Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

Order 

December 2, 2009 

137527 

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, 

as Trustee for BANKBOSTON HOME 

EQUITY LOAN TRUST 1998-1, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137527 

 COA: 272431 

Ct of Claims: 03-000057-MT 

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY and 

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, 

Defendants-Appellants. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal having been granted and 

the briefs and oral arguments of the parties having been considered by the Court, we 

hereby REVERSE the September 9, 2008 judgment of the Court of Appeals. For the 

reasons stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, we find that BankBoston 

received constitutionally sufficient notice. We REMAND this case to the Court of 

Claims for consideration of the issues raised by the plaintiff but not addressed by that 

court during its initial consideration of this case. 

CORRIGAN, J. (concurring). 

I concur in the order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

remanding to the Court of Claims for consideration of plaintiff’s remaining issues. I also 

concur with Justice Young that any additional inquiry regarding the quality of notice 

given to plaintiff’s assignor is unnecessary. I write separately to underscore my 

agreement with the well-reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion 

concerning why plaintiff lacks standing to assert BankBoston’s right to notice. A 

thorough review of the stipulated facts and exhibits fails to show how the mortgage 

assignment from BankBoston to plaintiff, which occurred after the certificate of 

forfeiture had already been recorded, left BankBoston with any residual property interest. 

See MCL 211.78i(6). Moreover, “it is well settled that the right to notice is personal and 

cannot be challenged by anyone other than the person entitled to notice.” In re AMB, 248 
I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

December 2, 2009 

p1124 

 

2

Mich App 144, 176 (2001). Therefore, plaintiff’s status as the trustee for a separate legal 

entity, BankBoston Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1, does not magically fulfill the 

statutory and constitutional prerequisites for plaintiff to file suit on behalf of a party that 

previously transferred its entire interest. See MCL 600.2041; Lee v Macomb Co Bd of 

Comm’rs, 464 Mich 726, 740 (2001). Accordingly, I agree with the Court of Appeals 

dissent that “there is no evidence that the single, isolated mortgage assignment imbued 

plaintiff with any continuing association with BankBoston, endowed it with any 

derivative entitlement to know BankBoston’s affairs, or enabled it to raise BankBoston’s 

legal claims, if any still existed.” First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v Dep’t of Treasury, 280 

Mich App 571, 593 (2008). 

MARKMAN, J., joins the statement of CORRIGAN, J. 

 YOUNG, J. (concurring). 

 I concur in the order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 

remanding the case to the Court of Claims for consideration of plaintiff’s remaining 

issues. I would further note that the constructive notice provided by recording a 

certificate of forfeiture pursuant to MCL 211.78g(2) provides constitutionally adequate 

notice for those property interests that are unknown and not of record at the time the 

property is forfeited to the county treasurer. See Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & 

Trust Co, 339 US 306, 317 (1950); Mennonite Bd of Missions v Adams, 462 US 791, 798 

(1983). Moreover, this particular method of notice “is not substantially less likely to 

bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes,” Mullane, 339 US 

at 315, and is given in addition to other methods of constructive notice required by law. 

MCL 211.78i(3)(d) and (5). Because plaintiff has received constitutionally adequate 

notice, I believe that any further inquiry into the quality of notice given to plaintiff’s 

assignor is wholly unnecessary. 

 CORRIGAN and MARKMAN, JJ., join the statement of YOUNG, J.