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# FllE**1~1** Cl.i:RKS OFFICE This opinion 

### was flied 

### for r'ecora at ;' 

### :ro· · : ·.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON EDWARD 0. GORRE, Respondent, 

### v. CITY OF TACOMA, Petitioner, and DEPARTMENT OF LABORAND INDUSTRIES, Defendant. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )



# _________________ ) No. 90620-3
En Bane

Filed 

### AUG 2 

## 72015

Yu, J.--This is an appeal from a denial of a workers' compensation claim. Under the Industrial Insurance Act (Act), Title 51 RCW, a worker injured in the
course of employment suffers from an "occupational disease" and is entitled to certain benefits. The burden ofproving an occupational disease generally falls on the worker. That is, to receive benefits an injured worker typically must show thatGorre v. City ofTacoma, No; 90620-3 his or her injury arose naturally and proximately from employment. This case involves an exceptionthat shifts that burden in certain circumstances. Under RCW 51.32.185(1), a firefighter who suffers from any of four enumerated classes ofinjury receives a rebuttable evidentiary presumption that the injury is an occupational disease. Atissue here are two ofthose presumptive classes ofoccupational disease: (1) In the case of firefighters
. . . there shall exist a prima facie presumption that: (a) Respiratory disease;
... and (d) infectious diseases are occupational diseases.
. This presumption of occupational disease may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence
.... (4) The presumption [for infectious diseases] shall be extended to any firefighter who has contracted any ofthe following infectious diseases: Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, all strains of hepatitis, meningococcal meningitis, or mycobacteriumtuberculosis. RCW 51.32.185 (emphasis added). A firefighter who does not qualify for RCW 51.32.185(1)'s presumption may still receive benefits, but he or she retains the burden ofproof. Edward 0. Gorre, afirefighter employedbythe city ofTacoma (City), suffers from valley fever (coccidioidomycosis). Gorre's diagnosis is not disputed. Atissue instead is whether valley fever is a "respiratory disease" or an "infectious disease" under RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) or (d) that shifts the burden ofproving the disease's

2Gorre v. City ofTacoma, No. 90620-3 proximate cause from Gorre to the employer City. The answer involves two questions ofstatutory interpretation. First, we must interpret "respiratory disease" in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a). Gorre asks us to affirmthe Court ofAppeals, which adopted the term's ordinary dictionary definition. The City urges us to interpret it as a term of art, limiting respiratory diseases to what doctors diagnose as such. Second, we must interpret the scope of RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'s presumption for "infectious diseases" and specificallywhat RCW 51.32.185(4) means by stating that the presumption "shall be extended to" HIV and AIDS, hepatitis, meningitis, andtuberculosis. The issue is whetherthat list ofdiseases is exclusive. The Court ofAppeals held it was not, interpreting RCW 51.32.185(1)(d) to cover every infectious disease, including valley fever. We reverse the Court ofAppeals and reinstate the superior court'sjudgment in the City's favor. We conclude that "respiratory disease," as used in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a), refers onlyto diseases that medical experts diagnose as respiratory diseases. We also conclude that the "infectious diseases" qualifying for RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'s evidentiary presumption are limited to those diseases specifically enumeratedin RCW51.32.185(4). Becausemedical experts in Gorre's casetestified that valley fever is an infectious disease, not a respiratory one, and because it is not
one ofthe infectious diseases enumerated in RCW 51.32.185(4), the presumption does not apply.

3Gorre v. Cityof Tacoma, No. 90620-3 BACKGROUND A firefighter employed by the City since 1997, Gorre fell 

### ill shortly after returning to Washington from a trip to Las Vegas, Nevada. His diagnosis was initially a mystery. Doctors went through several tentative diagnoses before a skin biopsytested positive for valley fever. Valley fever is a fungal infection endemic to the desert southwest, including Nevada and especially California's San Joaquin Valley (wherethe name derives). The fungus favors warm, dry climates, andthough it lives in the desert's arid soil, it releases spores into the air ifthe soil is disturbed. Humans acquire valley fever by inhaling those spores. Gorre filed for workers' compensation benefits with the City and the Department ofLabor and Industries. After both entities rejected his claim, Gorre appealed to the Board ofIndustrial Insurance Appeals (Board). His administrative appeal included both procedural and factual components. As to procedure, Gorre asserted that he had a "respiratory disease" and an "infectious disease" under RCW 51.32.185(1), which shiftedthe burden ofproving a nonemployment cause ofvalley fever to the City. As to fact, Gorre alleged that he was exposed to the fungus from responding to emergency calls on Interstate 5, where he inhaled spores transported byvehicles traveling north from California. 1

