IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

February 17, 2022 Session

DEBORAH LACY v. MEHARRY GENERAL HOSPITAL ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County

No. 16C1053 William B. Acree, Senior Judge

No. M2021-00632-COA-R3-CV

Plaintiff Deborah Lacy brought this action against Dr. Nagendra Ramanna, alleging that 

he committed a battery upon her by shaking her hand too forcefully during a visit in which 

Plaintiff was seeking medical treatment for an alleged heart condition. Following 

discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted after 

finding no evidence that the handshake caused injury to Plaintiff’s right hand. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed;

Case Remanded

KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D. MICHAEL SWINEY,

C.J., and THOMAS R. FRIERSON, II, J., joined.

Deborah Lacy, Madison, Tennessee, appellant, pro se.

Sara F. Reynolds and Ashley B. Tipton, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Nagendra 

Ramanna.

OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

This is Plaintiff’s second appeal of this action. In the first appeal, Lacy v. Meharry 

Gen’l Hosp., No. M2016–01477–COA–R3–CV, 2017 WL 6501915, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Dec. 19, 2017) (“Lacy I”), this Court provided the following factual background, in 

pertinent part:

On April 14, 2016, Ms. Lacy filed a complaint against Dr. Ramanna in the 

Circuit Court for Davidson County, Tennessee. . . . [T]he complaint alleged 

that Ms. Lacy made an appointment with Dr. Ramanna, a cardiologist, “to 

07/28/2022
2

check why she was getting so out of breath while doing her daily chores since 

February 11, 2015.” According to the complaint, “upon entering the room .

. . Plaintiff extended her right hand for the [sic] Dr. Nagendra Ramanna to 

shake her hand and this is when he squeezed Plaintiff [sic] fingers to [sic] 

hard.” Ms. Lacy generally described this interaction as “a beating” or 

“assault.” As a result, Ms. Lacy complained that her “hand is in constant 

pain” and “the fingers no longer have any strength.”

In Lacy I, we affirmed the dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims but the battery action against 

Dr. Ramanna, finding that “[w]hile further evidence may demonstrate otherwise, at this 

stage of the proceedings, we cannot conclude that the [Health Care Liability] Act applies 

to Ms. Lacy’s handshake claim” to bar her action for failure to comply with the statutory 

procedural requirements for a health care liability claim. 2017 WL 6501915, at *4. 

Following the remand to the trial court from Lacy I, Defendant filed a motion for 

summary judgment, arguing that “(a) Dr. Ramanna did not unreasonably squeeze 

Plaintiff’s hand or fingers during the July 15 handshake; (b) Plaintiff did not suffer any 

injury because of the handshake; and (c) Plaintiff consented to the handshake, precluding 

any cause of action for battery.” In support of the motion, Defendant filed affidavits from 

himself, his assistant whom Plaintiff alleged witnessed the handshake, and Dr. Douglas R. 

Weikert, an orthopaedic surgeon who testified among other things that there is no objective 

evidence of injury to Plaintiff’s right hand, and “no action or omission on the part of Dr. 

Ramanna caused Ms. Lacy any injury which would not otherwise have occurred.” 

Defendant also filed excerpts from Plaintiff’s deposition, in which she admitted that 

(1) she did not tell Defendant he was hurting her hand either during or after the handshake; 

(2) she did not tell anyone else at the clinic that day of her alleged injury; and (3) she did 

not seek any medical treatment for the alleged injury until two years later. Plaintiff also 

discussed in her deposition her prior claims that numerous other individuals had assaulted 

and “beaten” her right hand before the handshake with Dr. Ramanna in 2015. 

Defendant also filed a statement of material facts as to which he contended there 

was no genuine issue for trial, as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. Plaintiff responded 

with numerous filings, roughly 168 pages long, all of which but a few were handwritten. 

Defendant filed a reply. Plaintiff responded by filing a “notice of filing a flash drive,” 

stating only that “[t]he Response Reply Motion to the Summary Judgment Motion filed 

April 21, 2021. With Exhibits.” Plaintiff’s sur-reply consisted of various documents 

totaling 320 pages on a USB flash drive filed with the trial court. The trial court granted 

Defendant summary judgment in an order stating, “the Court finds that there is no credible 

evidence that the Defendant committed a battery upon the Plaintiff, and there is no evidence 

that the handshake injured the Plaintiff.”

