoal de serviço das missões diplomáticas, permanentes e especiais, funcionários dos serviços gerais das organizações internacionais e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « E » (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «F» (com barra amarela): pessoal doméstico privado dos membros das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, e dos postos consulares de carreira e pessoal doméstico privado dos funcionários de organizações internacionais / Carte de légitimation « F » (à bande jaune) : domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali; |
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Cartão de legitimação «F» (com barra amarela): pessoal doméstico privado dos membros das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, e dos postos consulares de carreira e pessoal doméstico privado dos funcionários de organizações internacionais / Carte de légitimation « F » (à bande jaune) : domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «G» (com barra azul turquesa): funcionários de organizações internacionais (contrato de trabalho «a termo») e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « G » (à bande turquoise) : fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme ») et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «G» (com barra azul turquesa): funcionários de organizações internacionais (contrato de trabalho «a termo») e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « G » (à bande turquoise) : fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme ») et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut /Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Carta de legitimação «H» (com barra branca): colaboradores não funcionários das missões diplomáticas permanentes ou especiais, dos consulados e das organizações internacionais, bem como as pessoas sem privilégios e imunidades autorizadas a acompanhar os membros das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, dos consulados e das organizações internacionais / Carte de légitimation « H » (à bande blanche) : collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali; |
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Carta de legitimação «H» (com barra branca): colaboradores não funcionários das missões diplomáticas permanentes ou especiais, dos consulados e das organizações internacionais, bem como as pessoas sem privilégios e imunidades autorizadas a acompanhar os membros das missões diplomáticas, permanentes ou especiais, dos consulados e das organizações internacionais / Carte de légitimation « H » (à bande blanche) : collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «I» (com barra verde-azeitona): pessoal não suíço do Comité Internacional da Cruz Vermelha e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « I » (à bande olive) : membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «I» (com barra verde-azeitona): pessoal não suíço do Comité Internacional da Cruz Vermelha e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « I » (à bande olive) : membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra vermelha): chefes de posto consular de carreira, funcionários consulares de carreira e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande rose) : chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra vermelha): chefes de posto consular de carreira, funcionários consulares de carreira e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande rose) : chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra azul): empregados consulares de carreira e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande bleue) : employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra azul): empregados consulares de carreira e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande bleue) : employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra violeta): membros do pessoal de serviço das representações consulares de carreira e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande violette) : membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra violeta): membros do pessoal de serviço das representações consulares de carreira e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande violette) : membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra branca): chefes honorários de posto consular / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande blanche) : chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari; |
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Cartão de legitimação «K» (com barra branca): chefes honorários de posto consular / Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande blanche) : chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «L» (com barra bege): pessoal não suíço da Federação Internacional das Sociedades da Cruz Vermelha e do Crescente Vermelho e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « L » (à bande de couleur sable) : membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Cartão de legitimação «L» (com barra bege): pessoal não suíço da Federação Internacional das Sociedades da Cruz Vermelha e do Crescente Vermelho e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « L » (à bande de couleur sable) : membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Cartão de legitimação «P» (com barra azul): pessoal científico não suíço do CERN e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « P » (à bande bleue) : personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « P » (mit blauem Streifen) : wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « P » (à banda blu) : personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto. |
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Cartão de legitimação «P» (com barra azul): pessoal científico não suíço do CERN e membros da família que beneficiam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « P » (à bande bleue) : personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « P » (mit blauem Streifen) : wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « P » (à banda blu) : personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.

| — | Cartão de legitimação «R» (com barra cinzenta): membros do pessoal não suíço das organizações internacionais quase governamentais ou outros organismos internacionais e membros da família que gozam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « R » (à bande grise) : membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « R » (mit grauem Streifen) : Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « R » (a banda grigia) : membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto. |
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Cartão de legitimação «R» (com barra cinzenta): membros do pessoal não suíço das organizações internacionais quase governamentais ou outros organismos internacionais e membros da família que gozam do mesmo estatuto / Carte de légitimation « R » (à bande grise) : membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « R » (mit grauem Streifen) : Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « R » (a banda grigia) : membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.

| — | Cartão de legitimação «S» (com barra verde): membros do pessoal, de nacionalidade suíça, das missões diplomáticas, permanentes e especiais, funcionários de nacionalidade suíça das organizações internacionais / Carte de légitimation « S » (à bande verte) : membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali. |
| --- | --- |

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Cartão de legitimação «S» (com barra verde): membros do pessoal, de nacionalidade suíça, das missões diplomáticas, permanentes e especiais, funcionários de nacionalidade suíça das organizações internacionais / Carte de légitimation « S » (à bande verte) : membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali.

Cartão de legitimação do Departamento Federal dos Negócios Estrangeiros (DFAE) de tipo «B»

| — | Embaixadas e missões permanentes: chefe de missão |
| --- | --- |

—

Embaixadas e missões permanentes: chefe de missão

| — | Organizações internacionais: alto dirigente



  O titular deste cartão goza de estatuto diplomático

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus |
| --- | --- |

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Organizações internacionais: alto dirigente

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de estatuto diplomático

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «C»

| — | Embaixadas e missões permanentes: membro do pessoal diplomático |
| --- | --- |

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Embaixadas e missões permanentes: membro do pessoal diplomático

| — | Organizações internacionais: alto funcionário



  O titular deste cartão goza de estatuto diplomático

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus |
| --- | --- |

—

Organizações internacionais: alto funcionário

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de estatuto diplomático

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «D»

| — | Embaixadas e missões permanentes: membro do pessoal administrativo e técnico (AT)



  O titular deste cartão goza de estatuto diplomático, com exceção da imunidade de jurisdição civil e administrativa, que apenas é concedida no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus, Immunität von der Zivil- und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit hat er jedoch nur für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
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Embaixadas e missões permanentes: membro do pessoal administrativo e técnico (AT)

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de estatuto diplomático, com exceção da imunidade de jurisdição civil e administrativa, que apenas é concedida no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Diplomatenstatus, Immunität von der Zivil- und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit hat er jedoch nur für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

| — | Organizações internacionais: funcionário da categoria profissional



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Organizações internacionais: funcionário da categoria profissional

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «E»

| — | Embaixadas e missões permanentes: membro do pessoal de serviço e membro do pessoal recrutado localmente |
| --- | --- |

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Embaixadas e missões permanentes: membro do pessoal de serviço e membro do pessoal recrutado localmente

| — | Organizações internacionais: funcionário dos serviços gerais



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Organizações internacionais: funcionário dos serviços gerais

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «F»

| — | Embaixadas, missões permanentes e organizações internacionais: doméstico privado de um membro do pessoal



  O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit |
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Embaixadas, missões permanentes e organizações internacionais: doméstico privado de um membro do pessoal

Image

O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «G»

| — | Organizações internacionais: funcionário temporário (funcionário com contrato a termo) e membro do pessoal destacado



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Organizações internacionais: funcionário temporário (funcionário com contrato a termo) e membro do pessoal destacado

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «H»

| — | Embaixadas, consulados, missões permanentes e organizações internacionais: pessoa sem privilégios e imunidades



  O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição e não tem acesso ao mercado de trabalho suíço

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit und keinen Zugang zum schweizerischen Arbeitsmarkt |
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Embaixadas, consulados, missões permanentes e organizações internacionais: pessoa sem privilégios e imunidades

Image

O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição e não tem acesso ao mercado de trabalho suíço

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit und keinen Zugang zum schweizerischen Arbeitsmarkt

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo « I »

| — | Comité Internacional da Cruz Vermelha (CICV): colaborador do CICV



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções Não tem privilégios aduaneiros

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien |
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Comité Internacional da Cruz Vermelha (CICV): colaborador do CICV

