### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON FE BR U A RY 14, 200 7 S es sio n

RONALD F. FLEMING v. J IM MURPHY, ET AL


### .

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sh elby County No. CT-004221-04 D ’Ar m y Bailey, Jud ge

No. W2006-00701-C OA-R3-C V - F iled Jul y 19, 2007

The plaintiff buyer, a

Texas resident, bec ame a war e of a used ca r for sale in Memphi s t hroug h an internet a dvertisement. The plaintiff contac ted t h e defe ndant who had pr epar ed the inter net adver tisement for the se ller, and w ho provided him with the phone number of the de fenda

nt seller. Th e pla int if

f a nd the de fe nd ant s e lle r a g re e d th a t th e pla int if f w ou ld t ra ve l to the se lle r’ s h ou se in Memphis to see the car and dec ide whethe r to purcha se it for $38,000. The plaintiff and his stepson drove to the se ller’s home in Memphis, inspecte d the ca r, and took it on a short test-dr ive. The plaintiff noted sever al problems with the car during the test-drive, but declined the de fenda nt seller’s offe r to have the ca

r inspecte d by

a Memphis are a mecha

nic prior to pur chase . The plaintiff te ndere d full pay ment for the car , and he and the seller signed a bill of sale that containe d “as is” disc laimers of wa rra nty . After the pl aintiff arrived back home in Texas, he took the car t o a mec hanic f or routine maintenanc e. The mecha nic informed the plaintiff that the ca r’s fr ame wa s sever ely

rusted,

re nd e ri ngit d ang e ro us to d ri ve . T he pla int if

f re c e ive d the same op ini on fr om a re sto ra tio n s pe c ia lis t, and the plaintiff claims ultimately to have spe nt near ly

$35,000 restoringthe vehicle . The plaintiff filed a c omplaint in Shelby County Circuit Court, asser ting c laims under the Te nnessee Consumer Protection Act a

nd claims for ne g lige nt misreprese ntation and bre ach of contra ct. The pla intiff claimed actua l da

mag es which included over $25,500 in r estoring the car to the co ndition repr esente d by

the d ef en d ants, and he soug ht treble damag es under the Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act. Af

ter discove ry , the trial cour t gr anted the de fend an t s ’ j o int moti on for summary judgme nt. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed

A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J. , d e li v e r e d th e o p in io no f th e c o u rt, in

w h ic hW. F RAN K C RAW FORD , P.J ., W.S ., and H OL L Y M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Fe lix H. B ean, I I I , Memphis, TN, for A ppellant

Gar rett M. Estep, Memphis, TN, for Appellee s-2- OP IN ION

I. F ACT S AND P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY

This case involves the sale of a used a

utomobile. Pl aintiff-buyer R o n al d Fleming (“A p p e ll an t” ) is a

T e xa s r e s id e n t wh o is e mp lo y e d a s a tr u c k dr iv e r , an d

w h o h a s p u r chase d

a pp ro xima te ly

15 us e d c ars in h is l if

e tim e fr om v ari ou s d e a le rs and ind ivi du a ls. De fe nd ants Jim Murp hy and Jim B ra nn on are re sid e nts of She lby

County , T e nn e sse e , a s is De fe nd ant D anny B ug g s, wh o co n d

u c t s b u s i n e s s a s a

u s e d c ar d e a l e r u n d e r t h e c o mp an y

n a m e o f “ B u g g s B u g g y s” (collec tively , “Appe llees”) . Mr. Murphy is a licensed u s ed ca r deale r and pur ported indepe ndent contra ctor of B ug g s Bug g y s, and Mr. B rannon pr epar ed an adver tisement for display

on the online auction we bsite, “eB ay ,” to assist Murphy in selling the ve hicle at issue.

I n F e br ua ry of 20 04 , M r. F le min g le arn e d o f t he sa le of

a 19 64 Che vr ole t Co rv e tte

con v er t i b l e from an a dvertisement on e Ba y . The a dvertisement state d that the ca r had onc e bee n
ow ne d b y the a c tor JohnTr avo lta , a

nd the Cor ve tte wa s d e sc ri be d a s f

oll ow s:

This vehicle has b een loving ly passed down, a

nd still has plenty

of life left in it . The pre vious owner ha s repr esente d the mileag e to be

corr ect. Clean sm ell throug hout, appea rs t o have ne ver be en smoked in. This vehicle shines like n ew ; it appear s to have a lway s been g ara g ed. This vehicle has a sm ooth shifting tra nsmissi on. The eng ine runs like a drea

m. There are no elec trical c oncer ns associate d wi th t his ve hic le . T his ve hic le is pe rf e c tly so un d, no kn ow n d e fe c ts.

This vehicle a

ppear s to have be en de t ai l ed on a r egular ba sis and lo o k s b r an d n e w

. T h e i n t e r i o r i s e xtr a c l e an ; i t w a s v e r y w e l l ke pt. There appea

rs to be a f

ull set of brand ne w tires. The eng ine in the

car is a 1967 327-350HP that runs very well. In the picture s Ihave a window sticker that was made up just for display purp o s es an d not orig inal to the car . Any

questions call me at .

. . or email me at . . . . Thanks, Ji m Bra

nnon.
Also display ed on the ad vertisement wa s a prominent disclaimer stating “ AS I S - NO WARR ANTY,” and “[i] t is the responsibility of the buy er to ha ve thoroug hly inspected the vehicle, and to hav e s a ti s f

ie d h im s e lf o r h e r s e lf a s to th e c o n d it io n an d v a lu e an d to b id b a s e d u pon that judgme nt solely .” An a dditional description provided:

This car is in v ery

nice c ondition. The paint is very g ood and the bo dy nic e

. Th e int e ri or is in g re a t sh a pe and the c arp e t s ho ws li tt le

wea r. The e ng ine runs g reat and the tra nsmissi on shifts good. The b ra k es ar e new and the r ear end has be en re built and service d Nov. 03. You could dri v e t h i s car and enjoy

it without fear of

brea kingW e no t e at t he o ut set o f t hi s o p i ni o n t hat M r. Fleming has not al l eged any m i sr ep res ent at i o ns rel at ed t o M r. 1

T ra v o lta’s p re v io u s o w n e rs h ip o f t h e C o rv e tte.

M r

. M u r ph y s t at ed i n his a f f i d av i t t h at h e per s on al l y pu r ch as ed t h e ca r “ as

- i s ” on N ov embe r 1, 2003, f or 2 $35, 805. H e cl ai med t o h av e s pen t a ppr ox i mat el y $1, 000 h av i n g t h e r ea r

- en d of t h e ca r r ebu i l t by Sn el l A ut o m o t i ve p rio r to li sting it fo r sa le

.

I n his a p p e llate b rie f, c o u n se l f o r A p p e llan t state s tha t F le m ing p a id this d e p o sit b y c h e c k m a d e p a ya b le to 3

Ji m M ur phy

. H owever , Fl emi ng s t at ed i n h i s d eposi t i on t hat he pai d t hi s amount i n c as h. Fur t her mo r e, t he exh i bi t ci t ed by coun s el f

or t hi s f act i s ac t ual l y a r ece i pt , dat ed Febru ar y 10, 200 4, f or a ca s hi er ch eck i n t he amo un t of $5 00 f or w hi ch Fl emi ng i s l i s t ed as pay ee. I t i s appare nt t hat t he r ece i pt cor r es po nds t o a ca s hi er ch ec k f or $500 t hat t he part i es

a c k n o w le d g e d M u rp h y se n t t o F le m ing so m e tim e a fter the tr a n sa c tio n , b e c a u se the d e p o sit wa s inte n d e d to b e re fun d a b le af t er Fl emi n g ’ s $38, 000 c h ec k c l ea r ed.

-3-

down. The a ir conditioning w orks ver y well and will keep you cool on hot day s.
Flemingstated at his deposition that he wa s a fa n of the films of John Travolta, and a dmitted that h e woul d not have be en intere sted in purcha sing the Corvette if it had not bee n for the “ J ohn Travolta link.” 1

On F e br ua ry 8, 20 04 , M r. F le min g c a lle d th e ph on e numbe r l ist e d in the a dv e rt ise me nt t o express his inter est in pur chasing the Corvette. I nitially
, Appellant spoke only with J im Bra nnon, who informed him that the c ar w as ac tually owned by

J im Murphy

. Mr. B rannon e x plained that he

2 had pre pare d the online listing at the re quest of Mr. Murphy , whom Mr. B rannon de scribed a s “a friend, a g ood ole boy [,] ” and that he was se lling the c ar f or Mr. Murphy . Appellant conte nds that at that t im e h e in qu ir e d a b o u t r u s t o n th e v e h ic le
, an d th a t M r

. B r an n o n in f o r me d h im th a t it was aff ecte d by “surf ace rust” and that “to his know ledg e, the car was ever y thing that was listed on the E

- B ay ad.” L at er that day , Appellant par ticipated in a c onfer ence call with Mr. Murphy and Mr. Br annon. Appellant states t hat onl y Mr. M urphy spoke to him during this ca ll, and that the two men neg otiated the pric e of the car . Mr. Fle ming state s t h at he did not di scuss the condition of the c ar with Mr. Murphy

at this tim e, and that Mr. Murphy insisted on a purcha se price of $38,000 for the Corvette. Mr. Murphy

ag ree d to suspend the eB ay auction so that Mr. F lem i n g co u l d d ri ve fr om Da lla s to Me mph is to loo k a t the c ar, and he re qu ir e d a

$5 00 de po sit

tha t w ou ld b e no n- re fu

nd a ble if Mr . F le min g de c ide d n ot t o p ur c ha se the ve hic le . M r. Flem in g an d Mr. M ur ph y e ng a g e d in another phone conve rsation later that day during which the a

rra ng ement wa s confirme d.

