THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Supreme Court

Sheena Brannon, Shane Stenci l, Tina Sullivan, and Brandon Beaty, Appellants,

v.

Henry Dargan McMaster, in his official capacity as
Governor of the State of S outh Carolina, and G. Daniel Ellzey, in his official capacity as the Director of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce, Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2021-000883

Appeal from Richland County R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge

Opinion No. 28065 Heard October 4, 2021 – Filed October 13, 2021

AFFIRM ED

Adam Protheroe and Susan B. Berkowitz, of South Carolina Appleseed Legal Ju stice Center; and John D. Kassel, of Kassel McVey, all of Columbia, for Appellants.

Rebecca Laffitte, Robert E. Tyson, Jr., and Vordman Carlisle Traywick, III, of R obinson Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, all of Columbia, fo r Respondents Henry Dargan
McMaster and G. Daniel Ellzey; Todd Timmons and Steven Jordan Jr., all of Columbia, for Respondent G. Daniel Ellzey; and Michael G. Shedd, Thomas A.Limehouse, Jr., and William Gr ayson Lambert, all of Columbia, for Respondent Henry Dargan McMaster.

Jack E. Cohoon, of Burnette Shutt & McDaniel, P.A., of Columbia, for amici curiae S outh Carolina Small Business Chamber of Commerce, Ameri can Sustainable Business Council, Shriver Center on Poverty Law, National Employment Law Project, Economic Policy Institute, and William E. Spriggs.

Christopher E. Mills, of Sper o Law, LLC, of Charleston,
for amici curiae South Caro lina Chamber of Commerce, South Carolina Restaurant and Lodging Association,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America,
and National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center.

PER CURIAM: Respondent Governor Henry McMast er instructed Respondent G. Daniel Ellzey, Director of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (DEW), to end South Carolina' s participation in federal unemployment insurance programs created under the Co ronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act. 1 Appellants brought this acti on challenging the legality of the Governor's decision and moved for a preliminary injunction requiring Respondents to reenroll in the programs. Respondents moved to dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion and denied Appellants' moti on for injunctive relief. We affirm the circuit court.

As part of the CARES Act it enacte d in March 2020 in response to the pandemic, Congress created various tem porary economic benefits, including new unemployment insurance programs. Three of those programs are at issue in the present case: (1) Pandemic Unemployment Assistance (PUA), 15 U.S.C. § 9021; (2) Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Co mpensation (PEUC), 15 U.S.C. § 9025; and (3) Federal Pandemic Unem ployment Compensation (FPUC), 15 U.S.C. § 9023 (collectively, Programs). Participation in the Programs is discretionary, and states may withdraw from the Programs with at l east thirty days' advanced notice to the Department of Labor. See, e.g. , 15 U.S.C. §§ 9023(a) & 9025(a )(1). In contrast to

1 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9141.state unemployment insurance programs, th e federal government provides the funds from the general fund of the United States Tr easury for paying benefits to claimants under the Programs. See, e.g. , 15 U.S.C. § 9023(d)(3).

South Carolina agreed to participate in and accept federal funds available pursuant to the Programs. However, on May 6, 2021, Governor McMaster ordered
the director of DEW to withdraw from the Programs effective June 30, 2021. Appellants argue Governor McMaster did not have the authority to do so because section 41-29-230(1) of the South Carolin a Code (2021) provides that DEW shall cooperate with the Secretary of Labor in a manner that required the State to accept and disburse funds from the Programs un til they expired. Section 41-29-230(1) provides:

In the administration of Chapters 27 through 41 of this title, [DEW] must cooperate with the United States Secretary of Labor to the fullest extent consistent with the provisions of these chapters, and act, through the promulgation of appropria te rules, regulations,
administrative methods and st andards, as necessary to
secure to this State and its citizens all advantages available under the provisions of the Social Security Act that relate to unemploymen t compensation, the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, the Wagner-Peyser Act, and the Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1970.

(emphasis added).

Appellants contend benefits paid under the Programs are "advantages available under" the Social Security Act (SSA). 2 Therefore, Appellants argue, DEW must continue to participate in the Pr ograms until the Programs expire. Respondents claim benefits paid pursuant to the Progr ams are not "advantages available under" the SSA. In granting Respondents' motion to dismiss, the circuit court found,

The benefits provided unde r the CARES Act are new benefits, never previously available to unemployed workers, and are provided by le gislation separate and apart

2 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397.from the [SSA]. Although th e federal government chose to use the funding mechanis ms available through the Social Security Administration, that does not mean these
new benefits fall under the [SSA]. It simply shows Congress used an existing mechanism to put [the Programs] into place quickly.

We affirm the circuit court. Secti on 41-29-230(1) is unambiguous and clear on its face. The only connection the Programs have to the SSA is that the funds to be distributed to recipients pass through bank accounts of the Social Security
Administration. This is not sufficient to render benefits paid under the Programs to be "advantages available under the provisions of the [SSA]." To construe section 41-29-230(1) otherwise would be to expa nd the scope of an unambiguous statute beyond the manifest intent of the legislature. 3 See Town of Mt. Pleasant v. Roberts

, 393 S.C. 332, 342, 713 S.E.2d 278, 283 (20 11) (explaining that under the plain meaning rule, this Court has no right to search for or impose another meaning or
resort to subtle or forced constructio n to change the scope of a clear and unambiguous statute); see also S.C. Pub. Int. Found. v. Calhoun Cnty. Council , 432
S.C. 492, 497, 854 S.E.2d 836, 838 (2021) (noting the primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly).

AFFIRMED.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEAR N, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.

3 Based on our holding that section 41-29-230( 1) is inapplicable to the CARES Act, we deny Appellants' motion to supplement the record as moot. Further, because we hold the Programs do not fall within the ambit of section 41-29-230(1), we do not reach the question of whether the Gover nor would have had discretion under the
CARES Act to withdraw the state from participation if the Programs did fall within
the ambit of this section.