J-A16015-17

2017 PA Super 362

E.S. MANAGEMENT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

YINGKAI GAO, PINGYUAN ZHENG, 

FANGYUAN CAO AND XUE GAO

XUE GAO

 v.

E.S. MANAGEMENT A/K/A KERPEC 

CORPORATION

No. 1271 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered September 14, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Civil Division at No: AR-14-5149, AR-14-5150

BEFORE: STABILE, J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2017

Appellant E.S. Management a/k/a Kerpec Corporation (“E.S. 

Management”) appeals from the judgment entered in the Court of Common 

Pleas of Allegheny County (“trial court”) against E.S. Management and in 

favor of Appellees Yingkai Gao, Pinguyan Zheng, Fangyuan Cao, and Xue 

Gao following the denial of E.S. Management’s post-trial motions seeking 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A16015-17

- 2 -

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”). Upon review, we affirm in 

part and reverse in part.

The facts underlying this case are undisputed. As summarized by the 

trial court:

Yingkai Gao, Xinyue Chen, Pingyuan Zheng and Fangyuan 

Cao (“the Students” hereafter), all citizens of China, needed 

housing for the 2014-2015 school year at Carnegie Mellon 

University. While the Students were in China, they had a friend 

in Pittsburgh go and look at 626 Maryland Avenue, #7 (“the 

Apartment” hereafter), which was available for rent from E.S. 

Management. On Wednesday June 11, 2014 the Students had a 

$5,785 security deposit plus a $100 application fee wire 

transferred by Yingkai Gao’s aunt, Xue Gao [(“Aunt”)], to E.S. 

Management to prevent the Apartment from being rented to 

others. The Students, however, could not agree among 

themselves on utility charges,[FN1] hence on Friday, June 13, 

2014 the Students notified E.S. Management they would not rent 

the Apartment. E.S. Management refused to refund the $5,785 

security deposit[.]

[FN1.] The Lease E.S. Management emailed the 

Students said water and sewer charges over $30.00 

per person per month will be pro-rated on a per 

person basis by dividing the excess amount by the

number of persons in the building. The Lease also 

said that blatant excessive water use shall be paid by 

the Tenant(s) responsible.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 1-2. On July 24, 2014, Aunt filed a suit 

against E.S. Management (“First Case”) in the magisterial district court, 

seeking to recover, inter alia, the security deposit. A month later, on August 

24, 2014, E.S. Management filed a suit against the Students and Aunt 

(“Second Case”) in the same magisterial district court. On October 30, 

2014, the magisterial district court found in favor of E.S. Management in 

both cases and against the Students and Aunt. 
J-A16015-17

- 3 -

On December 1, 2014, Aunt appealed to the trial court from the 

magisterial district court’s decision in the First Case. On the same date, 

Aunt and the Students appealed the magisterial district court’s decision in 

the Second Case, and filed a praecipe to enter rule to file complaint by E.S. 

Management.1 

In the First Case, Aunt filed a complaint against E.S. Management, 

alleging causes of action for breach of contract, and violations of the 

Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 (“LTA”), 68 P.S. § 250.101 et seq., and 

Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. 

§ 201–1, et seq. In support, Aunt alleged the following facts:

15. On 06/10/2014, [Aunt], upon reasonable belief by the 

Students that in order to continue negotiations, she should 

forward [to E.S. Management] the amount of $5,885.00 which 

included a non-refundable $100.00 application fee and a fully 

refundable $5,785.00 towards a security deposit if continued 

negotiations were unsuccessful, did in fact forward the entire 

$5,885.00 to [E.S. Management].

16. On 6/11/2014, [E.S. Management] acknowledged receipt of 

the $5,885.00.

17. [E.S. Management] further told [Aunt] that in order for 

negotiations to conclude and a lease to be valid, all rental 

applications and the lease must be fully executed by all Students 

and sent to [E.S. Mangement] on the same day, 06/11/2014.

18. By 06/11/2014, only one (1) of the Students, Xinyue Chen, 

signed the lease, and sent it [sic] documents to [E.S. 

Management].

19. The other three (3) Students did not execute the lease, and 

did not fill out their applications.

____________________________________________

1 Xinyue Chen, the only one of the Students to submit a rental application, 

did not appeal the magisterial district court’s decisions. 
J-A16015-17

- 4 -

20. On 06/12/2014, [Aunt] queried further as to the exact utility 

charges the Students will face.

21. [E.S. Management] replied on 06/12/2014 with estimates of 

utility charges, and further stated: “Please keep in mind without 

your paperwork returned to our office (which was due 

Wednesday, June 11), we cannot complete your lease 

agreement and you risk forfeiting your security deposit. Please 

let me know if you have any other questions.”

22. On 6/13/2014, only two (2) days after sending the 

$5,885.00 to [E.S. Management], [Aunt] notified [E.S. 

Management] that the Students “can’t reach [an] agreement on 

the additional charges stated in the lease and not made known 

to us in the previous communications”, and explicitly requested 

[E.S. Management] to return only the $5,785.00 paid towards a 

security deposit to [Aunt’s] address[.]

23. The parties never executed a lease for the Apartment.

Aunt’s Complaint, 12/1/14, at ¶¶ 15-23. Among other things, Aunt sought 

treble damages for E.S. Management’s alleged UTPCPL violations. 

In the Second Case, E.S. Management complied with Aunt and the 

Students’ praecipe to file a complaint. Following objections to its first 

complaint, E.S. Management filed an amended complaint against Aunt and 

the Students on January 21, 2015, raising a cause of action for breach of 

contract and, in the alternative, for promissory estoppel. In turn, on 

February 11, 2015, Aunt and the Students filed an answer with new matter, 

asserting, inter alia, counterclaims for breach of contract and violations of 

the LTA and the UTPCPL. In essence, Aunt and the Students’ counterclaims 

mirrored the causes of action Aunt raised against E.S. Management in the 

First Case. 

Upon Aunt’s motion, the trial court consolidated both cases on January 

23, 2015. In accordance with local rules, the cases were submitted to 
J-A16015-17

- 5 -

compulsory arbitration.2 On March 5, 2015, in the First Case, the arbitrators 

issued an award in favor of Aunt and against E.S. Management for 

$5,785.00. In the Second Case, the arbitrators issued an award for Aunt 

and the Students on E.S. Management’s claims and for E.S. Management on 

Aunt and the Students’ counterclaims. E.S. Management filed a de novo

appeal to the trial court. 

The cases proceeded to a consolidated jury trial on the breach of 

contract claims. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found that no contract 

existed between the parties and that E.S. Management failed to establish 

one of the elements of promissory estoppel. The jury, however, did not 

award damages to either party. Aunt and the Students then requested that 

they be permitted to poll the jury. The trial court granted their request. 

Upon being polled, the jurors unanimously indicated that they intended to 

award and refund Aunt and the Students the security deposit of $5,785.00. 

The trial court noted that, because Aunt and the Students failed to plead a 

____________________________________________

2 Allegheny County Local Rule 1301, relating to arbitration, provides, in 

relevant part, as follows:

(1) The following civil actions shall first be submitted to and 

heard by a Board of Arbitrators:

 . . . .

(c) Appeals from final judgments of Magisterial 

District Judges[.]

Allegheny Cty.Civ.Fam.R. 1301(1)(c).
J-A16015-17

- 6 -

count for unjust enrichment, the jury was without power to issue an award 

of quantum meruit.

Immediately after the trial court dismissed the jury, it conducted a 

bench trial on Aunt and the Students’ remaining claims implicating the 

UTPCPL and the LTA. Following the bench trial, the trial court concluded that 

E.S. Management violated the UTPCPL and that Aunt and the Students were 

entitled to treble damages. Specifically, the trial court found:

[1.] E.S. Management violated the [LTA] provision at 68 P.S. § 

250.511a by requiring “a sum in excess of two months’ rent to 

be deposited in escrow for the payment of damages to the 

leasehold premises and/or default in rent thereof . . .,” which 

also is a violation of the provision of the UTPCPL at 73 P.S. § 

201-2(4)(xxi); 

[2.] E.S. Management’s failure to inform the Students and 

[Aunt], either verbally or by writing, when it requested the 

$5,775.00 deposit, that this sum could be forfeited if the 

Students chose not to rent the [A]partment is a violation of the 

provision of the UTPCPL at 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi);