1 Gorre also argued that he suffered from eosinophilic lung disease, separate from and in addition to valley fever. But after hearing medical testimony, the Board found Gorre's only diagnosis was valley fever. The Court ofAppeals affirmed. Gorre v. City ofTacoma, 180 Wn.
4Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 After hearing extensive motions, an industrial appealsjudge (IAJ) ruled that
even if RCW 51.32.185 applied, the City's initial evidence had rebutted the presumption. The IAJ then held an evidentiary hearing where Gorre retained the burden of proving an employment-related exposure to valley fever. Following several days oftestimony, the IAJ proposed a decision and order finding that valley fever was an infectious disease that Gorre likely acquired in Nevada. Expert

·testimony supported these findings, and the Board adopted them. The Board

affirmed rejection of Gorre's benefits claim. The Pierce County Superior Court likewise affirmed after a bench trial. The Court ofAppeals reversed and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, holding that Gorre was entitledto RCW 51.32.185(1)'s presumptions for respiratory and infectious diseases. Gorre v. City ofTacoma, 180 Wn. App. 729, 324 P.3d 716 (2014). We granted the City's petition for review. Gorre v. City ofTacoma, 181 Wn.2d 1033,343 P.3d 760 (2015). STANDARD OF REVIEW A modified standard of review applies to workers' compensation appeals. The Board's decision and order is presumed correct, and the party challenging that decision carries the burden on appeal to the superior court. RCW 51.52.115. The

App. 729, 760, 324 P.3d 716 (2014). Since Gorre has not cross petitioned for review of that finding, it is not before us. 

### 5

### Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 superior court canmake its own findings orreach a different result only ifthejudge finds by apreponderance ofthe evidence that the Board's findings and decision are
erroneous. Ravsten v. Dep 't of Labor &Indus., 108 Wn.2d 143, 146, 736 P.2d 265 (1987). When reviewing the Board proceedings, we only examine "the record to see whether substantial evidence supports the findings made after the superior court's denovo review, andwhetherthe court's conclusions oflawflow from the findings." Ruse v. Dep'tofLabor &Indus., 138 Wn.2d 1, 5-6,977P.2d 570 (1999). However, statutory interpretation remains a question oflaw we determine de novo. Cockle v. Dep'tof Labor &Indus., 142 Wn.2d 801,807, 16 P.3d 583 (2001). ANALYSIS A. INTERPRETATION OF "RESPIRATORYDISEASE"

### INRCW51.32.185(l)(a) We first consider if valley fever is a "respiratory disease" under RCW 51.32.185(1)(a). This is a question ofstatutoryinterpretation,2 

### so webegin withthe plainmeaning oftheterm. Dep 'tof Ecologyv. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146Wn.2d 1, 11, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). Plain meaning is "discerned from the ordinary meaning of

2 Thebriefing somewhatmischaracterizes the issue as whether a certainmedical condition is a "respiratory disease" is a question oflaw or fact. What "respiratory disease" means in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) is undisputedly a question oflaw susceptible to judicial review. Cockle, 142 Wn.2d at 807. And whether a firefighter has a "respiratory disease"-whatever its statutory meaning-is afact questionreserved forthe fact finder. So thereal disputehere is howto interpret "respiratory disease" in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a), and specificallyifthe legislature intendedthe term to carryits ordinary ormedically accepted meaning. 

### 6Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 the language at issue, the context ofthe statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wn.2d 652, 657, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007). Our ultimate task, ofcourse, is to ascertain and carry outthe legislature's intent. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9. Because the Act does not define "respiratory disease," the Court ofAppeals turned to an ordinary dictionary. The Court of Appeals merged the ordinary definitions of "respiration" and "disease" and concluded the plain meaning of "respiratory disease" is any "discomfort or condition of an organism or part that impairs normal physiological functioning relating, affecting, or used in the physical act ofbreathing." Gorre, 180 Wn. App. at 762-63. Dictionaries are an appropriate
source ofplain meaning when the ordinary definition furthers the statute's purpose. State v. Veliz, 176 Wn.2d 849, 854, 298 P.3d 75 (2013). But the ordinary definition of a term is not dispositive of a statute's plain meaning when the term is also aterm ofart. 

### !d. "Respiratory disease" has aunique meaning in the medical community, which uses the term to refer to a category of specific diagnoses that share certain pathologies. This is different than the broad ordinary definition, so we must ascertain the legislature's intent and choose the meaning that best furthers the statute's intended purpose. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 9. Did the legislature intend to presume that any effect on breathing is an occupational disease acquired while firefighting, consistent with the ordinary

7Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 definition ofrespiratory disease? Or did it intend the presumption to apply only to specific diseases that doctors diagnose as respiratory diseases? For three reasons,
we hold that interpreting "respiratory disease" as a term of art better reflects the legislature's purpose in enacting RCW 51.32.185(1)(a). First, interpreting "respiratory disease" as a specific category of diagnoses rather than a broad category of symptoms fits with the mechanics of RCW 51.32.185(1)(a). The statute is simply a shortcut for proving medical causationi.e., thatjob conditions caused an occupational disease. Causation is a specialized
area where the legislature and the courts have always deferred to expert diagnosis. SeeDennis v. Dep 'tof Labor &Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467,477,745 P.2d 1295 (1987); Parr v. Dep 'tof Labor & Indus., 46 Wn.2d 144, 145,278P.2d 666 (1955); Ehman v. Dep'tof Labor & Indus., 33 Wn.2d 584,600,206 P.2d 787 (1949). Gorre responds that the ordinary definition of "respiratory disease" still requires evidence that his breathing is impaired. But testimony about symptoms is a step removed from a doctor's opinion about the symptoms' underlying cause. We do not believe the legislature meant to minimize the significance ofmedical opinion to claims under the Act when it drafted RCW 51.32.185(1)(a). Second, the relationship between RCW 51.32.185(1)(a)'s presumption and RCW 51.32.185(1)(b)-(d)'s three presumptions supports interpreting "respiratory disease" as a term of art. RCW 51.32.185(1)'s four presumptions vary in scope
8Gorre v. City ofTacoma, No. 90620-3 depending on the specific injury. For example, the legislature created apresumption for all respiratory diseases, but it limited the presumptions for cancers, heart conditions, and, as discussed below, infectious diseases. RCW 51.32.185(1)(a)-(d), (3), (4). Using the ordinary meaning of"respiratory disease," however, results in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) becoming a "superpresumption" thatundermines the express limits on the ?therpresumptions. For example, the legislature omitted lung cancer from the list of cancers entitledto RCW 51.32.185(1)(c)'spresumption. RCW 51.32.185(3). Yet underthe ordinary definition, lung cancer would almost certainly qualify for the respiratory disease presumption because it invades an organ critical to breathing. Likewise, RCW 51.32.185(1)(b) applies only to heart problems experienced shortly after certain firefighting activities. But if a heart problem occurs too late for that presumption, it becomes a respiratory disease as long as breathing is also impaired. In other words, the Court ofAppeals interpretation allows claimants to plead around the statutory limits in RCW 51.32.185. We believe the legislature intended RCW 51.32. 185(1)(a) to cover only what doctors diagnose as arespiratory disease and not what claimants strategically label as one. Third, interpreting "respiratory disease" as aterm ofart is consistent with the

9Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 presumption's intended scope. Whenthe legislature enactedRCW 51.32.185(1)(a),3 it justified the presumption by citing an evidentiary link between "respiratory diseases," as the term is used in the statute, and firefighters' routine exposure to "smoke, fumes, and toxic or chemical substances." LAWS OF 1987, ch. 515, § 1. Thus, the legislature necessarily intended RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) to cover respiratory diseases caused by exposure to smoke, fumes, and chemicals-hazardspervasive in fighting fires. Yet smoke, fumes, and chemicals do not cause valley fever. As an expert in Gorre's case testified, valley fever results from exposure to a fungus that dies in fire's extreme heat. This illustrates the problem with using the ordinary definition of ''respiratory disease." Interpreting RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) to include respiratory diseases unrelated to smoke and chemical inhalation broadens the scope of presumption beyond the legislature's underlying evidentiaryjustification for it. It leads to the presumption covering any impairment to breathing, even if the condition-like valley fever-has no established connection to the risks inherent in firefighting. Unfortunatelythe dissent adopts an interpretation of"respiratorydisease" that

3 The respiratory disease presumption was originally codified at former RCW**51.32~** 185(1). LAws OF 1987, ch. 515, §2. As discussed below, the legislature amendedthe statute in 2002 to add presumptions for cancers, heart problems, and infectious diseases, LAws OF 2002, ch. 337, § 2, and the respiratory disease presumption was recodified at RCW 51.32.185(1)(a). 10

### Gorre v. City of Tacoma, 

### No. 90620-3 is not consistentwithrisks connectedto fighting fire. Instead, the dissent concludes that because firefighting is risky and because valley fever is acquired through inhalation, the legislature must have intended the disease to be a "respiratory disease" under RCW 52.31.185(1)(a). Dissent at 4-5. While the dissent assures us that adopting a layperson's definitionpreserves the importance ofdoctors testifying about a "disease's causation and its effects," id. 

### at 5, interpreting valley fever as a respiratory disease undercuts the value ofthat verytestimony in Gorre's case: 

### Q.
. .. Dr. Ayars is Valley Fever an infectious disease? A. Yes. 

### Q. Is it an infectious disease that can cause respiratory symptoms? 

### A. Yes. Q. In your professional medical opmwn what are the chances that Lieutenant Gorre acquiredValleyFeverinWashington State? Canyou assign a number orpercentage? A. Well, right now we have zero to start with. I guess, you could say one in amillion. Thepeoplethat couldpotentiallybeatrisk are peoplethat are gardeners
.... [A]s far as trying to link it to firefighters, there is absolutely no linkthere. Tr. ofBd. Proceedings (June 14, 2010) at 362-68 (emphasis added). Despitethe fact that the medical community does not consider valley fever either a respiratory disease or a disease common to firefighting, the dissent concludes the legislature wouldhave intended the presumption to apply nonetheless. We believe otherwise.4

4 The dissent also suggests that, thoughthe layperson's definition of"respiratorydisease" is an appropriate interpretationhere, it "mayno longerbehelpful" in other cases. Dissent at 4 n.2. We agree that the triggering ofRCW 51.31.185(1)(a)'s presumption depends on the facts ofeach case, but those differences go to application ofthe statute, not its interpretation. This supports our view that "respiratory disease" is a term ofart to be appliedbymedical experts. 

