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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: E.G. :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: E.G., :

: No. 1255 WDA 2014

 Appellant :

Appeal from the Order Dated July 2, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. 1022 of 2014

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., DONOHUE AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 15, 2015

E.G.1appeals from the final order of the trial court that denied his 

petition for review of a commitment order entered pursuant to Section 303 

of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 P.S. § 7303, extending his 

confinement to a mental health facility for an additional 20 days. We affirm.

The facts underlying appellant’s involuntary commitment have been 

summarized by the trial court as follows:

On June 22, 2014, the Appellant, [E.G.], was 

admitted to Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic 

(WPIC) pursuant to the provisions of 50 P.S. § 7302. 

According to the Application for Involuntary 

Emergency Examination and Treatment it was 

reported, inter alia, that the Appellant continually 

talked to his neighbor about a “Pittsburgh chainsaw 

massacre”. The Appellant then purchased a 

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mindful of the sensitive nature of the case, we have amended the case 

caption to utilize only the initials of the appellant.
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chainsaw and told the neighbor that he needed to 

get a sharper blade for it. The Appellant also, 

according to the neighbor, loves fires and would 

“make large pillars of flames.”

On June 23, 2014, during a medical 

examination at WPIC the Appellant admitted to 

purchasing a chainsaw and making statements about 

using it. He denied any thoughts of harming himself 

or others. As a result of the exam, Dr. Robin E. 

Valpey, M.D. found that the Appellant was: 

“hyperverbal with overproductive speech, grandiose 

and very irritable. Admits to some paranoia in the 

past and perceiving things others don’t perceive, but 

would not share further.”

On June 24, 2014, a hearing was held 

pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7303 before Mental Health 

Review Officer (MHRO) Wrenna L. Watson, Esq. The 

Appellant was present at the hearing and was 

represented by the Office of the Public Defender. 

The Allegheny County Solicitor presented the 

testimony of Dr. Valpey that the Appellant was 

severely mentally disabled. A neighbor testified 

concerning the Appellant obtaining and displaying a 

chainsaw and that the Appellant had 4 tanks of 

gasoline in his backyard and would often build large 

fires with flames that reached 10 feet high or more. 

Furthermore, the neighbor testified that the 

Appellant’s driving was erratic, fast, and dangerous. 

The neighbor testified that he felt unsafe living next 

door to the Appellant and had his locks changed. 

Based on the testimony of the Doctor and the 

neighbor, the MHRO found that the Appellant 

continued to be severely mentally disabled and in 

need of involuntary inpatient and outpatient care for 

a period not to exceed 20 days.

Trial court opinion, 12/10/14 at 1-2.
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On June 2, 2014, following a hearing, the trial court upheld the 

certification of severe mental illness by final order. Appellant raises one 

issue on appeal:

I. WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO 

ESTABLISH THAT [APPELLANT] WOULD POSE A 

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO HIMSELF OR 

OTHERS WHERE THE COMMONWEALTH 

ESTABLISHED ONLY THAT [APPELLANT] 

SUFFERS FROM A MENTAL ILLNESS AND MADE 

ANOTHER PERSON UNCOMFORTABLE?

Appellant’s brief at 4.

This court reviews determinations pursuant to the MHPA “to determine 

whether there is evidence in the record to justify the hearing court’s 

findings.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa.Super. 2005), citing 

Commonwealth ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105, 107 (Pa. 

1981). Although “we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact that have 

support in the record, we are not bound by its legal conclusions from those 

facts.” Id. citing Gibson, 439 A.2d at 107.

The legislature’s purpose in enacting the Mental 

Health Procedures Act was “to assure the availability 

of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally 

ill” and “to make voluntary and involuntary 

treatment available where the need is great and its 

absence could result in serious harm to the mentally 

ill person or to others.” Mental Health Procedures 

Act, § 102. See also In re McMullins, 315 

Pa.Super. 531, 462 A.2d 718, 722 (1983). To 

achieve these objectives within the constraints of 

due process “the scheme adopted by the legislature 

here envisions that more extensive procedural or 

‘due process’ protections will apply as the amount of 

time a person may be deprived of liberty increases 
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above a bare minimum.” Matter of Seegrist, 517 

Pa. 568, 574, 539 A.2d 799, 802 (1988). The 

resulting progression in sections 302, 303, and 304, 

evinces the legislature’s clear concern that the 

procedural protections afforded our citizens reflect 

the extent of the deprivation of liberty at stake. 