The ne x t morning, Mr . Flemin g and his stepson arr ived in Memphis at the home of Mr

. Murphy to inspe ct the Corvette, which was kept in Mur phy ’s g ara g e with se vera l oth er antique automobiles. At some point during the vi sit, Fleming g ave Murphy the $500 deposit in cash. Mr. 3 Flemi n g an d h is stepson spent approxim ately 30 minutes ex amining the vehicle. D uring the ins pe c tio n, F le min g c la ims to have dis c us se d the c on dit ion of the c ar wi th Murp hy , w ho a lle g e dly stated that “[i] t was a sound c ar, shouldn’ t h av e an y p roblems with it.” Flemingand his stepson viewed the vehicle’ s exterior and the eng ine compar tment, use d mirrors provide d by Murphy to view the fr a me , a

nd c ra wl e d und e rn e a th t

he re ar end of the c ar i n o rd e r t o g e t a be tte r l oo k. I n h isI n h i s di s cov er y r es pon s es , M u r ph y c l ai med t h at h e wa s a l i ce n s ed ca r dea l er an d i n depe n den t c on t r ac t or f or 4

B u g g s B u g g ys. H e sta te d tha t t h e y w e n t t o B u g g s B u g g ys in o rd e r to o b ta in a “ d riv e -o u t t a g ,” a n d a lso to utilize the ir

n o ta ry se rv ic e s. F le m ing , i n his d e p o sitio n , t e stif ie d tha t M u rp h y to ld him tha t t h e ti tle w a s k e p t at the d e a le rs h ip

.
-4- deposition, Mr. Fleming testified t hat he did not see any problems t hat concerne d him. Flemingand his stepson also took the automobile for a test drive in Mur phy ’s re sidential neig hborhood for about 15 minutes. Mr. Flemingsaid that he heard a noise in the vehicle ’s re ar e nd, that the heater did not

wo rk , a nd tha t the radi o bl ew a f

us e . H ow e ve r, Ap pe lla

nt i nd ic a te d at hi s d e po sit ion tha t th e se problems wer e of minor c oncer n to him and did not abate his desire to buy the ca r.
Upo n his return to Murphy ’s home, Murphy offe red to let F leming take the c ar to a local mecha nic of his choice for a

profe ssional inspection, but Fleming declined this oppor t unity . Mr. Flemingthen ag ree d to purcha se the Corve tte for $38,000, a nd he filled out a c heck f or a pr ea pp ro ve d c re dit

lin e in thi s amou

nt. Mr . M ur

ph y ins tr uc te d App e lla

nt t o ma ke his c he c k p ay a

ble to B ug g s B ug g y s, wh ic h he did
, and he g a ve Murp hy the c he c k. Mr

. F le min g was given recei pts

a lle g e dly do c ume nt in g r e c on str

uc tio n w or

k M ur ph y ha d p e rf or me d o n th e re ar e nd

of the c ar i n No ve mbe r o f 2 00 3. Fle min g and his ste ps on

the n w e nt t o B ug g s B ug g y s. F le min g state d in his 4 deposition that he had unde rstood the Corvette to be from Murphy ’s own private c ollection, and that he wa s surprised that he had been asked to make the chec k out to Bug g s Bug g y s and follow Murphy to th e dea lership. Howe ver, A ppellant admitted that these c oncer ns did not deter him from proce eding with the transac tion, and he also stated that he per ceive d no defe ct af fec ting the ve hicle’s

c ha in of tit le

. Whe n the y arr ive d a t B ug g s B ug g y s, Murp hy int ro du c e d App e lla

nt t o D anny

B ug g s, wh o o wn e d th e de a le rs hip , a nd his wi fe . F le min g c la ime d that Mr. Murp hy re tr ie ve d th e c e rt if ic a te of title while he and his stepson waited. Mr. Fleming was prese nted with a bill of sale, which wa s
on B ug g s B ug g y s le tte rh e a d, and wh ic h d isp lay e d th e fo llo wi ngdis c la ime r:

Disclaimer of

Warranties

. . . All warranties on this vehicle a re the manufa cture r’s. The Seller[] here by

expressly disclaims all w arr anties, either e x presse d or imp lied, i ncl ud in g any

im pl iedwarra nt y

of M erch ant abi li ty

or Fitne ss for a Particular purpose, a

nd neither a ssumes nor authorizes any other person to assume f

or it any liability in connection with this sale. [T] his disclaimer in no way aff ects the te rms of the manuf actur er’ s
war ranty . The buy er sha ll not be entitled to recove r fr om the selling deale r any conseque ntial damag es, dama g es to proper ty , damag es for loss of use, los s o f t i m e, los s of profit or inc ome, or a ny other incidental dama g es. Any

exceptions to the above disclaimer must be expressly provided by

separ ate instrument in writing

. T H E V E H IC LE B E IN G S O LD UN D E RT H IS AGR EEM ENT I S BEI

NG P UR CH AS E D AN D AC CE P TED BY THE PURCHASER “AS I S”.-5-

Mr. Fle ming sig ned and dated the bill of sale beneath this provision. Additionally
, both Fleming and Murp hy sig ne d und e rn e a th a

no the r p ro vis ion , w hic h p ro vid e d in pa rt :

AL LUSED VEHI CL ES SOL D AS I S W I TH NO EX P RESS OR I MPL I ED WARRANTY OF A NY KI ND OR DESCRI PTI ON EXCEPT WHEN STATED AB OVE I N WRI TI NG OR I N THE CASE OF A USED VEHI CL E WI TH AN UNEXPI RED PORTI ON OF M AN UF AC T UR E R ’S W AR R AN T Y T HE RE ON AN D, I F AN Y, SAI D WARRANTY SHAL L B E D E T E RM I

N E D SO L E L Y B Y THE TERMS OF SAI D WARRANTY. Iunderstand a

nd ag ree that this inst rument comprise s the entire ag ree ment perta ining to this purcha se AND NO OTHER AGREEMENTS VERBAL OR OTHERWI SE I S [sic] UNDERSTOOD B Y ME OR SHAL LBE RECOGN I Z ED.

Mr

. F le min g and his ste ps on le ft Me mph is late r that a ft e rn oo n to re tur n to the ir ho me in Dall a s, Te xas, too k tu

rn s dri vin g the Cor

ve tte and the ir oth e r v e hic le , a

nd sto pp e d to sp e nd

the night i n L itt le Roc k, Ar ka ns a s. Th e y

arr ive d ho me on

F e br ua ry 10 , a nd Ap pe lla nt t e sti fi e d th a t ne ith e r h e no r h is stepson experience d any

problems with the Corvette on the tr ip back to Te x as.

On F e br ua ry 11 , App e lla

nt t oo k th e Cor

ve tte t o his me c ha

nic in D a lla s, B ud

L ang ton , in order to have its fluids chang ed. Af ter he place d the car

on the servic e ra ck, Mr. L ang ton informed Appellant that the ve hicle’s “ fra me was c ompletely ru s t ed throug h, brake lines rusted, g as lines rusted, re ar e nd rusted and show ed [him] wher e it had all been painted to cover it up.” Mr. Fle ming dr ov e the c ar b a c k ho me , and he se nt Da nny B ug g s a

fax in w hic h h e de mand e d r e sti tut ion . H e a lso sent letters t o Bu gg s, Murphy , and B rannon, two of which we re r eturne d to him unopened. Mr. F l e m i n g c l a i m e d

t o h av e r e c e i v e d

a m e s s a g e o nh i s c e l l p h o n e s o m e t i m e i n M ar c h f r o m M r

. M u r

p h y, who alleg edly stated that “they wer e not g oing to do any thing about the situation.” Appellant took the vehicle to a re storation specia list i n Tex as , Ga ry Ha t field, for a sec ond opinion reg ardingthe vehicle’ s condition. Mr. Hatfield simil arly noted t he rusted frame, parts, and underca rriag e that had been pa inted black. Appe llant testified that he ult imately paid M r. Hatfield near ly $35,000 for the vehicle’ s total restoration, which w as complete d approximately nine months later.

