NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0118n.06 Filed: F ebrua

ry 14, 2007 No. 06-1013

UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT DAWN COOP ER, P ersonal Repre sentative of t he Es t a t e o f D EM I TR I US MORTON, De c e as e d, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. COUNTY OF WASHTE NAW, CITY OF ANN ARBOR, ANTH ONY WOODF ORD, Wa sht e naw Co unt y Se r ge ant , P AM ELA RACI TI , W a s ht enaw Cou nty Of fi cer , EUGENE HAHN, Washtenaw County Of fi cer , MICHAEL WATCHOWSKI, Ann Arbor P olice Of fi cer , STE VE L AWRENCE, Ann Arbor P olice Off

icer , De fend ant s- App e lle e s. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE EASTE RN DISTRICT OF M ICHIGAN

BEFORE: CLAY, ROG ERS, an d SUT TON, Circuit Judges

. CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Plaintiff Dawn Cooper , persona l repr esentative of the e state of Demitrius Morton (“Mor

ton”), a dece ased pr isoner at Washtena w County J ail, appea ls the district court orde r g ranting summary judgme nt in favor of Def endants Washtenaw

County , the City

of Ann Arbor, a nd all office rs named individually as De fenda

nts (collectively

“De fenda

nts”). The districtNo. 06-1013

2 c ourt dis mis se d Pl a int if

f’ s 4 2 U .S. C. § 1 98 3 c la im a lle g ingDe fe nd ants vio la te d M or ton ’s Ei g hth Amendment rig hts by

actingwith deliberate indiffer ence to his known risk of suicidal behavior

. For the re asons t h at are set forth be low, we AF F IRM the district court’s de cision g ranting summary judgme nt as to D efe ndants L awr ence , Woodford, Hahn, Raciti, and the County of Washtenaw; we RE VE RSE th e g r an t o f

s u mm ar y ju d g me n t a s to D e f

e n d an ts Watc h o w s k i a

n d th e Ci ty o f Ann Arbor. BACK GR OUND The de tails of this case are trag ic. On Marc h 3, 2003, thirty -five y ear old Demetrius Morton pled g uilty

to domestic ass au l t an d battery . Morton was re lease d on persona l rec og nizance and order ed to r eturn to c ourt on April 3, 2003 for sentenc ing. Morton failed to a ppear on April 3, 2003 and a be nch wa

rra nt was issued for

his arre st. On J une 3, 2003 he w as ar rested by Dea rborn police , and an a rra ng ement wa s made to transf er him to the custody of the Ann Arbor police. During the

e xch ang e , M or

ton a tte mpt e d to e sc a

pe and wa s cau ght. Th e c a

ptu re pr omp te d h im t o b e c ome violent towa

rd the arr esting office rs and toward himself. During his tra nsport t o An n Ar b o r, he bang ed his hea d on the safe ty gl as s o f t he patr ol vehicle a nd stated that he w anted to kill himself. Reac ting to his violent behavior, A nn Arbor police transporte d Morton to the University of Michig an for psy cholog ical eva luation to determine if he nee ded to be hospitalized as he pr esente d a dang er to h ims e lf and oth e rs . M or

ton te ste d pos iti ve fo r co c a ine and his blo od a lc oh ol l e ve l w a s f

ound to be .363, which is ove r four times the leg al limit for ope rating a motor vehic le. Univer sity medical specia lists concluded that hospitaliz ation was unne cessa ry and that Morton’s violent beha vior wasNo. 06-1013

3 the re su lt o f h is d

ru g and a lc oh ol u se . M or

ton wa s r e le a se d fr om the Un ive rs ity Ho sp ita l the same day and take n to his arra ignme nt. At the ar raig nment, Morton once ag ain rea cted violently when he was told he would not be rele ased w hile he aw aited his sentenc ing hear ing se t for June 12, 2003. He bang ed his hea d on the table and y elled that he wanted to kill himself. Morton had to be phy sically restra ined and e scorted out of the cour

troom by the officers present. De spite the rec ommendation for the U niversity hospital that Morton did not present a dang er to himself, the judg e orde red Mor ton to be place d on suicide

watc h unti l se nte nc ing . O ff ic e r Watc ho ws ki o f t

he Ann A rb or

po lic e , o ne of

the de fe nd ants in t

his action, wa s prese nt at this arra ignme nt. Defe ndant Watchowski testified that he did not hea r the court plac e Morton on suicid e watch. Howeve r, he a dmitted that it i s customary for him to have

rec eived a

copy of t he court dispositi on and that he li kely rec eived one in this case as we ll. Further , wh ile he c la ime d th a t he c ou ld n ot r e me mbe r i f h e re a d it or no t, he a dmi tte d that it is l ike ly that if he re ceive d the cour

t disposit ion then he would have rea d it. The Ann Ar b o r police tra nsported Morton to Washtenaw Cou n t y j ai l , where he w ould be housed until sentencing . Def endant Watchowski was not one of the transpor

ting of fice rs. Def endant De puty

Raciti booked Morton when he arrived at the Washtenaw County J ail on June 3, 20 03

. De fe nd ant Ra c iti pla c e d Mo rt on on su ic ide watc h purs ua nt t o th e c ourt ’s or de r. Th is

wa s th e sixthtim e Mo rt on ha d b e e n a

n inma te a t Wa sh te na

w C ounty J ail

. Dur in g thre e of his previous incar cer ations at the jail he had been pla ced on suic ide watc h. Placing Morton on suicide watch c onsisted of placinghim in an observati on cell under 24-hour obse rvation, whe re he was housed fr om J une 3, 2003 until he was transporte d to his sentencing hear ing on June 12, 2003. TheNo. 06-1013

Def endants’ counsel ex plained during oral argument that “bam bam” g owns are so named 1 for the F lintst ones char acte r “B am Ba m.” The name ref

ers to the fac t that the jail’s bam bam g owns are flimsy , one-pie ce g owns that are desig ned to tear apar t upon the exertion of any pressure so that they cannot be used in a suicide a ttempt. 4 observation cells are rooms with g lass walls so that the prisoner can be observe d constantly . Morton

was a lso give n a “bam bam” gown to wea r. These gow ns are g iven t o inmates on suicide watch, 1

a s w e ll a s in ma te s w ho have oth e r sp e c ia l me dic a l ne e ds

. Th e ob se rv a tio na l c e lls are a dd iti on a lly used both to house inmates on suicide watch and inm ates who need to be obse rved f or other me dical and psy cholog ical nee ds. Over the course of his nine day stay , Morton was g iven consistent medica l evaluations and “wa s clea red of all alcohol/nar cotic withdra wals” on June 8, 2003. Def endants Of

fice rs Michae l Watchowski and Steve Law re nce, both of whom wer e Ann Arbor police office rs, wer e the tra nsport office rs on J une 12, 2003 who were responsible for taking Mo rt on to h is s e nte nc inghe ari ng . Whe n the of fi c e rs arr ive d, bo th De fe nd ants Of fi c e r P a me la

Ra c iti and Serg eant Anthony

Woodford o f W ashtena

w County wer e on duty

at the county

jail. When Def endants Watchowski and L awr ence inquired as to how M orton was doing, Defenda nts Raciti and Woodford informed them that Morton wa s “doing fine” and he w as “a lrig ht to be transpor ted as fa r as [Defe ndant Woodford] kn[ ew].” (J

. A. at 395). Neither De fenda nt Raciti nor Def

endant Woodford told e ither Def endant Watchowski or Def endant L awr ence that Morton was o n suicide watch. When the y first arr ived, Def endants Watchowski and L awr ence saw that Morton was be ing he ld i n a n o bs e rv a tio na l c e ll a

nd saw h im w e a

ri nga bam bam g ow n. B e fo re he wa s r e le a se d in to the custody

of De fenda

nts W atchowski a

nd L awr ence , Morton was c hang ed o u t of the bam bamNo. 06-1013

5 g own and into a white uniform, consisting of white pants and a white shirt. This unif orm is issued to i nmate s w ho have sp e c ia l nee ds , whi c h can inc lud e su ic ida l ten de nc ie s, dr ug or a lc oh ol p ro ble ms, or medica l conditions. Defenda nt Eug ene H ahn, Was h t en aw Count y Correc tions Office r, wa s responsible for

prepa ring the transpor

tation log c oncer

ning Mor ton’s J une 12, 2003 transportation to the sentenc ing he aring . Def endant Hah n had no dire ct contac t with Morton or the Ann Arbor D e f e n d an ts

. Wa s h te n aw D e p u ty Pi la r s k i c la im e d th a t h e in f

o r me d D e f e n d an t Watc h o w ski that Mo rt on wa s o n s uic ide watc h b e fo re Wat c ho ws ki l e ft the c ounty

ja il, and Cor po ra l Cr ow e ll confirme d that he heard thi s conver sation. Defe ndant Watchowski claimed that he ca nnot remembe r whether he wa s told thi s or not. Def endants Watchowski and L awr ence spoke with Morton on the ride to the se ntencing hear ing a nd acc ording to them he “se emed . . . nor mal” and the re w as “no i n d i ca t i o n ” h e had any suicidal tendenc ies. (J.A. at 397). Morton arr ived at the courthouse without incident. When Morton was sente nced to ninety -three day s in jail, he acc epted the se ntence calmly

. De fendants returne d Mo rt on to a ho ldi ngc e ll a ft e r t

he se nte nc ingun til the y

c ou ld t ra ns po rt him ba c k to the ja il. Def endants lef

t Mor ton f or a little over a

n hour unsuper

vised. When they

returne d, they

discovere d that he had ha

ng ed himself with his shirt in the cell. Plaintiff broug ht this action, claiming that Def endants showed deliberate indiffer ence to the suicidal tendenc ies of Morton. Defenda nts moved for summary

judgme nt. Defe ndants Watchowski and L awr ence both a dmitted that suicide risk was a major conc ern w hen inmates we re se en we aring bam bam g owns, but they further testified that o t h er re asons wer e equa lly possible for the g own. Def endant Rac iti confirmed tha t i n m at es are g iven this gow n in situations ot her tha n potentialNo. 06-1013

6 suicide risks. Def

endants also testified that inmates wer e place d in obse rvational cells for rea sons other than suicide preve ntion. Pl aintiff introduce d no testimony that contra dicted the a ssertions that suicide risk is only

one of severa l rea sons an inmate may be held in an obse rvation ce ll or wea r a bam bam g own. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

no te d th a t Pla int if

f w a s una ble to a lle g e fa c ts ind ic a tin g that D e fe nd a nts acte d any more than ne g lige ntly

in their interac tions with respect to Morton’s suicide r isk. The cour t emphasized that t h e standa rd for deliberate indiffer ence is whether the officia l “knows of a nd disreg ards a

n excessive risk to inmate health or safe ty .” (J.A. at 395) . The district cour t rea soned that w ith re sp e c t to De fe nd ant Wo od fo rd , Pl a int if f o ff e re d n o ev ide nc e that wou ld te nd to i nd ic a te that Plaint i ff m et the re quisite standard. B eca use Plaintiff’s ar g ument with respec t to Defe ndant Woodford was that he failed to tell De fenda nts Watchowski and L awr ence that Morton was on suicide watch, the district cour t rea soned that t his was sim ple neglig ence . Wit h respe ct to Def endant Raciti, Plainti ff onc e ag ain ar g ued that her failure to inf

orm the Ann Ar

bor police that Morton was suicidal constituted a violation of Morton’s Eig hth Amendment rig hts. Aga i n, the district court

rea soned that t his amounted only to neg lige nce. T he district cour t pointed out that Pl aintiff fa iled to make any

argument to support the alleg ation that Def endant Ha hn showed de liberate indiffer ence tow ard Mo rt on , b e c a

us e he ne ve r h a d a

ny dir e c t c on ta c t wi th him . T he c ourt ana ly zed De fe nd a nts Watchowski and L awr ence toge ther and conclude d that, assuming Plaintiff suc cessf ully alleg ed that t h ey h ad o b s erve d enoug h indicia of suicidal be havior to have draw n the infer ence , Plaintiff was unable to prove that they had ac tually

draw n the infer ence . Finally , the cour t pointed out that Plaintiff’s “fa ilure to train” a rg ument ag ainst Def

endants W ashtena

w C ounty and the Ci ty

of AnnNo. 06-1013

7 Ar bo r w a s me ri tle ss b e c a

us e § 1 98 3 c la ims canno t g ra nt r e lie f o n a

n a lle g a tio n o f f

a ilure to t ra in unless Plaintiff alleg ed that the County and the City

them s el v es eng ag ed in the constitutional violation. Thus, the district c ourt g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of all Def endants. Plaintiff timely filed a N otice of A

ppeal of this order. DI SCU SSIO N I. The dist r ic t c our t i m pr ope r ly g r ant e d sum m ar y j udgm e nt with r e spe c t t o D e fend ant Watchowsk i, bu t properly gr anted summ a ry ju dgm ent with respect t o the other ind ividu al Defendan ts A. Stand ard of Review Th is C ourt

re vie ws a

dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra

nt o f su mmar

y jud g me nt de novo

. Blackm ore v. Kalamazoo , 390 F.3d 890, 894- 95 (6th Cir. 2004). Summary judgme nt is proper whe re “ the pleading s, depositions, answers to interr og atories, a nd admi s s i o n s on file, tog ether with the

a ff ida vit s, if any , s ho w that the re is no g e nu ine iss ue a s to a ny ma te ri a l f

a c t and the mov ingpa

rt y is entitled to judgment a s a matter of law.” F ed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). The movi ng party bear s the initial burd e n o f de mon str a tin g the a bs e nc e of any g e nu ine iss ue of

ma te ri a l f

a c t, a nd a ll i nf e re nc e s sh ou ld be made in favor of

the non-moving party

. Ce lot e xCor p. v . Ca tre tt , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To su pp or t it s mo tio n, the mov ing pa rt y may sh ow “ that the re is an a bs e nc e of e vid e nc e to support the nonmoving party ' s case .” Id

. at 325. While all inferenc es must be dra wn in favor

of the nonmoving pa

rty , this Court i s under no oblig ation to imag ine favor able fac ts where the nonmoving p ar t y h as al l ege d

n o n e. “[ T ] h e m er e e x i s t en ce o f a s ci n t i l l a o f ev i d en ce i n s u p p o rt o f t h e p l ai n t i ff

's position wil l be insufficie nt [t o defe at a motion for summ ary judgme nt] ; there must be evidenc e onNo. 06-1013

