J-S50029-14

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

 Appellee 

 v.

YVONNE ICAN BRADLEY, 

 Appellant 

: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

: PENNSYLVANIA 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: No. 305 WDA 2014 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 13, 2014, 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, 

Criminal Division, at No. CP-26-CR-0000112-2013. 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and ALLEN, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2014 

 Appellant, Yvonne Ican Bradley, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered following her convictions of theft by deception, receiving 

stolen property, forgery, and tampering with records. We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows: 

 In November, 2012, Officer John M. Kauer of the 

Uniontown Police Department (“UPD”) was engaged in 

investigation of an unrelated matter when he learned that a gray 

GMC Yukon, stolen in Pittsburgh, might be present in Fayette 

County. 

 The vehicle was reported stolen by Mrs. Paula Thorpe, to 

whom its title had recently been transferred. Mrs. Thorpe 

testified that, on July 5, 2012, while searching Craigslist, she 

came across a 2007 GMC Yukon for sale. Mrs. Thorpe responded 

to the ad by email with her contact information. Within two 

hours, she received a phone call from an individual, identified as 

“Michelle Jorry.” Mrs. Thorpe, along with her husband, agreed to 

meet Jorry at the Uniontown Sunoco Station, at around 7:00 
J-S50029-14

-2- 

o’clock p.m. Mrs. Thorpe identified [Appellant] as the person 

who met the Thorpes at the Sunoco, and who called herself 

Michelle Jorry. 

 [Appellant] informed the Thorpes that she was a home 

healthcare aid, which was believable because she wore scrubs 

and a tag identifying herself as Michelle Jorry. She claimed to 

have purchased the Yukon the year prior at an auto auction. Her 

asserted reason for selling the Yukon was that she had recently 

lost everything she owned in a fire and needed money. She 

claimed the title to the vehicle was new, the original having also 

been destroyed by the fire. [Appellant] indicated she would take 

“ten or eleven thousand” for the Yukon. 

 In the dash compartment, Mrs. Thorpe noticed a window 

sticker of the type usually appearing in new vehicles. Using the 

VIN appearing on that sticker, she ran a Carfax report and 

contacted the DMV. Those sources returned results for a 2007 

GMC Yukon, and came up clear of any accidents or reports of 

theft. The next day, Mrs. Thorpe again met [Appellant] at the 

Sunoco, placing a $3,800.00 cash down payment. Mrs. Thorpe 

was able to get an additional $6,000.00 from her mother, for a 

total of $9,800.00, which [Appellant] accepted as final payment. 

 

 After taking possession of the Yukon, Mrs. Thorpe removed 

its title, bearing a notary stamp and the name “Michelle Jorry,” 

from the dash compartment. She then took the title to a notary, 

Tina Dennis, to transfer the same. Mrs. Thorpe executed a bill of 

sale and pink slip, and left the matter with Ms. Dennis’ office. 

Sometime in late August, Mrs. Thorpe learned that Ms. Dennis 

could not transfer the title. 

 Ms. Dennis testified that, in her opinion, the facts and 

circumstances of this case demonstrated that the title provided 

to Mrs. Thorpe was a fake. Ms. Dennis noted, the title bore the 

notary seal of “Maryann Maiolo.” 

 Following his meeting with Mrs. Thorpe, Officer Kauer ran 

both the vehicle’s registration and VIN through N.C.I.C. The 

VIN, having been recently transferred, returned to Mrs. Thorpe. 

The registration, however, indicated that the vehicle was indeed 

stolen and belonged to Jesse Virgin. 
J-S50029-14

-3- 

 In May or June, 2012, Mr. Virgin posted the Yukon on 

Craigslist for $25,000.00. He received several calls from an 

individual interested in purchasing the vehicle. That person, who 

came to be known as “Audrey Merkel,” said she worked for P&W 

foreign car dealership, of Pittsburgh, and asked Mr. Virgin to 

meet her there in the evening. Mr. Virgin identified [Appellant] 

as the person calling herself Audrey Merkel, and stated that he 

recognized her voice from the phone calls. [Appellant] handed 

Mr. Virgin a check for $25,000, at which time he handed her the 

keys. Mr. Virgin stated that the title could only be transferred 

after he used the money to pay off the loan on the vehicle. 

