IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–0362

Filed June 30, 2017

Amended September 18, 2017

STATE OF IOWA,

Appellee,

vs.

CHRISTOPHER GEORGE STORM,

Appellant.

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Randy V. 

Hefner, Judge. 

Defendant appeals his conviction claiming automobile exception to 

search warrant requirement should be abandoned. DISTRICT COURT 

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

Daniel J. Rothman of McEnroe, Gotsdiner, Brewer, Steinbach & 

Rothman, P.C., for appellant. 

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Louis S. 

Sloven, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
2

WATERMAN, Justice. 

In this appeal, we must decide whether to abandon the automobile 

exception to the search warrant requirement under article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution. In State v. Gaskins, we did not reach that issue,

but members of this court noted the rationale for the exception may be 

eroded by technological advances enabling police to obtain warrants from 

the scene of a traffic stop. 866 N.W.2d 1, 17 (Iowa 2015) (Cady, C.J., 

concurring specially). The defendant driver in today’s case was lawfully 

stopped for a seat belt violation. The deputy smelled marijuana and 

searched the vehicle, discovering marijuana packaged for resale. The 

defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver in violation 

of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d) (2015). He filed a motion to suppress,

claiming this warrantless search violated the Iowa Constitution because 

police can now obtain warrants electronically from the side of the road. 

The district court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing that 

included testimony that it would have taken well over an hour to obtain a 

search warrant. The defendant was convicted, and we retained his 

appeal.

On our review, we conclude, based on the evidence in the record,

that this deputy was unable to obtain a warrant electronically from the 

scene of the traffic stop, and the procedures in place at that time 

required a warrant application to be presented in person to a judicial 

officer. For the reasons further explained below, we elect to retain the 

automobile exception, consistent with our precedent, federal caselaw, 

and the overwhelming majority of other states. We are guided by the 

decisions of other states that abandoned the automobile exception only 

to reinstate it. Their experience shows the easy-to-apply automobile 

exception is preferable to the alternative—a less predictable, case-by-case 
3

exigency determination resulting in prolonged roadside seizures awaiting 

a warrant, with attendant dangers and no net gain for civil liberties. We 

may revisit this issue at a future time when roadside electronic warrants 

have become more practical. Today, we affirm the district court’s ruling 

denying the defendant’s motion to suppress and defendant’s conviction. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 

On the afternoon of April 19, 2015, sheriff’s deputy Clay Leonard 

was on patrol in Dallas County at the intersection of Highway 141 and 

Wendover. He saw a male driving a dark-colored Chevrolet pickup truck 

without wearing a seat belt. The deputy activated his emergency lights to 

stop the driver. He reported to dispatch the location of the traffic stop, 

about a twenty-five-minute drive from the Dallas County courthouse. He

walked to the driver’s side window and asked for the lone occupant’s

license and registration. As they talked, he noticed that the driver, 

Christopher Storm, “appeared to be nervous, hands shaking and quick 

labored breaths.” Deputy Leonard “could smell the distinct odor of 

marijuana coming from the vehicle.” He brought Storm back to the front 

seat of his patrol car for questioning. Storm made a call on his 

cell phone, and two of his acquaintances arrived. Storm initially denied 

smoking marijuana or having any in his truck, but after further 

discussion, he admitted to using marijuana previously and having a 

criminal record. Over Storm’s objection, Deputy Leonard searched the

truck. He found several packages of marijuana, a scale, a grinder, a 

pipe, an e-cigarette with residue, and pills in an unmarked bottle. These 

items were removed, and Storm was placed under arrest. One of Storm’s 

acquaintances drove his truck away after the arrest. 

The marijuana found in Storm’s truck totaled forty-seven grams. 

The fourteen pills in the unmarked bottle were amphetamine/
4

dextroamphetamine, with no prescription. Storm’s cell phone had text 

messages showing he had been selling marijuana. The State charged 

Storm by trial information with possession with intent to deliver 

marijuana in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(d); tax stamp 

violations under sections 453B.1, 453B.3, 453B.4, and 453B.12; and 

unlawful possession of a prescription drug in violation of section 

155A.21. 

Storm filed a motion to suppress. He argued that a warrantless 

search of a vehicle based solely upon probable cause no longer comports 

with article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because new technology 

enables officers to file warrant applications at the scene of the traffic

stop. The State resisted, and the district court conducted an evidentiary 

hearing. 

Deputy Leonard and Lieutenant Adam Infante testified for the 

State. Deputy Leonard testified that it is a “routine occurrence” that he 

is the only law enforcement officer “dealing with multiple individuals or 

suspects.” If he has to call for assistance, it could be thirty to forty 

minutes before another officer arrives. When he stopped Storm, Deputy 

Leonard had a personal cell phone, a department-issued flip phone, and 

an in-car computer. His internet connection was “slow” at that location. 

He lacked the equipment to remotely obtain a warrant.

Deputy Leonard also testified about the time needed to write a 

search warrant application:

Q. How long, in your experience, has it taken you to 

author search warrants? A. By the time I get back to the 

police department or my office . . . to type it up, make phone 

calls, get ahold of a county attorney to look over it, review 

it—I also have to get assistance because I’m not, I don’t do it 

all the time, so I either have a detective or somebody else 

that writes them up assist me. 
5

And then, after making phone calls, getting ahold of 

them, sending the document back and forth maybe to fix, 

grammatically fix a couple things or something, then the 

judge signs it. 

Most of the time I have to go to the judge’s house if it’s 

after hours. It’s 5, 6 hours by the time I get everything done 

and be able to execute the warrant. 

He noted how having to write a warrant in the patrol car would change 

this process: 

Well, typing up documents, trying to put everything into the 

document that’s required by law, and trying to watch 

somebody or what’s going on at the scene, or timewise, 

et cetera, is—I mean, it takes away from me being able to 

keep observation around me, keep me safe, et cetera. 

Lieutenant Infante, who estimated he had written “hundreds” of 

warrants, testified it would take him, in a “[b]are-bones case,” “about an 

hour.” He outlined the complexity of the warrant process: 

First thing you need to do in the search warrant is identify 

with specificity the item or property to be searched. In this 

case a vehicle make, model, VIN, license plate, color, location 

of the vehicle, that sort of thing. 

Next step would be to determine the items that you’re 

looking for in said vehicle. Which, once again, has to be 

fairly specific. 

After that I would lay out my affidavit for why I believe 

there’s probable cause to search the vehicle for the items 

that I’m looking for. 

The next step would be to add an attachment B if 

there was any sort of outside information that I might have 

received from another law enforcement officer or informant of 

some sort. 

In Dallas County the judges prefer that we assist them

with filling out the endorsement, where in some other 

counties that’s not the case. Then I would contact the 

county attorney to get their approval of the search warrant, 

to discuss any details or items that I might have left out. 

And then after I have had the county attorney’s approval I 

would then begin the arduous task of tracking down a judge. 

He testified tracking down a judge can be difficult, whether it is “3 or 4 

o’clock in the morning” or “3 o’clock in the afternoon” because they are 
6

often involved in other business such as hearings, appearances, or 

conferences. 

Lieutenant Infante acknowledged he takes a “cautious” approach 

to search warrants, explaining the importance of accuracy: 

I’ve lost a search warrant in this very courtroom before for

not being correct. You only have one opportunity to write a 

search warrant and get it signed by a judge. Once it’s 

signed, sealed, that’s it. You don’t get an opportunity to go 

back and edit it or make corrections or change anything. 

If he had to apply for a search warrant from his squad car, “It would be 

hard for [him to] do a good job. It would be hard for [him] to be accurate 

with having to pay attention to [the driver] and also keep an eye on the 

property to be searched.” He noted the challenge of multitasking while 

using the in-car computer: 

There’s a misconception that these in-car computers 

are, you know you’re going to sit there and you’re going to 

write all your reports on this in-car computer. That’s not the 

case. These computers issue citations, warnings; they do 

some accidents. A scanner is involved in that. The entering 

on the computer is minimal. 

We’re not typing an affidavit on our in-car computer. 

We’re going back to the office where we can sit down, face a 

computer, do it correctly. 

These deputies are turned sideways; they’re [not 

looking] out the side of the window to make sure nobody hits 

them; they’re watching the guy in the back seat. The in-car 

computer is not what people think it is. 

Lieutenant Infante also testified there was no process for submitting 

warrants electronically to judges in Dallas County. 

Storm presented testimony from Bryan Barker, a criminal defense 

attorney and former police officer and prosecutor, who estimated he

could fill out a warrant application in fifteen minutes. However, Barker 

qualified his testimony by stating he would be making extensive use of 

“boilerplate.” He noted it likely would take another “15 to . . . 30 
7

minutes” to get approval from a judge, assuming the warrant could be 

sent electronically and the judge was available, for a total of thirty to 

forty-five minutes. 

The district court denied Storm’s motion to suppress, concluding 

that Iowa statutes and rules “expressly anticipate that [a] warrant 

application will be signed under oath in the actual physical presence of 

the judge or magistrate.” The district court applied the automobile 

exception, stating, “Under these circumstances, mobility of the vehicle 

was more than a theoretical or presumed problem,” and “[a] very real 

possibility existed that the vehicle would be driven away from this 

location before a warrant could be obtained by any means.” The district 

court made a factual finding that “Deputy Leonard did not have available 

to him at the time and place of this search the technology or training 

that would have allowed submission” of an electronic warrant. 

Storm was convicted of possession with intent to deliver at a bench 

trial on the minutes of testimony. He was given a suspended prison 

sentence of no more than five years and placed on two years of

probation. He appealed, and we retained the appeal.

II. Standard of Review. 

“When a defendant challenges a district court’s denial of a motion 

to suppress based upon the deprivation of a state or federal 

constitutional right, our standard of review is de novo.” State v. Brown, 

890 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 2017). We look to the entire record and 

“make ‘an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” 

Id. (quoting In re Prop. Seized from Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 

2015)). “We give deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its 

opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses, but we are not 

bound by those findings.” Id. (quoting Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 390). 
8

III. Analysis. 

Storm asks us to abandon the automobile exception, contending 

its rationale has been eroded by new technology allowing warrants to be 

obtained promptly from the scene of the traffic stop. On our de novo 

review, we find the evidentiary record belies Storm’s factual premise. 

Like the district court, we find that Deputy Leonard lacked the capability 

to obtain a search warrant from the scene of the traffic stop and that it 

would have taken over an hour to get a warrant to search Storm’s truck. 

Based on this evidentiary record and our survey of precedent nationwide, 

we retain the automobile exception and affirm the district court. 

A. The Automobile Exception’s History and Rationales. “The 

Supreme Court has recognized a ‘specifically established and welldelineated’ exception to the warrant requirement for searches of 

automobiles and their contents.” State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 

792 (Iowa 2008) (quoting California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 

S. Ct. 1982, 1991 (1991)). “[T]his exception is applicable when probable 

cause and exigent circumstances exist at the time the car is stopped by 

police.” State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 736 (Iowa 1981). The 

inherent mobility of motor vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances 

requirement. Id. at 737. 

The automobile exception rests on twin rationales: (1) the inherent 

mobility of the vehicle, and (2) the lower expectation of privacy in vehicles

compared to homes and other structures. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d at 

793–94. There was no procedure in place in Dallas County in 2015 for 

Deputy Leonard to obtain a search warrant electronically from the scene 

of his traffic stop.1 We decline to replace the easy-to-apply automobile 

 1The State contends that Iowa law in 2015 required in-person presentations of 

warrant applications to judicial officers. We need not decide that question of statutory 
9

exception with a case-by-case exigency determination that results in less 

predictable, inconsistent outcomes and prolonged seizures with roadside 

hazards and no net gain in liberty. Vehicles remain inherently mobile 

with reduced expectations of privacy, while rapid roadside warrants are 

not yet a realistic option. We conclude the twin rationales for the 

automobile exception remain valid. 

1. The inherent mobility of the automobile. The United States 

Supreme Court first recognized the automobile exception to the searchwarrant requirement in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S. Ct.

280 (1925). The Carroll Court addressed when police could search the 

vehicles of bootleggers suspected of transporting liquor during the 

Prohibition. Id. at 160, 45 S. Ct. at 287–88. After surveying federal law 

since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court 

observed, 

[T]he guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and 

seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, 

practically since the beginning of the government, as 

recognizing a necessary difference between the search of a 

store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which 

a proper official warrant readily may be obtained and a 

search of a ship, motor boat, wagon, or automobile for 

contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a 

warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the 

locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. 

Id. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285. Given the inherent mobility of the 

automobile and the impracticability of securing a warrant, the Carroll 

Court held a warrantless search would be lawful if the officer had 

“reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he 

stops and seizes has contraband.” Id. at 156, 45 S. Ct. at 286. 

___________________________

interpretation because under the automobile exception, no warrant was required and 

the legislature this year prospectively authorized remote electronic warrants. S.F. 358, 

87th G.A., 1st Sess. § 4 (Iowa 2017). 
10

Forty-five years later in Chambers v. Maroney, the Supreme Court 

reaffirmed the automobile exception for a vehicle impounded and 

searched at the police station following the driver’s arrest. 399 U.S. 42, 

48, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1979 (1970). The Court reiterated its mobility 

rationale, stating, 

[A] search warrant [is] unnecessary where there is probable 

cause to search an automobile stopped on the highway; the 

car is movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car’s 

contents may never be found again if a warrant must be 

obtained. 

Id. at 51, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. The Chambers Court confronted the same 

argument Storm raises today: that a vehicle should simply be seized

until a magistrate authorizes a warrant. Id. The Court observed,

Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate’s 

judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be 

permitted until a search warrant is obtained; arguably, only 

the “lesser” intrusion is permissible until the magistrate 

authorizes the “greater.” But which is the “greater” and 

which the “lesser” intrusion is itself a debatable question 

and the answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. 

