NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JENNIFER B., Appellant,

v.

JESSE E., J.E., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 21-0011 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS20446

The Honorable Virginia L. Richter, Judge Pro Tempore (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Jamie R. Heller

Counsel for Appellant

FILED 9-9-2021
JENNIFER B. v. JESSE E., J.E.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Randall M. Howe delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Michael J. Brown joined.

H O W E, Judge:

¶1 Jennifer B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to J.E. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother gave birth to J.E. in August 2014. When J.E. was eight 

months old, Jesse E. (“Father”) petitioned for paternity, and the court found 

that he was J.E.’s father. The court also granted Father sole legal 

decision-making authority but ordered the parents to share parenting time.

¶3 In December 2017, Mother’s adult brother inappropriately 

held J.E. down on a bed and licked her stomach while in Mother’s care.

Father sought an order of protection against Mother’s brother and 

petitioned to modify parenting time. Mother and Father agreed that Father 

would become J.E.’s primary residential parent and continue to have sole 

legal decision-making authority. According to the agreement, Mother’s 

parenting time would not begin until she had a working phone, and the 

parenting time would be subject to all existing child support orders, 

including the order of protection against Mother’s brother. Father also 

contacted the Department of Child Services to investigate Mother’s failure 

to protect J.E. The Department could not finish the investigation, however, 

because it could not find Mother.

¶4 Two years later, Father petitioned to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights, asserting that she had abandoned J.E. by having no contact 

with her since December 22, 2017, and that Father’s wife wanted to adopt 

J.E. The court appointed a guardian ad litem for J.E. Initially, Mother could 

not be served with the petition because she could not be located, but Father 

eventually found her through the mobile application “Hangout.” During 

the pendency of the termination action, Mother contacted J.E. twice, but in 

both instances J.E. refused to communicate with her.
JENNIFER B. v. JESSE E., J.E.

Decision of the Court

3

¶5 The court held a contested termination hearing in October 

2020. The parties agreed to forego testimony and to have the court 

determine the matter on the information in the petition, Father’s disclosure, 

and attorney avowals. Father argued that Mother had abandoned J.E. by 

having no contact with her during 2018, 2019, and the majority of 2020, and 

by providing no financial support. He also argued that termination was in 

J.E.’s best interests because she did not want a relationship with Mother and

had developed a parent-child relationship with his wife, who wanted to 

adopt J.E.

¶6 J.E.’s guardian ad litem argued that Father proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that Mother had abandoned the child by showing 

that Mother had not participated in the child’s life for over two years. He 

further argued that the preponderance of the evidence showed a benefit to 

the termination of the parent-child relationship because J.E. could be 

adopted by Father’s wife and a detriment to continuing the parent-child 

relationship with Mother because J.E. would be at risk of abuse or neglect 

in Mother’s care.

¶7 Mother argued that although she did not seek new orders or 

enforce her visitation rights in court, Father prohibited her access to J.E. by 

unfriending her on Facebook and ignoring her e-mails and phone calls. She 

also argued that the termination was not in J.E.’s best interests.

¶8 The court found that Father proved the grounds of 

abandonment. The court found that Mother had failed to “maintain a 

normal parental relationship” with J.E. by not contacting her since 

December of 2017, not providing her any financial support, not 

communicating with her, and not giving her any cards, letters, or gifts 

despite having a court order that provided her with parenting time. The 

court further found that the preponderance of the evidence showed that 

termination was in J.E.’s best interest because it allowed her to be adopted 

by Father’s wife. Mother timely appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her

parental relationship with J.E. and finding that termination was in J.E.’s best 

interests. We review a juvenile court’s termination order for an abuse of 

discretion. E.R. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 56, 58 ¶ 9 (App. 2015). We 

will affirm an order terminating parental rights so long as reasonable 

evidence supports the order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 

86, 93 ¶ 18 (App. 2009). 
JENNIFER B. v. JESSE E., J.E.

Decision of the Court

4

¶10 To terminate parental rights, a court must find by clear and 

convincing evidence that at least one statutory ground in A.R.S. § 8–533 has 

been proved and must find by a preponderance of the evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. Jennifer S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

240 Ariz. 282, 286 ¶ 15 (App. 2016). “The juvenile court, as the trier of fact 

in a termination proceeding, is in the best position to weigh the evidence, 

observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make 

appropriate findings.” Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280 

¶ 4 (App. 2002).

¶11 The juvenile court may terminate parental rights when a 

“parent has abandoned the child.” A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(1). “Abandonment” 

means

the failure of a parent to provide reasonable support and to 

maintain regular contact with the child, including providing 

normal supervision. Abandonment includes a judicial finding 

that a parent has made only minimal efforts to support and 

communicate with the child. Failure to maintain a normal 

parental relationship with the child without just cause for a 

period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence of 

abandonment.

