1

Filed 12/17/21

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

WILLIAM MICHAEL CLAWSON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REGISTERED NURSING,

Defendant and Respondent.

 A159990

 (City & County of San Francisco

 Super. Ct. No. CPF19516578)

Plaintiff appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of 

administrative mandate following the revocation of his nursing license by the 

Board of Registered Nursing (Board) for gross negligence and unprofessional 

conduct in carrying out licensed nursing functions and unprofessional 

conduct–deceit. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

I. Board Hearing

Nina’s Care Home (Nina’s) was a residential care facility for the elderly 

(RCFE) licensed by the Community Care Licensing Division (CCL) of the 

State Department of Social Services. Following the unexpected death of the 

Nina’s administrator, an attorney for the administrator’s estate, Lisa Russ, 

hired plaintiff to assist with the closure of Nina’s. Plaintiff, who was a 

registered nurse and a certified legal nurse consultant, agreed to assess each 

of the residents and recommend a new facility for them, as required by the 
2

RCFE closing procedures. The purpose of the assessments was to help the 

residents choose an appropriate facility based upon their needs.1

On May 11, 2013, plaintiff and Mia B.2 performed the assessment for 

J.N., an 83-year-old resident of Nina’s. Mia B. lifted up J.N.’s clothing so that 

the plaintiff could see her skin condition. Plaintiff testified the assessment 

was “very quick. We were in there for maybe two minutes.” Plaintiff found 

that J.N.’s skin on her coccyx and on each of her heels was red and 

nonblanching to the touch, which he believed was significant.3 He did not 

touch the bandages covering J.N.’s feet. Nor did he notice that one of J.N.’s 

knees was significantly contracted.

Plaintiff signed the resident appraisal form using his “RN” initials and 

described J.N.’s overall health condition as: “Frail and cachextic [sic] female 

1 Health and Safety Code section 1569.682, subdivision (a)(1)(A)

requires that prior to transferring a resident to another facility an RCFE 

must “[p]repare . . . a relocation evaluation of the needs of that resident, 

which shall include: [¶] . . . [r]ecommendations on the type of facility that 

would meet the needs of the resident based on the current service plan.”

Health and Safety Code section 1569.70 provides guidelines for the varying 

levels of care provided by an RCFE, and section 1569.72, subdivision (a)

states, with a limited exception for some temporary illnesses, “no resident 

shall be admitted or retained in a residential care facility for the elderly 

if . . . : [¶] . . . [t]he resident requires 24-hour, skilled nursing or intermediate 

care [or] [¶] . . . is bedridden . . . .”

2 Mia B. had worked at Nina’s as a care worker for 24 years. She did 

not have any nursing credentials. When the administrator of Nina’s died, 

Mia B. became the interim administrator. She did not wish to be the interim 

administrator and did not understand why she became the interim 

administrator. Mia B.’s English was limited, such that she was not 

comfortable completing paperwork.

3 An expert witness for the Board testified, “By definition, a nonblanchable area . . . already demonstrates a skin compromise . . . and that is 

a stage one [pressure ulcer].”
3

with severe cognitive impairment, poor appetite, chronic nausea and 

diarrhea, and weight loss. Soft diet tolerated fair. Skin is friable with 

redness to bony prominences. Scratches self severely with fingernails.” 

Plaintiff also signed a “Needs and Services Plan” in which he described J.N. 

as: “Frail, pleasant elderly female with severe cognitive impairment, 

cachexia, and fragile skin. Disoriented, alert, unable to respond 

appropriately. Unable to walk, but can stand briefly with assistance. Unable 

to self-transfer from bed to chair or wheel chair. Minimally able to reposition 

self in chair or bed. Longstanding history of alcohol abuse per medical 

record. Easily agitated and becomes very anxious, requiring medication. 

Conservator is Public Guardian, Kelly Schwartz. Significant medical history 

includes rheumatoid arthritis, depression, low thyroid, urinary incontinence 

with chronic and severe urinary tract infections (requiring hospitalization), 

anorexia with significant weight loss, Alzheimer’s dementia, diarrhea, and 

poor nutrition and fluid intake with hospitalization for dehydration. Long

standing history of self-injury from fingernail scratching to face and body per 

care providers. Overall skin condition is fragile with compromised skin 

integrity to groin, significant redness to bony prominences including coccyx, 

heels, toes. Foot dressings cover toes.” (All caps omitted.) On both forms, 

plaintiff’s signature certified that “to the best of [his] knowledge [J.N.] does 

not need skilled nursing care.” (All caps omitted.)