8 which the jury

could re asonably

find for the plaintiff.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc ., 47 7 U .S. 242, 252 (1986). B. St anda r d for a § 19 83 Cl aim Section 1983 does not alone confer rig hts upon an indi vidual. I nstead, it is a vehicle to assert violations of constituti onal rig hts gua rante ed else wher e. Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 393-94, (1989). Thus, in orde r to succe ssfully bring a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must alleg e 1) the violation of an und e rl y ingc on sti tut ion a l r ig ht b y ; and 2) a state a c tor

wh o c omm itt e d th e vio la tio n w hil e actingunder the color of la w. Bake r v. Mc Collan , 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). I n the pre sent ca se, Plaintiff alleg es that by showing deliberate indif fe rence to Morton’s demonstrated suic idal tendenc ies, Def endants violated his Eig hth Amendment rig hts. (Pl.’s Brief at 3). Plaintiff prope rly

bases the unde rlying violation upon the Eig hth Amendment bec ause Mor ton

wa s a c on vic te d p ri so ne r a

t th e tim e of

his su ic ide . “ [T]he Ei g hth Am e ndme nt, wh ic h is sp e c if ic a lly

conce rned w ith the unnece ssary and wa nton infliction of pain in penal institu t i o n s , serve s as the primary source of subs t an t i v e p rotec tion to convicted prisoner s in cases suc h as this one. . . .” W hit le yv . A lbe rs , 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986). F urther, “ this con stitut ional g uara ntee e ncompasses

a rig ht to medical car e for

serious medica l needs, including psy cholog ical nee ds.” Perez v . Oakland Cou nty , 466 F.3d 416, 423( 6th Cir. 2006). Plainti ff is, there fore , able to mee t the first requir ement for a lleg ing a

§ 1983 claim. Additionally , Plaintiff na mes two municipalities a

nd four ag ents of the state as Def

endants. Acc ording ly , it is undisputed that their ac tions were unde rtake n under c olor of law. Thus, this § 1983 claim is properly formulated. C. Deliberat e Ind if

ferenceNo. 06-1013

9 Th e qu e sti on

be fo re us is wh e the r the re e xists a tr ia ble iss ue of fa c t ov e r w he the r D e fe nd a nts d i s c h ar g e d

t h e i r c o n s t i tu t i o n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w h i l e M o rt o nw a s i nc u s t o dy. “[T] he Constituti on gi v es go v ern m en t s co n s i d er ab l e l ee wa y wh en i tco m es t o t h e d ay -t o -d ay ch al l en ges o f m an agi n g a prison and ere cts a series of hurdles that alleg ations of prisoner mistreatment must c lear befor e they proce ed to a jury .” Clark-Murphy v . Foreback , 439 F.3d 280, 286 ( 6th Cir. 2006)

. A c c o r d i n g l y, deliberate indiffer ence involves two distinct st eps. F irst, a plaintiff must “establish[] that ‘the officia l knows of and disre g ar ds an excessive risk to inmate he alth or saf ety ,’ which is to say

‘the of fi c ia l mu st b oth be awa

re of fa c ts f

ro m w hic h th e inf

e re nc e c ou ld b e dr awn

that a su bs tanti a l r isk of serious harm exis ts, a

nd he must a lso dr aw the infer ence .’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). This re quirement c omprises t h e co n stitut ional violation question and contains both an objec tive and sub j ective element. Onc e a pla intiff is able to make the initial showing that there was in fa ct a constitut ional violation, a defenda nt may still avoid liability if the defe ndant is entitled to qualified i mmunity

. To overc ome a c laim of qualified immunity , plaintiff must show that “the rig ht at issue was . . .‘c lear ly established’ at t h e t i m e o f the violation.” Com sto c k v . M c Cra ry , 273 F.3d 693, 703 ( 6th Cir. 2001). 1. Constitutional Q uestion “[T] he Eighth Amendment prohibit s mistreatment onl y if it is tantamount to ‘punishment,’

and thu s c ourt s h a ve imp os e d li a bil ity up on pr iso n o ff

ic ia ls o nly

wh e re the y

are ‘s o d e lib e rate ly indiffer ent to the serious medic al nee ds of prisoners as to unnece ssarily and wa ntonly inflict pain.’” Perez , 4 6 6 F. 3 d

at 4 2 4 (q u o t i n g Ho rn v . Ma dis on Cou nty Fi sc al C ou rt , 22 F.3d 653, 660 ( 6th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ) )

. T h i s C o u rt h a s d e f i n e d “ [ a ] s e r i o u s m e d i c a l n e e d [ a s ] ‘ o n e t h a t h a s b e e n d i a g n o s e d b y aNo. 06-1013

10 ph y sic ian as man dat in g tr e a tme nt o r o ne that is so ob vio us that e ve n a lay pe rs on wo uld e a sil y

rec og nize the nece ssity

for a doctor' s attention.’” Blac k mo re , 3 9 0 F. 3 d at 8 9 7 (q u o t i n g Ga ud re au lt v. Munic ipality of Salem , 9 23 F .2 d 2 03 , 2 08 (1 st C ir . 1 99 0) ). I t i s well- e sta bli sh e d in thi s Ci rc uit that suicidal tendenc ies are consider e d “ser ious medical nee ds” for the purposes of

this analy sis. See, e.g ., Ho rn , 2 2 F .3 d at 66 0; Ba rber v . Ci ty of S ale m, Oh io , 953 F.2d 232, 239- 40 (6th Cir. 1992). There are two distinct pron gs o f t h e d el i b er at e i n d i ff er en ce s t an d ar d : An o b

j ec t i v e c o mp onent

an d a s u b je c ti v e c o mp o n e n t. F ir s t, th e me d ic a l n e e d “ mu s t b e , o b je c ti v e ly , s u f

f ic ie n tly serious.” Farmer , 5 11 U. S. at 83 5. As we have state d, it i s b e y on d disp ute that su ic ida l te nd e nc ie s me e t th is objective c omponent. Ho rn , 22 F.3d at 660. The subjec tive component, on the other hand, re quires fac ts that i n dicate “ that the offic ial being sued subjectively perc eived f

acts fr om which to infer substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fac t dr aw the infere nce, and that he the n disreg arde d that risk.” Comstock , 273 F.3d at 703. Thus, the subjective c omponent act u al l y has three prong s embedde d within it. First, the plaintiff must show that the officia l subjectively perc eived the fac ts that g ave rise t o the infer ence of the risk. Id

. T h en , t h e p l aint iff must show that the offic ial actua lly drewthe infer ence , and, importantly , not just that he or she should have done so. Farmer , 5 11 U. S. at 83 9; Br oo k s v . Ce le ste , 39 F .3 d 1 25 , 1 28 (6 th C ir . 1 99 4) . F ina lly , th e plaint if f mu st sho w t

hat th e of fi c ia l c on sc iou sly disreg arde d the per ceive d risk. Farmer , 511 U.S. at 839. Th e c on sti tut ion a l que sti on is furt he r co mpl ic a te d by the of

t- re pe a te d c a ve a t “ that de lib e rate indiffer ence entails something mor e than mer e n egl i gence.” Farmer , 5 11 U. S. at 83 5. Pr e c ise ly ho w m uc h mo re is r e qu ir e d r e mains d if fi c ult to d e te rm ine . “ De lib e rate ind if fe re nc e re qu ir e s aNo. 06-1013