For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on 

the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the 

probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand 

carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given 

probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 51–52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. Concluding the warrantless search was 

constitutional, the Court emphasized that “there is little to choose in 

terms of practical consequences between an immediate search without a 

warrant and the car’s immobilization until a warrant is obtained.” Id. at 

52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. 

The Supreme Court more recently reaffirmed that exigent 

circumstances apart from the mobility of the vehicle are not required to 

justify a warrantless search. In Maryland v. Dyson, police received a tip 
11

from a reliable confidential informant that a drug dealer would be 

returning to Maryland in a specifically identified red rental car. 527 U.S. 

465, 465, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2013 (1999) (per curiam). Officers stopped 

and searched the vehicle, finding twenty-three grams of crack cocaine. 

Id. at 466, 119 S. Ct. at 2013. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals 

reversed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress, 

finding that although there was probable cause to conduct the search, 

there “was no exigency that prevented or even made it significantly 

difficult for the police to obtain a search warrant.” Id. The Supreme 

Court reversed, noting that “under our established precedent, the 

‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.” Id. at 

466, 119 S. Ct. at 2014; see also Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 

940, 116 S. Ct. 2485, 2487 (1996) (per curiam) (using the automobile 

exception to justify a search based only on probable cause with no 

additional exigency). 

2. The lower expectation of privacy in automobiles. The United 

States Supreme Court has also justified the automobile exception based 

on the reduced expectation of privacy resulting from the “configuration, 

use and regulation of automobiles.” Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 

761, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (1979), abrogated on other grounds by 

Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 575, 111 S. Ct. at 1989. Indeed, “[o]ne has a lesser 

expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is 

transportation and it seldom serves as one’s residence or as the 

repository of personal effects.” Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590, 94 

S. Ct. 2464, 2469 (1974). Unlike a home or office, “[a] car has little 

capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares 

where its occupants and its contents are in plain view.” Id. 

Furthermore, 
12

[b]ecause of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles 

and traffic, and also because of the frequency with which a 

vehicle can become disabled or involved in an accident on 

public highways, the extent of police-citizen contact involving 

automobiles will be substantially greater than police-citizen 

contact in a home or office. 

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973). 

As the Supreme Court explained, 

In discharging their varied responsibilities for ensuring the 

public safety, law enforcement officials are necessarily 

brought into frequent contact with automobiles. Most of this 

contact is distinctly noncriminal in nature. Automobiles, 

unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing 

governmental regulation and controls, including periodic 

inspection and licensing requirements. As an everyday 

occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license 

plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other 

violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are 

noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in 

proper working order. 

South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3096 

(1976) (citation omitted). “In the interests of public safety . . . 

automobiles are frequently taken into police custody.” Id. at 368, 96 

S. Ct. at 3097 (citation omitted). Police may impound vehicles after 

accidents to permit “the uninterrupted flow of traffic.” Id. Not so with a 

home or other structure. 

The state’s interest in highway safety allows warrantless 

checkpoint stops without individualized reasonable suspicion. Mich. 

Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 

(1990). By contrast, the interest in safe neighborhoods cannot justify 

warrantless searches of homes or businesses on a city block. Rather, a 

search warrant is required to “effect an unconsented administrative entry 

into and inspection of private dwellings or commercial premises.” 

Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367 n.2, 96 S. Ct. at 3096 n.2 (citing Camara v. 

Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967)). 
13

B. Iowa’s Adoption of the Automobile Exception Under Our 

State Constitution. The search and seizure provisions of the Fourth 

Amendment to the United States Constitution2 and article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution3 are virtually identical. “We may construe the 

Iowa Constitution differently than its federal counterpart, despite the 

provisions containing nearly identical language and being structured 

generally with the same scope, import, and purpose.” State v. Kooima, 

833 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 2013). We adopted the automobile exception 

under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution in State v. Olsen, 293 

N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980). Previously, we had required exigency 

separate from the mobility of the vehicle to justify a warrantless search, 

but we clarified that we did so because “[a]t that time some doubt existed 

as to the scope of Chambers.” Id. at 219; see also State v. Schlenker, 234 

N.W.2d 142, 145 (Iowa 1975) (requiring separate showing of exigency). 

Federal cases subsequently clarified that “[t]he exigency requirement . . . 

is sufficiently established by the inherent mobility of the vehicle, the fact 

defendant was alerted, and the chance that the car’s contents might not 

be found again if a warrant had to be then obtained.” Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 

 2The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides, 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 

not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 

to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 

U.S. Const. amend. IV. 

3Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution provides,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not 

be violated; and no warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported 

by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 

and the persons and things to be seized. 

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. 
14

at 220. While acknowledging we were “still free to apply” our previous 

holdings under an independent approach to the Iowa Constitution, we 

were “persuaded that the state constitution should be given the same 

interpretation as the Federal.” Id. at 219, 220. 

We have continued to follow the federal automobile exception for 

decades. See, e.g., Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d at 791 n.2 (rejecting an Iowa 

constitutional challenge to a warrantless vehicle search); State v. 

Maddox, 670 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 2003) (applying the automobile 

exception to uphold a warrantless search under the Federal and Iowa 

Constitutions because of a vehicle’s “inherent mobility”); Holderness, 301 

N.W.2d at 737 (rejecting federal and state constitutional challenges to a 

warrantless vehicle search conducted at the police station); see also State 

v. Vance, 790 N.W.2d 775, 791 (Iowa 2010) (Cady, J., dissenting) (“This 

[automobile] exception has been firmly planted in our Iowa jurisprudence

for over twenty years.”). We are not persuaded to chart a different course 

today. “Stare decisis alone dictates continued adherence to our 

precedent absent a compelling reason to change the law.” Book v. 

Doublestar Dongfeng Tyre Co., 860 N.W.2d 576, 594 (Iowa 2015). Storm 

offers no compelling reason for overruling our precedent on the 

automobile exception. 

C. The Overwhelming Majority of State Courts Have Retained 

the Automobile Exception. 

1. All but five states have retained the automobile exception. An 

overwhelming majority of states continue to adhere to the automobile 

exception.4 These include courts that have construed their state 

 4See State v. Reyna, 71 P.3d 366, 369 n.5 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Jackson v. State, 

427 S.W.3d 607, 613 (Ark. 2013); People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Colo. 2016);

People v. Edwards, 836 P.2d 468, 471 (Colo. 1992); State v. Williams, 88 A.3d 534, 547 

(Conn. 2014); Reeder v. State, Nos. 552,1999, 583,1999, 2001 WL 355732, at *2 (Del. 
15

constitutions to allow greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 

See Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 126 (Pa. 2014) (“[A] generally 

enhanced concern for individual privacy” does not “translate[] into a 

conferral of increased privacy protection in every context in which it is 

asserted under [the state constitution.]”); see also Stout v. State, 898 

S.W.2d 457, 460 (Ark. 1995) (“Of course, we could hold that the 

Arkansas Constitution provides greater protection against unreasonable 

searches than does the Constitution of the United States, but we see no 

reason to do so.”); People v. Smith, 447 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ill. 1983) (noting 

“the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the automobile exception . . . 

achieves a fair balance”); Commonwealth v. Motta, 676 N.E.2d 795, 800 

(Mass. 1997) (“Indeed, while it is true that we have at times concluded 

that art. 14 provides more protection than the Fourth Amendment, we 

have also followed the Supreme Court in the area of the automobile 

exception.”); State v. Lloyd, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (Nev. 2013) (“Although it is 

elementary that states may provide greater protections than required by 

the federal Constitution, it is at least as fundamental that such decisions 

___________________________

Mar. 26, 2001); State v. Betz, 815 So. 2d 627, 631 (Fla. 2002); State v. Wallace, 910 

P.2d 965, 714 n.16 (Haw. 1996); State v. Anderson, 302 P.3d 328, 331 (Idaho 2012); 

People v. Smith, 447 N.E.2d 809, 813 (Ill. 1983); State v. Conn, 99 P.3d 1108, 1111–12 

(Kan. 2004); Chavies v. Commonwealth, 354 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Ky. 2011); State v. 

Crawford, 210 So. 3d 268, 269 (La. 2017); State v. Melvin, 955 A.2d 245, 250 (Me. 

2008); State v. Ireland, 706 A.2d 597, 599 n.2 (Me. 1998); Berry v. State, 843 A.2d 93, 

113 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004); Commonwealth v. Dame, 45 N.E.3d 69, 81 (Mass. 2016); 

People v. Kazmierczak, 605 N.W.2d 667, 674 (Mich. 2000); State v. Lester, 874 N.W.2d 

768, 771 (Minn. 2016); Moore v. State, 787 So. 2d 1282, 1288 (Miss. 2001); State v. 

Rocha, 890 N.W.2d 178, 202 (Neb. 2017); State v. Lloyd, 312 P.3d 467, 474 (Nev. 2013); 

State v. Witt, 126 A.3d 850, 853 (N.J. 2015); People v. Galak, 616 N.E.2d 842, 843–44 

(N.Y. 1993); State v. Isleib, 356 S.E.2d 573, 577 (N.C. 1987); State v. Zwicke, 767 

N.W.2d 869, 873 (N.D. 2009); Gomez v. State, 168 P.3d 1139, 1145 (Okla. 2007); State 

v. Andersen, 390 P.3d 992, 995 (Or. 2017); Commonwealth v. Gary, 91 A.3d 102, 136–

37 (Pa. 2014); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 1992); State v. Fischer, 873 

N.W.2d 681, 689 (S.D. 2016); State v. Sweedland, 721 N.W.2d 409, 413–14 (S.D. 2006); 

State v. Saine, 297 S.W.3d 199, 207 (Tenn. 2009); State v. Rigby, 369 P.3d 127, 137–38 

(Utah Ct. App. 2016); State v. Tompkins, 423 N.W.2d 823, 829 (Wis. 1988); McKenney v. 

State, 165 P.3d 96, 99 n.1 (Wyo. 2007). 
16

should be carefully reasoned and grounded in a strong public policy.”

(quoting Thomas B. McAffee et al., The Automobile Exception in Nevada: A 

Critique of the Harnisch Cases, 8 Nev. L.J. 622, 648 (2008) [hereinafter 

McAffee])). We should not simply “reflexively find ‘in favor of any new 

right or interpretation asserted’ under [the state search and seizure 

provision].” Gary, 91 A.3d at 126 (quoting Commonwealth v. Russo, 934

A.2d 1199, 1210 (Pa. 2007)). 

In State v. Rocha, the Nebraska Supreme Court this year 

addressed the continuing validity of the automobile exception under its 

state constitution. 890 N.W.2d 178, 207 (Neb. 2017). Police found 

marijuana on Eric Rocha after he consented to a pat-down search during 

a roadway stop. Id. at 188. The officer arrested Rocha and searched his 

vehicle, finding methamphetamine, marijuana, two glass vials, a glass 

pipe, and two digital scales near the center console. Id. Rocha moved to 

suppress the evidence discovered during the warrantless search of the 

automobile. Id. at 190. Rocha argued additional exigent circumstances, 

beyond the vehicle’s inherent mobility, were required for a warrantless 

search. Id. at 204. He asserted that when a defendant was incapable of 

physically moving the vehicle or destroying evidence, officers must obtain

a warrant. Id. at 205. The Nebraska Supreme Court disagreed. Id. The

Rocha court, after surveying federal and state decisions, concluded,

In light of the overwhelming weight of authorities, we 

hold that the requirement of ready mobility for the 

automobile exception is met whenever a vehicle that is not 

located on private property is capable or apparently capable 

of being driven on the roads or highways. This inquiry does 

not focus on the likelihood of the vehicle’s being moved 

under the particular circumstances and is generally satisfied 

by the inherent mobility of all operational vehicles. It does 

not depend on whether the defendant has access to the 

vehicle at the time of the search or is in custody, nor on 

whether the vehicle has been impounded. The purpose of 

the ready mobility requirement is to distinguish vehicles on 
17

public property from fixed, permanent structures, in which 

there is a greater expectation of privacy. 

Id. at 207. We reach the same conclusion. 

2. Five other states that had abandoned the automobile exception 

changed course and restored it. We can learn from the experiences of the 

five states previously requiring a separate showing of exigent 

circumstances that restored the automobile exception. See Lloyd, 312 

P.3d at 474; State v. Witt, 126 A.3d 850, 853 (N.J. 2015); State v. Zwicke, 

767 N.W.2d 869, 873 (N.D. 2009); Gomez v. State, 168 P.3d 1139, 1145 

(Okla. Crim. App. 2007); State v. Werner, 615 A.2d 1010, 1014 (R.I. 

1992). The Nevada Supreme Court reversed course after recognizing that 

its separate exigency requirement had produced “confusion, while doing 

little to enhance the protection of individual privacy interests.” Lloyd, 

312 P.3d at 473 (quoting McAffee, 8 Nev. L.J. at 624). By contrast, the 

automobile exception was “rooted in good policy that balances private 

interests with the collective good, even as it provides law enforcement 

with clear and unequivocal guidelines for doing their jobs.” Id. at 474 

(quoting McAffee, 8 Nev. L.J. at 648). 

Similarly, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island returned to 

the federal standard to restore clarity in the law. Zwicke, 767 N.W.2d at 

873 (“[S]ince this Court decided Meadows, the United States Supreme 

Court has held that . . . there need not exist exigent circumstances . . . . 

[T]o the extent that Meadows can be read to require something more 

than mobility for exigent circumstances, we overrule that part of our 

decision in that case.”); Gomez, 168 P.3d at 1145 (“Because we believe 

the United States Supreme Court’s decisions . . . rest on sound 

principles, we are persuaded they should inform our construction of 

Article 2, § 30 . . . . To the extent that [earlier cases] hold to the 
18

contrary, they are overruled.”); Werner, 615 A.2d at 1014 (“In light of the 

Supreme Court’s clarification of the exigency issue, we conclude that it is 

preferable to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and, 

in turn, eliminate the conflicting interpretations of article I, section 6, of 

the Rhode Island Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution.”). 

