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*********************************************** 
JOHN J. PARROTT ET AL. v.

AL L. COLON ET AL.

(AC 44178)

Bright, C. J., and Alexander and Bishop, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff tenants, J and S, sought, inter alia, an order to compel the

defendants to use the money collected from them for rent to make

certain repairs to their leased premises. The plaintiffs, who had entered

into a residential lease agreement with the defendants, filed a complaint

for housing code enforcement, pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 47a14h), with the town in which the premises was located, alleging that

the defendants had violated the statute (§ 47a-7) when they failed to

repair and maintain certain conditions at the premises, including, inter

alia, the swimming pool, furnace, and chimneys. The trial court determined that only the plaintiffs’ alleged violations concerning the furnace

and chimneys arguably fell within the statutory criteria. During the

bench trial, W, a town building official, testified that he notified D, a

sanitarian for the local health district that enforces the health code, of

the complaint because the alleged issues were property maintenance

matters to be addressed by the local health district. D attested that after

reviewing the complaint and speaking to J on the phone, she concluded

that the alleged violations did not rise to the level of a health, fitness,

or habitability concern and further determined that the defendants could

not be cited for any code violations as the furnace reached a level of

sixty-five degrees, which was legally sufficient, especially in July, and

the housing code did not require chimneys or fireplaces to be provided

or maintained. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined,

inter alia, that based on the record and the evidence presented, the

plaintiffs failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the evidence that

the violations alleged in the complaint rose to the level of violations

materially affecting the health, safety, and habitability of the premises

and, therefore, rendered judgment in favor of the defendants. Thereafter,

the plaintiffs appealed to this court, arguing that their claims regarding

the swimming pool, furnace, and chimneys did not need to constitute

violations of the housing code or rise to a level affecting the health,

safety, and habitability of the premises to prevail on their complaint

pursuant to § 47a-14h alleging violations of § 47a-7. Held that the trial

court’s finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that their allegations

constituted violations of the housing code or materially affected the

health, safety, and habitability of the premises as required under § 47a7 was not clearly erroneous: to trigger the sanctions available for a

violation of § 47a-7, the plaintiffs were required to show more than

dissatisfaction with the condition and operation of the pool, furnace,

and chimneys and, instead, were required to adduce evidence that established a substantial violation or series of violations of housing and health

codes that created a material risk or hazard to the plaintiffs as occupants;

moreover, the evidence in the record demonstrated that the plaintiffs

failed to establish that any of their allegations constituted a violation

of § 47a-7, as the furnace reached a legally sufficient level of temperature,

the lack of repairs to the pool was not a health, safety, or habitability

issue, especially considering that the parties’ signed agreement provided

that the pool was strictly an amenity, of which use was not guaranteed,

and J testified that the plaintiffs did not suffer any injury or illness as

a result of the defendants’ alleged failure to clean the chimneys.

Argued December 2, 2021—officially released June 21, 2022

Procedural History

Action for housing code enforcement, and for other

relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Middlesex, Housing Session at Middletown, and

tried to the court, Woods, J.; judgment for the defen-
dants, from which the plaintiffs appealed to this court.

Affirmed.

Robert J. Hale, Jr., for the appellants (plaintiffs).

David E. Rosenberg, for the appellees (defendants).
Opinion

ALEXANDER, J. In this housing code enforcement

action, the plaintiffs, John J. Parrott and Solanyi A.

Parrott-Rosario, appeal from the judgment of the trial

court, rendered after a bench trial, in favor of the defendants, Al L. Colon, Karen J. Colon (landlord), and Robert

C. White & Company, LLC (property manager). The

plaintiffs claim that the court incorrectly construed

General Statutes § 47a-7 when it required them to prove

by a fair preponderance of the evidence that their allegations constituted violations of the housing code or materially affected the health, safety and habitability of the

premises. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and

procedural history. In July, 2018, the plaintiffs and the

landlord, the owner of the premises, entered into a

residential lease agreement for a single-family home

located at 7 Redberry Lane in Portland (premises). The

plaintiffs, as tenants, agreed to lease the premises from

the landlord for the period of July 13, 2018, to June 30,

2019, for a rent of $2500 per month. Thereafter, the

plaintiffs and the landlord agreed to extend the period

of the lease agreement to June 30, 2020. In July, 2019,

the plaintiffs filed a complaint form with the town of

Portland’s Building & Land Use Division, in which they

alleged certain issues with the premises that the landlord and the property manager had failed to rectify. In

August, 2019, the plaintiffs initiated this action1 by filing

a complaint for housing code enforcement pursuant to

General Statutes § 47a-14h in which they alleged that

the landlord had violated § 47a-7. In their complaint,

the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants failed to repair

and/or maintain: (1) the plumbing and filtration system

for the swimming pool; (2) the furnace providing heat

to the second floor; (3) the trash compactor; (4) the

patio lights; (5) the front doorbell; and (6) the chimneys.

The plaintiffs sought: (1) an order requiring the defendants to make repairs and/or an order requiring a

receiver to collect rents and correct the identified conditions with the money collected for rent; (2) money,

which may include reimbursement of the money paid

to the court pursuant to § 47a-14h (h);2 and (3) attorney’s fees and expenses pursuant to General Statutes

§ 42-150bb.3 As a result of the plaintiffs’ complaint and

pursuant to § 47a-14h, the plaintiffs began paying their

monthly rent to the clerk of the court instead of to the

property manager. By the last day of trial, the plaintiffs

had paid $10,000 in rent payments to the clerk of the

court.

A trial on the plaintiffs’ complaint was held on September 9, October 25 and December 13, 2019. At trial,

the court heard testimony from John Parrott, Elizabeth

Davidson, a sanitarian III for the Chatham Health District for the town of Portland, and Lincoln Bond White,
a building official for the town of Portland.

The court summarized the relevant testimony as follows. ‘‘White testified that he received the complaint

from [John Parrott] and sent a request for voluntary

compliance to the [defendants]. After conferring with

the [defendants], White determined that there were no

violations of the state building code because the property was not under construction. He testified that, pursuant to the state building code, he was required to

investigate complaints of newly constructed or newly

installed items. White further testified that, as a building

official with the town of Portland, he therefore had no

authority to investigate the plaintiffs’ complaint and

said issues were property maintenance matters to be

addressed, instead, by the Chatham Health District.

White testified that, upon reaching these conclusions,

he notified Davidson, of the housing code enforcement

division, of the plaintiffs’ complaint. White also testified

that, based on his experience, nothing in the complaint

rose to [the] level of [a] health, fitness or habitability

[concern].

‘‘Davidson testified that, as the official at the Chatham

Health District that includes the town of Portland and

enforces the Chatham Health Code, she reviewed the

plaintiffs’ complaint and spoke with [John Parrott] over

the phone. She concluded that none of the six violations

alleged by the plaintiffs rose to the level of a health,

fitness or habitability concern. As a result, Davidson

determined that the [defendants] could not be cited for

any code violations based on the nature of the plaintiffs’

complaint.’’

The court determined that only the plaintiffs’ second

and sixth alleged violations, concerning the furnace and

the chimneys, arguably fell within the statutory criteria.

In analyzing the allegations regarding the second purported violation, that the defendants failed to repair

and maintain the furnace on the second floor of the

premises, the court noted that John Parrott ‘‘testified

that the furnace did not heat the second floor of his

house sufficiently. In response to this claim, Davidson

testified that, on its face, failure to maintain a furnace

in the middle of July was not indicative of a health,

safety or habitability issue. Davidson also testified that,

according to [John Parrott], with whom she had spoken

. . . the furnace worked and there was heat being provided to the area in question on the second floor. Davidson testified that the furnace reached a level of sixtyfive degrees, which was legally sufficient, particularly

in July, when the complaint was made. . . . Davidson

ultimately determined that there were no health concerns or health issues raised by the [plaintiffs] regarding

the performance of the furnace.’’

In analyzing the allegations regarding the sixth purported violation, that the defendants failed to have the

chimneys cleaned, the court noted that John Parrott
‘‘testified that soot and smoke came down the chimney

and into the house during a temperature inversion. In

response to this claim, Davidson testified that nothing

in the housing code requires chimneys or fireplaces to

be provided or maintained. She further testified that

cleaning of chimneys does not come under the jurisdiction of the public health code, and, therefore, does not

create a health, safety or habitability issue . . . . [John

Parrott] further testified that neither he nor anyone else

residing in the home suffered any injury, respiratory

problems, or required the care of a physician as the

result of any problems with the chimneys.’’

As to each of these claims, the court determined that

‘‘none of the plaintiffs’ claims are so significant or so

substantial that living under said conditions would be

detrimental to the safety and welfare of the [plaintiffs]’’

and found the testimony of the town officials to be

‘‘both compelling and persuasive.’’ It concluded that

‘‘[b]ased upon the record and the evidence presented

at trial . . . the [plaintiffs] failed to prove by a fair

preponderance of the evidence that the violations

alleged in [the] complaint rise to the level of violations

materially affecting the health, safety and habitability

of the premises . . . .’’ The court accordingly rendered

judgment for the defendants and ordered that the

$27,500 in rent payments that the plaintiffs paid to the

clerk of the court be disbursed to the property manager.

