# Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali C 236/2016

| | ISSN 1977-0987 |
| --- | --- |
| Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali
  tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236 |
| | |
| Edizzjoni bil-Malti | Informazzjoni u Avviżi | Volum 5930 ta' Ġunju 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0987

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali

tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236

Edizzjoni bil-Malti

Informazzjoni u Avviżi

Volum 5930 ta' Ġunju 2016

---

| Avviż Nru | Werrej | Paġna |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Komunikazzjonijiet |
| | KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2016/C 236/01 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/02 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/03 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2016/C 236/04 | Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Avviż Nru

Werrej

Paġna

II   Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2016/C 236/01

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/02

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/03

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  )

1

2

2016/C 236/04

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata (Il-Każ M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest) (
  1
  )

1

2

---

| | IV   Informazzjoni |
| --- | --- |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2016/C 236/05 | Rata tal-kambju tal-euro | 3 |
| 2016/C 236/06 | Wiċċ nazzjonali ġdid ta’ muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni | 4 |
| | Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri |
| 2016/C 236/07 | Rapport Speċjali Nru 14/2016 — Inizjattivi ta’ politika u appoġġ finanzjarju tal-UE għall-integrazzjoni tar-Rom: sar progress sinifikanti fl-aħħar għaxar snin, iżda sforzi addizzjonali huma meħtieġa fil-prattika | 5 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI |
| 2016/C 236/08 | Aġġornament tal-lista ta’ postijiet ta’ qsim il-fruntiera msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar- Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen) | 6 |
| 2016/C 236/09 | Aġġornament tal-karti mudell maħruġa mill-Ministeri tal-Affarijiet Barranin tal-Istati Membri lil membri akkreditati ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi u rappreżentanzi diplomatiċi u l-membri tal-familja tagħhom, skond l-Artikolu 20(2) tar-Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta' persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta' Schengen) | 11 |
| | INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA |
| | Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA |
| 2016/C 236/10 | Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat | 21 |
| 2016/C 236/11 | Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lil Hurtigruten ASA skont il-Ftehim dwar il-Kosta għas-Servizz Marittimu ta’ Hurtigruten mill-2012 sal-2019 | 29 |
| 2016/C 236/12 | Tħabbira min-Norveġja dwar id-Direttiva 94/22/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar il-kundizzjonijiet għall-għoti u l-użu ta’ awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-ipprospettar, l-esplorazzjoni u l-produzzjoni ta’ idrokarburi — Tħabbira ta’ stedina għall-applikazzjoni ta’ liċenzji għall-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża (BKN) — Għotjiet f’Żoni Predefiniti 2016 | 45 |

IV   Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2016/C 236/05

Rata tal-kambju tal-euro

3

2016/C 236/06

Wiċċ nazzjonali ġdid ta’ muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni

4

Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri

2016/C 236/07

Rapport Speċjali Nru 14/2016 — Inizjattivi ta’ politika u appoġġ finanzjarju tal-UE għall-integrazzjoni tar-Rom: sar progress sinifikanti fl-aħħar għaxar snin, iżda sforzi addizzjonali huma meħtieġa fil-prattika

5

INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI

2016/C 236/08

Aġġornament tal-lista ta’ postijiet ta’ qsim il-fruntiera msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar- Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen)

6

2016/C 236/09

Aġġornament tal-karti mudell maħruġa mill-Ministeri tal-Affarijiet Barranin tal-Istati Membri lil membri akkreditati ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi u rappreżentanzi diplomatiċi u l-membri tal-familja tagħhom, skond l-Artikolu 20(2) tar-Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta' persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta' Schengen)

11

INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

2016/C 236/10

Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat

21

2016/C 236/11

Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lil Hurtigruten ASA skont il-Ftehim dwar il-Kosta għas-Servizz Marittimu ta’ Hurtigruten mill-2012 sal-2019

29

2016/C 236/12

Tħabbira min-Norveġja dwar id-Direttiva 94/22/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar il-kundizzjonijiet għall-għoti u l-użu ta’ awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-ipprospettar, l-esplorazzjoni u l-produzzjoni ta’ idrokarburi — Tħabbira ta’ stedina għall-applikazzjoni ta’ liċenzji għall-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża (BKN) — Għotjiet f’Żoni Predefiniti 2016

45

---

| | V   Avviżi |
| --- | --- |
| | PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2016/C 236/13 | Sejħa għall-proposti f’konformità mal-programm ta’ ħidma multiannwali għall-għoti ta’ għajnuna finanzjarja fil-qasam tal-infrastruttura trans-Ewropea tal-enerġija fil-kuntest tal-Faċilità Nikkollegaw l-Ewropa għall-perjodu 2014-2020 (Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni (C(2016)1587)) | 47 |
| | PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI |
| | Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea |
| 2016/C 236/14 | Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-Każ M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata (
  1
  ) | 48 |

V   Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2016/C 236/13

Sejħa għall-proposti f’konformità mal-programm ta’ ħidma multiannwali għall-għoti ta’ għajnuna finanzjarja fil-qasam tal-infrastruttura trans-Ewropea tal-enerġija fil-kuntest tal-Faċilità Nikkollegaw l-Ewropa għall-perjodu 2014-2020 (Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni (C(2016)1587))

47

PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

2016/C 236/14

Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni (Il-Każ M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International) — Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata (
  1
  )

1

48

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE |

---

(1)   Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE

1

| MT | |
| --- | --- |

MT

---

II Komunikazzjonijiet

KOMUNIKAZZJONIJIET MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/1

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.8039 — Freudenberg/Vibracoustic)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2016/C 236/01)

Fit-22 ta’ Ġunju 2016, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8039. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-Internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8039. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-Internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/1

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.8049 — TPG Capital/Partners Group/TH Real Estate Portfolio)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2016/C 236/02)

Fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2016, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8049. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8049. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/2

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.8041 — M&G/Anchorage/PHS Group Investment)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2016/C 236/03)

Fit-23 ta’ Ġunju 2016, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8041. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8041. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/2

---

Ebda oppożizzjoni għal konċentrazzjoni notifikata

(Il-Każ M.8054 — 3i Group/Deutsche Alternative Asset Management/TCR Capvest)

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2016/C 236/04)

Fl-24 ta’ Ġunju 2016, il-Kummissjoni ddeċidiet li ma topponix il-konċentrazzjoni notifikata msemmija hawn fuq u li tiddikjaraha kompatibbli mas-suq intern. Din id-deċiżjoni hi bbażata fuq l-Artikolu 6(1)(b) tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1). It-test sħiħ tad-deċiżjoni hu disponibbli biss fl-Ingliż u ser isir pubbliku wara li jitneħħa kwalunkwe sigriet tan-negozju li jista’ jkun fih. Dan it-test jinstab:

| — | fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali, |
| --- | --- |

—

fit-taqsima tal-amalgamazzjoni tal-websajt tal-Kummissjoni dwar il-Kompetizzjoni (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Din il-websajt tipprovdi diversi faċilitajiet li jgħinu sabiex jinstabu d-deċiżjonijiet individwali ta’ amalgamazzjoni, inklużi l-kumpanija, in-numru tal-każ, id-data u l-indiċi settorjali,

| — | f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8054. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea. |
| --- | --- |

—

f’forma elettronika fil-websajt EUR-Lex (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=mt) fid-dokument li jġib in-numru 32016M8054. Il-EUR-Lex hu l-aċċess fuq l-internet għal-liġi Ewropea.

---

(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1.

---

IV Informazzjoni

INFORMAZZJONI MINN ISTITUZZJONIJIET, KORPI, UFFIĊĊJI U AĠENZIJI TAL-UNJONI EWROPEA

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/3

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Rata tal-kambju tal-euro (1)

Id-29 ta’ Ġunju 2016

(2016/C 236/05)

1 euro =

| | Munita | Rata tal-kambju |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | Dollaru Amerikan | 1,1090 |
| JPY | Yen Ġappuniż | 113,85 |
| DKK | Krona Daniża | 7,4376 |
| GBP | Lira Sterlina | 0,82550 |
| SEK | Krona Żvediża | 9,4311 |
| CHF | Frank Żvizzeru | 1,0854 |
| ISK | Krona Iżlandiża | |
| NOK | Krona Norveġiża | 9,3065 |
| BGN | Lev Bulgaru | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Krona Ċeka | 27,114 |
| HUF | Forint Ungeriż | 316,95 |
| PLN | Zloty Pollakk | 4,4261 |
| RON | Leu Rumen | 4,5253 |
| TRY | Lira Turka | 3,2157 |
| AUD | Dollaru Awstraljan | 1,4911 |
| CAD | Dollaru Kanadiż | 1,4407 |
| HKD | Dollaru ta' Hong Kong | 8,6041 |
| NZD | Dollaru tan-New Zealand | 1,5565 |
| SGD | Dollaru tas-Singapor | 1,4951 |
| KRW | Won tal-Korea t'Isfel | 1 283,15 |
| ZAR | Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel | 16,6016 |
| CNY | Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż | 7,3680 |
| HRK | Kuna Kroata | 7,5273 |
| IDR | Rupiah Indoneżjan | 14 577,25 |
| MYR | Ringgit Malażjan | 4,4594 |
| PHP | Peso Filippin | 52,106 |
| RUB | Rouble Russu | 71,0452 |
| THB | Baht Tajlandiż | 39,028 |
| BRL | Real Brażiljan | 3,6216 |
| MXN | Peso Messikan | 20,7331 |
| INR | Rupi Indjan | 74,9693 |

Munita

Rata tal-kambju

USD

Dollaru Amerikan

1,1090

JPY

Yen Ġappuniż

113,85

DKK

Krona Daniża

7,4376

GBP

Lira Sterlina

0,82550

SEK

Krona Żvediża

9,4311

CHF

Frank Żvizzeru

1,0854

ISK

Krona Iżlandiża

NOK

Krona Norveġiża

9,3065

BGN

Lev Bulgaru

1,9558

CZK

Krona Ċeka

27,114

HUF

Forint Ungeriż

316,95

PLN

Zloty Pollakk

4,4261

RON

Leu Rumen

4,5253

TRY

Lira Turka

3,2157

AUD

Dollaru Awstraljan

1,4911

CAD

Dollaru Kanadiż

1,4407

HKD

Dollaru ta' Hong Kong

8,6041

NZD

Dollaru tan-New Zealand

1,5565

SGD

Dollaru tas-Singapor

1,4951

KRW

Won tal-Korea t'Isfel

1 283,15

ZAR

Rand ta' l-Afrika t'Isfel

16,6016

CNY

Yuan ren-min-bi Ċiniż

7,3680

HRK

Kuna Kroata

7,5273

IDR

Rupiah Indoneżjan

14 577,25

MYR

Ringgit Malażjan

4,4594

PHP

Peso Filippin

52,106

RUB

Rouble Russu

71,0452

THB

Baht Tajlandiż

39,028

BRL

Real Brażiljan

3,6216

MXN

Peso Messikan

20,7331

INR

Rupi Indjan

74,9693

---

(1)  Sors: rata tal-kambju ta' referenza ppubblikata mill-Bank Ċentrali Ewropew.

