[Cite as State v. Sowers, 2019-Ohio-649.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

WILLIAM SOWERS 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2018-CA-58 

Trial Court Case No. 2018-CR-80 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 22nd day of February, 2019. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

MEGAN M. FARLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0088515, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark 

County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502 

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

JOHN S. PINARD, Atty. Reg. No. 0085567, 120 West Second Street, Suite 603, Dayton, 

Ohio 45402 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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DONOVAN, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant William Sowers appeals his conviction and sentence for 

the following offenses: Count I, felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), a 

felony of the second degree; Count II, domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), 

a felony of the third degree; Count III, kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(3), a 

felony of the first degree; and Count IV, abduction, in violation of R.C. 2905.02(A)(2), a 

felony of the third degree. Sowers filed a timely notice of appeal with this court on May 

3, 2018. 

{¶ 2} The incident which forms the basis for this appeal occurred during the 

evening of January 24, 2018, and the early morning hours of January 25, 2018, at the 

shared residence of Sowers and Linda McKinney in Springfield, Ohio. As they returned 

home from the grocery store, Sowers and McKinney were arguing about ordering dinner 

at an Arby’s fast-food restaurant. Immediately after entering their residence, Sowers 

shoved McKinney and kicked her dog. McKinney pushed Sowers away from her and 

went into their shared bedroom. Sowers followed McKinney into the bedroom and 

pushed her to the ground. Sowers then began punching and kicking McKinney in the 

head and upper body. Sowers also pushed furniture down on top of McKinney and hit 

her with a chair. After jumping up and down on McKinney several times, Sowers dragged 

her by her hair into the living room and rubbed hand sanitizer on her face while continuing 

to punch her in the face. 

{¶ 3} At some point after the assault, McKinney attempted to leave the residence 

through the front door. Sowers, however, pulled McKinney back inside the residence, 

telling her that she was “not going to run like the rest of them did.” Sowers then dragged 
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McKinney and allowed her to get a drink of water, because she said that she was thirsty. 

Thereafter, Sowers pulled McKinney into his son’s bedroom and made her sit on the bed. 

After kicking her legs several times, Sowers produced a lighter and told McKinney that he 

was going to set her on fire. 

{¶ 4} Sowers then forced McKinney into the bathroom and made her take a 

shower. Before entering the shower, McKinney looked in the mirror and observed that 

she was bloody, bruised, and one of her eyes was swollen shut. After McKinney finished 

showering, Sowers would not let her put on any clothes. Sowers then forced McKinney 

to sit on the couch in the living room. McKinney repeatedly asked Sowers if she could 

leave the residence, but he informed her that she could not leave until her injuries healed. 

To keep McKinney from leaving, Sowers laid down on the couch with his legs over her to 

keep her from moving. 

{¶ 5} Once Sowers fell asleep, McKinney was able to retrieve his cellphone and 

call 911, quietly providing her address to the dispatcher. Shortly thereafter, the police 

arrived at the residence, and McKinney was able to get out from under Sowers. 

McKinney initially tried to use the front door to exit the house, but it would not open. 

Ultimately, McKinney was able to exit the house through the side door where police were 

waiting for her. McKinney was able to identify Sowers as her attacker to the police, and 

he was arrested and taken into custody. 

{¶ 6} When she was rescued by the police, McKinney was still naked, but one of 

the officers went into the residence to retrieve some clothes for her to wear. McKinney 

was then transported to the Springfield Regional Medical Center, where she was treated 

for her injuries. Her treatment included inserting a chest tube in order to re-inflate her 
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left lung. McKinney was eventually flown to Miami Valley Hospital for further treatment. 

McKinney’s injuries included broken ribs, a collapsed lung, and extensive bruising on her 

arms, chest, legs and face. 

{¶ 7} On February 5, 2018, Sowers was indicted for one count of kidnapping, one 

count of abduction, one count of felonious assault, and one count of domestic violence. 

A jury trial was held on April 11, 2018, and Sowers was found guilty of all counts in the 

indictment. At the sentencing hearing held on April 20, 2018, the trial court merged 

Sowers’s convictions for kidnapping and abduction, as well as his convictions for 

felonious assault and domestic violence. The State elected to proceed to sentencing on 

Sowers’s convictions for felonious assault and kidnapping. The trial court refused 

Sowers’s request to merge his convictions for felonious assault and kidnapping. 