On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that their claims

regarding the swimming pool, furnace and chimneys4

need not constitute violations of the housing code or

rise to the level of materially affecting the health, safety

and habitability of the premises to prevail on their complaint brought pursuant to § 47a-14h alleging violations

of § 47a-7. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that there is

nothing ‘‘to indicate that the landlord’s responsibilities

under § 47a-7 are limited to those set forth in the applicable building and housing codes nor that they are

limited to those materially affecting health and safety’’

and that ‘‘[a]n action by [an] individual tenant to enforce

[a] landlord’s responsibilities under . . . § 47a-14h is

not the same thing as an action for breach of the lease

contract but neither is it incompatible with an action

against the landlord for violation of the lease.’’ We disagree.

The issue in this case is whether, pursuant to § 47a7, the plaintiffs were required to show that the alleged

breaches of the lease constituted violations of the housing or building code, or a threat to the health, safety

or habitability of the premises. ‘‘We are therefore faced

with an issue of statutory construction requiring a conclusion of law. When construing a statute, we adhere

to fundamental principles of statutory construction

. . . over which our review is plenary.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 777 Residential, LLC v. Metropolitan District Commission, 336 Conn. 819, 827, 251 A.3d
56 (2021).

‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent

of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to

determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the

statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case,

including the question of whether the language actually

does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning,

General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the

text of the statute itself and its relationship to other

statutes. If, after examining such text and considering

such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and

unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable

results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the

statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in

context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable

interpretation. . . . When a statute is not plain and

unambiguous, we also look for interpretive guidance

to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding

its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to

implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation

and common-law principles governing the same general

subject matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lagueux v. Leonardi, 148 Conn. App. 234, 239–40,

85 A.3d 13 (2014).

We next set forth the relevant language of the statutes. Section 47a-14h5 permits a tenant to institute an

action when a landlord has failed to perform his or her

legal duties as required by § 47a-7. Section 47a-7 (a)

provides: ‘‘A landlord shall: (1) Comply with the requirements of chapter 368o and all applicable building and

housing codes materially affecting health and safety of

both the state or any political subdivision thereof; (2)

make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put

and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition,

except where the premises are intentionally rendered

unfit or uninhabitable by the tenant, a member of his

family or other person on the premises with his consent,

in which case such duty shall be the responsibility of

the tenant; (3) keep all common areas of the premises

in a clean and safe condition; (4) maintain in good

and safe working order and condition all electrical,

plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating and other facilities and appliances and elevators, supplied or required

to be supplied by him; (5) provide and maintain appropriate receptacles for the removal of ashes, garbage,

rubbish and other waste incidental to the occupancy

of the dwelling unit and arrange for their removal; and

(6) supply running water and reasonable amounts of

hot water at all times and reasonable heat except if the

building which includes the dwelling unit is not required

by law to be equipped for that purpose or if the dwelling

unit is so constructed that heat or hot water is generated

by an installation within the exclusive control of the

tenant or supplied by a direct public utility connection.’’
In construing the statute, this court previously has

stated that § 47a-7 (a) requires that a landlord maintain

his or her leased premises in ‘‘a fit and habitable condition.’’ Visco v. Cody, 16 Conn. App. 444, 451, 547 A.2d

935 (1988). Although this court in Visco did not address

the specific claim raised by the plaintiffs in the present

appeal, we are ‘‘bound by our previous judicial interpretations of the language and the purpose of the statute.’’

Kasica v. Columbia, 309 Conn. 85, 93–94, 70 A.3d 1

(2013). In Visco, the defendants, month-to-month tenants living in an apartment owned by the plaintiff, had

requested that the plaintiff landlord make various

repairs to their apartment. Visco v. Cody, supra, 445.

The requests for repairs began in October, 1986, and

were made at various times thereafter. Id. On April 14,

1987, the plaintiff caused a notice to quit to be served

on the defendants and when the defendants failed to

vacate, the plaintiff initiated a summary process action.