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| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/4

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Wiċċ nazzjonali ġdid ta’ muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni

(2016/C 236/06)

Il-muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni għandhom status ta’ valuta legali fiż-żona kollha tal-euro. Sabiex tinforma lill-pubbliku u l-partijiet kollha kkonċernati li jużaw il-muniti, il-Kummissjoni tippubblika deskrizzjoni tad-disinji tal-muniti l-ġodda kollha (1). Skont il-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tal-10 ta’ Frar 2009 (2), l-Istati Membri taż-żona tal-euro u l-pajjiżi li kkonkludew ftehim monetarju mal-Unjoni Ewropea li jistipula l-ħruġ ta’ muniti tal-euro huma awtorizzati li joħorġu muniti kommemorattivi tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni kemm-il darba jintlaħqu ċerti kundizzjonijiet, b’mod partikolari li jintużaw muniti taż-EUR 2 biss. Dawn il-muniti għandhom l-istess karatteristiċi tekniċi bħall-muniti l-oħra ta’ EUR 2, iżda l-wiċċ nazzjonali tagħhom ikun fih disinn kommemorattiv li jkun tassew simboliku f’termini nazzjonali jew Ewropej.

Il-pajjiż tal-ħruġ
  : Spanja

Is-suġġett tal-kommemorazzjoni
  : Is-Siti ta’ Wirt Kulturali u Naturali Dinji tal-Unesco – il-Knejjes tar-Renju tal-Asturias

Deskrizzjoni tad-disinn
  : Id-disinn juri fuq quddiem il-Knisja ta’ Santa Maria del Naranco. Fin-naħa ta’ fuq taċ-ċirku ta’ ġewwa miktub għad-dawra hemm l-isem tal-pajjiż li qed joħroġ il-munita “ESPAÑA” u fuq il-lemin hemm is-sena tal-ħruġ “2017”. Fuq ix-xellug taċ-ċirku intern hemm il-marka taz-zekka.

Iċ-ċirku ta’ barra tal-munita juri t-12-il stilla tal-bandiera Ewropea.

L-għadd ta’ muniti li għandhom jinħarġu
  : 4 miljun

Data tal-ħruġ
  : l-1 ta’ Frar 2017

---

(1)  Ara ĠU C 373, 28.12.2001, p. 1 għall-uċuħ nazzjonali tal-muniti kollha li nħarġu fl-2002.

(2)  Ara l-konklużjonijiet tal-Kunsill tal-Affarijiet Ekonomiċi u Finanzjarji tal-10 ta’ Frar 2009 u r-Rakkomandazzjoni tal-Kummissjoni tad-19 ta’ Diċembru 2008 dwar linji gwida komuni għall-uċuħ nazzjonali u l-ħruġ ta’ muniti tal-euro maħsuba għaċ-ċirkolazzjoni (ĠU L 9, 14.1.2009, p. 52).

---

Il-Qorti tal-Awdituri

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/5 |
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30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/5

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Rapport Speċjali Nru 14/2016

“Inizjattivi ta’ politika u appoġġ finanzjarju tal-UE għall-integrazzjoni tar-Rom: sar progress sinifikanti fl-aħħar għaxar snin, iżda sforzi addizzjonali huma meħtieġa fil-prattika”

(2016/C 236/07)

Il-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri b’dan tinfurmak li r-Rapport Speċjali Nru 14/2016 “Inizjattivi ta’ politika u appoġġ finanzjarju tal-UE għall-integrazzjoni tar-Rom: sar progress sinifikanti fl-aħħar 10 snin, iżda sforzi addizzjonali huma meħtieġa fil-prattika” għadu kif ġie ppubblikat.

Ir-rapport jista’ jiġi kkonsultat jew imniżżel mis-sit web tal-Qorti Ewropea tal-Awdituri: http://eca.europa.eu jew mill-EU Bookshop: https://bookshop.europa.eu

---

INFORMAZZJONI MILL-ISTATI MEMBRI

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/6

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Aġġornament tal-lista ta’ postijiet ta’ qsim il-fruntiera msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar- Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen) (1)

(2016/C 236/08)

Il-pubblikazzjoni tal-lista ta’ postijiet ta’ qsim il-fruntiera msemmija fl-Artikolu 2(8) tar- Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta’ Marzu 2016 li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta’ persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Il-Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen) hija bbażata fuq l-informazzjoni mogħtija mill-Istati Membri lill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 39 tal-Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta’ Schengen.

Minbarra l-pubblikazzjoni fil-ĠU, huwa disponibbli aġġornament ta’ kull xahar fuq is-sit web tad-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Affarijiet Interni.

FRANZA

Emenda fl-informazzjoni ppubblikata fil-ĠU C 229, 14.7.2015

LISTA TA’ PUNTI TA’ QSIM BEJN IL-FRUNTIERI

Fruntieri tal-Ajru

| (1) | Abbeville |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Abbeville

| (2) | Agen-la Garenne |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Agen-la Garenne

| (3) | Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro

| (4) | Albert-Bray |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Albert-Bray

| (5) | Amiens-Glisy |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Amiens-Glisy

| (6) | Angers-Marcé |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Angers-Marcé

| (7) | Angoulême-Brie-Champniers |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Angoulême-Brie-Champniers

| (8) | Annecy-Methet |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Annecy-Methet

| (9) | Annemasse |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Annemasse

| (10) | Auxerre-Branches |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Auxerre-Branches

| (11) | Avignon-Caumont |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Avignon-Caumont

| (12) | Bâle-Mulhouse |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Bâle-Mulhouse

| (13) | Bastia-Poretta |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Bastia-Poretta

| (14) | Beauvais-Tillé |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Beauvais-Tillé

| (15) | Bergerac-Roumanière |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Bergerac-Roumanière

| (16) | Besançon-la Vèze |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Besançon-la Vèze

| (17) | Béziers-Vias |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Béziers-Vias

| (18) | Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet

| (19) | Bordeaux-Mérignac |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Bordeaux-Mérignac

| (20) | Brest-Guipavas |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Brest-Guipavas

| (21) | Brive-Souillac |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Brive-Souillac

| (22) | Caen-Carpiquet |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Caen-Carpiquet

| (23) | Calais-Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Calais-Dunkerque

| (24) | Calvi-Sainte-Catherine |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Calvi-Sainte-Catherine

| (25) | Cannes-Mandelieu |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Cannes-Mandelieu

| (26) | Carcassonne-Salvaza |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Carcassonne-Salvaza

| (27) | Châlons-Vatry |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Châlons-Vatry

| (28) | Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains

| (29) | Châteauroux-Déols |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Châteauroux-Déols

| (30) | Cherbourg-Mauperthus |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Cherbourg-Mauperthus

| (31) | Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat

| (32) | Colmar-Houssen |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Colmar-Houssen

| (33) | Deauville-Saint-Gatien |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Deauville-Saint-Gatien

| (34) | Dijon-Longvic |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Dijon-Longvic

| (35) | Dinard-Pleurtuit |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Dinard-Pleurtuit

| (36) | Dôle-Tavaux |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Dôle-Tavaux

| (37) | Epinal-Mirecourt |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Epinal-Mirecourt

| (38) | Figari-Sud Corse |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Figari-Sud Corse

| (39) | Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs

| (40) | Hyères-le Palivestre |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Hyères-le Palivestre

| (41) | Issy-les-Moulineaux |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Issy-les-Moulineaux

| (42) | La Môle |
| --- | --- |

(42)

La Môle

| (43) | Lannion |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Lannion

| (44) | La Rochelle-Laleu |
| --- | --- |

(44)

La Rochelle-Laleu

| (45) | Laval-Entrammes |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Laval-Entrammes

| (46) | Le Castelet |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Le Castelet

| (47) | Le Havre-Octeville |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Le Havre-Octeville

| (48) | Le Mans-Arnage |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Le Mans-Arnage

| (49) | Le Touquet-Paris-Plage |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Le Touquet-Paris-Plage

| (50) | Lille-Lesquin |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Lille-Lesquin

| (51) | Limoges-Bellegarde |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Limoges-Bellegarde

| (52) | Lognes-Emerainville |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Lognes-Emerainville

| (53) | Lorient-Lann-Bihoué |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Lorient-Lann-Bihoué

| (54) | Lyon-Bron |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Lyon-Bron

| (55) | Lyon-Saint-Exupéry |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Lyon-Saint-Exupéry

| (56) | Marseille-Provence |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Marseille-Provence

| (57) | Metz-Nancy-Lorraine |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Metz-Nancy-Lorraine

| (58) | Monaco-Héliport |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Monaco-Héliport

| (59) | Montbéliard-Courcelles |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Montbéliard-Courcelles

| (60) | Montpellier-Méditérranée |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Montpellier-Méditérranée

| (61) | Nantes-Atlantique |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Nantes-Atlantique

| (62) | Nevers-Fourchambault |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Nevers-Fourchambault

| (63) | Nice-Côte d’Azur |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Nice-Côte d’Azur

| (64) | Nîmes-Garons |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Nîmes-Garons

| (65) | Orléans-Bricy |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Orléans-Bricy

| (66) | Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel

| (67) | Paris-Charles de Gaulle |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Paris-Charles de Gaulle

| (68) | Paris-le Bourget |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Paris-le Bourget

| (69) | Paris-Orly |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Paris-Orly

| (70) | Pau-Pyrénées |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Pau-Pyrénées

| (71) | Perpignan-Rivesaltes |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Perpignan-Rivesaltes

| (72) | Poitiers-Biard |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Poitiers-Biard

| (73) | Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, temporanjament:






  — | Mill-Erbgħa 10 sal-Ħadd 14 ta’ Ġunju 2015 mill-10.00 sat-15.30.
  Dan il-ftuħ temporanju se jseħħ matul l-eżibizzjoni internazzjonali tal-Ajronawtica u tal-ispażju ta’ Le Bourget, li jimponi tnaqqis ta’ titjiriet li mhumiex fix-Schengen lejn l-ajrudrom ta’ Pontoise. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(73)

Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, temporanjament:

—

Mill-Erbgħa 10 sal-Ħadd 14 ta’ Ġunju 2015 mill-10.00 sat-15.30.

Dan il-ftuħ temporanju se jseħħ matul l-eżibizzjoni internazzjonali tal-Ajronawtica u tal-ispażju ta’ Le Bourget, li jimponi tnaqqis ta’ titjiriet li mhumiex fix-Schengen lejn l-ajrudrom ta’ Pontoise.

| — | Mit-Tnejn 15 sal-Ħadd 21 ta’ Ġunju 2015 mis-6.00 sal-16.30.
  Dan il-ftuħ temporanju jieħu effett għal perjodu li matulu titwaqqaf rotta staġonali (mhux ta’ Schengen)(Quimper-Londres). |
| --- | --- |

—

Mit-Tnejn 15 sal-Ħadd 21 ta’ Ġunju 2015 mis-6.00 sal-16.30.

Dan il-ftuħ temporanju jieħu effett għal perjodu li matulu titwaqqaf rotta staġonali (mhux ta’ Schengen)(Quimper-Londres).

| (74) | Quimper-Cornouailles, temporanjament mid-19 ta’ Mejju sal-4 ta’ Settembru 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Quimper-Cornouailles, temporanjament mid-19 ta’ Mejju sal-4 ta’ Settembru 2016.

| (75) | Rennes Saint-Jacques |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Rennes Saint-Jacques

| (76) | Rodez-Marcillac |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Rodez-Marcillac

| (77) | Rouen-Vallée de Seine |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Rouen-Vallée de Seine

| (78) | Saint-Brieuc-Armor |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Saint-Brieuc-Armor

| (79) | Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon

| (80) | Saint-Nazaire-Montoir |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Saint-Nazaire-Montoir

| (81) | Strasbourg-Entzheim |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Strasbourg-Entzheim

| (82) | Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes

| (83) | Toulouse-Blagnac |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Toulouse-Blagnac

| (84) | Tours-Saint-Symphorien |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Tours-Saint-Symphorien

| (85) | Troyes-Barberey |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Troyes-Barberey

| (86) | Vichy-Charmeil |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Vichy-Charmeil

Fruntieri tal-Baħar

| (1) | Ajaccio |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ajaccio

| (2) | Bastia |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Bastia

| (3) | Bayonne |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Bayonne

| (4) | Bonifacio |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Bonifacio

| (5) | Bordeaux |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Bordeaux

| (6) | Boulogne |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Boulogne

| (7) | Brest |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Brest

| (8) | Caen-Ouistreham |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Caen-Ouistreham

| (9) | Calais |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Calais

| (10) | Calvi |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Calvi

| (11) | Cannes-Vieux Port |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Cannes-Vieux Port

| (12) | Carteret |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Carteret

| (13) | Cherbourg |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Cherbourg

| (14) | Dieppe |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Dieppe

| (15) | Douvres |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Douvres

| (16) | Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Dunkerque

| (17) | Granville |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Granville

| (18) | Honfleur |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Honfleur

| (19) | La Rochelle-La Pallice |
| --- | --- |

(19)

La Rochelle-La Pallice

| (20) | Le Havre |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Le Havre

| (21) | Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port

| (22) | L’Ile-Rousse |
| --- | --- |

(22)

L’Ile-Rousse

| (23) | Lorient |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Lorient

| (24) | Marseille |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Marseille

| (25) | Monaco-Port de la Condamine |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Monaco-Port de la Condamine

| (26) | Nantes-Saint-Nazaire |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

| (27) | Nice |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Nice

| (28) | Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis

| (29) | Port-la-Nouvelle |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Port-la-Nouvelle

| (30) | Porto-Vecchio |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Porto-Vecchio

| (31) | Port-Vendres |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Port-Vendres

| (32) | Roscoff |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Roscoff

| (33) | Rouen |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Rouen

| (34) | Saint-Brieuc (maritime) |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Saint-Brieuc (maritime)

| (35) | Saint-Malo |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Saint-Malo

| (36) | Sète |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Sète

| (37) | Toulon |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Toulon

Fruntieri tal-art

Mar-RENJU UNIT

(kollegament fiss min-naħa għall-oħra taċ-Channel)

| (1) | Gare d’Ashford International |
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(1)

Gare d’Ashford International

| (2) | Gare d’Avignon-Centre |
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(2)

Gare d’Avignon-Centre

| (3) | Cheriton/Coquelles |
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(3)

Cheriton/Coquelles

| (4) | Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée |
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(4)

Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée

| (5) | Gare de Fréthun |
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(5)

Gare de Fréthun

| (6) | Gare de Lille-Europe |
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(6)

Gare de Lille-Europe

| (7) | Gare de Paris-Nord |
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(7)

Gare de Paris-Nord

| (8) | Gare de St-Pancras International |
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(8)

Gare de St-Pancras International

| (9) | Gare d’Ebbsfleet International |
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(9)

Gare d’Ebbsfleet International

| (10) | Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, l-1 ta’ Lulju 2016. |
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(10)

Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, l-1 ta’ Lulju 2016.

Ma’ ANDORRA

| (1) | Pas de la Case-Porta |
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(1)

Pas de la Case-Porta

Lista ta’ pubblikazzjonijiet preċedenti

| | ĠU C 316, 28.12.2007, p. 1 |
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ĠU C 316, 28.12.2007, p. 1

| | ĠU C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 16 |
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ĠU C 134, 31.5.2008, p. 16

| | ĠU C 177, 12.7.2008, p. 9 |
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ĠU C 177, 12.7.2008, p. 9

| | ĠU C 200, 6.8.2008, p. 10 |
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ĠU C 200, 6.8.2008, p. 10

| | ĠU C 331, 31.12.2008, p. 13 |
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ĠU C 331, 31.12.2008, p. 13

| | ĠU C 3, 8.1.2009, p. 10 |
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ĠU C 3, 8.1.2009, p. 10

| | ĠU C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 10 |
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ĠU C 37, 14.2.2009, p. 10

| | ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 20 |
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ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 20

| | ĠU C 99, 30.4.2009, p. 7 |
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ĠU C 99, 30.4.2009, p. 7

| | ĠU C 229, 23.9.2009, p. 28 |
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ĠU C 229, 23.9.2009, p. 28

| | ĠU C 263, 5.11.2009, p. 22 |
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ĠU C 263, 5.11.2009, p. 22

| | ĠU C 298, 8.12.2009, p. 17 |
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ĠU C 298, 8.12.2009, p. 17

| | ĠU C 74, 24.3.2010, p. 13 |
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ĠU C 74, 24.3.2010, p. 13

| | ĠU C 326, 3.12.2010, p. 17 |
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ĠU C 326, 3.12.2010, p. 17

| | ĠU C 355, 29.12.2010, p. 34 |
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ĠU C 355, 29.12.2010, p. 34

| | ĠU C 22, 22.1.2011, p. 22 |
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ĠU C 22, 22.1.2011, p. 22

| | ĠU C 37, 5.2.2011, p. 12 |
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ĠU C 37, 5.2.2011, p. 12

| | ĠU C 149, 20.5.2011, p. 8 |
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ĠU C 149, 20.5.2011, p. 8

| | ĠU C 190, 30.6.2011, p. 17 |
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ĠU C 190, 30.6.2011, p. 17

| | ĠU C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 14 |
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ĠU C 203, 9.7.2011, p. 14

| | ĠU C 210, 16.7.2011, p. 30 |
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ĠU C 210, 16.7.2011, p. 30

| | ĠU C 271, 14.9.2011, p. 18 |
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ĠU C 271, 14.9.2011, p. 18

| | ĠU C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 12 |
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ĠU C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 12

| | ĠU C 111, 18.4.2012, p. 3 |
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ĠU C 111, 18.4.2012, p. 3

| | ĠU C 183, 23.6.2012, p. 7 |
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ĠU C 183, 23.6.2012, p. 7

| | ĠU C 313, 17.10.2012, p. 11 |
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ĠU C 313, 17.10.2012, p. 11

| | ĠU C 394, 20.12.2012, p. 22 |
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ĠU C 394, 20.12.2012, p. 22

| | ĠU C 51, 22.2.2013, p. 9 |
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ĠU C 51, 22.2.2013, p. 9

| | ĠU C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 9 |
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ĠU C 167, 13.6.2013, p. 9

| | ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 2 |
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ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 2

| | ĠU C 275, 24.9.2013, p. 7 |
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ĠU C 275, 24.9.2013, p. 7

| | ĠU C 314, 29.10.2013, p. 5 |
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ĠU C 314, 29.10.2013, p. 5

| | ĠU C 324, 9.11.2013, p. 6 |
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ĠU C 324, 9.11.2013, p. 6

| | ĠU C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 4 |
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ĠU C 57, 28.2.2014, p. 4

| | ĠU C 167, 4.6.2014, p. 9 |
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ĠU C 167, 4.6.2014, p. 9

| | ĠU C 244, 26.7.2014, p. 22 |
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ĠU C 244, 26.7.2014, p. 22

| | ĠU C 332, 24.9.2014, p. 12 |
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ĠU C 332, 24.9.2014, p. 12

| | ĠU C 420, 22.11.2014, p. 9 |
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ĠU C 420, 22.11.2014, p. 9

| | ĠU C 72, 28.2.2015, p. 17 |
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ĠU C 72, 28.2.2015, p. 17

| | ĠU C 126, 18.4.2015, p. 10 |
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ĠU C 126, 18.4.2015, p. 10

| | ĠU C 229, 14.7.2015, p. 5 |
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ĠU C 229, 14.7.2015, p. 5

| | ĠU C 341, 16.10.2015, p. 19 |
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ĠU C 341, 16.10.2015, p. 19

| | ĠU C 84, 4.3.2016, p. 2. |
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ĠU C 84, 4.3.2016, p. 2.

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(1)  Ara l-lista ta’ pubblikazzjonijiet preċedenti fl-aħħar parti ta’ dan l-aġġornament.

