NO. 4-99-0863

	IN THE APPELLATE COURT

	OF ILLINOIS

	FOURTH DISTRICT

In re: Jesus. R., a Minor,			)	Appeal from

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,	)	Circuit Court of

	Petitioner-Appellee,    		)	Ford County

	v.			 			)	No. 99JD14

Jesus .R., a Minor,					)	

	Respondent-Appellant.   		)	Honorable

							)	Stephen R. Pacey,

							)	Judge Presiding.

_______________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:

	Respondent minor, Jesus .R. (born August 8, 1984) (hereinafter J.R.), was adjudicated a delinquent and committed to

the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division (DOC), for an

indeterminate period, not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. 

J.R. appeals from the trial court's dispositional order commit

ting him to the DOC, contending (1) the trial court erred when it

committed him to the DOC until age 21; and (2) he is entitled to

sentencing credit for 163 days served prior to his commitment to

the DOC.  We reverse the trial court's dispositional order and

remand with directions.

I.  BACKGROUND	

	Respondent minor, J.R., was adjudicated delinquent (705

ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 1998)) after the trial court found him

guilty of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(8) (West 1998)) and

illegal consumption of alcohol by a minor (235 ILCS 5/6-20 (West

1992)).  After an October 5, 1999, dispositional hearing, the

trial court entered a dispositional order committing J.R. to DOC for an indeterminate period.  The dispositional order stated

J.R.'s term of commitment could not exceed his twenty-first

birthday.  This appeal followed.

	Recitation of the facts of the incidents leading to

J.R.'s commitment is unnecessary for purposes of this appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Term of Commitment

	J.R. first contends the trial court erred when it

committed him to DOC until age 21 for the Class 3 felony of

aggravated battery.   The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act)

states: "[i]n no event shall a guilty minor be committed to [DOC]

for a period of time in excess of that period for which an adult

could be committed for the same act."  705 ILCS 405/5-710(7)

(West 2000).  The maximum nonextended sentence available to an

adult who is convicted of the Class 3 felony of aggravated

battery is five years.  730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(6) (West 2000). 

	J.R. was adjudicated a delinquent on October 5, 1999,

made a ward of the court, and committed to DOC until his 21twenty-

firstst birthday.  Because J.R. will not attain the age of 21 until

August 8, 2005, if he remains in DOC until age 21, he will have

served a term of 5 years, 10 months, and 3 days.  This clearly

exceeds the five-year maximum sentence an adult offender could

receive for the same offense.  

	The State concedes J.R.'s commitment to DOC until his

21sttwenty-first birthday would exceed the five-year maximum

nonextended term for Class 3 felony aggravated battery.  There

fore, the dispositional order committing J.R. to DOC until his

twenty-first birthday violates section 5-710 of the Act.  705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2000).  Accordingly, we remand the cause

so a corrected dispositional order may be entered.

B. Credit for Time Served

	Respondent next argues he is entitled to 163 days'

credit for time served prior to his commitment to DOC.  Respon

dent was taken into custody for the charged offenses on April 26,

1999.  He remained in custody until his dispositional hearing on

October 5, 1999, when he was committed to DOC.  Respondent urges

this court to remand the cause and order the trial court to apply

the proper credit of 163 days to his commitment in DOC.  We

agree.

	Criminal defendants are entitled to sentencing credit

for each day spent in custody.  People v. Hutchcraft, 215 Ill. App. 3d 533, 535, 574 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (1991).  In In re E.C., 297 Ill. App. 3d 177, 180, 696 N.E.2d 846, 848 (1998), we exam

ined the plain meaning of the Act to ascertain and give effect to

the legislative intent, and concluded juveniles are also entitled

to sentencing credit for time served prior to their commitment to

DOC.  Specifically, we looked to section 5-710(1)(a)(v) of the Act, which expressly provides juveniles are entitled to sentenc

ing credit when their dispositions involve a sentencing order of

detention.  705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(a)(v) (West 2000).  We then

examined section 5-710(1)(b), which states the time juveniles

spend in DOC as part of their disposition, "shall be considered as

time spent in detention."  (Emphasis added.).    705 ILCS 405/5- 710(1)(b) (West 2000).  When these provisions are considered

along with the provision providing "[i]n no event shall a guilty

minor be committed to [DOC] for a period of time in excess of that period for which an adult could be committed for the same

act" (705 ILCS 405/5-710(7) (West 2000)), we find no support for

denying a minor credit for time served prior to his commitment to

DOC.  To deny a juvenile credit for time served could lead to a

total commitment that exceeds the maximum time an adult could

serve for the same offense.  This is a result contrary to the

express provisions of the Act itself.

	The State concedes under the rationale of E.C., J.R. is entitled to receive credit against his sentence for the 163 days

served prior to his commitment.  However, the State invites us to

apply the reasoning of a Second District case which held that

section 5/-8-7(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified

Code) does not allow a juvenile delinquent who has been committed

for an indeterminate term in DOC to receive credit for time

served prior to his commitment.  In re J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d 327, 332, 701 N.E.2d 1170, 1173-74 (1998); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-7(b)

(West 1996) (offender entitled to credit for time served spent in

custody as a result of the offense for which the sentence was

imposed).  The gist of the court's reasoning in J.M.M. for not extending credit for time served was juveniles are not "similarly

situated" to the adult criminal defendant, and it is not the

purpose of the Unified Code and the Act to treat them similarly. 

J.J.M., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 330-32, 701 N.E.2d at 1173-74.  However, as discussed above, the Act itself refers to provisions

of the Unified Code to determine proper terms of juvenile commit

ment to DOC and affords the juvenile the same procedural

protections as the adult criminal.  

	Further, recent amendments to the Act have resulted in juvenile proceedings that are strikingly similar to adult crimi nal proceedings.  Our supreme court recently stated the Act "has

been reconfigured and now contains a purpose and policy section

which represents a fundamental shift from the singular goal of

rehabilitation to include the overriding concerns of protecting

the public and holding juvenile offenders accountable for viola

tions of the law."  In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317, 746 N.E.2d 732, 735 (2001).  While proceedings under the Act are still not

"criminal" in nature and the primary purpose of the Act is the

rehabilitation of the juvenile offender (In re Beasley, 66 Ill. 2d 385, 389, 362 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (1977)), the Act has clearly

evolved to include facets that resemble adult criminal proceed

ings.  Therefore, we decline to follow the Second District's

reasoning in J.J.M., which rests primarily on the "distinct" differences between the juvenile and adult criminal court sys

tems.

	We note our reasoning and holding in E.C. was recently cited with approval and applied by the Third District when the

court determined a juvenile was entitled to credit for his

predispositional confinement when the juvenile was committed to 

DOC under section 5-815(f) of the Act; this section provides for

the commitment of the habitual juvenile offender.  In re B.L.S., 325 Ill. App. 3d. 96, 100, 757 N.E.2d 637, 641 (2001); 705 ILCS

405/5-815(f) (West 2000).  

	Accordingly, we stand by our reasoning in E.C. and find J.R. is entitled to receive 163 days' credit against the term of

his commitment to DOC for time he spent in custody prior to the

entry of his dispositional order.  

III.  CONCLUSION

	We reverse the trial court's dispositional order and

remand the cuasecause for the entry of a new dispositional order

consistent with this decision.   

	Reversed. and remanded with directions.

	KNECHTMcCULLOUGH, P.J., and MYERSCOUGH, J., concur.

necht, J., with