1

Filed 12/21/20

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

----

MIGUEL ANGEL ROJAS-CIFUENTES,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN JOAQUIN 

COUNTY,

Respondent;

AMERICAN MODULAR SYSTEMS, INC.,

Real Party in Interest.

C085463

(Super. Ct. No. 

STKCVUOE20150007793)

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING in mandate. Petition granted. F. Clark Sueyres, Jr.,

Judge.

Mallison & Martinez, Marco A. Palau, Hilary Hammell, Eric S. Trabucco for 

Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Boutin Jones Inc., Bruce M. Timm, Kimberly A. Lucia, Andrew M. Ducart for 

Real Party in Interest.
2

Miguel Angel Rojas-Cifuentes (Rojas) brought this representative action against 

his former employer, American Modular Systems, Inc. (American Modular or AMS), on 

behalf of himself, other former and current employees of American Modular, and the 

State of California. Relevant here, relying on the Labor Code Private Attorneys General 

Act of 2004 (PAGA; Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.),1 Rojas seeks to recover civil penalties 

for labor violations that American Modular allegedly committed against its nonexempt 

employees. 

The trial court, however, rejected Rojas’s PAGA claim following American 

Modular’s motion for summary adjudication. As the court noted, those seeking to bring 

PAGA causes of action must, before filing suit, provide notice to a certain state agency of 

the laws the employer allegedly violated and the “facts and theories” supporting those 

allegations. But, the court found, Rojas failed to satisfy this threshold requirement. In 

particular, although the court found Rojas provided written notice to the state before he 

filed suit, it found his notice failed to include sufficient facts and theories to support his 

claims. It thus rejected his PAGA cause of action for failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies.

After Rojas filed a petition for writ of mandate seeking to set aside the court’s 

decision, we directed American Modular to show cause why the writ should not be 

issued. Because, unlike the trial court, we find Rojas’s PAGA notice supplied sufficient 

facts and theories to support at least some of his claims, we now issue a writ of mandate 

directing the trial court to set aside its order granting American Modular’s motion for 

summary adjudication.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
3

BACKGROUND

Rojas was a former employee of American Modular who was terminated in 

August of 2014. Shortly after, he sought to bring a representative action against 

American Modular under PAGA—a law that authorizes employees who have been the 

subject of certain Labor Code violations to file representative actions on behalf of 

themselves and other aggrieved employees. (§ 2699.)

Before bringing a PAGA action, however, Rojas first needed to provide notice to 

American Modular and the Labor and Workforce Development Agency “of the specific 

provisions of [the Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and 

theories to support the alleged violation.” (§ 2699.3, subds. (a)(1)(A), (c)(1)(A).) To that 

end, Rojas sent a letter in August of 2015 to American Modular and the Labor and 

Workforce Development Agency in which he alleged that American Modular

“systematic[ally] fail[ed] to pay current and former California non-exempt employees of 

AMS in conformance with [certain California laws].” He alleged that the “core” of these 

violations concerned “the systematic failure to keep accurate time and payroll records, 

and systematic failure to compensate employees for substantial portions of their 

workday.” He then detailed eight specific labor laws that American Modular allegedly 

violated through this conduct. For example, he asserted that American Modular violated 

“minimum and overtime wage[] [laws] by failing to compensate for all hours worked” 

because it “requir[ed] or knowingly permitt[ed] employees to work before and after the 

shift without compensation, unlawfully round[ed] employee time to the detriment of the

employee, [failed to compensate for time spent] donning and doffing, automatically 

deduct[ed] 30 minutes for meal periods not taken or meal periods that last less than 30

minutes, and manipulat[ed] time to avoid overtime compensation and compensation for 

all hours worked.” At the close of his letter, Rojas noted that he intended to file a civil 

action against American Modular under PAGA unless the Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency brought its own action.
4

Shortly after sending the letter, Rojas filed a complaint against American Modular

that included a PAGA claim, several non-PAGA class action claims, and an individual 

claim. Rojas’s PAGA claim was premised on the eight violations that he alleged in his 

letter to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency.

A year later, American Modular filed a motion for summary adjudication, 

contending that Rojas’s PAGA cause of action failed as a matter of law. It reasoned that 

“summary adjudication in favor of AMS on [Rojas’s PAGA] Cause of Action is proper 

because the Court lacks jurisdiction over [Rojas’s] PAGA claim due to [Rojas’s] failure 

to satisfy PAGA’s administrative exhaustion requirement.” In particular, American 

Modular contended, Rojas’s PAGA notice fell short of satisfying administrative 

exhaustion requirements because it failed to allege any “facts and theories” supporting 

Rojas’s claims.

The trial court agreed, finding that Rojas failed to allege sufficient “facts and 

theories” in his PAGA notice for three reasons. First, it found five of the eight 

paragraphs in Rojas’s PAGA notice that detailed American Modular’s alleged violations 

“[we]re merely statements of the statute or statements which ‘mimic’ the statute.” 

Second, it found Rojas was too “non-specific as to who was harmed by the alleged 

violations.” And third, it noted that Rojas’s notice “contain[ed] no allegations as to [his] 

status[,] failing to even identify [Rojas] as a current or former employee.” For these 

reasons, the court concluded that Rojas “failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by 

failing to provide the employer with sufficient notice.” It thus granted American 

Modular’s motion. It also granted Rojas leave to amend his complaint.

After Rojas sought writ review of the court’s decision, we directed American 

Modular to show cause why the writ should not be issued.2 

2 Both parties ask that we take judicial notice of documents filed after the trial 

court’s decision. American Modular asks that we take judicial notice of Rojas’s second 
5

DISCUSSION

“The Legislature enacted PAGA to remedy systemic underenforcement of many 

worker protections. This underenforcement was a product of two related problems. First, 

many Labor Code provisions contained only criminal sanctions, and district attorneys 

often had higher priorities. Second, even when civil sanctions were attached, the 

government agencies with existing authority to ensure compliance often lacked adequate 

staffing and resources to police labor practices throughout an economy the size of 

California’s.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 545 (Williams).) The 

Legislature’s solution to these two problems was to “adopt[] a schedule of civil penalties 

‘ “significant enough to deter violations” ’ for those provisions that lacked existing 

noncriminal sanctions,” and to “deputiz[e] employees harmed by labor violations to sue 

on behalf of the state and collect penalties, to be shared with the state and other affected 

employees.” (Ibid.) 

Our focus in this case is on PAGA’s administrative exhaustion requirements for 

these “deputize[d] employees.” Before filing a PAGA suit, “an aggrieved employee 

acting on behalf of the state and other current or former employees must provide notice to 

the employer and the [Labor and Workforce Development Agency] ‘of the specific 

provisions of [the Labor Code] alleged to have been violated, including the facts and 

theories to support the alleged violation.’ (Lab. Code, § 2699.3, subd. (a)(1)(A); see id., 

subd. (c)(1)(A) [same].)” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 545.) We consider here 

whether the notice Rojas provided to comply with this requirement was so deficient of 

“facts and theories” that it could not support any part of his PAGA cause of action. 

Unlike the trial court, we find it was not. 

amended complaint, and Rojas asks that we take judicial notice of American Modular’s 

demurrer to that complaint. We grant both requests. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, 

subd. (a).) 
6

To explain why, we consider first several recent cases discussing the amount of 

“facts and theories” required in a PAGA notice. We start with the California Supreme 

Court’s decision in Williams, a case that “concern[ed] the appropriate scope of discovery 

in a PAGA action.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 540.) As the court explained there, 

“[t]he evident purpose of the notice requirement is to afford the relevant state agency, the 

Labor and Workforce Development Agency, the opportunity to decide whether to 

allocate scarce resources to an investigation, a decision better made with knowledge of 

the allegations an aggrieved employee is making and any basis for those allegations.” 