 
3

II. ISSUES

The issues as framed and presented by Plaintiff are difficult to render 

comprehensible. Quoted verbatim, they state as follows:

1. Whether the Trial Court erred in Granting the Appellees Ramanna’s 

Motion for Summary and Reply Summary Judgment Motion, without 

including the Appellants Response to the Appellee’s Reply Summary 

Judgment Motion. Tenn. Civil Rule 27(c). The Appellants entire Response 

to the Appellee’s Reply Summary Judgment Motion is in a Brown envelope 

Vol. 1 of 1 on a flash Drive.

2. Whether the Trial Court erred in Granting the Appellees Motion for 

Summary Judgment and Reply Summary Judgment Motion when the 

Appellant was not properly included in the discovery process, by allowing 

the Appellant proof of the Appellee, fake hand x-ray and Medical Records to 

just go away.

a. Doctor Appellant has never been a patient of before 

b. Hand x-rays with Warning signs that had been clearly altered.

c. Taking one part of the Appellant medical Records and leaving the other 

part.

d. Clearly changing the numbers on the Appellants Medical records to take 

the records out of order.

3. Whether the Trial Court erred in Granting the Appellee Ramanna Motion 

for Summary Judgment and the Reply Summary Judgment. Filing Irrelevant 

inadmissible Evidence for the, Tenn. Rule 56, 26.02, 404.

We construe the primary issue presented to be whether the trial court properly 

granted Defendant summary judgment. Plaintiff also appears to argue that the trial court 

erred by not considering her sur-reply to Defendant’s reply to her response to the motion 

for summary judgment, and by accepting the authenticity of some of Plaintiff’s medical 

records and x-ray images proffered by Defendant. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court may grant summary judgment only if the “pleadings, depositions, 

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits . . . show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The propriety of a trial court’s 

summary judgment decision presents a question of law, which we review de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. Kershaw v. Levy, 583 S.W.3d 544, 547 (Tenn. 2019).
4

“The moving party has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law.” Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn. 2008). As our Supreme Court 

has instructed,

when the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving 

party may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively negating 

an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating 

that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the summary judgment stage is 

insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or defense. 

Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, 477 S.W.3d 235, 264 (Tenn. 2015). “[I]f the 

moving party bears the burden of proof on the challenged claim at trial, that party must 

produce at the summary judgment stage evidence that, if uncontroverted at trial, would 

entitle it to a directed verdict.” TWB Architects, Inc. v. Braxton, LLC, 578 S.W.3d 879, 

888 (Tenn. 2019) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 331, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 

L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). 

When a party files and properly supports a motion for summary judgment as 

provided in Rule 56, “to survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party may not rest 

upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading, but must respond, and by affidavits or 

one of the other means provided in Tennessee Rule 56, set forth specific facts . . . showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265 (internal quotation marks 

and brackets in original omitted). “Whether the nonmoving party is a plaintiff or a 

defendant—and whether or not the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on 

the challenged claim or defense—at the summary judgment stage, ‘[t]he nonmoving party 

must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record which could lead a rational 

trier of fact to find in favor of the nonmoving party.’” TWB Architects, 578 S.W.3d at 889 

(quoting Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265).

In reviewing the trial court’s summary judgment decision, we accept the evidence 

presented by the nonmoving party (in this case, Plaintiff) as true; allow all reasonable 

inferences in her favor; and “resolve any doubts about the existence of a genuine issue of 

material fact in favor of” Plaintiff, the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 887.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Compliance with Tenn. R. App. P. 27

As an initial matter, Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s failure to submit any 

intelligible argument results in waiver of all issues presented on appeal” and requests that 

the appeal be dismissed for noncompliance with Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Tenn. Ct. App. 
5

R. 6. In Lacy v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., M2018-00832-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 

1450390, at *3, *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2019), this Court took a similar approach, 

stating:

Ms. Lacy raises several issues for review. However, her statement of the 

issues is rambling and largely incoherent. Because Ms. Lacy’s brief fails to 

comport with the requirements of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, we do not reach her substantive issues.

* * *

Ms. Lacy’s brief is largely incoherent as she neither develops her arguments 

nor cites authority to support her positions. . . .

Ms. Lacy has extensive experience with this Court as she has filed no fewer 

than eleven (11) appeals since November 2015.1 In two prior appeals, this 

Court warned Appellant that she is required to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 

27 but then proceeded to address the case on the merits despite the procedural 

shortcomings in her brief. See Lacy v. HCA Tristar Hendersonville Hosp., 

2018 WL 575346 at *5-6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018); Lacy v. Hallmark 

Volkswagen, 2017 WL 2929502 at *1-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2017). 

