United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 2, 2016 Decided March 4, 2016

No. 14-5223

GEORGE B. KEEPSEAGLE, ET AL.,

APPELLEES

TIMOTHY LABATTE,

APPELLANT

v.

THOMAS J. VILSACK, SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE,

APPELLEE

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:99-cv-03119)

Erick G. Kaardal argued the cause and filed the briefs for 

appellant. 

Carleen M. Zubrzycki, Attorney, U.S. Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for appellee. On the brief were 

Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney 

General, Vincent H. Cohen Jr., Acting U.S. Attorney, and 

Charles W. Scarborough and Katherine Twomey Allen, 

Attorneys. 

Before: BROWN, PILLARD, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.
2

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge WILKINS.

WILKINS, Circuit Judge: Appellant Timothy LaBatte, a 

class member in a class action against the United States 

Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), seeks to intervene in 

that class action – despite the fact that the action was settled 

and closed – after his claim for compensation under the terms 

of the action’s settlement agreement was denied. We affirm 

the District Court’s determination that it lacked ancillary 

jurisdiction to hear Labatte’s challenge. We do so because

LaBatte’s motion to intervene is unrelated to the underlying 

lawsuit and because the District Court was not required to 

hear LaBatte’s motion in order to effectuate its decrees.

I.

A.

The instant litigation stems from a class action filed in 

1999, alleging that the USDA discriminated against Native 

American farmers in its provision of loans. The parties

settled the action in November 2010. The District Court 

approved the settlement, and dismissed the suit with prejudice

in April 2011, stating that it “retain[ed] continuing 

jurisdiction for a period of five years . . . for the limited 

purposes set forth in . . . the Settlement Agreement.” Final 

Order and Judgment, Keepseagle v. Vilsack, No. 99-CV-3119 

(D.D.C. 2011), ECF No. 607, J.A. 63.

The Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) created two 

tracks for recovery, Track A and Track B, each of which 

allowed for different amounts of damages based on different 

burdens of proof. Relevant here, Track B required a class 

claimant to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a 

number of factual points, including that (1) the claimant 
3

applied for a loan with the USDA and was denied, given less 

than she asked for, or given unfavorable terms; and (2) that 

the treatment the claimant received from the USDA was “less 

favorable than that accorded a specifically identified, 

similarly situated white farmer(s).” Revised Settlement 

Agreement § IX.D.1.e, J.A. 126. Claimants were permitted to 

meet their evidentiary burden as to the “similarly situated 

white farmer” by providing a “credible sworn statement based 

on personal knowledge by an individual who is not a member 

of the Claimant’s family.” Id. § IX.D.2.a, J.A. 127. 

The Agreement provided for a “Non-Judicial Claims 

Process,” id. § IX, J.A. 116, whereby each claimant’s claim 

would be processed by a Claims Administrator, id. § IX.B, 

J.A. 121-23, and reviewed by a third-party claims 

adjudication company (termed a “Neutral”), id. § IX.B.7, J.A. 

123, whose role was to “determine the merits of the claims 

submitted” under either Track A or Track B, id. §§ II.OO, 

II.AAA, J.A. 108, 110. The Agreement stated that the final 

determinations of these Neutrals are not reviewable: 

The Claim Determinations, and any other 

determinations made under this Non-Judicial 

Claims Process are final and are not 

reviewable by the Claims Administrator, the 

Track A Neutral, the Track B Neutral, the 

District Court, or any other party or body, 

judicial or otherwise. The Class 

Representatives and the Class agree to forever 

and finally waive any right to seek review of 

the Claim Determinations, and any other 

determinations made under this Non-Judicial 

Claims Process.

Id. § IX.A.9, J.A. 120. 
4

The Agreement also specified the precise – and limited –

contours of the District Court’s jurisdiction over the 

Agreement going forward. It stated that “[t]he Court shall 

retain jurisdiction over this action beyond the date of final 

approval of this Agreement only as set forth below.” Id.

§ XIII.A,

1 J.A. 141 (emphasis added). The Agreement then 

specified five areas of continuing jurisdiction, only one of 

which is relevant to the instant case:

Non-Judicial Claims Process. The Court shall 

retain jurisdiction over this action to supervise 

the distribution of the Fund . . . . This 

continuing jurisdiction will continue until final 

payment from the Fund . . . .