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções Não tem privilégios aduaneiros

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «K»

| — | Consulados – cartão K vermelho: chefe de posto de carreira e funcionário consular de carreira



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Consulados – cartão K vermelho: chefe de posto de carreira e funcionário consular de carreira

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

| — | Consulados – cartão K azul: empregado consular de carreira



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Consulados – cartão K azul: empregado consular de carreira

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

| — | Consulados – cartão K violeta: membro do pessoal de serviço e membro do pessoal recrutado localmente



  O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit |
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Consulados – cartão K violeta: membro do pessoal de serviço e membro do pessoal recrutado localmente

Image

O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

| — | Consulados – cartão K branco: chefe de posto honorário



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição exclusivamente para as funções consulares

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit lediglich für konsularische Tätigkeiten |
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Consulados – cartão K branco: chefe de posto honorário

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição exclusivamente para as funções consulares

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit lediglich für konsularische Tätigkeiten

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «l»

| — | Federação Internacional das Sociedades da Cruz Vermelha e do Crescente Vermelho (FISCV): colaborador da FISCV



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções Não tem privilégios aduaneiros

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien |
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Federação Internacional das Sociedades da Cruz Vermelha e do Crescente Vermelho (FISCV): colaborador da FISCV

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções Não tem privilégios aduaneiros

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten. Er hat keine Zollprivilegien

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «P»

| — | Centro Europeu de Investigação Nuclear (CERN): membro do corpo científico do CERN



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Centro Europeu de Investigação Nuclear (CERN): membro do corpo científico do CERN

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «R»

| — | Membros do pessoal não suíço das organizações internacionais quase governamentais ou outros organismos internacionais e membros da família que gozam do mesmo estatuto



  O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit |
| --- | --- |

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Membros do pessoal não suíço das organizações internacionais quase governamentais ou outros organismos internacionais e membros da família que gozam do mesmo estatuto

Image

O titular deste cartão não goza de imunidade de jurisdição

Der Inhaber dieser Karte hat keinen Anspruch auf Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit

Cartão de legitimação do DFAE de tipo «S»

O pessoal de nacionalidade suíça, independentemente da função que ocupa na representação estrangeira ou organização internacional, recebe, em princípio, um cartão de legitimação de tipo «S». O pessoal suíço recrutado localmente pelas embaixadas e pelos consulados não recebe cartão. Os funcionários temporários suíços (contrato a termo) das organizações internacionais não recebem cartão.

| — | Embaixadas e consulados: pessoal de carreira de nacionalidade suíça |
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Embaixadas e consulados: pessoal de carreira de nacionalidade suíça

| — | Missões permanentes: pessoal de nacionalidade suíça |
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Missões permanentes: pessoal de nacionalidade suíça

| — | Organizações internacionais: funcionário/colaborador de nacionalidade suíça



  O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

  Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten |
| --- | --- |

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Organizações internacionais: funcionário/colaborador de nacionalidade suíça

Image

O titular deste cartão goza de imunidade de jurisdição no exercício das suas funções

Der Inhaber dieser Karte geniesst Immunität von der Gerichtsbarkeit für dienstliche Tätigkeiten

Lista das publicações anteriores

| | JO C 247 de 13.10.2006, p. 85 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 247 de 13.10.2006, p. 85

| | JO C 153 de 6.7.2007, p. 15 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 153 de 6.7.2007, p. 15

| | JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 18 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 64 de 19.3.2009, p. 18

| | JO C 239 de 6.10.2009, p. 7 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 239 de 6.10.2009, p. 7

| | JO C 304 de 10.11.2010, p. 6 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 304 de 10.11.2010, p. 6

| | JO C 273 de 16.09.2011, p. 11 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 273 de 16.09.2011, p. 11

| | JO C 357 de 7.12.2011, p. 3 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 357 de 7.12.2011, p. 3

| | JO C 88 de 24.3.2012, p. 12 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 88 de 24.3.2012, p. 12

| | JO C 120 de 25.4.2012, p. 4 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 120 de 25.4.2012, p. 4

| | JO C 182 de 22.6.2012, p. 10 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 182 de 22.6.2012, p. 10

| | JO C 214 de 20.7.2012, p. 4 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 214 de 20.7.2012, p. 4

| | JO C 238 de 8.8.2012, p. 5 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 238 de 8.8.2012, p. 5

| | JO C 255 de 24.8.2012, p. 2 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 255 de 24.8.2012, p. 2

| | JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 13 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 242 de 23.8.2013, p. 13

| | JO C 38 de 8.2.2014, p. 16 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 38 de 8.2.2014, p. 16

| | JO C 133 de 1.5.2014, p. 2 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 133 de 1.5.2014, p. 2

| | JO C 360 de 11.10.2014, p. 5 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 360 de 11.10.2014, p. 5

| | JO C 397 de 12.11.2014, p. 6 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 397 de 12.11.2014, p. 6

| | JO C 77 de 27.2.2016, p. 5 |
| --- | --- |

JO C 77 de 27.2.2016, p. 5

| | JO C 174 de 14.5.2016, p. 12. |
| --- | --- |

JO C 174 de 14.5.2016, p. 12.

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(1)  Ver a lista das publicações anteriores no final da presente atualização.

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INFORMAÇÕES RELATIVAS AO ESPAÇO ECONÓMICO EUROPEU

Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/21

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Convite à apresentação de observações nos termos do Protocolo n.o 3, Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA, relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, em matéria de auxílios estatais

(2016/C 236/10)

Pela Decisão n.o 489/15/COL, publicada a seguir ao presente resumo na língua que faz fé, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA notificou as autoridades norueguesas da sua decisão de dar início ao procedimento previsto no Protocolo n.o 3, Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 2, do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA, relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, relativamente à medida de auxílio acima mencionada.

As partes interessadas poderão apresentar observações sobre a medida em causa no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação do presente convite, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

| Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA |
| --- |
| Registo |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA

Registo

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Essas observações serão comunicadas às autoridades norueguesas. Qualquer interessado que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

RESUMO

Procedimento

As autoridades norueguesas notificaram as contribuições para a segurança social com diferenciação regional 2014-2020, nos termos do Protocolo n.o 3, Parte I, artigo 1.o, n.o 3, por carta datada de 13 de março de 2014 (1). Com base na referida notificação e nas informações transmitidas posteriormente (2), o regime de auxílios notificado foi aprovado pelo Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA pela Decisão n.o 225/14/COL, de 18 de junho de 2014.

No acórdão de 23 de setembro de 2015 do processo E-23/14, Kimek Offshore AS contra ESA
   (3), o Tribunal de Justiça da EFTA anulou parcialmente a decisão do Órgão de Fiscalização.

Por carta datada de 15 de outubro de 2015 (4), o Órgão de Fiscalização solicitou às autoridades norueguesas informações adicionais. As autoridades norueguesas responderam ao pedido de informações por carta datada de 6 de novembro de 2015 (5).

Descrição da medida

O objetivo do regime geral de contribuições para a segurança social com diferenciação consiste em reduzir ou prevenir o despovoamento nas zonas menos habitadas da Noruega, estimulando o emprego. O regime de auxílio ao funcionamento compensa os custos do emprego, reduzindo as taxas de contribuição para a segurança social em determinadas zonas geográficas. Por norma, a intensidade do auxílio varia consoante a zona em que a empresa está registada. A legislação norueguesa impõe que as empresas registem subunidades em separado para cada uma das atividades empresariais desenvolvidas (6). Na eventualidade de uma empresa desenvolver vários tipos de atividades comerciais, deve proceder ao registo de cada subunidade. Além disso, quando as atividades são desenvolvidas em diferentes zonas geográficas, há que proceder ao registo das diferentes unidades em separado.