On May 23, 2013, the caregivers from the new RCFE, Frye’s Care 

Home, came to transfer J.N. They immediately noticed that J.N. was in 

significant pain. Every time they moved J.N. she cried out in pain. When 

they arrived at Frye’s, the caregivers tried to give J.N. a shower and body 

check. They discovered multiple bandages on her arm, knee and toes. The 

bandages “were stuck to [J.N.’s] skin and her wounds,” and they were not 
4

freshly placed. The wounds “all smelled really bad.” The sore on the back of 

J.N.’s knee was very large, and her tendons were visible. J.N.’s toes were 

black, and she had “a very strong infection odor.” One witness described 

J.N.’s condition as “very horrifying.” The Frye’s caregivers called 911 and 

went to the hospital with J.N. J.N. died several weeks later.

On May 31, 2013, a CCL investigator contacted plaintiff. Plaintiff 

identified himself to the CCL investigator as a registered nurse specializing 

in elder care in CCL-licensed facilities and explained that he had been hired 

by the estate and the estate’s attorney. A few months later, the CCL 

investigator conducted a recorded interview with plaintiff. Plaintiff stated he 

had performed J.N.’s assessment and described how he had directed Mia B.

to perform tasks at his direction. He stated he performed a “head-to-toe” 

assessment by having Mia B. lift J.N.’s clothing so that plaintiff could see 

areas of “bony prominences . . . .” He asked Mia B. to touch J.N.’s skin where 

it was very red so he could see how quickly the “capillary refill” occurred. He 

recalled looking at J.N.’s coccyx and stated there was no wound there.

Plaintiff told the investigator that J.N.’s feet were covered in dressings, 

which he did not remove to look at her skin. He understood from Mia B. that 

the dressings had been placed there by J.N.’s podiatrist. He did not know 

what the wound care plan was and did not see any documentation in J.N.’s 

records regarding the treatment plan for J.N.’s feet. Plaintiff stated that 

there was no malodor of J.N. during the assessment or when he was at the 

facility on May 23 when J.N. was transferred to Frye’s. He stated that he 

“would have been assessing if there were any odors of feces or urine or 

bacterial infection as a registered nurse, that’s what we do, and [his] 

assessment skills are fine.” In the May 2013 time frame, plaintiff further 
5

confirmed to others orally and in writing that he had performed J.N.’s 

assessment.

About 14 months after the incident, the Board interviewed plaintiff as 

part of its investigation. At that time, plaintiff denied performing J.N.’s 

physical assessment, stating that Mia B. “was the one in charge.” He told the 

investigator that Mia B. “decided what body part would be looked at and 

whether or not the clothing was moved, and if any of the gauze or bandages 

on the residents would be moved to expose anything.” He further denied even 

guiding or instructing Mia B. during the assessment. Plaintiff told the 

investigator that he was not acting as a registered nurse at the time of J.N.’s 

assessment. At the administrative hearing, plaintiff testified that he acted 

as a “scribe” by filling out the resident appraisal form based on the 

information Mia B. provided as she performed the assessment.

II. Board Decision

Following the eight-day administrative hearing, and submission of 

briefs by the parties, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed 

decision. The ALJ found clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff 

committed gross negligence in connection with the appraisal of J.N., 

unprofessional conduct in carrying out nursing functions in connection with 

the appraisal of J.N., and unprofessional conduct by not being truthful with 

the Board investigator regarding the care provided to J.N. The ALJ 

summarized his conclusions as follows: “[Plaintiff] had the express 

responsibility to perform resident appraisals and to make recommendations 

regarding the level of care each resident required, and by directly observing 

and assessing J.N., [plaintiff] was in the best position to identify and 

thoroughly document her serious condition.
6

“Even as [plaintiff] described J.N. as ‘emaciated,’ he neglected or 

overlooked the most important point in the Resident Appraisal and Needs 

and Services Plan: J.N. was far too sick to reside in an RCFE without the 

addition of . . . skilled nursing services, and he neither documented the 

specifics of her skin condition, nor her inability to reposition herself in bed, or 

her inability to independently take medication. Any of these issues required 

an enhanced level of care that is not provided by an RCFE, without special 

home health or other specialized services. [Plaintiff] did not identify the need 

for these services to be available following J.N.’s transfer, nor did he contact 

her physician to request that they be ordered. As a nurse he was require [sic]

to do so. (Health & Saf. Code, § 1569.72, subd. (b)(1); Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, 

§ 1443.5.)