Even after repeated warnings, Ms. Lacy still refuses to abide by the 

Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. Due to our inability to reach the 

substantive issues, given the deficiencies in Ms. Lacy’s brief after repeated 

warnings, Ms. Lacy’s appeal is dismissed.

(Footnote in original). In the present case, in contrast to some of her many prior appeals 

in other actions, Plaintiff’s appellate brief contains all the basic elements required by Tenn. 

R. App. P. 27, including a table of contents, table of authorities, and statements of the 

 

1

See Lacy v. HCA Tristar Hendersonville Hosp., No. M2017-01055-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 575346 

(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2018) (no perm. app. filed); Lacy v. Meharry Gen. Hosp., No. M2016-01477-

COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 6501915 (Tenn. Ct. App. December 19, 2017) (no perm. app. filed); Lacy v. 

Hallmark Volkswagen Inc. of Rivergate, No. M2016-02366-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 2929502 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. July 10, 2017) (no perm. app. filed); Lacy v. HCA Health Serv. of TN, Inc., No. M2016-01027-COAR3-CV, 2017 WL 1944351 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 2017), perm. app. denied (Aug. 17, 2017); Lacy v. 

Saint Thomas Hosp. W., et al., No. M2016-01272-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1827021 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 

4, 2017), perm. app. denied (May 4, 2017); Lacy v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., No. M2016-02014-COAR3-CV, 2017 WL 6273316 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 4, 2017) (no perm. app. filed); Lacy v. Mitchell, 541 

S.W.3d 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2016); Lacy v. HCA Tristar Hendersonville Hosp., No. M2015-02217-

COA-R3-CV, 2016 WL 4497953 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2016), appeal after remand. Additionally, Ms. 

Lacy has three cases still pending in this Court. See Lacy v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., No. M2018-00832-

COA-R3-CV; Lacy v. Saint Thomas Hosp. W., No. M2018-01758-COA-R3-CV; Lacy v. Big Lots Stores, 

Inc., M2019-00419-COA-R3-CV.
6

issues, the case, and the facts, with some citations to the record and reference to legal 

authorities, and an argument section. Much of it is rambling, incoherent, and difficult to 

understand; but in our discretion, we do not think it is so deficient as to warrant the harsh 

sanction of dismissal of her appeal without consideration of its merits. However, we 

conduct our review mindful of the admonition to Plaintiff in Lacy v. Vanderbilt, wherein 

we stated: 

Rule 6 of the Tennessee Rules of the Court of Appeals requires an appellate 

brief to contain a written argument in regard to each issue on appeal, with a 

statement of the alleged erroneous action of the trial court, as well as a 

specific reference to the record where such action is recorded. The Rule 

further provides:

No complaint of or reliance upon action by the trial court will 

be considered on appeal unless the argument contains a 

specific reference to the page or pages of the record where such 

action is recorded. No assertion of fact will be considered on 

appeal unless the argument contains a reference to the page or 

pages of the record where evidence of such fact is recorded.

Tenn. R. Ct. App. 6(b).

* * *

“[T]his Court is not charged with the responsibility of scouring the appellate 

record for any reversible error the trial court may have committed.” [Owen 

v. Long Tire, LLC, No. W2011-01227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 6777014, at 

*4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011)]. “It is not the role of the courts, trial or 

appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or 

her, and where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her 

contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.” 

Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 

2010).

2019 WL 1450390, at *2, *3 (quoting Clayton v. Herron, No. M2014-01497-COA-R3-

CV, 2015 WL 757240, at *2-3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2015)). 

B. Plaintiff’s Sur-reply in Opposition to Summary Judgment

Plaintiff appears to argue that the trial court erred by refusing to consider her surreply to Defendant’s reply to her response to the motion for summary judgment. Tennessee 

Rule of Civil Procedure 56.03 provides for the following summary judgment procedure:
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In order to assist the Court in ascertaining whether there are any material 

facts in dispute, any motion for summary judgment made pursuant to Rule 

56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure shall be accompanied by a 

separate concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party 

contends there is no genuine issue for trial. Each fact shall be set forth in a 

separate, numbered paragraph. Each fact shall be supported by a specific 

citation to the record.

Any party opposing the motion for summary judgment must, not later than 

five days before the hearing, serve and file a response to each fact set forth 

by the movant either (i) agreeing that the fact is undisputed, (ii) agreeing that 

the fact is undisputed for purposes of ruling on the motion for summary 

judgment only, or (iii) demonstrating that the fact is disputed. Each disputed 

fact must be supported by specific citation to the record. Such response shall 

be filed with the papers in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.

