ARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

I 

Supcemc Cowl Buildin 

c 

. 0. Box 12545 

wstin. TX. 79711 

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I An Equal Opporlunilyf 

Affirmative AclMn Employer 

I 

I 

The Attorney General of Texas 

January 12, 1982 

Honorable Harold Lerev 

Wichita County Attorney 

County Courthouse 

Wichita Falls. Texas 76301 

Opinion No. Ml-422 

Re: tlcanlng of “convictlonn 

in section 9(b)(3) of article 

2372p-3. V.T.C.S., prior to 

1981 amendment 

Dear Mr. Lerev: 

You have asked about the meaning of the term “conviction” as used 

in section 9(b)(3) of article 2372p-3. V.T.C.S.. prior to its 

amendment effective October 31, 1981. 

Prior to the recent amendment of article 2372p-3, section 9(b)(3) 

read as follows: 

(b) Any license may be suspended or revoked 

by the [County Bail Bond] Board for:- 

. . . 

or 

(3) o~hw$tlon under the laws of this . 

any state or of the federal 

government of a misdemeanor Involving moral 

turpitude or of a felony.... (Rmphasis 

added). 

The Sixty-seventh Legislature extensively revised article 2372p-3. 

Section 9(b)(3) remains the same. however, except the amendment 

changed the wording of section 9(b)(3) so that it now reads “final 

conviction” instead of merely “convictlon”. Acts 1981, 67th Leg., ch. 

312, 51 at 882. It is our opinion that the vord “conviction” as used 

in section 9(b)(3) of article 2372p-3 prior to the amendment thereto 

referred to a “final convlction” and that the’ recent addition of the 

word “f Inal” merely.. ‘clarified the matter; it did not work a 

substantive change. See Attorney General Opinion O-1894 (1939). 

“Final convlcclon” means conviction from which all rights of direct 

appeal have been exhausted. See Allen V. Texas Departient of Public 

Safety, 411 S.W.Zd 644 (Tex. C! App. - Texarkana 1966. no wrlt). 

p. 1437 
honorable Harold Lerev - Page 2 (UW-422) 

The revocation of a bail bondsman license by a county beil bond 

board is judicial in nature. Travis County Bail Bond Board v. Smith. 

331 S.W.Zd 236 (Tex. Civ. App. - Waco 1975. ‘no vrit). See Bcxar 

County Bail Bond Board v. Deckard. 604 S.W.Zd 214 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

San Antonio 1980. no wit). Unlike the failure or refusal of the 

board to ~ a license, the revocetion or suspension of a bondsman’s 

license may involve the loss of a property right protected under the 

due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Sea U.S. 

Const. Amend. 14; Tex. Const. art. I, 119; 10 Tex. Jur. 3d. iiiiness 

and Occupation Licenses SlS. Cf. Smith v. Travis County Ball Bond 

Board, 559 S.W.2d 693 (Tex. Cx App. - Austin 1977, writ ref’d 

n.r.c.1 (denial of license). The question of whether the revocation 

or suspension of such a ‘license for other than a final conviction 

would violete due process need not be sddressed, hovever, inasmuch as 

section 9(b)(3) of the statute alvays contemplated a final conviction, 

in our opinion. 

Similar language was contained in the old Liquor Control Act, 

article 667-S. Penal Code of 1925. vhen it was considered by Attorney 

General Gerald Mann In Attorney General Opinion O-1894 (1940). It 

required the county judge to refuse a license application if the 

applicant had been “convicted of a felony” within two years. Attorney 

General Mann concluded that under a statute like article 44.11 of the 

current Code of Criminal Procedure (vhich suspends and arrests the 

trial court’s judgment until the appellate court has rendered judgment 

and returned its mandate), the term “convicted of a felony” as used in 

a statute such as the one under consideration meant a “final 

conviction.” Thereafter, the legislature amended the statute to 

expressly require such refusal only if the applicant had been “finally 

convicted.” See Acts 1953, S3rd Leg., R.S.. ch. 249 at 643. As 

brought forwardin the 1977 Alcoholic Beverage Code. the provision now 

appears in section 61.43(l) of the code. Cf. V.T.C.S., art. 6252-13~ 

(revocation or suspension of licenses for prior criminal convictions). 

The situation here is analogous , and we reach a similar conclusion. 

We note that the vords “after conviction,” as used in article IV, 

sections 11 and 11-A of the constitution respecting the gubernatorial 

pardoning power. do not mean a final conviction in the sense that a 

mandate of affirmance has been issued by the court of criminal 

appeals, or that no appeal has been taken. See NcNew v. Stste. 608 

S.W.Zd 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Ex partexles. SO2 S.W.Zd 774 

(Tex. Grim. App. 1973); Duke v. State, 291 S.W. 541.(Tex. Crim. 1927). 

Nevertheless. it has been the law in Texas for many years that e 

person Is not Ed “‘convict” in the sense that the penalties, of 

conviction can be visited upon him until the judgment against him has 

become final. See Arcia v. Stare. 9 S.W. 685 (Tax. App. 1888. no 

writ). We do notthink it was the purpose of the legislature. when 

enacting section 9(b)(3) in its original form, to authorize the 

_ penalizing of a person found guilty by a jury regardless of whether 

p. 1638 : 
Honorable Harold Lcrcv - Page 3 (XW-622) 

the verdict was later overturned. See Code Crim. Proc.. art. 66.11 

(effect of appeal); State v. Klein, m S.W.Zd 250 (Tex. Crim. 1969). 

Cf. Woodmen of the World v. Dodd, 136 S.W. 256 (Tex. Clv. App. 1911, 

Twit) (avoidance of insurance policy).. 

SUMMARY 

The placement of the vord “final” before the 

word “conviction” in section 9(b)(3) of article 

2372p-3, as amended. did not vork a substantive 

change in the grounds for revocation or suspension 

of a bail bondsman’s license. but merely clarified 

the prior law. 

3ARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

RICHARD E. GRAY III 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Bruce Youngblood 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED : 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

Susan L. Garrison. Chairman 

Jon Bible 

Rick Gilpin 

W. Reed Lockhoof 

Jim Iloellinger 

Bruce Youngblood 

p. .1639