alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**Exhibit32.1**

 

**CERTIFICATION**

** **

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofMovie Gallery, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form l0-Q for the period endedApril 4, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on thedate hereof (the “Report”), I, J. T. Malugen, Chief Executive Officer of theCompany, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant toSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

 

##### **(1)**                                  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

##### ** **

##### **(2)**                                  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial condition and results of operations of theCompany.

 

 
| Date:  May 14, 2004     |
|------------------------------|
|                         |
|                         |
| /s/ J. T. Malugen            |   |
| Name: J. T. Malugen          |
| Its: Chief Executive Officer |

 

 

 

A signed original of this written statementrequired by Section 906 has been provided to Movie Gallery, Inc. and will beretained by Movie Gallery, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and ExchangeCommission or its staff upon request.

 

----
EXHIBIT 31.2 CERTIFICATION  I,  Melissa Schessler as Secretary and Treasurer (CFO),  certify  that:  1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB (Amendment #1) of Meltdown Massage and Body Works, Inc.; 2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report; 4. The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the small business issuer and have:  (a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by       others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; (b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and (c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the small business issuer's most recent fiscal quarter (the small business issuer's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report)that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's internal control financial reporting;  5. The small business issuer's other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit committee of small business issuer's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function):  (a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and (b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's internal control over financial reporting.  Date: September 12, 2008 By:/s/ Melissa Schessler Melissa Schessler, Secretary and Treasurer (CFO)
#### Milt H. Allen, Appellee, v. Mary Toucheo, Appellant.

APPEAL AND ERROR: Extent of Review of Order Refusing to Open Default. Refusal of the court to set aside a default judgment on the ground of no service will not be disturbed by the appellate court on a record revealing an irreconcilable conflict of testimony.

*Appeal from Des Moines Municipal Court.*— O. S. Franklin, Judge.

May *4,*1920.

Appellant moved to set aside a default judgment, entered against ber on the ground that she had not been legally served with notice. This is an appeal from the overruling of that *motion.*

Affirmed.

*Jordan & Jordan,*for appellant.

*Milt II. Allen,*for appellee.

Salinger, J.

I. The main point made for the appellant is that the court erred in the exercise of and abused its discretion in refusing to set the default judgment aside. On whether there was due service there is a flat conflict. The return of the sheriff asserts that substituted service was made at the usual place of residence of this appellant. The officer who made the service supports the truth of the return by his testimony. On the other hand, there is testimony that the service was made at a place other than said usual residence. We bold that the court did not abuse its discretion, and that we cannot interfere with its having believed the return and the testimony supporting the same, and, therefore, cannot disturb its resulting action in refusing to set the default judgment aside. See *Pyle v. Stone,*185 Iowa 785; *McWilliams v. Robertson,*180 Iowa 281.

*1176II. There is a complaint of the reception of certain testimony. It may not be denied that it presents a serious question, if the record leaves us at liberty to pass upon this complaint. We are constrained to hold that we cannot consider it. Much of it was received without any objection. In several instances, no ruling was had on objections made, and no ruling was demanded. In the instances where objections were overruled, no exception was taken. We cannot entertain the assignment.

Of necessity, this conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider various practice points urged by the appellee.

We are, however, of opinion that the motion of appel-lee, demanding an assessment of a penalty under Section 4141 of the Code, on the ground that the appeal was friv-, olous and taken for delay, is without *merit.*— Affirmed.

Wbavbe, C. J., Evans and Preston, JJ., concur.
P.1 

OAR Box 1147 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

134) IV-E-7 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 4/22/2008 2:42:55 PM Sheet 134 of 242 
P.2 

lay 

A-S7-XX 

3£--^ ~° 7 

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

ANN ARBOR. MICHIGAN 48105 

OFFICE OF 

AIR AND RADIATION 

SEP I 4 1987 

MEMORANDUM 

SUBJECT: 

FROM: 

TO: 

THRU: 

Meeting with 3M concerning Bladder Tanks b 

Charles L. Gray, Jr., Director 

Emission Control Technology Division --

Glenn Passavant, Senior Project Manager C&J&**\ lA*

i

*

raAi 

Standards Development and Support Branch 

Chester J. France, Chie 

Standards Development a 

A meeting concerning bladder tanks was 

and 3M at MVEL on June 18, 1987. Present at 

Ed Davis and Jim Balzer from 3M, and Glenn 

Steilen and Jean Schwendeman from EPA. 