A.R.S. § 8–531(1). A parent’s conduct, not a parent’s subjective intent, 

determines abandonment. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 

249 ¶ 18 (2000). When traditional means of bonding with a child are 

unavailable, a parent must act persistently to establish or maintain the 

relationship and must vigorously assert her legal rights “at the first and 

every opportunity.” Id. at 251 ¶ 25.

¶12 Reasonable evidence supports termination of Mother’s 

parental rights based on abandonment. Mother had no contact with J.E. 

from December of 2017 until September of 2020, a month before the 

severance hearing. Mother provided no record of e-mails to Father, phone 

calls to Father, or evidence of letters, gifts, or cards that she sent to J.E. The 

court did not err in finding that Father had proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that Mother had abandoned J.E.

¶13 Mother nonetheless argues that in its termination order, the 

juvenile court failed to set forth the standard of proof that it used to find 

abandonment. Appellate courts presume, however, that the juvenile court 

knows the law and applies the correct standard. See Hart v. Hart, 220 Ariz. 

183, 188 ¶ 18 (App. 2009). The presumption may be rebutted only by record 
JENNIFER B. v. JESSE E., J.E.

Decision of the Court

5

evidence. Id.; see also Brewer v. Peterson, 9 Ariz. App. 455, 458 (App. 1969) 

(“The controlling law, as we see it, is that an appellate court must assume 

that the [juvenile] court did no wrong, in the absence of a showing to the 

contrary.”). The record does not indicate that the court applied an incorrect 

standard and Mother has therefore failed to rebut the presumption that the 

court applied a clear and convincing standard in finding that Father proved 

the grounds for abandonment. See Hart, 220 Ariz. at 188 ¶ 18.

¶14 Mother next argues that reasonable evidence does not 

support the court’s finding of abandonment. In particular, she argues that 

the court erred in finding that she had no contact with J.E. since December 

2017 or that she had not communicated with J.E. or provided letters, cards, 

or gifts. She claims that Father’s disclosure demonstrated that she had 

telephone contact with J.E. twice in September 2020. A prima facie case of 

abandonment, however, requires only a showing of a lack of contact, 

including letters, cards, or gifts, for a period of six months. A.R.S. 

§ 8–533(B)(1). While Mother called J.E. twice in September 2020, she

provides no other evidence of contact with J.E. for the two and a half years 

leading up to the contested hearing and therefore has not rebutted the 

prima facie grounds of abandonment. See A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(1).

¶15 Mother further claims that Father’s statement that J.E. did not 

want to talk to her showed that she had contacted J.E. more than just in 

September 2020. But on appeal, courts do not reweigh the evidence, direct 

or inferential, presented to the juvenile court, see Clark v. Kreamer, 243 Ariz. 

272, 276 ¶ 14 (App. 2017), and we refuse to do so here. Mother’s argument 

that reasonable evidence does not support the juvenile court’s conclusion is 

therefore unavailing. 

¶16 Relying on Calvin B. v. Brittany B., 232 Ariz. 292 (App. 2013),

Mother also argues that Father inappropriately impeded her ability to have 

a parent-child relationship with J.E. because he unfriended her on Facebook 

and ignored her phone calls and messages. 232 Ariz. 292 (App. 2013). “A 

parent may not restrict the other parent from interacting with their child 

and then petition to terminate the latter’s rights for abandonment.” Id. at 

297 ¶ 21. In Calvin B., the father attempted to exercise his parental rights by 

contacting the mother’s parents, filing various pleadings in the family 

court, completing a required parenting course, and texting the mother 

multiple times. Id. at 294–95 ¶¶ 3, 5–6, 8. This court found that the father 

had “actively sought more involvement” with his son than the mother 

would allow. Id. at 297 ¶ 22. Here, however, Mother concedes that she has 

not attempted to exercise her parental rights through available court 

proceedings and provided no evidence that she ever called or e-mailed J.E. 
JENNIFER B. v. JESSE E., J.E.

Decision of the Court

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The record does not support Mother’s argument that Father 

inappropriately restricted her from contacting J.E. 

¶17 For her last argument, Mother claims that termination of her 

parental rights was not in J.E.’s best interests. Termination of parental rights 

is in a child’s best interests if the child will benefit from the termination or 

will be harmed if the relationship continues. Alma S. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 

245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 13 (2018). In determining whether the child will benefit 

from termination, relevant factors are whether the current placement is 

meeting the child’s needs, an adoption plan is in place, and if the child is 

adoptable. Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 239 Ariz. 1, 3–4 ¶ 12 (2016).

¶18 Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding 

that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in J.E.’s best interests. 

Mother has had virtually no contact with J.E. for more than two years and 

has provided no non-contact support in the form of letters, gifts, cards, or 

financial support throughout that period. Conversely, J.E. has formed a 

bond with Father’s wife that is akin to a parent-child relationship. 

Termination would allow Father’s wife to adopt J.E., providing stable and 

permanent care for J.E. Substantial evidence therefore supports the juvenile

court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights would 

benefit J.E. Mother’s argument to the contrary only asks this court to 

reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151–

52 ¶¶ 18–19.

CONCLUSION

¶19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.