Id. In their answer, the defendants raised a special

defense in which they asserted that pursuant to General

Statutes § 47a-20,6

the summary process action was

commenced within six months of the defendants’

request for repairs and, therefore, the action was

barred. Id., 446. At trial, the plaintiff testified that at

the defendants’ request, he ‘‘bled the bathroom radiator,

tightened the bedroom windows and replaced the sash

cords, weatherstripped the front door to eliminate

drafts, fixed some loose tiles on the bathroom floor

and provided paint to the defendants so that they could

repaint the kitchen. On the basis of this evidence, the

trial court determined that the protection afforded by

. . . § 47a-20 had not been triggered, because the

requested repairs did not relate to defects which materially affect health and safety.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

On appeal, the defendants argued that they need only

prove a good faith request for repairs in order to invoke

the protection of § 47a-20. Id., 446–47. This court

affirmed the judgment of the trial court, explaining that

‘‘[i]f we were to adopt the defendants’ argument, we

would have to acknowledge a greater duty to make

repairs as set forth in § 47a-20 than that which is specified in § 47a-7 (a). The latter obliges a landlord to maintain his leased premises in a fit and habitable condition;

the former, under the defendants’ construction, would

also oblige the landlord to make any cosmetic or aesthetic repairs, solely at the tenant’s good faith behest.

This is not to say that a tenant does not have the right

to request aesthetic repairs; rather, the tenant cannot

avoid eviction, using § 47a-20 as a shield, on the grounds

that he requested such repairs in good faith.’’ Id., 451.

This court further explained that the repair at issue was

not required to be of a substantial code violation. Id.,

453. ‘‘An adequate and fair balancing of the rights

involved may be achieved by requiring the requested

repair to be one necessary to put and keep the premises
in a fit and habitable condition.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id. Additionally, this court stated that

‘‘the sanctions in these sections are not triggered until

and unless evidence is adduced at trial establishing that

there is a substantial violation or series of violations

of housing and health codes creating a material risk

or hazard to the occupant.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id., 450–51.

In the present case, the plaintiffs contend that their

complaint specifically alleged violations of § 47a-7 (a)

(4) and that this section does not require them to ‘‘prove

a violation of the applicable building and housing codes

or a condition materially affecting health and safety

. . . .’’ The relevant subsection provides that a landlord

shall ‘‘maintain in good and safe working order and

condition all electrical, plumbing, sanitary, heating, ventilating and other facilities and appliances and elevators, supplied or required to be supplied by him . . . .’’

General Statutes § 47a-7 (a) (4). This subsection plainly

states that the landlord’s duty is to ‘‘maintain [the premises] in good and safe working order and condition

. . . .’’ Such a standard clearly requires the plaintiffs to

show more than their dissatisfaction with the condition

and operation of the swimming pool, furnace and chimneys. Furthermore, as this court stated in Visco v. Cody,

supra, 16 Conn. App. 450–51, the sanctions available

for a violation of § 47a-7 ‘‘are not triggered until and

unless evidence is adduced at trial establishing that

there is a substantial violation or series of violations

of housing and health codes creating a material risk

or hazard to the occupant . . . .’’ (Emphasis added;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Consequently, we

conclude that to prevail in their action alleging violations of § 47a-7, the plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that the lack of repairs made to the swimming

pool, furnace and chimneys affected the health, safety

or habitability of the premises.

To the extent that the plaintiffs challenge the court’s

factual findings, after our thorough review of the record,

we conclude that the court properly determined that

the plaintiffs failed to establish that any of the alleged

violations affected the health, safety or habitability of

the premises, as required under § 47a-7. ‘‘In a case tried

before the court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the

credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded

to specific testimony. . . . [When] the factual basis of

the court’s decision is challenged we must determine

whether the facts set out in the memorandum of decision are supported by the evidence or whether, in light

of the evidence and the pleadings in the whole record,

those facts are clearly erroneous. . . . In other words,

to the extent that the trial court has made findings of

fact, our review is limited to deciding whether those

findings were clearly erroneous. . . . A finding of fact

is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed. . . . In making

this determination, every reasonable presumption must

be given in favor of the trial court’s ruling.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Village

Mortgage Co. v. Veneziano, 175 Conn. App. 59, 69, 167

A.3d 430, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 957, 172 A.3d 205

(2017).

The plaintiffs contend that they have ‘‘presented substantial, uncontroverted evidence’’ to support their

claims relating to the pool,7

the furnace and the chimneys. None of their evidence, however, related to the

safety, health or habitability of the premises. To the

contrary, the court credited Davidson’s testimony that

the furnace did in fact function, and ‘‘reached a level

of sixty-five degrees, which was legally sufficient, particularly in July’’ and that the failure to maintain the

furnace in July did not constitute a threat to the health,

safety or habitability of the premises. As to the chimneys, the court credited John Parrott’s testimony that

the plaintiffs did not suffer any injury or illness as a

result of any issues with the chimneys and Davidson’s

testimony that the failure to clean the chimneys did not

create a health, safety or habitability issue.