[3.] E.S. Management’s requirement that the Students sign its 

lengthy lease within only 2 days from the time they received the 

lease is a violation of the provision of the UTPCPL at 73 P.S. § 

201-2(4)(xxi);

[4.] E.S. Management’s false claim that the Students and [Aunt] 

were responsible for rent for the entire term of the lease and 

utilities, even though two days after depositing the $5,755.00 

they informed E.S. Management they would not be renting the 

[A]partment, is a violation of the provision of the UTPCPL at 73 

P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi); [and]

[5.] Pursuant to UTPCPL provision at 73 P.S. § 201-9.2, [the trial 

court] award[s Aunt] and the Students their court costs, 

including those incurred with the Magisterial District Judge[.]

Trial Court’s Findings and Non-Jury Verdict, 4/4/16, at ¶ 5. E.S. 

Management timely filed motions for post-trial relief, arguing that the 

UTPCPL does not govern the instant dispute because no lease existed 
J-A16015-17

- 7 -

between the parties. See E.S. Management’s Motion for Post-trial Relief, 

4/20/16, at ¶¶ 7-13. E.S. Management further argued that the trial court 

erred in concluding that E.S. Management had violated Section 250.511a of 

the LTA because the jury found that no lease existed between the parties. 

In other words, E.S. Management did not have a landlord-tenant relationship 

with Appellees. E.S. Management also argued that the trial court erred in 

concluding that the UTPCPL requires more than a two-day review period for 

residential leases. E.S. Management next argued that the trial court abused 

its discretion in concluding that E.S. Management violated the UTPCPL when 

it claimed that Aunt was responsible for rent for the entire term of the lease 

and utilities. E.S. Management finally argued that the award of treble 

damages was excessive.

In response, Aunt and the Students argued that E.S. Management had 

waived its claim that the UTPCPL is inapplicable to the dispute at hand 

because it raised the claim for first time in its post-trial motion. They further 

argued that the LTA applied through the UTPCPL. Aunt and the Students 

also argued that E.S. Management’s decision to grant them only two days to 

review the lease was deceptive conduct under the UTPCPL. In addition, they 

argued that E.S. Management’s claim that Aunt was liable for rent and 

utilities was a false and deceptive claim under the UTPCPL. Lastly, Aunt and 

the Students argued that the award of treble damages was appropriate 

under the circumstances.
J-A16015-17

- 8 -

On June 25, 2016, the trial court denied E.S. Management’s post-trial 

motions. On August 23, 2016, E.S. Management timely appealed to this 

Court. The trial court ordered E.S. Management to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

statement of errors complained of on appeal. E.S. Management complied, 

repeating the claims raised in its post-trial motions. On September 14, 

2016, E.S. Management filed a praecipe for entry of judgment. On October 

15, 2016, the trial court issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, concluding that 

E.S. Management was not entitled to relief.

On appeal, E.S. Management raises five issues for our review:

I. Whether the trial court erred in awarding damages under 

the [UTPCPL], where the jury determined that there was 

no contract between the parties, as the UTPCPL requires 

that there must be a “purchase or lease” of goods or 

services in order to allow a private party claim?

II. Whether the trial court erred in finding that E.S. 

Management violated the [LTA] and that that violated the 

UTPCPL?

III. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding the UTPCPL 

requires more than a two-day review period for a tenant’s 

review of a residential lease?

IV. Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that E.S. 

Management made a “false claim” in litigation and that 

that violated the UTPCPL?

V. Whether the [trial] court erred in its use of discretion in 

trebling the damages under the UTPCPL?

E.S. Management’s Brief at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).3

____________________________________________

3 We observe that E.S. Management reprises exactly its position from below. 

Indeed, its brief, in large part, is a reproduction of its “Brief in Support of 

Motion for Post-trial Relief,” filed in the trial court on June 24, 2016. 
J-A16015-17

- 9 -

At the outset, we note that we need not address E.S. Management’s 

first issue relating to the applicability of the UTPCPL. As Aunt and the 

Student’s aptly point out, the issue is waived because E.S. Management 

failed to assert it timely before the trial court. In fact, it asserted this issue 

for the first time after trial in its post-trial motions. A party “may not, at the 

post-trial motion stage, raise a new theory which was not raised during 

trial.” Keffer v. Bob Nolan’s Auto Serv., Inc., 59 A.3d 621, 630 (Pa. 