“In the subsequent investigation of J.N.’s care, [plaintiff] first described 

one set of facts, but a year later when speaking to a different investigator, he 

characterized the critical few minutes he spent doing the assessment in much 

different terms. In the second retelling, he placed [Mia B.] in charge, while in 

the former, he acknowledged conducting the appraisal. The Resident 

Appraisal he prepared clearly reflected his thoughts and conclusions, not 

those of someone speaking limited English and without medical training. 

This second characterization was untruthful.”

The Board adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision and revoked plaintiff’s 

nursing license.

III. Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate

Plaintiff challenged the Board’s decision in a petition for writ of 

administrative mandate. He argued that the Board’s decision should be 

reversed because: (1) the performance of the RCFE appraisal was not a 

“nursing function”; (2) the Board failed to plead that plaintiff violated any 
7

RCFE statutes or regulations, and the Board has no power to discipline 

plaintiff for any such violations; (3) plaintiff had no obligation to render 

nursing services to J.N. because no nurse–patient relationship existed 

between them; and (4) Business and Professions Code section 27614 does not 

authorize disciplining plaintiff for dishonesty during the investigation. On 

October 16, 2019, the trial court issued an order rejecting each of plaintiff’s

arguments and denying the petition. Judgment was entered on January 8, 

2020.

DISCUSSION

On appeal, plaintiff raises the same issues he argued in the trial court. 

We review questions of law de novo, and we review the trial court’s factual 

findings under the substantial evidence standard, resolving all conflicts in 

evidence and indulging all reasonable inferences in favor of the trial court’s 

judgment. (Rand v. Board of Psychology (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 565, 574–

575 (Rand).) We find no errors of law and that substantial evidence supports 

the judgment. Accordingly, we affirm.

I. Substantial evidence supports the finding that plaintiff engaged 

in a “usual nursing function” when he performed J.N.’s resident 

appraisal.

Plaintiff argues that he cannot be disciplined for negligently 

performing J.N.’s appraisal because doing so was not a “nursing function.” 

He contends that because the RCFE statutes and regulations do not require 

facility licensees to hold nursing licenses (Health & Saf. Code, § 1569.15), and 

because they state that either the “facility” or the “licensee” must prepare 

resident appraisals (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, §§ 87456, subd. (a), 87457, subd. 

(c), 87463, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 1569.682, subd. (a)(1)), it 

4 All statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code 

unless otherwise stated.
8

necessarily follows that performing resident appraisals is not a nursing 

function. According to plaintiff, if resident appraisals constitute a nursing 

function, then the RCFE regulations permit non-nurse licensees to practice 

nursing without a license.

We disagree. First, simply because a resident appraisal may be 

performed by a person who is not a licensed nurse does not mean that when a 

nurse undertakes the task, using his or her scientific knowledge and 

technical skills, he or she must not be performing a nursing function. Under 

section 2761, subdivision (a)(1), a nurse may be disciplined for unprofessional 

conduct constituting “gross negligence in carrying out usual certified or 

licensed nursing functions.” Further, as the trial court explained, section 

2725, subdivision (a)(4) specifies that nursing functions include 

“ ‘[o]bservation of signs and symptoms of illness, reactions to treatment, 

general behavior, or general physical condition, and . . . determination of 

whether the signs, symptoms, reactions, behavior, or general appearance 

exhibit abnormal characteristics,’ as well as ‘implementation, based on 

observed abnormalities, of appropriate reporting, or referral . . . .’ ”

Substantial evidence supports the finding of the ALJ and the trial court 

that when plaintiff conducted his appraisal of J.N. he was performing a 

nursing function. Plaintiff signed both the appraisal and the needs and 

services plan using his “RN” designation. He described J.N. using scientific 

or technical terms such as “cachectic,” which the Board’s decision explains

refers to “general physical wasting and malnutrition usually associated with 

chronic disease.” He told the CCL investigator that part of his assessment of 

J.N. included “assessing if there were any odors of feces or urine or bacterial 

infection as a registered nurse, that’s what we do, and my assessment skills 

are fine.” He also testified that he agreed with his own expert “that 
9

performing a resident appraisal, the function is clinical nursing.” Plaintiff’s 

expert, who was a registered nurse and worked as a legal nurse consultant,

testified that she does not perform resident appraisals when she acts as a 

legal nurse consultant because doing so constitutes patient care.5

Additionally, two registered nursing experts with experience as RCFE 

administrators testified on behalf of the Board that RCFE resident appraisals 

involve usual nursing functions.