cooperative R&D program, 3M is working together 

domestic automobile producer in the development 

bladder tanks, 

and perspective 

control proposal 

held between EPA 

the meeting were 

Passavant, Kathy 

As part of a 

with a major 

of prototype 

3M was interested in discussing EPA's interest 

on bladder tanks and the onboard refueling 

3M described preliminary aspects of the prototype tank 

design and the automobile producer's tentative future plans for 

emission testing and fleet installation. Since the program is 

in the developmental stages, 3M suggested that we contact the 

automobile producer to discuss their program further. 

cc: Public Docket A-87-11
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. WR-24,047-14

EX PARTE JUAN JORGE SANCHEZ, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 1990CR0627-W13 IN THE 227TH DISTRICT COURT

FROM BEXAR COUNTY

Per curiam.

O R D E R

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of murder and

sentenced to ninety-nine years’ imprisonment.

In his present application, Applicant alleges the evidence is factually insufficient to support

his conviction. This application, however, presents a more serious question. This Court’s records

reflect that Applicant has filed twelve prior applications pertaining to this conviction. It is obvious

from the record that Applicant continues to raise issues that have been presented and rejected in
2

previous applications or that should have been presented in previous applications. The writ of

habeas corpus is not to be lightly or easily abused. Sanders v. U.S., 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Ex parte

Carr, 511 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). Because of his repetitive claims, we hold that

Applicant’s claims are barred from review under Article 11.07, § 4, and are waived and abandoned

by his abuse of the writ. This application is dismissed.

Therefore, we instruct the Honorable Abel Acosta, Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals,

not to accept or file the instant application for a writ of habeas corpus, or any future application

pertaining to this conviction unless Applicant is able to show in such an application that any claims

presented have not been raised previously and that they could not have been presented in a previous

application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte Bilton, 602 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).

Copies of this order shall be sent to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Correctional

Institutions Division and Pardons and Paroles Division.

Filed: July 27, 2016

Do not publish
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

January 16, 2019

No. 04-18-00913-CR

Tam-Monta Lamont Eugene HASTINGS,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 399th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2018CR8107

Honorable Frank J. Castro, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

Because the trial court’s certification in this appeal states that “this criminal case is a 

plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO right of appeal”, we ordered appellant to file an 

amended trial court certification showing appellant has the right of appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P.

25.2(d); 37.1; see also Daniels v. State, 110 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, order). 

We warned that if appellant did not do so, we would dismiss the appeal; we further suspended all

appellate deadlines pending further court order.

On January 11, 2019, appellant filed a “Motion to Extend Time to File Appellant’s 

Response to the Court’s December 14, 2018 Show Cause Order.” Counsel states he needs to 

review the September 28, 2018 sentencing hearing before he can make a final determination as to 

the basis, if any, for an amended certification. We GRANT appellant’s motion. In doing so, we 

ORDER court reporter Ms. Jessica C. Butts to file the reporter’s record of the September 28, 

2018 sentencing hearing no later than January 28, 2019. Appellant’s response to the December 

14, 2018 show cause order is due 10 days from the date the reporter’s record referenced above is 

filed.

_________________________________

Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 16th day of January, 2019.

___________________________________

KEITH E. HOTTLE,

Clerk of Court
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT  4.1


NUMBER                                                      CLASS A COMMON UNITS

EEP


THIS CERTIFICATE IS REGISTERED
IN NEW JERSEY AND NEW YORK

SEE REVERSE FOR CERTAIN DEFINITIONS                                     ENBRIDGE
                                                               CUSIP 29250R 10 6

                         ENBRIDGE ENERGY PARTNERS, L.P.
                  CERTIFICATE EVIDENCING CLASS A COMMON UNITS
             REPRESENTING CLASS A COMMON LIMITED PARTNER INTERESTS


THIS CERTIFIES THAT



IS THE REGISTERED HOLDER OF                                CLASS A COMMON UNITS,


representing Class A common limited partner interests in Enbridge Energy
Partners, L.P., a limited partnership formed under the laws of the State of
Delaware (the "Partnership"), transferable on the books of the Partnership, in
person or by duly authorized attorney, upon surrender of this Certificate
properly endorsed and accompanied by a properly executed application for
transfer of the Class A Common Units represented by the Certificate. This
Certificate and the Class A Common Units represented hereby are issued and shall
in all respects be subject to all of the provisions of the Agreement of Limited
Partnership of the Partnership, as amended or restated from time to time, to all
of which the holder, by acceptance hereof, assents, and to the additional terms
and provisions on the reverse side hereof.


