UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4237

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ROBERT STEWART,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge. 

(1:13-cr-00262-ELH-1)

Submitted: October 14, 2014 Decided: October 24, 2014

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Julie L.B. Johnson, 

Appellate Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Debra L. Dwyer, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Raishay Lin, Student Law Clerk, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Robert Stewart appeals the 180-month armed career 

criminal sentence imposed by the district court pursuant to 18 

U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012) following his guilty plea to possession 

of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 922(g)(1) (2012). On appeal, Stewart contends that the 

district court erred in imposing a statutory mandatory minimum 

sentence because such sentences conflict with the mandate of 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) to impose a sentence that is “sufficient 

but not greater than necessary.” Stewart also contends that the 

court increased his statutory maximum sentence based on facts 

that were not charged in the indictment or submitted to a jury,

in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

Stewart first contends that the § 924(e) mandatory 

minimum conflicts with the sentencing mandate of § 3553(a). We 

disagree. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a) (2012), courts must 

sentence a defendant in accordance with § 3553(a) “[e]xcept as 

otherwise specifically provided.” 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a). “Thus, 

the general sentencing provisions in § 3553(a) give way to 

specific mandatory sentencing provisions elsewhere in the 

criminal code.” United States v. Carter, 696 F.3d 229, 232 (2d 

Cir. 2012); see also United States v. Sutton, 625 F.3d 526, 529 

(8th Cir. 2010). Moreover, “[c]ourts have uniformly rejected 
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the claim that § 3553(a)’s ‘no greater than necessary’ language 

authorizes a district court to sentence below the statutory 

minimum.” United States v. Cirilo-Munoz, 582 F.3d 54, 55 (1st 

Cir. 2009) (collecting cases); see United States v. Robinson, 

404 F.3d 850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005) “([A] district court has no

discretion to impose a sentence outside of the statutory range 

established by Congress for the offense of conviction.”).

Second, Stewart contends that the district court 

violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by increasing his 

statutory maximum term of imprisonment based on prior 

convictions that were neither alleged in the indictment nor 

submitted to a jury. This claim is, however, foreclosed by 

Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–35 (1998). 

See United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 124 (4th Cir. 2014) 

(stating that “Almendarez–Torres remains good law”), petition 

for cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. June 16, 2014) (No. 13–

10640); United States v. Graham, 711 F.3d 445 (4th Cir.) (“[W]e 

are bound by Almendarez—Torres unless and until the Supreme 

Court says otherwise.”), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 449 (2013).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED