NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________________ Nos. 19-2062, 19-2103 & 19-2104

________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v. PARIS CHURCH also known as PAY MAY, also known as PAY, Appellant

________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern Distri ct of Pennsylvania (D.C. Criminal Action Nos. 2-14-cr-00323-003; 14-cr-00520-001 & 14-cr-00496-001) District Judge: Honorable Gerald A. McHugh

________________ Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) On April 16, 2020 Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA and ROTH, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: January 5, 2021)

________________ OPINION *

________________ ROTH, Circuit Judge

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Paris Church was convicted of numerous dr ug trafficking crimes and sentenced as a career offender. He appeals his sentence of 360 months imprisonment. He challenges his status as a career offender and the reason ableness of the sentence. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. 1 Church was charged in three differen t indictments for his involvement as a supplier in a large-scale dr ug trafficking conspiracy. 2 Three jury trials resulted in his conviction on seventeen counts. The cases were consolidated for sentencing. Church’s presentence report determined that he is a career offender based on two prior convictions. His designation as a career o ffender dictated an offense level of 37 and criminal history category VI, 3 subjecting him to the adviso ry guideline range of 360 months to life imprisonment. 4 The District Court accepted the PSR’s offense level calculation and sentenced him to 360 months imprisonment, 10 years supervised release, forfeiture of $262,000, and spec ial assessments totaling $1,400. Church argues on appeal that he is not a career offender, that his sentence is unreasonable given his advanced age and nonvio lent criminal history, and that the length of his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual pu nishment. Church asks us to vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

1 Because we write primarily for the parties, we only discuss the facts and proceedings to the extent necessary for resolution of this case. 2 E.D. Pa. Nos. 14-3 23, 14-496, 14-520. 3 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). 4 U.S.S.G. § 5A.3 II. The District Court had jurisdiction over vi olations of federal law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have juri sdiction to review a criminal sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Church did not object to his status as a career offender at sentencing, we review his challenge for plain error. 5 We review the reasonableness of the sentence for abuse of discretion. 6 Our review of Church’s sentence under the Eighth Amendment is plenary. 7 We proceed to the issues in that order.
III.
A. Career Offender A defendant is a career offende r if the instant offense is a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense and the defendan t has at least two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. 8 As relevant here, a prior felony counts as a predicate conviction if the sentence for the offense concluded within fifteen years of the commencem ent of the instant offense. 9 Church contends that it was plain error fo r the District Court to sentence him as a career offender because his firs t predicate offense is too ol d to be considered in his criminal history. That offense involved a 1991 drug conviction for which he was released from prison on December 19, 1997. He claims that his cr iminal activity for the

5 United States v. Glass , 904 F.3d 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2018). 6 United States v. Tomko , 562 F.3d 558, 567-68 (3 d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 7 United States v. Walker , 473 F.3d 71, 75 (3d Cir. 2007). 8 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 9 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1); U. S.S.G. § 4B1.2 app. n.3; United States v. Rengifo , 832 F.3d 220, 221 (3d Cir. 2016).4 instant offenses did not commence until Novemb er 2013, over fifteen years after he was released on the 1991 drug offense. However, Church overlooks his convic tion for Count Seven in the Third Superseding Indictment Number 14-520. That count charged him with participating in a drug-related conspiracy from Janu ary to October 2012, in viol ation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Thus, the relevant dates are Dece mber 19, 1997, upon hi s release from prison, and January 2012, with the commencement of his instant offense. The elapsed time between those dates is fourteen years a nd one month, well within the fifteen-year lookback. The District Court committed no error by counting his 19 91 drug conviction as a predicate offense and sent encing him as a career offender. 10
B. Reasonableness of Sentence Next, Church argues that his thirty-year sentence is unreasonable because of his advanced age and lack of convictions for vi olent crimes. At sentencing, the parties argued the issue of Church’s age warranti ng a downward departure from the guideline range. Church’s attorney also described him as a nonviolent participant in the conspiracy