Mr. Fle ming filed a complaint ag ainst the three defe ndants in Shelby County Circuit Court on J uly 22, 2004, asser

ting claims that Appellee s’ violated the Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act throug h either w illful or neg lige nt misreprese ntat i ons as to the vehicle ’s condition, as we ll as common law cla ims for n egl i gen t m isrepre sentation and bre ach of contra ct. Plaintiff claimed economic da

mag es “in e x cess of

$25,500.00” which he alleg ed to be “the cost of bringingthe value of the ve hicle up to the standa rd as r ep re s en t ed b y

the Def endants[.] ” Plaintiff soug ht to recove r actua l damag es in this amount, in addition t o pay ments made to his cre dit pro vider to financ e the pu rchase , “ ins ur anc e and tr ave l e xpe ns e s c onne c te d w ithre sto ratio n o f t he ve hic le [,]” and

tr e ble dama g e s und e r the Te nn e sse e Con sume r Pro te c tio n Ac t. Af te r the pa rt ie s ag re e d to a llo w m or e tim e for a response , Appellee s filed their a nswer on September 1, 2004, and they filed an a mended a nswer-6-

on Dec ember

10, 2004, by

leave of the trial c ourt. The pa rties exchang ed numer ous interrog atories and re quests for pr oduction of documents. I n a deta iled schedulingorder enter ed on Jul y

22, 2005, the trial cour

t rec og nized that a ll outstanding written discovery for the c ase w as complete , require d that all additional discovery be completed by J anuar y 15, 2006, and set a trial date for Fe bruar y 7, 2006.

Ap pe lle e s fi le d a mot ion fo r summa ry jud g me nt on

Janu ary 6, 20 06 , w hic h c on ta ine d th e ir statement of f

acts, the a ffid av i t of Mr. Murphy , the deposition of Mr. F leming, a nd sever al documents re lated to the purchase of the vehicle. Mr. Fleming filed a motion in response on January 30, which wa s acc ompanied by his o wn af

fi d av i t , as we ll as aff

idavits of his two ex perts, Mr. L ang ton and Mr . H a tf ie ld. Mr . L ang ton ’s a ff

ida vit pr ov ide d, in p art :

6. To servic e the c ar I

place d on the ra ck and lifte d it. W ith the car

onth e li f te d r a c k Io b s e r v e d th a t t h e f r a me o nth e c ar

w a s r u sted throug h. 7. Inoticed that the underc arr iag e had be en painted w ith black paint and the pa int on the fra

me had an odor of fre sh paint, was tac ky and Ino tic e d th e re wa s an o ve rs pr ay on on e of the wh e e l w e lls

. 8. Be cause of the c ondition of the frame this car w as dang erous.

Mr . H a tf ie ld’ s a ff ida vit pr ov ide d in

re le va nt p art :

6. On or befor e Fe bruar

y 26, 2004 my customer Ronald F . Fleming had a 1964 Chevrolet convertible C orvette car towed t o my shop for inspection and [sic] have work done

. 7. I t was cle ar to me that the frame of this car was rusted to such an extent as to make it dang erous. The fra me that was on the car

when

so ld t o Ro na ld F . F le min g wa s r e pla c e d b y me and my e mpl oy e e s. 8. I t w a s e qu a lly

c le ar t o me the un de rc arr ia g e had be e n r e c e ntl y painted blac k , there was a n odor of f

resh pa int, the paint was tac ky

and the re wa s an o ve rs pr ay of bla c k p a int

on on e of the wh e e l w e lls

.

. . . 9. I f t he re ar e nd

of thi s c ar h a d b e en r e bu ilt and se rv ic e d in November

of 2003 t hen it would have be en cle ar to whoe ver did the work that the f

rame was seve rely

rusted.

I n the aff

idavit, Mr

. Hatfie ld a lso state d that the descr iption of the Corvette in t h e eBa y adver tisement constituted a misrepre sentation of the ve hicle’s c ondition.

A summary

judgme nt hear ing w as held be fore the Honora ble D’A rmy

Ba iley on Fe bruar

y 24, 2006. Appellee s relied heavily on this Court’s decision in Pitz v. Woodruff , No. M2003-01849- COA-R3-CV, 2004 Tenn. A pp. L EXI S 851 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec . 17, 2004), an opinion that-7-

dis c us se s f

ra ud ule nt m isr e pr e se ntatio n, duri ngthe ir argume nts in s up po rt of summa ry jud g me nt. I n a nn ounc inghis ru lin g fr om t he be nc h, the tr ia l c ourt

state d in pa rt :
Judg e Ki rb y ’s op ini on

say s th a t, and a g a in sh e ’s makin g it c le ar t hat, she say s, quote, althoug h the cour ts will enforce as-is cla uses allocatingthe risk of unknown de fec ts to the buy ers, to do so whe re the sellers knew about the defec t and withheld mater ial information would be to blindly enfor ce a contra ct obtained by fra ud. She g oes on to say the d ef en d an t has a duty

to disclose such a f

act or condition, quote, unless ordinar

y diligenc e would have reve aled t he disclosed fac t, unquote. Thus, there is no duty t o d i s close a materia l fac t or

c on dit ion if it w a s a pp are nt t hr ou g h c omm on

ob se rv a tio n or i f i t would have be en dis cover able throug h the exercise of ordinary diligenc e, unquote. I t se e ms t o me that Mr . F le min g , th e pla int if f, buy e r, fa ile d to

e xer c ise or din ary dil ig e nc e on the fa c ts ev e n tak e n in the lig ht m os t favor able to t h e plaintiff a nd acc ording ly

the motion for summary judgme nt will be gr anted.

On Marc h 2, 2006, the t ri al co u rt enter ed an or der g rantingAppellee s summary judgme nt. I n the

or de r, the tr ia l c ourt

state d it s f

ind ing s a s f

oll ow s:
Among other matter s the Court consid ered the motion and memorand u m filed on beha lf of the de fenda nts, including the aff idavit of J im Murphy , the re sponse and memor a n d um opposing the motion filed on b eh alf of the plaintiff, including the af fidavits of Ronald Fleming , Bud L angt o n , and Ga ry Hatfie ld, the transcr ipt of Ronald Fleming ’s deposition, a nd the rele vant bill of sal e. Ha ving considere d the entire rec ord in this cause, the applicable law, and the

argume nts of

c ouns e l, t

he Court fi nd s th a t th e pla int if

f, Ron a ld F le min g , f

a ile d to e xer c ise or din ary dil ig e nc e

. Vi e wi ng the fa c ts i n the light most favor able to the plaintiff, Rona ld Flemingdid not j u s t i f i a b l y r e l y u p o nan y r e p r e s e n t a t i o nm a d e b y an y d e f e n d an t

. In the abse nce of

any g enuine issue of

materia l fac t, the Court finds that the summary

judgme nt motion i s well taken a nd should be g rante d .

. . .
Mr. Fle ming f

iled a timely

notice of a

ppeal.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED

Th e so le iss ue pr e se nte d b y Mr . F le min g on

a pp e a l, r e state d f

or the purp os e of

c lari ty , is whether the trial cour

t erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt in favor of

Appellee s on his claims for-8-

unfair or dece ptive acts or pr actice s under the T ennesse e Consumer Protec tion Act, neg lige nt misrepre sentation, and bre ach of contra ct. We aff

irm.

III

. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW

Sum mary jud g me nt is ap pr op ri a te “ if the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to i nte rr og a tor ie s,
and a dmi ssi on s o n f

ile , to g e the r w iththe a ff

ida vit s, if any , s ho w that th e re is n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any materia l fac t a

nd that the moving party is e ntitled to judgme nt a s a matter of la w.” Te nn. R. Civ. P. 56 .0 4 (2 00 6)

. Our re vie w of the tr ia l c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i s de novo on the re cord befor e this Court, with no presumption of cor rec tness. Wa rren v

. Es tat eof Kir k , 954 S.W .2d 722, 723 (Tenn. 1997)

. No presumption of correc tness attache s to a trial court’s f indings in a summar

y judgme nt c ase. Burgess v. Harley , 9 3 4 S

. W

. 2 d 5 8 , 6 2 (c i t i n g C

a r v e l l v . B o t t o ms , 900 S.W .2d 23, 26 (Tenn. 1995) ).

“The party moving for s ummary judgme nt must aff irmatively neg ate a

n essential ele ment of the nonmoving pa

rty ’s claim, o r co n cl usively establish an af

firmative de fense

. . . . Whe n a pa rt y
make s a pr op e rl y su

pp or te d moti on fo r sum mary

jud g me nt, the burd e n s hif ts t o th e no nmo vin g pa

rt y to establish the exis tence of disputed mater ial fac ts.” Pa tte rso n v . Arif , 1 73 S.W. 3d

8, 11 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g McCarley v . West Quality Food Serv. , 9 6 0 S

. W

. 2 d 5 8 5 , 5 8 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 8 ) )

. In deter mining whe ther or not a g enuine issue of

materia l fac t exi sts for purposes of summary jud g me nt, c ourt s in

th is st ate ha

ve ind ic a te d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt mus t take the str on g e st l e g iti mate view of the evidenc e in f

avor of the nonmoving party , allow all rea sonable infe renc es in favor of that party , and disca

rd all counte rvailing evidenc e. By rd v . Ha ll , 847 S.W .2d 208, 210-11 (Tenn. 1993)

. I f there is a dispute as to any materia l fac t or any

doubt as to the conc lusions to be drawn from that fac t, the summary

judgme nt motion m ust be denied. Id. at 211. The tria l court is not to “weig h” the evidenc e whe n evaluating a motion for summary

judgme nt. Id. The c ourt is simpl y to overrule the motion where a

g enuine dispute e x ists as to any materia l fac t. Id.

IV. D I S CUS S I ON

The Tenne ssee Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”)
, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101 et seq. , cre ates a privat e ri gh t o f action for “any person who suf

fer s an asc erta inable loss of money or proper ty , rea l, personal or

mix ed .

. . as a result of the use or e mploy ment by another person of

an unfair or dece ptive act or prac tice declare d to be unlawf ul by this part.” Te nn. Code Ann. § 47-18- 109(a) (1). Althoug h the TCPA does not define the phrase “unfa ir or decep t i v e ac t or prac tice,” § 47-18-104( b) provides a

list of specific e x amples. Ingram v. Cendant M o b i l i t y Fin. Cor

p. , 215 S

. W .3 d 3 67 , 3 75 (T e nn . Ct . App . 2 00 6) ; Gl ant on v . Bo b P ar ks Re alt y , No

. M 2 0 0 3 -0 1 1 4 4 -C OA-R3- CV, 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 263, at *14 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr . 27, 2005). Disclaimer s permitted by the Uniform Commercial Code may limit or modify liability otherwise imposed b y t h e c o d e, but such disclaimer s do not defe at sepa rate cause s of ac tion for unfa ir or dec eptive ac ts or prac tices under the TCPA

. Mo rri s v . M ack’ s U se d Ca rs , 8 24 S.W. 2d

53 8, 53 9 ( Te nn . 1 99 2) ; se e als o Godwin A ircraft, Inc. v. Houston , 851 S.W .2d 8 1 6 , 8 2 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993) ( noting the-9-

Tenne ssee Supre me Court’s hol ding that “disclaimer s permitted by the Uniform Commerc ial Code do not constitute a defe nse under the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act”).

Ap pe lla nt a lle g e d thre e un fa ir

or de c e pti ve a c ts o r

p r a c t i c e s un de r t

he TCP A i n h is c omp la int

. The fir st is provided at Tenn. Code A nn. § 47-18-104( b)(7) : “Repre senting that g oods or servic es
are of a pa

rticular standard, quality or g rade
, or that g oods are of a pa rticular style or model, if they

are of ano the r. ” An oth e r pr ov isi on re lie d up on by F le min g wa s § 4 7- 18 -1 04 (b )( 21 ), statin g in p art : “Usingstatements or illustrations in any adver tisement which cre ate a false impression of the g rade
, qual it y , qu an ti ty , ma

k e , v a lu e , a g e , s iz e , c o lo r , u s a b il it y o r o r ig in o f th e g o o d s o r

s e r v ic e s o ffe red . . . .” F inally , Appellant re l i ed u p on the TCPA’s “catch-a ll” provision located at § 47-18- 104(b)( 27): “Eng ag ing in a ny other a ct or pra ctice which i s dece ptive to the consumer or to any other person.” Flemingbased his TCPA claims upon alleg ed m i s re p resentations in the eBa y adver tisement, which wa s prepa red by Def enda n t J im Bra

nnon. Although it wa s not pled in the complaint, Fleming later testified that upon his initi al inquiry about the ca

r, B rannon ha d repr esente d that, t o h is k

no wl e dg e , th e Cor

ve tte wa s in

the c on dit ion

de sc ri be d in

the a dv e rt ise me nt, and

that it

was a ffe cted only by “surf ace rust.” Mr. F leming a lso stated that during his inspection of the vehic le, Mr. Murphy , the purporte d owner o f t h e ca

r, had de scribed it as “ sound” and one with which F le min g “ sh ou ldn ’t

have any pr ob le ms. ” F le min g a sse rt e d th a t th e se re pr e se ntatio ns c a us e d him to p u r c h a s e th e c ar , w h ic h h is me c h an ic an d r e s to r a ti o ns p e c ia li s t i nT e xa s late r in f o r me d h im w as da ng e ro us to dr ive be c a

us e of its ru ste d f

ra me . F le min g c la ime d th a t D e fe nd ants kn e w o r s ho uld have kno wn that their statements we re f alse, a nd that they

wer e liable unde r the TCPA for e ither knowing ly

or neg lige ntly

eng ag ing in unf

air or de ceptive acts or pra ctices. F leming a lso alleg es that Def endants knew or should ha ve known that the vehicle’ s underc arr iag e had been p ai n t ed b lack, hinderinghis ability

to discover its true c ondition.

The tra nscript of the he aringbelow indicate s that the trial co u rt ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s claims f o c u s e d p r im arily on the common law e lements for f raudule nt misreprese ntation, as reiter ated by this Court i n Pi tz v . W

oo dr uff . A s a thr e sh old matte r, we no te that “ the sc op e of the TCP A i s
m uch broa der tha

n that of common-law

fra ud.” Tucke r v

. Sie rra Buil

de rs , 1 8 0 S. W. 3 d

1 0 9 , 1 15 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). “ Under the TCPA, a consumer

can obta in rec overy

without having to mee t the burde n of proof that is r equire d in c ommon-law fra ud case s, and the numer ous defe nses that ar e
a va ila ble to t he de fe nd ant i n a

c omm on -l aw f

ra ud c a se are sim

ply no t ava ila

ble to t he de fe nd ant i n a TCPA case .” Id. For example, this C ourt has he l d t h at i n TCPA cases involving mis re pr e se ntatio n, a

pla int if f i s n ot r e qu ir e d to sh owre lia nc e up on a

mis re pr e se ntatio n in

or de r t o maintain a ca

use of a ction. See Messer Grie sheim Indu s., Inc. d/b/a MG In dust. v. Cryotech of Kin gsport, In c. , 1 3 1 S

. W

. 3 d 4 5 7 , 4 6 9 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 3 ) ( ci t i n g Har v e y v . Fo rd Mo tor Cre dit Co. , No. 03A01-9807- CV-00235, 1999 Tenn. A pp. L EXI S 448, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 13, 1999)). How ever , there must be an unfair or dece ptive act or prac tice by the defe ndant befor e the defe ndant ca

n be held liable unde r the TCPA. See, e .g., Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47- 18-104(a ) & -1 09 (a )( 1) ; McLean v. Bourget’s Bike Works, In c. , No. M2003-01944-COA- R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. Ap p. L EX I S 64 5, a t *2 0 ( Te nn . Ct . App . O c t. 7 , 2 00 5) ; New Life Corp. v. Thom as Nelson, Inc. , 932 S.W .2d 921, 928 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).-10-

Fur thermore , althoug h the TCPA does not require re liance, pla intiffs are require d to show that the def

endant’ s wrong ful conduc t prox imately cause d their injury

. Whit e v . Ea rly , 211 S.W .3d 72 3, 74 1 (T e nn

. Ct. Ap p. 20 06 ); Pr ude ntia l Bo tts & As so cs. Re alt or s, Inc . v . R & E Prop s. , L L C, No. E2002-01827- C OA-R3-CV, 2003 Te nn. App. L EXI S 454, at *4-5 (Te nn. Ct. App. J une 25, 20 03 ); Mil

like n v . Cr y e -L e ike Re alt or s , N o

. M 1 9 9 9

- 0 0 0 7 1

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 2 0 0 1 T e n n

. Ap p

. LE X IS 47 2, a t *2 1- 24 (Jul y

5, 20 01 ); Harvey , 1 99 9 Te nn . App . L EX I S 44 8, a t *4 -5 ; Stra c e ne r v . Swi ndl e , No . 0 1A 01 -9 50 2- CH -0 00 47 , 1 99 5 T e nn . App . L EX I S 47 1, a t *6 (Jul y 14 , 1 995). Th e TCP A provides a cause of action for “any person who suffe rs an asce rtainable loss. . . as a result of the us e or employ

ment by another person of an unfa ir or dec eptive ac t or prac tice dec lare d to be unlawf ul by this part . . . .” Land v. Dixon , No. E2004-03019-COA-R3-CV, 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 401,

a t *12 (Ten n. Ct

. Ap p. July 12 , 2 00 5) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 18- 109(a) (1). “ The phra se ‘a s a re sult of’ requir es a showing by a plaintiff that the a lleg ed violations

cause d his or her injury .” La nd , 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 401, at *12. In Ga nze v oo rt v . Rus se ll , 949 S.W .2d 293, 298-99 (Te nn. 1997), the Te nnessee Supreme Court cited a fede ral district cour

t case , Klotz v. Underwood , 563 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1982), aff’d , 709 F.2d 1504 ( 6th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that “the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act im poses no l iability wher e the se ller had no knowledg e of the hidden defects and wher e an inspection by the purchaser would reve al the same infor

mation known by the seller.” I n La nd , the Easter n Section of this Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ TCPA claim wa s prope rly dismiss ed whe re the y

voluntarily

elec ted to close on a

c on tr a c t f or the sa le of

pr op e rt y wi th f ull kn ow le dg e of

a lle g e d mi sr e pr e se ntatio ns and of the tr uth reg ardingthe prope rty , holding that the pla i n t i ff s could not show “the r equire d causative link betwee n the misrepre sentations and their a lleg ed injury .” 2005 Te nn. App. L EXI S 401, at *12.

