[Cite as Rheinhold v. Reichek, 2014-Ohio-31.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

 EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

 JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

 No. 99973 

BARBARA RHEINHOLD

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs.

EDWARD R. REICHEK, ET AL.

DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-782576 

BEFORE: Kilbane, J., S. Gallagher, P.J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: January 9, 2014
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Paul W. Flowers 

Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A. 

Terminal Tower, 35th Floor 

50 Public Square 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

W. Craig Bashein 

Anthony N. Palombo 

Bashein & Bashein Co., L.P.A. 

Terminal Tower, 35th Floor 

50 Public Square 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES 

For Edward R. Reichek

Steven G. Janik 

Janik L.L.P. 

9200 South Hills Boulevard 

Suite 300 

Broadview Heights, Ohio 44147 

For Dollar Bank 

Adam M. Fried 

Holly Marie Wilson 

Reminger Co., L.P.A. 

101 West Prospect Avenue 

Suite 1400 

Cleveland, Ohio 44115 
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.: 

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Barbara Rheinhold (“Rheinhold”), appeals from the trial 

court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in 

favor of defendant-appellee, Dollar Bank. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 

{¶2} In May 2012, Rheinhold filed a complaint against her mother, Debra 

Pickering (“Pickering”), Edward Reichek, Esq. (“Reichek”), and Dollar Bank in the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, General Division. Rheinhold’s complaint 

arises from a monetary settlement she received after she was injured in a car accident in 

1999. Rheinhold was seven years old at the time of the accident. As a result, the 

settlement proceeds were deposited into a guardianship account at Dollar Bank, which 

was administered by the Cuyahoga County Probate Court. Pickering was appointed the 

guardian of Rheinhold’s estate. The guardianship was set to terminate when Rheinhold 

reached the age of majority (18 years old). As of November 2008, the funds in the 

account totaled $16,383.38. 

{¶3} On January 11, 2010, Pickering, as guardian, and Reichek, as attorney for 

guardian, filed an application in probate court to terminate the guardianship and authority 

to distribute the funds, stating that Rheinhold “attained the age of 18 on January 7, 2010.” 

 The application included a waiver, indicating that Rheinhold waived service and notice 

and consented to the application to terminate guardianship. Rheinhold alleges that this 

waiver was not signed by her. She further alleges she did not have knowledge that the 
application was filed with regard to her estate. On January 14, 2010, the probate court 

granted this application and Dollar Bank released the funds to Pickering, which totaled 

$16,485.65. 

{¶4} In her complaint, Rheinhold asserts six causes of action. Count 1 alleges 

conversion against Pickering, Reichek, and Dollar Bank. Count 2 alleges fraud against 

Pickering. Count 3 alleges negligence and legal malpractice against Reichek. Count 4 

alleges civil liability for criminal conduct against Pickering. Count 5 alleges breach of 

fiduciary duties against Pickering and Reichek. Count 6 alleges statutory liability against 

Dollar Bank. She seeks monetary damages. 

{¶5} In July 2012, Dollar Bank filed a motion to dismiss Rheinhold’s complaint 

under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (B)(6). Dollar Bank argued that this matter is within the 

exclusive jurisdiction of probate court. Alternatively, Dollar Bank argued Rheinhold 

failed to state a claim because it is shielded from liability for releasing funds under R.C. 

5815.06. Rheinhold opposed, and the trial court in a detailed opinion granted Dollar 

Bank’s motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The trial court found that 

Rheinhold’s “claims arise from the alleged misappropriation of funds from an account 

created by and for a guardianship. * * * [T]his matter pertains to guardian, and is 

therefore improperly before this Court.” 

{¶6} It is from this order that Rheinhold appeals, raising the following single 

assignment of error for review. 

Assignment of Error
The trial judge erred, as a matter of law, by dismissing the action on the 

grounds that only the probate division possesses jurisdiction over the claims 

that have been raised. 

Standard of Review

{¶7} We review a trial court’s decision on a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss for 

lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a de novo standard of review. Bank of Am. v. 

Macho, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96124, 2011-Ohio-5495, ¶ 7, citing Crestmont Cleveland 

Partnership v. Ohio Dept. of Health, 139 Ohio App.3d 928, 936, 746 N.E.2d 222 (10th 

Dist.2000). In order to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(1), the court must 

determine whether a plaintiff has alleged any cause of action that the court has authority 

to decide. Crestmont at 936. When determining its subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 

to a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss, the trial court is not confined to the allegations of 

the complaint and may consider material pertinent to such inquiry. Southgate Dev. Corp. 

v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 211, 358 N.E.2d 526 (1976), paragraph 

one of the syllabus. 