(Id. at pp. 545-546.) But as the court demonstrated, a PAGA notice need not be 

exhaustive to serve that purpose. The defendant in that case, taking a contrary view, 

interpreted PAGA’s notice requirement—and in particular, the requirement to allege

“facts and theories”—“as imposing a requirement that an aggrieved employee seeking to 

pursue civil penalties on behalf of other current or former employees must have some 

modicum of substantial proof before proceeding with [a civil suit and] discovery.” (Id. at 

p. 545.) But the Williams court rejected that reading. “Nothing in Labor Code section 

2699.3, subdivision (a)(1)(A),” the court found, “indicates the ‘facts and theories’

provided in support of ‘alleged’ violations must satisfy a particular threshold of 

weightiness, beyond the requirements of nonfrivolousness generally applicable to any 

civil filing. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128.7.)” (Id. at p. 545.) “Moreover,” the court 

added, “to insert such a requirement into PAGA would undercut the clear legislative 

purposes the act was designed to serve.” (Id. at p. 546.) The Legislature, the court 

explained, “sought to remediate present violations and deter future ones.” (Ibid.) And 

“[t]hese purposes,” the court concluded, “would be ill served by presuming, 

notwithstanding the failure explicitly to so indicate in the text, that deputized aggrieved 

employees must satisfy a PAGA-specific heightened proof standard at the threshold, 

before discovery.” (Ibid.) 
7

Following the Williams court’s admonition that the “facts and theories” alleged in 

a PAGA notice need not “satisfy a particular threshold of weightiness,” courts have since 

found few “facts and theories” are needed to satisfy PAGA’s notice requirement. In 

Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 824, for example, the court found 

adequate a PAGA notice that alleged an employer provided inaccurate wage statements 

because it “ ‘fail[ed] to include the name and address of the legal entity that is the 

employer.’ ” (Id. at p. 838.) “This minimal fact,” the court concluded, “support[ed] the 

alleged violation, making the [plaintiff’s] Notice adequate.” (Ibid.) And in Brown v. 

Cinemark USA, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 705 Fed. Appx. 644, 645 (Cinemark), similarly, the 

Ninth Circuit found adequate a PAGA notice that alleged an employer provided 

inaccurate wage statements because it “fail[ed] to state the total hours . . . worked as a 

result of working off-the-clock” and failed to “record[] or pay[] for those hours.” (Amey 

v. Cinemark USA Inc. (N.D.Cal. May 13, 2015, No. 13-cv-05669-WHO) 2015 

U.S.Dist.LEXIS 63524, at *41 [quoting substance of the PAGA notice], revd. &

remanded sub nom. Cinemark, supra, 705 Fed. Appx. 644.) Considering Williams, the 

Ninth Circuit found these “pleaded facts and theories [were] sufficient to put [the 

plaintiffs’ employer] and the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency on 

notice for potential investigation, which satisfies the policy goal of California Labor 

Code § 2699.3(a).” (Cinemark, at p. 645.)

With that background in mind, we now turn to American Modular’s motion for 

summary adjudication. American Modular contended in its motion that Rojas’s “PAGA 

letter amounts to ‘nothing more than a string of legal conclusions with no factual 

allegations or theories of liability to support them.’ ” After we directed American 

Modular to show cause why Rojas’s requested relief should not be granted, American 

Modular modified its position somewhat. It now accepts that Rojas offered some facts 

and theories to support his allegations but, for several reasons, maintains these facts and 

theories are insufficient. Agreeing with Rojas, however, we find none of American 
8

Modular’s offered reasons warrant summary adjudication of the entirety of Rojas’s 

PAGA claim. In our view, as discussed more below, Rojas’s PAGA notice supplied 

sufficient “facts and theories” to support at least some of the violations he alleged. And 

because a motion seeking summary adjudication of an entire cause of action may not be 

granted unless “it completely disposes of [the] cause of action” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, 

subd. (f)(1)), we find that reason enough to rule in Rojas’s favor.

