If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

DEMETRIUS TAYLOR-BEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNPUBLISHED

April 30, 2019

v No. 342122

Montcalm Circuit Court

CARSON CITY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 

WARDEN,

LC No. 2017-023222-AH

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: BECKERING, P.J., and SERVITTO and STEPHENS, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff, Demetrius Taylor-Bey, appeals an order denying his petition for habeas corpus 

relief. We affirm.

I. RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 2009, following his conviction for felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, 

and possession of a firearm while committing a felony, MCL 750.227b, the trial court sentenced 

plaintiff as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to appropriate terms of imprisonment. 

While incarcerated, plaintiff was convicted of being a prisoner in possession of a weapon, MCL 

800.283(4), for which he received a sentence of 16 months to five years in prison. In 2014, the 

Michigan Parole Board approved plaintiff’s parole and assigned him a 24-month term of parole. 

In September 2015, plaintiff was convicted of filing a false police report, MCL 750.411a(1)(b) 

and sentenced to two years’ probation. As conditions for his probation, plaintiff was prohibited 

from using or possessing weapons, using or possessing intoxicating substances, being in the 

company of anyone using or possessing weapons, operating a motor vehicle without permission 

from his parole officer, and associating with felons.

While plaintiff was on parole, Detroit Police Officers observed a person wanted on a 

felony warrant sitting in the passenger seat of the vehicle plaintiff was driving. After pulling the 

vehicle over, officers observed a small bag with “crumbs of crack/cocaine” on the ground near 

the passenger side of the vehicle. After having the passengers exit the vehicle, officers searched 
-2-

it and found a paper bag containing 31 small bags of crack/cocaine in the back seat, and a large 

meat cleaver and a loaded handgun with an extended magazine in the front seat. Plaintiff denied 

knowledge of the gun, stating that it belonged to the person who had been sitting in the passenger 

seat. Plaintiff was charged with 11 parole violations as a result of this incident.

At a formal parole revocation hearing, the arresting officer testified that he observed 

plaintiff “lean over towards the passenger side floorboard” and he heard a thump sound on the 

floorboard. The officer testified that plaintiff told him that he was trying to get something out of 

the glove box, but that he did not see plaintiff move towards the glove box. When officers 

searched the vehicle, they recovered a handgun from under the front passenger seat. Plaintiff 

testified that when the police pulled him over, the person sitting in the passenger seat took the 

gun from her backpack and threw it under the front seat, and then threw her backpack in the 

backseat. Plaintiff explained that he reached into the center console to remove his driver’s 

license, and the thump the officer heard was the center console closing. Plaintiff testified that he 

did not go to the glove box. Plaintiff testified that the only things he did wrong were driving 

without his parole officer’s permission and picking up the wanted individual.

The parole board considered the charged parole violations of possessing a weapon and 

possessing ammunition. After considering plaintiff’s past conviction for filing a false police 

report and his character for untruthfulness, the parole board found that the testifying officer was 

more credible than plaintiff’s testimony and defense. The parole board found that there was 

“strong evidence” that plaintiff reached down toward the front passenger floorboard to discard 

the handgun and, in so doing, the gun made a thumping noise. By grabbing the gun to discard it, 

plaintiff was in actual possession of the gun, so the parole board found plaintiff guilty of 

possessing a weapon and possessing ammunition. The parole board also found plaintiff guilty of 

driving without his parole officer’s permission, but dismissed all other parole violations.

Turning next to the question of mitigating circumstances, the parole board considered 

five letters of support provided by plaintiff, as well as character testimony from plaintiff and 

three supporting witnesses. Plaintiff’s mother, friend, and girlfriend each testified that he would 

adhere to the terms of his parole if released, and that he was an asset, rather than a menace, to the 

community.