The New Jersey Supreme Court recently overruled its prior 

decisions that applied a “pure exigent-circumstances requirement to 

justify an automobile search.” Witt, 126 A.3d at 853 (citing State v. 

Cooke, 751 A.2d 92, 97 (2000), abrogated by Witt, 126 A.3d at 853). The

court had used a multifactor approach. Id. at 864 (listing exigent 

circumstances as “the time of day; the location of the stop; the nature of 

the neighborhood; the unfolding of the events establishing probable 

cause; the ratio of officers to suspects; the existence of confederates who 

know the location of the car and could remove it or its contents; whether 

the arrest was observed by passersby who could tamper with the car or 

its contents; whether it would be safe to leave the car unguarded and, if 

not, whether the delay that would be caused by obtaining a warrant 

would place the officers or the evidence at risk” (quoting State v. PenaFlores, 965 A.2d 114, 128 (N.J. 2009), abrogated by Witt, 126 A.3d at 

853)). The New Jersey Supreme Court had concluded that telephonic 

warrants would provide an “efficient and speedy” procedure “that will be 

available to [officers] on the scene; that will obviate the need for difficult 

exigency assessments; and that will guarantee our citizens the 

protections that the warrant requirement affords.” Id. (quoting PenaFlores, 965 A.2d at 132). Experience proved otherwise: 

Experience and common sense persuade us that the 

exigent-circumstances test in Pena-Flores does not provide 

greater liberty or security to New Jersey’s citizens and has 
19

placed on law enforcement unrealistic and impracticable 

burdens. First, the multi-factor exigency formula is too 

complex and difficult for a reasonable police officer to apply 

to fast-moving and evolving events that require prompt 

action. Thus, we cannot expect predictable and uniform 

police or judicial decision-making. Second, the securing of 

telephonic warrants results in unacceptably prolonged 

roadway stops. During the warrant-application process, the 

occupants of a vehicle and police officers are stranded on the 

side of busy highways for an extended period, increasing the 

risk of serious injury and even death by passing traffic. If 

the car is impounded, then the occupants’ detention will be 

extended for an even longer period as a warrant is procured. 

Id. at 853. 

Specifically, the New Jersey court noted in 2015 that the average 

time to issue a telephonic warrant was fifty-nine minutes. Id. at 869. 

Some troopers experienced delays of two hours.5 Id. The Witt court 

recognized, “The hope that technology would reduce the perils of 

roadside stops has not been realized.” Id. Prolonged encounters along 

the shoulder of the highway posed “unacceptable risk of serious bodily 

injury and death.” Id. “News reports reveal the carnage caused by cars 

and trucks crashing into police officers and motorists positioned on the 

 5Other courts have noted the complexity of obtaining remote warrants. We have 

observed that “[o]btaining a warrant by telephone is fairly complicated” and “requires 

considerable time.” State v. Johnson, 744 N.W.2d 340, 345 (Iowa 2008) (describing the 

telephonic warrant application process). Other states have had similar experiences, 

finding the “average time for obtaining a telephone warrant” was about two hours. 

State v. Raymond, 360 P.3d 734, 737 (Or. Ct. App. 2015); see also United States v. 

Orozco, No. 98-CR-934, 1990 WL 118287, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (noting police testimony 

that a telephonic warrant “definitely” could not be obtained in less than one and a half 

hours); State v. Sanchez-Loredo, 272 P.3d 34, 36 (Kan. 2012) (“Reno County law 

enforcement officers made a traffic stop of Dinah Sanchez–Loredo’s vehicle [and] 

detained her at the scene for approximately 75 minutes while obtaining a search 

warrant.”); David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal 

Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1250–51 (2002) (noting that under federal law, “[a]n 

officer’s decision to seek a telephonic warrant rather than to proceed without a warrant 

. . . can mean a significant delay”). We are not persuaded by United States v. Baker, 

520 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 1981). In Baker, the court found that police could 

procure an arrest warrant, not a search warrant, in twenty minutes. Id. This was 

without the defendant present, so officers were able to focus their full attention on the 

warrant application and prepare it at a desk, not at a roadside stop. Id. 
20

shoulders of our highways.” Id. We decline to impose those risks on 

Iowa motorists and peace officers.

The New Jersey Supreme Court noted another downside to 

requiring warrants for roadside searches of automobiles—the pressure 

put on motorists to consent to the search to avoid the delay:

[O]ne of the unintended consequences of Pena-Flores is the 

exponential increase in police-induced consent automobile 

searches. The resort to consent searches suggests that law 

enforcement does not consider time-consuming telephonic 

warrants or the amorphous exigent-circumstances standard 

to be a feasible answer to roadway automobile searches. The 

heavy reliance on consent searches is of great concern given 

the historical abuses associated with such searches and the 

potential for future abuses. 

Id. at 853. New Jersey studies revealed that after implementing the 

exigent-circumstances approach, “nearly ninety-five percent of detained 

motorists granted a law enforcement officer’s request for consent to 

search.” Id. at 870 (quoting State v. Carty, 790 A.2d 903, 911 (N.J. 

2002)). The Witt court recognized the “coercive effect of a search request 

made to a motorist stopped on the side of a road.” Id.; see also State v. 

Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 783 (Iowa 2011) (considering that the driver was

“seized in the front seat of a squad car with his own vehicle parked on 

the side of a public highway” as part of the coercion analysis). 

Finally, the Witt court elaborated on the “difficulty presented to 

police officers” by the multifactor, exigent-circumstances approach. 126

A.3d at 871. 

Under that standard, before conducting a warrantless 

roadside search, police officers must take into account a 

dizzying number of factors. These factors leave open such 

questions as “what is the acceptable ratio of officers to 

suspects, what should the officer know about the 

neighborhood, how is he to know if confederates are 

skulking about, and what does it mean to consider leaving 

the car unguarded when the car can be safely towed and 

impounded?” 
21

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Pena-Flores, 965 A.2d at 139 (Albin, J., 

dissenting)). Overall, the court concluded that the multifactor approach 

“places significant burdens on law enforcement,” but “[o]n the other side 

of the ledger, [the court] did not perceive any real benefit to our citizenry 

by the warrant requirement in such cases.” Id. at 872. The Witt court 

therefore decided to reinstate the automobile exception under the 

New Jersey Constitution. Id. We likewise retain the automobile 

exception to avoid the litany of problems experienced in New Jersey

under its prior multifactor exigent-circumstances test. 

3. The state court decisions cited by Storm are 

unpersuasive. Storm relies on the decisions of five state courts that do 

not recognize the automobile exception.6 See State v. Elison, 14 P.3d 

456, 471 (Mont. 2000); State v. Sterndale, 656 A.2d 409, 411 (N.H. 

1995); State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 12 (N.M. 1997); State v. Bauder, 924 

A.2d 38, 50 (Vt. 2007); State v. Tibbles, 236 P.3d 885, 888 (Wash. 2010). 

These decisions are unpersuasive and distinguishable. 

For example, Montana’s constitution contains an express right to 

privacy, separate from its search and seizure provision, that provides 

“[t]he right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free 

society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling 

state interest.” Mont. Const. art. II, § 10. Based on this “unique 

constitutional language,” the Montana Supreme Court determined the 

 6Connecticut and Oregon follow a modified version of the automobile exception, 

which provides that the automobile’s mobility justifies a search of a vehicle stopped on 

the side of the road, but not a vehicle that has already been impounded or parked. See 

State v. Winfrey, 24 A.3d 1218, 1224 (Conn. 2011); Andersen, 390 P.3d at 998. 

Because this was a roadside stop, these states would permit the automobile exception 

as justification for the warrantless search. Two other states, Hawaii and Utah, while 

disallowing searches of closed containers within the automobile, follow the automobile 

exception for the vehicle itself. See Wallace, 910 P.2d at 714 n.16; Rigby, 369 P.3d at 

138. 
22

state constitution “affords citizens a greater right to privacy, and, 

therefore, provides broader protection than the Fourth Amendment in 

cases involving searches of private property.” Elison, 14 P.3d at 468–69. 

Washington’s constitution also contains an express right to privacy. See 

Wash. Const. art. I, § 7 (containing privacy provision stating “[n]o person 

shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without 

authority of law”). The Washington Supreme Court relied on that privacy 

provision to require exigency. Tibbles, 236 P.3d at 889. The Iowa 

Constitution lacks a separate privacy provision. So does the Constitution 

of Pennsylvania, and that state’s supreme court declined to follow the 

Washington precedent for that reason. See Gary, 91 A.3d at 132. 

The search and seizure provisions of the New Hampshire and 

Vermont Constitutions also differ textually from the Fourth Amendment. 

See N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. XIX (containing additional language, “all 

warrants to search suspected places . . . are contrary to this right, if the 

cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or 

affirmation; and if the order, in a warrant to a civil officer, to make 

search in suspected places, . . . be not accompanied with a special 

designation of the persons or objects or search”); State v. Savva, 616 

A.2d 774, 779 (Vt. 1991) (noting additional language in search and 

seizure provision that warrants issued “without oath or affirmation first 

made, affording sufficient foundation for them” and without property 

“particularly described” are “contrary to [the right to be free from search

or seizure], and ought not be granted” (quoting Vt. Const. ch. I, art. XI)). 

By contrast, there is no such textual difference between the search and 

seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution. We will follow our own precedent. 
23

D. New Technology Has Not Undermined the Validity of the 

Automobile Exception. 

1. The automobile exception retains its validity under federal law 

notwithstanding decades of experience with electronic court filings. 

Adherence to the automobile exception has not waned in the face of 

developing technology. Storm points to our statewide use of electronic 

court filings through the electronic data management system (EDMS). 

But federal courts have used electronic filing for decades and continue to 

apply the automobile exception to uphold warrantless searches of 

vehicles. See United States v. DeLeon, ___ F. App’x ___, ___, 2017 WL 

1828095, at *1 (5th Cir. May 4, 2017) (per curiam) (“[T]he district court 

correctly found that the automobile exception applied when there was 

probable cause to justify the search of the vehicle.”); United States v. 

Shackleford, 830 F.3d 751, 753 (8th Cir. 2016) (“Probable cause to 

believe that an automobile contains contraband or evidence of criminal 

activity has long been held to justify a warrantless search of the 

automobile and seizure of the contraband.”); United States v. White, 804 

F.3d 132, 138 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting police had probable cause to search 

vehicle, and “[u]nder these circumstances, the automobile exception and 

the Fourth Amendment require nothing more”); United States v. Reaves, 

796 F.3d 738, 741 (7th Cir. 2015) (“We believe the automobile exception 

to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is determinative.”);

United States v. Alston, 598 F. App’x 730, 734 (11th Cir. 2015) (“We 

affirm the denial of the motion to suppress alternatively under the 

automobile exception because officers had probable cause to believe that 

the vehicle contained evidence of criminal activity.”); United States v. 

Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 300 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The broad sweep of the 

automobile exception is of controlling significance in this case . . . .”). We 
24

reach the same conclusion as the unanimous federal decisions and hold 

that EDMS in Iowa state courts has not undermined the validity of the 

automobile exception.

2. Technological advances have not circumvented the need to take 

time to produce accurate warrants. States have retained the automobile 

exception despite advances in technology. This spring, the Oregon 

Supreme Court rejected a defendant’s argument that the automobile 

exception should be abandoned in light of technological advances that 

permit speedier warrants. State v. Andersen, 390 P.3d 992, 998 (Or. 

2017). The defendant argued “warrants can now be obtained within 

minutes.” Id. The Andersen court disagreed and, as we do today, relied 

on the record evidence.

We question the premises on which defendant’s 

argument rests. As an initial matter, the length of time that 

it takes to write a warrant application and obtain a warrant 

is a factual issue for the trial court, and not all warrants will 

take the same amount of time. Depending on the complexity 

of the circumstances that give rise to probable cause and the 

significance of the case, some warrants will require a longer 

time to prepare and obtain than others. In this case, the 

only evidence in the record is that it would have taken 

hours, not minutes, to prepare a warrant application and 

obtain a warrant. Officer McNair testified without 

contradiction that, “[j]ust [to get a warrant] for a cell phone it 

takes me several hours to write a search warrant, and go get 

that approved by a DA.” The officer also explained that, if 

the district attorney had suggestions or corrections, it could 

take another hour to add those corrections to the warrant 

application. Not only did the trial court implicitly credit the 

officer’s testimony, but defendant identifies no contrary 

evidence in the record. 

Id. at 998–99 (alterations in original). The Andersen court retained the 

automobile exception and affirmed the warrantless search. Id. at 1000. 

That court left open the possibility that in future cases technological 

advances could undermine the automobile exception for all cases or 
25

obviate its application in an individual case. Id. at 999. We exercise the 

same restraint today. 

The Andersen court also noted the need for accuracy in search 

warrant applications requires time to prepare them. 

Beyond that, defendant’s argument appears to assume 

that the only impediment to obtaining a warrant quickly is 

the time that it takes to transmit a completed warrant 

application to a magistrate and have the magistrate review 

and act on the application. While technology has made it 

easier to prepare and transmit completed applications, the 

testimony in this case illustrates what our cases have 

recognized. An officer must prepare the warrant application 

before submitting it to a magistrate for approval, and the 

process of preparing a warrant application can sometimes 

entail a substantial amount of time. Affidavits submitted in 

support of a warrant are subject to technical requirements 

that are intended to protect citizens’ privacy. . . . 

Ultimately, not only must search warrant applications 

be sufficient to satisfy issuing magistrates, but they also 

must withstand scrutiny in later motions to suppress if 

evidence discovered while executing the warrant leads to a 

criminal prosecution. As in this case, district attorneys may 

review warrant applications drafted by officers who may be 

experienced in criminal matters but untrained in the law. 

Without that review, warrant applications might fail to 

comply with the technical specifications our cases have 

required. Those human efforts can sometimes entail 

substantial expenditures of time despite technological 

advances. 

