NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0164n.06

Case No. 21-2791

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

CHAZ WALLS,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

GRAPHIC PACKAGING CORPORATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

Before: BATCHELDER, COLE, and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Shortly after returning to work at Graphic 

Packaging Corporation (“Graphic Packaging”) from Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) 

continuous leave, Chaz Walls realized he had missed a doctor’s appointment. Walls did not 

previously inform Graphic Packaging of the appointment or request time off to attend it. 

Referencing his FMLA intermittent leave, Walls informed his supervisor he needed to leave his 

scheduled shift four hours early to go to the doctor’s office. Although his supervisor was unable 

to find anyone to cover the remainder of his shift, Walls left the premises. Graphic Packaging 

terminated his employment three days later. Walls sued, alleging violations of Michigan’s ElliottLarsen Civil Rights Act (“ELCRA”), Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), 

and public policy. The district court granted summary judgment to Graphic Packaging. We affirm.
No. 21-2791, Walls v. Graphic Packaging Corp.

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I

Graphic Packaging, a paperboard manufacturing and fabrication company, hired Walls to 

work at a Michigan manufacturing facility in July 2014. A collective bargaining agreement 

(“CBA”) applied to the employment relationship between Graphic Packaging and Walls, a member 

of the United Steelworkers Union Local 2-1010. 

Walls suffers from irritable bowel syndrome (“IBS”). He was granted FMLA intermittent 

leave from May 8, 2017 to August 5, 2017, and FMLA continuous leave from May 13, 2017 to 

June 24, 2017. Walls’s intermittent leave determination letter states: “When planning foreseeable 

medical treatment relating to your leave, you must consult with your Supervisor and/or Human 

Resources representative and make every reasonable effort to provide notification for an absence 

at least 30 days in advance, or as soon as practicable depending on your individual circumstances.” 

DE 16-3, May FMLA Approval, Page ID 342.

Before his continuous leave expired, Walls returned to work with doctor’s orders for 

frequent restroom breaks and days off between IBS flareups. Graphic Packaging prohibited 

employees from leaving their machine unattended unless they had coverage from another 

employee. Although he was occasionally asked to wait before using the restroom for coverage 

purposes, supervisors never told Walls that he could not take restroom breaks, and he was never 

disciplined for using the restroom. During his employment, he never told his supervisor or Human 

Resources that he was getting insufficient restroom breaks, nor did he file any grievances. 

On June 13, 2017, Walls received a voicemail from his doctor’s office stating he had 

missed an appointment and he needed to report to the office to “[s]ign paperwork to not get 
No. 21-2791, Walls v. Graphic Packaging Corp.

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dropped as a patient.”1 DE 16-15, Walls Dep., Page ID 405. The office wanted him to come “as 

soon as possible,” which Walls understood to mean before the office closed at 5:00 p.m. Id. Walls 

had forgotten about the appointment and, although it was scheduled several weeks prior, did not

inform anyone at Graphic Packaging about the appointment. Around 9:00 a.m., Walls called his 

supervisor, Lindsay Fisher, requesting to leave at 3:00 p.m., four hours early, to go to the doctor’s 

office. Walls informed Fisher that he missed an appointment and had “important issues with [his] 

health” that he “ha[d] to take care of.” DE 17-4, Arbitration Tr., Page ID 525. Walls and Fisher 

spoke at least three times throughout the day, but Fisher continuously told Walls she could not find 

anyone to cover his shift and he could not leave. Walls did not tell Fisher that he was sick or 

feeling ill, just that he “needed to fill out paperwork.” Id. at 519.

At 3:00 p.m., Fisher came to Walls’s workstation as he was preparing to leave and again 

told him she was unable to find coverage. Walls told her he had to leave and he “had FMLA.” Id.

at 525–26. The parties dispute Fisher’s response. Walls claims Fisher first told him he “had to 

stay,” but later told him “okay, then, leave.” Id. at 525–26. Walls’s coworker, Matthew Williams, 

was standing close to Walls during the conversation and testified that Fisher told Walls “well, just 

leave then.” Id. at 523. Fisher denied giving Walls permission to leave, testifying she told him “I 

don’t have anybody to cover you. You can’t leave.” Id. at 520; see also DE 16-6, Fisher Email, 

Page ID 354. Whatever Fisher’s response, Walls clocked out, “call[ed] in for FMLA,” and went 

to the doctor’s office. DE 17-4, Arbitration Tr., Page ID 525. Shortly after Walls’s departure, 

1

Jeffrey Carroll, the corporate representative for Walls’s doctor’s office, stated the office “does not have a practice of 

requiring patients who miss appointments to fill out any type of paperwork in order to remain on as patients.” DE 16-

5, Carroll Aff., Page ID 351. Carroll asserted no one from the doctor’s office informed Walls that he needed to fill 

out paperwork to remain a patient, and the office has no record of paperwork being completed by Walls on June 13. 
No. 21-2791, Walls v. Graphic Packaging Corp.