 Maureen Lucas, the officer manager at P&W testified that, 

while Audrey Merkel was a real employee, [Appellant] was not 

Audrey Merkel. Though she had only seen [Appellant] one time 

at P&W, Ms. Lucas was able to identify her as a member of the 

cleaning staff. Around the end of June, Ms. Lucas became aware 

of an unauthorized check for $25,000, bearing forged signatures, 

which had cleared P&W’s bank account. The check’s number 

was 7698 and was made out to Jesse Virgin. After speaking with 

Mr. Virgin, Ms. Lucas contacted the bank and the police. 

 [Appellant] was arrested sometime later, during which

time her purse was taken by Uniontown Police and transferred to 

Officer Jamie Holland. Officer Holland inventoried the bag and 

provided lengthy testimony of its contents. Officer Holland 

catalogued, inter alia, $5,237.00 in cash, an identification card 

bearing the name “Michelle Jorry,” and a black bag containing 

four USB flash drives. 

 The flash drives were analyzed by PSP Trooper Donald

Lucas. Trooper Lucas is a member of the Bureau of Criminal 

Investigation, computer crimes unit, and was recognized as an 

expert in the field of forensic analysis of digital devices. His 

investigation uncovered twenty-two files, all of which were 

converted to twenty-four image printouts. Those printouts 

depicted, in relevant part: (1) a title bearing the name “Michelle 

Jorry,”; (2) a check, numbered 7698, made out to Jesse Virgin, 

for $25,000; (3) an image, titled “07 Yukon,”; (4) a PDF of a 

notarial seal for Maryann Maiolo; (5) a blank back page of a 

Pennsylvania vehicle title, bearing Maryann Maiolo’s same 
J-S50029-14

-4- 

notarial seal; and, (6) an image matching the image that 

appeared on the badge [Appellant] wore while meeting the 

Thorpes. 

 Trooper Lucas opined that many of the noted documents 

bore clear evidence of electronic forgery or were formatted in 

ways that would make forgery a relatively simple task. 

Trial Court Opinion, at 2-6.

 Following a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of theft by deception, 

receiving stolen property, forgery, and tampering with records. No post-trial 

or post-sentence motions were filed. Appellant filed this timely appeal and, 

pursuant to court order, filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 

 Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Did the court err when it failed to grant Appellant’s 

motions for mistrial based upon the Commonwealth introducing 

evidence of other crimes, specifically the reference to checks 

possibly stolen from P & W Motors? 

2. Did the court err when it failed to grant Appellant’s 

motions for judgment of acquittal as to the forgery and 

tampering with documents charges. Specifically, that the

Commonwealth did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

Appellant forged or tampered with the documents in the instant 

case? 

3. Did the Commonwealth fail to establish Appellant[’s] guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the person that 

purchased the vehicle from Mr. Virgin or had ever been to P & W 

Motors? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7. 

 

 Appellant first asserts that the trial court erred when it failed to grant 

Appellant’s motions for mistrial. Appellant’s Brief at 10.
J-S50029-14

-5- 

 It is well-settled that the review of a trial court’s denial of 

a motion for a mistrial is limited to determining whether the trial 

court abused its discretion. “An abuse of discretion is not merely

an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is 

overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised is

manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, 

bias or ill-will ... discretion is abused.” A trial court may grant a

mistrial only “where the incident upon which the motion is based 

is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the 

defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing 

and rendering a true verdict.” A mistrial is not necessary where 

cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome prejudice. 

Commonwealth v. Chamberlain, 30 A.3d 381, 422 (Pa. 2011) (internal 

citations omitted). 