11 deg ree of culpa

bility g reater than me re negl i gen ce , b u t less than ‘ac ts or omissions for the ve ry purpose of

causingharm or with know ledg e that harm will result.’” Mi lle r v . Ca lho un Cou nty , 408 F. 3 d 8 0 3 , 8 1 2 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834) . I n Farmer , the Court indicated that the line betwe en these two conce pts is marked by actua l k n o wl ed g e. The Court defines de lib e rate dif

fe re nc e a s c ri min a l r e c kle ssn e ss a nd no te s that “ [t]he c ri min a l la w. . . g e ne ra lly

pe rm its a finding o f

r e c k le s s n e s s o n ly

w h e na p e r s o nd is r e g ar d s a

r is k o f h ar m o f w h ic h h e is aw are .” Farmer , 5 11 U. S. at 83 6- 83 7. Th e lin e be tw e e n n e g lig e nc e and de lib e rate ind if

fe re nc e is p art ic ula

rl y difficult to drawwhen the r isk at i s s u e is suicide bec ause the officia ls will necessar ily be ac cused of a f ailure to a ct, which usua lly falls in the domain of ne g lige nce. We have cla rified that the prope r inquiry in a ca se whe re an inmate has committed suic ide is “whethe r the de cede nt showed a strong lik e lih oo d th a t he wo uld a tte mpt to take his ow n lif e in su c h a mann e r that fa ilure [by a de fe nd a nt] to take ade quate pr eca

utions amounted to deliberate indiffer ence to the dece dent' s serious medica l needs

. ” Gray

v . Ci ty of D e tro it , 3 9 9 F. 3 d 6 1 2 , 6 1 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Barber v. City of Salem , 953 F.2d 232, 239- 40 (6th Cir. 1992)). No t i c e a b l y , t h i s i s a d i f

f i c u l t s t an d ar d t o m e e t a t t h e s u m m ar y j u d g m e n t s t a g e . T h u s, thi s Court must adhere t o a standa rd that simultaneously

reta ins a diffe renc e betwe en neg lige nce a nd deliberate indiffer ence while not rende ring it prohibiti vely difficult for a

plaintiff to suc cee d at the summary judgme nt stag e. This Court has held that [a] lthough the pla intiff bear s the onerous burden of proving the officia l’s subjective knowledg e, this element is subject to pr oof by “the usual way s.” Farmer , 5 11 U. S. a t 84 2. Thus , th e Sup re me Cou rt no te d that it w a s p e rm iss ibl e fo r r e vie wi ngc ourt s to i nf e r f ro m c ir c um st antia l e vid e nc e that a pr iso n o ff

ic ia l ha d th e re qu isi te knowledg e. Id . at 842. Moreove r, the Court wa rned, a p ri s o n o ff

i cial may “not esca pe liabi l i t y if the evide nce show ed that he me rely ref used to verif

y underlyingNo. 06-1013

12 fa c ts that he str on g ly

su sp e c te d to be tr

ue , or de c lin e d to c on fi rm inf e re nc e s o f r isk that he strong ly

suspected to e x ist.” Id . at 843 n.8. Comstock , 2 73 F .3 d at 703

. Ac c or din g ly , w e do no t de mand tha t a pla int if f p ro ve tha

t he or sh e wi ll ult ima t e l y b e s u c c e s s f

u l o n t h e § 1 9 8 3 c l a i m a t t h i s s t a g e i n o r d e r t o s u r v i v e s u m m ar

y jud g me nt. I nstead, a plaintiff nee d only

to “alleg e facts which, if true, would show that the officia l being sued perc eived fac ts f

rom which to inf

er substantial risk to the prisone r, that he [or she] did in fact dra w th e in f e r e n c e , an d th a t h e [o r s h e ] th e n d is r e g ar d e d th a t risk.” Id . This satisfies our twin g oals of keepingthe standar d high enoug h so that it does not amount to mere neg lige nce a nd low enoug h that it is poss ible for a

plaintiff to survive summary judgme nt without proving his or he r entire case . I n Perez , we we re f

ace d with a situation simi lar to the one befor e us pre sently . I n that case , the plaintiff appealed the g rant of summar y judgme nt dismi ssing the pla intiff’s § 1983 claim alleg ing deliberate ind i ff

er ence when the pla intiff’s son, Perez, killed himself while beinghoused at the Oakland County

jail. Perez , 466 F.3d at 419. One of the i ndividual defe ndants who wa s named by plaintiff was Rice , who was the counselor a ssigne d to work with Perez while he w as i n custody

. Id

. The plai n ti f

f a ll e g e d th a t Ri c e ’ s d e c is io n to r e mo v e Pe r e z f r o m an o b s e r

v a ti o n a l c e ll w it

h other inmates amounted to deliber ate indiffe renc e bec ause she had previously deeme d him to be suicidal and plac ed him on suicide watch. Id . at 424-25. The defe ndant re sponded that she did not disreg ard Perez’s psy cholog ical nee ds, but that she g enuinely did not perce ive Pere z to be suicidal any longe r. Id

. The district cour

t found that a g enuine issue of fac t remaine d as t o whether Rice disreg arde d the ri sk and thi s Cour

t a g re e d. I n th a t c a se , w e fo c us e d o n th e fa c t th a t th e de fe nd ant h a d b e e n in direc t contact with Pere z in t he we eks lea ding up to his death. Be cause she had be en the one to placeNo. 06-1013

13 him on suicide watch, w e conc luded that she had actua l knowledg e that Pere z had exhi bited suicidal tendenc ies. Id . T hu s, a

tr ia ble iss ue of

fa c t r e ma ine d a s to wh e the r t he de c isi on

to d isc ha rg e him from suicide w atch a

nd place him in an unmonitored cell surpa ssed mere neg lige nce a nd amounted to deliberate i ndiffer ence . I n so concluding , we held that when “[v] iewing this evidence in the light most favora

ble to [pl aintiff], this evidence c an be c onst rued as demonstrating that Rice had the subjective knowle dg e, at lea st at times, that Perez posed a risk of suicide .” Id . at 42 5. Th us , in Perez , we held that once actua l know ledg e of the risk could be shown at the s u m m ar y j u d g ment stag e, the que stion of whether there was conscious disreg ard of that risk was to be deter mined by the jury

. Id. Se e als o , Clark-Murphy, 43 9 F .3 d at 28 9 ( “ F or su mma ry -j ud g me nt p ur

po se s, we ho ld o nly that these 11 defenda

nts could have perc eived a substantial risk of serious har m to Cl ark. Whether in fac t they

perc eived, infe rre d or disreg arde d that risk is an issue for tria l.”)

2. Quali fi ed Im m uni ty After a plaintiff make s the nec essar y showing with respec t to the constituti onal question, a defe ndant may

still asser

t qualified immunit y to suc cee d on summary judgme nt. Perez , 466 F.3d at 426. “The philosophy behind t h e d o ctrine of

qualified immunity

‘is a desire to avoid the substantial costs imposed on gove rnment, and soc iety , by subjecting officia ls to the risks of trial.’” Skousen v . Brighton High Sch

. , 3 0 5 F. 3 d 5 2 0 , 5 2 6 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 2 ) ( qu o t i n g Vaughn v. United States Sm all Bu s. Ad mi n ., 65 F .3 d 1 32 2, 13 26 (6 th C ir . 1 99 5) ). Th e purp os e of the do c tr ine is t o s hi eld “g overnme nt officials perf orming discretionar

y functions . . . from liability for c ivil damag es insofar as their c onduct does not violate c lear ly established stat utory

or constitutional rig hts of which a

rea sonable pe rson would have known.” Ha rlo w v . F itz ge ra ld , 457 U.S. 8 0 0 , 8 1 8 (2004). As w eNo. 06-1013

