96-640

 No. 96-640

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

 

1997

THE ASSOCIATED PRESS; BIGFORK EAGLE; THE BILLINGS 

GAZETTE; BOZEMAN DAILY CHRONICLE; THE MONTANA 

STANDARD; GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE; HAVRE DAILY 

NEWS; HELENA INDEPENDENT RECORD; THE DAILY 

INTER LAKE; KECI-TV, MISSOULA; KFBB-TV, GREAT FALLS; 

KXLF-TV, BUTTE; KRTV-TV, GREAT FALLS; KTVQ-TV,

BILLINGS; KULR-TV, BILLINGS; LIVINGSTON ENTERPRISE;

MILES CITY STAR; MISSOULIAN; MONTANA NEWSPAPER 

ASSOCIATION; NEWS MONTANA, INC.; (as publishers of 

BIGHORN COUNTY NEWS, CARBON COUNTY NEWS, 

and STILLWATER COUNTY NEWS); RAVALLI REPUBLIC; and

THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS,

MONTANA CHAPTER,

 Plaintiffs and Appellants,

 v.

THE MONTANA SENATE REPUBLICAN CAUCUS; THE 

MONTANA SENATE DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS; THE 

MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES REPUBLICAN

CAUCUS; and THE MONTANA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS,

 Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

 In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

 The Honorable Thomas C. Honzel, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

 For Appellant:

 James P. Reynolds, Reynolds, Motl and Sherwood, Helena, Montana

 For Respondent:

 Stanley T. Kaleczyc, Oliver H. Goe, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven,

 Helena, Montana

 Heard: October 23, 1997

 Submitted: October 30, 1997

 Decided: December 18, 1997

Filed:

 __________________________________________

 Clerk

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Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

 This is an appeal from the District Court's November 16, 1995 order dismissing

the Appellants' complaint. The trial court held that the Respondent Senate and House

Republican and Democratic party in-session caucuses were not persons within the

meaning of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P., and that, therefore, the court did not have 

jurisdiction

over them. Subsequently, on July 12, 1996, the court's order was converted into one 

for

summary judgment, and this appeal followed. We reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

 Issue

 We address but one issue in this appeal: Under Montana law, are the Senate and

House caucuses of the Republican and Democratic parties "persons" within the meaning

of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P.? We answer this question in the affirmative.

 Background

 The Appellants (Plaintiffs in the underlying action) are twenty-two Montana

newspapers, television stations and trade and professional news organizations, 

hereafter

collectively referred to as the media. The Respondents (Defendants in the underlying

action) are the State Senate and House caucuses of the Republican and Democratic

parties. The Respondents are hereafter collectively referred to as the caucuses.

 The media filed their complaint on February 17, 1995, alleging that, for a 

variety

of reasons, the caucuses are public bodies or agencies of state government performing

public functions in public facilities at public expense. The media further alleged 

that the

proceedings and records of the caucuses were closed to the media and to the public in

violation of Montana's Open Meetings law, Title 2, chapter 3, part 2, MCA; in 

violation

of Montana's Public Records law, Title 2, chapter 6, part 1, MCA; and in violation of

the Right-To-Know provision of Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution. 

The

media prayed for declaratory and injunctive relief and for costs and attorney fees. 

 Four legislators serving in the 1995 Legislature, Senate Majority Leader John

Harp, Senate Minority Leader Mike Halligan, Speaker of the House John Mercer and

then-House Minority Leader Ray Peck, were served with process. These four 

legislators

entered a special appearance, by counsel, without admitting that they were the proper

persons to receive service of process on behalf of the caucuses. In due course they 

filed

a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.

P.,

contending, among other things, that the caucuses were not "persons" within the 

meaning

of Rule 4, M.R.Civ.P., and that the caucuses were, therefore, not subject to the

jurisdiction of the court.

 Relying on our decision in Common Cause v. Statutory Committee (1994), 263

Mont. 324, 868 P.2d 604, the District Court effectively differentiated between the 

presession and the in-session party caucuses. The court held that, because pre-session

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caucuses are required by õ 5-2-201, MCA, to meet and because they clearly perform a

governmental or public purpose these caucuses are subject to the Open Meetings law. 