Super. 2012) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 602 (Pa. 2013). 

Moreover, explaining waiver in the context of post-trial motions, our 

Supreme Court remarked: “Rule 227.1, which governs post-trial relief, 

provides in relevant part that a ground may not serve as the basis for posttrial relief, including a judgment n.o.v., unless it was raised in pre-trial 

proceedings or at trial.” Straub v. Cherne Indus., 880 A.2d 561, 566 (Pa. 

2005). “The Rule further notes that error that could have been corrected by 

timely objection in the trial court may not constitute a ground for such a 

judgment. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(b)(1).” Id. Instantly, as Aunt and the Students 

emphasize, E.S. Management never objected to the application of the 

UTPCPL at any stage before the trial court prior to the filing of its post-trial 

motions. Even though E.S. Management raised the issue in its Rule 1925(b) 

statement, it still is waived because a party cannot preserve a claim not 

raised below by raising it in its Rule 1925(b) statement. See 

Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 A.3d 1111, 1118 (Pa. Super. 2011) 

(issues raised for first time in Rule 1925(b) statement are waived); see also
J-A16015-17

- 10 -

Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and 

cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.). Accordingly, E.S. 

Management’s first issue on appeal is waived. 

We now address E.S. Management’s argument that the trial court 

erred in finding that E.S. Management’s violated the LTA because it collected 

a security deposit from the Students that exceeded two months of rent and 

that such violation ran afoul of the UTPCPL. 

Section 250.511a(a) of the LTA provides that “[n]o landlord may 

require a sum in excess of two months’ rent to be deposited in escrow for 

the payment of damages to the leasehold premises and/or default rent 

thereof during the first year of any lease.” 68 P.S. § 250.511a(a). 

E.S. Management argues that the last month’s rent of $1,795 qualifies 

as prepayment, and consequently, must not be considered a security for 

default rent. See E.S. Management’s Brief at 19-20. We disagree.

Here, our review of the record confirms the trial court’s finding that 

E.S. Management collected from the Students a security deposit that 

exceeded two months of rent. As the trial court correctly found, the 

Students transferred to E.S. Management $5,885, which reflected a nonrefundable application fee of $100, two months’ rent of $3,990 ($1,995 per 

month) and last month’s rent of $1,795, less a $200 discount. Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/25/16, at 4; see also N.T. Trial, 3/30-4/1/16, at 237. In 

rejecting E.S. Management’s argument that the last month’s rent should be 

considered a prepayment of rent, the trial court reasoned:
J-A16015-17

- 11 -

[T]he $1,795 was part of the $5,785 deposited with E.S. 

Management “to secure the execution of a rental agreement on

residential property,” therefore 68 P.S. § 250.511b clearly 

makes its deposit into an escrow account mandatory. Since the 

$1,795 is last month’s rent, which is not owed to E.S. 

Management until twelve months in the future, that $1,795 is for 

“default in rent” during the last month. In addition, an E.S. 

Management representative actually testified [at trial] 

that the $1,795 would be used for the last month’s rent if 

the Students failed to pay rent that month. [N.T. Trial, 

3/30-4/1/16, at 547-48]. E.S. Management patently collected a 

security deposit that consisted of at least three months of rent 

when the [LTA] permits it to collect no more than two months of 

rent. It is disingenuous for E.S. Management to assert that rent 

paid twelve months before it is due is not for “default in rent.” 

Hence, [the trial court] correctly determined that the security 

deposit required by E.S. Management exceeded two months of 

rent in violation of 68 P.S. § 250.511a of the [LTA]. 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 4-5 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 

Accordingly, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that E.S. 

Management collected from the Students a security deposit in excess of two 

months of rent in violation of the LTA. 

Having concluded that E.S. Management violated the LTA, we now 

must determine whether such violation also ran afoul of Section 201-2(4) 

(xxi) of the UTPCPL, which provides that “unfair or deceptive acts or 

practices” include the following: “[e]ngaging in any other fraudulent or 

deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of 

misunderstanding.” 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(xxi).4 

____________________________________________

4 The UTPCPL makes this violation unlawful if done in connection with any 

trade or commerce. See 73 P.S. § 201-3.
J-A16015-17

- 12 -

Instantly, we agree with the trial court’s determination that E.S. 

Management’s violation of the LTA also triggered a violation of the UTPCPL 

under the circumstances of this case. As the trial court explained:

E.S. Management also contends that, even if the excessive 

security deposit violated the [LTA], [the trial court] incorrectly 

presumed this also violated the UTPCPL. However, [the trial 

court] did not presume this [LTA] violation automatically was in 

violation of the UTPCPL. Instead, [the trial court] found E.S. 

Management’s conduct in collecting the security deposit was 

deceptive, which created a likelihood of confusion or 

misunderstanding in violation of the UTPCPL. There are two 

examples of this conduct. First, the lease that E.S. Management 

emailed to the Students set forth a much smaller security 

deposit of $1,995.00. Second, an E.S. Management 

representative disclosed at trial that it required the $3,990.00 

“double security deposit” portion from the Students because 

they were international students without social security numbers 

and other information available from students who are U.S. 

citizens. This E.S. Management conduct was deceptive and 

would confuse someone with good understanding of the English 

language (the Students struggled to understand and speak 

English). Therefore, [the trial court] was correct in finding that 

the $5,785 security deposit required by E.S. Management 

violated the UTPCPL.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 4-5 (internal citations omitted). 

Accordingly, as the trial court found, E.S. Management demanded from the 

Students as a security deposit double rent in addition to last month’s rent, 

whereas the lease provided to the Student required only a security deposit 

consisting of one month’s rent. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in 

finding a UTPCPL violation. 

We now turn to E.S. Management’s argument that the trial court erred 

in finding a UTPCPL violation because E.S. Management failed to provide the 

Students more than two days to review the residential lease. We disagree.

The trial court fully explained:
J-A16015-17

- 13 -

The lease E.S. Management emailed the Students is a typed, 

single-spaced document that is fifteen pages long. 

Provisions include one for pro-rating water and sewer charges 

among the number of persons in the building and a “partial list 

of the minimum charges of assorted items or jobs that [may] 

sometimes be required after a residence is vacated.” The last 

page of the lease contains this provision: TENANT(S) AGREES 

LANDLORD GAVE TENANT(S) TIME TO REVIEW THIS LEASE. IF 

THE LEASE TERMS ARE NOT UNDERSTOOD, TENANTS ARE 

ENCOURAGED TO SEEK THE ADVICE OF ANY ATTORNEY BEFORE 

SIGNING. BY SIGNING THIS LEASE, EACH TENANT AGREES HE 

OR SHE HAS READ AND UNDERSTANDS ALL OF THE TERMS AND 

CONDITIONS OF THIS LEASE WITH ANY ADDED CLAUSES, OR 

HOUSE RULES . . . .” E.S. Management allowed the students 

only two days to return a fully signed lease. It is deceptive to 

encourage students in China to seek the advice of an attorney 

and allow them only two days to do so. The water and sewage 

provision confused them since they had no idea of the number of 

persons in the building. Therefore, E.S. Management’s conduct 

was deceptive, which created the likelihood of confusion in 

violation of the UTPCPL. Hence, [the trial court’s] decision that 

E.S. Management violated the UTPCPL by giving the Students 

only two days to review the lease is correct.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 7-8 (unnecessary capitalizations omitted) 

(emphasis added). Thus, because E.S. Management provided the Students 

who were residing in China only two days to review a lengthy and 

complicated lease with the advice of legal counsel, we are constrained to 

agree with the trial court’s conclusion that such conduct violated Section 

201-2(4)(xxi) of the UTPCPL. 

E.S. Management next argues that its demand that Aunt was liable for 

an entire year of rent and utilities payment under the lease did not fall 

within the purview of the UTPCPL because Aunt did not have a contractual

relationship with E.S. Management.5 We agree. Unlike the Students here 

____________________________________________

5 E.S. Management’s argument on the fourth issue is confined to one 

paragraph, which barely spans sixteen lines. The argument is not developed 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A16015-17

- 14 -

who agreed to pay a security deposit to E.S. Management to secure the 

Apartment, Aunt did not have an agreement with E.S. Management. Rather, 

Aunt acted solely as an agent for the Students to transfer the money to E.S. 