### 11

### Gorre 

### v. City of Tacoma, 

### No. 90620-3 There is no doubt firefighting is a dangerous profession, a fact the legislature recognized by enacting RCW 51.32.185. But our appreciation for the work firefighters do is not a license to discard the ample evidence that the legislature nonetheless intended the statute's presumptions to be narrow. For all the above reasons, we interpret "respiratory disease" in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) as a term ofart to mean only those diseases the medical profession understands to be respiratory diseases. Inpractice, thisrequires medical experttestimonythata claimant's disease is a respiratory disease, not merelytestimonythat it affects breathing. B. INTERPRETATION OF "INFECTIOUS DISEASES" IN

### RCW51.32.185(1)(d) We turn next to the scope of RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'s presumption for "infectious diseases." The issue is whether that general reference to infectious disease includes all infectious diseases (including valley fever), or whether the presumption is limitedbyRCW 51.32.185(4): The presumption established in subsection ( 1 )(d) ofthis section shall be extended to any firefighter who has contracted any ofthe following infectious diseases: Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, all strains of hepatitis, meningococcal meningitis, ormycobacteriumtuberculosis. Theparties disagree abouttheeffectofRCW51.32.185( 4). Gorre arguesitis merely illustrative of possible infectious diseases; the City responds that the list is an exclusivedefinition of"infectiousdiseases" qualifyingunderRCW51.32.185(1)(d). This question turns on what the legislature intended by "extending" the infectious

12Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 disease presumption to certain diseases. We again start with the statute's plain meaning. If the text has only one reasonable meaning, it is unambiguous and we give it that effect. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11-12. Unlike "respiratory disease," "extend" is not aterm of art in this context, so a dictionary is an appropriate starting point. Gorre reads "extend"to mean "increasethe scope, meaning, or application of," as inthe diseases enumerated in RCW 51.32.185(4) "increase the scope of' the infectious disease presumption described inRCW 51.32.185(1)(d). Hebolsters his definitionby noting different verbs to modify the cancer and infectious disease presumptions in RCW 51.32.185. The legislature clearly drafted RCW 51.32.185(3) to restrict RCW 51.32.185(1)(c)'s cancer presumption, which "shall only apply to" the specific
cancers it identifies. Gorre argues that RCW 51.32.185(4) is not as unambiguously limiting, perhaps indicating a different intended effect. The City responds with a competing definition that means "to reach in scope or application," arguing RCW 51.32.185(4) therefore limits the scope ofRCW 51.32.185(1)(d). Even with the benefit ofcontext, however, there is not a single, reasonable interpretation of "shall be extended to" that makes RCW 51.32.185(4) unambiguous.5 We must therefore resort to other aids ofstatutory interpretationto

5For example, Gorre's interpretation is strained. Since the diseases listed in subsection (4) are infectious diseases, they would already qualify under RCW 51.32.185(1)(d)'spresumption for "infectious diseases." And if RCW 51.32.185(1)(d) subsumes the diseases listed in RCW
13Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 resolve that ambiguity. State v. A.G.S., 182 Wn.2d 273, 277-78, 340 P.3d 830 (2014). And one ofthose aids-legislative history-ends our analysis. It offers conclusive evidence that RCW 51.32.185(4) limits, not expands, RCW 51.32.185(1)(d). The legislature added the infectious disease presumption to RCW 51.32.185 in 2002 after extended negotiations between two primary stakeholders. Firefighters lobbied in support, arguing that while they were routinely exposed to contagious bodily fluids on the job, it was difficult to prove a specific employment-related exposure. The firefighters' employers, cities and fire commissioners, were concerned about the cost of insurance premiums increasing with the number of presumptively covered diseases. H.B. 

### REP. ON H.B. 2663, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). The goal was to agree on abillthat "represent[ed] a compromisewith
no opposition." S.B. 

### REP. ON SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2663, at 2, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). The bill's three sequential drafts chronicle those negotiations. As first introduced, House Bill (HB) 2663 was significantly broader than the presumptions ultimately enacted. Forexample,thepresumptionfor cancers, whichwas also added

51.32.185(4), it is hard to read it as increasing the presumption's scope. The scope of RCW 51.32.185(1)(d), with or without RCW 51.32.185(4), is still any infectious disease. Likewise, the City's interpretation that RCW 51.32.185(1)(d) "reaches" the diseases in RCW 51.32.185(4) does not necessarily preclude the presumption from also reaching other diseases. 14

### Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 in 2002, originally covered all cancers affecting a number oforgan systems, notjust the specific cancers in today's statute. 