Subject Matter Jurisdiction

{¶8} Rheinhold argues that probate court does not have jurisdiction over her 

claims for monetary damages against a former guardian, attorney, and financial 

institution. Dollar Bank argues that Rheinhold’s claims are within the jurisdiction of 

probate court because Rheinhold’s claims center on Pickering’s conduct as guardian, the 
probate court’s approval of the release of the estate funds, and Dollar Bank’s alleged 

mishandling, which enabled Pickering to obtain the funds. 

{¶9} Under R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(e), a probate court has exclusive jurisdiction to 

“appoint and remove guardians, conservators, and testamentary trustees, direct and 

control their conduct, and settle their accounts.” It also “has plenary power at law and in 

equity to dispose fully of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is 

expressly otherwise limited or denied by a section of the Revised Code.” R.C. 

2101.24(C). 

{¶10} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that the probate division has continuing 

and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to a guardian and ward. In re 

Clendenning, 145 Ohio St. 82, 92, 60 N.E.2d 676 (1945). Indeed, the probate court’s 

jurisdiction extends “to all matters ‘touching the guardianship.’” In re Guardianship of 

Jadwisiak, 64 Ohio St.3d 176, 180, 593 N.E.2d 1379 (1992), quoting In re Zahoransky, 

22 Ohio App.3d 75, 488 N.E.2d 944 (1985). Therefore, in the instant case, the issue of 

jurisdiction turns upon whether Rheinhold’s claims “touch upon the guardianship.” 

{¶11} In State ex rel. Lewis v. Moser, 72 Ohio St.3d 25, 1995-Ohio-148, 647 

N.E.2d 155, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the probate court’s 

jurisdiction to decide a claim for breach of fiduciary duties even though the relator sought 

monetary damages. The court adopted the view that: (1) claims for breach of fiduciary 

duty, which inexorably implicate control over the conduct of fiduciaries, are within the 

jurisdiction of the probate court by virtue of R.C. 2101.24(A)(1)(c) and (e), and (2) the 
probate court’s plenary jurisdiction at law and in equity under R.C. 2101.24(C) authorizes 

any relief required to fully adjudicate the subject matter within the probate court’s 

exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 28-29. This broad statutory grant of authority to fully 

resolve matters properly before it includes the power to award monetary damages. Goff 

v. Ameritrust Co., N.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 65196, 1994 Ohio App. LEXIS 1916 

(May 5, 1994) (cited in Lewis for holding that R.C. 2101.24(C) authorizes any relief that 

is required to fully adjudicate a claim within the probate court’s jurisdiction). 

{¶12} Since Lewis, this court, as well as other appellate courts, have rejected the 

proposition that probate courts cannot award monetary damages for claims that are within 

the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court, such as claims based upon the conduct of a 

guardian. See Rowan v. McLaughlin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85665, 2005-Ohio-3473, ¶ 

9 (where we affirmed the common pleas court’s dismissal of complaint for lack of 

jurisdiction because claims for monetary damages pertaining to conduct of guardian were 

within jurisdiction of probate court); Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Bank One, 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 16981, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 3854, *22 (Aug. 21, 1998) (“we hold 

that probate courts in some instances may award monetary damages in the exercise of 

their plenary power to adjudicate fully any matter properly before the court.”); Keith v. 

Bringardner, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 07-AP-666, 2008-Ohio-950 (appellant’s claims of 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, abuse of process, negligence, conversion, and 

civil conspiracy revolve around appellees’ conduct as guardians and are within the 

exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court.) 
{¶13} In the instant case, all of Rheinhold’s claims arise out of the alleged conduct 

by Pickering, as guardian, Reichek, as attorney for guardian, the probate court’s approval 

to terminate the guardianship and allow Pickering to access the estate funds, and Dollar 

Bank’s handling of the funds. In her complaint, Rheinhold challenges the actions of the 

guardian, attorney for the guardian, the probate court’s administration of her estate, and 

Dollar Bank’s distribution of estate funds. These claims “touch the guardianship” and 

are, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court. The fact that the 

guardianship has terminated does not foreclose the probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. 

Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Huntington Natl. Bank, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 76303, 2000 

Ohio App. LEXIS 4533, *16 (Sept. 28, 2000) (where we found that appellant’s complaint 

was within exclusive jurisdiction of probate court that alleged claims concerning acts of 

former guardian). Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that the probate court 

had exclusive jurisdiction over Rheinhold’s claims. 

{¶14} Thus, the sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶15} Judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 

 

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR