COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-15-00315-CR

DANIEL GARCIA APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. 1385098D

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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In four points, Appellant Daniel Garcia appeals his conviction for 

continuous sexual abuse of a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.02(b) (West 

Supp. 2016). We affirm. 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
2

Background

Audrey,

2 who was twelve at the time of trial, did not meet her father, 

Appellant, until her seventh birthday in October 2009, after her mother located 

him on Facebook.

3

Initially, Audrey enjoyed going to Appellant’s home because 

he had two dogs and several cats that she liked to play with. But that changed 

when, shortly after she met Appellant,4 he started to touch Audrey

inappropriately. Audrey testified that Appellant would touch and lick her “private 

areas”5 and make her watch “inappropriate videos” while he did so. She testified 

that, over the next four years, Appellant rubbed his private parts on hers, put his 

finger in her private areas, held her down and put his private part in her private 

area and in the part “where [she] poop[s] from,” and put his tongue in “the part 

where [she] poop[s] from.” Appellant also tried to get Audrey to put her mouth 

and hands on his penis, and he masturbated in front of Audrey and ejaculated 

 

2We use an alias to protect the victim’s anonymity. See McClendon v. 

State, 643 S.W.2d 936, 936 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982).

3Audrey’s mother testified that when Audrey became curious about her 

father, she began looking for him, found him, and set up a meeting between the 

two. 

4Audrey testified that it may have been as early as a few weeks after they 

met, but no longer than six months. 

5Audrey testified that “private part” or “private area” meant her vagina or 

Appellant’s penis. 
3

onto her stomach. Audrey testified that it hurt and that the abuse happened 

every time she went to his house.6 

Audrey testified that she “was too scared to say anything” because 

Appellant had told her not to. But in January 2014, when Audrey was eleven 

years old, Audrey’s mother asked Audrey if anyone had touched her because 

Audrey was having a problem with itching in her private area. Audrey told her 

mother about the abuse. The next day, Audrey’s mother reported the abuse to 

the police and took Audrey to Cook Children’s Hospital. Audrey was later 

interviewed by a forensic interviewer with Alliance for Children and examined by 

a Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner. 

In October 2014, Appellant was charged with eleven counts of continuous 

sexual abuse of Audrey. Appellant filed a motion to quash the indictment on the 

basis that section 21.02 of the penal code, the statute supporting his charge, was 

facially unconstitutional in violating the requirement of jury unanimity. The trial 

court denied the motion to quash. 

A jury found Appellant guilty of continuous sexual assault of a child, and he 

was sentenced to life in prison. 

 

6Audrey also testified that she saw Appellant “take empty cans like from 

Sprite or Coke and put spray paint in it and inhale the air from inside” and that 

Appellant told her he did that to get high.
4

Discussion

I. Denial of motion to quash

In his first point, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it denied 

his motion to quash the indictment on the ground that section 21.02 of the penal 

code is facially unconstitutional. 

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash an indictment de novo 

because the sufficiency of a charging instrument is a question of law. State v. 

Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d 550, 555 n.6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In order to prevail on 

a facial challenge to a statute, a party must establish that the statute always 

operates unconstitutionally in all possible circumstances. Id. at 557. 

Section 21.02 provides that a person commits the offense of continuous 

sexual abuse of a child if, during a period that is more than 30 days in duration, 

the person is 17 years of age or older and commits two or more acts of sexual 

abuse, and the victim is a child younger than 14. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 21.02(b). “Acts of sexual abuse” include indecency with a child, sexual assault, 

and aggravated sexual assault. Id. § 21.02(c)(2)–(4). The statute also provides 

that “members of the jury are not required to agree unanimously on which 

specific acts of sexual abuse were committed by the defendant or the exact date 

when those acts were committed.” Id. § 21.02(d).
5

Texas courts, including this court, have upheld section 21.02’s federal and 

state constitutionality and definitively ruled against Appellant’s position.7 

See Holton v. State, 487 S.W.3d 600, 606–08 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no 

pet.); Pollock v. State, 405 S.W.3d 396, 405 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no 

pet.); Reckart v. State, 323 S.W.3d 588, 601 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2010, 

pet. ref'd); Render v. State, 316 S.W.3d 846, 857–58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, 

pet. ref'd), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1243 (2011); see also Macintosh v. State, No. 