On the other hand, the court concluded that while the party caucuses are not the

legislature nor are they an official body or committee of the legislature, the 

caucuses are

"a 'de facto' part of the legislative process where important public policy issues 

are

discussed by legislators.þ The court then ruled that the caucuses are not "persons" 

within

the meaning of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P., since the caucuses are neither unincorporated

associations nor groups of two or more persons having a joint or common interest nor

any other legal or commercial entity. Rather, the court concluded that the party 

caucuses

are unofficial gatherings of legislators and not separate legal entities, and, 

therefore, they

are not persons within the meaning of Rule 4A. On this rationale, the District Court

denied the motion to dismiss the media's complaint as to the pre-session caucuses, 

but

granted dismissal, and later converted that to summary judgment, as to the in-session

caucuses.

 The media timely appealed the court's grant of summary judgment dismissing their

complaint as to the in-session caucuses. No cross-appeal was filed by the caucuses,

however, as to the court's ruling on the pre-session caucuses.

 Standard of Review

 As stated above, the court dismissed the media's complaint for failure to state 

a

claim and then converted the order of dismissal into one for summary judgment

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because the in-session caucuses are not 

persons

within the meaning of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P. Under these circumstances our review of

the trial court's decision, de novo, is clearly mandated.

 A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it 

appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim 

which

would entitle him to relief. Moreover, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a 

claim

under Rule 12(b)(6), M.R.Civ.P., has the effect of admitting all well-pleaded 

allegations

in the complaint. In considering the motion, the complaint is construed in the 

light most

favorable to the plaintiff, and all allegations of fact contained therein are taken 

as true. 

The determination that a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted

is a conclusion of law which we review de novo. Common Cause of Montana v.

Argenbright (1996), 276 Mont. 382, 386, 917 P.2d 425, 427 (citations omitted). 

 In like manner, a court's determination of its jurisdiction is a conclusion 

of law

over which our review is plenary. See Lurie v. 8182 Maryland Associates (Mont. 

1997),

938 P.2d 676, 678, 54 St. Rep. 429, 430; Agri West v. Koyama Farms, Inc. (Mont.

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1997), 933 P.2d 808, 810, 54 St. Rep. 118, 119; Bird v. Hiller (1995), 270 Mont. 467,

470, 892 P.2d 931, 932. Finally, as to motions granting summary judgment, it is 

wellsettled that we review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, 

applying the

same Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P., criteria used by that court. Ash Grove Cement Co. v.

Jefferson County (Mont. 1997), 943 P.2d 85, 88, 54 St. Rep. 756, 758 (citation 

omitted).

 Discussion

 The media argue, and we agree, that the word "caucus" has two related, yet

distinct meanings. On the one hand a "caucus" can be a group of persons sharing

common interests and attempting to influence the decision of a larger group. In this

context a caucus is "[a] group within a legislative or decision-making body seeking 

to

represent a specific interest or influence a particular area of policy," American 

Heritage

Dictionary 304 (3d ed. 1992), or "a group of people united to promote an agreed-upon

cause," Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 182 (10th ed. 1997).

 On the other hand, "caucus" can refer to the meetings of such groups. Under 

this

usage of the word, caucus is variously defined as "a closed meeting of a group of 

persons

belonging to the same political party or faction [usually] to select candidates or 

to decide

on policy," Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 182 (10th ed. 1997); "[a] meeting

of the legal voters of any political party assembled for the purpose of choosing 

delegates

or for the nomination of candidates for office," Black's Law Dictionary 220 (6th ed.

1990); or "[a] closed meeting of party members within a legislative body to decide on

questions of policy or leadership," American Heritage Dictionary 304 (3d ed. 1992).

 In their complaint, the media carefully differentiated between the two 

definitions,

focusing their claims for purposes of this case on the first definition of caucus. 

Specifically, the media defined each of the four defendant caucuses as consisting of 

state

senators or representatives elected, respectively, to the state Senate or House on 

either

the Republican or Democratic party ticket.

 In determining that the media's complaint should be dismissed, the District 

Court,

however, effectively adopted the argument of the caucuses and rejected the first 

definition 

--i.e., that a caucus is a group of people sharing a common interest and seeking to

promote a specific interest, policy or cause--and, instead, narrowed its 

determination to

the second definition--i.e., that party caucuses are unofficial gatherings of 

legislators and

not separate legal entities. While the court grounded its ruling on our decision in

Common Cause v. Statutory Committee (1994), 263 Mont. 324, 868 P.2d 604, we did

not address in that case the issue presented here, and, accordingly, we do not find 

our

decision dispositive as to this issue.