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| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/11 |
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30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/11

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Aġġornament tal-karti mudell maħruġa mill-Ministeri tal-Affarijiet Barranin tal-Istati Membri lil membri akkreditati ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi u rappreżentanzi diplomatiċi u l-membri tal-familja tagħhom, skond l-Artikolu 20(2) tar-Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta' persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta' Schengen) (1)

(2016/C 236/09)

Il-pubblikazzjoni ta' karti mudell maħruġa mill-Ministeri tal-Affarijiet Barranin tal-Istati Membri lil membri akkreditati ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi u rappreżentanzi konsulari u l-membri tal-familji tagħhom, skont l-Artikolu 20(2) tar-Regolament (UE) 2016/399 tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill tad-9 ta' Marzu 2016 li jistabbilixxi Kodiċi tal-Unjoni dwar ir-regoli li jirregolaw il-moviment ta' persuni min-naħa għall-oħra tal-fruntiera (Il-Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta' Schengen) hija bbażata fuq l-informazzjoni mogħtija mill-Istati Membri lill-Kummissjoni skont l-Artikolu 39 tal-Kodiċi tal-Fruntieri ta' Schengen (kodifikazzjoni).

Minbarra l-pubblikazzjoni fil-ĠU, huwa disponibbli aġġornament ta' kull xahar fuq is-sit web tad-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Affarijiet Interni.

L-IŻVIZZERA

Sostituzzjoni tal-informazzjoni ppubblikata fil-ĠU C 133, 1.5.2014

PERMESSI TA' RESIDENZA SPEĊJALI MAĦRUĠA MILL-MINISTERU TAL-AFFARIJIET BARRANIN

Dokumenti ta’ leġittimazzjoni (permessi ta’ residenza) tad-Dipartiment Federali tal-Affarijiet Barranin:

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “B” (bi strixxa roża): kapijiet ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, membri tal-maniġment superjuri ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « B « (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “B” (bi strixxa roża): kapijiet ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, membri tal-maniġment superjuri ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « B « (à bande rose): chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “C” (bi strixxa roża): membri tal-persunal diplomatiku ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, uffiċjali għolja ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « C « (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “C” (bi strixxa roża): membri tal-persunal diplomatiku ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, uffiċjali għolja ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « C « (à bande rose): membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “D” (bi strixxa blu): membri tal-persunal amministrattiv u tekniku ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation «D « (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “D” (bi strixxa blu): membri tal-persunal amministrattiv u tekniku ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation «D « (à bande bleue): membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “D” (bi strixxa kannella): uffiċjali fil-kategorija professjonali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « D « (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “D” (bi strixxa kannella): uffiċjali fil-kategorija professjonali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « D « (à bande brune): fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “E” (bi strixxa vjola): membri tal-persunal tas-servizz ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti u speċjali, uffiċjali tas-servizzi ġenerali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « E « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “E” (bi strixxa vjola): membri tal-persunal tas-servizz ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti u speċjali, uffiċjali tas-servizzi ġenerali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « E « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “F” (bi strixxa safra): impjegati domestiċi privati tal-membri ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali u ta' membri tal-persunal b'karigi konsulari ta' karriera u impjegati domestiċi privati ta' uffiċjali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali/Carte de légitimation « F « (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales/Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen/Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “F” (bi strixxa safra): impjegati domestiċi privati tal-membri ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali u ta' membri tal-persunal b'karigi konsulari ta' karriera u impjegati domestiċi privati ta' uffiċjali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali/Carte de légitimation « F « (à bande jaune): domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales/Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen/Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “G” (bi strixxa turkważ): uffiċjali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali (kuntratt tax-xogħol “ta' terminu qasir”) u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « G « (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme «) et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “G” (bi strixxa turkważ): uffiċjali ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali (kuntratt tax-xogħol “ta' terminu qasir”) u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « G « (à bande turquoise): fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme «) et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “H” (bi strixxa bajda): kollaboraturi, li mhumiex uffiċjali, ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, ta' konsulati u ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali, kif ukoll il-persuni mingħajr privileġġi u immunitajiet awtorizzati jakkumpanjaw lill-membri ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, ta' konsulati u ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali/Carte de légitimation « H « (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales/Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten./Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali; |
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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “H” (bi strixxa bajda): kollaboraturi, li mhumiex uffiċjali, ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, ta' konsulati u ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali, kif ukoll il-persuni mingħajr privileġġi u immunitajiet awtorizzati jakkumpanjaw lill-membri ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti jew speċjali, ta' konsulati u ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali/Carte de légitimation « H « (à bande blanche): collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales/Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten./Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “I” (bi strixxa lewn żebbuġi): membri tal-persunal mhux Svizzeri tal-Kumitat Internazzjonali tas-Salib l-Aħmar u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « I « (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “I” (bi strixxa lewn żebbuġi): membri tal-persunal mhux Svizzeri tal-Kumitat Internazzjonali tas-Salib l-Aħmar u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « I « (à bande olive): membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa roża): kapijiet b'karigi konsulari ta' karriera, uffiċjali konsulari ta' karriera u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa roża): kapijiet b'karigi konsulari ta' karriera, uffiċjali konsulari ta' karriera u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande rose): chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa blu): impjegati konsulari ta' karriera u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa blu): impjegati konsulari ta' karriera u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande bleue): employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa vjola): membri tal-persunal tas-servizz ta' rappreżentanzi konsulari ta' karriera u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa vjola): membri tal-persunal tas-servizz ta' rappreżentanzi konsulari ta' karriera u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa bajda): kapijiet b'karigi konsulari onorarji/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “K” (bi strixxa bajda): kapijiet b'karigi konsulari onorarji/Carte de légitimation « K « (à bande blanche): chefs de poste consulaire honoraire/Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen/Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “L” (bi strixxa lewn ir-ramel): membri tal-persunal mhux Svizzeri tal-Federazzjoni Internazzjonali tas-Soċjetajiet tas-Salib l-Aħmar u n-Nofs Qamar l-Aħmar u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « L « (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

—

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “L” (bi strixxa lewn ir-ramel): membri tal-persunal mhux Svizzeri tal-Federazzjoni Internazzjonali tas-Soċjetajiet tas-Salib l-Aħmar u n-Nofs Qamar l-Aħmar u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « L « (à bande de couleur sable): membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “P” (bi strixxa blu): membri mhux Svizzeri tal-persunal xjentifiku tas-CERN u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « P « (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte « P « (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di Legittimazione « P « (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto. |
| --- | --- |

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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “P” (bi strixxa blu): membri mhux Svizzeri tal-persunal xjentifiku tas-CERN u membri tal-familji tagħhom li jgawdu mill-istess status/Carte de légitimation « P « (à bande bleue): personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte « P « (mit blauem Streifen): wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di Legittimazione « P « (à banda blu): personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto.

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “R” (bi strixxa griża): membri tal-persunal mhux Żvizzeru tal-organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali kważi governattivi jew entitajiet internazzjonali oħra u membri tal-familja li jgawdu mill-istess statut/Carte de légitimation « R « (à bande grise): membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte « R « (mit grauem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di Legittimazione « R « (a banda grigia): membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto; |
| --- | --- |

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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “R” (bi strixxa griża): membri tal-persunal mhux Żvizzeru tal-organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali kważi governattivi jew entitajiet internazzjonali oħra u membri tal-familja li jgawdu mill-istess statut/Carte de légitimation « R « (à bande grise): membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut/Legitimationskarte « R « (mit grauem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen/Carta di Legittimazione « R « (a banda grigia): membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto;

| — | Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “S” (bi strixxa ħadra): membri tal-persunal ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti u speċjali, uffiċjali ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali/Carte de légitimation « S « (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales/Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen/Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali; |
| --- | --- |

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Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni “S” (bi strixxa ħadra): membri tal-persunal ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera ta' missjonijiet diplomatiċi, permanenti u speċjali, uffiċjali ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali/Carte de légitimation « S « (à bande verte): membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales/Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen/Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali;

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “B” tad-Dipartiment Federali tal-Affarijiet Barranin (DFAE)

| — | Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: kapijiet ta' missjonijiet |
| --- | --- |

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Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: kapijiet ta' missjonijiet

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: membri tal-maniġment superjuri



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu minn status diplomatiku. |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: membri tal-maniġment superjuri

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu minn status diplomatiku.

dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “C” tad-DFAE

| — | Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal diplomatiku |
| --- | --- |

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Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal diplomatiku

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali għolja



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu minn status diplomatiku. |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali għolja

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu minn status diplomatiku.

dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “D” tad-DFAE

| — | Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal amministrattiv u tekniku (AT)



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu minn status diplomatiku, minbarra l-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni ċivili u amministrattiva, li tingħata biss fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal amministrattiv u tekniku (AT)

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu minn status diplomatiku, minbarra l-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni ċivili u amministrattiva, li tingħata biss fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali fil-kategorija professjonali



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali fil-kategorija professjonali

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “E” tad-DFAE

| — | Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal ta' servizz u membri tal-persunal irreklutati lokalment |
| --- | --- |

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Ambaxxati u missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal ta' servizz u membri tal-persunal irreklutati lokalment

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali tas-servizzi ġenerali



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali tas-servizzi ġenerali

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “F” tad-DFAE

| — | Ambaxxati, missjonijiet permanenti u organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: impjegati domestiċi privati ta' membri tal-persunal



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni. |
| --- | --- |

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Ambaxxati, missjonijiet permanenti u organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: impjegati domestiċi privati ta' membri tal-persunal

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni.

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “G” tad-DFAE

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali temporanji (uffiċjali “ta' terminu qasir”) u membri tal-persunal issekondat



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali temporanji (uffiċjali “ta' terminu qasir”) u membri tal-persunal issekondat

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “h” tad-DFAE

| — | Ambaxxati, konsulati, missjonijiet permanenti u organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: persuni mingħajr privileġġi u immunitajiet



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni u ma għandhomx aċċess għas-suq tax-xogħol Żvizzeru. |
| --- | --- |

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Ambaxxati, konsulati, missjonijiet permanenti u organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: persuni mingħajr privileġġi u immunitajiet

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni u ma għandhomx aċċess għas-suq tax-xogħol Żvizzeru.

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “I” tad-DFAE

| — | Il-Kumitat Internazzjonali tas-Salib l-Aħmar (CICR): kollaboraturi tas-CICR



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. Ma għandhomx privileġġi doganali. |
| --- | --- |

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Il-Kumitat Internazzjonali tas-Salib l-Aħmar (CICR): kollaboraturi tas-CICR

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. Ma għandhomx privileġġi doganali.

