COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Bray and Senior Judge Hodges 

SUNNYSIDE PRESBYTERIAN HOME 

AND 

HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS GROUP SELF-INS. ASSOC. 

v. Record No. 2284-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

PHYLLIS M. SHIFFLETT NOVEMBER 7, 1995 

 FROM THE VIRGINIA 

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on 

briefs), for appellants. 

 (Terry L. Armentrout; Roger Ritchie & Partners, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Sunnyside Presbyterian Home and its insurer (hereinafter 

collectively referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' 

Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) Phyllis M. 

Shifflett's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome constituted a 

"disease" as required for awarding compensation for an 

occupational disease; and (2) her carpal tunnel syndrome met the 

requirements under Code § 65.2-401 for a compensable ordinary 

disease of life. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 

5A:27. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 I. 

 The facts are not in dispute. Shifflett worked for employer 
 2 

as a certified nursing assistant for approximately nineteen 

years. In her job, she lifted, turned, and washed patients. In 

early 1991, she noticed symptoms of numbness in her hands and 

fingers. She did not seek medical treatment until February 1993. 

 At that time, she was examined by Dr. Glenn E. Deputy, a 

neurologist. On March 19, 1993, Dr. Deputy diagnosed bilateral 

carpal tunnel syndrome. He referred Shifflett to Dr. Galen G. 

Craun, Jr., an orthopedic surgeon. On April 27, 1993, Shifflett 

underwent carpal tunnel release surgery. Drs. Deputy and Craun 

opined that Shifflett's condition was caused by the repetitious 

use of her hands required in her employment. 

 We recently held in Perdue Farms, Inc. v. McCutchan, 21 Va. 

App. 65, 69, 461 S.E.2d 431, 433 (1995), that the general medical 

definition of carpal tunnel syndrome places it within the 

definition of disease set forth in Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 

Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769, 772 (1993). As in Perdue, 

Shifflett's condition did not present as an obvious, sudden, 

mechanical or structural change in her body. Based upon our 

holding in Perdue and upon the diagnoses of Drs. Deputy and 

Craun, we conclude that credible evidence supports the 

commission's finding that Shifflett's carpal tunnel syndrome is a 

condition characterized as a "disease" within the meaning of the 

Act. 

 II. 

 Furthermore, the commission did not err in treating 
 3 

Shifflett's disease as a compensable ordinary disease of life 

under Code § 65.2-401. For an ordinary disease of life to be 

treated as a compensable occupational disease, a claimant is 

required to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, to a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the disease arose 

out of and in the course of the employment; did not result from 

causes outside of the employment; is characteristic of the 

employment; and was caused by conditions peculiar to the 

employment. Id. 

 "Whether a disease is causally related to the employment and 

not causally related to other factors . . . is a finding of 

fact." Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 12, 365 

S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988). When there is credible evidence to 

support it, such a finding is "conclusive and binding" on this 

Court. Id. Moreover, "[a] question raised by conflicting 

medical opinion is a question of fact." Commonwealth v. Powell, 

2 Va. App. 712, 714, 347 S.E.2d 532, 533 (1986). 

 The medical records and reports of Drs. Deputy and Craun, 

the treating physicians, provide credible evidence to support the 

commission's finding that Shifflett proved by clear and 

convincing evidence that her disease met the requirements of Code 

§ 65.2-401 for a compensable ordinary disease of life. In its 

role as fact finder, the commission was entitled to accept the 

opinions of Drs. Deputy and Craun, and to reject the opinions of 

the three physicians who reviewed Shifflett's records at 
 4 

employer's request, but who did not examine Shifflett. In cases 

of conflicting medical evidence, "[t]he general rule is that when 

an attending physician is positive in his diagnosis . . . , great 

weight will be given by the courts to his opinion." Pilot 

Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Reeves, 1 Va. App. 435, 439, 339 S.E.2d 

570, 572 (1986). 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.