Id. We too require accuracy in search warrant applications. As Justice 

Appel has emphasized,

The issuing of a search warrant—which, among other 

things, may authorize a home invasion by authorities—is 

among the most delicate and sensitive legal process known 

under our constitutional system. The process of issuing a 

valid search warrant is not a bureaucratic bother in which a 

lackadaisical, close-enough attitude toward legal 

requirements is good enough. Because of the gravity of the 

individual rights at stake and the central role of the search 

warrant process in protecting citizens from unwarranted 

intrusions by government, our review of the warrant process 

must be highly detailed and demanding. 
26

State v. Angel, 893 N.W.2d 904, 912–13 (Iowa 2017) (Appel, J., 

dissenting). While electronic filing may save time, the officer still must 

take care to prepare the warrant application accurately whether he or 

she is in a patrol car at the scene of the stop or at a desk at the station

house. 

At this point, forcing an officer to draft a search warrant

application while multitasking on the side of the road may jeopardize the 

accuracy of the warrant application and would require motorists to be 

detained for much longer periods. On the civil liberties side of the ledger, 

we perceive no meaningful net benefit to motorists being subjected to 

longer seizures. Our court has indeed expressed a preference for 

warrants. State v. Breuer, 808 N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 2012). But the 

purposes for requiring warrants are not furthered here. For example, the 

particularity requirement limits the scope of the search to “cabin police 

power” so police do not search places and things not described in the 

warrant. Id. (quoting State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 273 (Iowa 2010)). 

That rationale does not apply when the search by definition is confined to 

a specific vehicle. A warrant requirement also imposes the “deliberate, 

impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . between the citizen and the 

police.” Id. at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 

Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 99, 126 S. Ct. 1494, 1501 (2006)). Yet under the 

automobile exception, police still must have probable cause to search the 

vehicle. When probable cause is absent, evidence is rightfully 

suppressed. See State v. Tompkins, 423 N.W.2d 823, 832 (Wis. 1988) 

(“The exclusionary rule continues to protect against unreasonable 

searches of an automobile; evidence obtained will not be admissible in 

prosecutions unless the officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle 

contained contraband or evidence of a committed crime.”). Requiring a 
27

warrant for an automobile search thus does little to protect privacy or 

advance civil liberty.

3. New technology may pose unusual difficulties for officers on the 

side of the road. While improving technology someday may allow for a 

different analysis of the automobile exception, we have no doubt that it 

will also pose its own difficulties for officers in roadside stops. For

example, new technology allows for quicker communication between 

coconspirators. As the Connecticut Supreme Court noted, 

[W]hen officers are forced to delay their search until a 

warrant is procured, while the vehicle remains accessible to 

the public and is potentially mobile, the possibility remains 

that someone—possibly someone other than the defendant—

will attempt either to remove the vehicle or to interfere with 

law enforcement efforts to maintain a secure crime scene. 

State v. Winfrey, 24 A.3d 1218, 1226 (Conn. 2011). Indeed, here, Storm 

called two compatriots to the scene, so Deputy Leonard was 

outnumbered three to one. While they caused him no trouble, the next 

officer on the roadside may not be so fortunate. 

E. The Automobile Exception’s Bright-Line Rule Is Preferable 

to an Ad Hoc Exigency Analysis for Time-Sensitive Police 

Interactions with Motorists. The automobile exception is easy to 

apply, unlike its alternative—an amorphous, multifactor exigentcircumstances test. We generally “prefer the clarity of bright-line rules in 

time-sensitive interactions between citizens and law enforcement.” State 

v. Hellstern, 856 N.W.2d 355, 364 (Iowa 2014). Bright-line rules are 

“especially beneficial” when officers “have to make . . . quick decisions as 

to what the law requires where the stakes are high, involving public 

safety on one side of the ledger and individual rights on the other.” 

Welch v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801 N.W.2d 590, 601 (Iowa 2011). The

ad hoc exigency approach is the antithesis of a bright-line rule. 
28

That which constitutes “exigent circumstances” is frequently 

“in the eye of the beholder,” often requiring an on-the-scene 

judgment call by a police officer, often under stressful 

circumstances. Months later, in hindsight, it might not so 

appear to a judge far removed in time and place from the 

point of decision. “Exigent circumstances,” far from being a 

“bright line,” is often a difficult conclusion about which 

reasonable minds may differ. 

Tompkins, 423 N.W.2d at 833 (Ceci, J., concurring). Abandoning the 

automobile exception would lead to many more contested suppression 

hearings with inconsistent and unpredictable results. 

Automobile searches are conducted on the side of the road where 

ad hoc judgments have critical ramifications.

In a decision that is often instantaneous, the officer must 

[choose] either to conduct the search and risk having the 

evidence suppressed at trial, immobilize the vehicle until a 

search warrant can be obtained, or let the suspect leave 

without searching the vehicle and risk the evidence being 

released into the community. The later choice can be a 

critical one if that evidence involves a large quantity of illegal 

narcotics or a firearm. 

Elizabeth Fischer, Confusion and Inconsistencies Surrounding the 

Exigency Component for Warrantless Vehicle Searches Under Article I, 

Section 8, 2 Duq. Crim. L.J. 123, 138 (2011) (footnote omitted). Brightline rules support predictability of result and avoid inconsistent police 

and judicial determinations. See id. at 139 (comparing two factually

similar Pennsylvania cases with different outcomes). 

“It is asking too much of law enforcement officers, who are 

responding to fast-moving and [fast]-evolving events, to process the type 

of complex and speculative information contained in [the exigentcircumstances] formula and expect uniform and consistent decisionmaking.” Pena-Flores, 965 A.2d at 139. We agree. 
29

IV. Disposition. 

For these reasons, we elect to retain the automobile exception at 

the present time. We therefore affirm the district court’s ruling denying 

Storm’s motion to suppress and affirm his judgment of conviction. 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. 

Cady, C.J., Mansfield, and Zager, JJ., join this opinion. Cady, 

C.J., files a concurring opinion. Hecht, J., files a dissenting opinion 

joined by Wiggins and Appel, JJ. Appel, J., files a separate dissenting 

opinion joined by Wiggins, J. 
30

#16–0362, State v. Storm

CADY, Chief Justice (concurring specially).

I concur in the opinion of the court but write separately to express 

my commitment to the views I expressed in State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 

1, 17 (Iowa 2015) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially). Specifically, I 

repeat, 

An automatic exception to the warrant requirement, 

particularly one based on exigency, must account for the 

new world of technology, and must not continue to exist 

simply because it existed in the past. In some instances, 

this new world may require movement from an automatic 

exigency to the standard exigent-circumstances requirement 

in which the rapid nature of occurrences precluding the wait 

for a warrant must be explained on a case-by-case basis.

Id. Today, on this record, I agree with the court that Christopher George 

Storm has not met his burden of proving that technological advances 

have made the automobile exception obsolete. Thus, this new world we 

live in does not yet require we move to a case-by-case exigency standard 

for automobile searches. 

Nearly 100 years ago, the government succeeded in establishing an 

exception to the warrant requirement to deal with automobiles. See 

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149, 45 S. Ct. 280, 283–84 (1925). 

The Court found the government met its burden of establishing the 

exception. See id.; see also United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51, 72 

S. Ct. 93, 95 (1951) (“Only . . . in ‘exceptional circumstances,’ may an 

exemption [from the warrant requirement] lie, and then the burden is on 

those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.” (citations omitted) 

(quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 

(1948))). Eventually, we adopted the doctrine under our state 

constitution. See State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 220 (Iowa 1980). In 

effect, the state proved we could assume exigent circumstances existed 
31

in this specific context because of “the inherent mobility of the vehicle, 

the fact [the] defendant [would be] alerted, and the chance that the car’s 

contents might not be found again if a warrant had to be then obtained.” 

Id. For us to reject this rationale now, we must be convinced it is no 

longer correct. Because automobiles are inherently mobile and a person 

subjected to a traffic stop will always be alerted, it is the third finding 

that is being eroded by technological advances that make it easier to 

obtain a warrant and thus remove the risk of evidence being lost. On 

this record, Storm has not presented compelling evidence showing it is 

no longer reasonable to assume an exigency exists when an officer has 

probable cause to believe an automobile stopped on a street or highway 

contains contraband or evidence of a crime. 

While I remain convinced the automobile exception has a limited 

lifespan, its longevity will depend on the ability and pace of this state in 

integrating and using technological advances in a way that renders a 

categorical rule unreasonable. 

For these reasons, I concur. 
32

#16–0362, State v. Storm

HECHT, Justice (dissenting).

Because I would abandon the automobile exception as a 

categorical exception to the warrant requirement under the Iowa 

Constitution and conclude on this record that the State failed to prove 

exigent circumstances justified a warrantless search of Christopher 

Storm’s car, I respectfully dissent.

I. The Parties’ Positions.

On appeal, Storm challenges the constitutionality of the 

automobile exception to article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. He 

contends the mobility of a vehicle is no longer a per se exigency justifying 

a categorical exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles 

because officers using widely available communications technology can 

lawfully obtain a warrant without leaving the scene of a stop. He also 

asserts the warrantless search of his vehicle based upon probable cause 

violated article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution because no exigency 

justified the warrantless search in this case. 

The State does not dispute that modern communications 

technology is available that would enable law enforcement officers to 

submit warrant applications from the scene of most roadside stops. Yet, 

the State offers three primary reasons in support of its position that it is 

not feasible for law enforcement officers to submit warrant applications 

from the scene of roadside stops. First, the State argues there is no 

existing legal authority for electronic warrant applications because Iowa 

Code section 808.3 (2015) requires warrant applications be submitted 

and sworn to in a magistrate’s presence.7 Second, the State asserts 

 7In 2017, the legislature amended Iowa Code section 808.3 to clarify that the 

submission of a warrant application can be electronic and the oath or affirmation 
33

electronic applications for warrants would take too much time and 

unreasonably extend the duration of traffic stops in violating the 

prohibition on unreasonable seizures under article I, section 8. Finally, 

the State asserts remote applications are not feasible because of safety 

concerns, the complexity of warrant applications, and training concerns. 

In the alternative, the State contends that even were we to permit remote 

warrant applications, special exigencies justified the warrantless search 

of Storm’s vehicle. 

I part ways with the majority because I believe the rationale 

supporting the categorical exception from the warrant requirement for 

searches of automobiles has outlived the rationale for its adoption. 

Because existing technology now makes it possible for law enforcement 

officers to submit applications and for judicial officers to issue warrants 

electronically, I can no longer conclude warrantless searches of 

automobiles are justified solely by virtue of a vehicle’s mobility. On 

de novo review, I conclude the circumstances surrounding the 

warrantless search of Storm’s automobile were not exigent, and I would 

therefore reverse and remand. 

II. Standards of Constitutional Interpretation.

When determining whether to adopt a different interpretation of a 

provision of the Iowa Constitution than an analogue provision of the 

United States Constitution, we employ an independent approach. State 

v. Short, 851 N.W.2d 474, 486–87, 492 (Iowa 2014). Within this 

independent approach, we generally consider factors such as the 

provision’s text and purpose, our caselaw, authority from other 

jurisdictions, scholarship and changing circumstances, and practical 

___________________________

requirement can be met through electronic means of communication. S.F. 358, 87th 

G.A., 1st Sess. § 4 (Iowa 2017).
34

effects of various interpretations. See State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 

27–35 (Iowa 2015) (Appel, J., concurring). While we often follow federal 

interpretations out of consideration for interests of uniformity and 

judicial respect, we do not allow those interests to subvert our 

constitutional duty to interpret the Iowa Constitution with fidelity to its 

letter and purpose. See Short, 851 N.W.2d at 487–89.

For more than ninety years, it has been the rule that we do not 

presumptively defer—or otherwise delegate our constitutional duties—to 

the Justices of the United States Supreme Court; rather, we consider 

whether to follow federal interpretations of the warrant requirement on a 

case-by-case basis, maintaining strict fidelity to our independent 

interpretive duties under the Iowa Constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. 

Kuble v. Bisignano, 238 Iowa 1060, 1066, 28 N.W.2d 504, 508 (1947) (“It 

is true Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution is identical in 

language with the Fourth Amendment. This fact however does not 

compel us to follow the construction placed on the language by the 

United States Supreme Court.”), abrogated on other grounds by Mapp v. 

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654–55, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1961); State v. 

Rollinger, 208 Iowa 1155, 1156, 225 N.W. 841, 841 (1929) (“[W]hile the 

Constitution of this state is almost a verbatim copy of a similar provision 

of the federal Constitution, this court has thought fit to put a 

construction thereon which does not correspond with the interpretation 

of the federal Constitution by the Supreme Court of the United States.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654–55, 81 S. Ct. at 

1691. 

We have repeatedly rejected the argument that we should adopt a 

“lockstep” policy of judicial deference when interpreting article I, section 

8 of the Iowa Constitution to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
35

Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., State v. Baldon, 829 N.W.2d 785, 790 

(Iowa 2013) (“[O]ur right under principles of federalism to stand as the 

final word on the Iowa Constitution is settled, long-standing, and good 

law.”); State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 104–07, 191 N.W. 530, 535–36 (1923) 

(rejecting a lockstep approach to the interpretation of article I, section 8 

of the Iowa Constitution in favor of an interpretation of the warrant 

requirement adopted by other states), abrogated on other grounds by 

Mapp, 367 U.S. at 654–55, 81 S. Ct. at 1691; see also Gaskins, 866 

N.W.2d at 6–7 (majority opinion) (collecting cases); Short, 851 N.W.2d at 

481 (collecting cases). 

A. The Warrant Requirement. Article I, section 8 of the Iowa 

Constitution provides,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 

houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures 

and searches shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 

issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or 

affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, 

and the persons and things to be seized.

Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. “Evidence obtained in violation of th[is] 

provision[ ] is inadmissible.” State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 

2005) (quoting State v. Reinders, 690 N.W.2d 78, 81 (Iowa 2004)). 

Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution is an independent 

source of legal rights and governing principles, and we jealously guard 

our duty to independently interpret the protections it affords, 

notwithstanding its similarity to the Fourth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution. State v. Brooks, 888 N.W.2d 406, 410–11 (Iowa 

2016); accord State v. Olsen, 293 N.W.2d 216, 219–20 (Iowa 1980); State 

ex rel. Kuble, 238 Iowa at 1066, 28 N.W.2d at 508. 

The framers of the Iowa Constitution believed the gradual erosion 

of personal rights undermines the stability of government, so they placed 
36

article I, section 8 within a strong and clearly defined bill of rights at the 

beginning of the Iowa Constitution. State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d 260, 274 

(Iowa 2010) (citing 1 The Debates of the Constitutional Convention of the 

State of Iowa 100–01 (W. Blair Lord rep., 1857), 

http://www.statelibraryofiowa.org/services/law-library/iaconst). The 

section limiting the power of the government to conduct seizures and 

searches protects individuals from government intrusion into property or 

protected individual rights. Id. at 273–75. 

The first clause of article I, section 8 protects individuals’ 

legitimate expectations of privacy and interests in property, security, and 

mobility. See id. at 268, 284–85; see also Short, 851 N.W.2d at 504. The 

reasonableness of a seizure or search depends on the particular facts of a 

case. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 107 (Iowa 2001). A warrantless 

search is per se unreasonable unless the state proves by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the search falls within one of a few 

specifically established and carefully drawn exceptions to the warrant 

requirement. Id. at 107–08; see also Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 791. 

The second clause of article I, section 8 requires government 

officials obtaining a warrant from an independent officer of the court to 

make a showing of probable cause that is supported by oath or 

affirmation. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d at 268–69, 285. This requirement 

protects individuals from the risks of government error, bias, arbitrary 

action, corruption, and abuse, prioritizing accuracy in law enforcement 

over expediency. See id. at 274; see also Brooks, 888 N.W.2d at 418 

(Appel, J., dissenting); Baldon, 829 N.W.2d at 829 (Appel, J., specially 

concurring). 

The exceptions to the warrant requirement include the exigentcircumstances exception, which permits a warrantless search with 
37

probable cause if “exigent circumstances require that the search be 

conducted immediately.” Carter, 696 N.W.2d at 37. We have applied 

this exception to the warrantless search of automobiles, concluding that 

a readily mobile vehicle poses a per se exigency justifying a warrantless 

search upon probable cause because the vehicle or its contents may 

disappear if an officer leaves the scene of a traffic stop to obtain a 

warrant. State v. Maddox, 670 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 2003). 

B. The Automobile Exception. We adopted the automobile 

exception to article I, section 8 as a rule of exigency under the Iowa 

Constitution in Olsen, 293 N.W.2d at 220. In adopting the exception, we 

followed precedents emanating from federal courts holding that the 

inherent mobility of a vehicle is an exigency justifying the automobile 

exception to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 

See id. (concluding federal exigency requirement is met if the vehicle is 

mobile, its occupants alerted, and its contents at risk of disappearing if a 

warrant must be obtained).

1. Federal origins of the automobile exception. The automobile 

exception to the Fourth Amendment began as a judicial response to 

practical law enforcement problems created by the National Prohibition 

Act’s ban on the transportation of intoxicating liquors. See Carroll v. 

United States, 267 U.S. 132, 143–44, 151, 153–54, 45 S. Ct. 280, 281–

82, 284, 285–86 (1925) (permitting an exception to the warrant 

 8The evolution of the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution is reviewed at length in State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 

789, 792–95 (Iowa 2008). Contrary to the majority’s assertion, Allensworth did not 

reject an Iowa constitutional challenge to the warrantless search of a vehicle but limited 

its analysis to the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment after concluding no 

state claim had been raised or decided in the district court. See id. at 791 n.2. I 

discuss the relevant portions of the federal exception’s history below in my discussion of 

the impact of modern communications technology on justifications underlying the 

automobile exception to article I, section 8. 
38

requirement because “goods in course of transportation and concealed in 

a movable vessel . . . readily could be put out of reach of a search 

warrant”). In Carroll, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless search 

of an automobile for intoxicating liquors based upon probable cause does 

not violate the Fourth Amendment “where it is not practicable to secure a 

warrant.” Id. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285. The Court concluded it was not 

practicable to secure a warrant for the search of a vehicle at a traffic stop 

“because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or 

jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.” Id. Because a 

vehicle’s mobility posed the risk that it could be moved outside the 

jurisdiction while an officer left to secure a search warrant, the Court 

approved the warrantless search based on exigency. Id. at 162, 45 S. Ct. 

at 288.

Importantly, the Supreme Court emphasized in Carroll that if 

securing a warrant is “reasonably practicable,” it must still be obtained. 

Id. at 156, 45 S. Ct. at 286; cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 

1868, 1879 (1968) (“We do not retreat from our holdings that the police 

must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches 

and seizures through the warrant procedure . . . .”). 

In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court expanded the contours of 

the automobile exception recognized in Carroll. The Court concluded in 

Husty v. United States that a warrantless search of an automobile by a 

prohibition officer was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 

even if the officer had sufficient time—after acquiring probable cause but 

before conducting the subsequent stop and search of the defendant’s 

car—to procure a search warrant. 282 U.S. 694, 701, 51 S. Ct. 240, 242 

(1931). The Supreme Court held in Chambers v. Maroney that the 

location of the automobile at the time of the search did not matter as 
39

long as exigency and probable cause were both obtained at the scene of 

the stop; thus, a warrant was not required to search a vehicle on 

probable cause after the vehicle had been relocated from the roadside to 

the stationhouse.9 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970). In 

either location—at the scene of the stop or at the stationhouse—the 

Court determined the risk that evidence would disappear before an officer 

returned with a search warrant supplied exigency and made it 

impracticable to require law enforcement officers to procure a search 

warrant. See id. at 52, 90 S. Ct. at 1982 (“The probable-cause factor still 

obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car . . . .”); 

Husty, 282 U.S. at 701, 51 S. Ct. at 242 (“In such circumstances, we do 

not think the officers should be required to speculate upon the c[h]ances 

of successfully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal 

from the scene of one or more officers which would have been necessary 

to procure a warrant.”). 

In a series of cases decided after Chambers, the Supreme Court 

has continued to view the mobility of automobiles as a justification for 

the automobile exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth 

Amendment. In California v. Carney, the Court concluded that a 

vehicle’s “ready mobility” alone presents a per se exigency. 471 U.S. 386, 

394, 105 S. Ct. 2066, 2070–71 (1985); see also Maryland v. Dyson, 527 

U.S. 465, 467, 119 S. Ct. 2013, 2014 (1999) (per curiam) (“[T]he 

‘automobile exception’ has no separate exigency requirement.”). The 

 9The Court has since indicated the scope of this rule may be limited. See United 

States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487, 105 S. Ct. 881, 887 (1985) (“We do not suggest that 

police officers may indefinitely retain possession of a vehicle and its contents before 

they complete a vehicle search.”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 523, 91 

S. Ct. 2022, 2066 (1971) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 

(concluding a warrantless stationhouse search is only valid if performed with “some 

expedition”).
40

Court also construed “ready mobility” broadly to include vehicles capable 

of movement and “in a setting that objectively indicates that the vehicle 

is being used for transportation.” Carney, 471 U.S. at 394, 105 S. Ct. at 

2070–71 (footnote omitted). The Court augmented its “ready mobility” 

rationale with another rationale for the automobile exception—that 

individuals have a lower expectation of privacy in vehicles than homes 

because vehicles, unlike homes, are pervasively regulated. Id. at 391–94, 

105 S. Ct. at 2069–71.

2. The automobile exception in Iowa. We first applied the 

automobile exception as a matter of federal law in State v. King, 191 

N.W.2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971). Nearly a decade later, we recognized the 

automobile exception under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 

See Olsen, 293 N.W.2d at 220.

Our earliest cases applying the federal automobile exception did so 

within the then-existing exigent-circumstances framework. E.g., State v. 

Shea, 218 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Iowa 1974) (“[A] peace officer may search an 

automobile without a warrant when exigent circumstances and probable 

cause exist.”). We assessed exigency by looking at multiple factors, such 

as whether the car was movable, its occupants were on alert, and its 

contents were at risk of disappearing if officers left to secure a warrant. 

See, e.g., State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 737 (Iowa 1981) (“These 

facts, coupled with the inherent mobility of the vehicle, created a clear 

likelihood that the car and its contents might never have been located 

again had the police departed to obtain a warrant.” (Emphasis added.)); 

State v. Lam, 391 N.W.2d 245, 249 (Iowa 1986) (“If the automobile had 

not been seized immediately, there was a clear likelihood that the car 

and its contents may never have been located again had the police 

departed to obtain a search warrant.” (Emphasis added.)). 
41

Importantly, from our earliest cases applying the automobile 

exception under the Fourth Amendment, we concluded a warrant was 

required for the search of an automobile if it was practicable to obtain 

one. See, e.g., State v. Schlenker, 234 N.W.2d 142, 144–45 (Iowa 1975); 

Shea, 218 N.W.2d at 613 (“[E]xistence of exigent circumstances may 

relieve an officer from the obligation to obtain a warrant if it is 

impracticable to do so.” (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Jackson, 210 

N.W.2d 537, 539 (Iowa 1973))). In State v. Schlenker, we concluded the 

fact that an officer actually secured a warrant—later held invalid—to 

search a vehicle conclusively demonstrated that no exigent 

circumstances justified the search. 234 N.W.2d at 145. Implicit in this 

conclusion was a determination that it would have been practicable to 

secure a warrant authorizing the search of Schlenker’s automobile. 

After the Supreme Court determined that the inherent mobility of a 

vehicle is a per se exigency for purposes of the automobile exception in

Carney, we abandoned our more probing exigency inquiry in cases 

challenging warrantless searches under both the Federal and State 

Constitutions. See State v. Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d 789, 795 (Iowa 

2008) (noting the Supreme Court no longer requires a separate showing

of exigency because the mobility of a vehicle is enough). In State v. Cain, 

for example, we noted that the state did not have to prove the existence 

of exigent circumstances supporting a warrantless search under the 

Fourth Amendment because vehicles are inherently mobile. 400 N.W.2d 

582, 585 (Iowa 1987). Likewise, in Maddox, we opined that the inherent 

mobility of a vehicle “presents an exigent circumstance” under article I, 

section 8 of the Iowa Constitution. 670 N.W.2d at 171. Our perception 

of exigency in this context has been based on the risk that if an officer 

leaves the scene of a stop to secure a warrant, the vehicle or its contents 
42

will be gone when the officer returns to perform the search. See, e.g., 

Lam, 391 N.W.2d at 249; Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 737; see also 

Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d at 795 (noting the risk the vehicle will 

disappear is at the root of the mobility exigency under the Fourth 

Amendment); Olsen, 293 N.W.2d at 220 (noting exigency might exist for 

purposes of article I, section 8, if there is a risk the vehicle’s contents will 

disappear). 

C. Physical Presence Requirement. Before addressing the 

merits of Storm’s contention that we should abandon the per se exigency 

rule for warrantless searches of automobiles under article I, section 8, I 

will address the district court’s conclusion that Iowa Code section 808.3 

requires an applicant for a warrant be in the physical presence of a 

judicial officer when applying for a warrant. 

Iowa Code section 808.3 establishes “procedural requirements for 

issuance, execution and return” of a search warrant. See Meier v. 

Sulhoff, 360 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Iowa 1985). The statute provides,

A person may make application for the issuance of a 

search warrant by submitting before a magistrate a written

application, supported by the person’s oath or affirmation, 

which includes facts, information, and circumstances 

tending to establish sufficient grounds for granting the 

application, and probable cause for believing that the 

grounds exist. 

Iowa Code § 808.3 (emphasis added).

When interpreting a statute, we seek to determine and enforce 

legislative intent. Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Kratzer, 778 N.W.2d 42, 

46 (Iowa 2010). In determining legislative intent, we begin with the 

statute’s text, interpreting undefined terms in accordance with their 

ordinary and accepted usage. Id. The plain meaning of a statute is 

conclusive unless one of the limitations or exceptions to the plain 
43

meaning rule applies; for instance, a court may depart from a plainly 

worded statute if: 

[(1)] applying the language according to its plain meaning 

would lead to an absurd result, or there is “obvious” or 

“clear” evidence of contrary legislative intent; [(2)] it finds a 

“specific indication to the contrary;” [(3)] it finds “compelling 

reasons to hold otherwise;” [(4)] some other section of an act 

expands or restricts its meaning, or a particular provision is 

repugnant to an act’s general purview, or other acts in pari 

materia[—]or the relevant legislative history[—]imports a 

different meaning; [(5)] an act’s plain meaning departs from 

its policy, and it finds a clearly expressed legislative 

intention contrary to the statute’s language; [or] [(6)] it finds 

“some other compelling reason” to disregard an act’s or 

provision’s plain meaning.

2A Norman J. Singer & Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory 

Construction § 46:1, at 163–68 (7th ed. 2014) (footnotes omitted).

A statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible of two or more plausible 

interpretations. Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 

724, 728 (Iowa 1995). “Ambiguity may arise from specific language used 

in a statute or when the provision at issue is considered in the context of 

the entire statute or related statutes.” Sherwin-Williams Co. v. Iowa Dep’t 

of Revenue, 789 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Midwest Auto. III, 

LLC v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 425 (Iowa 2002)). If a 

statute is ambiguous, we consider “the statute’s subject matter, the 

object sought to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, underlying 

policies, remedies provided, and the consequences of the various 

interpretations.” State v. McCullah, 787 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Iowa 2010); see 

also Iowa Code § 4.6.

In deciding whether an application for a search warrant can be 

submitted under section 808.3, we must decide whether the phrases 

“submitting before a magistrate” and “supported by the person’s oath or 
44

affirmation” in section 808.3 require that an applicant for a warrant be in 

the physical presence of a magistrate.10 I conclude they do not. 

1. “Submitting before a magistrate.” I begin with the phrase 

“submitting before a magistrate.” Iowa Code § 808.3. The words in this 

phrase are not defined in Iowa Code chapter 808. By its ordinary 

meaning, “submit” means “to present or propose to another for review, 

consideration, or decision” or “to deliver formally.” Submit, Merriam 

Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2012). The term “before” in this 

context can mean, alternatively, “in front of,” “in the presence of,” or 

“under the jurisdiction for consideration of.” Before, Merriam Webster’s 

Collegiate Dictionary. “Magistrate” is defined elsewhere in the Iowa Code 

to mean “a person appointed under article 6, part 4 to exercise judicial 

functions.” See Iowa Code § 602.1101(8); cf. id. §§ 602.6401–.6405 

 10The parties also address whether the language of another statute should lead 

us to conclude Iowa Code section 808.3 requires a search warrant application be 

presented to a magistrate. Iowa Code section 321J.10 provides, in relevant part,

Notwithstanding section 808.3, the issuance of a search warrant [for 

urine or blood tests after a fatal vehicle crash] under this section may be 

based upon sworn oral testimony communicated by telephone if the 

magistrate who is asked to issue the warrant is satisfied that the 

circumstances make it reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit. 

Iowa Code § 321J.10(3). I would conclude this exception does not conclusively 

demonstrate the general assembly intended in section 808.3 to prohibit remotely 

administered oaths supporting search warrant applications. The exception in section 

321J.10 does not focus on the oath but rather upon the form of application. It permits 

an oral warrant application as an express exception to the requirement in section 808.3 

that warrant applications be made in writing. See id. (permitting “sworn oral testimony” 

if it is “reasonable to dispense with a written affidavit”). The focus on the form of the 

application is evident in the comprehensive procedural requirements of section 

321J.10(3), which preserve the safeguards of a written application by requiring the 

applicant prepare a duplicate warrant and read it to the magistrate, the magistrate to 

keep a written record of the call, and the clerk of court to maintain the original and 

duplicate warrants along with the written record of the call. See id. § 321J.10(3)(a)–(h). 

If section 321J.10(3) focused on securing the protections provided by a physical 

presence requirement, its procedural protections would instead require things like a 

verification of identity and a reminder of the consequences of perjured testimony “to 

enhance the conscience of the person taking the oath.” See City of Cedar Rapids v. 

Atsinger, 617 N.W.2d 272, 276 n.2 (Iowa 2000).
45

(describing appointment, qualifications, and powers of a magistrate). 

Magistrates have jurisdiction of search warrant proceedings. See id.

§ 602.6405.

I conclude the phrase “submitting before a magistrate” is 

ambiguous because it is capable of more than one interpretation. Under 

the State’s preferred interpretation, the statute requires an applicant for 

a warrant be physically present with a magistrate. Under the 

interpretation preferred by Storm, the statute requires written 

applications to be presented for decision “under the jurisdiction or 

consideration of” the magistrate.11 I find both interpretations to be 

plausible; hence, I conclude the statute is ambiguous.

Because section 808.3 is ambiguous, I resort to our tools of 

statutory construction. When interpreting an ambiguous statute, we 

consider the consequences of various interpretations. State v. Hoyman, 

863 N.W.2d 1, 14 (Iowa 2015); see also Iowa Code § 4.6(5). The phrase 

at issue here concerns the method of delivering a written application to a 

judicial officer for a decision. The Iowa Court Rules permit written 

applications and other filings to be electronically submitted in court 

proceedings. See Iowa Ct. Rs. 16.201, 16.307(2). I perceive no 

reasonable purpose for requiring personal physical delivery of a written 

application for a search warrant. 

“[W]e interpret statutes when possible to avoid untoward results.”

Hoyman, 863 N.W.2d at 13. If we interpret the phrase to require 

applicants to be physically present with the magistrate when submitting 

 11The State contends that the interpretation advanced by Storm should be 

rejected because the term “before” is surplusage if “submit” means “to present or 

propose to another for review, consideration, or decision.” I disagree. In this context, 

the term “before” adds the jurisdictional component to the phrase “submitting before,” 

which indicates that the magistrate must be acting within the judicial officer’s lawful 

authority.
46

applications for search warrants, we will impose an unnecessary 

procedural barrier and discourage their use. Resolving the ambiguity in 

favor of defendants who are the subject of a search and law enforcement 

officers who have an interest in efficiently applying for warrants, I would 

conclude the phrase “submitting before a magistrate” in section 808.3 

does not require an applicant be in the physical presence when making 

an application for a search warrant.

2. “Supported by the person’s oath or affirmation.” I next consider 

whether Iowa Code section 808.3 requires an applicant for a search 

warrant be in the physical presence of a magistrate when making an 

oath or affirmation in support of an application for a search warrant. 

The text of section 808.3 requires that every warrant application be 

“supported by the person’s oath or affirmation.” Iowa Code § 808.3. The 

oath or affirmation requirement is in a wholly separate phrase from the 

requirement of a signed writing and separated by a comma. Even if 

physical presence is not required for the submission of a written 

application, it might still be required for the swearing of an oath or 

affirmation. 

Turning to the plain language of the statute, the word “oath” is 

commonly defined as “[a] solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing 

to God or a revered person or thing, that one’s statement is true or that 

one will be bound to a promise[.]” Oath, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 

2014). An “affirmation” is considered “[a] solemn pledge equivalent to an 

oath but without reference to a supreme being or to swearing.” 

Affirmation, Black’s Law Dictionary. Statements made under oath or 

affirmation constitute sworn testimony, subjecting the affiant to the 

penalty of perjury for false statements. See City of Cedar Rapids v. 

Atsinger, 617 N.W.2d 272, 276 (Iowa 2000). 
47

Section 808.3 is silent on whether physical presence of the affiant 

before a magistrate is required. At common law, oaths and affirmations 

were administered in person. See United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 46, 

50 (2d Cir. 1977). However, the modern trend recognizes that oaths and 

affirmations can be remotely administered. See, e.g., id. (“Long Distance 

has truly become . . . ‘the next best thing to being there.’ The Fourth 

Amendment is sufficiently flexible to account for such technological 

advances.”); State v. Gutierrez-Perez, 337 P.3d 205, 210–11 (Utah 2014) 

(concluding language in an e-Warrant application met the Fourth 

Amendment’s oath or affirmation requirement); Smith v. State, 311 P.3d 

132, 140 (Wyo. 2013) (concluding a telephonic oath provides protections 

for a defendant equal to those provided by an in-person oath). Given the 

difference between the common law approach and the modern 

understanding, I conclude the phrase in section 808.3 requiring a 

warrant application be “supported by the person’s oath or affirmation” is 

ambiguous. Accordingly, I resort to our rules of statutory construction 

in resolving the ambiguity. 

Generally, “we interpret statutes consistent with the common law 

unless the statutory language clearly negates the common law.” State v. 

Carter, 618 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 2000). As recognized above, oaths 

and affirmations at common law were administered in person. See 

Turner, 558 F.2d at 50. However, I find no basis for concluding the 

common law required physical presence—physical presence for the 

administration of an oath or affirmation was the only option in a world 

where remote audio and video communications technologies did not 

exist. In the late eighteenth century, 

the main requirements for a valid affirmation were that the 

affiant (1) knowingly and intentionally make a statement to a 

neutral and detached magistrate; (2) affirm, swear, or declare 
48

that the information in the statement is true and correct; 

and (3) do so under circumstances that impress upon the 

affiant the “solemnity and importance of his or her words 

and of the promise to be truthful, in moral, religious, or legal 

terms.”

Gutierrez-Perez, 337 P.3d at 210 (quoting United States v. Bueno-Vargas, 

383 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004)). Notably, physical presence was 

not among these requirements. Id. at 210–11 (concluding physical 

presence was not required to satisfy these requirements). Thus, the 

common law rule does not resolve the ambiguity.

We do not interpret statutes in isolation but “strive to achieve 

harmony and consistency” between provisions. Carter, 618 N.W.2d at 

377. In Carter, we held that an oath or affirmation must occur “in the 

presence of an authorized official” in order to support a conviction for 

perjury under Iowa Code section 720.2. Id. This was, in part, because 

the physical presence of an official was deemed necessary to bind a 

person’s conscience. Id. at 376–77. Because physical presence is 

required to support perjury convictions under the Iowa Code, I would 

likewise interpret section 808.3 to require a form of presence sufficient to

maintain a criminal consequence for a warrant applicant violating the 

legal obligation to tell the truth. See Atsinger, 617 N.W.2d at 276 

(finding presence of another is required for valid oath in perjury context). 

My analysis does not stop there, however. I believe the meaning of 

text remains sufficiently flexible to allow the legal system to embrace new 

technologies. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The 

Interpretation of Legal Texts 86–87 (2012); see also, e.g., United States v. 

Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 400–05, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (recognizing a 

GPS tracking device can effect a “search” within the Fourth Amendment); 

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 2046 (2001) 

(recognizing a “search” within the Fourth Amendment can be undertaken 
49

through thermal imaging); State v. Pashal, 300 N.W.2d 115, 117–19 

(Iowa 1980) (interpreting the warrant application process to permit taperecorded testimony in support of probable cause determination). It might 

be tantamount to physical presence for purposes of section 808.3 for a 

warrant applicant to be present before a magistrate through two-way 

video communication. In making this assessment, we should consider 

the purposes underlying the oath-or-affirmation requirement and explore 

whether technological presence can adequately serve those purposes.

The requirement of an oath or affirmation exists to impress on an 

affiant the importance of telling the truth and to ensure the affiant 

recognizes the legal obligation to tell the truth. See Atsinger, 617 N.W.2d 

at 276 & n.2. The presence of a court officer serves “to enhance the 

conscience of the person taking the oath” and “to assure that the person 

who had knowledge of the facts is the same person who subscribed to 

the verification.” Id. at 276 n.2. The oath or affirmation and the 

interconnection between the affiant and the court officer are calculated to 

increase the reliability of information asserted in a warrant application. 

I conclude the use of two-way video technology is tantamount to 

physical presence for purposes of the administration of an oath or 

affirmation.12 Two-way video systems such as SkypeTM and FaceTimeTM

enable people located at different places “to see and hear one another 

simultaneously.” State v. Rogerson, 855 N.W.2d 495, 500 (Iowa 2014). 

 12My interpretation of the oath and affirmation requirement of Iowa Code section 

808.3 is supported by a recent amendment to the statute. Without altering the existing 

statutory requirements that warrant applications be in writing, submitted before a 

magistrate, and supported by oath or affirmation, the legislature clarified that the 

submission can be electronic and the oath or affirmation requirement can be met 

through electronic means of communication. See S.F. 358, 87th G.A., 1st Sess. § 4 

(Iowa 2017). 
50

Although virtual presence is not identical to physical presence, see id. at 

509 (Hecht, J., concurring specially), it does not significantly diminish 

the protections provided by an oath or affirmation made in the physical 

presence of a magistrate for purposes of the warrant requirement. A 

magistrate administering a video oath or affirmation can see the affiant 

in assessing credibility and connect the affiant with a warrant 

application. The audio and video connection between a magistrate and 

an affiant can, in my view, adequately impress upon the affiant the legal 

obligation to tell the truth and underscore the solemnity of the oath. See 

Astinger, 617 N.W.2d at 276 & n.2. Because two-way video technology 

provides access to auditory and visual information for both the 

magistrate and the affiant, I conclude it is tantamount to physical 

presence for purposes of the administration of oaths and affirmations 

under section 808.3. 

While adequately serving the purposes of physical presence, video 

technology dramatically enhances the efficiency of the warrant 

application process. We should not avert our eyes from the technological 

changes that are all around us and cling to old ways of doing things 

fashioned long before the communications revolution began. The users 

of our justice system reasonably expect it will incorporate the 

technologies they are using in their daily lives. Indeed, I would embrace 

existing technologies enabling law enforcement officers to seek, and 

allowing judicial officers to issue, search warrants before conducting 

automobile searches when possible and reasonably practicable, thereby 

enhancing the protection of privacy afforded by article I, section 8. See 

Smith, 311 P.3d at 140 (“[T]he availability of such a procedure increases 

the likelihood that a search warrant will be obtained in DWUI arrest 
51

situations, and it greatly decreases the amount of time necessary to 

obtain the warrant.”).

D. Technology and the Mobility Exigency. I now turn to 

Storm’s assertion that the mobility of an automobile no longer poses a 

per se exigency justifying a categorical automobile exception under article 

I, section 8 because modern communications technologies enable 

warrant applications to be remotely prepared and submitted without 

leaving the scene of a traffic stop. See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 17 (Cady, 

C.J., concurring specially) (“An automatic exception to the warrant 

requirement, particularly one based on exigency, must account for the 

new world of technology, and must not continue to exist simply because 

it existed in the past.”).

As I have already noted, the Supreme Court emphasized in Carroll 

that a warrant must be obtained if it is “reasonably practicable” to do so 

and noted that “where the securing of a warrant is reasonably 

practicable, it must be used.” See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156, 45 S. Ct. at 

286; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879 (“We do not retreat 

from our holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain 

advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant 

procedure . . . .”). Our own early automobile exception jurisprudence did 

the same. See, e.g., Shea, 218 N.W.2d at 613 (“[E]xistence of exigent 

circumstances may relieve an officer from the obligation to obtain a 

warrant if it is impracticable to do so.” (quoting Jackson, 210 N.W.2d at 

539)); Schlenker, 234 N.W.2d at 145.

Among the foundational principles undergirding the automobile 

exception are the concepts of mobility and “reasonable practicability.” In 

determining it was not reasonably practicable for the law enforcement 

officer to obtain a warrant in Husty, the Supreme Court expressly cited 
52

the risk that any evidence within the vehicle would have been lost during 

“the delay and withdrawal from the scene of one or more officers which 

would have been necessary to procure a warrant.” 282 U.S. at 701, 51 

S. Ct. at 242. Indeed, the Court implicitly determined in Chambers that 

the mobility of the suspect’s vehicle renders a search warrant 

impracticable even if there had been time to obtain one prior to the 

search. See 399 U.S. at 52, 90 S. Ct. at 1982. 

As Chief Justice Cady recently presaged, however, the need for an 

automatic exigency rule “may be affected by the changing technology 

that is speeding up the warrant process.” Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 17. 

Technological advances now make it reasonably practicable to apply for a 

warrant from the scene of a traffic stop, at least in some circumstances. 

Law enforcement officers equipped with laptops and smart phones can 

and do access the internet from their patrol cars.13 Using laptops or 

smartphones, law enforcement officers can establish an audiovisual 

connection with a magistrate for remote administration of the oath or 

affirmation. These technologies are widely available and accessible to 

most officers. Where it is reasonably practicable to use such 

technologies in applying for search warrants during traffic stops, we 

should require their use. 

I do not contend here that the automobile exception should be 

categorically abandoned. The exception should be maintained for 

circumstances in which the State establishes exigency other than the 

mobility of the automobile rendered an application for a search warrant 

impracticable. For example, if an officer’s lack of internet access 

 13Indeed, Deputy Leonard confirmed that he had internet access from the 

roadside where he stopped Storm. Although he characterized the access as “slow,” the 

State failed to establish it was so poor as to support a finding that communication with 

either the prosecutor or a magistrate was impractical. 
53

precludes the submission of an application for a warrant from the scene 

of a stop for a reason outside of the State’s control, it would not be 

reasonably practicable to secure a warrant from the scene of the stop.14 

If securing a warrant is not “reasonably practicable” under the 

circumstances, then the officer can search a readily mobile vehicle based 

upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. 

The State contends, and the majority affirms, that the categorical 

automobile exception can be justified and should be maintained because 

individuals hold lower expectations of privacy in motor vehicles. I 

disagree. Professor LaFave has observed that “[m]ost Americans view the 

automobile as more than merely a means of transportation.” 3 Wayne R. 

LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 

§ 7.2(b), at 735 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting Lewis R. Katz, Automobile 

Searches and Diminished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 Am. 

Crim. L. Rev. 557, 570–72 (1982)). In his concurring opinion in State v. 

Gaskins, Justice Appel aptly described how people use their automobiles.

Automobiles are used as temporary homes or even a place to 

take a snooze after a long (or not so long) drive. Bank 

statements, recent mail, credit card invoices, love notes, and 

medical information may be stored in automobiles. Glove 

compartments and consoles are pretty good places to keep 

 14The State contends circumstances other than potential shortcomings of 

technology support a categorical automobile exception to the warrant requirement. For 

example, an officer’s concentration on the task of preparing an application for a warrant 

could be disrupted by the need to manage the conduct of multiple people present at the 

scene of the stop. The State also suggests that some warrant applications are complex 

and their preparation at the scene of the stop would unreasonably extend the duration 

of the stop. I view these factors as part of the circumstances upon which any claim of 

actual exigency should be made. Unlike my colleagues in the majority, I have 

confidence in our law enforcement officers’ ability to assess the circumstances at the 

scene of a traffic stop and decide whether an exigency other than mere mobility of the 

automobile renders an electronic application for a warrant impracticable. Prior to the 

Supreme Court’s determination in Carney that the inherent mobility of a vehicle is a per 

se exigency for purposes of the automobile exception, we required a similarly probing 

exigency inquiry to be made for warrantless vehicle searches under both the Federal 

and State Constitutions. See Allensworth, 748 N.W.2d at 795. 
54

“papers and effects.” Professionals driving home from work 

take bundles of documents with them in both hard and 

electronic formats that are often placed on the back seat. . . . 

Today, with new electronic devices and wireless networks, it 

is not unusual for an automobile to serve as a virtual office 

for the conduct of private business.

866 N.W.2d at 36 (Appel, J., concurring specially). I conclude Justice 

Appel’s characterization of the contemporary uses commonly made of 

automobiles is apt. I therefore strongly disagree with the notion that the 

reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s car is so diminished as to 

support the categorical exception to the warrant requirement reaffirmed 

today by the majority. 

We measure privacy interests by gauging the subject’s “exposure to 

public view, the types of activities that take place there, the steps taken 

to protect it from public view, and a host of other variables.” Christopher 

Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 22 

(1991) [hereinafter Slobogin] (footnotes omitted). Storm had a 

constitutionally protected privacy interest in his vehicle. This is evident 

from the fact that even under the rubric of the automobile exception, we 

have protected motorists’ article I, section 8 rights by enforcing the 

requirement to show probable cause and ready mobility. See id. (noting 

without an expectation of privacy, probable cause would not be required 

either). Storm took steps to protect his vehicle’s contents from public 

view by placing them in the vehicle’s middle console, which indicates he 

expected privacy. Although I would concede his automobile is less 

private than his residence, “the minor privacy infringement to enforce 

traffic laws does not itself justify the further intrusiveness of criminal 

investigations.” Sarah A. Seo, Essay, The New Public, 125 Yale L.J. 

1616, 1670 (2016). 
55

The majority concludes alternatively that the categorical 

automobile exception should be maintained because of compelling 

societal interests in efficiency, public safety, and officer safety. I concede 

the argument that the automobile exception is easy for law enforcement 

officers to apply. Because no search warrant is required under the 

categorical exception, officers do not have to bother with warrants before 

searching automobiles. From the perspective of law enforcement officers, 

the exception is quite efficient to be sure. But the primary purpose of the 

warrant clause was clearly not to make investigations of crime easy or 

efficient. See State v. Tibbles, 236 P.3d 885, 889 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) 

(“[W]hatever relative convenience to law enforcement may obtain from 

forgoing the burden of seeking a warrant once probable cause to search 

arises . . . , we adhere to the view that ‘mere convenience is simply not 

enough.’ ” (quoting State v. Patterson, 774 P.2d 10, 12 (Wash. 1989))). A 

quotation of Justice Robert Jackson is apt here. He once observed that 

“[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search 

is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or 

Government enforcement agent.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 

14, 68 S. Ct. 367, 369 (1948). Thus, although the categorical automobile 

exception obviously promotes efficiency for law enforcement officers 

wishing to search automobiles in furtherance of the investigation of 

crimes, it comes with far too great of a privacy cost. The exception 

obliterates the warrant requirement and motorists’ right of privacy in 

their vehicles. Although this cost might formerly have been deemed 

acceptable because of the impossibility of obtaining a warrant from the 

scene of a stop, I now conclude it is one this court should no longer 

require Iowans to pay. The ease and efficiency of a criminal investigation 
56

are not constitutionally protected interests and must yield to the 

constitutional requirement for a warrant. 

The interests in public and officer safety, however, warrant special 

consideration. All traffic stops executed by law enforcement officers 

along the roadway are attended by a risk of injury to motorists and law 

enforcement officers. The State has deemed the level of risk low enough 

to perform warrantless roadside vehicle searches under the most recent 

iteration of the automobile exception. It is clear the State has deemed 

this risk to be acceptable because warrantless searches along the open 

roadway have been routine since Carroll was decided. Yet the majority 

would now conclude a warrant application—performed inside a secured 

police car—is too dangerous to justify extending a stop. Certainly, when 

the duration of a traffic stop is extended, the risk to motorists and law 

enforcement officers will, to some unknown extent, be enhanced. I 

acknowledge this may be true if a warrant must be sought and obtained 

prior to conducting a valid automobile search. But I am not convinced 

by the majority’s assertion that the magnitude of the enhanced risk 

resulting from electronic applications for search warrants made possible 

by advancing technology is so great as to justify continued recognition of 

a categorical exception to the warrant requirement for automobile 

searches. 

I conclude the categorical exception permitting a warrantless 

search of a vehicle under article I, section 8 can no longer be sustained 

under the theory that a vehicle’s mobility poses a per se exigency. 

Accordingly, I would hold that a warrantless search of a vehicle must be 

justified by exigent circumstances other than mobility. See, e.g., Lam, 

391 N.W.2d at 249; Holderness, 301 N.W.2d at 736–37; Shea, 218 

N.W.2d at 613. 
57

E. Duration of a Seizure Required to Obtain a Warrant. The 

majority asserts that we should not abandon the automobile exception as 

a categorical rule under article I, section 8 because it no more violates 

article I, section 8 to search a vehicle without a warrant than it does to 

seize a person without a warrant long enough to obtain a warrant to 

search. I acknowledge the dissonance between these interests, but 

conclude that the automobile exception should still be abandoned as a 

categorical rule. 

Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution protects the right of 

individuals to be free from “unreasonable seizures and searches.” Iowa 

Const. art. I, § 8. “A search and seizure without a valid warrant is per se 

unreasonable unless it comes within a recognized exception such as 

consent, search incident to arrest, probable cause and exigent 

circumstances, or plain view.” State v. Pickett, 573 N.W.2d 245, 247 

(Iowa 1997) (quoting State v. Manna, 534 N.W.2d 642, 644 (Iowa 1995)). 

The majority accepts the State’s argument that if we strike down 

the automobile exception and require remote warrant applications when 

it is reasonable under the circumstances to obtain a warrant, then we 

will be protecting individuals from a warrantless search by subjecting 

them to a lengthier warrantless seizure. In Chambers, the Supreme 

Court adverted to this conflict between competing constitutional 

interests.

For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on 

the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the 

probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand 

carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given 

probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment. 

399 U.S. at 51–52, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. By permitting an unreasonable 

search in order to protect a suspect from what would be a reasonable 
58

seizure, the majority has given primacy to the mobility interests 

protected by article I, section 8 and concluded as a matter of law that the 

property, privacy, and security interests protected by the same provision 

are less worthy of protection.

I acknowledge that vehicle searches conducted during traffic stops 

present an inherent conflict between the interests protected by the 

prohibitions on unreasonable seizures and unreasonable searches. 

However, I conclude the deprivation resulting from a warrantless seizure 

of a reasonable duration pending an application for a warrant to search 

an automobile is a constitutionally tolerable cost for protection of the 

privacy rights at issue. I agree with the thoughtful comments of a 

scholar who has written on the conflicting interests in this context.

Undeniably, the brief seizure of the automobile and its 

occupants is an intrusion upon the Fourth Amendment 

rights of its occupants, but the brevity of the 

immobilization—which often will not require more than an 

hour—reduces the seriousness of this intrusion. The 

alternative—an immediate search of the car—irreparably 

destroys the occupants’ privacy interests in the automobile 

and the containers inside. There can be no serious debate 

as to which is the greater and which is the lesser intrusion, 

Chambers notwithstanding. The rights protected by the 

Fourth Amendment are more faithfully observed when only 

the lesser intrusion—the brief seizure—is permitted unless 

and until a judicial officer authorizes the greater intrusion: 

a search pursuant to a search warrant issued after a judicial 

officer concurs that there is probable cause to search.

Carol A. Chase, Privacy Takes a Back Seat: Putting the Automobile 

Exception Back on Track After Several Wrong Turns, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 71, 

89 (1999) [hereinafter Chase] (footnote omitted).

Article I, section 8 protections in the automobile stop and search 

contexts should apply more forcefully to searches because individuals 

who prefer seizures to searches can only be protected by a warrant, while 

individuals who prefer warrantless searches to seizures can be protected 
59

by consenting to the search.15 See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 63, & n.8, 90 

S. Ct. at 1987, & n.8 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 

part); see also Slobogin, 39 UCLA L. Rev. at 21 n.64. While a 

warrantless seizure invades a person’s mobility interest temporarily until 

mobility is restored, a warrantless search invades someone’s privacy 

permanently. Chase, 41 B.C. L. Rev. at 88–89 (predicting that as 

technological advances permit warrants to be remotely obtained and 

reduce the time required to procure a warrant, a brief seizure for the 

sake of getting a warrant arguably becomes an even lesser intrusion into 

an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights than an immediate warrantless 

search). 

Upon developing probable cause to search a vehicle, an officer 

wishing to search the vehicle should inform a suspect that they have a 

constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches, explain that 

probable cause gives the officer the right to detain the suspect for a 

reasonable period of time necessary to secure a warrant, and advise the 

suspect that if they would prefer to avoid the delay attending the 

application for a search warrant, they may waive the right to demand a 

warrant and consent to the search. Upon receipt of this advisory, the 

suspect is given an opportunity to make an informed and voluntary 

choice to require a warrant be obtained or consent to a warrantless 

search in order to limit the duration of the seizure. 

If technology permitting a remote application for a warrant to 

search an automobile is reasonably accessible to the officer executing the 

stop, it should be used. In my view, the potential unreasonableness of a 

seizure’s duration does not, by itself or in combination with a vehicle’s 

 15I note that when Storm asked if a warrant was required for the search of his 

truck, Deputy Leonard told him a warrant was not required.
60

mobility, justify a categorical exception to the warrant requirement for 

automobile searches under article I, section 8. Considerations affecting 

the time it takes to apply for a warrant—such as the time of day, the 

complexity of the facts supporting a finding of probable cause, and the 

degree of detail constitutionally required—may be addressed within a 

case-specific exigency analysis. See State v. Andersen, 390 P.3d 992, 

999 (Or. 2017) (reviewing considerations affecting the time it takes to get 

a warrant that are relevant to a case-specific exigency determination).

In my view, the mobility of an automobile no longer provides a 

sound rationale for a per se exigency rule. Under the standard I would 

adopt, the State must show facts demonstrating an objectively 

reasonable basis for its claim of exigency supporting a warrantless 

search. See Tibbles, 236 P.3d at 890 (“Exigent circumstances will be 

found only where obtaining a warrant is not practical because the delay 

inherent in securing a warrant would compromise officer safety, facilitate 

escape, or permit the destruction of evidence.”).16

F. Exigent Circumstances. With the foregoing principles in 

mind, I now turn to the issue of whether an exigency beyond the mobility 

of Storm’s vehicle justified the warrantless search in this case. Because 

Storm does not argue that we should apply a different standard for 

analyzing exigency under article I, section 8 than the Supreme Court 

applies under the Fourth Amendment, I would apply the federal standard 

but reserve the right to apply it more stringently than under federal law. 