Witness the facsimile signatures of the duly authorized officers of the General
Partner of the Partnership.


                                            Enbridge Energy Company, Inc.


Dated:

Countersigned and Registered;
Mellon Investor Services LLC
Transfer Agent and Registrar
By

                                     (SEAL)

                              By /s/ S. MARK CURWIN        By /s/ DAN C. TUTCHER


                              S. Mark Curwin               Dan C. Tutcher
Authorized Signature          Corporate Secretary          President


FURTHER CONDITIONS AND AGREEMENTS FORMING PART OF
THIS CERTIFICATE APPEAR ON THE REVERSE SIDE.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      EXHIBIT 4D


                          PURCHASE PAYMENT ACCUMULATION
                       OPTIONAL DEATH BENEFIT ENDORSEMENT

This Endorsement is made a part of, and subject to, the other terms and
conditions of the Contract to which it is attached.

This Endorsement modifies the AMOUNT OF DEATH BENEFIT under the DEATH OF OWNER
BEFORE THE ANNUITY DATE in the Contract.

PURCHASE PAYMENT ACCUMULATION OPTIONAL DEATH BENEFIT CHARGE On an annualized
basis, this charge equals [0.20%] of Your average daily ending value of the
assets attributable to the Accumulation Units of the Subaccount(s) to which the
Contract is allocated. We deduct this charge daily. This charge is in addition
to the charges in Your Contract.

PURCHASE PAYMENT ACCUMULATION OPTIONAL DEATH BENEFIT As of the date We receive
Your Due Proof of Death, the Death Benefit will be the greatest of:

(a)  The Contract Value; or

(b)  Purchase Payment(s) reduced for any partial withdrawals (and any charges
     applicable to such withdrawals), in the same proportion that the Contract
     Value was reduced on the date of such withdrawal, compounded at [4%]
     interest to date of death, plus any Purchase Payment(s) recorded after the
     date of death; and reduced for any partial withdrawals (and any charges
     applicable to such withdrawals) in the same proportion that the Contract
     Value was reduced on the date of such withdrawal recorded after the date of
     Death; or

(c)  The Contract Value at the seventh Contract anniversary, plus any subsequent
     Purchase Payments, reduced for any subsequent withdrawals (and any charges
     applicable to such withdrawals) in the same proportion that the Contract
     Value was reduced on the date of such withdrawal, compounded until the date
     of death at [4%] interest, plus any Purchase Payments recorded after the
     date of death; and reduced for any withdrawals (and any charges applicable
     to such withdrawals) in the same proportion that the Contract Value was
     reduced on the date of such withdrawal recorded after date of death.

If the Owner was age 70 or older on the Contract Date, both (b) and (c) above
will be compounded at 3%, rather than 4%. If the death benefit is paid on the
death of an Owner who was not originally named in the application and was age 70
or older on the Contract Date, both (b) and (c) above will be compounded at 3%,
rather than 4%.

Once elected, this Purchase Payment Accumulation Optional Death Benefit cannot
be changed or terminated.

Signed for the Company to be effective on the Contract Date.



ANCHOR NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY




      /s/ CHRISTINE A. NIXON                     /s/ JAY S. WINTROB
    ----------------------------              -----------------------------
        Christine A. Nixon                           Jay S. Wintrob
            Secretary                                   President
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 495 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 495

      To amend the Clean Air Act to repeal the highway sanctions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             March 2, 1999

  Mr. Bond (for himself, Mr. Ashcroft, and Mr. Inhofe) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                      Environment and Public Works

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
      To amend the Clean Air Act to repeal the highway sanctions.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. REPEAL OF HIGHWAY SANCTIONS IN CLEAN AIR ACT.