 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a 

mistrial based on the prosecutor’s comments during opening statement that 

“there were 100 checks stolen from P&W Motors and that Mr. Virgin had 

received a stolen check.” Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant maintains that 

because she was not charged with theft of the checks or receiving stolen 

property for the checks, such thefts should not have been referenced as they 

constitute prior uncharged bad acts. Id. at 10-11. Appellant claims that 

evidence of the stolen checks did not relate to the crimes charged. Id. at 

11.

 A review of the record reflects that Appellant made a motion for 

mistrial following the prosecutor’s opening statement. N.T., 2/3/14, at 7-8. 

The notes of testimony, however, do not include the prosecutor’s opening 

statement. Id. at 7. Instead, a simple notation indicates: 
J-S50029-14

-6- 

“(Commonwealth’s opening statement given by Miss Kelley).” Id. Following 

that notation is a discussion among the attorneys and the trial court as to 

what was actually said in referencing those stolen checks, indicating that 

there was some uncertainty or disagreement as to the specific statements 

made to the jury. Id. at 7-8. 

Because we are unable to review the prosecutor’s opening statement, 

we have no way of knowing what the prosecutor actually said during her 

opening statement. In addressing a lack of notes of testimony necessary for 

appellate review, our Supreme Court has stated the following: 

Rule 1911(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 

provides that “[t]he appellant shall request any transcript 

required under this chapter in the manner and make any 

necessary payment or deposit therefor in the amount and within 

the time prescribed by Rules 5000.1 et seq. of the Pennsylvania 

Rules of Judicial Administration (court reporters).” Of course, if 

a party is indigent, and is entitled to taxpayer-provided 

transcripts or portions of the record, he will not be assessed 

costs. But, that does not absolve the appellant and his lawyer of 

his obligation to identify and order that which he deems 

necessary to prosecute his appeal. The plain terms of the Rules 

contemplate that the parties, who are in the best position to 

know what they actually need for appeal, are responsible to take 

affirmative actions to secure transcripts and other parts of the 

record. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Steward, 775 A.2d 

819, 833 (Pa. Super. 2001) (noting that it was not the 

responsibility of the trial court to order the notes of transcript of 

defense counsel’s closing as Rule 1911 “makes it abundantly 

plain that it is the responsibility of the Appellant to order all 

transcripts necessary to the disposition of his appeal.”); 

Commonwealth v. Peifer, 730 A.2d 489, 492 n. 3 (Pa. Super. 

1999) (explaining that it is the responsibility of the appellant and 

not the court to provide a complete record for review, including 

any necessary transcripts). 
J-S50029-14

-7- 

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 15 A.3d 345, 410 (Pa. 2011). 

 In Steward, this Court was presented with an instance, similar to that 

herein, where counsel’s closing statement had not been transcribed, and the 

appellant’s challenge was based on the substance of that closing statement. 

Steward, 775 A.2d at 833. We explained that although counsel requested 

transcripts, he did not specifically order a transcript of the closing 

arguments. Id. at 833-834. As a result, the court reporter did not 

automatically transcribe those arguments because, under our rules of 

judicial administration, he was under no obligation to do so. Id. at 834; 

See also Pa.R.J.A. 5000.2(g) (“[O]pening or closing statements of counsel 

... shall be recorded, but not transcribed, unless otherwise ordered.”). 

Without a transcription of the closing statement, this Court concluded it was 

unable to address the appellant’s claim, and therefore found it waived. 

Steward, 775 A.2d at 835. 

 In the case sub judice, Appellant’s motion for mistrial was based on 

statements made in the prosecutor’s opening statement. Without the 

transcript of that statement, however, we cannot address Appellant’s claim 

that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for mistrial. 

Rule 1911 makes it abundantly plain that it is the responsibility of the 

appellant to order all transcripts necessary to the disposition of his appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Reed, 971 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. 2009) (stating that 
J-S50029-14

-8- 

“[i]t is an appellant’s duty to ensure that the certified record is complete for 

purposes of review.”) Appellant has failed to provide us with the transcript 

necessary to the disposition of her claim, and as a result, we are precluded 

from addressing Appellant’s claim for relief. 1

 We also note that although Appellant was permitted to proceed in 

forma pauperis (“IFP”), she was not thereby absolved of her duty to identify 

and order that which she deemed necessary to prosecute her appeal. 

Lesko, 15 A.3d at 410. Because Appellant has failed to provide us with the 

information upon which we may evaluate her claim that the prosecutor’s 

statements unfairly prejudiced her, we are constrained to conclude that this 

issue is waived. Steward, 775 A.2d at 835 (“[f]ailure to ensure that the 

record provides sufficient information to conduct a meaningful review 

constitutes waiver of the issue sought to be reviewed.”).

 Appellant next argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Appellant forged or tampered with the documents in 

this case. Appellant’s Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant argues, that the 

 

1 We also note that the record reflects no attempt by Appellant to include a 

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1923 (providing that where no report of the 

evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is 

unavailable, appellant’s burden to supply a record may be satisfied through 

a statement in absence of transcript procedures). We are mindful, however, 

that a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1923 may not have been sufficient 

under the facts of this case given that the specific statements made by the 

prosecutor, in the presence of the jury, would be necessary to review the 

claim in this case. 
J-S50029-14

-9- 

Commonwealth established only that Appellant was in possession of a flash 

drive that contained altered documents, but failed to present any evidence 

that Appellant was the individual who had altered or created these 

documents. Id. at 14. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, 

Appellant’s counsel made a motion for judgment of acquittal with regard to 

these charges. Id. at 13. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred when 

it failed to grant that motion. Id. 

“A motion for judgment of acquittal challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to sustain a conviction on a particular charge, and is granted only 

in cases in which the Commonwealth has failed to carry its burden regarding 

that charge.” Commonwealth v. Foster, 33 A.3d 632, 635 (Pa. Super. 

2011). Our standard of review when considering a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence is well settled: 

 The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of

proof or proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 
J-S50029-14

-10- 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Lehman, 820 A.2d 766, 772 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

 Appellant was convicted of forgery, as defined at 18 Pa.C.S. § 

4101(a)(2): 

§ 4101. Forgery 

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of forgery if, with 

intent to defraud or injure anyone, or with knowledge that he is 

facilitating a fraud or injury to be perpetrated by anyone, the 

actor: 

* * * 

(2) makes, completes, executes, authenticates, 

issues or transfers any writing so that it purports to 

be the act of another who did not authorize that act,

or to have been executed at a time or place or in a 

numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, 

or to be a copy of an original when no such original 

existed; 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4101(a)(2). 

 Appellant was also convicted of tampering with records, as defined at 

18 Pa.C.S. § 4104(a): 

§ 4104. Tampering with records or identification 

(a) Writings.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the first 

degree if, knowing that he has no privilege to do so, he falsifies, 

destroys, removes or conceals any writing or record, or 

distinguishing mark or brand or other identification with intent to 

deceive or injure anyone or to conceal any wrongdoing. 
J-S50029-14

-11- 

18 Pa.C.S. §4104(a). 

 With regard to the charge for forgery, the evidence of record supports 

the conclusion that Appellant, with the intent to defraud, executed the 

unauthorized check from P&W Motors and presented it to Jesse Virgin for 

purposes of obtaining the GMC Yukon. N.T., 2/3/14, at 17, 20. By doing so, 

Appellant purported to be an agent of P&W Motors and acted on its behalf 

when she did not have the authority to do so. Id. at 83-84. Viewing the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 

we conclude that the Commonwealth produced evidence sufficient to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of forgery. 

Thus, the jury’s determination was supported by evidence of record. 