### Compare H.B. 2663, at 2, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002) (applying cancer presumption to "cancers affecting the
... lymphatic, digestive, hematological, urinary, skeletal, oral, or reproductive systems"), 

### with RCW51.32.185(3) (limiting cancerpresumptionto "prostatecancer diagnosed prior to age fifty, primarybrain cancer, malignant melanoma, leukemia, non-Hodgkin'slymphoma, bladdercancer,uretercancer, colorectal cancer, multiple myeloma, testicular cancer, and kidney cancer"). Likewise, HB 2663 did not identify any specific infectious diseases. H.B. 2663, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). The cities opposed this first draft as too expensive, their representative expressing "concern
... that right now [the presumption's language] is just 'infectious diseases.'" 6 A legislatorwho sponsoredthebill agreed that "the scope .

. . need[ed] to be narrowed."7 The bill's second draft clearly**addres~ed** the concern that the infectious diseasepresumptionwas too inclusive. SubstituteHB 2663 limitedthepresumption to four specific diseases byadding a subsection (4): (4) For the purposes of this act, "infectious disease" 

### means acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, all strains of hepatitis, meningococcal meningitis, and mycobacteriumtuberculosis.

6 Hr'g on H.B. 2663 Before the H. Commerce and Labor Comm., 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Jan. 28, 2002), at 92 min., 57 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org. 7Id. at 91 min., 48 sec. 15Gorre v. City of Tacoma, 

### No. 90620-3 SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2663, at 2, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002) (emphasis added). Representatives for both sides testified they accepted this limitation. Their focus then turned to narrowing the cancer presumption, which still broadly covered
cancers ofmanybody systems. See 

### H.B. 

### REP. ONH.B. 2663, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). The bill's final draft, Second Substitute HB 2663, finally narrowed the list of
cancers. SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2663, at 3, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002) (as passedbylegislature). Yet it also modified subsection (4) to its current form: The presumption established in subsection (1) (d) ofthis section shall be extended to 

### any fire fighter who has contracted any ofthe following infectious diseases: Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, all strains of hepatitis, meningococcal meningitis, or mycobacterium tuberculosis. 

### !d. (emphasis added). The addition of"shall be extended to" is not explained in the written legislative record, which characterizes the change to subsection (4) only as
a "[t]echnical correction[ ]
... to clarify the references to ... HIV/AIDS." H.B. 

### REP. ON H.B. 2663, at 4, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). The new language may have come from a companion senate bill that also "extended" its infectious disease presumption to the same diseases. 8 See 

### SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6643, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002).

8 Notably, the senate interpreted subsection (4) in its bill as "limit[ing] the types of infectious diseases for which a presumption ofoccupational disease is established." S.B. REP. ON SUBSTITUTE S.B. 6643, at 1, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). The first draft ofthe senatebill, like HB 2663, left infectious diseases undefined. S.B. 6643, 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). 

### 16Gorre v. City ofTacoma, No. 90620-3 Gorre argues the change to subsection ( 4)-eventually codified at RCW 51.32.185(4)-signals that the legislature intended to enlarge the infectious disease presumption. But that inference is at odds with the uniform interpretation ofthose involved in drafting the law. See State v. Evans, 177 Wn.2d 186, 199, 298 P.3d 724 (2013) (using "probative committee hearings" to derive legislative intent). Afterthe house passed Second Substitute HB 2663, the sponsoring representative testified before members ofthe senate to urge its passage in that chamber: This bill passed unanimously out ofthe House
... due to the fact that we sat down with the firefighter organizations, with the fire districts, and withthe cities andworkedoutacompromise
.... [T]he compromise onthis bill is really inthe last section ofthatbill
...where we basically definethe cancers ... and also restrictthe infectiousdiseases andhence we kind ofreduce the cost ofthis.9 The stakeholders echoed a restrictive interpretation of subsection ( 4). The firefighters' representative testified that negotiations had "very much narrowed the scope ofthis particularbill.
...The cancers havebeenlimited
... [and] the infectious diseases are limitedtojustthose four diseases that have been listed in the text of the bill." 10 The cities' representative likewise cited subsection (4)'s "narrowed definition of infectious diseases" as a reason the cities withdrew their previous

9 Hr'g on Second Substitute H.B. 2663 Before the S. Labor, Commerce and Fin. Inst. Comm., 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Feb. 25, 2002), at 25 min., 55 sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State's Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org (emphasis added). 10 Hr'gon Second Substitute H.B. 2663 Before the S. Ways and Means Comm., 57th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mar. 1, 2002), at 51 min., audio recordingbyTVW, Washington State'sPublicAffairs Network, http://www.tvw.org (emphasis added).
17Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 opposition to the bill. 11 The senate passed Second Substitute HB 2663 without amendment, and it wasincorporated into RCW 51.32.185. LAWS OF 2002, ch. 337, § 2. The final bill report also treats subsection (4) as a limiting provision. FINALB. REP. ON SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2663, 57thLeg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2002). While curious, the change to RCW 51.32.185(4) does not overcome the conclusivehistorythattheprovisionlimits the infectious diseasepresumption. From the outset, the stakeholders and legislators acknowledged the original bill was overbroad. Each successive draft addressedthatconcern, first inSubstituteHB 2663 by enumerating certain infectious diseases, and then in Second Substitute HB 2663 by narrowing the number of cancers. This is a clear trend of whittling the presumptions, notexpandingthem. CfLewis v. Dep 'tof Licensing, 157 Wn.2d446, 470, 139 

### P.3d 1078 (2006) (sequential drafts ofa bill can indicate legislative intent). Instead ofinterpreting the statute consistent with this trend, Gorre asks us to infer that in the final stages of negotiation, the legislature eschewed compromise and revived an expansive infectious disease presumption that it had already outright rejected. Nothing in the legislative record supports such an abrupt shift in policy. Consideringthe legislativerecord as a whole, weholdthatRCW 51.32.185(4) limits the presumption in RCW 51.32.185(l)(d) to the infectious diseases expressly enumerated.

11 Id. at 52 min., 35 sec. 18Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3 CONCLUSION RCW 51.32.185 is a narrow exception to the Act's general rule that workers mustprovethey suffer from an occupational disease. Consistent withthat intent, we interpret "respiratory disease" in RCW 51.32.185(1)(a) to mean those diseases that the medical profession understands to be respiratory diseases. We also interpret RCW 51.32.185(4) as the exclusive list of "infectious diseases" qualifying under RCW 51.32.185(1)(d). This does notpreclude firefighters with impaired breathing
or other infectious diseases from obtaining workers' compensation benefits; itjust requires them to prove causationjust like any other injured worker. We reversethe CourtofAppeals and reinstatethe superior court'sjudgmentP

12 Substantial evidence supports the superior court's findings and the court's legal conclusions flow from those findings. See Ruse, 138 Wn.2d at 5-6. The superior court adopted the Board's findings that valley fever was an infectious disease, not a respiratory one, and that Gorre's exposure occurred in Nevada. The superior court concluded that Gone failed to show he suffered an occupational disease under the Act. Substantial evidence exists ifarational trier offact could find the facts by apreponderance ofthe evidence; unchallenged findings are verities on appeal. In re Welfare of A. W., 182 Wn.2d 689, 711, 44 P.3d 1186 (2015) (citing Merriman v. Cokeley, 168 Wn.2d 627, 631, 230 P.3d 162 (20 1 0)). Notonly does Gorre fail to challenge valley fever's classification as an infectious disease, his briefs rely on it. And the City's medical experts testified on a more probable than not basis that Gorre was exposed to the fungus while golf1ng in Las Vegas. The superior court's legal conclusion that Gorre's valley fever is not an occupational disease flows from those two findings. An occupational disease must "arise[ ] naturally and proximately out of employment." RCW 51.08.140. Golf1ng in Nevada is not naturally or proximately connected to firefighting in Washington. Reinstatement of the superior court's judgment is therefore the appropriate remedy. 19

### Gorre v. City of Tacoma, No. 90620-3



### WE CONCUR:

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### Gorre v. City of Tacoma Dissent by Johnson, J.

No. 90620-3 JOHNSON, 

### J. (dissenting)-This case involves the Industrial Insurance Act's (IIA) 1

### evidentiary exception designed to benefit and protect our state's firefighters. In exchange for firefighters' willingness to compromise their own health and safety as a part oftheir occupation, the legislature grants them a rebuttable presumptionthat certain afflictions-respiratory diseases, certain cancers, certain heartproblems, and infectious diseases-areprima facie occupational diseases under RCW 51.08.140. We are obligatedto construe this remedial exception broadly, in favor ofthose whosejobputs them at higher risk for disease and infection. Butin applying that statute, the majority finds ambiguity where there is none and arrives at an interpretation ofthe statute that contravenes the statute's plain language and legislative intent. Forthe foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

1 Title 51 RCW.Gorre v. City o.fTacoma, No. 90620-3 (Johnson, J., dissenting) 

### StatutoryInterpretation The IIA provides certain benefits to employees who suffer from occupational diseases. To qualify for benefits, a claimant generally bears the burden ofestablishing causation between the workplace conditions and the disease. RCW 51.32.185(1) flips this burden with respectto those diseases firefighters are most susceptible to as a class: relevant to this case, we presume that "[r]espiratory disease[s]" and "infectious diseases" are causedbythe nature oftheir work. RCW 51.32.185(1 )(a), (d). As discussed by the majority, the IIA does notprovide a definition for "respiratory diseases" or "infectious diseases," and it is our obligation to interpret those terms in accord with legislative intent. We startthat analysis with the purpose ofthe statute at issue. The legislature specifically recognized that firefighters as a class suffer a higherrate oflung disease thanthe general public due to their regular exposure to notjust smoke and fumes but also toxic or chemical substances. 