Rand, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th 565, addressed an analogous situation in 

which a licensed psychologist was disciplined for conduct while acting as a 

court-appointed special master in a divorce proceeding and while acting as an 

expert witness in another family law matter. (Id. at pp. 569–572.) The court 

rejected Rand’s argument that he could not be disciplined by the Board of 

Psychology for conduct he believed he performed in his judicial capacity. (Id. 

at pp. 579–580.) It found that the evidence, including the parties’ agreement, 

supported the finding that the tasks Rand was asked to perform, including 

managing interpersonal conflict and minimizing the impact of such conflict 

on the children, involved the application of psychological principles. (Ibid.) 

Further, the Board’s experts opined that Rand engaged in the practice of 

psychology while acting as a special master. (Id. at p. 580.) The court 

rejected Rand’s argument that because nonpsychologists may be appointed 

special masters, the activities of special masters do not involve the practice of 

psychology. (Id. at p. 581.)

Here, too, the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that in 

performing the appraisal, plaintiff observed J.N. for symptoms of illness and 

5 Plaintiff’s expert opined that in this case Mia B. performed the 

appraisal and that plaintiff only transcribed what she told him. But she 

acknowledged that if, in fact, plaintiff had performed the appraisal it would 

have constituted patient care.
10

evaluated her general physical condition to determine her suitability for 

transfer to another facility, and that these tasks were “textbook nursing 

functions.” Plaintiff argues Rand is distinguishable because the attorney for 

the estate who hired plaintiff testified that she did not hire him “ ‘as a 

nurse’ ” and plaintiff expressly told her that he was not providing nursing 

care. We are not persuaded that this testimony meaningfully distinguishes 

Rand, particularly because other documentary evidence indicates that 

plaintiff was hired because of his nursing background. The contract between 

plaintiff and the attorney for the estate requires that plaintiff have and 

maintain his license to practice nursing. Further, the administrators of the 

estate wrote to CCL, stating that plaintiff had been hired “to evaluate each of 

the residents for relocation and recommend the best type of facility for each 

resident . . . .” Plaintiff then did so and signed the required documentation as 

a registered nurse using his “RN” designation. Plaintiff’s efforts to 

distinguish Rand are unpersuasive.

II. The Board applied the correct standard of care.

Plaintiff argues the Board should not have applied a nursing standard 

of care to the resident appraisal and that the ALJ erred by relying on expert 

testimony to make this legal determination. Plaintiff’s argument is entirely 

dependent upon his position that he did not perform the duties of a registered 

nurse. As discussed ante, substantial evidence supports the factual finding 

that plaintiff engaged in a “nursing function” when he conducted J.N.’s 

resident appraisal. Thus, applying a nursing standard of care to evaluate 

plaintiff’s conduct was proper.

The Board’s regulations establish that the standard of care in 

disciplinary proceedings involving licensed nursing functions is to exercise 

the degree of “care which, under similar circumstances, would have 
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ordinarily been exercised by a competent registered nurse.” (Cal. Code Regs., 

tit. 16, § 1442.) The Board’s findings of gross negligence and unprofessional 

conduct were based on the ALJ’s findings that plaintiff’s conduct was an 

“extreme departure from the standard of care in carrying out nursing 

functions in connection with the appraisal of J.N. . . . .”

6 These findings were 

supported by the record, including expert testimony. (See Lattimore v. Dickey 

(2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 969 [expert testimony is necessary to establish 

nursing standard of care and to evaluate alleged breaches, except where 

negligence is obvious to laypersons].)

Plaintiff further argues that implying a different standard of care for 

resident appraisals performed by licensed nurses renders the California 

Residential Care Facilities for the Elderly Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1569 

et seq.) impermissibly vague and uncertain. We agree with the Board that its

decision does not imply a standard of care into the act. Rather, the Board’s 

decision is based upon its finding that plaintiff performed a nursing function 

and breached the standard of care for nurses set forth in the regulations 

applicable to nurses. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 16, § 1442.)7

6 Specifically, the expert witnesses testified that a nurse performing a 

resident appraisal should perform a functional, head-to-toe assessment, 

looking at all of the skin. The evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that 

plaintiff’s assessment of J.N. was inadequate because he failed to identify 

and fully describe her multiple wounds.

