UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5896

REBECCA GREENE,

Defendant-Appellant.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. No. 95-5901

TAMMY DUDLESON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Bluefield.

David A. Faber, District Judge.

(CR-95-84, CR-95-85)

Submitted: June 18, 1996

Decided: August 2, 1996

Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

William S. Winfrey, II, Princeton, West Virginia; Hunt L. Charach,

Federal Public Defender, C. Cooper Fulton, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Rebecca A.

Betts, United States Attorney, Margaret A. Hickey, Assistant United

States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Rebecca Greene and Tammy Dudleson were convicted of embezzlement in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 (West Supp. 1996). The

district court sentenced them to a two-day period of confinement in

a community confinement center, followed by a three-year term of

supervised release. Greene and Dudleson appeal, claiming that the

district court erred in determining that it was unable to order a sentence of no imprisonment. For the following reasons, we affirm.

After Greene and Dudleson were indicted, they both entered plea

agreements and pleaded guilty. Their sentencing guideline range was

properly calculated to be 0-6 months. At sentencing, the Defendants

asked the district court not to impose a term of imprisonment. The

district court agreed that both Defendants would be good candidates

for probation. The court determined, however, that since Greene and

Dudleson were convicted of a Class B felony,* 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3561(a)(1) (West Supp. 1996), which prohibits probation for persons convicted of Class B felonies, precluded such a sentence.

Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3561(a)(1), an individual convicted of a Class

B felony may not be sentenced to a term of probation. This court has

_________________________________________________________________

*Because 18 U.S.C.A. § 656 has a maximum penalty of 30 years

imprisonment, it is classified as a Class B felony. See 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3559(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996) (offense is classified as Class B felony

if maximum penalty is 25 years or more).

 2
reasoned that there is no logical distinction between a mandatory

minimum sentence and this prohibition against probation. United

States v. Daiagi, 892 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1989). Under 18 U.S.C.A.

§ 3553(e) (West Supp. 1996), a sentencing court may impose a sentence below a mandatory minimum only for substantial assistance on

the motion of the government. Applying this rule to the ban against

probation, this court held in Daiagi that:

the ban on probation in sentencing Class A and Class B

cases is maintained save in the rare case where the assistance of the defendant has been sufficiently substantial that

the Government determines to move the sentencing court to

impose a sentence below the statute's minimum or without

the prohibition on a probationary sentence.

Daiagi, 892 F.2d at 33 (emphasis supplied). The Defendants correctly

point out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in addressing a case identical to theirs, found that a sentence of

zero months imprisonment was permissible despite the prohibitions

contained in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3561(a)(1). See United States v. Elliott,

971 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1992) (sentence of no imprisonment permissible because such a sentence is not probation and embezzlement statute, 18 U.S.C.A. 656, does not require imprisonment). We find,

however, that this court's prior holding in Daiagi is controlling. We

discern no logical distinction between a sentence of probation and of

0 months imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

 3