### LAws OF 

### 1987, ch. 515, 

### § 1. The legislature conferred this benefit in order to ease the evidentiary burden for firefighters, whose employmentputs their health and safety at risk. Because the IIA "is remedial in nature," we are required to construe it "liberally

... in order to achieve its purpose ofproviding compensationto all covered employees injured in their employment, with doubts resolved in favor ofthe

2Gorre v. City ofTacoma, No. 90620-3 (Johnson, J., dissenting) 

### worker." Dennis v. Dep 't of Labor &Indus., 109 Wn.2d 467,470, 745 P.2d 1295 (1987). Through that lens, the Court ofAppeals correctly recognized that valley fever--a disease that "is transmitted through inhalation" and "'impairs a person's respiratory system"--constitutes both a "respiratory disease" and an "infectious disease" under the statute.2 

### Gorre v. City ofTacoma, 180 Wn. App. 729, 763, 324 P.3d 716 (2014), review granted, 181 Wn.2d 1033, 343 P.3d 760 (2015). I agree with the Court ofAppeals that valley fever constitutes both types ofdiseases and that both exceptions qualify Gorre for the rebuttable presumption. RespiratoryDisease It is well settled thatwhen a term is not defined by statute, the court may look to the dictionary to give the undefined term meaning. Ultimately, the court will adopt the interpretation that best advances the legislative purpose, but so long
as the dictionary provides a definition consistent with legislative intent, it is an (.).ppropriate source for interpretative guidance. LaCoursiere v. CamwestDev., Inc., 181 Wn.2d 734, 742, 339 P.3d 963 (2014).

2 These statutory terms do not purportto be mutually exclusive, and this court should refrain from reading a nonexistent limitation into what shouldhave been a broad reading ofthe statutory exception. 3Gorre v. City ofTacqrna, No. 90620-3 (Johnsori, J., dissenting) · 

### Here, the Court ofAppeals lookedto the dictionary, which defines (1) '"respiratory' as 'oforrelating to respiration,"' wherein "respiration" means the "'single, complete act ofbreathing,"' and (2) "'disease' as a 'cause ofdiscomfort
or harm,' or 'an impairment ofthe normal state ofthe living animal or plantbody
or any ofits components that interrupts or modifies the part ofthe vital functions.'"

, Gorre, 

### 180 Wn. 

### App. at 762 (footnote omitted) (quoting WEBSTER'S 

### THIRD NEW INTERNATIONALDICTIONARY 

### 1934, 648 (2002)). Thus, "respiratory disease" is a condition ofthe respiratory system that causes discomfort or harm, impairing the normal physiological functioning relating to, affecting, or used in the physical act ofbreathing. The dictionary definition reflects a common, layperson's understanding of "respiratory disease," and here it serves as an appropriate guide for interpretation. Where the legislative intentis to afford an exception to firefighters in recognition thatthey expose their lungs to all sorts ofchemicals and substances, it follows that the legislature would intendto include those diseases, like valley fever, that are contracted through inhalation, infect the lungs, and cause serious damage to the respiratory system.3



### --------------- 3 Vve address only the cases before us, butto the extentthe dictionary definition could be applied to different facts in a manner that is incongruous with legislative intent, the dictionary definition may no longer be helpful. Here, the dictionary definition aptly serves as an 4Gorre v. City o.fTacoma, No. 90620-3 (Johnson, J., dissenting) 

### The majority adopts a much narrower definition, reasoning in partthatthe exception serves as a shortcutto proving causation, which typically requires a plaintiffto present extensive medical expert testimony. Therefore, the legislature

. . . 

### must have fntended that "respiratory disease" consists ofonly those diseases that fall within the technical, medical definition. The rnajority's analysis diminishes the larger purpose ofthe statute by focusing instead on its ancillary features. As discussed by the majority, the importance ofexpert medical testimony can certainly be inferred from the statute and legislative history; butthe primary goal ofthe statute is to provide an evidentiary shortcut for certain diseases in recognition that airborne contaminants
are a**comm~m** 

### cause of**~isease** 

### among firefighters. The majority's definition of "respiratory disease" could potentially exclude a whole host ofother diseases, like valley fever, that are causedby inhaling contaminated air, but may be characterized by the medical community in a way that the legislature could not havepredicted. This is why it is the role ofmedical experts to testify as to the medical aspects ofthe disease-such as the disease's causation and its effects-but it is within the proper ambit ofthe courtto determine whether the legislature likely

interpretative guiding tool for determining whether valley fever constitutes "respiratory disease" under the statute. · 5Gorre v. City ofTacoma, No. 90620-3 (Johnson, J., dissenting) intended the exceptionto apply. Here, expertmedical testimony establishedthat valley fever is caused by the inhalation oftoxic spores into the lungs, which causes serious respiratory and pulmonary symptoms. The**me~ical** community may categorize the disease differently, but a broader, ordinary interpretation ofthe term confirn1s·our commitmentto reading remedial statutes broadly andbetterreflects .<Jt:the underlying legislative purpose ofthis exception. 

