NO. 07-04-0485-CV IN THE COUR

T OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVEN TH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO PANEL D SEPTEMBER 27, 2005

______________________________ TEXAS DEPARTME NT of TRANSPORTATION, Appellant
v. CITY of AMARILL O, Appellee

_________________________________ FROM THE 251 ST DISTRIC T COURT O F POTT ER COUNTY; NO. 92,160-C; HON. PATRICK PIRTLE , PRESIDING

_______________________________ Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS an d CAMPBELL, JJ. In this i nter locu tory ap peal, the TexasDepartment of Transpor tation (the Department)challengesthe trial court’s or der denying its plea to t he jurisdic tion. The City of Amarillo (

Amarillo) initiated suit req uesting a dec laratory judgment adjudi cating the right, if any, of the Depar

tment to issue a permit f or the constructi on of a billboard in an area adjacent to an interstate freeway

. Local zoning ordinances enac ted by Amari llo did not auth orize the erection of such a structu re in the particular area. So, disp ute arose as to2

which rules, ordinances, or regulati ons control the dispute, thos e of Amarillo or those of the De partment. And, thus, Amari llo sued the D epartment in Amari llo, Potter Count y for a declaratory judgment

resolvi ng that ques tion. The Depart ment moved to dismiss the suit
on the basis of

sovereig n immunity, w hich motion the t rial court denied. The three issues before us concern w hether 1) theUniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) waives the State’s sovereig n immunity from s uit, 2) §2001.038 of the Texas Governmen t Code providesa specific declaratory remedy for Amar illo’s c laims that pre empts the UDJA, and 3) dismissal is required due to the failure t o j o i n a p u r p o rt e d i n d i s p e n s a b l e p a rt y . We affirm the order. Issue One – Waiver of I mmunity U

nder UDJA The Department inv

oked sovere ign immunity and c o ntended that the shield insulated it from suit by A marillo. We disagree. Sovereign immunity or immunity from s uit is waived w hen 1) on e i nitiates a declaratory action agai nst a state ag ency seeki ng the inter pret ation o f a statute or the extent of the agency ’s statut ory authori ty and 2) t he agency is a necessar y party to the action. Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Pub lic Utiliti es Commission , 100 S.W.3d 510, 515-16 (Tex. App.–Aus tin 2003, pet. deni ed); see also Texas Dep’t Protective & Reg. Serv.
v. Mega Child Care Inc. , 145 S.W .3d 170 , 198 (T ex. 2004 ) (citing Texas Education Agency
v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. 1994) for the pr oposition that t he UDJA prov ides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity); Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor

, 106 S.W.3d 692, 697- 98 (Tex. 2003)(stating that if the Legi slature req uired the State to be j oined in a law suit for which immun ity would oth erwise atta ch, the Legi slature intentionally waived the State’s3

sovereign immunity and noting that Texas Educati on Agency

v. Leeper

, stands for the proposition t hat the UDJA doeswaive aspects of sovereign immuni ty); Texas Education Agency v. Leeper

, 893 S.W.2d 432, 4 46 (Tex. 1 994) (holding that the UDJA served to waive sovereig n immunity w hen the State is a necessary pa rt y to the act ion); Ware v. Miller , 82 S.W.3d 795, 802 (Tex. App.–Amarillo 2002, pet. denied) (stating that the UDJA waives sovereig n immunity w hen used to declar e rights under a statute or ordinance). Here, Amar illo sued for a declaration adjudica ting the extent of the Departme nt’s statutory authority

to issue the pe rmit al lowi ng for the const ruction of the bi llboard. Furthermore, no monetary damages were sought. Thus, the claim falls w ithin the exception to soverei gn immunity provided for

in Leeper

, Texas Municipal Power Agency , and Ware and as reiter ated in Mega Childcare and Wichita Falls State Hospital

. Though the Department cites Texas Nat. Resource Comm’n v. IT-Davy , 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) as holding o therwis e, we find the case distingui shable. Here , unlike the situation in Davy , we are n ot dealing with the State’s liability for contractual damages. Rather, Amarillo r

equests a decl aration speci fying the extent of the Departm ent’s statutory authority to issue buil ding permits or license s in certai n areas. No da mages are soug ht. Issue Two –

Declaratory Action un der the APA Next, the Department ar gues that the s uit should b e dismissed because the Adm inist rative Procedure Act (APA) pres cribed not onl y the m eans by w hi ch one could obtain a declarator

y judgment but also rest ricts the pr osecution of such an ac tion to the district courts of Trav is County . We overrule the iss ue. According to the APA, “[t]hevalidit y or appli cability

of [an agency

] rule . . . may be4

det erm ined in an action for declaratory

judgment if it

is alleg ed that the rule or its threatened application i nterferes wi th or impairs . . . a leg al right or priv ilege of the pl aintiff.” T EX
. G OV ’ T C ODE A NN . §2001.038(a) (Vernon 2000). F urth ermore, that par ticular act ion “may be brought only in a Travis County district court.” Id. §2001.038(b). Next, a “rule” is defined as “a stateagency s tatement of general applicabili ty that . . . implements, i nterprets
or prescribes

law or policy”or “descr ibes the procedure or practice r

equirements of a s tate agency. . . .” Id. §2001.003(6)(A) (i) & (i i). Upon r eviewi ng the live pleadings of Amarillo,
we find no mentio n of any “rul e,” as that term is defined by the APA, being attacked. Instead, it contends tha t the Department’s action exceeds statutory authority . Nor hasthe Department

referred us toany such rule o f “ge nera l app licab ility” in ord er to satis fy § 2001.003(6)(A). At most, we are told that there are some “infor mal” rules involved and that they are s usceptible to development on a case-by- case basis. Yet, what they are g oes undisclosed. Given this, we cannot say that §2001.038 enco mpasses, and theref ore bars prosecution of, thedispute pending in the 251 st Distr ict Co urt f or Po tter Coun ty. Issue Three – Missing Party Last ly, t he Department contends that the absence of an indispensabl e party, nam el y recipient of t h e p e r m i t , d e p r i v e d t h e t r i a l c o u rto f s u bj e c tm a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n
. We overrule it as well. Assuming arguendothat we were to find the permit hold er to be an indispensable party and that its non-

joinder somehow

deprived t he trial cour

t of subject matter

jurisdic tion,
we could not dismiss the proceeding without fir st affording Amari llo opportuni ty to cur e the defect. City of Lubbock v. Rule , 68 S.W.3d 853, 861 (Tex. App.–Amari llo 2002, no pet.)5

(hold ing that w e can not d ismi ss fo r want of jur isd ict ion wi thou t fir st g iv ing the p lai ntif

fs opportunity

to allege acause of action within the trial court’s jurisdiction). So, until a court of competent

jurisdic tion firs t det ermi nes t hat t he pe rmit hold er is a n ind ispe nsab le pa rty, thatthe party cannot be joined via court order, and tha t Amarillo re f uses to amend its pleading to join it, w

e cannot dismis s the cause. T EX
. R. C IV
. P. 39(a) (stat ing that thetrial court may or

der the joinder

of the necessary

or indispens able parties)

. Having overrul ed each issue, w e affirm the order

denying the Department’s plea to the jurisdi ction of the tri al court.

Brian Quinn Chief Justice