In re Hancock, 719 A.2d 1053, 1057 

(Pa.Super.1998).

Section 302, which provides for involuntary 

emergency examination and treatment, allows 

confinement of the patient for up to 120 hours upon 

certification by a physician, or authorization by the 

county mental health administrator. Mental Health 

Procedures Act, § 302(a), (d). Though action by the 

administrator requires issuance of a warrant, “[i]n 

light of the emergency nature, therapeutic purpose 

and short duration” of a section 302 commitment, 

the warrant need not be supported by probable 

cause and may be based upon hearsay. In re J.M., 

556 Pa. [63,] 75-76 n. 9, 726 A.2d [1041,] 1046-47 

n. 9 [(1999)].

Section 303 provides for extended involuntary 

emergency treatment whenever, following a patient’s 

commitment under section 302, “the facility [where 

the individual is currently under treatment] 

determines that the need for emergency treatment is 

likely to extend beyond 120 hours.” Mental Health 

Procedures Act § 303(a). To ensure that the 

individual’s liberty interest is protected, section 303 

subjects the facility’s determination to substantial 

legal scrutiny. Application for continued treatment 

must be made to the court of common pleas and 

shall state the grounds on which treatment is to be 

imposed along with the name of any examining 

physician and the substance of his opinion regarding 

the mental condition of the patient. Id. at § 303(a). 

Because a patient may be confined under 

section 303 for as long as twenty days, the 

legislature has mandated a right to counsel, and the 

right to an informal hearing, at which counsel may 

question the examining physician and other 

witnesses. Id. at § 303(b), (c). Though the rules of 
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evidence need not be applied, the reviewing judge or 

mental health review officer (MHRO) must confine 

his consideration to evidence he deems reliable. Id.

at § 303(c). Moreover, we have held that a patient 

may not be confined under section 303 on a showing 

of less than “clear and convincing evidence.” In re 

Hancock, supra at 1058.

In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 555-556 (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 751 

A.2d 192 (Pa. 2000).

Instantly, appellant’s commitment was extended under Section 303 

after an informal commitment hearing.2 To prove the necessity for 

emergency involuntary commitment under Section 303, the petitioner must 

demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the person being 

committed is severely mentally disabled and in need of extended involuntary 

treatment. In re S.B., 777 A.2d 454 (Pa.Super. 2000).

The MHPA defines a person who is severely mentally disabled in 

pertinent part as follows:

§ 7301. Persons who may be subject to 

involuntary emergency examination and 

treatment

(a) Persons Subject.--Whenever a person 

is severely mentally disabled and in need 

of immediate treatment, he may be 

 

2 This court notes that although the commitment order in this appeal has 

since expired, “appeals from involuntary commitment orders which have 

expired are not moot because involuntary commitment affects an important 

liberty interest, and because by their nature most involuntary commitment 

orders expire before appellate review is possible.” In re Condry, 450 A.2d 

136, 137 (Pa.Super. 1982) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted); 

In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293 (Pa.Super. 1997). Accordingly, appellant’s 

arguments are not moot, and will be considered on their merits.
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made subject to involuntary emergency 

examination and treatment. A person is 

severely mentally disabled when, as a 

result of mental illness, his capacity to 

exercise self-control, judgment and 

discretion in the conduct of his affairs 

and social relations or to care for his own 

personal needs is so lessened that he 

poses a clear and present danger of 

harm to others or to himself.

50 P.S. § 7301.

Pursuant to 50 P.S. § 7301(b), “a clear and present danger of harm to 

others may be demonstrated by proof that the person has made threats of 

harm and has committed acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm.”

