### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 27, 200 5 S es sio n

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CURTIS EMMANUEL LANE

Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for K nox Coun ty No. 73422 Ray L. Jenkin s, Jud ge

No. E2004-02340-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Novem ber 2, 2005

The a p p e ll a n t, Cu r ti s E mm a n u e l L a n e , p le d g u il ty to s imp le p o s s e s s io n o f ma r ij u a n a a n d w as

se nte nc e d to e le ve n mo nth s a ndtw e nty -n ine da y s, su sp e nd e d upo n pa y me nt of c ou rt c os ts a ndfi ne s. Pursuant to Rule 37 (b)(2) (i) of the Tenne ssee Rules of Criminal Proc edure , the appe llant attempted
to reser ve a c ertified question of l aw to this Court on the issue of whe ther the e vidence should have been suppr essed a s the result of an illega l a rre st. After a thoroug h revie w of the re cord, w e conc lude that the appe llant failed to prope rly rese rve a certified question of law. There fore , the appe llant’s issue is not properly

befor e this Court, and this appeal is dismissed.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Trial Court Appeal Dism issed

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opi nion of t he court, in which N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , and A L AN E. G L EN N , J J ., joined.

Mark E. Stephe ns, District Publi c Def ender and Robert C. Edwar ds, Assistant Publ ic Def ender , for the appe llant, Curtis Emm anuel L ane.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Da vidE. Coe ne n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; and Randa ll E. Nichols, District Attorney Gene ral; and Z ane Sca rlett, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

Th e app e lla nt w a s in dic te d by a Kn ox Cou nty Gr a nd Jury in Sep te mbe r of 20 01 fo r s imp le possession of marijuana . Subsequently , the appe llant filed a motion to suppress the evide nce obtained during a sea

rch inc ident to his arre st as well as a motion to di smiss t he cha rg e.

At the hea

ring on t h e m o tion to suppress, Office r Ke lly Tanne r of the Knox ville Poli ce Depa rtment testified that on Jul y 11, 2000, at about 5:30 p.m., he stopped the appe llant’s car on Dora-2-

Street in Knoxvi lle beca

use he noticed that “the vehicle that [t he appe llant] was driving was be aring an expired license plate.” A fter stopping t h e ap p ell ant, Off icer Tanne r re quested the a

ppellant’s ide nti fi c a tio n. Th e app e lla nt fa ile d to pr od uc e a ny ide nti fi c a tio n a nd did no t ha ve a drive r’ s li c e ns e or any other form of identification showing his name.

At that time , the app e lla nt tol d Of fi c e r Ta nn e r his na me , da te of birth, a nda so c ia l se c ur ity

nu mbe r. Of

fi c e r Ta nn e r wa s un able to ve ri fy the inf orma tio n b e c a us e “ [a]t the tim e , th e mob ile da ta terminal in the ca

r wa s out of service - or - let me ba ck up and say that the NCI C capa

bilitywas out of ser vice on the mobile data t erminal.” The off icer explained that he tried to che ck the ve rac ity of the information throug h the “r ecor ds channe l” and was advised that NCI C ha d been “ pulled down” for some r eason. O ffice r Tanne r then de cided to arrest the a ppellant rather than g ive him a citation b ec ause there wa s no way to verify the information. Upon the a ppellant’s ar

rest, Of fice r Tanne r found marijuana

in the appellant’ s possession. On cross-e x amination, Offic er Tanner a dmitted that the inf or ma tio n th a t th e app e lla nt g a ve him turne d o ut t o b e true on c e he wa s a ble to v e ri fy

it.

The trial c ourt determined th at t h e p o l ice of fice r prope rly

arr ested the a

ppellant under

the circ umstances a nd denied both the m o t i o n t o suppress and the motion to di smiss, m aking the fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

Th e Cou rt is of the op ini on that the c a se of Te nn e sse e v. Wal ke r, 12 S.W. 3d46 0, is controlling . The proof

from the a

rre sting off

icer indicated that the lice nse plate w as expired, the defe ndant had no identification, no driver ’s license , information g iven by the defendant could not be verified throug h no fault of e ither party , the NCI C was out of commission. Theref ore, the defe ndant was a

rre sted properly

. . ..