In addition, the non-movant’s response may contain a concise statement of 

any additional facts that the non-movant contends are material and as to 

which the non-movant contends there exists a genuine issue to be tried. Each 

such disputed fact shall be set forth in a separate, numbered paragraph with 

specific citations to the record supporting the contention that such fact is in 

dispute.

If the non-moving party has asserted additional facts, the moving party shall 

be allowed to respond to these additional facts by filing a reply statement in 

the same manner and form as specified above.

Rule 56 does not anticipate or provide for a sur-reply in support of or opposition to 

summary judgment. Consequently, we believe it was within the trial court’s discretion to 

determine how to deal with Plaintiff’s pleading. See generally Demquarter Healthcare 

Invs., L.P. v. OP Chattanooga, LLC, No. E2016–00031–COA–R3–CV, 2016 WL 

7479143, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2016) (“We find no abuse of discretion in the trial 

court’s decision to allow the defendants’ new arguments raised in their ‘surreply’ brief and 

to rely on those arguments in denying the motion for summary judgment”). 

In the present case, as Defendant argues, there is no indication in the record that the

trial court declined to consider Plaintiff’s sur-reply in ruling on the summary judgment 

motion. Defendant did not object to it. The trial court entered no order stating it denied 

consideration of the sur-reply. The final judgment states that the court grants summary 

judgment “[a]fter listening to oral arguments and reviewing the Defendant’s Motion, the 

Plaintiff’s Response, and the record as a whole.” (Emphasis added). 
8

Moreover, Plaintiff points to nothing in the 320-page sur-reply that creates a genuine 

issue of material fact on the dispositive question of causation of any alleged injury. It 

consists primarily of copies of handwritten pleadings filed by Plaintiff in her many other 

lawsuits. There are some medical records, many of which involve alleged injuries to parts 

of her body other than her right hand. Some of the documents in the voluminous sur-reply 

are duplicative of filings that were already in the record. We find no error in the trial 

court’s handling of Plaintiff’s sur-reply.

C. Authenticity and Admissibility of Medical Records

Throughout her brief, Plaintiff repeatedly refers to “fake medical records,” “fake xrays,” and “fake doctors” in reference to certain of her own medical records that were 

provided to her and filed with the trial court in support of Defendant’s assertions. However, 

the records were filed with the affidavits of records custodians from three health care 

providers, stating that (1) the copies of the records were “true and correct cop[ies] of each 

and every record and tangible thing maintained by” the providers pertaining to Plaintiff; 

(2) that “the records and tangible items . . . were created at or near the time of the events 

recorded in those documents/tangible things by, or from information transmitted by, a 

person with knowledge of and a business duty to record or transmit those matters,” and (3) 

the records “were created, kept and maintained in the ordinary course of regularly 

conducted activity at the offices of [the health care providers] as a regular business 

practice.” See Tenn. R. Evid. 902(11) (setting forth requirements for self-authentication of 

certified records of a regularly conducted activity). It thus appears that the records were 

properly authenticated. “Both the rules of evidence and the common law designate the trial 

court as the ‘arbiter of authentication issues,’ and, accordingly, that court’s ruling will not 

be disturbed absent a showing that the court clearly abused its discretion.” State v. Miller, 

No. M2019-00214-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 526094, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 3, 2020). 

Plaintiff provided no proof to support her belief that the medical records were “fake.” This 

issue is without merit.

D. Summary Judgment: Causation of Alleged Injury

As we have recently reiterated, “[t]his Court has defined the tort of battery as ‘an 

intentional act that causes an unpermitted, harmful or offensive bodily contact.’”

Spearman v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 637 S.W.3d 719, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting 

Lacy v. Hallmark Volkswagen Inc. of Rivergate, No. M2016-02366-COA-R3-CV, 2017 

WL 2929502, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 10, 2017)). “Therefore, Ms. Lacy must show that 

the Defendant[] intentionally committed an act that resulted in a harmful or offensive 

contact. Contact constitutes ‘offensive contact’ if it ‘infringes on a reasonable sense of 

personal dignity ordinarily respected in a civilized society.’” Lacy v. Hallmark 

Volkswagen, 2017 WL 2929502, at *4 (quoting Doe v. Mama Taori’s Premium Pizza, LLC, 

No. M1998–00992–COA–R9–CV, 2001 WL 327906, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2001)). 
9

