[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12220

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

PARVATHI SIVANADIYAN, 

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 1:14-cr-00391-TCB-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12220

Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

In 2014, Parvathi Sivanadiyan pleaded guilty, pursuant to a 

written plea agreement, to failing to obey an IRS summons. The 

plea agreement contained a binding sentencing agreement, 

pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), 

which provided that the Government and Sivanadiyan agreed 

that she would “receive a sentence of time served to be followed 

by up to a one year term of supervised release or probation,” and 

that she would “be ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $5,000.” 

Additionally, the plea agreement contained a limited sentence 

appeal waiver, which provided that Sivanadiyan waived her right 

to appeal her conviction and sentence on any ground (including 

through a collateral attack), except that she could appeal if she 

received, in relevant part, “any sentence other than time served to 

be followed by up to a one year term of supervised release or 

probation, to be determined in the [c]ourt’s discretion, along with 

a $5,000 fine.” 

Sivanadiyan was sentenced in accordance with the terms of 

the plea agreement to time served and one year of supervised 

release, along with a fine of $5,000. Sivanadiyan paid the fine in 

full in November 2014, and completed her sentence. 

Over six years later, in March 2021, Sivanadiyan, through 

her husband, filed a motion seeking to “correct misstatements” 

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21-12220 Opinion of the Court 3

and requesting a refund of “‘excess fines’ charged in violation of 

law.” She asserted that she was entitled to a refund of $4,000 of 

the $5,000 fine she paid because it was in excess of the maximum 

$1,000 fine for failing to obey an IRS summons. 

The district court denied Sivanadiyan’s motion. It found 

that it did not have jurisdiction because Sivanadiyan’s conviction 

was final, and the court was not authorized by statute to modify 

her sentence.1 

Sivanadiyan now appeals the denial of that motion, and the 

government seeks to dismiss her appeal based on her sentenceappeal waiver. In response, Sivanadiyan argues that she is not 

challenging her conviction or sentence, and is seeking to only 

correct a misstatement of law, which her plea agreement 

authorized her to do. 

Sivanadiyan’s argument is misplaced. The $5,000 fine was 

imposed as part of her sentence. Therefore, any challenge to the 

legality of the fine is barred by the sentence-appeal waiver 

provided that the waiver is valid and enforceable. Our review of 

the record confirms that the district court specifically questioned 

Sivanadiyan about the sentence-appeal waiver during the plea 

colloquy, and she stated that she understood the terms of the 

1 The district court noted that, if it had jurisdiction, her claim would fail on 

the merits because 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(5) authorizes a fine of up to $100,000 

for a Class A misdemeanor, like Sivanadiyan’s crime, and overrides the fine 

provision in 26 U.S.C. § 7210, which provides that a person who fails to obey 

a summons “shall . . . be fined not more than $1,000 . . . .” 

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-12220

waiver. Further, she does not dispute the validity of the waiver 

on appeal or that she understood it. Rather, she argues that the 

waiver does not apply, but that contention is incorrect because 

the fine was part of her sentence. Accordingly, the sentenceappeal waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made and is 

enforceable. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350–51 

(11th Cir. 1993) (explaining that we enforce appeal waivers that 

are made knowingly and voluntarily and to demonstrate that a 

waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, the government 

must show that either (1) the district court specifically questioned 

the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy or (2) the 

record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the 

full significance of the waiver); see also United States v. Weaver, 

275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (enforcing an appeal waiver 

where “the waiver provision was referenced during [the 

defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant] agreed that 

she understood the provision and that she entered into it freely 

and voluntarily”).

Because Sivanadiyan’s claim concerning the already-paid 

fine does not fall within any of the exceptions to her valid 

sentence-appeal waiver, the waiver forecloses this appeal. See 

United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 

2005) (holding that a valid appeal waiver waives the right to 

appeal “difficult or debatable legal issues or even blatant error”). 

Consequently, we GRANT the government’s motion to dismiss. 

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