The court determined that none of the plaintiffs’

claims was ‘‘so significant or so substantial that living

under said conditions would be detrimental to the safety

and welfare of the [plaintiffs]’’ and found that the plaintiffs ‘‘failed to prove by a fair preponderance of the

evidence that the violations alleged in [their] complaint

[rose] to the level of violations materially affecting the

health, safety and habitability of the premises . . . .’’

We conclude that there was sufficient evidence in the

record to support the court’s determination that the

plaintiffs failed to establish that any of their allegations

constituted a violation of § 47a-7.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiffs maintained this action in the trial court as self-represented

parties and brought this appeal in that capacity. After the appeal was filed,

the plaintiffs retained counsel.

2 General Statutes § 47a-14h (h) provides in relevant part: ‘‘On each rent

due date on or after the date when the complaint is filed with the clerk of

the court, or within nine days thereafter, the tenant shall deposit with the

clerk of the court an amount equal to the last agreed-upon rent. . . . Payment to the clerk shall, for all purposes, be the equivalent of having made

payment to the landlord himself.’’

3 General Statutes § 42-150bb provides in relevant part: ‘‘Whenever any

contract or lease entered into . . . provides for the attorney’s fee of the

commercial party to be paid by the consumer, an attorney’s fee shall be

awarded as a matter of law to the consumer who successfully prosecutes or

defends an action or a counterclaim based upon the contract or lease. . . .’’

4 The plaintiffs only challenge on appeal the court’s conclusion as to their

claims relating to the swimming pool, the furnace and the chimneys, and

have abandoned the remaining claims set forth in the complaint. In their

brief, the plaintiffs acknowledge that they ‘‘did not present any substantial

evidence to support their allegations with regard to the defendants’ failure

to maintain the trash compactor, the patio lights, nor the front doorbell
. . . .’’ They state, however, that they have ‘‘certainly proved, by a fair

preponderance of the evidence, their factual allegations of the landlord’s

failure to maintain (1) the pool; (2) the furnace providing heat to the second

floor; and (6) the chimneys.’’ Therefore, we need not address the additional

claims related to the trash compactor, patio lights and front doorbell.

5 General Statutes § 47a-14h provides in relevant part: ‘‘(a) Any tenant

who claims that the landlord has failed to perform his or her legal duties,

as required by section 47a-7 . . . may institute an action in the superior

court having jurisdiction over housing matters in the judicial district in

which such tenant resides to obtain the relief authorized by this section

and sections 47a-7a, 47a-20 and 47a-68 . . . .

‘‘(b) . . . The complaint shall also allege that at least twenty-one days

prior to the date on which the complaint is filed, the tenant made a complaint

concerning the premises to the municipal agency, in the municipality where

the premises are located, responsible for enforcement of the housing code

or, if no housing code exists, of the public health code, or to the agency

responsible for enforcement of the code or ordinance alleged to have been

violated, or to another municipal agency which referred such complaint to

the municipal agency responsible for enforcement of such code or ordinance. . . .’’

6 General Statutes § 47a-20 provides: ‘‘A landlord shall not maintain an

action or proceeding against a tenant to recover possession of a dwelling

unit, demand an increase in rent from the tenant, or decrease the services

to which the tenant has been entitled within six months after: (1) The tenant

has in good faith attempted to remedy by any lawful means, including

contacting officials of the state or of any town, city or borough or public

agency or filing a complaint with a fair rent commission, any condition

constituting a violation of any provisions of chapter 368o, or of chapter 412,

or of any other state statute or regulation, or of the housing and health

ordinances of the municipality wherein the premises which are the subject

of the complaint lie; (2) any municipal agency or official has filed a notice,

complaint or order regarding such a violation; (3) the tenant has in good

faith requested the landlord to make repairs; (4) the tenant has in good

faith instituted an action under subsections (a) to (i), inclusive, of section

47a-14h; or (5) the tenant has organized or become a member of a tenants’ union.’’

7 The court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims alleging violations of

§ 47a-7 relating to the pool did not have merit. At trial, the parties stipulated

that ‘‘the pool was not in working order, at least not to the plaintiffs’ satisfaction . . . .’’ They further stipulated that the plaintiffs had signed a pool/spa

addendum that provided that the pool was ‘‘strictly an amenity and that the

use of the amenity is not guaranteed under the terms of the lease.’’ On the

basis of this evidence, we conclude that the court properly determined that

the plaintiffs’ allegations regarding the swimming pool did not constitute a

violation of § 47a-7 because the lack of repairs made to the swimming pool

did not affect the health, safety or habitability of the premises, especially

in light of the parties’ agreement that the swimming pool was ‘‘strictly an

amenity . . . .’’