[Cite as Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 464, 2009-Ohio-1247.]

MINNO ET AL., APPELLEES, v. PRO-FAB, INC., APPELLANT, ET AL. 

[Cite as Minno v. Pro-Fab, Inc., 121 Ohio St.3d 464, 2009-Ohio-1247.]

A corporation’s veil may not be pierced in order to hold a second corporation 

liable for the corporate misdeeds of the first when the two corporations 

have common individual shareholders but neither corporation has any 

ownership interest in the other corporation. 

(No. 2008-0170 — Submitted October 14, 2008 — Decided March 25, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County, 

No. 2007-T-0021, 2007-Ohio-6565. 

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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

A corporation’s veil may not be pierced in order to hold a second corporation 

liable for the corporate misdeeds of the first when the two corporations 

have common individual shareholders but neither corporation has any 

ownership interest in the other corporation. 

__________________ 

 CUPP, J. 

{¶ 1} The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the doctrine of 

piercing the corporate veil applies to a situation in which two corporations are 

owned by common individual shareholders but neither corporation owns an 

interest in the other corporation. Because this situation does not involve the 

owner of a corporation misusing his control over that corporation, we conclude 

that the doctrine does not apply. Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals 

is reversed. 

I 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

{¶ 2} This case began in 2004 when James Minno, his wife, his 

stepdaughter, and his son, plaintiffs-appellees, filed a complaint against Pro-Fab, 

Inc., and See-Ann, Inc. In the complaint, Minno alleged various claims, generally 

asserting that See-Ann had failed to provide a safe working environment. Minno 

alleged that while in the scope of his employment as an ironworker, See-Ann’s 

actions caused him to fall from a height of 19 feet and, as a consequence, to suffer 

serious injuries. Minno also asserted a claim against Pro-Fab, alleging that ProFab had been in control of the work site, was the alter ego of See-Ann, and was, 

therefore, also liable for his injuries. Minno did not allege any individual claims 

against the shareholders of Pro-Fab or See-Ann, and he acknowledged that ProFab and See-Ann were sister companies. 

{¶ 3} Pro-Fab and See-Ann answered that they are separate legal entities, 

a fact that is evidenced by different incorporation dates. Pro-Fab and See-Ann 

also responded that although they have common owners and officers, engage in a 

similar line of work, and have the same business address, neither corporation has 

an ownership interest in the other. As relevant to Minno’s complaint, See-Ann 

carries no general-liability insurance. 

{¶ 4} In the trial court, both Pro-Fab and See-Ann filed motions for 

summary judgment. See-Ann’s motion was denied on the ground that a material 

issue of fact existed regarding whether See-Ann committed an intentional tort 

against Minno. This claim remains pending in the trial court. However, ProFab’s motion was granted because the trial court concluded that Pro-Fab had no 

dominion or control over Minno in the performance of his duties while he worked 

for See-Ann. 

{¶ 5} A divided appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor 

of Pro-Fab. It concluded that Minno had presented sufficient evidence to 

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Pro-Fab was 

fundamentally indistinguishable from See-Ann and whether Minno could, 
January Term, 2009 

3 

therefore, pierce the corporate veil of See-Ann and reach Pro-Fab’s assets 

pursuant to the test set forth in Belvedere Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. 

R.E. Roark Cos., Inc. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075, paragraph 

three of the syllabus. Specifically, Minno wanted to pierce See-Ann’s corporate 

veil in order to reach Pro-Fab’s general-liability insurance. 

{¶ 6} Thereafter, Pro-Fab appealed from the decision of the appellate 

court, and we accepted review under our discretionary jurisdiction. Minno v. ProFab, Inc., 117 Ohio St.3d 1496, 2008-Ohio-2028, 885 N.E.2d 954. 

II 

{¶ 7} As acknowledged in Belvedere, 67 Ohio St.3d at 287, 617 N.E.2d 

1075, and recently restated in Dombroski v. WellPoint, Inc., 119 Ohio St.3d 506, 

2008-Ohio-4827, 895 N.E.2d 538, one purpose of incorporation is the ability to 

limit the liability of the individual shareholders. See also Section 3, Article XIII, 

Ohio Constitution. “The corporate form is useful primarily because it creates a 

division between shareholders and their business concerns: ‘[The corporate form] 

has been introduced for the convenience of the company in making contracts, in 

acquiring property for corporate purposes, in suing and being sued, and to 

preserve the limited liability of the stockholders, by distinguishing between the 

corporate debts and property of the company, and of the stockholders in their 

capacity as individuals.’ ” Dombroski at ¶ 16, quoting State ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. 

Std. Oil Co. (1892), 49 Ohio St. 137, 177, 30 N.E. 279. 