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Fisher emailed several individuals at Graphic Packaging to report that Walls left his shift early 

without coverage. 

Jennifer Strey, Human Resources Manager at Graphic Packaging, met with Walls the 

following day as part of her investigation into the incident. Walls did not tell Strey that he had a

medical condition requiring him to leave. After telling her he left to complete paperwork, Walls 

“acknowledged the fact that you can’t just use [FMLA leave] for any absence” and that this was 

an improper use of FMLA leave. Id. at 521–22. Graphic Packaging suspended Walls following 

the meeting. Two days later, Graphic Packaging discharged him for “[l]eaving the premises while 

on duty without permission of the supervisor,” which is listed as a cause for discharge in the CBA. 

DE 16-2, Walls Discipline Slips, Page ID 339; DE 16-8, CBA, Page ID 360.

The Union represented Walls in an arbitration grievance proceeding. The arbitrator 

sustained the termination and denied the grievance. Walls sued Graphic Packaging in Michigan 

state court in September 2019, alleging hostile workplace environment and retaliation under the 

ELCRA, retaliation and discrimination under the PWDCRA, and wrongful discharge in violation 

of Michigan public policy.2 Graphic Packaging removed the case to the Western District of 

Michigan pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1) and 1441(a). Walls abandoned both of his claims 

under the ELCRA, and the district court granted summary judgment to Graphic Packaging on 

Walls’s remaining claims. Walls timely appealed. 

II

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. El-Khalil v. Oakwood 

Healthcare, Inc., 23 F.4th 633, 634 (6th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

2 Walls did not bring any claims under FMLA, presumably because the two-year statute of limitations had already 

expired. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1); DE 34, Op., Page ID 749.
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judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of material fact exists 

when “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for 

that party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). “The mere existence of a 

scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be 

evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Id. at 252. While we 

draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmovant, we do not determine credibility or weigh 

the evidence. Id. at 255.

III

Walls argues the district court erred in finding he did not establish a prima facie case of 

retaliation and in finding Graphic Packaging’s reason for his discharge legitimate and 

nondiscriminatory.

3

 The PWDCRA prohibits employers from retaliating or discriminating against 

an employee who either has “opposed a violation” of the act or “made a charge, filed a complaint, 

testified, assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under the act. M.C.L. 

§ 37.1602(a). The PWDCRA also makes it unlawful for employers to “[d]ischarge or otherwise 

discriminate against” an employee “because of a disability . . . that is unrelated to the individual’s 

ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.” M.C.L. § 37.1202(b). Because Walls 

cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation or that Graphic Packaging’s legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for his termination was pretextual, we affirm.

A

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the PWDCRA, Walls must show: 

“(1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) that this was known by the defendant, (3) that the 

defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff, and (4) that there was a causal 

3 On appeal, Walls does not address the dismissal of his wrongful discharge claim under Michigan public policy, thus

that claim is waived. See Buziashvili v. Inman, 106 F.3d 709, 719 (6th Cir. 1997).
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connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Aho v. Dep’t of 

Corrs., 688 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). The district court found that Walls did not 

engage in a protected activity. Walls argues “he presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima 

facie case” without identifying a protected activity, instead arguing that Graphic Packaging’s 

proffered legitimate reason for his discharge was pretextual. CA6 R. 20, Appellant Br., at 12–16.

Walls can establish that he engaged in a protected activity by showing either that (1) he 

opposed a violation of the PWDCRA, or (2) he made a charge, filed a complaint, or testified, 

assisted, or participated in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under the PWDCRA. See

M.C.L. § 37.1602(a); see also Bachman v. Swan Harbour Assocs., 653 N.W.2d 415, 437 (Mich. 

Ct. App. 2002). Walls does not put forth evidence that he opposed a violation of the act, and he 

did not file a complaint or testify, assist, or participate in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing. 

We must therefore determine whether his conduct amounted to a charge made under the 

PWDCRA.

While “[a]n employee need not specifically cite the [PWDCRA] when marking a charge 

under the act[,] . . . the employee must do more than generally assert unfair treatment.” Barrett v. 

Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). To constitute protected activity, 

the “charge must clearly convey to an objective employer that the employee is raising the specter 

of a claim of unlawful discrimination pursuant to the [PWDCRA].” Id.; see also Mitan v. Neiman 

Marcus, 613 N.W.2d 415, 416 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that a plaintiff must at least 

“suggest or imply that the alleged job discrimination was related to her disability”). Merely 

requesting an accommodation is not a protected activity. Bachman, 653 N.W.2d at 437–38. 

Walls requested and was granted FMLA leave and referenced his FMLA leave in his sameday request to leave early on June 13, 2017, but these acts do not amount to making a charge of 
No. 21-2791, Walls v. Graphic Packaging Corp.