14 have noted, the question of whether qualified immunity

exis ts involves a two-par t inquiry

. Perez , 466 F.3d at 426. Th e ini tia l qu e sti on be fo re the c ourt in a qu a lif ie d immun ity inq

uir y is whe th er t he fa c ts, taken in the lig ht most favorable to the plaintiff, indicate that t h e o ffice r' s conduct violated a constitutional right. Sa uc ie r v . Ka tz , 533 U.S. 194, 201( 2001). I f the a nswer to this first question is n o, the n th e inq

uir y is en de d. I n othe r wo rd s, the fi rs t ste p o f t he qu a lif ie d immun ity

ana ly sis is deter mining whe ther the plaintiff has proved the consti tutional question. I f the plaintiff c an show that a c o n s ti tuti o n a l v io lati o n o c c u r r e d , w e mu s t a s k w h e th e r th e c o n s ti tuti o n a l r ig h t a t is s u e was “cle arly established” at the time of the violation. Id

. a t 202. “ Th e re le va nt, dis po sit ive inq

uir y in deter mining whether a rig ht is clear ly established is whethe r it would be cle ar to a rea sonable off

icer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confr onted.” Id . Impo rt antl y , q ua lif ie d im mun ity is not analy

zed as an a ffirmative defe nse. When a defenda nt claims qualified im munity , it creates a hurdle for the pla i n t i ff t o s u rmount befor e he or she ca n overc ome the cla im. The burden of showing that a rig ht was cle arly established fa lls wholly

on the plaintiff. Key v . Grayson , 179 F.3d 99 6, 10 00 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9)

. Th e pla int if f mus t fu rt he r sh ow that the ri g ht w a s c le arl y e sta bli sh e d “ in ligh t o f t h e spec ific conte x t of the ca se, not as a br oad g ener al proposition.” Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201. Thus, if rea sonable off icer s could disag ree about the lawf ulness of the c onduct in questi o n, immunit y must be g rante d. Key , 179 F.3d at 1000. A p la int if f m us t make the sh ow ingthat a ri g ht w a s c le arl y

e sta bli sh e d b y

loo kin g “ pr inc ipa lly to the l aw of this circ uit and to the S upreme Court.” Perez , 4 66 F .3 d 4 16 . “ Ho we ve r, we have he ld that the lack of

Supreme Court or Six th Circuit pr ece dent ‘is not a sufficie nt c ondition for concludingNo. 06-1013

Def endant Hahn was not mentioned i n Plaintiff’s brief or in oral a rg ument. There fore , we 2 deem a ny argument focusingon his actions waived. 15 that the l aw i s u n clea

r on the subjec t and [thus t hat] qualified immunit y must be g rante d to a defe ndant.’” Id

. (q u o t i n g Mc Clo ud v . Te sta , 97 F.3d 1536, 1556 (6th Cir. 1996)). “ [T] he dec isions of other c ourts can a lso clear ly establish the law[,] but they must point [unm istakabl y ] to the unconstitutionalit y

of the c onduct and be so clea rly fore shadowe d by applicable direc t authority as to leave no doubt in the mind of a reasona ble offic er that his conduct was unc onstitut ional.” Summar

v . B e nn e tt , 157 F.3d 1054, 1058 ( 6th Cir. 1998) (i n t er nal citation omitted). “The re ne ed not be a

c a se wi th t

he e xac t same fa c t patte rn , or e ve n ‘f un dame nta lly sim ila

r’ or ‘m a te ri a lly

sim ila r’ fa c ts; rathe r, the que stion is whether the de fenda nts had ‘fair war

ning’ that their ac tions were unconstitutional.” Cummings v. City of Akron , 4 1 8 F. 3 d 6 7 6 , 6 8 7 (q u o t i n g Hope v . Pelzer , 5 36 U. S. 730, 741 (2002). The Supreme Court has been cautious t o draw a dis tinction betwee n behavior that violates a statutory

or constitutional rig ht and beha vior that violates an a dminist rative pr ocedur e of the

a g e nc y fo r w hic h th e of

fi c ia ls w or

k. Spe c if ic a lly , th e Court ha s he ld that of fi c ia ls “ do no t lo se the ir qualified immunity

mere ly beca use their c o n d u ct violates some statutory or administrative provision.” Davis v. Sc herer , 46 8 U. S. 18 3, 19 4 (1 98 4)

. Gu ide d b y Sup re me Cou

rt pr e c e de nt, thi s Court has held that “unde r § 1983, the issue is whether [t he office r] violated the Constit ution, not whether he should be disciplined by the local police for ce.” Smith v. Freland , 954 F.2d at 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1992). D. Appli cation to Indivi dual Defendan ts 2No. 06-1013

16 1. De fend antWa tc howski Def endant Watchowski wa s prese nt at Morton’s orig inal hear ing on J une 3, 2003 when the court order ed him plac ed on suicide watch. Def endant Watchowski claimed that he did not hear the court plac e Morton on suicide w atch, but that he likely rec eived a copy of the court dispositi on, and if he rece ived i t he li kely rea d it. Deputy Pilarski claimed that he infor med Def endant Watchowski that Morton was on suicide w atch. This wa s confirme d by Corporal Crowe ll, and Def endant Wat c ho ws ki d oe s n ot re me mbe r wh e the r he wa s inf or me d by Pila

rs ki or no t. B e c a

us e De fe nd a nts

mov e fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt, we mus t draw a ll inf e re nc e s in

fa vo r o f P la int if

f. Thus , w e wi ll assume base d on this e vidence that Def endant Watchowski was put on notice that Morton was on suicide watch while he w as at Washtenaw Count y J ail. When Defe ndant Watchowski appe are d on J une 12, 2003 to ta

ke Morton to his hear ing, Morton was we aringa bam bam gow n and wa s being housed in an obser

vational ce ll. W hile the offic ers on duty told W atchowski that Morton wa s doing fi ne , th e se fa c ts a ll t a ke n to g e the r i nd ic a te that Wa tc ho ws ki h a d a t le a st p e rc e ive d e no ug h f a c ts t o g ive rise to an inf

eren ce o f t h e ri sk, which is the first prongof the subjec tivity component for deliberate indiffer ence . Comstock , 273 F.3d at 703. The ne x t question is whether Watchowski ac tually drew the i nfer ence . As this Court st ated in Comstock, this Court may infer know ledg e fr om circumstantial evide nce. Id . Be cause Def endant Watchowski was on notice that Morto n wa s a suicide r isk, it i s appropr iate to pre sume that Wat c ho ws ki h a d th e re qu isi te kn ow le dg e . We ne e d no t a dd re ss wh e the r Pla int if

f h a s a lle g e d f

a c ts perta ining to the question of conscious disreg ard of the risk. As we held in Perez an d i t s p r o g e n y, wh e re the re is e vid e nc e of a c tua l know le dg e of the ri sk , c on sc iou s d isr e g ard ne e d n ot b e e xplic itl yNo. 06-1013

17 alleg ed in orde r to survive summary judgme nt. Perez , 46 6 F .3 d at 42 5; Clark-Murphy, 439 F.3d at 28 9. Th e re fo re , w e c on c lud e tha t Pla int if f a lle g e d s uf

fi c ie nt f a c ts t o o ve rc ome su mma

ry jud g me nt. D e f e n d an tW a t c h o w s k i a l t e r n a t i v e l y ar g u e s t h a th e i s e n t i t l e d t o qu a l i f

i e d i m m u n i t y. Be cause Def

endant Watchowski’s a ctions amounted to a constitut ional violation, the next question we must deter

mine is “whethe r [Defe ndant Watchowski] had ‘fair war ning’ that [hi s] actions we re unconstitutional.” Cummings , 418 F.3d at 687. We hav e pre viously addre ssed this question.