Dokumenti ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “K” tad-DFAE

| — | Konsulati — dokument aħmar “K”: kapijiet ta' karigi ta' karriera u uffiċjali konsulari ta' karriera



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulati — dokument aħmar “K”: kapijiet ta' karigi ta' karriera u uffiċjali konsulari ta' karriera

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

| — | Konsulati — dokument blu “K”: impjegati konsulari ta' karriera



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulati — dokument blu “K”: impjegati konsulari ta' karriera

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

| — | Konsulati — dokument vjola “K”: membri tal-persunal tas-servizz u membri tal-persunal irreklutati lokalment



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulati — dokument vjola “K”: membri tal-persunal tas-servizz u membri tal-persunal irreklutati lokalment

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni

| — | Konsulati — dokument abjad “K”: kapijiet ta' karigi onorarji



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni għad-dmirijiet konsulari biss |
| --- | --- |

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Konsulati — dokument abjad “K”: kapijiet ta' karigi onorarji

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni għad-dmirijiet konsulari biss

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “L” tad-DFAE

| — | Il-Federazzjoni Internazzjonali tas-Soċjetajiet tas-Salib l-Aħmar u n-Nofs Qamar l-Aħmar (FISCR): kollaboraturi tal-FISCR



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. Ma għandhomx privileġġi doganali. |
| --- | --- |

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Il-Federazzjoni Internazzjonali tas-Soċjetajiet tas-Salib l-Aħmar u n-Nofs Qamar l-Aħmar (FISCR): kollaboraturi tal-FISCR

Image

Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. Ma għandhomx privileġġi doganali.

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “P” tad-DFAE

| — | L-Organizzazzjoni Ewropea għar-Riċerka Nukleari (CERN): membri tal-persunal xjentifiku tas-CERN



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom |
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L-Organizzazzjoni Ewropea għar-Riċerka Nukleari (CERN): membri tal-persunal xjentifiku tas-CERN

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Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “R” tad-DFAE

| — | Membri tal-persunal mhux Żvizzeru tal-organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali kważi governattivi jew entitajiet internazzjonali oħra u membri tal-familja li jgawdu mill-istess statut.



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni. |
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Membri tal-persunal mhux Żvizzeru tal-organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali kważi governattivi jew entitajiet internazzjonali oħra u membri tal-familja li jgawdu mill-istess statut.

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Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument ma jgawdux mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni.

Dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “S” tad-DFAE

Fil-prinċipju, il-membri tal-persunal ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera, jingħataw dokument ta' leġittimazzjoni tat-tip “S”, irrispettivament mill-kariga li jkollhom fir-rappreżentanza barranija jew fl-organizzazzjoni internazzjonali. Il-membri tal-persunal Svizzeri, irreklutati lokalment mill-ambaxxati u mill-konsulati ma jingħataw l-ebda dokument. L-uffiċjali temporanji Svizzeri (uffiċjali ta' terminu qasir) ta' organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali ma jingħataw l-ebda dokument.

| — | Ambaxxati u konsulati: membri tal-persunal ta' karriera ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera |
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Ambaxxati u konsulati: membri tal-persunal ta' karriera ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera

| — | Missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera |
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Missjonijiet permanenti: membri tal-persunal ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera

| — | Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali/kollaboraturi ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera



  Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom. |
| --- | --- |

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Organizzazzjonijiet internazzjonali: uffiċjali/kollaboraturi ta' nazzjonalità Żvizzera

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Id-detenturi ta' dan id-dokument igawdu mill-immunità mill-ġuriżdizzjoni fit-twettiq ta' dmirijiethom.

Lista ta' pubblikazzjonijiet preċedenti

| | ĠU C 247, 13.10.2006, p. 85 |
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ĠU C 247, 13.10.2006, p. 85

| | ĠU C 153, 6.7.2007, p. 15 |
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ĠU C 153, 6.7.2007, p. 15

| | ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 18 |
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ĠU C 64, 19.3.2009, p. 18

| | ĠU C 239, 6.10.2009, p. 7 |
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ĠU C 239, 6.10.2009, p. 7

| | ĠU C 304, 10.11.2010, p. 6 |
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ĠU C 304, 10.11.2010, p. 6

| | ĠU C 273, 16.09.2011, p. 11 |
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ĠU C 273, 16.09.2011, p. 11

| | ĠU C 357, 7.12.2011, p. 3 |
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ĠU C 357, 7.12.2011, p. 3

| | ĠU C 88, 24.3.2012, p. 12 |
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ĠU C 88, 24.3.2012, p. 12

| | ĠU C 120, 25.4.2012, p. 4 |
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ĠU C 120, 25.4.2012, p. 4

| | ĠU C 182, 22.6.2012, p. 10 |
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ĠU C 182, 22.6.2012, p. 10

| | ĠU C 214, 20.7.2012, p. 4 |
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ĠU C 214, 20.7.2012, p. 4

| | ĠU C 238, 8.8.2012, p. 5 |
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ĠU C 238, 8.8.2012, p. 5

| | ĠU C 255, 24.8.2012, p. 2 |
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ĠU C 255, 24.8.2012, p. 2

| | ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 13 |
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ĠU C 242, 23.8.2013, p. 13

| | ĠU C 38, 8.2.2014, p. 16 |
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ĠU C 38, 8.2.2014, p. 16

| | ĠU C 133, 1.5.2014, p. 2 |
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ĠU C 133, 1.5.2014, p. 2

| | ĠU C 360, 11.10.2014, p. 5 |
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ĠU C 360, 11.10.2014, p. 5

| | ĠU C 397, 12.11.2014, p. 6 |
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ĠU C 397, 12.11.2014, p. 6

| | ĠU C 77, 27.2.2016, p. 5 |
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ĠU C 77, 27.2.2016, p. 5

| | ĠU C 174, 14.5.2016, p. 12. |
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ĠU C 174, 14.5.2016, p. 12.

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(1)  Ara l-lista ta’ pubblikazzjonijiet preċedenti fl-aħħar parti ta' dan l-aġġornament.

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INFORMAZZJONI DWAR IŻ-ŻONA EKONOMIKA EWROPEA

Awtorità ta' Sorveljanza EFTA

| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/21 |
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30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/21

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Stedina biex jitressqu kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat

(2016/C 236/10)

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 489/15/COL, imsemmija hawn fuq, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni ta’ wara dan is-sommarju, l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA notifikat lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi bid-deċiżjoni tagħha biex tibda proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u Qorti tal-Ġustizzja fir-rigward tal-miżura msemmija hawn fuq.

Il-partijiet interessati jistgħu jissottomettu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni lil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
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| Registry |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tressaq il-kummenti tista’ tinżamm kunfidenzjali jekk issir rikjesta bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għal tali rikjesta.

SOMMARJU

Proċedura

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi nnotifikaw il-kontribuzzjonijiet tal-iskema ta’ sigurtà soċjali differenzjati reġjonalment tal-2014-2020, skont l-Artikolu 1(3) tal-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 permezz ta’ ittra fit-13 ta’ Marzu 2014 (1). Fuq il-bażi ta’ dik in-notifika u l-informazzjoni sottomessa wara (2), l-Awtorità approvat l-iskema ta’ għajnuna notifikata permezz tad-Deċiżjoni tagħha Nru 225/14/COL tat-18 ta’ Ġunju 2014.

Permezz tas-sentenza tagħha tat-23 ta’ Settembru 2015 fil-kawża E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS vs. ESA
   (3), il-Qorti tal-EFTA annullat parzjalment id-deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità.

Permezz ta’ ittra datata l-15 ta’ Ottubru 2015 (4), l-Awtorità talbet informazzjoni addizzjonali mingħand l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. Permezz ta’ ittra datata s-6 ta’ Novembru 2015 (5), l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi wieġbu għat-talba għal informazzjoni.

Deskrizzjoni tal-miżura

L-objettiv tal-iskema ġenerali fuq kontribuzzjonijiet differenzjati tas-sigurtà soċjali bħala tali huwa biex titnaqqas jew ikun hemm prevenzjoni tad-depopolazzjoni fl-inqas reġjuni abitati fin-Norveġja, billi jistimulaw l-impjiegi. L-iskema tal-għajnuna operatorja tikkumpensal-ispejjeż tal-impjieg billi jitnaqqsu r-rati ta’ kontribuzzjoni tas-sigurtà soċjali f’ċerti żoni ġeografiċi. Bħala regola ġenerali, l-intensitajiet tal-għajnuna jvarjaw skont iż-żona ġeografika li fiha l-unità kummerċjali hija reġistrata. Il-liġi Norveġiża teħtieġ li impriżi jirreġistraw is-sottounitajiet għal kull attività ta’ negozju separata mwettqa (6). Jekk impriża twettaq tipi differenti ta’ attivitajiet ta’ negozju, sottounitajiet separati jridu jiġu reġistrati. Barra minn hekk, unitajiet separati jridu jkunu rreġistrati jekk l-attivitajiet huma mwettqa f’postijiet ġeografiċi differenti.

Permezz ta’ eżenzjoni mir-regola ewlenija dwar ir-reġistrazzjoni, l-iskema tapplika wkoll għal impriżi rreġistrati barra ż-żona eliġibbli fejn huma jibagħtu ħaddiema jaħdmu fiż-żona eliġibbli u fejn l-impjegati tagħhom ikunu involuti f’attivitajiet mobbli fi ħdan iż-żona eliġibbli (għall-finijiet ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni, din hija msemmija bħala “servizzi ambulanti”). Din hija r-regola ta’ eżenzjoni taħt skrutinju fid-Deċiżjoni inkwistjoni. Il-bażi ġuridika nazzjonali għall-iskema bħala tali hija t-Taqsima 23-2 tal-Att ta’ Assigurazzjoni Nazzjonali (7). Il-bażi ġuridika nazzjonali għall-eżenzjoni hija pprovduta mit-Taqsima 1(4) tad-Deċiżjoni tal-Parlament Norveġiż Nru 1482 tal-5 ta’ Diċembru 2013 dwar id-determinazzjoni tar-rati ta’ taxxa eċċ. skont l-Att ta’ Assigurazzjoni Nazzjonali.

L-eżenzjoni tapplika biss meta l-impjegat jqatta’ nofs jum jew aktar ta’ xogħol tiegħu jew tagħha f’żona eliġibbli. Barra minn hekk, din ir-rata mnaqqsa hija applikabbli biss għall-parti tax-xogħol imwettaq hemmhekk.

Valutazzjoni tal-miżura

L-Awtorità trid tivvaluta jekk ir-regola ta’ eżenzjoni hijiex kompatibbli mat-tħaddim tal-Ftehim taż-ŻEE fuq il-bażi tal-Artikolu 61(3)(c) tiegħu f’konformità mal-Linji Gwida tal-Awtorità dwar l-Għajnuna Reġjonali mill-Istat għall-2014-2020 (ir-RAG) (8).

