alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 204 (Tuesday, October 22, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 84349-84350]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-24438]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION


Designated Reserve Ratio for 2025

AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

ACTION: Notice of Designated Reserve Ratio for 2025.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), the 
Board of Directors (Board) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) designates that the Designated Reserve Ratio (DRR) for the 
Deposit Insurance Fund shall remain at 2 percent for 2025.

[[Page 84350]]

The Board is publishing this notice as required by the FDI Act.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ashley Mihalik, Associate Director, 
Financial Risk Management, Division of Insurance and Research, 202-898-
3793, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#badbd7d3d2dbd6d3d1fadcded3d994ddd5cc"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="47262a2e2f262b2e2c0721232e2469202831">[email protected]</span></a>; Daniel Hoople, Chief, Fund Analysis and 
Pricing Section, Division of Insurance and Research, 202-898-3835, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#b7d3dfd8d8c7dbd2f7d1d3ded499d0d8c1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="492d21262639252c092f2d202a672e263f">[email protected]</span></a>; or Kathryn Marks, Counsel, Legal Division, 202-898-
3896, <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#e18a8c80938a92a187858882cf868e97"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="204b4d41524b5360464449430e474f56">[email protected]</span></a>.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to the FDI Act, the Board 
designates that the DRR for the Deposit Insurance Fund shall remain at 
2 percent for 2025. The Board is publishing this notice as required by 
section 7(b)(3)(A)(i) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(3)(A)(i)). 
There is no need to amend 12 CFR 327.4(g), the section of the FDIC's 
regulations which sets forth the DRR, because the DRR for 2025 is the 
same as the current DRR.

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

    Dated at Washington, DC, on October 17, 2024.
James P. Sheesley,
Assistant Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-24438 Filed 10-21-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6714-01-P


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##### 



Exhibit 3.10  Certificate of Designation for 2006-A Series of Convertible Redeemable
Preferred Stock  dated November 7, 2006
 
 VERIDIEN CORPORATION
 
 
 
 
   1. Designation.
  1




---



##### 



2. Number of Shares; Par Value; Stated Capital.
  3. Relative Seniority.
  4. Voting.
  2




---



##### 



5. Dividends.
  6. Liquidation.
  3




---



##### 



7. Redemption.
    8. Conversion.
  4




---



##### 



5




---



##### 



i.e.
   6




---



##### 



9. Adjustment to Conversion and Voting Rights.
 e.g.
  7




---



##### 



10. No Preemptive Rights.
  IN WITNESS WHEREOF
 VERIDIEN CORPORATIONBy:
    /s/ Sheldon FentonSheldon Fenton, President 8
^a^t^^-/Haf'f0^ f'^f/i^e^ 

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 6i4s.u,hBrond,.ay 

Robert P. Hatch Saiun Maria, CA 

Pr,sida,t/CEO & VISITO R & CONVENTIO N BUREA U 93^^54-5]} J 

August 19,2010 -< • ' -j ; 

Aloha Ley, Acting Associate Director >> yl<:::^ 

U.S. Department of Transportation — r-O p 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, ^E WS6-3iO ^ -^ ^^ 

Washington. DC 20590 _j 

Dear Ms. Ley, 

The Santa Maria Valley Chamber of Commerce, and its subordinate units the Santa 

Maria Valley Economic Development Commission and the Santa Maria Valley Visitor 

and Convention Bureau, is pleased to offer this letter of support for the Santa Maria 

Public Airport District in its quest to receive one of the FAA's Small Community Air 

Service Development Grants. 

To demonstrate our commitment, and continuing support for enlianced air service to 

Denver, the Chamber will contribute the sum of $20,000 to augment the impressive sum 

pledged by the Airport. Additionally, we will set aside 510,000, representing in-kind 

services and marketing assistance to assist in this effort. 

A synchronized campaign is underway to attract additional air service to Santa Maria as 

evidenced by the number of letters of support I have read. It is crucial we have the 

support of the Department of Transportation if we are to move forward. Thank you in 

advance for your favorable consideration. 

Please do not hesitate to contact me personally if I may clarify our position. 

Respectfiilly, ^ » 

Robert P. Hatch 

President and CEO 

Mission: To promote a favorable economic cliinate uibife niabing the Santa Marin VaUey a better place to live anil work. 

(805) 925-2403 • (805) 928-7559 (Fax) • (800) 331-3779 • http:liwivw.snntamaria.eom • email: sinvcc@santnmana.eom
#### Warren Dickinson, Appellee, v. City of Des Moines, Appellant.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: Special ■ Assessments — Appeal—Non-formal Approval of Bond. In an appeal from tlie action of the city council in -confirming a special assessment, an appeal bond is all-sufficient if it is actually approved by the clerk of the district court, even though- such approval is not *formally indorsed in writing on 'the hond.*

Headnote 1: 3 C. J. p. 1172; 28 Cye. p. 1183. -

*Appeal from. Polk District Court.*— Joseph E. Meyer, Judge.

