[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-13927

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:13-cv-00006-RS-GRJ

PRESTON SHANE ALLEN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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(August 21, 2014)

Before ROSENBAUM, FAY, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM: 

In this prison conditions case that focuses on the conduct of correctional 

officers, Preston Shane Allen, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the 

district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action for failure to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

 

Reversible error has been shown; we affirm the judgment in part and vacate in 

part; and remand the case for further proceedings. 

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under section 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), accepting the allegations in the complaint as true. Douglas v. 

Yates, 535 F.3d 1316, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2008). “[A] complaint must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible 

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Id. We construe liberally pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 

F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). 

 1 In addition to challenging the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a 

claim, Allen raises three other issues on appeal: (1) the district court failed to give proper 

consideration to Allen’s pro se status; (2) the district court erred in denying Allen’s request for 

class action certification; and (3) the magistrate judge and the district court erred in failing to 

recuse themselves. These arguments are without merit. 

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Briefly stated, Allen alleges that Defendant correctional officers conspired 

together and, on two specific occasions, retaliated against him for filing grievances 

about the conditions of his confinement. In the first instance, Allen alleges that 

Defendant Officer Spradley placed Allen in administrative confinement and that 

Defendant Sgt. Cook issued Allen a fraudulent disciplinary report in retaliation for 

Allen’s grievances against Defendants Sgt. Thompson and Officer Richardson. 

Allen alleges that, at the resulting disciplinary hearing (“February disciplinary 

hearing”), he was not permitted to call witnesses on his behalf. Following the 

hearing, Allen was placed into administrative confinement.2

 

About the second occasion, Allen contends that Defendant Sgt. Eldridge 

issued him a disciplinary report after Allen filed a grievance against Sgt. Lambert 

(female). Following a disciplinary hearing (“June disciplinary hearing”), where 

Allen was again denied the opportunity to call witnesses, Allen was found guilty of 

the charged offense and was placed in disciplinary confinement. Allen alleges that 

an officer later admitted to Allen that he, Sgt. Eldridge, Sgt. Lambert (male), and 

Sgt. Lambert (female) had conspired to place Allen in confinement in retaliation 

for Allen’s filing a grievance against Sgt. Lambert (female). 

 2 The operative third amended complaint does not indicate the outcome of Allen’s February 

disciplinary hearing, but in Allen’s second amended complaint, he alleges that he “won” the 

hearing. 

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Construed liberally, Allen’s third amended complaint touches on two 

constitutional assertions: (1) that Defendants violated his due process rights under 

the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) that Defendants retaliated against him for 

exercising his First Amendment rights.3

 

I. Due Process Claim:

Allen alleges that Defendants violated his due process rights when they 

failed to speak to or ensure the appearance of Allen’s witnesses at Allen’s two 

disciplinary hearings. 

The Supreme Court has recognized two instances in which a prisoner may 

be deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, such that due process is 

required: (1) “when a change in the prisoner’s conditions of confinement is so 

severe that it essentially exceeds the sentence imposed by the court”; and (2) 

“when the state has consistently bestowed a certain benefit to prisoners . . . and the 

 3 Allen also alleges that, while he was in confinement, Defendants seized his personal property in 

violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. We reject this claim. Prisoners have no 

reasonable expectation of privacy and, thus, no Fourth Amendment protection against 

unreasonable searches of their prison cells. See Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 3200 (1984). 

Moreover, “an unauthorized deprivation of property by a state employee does not constitute a 

violation of procedural requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if 

a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” Id. at 3204. Because, under 

Florida law, Defendants could be held liable for conversion for the alleged unlawful seizure of 

Allen’s personal property, Allen has access to an adequate postdeprivation remedy and has 

alleged no due process violation. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009). 

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deprivation of that benefit ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate 

in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 

1285, 1291 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2300 

(1995)). When a prisoner’s due process rights are triggered, he is entitled to, 

among other things, an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary 

evidence at a disciplinary hearing. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2979-

80 (1974).

Allen has alleged no deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty 

interest. Although Allen alleges that he was placed in administrative and 

disciplinary confinement in connection with his two disciplinary hearings, he has 

not alleged that the conditions of such confinement presented “the type of atypical, 

significant deprivation” that creates a liberty interest. See Sandin, 115 S.Ct. at 

2300-01 (30-days in segregated disciplinary confinement did not trigger due 

process protection where the conditions of disciplinary segregation were not 

significantly different from the conditions outside disciplinary segregation). Nor 

has Allen alleged that he lost good time credits as a result of his disciplinary 

proceedings. See Wolff, 94 S.Ct. at 2975 (prisoners have a constitutionally 

protected liberty interest in state-created right to good time credits). And, to the 

extent that Allen alleges that the mishandling of grievance procedures violated his 

due process rights, prisoners have no constitutionally protected liberty interest in 

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having access to prison grievance procedures. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 

1171, 1177 (11th Cir. 2011). Because Allen has alleged no constitutionally 

protected liberty interest, he has failed to state a claim for due process violation 

under the Fourteenth Amendment. 