Management.6 Aunt did not have a separate, independent relationship with 

E.S. Management. Section 201-9.2 of the UTPCPL, relating to private 

actions, provides:

Any person who purchases or leases goods or services 

primarily for personal, family or household purposes and 

thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real 

or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person 

of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 3 of 

this act, may bring a private action to recover actual damages or 

one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater.

73 P.S. § 201-9.2 (emphasis added). Because Aunt was not a person who 

purchased or leased any goods or services from E.S. Management, E.S. 

Management’s claim against her for rent and utility payment, no matter how 

deceptive and misleading, does not fall within the ambit of the UTPCPL. 

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s conclusion to the contrary. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

sufficiently as it is bereft of any citation to relevant legal authority or record. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; see also Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. 

Super. 2011) (stating “where an appellate brief fails to provide any 

discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the 

issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is 

waived[]”) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 47 A.3d 848 (Pa. 2012). We, 

however, decline to find waiver. 

6 Admittedly, even if the Students were not made whole by E.S. 

Management, Aunt would have an indemnification claim against them.
J-A16015-17

- 15 -

Lastly, E.S. Management argues that the trial court abused its 

discretion in awarding the Students treble damages. Section 201-9.2 of the 

UTPCPL provides in pertinent part:

The court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the 

actual damages sustained, but not less than one hundred dollars 

($100), and may provide such additional relief as it deems 

necessary or proper. The court may award to the plaintiff, in 

addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and 

reasonable attorney fees.

73 P.S. § 201–9.2(a). In discussing treble damages, our Supreme Court has 

explained:

[A]s a matter of statutory construction, that the courts’ 

discretion to treble damages under the UTPCPL should not be 

closely constrained by the common-law requirements associated 

with the award of punitive damages. . . . Nevertheless, the 

discretion of courts of original jurisdiction is not limitless, as we 

believe that awards of treble damages may be reviewed by the 

appellate courts for rationality, akin to appellate review of the 

discretionary aspect of equitable awards, as previously 

discussed. Centrally, courts of original jurisdiction should focus 

on the presence of intentional or reckless, wrongful conduct, as 

to which an award of treble damages would be consistent with, 

and in furtherance of, the remedial purposes of the UTPCPL.

Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885, 898 (Pa. 2007) (internal citation and 

footnote omitted). 

Instantly, upon our review of the entire record, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding treble damages. As the 

trial court reasoned:

While egregious conduct is not required for an award under the 

UTPCPL of “three times the actual damages sustained”, [the trial 

court] did find that E.S. Management’s conduct was egregious. 

E.S. Management knew that other renters were unlikely as the 

student rental season “window” had closed. Yet, E.S. 

Management rushed the Students into submitting the security 

deposit by telling them it would prevent other prospective 

tenants from renting the Apartment. But, it never told the 
J-A16015-17

- 16 -

Students until after it got the funds that the funds could be 

forfeited if the Students did not lease the Apartment. Only two 

days passed between E.S. Management’s receipt of the funds 

and the Students notifying E.S. Management they would not be 

renting the Apartment. Thus, E.S. Management attempted to 

extract $5,785 from the Students because the Apartment was 

removed from the rental market for two days. There was 

absolutely no credible evidence that E.S. Management lost the 

opportunity to rent to others during those two days. E.S. 

Management provided almost no services in return for the 

$5,785 and the Students of course, received absolutely nothing 

in return for it. To [the trial court], this was egregious conduct. 

In any event, the behavior of E.S. Management in violating the 

two months’ rent security deposit law, not providing advance 

disclosure the security deposit would be forfeited, [and] 

providing only two days for review of the lease . . . constitutes 

“intentional or reckless, wrongful conduct” that makes [the trial 

court’s] treble damages award appropriate. Therefore, [the trial 

court’s] award of treble damages was correct.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 8-9. Accordingly, E.S. Management is not 

entitled to relief. 

In sum, we affirm in part the trial court’s September 14, 2016 

judgment and reverse it to the extent the trial court determined that E.S. 

Management violated the UTPCPL because it demanded from Aunt an entire 

year’s rent and utilities payment. 

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Jurisdiction 

relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary
J-A16015-17

- 17 -

Date: 11/15/2017