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 If the "group" definition of caucus (as opposed to the "gathering" or "meeting"

definition) is valid--and we have been cited to no authority that would lead us to 

the

conclusion that it is not--then, the question simply becomes whether the caucuses as

"groups of persons sharing a common interest" fit within the definition of "persons" 

within the meaning of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P. We conclude that they do.

 At the outset, we note that while the parties have injected into this appeal

arguments which more properly go to the underlying merits of the case, in actuality, 

the

narrow question of law at issue here is not particularly complex. We conclude that 

this

legal issue is resolved on the plain language of Rule 4A itself and that we need not 

resort

to the various out-of-state authorities cited in the briefs. 

 When we are called upon to interpret the Rules of Civil Procedure, we utilize

applicable rules of statutory construction. Thus in our interpretation of the 

Rules, we are

required

 simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained

 therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been

 inserted [and][w]here there are several provisions or particulars, such a

 construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.

Busch v. Atkinson (1996), 278 Mont. 478, 483-84, 925 P.2d 874, 877 (citations 

omitted).

 Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P., defines "person" as follows:

 As used in this rule, the word "person," whether or not a citizen or

 resident of this state and whether or not organized under the laws of this

 state, includes an individual whether operating in the individual's own name

 or under a trade name; an individual's agent or personal representative; a

 corporation; a business trust; an estate; a trust; a partnership; an

 unincorporated association; and any two or more persons having a joint or

 common interest or any other legal or commercial entity. [Emphasis added].

 Clearly, a party caucus, whether defined as a group or a gathering, is not an

individual, a corporation, a business trust, an estate, a trust or a partnership 

within the

meaning of Rule 4A. Neither the media nor the caucuses argue to the contrary. If a

party caucus is a person within the meaning of Rule 4A, then the caucus must be 

either

an "unincorporated association" or "any two or more persons having a joint or common

interest." We hold that the caucuses fit within both definitions.

 In their brief to the trial court, while focusing on the "gathering" or 

"meeting"

definition of caucus, the caucuses, nevertheless, defined themselves and their 

activities

thus:

 These caucuses are meetings of members of a political party who

 periodically come together to discuss matters of common interest, including

 matters related to their respective party meetings, their party's platform,

 elections and election related activities, and personal matters, as well as

 issues generally related to substantive or procedural matters at the Montana

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 legislature, including matters previously proposed or considered, matters

 which are currently pending, and matters which may be proposed in the

 future.

 These meetings provide an opportunity for individuals who are

 elected to the Montana Senate or House and share a common political

 philosophy by which they are known and elected, which philosophy is

 identified by their political party affiliation, to gather together, think out

 loud, formulate ideas, and discuss among other things, various political,

 social, and public policy issues in private. This ability to associate and to

 discuss political ends in a private setting is an integral part of the free flow

 of political thought and ideas between and among members of the respective

 political parties who are elected to the legislature.

 While the term "unincorporated association" is not defined in either Montana's

statutory or case law, Black's Law Dictionary defines this term as, among other 

things,

a "[v]oluntary group of persons, without a charter, formed by mutual consent for 

[the]

purpose of promoting [a] common enterprise or prosecuting [a] common objective." 

Blackþs Law Dictionary 1531 (6th ed. 1990). Comparing how the caucuses define

themselves and their activities with this definition of "unincorporated 

association," it is

evident that the caucuses fit neatly within its parameters. The caucuses are 

voluntary,

they are a group of persons, they do not have a charter, they are formed by mutual

consent, and they meet to discuss and promote common objectives.

 The caucuses, nevertheless, argue that an "unincorporated association" is not an

entity and has no status distinct from the persons composing it, but is rather a 

body of

individuals acting together for the prosecution of a common enterprise without a 

corporate

charter but upon methods and forms used by a corporation. The short answer to this

argument is that nothing in Rule 4A, in Montana's statutes or in our prior case law, 

so

restrictively defines an unincorporated association for purposes of determining 

whether

it is subject to the jurisdiction of this state's courts and to service of process. 

Regardless

of whether the powers and authority of an unincorporated association may be limited 

in

one way or another by other specific statutes, rules or by the case law, we are not

persuaded that any good purpose is served by so narrowly defining the term

unincorporated association in the context of determining personal jurisdiction under 

our

Rules of Civil Procedure. And, we are not cited to any compelling authority that 

would

dictate a conclusion to the contrary.