Enquanto exceção à regra principal em matéria de registo, o regime é igualmente aplicável às empresas registadas fora da zona elegível sempre que empreguem trabalhadores na zona elegível ou sempre que os seus trabalhadores exerçam atividades móveis no interior da zona elegível (designados «serviços ambulantes» para efeitos de aplicação da presente decisão). Trata-se do regime de exceção em apreço na presente decisão. A base jurídica nacional do regime é o artigo 23-2 da Lei Nacional da Segurança Social (7). A base jurídica nacional para o regime de exceção é o artigo 1(4) da Decisão do Parlamento norueguês n.o 1482, de 5 de dezembro de 2013, relativa à determinação das taxas de tributação nos termos da Lei Nacional da Segurança Social.

A exceção só é aplicável se o trabalhador passar metade ou mais dos seus dias de trabalho na zona elegível. Além disso, a taxa reduzida só é aplicável à parte do trabalho aí efetuada.

Apreciação da medida

O Órgão de Fiscalização deve apreciar se o regime de exceção é compatível com o funcionamento do Acordo EEE, com base no seu o artigo 61.o, n.o 3, alínea c), em conformidade com as Orientações do Órgão de Fiscalização relativas aos auxílios estatais com finalidade regional para 2014-2020 (OAR) (8).

Os auxílios com finalidade regional podem ser mais eficazes para promover o desenvolvimento económico das regiões desfavorecidas unicamente quando forem concedidos para incentivar um maior investimento ou atividade económica nessas regiões (9). Os regimes de auxílio ao funcionamento só podem ser abrangidos pelo artigo 61.o, n.o 3, alínea c), EEE, se visarem a redução de desvantagens específicas ou permanentes das empresas de regiões desfavorecidas (10).

Não há dúvida de que o âmbito geográfico do regime enquanto tal está limitado às regiões desfavorecidas. O âmbito da presente decisão encontra-se limitado ao regime de exceção. A questão é saber se a referida regra, que implica que as empresas registadas fora das regiões desfavorecidas abrangidas pelo regime podem beneficiar de um auxílio ao abrigo do regime, na medida em que desenvolvam atividades económicas em regiões desfavorecidas, é compatível com as regras em matéria de auxílios estatais. Por outras palavras, a exceção reduz as desvantagens específicas ou permanentes das empresas nas regiões desfavorecidas?

Cabe às autoridades norueguesas demonstrar o risco de despovoamento na ausência de regime de exceção (11). As autoridades norueguesas sublinharam os benefícios desse regime para as empresas locais. Estas podem ter acesso, a um custo inferior, a mão de obra especializada, o que de outro modo não seria viável. Além disso, o regime de exceção conduz ao aumento da concorrência entre os serviços ambulantes nas zonas elegíveis, o que é igualmente benéfico para as empresas locais (excluindo as que fornecem serviços ambulantes), uma vez que os custos inferiores dos serviços ambulantes os tornam mais aliciantes, aumentando a rendibilidade das empresas da zona elegível. O recurso aos auxílios ao abrigo do regime constitui um instrumento indireto, no sentido em que é utilizado para reduzir os encargos resultantes do emprego de trabalhadores enquanto medida destinada a reduzir ou prevenir o despovoamento. A ideia é que o mercado de trabalho é o principal fator que influencia o local onde as pessoas vivem.

As autoridades norueguesas alegaram ainda que as empresas registadas fora da zona elegível contratam ocasionalmente trabalhadores nas zonas elegíveis. Assim, as empresas proporcionam postos de trabalho que, embora de natureza mais temporária, podem, no entanto, contribuir para o aumento do rendimento salarial nas regiões elegíveis. A atividade económica é igualmente estimulada desta forma. Além disso, as autoridades norueguesas alegam também que os trabalhadores que residem temporariamente na zona elegível compram bens e serviços locais, contribuindo, portanto, para a economia local. Isto aplica-se, em especial, aos trabalhadores que se deslocam durante um período curto ou médio, porque provavelmente irão dormir em hotéis, comer em restaurantes, etc. As autoridades norueguesas estimaram que o montante do auxílio resultante do regime de exceção corresponde a dois por cento do total da ajuda para 2015, sublinhando que se trata de uma estimativa incerta. Dois por cento corresponde a cerca de 19 milhões de euros (12). O Órgão de Fiscalização convida as autoridades norueguesas a fornecer informações mais precisas sobre o efeito financeiro da regra.

Para além destas observações de caráter geral, as autoridades norueguesas não demonstraram o risco de despovoamento da região na ausência do regime de exceção. Na opinião do Órgão de Fiscalização, a fim de cumprir os requisitos das OAR, uma medida deve ter efeitos que transcendem o mero aumento marginal das possibilidades de emprego e das despesas efetuadas na zona elegível. Nesta base, o Órgão de Fiscalização convida as autoridades norueguesas a fornecer mais informações a fim de demonstrar o risco de despovoamento na ausência do regime de exceção.

Em termos de efeitos deste regime na concorrência e nas trocas comerciais, as autoridades norueguesas alegam que o regime de exceção cria condições equitativas para todas as empresas ativas nas regiões desfavorecidas, uma vez que se aplica indiferentemente a qualquer empresa com sede no EEE. Como consequência, evitam-se efeitos adversos para a concorrência. Na opinião do Órgão de Fiscalização, esta é uma característica positiva à luz dos pontos 3 e 53 das OAR. Não obstante, as empresas registadas na zona elegível podem, em geral, enfrentar mais dificuldades permanentes do que as empresas que apenas colocam os seus trabalhadores à disposição nessa zona sem caráter permanente. As autoridades norueguesas alegam que as empresas registadas fora da zona elegível podem ter uma desvantagem concorrencial em comparação com as empresas locais, nomeadamente, devido aos custos de transporte e alojamento do pessoal. As autoridades norueguesas não apresentaram quaisquer dados ou uma justificação suplementar para apoiar este pressuposto. O Órgão de Fiscalização convida as autoridades norueguesas a esclarecer por que razão o regime de exceção não tem efeitos adversos indevidos na concorrência e a aduzir elementos adicionais para substanciar esta ideia.

As autoridades norueguesas salientaram que é evidente que o regime de exceção tem um efeito de incentivo. O efeito de incentivo de um auxílio não pode ser simplesmente presumido. Embora não seja necessário fornecer provas individuais de que os auxílios ao abrigo de um regime facultam a cada beneficiário um incentivo, numa base individual, para desenvolver uma atividade que, de outro modo, não teria prosseguido, o efeito de incentivo deverá, no mínimo, ser baseado numa teoria económica sólida. Não basta a simples referência a uma alegada evidência. Embora seja verdade que o regime de exceção para as empresas registadas fora das zonas elegíveis reduz os custos da mão de obra para os serviços ambulantes nas zonas elegíveis, as autoridades norueguesas não apresentaram quaisquer elementos comprovativos ou argumentos no sentido de que é provável que, na ausência do auxílio, o nível de atividade económica na região poderia ser consideravelmente reduzido devido à existência dos problemas que o auxílio procura resolver (13).

As autoridades norueguesas indicaram que as empresas que prestam serviços ambulantes podem, em certa medida, registar subunidades na zona elegível. Além disso, são obrigadas a fazê-lo quando pelo menos um trabalhador efetuar o seu trabalho para a unidade-mãe numa zona separada, podendo a empresa nessa zona ser visitada.

As autoridades norueguesas argumentam que, na ausência do regime de exceção para serviços ambulantes na zona elegível, existiria uma diferença de tratamento injustificada dependendo do facto de a empresa prestadora de serviços ter criado uma subunidade na zona elegível.

Em primeiro lugar, não é claro para o órgão de fiscalização quais são as implicações do requisito de «pelo menos um trabalhador efetuar o seu trabalho para a unidade-mãe numa zona separada, podendo a empresa nessa zona ser visitada.» Por conseguinte, o Órgão de Fiscalização convida as autoridades norueguesas a clarificar este aspeto.