Defendant makes several arguments as to why the trial court correctly granted him 

summary judgment. He asserts that Plaintiff’s claim of battery was negated by her consent 

to shake hands with him. Plaintiff’s allegations regarding who initiated the handshake are 

inconsistent and contradictory. In her complaint, she alleged that “upon entering the 

[examination] room is when Plaintiff extended her right hand for the Dr. Nagendra

Ramanna to shake her hand and this is when he squeezed Plaintiff fingers to[o] hard.” In 

Plaintiff’s deposition, she testified that Defendant “reached his hand out and I grabbed it 

to shake it.” Regardless of who initiated the handshake, the trial court did not base its 

ruling on consent, and neither do we. This is because a person may consent to shaking 

hands with someone and still not consent to the other person using such excessive force as 

to cause a hand injury. 

Defendant also argues that the trial court correctly held that he presented evidence 

that negated the elements of injury and causation of her battery claim. He points to 

Plaintiff’s deposition testimony where she stated as follows:

Q. So you don’t remember if all -- if he squeezed all of your hand?

A. No, he shook my hand so I’m sure he -- no, I didn’t -- no, he -- he squeezed 

all my fingers, but the most affected was the two middle fingers. I mean all 

of them were affected but the two middle fingers were the most affected.

Q. When you say “middle fingers,” you’re talking about the middle finger 

and your ring finger?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you say anything to him during the handshake?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever tell him, “You’re hurting my hand. Please stop”?

A. I jerked my hand. Jerked my hand.

Q. So during the handshake, you jerked --

A. Not --

Q. -- your hand back?

A. Not forcefully because he -- I just kind of like pulled it back when he 

started squeezing it. But he had it so tight I couldn’t just yank it out, because 

he had it.

Q. Did you ever tell him that he was --

A. No.

Q. -- hurting your hand?

A. No, why? He knew.

Q. After you pulled your hand back, what happened?

A. I let him talk to me. Because he was not first one to assault me. All the 

doctors and nurses do it.

* * *
10

Q. So you never mentioned that his hand – handshake hurt your hand to Dr. 

Ramanna until you filed the lawsuit?

A. Right.

* * *

Q. Did you ever tell the nurse that was in the room that Dr. Ramanna hurt 

your hand?

A. No.

Q. Did you tell anyone that he hurt your hand before you left the clinic that 

day?

A. No.

Defendant submitted his affidavit in which he testified as follows in pertinent part:

I do not shake every patient’s hand. When I do shake a patient’s hand, I only 

do so if the patient extends his or her hand to initiate or accept the handshake.

I did not squeeze or shake Ms. Lacy’s hand or fingers in a hard, unreasonable, 

or abnormal manner. Instead, I shook Ms. Lacy’s hand in a gentle and 

courteous manner as that is my habit and practice when I shake anyone’s 

hand. Furthermore, I have never squeezed a patient’s hand or fingers in a 

hard, unreasonable, or abnormal manner.

I would remember if a patient, colleague, or acquaintance stated or otherwise

indicated that my handshake was painful. I do not remember a patient, 

colleague, or acquaintance ever stating or otherwise indicating that my 

handshake was painful. I do not remember a patient, colleague, or 

acquaintance ever asking me to stop shaking his or her hand.

I would remember if I witnessed a patient, colleague, or acquaintance 

wincing, flinching, recoiling, or grimacing when shaking my hand. I do not 

remember a patient, colleague, or acquaintance ever[] wincing, flinching, 

recoiling, or grimacing when shaking my hand.

Ms. Lacy never complained to me about the handshake. The first time I 

learned that Ms. Lacy was claiming she was injured from shaking my hand 

was when she filed her lawsuit.

In shaking Ms. Lacy’s hand, I never intended to threaten, harm, frighten, or

offend Ms. Lacy. My intention in shaking Ms. Lacy’s hand was to greet her 

in a professional and courteous manner.
11

During the appointment, I never threatened any harmful or offensive contact 

with Ms. Lacy. 

(Numbering in original omitted). Defendant’s medical assistant, Quistina UrseryMcMillan, whom Plaintiff alleged was in the room during the handshake, testified by 

affidavit that she did “not remember a patient ever stating or otherwise indicating that Dr.

Ramanna’s handshake was painful [or] asking Dr. Ramanna to stop shaking his or her 

hand.” She said, “I would remember if I witnessed a patient wincing, flinching, recoiling, 

or grimacing when shaking Dr. Ramanna’s hand.”