II. First Amendment Retaliation Claim:

Prison officials are forbidden by the First Amendment from retaliating 

against prisoners for filing grievances complaining about the conditions of 

confinement. O’Bryant v. Finch, 637 F.3d 1207, 1212 (11th Cir. 2011). To state a 

claim for retaliation, a prisoner must allege that “(1) his speech was 

constitutionally protected; (2) the inmate suffered adverse action such that the 

[official’s] allegedly retaliatory conduct would likely deter a person of ordinary 

firmness from engaging in such speech; and (3) there is a causal relationship 

between the retaliatory action [the disciplinary punishment] and the protected 

speech [the grievance].”4

 Id. (alterations in original). For the third element, a 

prisoner must allege facts showing that the alleged retaliatory conduct would not 

have occurred but for the retaliatory motive. Id. at 1217. We have said that a 

 4 The parties do not dispute that Allen has satisfied the first two elements. The only issue on 

appeal is whether Allen alleged sufficiently a causal relationship between Defendants’ retaliatory 

acts and Allen’s protected speech. 

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prisoner “cannot state a claim of retaliation for a disciplinary charge involving a 

prison rule infraction when the inmate was found guilty of the actual behavior 

underlying that charge after being afforded adequate due process.” Id. at 1215. 

In rejecting Allen’s retaliation claims, the district court concluded that Allen 

failed to state a claim for retaliation because (1) he was in fact found guilty of a 

disciplinary violation and (2) he failed to allege facts demonstrating a causal 

connection between his grievances and Defendants’ disciplinary conduct. 

We agree that, because Allen failed to allege a due process violation at his 

June disciplinary hearing, and because Allen concedes that he was found guilty of 

the charged offense at his June disciplinary hearing, he cannot state a claim for 

retaliation based on that incident. See id. 

The district court erred, however, in dismissing Allen’s retaliation claim 

based on his February disciplinary hearing. First, Allen does not allege -- and 

nothing evidences -- that he was found guilty of a disciplinary offense at his 

February disciplinary hearing. Thus, Allen is not foreclosed from stating a 

retaliation claim by our decision in O’Bryant. Second, construing the complaint 

liberally and accepting Allen’s allegations as true, Allen has alleged sufficiently 

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that Defendants conspired with one another to retaliate against Allen for filing 

grievances.5

 

To state a claim for conspiracy, a complaint must contain more than just 

vague and conclusory accusations. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 

1955, 1964-65 (2007); Fullman v. Graddick, 739 F.2d 553, 556-57 (11th Cir. 

1984). “It is not enough to simply aver in the complaint that a conspiracy existed.” 

Fullman, 739 F.2d at 557. Instead, the complaint must contain “enough factual 

matter (taken as true) to suggest than an [illegal] agreement was made.” Twombly, 

127 S.Ct. at 1965. “Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not 

impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough 

facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal 

agreement.” Id. Moreover, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it 

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.” Id. 

In this case, Allen has not just alleged broadly that a conspiracy existed 

between Defendants. Instead, Allen contends specifically that “[D]efendants are 

 5 We construe Allen’s complaint -- which contends that Defendants engaged in a pattern of 

conspiring against prisoners who file grievances -- as alleging facts sufficient to assert the 

existence of a single conspiracy among all seven Defendants, involving two specific instances of 

that conspiracy acting to retaliate against Allen. Thus, although we have determined that the 

events surrounding Allen’s June disciplinary hearing are not actionable, we believe Allen has 

stated a plausible claim for liability against all Defendants as participants in a single conspiracy 

responsible for the February disciplinary hearing. We cannot say, at this early stage in the 

proceedings, whether the evidence will demonstrate ultimately the existence of a single 

conspiracy (responsible for both the February and June disciplinary hearings), multiple 

conspiracies (one conspiracy, with its own members, involving just the February incident and a 

separate conspiracy, with other members, involving just the June incident), or no conspiracy at 

all. 

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either family to one another, drinking buddies, hunting buddies, and all are 

members of a Department of Corrections brotherhood [something like a gang] and 

has pledged [for all to hear] that they will protect one another no matter what it 

takes.” As further evidence of the alleged conspiracy among Defendants, Allen 

contends that Officer Canon told Allen expressly that “Sgt. Lambert’s husband 

asked Officer Canon and Sgt. Eldridge to do him a favor since they are friends and 

hunting buddies” and to have Allen placed in confinement in retaliation for filing a 

grievance against Sgt. Lambert (female).6

 Based on these fact-specific allegations, 

we believe Allen’s complaint contains sufficient facts to suggest plausibly that 

Defendants entered into an illegal agreement. Because Allen has stated a claim for 

conspiracy among Defendants that is plausible on its face, he has alleged 

sufficiently a causal connection between his protected speech and Defendants’ 

alleged retaliatory acts. 

To the extent that the district court dismissed, for failure to state a claim, 

Allen’s retaliation claim based on the events surrounding Allen’s February 

discipline hearing, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART; AND REMANDED.

 6 Although Allen cannot state a claim for retaliation based on the events surrounding his June 

disciplinary hearing, Allen’s factual allegations about that alleged retaliatory incident are still 

pertinent (showing intent, plan, motive) to his claim that Defendants participated in a single 

conspiracy to retaliate against him for filing grievances against other members of the alleged 

“brotherhood.” 

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