 More importantly, restricting those who can be sued in Montana's courts by

judicially adopting definitional restrictions not found in the plain, broad language 

of our

statutes and procedural rules flies directly in the face of the open courts 

provision of

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Article II, Section 16 of the Montana Constitution. Certainly, it will be of little

consolation to the Montana citizen or business injured by a body of individuals 

acting

together for the prosecution of a common enterprise without a corporate charter that 

such

citizen or business is deprived of access to our courts and to a remedy for the 

wrong done

simply because this body perpetrated its mischief without methods and forms used by a

corporation. Worse, the likely consequence of our adopting such a narrow definition 

of

unincorporated association under Rule 4A would be to effectively immunize the myriad

unincorporated hate groups and paramilitary organizations in this state--many of 

which

pride themselves on their lack of formality and structure--from suit in our civil 

courts. 

We refuse to so lightly create such a safe harbor for tortfeasors and other 

wrongdoers. 

 Accordingly, we hold that the caucuses are persons within the meaning of Rule 4A by

reason of their being unincorporated associations.

 The media also maintain that the caucuses are persons for Rule 4A purposes

because these bodies are "two or more persons having a joint or common interest." As

to this argument we need pause only momentarily. Referring back to the manner in

which the caucuses have defined themselves and their activities, and for the same 

reasons

that we rejected a narrowing interpretation of the term unincorporated association, 

we

likewise conclude that the caucuses also fit within this definition of "person" 

under Rule

4A. Without question, the caucuses are comprised of two or more persons; they have

a joint or common interest; and there is no requirement in our statutes, rules or 

case law

that limits this definition to only legal entities for purposes of determining the 

jurisdiction

of our courts and for service of process. We hold that the caucuses are "persons" 

within

the meaning of Rule 4A by reason of their being "two or more persons having a joint 

or

common interest."

 Finally, having decided the issue on appeal on the basis of the plain language 

of

Rule 4A, there remains to be mentioned, however, one further point that lends support

to our analysis. As mentioned above, the District Court refused to dismiss the 

media's

complaint as to the pre-session caucuses but did grant dismissal of the complaint as 

to the

in-session caucuses. In doing so, the court effectively held that the pre-session 

caucuses

are persons for Rule 4A purposes--for if they are not, then the pre-session caucuses

would be no more subject to suit , subject to the jurisdiction of the court and 

subject to

service of process than the in-session caucuses. This ruling--that the pre-session 

caucuses

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are persons, but that the in-session caucuses are not--makes little sense. 

 While the pre-session caucuses have certain statutorily defined duties under õõ 

5-2-

201, 202 and 203, MCA, there is nothing in these statutes that supports a conclusion 

that

at twelve noon on the day appointed for the meeting of a regular session of the 

legislature

the caucuses suddenly cease being or doing what they were and did before that magic

hour. In fact, the law directs the caucuses to perform certain duties during the 

session

as well. See õ 5-2-221(4), MCA (the majority and minority floor leaders and the

majority and minority whips of the Senate and the House are elected by their 

respective

caucuses). 

 Importantly, however, it is not the statutory duties that cause the pre-session

caucuses to be persons within the meaning of Rule 4A. Rather, it is because these

caucuses are groups of persons sharing common interests and attempting to influence 

the

decision of a larger group; groups within a legislative or decision-making body 

seeking

to represent a specific interest or influence a particular area of policy; and 

groups of

people united to promote an agreed-upon cause, that brings them within the 

definitions

of "unincorporated association" and "two or more persons having a joint or common

interest" and which, thus, renders them persons within the meaning of Rule 4A. 

Likewise, and for these same reasons, the in-session caucuses are persons for Rule 4A

purposes as well.

 We hold that the Republican and Democratic party Senate and House caucuses--the

Respondents in this appeal and the Defendants in the underlying action--are persons

within the meaning of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P. Accordingly, we reverse the order of

dismissal and order granting summary judgment entered by the District Court, and we

remand for further proceedings.

 Reversed and remanded.

 /S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ JIM REGNIER 

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

Justice Karla M. Gray, dissenting.

 I respectfully dissent from the Court's opinion because, in my view, the Court 

has

adopted and applied the wrong definition of "caucus." Thus, while I also disagree 

with

portions of the Court's discussion about the Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P., terms 

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"unincorporated

association" and "any two or more persons having a joint or common interest," I would

not reach those issues because applying the correct definition of "caucus" precludes 

this

case from coming within the purview of Rule 4A's listing of "persons" subject to 

suit in

Montana.