“ [O]nc e a pr iso ne r ha s be e n de e me d su ic ida l, it i s c le arl y e sta bli sh e d th a t th e pr iso ne r i s e nti tle d to continuing me dical tre atment.” Perez , 4 6 6 F. 3 d at 4 2 8 (c i t i n g Comstock , 273 F .3 d at 70 2- 03 ). Thus , Def endant ha d fair w arning that his actions would constit ute a c onstitut ional violation. Defe ndant failed to show that a

ny rati o n al t rier of

fac t would conclude that he was e ntitled to qualified immunit y and ther efor e summary judgme nt was inappropr iat e with respec t to Defe ndant Wat c ho ws ki. 2. Defendan t Lawrence Whil e De fenda

nt L awr ence and De fenda nt Watchowski were bo t h M o rton’s transpor t office rs, their de g ree of liability differ s in that Defe ndant L awr en ce had no ac tual knowledg e that Morton was on suicide w atch. The crux of Plaintiff’s argument is that Def endant L awr ence sh ou ld have know n that Morton had a high risk of hurting himself beca use of the f

acts De fenda

nt L awr ence pe rc e ive d. Pla int if

f a rgue s th a t D e fe nd ant L awr e nc e kn e w Mor ton wa s o n a su ic ide watc h b e c a

us e of the bam bam g own in which he w as outfitted, the obser vational ce ll in which he had be en held, and the white u n iform he wa s g iven upon his relea se. Howe ver, the rec ord is reple te with other explanations for ea ch of those observations be sides the suicide watch explanation. Bec ause e ach ofNo. 06-1013

18 those prec autions could have indicated Morton had other specia l needs a

nd neede d to be observe d,

we c an n o t c o n c lu d e th a t p e r c e iv in g th e m p u t D e f e n d an t L aw r e n c e o n n o ti c e th a t Morton was suicidal. Fur

ther, Plaintiff’s e x pert witness testimony shows at most that Defe ndant L awr ence should have known that Morton was sui cidal, which is insufficient for a deliberate indiffer ence claim. F ina lly , Plaintiff argues that the fa ct that Watchowski violated Ann Ar bor sec urity

proce dures by not at le a s t c h e c k in g o n M o rto n a f te r th e r e qu is it e th ir

ty mi n u te s s h o u ld g iv e r is e to the pr e su mpt ion

that he a c te d unc on sti tut ion a lly

. How e ve r, the Sup re me Cou rt ha s f or e c los e d th is

argume nt. A v iol a tio n o f i nte rn a l po lic y do e s n ot ips o fa c to g ive rise to a pre sumption of unconstitutionalit y . Da v is , 468 U.S. at 194. Thus, L awr ence was properly g rante d summary judgme nt. 3. Defendan t Rac iti Def endant Rac iti was responsible for placingMorton under suicide watch, so it is bey ond dispute that she per ceive d the re quisite facts that g ave r ise to an infer ence of a r isk and that she actua lly knew that Morton wa s o n suicide watch. Fur ther, she did not wa

rn either Def endant Watchowski or Def

endant L awr ence , who would be responsible for monitoring Morton, that he wa s under obse rv at i o n as a sui cide r isk. Contrary to the asser

tion by J udg e Rog ers’ concur

renc e that there is some dispute reg arding this fa ct, there is a bsolutely no testimony on the rec ord i n dicating that she eve r g ave suc h a wa rning

. Despi t e t h es e facts as understood by the lead opinion, we

co n c lu d e th a t, a s e xp la in e d in Ju d g e Ro g e r s ’ c o n c u r

r e n c e , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt p r o p e r ly g r a n te d summary judgme nt in favor of

Def endant Rac iti.No. 06-1013

19 As the Supreme Court ha s held, the rig ht that is violated must be clea rly established “in lig ht of the spec ific conte x t of the ca se, not as a br o ad gen er al p ro p o sition.” Saucier , 533 U.S. at 201. Thus , w hil e it i s w e ll- e sta bli sh e d that an inm a te wh o ha s e xhibi te d s uic ida l te nd e nc ie s is e nti tle d to medical treatment, it mus t have be en cle ar that Defe ndant Raciti’s deliber ate indiffe renc e depr ived him of that tr e a tme nt i n o rd e r for her to be liab le . T oo many tr ia ble iss ue s o f f

a c t r e ma in w ith respe ct to whether Def

endant Raciti knew her f

ailure to wa

rn would subject Morton to the injury he experience d. Con tr ary to Jud g e Rog e rs ’ c on c ur re nc e , th e re c or d is c omp le te ly sil e nt with r e sp e c t to whether Def endant Rac iti actually

knew that De fe n d an t Watchowski had attende d Morton’s

arr a ig nme nt. With ou t th is k no wl e dg e , it

wo uld be ill og ic a l to re lie ve De fe nd ant R a c iti of he r d uty to w arn Mo rt on ’s tr ans po rt of

fi c e rs that he wa s a suic ide ri sk so that the y c ou ld c on tin

ue to c los e ly observe him. Even if we wer e to assume, ar g u endo , that Def

endant Rac iti was awa

re that Defe ndant Watch o ws k i at t en d edM o rt o n ’s arra i gn m en t , m at er i al fa ct s wo u l d re m ai n in dispute about Defe ndant Raciti’s potential l i abil ity . Def endant Rac iti had no basis to assume that Def endant Watchowski

reme mbere d or eve n hear d the judg e plac e Morton on suicide w atch nine da y s ear lier. Fur

ther, the fac t that Defe ndant Watchowski may have been awar e that Morton was place d on suicide watch on J une 3, 2003 does not a ddress whe ther De fenda nt Raciti should hav e as s umed Def endant Watchowski knew Morton was still on suicide watch on J une 12, 2003. Morton’s suicida l behavior

was attributed to a lcohol and drug use at his a rra ignme nt; by

J une 12, 2003, he ha d been c lear ed of all alcohol and na

rcotic w ithdrawa l. Thus, Defe ndant Raciti had no rea son to r efr ain from informingNo. 06-1013

20 D e f e n d an t W a t c h o w s k i t h a tM o rt o n , a l t h o u g hh e w a s s o b e r , s t i l l p o s e d a s u i c i d e r i s k

. F i n a l l y, beca use De fe n d ant Raciti did not know whether Def endant Watchowski would be the offic er char g ed with observingMorton, she may have ha d a duty

to insure that Def

endant L awr ence knew of Mo rt on ’s su ic ida l te nd e nc ie s a s w e ll. Con tr ary to the c on c ur re nc e , the re c or d is c le ar t hat on ly Def endant Watchowski, a

nd not Defe ndant L awr ence , attended Mor ton’s arr aig nment. (J.A. at 103- 07; J .A. at 162-63)