Instantly, appellant argues the evidence presented at his certification 

did not establish that he was a clear and present danger to himself or 

others. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he 

committed any acts in furtherance of the threat to commit harm. He 

contends that there is no indication that he did anything more than cut up 

sticks in his backyard with a chainsaw. There was no allegation that he 

attempted to strike his neighbor with the chainsaw or swing it in a 

threatening manner. Appellant contends that the testimony established only 

that appellant made one of his neighbors “really uncomfortable” and that 

merely making another person uncomfortable did not justify his involuntary 
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commitment. We disagree with appellant’s version of the evidence and find 

that the record amply supports the hearing court’s findings.3

The Commonwealth called two witnesses, (1) Charlie Hron-Weigle, 

appellant’s neighbor and friend, and (2) Dr. Robin Valpey, appellant’s 

treating physician at WPIC.

Hron-Weigle testified that over the previous 30 days, he had become 

“increasingly uncomfortable” by appellant. Hron-Weigle testified that 

appellant was “talking about chainsawing me.” (Hearing audio, 6/24/14 at 

1:40.) Appellant then obtained a chainsaw and began using it near 

Hron-Weigle. While holding the chainsaw near Hron-Weigle, appellant 

repeated the threat, “maybe I should chainsaw Charlie [Hron-Weigle].” (Id.

at 2:53.) Hron-Weigle also testified that appellant stated that he needed to 

sharpen the chainsaw blades. Appellant then had the blades sharpened. 

Hron-Weigle felt so unsafe that he changed the locks on his door, could not 

sleep until sunrise, and slept with a knife. Hron-Weigle also testified that 

appellant poured kerosene on a live fire near the apartment building and the 

flames reached ten feet high (id. at 3:10), and that appellant’s driving had 

become erratic, fast, and dangerous. (Id. at 4:22.)

 

3 The audio recording of the June 24, 2014, hearing before the health review 

officer has been made part of the record. This court has reviewed the 

recordings. References to the audio recording will be cited using this 

format: (Hearing audio, 6/24/14 at __:__.)
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Dr. Valpey testified that appellant was previously diagnosed with 

schizophrenia and ADHD. She also stated that he was diagnosed with 

“Mood Disorder” during his initial commitment. (Id. at 9:42.) Dr. Valpey

stated that appellant admitted to stopping his medications from a prior 

hospitalization and was reluctant to take the medications while at the 

hospital. She testified that appellant drew a picture of blood dripping from 

the acronym WPIC. (Id. at 11:48.) Dr. Valpey expressed her belief that 

appellant required further inpatient treatment.

In In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293 (Pa.Super. 1997), a man argued 

that his initial involuntary commitment was improper because the petition 

filed by his estranged wife failed to allege a threat and acts in furtherance of 

the threat. He claimed first that his statement to another, that he “might as 

well get a scope and a rifle and get rid of the problem, my soon-to-be-exwife,” did not constitute a threat. Id. at 1296. We rejected that argument. 

The question remaining was whether there was an overt act in furtherance 

of the threat. We held that the man’s purchase of a rifle scope from a 

sporting goods store on the day of his commitment constituted an overt act 

in furtherance of the threat.

In In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548 (Pa.Super. 1999), this court held that an 

elderly woman’s act of picking up her cane in an effort to hit another, 

together with verbal threats of harm, constituted an act in furtherance of the 

threat to commit harm, as contemplated by the statute.
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Here, the record demonstrates that appellant stated to Hron-Weigle, 

“maybe I should cut up Charlie.” The threat to cut someone up with a 

chainsaw could reasonably be determined to be a threat of harm. Having 

established the existence of a threat, we must determine under 

Section 7301(b) whether appellant “committed acts in furtherance of the 

threat to commit harm.” Contrary to appellant’s argument, the fact that 

there was no allegation that appellant attempted to strike Hron-Weigle with 

the chainsaw or swing it in a threatening manner is of no moment. We 

agree with the trial court that appellant’s subsequent procurement of a 

chainsaw after the verbal threat constituted an overt act in furtherance of 

the threat directed at Hron-Weigle. As we noted in In re Woodside, “the 

stakes are simply too high to require, beyond this conduct, a more explicit 

demonstration of appellant’s intention to carry out his threat.” In re 

Woodside, 699 A.2d at 1298.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court properly 

certified appellant’s continued involuntary treatment under Section 7303 

based on sufficient evidence of a clear and present danger to others. See

50 P.S. § 7301(b). Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/15/2015