02-13-00059-CR, 2014 WL 1087926, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar. 20, 

2014, pet. ref'd) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (collecting other 

cases). We have held that while jury unanimity is required in all criminal cases in 

Texas, Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), and every 

juror must agree that “the defendant committed the same, single, specific 

criminal act,” Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), this 

does not mean that the “jury must unanimously find that the defendant committed

that crime in one specific way,” Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2008). A trial court may not submit “separate offenses” to the jury in 

the disjunctive, but a trial court may submit a disjunctive jury charge and obtain a 

general verdict when alternate theories or “manner and means” involve the 

commission of the “same offense.” Pollock, 405 S.W.3d at 405 (quoting Clement 

 

7Appellant acknowledges in his brief that this court has previously held that 

section 21.02 does not violate the requirement of jury unanimity and states that 

he has raised this issue in order to preserve it for further review. 
6

v. State, 248 S.W.3d 791, 800 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.)). 

Therefore, we have held that section 21.02 does not violate the state 

constitutional right to jury unanimity because it does not allow jurors to convict on 

the basis of different elements. Id. 

Appellant argues that the Texas appellate court opinions upholding the 

statute are flawed because each juror could disagree as to which two acts of 

abuse alleged actually occurred, “thus permitting a jury to find someone ‘probably 

guilty’” of continuous sexual abuse. We do not find this argument persuasive. 

As we stated in Pollock, “The commission of two or more acts of sexual abuse 

over a specified time period—that is, the pattern of behavior or the series of 

acts—is the element as to which the jurors must be unanimous in order to 

convict.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Lewis v. State, No. 02-10-00004-CR, 

2011 WL 2755469, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 14, 2011, pet. ref’d) (mem. 

op., not designated for publication) (explaining that, unlike the case of the State 

charging two separate offenses in the disjunctive, section 21.02 “does not make 

each act a separate element but creates a single element, a ‘series’ of sexual 

abuse”) (internal citations omitted). We therefore overrule Appellant’s first point. 

II. Constitutionality of code provisions imposing court costs

In his second and third points, Appellant argues that two articles of the 

code of criminal procedure, 102.020(a)(1) and 102.0186, are unconstitutional. 

Article 102.020(a)(1) concerns costs related to DNA testing and requires the 

payment of $250 by a defendant convicted of certain offenses. Tex. Code Crim. 
7

Proc. Ann. art. 102.020(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016). Article 102.0186 concerns 

costs related to certain sex-related convictions and requires the payment of $100 

upon certain convictions. Id. art. 102.0186 (West Supp. 2016). 

In his brief, Appellant acknowledges that the court of criminal appeals has 

held contrary to his argument in Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 521 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2015), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1188 (2016). In Peraza, the court of 

criminal appeals unanimously rejected its prior opinion in Ex parte Carson, the

case upon which Appellant principally relies, as governing the constitutionality of 

court costs. 159 S.W.2d 126, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1942) (op. on reh’g), 

overruled by Peraza, 467 S.W.3d at 517. In doing so, the court of criminal 

appeals rejected Carson’s requirement that court costs must be “necessary” and 

“incidental” to the trial of a criminal case, recognizing that the criminal justice 

system has greatly evolved in the 73 years since Carson was decided. Peraza, 

467 S.W.3d at 517. As the court noted, 

Our legislature has developed statutorily prescribed court costs with 

the intention of reimbursing the judicial system for costs incurred in 

the administration of the criminal justice system. To require such 

costs to be “necessary” or “incidental” to the trial of a criminal case in 

order to be constitutionally valid ignores the legitimacy of costs that, 

although not necessary to, or an incidental expense of, the actual 

trial of a criminal case, may nevertheless be directly related to the 

recoupment of costs of judicial resources expended in connection 

with the prosecution of criminal cases within our criminal justice 

system.

Id. Thus, so long as a statute provides for an allocation of court costs to be 

expended for “legitimate criminal justice purposes,” then the statute will not be 
8

held to be unconstitutional. Id. The court decided that allocations of funds 

collected pursuant to Article 102.020 allow for such funds to be expended for 

legitimate criminal justice purposes and as such do not operate as an 

unconstitutional tax. Id. at 521. 

Despite Appellant’s argument that Peraza was wrongly decided, we do not 

have discretion to reject the holdings of the court of criminal appeals. See State 

ex rel. Vance v. Clawson, 465 S.W.2d 164, 168 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 

404 U.S. 910 (1971); Crenshaw v. State, 424 S.W.3d 753, 755 (Tex. App.—Fort 

Worth 2014, no pet.). We therefore overrule Appellant’s second and third points. 

See Machado v. State, No. 02-15-00365-CR, 2016 WL 3962731, at *4 (Tex. 

App.—Fort Worth July 21, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for 

publication) (rejecting facial challenge to articles 102.020 and 102.0186 and 

argument that Peraza was wrongly decided). 