Id. § XIII.A.1, J.A. 141-42. This portion of the Agreement 

mentions nothing about the decisions of the Claim 

Administrator or the Track A or B Neutral and therefore 

confers on the District Court no jurisdiction over those 

determinations. After listing these narrow areas where the 

Court retains jurisdiction, the Agreement reiterates that 

“[o]ther than the provisions expressly described above . . . , 

the Court will not retain jurisdiction over any aspect of this 

action, or in connection with the enforcement of any of its 

provisions, after the date of the final approval of this 

Agreement.” Id. § XIII.A, J.A. 143. 

 1 The revised Agreement erroneously renumbered many of the 

agreement’s sections and sub-sections. For instance, what should 

be numbered as Section XIII.A.1, is numbered as Section V.A.7, 

despite the fact that it is the thirteenth section in the Agreement, 

and the first, not seventh, sub-sub-section. Section V already exists 

earlier in the agreement. Compare J.A. 111, with J.A. 141. This 

opinion retains the original, correct section numbering, which was 

used in the original Agreement, see J.A. 47, and is also reflected in 

the table of contents to the revised Agreement, see J.A. 100-01. 
5

The Agreement also sets forth the process a claimant 

must follow to enforce the Agreement. It notes initially that a 

claimant can seek an order asking the District Court to 

enforce the Agreement, but only concerning an “alleged 

violation of the provisions of th[e] Settlement Agreement that 

are enforceable by the Court.” Id. § XIII.B, J.A. 143

(emphasis added). To do so, however, the claimant must first 

serve the opposing party with a written notice “that describes 

with particularity the term(s) of the Settlement Agreement 

that are alleged to have been violated, the specific errors or 

omissions upon which the alleged violation is based, and the 

corrective action sought.” Id. § XIII.B.1, J.A. 143. The 

opposing party then has 45 days to respond to the notice. Id.

§ XIII.B.2, J.A. 143. If that party fails to respond, or the 

parties are unable to resolve their dispute, the claimant may 

then move the Court to enforce “the provisions of th[e] 

Settlement Agreement that are enforceable by the Court.” Id.

B.

To file a claim, LaBatte recognized that he needed to find 

at least one witness who could submit a declaration on his 

behalf stating that similarly situated white farmers received 

better treatment from the USDA than did LaBatte. LaBatte 

claims that he found two such witnesses: Russell Hawkins 

and Tim Lake. Both individuals currently work for the 

Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”). LaBatte alleges that after

he spoke with both witnesses and drew up their declarations, 

the Government prohibited Hawkins and Lake from signing 

them. 

LaBatte filed his claim under the Agreement in 

December 2011, via Track B. Because he lacked signed 

declarations attesting to similarly situated white farmers, 

LaBatte submitted the declarations that Hawkins and Lake 
6

allegedly would have signed, along with an additional 

declaration from his attorney explaining that the BIA 

prohibited Hawkins and Lake from signing the declarations. 

The Track B Neutral rejected LaBatte’s claim, stating 

that LaBatte “failed to satisfy the requirement of the 

Settlement Agreement, through a sworn statement, that named 

white farmers who are similarly situated to [LaBatte] received 

USDA loans . . . that w[ere] denied to [LaBatte].” J.A. 155. 

The Neutral specifically found the unsigned declarations, 

along with LaBatte’s attorney’s declaration accusing the 

Government of interfering with LaBatte’s claim, to be 

inadequate. Id. at 155-56. 

C.

After receiving his rejection notice, LaBatte attempted to 

follow the requirements of the Agreement by serving the 

Government with a written notice alleging that, by prohibiting 

Hawkins and Lake from signing LaBatte’s declarations, the 

Government impermissibly interfered with the Keepseagle 

claims process. In doing so, LaBatte alleged, the Government 

breached the “covenant of good faith and fair dealing” 

implied in the Agreement. See J.A. 157-60. His notice did 

not otherwise accuse the Government of violating any 

particular provision in the Agreement. 

The Government never responded to LaBatte’s notice.

After waiting the appropriate amount of time, LaBatte filed a 

“complaint in intervention,” which the District Court treated 

as a motion to intervene. He alleged that the Government had 

breached the Agreement, Compl. ¶¶ 191-215, had violated his 

due process and First Amendment rights, id. ¶¶ 216-45, and 

had violated the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the 

Administrative Procedure Act, id. ¶¶ 254-59. He also sought 

a declaratory judgment finding that the Government rendered 
7

the Agreement’s Track B process “illusory,” and had 

otherwise violated LaBatte’s constitutional and other rights. 

Id. ¶¶ 183-90, 246-53. 

The District Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear 

LaBatte’s motion. Because the Court had dismissed the case 

with prejudice following settlement, it determined that it was 

only through its ancillary jurisdiction that it could hear 

LaBatte’s motion. Memorandum Order at 7-8, Keepseagle v. 

Vilsack, No. 99-CV-3119 (D.D.C. 2014), ECF No. 692, J.A. 

239-40. Relying on the fact that the Court had retained 

jurisdiction over the case only in very limited areas, none of 

which applied to LaBatte’s motion, it found that LaBatte had 

failed to establish that the Court had ancillary jurisdiction 

over his motion. Id. at 8-10, J.A. 240-42. 

LaBatte now seeks our review of the District Court’s 

determination.

II.

Because “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited 

jurisdiction,” “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside 

this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the 

contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” 

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 

(1994) (internal citations omitted). The doctrine of “ancillary 

jurisdiction” “recognizes [that] federal courts[] [have] 

jurisdiction over some matters (otherwise beyond their 

competence) that are incidental to other matters properly 

before them.” Id. at 378. The Supreme Court has defined 

two separate purposes for which courts may assert ancillary 

jurisdiction: “(1) to permit disposition by a single court of 

claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually 

interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function 

successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its 
8

authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. at 379-80 (internal 

citations omitted). 

Interpreting Kokkonen as it pertains to settlement 

agreements, we have explained that “district courts enjoy no 

free-ranging ‘ancillary’ jurisdiction to enforce consent 

decrees, but are instead constrained by the terms of the decree 

and related order.” Pigford v. Veneman (Pigford I), 292 F.3d 

918, 924 (D.C. Cir. 2002); accord Pigford v. Vilsack (Pigford 

II), 777 F.3d 509, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“While it may be a 

‘well-established principle . . . that a district court retains 

jurisdiction under federal law to enforce its consent 

decree[s],’ it retains this authority only if the parties’ 

agreement or the court order dismissing the action reserves 

jurisdiction to enforce compliance.” (quoting Beckett v. Air 

Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (citing 

Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381)).

“We review a district court decision interpreting a 

consent decree and any underlying agreement de novo.” 

Pigford II, 777 F.3d at 513. “We review the denial of a 

motion to intervene de novo for issues of law, for clear error 

as to findings of fact and for abuse of discretion on issues that 

involve a measure of judicial discretion.” Defs. of Wildlife v. 

Perciasepe, 714 F.3d 1317, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

III.

The District Court correctly applied Kokkonen and 

determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear LaBatte’s

claim. LaBatte’s claim is not “factually interdependent” with 

the Keepseagle class action itself, nor would the District 

Court’s consideration of LaBatte’s claim enable the Court to 

“effectuate its decrees.” 
9

A.

LaBatte first argues that the “distribution of the 

Settlement Fund and a right to non-government interference 

with the Track B process . . . are interrelated and 

interdependent to the claims LaBatte asserted in his 

complaint.” Principal Br. of Appellant at 37 (emphasis in 

original). His argument misapplies Kokkonen’s first prong. 

Whether his claim is factually interdependent with the 

Agreement that stemmed from that class action is irrelevant to 

Kokkonen’s first prong. What matters is that LaBatte’s claim 

is not factually interdependent with the underlying 

Keepseagle class action. 

In Kokkonen, the parties settled a suit that involved the 

alleged breach of a “general agency agreement.” 511 U.S. at 

376. After a disagreement over the parties’ obligations under 

the settlement, the defendant brought suit asking the District 

Court to enforce the settlement. Id. at 377. Assessing what it 

had established as the first ancillary jurisdiction prong, the 

Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to establish 

jurisdiction because “the facts underlying respondent’s 

dismissed claim for breach of agency agreement and those 

underlying its claim for breach of settlement agreement have 

nothing to do with each other; it would neither be necessary 

nor even particularly efficient that they be adjudicated 

together.” Id. at 380. 

The same can be said for the instant case. Although the 

Keepseagle class action generated the Agreement, the 

operation of which is contested in this suit, the facts of the 

two actions are not “interdependent.” LaBatte’s claim that the 

Government interfered with his ability to file properly a claim 

pursuant to the Keepseagle Agreement has nothing to do with 

the facts underlying the Keepseagle class action, which 
10

involved discrimination in providing loans to Native 

American farmers. As in Kokkonen, there would be no 

advantage to or logic in adjudicating the two disputes 

together. 

Thus, LaBatte cannot establish ancillary jurisdiction 

under Kokkonen’s first prong. 

B.

LaBatte fares no better under Kokkonen’s second prong: 

whether hearing LaBatte’s motion would “enable [the] court 

to function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, 

vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.” Id. 

Because courts retain jurisdiction over a settlement such as 

the one at issue here “only if the parties’ agreement or the 

court order dismissing the action reserves jurisdiction to 

enforce compliance,” Pigford II, 777 F.3d at 514, Kokkonen’s 

second prong applies only if the District Court in this case

retained the authority to enforce the portion of the Agreement 

that LaBatte alleges the Government violated – namely, the 

Track B decisionmaking process. See Compl. ¶ 185 (alleging 

that the Government “interfered and denied LaBatte a Track 

B process by instructing Hawkins and Lake as BIA 

employees not to sign the prepared declarations.”).

 LaBatte argues that the District Court did retain such 

authority, focusing on the provision in the Agreement that

provided the District Court with jurisdiction over “the 

distribution of the Fund.” Revised Settlement Agreement 

§ XIII.A.1, J.A. 141. He claims that by interfering with 

LaBatte’s ability to prove his claim, the Government 

disrupted the Track B process generally, which affected the 

distribution of funds. See Principal Br. of Appellant at 38

(“The process of distribution included the Track B process. 

There is no distribution without a process . . . .”). 
11

However, LaBatte’s understanding of the meaning behind

“distribution of funds” runs counter to the use of the term 

“distribute” (or its variations) in the remainder of the 

Agreement. For instance, section IX.F.8 describes postdetermination procedures for dispending funds to successful 

claimants. See J.A. 134 (“All checks distributed under this 

Section . . . will be valid for 180 calendar days from the date 

of issue.” (emphasis added)). Similarly, section X.A.5 notes 

that class counsel must provide information to class members 

“regarding the status of claims processing or the distribution 

of funds,” J.A. 135 (emphasis added), clearly distinguishing 

the one from the other. In both instances, the notion of 

“distribution” concerns only processes that take place after the 

claims determination process. See also id. § XII.E.1, J.A. 140

(describing “the distribution of a Debt Relief Award” as being 

separate from “the Claims Determination”). 

Additionally, LaBatte’s argument fails to account for the 

Agreement’s strong finality language declaring all claim 

determinations final and unreviewable. See Revised 

Settlement Agreement § IX.A.9, J.A. 120 (“The Claim 

Determinations, and any other determinations made under this 

Non-Judicial Claims Process are final and are not reviewable 

by the Claims Administrator, the Track A Neutral, the Track 

B Neutral, the District Court, or any other party or body, 

judicial or otherwise.”); id. § II.C, J.A. 102 (defining “Claim 

Determination” as “the binding and final result of a Track A 

or Track B adjudication [that] represents whether a Class 

Member is eligible to receive an award as a result of the NonJudicial Claims Process, and if so, the amount of the award”). 

The Agreement’s determination that the District Court would 

maintain continuing jurisdiction over “the distribution of the 

Fund” must be interpreted in light of such finality language. 

See Pigford II, 777 F.3d 514-15 (“The Consent Decree, as a 

written reflection of the parties’ bargain resolving their case, 
12

should be interpreted as a contract.”); Pigford I, 292 F.3d at 

924 (holding that “an enforcement clause limited by its plain 

language” to only certain kinds of enforcement disputes does 

not confer ancillary jurisdiction over disputes that extend 

beyond that limiting language). 

Following LaBatte’s argument to its logical conclusion 

would write the finality provision out of the Agreement 

almost entirely. If any dispute concerning the Track B 

process is, in essence, a dispute concerning the distribution of 

funds because “[t]here is no distribution without a process,” 

Principal Br. of Appellant at 38, then the entire non-judicial 

claims process would be open to judicial review (whether 

Track A or Track B), a result in direct contravention to the 

finality provision. Given the explicit terms circumscribing 

the Court’s jurisdiction, such an interpretation of fund 

distribution would run counter to the intent of the parties in 

entering into the Agreement. 

LaBatte’s reliance on our decision in Pigford II is no 

more helpful. In Pigford II, a claimant, McGiniss, sought to 

pursue his claim under the Track B process, but his claim was 

mistakenly and finally reviewed under the Track A process, 

which resulted in him receiving less money from the 

settlement than he might have otherwise. 777 F.3d at 512-13. 

According to the consent decree in that case, a “facilitator” 

was supposed to send Track A claims to an “adjudicator” and 

Track B claims to an “arbitrator.” Id. at 511. As in the 

instant case, the consent decree there also included a finality 

provision, stating that “decisions of the adjudicator and 

arbitrator are ‘final’ . . . and the parties consent ‘to forever 

waive their right to seek review in any court’ of ‘any claim 

that is, or could have been[,] decided by the adjudicator or 

arbitrator.’” Id. at 511-12 (quoting from the consent decree). 

Unlike the settlement here, however, the consent decree 
13

provided the District Court with much broader continuing 

jurisdiction, stating that the District Court would retain 

jurisdiction “to issue orders ‘concerning the alleged violation 

of any provision’” of the consent decree. Id. at 511 (quoting 

from the consent decree). Because the Pigford II consent 

decree required the facilitator to send Track A claims to the 

adjudicator and Track B claims to the arbitrator, we explained

that the facilitator had failed to comply with the consent 

decree when it sent McGinnis’s Track B claim to an 

adjudicator. Id. at 514. Accordingly, we held that by 

correcting the facilitator’s error, “the District Court did no 

more than enforce the parties’ agreement,” as it had 

jurisdiction to do under the language of the consent decree. 

Id. 

The instant case differs from Pigford II in two important 

ways. First, the consent decree in Pigford II provided the 

District Court with much broader jurisdiction over the 

enforcement of the settlement generally: jurisdiction over any 

violation of any provision in the consent decree. Thus, our 

focus on conduct antecedent to the rejection of McGinnis’s 

claim (namely, the facilitator’s erroneous transfer of 

McGinnis’s claim to a Track A adjudicator, instead of a Track 

B arbitrator) was warranted because the Court’s jurisdiction 

there was defined in such a way that, so long as it did not 

involve the finality of claim determinations, the Court could 

seemingly hear any other dispute over a violation of the 

consent decree. In the instant case, however, the jurisdiction 

retained by the District Court was much narrower. There is 

nothing in the Keepseagle Agreement that confers jurisdiction 

on the District Court unless the conduct at issue involves one 

of the specified, narrow ways in which the Court maintained 

jurisdiction, such as over the distribution of the settlement 

fund. 
14

Second, the finality bar in the Pigford II agreement 

conflicted with the agreement’s broad enforcement provision. 

In the circumstances of that case, the contradiction could be 

reconciled by reference to “the parties’ purpose in rendering 

adjudicator decisions final” to enforce the facilitator’s correct 

tracking of claims, which entailed no review of any final 

adjudicator or arbitrator decision. Id. at 515. No such 

contradiction exists here. The District Court’s jurisdiction is 

drawn exceedingly narrowly, and, as relevant here, exists only 

as to matters concerning the distribution of the settlement 

fund. There is no explicit and direct conflict between such 

matters and claim determinations. Funds are distributed only

after claim determinations have been made, and that 

distribution is therefore separate from the claim determination 

process. 

Accordingly, LaBatte cannot establish ancillary 

jurisdiction under Kokkonen’s second prong. 

C.

None of LaBatte’s remaining arguments is persuasive. 

LaBatte claims that the District Court erred because it was 

required to determine whether the USDA breached the 

Agreement before it determined whether it had ancillary 

jurisdiction. However, LaBatte did not raise this argument 

below, and therefore it is forfeited. See Benoit v. USDA, 608 

F.3d 17, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 

LaBatte also claims that the Government’s interference 

with LaBatte’s declarations constitutes spoliation. The 

District Court refused to consider the argument below because 

LaBatte “never explained how these allegations, if true, create 

jurisdiction.” Memorandum Order at 11, Keepseagle v. 

Vilsack, No. 99-CV-3119 (D.D.C. 2014), ECF No. 692, J.A. 

243. On appeal, LaBatte makes the same mistake. He never 
15

explains how his spoliation argument is at all relevant to the 

Court’s jurisdiction. It is axiomatic that a court must have 

jurisdiction before it can hear any argument on the merits. 

See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-

95, 101-02 (1998). 

***

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 

judgment.

So ordered.