{¶ 8} Nevertheless, in certain circumstances the corporate form may be 

disregarded, and the corporate veil pierced, for the purpose of reaching the assets 

of the corporation’s individual shareholders. “Piercing the corporate veil” is 

“[t]he judicial act of imposing personal liability on otherwise immune corporate 

officers, directors, or shareholders for the corporation’s wrongful acts.” Black’s 

Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 1184. 
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{¶ 9} To determine whether a corporation’s veil can be pierced in a 

specific situation, a court must apply the three-pronged test set forth in Belvedere,

67 Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075, at paragraph three of the syllabus, as 

modified by Dombroski, 119 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-4827, 895 N.E.2d 538.1

 

A plaintiff’s successful proof of each of the three elements will result in 

individual shareholders being held liable for corporate misdeeds because “it 

would be unjust to allow the shareholders to hide behind the fiction of the 

corporate entity.” Belvedere at 287. 

III 

{¶ 10} The question presented in this appeal, however, is whether a 

corporation’s veil may be pierced in order to hold a second corporation liable for 

the corporate misdeeds of the first, when the two corporations have common 

individual shareholders but neither corporation has any ownership interest in the 

other corporation. 

{¶ 11} The Belvedere test for piercing the corporate veil has been applied 

to determine whether an individual shareholder may be held liable for corporate 

wrongdoings. Belvedere, 67 Ohio St.3d at 287, 617 N.E.2d 1075. When a 

shareholder exercises such control over a corporation that the corporation 

becomes the shareholder’s alter ego, and when the shareholder misuses his control 

of a corporation to commit specific, egregious acts that injure a third party, then it 

is unjust to allow the shareholder to use the corporate form as a shield to escape 

 

1. This test provides, “The corporate form may be disregarded and individual shareholders held 

liable for wrongs committed by the corporation when (1) control over the corporation by those to 

be held liable was so complete that the corporation has no separate mind, will, or existence of its 

own, (2) control over the corporation by those to be held liable was exercised in such a manner as 

to commit fraud, [an illegal act, or a similarly unlawful act] against the person seeking to disregard 

the corporate entity, and (3) injury or unjust loss resulted to the plaintiff from such control and 

wrong.” Belvedere, 67 Ohio St.3d 274, 617 N.E.2d 1075, at paragraph three of the syllabus, and 

as modified (bracketed language) by the syllabus in Dombroski, 119 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio4827, 895 N.E.2d 538. 
January Term, 2009 

5 

the consequences of those wrongful acts. Id. at 289. The Belvedere test for 

piercing the corporate veil has also been applied to ascertain whether a parent 

corporation could be held liable for its subsidiary corporation’s misconduct. 

Dombroski, 119 Ohio St.3d 506, 2008-Ohio-4827, 895 N.E.2d 538, at ¶ 9, 18-19. 

The common element in both of these situations is that the party upon whom 

liability is sought to be imposed had a controlling interest through ownership of 

more than one-half of the voting stock in the corporation allegedly committing 

wrongful acts. See also Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 367 (defining 

“parent corporation”). 

{¶ 12} In this case, however, Minno seeks to impose liability upon a 

corporation that holds no ownership interest in the corporation that allegedly 

committed the wrongful acts. When “two or more corporations [are] controlled 

by the same, or substantially the same, owners,” the corporations are called 

“sisters.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed.2004) 368. In contrast to a 

shareholder’s ownership of a corporation or a parent corporation’s ownership of 

another corporation, the common shareholder ownership of sister corporations 

does not provide one sister corporation with the inherent ability to exercise 

control over the other. Any wrongful act committed by one sister corporation 

might have been instigated by the corporation’s owners, but it could not have 

been instigated by the corporation’s sister. 

{¶ 13} Thus, we hold that a plaintiff cannot pierce the corporate veil of 

one corporation to reach its sister corporation. A corporation’s veil may not be 

pierced in order to hold a second corporation liable for the corporate misdeeds of 

the first when the two corporations have common individual shareholders but 

neither corporation has any ownership interest in the other corporation. Despite 

the element of common shareholder identity, sister corporations are separate 

corporations and are unable to exercise control over each other in the manner that 

a controlling shareholder can. This lack of ability of one corporation to control 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

the conduct of its sister corporation precludes application of the piercing-thecorporate-veil doctrine. 

{¶ 14} In the case before us, Pro-Fab and See-Ann have common 

individual shareholders and officers, are engaged in similar lines of work, and 

possess identical business addresses. However, the corporations are separately 

incorporated and neither corporation has an ownership interest in the other. 

Under this arrangement of the corporate structures, Pro-Fab and See-Ann are, for 

legal purposes, sister corporations, and the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 

is therefore inapplicable. Pro-Fab was entitled to summary judgment. 

IV 

{¶ 15} For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the court of appeals 

is reversed. 

Judgment reversed. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

 James R. Scher, for appellees James Minno, Ruth Minno, Amy Byrns, and 

James Minno Jr. 

 Pelini, Campbell, Williams & Traub, Craig G. Pelini, and Eric J. Williams, 

for appellant. 

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