Before turning to the merits, we briefly address American Modular’s effort to have 

Rojas’s petition “denied without the need to even reach its merits.” Because the trial 

court granted Rojas leave to amend his complaint, American Modular contends Rojas 

“has a plain, speedy, and adequate alternative remedy” that should foreclose the 

availability of writ relief. But Rojas’s ability to file an amended complaint is no remedy 

at all. The trial court found Rojas’s PAGA cause of action failed because his PAGA 

notice, not his complaint, was deficient. And no change Rojas may make to his 

complaint can ever remedy this believed flaw in his PAGA notice.

Turning to the merits, American Modular begins with several arguments tracking 

the trial court’s reasoning. First, following the trial court’s logic, it asserts that five of 

Rojas’s eight paragraphs detailing American Modular’s alleged violations “provide[d] 

only a statement mimicking the relevant statutory language.” But even supposing an 

employee’s PAGA notice falls short when it couches alleged violations in the language of 

the relevant statute, that principle would offer American Modular little help here. At 

least some of the five referenced paragraphs supplied much more than American Modular

supposes. One of those paragraphs, for example, stated the following: American 

Modular violated “wage statement requirements by providing workers with wage 

statements that are inaccurate as to hours worked, total net and gross wages earned and 

applicable hourly or piece rates. The inaccuracies stem from the failure to pay for all 

hours worked, within the meaning of the wage orders, and failing to pay rest and meal 

period premiums.” Rojas then described elsewhere in his notice the cause of American 
9

Modular’s alleged failure to pay for all hours worked and rest and meal periods missed: 

American Modular “requir[ed] or knowingly permitt[ed] employees to work before and 

after the shift without compensation, unlawfully round[ed] employee time to the 

detriment of the employee, [failed to compensate for time spent] donning and doffing, 

automatically deduct[ed] 30 minutes for meal periods not taken or meal periods that last 

less than 30 minutes, and manipulat[ed] time to avoid overtime compensation and 

compensation for all hours worked.” 

Rojas’s allegations here thus included an ultimate fact (American Modular

provided workers with wage statements that inaccurately listed hours worked, wages 

earned, and applicable hourly or piece rates) and supportive evidentiary facts (American 

Modular’s inaccurate wage statements resulted from American Modular’s failure to pay 

workers for all hours worked and rest and meal periods missed—and this failure to pay, 

in turn, resulted from American Modular’s failure to compensate for, among other things, 

time spent “donning and doffing”). American Modular’s contention, then, that this and 

several other paragraphs “provide[d] only a statement mimicking the relevant statutory 

language” is wrong. To be sure, Rojas’s alleged “facts and theories” here did not 

exhaustively explain why American Modular’s wage statements were inadequate. But 

his allegations sufficed to notify American Modular and the Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency of the general basis for this claim. And considering Williams and 

later cases, these allegations were at least enough to supply the minimum “facts and 

theories” necessary to support that claim. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 545 

[“facts and theories” alleged in a PAGA notice need not “satisfy a particular threshold of 

weightiness”]; Brown v. Ralphs Grocery Co., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 838 [finding 

adequate a PAGA notice that alleged an employer provided inaccurate wage statements 

because it “ ‘fail[ed] to include the name and address of the legal entity that is the 

employer’ ”]; Cinemark, supra, 705 Fed. Appx. at p. 645.) 
10

Next, again adopting the trial court’s reasoning, American Modular contends 

Rojas’s notice “was deficient because it failed to adequately identify who the alleged 

‘aggrieved employees’ were with regard to the alleged violations.” Rojas, however, did 

specify the particular class of workers who he believed were harmed— “current and 

former California non-exempt employees of AMS.” That is a broad class of employees, 

to be sure; but it is a specific class of employees. And it appears to be the same class of 

employees discussed in the PAGA notice in Williams. The complaint in that case, after 

all, concerned a similarly broad class of employees—namely, all nonexempt hourly 

employees who suffered the same alleged harms as the plaintiff. (Williams, supra, 3 

Cal.5th at pp. 542-543.) 