10 As noted by the government, the Dist rict Court erred by imposing a 96-month concurrent sentence instead of a 360-mont h concurrent sentence on Count Seven. The total guideline term should be imposed conc urrently on each coun t so long as the statutory maximum for the offense permits. U. S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b), app. n.1. The court should have imposed a 360-m onth concurrent sentence on C ount Seven since 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) permits a life sentence. Beca use this error did not affect the guideline calculation and the government do es not ask us to send this case back to the District Court, we will not remand to address this error.5 and merely a businessman “who picked the wrong business.” 11 The District Court considered these arguments and found th at no variance was appropriate. It is unclear whether Church alleges a pr ocedural error, substantive error, or both. Regardless, we cannot say that the District Cour t abused its discretion. Our review of the record reveals Church’s sentence is procedur ally sound. The Dist rict Court correctly calculated the guideline range, entertained argu ments regarding varian ces, and considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 12 The sentence is also substantively sound. We will affirm a procedurally correct sentence “unless no reasonable sentencing cour t would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided.” 13 Mitigating factors like a defendant’s age may be relevant to his “history and characteristics” during sentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 14 But the fact that a sentence exceeds a defendant’s life expectancy does not mean that the sentence is unreasonable. 15 The District Court gave meaningful considera tion to Church’s age in handing down its sentence. Indeed, the court found Church’s ag e relevant in sustaining an objection to a firearm enhancement that would have affect ed his quality of life while serving his

11 A63-64. 12 See United States v. Levinson , 543 F.3d 190, 194- 95 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Tomko , 562 F.3d at 568 (“A sentencing court does not have to ‘discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.’”) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Cooper , 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006)). 13 Tomko , 562 F.3d at 568. 14 Id. at 582, Fisher, J., dissenting (citing Rita v. United States , 551 U.S. 338, 364-65 (2007), Stevens, J., concurring). 15 United States v. Ward , 732 F.3d 175, 186-87 (3d Cir. 2013).6 sentence. However, the court concluded that he failed to achieve the “judgment and maturity” associated with aging and that a lengthy sentence would prevent him from committing other crimes. 16 That conclusion is supported by Church’s continuing recidivism. Church’s argument concerning his nonvio lent history fares no better. “[T]he presence or absence of violence does not always affect the strength of society’s interest in deterring a particular crime or in punishing a particular criminal.” 17 Church’s offense level was determined by hi s career offender status. 18 The career offender enhancement is not conditioned on the prior commission of crim es of violence, but rather requires “two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” 19 This requirement is consistent with the Se ntencing Commission’s choice “to focus more precisely on the class of recidivist offenders for whom a lengthy term of imprisonment is appropriate.” 20 As noted by the District Court, Church was a supplier of “substantial quantities of drugs” that brought “death an d destruction to the streets” of his community. 21 Given his “sustained pattern of dr ug dealing,” his within-guideline-range sentence is not unreasonable. 22 Rather, it reflects the seriousness of his offenses,

16 A72. 17 Rummel v. Estelle , 445 U.S. 263, 275 (1980). 18 See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). 19 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) (emphasis added). 20 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 cmt. background. 21 A71. 22 A71.7 promotes respect for the law, provides just punishment, affords adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protects the public from further crimes of the defendant. 23
C. The Eighth Amendment Last, Church argues that his sentence is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime.” 24 Our constitutional inquiry focuses on “(1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the pe nalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3 ) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 25 The first factor acts as a gateway and “restrains us from [undertaking] an extended analysis of proportionality” unless the defendant “show[s] a gross imbalance between the crime and the sentence.” 26 When evaluating the gravity of a crime, we consider a defendant’s criminal history, 27 his culpability, and the harm caused to society. 28 As noted above, Church had an extensive history of convictions for similar crimes, his role in the instant drug c onspiracy was substantial, and

23 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also Rummel , 445 U.S. at 275-76 (upholding a life sentence for nonviolent offenses unde r Texas’s recidivist statute). 24 Ewing v. California , 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003). 25 United States v. MacEwan , 445 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 20 06) (internal quotation marks omitted); Walker , 473 F.3d at 80-82. 26 MacEwan , 445 F.3d at 247-48 (quoting United States v. Rosenberg , 806 F.2d 1169, 1175 (3d Cir. 1986)). 27 Ewing , 538 U.S. at 29. 28 See Solem v. Helm , 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).8 his involvement caused great harm to his community. We view his punishment as commensurate with his crimes. 29
IV. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of se ntence imposed by the District Court.

29 See Rummel , 445 U.S. at 284-85; Hutto v. Davis , 454 U.S. 370, 370-74 (1982) (per curiam) (upholding recidivist’s forty-year sent ence for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana).