RENDERED: DECEMBER 16, 2021

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2021-SC-0151-MR

JOHN GOBLE APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 2020-CA-1455

SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 19-CR-00146

HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL 

MATTOX, JUDGE, SCOTT CIRCUIT 

COURT

APPELLEE 

AND 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 

AND

2021-SC-0162-MR

AMOS BURDETTE APPELLANT 

V. 

ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 2020-CA-0103

SCOTT CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CR-00253

HONORABLE JEREMY MICHAEL 

MATTOX, JUDGE, SCOTT CIRCUIT 

COURT

APPELLEE 

AND 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY REAL PARTY IN INTEREST 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE HUGHES

AFFIRMING
2

John Goble and Amos Burdette filed petitions for writs of mandamus 

seeking dismissal of their respective criminal indictments for various felony 

and misdemeanor offenses. The primary basis for each petition is a challenge 

to the ability of a county attorney to perform prosecutorial duties outside of his 

or her judicial circuit. After careful review, we conclude that Goble and 

Burdette are not entitled to a writ. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

John Goble and Amos Burdette were separately indicted by a Scott 

County Grand Jury on a series of misdemeanor and felony charges stemming 

from unrelated criminal conduct. Because Goble and Burdette advance the 

same legal challenge in their writ appeals to this Court, their cases were 

consolidated by this Court on October 8, 2021. The facts of each case are 

discussed in turn. 

John Goble was the Scott County coroner when complaints were made 

against him regarding narcotics, firearms, and the misuse of county property. 

The Scott County Commonwealth’s Attorney recused from the case and 

requested the appointment of the Office of the Fayette County Attorney as 

special prosecutor. The Attorney General appointed the Fayette County 

Attorney, who then presented the case to the grand jury. Goble was indicted 

by the Scott County Grand Jury on charges of receiving stolen property, 

$10,000 or more, a Class D felony; receiving stolen property (a firearm), a Class 

D felony; abuse of the public trust, less than $10,000, a Class D felony; firstdegree perjury, a Class D felony; first-degree possession of a controlled 
3

substance, a Class D felony; and two counts of first-degree official misconduct, 

a Class A misdemeanor.1

Goble filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Court of Appeals

on September 16, 2019 seeking to dismiss the indictment, arguing both that 

the circuit court acted outside of its jurisdiction and that it acted erroneously 

in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the 

appointment of the Fayette County Attorney as special prosecutor was invalid. 

The Court of Appeals denied the petition, concluding that “[a]lthough the other 

statutes may fail to specifically state that a county attorney can be appointed 

as a special prosecutor outside of his judicial circuit to handle felony cases, 

there is nothing in the statutes that prohibit[s] such and [Kentucky Revised 

Statute] KRS 15.730 reveals the intent of the General Assembly.” The appellate 

court held that the trial court did not err in concluding that the appointment of 

the Fayette County Attorney as special prosecutor was proper. 

Goble appealed to this Court and at the time of that appeal the original 

indictment had been superseded. Goble v. Mattox, 2020-SC-000078-MR, 2020 

WL 4047465, at *1 (Ky. July 9, 2020). Consequently, this Court determined 

that the case was moot. Id. at *2. Goble then began his case again by filing a 

motion to dismiss the superseding indictment in Scott Circuit Court. 

 

1 Three indictments have issued in Goble’s case: Scott County case numbers 

18-CR-00185, 19-CR-00129 and the current indictment, 19-CR-00146. According to 

the Commonwealth, superseding indictments were required due to Goble’s perjurious 

statements before the first grand jury on May 18, 2018 and to correct technical issues 

in the first superseding indictment in 19-CR-00129. At this time, all prior indictments 

have been properly dismissed and the only case which is not moot is this case, 19-CR00146. 
4

The trial court denied the motion, noting that dismissal of an indictment 

over the Commonwealth’s objection was only allowed in extraordinary 

circumstances. The trial court concluded that Goble “failed to show by statute, 

or otherwise, that county attorneys must only assist within their judicial 

circuit. Therefore, based on this argument, there are no extraordinary 

circumstances that would require the Court to dismiss an indictment without 

the Commonwealth’s consent.” The trial court held that “[t]here is no 

indication that the statutes expressly limit the agreement to prosecutors in the 

same judicial circuit.” 

Once again, Goble petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of 

mandamus. The Court of Appeals denied the petition, citing the same 

reasoning it relied upon in denying Goble’s first writ petition. 

In September 2018, the Scott County Grand Jury indicted Amos 

Burdette on a series of misdemeanor and felony charges. The previous 

Commonwealth’s Attorney for the 14th Judicial Circuit, Gordie Shaw, 

presented the case to the Scott County Grand Jury. Shaw did not seek 

reelection and Sharon Muse was elected as the Commonwealth’s Attorney for 

the 14th Judicial Circuit. Muse hired Brooks Frye as an Assistant 

Commonwealth’s Attorney and assigned him to the Burdette case. At the 

beginning of 2020, Frye notified Muse of his intention to accept employment 

with the Fayette County Attorney’s Office effective January 15, 2020. 

Burdette’s case was set for trial beginning on January 27, 2020. Muse 
5

requested that Frye continue to handle the case given that the trial was 

scheduled within two weeks of his transfer and he had fully prepared for trial. 

As a result, and at the Scott County Commonwealth Attorney’s request, 

the Attorney General appointed the Office of the Fayette County Attorney as 

special prosecutor. On January 21, 2020 Burdette filed a petition for a writ of 

mandamus with the Court of Appeals seeking to dismiss the indictment, 

arguing both that the circuit court acted outside of its jurisdiction and that it 

acted erroneously within its jurisdiction by denying his motion to dismiss the 

indictment. His petition was premised on the grounds that the appointment of 

the Fayette County Attorney as special prosecutor was invalid. The Court of 

Appeals determined that Burdette is not entitled to relief by a first-class writ 

because he failed to prove that the trial court acted outside its jurisdiction nor 

was a second-class writ appropriate because the trial court did not act 

erroneously in denying the motion to dismiss the indictment. Turning to KRS 

15.730, the Court of Appeals held that “[a]lthough the other statutes may fail 

to specifically state that a county attorney can be appointed as a special 

prosecutor outside of his judicial circuit to handle felony cases, there is 

nothing in the statutes that prohibits such and KRS 15.730 reveals the intent 

of the General Assembly.” 

In their appeals to this Court, Goble and Burdette make similar 

arguments regarding the distribution of prosecutorial duties and the ability of a 

county attorney to prosecute cases outside of their judicial district or circuit. 

We address their arguments together. 
6

ANALYSIS

As often noted, “courts of this Commonwealth are―and should be―loath 

to grant the extraordinary writs unless absolutely necessary.” Cox v. Braden, 

266 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Ky. 2008). This Court has held that: 

A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the 

lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its 

jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an 

intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about 

to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there 

exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great 

injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not 

granted.

Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ky. 2004). 

Typically, we review the decision of the Court of Appeals to deny a writ 

under an abuse of discretion standard. Grange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trude, 151 

S.W.3d 803, 810 (Ky. 2004). “But when the issue presented involves a 

question of law, we review the question of law de novo.” Commonwealth Fin. & 

Admin. Cabinet v. Wingate, 460 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Ky. 2015). Because Goble’s

and Burdette’s claims on appeal involve statutory interpretation our standard 

of review in this matter is de novo. Goble and Burdette argue that they are 

entitled to writs either of the first-class or second-class or based on the special 

cases exception outlined in Marcum v. Scorsone, 457 S.W.3d 710 (Ky. 2015). 

I. Goble and Burdette Are Not Entitled to First-Class Writs.

“The first class of writs refers to subject-matter jurisdiction; that is, the 

lower court’s core authority to hear the case at all.” Appalachian Racing, LLC v.

Commonwealth, 504 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2016). Goble and Burdette are not 
7

entitled to first-class writs because they have failed to show that the trial court 

proceeded outside of its jurisdiction. “Whether a court has subject-matter 

jurisdiction is determined at the beginning of a case, based on the type of case 

presented.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Ky. 2018) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 722 (Ky. 2013)). The Kelly Court 

further explained: 

Once filed, a court has subject matter jurisdiction of the case so 

long as the pleadings reveal that it is the kind of case assigned to 

that court by a statute or constitutional provision. A court, once 

vested with subject matter jurisdiction over a case, does not 

suddenly lose subject matter jurisdiction by misconstruing or 

erroneously overlooking a statute or rule governing the litigation.

554 S.W.3d at 860 (internal quotations and citations omitted). A review of

relevant statutes establishes that the Scott Circuit Court has jurisdiction over

both cases before us, each of which arose in Scott County.

Pursuant to KRS 23A.010(1), “[t]he Circuit Court is a court of general 

jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not exclusively 

vested in some other court.” “When the legislature does not specifically assign 

jurisdiction of a particular matter to the district court, jurisdiction rests in the 

circuit court.” Hyatt v. Commonwealth, 72 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Ky. 2002). 

District Courts maintain jurisdiction to make final disposition of all criminal 

matters, except felonies. KRS 24A.110(1)(a). KRS 24A.110(2) states that “[t]he 

District Court has exclusive jurisdiction to make a final disposition of any 

charge or a public offense denominated as a misdemeanor or violation, except 

where the charge is joined with an indictment for a felony . . . .” Goble and 
8

Burdette were both indicted for multiple felonies and misdemeanors occurring 

in Scott County, which properly places their cases within the jurisdiction of the 

Scott Circuit Court. As such, Goble and Burdette are not entitled to first-class 

writs. 

II. Goble and Burdette Are Not Entitled to Second-Class Writs.

To prove entitlement to a second-class writ, Goble and Burdette must 

show “that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although 

within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or 

otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is 

not granted.” Hoskins, 150 S.W.3d at 10. They cannot meet this standard 

because the lower court did not act erroneously.

Both the Goble and Burdette cases involve (1) an agreement between the 

Scott County Commonwealth Attorney’s Office and the Fayette County 

Attorney’s Office to have the Fayette County Attorney act as special prosecutor 

before the Scott Circuit Court and (2) a letter from the Attorney General 

acknowledging the arrangement and appointing the special prosecutor “in 

accordance with [KRS] Chapter 15.” Generally, the Commonwealth’s attorney 

is responsible for prosecuting felonies and has the primary responsibility 

within a judicial circuit to present cases to the grand jury. KRS 15.725(1). 

Conversely, county attorneys are responsible for the prosecution of all criminal 

cases within the jurisdiction of the district court in the county or consolidated 

government where the county attorney is elected. KRS 15.725(2). The county 
9

attorney prosecutes all misdemeanors, violations, and juvenile matters, and 

also conducts preliminary hearings in felony cases.

Kentucky Constitution Section 112 establishes judicial circuits and 

provides that circuit courts are courts of general jurisdiction, having authority 

over all causes not specifically delegated to other courts. Section 113 

establishes judicial districts and provides that district courts are courts of 

limited jurisdiction able to exercise jurisdiction only when mandated by the 

legislature. In addition to these constitutional parameters, two statutes are 

particularly relevant to our inquiry. KRS 15.725(3) states:

The Commonwealth’s attorney and county attorneys in a 

judicial circuit shall cooperate in the enforcement of criminal and 

penal laws of the Commonwealth. When necessary, the 

Commonwealth’s attorney and county attorney shall assist each 

other in prosecution within their respective courts. Each 

Commonwealth’s attorney and county attorney may enter into 

agreements to share or redistribute prosecutorial duties in the 

Circuit and District Courts. Any prosecutorial or related duty 

assigned by statute to the Commonwealth’s attorney may be 

performed by the county attorney, and any prosecutorial or 

related duty assigned by statute to the county attorney may 

be performed by the Commonwealth’s attorney pursuant to 

these agreements. Copies of the agreements shall when executed 

be forwarded to the Attorney General, the chief judges of the 

Circuit and District Courts, and the chief regional judges of the 

Circuit and District Courts.

(Emphasis added). KRS 15.730 states:

Each regular Commonwealth’s attorney and county attorney 

shall be, ex officio, a special prosecutor of the Commonwealth, and 

as such shall perform such duties and render such services, at 

such time and places, coextensive with the Commonwealth as may 

be required by the Attorney General. The duties and services 

may include, but are not limited to, prosecution of or 

participation in action outside of his judicial circuit or judicial 

district when directed by the Attorney General and assisting 

the Attorney General in preparation and presentation of the 
10

Commonwealth’s position in criminal cases appealed to Circuit 

Court, Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court.

(Emphasis added). 

Goble and Burdette argue that the Fayette County Attorney was 

erroneously appointed as special prosecutor given that the relevant statute, 

namely KRS 15.725(3), does not expressly permit a county attorney to 

prosecute felonies outside his or her judicial circuit. When interpreting a 

statute, a court should “give effect to the intent of the General Assembly.”

Beckham v. Bd. of Educ., 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (Ky. 1994).

[W]e must look first to the plain language of a statute and, if the 

language is clear, our inquiry ends. We hold fast to the rule of 

construction that the plain meaning of the statutory language is 

presumed to be what the legislature intended, and if the meaning 

is plain, then the court cannot base its interpretation on any other 

method or source. In other words, we assume that the Legislature 

meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant.

Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 648 (Ky. 2017) (citations and 

quotations omitted). “We also presume that the General Assembly intended for 

the statute to be construed as a whole, for all of its parts to have meaning, and 

for it to harmonize with related statutes.” Shawnee Telecom Res., Inc. v. 

Brown, 354 S.W.3d 542, 551 (Ky. 2011) (emphasis added). Turning to the 

plain language of the statutes that authorize Commonwealth and county 

attorneys to participate in or prosecute criminal cases, we are satisfied that the 

trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictment. 

In this case a county attorney performed the functions of a 

Commonwealth attorney pursuant to a written agreement between the two 

offices and appointment by the Attorney General. KRS 15.725(3) explicitly 
11

states that “[a]ny prosecutorial or related duty assigned by statute to the 

Commonwealth's attorney may be performed by the county attorney . . .” 

pursuant to agreements between the two to redistribute prosecutorial duties in 

circuit and district courts. Goble and Burdette emphasize that this particular 

statute does not authorize inter-circuit agreements as occurred here, i.e., it 

could authorize an agreement between the Scott County Commonwealth

Attorney and the Scott County Attorney but not agreements between 

prosecutors from different circuits. As the Court of Appeals aptly observed, 

KRS 15.725(3) does not expressly authorize such agreements but neither does 

it prohibit them. 

Cognizant of the need to consider “related statutes,” Shawnee Telecom, 

354 S.W.3d at 551, we turn to KRS 15.730. That statute provides in relevant 

part that “[e]ach regular . . . county attorney shall be, ex officio, a special 

prosecutor of the Commonwealth, and as such shall perform such duties and 

render such services, at such time and places, coextensive with the 

Commonwealth as may be required by the Attorney General.” These duties 

include, but are not limited to, “prosecution of or participation in action 

outside of his judicial circuit or judicial district when directed by the Attorney 

General . . . .” Id. 

Because county attorneys are permitted to perform the duties of a 

Commonwealth’s attorney pursuant to an appropriate agreement and KRS 

15.730 explicitly allows the performance of these duties outside of the county 

attorney’s judicial circuit or judicial district, “when directed by the Attorney 
12

General,” the Fayette County Attorney may properly prosecute in place of the 

Scott County Commonwealth’s Attorney under the facts of these cases. In 

short, the plain meaning of the statutory language supports the conclusion

that county attorneys are permitted to perform the duties of a Commonwealth’s 

attorney and can do so outside of their own judicial district with the requisite 

Attorney General appointment. 