Similarly, once more following the trial court’s reasoning, American Modular

contends Rojas’s notice “was deficient because it failed to . . . provide a statement 

regarding [Rojas’s] own position and status.” Rojas’s notice perhaps could have been

more detailed in this regard. He identified himself as an “aggrieved employee”—which, 

in PAGA parlance, means he “was employed [at some point] by the alleged violator” 

(Lab. Code, § 2699, subd. (c))—and he indicated he was a nonexempt California 

employee. But he offered little else about his status, never revealing his particular 

position with American Modular or his period of employment. 

Even so, we find the alleged facts in his notice sufficient. Considering the whole 

of Rojas’s allegations, it is at least clear that Rojas asserted that American Modular is 

currently committing the listed violations against its nonexempt employees. And 

although the state agency reviewing this notice might be left to wonder when these 

violations began, that is not reason enough to find the notice wholly inadequate. A 

complaint, as an analogue, is generally not deficient merely because it fails to describe 

the particular date when a defendant’s misconduct began. (See People v. Superior Court

(1973) 9 Cal.3d 283, 288 [complaint that accused the defendants of making false and 

misleading statements, but without noting “the time and place of the misrepresentations,” 
11

was not inadequate for that reason; “[i]f defendants require further specifics in order to 

prepare their defense, such matters may be the subject of discovery proceedings”].) And 

we see nothing in section 2699.3 suggesting that factual allegations in PAGA notices 

must exceed those normally found sufficient in complaints. 

Nor do we find anything in PAGA as a whole supporting this proposition. To the 

contrary, taking our cues from Williams, we find that requiring some sort of heightenedpleading standard at the notice stage would “undercut the clear legislative purposes the 

act was designed to serve.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 546.) PAGA, again, sought 

to “expand[] the universe of those who might enforce the law, and the sanctions violators 

might be subject to,” to “remediate present violations [of the Labor Code] and deter 

future ones.” (Ibid.) And, tweaking the Williams court’s words slightly, we find “[t]hese 

purposes would be ill served by presuming, notwithstanding the failure explicitly to so 

indicate in the text, that deputized aggrieved employees must satisfy a PAGA-specific 

heightened [pleading] standard at the threshold, before discovery.” (Ibid.; see also id. at 

p. 548 [“Hurdles that impede the effective prosecution of representative PAGA actions 

undermine the Legislature’s objectives.”].)3 

Branching out from the trial court’s reasoning, American Modular also contends

Rojas’s PAGA notice was deficient because it “fail[ed] to identify any specific policy or 

practice of AMS that could have allowed AMS and the [Labor and Workforce 

Development Agency] to realistically ascertain what allegedly gave rise to the purported 

violations.” But Rojas did allege specific practices that he believed unlawful. Again, for 

3 Williams, as American Modular notes, is not on all fours with our case. Williams

considered, among other things, whether a PAGA notice requires something more than 

mere allegations—say, “some modicum of substantial proof”—to be sufficient. 

(Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 545.) Here, in contrast, we consider the number of 

allegations necessary in a PAGA notice. But although our issues are slightly different, 

the reasoning of the Williams court lends clear support to our conclusion, even if it does 

not explicitly dictate it. 
12

example, he contended American Modular undercompensated him and other nonexempt 

employees based on the following practices: American Modular “requir[ed] or 

knowingly permitt[ed] employees to work before and after the shift without 

compensation, unlawfully round[ed] employee time to the detriment of the employee, 

[failed to compensate for time spent] donning and doffing, automatically deduct[ed] 30

minutes for meal periods not taken or meal periods that last less than 30 minutes, and 

manipulat[ed] time to avoid overtime compensation and compensation for all hours 

worked.” 