    (a) In General.--Section 179 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7509) 
is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in the first sentence, by striking ``one of the 
                sanctions'' and all that follows and inserting the 
                following: ``the sanctions described in subsection (b) 
                shall apply until the Administrator determines that the 
                State has come into compliance.''; and
                    (B) by striking the second sentence; and
            (2) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) by striking ``are as follows:'' and all that 
                follows through ``(2) Offsets.--In applying'' and 
                inserting ``are to apply'';
                    (B) by striking ``part D, the'' and inserting 
                ``part D such that the''; and
                    (C) by striking ``shall be'' and inserting ``is''.
    (b) Conforming Amendments.--
            (1) Section 110(m) of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7410(m)) 
        is amended in the first sentence by striking ``any of''.
            (2) Section 502 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7661a) is 
        amended--
                    (A) in subsection (d)(2)--
                            (i) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``any 
                        of''; and
                            (ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking 
                        ``section 179(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 
                        179(b)''; and
                    (B) in subsection (i)--
                            (i) in paragraph (1), by striking ``any 
                        of''; and
                            (ii) in paragraph (3), by striking 
                        ``section 179(b)(2)'' and inserting ``section 
                        179(b)''.
                                 <all>
```
#### DAVID SWINDALL, *by his next friend,*WILLIAM *J.*McNEILL, *v.*WILLIAM BRADLEY.

Where the owner of a life interest in slaves, a demoralised and needy man, who had made a sale of all his property, enquired of a person whether he could be subjected, criminally, if he removed the slaves out of the State, ■and intimated to another, after a suit was brought, that if he could get the slaves in his possession, the remainderman should never receive any benefit from them, it was *Jield*a proper case for a writ of sequestration.

Appeal from an order made by EeeNCh, Judge, at the Fall Term, 1860, of the Court of Equity of Bladen county.

The cause having been set for hearing, was heard below upon the bill, answer and proofs, filed by both parties, and it was ordered that the sequestration, which had theretofore issued, should be dissolved, from which order,'the plaintiff appealed to this Court.

The facts of the case, upon which the decision is mainly founded, are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the Court.

*JLeitch,*for the plaintiff.

*JFowle,*and *O. G.*Wriylvt, for the defendant.

MaNly, J.

Any doubt as to the merits of this case, as it was presented by the bill and answer alone, has been entirely dissipated by the proofs subsequently taken. The case is a strong one, for the interposition of a court of equity to protect the minor, who is entitled in remainder.

It seems that complainant is a son by a former husband of Mary Bradley, wife of the defendant; that defendant has separated himself from his wife, and has another woman living with him ; that he has sold all the property, acquired by his marriage, except the slaves in question, and has no property besides ; that he consulted with H. H. Robinson sometime before the suit, whether he (defendant) would incur any *crim/mal*responsibility, if he sold them, and that he has intimated since the suit was instituted against him, in indirect, but intelligible terms, that if he could again get possession of *42them, he would put them beyond the reach of the claimant.

These leading facts, now developed in the case, convince us, that,the danger to the property, in the hands of the defendant, would be imminent, and that it is highly expedient and necessary, the person in remainder should be protected by the writs heretofore gi’anted in the cause.

The testimony from one witness (Bobinson) is, alone, conclusive of the case. Erom his testimony, it appears the defendant deliberately meditated a conversion of the slaves out and out, to his own use, and was making the plan turn in his mind, upon the point, whether it involved any *criminal*responsibility. A person who could entertain such thoughts, requires, in the opinion of this Court, other restraints than those of a moral nature. u

This is especially so, when such person is found under demoralizing and necessitous circumstances.

Therefore, the decree of the Court below, dissolving the sequestration in the cause, should be reversed, and a decree, in conformity with this opinion, to continue the sequestration.

Pee CueiaM, Decree accordingly.
Exhibit 32.2


                                 CERTIFICATION

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Movie Gallery, Inc. (the "Company")
on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 3, 2005, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Timothy R. Price,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my
knowledge:

(1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as
of and for the periods covered in the report.


Date:   August 12, 2005


/s/  Timothy R. Price
-----------------------------------
Name: Timothy R. Price
Its:  Chief Financial Officer