See, e.g., State v. Kern, 831 N.W.2d 149, 174 (Iowa 2013). 

 16We have found, for example, an exigency supporting a warrantless search 

exists where there is a “danger of violence and injury to the officers or others; risk of the 

subject’s escape; or the probability that, unless taken on the spot, evidence will be 

concealed or destroyed.” Jackson, 210 N.W.2d at 540. 
61

Here, the State made several arguments in support of its 

contention that exigent circumstances permitted the warrantless search 

of Storm’s vehicle under the facts of this case. The State argues that 

even after Storm was handcuffed and detained, his friends or 

accomplices could have arrived, commandeered the vehicle, and driven it 

away. Cf. State v. Winfrey, 24 A.3d 1218, 1226 & n.8 (Conn. 2011) 

(discussing the concern that defendant or someone else could interfere 

by removing the vehicle from the scene). In adopting the State’s position, 

the majority notes that Storm used his cell phone at the scene of the stop 

to call a friend. Two people subsequently arrived at the scene of the stop

and, with Deputy Leonard’s approval, took responsibility for Storm’s 

automobile. There is no evidence that either Storm or the two persons 

who came to retrieve the automobile were uncooperative or unresponsive 

to the deputy’s commands during the stop. 

The majority concludes, however, that the prevalence of cell 

phones makes it easier, as a general matter, for detained suspects to 

summon others and arrange for evidence to be destroyed during delays 

occasioned by warrant applications. This determination should be made 

on a case-specific basis. In this case, the officer perceived a low enough 

degree of danger to feel comfortable permitting Storm to summon his 

friends. Although the number of people present at the scene of the stop 

and the ability of law enforcement officers present there to manage the 

scene under the circumstances are among the circumstances considered 

in the exigency analysis I would adopt, see Jackson, 210 N.W.2d at 540, I 

find no substantial evidence in this record tending to prove that the 

arrival of Storm’s friends interfered in any way with the deputy’s control 

of the environment or his ability to prepare a warrant application if he 

had chosen to do so. 
62

My colleagues in the majority also conclude a warrant requirement 

for the search of Storm’s automobile raises grave safety concerns for 

arresting officers. If Deputy Leonard’s attention had been divided 

between managing the scene of the stop and preparing a warrant 

application, the majority suggests, it would have been much easier for 

Storm’s friends or associates to catch the deputy off guard. See Winfrey, 

24 A.3d at 1226 & n.8. Although public and officer safety concerns are a 

factor in the exigency analysis I propose, see Jackson, 210 N.W.2d at 

540, I find no evidence in this record tending to prove such concerns 

were justified during the stop that is the subject of this case. The stop 

occurred in the middle of the afternoon in broad daylight. No inclement 

weather, visibility problems, or traffic-related issues presenting safety 

concerns for Deputy Leonard, Storm, or other motorists are evident in 

this record. Deputy Leonard had no difficulties managing the scene of 

the stop where all persons present were obedient to the officer’s 

direction. 

Although my colleagues in the majority must acknowledge that 

mere inconvenience surrounding the warrant application process is not 

enough to establish an exception to the warrant requirement under 

article I, section 8, they nonetheless assert it would have been 

impracticable for the deputy in this case to apply for a warrant. An 

extension of the duration of the roadside stop for the amount of time 

necessary to apply for a search warrant would, they contend, have 

created an impracticable burden for Deputy Leonard in this case and 

would create a similar burden for Iowa law enforcement officers who are 

already stretched too thin in counties with only one or two deputies on 

duty at a time. My colleagues further contend Deputy Leonard lacked 

the training, equipment, and administrative support necessary to use 
63

modern communications technology to expedite the warrant application 

process. Given these equipment and training circumstances, my 

colleagues contend, Deputy Leonard could not reasonably have been 

expected to apply for a warrant. 

I am not persuaded. Under the facts of this case, I find the time it 

would likely have taken to apply for a warrant did not render an 

electronic warrant application impracticable. Deputy Leonard believed 

any application for a warrant must first be approved by the county 

attorney under a local policy; however, there is no evidence in this case 

that such approval would not have been readily available. Although the 

State’s evidence suggested it would have taken Deputy Leonard at least 

an hour or two to prepare a warrant application in this case, I would 

credit the more credible testimony of Storm’s expert witness on this 

subject.17 Storm’s expert, Bryan Barker, is a former law enforcement 

patrolman who became a prosecutor and trained officers on obtaining 

search warrants. Barker persuasively testified that it would have taken 

the deputy as little as fifteen minutes to prepare an uncomplicated 

warrant application under the circumstances of this case and a warrant 

could have been obtained within an hour. Barker’s opinion that an 

application for a search warrant for routine automobile searches could 

have been promptly prepared is bolstered by reports from other 

jurisdictions: (1) in 1981 an Iowa federal court determined a telephonic 

warrant could be obtained in the federal system in as little as twenty 

minutes, see United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 

1981); (2) in 1973 (before the advent of cell phones) the San Diego 

 17In this respect, this case is different than Andersen, 390 P.3d at 999, where 

the officer’s contention that it would take hours to obtain a search warrant went 

unrebutted.
64

District Attorney’s Office estimated ninety-five percent of telephonic 

warrants were obtained in fewer than forty-five minutes, see People v. 

Blackwell, 195 Cal. Rptr. 298, 302 n.2 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Paul D. 

Beechen, Oral Search Warrants: A New Standard of Warrant Availability, 

21 UCLA L. Rev. 691, 700 (1973)); (3) in 2009, an Oregon officer testified 

that he could obtain a telephonic search warrant in just one hour, see 

State v. Machuca, 218 P.3d 145, 153 (Or. Ct. App. 2009), rev’d on other 

grounds, 227 P.3d 729 (Or. 2010) (en banc); and (4) in 2015, the New 

Jersey Supreme Court cited a study of forty-two telephonic automobile 

search warrant applications that on average took less than one hour, see 

State v. Witt, 126 A.3d 850, 865–66 (N.J. 2015). 

I acknowledge that although law enforcement officers may be 

equipped to submit electronic warrant applications, “improvements in 

communications technology do not guarantee that a magistrate judge 

will be available when an officer needs a warrant.” Missouri v. McNeely, 

569 U.S. 141, ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1562 (2013). Nonetheless, the 

Supreme Court has observed that “technological developments that 

enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly, and do so without 

undermining the neutral magistrate judge’s essential role as a check on 

police discretion, are relevant to an assessment of exigency” in OWI 

cases. Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1562–63; see also State v. Pettijohn, 899

N.W.2d 1, 22 (Iowa 2017). 

The majority contends Deputy Leonard was not equipped to submit 

an electronic application for a warrant from the scene of the stop in this 

case. I am not persuaded. Deputy Leonard possessed a smart phone18

 18The majority notes that the phone supplied to Deputy Leonard by his employer 

was an older “flip phone,” not a smart phone. The standard I propose for exigency 

determinations would not allow the State to justify the categorical automobile 

exception’s continuing existence by claims that law enforcement officers are not 
65

and his patrol car was equipped with a computer. Although I credit the 

deputy’s testimony that internet access is not available from all locations 

in the county, he admitted access was available to him from the scene of 

the stop in this case. 

I also reject the majority’s conclusion that Deputy Leonard was not 

adequately trained to make a warrant application from the scene of the 

stop in question. Although he had submitted fewer than ten warrant 

applications during his eight years of service as a law enforcement 

officer, the deputy testified that he had received training on the subject 

at the law enforcement academy. If the deputy had not been trained on 

the specific topic of electronic applications for warrants, this deficit was a 

matter that was entirely within the control of the state. We should not 

recognize such state-created training deficits as a matter of exigency 

excusing a warrant under article I, section 8. 

Accordingly, I would reverse the ruling on the motion to suppress, 

vacate Storm’s conviction, and remand for further proceedings. 

Wiggins and Appel, JJ., join this dissent. 

___________________________

supplied with smart technology that is widely used by other Iowans. This court’s 

understanding of constitutional doctrine and fidelity to the warrant requirement should 

not be driven by the unwillingness of appropriators to provide commonly available 

technology to law enforcement officers. Notwithstanding, Deputy Leonard did possess a 

smart phone that was available for use in establishing an internet connection at the 

scene of the stop if he had chosen to do so.
66

#16–0362, State v. Storm

APPEL, Justice (dissenting).

I join Justice Hecht’s dissent, but write separately to emphasize 

several points. As I noted in Gaskins, a federal court in Iowa has stated 

it takes as little as twenty minutes to obtain a telephonic search warrant. 

State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 19 (Iowa 2015) (Appel, J., concurring 

specially); see United States v. Baker, 520 F. Supp. 1080, 1084 (S.D. 

Iowa 1981). And that was almost forty years ago. Decades-old caselaw 

in other jurisdictions indicate police are able to obtain warrants in as 

little as twelve and fifteen minutes. See, e.g., State v. Flannigan, 978 

P.2d 127, 131 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (stating a warrant can be obtained in 

fifteen minutes); People v. Aguirre, 103 Cal. Rptr. 153, 155 (Ct. App. 

1972) (involving a warrant obtained to search a home in twelve minutes). 

Why is it that law enforcement is able to obtain warrants in twenty 

minutes, fifteen minutes, and twelve minutes in these cases decades ago, 

but it now takes much longer to obtain a warrant in Dallas County?

I also find the majority’s discussion of “bright line” rules unhelpful. 

I have critiqued resort to the claimed need for bright-line rules as a mere 

slogan for results-oriented jurisprudence, and it need not be repeated 

here. See Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 19.

In any event, the requirement that law enforcement obtain a 

warrant before engaging in a search is a very bright-line rule. In fact, the 

constitutionally enshrined warrant requirement shines too bright for the 

majority, which modifies it by continuing a broad and outdated exception 

to the warrant requirement. No one should think this case involves a 

preference for bright-line rules—it involves a choice between competing 

bright-line approaches. 
67

Further, the preference for bright-line rules seems to apply only 

when it favors the state. For example, the exigent-circumstance and 

community-caretaking exceptions to the warrant requirement are factbased exceptions not based on bright-line rules. One wonders whether 

the majority will abandon them in favor of a “bright line.” In particular, 

it will be interesting to see if the repeatedly stated preference for brightline rules means the notoriously spongy and inconsistently applied 

multifactor test of consent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 

93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973), will fall to the wayside under article I, section 8 of 

the Iowa Constitution in favor of a bright-line rule that law enforcement 

must specifically inform a citizen of his right to decline to a search and 

obtain truly knowing and voluntary consent. See State v. Lowe, 812 

N.W.2d 554, 590–94 (2012) (Appel, J., concurring in part and dissenting 

in part) (noting question of whether Schneckloth should be abandoned 

was not raised and questioning wisdom of continued reliance on 

Schneckloth); State v. Pals, 805 N.W.2d 767, 782 (Iowa 2011) (reserving 

the question of whether Schneckloth should be abandoned under article 

I, section 8). Or is the preference for bright lines an unbalanced and 

preferential doctrine generally available to the state, but not to a person 

asserting constitutional protections?

In addition, our caselaw indicates that exceptions to the warrant 

requirement be “jealously and carefully drawn.” State v. Ochoa, 792 

N.W.2d 260, 284 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 

493, 499, 78 S. Ct. 1253, 1257 (1958)); State v. Strong, 493 N.W.2d 834, 

836 (Iowa 1992); State v. Sanders, 312 N.W.2d 534, 538 (Iowa 1981), 

overruled by Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d at 16. Interested readers may make 

their own judgment, but nothing in the majority opinion persuades me 

that it seeks to ensure that exceptions to the warrant requirement are 
68

jealously and carefully drawn. Indeed, the majority opinion turns the 

jealously-and-carefully-drawn formula established in existing Iowa 

caselaw on its head and embraces an opposite approach, namely that 

exceptions to the warrant requirement are to be broadly and generously 

construed.

In any event, the controlling opinion of the chief justice undercuts 

a bright-line rule to some extent. According to Chief Justice Cady, the 

defendant failed to meet its burden to introduce sufficient facts to defeat 

the automobile exception. Although not so stated, the opinion in effect 

employs a presumption of exigent circumstances in favor of law 

enforcement when law enforcement seeks to search an automobile and 

shifts the burden to the defendant to prove otherwise. Under the opinion 

of the chief justice, once law enforcement raises the automobile exception 

the burden shifts to the defendant to establish what was found by the 

Iowa federal district court in Baker in 1981, namely, that law 

enforcement authorities are capable of obtaining a search warrant in 

short order. See 520 F. Supp. at 1084.

I do not agree that the burden of proof on what the state is capable 

of doing should rest with the defendant. Aside from constitutional 

considerations, the burden of proof ordinarily rests on the party in the 

best position to produce the evidence. But in any case, the chief justice’s 

approach allows a defendant to make a fact-based showing that the 

presumption of exigency under the automobile exception cannot be 

invoked to support a search.

If narrowly construed, this fact-based approach could run the risk 

of results that vary from county to county and could provide a distinct 

disincentive for law enforcement to adopt current feasible technology. I 

am sure, however, the chief justice does not intend to embrace a rule 
69

with such perverse incentives. Indeed, I read the chief justice’s opinion 

as promoting adoption of feasible technology with all deliberate speed. In 

order to avoid perverse incentives under the framework established by 

the chief justice, a defendant must be able to meet his or her newly 

established burden to overcome the presumption of exigency in the case 

of an automobile search by showing the availability of feasible technology 

to obtain a warrant with dispatch. The opinion of the chief justice does 

not indicate what kind of evidence the defendant must produce, but 

apparently the defendant must make a better and more detailed record 

than was developed in this case.

Wiggins, J., joins this dissent.