December 14, 1926.

This is an appeal from the action of the district court in reducing a special assessment levied by appellant against appel-lee’s property on account of a paving assessment in said city.—

*Affirmed.*

*John J. Halloran, Beson 8. Jones, Chauncey A. Weaver,*and *Paul Hewitt,*for appellant.

*Howe & Howe,*for appellee. '

Albert, J.

Tbe single, question presented in this case is *783akin to that decided by this court in *Bates v. City of Des Moines,*201 Iowa 1233, and also in *Rivers v. City of Des Moines,*202 Iowa-.

Appellee presented to the clerk of the district court a bond for costs, as provided by Section 6064, Code of 1924. This bond was received by the clerk and indorsed “filed” within the statutory time, and the complaint urged by appellant is that the word “approved,” or its equivalent, was not indorsed in writing on said bond by the clerk of the district court at the time same was filed.

To perfect an appeal from the action of the city council in levying these special assessments, one .of the requirements is that the property owner shall file “within said fifteen days in the office of the clerk of the district court, an appeal bond, approved by the clerk of said court. ” As to this bond, therefore, two things are necessary: (1) The filing and (2) the approval by the clerk. We have repeatedly held that these requirements of the statute are mandatory. *Sutton v. Bower*& *Perkins,*124 Iowa 58; *Johannsen v. City of Colfax,*161 Iowa 502; *Van Meter v. City of Tipton,*178 Iowa 1201; *McCord v. City of Cherokee,*180 Iowa *448; In re Paving Assessments,*193 Iowa 1234; *St. Mary’s Church v. City of Pella,*197 Iowa 205.

In the *McCord*ease, supra, we held that the filing of the bond without approval was not sufficient to comply with, this section of the statute. The question left, therefore, is whether such approval must be indorsed in writing on the bond; or, to put it another way, whether oral testimony is admissible to show the approval by the proper officer.

The evidence of the deputy clerk in this case is that this bond was filed on the 10th day of January, 1925, and that it was approved on that date. He further says that the bond was in fact approved when filed. With this testimony, the case falls squarely within the rule of the *Bates*ease and the *Bivers*case, supra, and it must be held that this statutory requirement has been complied with. Therefore the ruling of the district court is right on this question, and is *approved.*— Affirmed.

Evans, Vermilion, and Mokling, JJ., concur.
#### Susan Cason, plaintiff in error, *vs.*Jesse T. Mulling, defendant in error.

Where upon a rule against the former and present sheriffs, requiring them to show cause why one or the other should not pay over the money due on a certain execution, the former answered that he turned over the *fi. fa.*to his successor in time to have made the money before Court, and the present sheriff set up that he was enjoined from proceeding thereon, it was not error in the Court, in the absence of a traverse of the answers, to discharge the rule.

Rule. Sheriff. Execution. Before Judge Herschel "V". Johnson. Jefferson Superior Court. May Term, 1873.

For the facts of this case, see the decision.

Cain & Polhill, by Z. D. Harrison, for plaintiff in error.

Carswell *&*Denny, by brief, for defendants.

*599Warner, Chief Justice.

This was a rule against a former sheriff and his successor in office to show cause why one or the other of them should not pay the money due on plaintiff’s *fi. fa.*The former sheriff, by his answer, stated he turned over the *fi. fa.*to his successor in time to have made the money before Court, and the present sheriff answered that he was served with an injunction before the expiration of the time to have made the money by Court. There being no traverse of the answers in either case, the Court discharged both rules, and the plaintiff excepted. Where the answer of a sheriff to a rule to show cause is made in writing under oath, and not denied, the rule shall be discharged or made absolute, according as the Court may deem the answer sufficient or not: Code, sec. 3954. We find no error in the judgment of the Court on the facts as stated in the record, which will authorize this Court to interfere and control it.

Let the judgment of the Court below be affirmed.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                      EXHIBIT 4C


                       MAXIMUM ANNIVERSARY VALUE OPTIONAL
                            DEATH BENEFIT ENDORSEMENT

This Endorsement is made a part of, and subject to, the other terms and
conditions of the Contract to which it is attached.

This Endorsement modifies the AMOUNT OF DEATH BENEFIT under the DEATH OF OWNER
BEFORE THE ANNUITY DATE in the Contract.