7 Plaintiff also argues he had no duty to provide nursing services to 

J.N. because there was no nurse–patient relationship between him and J.N. 

Again, this argument is premised upon plaintiff’s position that his resident 

appraisal of J.N. was not a nursing function. Under the facts of this case, 

plaintiff’s premise is faulty and his related argument based on a purported 

lack of a nurse–patient relationship also fails.

The ALJ decision, adopted by the Board, found that plaintiff had a duty 

to J.N. as a registered nurse and he was subject to the standard of care 

applicable to registered nurses. This finding implies the existence of a 
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To summarize, a licensed nurse may be subject to discipline by the 

Board when he or she agrees to assess a resident’s physical and mental

condition; holds him- or herself out as a licensed professional while doing so;

and knows that his or her assessment will be, and in fact is, relied upon to 

determine the level of care the resident needs in a new facility. Applying 

some undefined, lesser standard of care to plaintiff’s misconduct under these 

nurse–patient relationship, which is supported by substantial evidence. The 

Board’s registered nursing expert testified that the performance of an RCFE 

assessment by a nurse creates a nurse–patient relationship. Plaintiff’s own 

expert similarly acknowledged that performing resident assessments 

constitutes patient care.

Plaintiff relies upon Keene v. Wiggins (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 308, 313–

314 (physician retained by workers’ compensation carrier to examine injured 

employee for purpose of rating injury “has no reason to believe the person 

examined will rely upon this report,” and is not liable to the person examined 

for negligence in making the report) and Felton v. Schaeffer (1991) 229 

Cal.App.3d 229, 236–237 (no physician–patient relationship between 

physician hired to perform preemployment physical examination and 

prospective employee because the “physician’s sole function was to provide 

information to aid the employer’s decisionmaking process, not to serve the 

[prospective employee]”). Both cases are distinguishable because they 

address whether the physicians have civil liability for negligence as opposed 

to whether they are subject to discipline by a licensing board. (Keene, at p. 

310; Felton, at p. 234.) Further, in neither case was it foreseeable that the 

patient would rely upon the physician’s report. (Keene, at pp. 313–314; 

Felton, at pp. 236–237.) In contrast, here, J.N.’s assessment was performed 

to determine the level of care she needed when she was transferred from 

Nina’s. This was most certainly for J.N.’s benefit. Plaintiff even 

acknowledged as much when he testified that the reason for completing the 

assessment was to assist the residents in choosing their next home. It was 

foreseeable that J.N., through her conservator, would rely upon the 

assessment, and, in fact, she did so. Under these circumstances, plaintiff is 

subject to discipline by the Board. The issue whether plaintiff could be held 

liable in a civil action for his misconduct is not before us, and we express no 

opinion on this question.
13

circumstances is counter to the Board’s “highest priority” of public protection. 

(§ 2708.1.)

III. The Board was not required to plead a violation of the RCFE 

statutes.

Plaintiff complains that he cannot be disciplined for failing to properly 

perform J.N.’s resident appraisal as required by RCFE statutes and 

regulations because (1) the Board did not plead violations of any specific 

RCFE regulations and (2) the Board does not have the power to discipline 

plaintiff for violations of the RCFE regulations. We address plaintiff’s latter

argument first. The Board disciplined plaintiff for gross negligence and 

unprofessional conduct while engaged in nursing functions. This is well 

within the Board’s jurisdiction. (See Rand, supra, 206 Cal.App.4th at pp. 

581–582 [rejecting argument that Board of Psychology lacked jurisdiction to 

discipline licensed psychologist for unprofessional conduct while acting as 

court appointed special master].)

Nor do we agree the Board was required to plead specific violations of 

RCFE regulations to discipline plaintiff for gross negligence under Business 

and Professions Code section 2761, subdivision (a)(1). The Board’s accusation 

alleged plaintiff was hired to assist with the closure of Nina’s and that he was 

grossly negligent in, among other things, failing to perform a complete 

assessment of J.N., failing to ensure that her service plan accurately reflected 

her needs and status, and failing to recommend a higher level of care. The 

Board further alleged incompetence and unprofessional conduct based upon 

the same alleged omissions. Although the Board did not specifically reference 

RCFE regulations, it did allege that the assessment was required by the CCL 

as part of the closing process. Finally, the Board alleged unprofessional 

conduct based upon plaintiff’s dishonesty during the Board’s investigation. 