. Cle arl y , many ma te ri a l fa c ts re ma in i n d isp ute a bo ut w he the r D e fe nd ant R a c iti had “f air wa rning ” that her

failure to warn w ould result in a violation of Morton’s constit u t i o nal rig hts. Cummings , 418 F.3d at 687. Th e se re ma ini ngiss ue s o f f a c t in dic a te that it

wo uld be e nti re ly possible for a r ational trier of fac t to fi n d t h at De fe n dant Raciti ac ted with deliberate indiffer ence toward Mor

ton. Thus, summary

judgme nt was inappropr iate with re spect to Raciti. I n o rd e r t o r e a c h th e c ontr ary c on c lus ion , the c on c ur

re nc e ha s imp e rm iss ibl y e ng a g e d in i ts own fa ct-finding . The c oncurr ence conclude s that Def endant Raciti cannot be liable “ beca use there is no evidenc e that Rac iti knew that Watchowski and L awr ence wer e ig norant a bout or would ig nore sig ns of Mo rt on ’s su ic ide ri sk .” Ho we ve r, thi s sw e e pin g state me nt a ssume s f a c ts w ho lly unsupported by

the re cord. Contra

ry to the asser

tions made by

the conc urrence, it is very much disputed as to whether

Def e n dants Watchowski and L awr ence observe d signs indicating that Morton might be a

suicide risk. Acc ording to Defe ndant Raciti’s testimony , she “a ssum e d ” that De fenda nts W atchowski a

nd L awr ence knew that Morton was on suicide watch, but she di d not know that for sure . (J.A. at 162). She based he r assumption on the fact that the i nformation could be found in the cour t disposit ion, on the fa ct that Morton was be ing house d in an observational cell, an d o n t h e fact that she wasNo. 06-1013

21 outfitted in a bam b am go wn . Howeve r, she a dmitted that she did not know whether e ither De fe nd ants Wat c ho ws ki o r L awr e nc e a c tua lly re a d th e c ourt

dis po sit ion . Impor tantl y , s he a lso admitted that there wer e re asons other than be ing on suic ide watc h that a per son might be he ld in an ob s e r v a t i o n a l c e l l an d b e o u t f

i t t e d i n a b a m b a m g o w n . T h u s , t h e i s s u e o f w h e t h e r D e fe nd a nts Wat c ho ws ki a

nd L awr e nc e a c tua lly

ob se rv e d a

ny sig ns tha t put th e m on

no tic e that Mo rt on

wa s a suicide risk is in d i s p u t e. Be cause that issue g oes to the ver y hear t of the question of De fenda nt Raciti’s liability , summary judgme nt should not be gr anted. The c oncurr ence ref

ers to the c onnecti o n b etwee n Raciti’s ac tions and Morton’s death as

“ te nu ou s” and e sse nti a lly ho lds that only a dir e c t ca us a l ef fe c t of inju

ri e s can amo un t to de lib e rate indiffer ence . Howeve r, such a h o lding imprope rly injects a proximate cause discussion into our deliberate in d i ff

er ence ana ly sis. W e have previously held that while proximate cause may be

nece ssary “to assess whe ther the de nial o f m ed i ca l car e ca used a se rious medical injury in case s wher e the pr isoner or pr etrial de tainee’ s ‘af fliction is seeming ly

minor or non-ob v i o u s ,’ no such evidenc e is require d wher e the individual had a ‘ser ious need for medical c are that was so obvious that even a

lay person would e asily

rec og nize the nece ssity

for a doctor' s attention.’” Ow e ns by v . Ci ty of Cinc inn ati , 4 1 4 F. 3 d 5 9 6 , 6 0 4 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Blac k mo re v . Ka lam az oo Cou nty , 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004). Specific ally , in Blac k mo re , we he ld: Where the se riousness of a prisoner’ s needs f

or medica l c are is obvious even to a lay person, the c onstitut ional violation may arise. T his violation is not premised upon the ‘detrimenta l effe ct’ of the delay , but rather that the delay alone in pr oviding medic al car e cr eate s a substantial risk of serious harm. W hen prison off icials are awa

re of a p ri soner' s obvious and serious nee d for medic al treatment and delay medical treatment of that con d i t i o n for non- medical r easons, their conduct in ca

using the delay cre ates the c onstitut ional infirmity

. I n such cases, t he effec t of the de lay g oes to the extent of the injury , not the exis tence of a se rious medical c ondition.No. 06-1013

22 Id

. We have a lso pr e vio us ly he ld t hat on c e a pr iso ne r h a s b e e n d e e me d s uic ida l th a t pr iso ne r i s sa id to have this t y

pe of obvious and se rious need f or medica l car e. Pe re

z v . O ak lan d Co un ty , 466 F.3d 41 6, 42 8 ( 6th

Cir . 2 00 6) ; Com sto c k

v . M c Cra ry , 273 F.3d 693 (2001). Acc ording ly , there need not be a show ing of

proxi mate ca

use in order

to hold Raciti li able. Fur ther, e ven if a showing that Raciti’s failure to war n was the prox imate ca

use of Morton’ s death we re r equire d, such a requirement would weig h strong ly ag ainst the g ranting of summary judgme nt. As we h av e ex p l i cit ly stated in the past, “[p]rox imate ca use, and its under ly ing fore seea bility inquiry , is a question of fa ct for the jury .” Jame s v. Me ow Media, Inc ., 300 F.3d 683, 692 (6th Cir. 2002). Ne ve rt he le ss, we c on c lud e that summa ry jud g me nt w a s app rop ri ate wi th respe ct to Def

endant Rac iti for the re asons stated in the c oncurr ence . 4. Defendan t Woodford Be cause Def

endant Woodford wa s not responsible fo r p l acing Morton on suicide watch, Plaintiff has failed to make a showing t hat Defenda nt Woodford drew the i nfer ence that Morton was a suicide r isk. W ithout facts alleg ing that Defe ndant Woodford had the req u i s i te knowledg e of Morton’s suicidal tendenc ies, he cannot be liable for deliberate indiffer ence . Plaintiff’s argument amounts to a

n alleg ation that he should ha ve made the infere nce, which is insufficient f or the re asons we discusse d above with r espec t to Def endant L awr ence . Thus, Def endant Woodford was e ntitled to summary

judgme nt. II. The dist r ic t c our t i m pr ope r ly g r ant e d sum m ar y j udgm e nt with r e spe c t t o D e fend ant City of Ann Arbor , but pr ope r ly g r a n t e d s u m m ar y j udgm e nt with r e spe c t t o D e fend ant C o un t y o f W a s ht e na wNo. 06-1013

23 I n an ef fo rt to shield municipaliti es fr om liabilit y for § 1983 c laims, the Supreme Court

cre ated a high burden for a plaintiff to me et to bring a § 1983 cla im for fa ilure to train. The Court he ld t hat [a] cit y i s not liable under § 1983 unless a municipal “policy” or “ custom” is the mov ing fo r c e b e h i n d

t h e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n . O n l y w h e r e a f a i l u r e t o t r a in ref lects a “ deliberate” or

“consc ious” choice by

the municipality

can t h e fa i lure be proper ly thought of as an actionable city “policy .” Mo ne ll

w i l l n o tb e s a t i s f

i e d b y a me re a l l e g a t i o n t h a t a t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m r e p r e s e n t s a p o l i c y f o r w h i c h t h e c i ty

is responsible. Rather , the foc us m u s t b e o n whether the prog ram is ade quate to the tasks the par

ticular e mploy ees must per form, and if it is not , on whether

such inadequate training can justi fiably be said to repr esent “city policy .” Moreover, the ide nti fi e d d e fi c ie nc y

in t he tr a ini ngpr og ra

m mu st be c los e ly

re la te d to the ult imate i n j u r y. City of C an ton v . H

arris , 489 U.S. 378 (U.S. 198 9 ). T his Court has interprete d that standard a nd

announce d a thre e-pa

rt test to a id in the deter

mination. This C ourt has held that “ [t ]o succeed on a failure to train or super

vise claim [under a § 1983 theory ], the plaintiff must prove the f ollowing: (1) the tr a ini ngor

su pe rv isi on wa s in a de qu a te fo r t

he ta sk s p e rf

or me d; (2 ) the ina de qu a c y

wa s th e re su lt of the mun ic ipa lity ' s de lib e rate ind if fe re nc e ; and