Em segundo lugar, o princípio da igualdade de tratamento constitui um princípio geral do direito do EEE. Todavia, este facto não pode, por si só, servir de base para justificar o regime de exceção. O regime de exceção deve ser compatível com o funcionamento do Acordo EEE.

Em conclusão, devido à ausência de informações pertinentes, o Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas quanto à compatibilidade do regime de exceção com o funcionamento do Acordo EEE.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 489/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening a formal investigation into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020

(Norway)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014.

| (2) | By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision.

| (3) | By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The scheme as such is not the subject of the formal investigation

| (4) | By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled.

3.   The scheme

3.1   
  Objective

| (5) | The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below.

3.2   
  National legal basis

| (6) | The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme.

| (7) | For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

3.3   
  Rules on registration

| (8) | As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered.

| (9) | Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations.

| (10) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area.

3.4   
  Ambulant services – the measure under scrutiny

| (11) | By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014.

| (12) | The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month.

| (13) | This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo.

4.   The judgment of the EFTA Court

| (14) | The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21).

5.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (15) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22).

| (16) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates.

| (17) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme.

| (18) | Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (19) | The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel.

| (20) | In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services.

| (21) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (22) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (23) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition.

| (24) | In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (25) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (27) | The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG.

| (28) | The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas.

| (29) | Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25).

| (30) | There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions? |
| --- | --- |

(30)

There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions?

| (31) | It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live.

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule.

| (33) | Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule.

| (34) | In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up.

| (35) | The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28).

| (36) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there.

| (37) | The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (38) | Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this.

| (39) | Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (40) | In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (41) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (43) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules.

| (44) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 10 January 2016.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 10 January 2016, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, on 9 December 2015

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  Documentos n.o 702438-702440, 702442 e 702443.

1

o

(2)  Ver n.o 2 da Decisão n.o 225/14/COL, disponível em linha: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

2

o

o

(3)  Ainda não comunicado.

3

(4)  Documento n.o 776348.

4

o

(5)  Documentos n.o 779603 e 779604.

5

o

(6)  Lei relativa ao registo de coordenação para as entidades jurídicas (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

6

(7)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

7

(8)  JO L 166 de 5.6.2014, p. 44 e Suplemento EEE n.o 33 de 5.6.2014, p. 1.

8

o

(9)  Ponto 6 das OAR.

9

(10)  Ponto 16 das OAR.

10

(11)  Ponto 43 das OAR.

11

(12)  Com base no orçamento notificado de 2013, ver n.o 49 da Decisão n.o 225/14/COL do Órgão de Fiscalização.

12

o

o

(13)  Ponto 71 das OAR.

13

(14)  Documents No 702438-702440, 702442 and 702443.

14

(15)  See paragraph 2 of Decision No 225/14/COL, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

15

(16)  Not yet reported.

16

(17)  Document No 776348.

17

(18)  Documents No 779603 and 779604.

18

(19)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

19

(20)  The Act on the Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

20

(21)  See Order of the EFTA Court of 23.11.2015 in Case E-23/14 INT Kimek Offshore AS v ESA (not yet reported).

21

Kimek Offshore AS

ESA

(22)  OJ L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 and EEA Supplement No 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

22

(23)  The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014 (OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61) at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

23

(24)  Para. 6 of the RAG.

24

(25)  Para. 16 of the RAG.

25

(26)  Para. 43 of the RAG.

26

(27)  Based on the notified 2013 budget, see para. 49 of the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

27

(28)  Para. 71 of the RAG.

28

---

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/29

---

Convite para apresentação de observações, nos termos do artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça, sobre as questões suscitadas acerca do potencial auxílio concedido à Hurtigruten ASA no âmbito do acordo costeiro relativo aos Hurtingen Maritime Services para o período 2012-2019

(2016/C 236/11)

Pela Decisão n.o 490/15/COL, de 9 de dezembro de 2015, publicada na língua que faz fé a seguir ao presente resumo, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA deu início a um procedimento nos termos do artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Parte 1 do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça. As autoridades norueguesas foram informadas mediante cópia da decisão.

Pelo presente, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA convida os Estados da EFTA, os Estados-Membros da UE e as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações sobre a medida em causa no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação da presente comunicação, enviando-as para o seguinte endereço:

| Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA |
| --- |
| Registo |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA

Registo

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

As observações serão comunicadas às autoridades norueguesas. Qualquer parte interessada que apresente observações pode solicitar por escrito o tratamento confidencial da sua identidade, devendo justificar o pedido.

RESUMO

Contexto

A Hurtigruten ASA (a seguir designada «Hurtigruten») explora serviços de transporte marítimo combinado (pessoas e mercadorias) ao longo da costa norueguesa entre Bergen e Kirkenes.

Na sequência de um concurso, em 13 de abril de 2011 foi assinado com a Hurtigruten um acordo relativo à prestação de serviços na rota costeira Bergen-Kirkenes para o período de 1 de janeiro de 2012 a 31 de dezembro de 2019 (a seguir designado «Acordo AH»). Nos termos deste acordo, a Hurtigruten assegura, ao longo de todo o ano, serviços marítimos diários com escala em 32 portos intermédios entre Bergen e Kirkenes. O transporte de mercadorias é igualmente assegurado nas rotas entre Tromsø-Kirkenes e Kirkenes-Tromsø. Os serviços propostos devem preencher determinados requisitos em termos de capacidade e de embarcações, em conformidade com o contrato. As embarcações utilizadas na rota costeira devem poder transportar pelo menos 320 passageiros, dispor de camarotes com beliches para 120 passageiros e ter uma capacidade de transporte de mercadorias para 150 europaletes no porão com uma altura de carga normal. Devem igualmente satisfazer os requisitos legais e técnicos indicados na secção 4.4 do caderno de encargos.

Em relação aos serviços abrangidos pelo Acordo AH, as autoridades norueguesas pagam uma compensação num montante total de 5 120 milhões de NOK durante os oitos anos de vigência do acordo.

Apreciação da compensação concedida sob o ângulo dos auxílios estatais

O único critério do conceito de auxílio estatal que está em causa neste caso é a questão de saber se o contrato conferiu à Hurtingen uma vantagem económica seletiva indevida.

Vantagem económica seletiva a favor da Hurtigruten

O Órgão de Fiscalização analisou as quatro condições enumeradas no acórdão Altmark
   (1) e concluiu que, na fase atual, nenhuma delas parece estar preenchida, sendo assim conferida à Hurtigruten uma vantagem seletiva na aceção do artigo 61.o, n.o 1, do Acordo EEE.

No que respeita à primeira condição de uma definição clara da obrigação de serviço público, o Órgão de Fiscalização manifesta dúvidas quanto ao facto de o requisito relativo à capacidade de reserva constante da secção 4-2 do Acordo AH poder ser classificado pela Noruega como um serviço de interesse económico geral (SIEG) e convida as autoridades norueguesas a fornecer uma justificação objetiva da necessidade de uma obrigação de serviço público (OSP), tendo em conta as flutuações sazonais do transporte comercial de passageiros.

No que diz respeito à segunda condição e ao facto de os parâmetros com base nos quais a compensação é calculada deverem ser previamente estabelecidos de forma objetiva e transparente, o Órgão de Fiscalização interroga-se, na fase atual, se o requisito relativo à reserva de capacidade se prende com o número efetivo de passageiros transportados abrangidos pela OSP. Não foi estabelecida, por exemplo, qualquer metodologia objetiva e transparente para calcular de antemão o custo por passageiro/quilómetro. A Hurtigruten elaborou um orçamento distinto que integra todas as receitas e os custos imputados às rotas abrangidas pela OSP. Esta contabilidade separada não visa, contudo, estabelecer previamente os parâmetros da compensação, que estão diretamente ligados aos prejuízos e aos custos reais (custos em matéria de capacidade e passageiros) suportados pela Hurtigruten.