L-għajnuna reġjonali tista’ tkun effettiva fil-promozzjoni tal-iżvilupp ekonomiku f’oqsma żvantaġġati biss jekk tingħata biex twassal għal investiment addizzjonali jew attività ekonomika f’dawk iż-żoni (9). L-għajnuna operatorja reġjonali tista’ taqa’ biss taħt l-Artikolu 61(3)(c) ŻEE jekk tingħata biex tindirizza żvantaġġi speċifiċi jew permanenti ffaċċjati minn impriżi f’reġjuni żvantaġġati (10).

M’hemm l-ebda dubju li l-ambitu ġeografiku tal-iskema bħala tali huwa ristrett għal reġjuni żvantaġġati. L-ambitu ta’ din id-Deċiżjoni huwa limitat għar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni. Il-kwistjoni hija dwar jekk din ir-regola, li tinvolvi li l-impriżi rreġistrati barra r-reġjuni żvantaġġati koperti mill-iskema jistgħu jibbenefikaw minn għajnuna taħt l-iskema, sal-punt fejn huma jwettqu attivitajiet ekonomiċi f’reġjuni żvantaġġati hijiex kompatibbli mar-regoli dwar l-għajnuna mill-Istat. Fi kliem ieħor, ir-regola ta’ eżenzjoni tindirizza żvantaġġi speċifiċi jew permanenti li jħabbtu wiċċhom magħhom l-impriżi f’reġjuni żvantaġġati?

Huwa f’idejn l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex juru r-riskju ta’ depopolazzjoni fin-nuqqas tar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni (11). L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi saħqu dwar il-benefiċċji tar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni għal impriżi lokali. Huma jista’ jkollhom aċċess, bi prezz aktar baxx, għax-xogħol speċjalizzat li kieku ma kienx ikun disponibbli. Barra minn hekk, ir-regola ta’ eżenzjoni twassal għal kompetizzjoni akbar bejn is-servizzi ambulanti fiż-żoni eliġibbli, li għal darb’oħra huwa ta’ benefiċċju għal impriżi lokali (differenti minn dawk li jipprovdu servizzi ambulanti) billi spejjeż aktar baxxi għal servizzi ambulanti jagħmluha aktar attraenti u aktar profittabbli li tmexxi negozju fiż-żona eliġibbli. L-użu ta’ għajnuna taħt l-iskema huwa għodda indiretta fis-sens li huwa użat biex titnaqqas l-ispiża għall-impjieg ta’ ħaddiema bħala miżura biex titnaqqas jew ikun hemm prevenzjoni tad-depopolazzjoni. L-idea hija li s-suq tax-xogħol huwa l-aktar fattur importanti li jinfluwenza fejn jgħixu n-nies.

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi sostnew ukoll li l-kumpaniji reġistrati barra ż-żona eliġibbli okkażjonalment se jimpjegaw ħaddiema fiż-żoni eliġibbli. B’hekk l-intrapriżi se jipprovdu impjiegi li, għalkemm ta’ natura aktar temporanja, xorta se jikkontribwixxu biex tiżdied il-paga fir-reġjuni eliġibbli. Dan ukoll tistimola l-attività ekonomika. Barra minn hekk, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi jsostnu li l-impjegati li joqogħdu b’mod temporanju fiż-żona eliġibbli se jixtru prodotti u servizzi lokali u b’hekk jikkontribwixxu għall-ekonomija lokali. Dan japplika b’mod partikolari għal impjegati li jivvjaġġaw mid-dar għax-xogħol u lura lejn il-post speċjalment fuq żmien qasir jew medju, peress li dawn x’aktarx li joqogħdu f’lukandi, jieklu f’ristoranti, eċċ. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi kkalkulaw l-ammont ta’ għajnuna li jirriżulta mir-regola ta’ eżenzjoni li tiġi tnejn fil-mija tal-għajnuna totali għall-2015 li huma jenfasizzaw li hija stima inċerta. Tnejn fil-mija jammontaw għal madwar EUR 19 il-miljun (12). L-Awtorità tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex jipprovdu informazzjoni iktar dettaljata dwar l-effett finanzjarju tar-regola.

Minbarra dawn l-osservazzjonijiet ta’ natura ġenerali, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ma wrewx ir-riskju tad-depopolazzjoni taż-żona rilevanti fin-nuqqas tar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni. Hija l-fehma tal-Awtorità li miżura, sabiex tissodisfa r-rekwiżiti tar-RAG, irid ikollha effetti li jkunu aktar minn żieda marġinali ta’ possibilitajiet ta’ impjieg temporanju u nfiq fiż-żona eliġibbli. Fuq din il-bażi, l-Awtorità tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex jagħtu aktar informazzjoni biex juru r-riskju tad-depopolazzjoni fin-nuqqas tar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni.

F’termini ta’ effett fuq il-kompetizzjoni u l-kummerċ tar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi jargumentaw li r-regola ta’ eżenzjoni toħloq kundizzjonijiet ekwi għall-impriżi kollha attivi f’żoni żvantaġġati billi din tapplika ugwalment għal kull impriża bbażata fiż-ŻEE. Il-konsegwenza hija li tiżgura li l-effetti negattivi mhux dovuti fuq il-kompetizzjoni huma evitati. Hija l-fehma tal-Awtorità li din hija karatteristika pożittiva fid-dawl tal-paragrafi 3 u 53 tal-RAG. Madankollu, l-impriżi rreġistrati fiż-żona eliġibbli jistgħu, b’mod ġenerali, jiffaċċjaw iktar diffikultajiet permanenti minn impriżi li sempliċiment jibagħtu l-impjegati tagħhom biex jaħdmu fiż-żona b’mod mhux permanenti. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi jargumentaw li l-impriżi rreġistrati barra miż-żona eliġibbli jista’ jkollhom żvantaġġ kompetittiv meta mqabbla ma’ kumpaniji lokali minħabba, fost l-oħrajn, l-ispejjeż tat-trasport u l-akkomodazzjoni tal-persunal. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ma ppreżentaw l-ebda dejta jew spjegazzjoni ulterjuri biex isaħħu din is-suppożizzjoni. L-Awtorità tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex jiċċaraw aktar għaliex din ir-regola ta’ eżenzjoni ma għandhiex effetti negattivi mhux dovuti fuq il-kompetizzjoni u biex jippreżentaw aktar informazzjoni li tappoġġjaha.

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi saħqu li huwa evidenti li r-regola ta’ eżenzjoni għandha effett ta’ inċentiv. L-effett ta’ inċentiv ta’ għajnuna ma jistax jiġi sempliċiment assunt. Filwaqt li mhuwiex meħtieġ li tiġi pprovduta evidenza individwali li l-għajnuna taħt skema tipprovdi kull benefiċjarju b’inċentiv, fuq bażi individwali, biex titwettaq attività li kieku ma kinetx titwettaq, l-effett ta’ inċentiv għandu, tal-anqas, ikun ibbażat fuq teorija ekonomika soda. Mhuwiex biżżejjed li wieħed sempliċiment jirreferi għal xi ħaġa allegatament ovvja. Filwaqt li huwa veru li r-regola ta’ eżenzjoni għal kumpaniji rreġistrati barra ż-żoni eliġibbli tnaqqas l-ispejjeż tax-xogħol għal servizzi ambulanti fiż-żoni eliġibbli, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ma pprovdewx evidenza jew argumenti li huwa probabbli li, fin-nuqqas ta’ għajnuna, il-livell ta’ attività ekonomika fiż-żona se titnaqqas b’mod sinifikanti minħabba l-problemi li l-għajnuna għandha l-għan li tindirizza (13).

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi spjegaw li l-impriżi li jwettqu servizzi ambulanti sa ċertu punt jistgħu jirreġistraw subunitajiet fiż-żona eliġibbli. Barra minn hekk, huma meħtieġa li jagħmlu dan meta tal-anqas impjegat wieħed iwettaq ħidma għall-unità prinċipali f’żona separata, u l-impriża tista’ ssirilha żjara hemmhekk.

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi jargumentaw li, fin-nuqqas tar-regola ta’ eżenzjoni għal servizzi ambulanti fiż-żona eliġibbli, ikun hemm differenza mhux iġġustifikata fit-trattament skont jekk l-impriża li tipprovdi s-servizz kinitx stabbiliet subunità fiż-żona eliġibbli.

L-ewwel nett, mhuwiex ċar għall-Awtorità x’jinvolvi r-rekwiżit li “mill-inqas impjegat wieħed iwettaq ħidma għall-unità prinċipali f’żona separata, u l-impriża tista’ ssirilha żjara hemmhekk”. Għalhekk, l-Awtorità tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex jiċċaraw dan.

It-tieni nett, il-prinċipju ta’ trattament ugwali huwa prinċipju ġenerali tal-liġi taż-ŻEE. Madankollu, din ma tistax fiha nnifisha u minnha nnifisha sservi bħala bażi biex tiġġustifika r-regola ta’ eżenzjoni. Ir-regola ta’ eżenzjoni trid hija stess tkun kompatibbli mal-funzjonament tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

Bħala konklużjoni, in-nuqqas ta’ informazzjoni rilevanti, kif deskritt hawn fuq, iwassal lill-awtorità li jkollha dubji dwar il-kompatibbiltà tal-eżenzjoni tar-regola mal-funzjonament tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 489/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening a formal investigation into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020

(Norway)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014. |
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(1)

The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014.

| (2) | By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision. |
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(2)

By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision.

| (3) | By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
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(3)

By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The scheme as such is not the subject of the formal investigation

| (4) | By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled. |
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(4)

By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled.

3.   The scheme

3.1   
  Objective

| (5) | The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below. |
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(5)

The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below.

3.2   
  National legal basis

| (6) | The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme. |
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(6)

The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme.

| (7) | For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL. |
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(7)

For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

3.3   
  Rules on registration

| (8) | As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered. |
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(8)

As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered.

| (9) | Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations. |
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(9)

Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations.

| (10) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area. |
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(10)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area.

3.4   
  Ambulant services – the measure under scrutiny

| (11) | By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. |
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(11)

By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014.

| (12) | The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month. |
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(12)

The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month.

| (13) | This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo. |
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(13)

This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo.

4.   The judgment of the EFTA Court

| (14) | The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21). |
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(14)

The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21).