In support of their writ petitions, Goble and Burdette cite Commonwealth 

v. Vibbert, 397 S.W.3d 910 (Ky. App. 2013), in which the Court of Appeals 

addressed the distinction between district and circuit court jurisdiction. In 

that case the Court of Appeals reiterated this Court’s holding in Barnett v. 

Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 98, 101 (Ky. 1998) that written agreements are 

required when a county attorney performs the duties of a Commonwealth’s 

attorney, but no written agreement is required when a county attorney merely 

assists a Commonwealth’s attorney in prosecution. Notably, in the cases 

before this Court, the Fayette County Attorney and the Scott County 

Commonwealth’s Attorney have a written agreement regarding the distribution 

and sharing of prosecutorial duties.2 Further, the Fayette County Attorney was 

specifically appointed by the Attorney General to prosecute the cases against 

Goble and Burdette. The Vibbert court was not tasked with distinguishing 

between the duties of Commonwealth and county attorneys or determining 

 

2 We note that this agreement is not in the record. However, all parties 

acknowledge that a written agreement between the offices exists and the two 

appointment letters from the Attorney General that are in the record reference the 

agreement. 
13

when each can prosecute certain cases and thus that Court of Appeals opinion

has little bearing in these appeals. 

Ultimately, the statutes clearly allow a county attorney to perform 

prosecutorial duties outside his judicial district or circuit when directed by the 

Attorney General. Because the statutes are clear, the trial court properly 

denied Goble’s and Burdette’s motions to dismiss their indictments, resulting 

in no erroneous action on which to premise a second-class writ. We also note 

that, while not dispositive of these cases given the statutory authority, Goble 

and Burdette have failed to identify any irreparable harm or injury that would 

result from the Fayette County Attorney’s prosecution of their respective cases.

III. Goble and Burdette Are Not Entitled to Writs Under the

Special Case Exception.

Goble and Burdette also argue that their petitions qualify for the special 

case exception. A court may grant a writ absent a showing of irreparable harm 

if 

a substantial miscarriage of justice will result if the lower court is 

proceeding erroneously, and correction of the error is necessary 

and appropriate in the interest of orderly judicial administration. 

It may be observed that in such a situation the court is recognizing 

that if it fails to act the administration of justice generally will

suffer the great and irreparable injury.”

Hodge v. Coleman, 244 S.W.3d 102, 109–10 (Ky. 2008). 

In support, Goble and Burdette cite Marcum, 457 S.W.3d at 710, a 

disqualification of counsel case in which this Court held that the litigation of a 

case by a particular attorney cannot be remedied on appeal. In that case the 

trial court had deprived one party of their private counsel of choice on 
14

appearance of impropriety grounds. Goble and Burdette argue that the same 

analysis should apply in the criminal context with prosecutors. They assert 

that while the issue of whether counsel should properly be allowed to litigate a 

case may not fall squarely under great and irreparable harm, the nature of the 

issue brings it under the special case exception that allows issuance of writs.

We agree that prosecution by an impermissible party—an unauthorized 

office or individual—is not a harm that can be adequately remedied on appeal. 

However, given our conclusion that the Fayette County Attorney is fully 

authorized by statute to prosecute the cases against Goble and Burdette, their 

writ petitions do not qualify for the special case exception. 

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ denial of the 

petitions for writs of mandamus. 

All sitting. All concur. 
15

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,

JOHN GOBLE:

Rhey Denniston Mills

Fred Everett Peters

Fred Peters Law Office

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,

AMOS BURDETTE:

John Elliott Cornett

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Honorable Jeremy Michael Mattox, Judge

Scott Circuit Court 

COUNSEL FOR REAL PARTY IN

INTEREST, COMMONWEALTH OF

KENTUCKY:

Daniel J. Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Larry Roberts

Special Assistant Attorney General