No que se refere à terceira condição, o Órgão de Fiscalização manifesta dúvidas quanto ao facto de as autoridades norueguesas terem assegurado que a compensação concedida não excede o necessário para cobrir, no todo ou em parte, os custos ocasionados pelo cumprimento das obrigações de serviço público, tendo em conta as receitas obtidas, bem como um lucro razoável pela execução dessas obrigações.

O Órgão de Fiscalização não pode excluir, na fase atual, que a Hurtigruten tenha beneficiado de uma sobrecompensação pela prestação do serviço público. Para chegar a esta conclusão preliminar, o Órgão de Fiscalização analisou os seguintes aspetos:

| i) | a Hurtigruten não reserva uma capacidade para os passageiros abrangidos pelo serviço público, limitando-se a vender a sua capacidade aos passageiros de cruzeiros, mantendo simultaneamente a compensação de serviço público ao mesmo nível; |
| --- | --- |

i)

a Hurtigruten não reserva uma capacidade para os passageiros abrangidos pelo serviço público, limitando-se a vender a sua capacidade aos passageiros de cruzeiros, mantendo simultaneamente a compensação de serviço público ao mesmo nível;

| ii) | a compensação concedida para a prestação do serviço público aumentou substancialmente face ao anterior período contratual; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

a compensação concedida para a prestação do serviço público aumentou substancialmente face ao anterior período contratual;

| iii) | a Hurtigruten continua a beneficiar de uma compensação pelos serviços que não são prestados; e |
| --- | --- |

iii)

a Hurtigruten continua a beneficiar de uma compensação pelos serviços que não são prestados; e

| iv) | a Hurtigruten procura, além disso, obter preços inferiores para as taxas portuárias, mantendo simultaneamente a compensação de serviço público ao mesmo nível. |
| --- | --- |

iv)

a Hurtigruten procura, além disso, obter preços inferiores para as taxas portuárias, mantendo simultaneamente a compensação de serviço público ao mesmo nível.

Por último, no que respeita à quarta condição, que exige o lançamento de um concurso ou de um exercício de comparação com um operador eficiente, e perante o processo de concurso que resultou na apresentação de uma única proposta pela Hurtigruten, o Órgão de Fiscalização interroga-se na fase atual se esse concurso pode ser considerado suficiente para assegurar «o menor custo para a coletividade». Isto é tanto mais válido porquanto a Hurtigruten beneficiou de uma importante vantagem concorrencial que reforçou a sua posição no âmbito do concurso, uma vez que já dispunha de embarcações adaptadas aos requisitos do caderno de encargos.

Além disso, de acordo com o caderno de encargos, a atribuição da execução das OSP foi publicitada sob a forma de três alternativas, o que parece indicar a existência de informações e/ou critérios de ponderação suplementares entre estas alternativas. Tendo em conta o facto de essas informações não terem sido incluídas nos documentos de concurso, o Órgão de Fiscalização tem dúvidas se o concurso, tal como concebido, incentivou outros proponentes potenciais, para além da Hurtigruten, a apresentar propostas em conformidade com os requisitos associados às três alternativas diferentes e para uma outra alternativa que não foi a efetivamente escolhida.

As autoridades norueguesas não apresentaram quaisquer informações sobre o exercício de comparação com um operador eficiente.

Apreciação da compatibilidade

A compatibilidade da compensação de serviço público no domínio dos transportes marítimos é avaliada com base no artigo 59.o, n.o 2, do Acordo EEE, em articulação com o enquadramento dos auxílios estatais sob a forma de compensação de serviço público (a seguir designado o «enquadramento») do Órgão de Fiscalização (2).

Os princípios enunciados no enquadramento só são aplicáveis às compensações de serviço público na medida em que constituam auxílios estatais não abrangidos pela Decisão 2012/21/UE da Comissão relativa à aplicação do artigo 106.o, n.o 2, do Tratado sobre o Funcionamento da União Europeia aos auxílios estatais sob a forma de compensação de serviço público concedidos a certas empresas encarregadas da gestão de serviços de interesse económico geral (Decisão SIEG) (3).

O Órgão de Fiscalização não recebeu quaisquer informações das autoridades norueguesas sobre as considerações em matéria de compatibilidade e, na fase atual, manifesta dúvidas quanto à questão de saber se o Acordo AH é compatível com o funcionamento do Acordo EEE.

Conclusão

Tendo em conta o que precede, o Órgão de Fiscalização da EFTA decidiu dar início ao procedimento formal de investigação em conformidade com o artigo 1.o, n.o 2, da Parte I do Protocolo n.o 3 do Acordo entre os Estados da EFTA relativo à criação de um Órgão de Fiscalização e de um Tribunal de Justiça. Convida-se as partes interessadas a apresentarem as suas observações no prazo de um mês a contar da data de publicação da presente comunicação no Jornal Oficial da União Europeia.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 490/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening the formal investigation procedure on the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019

(Norway)

[NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION]

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 59(2) and 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019.

| (2) | A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text.

| (3) | By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015.

2.   Background – the Hurtigruten Agreement

| (4) | Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

  Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route

| (5) | The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid.

| (6) | The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5) |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5)

| (7) | Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications.

| (8) | The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities.

| (9) | For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport.

| (10) | For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

  Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA







  2012 | NOK 700 million |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | NOK 683 million |
| 2014 | NOK 666 million |
| 2015 | NOK 649 million |
| 2016 | NOK 631 million |
| 2017 | NOK 614 million |
| 2018 | NOK 597 million |
| 2019 | NOK 580 million |

(10)

For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA

2012

NOK 700 million

2013

NOK 683 million

2014

NOK 666 million

2015

NOK 649 million

2016

NOK 631 million

2017

NOK 614 million

2018

NOK 597 million

2019

NOK 580 million

| (11) | According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route.

3.   The complaints
   (8)

| (12) | Both complainants have requested confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Both complainants have requested confidential treatment.

| (13) | The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:






  1. | The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:

1.

The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period.

| 2. | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:






  a. | Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:

a.

Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services.

| b. | Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.
  The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.
  In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions. |
| --- | --- |

b.

Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.

The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.

In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions.

| 3. | Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level.

| 4. | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities
   (10)

| (14) | On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes.

| (15) | Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million.

| (16) | Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013).

| (17) | As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions.

| (18) | Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12).

| (19) | In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo.

| (20) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing.

| (21) | As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis.

| (22) | The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices.

| (23) | It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction.

| (24) | In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service.

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand.

| (26) | For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge.

4.1   
  The BDO report

   (14)

| (27) | The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services).

| (28) | In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers.

| (29) | [...] |
| --- | --- |

(29)

[...]

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

1.1   
  The concept of state aid

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (31) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.2   
  State resources

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources.

1.3   
  Impact on trade and distortion of competition

| (33) | The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

| (34) | According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States.

| (35) | The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten.

1.4   
  Selective economic advantage on Hurtigruten

| (36) | The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (37) | It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  i. | ‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

i.

‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined;

| ii. | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...]; |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...];

| iii. | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;

| iv. | Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19) |
| --- | --- |

iv.

Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19)

1.4.1   The first Altmark condition

| (38) | The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel.

| (39) | Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20).

| (40) | In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21).

| (41) | However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23).

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service.

| (43) | Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower.

| (44) | For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation.

| (45) | The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged.

| (46) | In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA.

| (47) | The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation.

| (48) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met.