T h e a p p el l an t p l ed gu i l t y t o s i m p l e po s s es s i o n o f m ar i j u an a on S ep t em b er 6
, 2 0 0 4

. In excha n g e f

o r h is g u il ty

p le a , th e ap p e ll a n t r e c e iv e d a n e le v e n mo n th
, tw e n ty

- n in e d a y s entenc e, which wa s to be suspended upon pay ment of court costs and fines. The transcript of the g uiltyplea hearing indicates that the appe llant, State and trial court “ ag ree d . . . [t o] t ake a certified question of law re g arding the ar

rest on this matter to the Court of Criminal Appea ls.” Def ense c ounsel informed the c ou rt that he ha d th e “ pa

pe rw or k r e a dy ” fo r the c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on , b ut the parti es agree d to

rese rve judg ment until ev er y t h i n g was c ompleted. On September 10, 2004, defe nse counse l submitt ed an “adde ndum to the judgme nt f or the certified question” and informed the trial court that

“ e ve rythi ng is i n a

po stu re to be app e a le d on the c e rt if ie d q ue sti on .” Th e “ a dd e nd um t o ju dg me nt” and the judg ment form wer e enter ed on the same day
, September 10, 2004. The judgme nt form does

no t r e fe re nc e the “ a dd e nd um t o j ud gment ,” or the c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w. Th e “ a dd e nd um t o judgme nt” contains the f

ollowing lang uag e:

This addendum has been prepa red for counsel by

the def endant a nd submitt ed to the court for approva l in order to compl y wi th Tennesse e Rule of Criminal Proce dure Rule 3 7 c o n c e r n in g th e s u b mi s s io n o f a c e r ti f ie d q u e s ti o n o f

la w to th e T e n n e ssee Court of Criminal Appeals. It is int ended to be part a nd parc el of the judg ment of

c on vic tio n o f the c a se sty le d a bo ve to w hic h spe c if

ic re fe re nc e s her e by ma de a ndsa id-3-

judgme nt makes spec ific re fer ence here to so that eac h document re fer ence s the other. Th e Cou rt

the re fo remake s th e fo llo wi ng fi nd ing s:

A. The de fenda nt has enter ed into a plea ag ree ment u n der Rule 11( e) but ha s

e xplic itl y re se rv e d w ith the c on se nt o f the Sta te a ndthe Cou rt the ri g ht t o a

pp e a l a

c e rt if ie d qu e sti on of la w to the Cou rt of [sic ] T e nn e sse e Cou rt of Cr imi na l A pp e a ls that is disposi tive of the c ase.

B. That the judgme nt in this c ase must contain a statement of the c ertified que stion of la w r e se rv e d b y

the de fe nd a nt f

or app e llate re vie w. Th e qu e sti on of la w i n th is

c a se is a s f

oll ow s:

“ Di d th e de fe nd a nt p ro vid e sa tis fa c tory e vid e nc e of

ide nti ty wh e n s top pe d b y

po lic e wh e n d ri vin g his a uto mob ile so a s to e nti tle him to b e c ite d a ndre le a se d f or the of fe ns e of drivi ng wi tho ut a lic e ns e in h is p os se ssi on ; or wa s the of fi c e r e nti tle d to arr e st h im a s, [si c] allowed b y T ennesse e Code Annotated § 40-7-118, f or failure to provide satisfac tory

evidenc e of ide ntity .”

C. T he c e rt if

ie d q ue sti on e xpre sse d in the fo re g oin g pa ra g ra ph ha s b e e n e xpre ssl y

rese rved f or appe al with the conse nt of the State and the trial judg e.

D. The de fenda nt, the State, and the trial judge are all of t he opini on that the ce rtified question in the fore g oing is dispositive under the f acts of this ca se. . . .

The a ppellant filed a

timely notice of a

ppeal, pr esenting the certified question for our revie w.