5.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (15) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22). |
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(15)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22).

| (16) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates. |
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(16)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates.

| (17) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme. |
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(17)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme.

| (18) | Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
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(18)

Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (19) | The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. |
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(19)

The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel.

| (20) | In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services. |
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(20)

In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services.

| (21) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. |
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(21)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (22) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
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(22)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (23) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition. |
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(23)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition.

| (24) | In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition. |
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(24)

In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (25) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
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(25)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful. |
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(26)

The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (27) | The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG. |
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(27)

The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG.

| (28) | The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas. |
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(28)

The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas.

| (29) | Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25). |
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(29)

Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25).

| (30) | There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions? |
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(30)

There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions?

| (31) | It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live. |
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(31)

It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live.

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule. |
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(32)

The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule.

| (33) | Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule. |
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(33)

Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule.

| (34) | In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up. |
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(34)

In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up.

| (35) | The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28). |
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(35)

The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28).

| (36) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. |
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(36)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there.

| (37) | The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
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(37)

The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (38) | Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this. |
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(38)

Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this.

| (39) | Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (40) | In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (41) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (43) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules.

| (44) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 10 January 2016.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 10 January 2016, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, on 9 December 2015

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

---

(1)  Id-Dokumenti Nru 702438-702440, 702442 u 702443.

1

(2)  Ara l-paragrafu 2 tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 225/14/COL, disponibbli onlajn fuq: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

2

(3)  [Għadha mhux rappurtata.]

3

(4)  Dokument Nru 776348.

4

(5)  Dokumenti Nru 779603 u 779604.

5

(6)  L-Att dwar ir-Reġistru ta’ Koordinazzjoni għal Entitajiet Legali (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

6

(7)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

7

(8)  ĠU L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 u s-Suppliment ŻEE Nru 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

8

(9)  Paragrafu 6 tar-RAG.

9

(10)  Paragrafu 16 tar-RAG.

10

(11)  Paragrafu 43 tar-RAG.

11

(12)  Abbażi tal-baġit 2013 notifikat, ara l-para. 49 tad-Deċiżjoni tal-Awtorità Nru 225/14/COL.

12

(13)  Paragrafu 71 tar-RAG.

13

(14)  Documents No 702438-702440, 702442 and 702443.

14

(15)  See paragraph 2 of Decision No 225/14/COL, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

15

(16)  Not yet reported.

16

(17)  Document No 776348.

17

(18)  Documents No 779603 and 779604.

18

(19)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

19

(20)  The Act on the Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

20

(21)  See Order of the EFTA Court of 23.11.2015 in Case E-23/14 INT Kimek Offshore AS v ESA (not yet reported).

21

Kimek Offshore AS

ESA

(22)  OJ L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 and EEA Supplement No 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

22

(23)  The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014 (OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61) at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

23

(24)  Para. 6 of the RAG.

24

(25)  Para. 16 of the RAG.

25

(26)  Para. 43 of the RAG.

26

(27)  Based on the notified 2013 budget, see para. 49 of the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

27

(28)  Para. 71 of the RAG.

28

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| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/29

---

Stedina biex jitressqu l-kummenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja dwar kwistjonijiet ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat rigward għajnuna potenzjali lil Hurtigruten ASA skont il-Ftehim dwar il-Kosta għas-Servizz Marittimu ta’ Hurtigruten mill-2012 sal-2019

(2016/C 236/11)

Permezz tad-Deċiżjoni Nru 490/15/COL tad-9 ta’ Diċembru 2015, riprodotta fil-lingwa awtentika fil-paġni li jsegwu din il-ġabra fil-qosor, l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA bdiet proċedimenti skont l-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ġew infurmati permezz ta’ kopja tad-deċiżjoni.

Permezz ta’ dan l-avviż, l-Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza tal-EFTA tavża lill-Istati tal-EFTA, lill-Istati Membri tal-UE u lill-partijiet interessati biex jibagħtu l-kummenti tagħhom dwar il-miżura inkwistjoni, fi żmien xahar mid-data tal-pubblikazzjoni, lil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35/Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Il-kummenti se jkunu kkomunikati lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi. L-identità tal-parti interessata li tressaq il-kummenti tista’ tinżamm kunfidenzjali jekk issir rikjesta bil-miktub li tiddikjara r-raġunijiet għal tali rikjesta.

ĠABRA FIL-QOSOR

Sfond

Hurtigruten ASA (Hurtigruten) topera servizzi tat-trasport li jikkonsistu mit-trasport ikkombinat ta’ persuni u prodotti tul il-kosta Norveġiża minn Bergen għal Kirkenes.

Wara proċedura ta’ ħruġ ta’ offerti, fit-13 ta’ April 2011 ġie ffirmat ftehim għall-akkwist tas-servizzi għar-rotta kostali minn Bergen sa Kirkenes għall-perjodu mill-1 ta’ Jannar 2012 sal-31 ta’ Diċembru 2019 flimkien ma’ Hurtigruten (il-FH). Skont dan il-ftehim, Hurtigruten għandha twettaq traġitti kuljum matul is-sena b’waqfiet fi 32 port intermedju definit bejn Bergen u Kirkenes. Għar-rotot bejn Tromsø u Kirkenes u bejn Kirkenes u Tromsø, għandu jkun provdut ukoll it-trasport tal-merkanzija. Is-servizzi għandhom ikunu operati f’konformità ma’ ċerti rekwiżiti ta’ kapaċità u ta’ bastimenti, kif stipulati fil-kuntratt. Il-bastimenti li jintużaw fir-rotta tal-kosta għandhom bħala minimu jkollhom kapaċità ta’ passiġġieri għal 320 passiġġier, kapaċità ta’ kuċċetti f’kabini għal 120 passiġġier u kapaċità ta’ merkanzija għal 150 EURO pallet fi stiva tal-merkanzija b’għoli normali tat-tagħbija. Għandhom ukoll jissodisfaw rekwiżiti legali u tekniċi kif indikat fit-Taqsima 4.4 tal-ispeċifikazzjonijiet tal-offerta.

Għas-servizzi koperti mill-FH, l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi jħallsu kumpens totali ta’ NOK 5 120 miljun għad-durata ta’ tmien snin tal-ftehim.

Valutazzjoni tal-għajnuna mill-Istat tal-kumpens mogħti

L-uniku kriterju tal-kunċett ta’ għajnuna mill-Istat li jinsab inkwistjoni huwa jekk il-kuntratt tax vantaġġ ekonomiku mhux dovut u selettiv lil Hurtigruten.

Vantaġġ ekonomiku selettiv lil Hurtigruten

L-Awtorità vvalutat l-erba’ kundizzjonijiet tas-sentenza Altmark
   (1) u rriżultalha li f’dan l-istadju, ebda minn dawn il-kundizzjonijiet ma tidher li hija ssodisfata, u qiegħed b’hekk jingħata vantaġġ selettiv lil Hurtigruten fis-sens tal-Artikolu 61(1) tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

Fir-rigward tal-ewwel kundizzjoni ta’ definizzjoni ċara ta’ obbligu ta’ servizz pubbliku, l-Awtorità għandha dubji dwar jekk ir-rekwiżit ta’ kapaċità ta’ riserva fit-Taqsima 4-2 tal-FH jistax jiġi kklassifikat minn Norveġja bħala servizz ta’ interess ekonomiku ġenerali (SGEI, service of general economic interest) u tistieden lill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi biex jipprovdu ġustifikazzjoni oġġettiva dwar il-ħtieġa għal obbligu ta’ servizz pubbliku (OSP), filwaqt li jitqiesu l-varjazzjonijiet staġjonali tat-trasport kummerċjali tal-passiġġieri.

Fir-rigward tat-tieni kundizzjoni u l-fatt li l-parametri li abbażi tagħhom huwa kkalkolat il-kumpens irid jkunu stabbiliti minn qabel b’mod oġġettiv u trasparenti, l-Awtorità f’dan l-istadju, għandha dubji dwar jekk ir-rekwiżit ta’ kapaċità ta’ riserva huwiex marbut ma’ numri ta’ passiġġieri li fil-verità huma OSP. Ma kien hemm, pereżempju, ebda metodoloġija oġġettiva u trasparenti biex jiġi kkalkulat minn qabel il-kost għal kull passiġġier/kilometru. Hurtigruten stabbiliet baġit separat li jinkorpora l-kostijiet u d-dħul kollu attribwiti għar-rotot OSP. Din il-kontabilità separata madanakollu ma għandhiex l-għan li tistabbilixxi minn qabel il-parametri tal-kumpens, li għandhom ikunu direttament marbutin mat-telf u mal-kostijiet reali (kostijiet ta’ kapaċità u ta’ passiġġieri) imġarrba minn Hurtigruten.

Fir-rigward tat-tielet kundizzjoni, l-Awtorità tesprimi d-dubji tagħha dwar jekk l-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi assigurawx li l-kumpens mogħti ma jaqbiżx dak li huwa neċessarju biex ikopri l-kostijiet kollha jew parti minnhom li ġġarrbu fit-twettiq tal-OSP, filwaqt li jitqiesu r-riċevuti rilevanti jew il-profitt raġonevoli għat-twettiq ta’ dawk l-obbligi.

F’dan l-istadju, l-Awtorità ma tistax teskludi li l-Hurtigruten ingħatat kumpens eċċessiv għall-forniment tas-servizz pubbliku. Din il-konklużjoni preliminarja ntlaħqet wara li l-Awtorità vvalutat il-punti segwenti:

| i) | Hurtigruten ma tirriservax il-kapaċità għall-passiġġieri ta’ servizz pubbliku, iżda minflok tbigħ il-kapaċità lill-passiġġieri tal-kruċieri, filwaqt li żżomm il-kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi fl-istess livell; |
| --- | --- |

i)

Hurtigruten ma tirriservax il-kapaċità għall-passiġġieri ta’ servizz pubbliku, iżda minflok tbigħ il-kapaċità lill-passiġġieri tal-kruċieri, filwaqt li żżomm il-kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi fl-istess livell;

| ii) | Il-kumpens għall-forniment tas-servizz pubbliku żdied b’mod sostanzjali meta mqabbel mal-perjodu preċedenti ta’ kuntratt; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

Il-kumpens għall-forniment tas-servizz pubbliku żdied b’mod sostanzjali meta mqabbel mal-perjodu preċedenti ta’ kuntratt;

| iii) | Hurtigruten qiegħda tibqa’ tirċievi l-kumpens għal servizzi mhux mogħtija; u, |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten qiegħda tibqa’ tirċievi l-kumpens għal servizzi mhux mogħtija; u,

| iv) | Hurtigruten qiegħda ulterjorment tipprova tikseb prezzijiet irħas għat-tariffi tal-portijiet, filwaqt li żżomm il-kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi fl-istess livell; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten qiegħda ulterjorment tipprova tikseb prezzijiet irħas għat-tariffi tal-portijiet, filwaqt li żżomm il-kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi fl-istess livell;

Fl-aħħar nett, fir-rigward tar-raba’ kundizzjoni, li tirrikjedi t-tnedija ta’proċedura ta’ ħruġ ta’ offerti jew ta’ eżerċizzju ta’ parametraġġ referenzjarju ma’ operatur effiċjenti, l-Awtorità, b’referenza għall-proċedura ta’ ħruġ ta’ offerti mwettqa li rriżultat f’offerta waħda biss, dik ta’ Hurtigruten, f’dan l-istadju tiddubita jekk proċedura ta’ ħruġ ta’ offerti bħal dik inkwistjoni, tistax titqies li hija biżżejjed biex ikun żgurat “l-inqas kost għall-komunità”. Dan huwa partikolarment minnu għaliex Hurtigruten kellha vantaġġ kompetittiv sinifikanti li saħħaħ il-pożizzjoni tagħha fil-proċedura ta’ ħruġ ta’ offerti, ġaladarba fil-pussess tagħha kellha diġà vetturi adattati għar-rekwiżiti tal-ispeċifikazzjonijiet tal-offerta.