The following are added under the DEFINITIONS section of the Contract:

         NET PURCHASE PAYMENT
         The sum of all Purchase Payments, reduced proportionately on the date
         of each partial withdrawal by the percentage at which the Contract
         Value is reduced by such withdrawal (including any charges applicable
         to the withdrawal).

AMOUNT OF DEATH BENEFIT
If, upon the death of the Owner and prior to the Annuity Date, the Owner has not
attained age 90, the amount of the Death Benefit will be as described under the
Maximum Anniversary Value Optional Death Benefit. If the deceased Owner has
attained age 90, then the Death Benefit will be the Contract Value. This Death
Benefit option cannot be changed or terminated.

MAXIMUM ANNIVERSARY VALUE OPTIONAL DEATH BENEFIT
As of the date We receive Your Due Proof of Death and prior to the Owner
attaining age 90, the Death Benefit will be the greatest of:

(a)  Net Purchase Payments; or

(b)  Contract Value; or

(c)  The Maximum Anniversary Value.

We will calculate the Maximum Anniversary Value, by determining the Contract
Value for each Contract anniversary prior to the Owner's 81st birthday. An
anniversary value is equal to the Contract Value at a Contract anniversary
increased by the dollar amount of any Purchase Payment(s) made since that
anniversary and reduced for any partial withdrawals since that anniversary (and
any charges applicable to such withdrawals) in the same proportion that the
Contract Value was reduced on the date of such withdrawal. If any of those
anniversary values is greater than Your Contract Value, You will receive that
amount as the Maximum Anniversary Value.

MAXIMUM ANNIVERSARY OPTIONAL DEATH BENEFIT CHARGE
On an annual basis, this charge equals [0.15%] of Your average daily ending
value of the assets attributable to the Accumulation Units of the Subaccount(s)
to which the Contract is allocated. We deduct this charge daily. This charge is
in addition to the charges in Your Contract.




Signed for the Company to be effective on the Contract Date.

ANCHOR NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY


  /s/ CHRISTINE A. NIXON                      /s/ JAY S. WINTROB
----------------------------             -------------------------------
    Christine A. Nixon                          Jay S. Wintrob
       Secretary                                   President


                                       1
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

RULE 13a-14(b) OF

THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934



In connection with the annual report on Form 10-K, (the Report), of Triton PCS, Inc. (the Company) for the period ended December
31, 2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission as of the date hereof, I, Michael E. Kalogris, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350, as adopted pursuant to §906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1) the Report fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as appropriate, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and



(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



/s/ Michael E. KalogrisName:

Michael E. KalogrisTitle:

Chief Executive OfficerDate:

March 19, 2004




A signed
original of this written statement required by Rule 13a-14(b), or other document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement required by Rule
13a-14(b), has been provided to Triton PCS, Inc. and will be retained by Triton PCS, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



This certification accompanies the annual report on Form 10-K to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of Triton PCS, Inc. under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (whether made before or after the
date of the annual report on Form 10-K, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing).
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO

FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND

DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

EDWARD SHAW, 

Appellant, 

v. Case No. 5D22-9

LT Case No. 2008-CF-826-A

STATE OF FLORIDA, 

 Appellee. 

________________________________/ 

Decision filed June 7, 2022

3.800 Appeal from the Circuit Court 

for Seminole County, 

Melanie Chase, Judge. 

Edward Shaw, Crestview, pro se. 

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock 

McGuigan, Assistant Attorney 

General, Daytona Beach, for Appellee. 

PER CURIAM. 

AFFIRMED. 

HARRIS, SASSO and NARDELLA, JJ., concur.
# L_2012305EN.01002501.xml

| 1.11.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 305/25 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

1.11.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 305/25

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 29 October 2012

appointing three United Kingdom members and two United Kingdom alternate members of the Committee of the Regions

(2012/675/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the United Kingdom Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015.

| (2) | Three members’ seats on the Committee of the Regions have become vacant following the end of the terms of office of Mr Jonathan BELL, Mr Iain MALCOLM and Ms Irene OLDFATHER. Two alternate members’ seats on the Committee of the Regions have become vacant following the end of the terms of office of Mr Ted BROCKLEBANK and Mr Nicol STEPHEN, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Three members’ seats on the Committee of the Regions have become vacant following the end of the terms of office of Mr Jonathan BELL, Mr Iain MALCOLM and Ms Irene OLDFATHER. Two alternate members’ seats on the Committee of the Regions have become vacant following the end of the terms of office of Mr Ted BROCKLEBANK and Mr Nicol STEPHEN,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following are hereby appointed to the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2015:

| (a) | as members:






  — | Ms Patricia FERGUSON MSP, Member of the Scottish Parliament, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(a)

as members:

—

Ms Patricia FERGUSON MSP, Member of the Scottish Parliament,

| — | Mr Paul WATSON, Councillor, |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Paul WATSON, Councillor,

| — | Mr Trevor CUMMINGS, Councillor, |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Trevor CUMMINGS, Councillor,

and

| (b) | as alternate members:






  — | Mr Jim HUME MSP, Member of the Scottish Parliament, |
| --- | --- | --- |

(b)

as alternate members:

—

Mr Jim HUME MSP, Member of the Scottish Parliament,

| — | Mr Jamie McGRIGOR MSP, Member of the Scottish Parliament. |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Jamie McGRIGOR MSP, Member of the Scottish Parliament.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Luxembourg, 29 October 2012.

For the Council

The President

E. FLOURENTZOU

---

(1)  
  OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 22.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 12, 19.1.2010, p. 11.

2

---
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 37

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to repeal the restriction

on payment for certain hospital discharges to post-acute care imposed

by section 4407 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 19, 1999

Mr. GRASSLEY introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to repeal

the restriction on payment for certain hospital discharges

to post-acute care imposed by section 4407 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. REPEAL OF RESTRICTION ON MEDICARE PAY4 MENT FOR CERTAIN HOSPITAL DISCHARGES

5 TO POST-ACUTE CARE.

6 (a) IN GENERAL.—Section 1886(d)(5) of the Social

7 Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395ww(d)(5)), as amended by
2

•S 37 IS

1 section 4407 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, is

2 amended—

3 (1) in subparagraph (I)(ii), by striking ‘‘not

4 taking in account the effect of subparagraph (J),’’,

5 and

6 (2) by striking subparagraph (J).

7 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

8 subsection (a) shall take effect on the date of enactment

9 of this Act.

Æ
J

- A16006

- 16

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court. NON

- PRECEDENTIAL DECISION

– SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

MONTY CLAIR CHAPMAN, TRUSTEE OF THE MONTY CLAIR CHAPMAN TRUST AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 17, 2000, AND CONNIE A. CHAPMAN,

Appellants

v.
CHEVRON APPALACHIA, LLC,

Appellee :
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1201 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered July 14, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Civil Division at No(s): 902 CD 2014

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED: AUGUST 29, 2016

Because the trial court erred in sustaining the preliminary objections in

the nature of a demurrer filed by Chevron Appalachia, LLC (“Chevron”), I

respectfully dissent and offer the following analysis.

“The question presented by the demurrer is whether, on the facts

averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible. Where any

doubt exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it should be

resolved in favor of overruling the demurrer.” Sullivan v. Chartwell Inv.

Partners, LP , 873 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. Super. 2005)

. Instantly, there is no dispute that in November 2012, a month after

the lease purportedly expired, Chevron recorded both leases. The effect of

that recording, however, is in dispute. Here, the trial court sustainedJ

- A16006

- 16

- 2

-

Chevron’s preliminary objection, in part, based on the conclusion that “even

if [it] were to decide that [Chevron’s] rec[ording] of the leases was a

manifestation of assent, such a ma nifestation would have had no effect

because the period to accept the offer had expired.” Trial Court Opinion,

7/14/2015, at 3. That may be true; however, at this juncture, it is

premature to make that determination. What effect, if any, the recording of

the leases had is the type of issue that warrants, at a minimum, the

opportunity to conduct discovery. Accordingly, the trial court erred in

sustaining Chevron’s preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

MICHAEL ANTHONY LoRUSSO,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 2D22-1773

September 16, 2022

Appeal pursuant to Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2) from the Circuit 

Court for Pinellas County; Nancy Moate Ley, Judge.

Michael Anthony LoRusso, pro se.

ORDER RESTRICTING APPELLANT FROM FUTURE PRO SE 

FILINGS

PER CURIAM.

On July 19, 2022, this court dismissed this appeal as 

untimely filed and issued an order detailing Appellant's initiation of 

over thirty proceedings in this court related to his judgment and 
2

sentence in Pinellas County Circuit Court case 20-04126-CF. The 

order directed Appellant to show cause why this court should not 

direct the clerk to reject pleadings in this court related to Pinellas 

County Circuit Court case 20-04126-CF unless the filing is related 

to a pending proceeding or submitted by a licensed Florida attorney. 

See State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47, 48–49 (Fla. 1999). 

Appellant's response is unavailing as it fails to justify his 

meritless and repetitive filings. Accordingly, we direct the clerk of 

this court to place in an inactive file any original proceedings or 

notices of appeal filed by Appellant related to the lower tribunal 

case number listed in this order unless the filing is signed by a 

member in good standing of The Florida Bar. See id.

NORTHCUTT, BLACK, and STARGEL, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.