The parole board revoked plaintiff’s parole, and plaintiff filed a pro se petition for a writ 

of habeas corpus challenging the parole board’s decision. The trial court issued a brief order 

denying plaintiff’s petition, finding that plaintiff was seeking relief outside the scope of a habeas 

action, and stating that plaintiff could seek relief from the parole board’s decision by filing an 

administrative appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by declining to consider the merits of his 

petition and by denying him habeas relief, and that his petition set forth radical defects in the 

parole board’s jurisdiction that render the proceeding void. We disagree. We review de novo 

questions of law, People v Henry, 315 Mich App 130, 143; 889 NW2d 1 (2016), as well as a trial 

court’s interpretation and application of statutes and court rules, Morales v Parole Bd, 260 Mich 

App 29, 33; 676 NW2d 221 (2003).
-3-

A parole board may revoke parole “[i]f a preponderance of the evidence supports the 

allegation that a parole violation occurred.” MCL 791.240a(10). If a proceeding before the 

parole board contains a radical defect in jurisdiction that renders the proceeding or decision 

absolutely void, a petition for habeas corpus is proper. See In re Stone, 295 Mich 207, 209; 294 

NW 156 (1940). “A radical defect in jurisdiction contemplates . . . an act or omission by state 

authorities that clearly contravenes an express legal requirement in existence at the time of the 

act or omission.” People v Price, 23 Mich App 663, 671; 179 NW2d 177 (1970). Habeas relief 

is not available to “test questions of evidence,” Stone, 295 Mich at 212, nor is it available as a 

writ of error, Kenney v Booker, 494 Mich 852, 852; 830 NW2d 382 (2013).

The trial court did not err in declining to consider the merits of plaintiff’s petition. 

Plaintiff alleged in his petition that the board’s conclusion that he was in violation of his parole 

was contrary to the evidence. He also alleged that the board violated his right to due process 

when it considered his conviction for filing a false police report while on parole, and when it

determined his guilt based solely on the arresting officer’s testimony. Finally, he alleged that he 

received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the conditions of his parole were 

constitutionally vague. These allegations pertain to the board’s consideration of the evidence of 

plaintiff’s parole violation. Plaintiff essentially asked the trial court to review the sufficiency of 

the evidence, the contents of the evidence, defense counsel’s performance with the evidence, and 

the parole board’s determinations regarding the weight and credibility of the evidence. Habeas 

relief is not available to “test questions of evidence,” Stone, 295 Mich at 212, nor is it available 

as a writ of error, Kenney, 494 Mich at 852. Thus, the trial court did not err by declining to 

consider these allegations of error in plaintiff’s petition because they were not subject to habeas 

relief.

Plaintiff also alleged in his petition that the board denied him an in-person hearing at the 

mitigation stage of the revocation proceedings. To the contrary, the record evidence shows that 

plaintiff was present for the mitigation stage of the board’s proceedings and presented five letters 

of support, testified, and presented the testimony of three other witnesses. Thus, plaintiff’s 

allegation of error in the board’s proceedings at the mitigation stage is without factual support. 

In addition, even if there were factual support for plaintiff’s allegation, any error would not rise 

to the level of a “radical defect.” “[T]he full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal 

proceeding does not apply to parole revocation, but . . . some orderly process, however informal, 

[is] required.” Triplett v Deputy Warden, 142 Mich App 774, 782; 371 NW2d 862 (1985), citing 

Morissey v Brewer, 408 US 471; 92 S Ct 2593; 33 L Ed 2d 484 (1972). Moreover, the due 

process required in the context of parole is minimal: a prisoner must be afforded an opportunity 

to be heard and provided with a statement of reasons why his parole was denied. Swarthout v 

Cooke, 562 US 216, 220; 131 S Ct 859; 178 L Ed 2d 732 (2011). The record is clear that 

plaintiff had an opportunity to be heard, to call his own witnesses, to cross-examine the State’s 

witness, and to present evidence and witnesses of any mitigating circumstances, and that he 

received notification of why his parole was revoked. Thus, plaintiff enjoyed more than minimal 

due process. See id.

We conclude that the trial court did not err by declining to consider the merits of 

plaintiff’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Five of plaintiff’s six allegations of error
-4-

pertained to questions about evidence, and habeas relief is not available to “test questions of 

evidence,” Stone, 295 Mich at 212, and plaintiff’s sixth allegation was unsupported by fact.

Affirmed.

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto

/s/ Cynthia Diane Stephens