In support of his summary judgment motion, Defendant filed the affidavit of 

Douglas R. Weikert, M.D., who testified:

I practice in the specialty of orthopaedic surgery in Nashville, Tennessee. I 

have been continuously licensed and practicing medicine in Tennessee since 

1993. I am board certified in orthopaedic surgery with a certificate of added 

qualification in hand surgery. . . . I make this affidavit based on my personal 

knowledge, education, and experience as well as my review of numerous 

materials related to this action, including pleadings, medical records,

radiology studies, depositions, and other documents.

Ms. Lacy suffered no injury to her right hand or fingers as a result of any

handshake with Dr. Ramanna. No action or omission on the part of Dr. 

Ramanna caused Ms. Lacy any injury which would not otherwise have 

occurred.

It is my understanding that Ms. Lacy claims Dr. Ramanna squeezed her right 

hand and fingers so hard during a July 15, 2015 handshake that it “crushed”

her middle and ring fingers and left her with functional limitations and 

permanent injury. If Ms. Lacy had suffered such injuries, evidence of the 

damage would be visible on a radiology study of Ms. Lacy’s right hand.

A 2017 radiology study of Ms. Lacy’s right hand shows no evidence of any

traumatic or other injury to her right hand or fingers. Ms. Lacy’s medical 

records also contain a 2014 radiology study of her right hand. Between the 

2014 and 2017 radiology studies, there is no objective change in the bony 

anatomy of Ms. Lacy’s right hand or fingers because of any acute or chronic 

trauma. In other words, there are no anatomical differences in Plaintiff’s 

right hand or fingers in the 2014 and 2017 radiology studies.

Had Ms. Lacy suffered the injuries alleged, she would have needed to seek

medical care and treatment. Ms. Lacy, however, did not seek any medical 
12

care or treatment for her right hand or fingers until October 2017 when she 

allegedly injured her right hand in a car accident. The fact that Ms. Lacy did 

not seek any medical care or treatment until after the October 2017 car 

accident further supports my medical opinion that Ms. Lacy’s hand or fingers

were not injured during the handshake with Dr. Ramanna.

(Numbering and footnote in original omitted). 

Defendant also submitted a copy of a medical intake questionnaire that Plaintiff 

filled out two days after her alleged handshake injury during another unrelated medical 

appointment, wherein Plaintiff answered “no” to the question “Have you been hit, kicked, 

punched, [or] otherwise hurt by someone in the past year?” Moreover, Plaintiff herself 

testified as follows:

Q. Did you ever seek medical treatment for your hand based on this 

handshake?

A. I finally did.

Q. And when did you seek that treatment?

A. 2017 -- two years later. I’ll be honest, I was afraid to go anywhere.

* * *

Q. Was [that] the first time that you sought treatment?

A. Yes, yes.

* * *

Q. So immediately after the handshake, can you describe the pain that you 

felt in your fingers?

A. Just felt like crushed bones, like it was being crushed. That’s all. . . .

Q. But you didn’t go and seek any treatment to see if, you know, your fingers 

had been broken or anything? You didn’t seek any medical treatment 

regarding your hand until 2017 -- your fingers? Sorry.

A. Not right after, no.

Q. And it was 2017 when you went?

A. You know, the car wreck was in October of 2017 so it could have been 

possibly early January.

Q. Of 2018?

A. Yeah, could have been.

Considering the above-quoted evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, even 

assuming for argument’s sake that Plaintiff suffered a hand injury ̶which is frankly a big 
13

stretch, but one warranted by a faithful application of the summary judgment standard ̶

Defendant successfully negated the element of causation. In the face of Defendant’s expert 

medical testimony, Plaintiff produced no proof, by expert medical testimony, or otherwise, 

that any injury she might have suffered was caused by Defendant’s handshake. No 

reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Dr. Ramanna caused any hand injury to Ms. 

Lacy. The trial court therefore correctly granted Defendant summary judgment. 

In the argument section of his brief, Defendant argues that this is a frivolous appeal 

and requests an award of his attorney’s fees on appeal. However, “[a] request for attorney 

fees is waived if not included in the statement of issues.” Sexton v. Carden, No. E2019-

01057-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 7240297, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2020) (citing 

Keeble v. Keeble, No. E2019-01168-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 2897277, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. June 3, 2020)). Because Defendant did not raise attorney’s fees in his statement of 

the issues, we deem this issue to have been waived.

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs on appeal are assessed to the 

appellant, Deborah Lacy, for which execution may issue if necessary.

_______________________________

KRISTI M. DAVIS, JUDGE