1.4.2   The second Altmark condition

| (49) | The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations.

| (50) | Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’.

| (51) | It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

  Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service







  A: | Total revenues distance passengers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| B: | Passengers cost distance passengers |
| C: | Net passenger revenues (A+B) |
| D: | Revenues from on board sales |
| E: | Net revenues from goods and cars |
| F: | Other revenues |
| G: | Total own revenues (C+D+E+F) |
| H: | Government procurement of service |
| I: | Total revenue (G+H) |
| J: | Safety crew |
| K: | Oil and fuel |
| L: | Repairs and maintenance |
| M: | Port costs |
| N: | Insurance costs |
| O: | Depreciation own vessels/bareboat |
| P: | Net financial costs |
| Q: | Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P) |
| R: | Cost of goods sold |
| S: | Crew not included in the safety crew |
| T: | Marketing costs and sales provision |
| U: | Administration costs |
| V: | Other costs |
| W: | Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V) |
| X: | Total costs public service (Q+W) |
| Y: | Net result before taxes (I-X) |

(51)

It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service

A:

Total revenues distance passengers

B:

Passengers cost distance passengers

C:

Net passenger revenues (A+B)

D:

Revenues from on board sales

E:

Net revenues from goods and cars

F:

Other revenues

G:

Total own revenues (C+D+E+F)

H:

Government procurement of service

I:

Total revenue (G+H)

J:

Safety crew

K:

Oil and fuel

L:

Repairs and maintenance

M:

Port costs

N:

Insurance costs

O:

Depreciation own vessels/bareboat

P:

Net financial costs

Q:

Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P)

R:

Cost of goods sold

S:

Crew not included in the safety crew

T:

Marketing costs and sales provision

U:

Administration costs

V:

Other costs

W:

Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V)

X:

Total costs public service (Q+W)

Y:

Net result before taxes (I-X)

| (52) | In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers.

| (54) | At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre.

| (55) | Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs).

| (56) | In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26).

| (57) | In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27).

| (58) | In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn).

| (59) | The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service.

| (60) | Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition.

| (61) | As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled.

1.4.3   The third Altmark condition

| (62) | When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (63) | In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28).

| (64) | Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:






  i) | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:

i)

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| ii) | The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly

| iv) | Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| (65) | As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation.

| (66) | The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year.

| (67) | The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers.

| (68) | Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120.

| (69) | In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded.

| (70) | Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation.

| (71) | On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions.

| (72) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted.

| (73) | Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided.

| (75) | Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period.

| (76) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled.

1.4.4   The fourth Altmark condition

| (77) | Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013).

| (78) | Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below.

| (79) | Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications.

| (80) | Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:








  i. | : | Alternative 1 | : | Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ii. | : | Alternative 2 | : | Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and |
| iii. | : | Alternative 3 | : | Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports. |

(80)

Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:

i.

:

Alternative 1

:

Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports;

ii.

:

Alternative 2

:

Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and

iii.

:

Alternative 3

:

Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports.

| (81) | However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1).

| (82) | The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped.

| (83) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met.

1.4.5   Conclusion on the Altmark conditions

| (84) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations.

2.   Conclusion on the presence of aid

| (85) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (86) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (87) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1   
  The legal framework

| (88) | The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33).

| (89) | The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34).

| (90) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility.

4.2   
  Applicability of Decision 2012/21/EU

| (91) | The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

| (92) | There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:







  ‘(d) | compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:

‘(d)

compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’;

| (93) | The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers.

| (94) | In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit.

| (95) | The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with.

4.3   
  Applicability of the Framework

| (96) | On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’.

| (97) | Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36) |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36)

| (98) | On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service.

| (99) | The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:
  a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;
  b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;
  c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;
  d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;
  e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;
  f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;
  g.   Paragraph 60: transparency. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:

a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;

b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;

c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;

d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;

e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;

f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;

g.   Paragraph 60: transparency.

| (100) | The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (101) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (102) | The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (103) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (104) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules.

| (105) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten.

| (106) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. They are further requested to provide, also within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 4

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, on 9 December 2015.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Svedman

President

Helga Jónsdóttir

College Member

---

(1)  Acórdão proferido no processo C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH e Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg/Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), UE:C:2003:415, n.os 87 a 93.

1

Altmark Trans GmbH e Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg/Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

os

(2)  A consultar em http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

2

(3)  JO L 7 de 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporado no ponto 1h do anexo XV do Acordo EEE.

3

(4)  OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1. See also Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, upholding the Authority's Decision.

4

Hurtigruten

(5)  See www.doffin.no.

5

(6)  If Statistics Norway's cost index is unavailable, Statistics Norway's Consumer Price Index would be used.

6

(7)  As mentioned in the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL ‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’, section 1.2.

7

‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’,

(8)  Doc Nos 748323 and 715314.

8

(9)  The complainants point to the fact that in the call for tender for the 2005-2012 contract period force majeure as a result of extreme weather conditions was defined as wind speeds over 25 m/s (full storm). However, in the current HA, ‘extreme weather conditions’ are defined as ‘conditions where ocean and/or wind conditions are such that the ship's captain judges it to be unsafe to continue the sailing and/or arrive at a specific port’. This, according to the complainants, has resulted in the majority of the cancellations during the period 2012-2013 in select ports to have occurred at wind conditions below 15 m/s.

9

force majeure

(10)  Doc Nos 723002 and 742652.

10

(11)  The Norwegian authorities submit that according to Hurtigruten's reports, ships were out of production for 171 operating days in 2012 and 186.7 operating days in 2013 due to maintenance and unforeseen operational disturbances, for 5 operating days in 2012 and 12.8 operating days in 2013 due to the ships being used for cultural or similar activities, and finally for 87 operating days in 2012 and 99.8 operating days in 2013 due to extraordinary weather conditions.

11

(12)  On 12 December 2014, Hurtigruten paid back to the Norwegian authorities the amount of NOK [24 – 32] million due to cancellations in 2012 and 2013.

12

(13)  The previous NPA of 1984 distinguished between port fees and service charges. There were several different port fees, e.g. quay fees covering quay costs, approach fees covering costs of keeping the fairway and port approach open and safe, passenger fees covering costs of special passenger facilities etc. Ports could additionally levy service charges for services they sold, which were not covered by the port fees.

13

(14)  BDO Memo, ‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’, Oslo 14 January 2015, p. 7.

14

‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’

(15)  Judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11; judgment in Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41; and judgment in Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 75.

15

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7).

16

(17)  The maritime cabotage regulation was incorporated at point 53a in Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 30, 5.2.1998, p. 42).

17

(18)  Norwegian Cruise Line, MSC Cruises, Royal Caribbean, Holland America Line, etc.

18

(19)  Paragraphs 87-93.

19

(20)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15132&1=1.

20

(21)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

21

(22)  Judgment in Alanir and others, C-205/1999, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 34.

22

Alanir and others

(23)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions updating and rectifying the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), COM(2003) 595 final, 22.12.2003, section 5.2.

23

(24)  BDO Memo, page 7.

24

(25)  Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraph 117.

25

Hurtigruten

(26)  Ibid, paragraphs 128-129.

26

(27)  Ibid, paragraph 127.

27

(28)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, judgment in Enirisorse, C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, paragraphs 37-40.

28

Enirisorse

(29)  Section 2.

29

(30)  See footnote 11.

30

(31)  Paragraph 68, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

31

(32)  For background information on the Hurtigruten Agreement, see Decision No 205/11/COL on the Supplementary Agreement on the Hurtigruten service, section 2, OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1.

32

(33)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

33

(34)  OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporated at point 1h of Annex XV of the EEA Agreement.

34

(35)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

35

Italy

Commission

(36)  See also paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Framework for alternative calculation methods.