The accusation detailed plaintiff’s alleged errors and omissions in conducting 
14

J.N.’s assessment and asserted that each cause for discipline was based upon 

violations of Business and Professions Code section 2761, subdivision (a)(1). 

No more was required. (Gov. Code, § 11503, subd. (a) [requiring that 

agencies set forth in the accusation acts and omissions with which the 

licensee is charged and specify “statutes and rules that the [licensee] is 

alleged to have violated”].)8

IV. Plaintiff’s dishonesty during the investigation constitutes 

unprofessional conduct under section 2761.

Plaintiff’s final contention is that he cannot be disciplined for 

dishonesty because section 2761 does not expressly list dishonesty as a type 

of unprofessional conduct.9 Plaintiff’s argument ignores that the plain 

8 Plaintiff’s reliance upon Linda Jones General Builder v. Contractors’ 

State License Board (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1320 is misplaced. In Linda 

Jones General Builder, the Contractors’ State License Board alleged a 

contractor was subject to discipline for a willful departure from “ ‘accepted 

trade standards in the absence of specific requirements in the plans or 

specifications,’ ” and then, at the hearing, the board argued the contractor 

should be disciplined for a willful departure from plans or specifications. (Id.

at p. 1323, italics added.) The court found that because the board had not 

charged the contractor with a willful departure from plans or specifications, 

the contractor could not be disciplined on this ground. (Id. at pp. 1326–1327.) 

Here, plaintiff was charged with violating section 2761, subdivision (a)(1),

and the disciplinary action was based upon this accusation.

9 In making the legal argument that he cannot be disciplined for 

dishonesty under section 2761, plaintiff does not appear to dispute that 

substantial evidence supports the finding that he was dishonest. However, 

his brief also includes a section titled “Conclusion” which disputes that he 

was dishonest during his interviews with the Board investigator. We 

disregard this argument for three reasons. First, plaintiff’s argument is not 

under an appropriate heading. (See Cox v. Griffin (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440, 

453–454 [argument contained in section headed “ ‘Introduction’ ” violates Cal. 

Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) requiring separate headings summarizing 

argument and is forfeited].) Second, plaintiff fails to cite to the appellate 

record. (Sky River LLC v. County of Kern (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 720, 741 

[Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C), requiring appellate briefs to cite to 
15

language of section 2761, subdivision (a) provides a non-exhaustive list of 

what constitutes “unprofessional conduct.” It expressly states that 

unprofessional conduct “includes, but is not limited to,” the examples listed. 

(§ 2761, subd. (a); Moustafa v. Board of Registered Nursing (2018) 29 

Cal.App.5th 1119, 1136 [recognizing that additional forms of conduct may be 

deemed unprofessional conduct because § 2761, subd. (a) provides that 

unprofessional conduct “ ‘is not limited to’ ” the examples given].) Courts 

have held that unspecified “ ‘unprofessional conduct’ ” must involve “conduct 

which indicates an unfitness to practice [the profession].” (E.g., Shea v. 

Board of Medical Examiners (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 564, 575; Rand, supra, 206 

Cal.App.4th at p. 590 [“A professional who has shown dishonesty has 

demonstrated professional unfitness meriting license discipline”].)

Plaintiff was found to have been dishonest with the Board investigator 

when he characterized his role in J.N.’s assessment as significantly more 

limited than what he explained in his earlier statement to the CCL 

investigator. We find that such dishonesty to the Board investigating 

plaintiff’s alleged malfeasance constitutes unprofessional conduct and 

demonstrates an unfitness to practice nursing.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to its costs on appeal.

appellate record, applies to matter references at any point in the brief and 

not just to the statement of facts].) Third, he makes no reasoned argument 

that the Board’s finding is not supported by substantial evidence. (Okorie v. 

Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574, 600 [appellant is 

required to present cognizable legal argument in support of reversal of 

judgment], disapproved on other grounds in Bonni v. St. Joseph Health 

System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1012, fn. 2.)
16

_________________________

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Needham, J.

_________________________

Burns, J.

A159990/Clawson v. Bd. of Registered Nursing
17

A159990/Clawson v. Bd. of Registered Nursing

Trial Court: Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco

Trial Judge: Ethan P. Schulman

Counsel: William Michael Clawson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Assistant 

Attorney General, Joshua A. Room and Brett A. 

Kingsbury, Deputy Attorneys General, for 

Defendant and Respondent.