Thereafter, the trial court sentenced Sowers to eight years in prison for felonious assault 

and eight years for kidnapping. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served 

consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 16 years of imprisonment. 

{¶ 8} It is from this judgment that Sowers now appeals. 

{¶ 9} Sowers’s sole assignment of error is as follows: 

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MERGE ALL OF THE ALLIED 

OFFENSES FOR SENTENCING. 

{¶ 10} In his sole assignment, Sowers contends that the trial court erred when it 

refused to merge all of his convictions at sentencing. Specifically, Sowers argues that 

his convictions for felonious assault and kidnapping were subject to merger as the 

offenses were committed with the same animus, were not committed separately, and 

were not dissimilar in import. 
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{¶ 11} R.C. 2941.25, Ohio’s allied offense statute, provides that: 

(A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to constitute 

two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information 

may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be 

convicted of only one. 

(B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of 

dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of 

the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as 

to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such 

offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them. 

{¶ 12} The Ohio Supreme Court clarified the applicable standard when 

determining whether offenses merge as allied offenses of similar import in State v. Ruff, 

143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892: 

Rather than compare the elements of two offenses to determine 

whether they are allied offenses of similar import, the analysis must focus 

on the defendant’s conduct to determine whether one or more convictions 

may result, because an offense may be committed in a variety of ways and 

the offenses committed may have different import. No bright-line rule can 

govern every situation. 

As a practical matter, when determining whether offenses are allied 

offenses of similar import within the meaning of R.C. 2941.25, courts must 

ask three questions when the defendant’s conduct supports multiple 

offenses: (1) Were the offenses dissimilar in import or significance? (2) 
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Were they committed separately? and (3) Were they committed with 

separate animus or motivation? An affirmative answer to any of the above 

will permit separate convictions. The conduct, the animus, and the import 

must all be considered. 

Id. at ¶ 30-31. 

{¶ 13} In State v. Wood, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26134, 2016-Ohio-143, we 

stated the following: 

[T]he Ohio Supreme Court addressed the allied-offense issue again 

in State v. Earley, [145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d 266]. 

There the majority characterized the analysis in its earlier [State v.] 

Johnson[, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061] lead 

opinion as “largely obsolete.” Id. at ¶ 11. The Earley court instead 

embraced Ruff, which, as noted above, considers a defendant’s conduct, 

his animus, and the import or significance of his offenses. Applying Ruff, 

the Earley court concluded that misdemeanor OVI and felony aggravated 

vehicular assault “are offenses of dissimilar import and significance that are 

to be punished cumulatively.” Earley at ¶ 20. For purposes of our analysis 

here, we note that a defendant bears the burden of establishing entitlement 

to merger, and we review a trial court’s ruling on the issue de novo. State v. 

LeGrant, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2013-CA-44, 2014-Ohio-5803, ¶ 15. 

 * * * 

We reach the same conclusion under the Ruff standard, which the 

Ohio Supreme Court applied in Earley. We see nothing in Ruff that alters 
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or undermines the foregoing analysis about [the defendant’s] commission 

of murder and aggravated robbery involving the same conduct committed 

with the same animus. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that 

the two offenses were not committed separately and were not committed 

with a separate animus or motivation. These findings remain pertinent 

under Ruff, which, as noted above, provides that offenses do not merge if 

“(1) the offenses are dissimilar in import or significance—in other words, 

each offense caused separate, identifiable harm, (2) the offenses were 

committed separately, or (3) the offenses were committed with separate 

animus or motivation.” Ruff at ¶ 25 [and] ¶ 30-31. 

Id. at ¶ 54, quoting State v. McGail, 2015-Ohio-5384, 55 N.E.3d 513, ¶ 51, 60 (2d Dist.). 

{¶ 14} An appellate court applies a de novo standard of review in reviewing a trial 

court’s R.C. 2941.25 merger determination. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-

Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28. “The defendant bears the burden of establishing his 

entitlement to the protection provided by R.C. 2941.25 against multiple punishments for 

a single criminal act.” State v. Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 

N.E.2d 661, ¶ 18. 

{¶ 15} Recently, we discussed whether a defendant’s convictions for robbery and 

abduction merged for purposes of sentencing. In State v. Moore, 2d Dist. Clark No. 