36

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| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/45 |
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30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/45

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Anúncio da Noruega relativo à Diretiva 94/22/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho relativa às condições de concessão e de utilização das autorizações de prospeção, pesquisa e produção de hidrocarbonetos

Anúncio de convite à apresentação de pedidos de licença de produção de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa — «Awards in Predefined Areas 2016»

(2016/C 236/12)

O Ministério do Petróleo e da Energia norueguês anuncia um convite à apresentação de pedidos de licenças de produção de petróleo, em conformidade com o artigo 3.o, n.o 2, alínea a), da Diretiva 94/22/CE do Parlamento Europeu e do Conselho, de 30 de maio de 1994, relativa às condições de concessão e de utilização das autorizações de prospeção, pesquisa e produção de hidrocarbonetos (1).

As licenças de produção só serão concedidas a sociedades por ações registadas na Noruega ou noutro Estado parte no Acordo sobre o Espaço Económico Europeu (Acordo EEE) ou a pessoas singulares domiciliadas num Estado parte no Acordo EEE.

Podem ser concedidas licenças de produção às empresas que não são titulares de licenças na plataforma continental norueguesa, se tiverem sido pré-qualificadas para o efeito.

As empresas que apresentem pedidos individuais e as que apresentem um pedido enquanto parte de um grupo serão tratadas da mesma forma pelo Ministério. Tanto os candidatos que apresentem um pedido individual como os candidatos que façam parte de um grupo que apresente um pedido conjunto serão considerados como um só candidato a uma licença de produção. Com base nas candidaturas apresentadas por grupos ou por candidatos individuais, o Ministério pode determinar a composição dos grupos de licenças aos quais é atribuída uma licença de produção, nomeadamente afastar candidatos pertencentes a um grupo que apresenta um pedido e acrescentar candidatos individuais, bem como designar o operador para esses grupos.

A concessão de uma participação numa licença de produção ficará sujeita à participação dos titulares de licenças num acordo com vista ao exercício de atividades no domínio do petróleo, incluindo um acordo de exploração comum e um acordo contabilístico. Se a licença de produção estiver dividida do ponto de vista estratigráfico, os titulares das duas licenças assim divididas devem também celebrar um acordo específico de exploração comum que reja as suas relações neste domínio.

Após terem assinado os referidos acordos, os titulares de licenças constituirão uma empresa comum na qual a importância da sua participação será sempre idêntica à respetiva participação na licença de produção.

Os documentos de autorização basear-se-ão principalmente nos documentos pertinentes dos «Awards in Predefined Areas 2015». O objetivo consiste em disponibilizar ao setor os principais elementos dos eventuais ajustamentos do quadro antes da apresentação dos pedidos.

Critérios de concessão de uma licença de produção

A fim de promover uma boa gestão dos recursos, bem como uma exploração e produção de petróleo rápidas e eficientes na plataforma continental norueguesa, incluindo a composição dos grupos de titulares de licenças que permitirão alcançar este objetivo, devem ser aplicados os seguintes critérios à concessão de participações nas licenças de produção e à designação do operador:

| a) | o conhecimento geológico da área geográfica em questão por parte do candidato e a forma como os titulares de licenças tencionam proceder a uma exploração eficiente do petróleo; |
| --- | --- |

a)

o conhecimento geológico da área geográfica em questão por parte do candidato e a forma como os titulares de licenças tencionam proceder a uma exploração eficiente do petróleo;

| b) | as competências técnicas pertinentes do candidato e a forma como estas competências podem contribuir ativamente para uma exploração e, se for caso disso, a produção de petróleo rentáveis na área geográfica em questão; |
| --- | --- |

b)

as competências técnicas pertinentes do candidato e a forma como estas competências podem contribuir ativamente para uma exploração e, se for caso disso, a produção de petróleo rentáveis na área geográfica em questão;

| c) | a experiência anterior do candidato na plataforma continental norueguesa ou uma experiência pertinente equivalente noutras áreas; |
| --- | --- |

c)

a experiência anterior do candidato na plataforma continental norueguesa ou uma experiência pertinente equivalente noutras áreas;

| d) | o candidato deve dispor da capacidade financeira necessária para realizar a exploração e, se for caso disso, para produzir petróleo na área geográfica em questão; |
| --- | --- |

d)

o candidato deve dispor da capacidade financeira necessária para realizar a exploração e, se for caso disso, para produzir petróleo na área geográfica em questão;

| e) | se o candidato é ou foi titular de uma licença, o Ministério pode ter em conta qualquer forma de ineficiência ou de falta de responsabilização demonstrada pelo candidato como titular de uma licença; |
| --- | --- |

e)

se o candidato é ou foi titular de uma licença, o Ministério pode ter em conta qualquer forma de ineficiência ou de falta de responsabilização demonstrada pelo candidato como titular de uma licença;

| f) | as licenças de produção serão principalmente concedidas a uma empresa comum em que, pelo menos, um titular de licença tenha efetuado, no mínimo, uma perfuração para a exploração de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operador ou possua uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora da referida plataforma; |
| --- | --- |

f)

as licenças de produção serão principalmente concedidas a uma empresa comum em que, pelo menos, um titular de licença tenha efetuado, no mínimo, uma perfuração para a exploração de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operador ou possua uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora da referida plataforma;

| g) | as licenças de produção serão principalmente concedidas a dois ou mais titulares de licenças, em que pelo menos um deles possua a experiência referida na alínea f); |
| --- | --- |

g)

as licenças de produção serão principalmente concedidas a dois ou mais titulares de licenças, em que pelo menos um deles possua a experiência referida na alínea f);

| h) | o operador designado para as licenças de produção no mar de Barents deve ter efetuado, pelo menos, uma perfuração para a exploração de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operador ou possuir uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora da referida plataforma; |
| --- | --- |

h)

o operador designado para as licenças de produção no mar de Barents deve ter efetuado, pelo menos, uma perfuração para a exploração de petróleo na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operador ou possuir uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora da referida plataforma;

| i) | no que se refere às licenças de produção em águas profundas, o operador designado e, pelo menos, um outro titular da licença devem ter efetuado, no mínimo, uma perfuração na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operadores ou possuírem uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora dessa plataforma. Na licença de produção, um dos titulares deve ter efetuado uma perfuração em águas profundas enquanto operador; |
| --- | --- |

i)

no que se refere às licenças de produção em águas profundas, o operador designado e, pelo menos, um outro titular da licença devem ter efetuado, no mínimo, uma perfuração na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operadores ou possuírem uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora dessa plataforma. Na licença de produção, um dos titulares deve ter efetuado uma perfuração em águas profundas enquanto operador;

| j) | no que se refere às licenças de produção em que se espera efetuar uma perfuração para a exploração de petróleo a pressões elevadas e/ou a altas temperaturas, o operador designado e, pelo menos, um outro titular da licença devem ter efetuado, no mínimo, uma perfuração na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operadores ou possuírem uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora dessa plataforma. Na licença de produção, um dos titulares deve ter efetuado uma perfuração a pressões elevadas e/ou a altas temperaturas enquanto operador. |
| --- | --- |

j)

no que se refere às licenças de produção em que se espera efetuar uma perfuração para a exploração de petróleo a pressões elevadas e/ou a altas temperaturas, o operador designado e, pelo menos, um outro titular da licença devem ter efetuado, no mínimo, uma perfuração na plataforma continental norueguesa enquanto operadores ou possuírem uma experiência operacional pertinente equivalente fora dessa plataforma. Na licença de produção, um dos titulares deve ter efetuado uma perfuração a pressões elevadas e/ou a altas temperaturas enquanto operador.

Blocos para os quais devem ser apresentados os pedidos

Os pedidos de participação nas licenças de produção podem ser apresentados relativamente aos blocos que não estão licenciados na área previamente definida, ilustrada nos mapas publicado pela NPD. É igualmente possível apresentar um pedido relativo a uma superfície abandonada na área previamente definida, após o anúncio, em conformidade com os mapas atualizados incluídos nos mapas factuais interativos (interactive Factmaps) que estão disponíveis na página web da NPD.