An a ly sis

The a ppellant pre sents an ostensible ce rtified question of law on appea l in which he ar g ues that hi s a rr e st w a s il le g a l. T he Sta te arg ue s th a t th e app e lla nt h a s fail ed to pr op e rl y re se rv e his

certified question of law f or appea l, that this Court la cks jurisdiction to consider the appea l and that the appe al should be dismissed.

I n p e rt ine nt p art , Ru le 37 (b )( 2) (i ) of the Te nn e sse e Rul e s of Cr imi na l Pr oc e du re pr ov ide s:
An appe al lies from an y

order or judg ment in a criminal procee ding w here the law provides for

such appe al, and f

rom any judgme nt o f co n v i cti on . . . upon a plea of g uiltyor nolo contende re if . . . the defe ndant enter ed into a plea ag ree ment under Rule 11(e) but expl icitly

rese rved w ith the consent of the State and of the court the rig h t t o ap p e a l a

c e r ti f ie d q u e s ti o n o f

la w th a t i s d is p o s it iv e o f th e c a s e , a n d the-4-

following require ments are met: (A) the judg ment of convic tion, or other doc ument to w hic h s uc h ju dg me nt r e fe rs that is fi le d be fo re the no tic e of app e a l, m us t c on ta in

a s t a t e m e n t o f t h e c e r t i f

i e d q u e s t i o n o f l a w r e s e r v e d b y d e f e n d a n t f o r a pp e lla te

re vie w; (B ) the qu e sti on of la w m us t be state d in the jud g me nt or do c ume nt s o a s to identify clea rly the scope and limits of the l eg al issue re serve d; (C) the judg ment or docum e n t m u s t r e f

le c t th a t th e c e r ti f

ie d q u e s ti o n w a s e xp r e s s ly r e s e r v e d w ith the

c on se nt o f the s ta te a ndthe tr ia l ju dg e ; a nd(D ) the jud g me nt o r d oc ume nt mus t ref lect that t h e d ef

endant, the state, and the tria l judge are of the opinion that the

certified question is disposi tive of the c ase; . . . .

I n State v. Preston, 759 S.W .2d 647 (Tenn.1988) , our Supreme Court made expli cit to the bench a nd bar e x actly

what the appellate courts require as prerequisites t o the consider ation of the

me ri ts o f a

c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w. Th e se re qu ir e me nts are a s f oll ow s:
Reg ardle ss of what ha s appea red in prior

petitions, orders, colloquy in open court or otherwise, the final orde r or judgment from which the time beg ins to run t o pursue a T.R.A.P. 3 appea l must contain a statement of the di spositive certified question of law re serve d by defe ndant for appellate revie w and the question of law must be stated so as to clea

rly identi fy the scope and the limits of the leg al issue re serve d. For example, where questi o n s o f law involve the validity of sea rche s and the admissibili ty

of statements a n d confe ssions, etc., the re asons re lied upon by defe ndant in the trial c o u rt at t he suppre ssion hearing must be identified in the statement of the certified question of law and re view by the appe llate courts will be limit ed to those passe d upon by the trial judg e and stated i n t h e certified question, absent a constitutional requireme nt otherwise. Wit hout an expli cit statement of the

certified question, neither the defe ndant, the State nor the tr ial judge can ma ke a meaning ful determination of whether the issue soug ht to be reviewe d is disposi tive of the c a se

. . . . Al so , th e or de r m us t st a te that th e c e rt if ie d q ue sti on wa s e xpre ssl y

re se rv e d a s p art

of a ple a a g re e me nt, that th e Sta te and th e tr ia l ju dg e c on se nte d to the re servation an d t h at t he State and the trial judg e ar e of the opinion that the qu es t i o n i s d i s p o s itive of the ca se . . . . No issue be y ond the scope of the c ertified question will be considere d.

