Filed 6/29/22 P. v. Edwards CA4/1

Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CLIFF EDWARDS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D076088

 (Super. Ct. No. SCD280337)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Robert O’Neill, Judge. Prior opinion vacated. Affirmed in part; sentence 

vacated and remanded with directions.

Shaghayegh Dinata-Hanson, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 

Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Lance E Winters, 

Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland and Charles C. Ragland, 

Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel and Stephanie H. Chow, 

Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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In May 2019, appellant and defendant Cliff Edwards pleaded guilty to 

one count of first degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 §§ 211, 212.5), stipulating that 

he “entered an inhabited dwelling and took property from the immediate 

possession of another by force or fear.” Edwards admitted he suffered a prior 

strike conviction (§§ 667, subd. (b)-(i), 1170.12, 668), as well as two prior 

prison convictions (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668). He stipulated to a 10-year prison 

term: the four-year midterm doubled for the strike conviction plus two oneyear enhancements for his prior prison convictions. Following Edwards’s 

guilty plea, the Legislature limited application of prior prison term sentence 

enhancements to terms for sexually violent offenses. This court held the law 

applied retroactively to cases not yet final on appeal. (People v. Keene (2019) 

43 Cal.App.5th 861, 865; People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681-

682.)

Edwards appealed and asked this court to strike his one-year 

enhancements as a result of Senate Bill No. 136, which amended section 

667.5, subdivision (b). He further contended the superior court violated his 

due process rights by imposing assessments, fines and fees without first 

determining his ability to pay them. We remanded the matter with 

directions that the court strike the prison term enhancements, but directed it 

pursuant to People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685 to allow the prosecution an 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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opportunity to withdraw prior approval of the plea agreement.2 We 

otherwise affirmed the judgment.

In February 2021, the California Supreme Court granted Edwards’s 

petition for review and deferred action pending consideration and disposition 

of a related issue in People v. Hernandez (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 942 (review 

granted January 27, 2021, S265739, cause transferred December 22, 2021,

with directions to vacate decision and reconsider the matter in light of Senate

Bill No. 483). 

In March 2022, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter 

for this court to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of the 

enactment of Senate Bill No. 483 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.), which added 

sections 1171 and 1171.1 to the Penal Code (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1). We 

invited the parties to provide supplemental briefing on application of that 

law. The People argue Edwards is not entitled to remand because the 

Legislature created a procedure and timeline for relief within section 1171.1

that controls. They maintain Edwards’s case will be referred to the trial 

court by July 1, 2022, and resolved by December 31, 2023, and thus remand 

2 We held Stamps warranted this result. The California Supreme Court

in Stamps addressed a defendant’s remedy in a situation when recent 

changes to the law—a grant of new trial court discretion under section 1385 

to dismiss previously mandatory enhancements—impacted his or her plea 

with a stipulated term. (People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 705-709.) 

Stamps stated: “If the court indicates an inclination to exercise its discretion 

[to strike an enhancement] under section 1385, the prosecution may, of 

course, agree to modify the bargain to reflect the downward departure in the 

sentence such exercise would entail. Barring such a modification agreement, 

‘the prosecutor is entitled to the same remedy as the defendant—withdrawal 

of assent to the plea agreement . . . .’ [Citation.] [¶] Further, the court may 

withdraw its prior approval of the plea agreement. The court’s authority to 

withdraw its approval of a plea agreement has been described as ‘nearplenary.’ ” (Id. at pp. 707-708.)
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for resentencing is not required at this time. Edwards argues that because 

his enhancements are now legally invalid, his sentence is subject to 

correction any time, and judicial economy favors a remand now for 

resentencing in accordance with section 1171.1. For reasons explained below, 

we will remand the matter for resentencing under section 1171.1.

DISCUSSION

I. Edwards’s Prior Prison Term Enhancements

While Edwards’s appeal was pending review, the Legislature passed 

and the Governor approved Senate Bill No. 483, which became effective 

January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1; Cal. Bill Tracking Rep. (Dec. 2, 

2021).) The bill added section 1171.1, subdivision (a), which invalidates any 

enhancement under former section 667.5, subdivision (b) that was imposed 

prior to January 1, 2020, except for enhancements imposed for prior sexually 

violent offense convictions. (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; see People v. Flores

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 420, 443, review granted June 22, 2022, S274561.) 

Section 1171.1 requires recall of the sentence and resentencing, and among 

other requirements provides: “Resentencing pursuant to this section shall 

result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the 

elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and 

convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public 

safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a longer 

sentence than the one originally imposed.” (§ 1171.1, subd. (d)(1).) Senate 

Bill No. 483 contains an express statement of intent as to sentences 

negotiated as part of plea agreements: “It is the intent of the Legislature 

that any changes to a sentence as a result of the act that added this section 

shall not be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.” 

(Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.) 
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Section 1171.1 contains procedures and deadlines for recall of the 

sentences and resentencing of all eligible persons in custody. (§ 1171.1,

subds. (b), (c).) It mandates the Secretary of the Department of Corrections 

and Rehabilitation and the county correctional administrator of each county 

to identify and report to the sentencing court all persons in their custody 

currently serving a term for a judgment having a former section 667.5,

subdivision (b) enhancement. (§ 1171.1, subd. (b).) For those persons who 

have served their base term as well as any other sentencing enhancements 

and are currently serving the section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancement, the 

information was to be provided by March 1, 2022. (§ 1171.1, subd. (b)(1).) 

For all other defendants, the information must be provided by July 1, 2022.

(§ 1171.1, subd. (b)(2).)

The sentencing courts are to verify that the current judgment includes 

a now-invalid enhancement, and if so, recall the sentence and resentence the

defendant. (§ 1171.1, subd. (c).) For the first group of defendants, review and 

resentencing must be completed by October 1, 2022; it must be completed by 

December 31, 2023, for all other eligible defendants. (§ 1171.1, subd. (c)(1),

(2).) 

At the resentencing hearing, the court “shall apply the sentencing rules 

of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce 

sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of 

sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1171.1, subd. (d)(2).) 

It “may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the 

disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while 

incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished 

physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future 

violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since 
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the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the 

interest of justice.” (§ 1171.1, subd. (d)(3).) Further, “[u]nless the court 

originally imposed the upper term, the court may not impose a sentence 

exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation 

that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle 

term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been 

found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a 

court trial.” (§ 1171.1, subd. (d)(4).) The court must appoint counsel to 

represent the defendant at resentencing. (§ 1171.1, subd. (d)(5).) The parties 

may waive a resentencing hearing, or the hearing may be conducted remotely 

if the defendant agrees to use of that technology. (§ 1171.1, subd. (e).)

After the California Supreme Court transferred the matter, this court 

obtained supplemental briefing on the effect of Senate Bill No. 483. The 

People point to section 1171.1’s procedures and timelines for resentencing, 

and argue no remand is necessary at this point: “Given that [Edwards] is 

currently serving a lengthy term before the two prior prison term 

enhancements, under the bifurcated process adopted by the Legislature, he 

will be part of the second group to be considered for relief, not the first. 

[Edwards’s] case will be referred to the trial court by July 1, 2022, and 

resolved by December 31, 2023. Thus, while [Edwards] will eventually be 

provided relief under section 1171.1, remand for resentencing is not required 

at this time.” Edwards disagrees, stating Senate Bill No. 483 “does not state 

its mechanism is the exclusive remedy for relief . . . . And because the 

legislation is retroactive to [his] sentence, making his enhancements legally 

invalid, his sentence is subject to correction anytime it is raised before the 

court.” He maintains “judicial economy favors remand.” According to 

Edwards, “[t]he [attorney general’s] proposed remedy will result in a 
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remittitur closing the case. The [Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation] will then have to file paperwork to notify the court of 

Edwards’s illegal sentence, and the trial court will have to reopen the case, 

appoint counsel, and hold the hearing.” He argues “[r]emanding with 

instructions to follow the new law will be much more efficient and there is no 

chance the case will be missed by the [Department of Corrections and 

Rehabilitation].” He asks this court to remand for resentencing in accordance 

with section 1171.1. 

We are persuaded that the preferred course—one that preserves 

judicial economy and minimizes duplication of effort—is to remand for 

resentencing. Even assuming the People are correct that Edwards’s matter 

will be resolved by the end of 2023, the statute does not preclude courts from 

granting relief before that time. (§ 1171.1, subd. (c)(2).) If we were to do 

nothing at this point, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and 

trial court will have to verify Edwards as a defendant eligible for relief, which 

we have now done. Further, a court may correct an unauthorized sentence at 

any time, as long as the court has jurisdiction over the judgment as we do 

here. (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119, 1130; see People v. Moore (2021) 68 

Cal.App.5th 856, 865.) Accordingly, it is appropriate to remand the matter 

for resentencing consistent with section 1171.1. 

II. Imposition of Fines, Fees and Assessments

At the sentencing hearing, Edwards’s counsel asked the court to stay 

all fines and fees based on Edwards’s inability to pay them during his 10-year 

prison term. The trial court declined to do so and imposed on Edwards a 

court facilities assessment of $30 (Gov. Code, § 70373), a $40 court operations 

assessment (§ 1465.8), a $154 criminal justice administration fee (Gov. Code, 
8

§ 29550), a $41 theft fine (§ 1202.5) and a $3,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4). 

The court stayed an additional $3,000 restitution fine under section 1202.45. 

In his appeal from the judgment, Edwards relied on People v. Dueñas 

(2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 to assert the court violated his right to due 

process under the United States and California Constitutions by imposing 

these charges without holding a hearing on whether he had the present 

ability to pay them. He asked us to vacate the assessments and stay the 

fines, or alternatively remand the matter for the court to hold a hearing on 

his ability to pay. The California Supreme Court is presently considering 

whether courts must consider a defendant’s ability to pay before imposing or 

executing fines, fees and assessments and which party bears the burden of 

proof. (People v. Kopp (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 19, 

2019, S257844.) 

Because we vacate Edwards’s sentence and remand the matter for 

resentencing, we need not reach the merits of these arguments. Edwards will 

have an opportunity to challenge the fines, fees and assessments anew at 

that time. He may also raise the applicability, if any, of recent changes in the 

law, including regarding the criminal justice administration fee imposed 

under Government Code section 29550, subdivision (c) or (f). (Gov. Code, 

§ 6111;3 see People v. Lopez-Vinck (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 945, 953.)

3 Government Code section 6111 provides: “(a) On and after July 1, 

2021, the unpaid balance of any court-imposed costs pursuant to Section 

27712, subdivision (c) or (f) of Section 29550, and Sections 29550.1, 29550.2, 

and 29550.3, as those sections read on June 30, 2021, is unenforceable and 

uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those costs shall be 

vacated. [¶] (b) This section shall become operative on July 1, 2021.”
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DISPOSITION

We vacate our prior opinion in this matter. Edwards’s sentence is 

vacated and modified to strike the prior prison term enhancements. The 

matter is remanded for resentencing consistent with Penal Code section 

1171.1 and with this opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. 

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

DO, J.