Cada licença de produção pode incluir um ou mais blocos ou uma ou mais partes de blocos. Os candidatos são convidados a limitar o seu pedido às zonas em que determinaram o potencial de extração.

O texto integral do anúncio, incluindo os mapas pormenorizados das áreas disponíveis, pode ser consultado no sítio da Norwegian Petroleum Directorate: www.npd.no/apa2016.

Os pedidos de licenças de produção de petróleo devem ser apresentados ao:

| Ministério do Petróleo e da Energia |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 8148 Dep. |
| N-0033 Oslo |
| NORUEGA |

Ministério do Petróleo e da Energia

P.O. Box 8148 Dep.

N-0033 Oslo

NORUEGA

Devem ser apresentadas duas cópias à:

| Direção do Petróleo da Noruega |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 600 |
| N-4003 Stavanger |
| NORUEGA |

Direção do Petróleo da Noruega

P.O. Box 600

N-4003 Stavanger

NORUEGA

Data-limite: 6 de setembro de 2016, às 12h00.

A concessão de licenças para a produção de petróleo no quadro dos «Awards in Predefined Areas 2016» na plataforma continental norueguesa está prevista para o primeiro trimestre de 2017.

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(1)  JO L 164 de 30.6.1994, p. 3.

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V Avisos

PROCEDIMENTOS ADMINISTRATIVOS

Comissão Europeia

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/47 |
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30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/47

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Convite à apresentação de propostas no âmbito do programa de trabalho plurianual para a concessão de apoio financeiro no domínio das infraestruturas energéticas transeuropeias, ao abrigo do Mecanismo Interligar a Europa, para o período de 2014-2020

[Decisão C(2016) 1587 da Comissão]

(2016/C 236/13)

A Direção-Geral da Energia da Comissão Europeia lança um convite à apresentação de propostas, com vista à concessão de subsídios, em conformidade com as prioridades e os objetivos definidos no programa de trabalho plurianual no domínio das infraestruturas energéticas transeuropeias, ao abrigo do Mecanismo Interligar a Europa, para o período de 2014-2020.

Solicita-se a apresentação de propostas em resposta ao seguinte convite:

CEF-Energy-2016-2

O montante indicativo disponível para as propostas selecionadas no âmbito do presente convite é de 600 milhões de EUR.

As propostas devem ser apresentadas até 8 de novembro de 2016.

O texto integral do convite está disponível em:

https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/https%3A//ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/calls/second-2016-cef-energy-call-proposals-2016-2

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PROCEDIMENTOS RELATIVOS À EXECUÇÃO DA POLÍTICA DE CONCORRÊNCIA

Comissão Europeia

| 30.6.2016 | PT | Jornal Oficial da União Europeia | C 236/48 |
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30.6.2016

PT

Jornal Oficial da União Europeia

C 236/48

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Notificação prévia de uma concentração

(Processo M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International)

Processo suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento simplificado

(Texto relevante para efeitos do EEE)

(2016/C 236/14)

| 1. | Em 21 de junho de 2016, a Comissão recebeu a notificação de um projeto de concentração nos termos do artigo 4.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1), pelo qual a BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV («BNPPF PE», Bélgica), a Sofindev IV NV («Sofindev», Bélgica) e a DHAM NV («Korys/Colruyt Group», Bélgica) adquirem, na aceção do artigo 3.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento das Concentrações, o controlo conjunto da Novy International NV («Novy», Bélgica), mediante aquisição de ações. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Em 21 de junho de 2016, a Comissão recebeu a notificação de um projeto de concentração nos termos do artigo 4.o do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (1), pelo qual a BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV («BNPPF PE», Bélgica), a Sofindev IV NV («Sofindev», Bélgica) e a DHAM NV («Korys/Colruyt Group», Bélgica) adquirem, na aceção do artigo 3.o, n.o 1, alínea b), do Regulamento das Concentrações, o controlo conjunto da Novy International NV («Novy», Bélgica), mediante aquisição de ações.

| 2. | As atividades das empresas em causa são as seguintes:
  —   BNPPF PE: private equity e financiamento mezzanine. As suas empresas em carteira operam em setores como o do fabrico e fornecimento de componentes metálicos e plásticos, fundos de capital de arranque para universidades, produtos de panificação, prestação de serviços industriais e bens imobiliários,
  —   Sofindev: investimentos em private equity em pequenas e médias empresas belgas. As suas empresas em carteira são ativas na distribuição de materiais para telhados e fachadas e no desenvolvimento de soluções de software para localização,
  —   Korys/Colruyt Group: mercados retalhista, grossista e de restauração. Ativa igualmente nos setores de soluções de software, projetos de energia sustentável/renovável e no mercado médico/ciências da vida,
  —   Novy: conceção, fabrico e comercialização de equipamento de cozinha de topo de gama, principalmente exaustores de cozinha. |
| --- | --- |

2.

As atividades das empresas em causa são as seguintes:

—   BNPPF PE: private equity e financiamento mezzanine. As suas empresas em carteira operam em setores como o do fabrico e fornecimento de componentes metálicos e plásticos, fundos de capital de arranque para universidades, produtos de panificação, prestação de serviços industriais e bens imobiliários,

—   Sofindev: investimentos em private equity em pequenas e médias empresas belgas. As suas empresas em carteira são ativas na distribuição de materiais para telhados e fachadas e no desenvolvimento de soluções de software para localização,

—   Korys/Colruyt Group: mercados retalhista, grossista e de restauração. Ativa igualmente nos setores de soluções de software, projetos de energia sustentável/renovável e no mercado médico/ciências da vida,

—   Novy: conceção, fabrico e comercialização de equipamento de cozinha de topo de gama, principalmente exaustores de cozinha.

| 3. | Após uma análise preliminar, a Comissão considera que a operação notificada pode ser abrangida pelo âmbito de aplicação do Regulamento das Concentrações. Reserva-se, contudo, o direito de tomar uma decisão definitiva sobre este ponto. De acordo com a Comunicação da Comissão relativa a um procedimento simplificado para o tratamento de certas concentrações nos termos do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (2), o referido processo é suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento previsto na comunicação. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Após uma análise preliminar, a Comissão considera que a operação notificada pode ser abrangida pelo âmbito de aplicação do Regulamento das Concentrações. Reserva-se, contudo, o direito de tomar uma decisão definitiva sobre este ponto. De acordo com a Comunicação da Comissão relativa a um procedimento simplificado para o tratamento de certas concentrações nos termos do Regulamento (CE) n.o 139/2004 do Conselho (2), o referido processo é suscetível de beneficiar do procedimento previsto na comunicação.

| 4. | A Comissão solicita aos terceiros interessados que lhe apresentem eventuais observações sobre o projeto de concentração.
  As observações devem chegar à Comissão no prazo de 10 dias após a data da presente publicação. Podem ser enviadas por fax (+32 22964301), por correio eletrónico para COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ou por via postal, com a referência M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, para o seguinte endereço:





  Comissão Europeia |
| --- | --- |
| Direção-Geral da Concorrência |
| Registo das Concentrações |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

A Comissão solicita aos terceiros interessados que lhe apresentem eventuais observações sobre o projeto de concentração.

As observações devem chegar à Comissão no prazo de 10 dias após a data da presente publicação. Podem ser enviadas por fax (+32 22964301), por correio eletrónico para COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu ou por via postal, com a referência M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, para o seguinte endereço:

Comissão Europeia

Direção-Geral da Concorrência

Registo das Concentrações

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  JO L 24 de 29.1.2004, p. 1 («Regulamento das Concentrações»).

(2)  JO C 366 de 14.12.2013, p. 5.

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