I d. at 65 0; se e a lso Sta te v. Ca ldw e ll, 92 4 S. W.2 d 1 17 , 1 18 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ). F a ilu re to proper l y re s er v e a certified question of law pur suant to Preston will result in the dismi ssal of the appea l. State v. Penderg rass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 838 (Tenn. 1996). As the appellate courts have

w r it te n ti me a n d a g a in
, th e r e q u ir e me n ts o f Pr e s to n ar e e xtr e me ly c le a r

. Se e Pe n d e r g r a s s , 937 S.W. 2da t 83 7. Th is C ou rt ha s c on sis te ntl y

he ld t hat th e Pr e sto n r e qu ir e ment s are j urisd ic tio na l. Se e Sta te v. Al ari c B arr e tt Cro uc h, No . 01C0 1- 99 06 -C C- 00 21 6, 20 00 WL 31 85 9, a t *2 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , a t N a sh vil le , Jan . 1 8, 20 00 ), pe rm . a pp . d e nie d (T e nn . 200 0) ; Stat e v. Stu art Al le n Jen kin s, No. 01C01-9712-CR-00590, 1998 W L 9 1 7806, at *2 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, De c. 21, 19 98 ); Sta te v. Cha

rl ott e L itt le , N o. 03 C01 -9 50 4- CR- 00 11 3, 19 96 WL 33 17 4, a t *3 (T e nn . Crim. App. at Knoxvill e, Jan. 30, 1996); State v. Charles R. Sanders, No. 01C01-9312- CC-00420, 1994W e ar e not un s y mp at het i c t o t he appel l ant ’ s i nev i t abl e f r us t r at i on wi t h t hi s C our t ’ s di s mi s s al o f his ap p eal 1

d e sp ite his e ff

o rts at c o m p lian c e w ith the P re sto n re q u ire m e n ts. H o w e v e r, the h o ld ing in P re sto n a n d m o re r e c e n tly T enn. R

. C ri m

. P

. 37 (b)(2)(i ) cr eat ed a bri ght

- l i ne rul e f rom whi ch t hi s C o urt m ay no t de p art

. B ecause t he f i nal judgm ent d o es not co nt ai n a s t at em ent of t he cert i f i ed que st i o n of l aw, no r do es t he judgm ent ref er t o an i nd ep end ent do cum ent

w h ic h w o u ld sa tisf

y the re q u ire m e n ts o f P re sto n , w e a re left w ith n o c h o ic e b u t t o d ism iss this a p p e a l.

-5- WL 398823, at *1 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jul y 21, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1994)

. I n ma ny of the se c a se s th e State , d e fe nd a nt and tr ia l c ou rt ha ve a ll a g re e d, a s e vid e nc e d b y the g uil ty plea tra nscript, that the question is proper ly certified, only

to have the State corr ectly arg ue on appe al that the c e rt if

ic a tio n wa s not in co mpl ia nc e wi th Pre sto n, re qu ir ing dis mis sa l of the app e a l be c a us e thi s Co urt c a nn ot a ssu me jurisd ic tio n o f a ma tte r u po n the a g re e me nt of the pa rt ie s. Sta te v. Wilk e s, 684 S.W .2d 663, 667 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)

.

I n State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1998), our Supreme Court r elaxed the Preston

re qu ir e me nts so me wh a t by a llo wi ng a

c e rt if ie d q ue sti on to b e se t ou t in a n in de pe nd e nt d oc ume nt,

a ndsu c h do c ume nt to be inc or po rate d by re fe re nc e int o the jud g me nt. Ho we ve r, the “ a dd e nd um t o judgme n t , ” whi ch would ar g uably satisfy the Preston re quirements her ein, is not incorporated by ref ere nce into the f

inal judgme nt entere d on September 10.

I n the ca se her ein, the judg ment makes no mention of the rese rvation of a certified question of law. The judgme nt does not ref er en ce o r incorpor ate the “ addendum of judgme nt” filed by de fe ns e c ou ns e l in wh ic h th e c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w i s enu me rate d. Ac c or din g ly , a ft e r c are fu lly revie wing the re cord in this case , we de termine that the a ppellant has failed to proper ly rese rve the ri ght to appea l a

c e rt if ie d q ue sti on of

la w i n a c c or da nc e wi th the re qu ir e me nts of Te nn e sse e Rul e of Criminal Procedur e 37. Finding the failure to proper ly certify the question of law a

jurisdictional de fe c t, w e mus t di smi ss the app e a l. 1

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, this appe al is dismis sed.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE