NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff

- Appellee,

v. MANUEL VALDOVINOS REYES, AKA Carlos Cepeda, AKA Manuel Reyes, AKA Manuel Valdovinos, AKA Manuel Reyes Valdovinos,
Defendant

- Appellant. No. 19

- 50295
D.C. No. 5:18

- cr - 00328

- MWF

- 1

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Michael W. Fitzgerald, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 20, 2021

Pasadena, California Before: CALLAHAN and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and AMON, * * District Judge.
Manu e l Valdovinos Reyes appeals his conviction and sentence for illegal

reentr y in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We h av e jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation. 

# FILED

MAY 9 2022 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2

and we affirm in part , vacate in part, and remand for the limited purpose of permitting the district court to re consider the conditions of supervised release.
1. Aggravated Felony. Reyes argues that his illegal reentry conviction is
invalid because h is prior Illinois conviction for attempted murder was not an aggravated felony

. To determine whether a state conviction for attempted murder qualifies as an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 , we compare the underlying statute of conviction with its federal equivalent to determine whether they are a catego rical match

. See Moncri effe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 190 (2013) ; 8 U.S.C. § § 1 101(a)(43)(A), (U) (designating attempted murder as an aggravated felony). In this case, Reyes ’s state conviction for attempt ed murder is a categorical
match to its federal equivalent

. B oth require that a “substantial step” be taken with specific intent to commit murder

. 720 I ll

. C omp
. S tat . 5/8

- 4(a); 720 I ll

. C omp
. S tat

. 5/9

- 1; United States v. Gracidas

- Ulibarry , 231 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

. While first

- degree murder in Illinois also encompasses felony murder, 720
I ll

. C omp
. S tat . 5/2

- 8, where the federal definition does not , it is a legal impossibility
that Reyes’s conviction was premised on felony murd er because Illinois felony
murder is incompatible with a conviction for an attempt crime

. People v. Viser , 343 N.E.2d 903, 910 (Il l. 1975) ; see United States v. Gomez

- Hernandez , 680 F.3d 1171,
117 2

– 77 (9th Cir. 2012) ( “ [I] gnor[ing ] his crime of conviction” is a “ hyper

-3

formalistic approach” that inappropriately overlooks the “context of the defendant’s
actual crime of conviction.” )

. 1 Therefore, we conclude that Reyes’s prior state conviction was a proper predicate offense for removal , and we affirm his conviction for illegal reentry

. 2. Terms of Supervis ed Release
. As part of Reyes’s sentence, the district court imposed a term of supervised release, including Standard Condition 14 that requires Reyes to “notify specific persons and organizations of specific risks” he poses to those persons or organizations at his probation officer’s direction

. We have
held that this standard condition is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to
“ans wer the question of what conduct the defendant needed to warn the public
about.” United States v. Magdirila , 962 F.3d 1152 , 1158 (9th Cir. 2020)

. Consequently, we vacate this condition of release and remand for the district court to “craft a supervised release condition that accords with [Reyes’s] criminal history.”
Id. at 1159

. A FFIRMED IN PART , VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

1 Because we conclude that Re yes’s state attempted murder conviction is a n aggravated felony , we need not analyze the government’s argument that it a lso constitutes a n aggravated felony as a “crime of violence” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F ).