 Again viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, we also conclude that the Commonwealth produced 

evidence sufficient to establish the elements of tampering with records 

beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence established that Appellant 

presented herself to the Thorpes as Michelle Jorry and provided the Thorpes 

with a falsified Pennsylvania certificate of title for the vehicle, indicating that 

Michelle Jorry had title to the vehicle. N.T., 2/3/14, at 58, 111, 120-122, 

126. This falsified document was included on the flash drive found on 

Appellant’s person. N.T., 2/3/14, at 43, 67; N.T., 2/5/14, at 140-141, 145, 

149.
J-S50029-14

-12- 

 Appellant contends that such evidence was insufficient to establish 

that Appellant altered the documents. Appellant’s Brief at 14. We disagree. 

The fact that no evidence was produced showing specifically that Appellant 

was the individual who had created those documents, does not render the 

jury’s findings unsubstantiated. The evidence established Appellant’s direct 

involvement with the altered record, specifically her providing the fake title 

to Mrs. Thorpe. Additionally, these altered documents were found on a flash 

drive in Appellant’s possession. Such evidence was sufficient to allow the 

jury to determine that it was Appellant who had altered these records. The 

Commonwealth may establish elements of a crime by wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Lehman, 820 A.2d at 772. As such, the trial court did not err in 

denying Appellant’s motion for acquittal.

 In her final argument, Appellant maintains that the Commonwealth 

failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was the person who 

purchased the vehicle from Mr. Virgin, or had ever been to P&W Motors. 

Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant claims that Mr. Virgin was able to identify 

her as the individual who bought the car only after seeing her identified as 

the “defendant” at the preliminary hearing and during the course of the trial. 

Id. 

 Jesse Virgin testified that he had posted his 2007 GMC Yukon on 

Craigslist for sale for $25,000.00, which was based on the Kelly Bluebook 
J-S50029-14

-13- 

value. N.T., 2/3/14, at 10, 12. He received approximately three or four 

phone calls from a single individual, who was inquiring about the vehicle and 

trying to set up a time to see the vehicle. Id. at 13. The individual inquiring 

about the purchase of the vehicle identified herself as Audrey Merkel and 

indicated that she worked for P&W Motors dealership. Id. at 16-17. The 

individual made plans for Mr. Virgin to meet her at P&W Motors for the sale 

of the vehicle. Id. at 16. He testified that the voice of the person that he 

met at P&W Motors matched the voice of the individual with whom he spoke 

on the phone. Id. at 14. Appellant, identifying herself as Audrey Merkel, 

presented Mr. Virgin with a dealership’s check in the amount of $25,000.00. 

Id. at 20. At trial, Mr. Virgin identified Appellant as the person who had 

purchased his GMC Yukon at P&W Motors. Id. at 19. 

We find Appellant’s argument that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual who sold the 

car to Mr. Virgin to be unpersuasive. In his testimony, Mr. Virgin 

unwaveringly identified Appellant as the woman who had purchased his 

vehicle. On cross-examination he stated that he spent approximately tento-fifteen minutes with her during this exchange and confirmed that 

Appellant was the woman he met at P&W Motors. N.T. 2/3/14, at 24. Thus, 

there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could determine that 

Appellant was in fact the individual who had “purchased” Mr. Virgin’s vehicle. 
J-S50029-14

-14- 

 Similarly, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to 

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was the individual who 

Ms. Lucas saw at the dealership. Ms. Lucas, Office Manager for P&W Motors, 

testified to having seen Appellant at the dealership on one prior occasion. 

N.T., 2/3/14, at 29. Ms. Lucas stated that Appellant had worked for a 

cleaning company that P&W Motors had employed, and that she saw 

Appellant on a Friday evening as Ms. Lucas was leaving the dealership. Id. 

 Proof that Ms. Lucas saw Appellant at the dealership was not 

necessary, in and of itself, to satisfy the elements of the crimes with which 

Appellant was charged. Such testimony, however, was circumstantial 

evidence that the jury could rely upon in making a fact determination as to 

Appellant’s guilt in this case. Thus, we cannot agree with Appellant’s claim 

that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof with regard to 

identifying Appellant as the actor in this case. 

 Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 10/06/2014