A lis t of unfair

or dec eptive ac ts or prac tices within the province of the TCPA is provided

a t T e nn . Co de Ann. § 4 7- 18 -1 04 (b ) ( 20 07 ). Th e TCP A w a s th or ou g hly dis c us se d b y the M idd le Section of this Court in Tucker , 1 8 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t1 1 4

- 2 0

. J u d g e K o c h
, w r i t i n g f o r t h e m a j o r i t y, discussed the historica l backg round of the T CPA and other state s ’ s ta tu tor y counter parts, which w ere considere d “little FTC ac ts” bec ause of their similarity

to the Fe dera l T rade Commi ssion (“F TC”) Ac t outla wi ngun fa ir

or de c e pti ve tr a de pr a c tic e s, and state d in re le va nt p art :

The TCPA was not intended to b e a codif ication of the common law. To the c ontrary , one of the express purposes of the TCP A is to pr ov ide a dd iti on a l, su pp le me nta

ry state law r e me die s to consumers vic timiz ed by unfair or dec eptive business ac ts or prac tices that we re c ommitt ed in Tenne ssee in whole or in part. Te nn. Cod e Ann. §§ 47 -1 8- 10 2( 2) ,( 4) -1 12 . M or e ov e r, the TCP A i s
e xplic itl y re me dia l, a

nd Te nn e sse e c ourt s a

re the re fo re re qu ir e d to construe it libera lly

to protec t consumers in Tenne ssee a nd elsewhe re. Te nn . Co de Ann. § 47-1 8-115; Myint v. Alls tate Ins. C o. , 970 S.W. 2d 92 0, 92 5 ( Te nn . 1 99 8) ; Mo rr is v . M ack’ s U se d Ca rs , 824 S.W .2d 538, 540 (Tenn. 1992)

.-11- The s c o p e o f th e T CP A is mu c h b r o a d e r th an tha t of common-law f

raud. ( footnote omitted) Under the TCPA, a consum er can obta in rec overy without having to meet the burden of pr oof that is require d i n common-law f raud c ases, a

nd the numerous de fense s that are available to the defe ndant in a common-la w fra ud ca s e are simply not a

vailable to the defe ndant in a T C P A c as e. See Sm ith v. Bal dwi n , 611 S.W .2d 611, 616, 24 Tex. Sup. Ct. J

. 149 (Tex. 1980). Misrepre sentations that would not be a ct ionable as c ommon-law fr a ud may ne ve rt he le ss b e a c tio na

ble un de r t

he pr ov isi on s o f the little FTC ac ts, including the TCPA. See, e .g., Stutman v . Chemica l Ba nk , 95 N.Y.2d 24, 73 1 N.E.2d 608, 611-12, 709 N.Y .S.2d 892 (N.Y. 2000 ); Eagle Props., Ltd. v. Scharbauer , 8 0 7 S. W. 2 d 7 1 4 , 724, 34 Tex. S up. Ct. J . 463 (Tex. 1990). C l ai m s u n der the TCPA are not limit ed to misrepre sentations that are fra udulent or willful. Sm ith v. Scott Lewis Ch evrole t, Inc. , 843 S.W .2d 9, 12-13 (Te nn. Ct. App. 19 92 ). I ns te a d, the TCP A a pp lie s to any a c t or pr a c tic e that is un fa ir or dec eptive to consumer s. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47- 18-104(a ), -104(b) (27). ( footnote omitted)

I n order to rec over unde r the TCPA, the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the de fenda

nt eng ag ed in an unfair or dece ptive act or prac tice decla red unla wful by the TCPA and (2) that the defe ndant’s conduc t

cause d an “a scer

tainable loss of money

or prope rty , rea l, personal, or mix ed, or any other article
, commodity
, or thing of valu e w h ere ver sit uat ed . . . .” Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 7- 18 -1 09 (a )( 1) . ( fo otn ote omitted) The def

endant’ s co n d u ct need not be willful or eve n kn ow ing , b ut i f i t is , th e TCP A pe rm its the tr ia l c ourt to a wa rd tr e ble dama g e s. Te nn

. Cod e Ann. § 4 7- 18 -1 09 (a )( 3) ; Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender , 2 S.W .3 d 9 01 , 9 10 n. 13 (T e nn . 1 99 9) ; Holm es v. Foster Pontiac GMC, In c. , 1989 Tenn. App. L E XIS 333, Shelby L aw No. 9, 1989 WL 48515, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 10, 1989), perm. app. denied , ( Te nn . O c t. 2 , 1 98 9) ; Haverlah v. Memph is Aviation, Inc. , 674 S.W .2d 297, 306 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).

Id. at 114-116.

The Tucker

Court no ted th at “th e c on c e pt o f d e c e pti ve ne ss i s a br oa de r, mor e fl e xible standard of

actionable merc hant misconduct than the tra ditional remedy of common-law

fra ud” and

we nt o n to de fi ne a “ de c e pti ve ” a c t or pr a c tic e a s “ on e that c a us e s o r t e nd s to c a

us e a c on sume r t o believe what is false or that misleads or t ends t o mislead a consumer as to a matter of fa ct.” Id. at 116. I n interpre ting what constituted an “unfa ir” a ct or pra ctice, the Court looked t o the leg islative his tor y of the fe de ra l a c t, wh ic h ind ic a te d that “ an a c t or pr a c tic e sh ou ld no t be deemed un fair ‘unless the a ct or pra ctice c auses or is likely to c ause substantial injury to consumers whic h is notM r

. Fl emi n g al s o c l ai med t h at t h e r ea r e n d of t h e Cor v et t e wa s n ot a ct u al l y r ec on s t r u ct ed i n N ov embe r of 5

20 03 , as r epre s ent ed by t he adver t i s ement and by M r

. M ur phy at t he t i me of sal e. H i s o nl y evi dence f or t hi s cl ai m i s t hat the re c e ip ts o r in v o ic e s M u rp h y p ro v id e d him re fer re d to a n “‘8 1 C o rv e tte” ra the r th a n F le m ing ’s 1 9 6 4 m o d e l. In his af f i d avi t , M urphy cl ai m ed t hat t hi s was an i nvo i ce m i st ake, and t hat he spent o ver $ 1 , 0 0 0 havi ng t he vehi cl e’ s rear- end

re c o n stru c te d b y S n e ll A u to m o tive . F le m ing o ff e re d no e v id e n c e to re fute this c o n te n tio n

.
-12- re a so na bly avo ida ble by c on sume rs the mse lve s and no t outw e ig he d b y

c ounte rv a ili ngbe nefits to

consumers or to c ompetition.’” Id. at 116-17. The Court found that the conc ept of “ unfairne ss” was even br oader

than “de ceptivene ss,” and joi n edC o n n ec t i cu t , M ai n e, M aryl an d
, Oh i o , an d W as h ington in using the de finition of unfairne ss to guide its i nterpre tation of the TCPA. Id. at 117; se e als o Ga nze v oo rt , 949 S.W .2d at 299 (noting the Supreme Court of Ver mont’s de finition of “dec eptive

a c t o r pr a c tic e ” a s “ a

mate ri a l r e pr e se ntatio n, pr a c tic e or omi ssi on lik e ly to m isl e a d a

re a so na ble consumer” ).

I n his response to D efe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt, Plaintiff stated: “Some of the things t h at wer e re prese nted he c ould overlook but taken a ll togethe r he w as misled by the sellers and pu rc h as ed a c ar that was not only not up to standards but one that wa s dang erous.” I ndeed, althoug h Plaintiff’s complaint alleg ed a litany of discovere d problems with the vehicle, the rec ord sug g ests that he wa s made a war e of sever al defe cts throug h his own inspection prior to purc hase a nd that he had be en altog ether unconce rned with them. For example, Flemingalleg ed that “[t]he eng ine in the car is not the same number a s the Def endants advertised.” Yet in his deposition, he testified that he “kne w it wasn’t a numbe rs-matc hing c ar when [he] b o u gh t t h e ca r” a nd that this did not matter to him beca

use he liked the car . Plainti ff als o asser ted that the stateme nt in the eB ay adver tisement, “[t] he air

conditionin g works ver

y well,” wa s a misrepre sentation. His complaint

a lle g e d, “ [t]he a ir

c on dit ion e r i s n ot coo ling du e to b e ingins ta lle d im pr op e rl y .” Ye t in

his deposition, Fleming admitted that he neve r had a ny problems with the air conditioning, that he never used it be fore Mr. Hatfie ld ha d restore d the vehicle , and that he did not know whe ther it worke d or not at the time of purc hase. A s for the statement in the adve rtisement that “[t] here are no elec trical

c on c e rn s a sso c iate d with thi s veh ic le [,]” Mr . F le min g te sti fi e d th a t w he n th e fu se ble w i n th e ra dio on his brief test-dr i v e, the pr oblem was of no r eal c oncer n to him. He also testified that the dashboar d later c aug ht fire due t o some elec trical problem, but conce ded that this problem occ urre d afte r he ha d the vehicle restore d and that he did not assoc iate the de fec t with Defe ndan t s . As the fo re g oin g a lle g e d me c ha

nic a l pr ob le ms a

re c on c e rn e d, we fi nd

the se fa c ts t o b e sim ila

r to t ho se in Land , 2005 Tenn. App. L EXI S 401, at *12, where the plaintiffs pr o cee ded with their purc hase of p r o p e rt y d e s p i t e t

h e i r k n o w l e d g e o f

a l l e g e d m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s an d

t h e t r u e c o n d i t i o no f

t h e p r o p e rt y. We simi larly

conclude that in this case, Mr. F leming f ailed to s h o w t he re quired c ausative link b e t w e e nt h e s e a l l e g e d

m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s an d

h i s i n j u r y. 5

Th e de fe c t of

pr ima ry c oncer n, a lle g e dly

un kn ow n to Mr . F le min g a t th e tim e of purc ha se of the Corve tte, was the se vere ly rusted fr ame a

nd various compone nts of the vehicle . Both of Pla int if f’ s e xpe rt me c ha nic s a tte ste d by a ff

ida vit that thi s c on dit ion ma de the ve hic le da ng e ro us to drive. The only

alleg ed misrepr esentation specifica lly ref err ing to r ust on the vehicle was B rannon’ s statement t o Fleming
, in the first telephone conver sation on Fe bruar y 8, 2004, that the vehicle wasI n h i s i nt er r ogat ory r es po ns es , D ef endan t B r ann on admi t t ed t o p r e pa r i n g t h e e

- B ay adve r t i s ement , but cl ai med 6

t hat i n Fleming’ s i ni t i al pho ne cal l t o hi m , t he ext ent of hi s o wn i nvo l vem ent i n t he t rans act i o n was pro vi d i ng Fleming

w ith M u rp h y’s p h o n e nu m b e r.

-13- a ff e c te d b y “ surf a c e ru st. ” Mr . F le min g argue s t hat th is state me nt b y Mr . B ra nn on wa s a 6 mis re pr e se ntatio n a

bo ut t he ve hic le ’s c on dit ion
, c on sid e ri ng his own me c ha nic s’ late r d isc ov e ri e s. Howe v e r , d e s p it e a ll e g e d ly h av in g b e e np u t o nn o ti c e b y B r an n o no f

p o s s ib le r

u s t o nth e v e hicle, Flemingcould not identify any inquiries that he made in this reg ard to the se ller, Murphy
, in either of his su bs e qu e nt c on ve rs a tio ns or up on his ow n in sp e c tio n o f t

he Cor ve tte at Mu rphy ’s ho me in Memphis. Even more notably
, despite being g iven the opportunity by Murphy to ha ve th e c ar inspected by a mecha

nic of his c hoosing, Appellant inexpl icably declined this option. Mr. Fle ming

c o n te n d s o na

p p e a l t h a t h e r e f us e d th is o p p o rtu

n it y b e c a u s e “ h e d id

n o t k n o w w h e r e th e r e w a s [a mecha nic]” in Memphis.

I n s up po rt of his c la ims un de r the TCP A, Mr

. F le min g re fe re nc e d s e ve ra l sp e c if ic state me nts contained in the e Ba

y adver tisement, assertingthat they constituted materia l r epre sentations about the vehicle ’s condition

. As n oted above , howeve r, seve ral of the se statements re fer red to minor problems with the ca

r that we re know n to Flemingafte r his own inspection and te st drive, and they cannot be said to have c aused F leming’ s alleg ed injury . We perc eive t h e fo l lowing g ener al statements in the eB ay

adver t i sement to serve as the ba sis for his TCPA claims reg ardingthe vehicle’ s rusted fr ame: “T his vehicle is per fec tly s o und, no known def ects. . . This ca

r is in very nice c ondition. . . You could drive this car and enjoy

it without fear of

brea king down.”

As f o r a ny a ll e g e d T CP A v io la tions for fra udulent misrepre sentations reg ardingthe vehicle ’s

c o n d i t i o n , w h e t h e r r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e e B ay a dv e rt i s e m e n t o r o r a l l y b y J i mB r an n o no r J i mM u r p h y,
we c on c lud e th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a pp ro pr iate ly

g ra nte d s umm ary

jud g me nt i n f

a vo r o f A pp e lle e s. Viewingthe g ener al re prese ntations made in the eB ay adver tisement in a light most fa vorable to Mr. F le min g , a

nd a ssumin g that e ith e r B ra

nn on or Murp hy kn e w the m to be un tr

ue , th e un dis pute d f

a c ts of this case indicate that Appe llant’s injury , purcha sing the sever ely rusted 1964 Corvette at issue,

was re asonably

avoidable by

Mr. Fle ming pr ior to purcha se. “Eve n if an a ct or pra ctice c auses or is l ike ly to c a us e su bs tanti a l in

jur y , it wi ll n ot b e c on sid e re d un fa ir un le ss the inj ur y is n ot r e a so na

bly avoidable by

consumers the mselves.” Tucker , 180 S.W .3d at 117. For ex ample, “[c]onsumers

c an n o t r e a s o n a

b ly av o id in ju r y w h e na me r c h an t’ s s a le s p r a c ti c e s u n r e a s o n a b ly c r e a te o r ta ke advanta g e of a

n obstacle to the f

ree exercise of

consumer de cision-making .” Id. Whil e B rannon alleg edly rep re s ented to F leming that the vehicle w as af fec ted by “surf ace rust,” Appe llant admittedly

knew that B rann o n ’s role in the tra nsaction wa s limi ted to prepa ring the eB ay adver tisement that initially sparke d his inter est in the ca r. Most importantly , Flemingref used to take advanta g e of Mur

phy ’s offe r to have the car inspected by a mec hanic in Memphis prior to purc hase. The fa ct that Murphy offe red Flemingthis accommodation ser iously undermines a

contention that his sa les prac tices unrea sonably cre ated or took a dvantag e of an obstacle to the fre e exerc ise of Mr. Fleming ’s dec ision-making. Seeid. I t is not a lleg ed that Mr. Bug g s, owner of Bug g s Bug g y ’s, made any repr esentations as to the car ’s condition, or even spoke gene rally to Mr. Fle ming a bout the car

. Although this would not nec essar ily prec lude his liabilit y

under the TCPA if Br annon and Murphy-14-

could be said to have committed unfair or dece ptive acts as his ag ents, we conclude that summary jud g me nt w a s a lso c or

re c tly g ra nte d in his fa

vo r. As Mr

. F le min g ’s inj ur y wa s re a so na

bly a vo ida ble on these und i s p uted fa cts, we be lieve that no re prese ntations made by Def endants c ould be found to have be en unfa ir or dec eptive pursua nt to the TCPA.

Ap p el l an t co n t en d s t h at t h e De fe n d an t s kn ew o r sh o u l d h av e kn o wn t h at t h e u n d er ca rr i age of the Corve tte had been painted black to conce al i ts true condition from him . Howeve r, his expert

me c ha nic state d in

his a ff ida vit tha t he ob se rv e d th is f

a c t a ft e r t he c ar wa s pla c e d on the ra c k at hi s shop. H i s o t h er expert, a re storation specia list, attested that the rusted fr ame would have bee n noticeable by Snell Automotive in November of 2003 whe n it alleg edly rebuilt the Corvette’ s rea r end. Mr. F leming te stified at his deposition that M r. M u rp h y “had mirr ors on the side of the car underne ath so y ou could see the fra me” and that he and his stepson spent approximately 30 minutes visually inspecting the ca

r i n Murphy ’s gar ag e. Although Fleming stated that it was ra ining outside, and the g ara g e wa s equipped only with f l u o re scent lig hting, he admitted that the lightingwas sufficie nt for his purpose. When asked whe ther the mirr ors wer e suff icient for F leming to f

ully view underne ath the ca

r, g iven his knowledg e at the time, he said no, and that he cra wled under

neath the

car but was unable to see any better. Ag ain, despit e his alleg ed inabili ty to properly inspect the c ar
a t th is t ime , it

is und isp ute d th a t F le min g de c lin e d M ur ph y ’s of fe r to have t

he c ar p ro fe ssi on a lly inspected pr ior to purcha se. On these fac ts, and eve n operating unde r the unlikely assumption that the car ’s black painted fra

me was the proxi mate cause of Mr. Fle ming’ s injury , we be lieve that it was

re a so na ble avo ida

ble un de r t

he se c ir c ums tanc e s and tha t summa ry jud g me nt w a s a

pp ro pr iate on

thi s aspec t of his claim under the TCPA.
To the extent that the summary judgme nt ruling on the TCPA claims was base d u p on a finding that Mr. Fle ming ha d not re as onably relied upon a

ny alleg ed misrepr esentations by Appellee s, we disag ree with the trial court’ s t re at m ent of this issue. A plaintiff proc eedingunder the T C P A i s n o t r e qu i r e d t o s h o w r e l i an c e u p o n a m i s r e p r e s e n t at i o n o f t h e d e f e n d an t i n or de r t o maintain a ca

use of a ction. See Me

sse r Grie she im Ind

us. , Inc . d /b/ a M G I ndus t. , 131 S.W .3d at 469. Howeve r, this Court cannot re verse for matters which would not alter the outcome of

the litigation. See, e .g. , O’Brien v. S m ith B ros. En gine Rebuil ders, Inc. , 4 94 S.W. 2d

78 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 73 ). We t

he re fo re c on c lud e th at th e tr ia l c ourt ’s summa ry jud g me nt r

uli ngis s us ta ina

ble g iven the leg al principles g overningthe TCPA, as discussed her ein.

We r e c og nize that an unf

a ir or de c e pti ve a c t do e s no t have to be fr a ud ule nt or int e nti on a l to impose liabilit y

under the Act. Bra ndo n v . W inne tt , No. 01A01-9411- CH-00529, 1995 Tenn. A pp. L E X I S 5 0 8 , a t * 1 6 ( T e n n

. C t

. A p p

. J u l y 2 8 , 1 9 9 5 )

. I n Ap p e l l an t ’ s c o mp l a i n t , h e s t a t e d t h a t “ [i ]n

m ak i n g t h e r ep re s en t at i o n s co mp l ai n edo f i nt h i s co mp l ai n t , t h e D ef en d an t s d i d

s o k n o wi n gl y o r t h ey had re ason to know the repre sentations complained of were misrepre sentations.” (R. Vol. 1, p. 3-4). The c omplaint later provided, “[y ]our Plaintiff reiter ates all aver ments contained in the f

irst twelve para g raphs of

this Com plaint and aver s that the Def endants are g uilty of neg lige nce in repre senting t h e v eh i cl e t o be in the condition they descr ibed when the vehicle w as not in that condition.” Construing the ple ading s liberally , Appellant’s c omplaint averred a T CPA claim for neg lige ntM r

. Fl emi ng bri ef l y s t at es i n h i s appel l at e br i ef t hat hi s ne gl i gen t mi s r epre s ent at i on cl ai m wa s pur s ued u nder 7

t h e common l aw

. W e addr es s Appel l an t ’ s pos i t i on be l ow, i n ou r di s cu s s i on r eg ar di n g Fl emi n g ’ s c ommon l aw c l ai m f or b re a c h o f co n tra c t.

-15- misrepre sentation. Neg lige nt misrepre sentations which are unfair or dece ptive to the consumer can 7 also be de emed viol at i o n s o f t he TCPA. Id. (citingSm ith v. Scott Lewis Chevrolet, Inc. , 843 S.W .2d 9, 13 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992)) . Howeve r, the undisputed fa cts on rec ord have alre ady led us to find that Appellant’s injury was re asonably

avoidable. This prec ludes Mr. Fleming, as a matter of law, f rom beingable to show that Appellee s eng ag ed in unfair or dece ptive acts or prac tices under the TCPA. See Tucker , 180 S.W .3d at 117. I t is appar ent to this Court t hat summary judgme nt was

a lso a pp ro pr iate ly g ra

nte d in Ap pe lle e s’ fa

vo r on F le min g ’s c la im un de r the TCP A f or any a lle g e dly neg lige nt misreprese ntations made by Appellee s.

We next consider Mr

. Fleming ’s claim ag ainst Murphy , Br annon, and B ug g s for bre ach of

c on tr a c t. A

pp e lla nt’ s c omp la int

fa ile d to re fe re nc e any

wr itt e n a g re e me nt be tw e e n th e pa rt ie s a s to the tr ans a c tio n in qu est ion , a nd a pp are ntl y re lie d s ole ly

up on the a fo re me nti on e d s tate me nts contained in the e Ba

y ® ad v er t i sement for

the Corvette a s a basis for this claim. At the summary jud g me nt h e ari ng , th e tr ia l c ourt a sk e d App e lla

nt’ s c ouns e l, M r. B e an, to e xpla in h is p os iti on wi th reg ard to the “as is” lang uag e in the signe d bill of sale, which the c ourt rec og nized as the sole written

e mbo dim e nt o f t

he pa rt ie s’ a g re e me nt. Mr

. B e an re sp on de d that the “ a s- is” langua g e a pp e are d in th e b i l l o f s a l e , an d “ t h e r e w a s n o w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t t o e n t e r i n t o t h i s s a l e o r p u rc ha se a s f a r a s I know.” Mr. Bean corre ctly cited Mo rri

s v . M ack’ s U se d Ca rs , 824 S.W .2d 538 (Tenn. 1992) , for his positi on that “y ou cannot have an as-is provision unde r the UCC to prohibit t he application of the Tenne ssee Consumer Protec tion Act.” The trial court ag ree d that fra udulent misrepre sentation would indeed be a def

ense to such a disclaimer under both the TCPA and the common law. The trial court re cog nized Defe ndants’ a rgument that Plaintiff’s claims of misrepr esentation and brea ch of

c on tr a c t we re we ake ne d by the fa c t tha t the ve hic le ’s c on dit ion wo uld have be e n r e a dil y ob se rv a ble to Mr. Flem i n g befor e purc hase if F leming ha d acc epted Murphy ’s offe r to let him have the c ar inspected by a local mecha nic. The trial court went on to a pply the elements fo r f

ra u d u lent misrepre sentation as re cited in this Court’s decision in Pi tz , 2004 Tenn. A p p. L EXI S 851, at *23, and conc luded that Mr. F leming did not e x er ci s e ordina ry car e or dilig ence in relying upon a ny alleg ed re prese ntations made by Def endants, or in declining the opportunity to have a profe ssional inspection of the ve hicle bef ore he tender ed pay

ment.

The e ssential elemen t s of any brea ch of c ontrac t claim include (1) the exist ence of an enfor cea ble co n t ra ct , (2) nonpe rfor mance amounting to a

brea ch of the contra ct, and ( 3) dama g es
cause d by the breach of the contra ct. Ingram v. Cendant Mobil ity Fin . Corp. , 215 S.W .3d 367, 374 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 20 06 ). Th e int e rp re tatio n of a wr itt e n a g re e me nt is a matte r of law a nd no t of fa c t. Id. I n Ingram , the plaintiffs pursued various claims based upon their purc hase of a house, a fter the y alleg edly discovere d that the house was not in the condition repre sented by the def endant se ller. Id. at 369. In Ingram , this Court affirmed the tr ial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt on a cla im for b re ac h o f c o n t ra ct , s t at i n g:-16- Th e pla intiff

s’ the or y ne c e ssa ri ly re qu ir e s th e e xiste nc e of so me g uara ntee in the Sales Contract re g ardingthe condition of the Residence at the ti me of the sa le. The Sale s Contract, howe ver, contains an “ as-is” c lause

. . . . The for eg oing c lauses ar e valid and enfor cea ble i n the abse nce of

fra udulent misrepre sentation and

conce alment. Chadw ick v. Spence , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 92, No. W2003-00931-COA-R3-CV, 2 0 0 4 WL 2 9 8 3 6 7 , a t * 5 ( T e nn. Ct. App. F e b. 11 , 2 00 4) ; Edm ondson v. Coates , 1992 Tenn. App. L EXI S 466, No . 0 1- A- 01 -9 10 9- CH -0 00 32 4, 19 92 WL10 87 17 , at *1 1 ( Te nn . Ct

. Ap p. May 22 , 1 99 2) ; Simm ons v

. Ev ans , 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S.W.2d 295, 2 9 6 (T en n

. 1 9 4 7 ). [ De fe n d an t ] C en d an th as s u cc es s fu l l y neg ated the Plaintiffs’ claims of f raudule nt misreprese ntation and

conce alment. Acc ording ly , the “as-is” clause i s enfor cea ble, and we aff irm the Trial Court on this issue.

Id. at 374.

I n th is c a se , th e bil l of

sa le , w hic h th e tr ial cou rt app ro pr iate ly re c ognize d to be the so le written ag ree ment enter ed into betwee n the par ties, contained two separate di sclaimers simi lar to t he one found in Ingram

. Specifica lly
, Mr. Fleming and Mr. Murphy eac h signe d the bill of sale whic h

c on ta ine d th e fo llo wi ngdis c la ime rs :

Disclaimer of Warranties

. . . All warranties on this vehicle a re the manufa cture r’s. The Seller[] here by

expressly disclaims all w arr anties, either e x presse d or imp lied, i ncl ud in g any

im pl iedwarra nt y

of M erch ant abi li ty

or Fitne ss for a Particular purpose, a

nd neither a ssumes nor authorizes any other person to assume f

or it any liability in connection with this sale. [T] his disclaimer in no way aff ects the te rms of the manuf actur er’ s
war ranty . The buy er sha ll not be entitled to recove r fr om the selling deale r any conseque ntial damag es, dama g es to proper ty , damag es for loss of use, los s o f t i m e, los s of profit or inc ome, or a ny other incidental dama g es. Any

exceptions to the above disclaimer must be expressly provided by

separ ate instrument in writing

. T H E V E H IC LE B E IN G S O LD UN D E RT H IS AGR EEM ENT I S BEI

NG P UR CH AS E D AN D AC CE P TED BY THE PURCHASER “AS I S”.

. . . AL LUSED VEHI CL ES SOL D AS I S W I TH NO EX PRES S OR I MPL I ED WARRANTY OF A NY KI ND OR DESCRI PTI ON EXCEPT WHEN STATED AB OVE I N WRI TI NG OR I N THE CASE OF A USED VEHI CL E WI TH AN UNEXPI RED PORTI ON-17- OF MA NUF ACTURER’ S W

ARRANTY THEREON A ND, IF ANY, SAI D WARRANTY S HA L LBE DE T E R M I NE D S OLELY B Y THE TERMS OF SAI D WARRANTY. Iunderstand a

nd ag ree that this inst rument comprise s the entire ag ree ment perta in i n g to this purchase A ND NO O THER AGREEMENTS VERB AL OR OTHER WI SE I S [ sic] UNDERSTOOD B Y ME OR SHAL LBE RECOGN I Z ED.

Under the common law of contra cts, we interpret ex culpatory clause s acc ording to the plain meaning of their ter

ms. Ouzts v. Wom ack , 160 S.W .3d 883, 885 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. F eb. 28, 200 5 ). Di s cl aimers suc h as these a re va lid in Tennessee , absent fr audulent misrepre sentation and c oncea lment. Ingram , 2 15 S.W. 3d a t 374. Th e re fo re it is ne c e ssa ry fo r t his Court to discuss the elements for the se ca uses of a ction under the common law.

Mr . F le min g c on te nd s th a t App e lle e s mi sr e pr e se nte d th e tr ue c on dit ion

of the vehi c le in question. The we ll-established ele ments of a common law c laim for fr audulent misrepr esentation

wer e re cited by

this Court i n Pi

tz , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 851, at *23:

(1) the defe ndant m ade a represe ntation of an exis ting or past fac t; (2) the re prese ntation was fa lse when made; (3) the repr esentation related to a mater ial fac t; (4) the fa l s e representation was made e ither knowing ly

or without belief in its truth or rec klessly ; (5) the plaintiff

rea s o n ably

relied on the misrepre sented mate rial fa cts; and (6) the plaintiff s u ff

ered damag e as a

result of the misre prese ntation. Metropol it a n Go v’ t o f N a s h vil l e [ & ] D a vi d s o n C o u n t y v . McKinn ey , 85 2 S.W. 2d 23 3, 23 7 (T e nn

. Ct. App . 199 2) ; see Anderson v. Warren , 2001 Tenn. App. L EXI S 958, W 2000-02649-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 1683810, at *3 (Te nn. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2001) . I n such an action, the bur den is upon the pl aintiff to show that his relianc e on the defe ndant’s re prese ntation was re asonable

. Metropol i t a n Gov’t of Na shv ill e& D av ids on Co unty , 852 S.W .2d at 237.

Mr. Fle ming a lso argues that Appe lle es fr au d u l ently conce aled the r

usted condition of the ca r’s frame by painting it black. “The tort of fra udulent conce alment is committed when a pa rty who has a duty to disclose a known f

act or condition fails to do so, and another par ty rea sonably

relies upon the re sult ing misre prese ntation, thereby suffe ring injury .” Ingram , 215 S.W .3d at 373 (quoting Chri sm an v. Hill H

om e De v., Inc. , 978 S.W .2d 535, 538-59 (Tenn. 1998)). “More over a plaintiff must show that the defe ndant had actua l knowledg e of the defe ct alleg edly conce aled.” Id. (citing Akb ari v . Ho rn , 641 S.W .2d 506, 507 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)) . I n this case, the only evidenc e offe red by

Mr. Fle ming to support his co n tention that Appellees ha d actua l knowledg e that the Corvette had be en painted bla ck to conc eal its rusted fr ame wa s t h e af fi davit of his restoration sp e c ia lis t, M r. Hatf

ie ld, wh o s tate d th a t “ [i]f t he re ar en d of the c ar h a d b e e n r e bu ilt and se rv ic e d in-18-

November

of 2003 then it would have been c lear to whoeve r did the work that the frame was
sever ely rusted.”

I n Pi tz , w e e la

b o r a te d a s to s e v e r a l f

a c to r s th a t s h o u ld

b e c o n s id e r e d

w h e nd e te r

mining whet h er a plaintiff’s re liance on a defe ndant’s re prese ntations is reasonable : (1) the plaintiff’ s business expertise and sophistication; (2) the e x istence of a long standing busin es s or per sonal relationship betwe en the parties; (3) the a vailability

of the re levant information; (4) the exist ence of a fiduc iary

relationship; (5) the c oncea lment of the fra ud; ( 6) the opportunity to disc over the fra ud; (7) the pa rty which ini tiated t he transaction; and (8) the s pecif icity of t he misrepr esentation. Pi tz , 2004 Tenn. App. L EXI S 851, at *32 (citing J. C. Brad fo rd & Co . v

. S. Re alt y Pa rtne rs , 2000 Tenn. Ap p

. L E XIS 5 5 5 , W 1 9 9 9 -0 1 6 1 7 -C OA -R 3 -C V, 2 0 0 0 W L3 4 4 1 1 1 5 3 , at * 1 0 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. Au g. 14, 2000)).

I n th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt a pp lie d th e se fa c tor s at th e summa ry jud g me nt h e ari ng , a ft e r a ll discovery had bee n completed. In the final orde r grantingsummary judgme nt, J udg e B ailey

stated his finding that Mr. Fleming ha d not rea sonably relied on a

ny misrepre sentations by

Appellee s. For the re asons alre ady

discussed, we ag ree with this finding by the trial cour

t. As such, Appellee s
su c c e ssf ull y ne g a te d M r. F le min g ’s c la ims of fr a ud ule nt m isr epre se ntatio n a nd c on c e a lme nt. There fore , the exculpatory clause s found within the bill of sale were valid and enforce able, a nd Mr. F le min g ’s br e a c h o f co ntr a c t cla im fa ils a s a matt e r o f l aw, makin g summa ry jud g me nt a

pp ro pr iate on this iss ue.

Mr. Fle ming state s in his appellate brief that his c laims f or neg lige nt misreprese ntation were pursued unde r the c ommon law. Howeve r, Appe llant fails to cite any Tenne ssee a

uthority d isc ussing the common law e lements for neg lige nt misreprese ntation, or otherwise offe r an a rgument in support of su c h a cla im. No ne the le ss, we no te the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court ’s dis c us sio n of the e le me nts for ne g lige nt misreprese ntation:

One who, in the c ourse of

his business, profession or e mploy ment, or in any other tra nsaction in which he ha s a pec uniary interest, supplies fa lse inf or matio n f or the g uid anc e of

others in

the ir bu sin e ss transac tions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss cause d to them by their justifiabl e relianceupon the information
, if he fa il s to exercise r ea s o n able care or compe tence in obtaining or communicatingthe information.

Robin son v. Olm er , 952 S.W .2d 423, 427 (Tenn. 1997) (quoting Section 402B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) ) (emphasis added) . We have a lrea dy expressed our a g ree ment with the trial court’s f indi ng that Mr. Fle ming did not re asonably rely on any alleg ed misrepr esentations by Appellee s, for reasons a lrea dy thoroug hly

discussed. We additionally find that Mr. F leming did not justifiably

rely on any of these pur

ported re prese ntations, thu s an y cl ai m pursued f or neg lige nt misrepre sentation under the common law was appropr iately dismiss ed throug h the trial court’ s g rant of summary

judgme nt.-19- V. C ONCL US I ON

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med. Co s t s ar e assessed ag ainst Appellant, R onald Fleming, and his surety , for which execution may issue if nec essar y

.

___________________________________ AL AN E. HI GHERS, J UDGE