(3 ) t he ina de qu a c y

wa s c los e ly

re la te d to or

a c tua lly

c a u s e d th e in

ju r y .” El li s v. C

le v e lan d M

un . S c h. Di st ., 455 F.3d 690, 700 ( 6th Cir. 2006). The inquiry , howeve r, m ust extend bey ond the questi on of whether the individual offic ers involved we re po or ly tr a ine d. Th e a

pp ro pr ia te qu e sti on

is “w he the r that tr a ini ngpr og ra m is a de qu a te ; and

if it i s

no t, t he qu e sti on be c ome s whe the r suc h ina de qu a te tr a ini ng c an ju sti fi a bly be sa id t o r e pr e se nt ‘ c ity policy .’” City of Canton , 4 89 U. S. at 39 0. “ Pla int if f m us t do mor e tha

n p oin t to so me thi ngthe c ity could have done to pre vent the unfor tunate incident.” Kahlich v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms , 120 Fe d

. Ap p x . 5 8 0 , 5 8 5 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( u np u b l i s h ed ) ( ci t i n g City of Cant on , 489 U.S. at 392 (citationNo. 06-1013

24 omitted). Howeve r, bef

ore this Court can a

pply the El lis test, the plaintiff must first establish that the ag ents of the municipality have violate d a constitutional rig ht. W atkins v. City of Battle Creek , 27 3 F .3 d 6 82 , 6 87 (6 th C ir . 2 00 1) . T hu s, thi s c la im i s in e xtri c a bly lin ke d to the plai nt if

f’ s f ir st claim: I f the individual defe ndants have violated no constitutional right, the municipa lity cannot be liable under

§ 1983 for a

failure to train. Id

. I n the pr e se nt c a se , D e fe nd ant Watc ho ws ki’ s and De fe nd ant R a c iti ’s be havio r a rgua bly constitute constitutional violations. W hether the County

of Washtenaw a

nd the City

of Ann Ar

bor may be liable is g overne d by the El lis test. Be cause the di strict court concluded that ther e we re no underlying c onstitut ional violatio n s , i t summarily dismiss ed Plaintiff’s cla ims ag ainst the

mu n ic ip a li ti e s w it

h o u t a p p ly ing the El lis test. Be cause we c onclude that Watchowski’s be havior constituted a constitutional violat i o n , we sha ll remand the issue of the liability

of the City

of Ann Arbor to the di s t ri ct cour t to determine whe ther a rational trier

of fa ct ca

n conclude that Watchowski’s defic ient behavior can be fairly char acte rized as a “city policy .” City of Cant on , 489 U.S. at 390. Th is Court should also rema nd the issue of the liability of the County

of Washtenaw to the di strict court for the application of the El lis test and further fac tual development. How ever , the County of Was hte na

w sh a ll b e dis mis se d b y

the pa ne l ma jor ity purs ua nt t o th e re a so nin g se t f

or th by J udg e Rog ers’ concur

renc e. We remand to the district c ourt the issue of the liability of the City of Ann Arbor ; however , the dismissal of the County of Washtenaw pur suant to summary j u d gm ent wil l be af firmed ba sed upon the holding of

the majority

constituted by

J udg es Rog ers a

nd Sutton as to t hat issue. CO NC LU SIONNo. 06-1013

25 For the foreg oing r easons, we AF F IRM the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt of su mma ry jud g me nt w ith respe ct to Def

endants L awr ence , Woodford, and Ha hn, and REVERSE an d REMAND wi th

re sp e c t to De fe nd ants Wat c ho ws ki a nd the City of Ann A rb or . Summa

ry jud g me nt w ithre sp e c t to De fe ndant s Ra citi an d th e County of Was hte na

w i s AF F IR M ED fo r t h e r ea s o n s s t at edi nJ u d ge Roge rs’ c oncurr ence .No. 06-1013

26 Ro ge r s, J. , c onc ur r ing : I c on c ur in t he le a d o pin ion e xce pt wit h re g ard to de fe nd ant R a c iti , and ther efor e do not join P ar t I

. D. 3

. and the por tion of Part I Idealingwith Washtenaw County ’s potential l i ab i l i ty

under Ellis v. Cleveland Municipal School District , 455 F.3d 690, 700 ( 6th Cir. 2006). On J u n e 12, 2003, when Of fice rs Watchowski and L awr ence arr ived to pick up Morton, Offic er Watchow ski asked Co rr ections Off icer Pamela Rac iti how Morton was doing , to which Raciti responde d that Morton was doing fine. J A 139. Raciti did not observe a ny problems from Mo rt on duri nghis nin e -d ay

pe ri od of inc arc e ra tio n, JA 15 7, and

ob se rv e d h im s mil inga t on e po int

. J A 160. Ther e is som e ev i d en ce t hat, during this conversation, Office r Raciti war ned Of fice rs Watchowski and L awr ence that Morton was on suicide watch. J A 164. The re cord, how ever , is not clea r on this po i nt, as Off

icer Raciti testified that she did not specific ally reme mber wa

rning the other off icer s, J A 164, and this disputed fac t at t his point should be resolved i n the plaintiff’s f avor. Assuming that Of

fice r Raciti did not w arn Offic ers Watchowski a nd L awr ence of Morton’s suicide risk, Off

icer Raciti observe d three signific ant facts that would war rant he r re asonable belief that an experienc ed tra

nspo rt at i on office r, like Watchowski or L awr ence , would have be en aw are of the risk. First, the court orde red that Morton be put on suicide watch and Rac iti believed that the court orde r was in the fil e that Watchowski and L awr ence rec eived. (Off icer Watchowski, as it turns out, was pre sent in the courtr oom when the judg e instructe d authorities to put Morton on suicide watch.) Second, Rac iti believed that Watchows k i an d L aw rence kne w that Morton was in a n observation cell. Third, Raciti believe d that Watchowski and L awr ence knew that Morton wor e aNo. 06-1013

27 b am -b am u niform, which, c ombined with the other two fa ctors, sug g ested that Morton wa s on suicide watch. These f acts de monstrate a r eason a b le b e li e f o n O f f ic e r Raciti’s part that Of

fice rs Watchowski and L awr ence s h o u l d h ave be en aw are of Morton’s suicide r isk. Even if such a belief w as not

rea sonable, the f

acts at le ast prec lude the infere nce that Offic er Raciti was deliberately indiffer ent by failing to warn O ffice rs Watchowski and L awr ence of Morton’s risk. Rac iti’s reliance on O ffice rs Watchowski and L awr ence to deal with Morton’s suicide r isk might have been mis t ak en , or eve n

car eless. (The re is a dispute as to whethe r Off icer s Watchowski and L awr ence wer e aw are of the ri sk .) Ne ve rt

he le ss, Ra c iti ’s a c tio ns c ann ot b e de te rm ine d to have sunk to t he le ve l of

de lib e rate indiffer ence . Raci t i’s failure to warn Watchow ski and L awr ence of Morton’s suicide r isk amounted, at most, to neglig ence beca

use there is no evidence that Raciti knew that Watchowski and L awson we re ignor ant about or w ould i gn o re s i gn s of Morton’s suicide r isk. I n essenc e, Cooper c laims that an office r ca n be deliber ately

indiffer ent to a

risk that others would be de liberate ly indiffer ent to a risk. The Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer v . Brennan , 51 1 U. S. 8 25 , 8 35 (1 99 4) , h ow e ve r, ins tr uc ts us not to find an office r liable for a tenuous c onnection similar to the one in this case

.