Finally, because Rojas’s PAGA claim is based on American Modular’s alleged 

violation of eight distinct labor laws, American Modular asks that we at least consider 

whether it is entitled to summary adjudication relating to some of those eight laws. In 

explaining its argument, American Modular acknowledges that summary adjudication 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f)(1) is typically only 

appropriate when it disposes of an entire cause of action. But it contends Rojas’s PAGA 

claim is effectively eight causes of action—one cause of action for each of the eight 

distinct labor laws allegedly violated. And so it asks that we at least consider whether 

some of these eight parts of Rojas’s PAGA claim are inadequate. 

We decline to do so. We agree Rojas’s PAGA claim can be regarded as multiple 

causes of action for purposes of summary adjudication. (See Silva v. See’s Candy Shops, 

Inc. (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 235, 257 [each set of allegations in a cause of action that raises 

a distinct theory of liability may be regarded as a distinct cause of action for purposes of 

summary adjudication].) But we decline to consider whether summary adjudication, 

even if not appropriate for all these causes of action together, would at least be 

appropriate for some of them. At the trial level, American Modular limited its challenge 

to the entirety of Rojas’s PAGA claim. It never sought summary adjudication for each of 

the eight parts of Rojas’s PAGA cause of action; it instead treated the PAGA cause of 

action as a single claim and sought summary adjudication of the entirety of this claim. 
13

As the motion was presented, then, the trial court had to deny it if it found any part of 

Rojas’s PAGA cause of action survived. After all, a motion seeking summary 

adjudication of an entire cause of action may not be granted unless “it completely 

disposes of [the] cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Understanding 

American Modular’s motion this way, Rojas never attempted to show his PAGA notice 

satisfied administrative exhaustion requirements for each of the eight alleged violations 

in his PAGA cause of action. He instead attempted to show his PAGA notice at least 

satisfied exhaustion requirements for some of his allegations. And, he contended, 

because American Modular could not show his “notice [wa]s deficient as to each and 

every PAGA predicate, or that AMS has a complete defense,” that was reason enough to 

deny American Modular’s motion. 

American Modular now, however, attempts to change the relevant legal question. 

No longer should we consider whether Rojas’s PAGA cause of action, considered as a 

single unit, could be summarily adjudicated. Instead, American Modular now contends, 

we should consider whether any part of Rojas’s PAGA cause of action could be 

summarily adjudicated. But that is a very different issue than the one Rojas faced and the 

trial court considered below. As American Modular framed the issue below, Rojas 

needed to show only that some part of his PAGA cause of action could not be summarily 

adjudicated to ensure a ruling in his favor. And, not surprisingly, that was all Rojas 

attempted to show in opposing American Modular’s motion. But as American Modular 

frames the issue now, for the first time in its brief on appeal, Rojas instead should have 

attempted to show that all eight parts of his PAGA cause of action could not be 

summarily adjudicated. We decline, however, to consider this new theory for the first 

time on appeal. (See Nellie Gail Ranch Owners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 
14

982, 997 [“ ‘As a general rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for 

the first time on appeal.’ ”].)4

DISPOSITION

Let a writ of mandate issue directing the trial court to set aside its order granting 

real party American Modular’s motion for summary adjudication and to enter a new 

order denying that motion. Rojas is entitled to recover his costs in this original 

proceeding. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.493(a)(1)(A).) 

 /s/

BLEASE, Acting P.J.

We concur:

 /s/

MURRAY, J.

 /s/

RENNER, J.

4 Rojas contends we should decline American Modular’s request for an alternative 

reason: American Modular failed to follow the proper procedural route for obtaining 

summary adjudication on less than the entire cause of action. In Rojas’s view, to obtain 

its requested relief, American Modular needed to follow the procedure set out in Code of 

Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (t)—which describes the procedure for 

obtaining “summary adjudication of a legal issue or a claim for damages other than 

punitive damages that does not completely dispose of a cause of action. . . .” But we find 

that particular provision irrelevant here. American Modular’s aim here is not to attack 

something less than a cause of action. It instead contends Rojas’s PAGA cause of action 

is really eight distinct causes of action, and it then seeks summary adjudication of at least 

some of those eight causes of action. That said, we still agree with Rojas’s desired result 

for the reasons stated.