United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 12-2091

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Deborah Mae Todd-Smith

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Michael J. Astrue, Social Security Commissioner

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellee

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Western District of Arkansas - Ft. Smith

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 Submitted: November 6, 2012

Filed: January 4, 2013

[Unpublished]

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Before WOLLMAN, MELLOY, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Deborah Todd-Smith appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of

supplemental security income (SSI). Todd-Smith protectively filed for SSI benefits

in January 2007, alleging disability since January 1997 based on problems with her

spine, back, legs, knees, and toe. Following a November 2008 hearing, an

administrative law judge (ALJ) found that (1) Todd-Smith had degenerative disc
disease of the lumbar spine, which was severe, but she did not have an impairment

or combination of impairments that met or equaled a listed impairment; (2) her

allegations regarding the limiting effects of her symptoms were not fully credible; (3)

she had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform the exertional demands of

light work with some additional limitations; and (4) she had no past relevant work,

but based on the testimony of the vocational expert (VE), she could perform the jobs

of machine tender, assembler, and poultry worker, which exist in significant numbers

in the local and national economy. The Appeals Council denied review, and the

district court affirmed. Upon careful review of the record and Todd-Smith’s

arguments for reversal, see Perkins v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 2011)

(standard of review), we conclude that certain aspects of the ALJ’s decision were not

supported by substantial evidence.

Todd-Smith contends that the ALJ erred in finding her not credible regarding

the degree of her pain and functional limitations. Although the ALJ is not required

to discuss each credibility factor, see Halverson v. Astrue, 600 F.3d 922, 932 (8thCir.

2010), in this case the ALJ did not give any specific reasons for discounting ToddSmith’s credibility, cf. McCoy v. Astrue, 648 F.3d 605, 614 (8th Cir. 2011) (if ALJ

explicitly discredits claimant and gives good reasons for doing so, this court normally

defersto ALJ’s credibility determination). To the extent the ALJ’s finding was based

on the belief that Todd-Smith’s complaints were not fully supported by the objective

medical evidence, the lack of objective evidence is only one factor to consider in

evaluating credibility, see Curran-Kicksey v. Barnhart, 315 F.3d 964, 968-69 (8thCir.

2003), and in any event Todd-Smith’s medical records show a long history of back

surgeries, epidural steroid injections, and significant pain medication. Moreover,

Todd-Smith did not represent that she participated in any daily activities that were

inconsistent with her testimony about her limitations. See Renstrom v. Astrue, 680

F.3d 1057, 1065 (8th Cir. 2012) (claimant’s report of daily activities is factor to

consider in assessing credibility).

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We also find that the ALJ’s RFC assessment and hypothetical to the VE did not

contain many of the mental limitationsset out by the doctors--even the lessrestrictive

limitations set out by the consultative examiners--and thus the ALJ’s determination

was unsupported by the record. See Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 784 (8th Cir.

2004) (VE testimony constitutes substantial evidence only when based on proper

hypothetical which includes all impairments supported by substantial evidence in

record). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

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