 The Court states, and correctly so, that the word "caucus" has two separate and

distinct meanings. The first is the "group of persons" definition; the second is the

"meeting" or "gathering" definition. The Court then implicitly chooses the "group"

definition, apparently on two bases: first, that the media said it was so in its 

complaint;

and second, that no authority had been cited to support the conclusion that the 

"group"

definition is not valid. I disagree.

 With regard to the complaint, I agree that the media carefully phrased its

allegations to meet the "group" definition of caucus. The caucuses just as carefully

phrased their pleadings and briefs to satisfy the "meeting" definition, as the 

Court's quote

of the caucuses' self-definition points out. The question before us is not, 

however, one

of "artful pleading." The question is which definition of "caucus" applies here. I 

submit

that Montana statutes provide the dispositive answer and thus preclude the Court from

merely choosing among competing definitions.

 Caucuses are referenced in statutes concerning the organization of the Montana

Legislature. Section 5-2-201, MCA, provides for presession caucuses via its mandate

that, by December 1 of each year in which legislative elections are held, the 

parties of

each legislative house "shall hold a presession caucus. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 

The

purposes of "the caucus" also are specified. It is clear that "the parties" cannot 

"hold"

a "group of persons." Thus, I submit that this statute clearly expresses the 

legislature's

intent that a "caucus" is a meeting or a gathering, rather than a group of persons.

 Section 5-2-202, MCA, also references caucuses and further buttresses the

conclusion that, in Montana, a legislative caucus is a meeting or gathering rather 

than a

group of persons. That statute addresses legislators nominated to leadership 

positions

"during the presession caucus." It simply is not reasonable to interpret the 

language in

õ 5-2-202, MCA, as addressing legislators nominated during the presession "group of

persons." 

 I acknowledge that the quoted statutes address only presession caucuses and that

the issues before us relate to caucuses held during legislative sessions. It is my 

view,

however, that the legislature has provided the applicable definition of caucuses via 

these

statutes and that this Court cannot properly just choose the alternative definition 

for

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purposes of this case.

 Because application of the proper definition renders a caucus a "meeting," it is

clear that a "meeting" cannot be sued. As a result, it is unnecessary to reach the 

question

of whether a caucus is a "person"--that is, an unincorporated association or two or 

more

persons having a joint or common interest--under Rule 4A.

 /S/ KARLA M. GRAY

Chief Justice J. A. Turnage dissenting. 

 I join in the dissent of Justice Karla M. Gray. 

 I further respectfully dissent to the majority opinion holding that a 

legislative

caucus is an "unincorporated association." This holding is totally unnecessary to 

the

majority holding that, for the purpose of Rule 4A, M.R.Civ.P., a caucus is "any two 

or

more persons having a joint or common interest." 

 Notwithstanding that Rule 4A, in its attempt to define persons for jurisdiction 

and

service of process, has included in a long list of recognizable legal entities "an

unincorporated association," such inclusion is neither logical or practical for the 

purpose

of jurisdiction and service of process. The inclusion of "unincorporated 

associations"

should be deleted from Rule 4A. 

 Rule 4D(e), M.R.Civ.P., requires service of process upon "an incorporated

association" by delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to an office, 

director,

superintendent, managing or general agent or partner or associate or with a person in

charge of such office or by delivery to the registered agent or other agent 

designated by

statute. Undoubtedly in Montana there are hundreds of "unincorporated associations,"

none of which have any structure that would allow service, as a practical matter, 

under

Rule 4D(e), ranging from volunteers who participate in such worthwhile endeavors as

gray ladies, hospice volunteers, community watch, altar societies, bridge clubs and 

many

other such "associations" unincorporated and without officers, agents, or offices. 

 Further, in the not unlikely event such entities are named as a party in 

litigation

and damages are awarded, what defendants must pay the judgment? Upon whose

property would a judgment lien attach? In the event the "association" should be 

awarded

judgment, who shares in the award and who can lawfully satisfy the judgment of 

record? 

 If the majority fears that some one or some association would escape liability 

for

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a tort, they need have no fear--some real live person or persons must by necessity 

have

committed the wrong, can be identified, and properly named a party. 

 /S/ J. A. TURNAGE

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