### Infectious Disease There is no dispute that valley fever constitutes an "infectious disease[]" under RCW 51.32.185(1)(d); medical experts onboth sides testified thatvalley fever qualif1es as an infectious disease. The dispute lies in the proper interpretation ofsubsection (4) ofthe statute, which provides that "[t]the presumption established in subsection (1)(d) ofthis section[, "infectious diseases,"] 

### shall be extendedto any firefighter who has contacted any ofthe following diseases
...." RCW 51.32.185(4) (emphasis added). Ininterpreting the meaning ofany statutory provision, we follow certain steps. First, when a statute's meaning is clear on its face, we give effectto that plain meaning as an expression oflegislative intent We discern thatplain meaning from the ordinary meaning ofthe**l~n.guage** at issue, the context in whichthe statutory provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as whole.

6Gon"e.v. Cityof Tacoma, No.**90620~3** (Johnson, J., dissenting) If, after this, the term is then susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,
we may lookto other sources oflegislative intent. 

### State v. Ervin, 169 Wn.2d 815, 820,239 P.3d 354 (2010). The ordinary meaning ofRCW 51.32.185(1)(d) is that the evidentiary exception applies to "infectious diseases." Subsection (4), byits ordinary meaning,**·~** >lt'equires thatthe term "infectious diseases" extendto four enumerated diseases. As recognized by the Court ofAppeals, the phrase "shall be extendedto" evinces the clear legislative intentto ensure the inclusion offour specific types ofinfectious diseases. Nothing within this subsection should be readto limitthe coverage of infectious diseases generally. Instead of**~pplying** the statute's plain meaning, the majority delves into**legislativ~** history_, insisting that.the statute is ambiguous because subsection (4) coul.d be read as creating an exclusive list. Butthe majority manufactures this ambiguity. The language ofthis subsection does not contain any limitingphrases,
nor by its terms does the subsection even suggest a limitation ofthe exceptionto the enumerated list. Subsection (4) purports to do nothing more than ensure coverage 

### for four specifiedtypes ofinfectious diseases. The majority disagrees, reasoning that whenthe legislature said "shall extendto," it mighthave 

### actually

. ' . . meant "shall 

### only extendto." Butthis interpretation ofthe statute requires an

7Gorre v. City o.fTacoma, No. 90620-3 (Jbhnson, J., dissenting) 

### infere.nce thatthe legislature omittedthe word "only" out ofeither sloppiness or mistake. 

### I disagree that such ambiguity exists. The legislature is perfectly proficient at drawing statutes carefully and will includelimiting language when it intends to create a limitation. In fact, the legislature demonstrated its ability to do so inthe dwo subsections immediately preceding subsection (4): (2) The presumptions established in subsection (1) ofthis section shall be extendedto an applicable member following termination ofservice for a period ofthree calendar months for each year ofrequisite service, butmaynotextendmore than sixty months following the last date ofemployment. (3) The presumption established in subsection ( 1 )(c) ofthis section[, cancer,] shall onjy_ apply to anyactive or former firefighter tvho has cancer that develops or manifests itselfafter the firefighter has served at leastten years .... The presumption within subsection 

### (I)(c) ofthis section shall9nlyapply to prostate cancer diagnosed priorto the age offifty, primary brain cancer, malignant melanoma,
·leukemia, non.:.Hodgkin's lymphoma, bladder cancer, ureter cancer,

colorectal cancer, multiple myeloma, testicular cancer, and kidney cancer. RCW 51.32.185 (emphasis added). It

### is unlikely that the legislature, having expressly limited the exception's scope in both subsections (2) and (3), suddenly forgot howto do so when drafting subsection ( 4). It

### is also anunreasonable interpretation ofthe statute to assume this to be the·case. The language ofthesepreceding subsections is the strongest

8GQrre v. City.ofTacoma, No. 90620--3 (Johnson; J., dissenting) 

### conceivable evidence that the legislatureknows how 

### to create an exclusive list when it wants to but that it chose not to do so with respectto infectious diseases. It 

### is inappropriate to delve into legislative history whenthe meaning ofthis provision is plain on its face. To replace the plain meaning ofthe statute with our own derived interpretation is to deprive the legislature ofits own chosen words and :iCarefully selected omissions and, in essence, rewrites the statutory language. I wouldhold that the statute plainly covers infectious diseases and provides only an additional assurance that certain diseases fall within the statutory definition of"infectious disease." Ifthe legislature intends to limitthe scope ofthe exception with respect to infectious diseases, it is within its proper authority to revise the statute as h sees

### fit. Butit is not the role ofthe court to read in language not present in the statute. Because it is undisputed that valley fever constitutes an "infectious disease," it is covered by the statute and Gorre shouldhave been

9Gorre v. City ofTacoma,No. 90620-3 (Johnsori, J., dissenting) 

### entitled to the presumption in his favor. I respectfully dissent.

10