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discrimination under the PWDCRA. During his employment, Walls never told his supervisor or 

Human Resources orally or in writing that he was not getting restroom breaks he needed due to 

his IBS. Nor did he file a grievance. Walls did not “clearly convey” to Graphic Packaging that he 

was being discriminated against on the basis of a disability. Barrett, 628 N.W.2d at 72. Since 

Walls did not engage in a protected activity, he cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation 

under the PWDCRA.4

B

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the PWDCRA, Walls must show: 

“(1) that he is disabled as defined in the act, (2) that the disability is unrelated to his ability to 

perform his job duties, and (3) that he has been discriminated against in one of the ways delineated 

in the statute.” Peden v. City of Detroit, 680 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Mich. 2004) (quotation omitted) 

(cleaned up). The district court assumed that Walls established a prima facie case of 

discrimination. Graphic Packaging does not challenge that assumption, instead arguing Walls 

cannot establish pretext. We therefore assume, without deciding, that Walls established a prima 

facie case of unlawful discrimination. The burden thus shifts to Graphic Packaging “to articulate 

a legitimate business reason for the decision.” Jewett v. Mesick Consol. Sch. Dist., 957 N.W.2d 

377, 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 2020). If Graphic Packaging provides such a reason, the burden shifts 

back to Walls to establish that the proffered reason is pretextual. Id. Walls argues the district 

court erred in finding Graphic Packaging’s proffered reason legitimate because a genuine issue of 

material fact exists as to whether Walls had permission to leave. 

4

In his reply brief, Walls argues for the first time in this litigation that Graphic Packaging is liable for retaliation 

because it discharged him based on a “mistaken perception that Walls walked off the job without FMLA or improperly 

used FMLA.” CA6 R. 25, Reply Br., at 1. Walls did not raise this theory of liability to the district court or in his 

principal brief. We therefore cannot consider the argument. See Armstrong v. City of Melvindale, 432 F.3d 695, 700

(6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he failure to present an issue to the district court forfeits the right to have the argument addressed 

on appeal.”); Scott v. First S. Nat’l Bank, 936 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[A]n appellant forfeits an argument that 

he fails to raise in his opening brief.”).
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The district court found that Walls was terminated for leaving work without permission. 

Walls asserts the district court reached this conclusion because it made inferences in favor of 

Graphic Packaging, the moving party, in conflict with the court’s role at the summary judgment 

stage. The key question, however, concerns Graphic Packaging’s honest belief at the time of its 

decision. See Jewett, 957 N.W.2d at 386 (finding an employer’s proffered reason of performance 

deficiencies legitimate, even though “[t]here may be a genuine question of fact whether plaintiff’s 

performance issues were real”). Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Walls,

Graphic Packaging has put forth sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden. Fisher emailed members

of the management team within two hours of Walls’s departure, explaining that Walls “walked off 

the job.” DE 16-6, Fisher Email, Page ID 354. Strey met with Walls the following day to address 

“him walking off the job.” DE 17-3, Strey Dep., Page ID 491. Two days later, Graphic Packaging 

discharged Walls for “[l]eaving the premises while on duty without permission of the supervisor,” 

DE 16-2, Walls Discipline Slips, Page ID 339, which is a cause for discharge under the terms of 

the parties’ CBA. Graphic Packaging made its termination decision based on its belief that Walls 

left without permission, which is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his termination.

Walls can establish Graphic Packaging’s reason for his discharge is pretextual by showing 

the reason (1) had no basis in fact, (2) was not the actual reason for his discharge, or (3) was 

insufficient to justify the discharge. Jewett, 957 N.W.2d at 385. Pretext can be established with 

direct or indirect evidence, but Walls must ultimately “establish a causal connection between the 

discriminatory animus and the adverse employment decision.” Id. at 386. Walls argues that his 

disability was the actual reason for his discharge for multiple reasons, including suspicious timing 

of his discharge with his return from FMLA continuous leave and the fact that Graphic Packaging 

knew Walls needed to leave for a doctor’s appointment and fired him for leaving for the
No. 21-2791, Walls v. Graphic Packaging Corp.

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appointment. While Walls was fired within one month of returning from his continuous FMLA 

leave, his decision to leave the premises without permission was certainly an intervening event. 

Walls mentioned FMLA to Fisher on the day of the incident and Strey discussed the proper use of 

FMLA leave with Walls the following day, but there is no indication that Graphic Packaging made 

its decision for any reason other than its belief that Walls left the premises without permission. 

“An honest belief, even if ultimately found to be objectively incorrect or improvident, precludes a 

finding of pretext or bad faith.” Jewett, 957 N.W.2d at 386. Walls offers no evidence suggesting 

that Graphic Packaging made its decision with discriminatory animus and thus cannot establish 

pretext.

IV

Walls cannot establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation or that Graphic 

Packaging’s legitimate business reason for his discharge is pretextual. We affirm.