III. Constitutionality of Appellant’s life sentence

Appellant’s fourth point is initially broadly stated, “The sentence imposed 

on Appellant is violative of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and 

unusual sentences.” However, Appellant’s argument focuses on a challenge to 

the trial court’s decision to overrule his objection to the jury charge on the basis 

that the statutory scheme disallowing parole eligibility is facially unconstitutional. 

During the charge conference in the trial court, Appellant’s counsel lodged 

a single objection to the charge:
9

Judge, we object to the charge based on the charged offense 

and the range of punishment. The range of punishment in this case 

is 25 to life without the possibility of parole. You understand, we 

understand that’s day for day. 

In comparison, the offense of murder if convicted carries a 

range of five years to 99 years or life. And it does include the 

possibility of parole after an individual has served half their 

sentence. When comparing those two, just as an example, the 

range of punishment for this offense violates the Eight Amendment 

to the US Constitution and its state analogs, and we would object to 

the charge based upon that argument. 

Appellant did not object at the time he was sentenced or include his objection in 

his motion for new trial. 

In his brief to this Court, Appellant refers us to his objection to the jury 

charge and argues that, because the jury charge authorized a punishment “which 

was more severe than that possible for a conviction for murder,” the available 

punishment was disproportionate and a violation of the prohibition against cruel 

and unusual punishment. Appellant further argues that the “categorical denial” of 

parole permitted by section 508.145(a) of the government code is 

“disproportionate to any similar sentence that could be imposed for the more 

serious homicide offense of murder of a child, where the offender would be 

eligible for parole.” 

We interpret Appellant’s complaint as a facial challenge to the 

constitutionality of section 508.145(a) of the government code. Tex. Gov’t Code 

Ann. § 508.145(a) (West Supp. 2016). At the time he made his objection to the 

jury charge, section 508.145 had not been applied to his detriment. By failing to 
10

object to the sentence at the time it was applied at pronouncement or through his 

motion for new trial, Appellant has not preserved an objection to the application 

of section 508.145(a) against him—an “as applied” challenge to the 

constitutionality of the statute. See, e.g., Gillenwaters v. State, 205 S.W.3d 534, 

537–38 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (holding that appellant, who had preserved facial 

challenge to statute through motion to quash indictment, had also preserved an 

“as applied” challenge to statute through his motion for new trial). 

To prevail on a facial challenge to a statute, a party must establish that the 

statute always operates unconstitutionally in all possible circumstances. 

Rosseau, 396 S.W.3d at 557. Because of this, the court of criminal appeals has 

observed that “[a] facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult challenge to 

mount successfully.” Santikos v. State, 836 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 

1992). In analyzing a constitutional challenge to a statute, we begin with the 

presumption that the statute is valid and that the Legislature did not act arbitrarily 

or unreasonably in enacting it. Rodriguez v. State, 93 S.W.3d 60, 69 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2002). As the individual challenging the statute, it is Appellant’s burden to 

establish its unconstitutionality. State ex rel Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 911 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

The offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child is a felony of the first 

degree, with a sentencing range of 25 to 99 years, or life. Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 21.02(h). Section 508.145 of the government code further provides that an 

inmate serving a sentence for the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child 
11

is not eligible for release on parole. Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 508.145(a). But 

section 508.145 is not limited to life sentences, nor to the offense of continuous 

sexual abuse of a child. Section 508.145(a) provides: 

An inmate under sentence of death, serving a sentence of life 

imprisonment without parole, serving a sentence for an offense 

under Section 21.02, Penal Code, or serving a sentence for an 

offense under Section 22.021, Penal Code, that is punishable under 

Subsection (f)8 of that section is not eligible for release on parole. 

Thus, in order to successfully challenge section 508.145 as facially 

unconstitutional, Appellant would have to show that it is unconstitutional in its 

application to an inmate serving a death sentence, an inmate serving a sentence 

of life without parole, an inmate serving any sentence for continuous sexual 

abuse of a child—not just a life sentence, and an inmate serving any sentence 

for aggravated sexual assault of a child. See Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 908 (“A party 

raising a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute must demonstrate 

that the statute operates unconstitutionally in all of its applications.”). Appellant 

has not attempted to do that, instead limiting his argument to the situation in 

which an individual receives a life sentence for continuous sexual abuse of a 

child. We therefore overrule Appellant’s fourth point. 

 

8This is the offense of aggravated sexual assault committed against a 

child. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.021(f) (West Supp. 2016). 
12

Conclusion

Having overruled Appellant’s points, we affirm the judgment of the trial 

court. 

/s/ Bonnie Sudderth

BONNIE SUDDERTH

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and SUDDERTH, JJ.

DAUPHINOT, J., filed a concurring opinion.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: August 25, 2016