2016-CA-45, 2018-Ohio-2111, we stated: 

* * * According to the record, two employees were in the Speedway 

gas station at the time of the robbery on February 8, 2016; one employee 

was behind the counter. Moore entered the business and brandished a BB 
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gun. Moore jumped over the counter by the cash register and the 

employee behind the counter attempted to flee through the back of the 

store. Moore pursued the employee and escorted him back to the register 

using the BB gun. Moore had the employees open the registers while 

pointing the BB gun at them, and then had them lie on the ground. Moore 

grabbed the cash from the register, exited the store, and got into a vehicle 

that was waiting to drive him away from the scene. 

* * * 

Here, the record reflects that Moore did not simply display a weapon 

during the commission of the robbery, thereby restraining the employees 

simultaneously with the robbery. Rather, when an employee attempted to 

flee the building through the back of the store, Moore pursued the employee 

and brought him back to the registers at gunpoint. Moore’s actions in 

pursuing, stopping, and returning with the employee were separate acts and 

reflected an intention to prevent the employee’s escape, not simply to rob 

the store. Accordingly, we find no error, plain or otherwise, in the trial 

court’s failure to merge the robbery and abduction as allied offenses of 

similar import. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 15, 17. 

{¶ 16} Applying the rationale in Moore to the facts in the instant case, we cannot 

find that the trial court erred when it failed to merge Sowers’s convictions for felonious 

assault and kidnapping. Here, the record reflects that Sowers assaulted McKinney over 

a long period of time during the night of January 24, 2018, and the early morning of 
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January 25, 2018. However, when Sowers stopped assaulting McKinney, he attempted 

to prevent her from leaving the residence in an effort to conceal his earlier conduct. After 

he was finished assaulting McKinney, he forced her to take a shower, after which he did 

not punch or kick her any further. 

{¶ 17} In State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 130, 397 N.E.2d 1345 (1979), 

paragraph one of the syllabus, the court provided the following guidelines for determining 

whether kidnapping and another offense are allied offenses that should merge prior to 

sentencing: 

(a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental to a 

separate underlying crime, there exists no separate animus sufficient to 

sustain separate convictions; however, where the restraint is prolonged, the 

confinement is secretive, or the movement is substantial so as to 

demonstrate a significance independent of the other offense, there exists a 

separate animus as to each offense sufficient to support separate 

convictions; 

(b) Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the victim to a 

substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that involved in 

the underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to each offense 

sufficient to support separate convictions. 

Id. 

{¶ 18} Although Logan predates Ruff, Ohio courts continue to apply the guidelines 

set forth in Logan in determining whether kidnapping and another offense were committed 

with a separate animus, in accordance with the third prong of the Ruff test. See e.g. State 
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v. Armengau, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-679, 2017-Ohio-4452, ¶ 125, citing State v. 

D.E.M., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-589, 2016-Ohio-5638, ¶ 143; State v. Williams, 43 

N.E.3d 797, 2015-Ohio-4100, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.); State v. Stinnett, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 15-

CA-24, 2016-Ohio-2711, ¶ 53. 

{¶ 19} Sowers’s actions in assaulting McKinney, stopping the assault to compel 

her to shower, and then laying on top of her on the sofa to prevent her from leaving the 

residence were separate and identifiable acts committed with a separate animus. Simply 

put, once Sowers concluded his assault of McKinney, his focus changed to concealing 

the assault by not allowing her to leave the residence. This is apparent, in part, from 

Sowers’s statement to McKinney that she could not leave until she was healed. In order 

to keep her from leaving, thereby concealing the assault, Sowers literally fell asleep on 

the couch with his legs on top of McKinney, ostensibly so that she could not leave without 

his knowledge. Sowers’s conduct in preventing McKinney from leaving the residence 

(kidnapping) involved a separate harm from the harm that was involved in the commission 

of the felonious assault and was committed with a separate animus. Thus, the trial court 

did not err when it refused to merge Sowers’s convictions for felonious assault and 

kidnapping. 

{¶ 20} Sowers’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶ 21} Sowers’s assignment of error having been overruled, the judgment of the 

trial court is affirmed. 

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FROELICH, J. and HALL, J., concur. 
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Copies sent to: 

Megan M. Farley 

John S. Pinard 

Hon. Douglas M. Rastatter