Barra minn hekk, skont l-ispeċifikazzjonijiet tal-offerta, l-assenjazzjoni għat-twettiq tal-OSP ġiet irreklamata bħala tliet alternattivi. Dan jindika l-eżistenza ta’ informazzjoni u/jew kriterji ta’ ponderazzjoni ulterjuri fost dawk l-alternattivi. Fid-dawl tal-fatt li tali informazzjoni ma kinitx inkluża fid-dokumenti tal-offerta, l-Awtorità għandha dubji dwar jekk l-offerta kif imfassla pprovdietx inċentivi lill-offerenti potenzjali, apparti Hurtigruten, li kienu jkunu lesti li jissottomettu l-offerta tagħhom f’konformità mar-rekwiżiti tat-tliet alternattivi differenti u għal alternattiva differenti minn dik li fir-realtà ntgħażlet.

L-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi ma ssottomettew l-ebda informazzjoni dwar l-eżerċizzju ta’ parametraġġ referenzjarju ma’ operatur effiċjenti.

Valutazzjoni tal-kompatibbiltà

Il-kompatibbiltà tal-kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi għat-trasport marittimu hija vvalutata abbażi tal-Artikolu 59(2) tal-Ftehim ŻEE flimkien mal-Qafas tal-Awtorità għall-għajnuna mill-Istat fl-għamla ta’ kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi (il-Qafas) (2).

Il-prinċipji stabbiliti fil-Qafas japplikaw biss għal kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi sa fejn ikun jikkostitwixxi għajnuna mill-Istat mhux koperta mid-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni 2012/21/UE dwar l-applikazzjoni tal-Artikolu 106(2) tat-Trattat dwar il-Funzjonament tal-Unjoni Ewropea għall-għajnuna mill-Istat taħt il-forma ta’ kumpens għas-servizzi pubbliċi mogħti lil ċerti impriżi inkarigati bil-ġestjoni ta’ servizzi ta’ interess ekonomiku ġenerali (id-Deċiżjoni SGEI) (3).

L-Awtorità ma rċeviet l-ebda informazzjoni mill-awtoritajiet Norveġiżi fir-rigward tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta’ kompatibbiltà u f’dan l-istadju għandha dubji dwar jekk il-FH huwiex kompatibbli mat-tħaddim tal-Ftehim ŻEE.

Konklużjoni

Fid-dawl tal-kunsiderazzjonijiet ta’ hawn fuq, l-Awtorità ddeċidiet li tiftaħ il-proċedura ta’ investigazzjoni formali f’konformità mal-Artikolu 1(2) fil-Parti I tal-Protokoll 3 tal-Ftehim bejn l-Istati tal-EFTA dwar it-Twaqqif ta’ Awtorità ta’ Sorveljanza u ta’ Qorti tal-Ġustizzja. Il-partijiet interessati huma mistiedna jissottomettu l-kummenti tagħhom fi żmien xahar mill-pubblikazzjoni ta’ dan l-avviż f’Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 490/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening the formal investigation procedure on the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019

(Norway)

[NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION]

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 59(2) and 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019.

| (2) | A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text.

| (3) | By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015.

2.   Background – the Hurtigruten Agreement

| (4) | Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

  Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route

| (5) | The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid.

| (6) | The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5) |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5)

| (7) | Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications.

| (8) | The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities.

| (9) | For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport.

| (10) | For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

  Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA







  2012 | NOK 700 million |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | NOK 683 million |
| 2014 | NOK 666 million |
| 2015 | NOK 649 million |
| 2016 | NOK 631 million |
| 2017 | NOK 614 million |
| 2018 | NOK 597 million |
| 2019 | NOK 580 million |

(10)

For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA

2012

NOK 700 million

2013

NOK 683 million

2014

NOK 666 million

2015

NOK 649 million

2016

NOK 631 million

2017

NOK 614 million

2018

NOK 597 million

2019

NOK 580 million

| (11) | According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route.

3.   The complaints
   (8)

| (12) | Both complainants have requested confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Both complainants have requested confidential treatment.

| (13) | The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:






  1. | The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:

1.

The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period.

| 2. | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:






  a. | Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:

a.

Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services.

| b. | Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.
  The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.
  In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions. |
| --- | --- |

b.

Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.

The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.

In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions.

| 3. | Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level.

| 4. | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities
   (10)

| (14) | On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes.

| (15) | Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million.

| (16) | Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013).

| (17) | As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions.

| (18) | Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12).

| (19) | In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo.

| (20) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing.

| (21) | As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis.

| (22) | The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices.

| (23) | It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction.

| (24) | In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service.

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand.

| (26) | For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge.

4.1   
  The BDO report

   (14)

| (27) | The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services).

| (28) | In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers.

| (29) | [...] |
| --- | --- |

(29)

[...]

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

1.1   
  The concept of state aid

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (31) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.2   
  State resources

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources.

1.3   
  Impact on trade and distortion of competition

| (33) | The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

| (34) | According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States.

| (35) | The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten.

1.4   
  Selective economic advantage on Hurtigruten

| (36) | The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (37) | It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  i. | ‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(37)

It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

i.

‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined;

| ii. | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...]; |
| --- | --- |

ii.

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...];

| iii. | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;

| iv. | Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19) |
| --- | --- |

iv.

Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19)

1.4.1   The first Altmark condition

| (38) | The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel.

| (39) | Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20). |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20).

| (40) | In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21). |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21).

| (41) | However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23). |
| --- | --- |

(41)

However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23).

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service.

| (43) | Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower.

| (44) | For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation.

| (45) | The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged.

| (46) | In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA. |
| --- | --- |

(46)

In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA.

| (47) | The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation.

| (48) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met.

1.4.2   The second Altmark condition

| (49) | The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations.

| (50) | Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’.

| (51) | It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

  Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service







  A: | Total revenues distance passengers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| B: | Passengers cost distance passengers |
| C: | Net passenger revenues (A+B) |
| D: | Revenues from on board sales |
| E: | Net revenues from goods and cars |
| F: | Other revenues |
| G: | Total own revenues (C+D+E+F) |
| H: | Government procurement of service |
| I: | Total revenue (G+H) |
| J: | Safety crew |
| K: | Oil and fuel |
| L: | Repairs and maintenance |
| M: | Port costs |
| N: | Insurance costs |
| O: | Depreciation own vessels/bareboat |
| P: | Net financial costs |
| Q: | Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P) |
| R: | Cost of goods sold |
| S: | Crew not included in the safety crew |
| T: | Marketing costs and sales provision |
| U: | Administration costs |
| V: | Other costs |
| W: | Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V) |
| X: | Total costs public service (Q+W) |
| Y: | Net result before taxes (I-X) |

(51)

It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service

A:

Total revenues distance passengers

B:

Passengers cost distance passengers

C:

Net passenger revenues (A+B)

D:

Revenues from on board sales

E:

Net revenues from goods and cars

F:

Other revenues

G:

Total own revenues (C+D+E+F)

H:

Government procurement of service

I:

Total revenue (G+H)

J:

Safety crew

K:

Oil and fuel

L:

Repairs and maintenance

M:

Port costs

N:

Insurance costs

O:

Depreciation own vessels/bareboat

P:

Net financial costs

Q:

Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P)

R:

Cost of goods sold

S:

Crew not included in the safety crew

T:

Marketing costs and sales provision

U:

Administration costs

V:

Other costs

W:

Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V)

X:

Total costs public service (Q+W)

Y:

Net result before taxes (I-X)

| (52) | In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers.

| (54) | At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre.

| (55) | Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs). |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs).

| (56) | In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26).

| (57) | In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27). |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27).

| (58) | In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn). |
| --- | --- |

(58)

In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn).

| (59) | The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service.

| (60) | Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition.

| (61) | As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled.

1.4.3   The third Altmark condition

| (62) | When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (63) | In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28).

| (64) | Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:






  i) | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:

i)

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| ii) | The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly

| iv) | Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| (65) | As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation.

| (66) | The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year.

| (67) | The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers.

| (68) | Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120.

| (69) | In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded.

| (70) | Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation.

| (71) | On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions.

| (72) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted.

| (73) | Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided.

| (75) | Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period.

| (76) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled.

1.4.4   The fourth Altmark condition

| (77) | Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013).

| (78) | Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below.

| (79) | Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications.

| (80) | Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:








  i. | : | Alternative 1 | : | Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ii. | : | Alternative 2 | : | Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and |
| iii. | : | Alternative 3 | : | Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports. |

(80)

Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:

i.

:

Alternative 1

:

Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports;

ii.

:

Alternative 2

:

Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and

iii.

:

Alternative 3

:

Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports.

| (81) | However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1).

| (82) | The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped.

| (83) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met.

1.4.5   Conclusion on the Altmark conditions

| (84) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations.

2.   Conclusion on the presence of aid

| (85) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (86) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (87) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1   
  The legal framework

| (88) | The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33).

| (89) | The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34).

| (90) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility.

4.2   
  Applicability of Decision 2012/21/EU

| (91) | The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

| (92) | There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:







  ‘(d) | compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:

‘(d)

compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’;

| (93) | The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers.

| (94) | In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit.

| (95) | The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with.

4.3   
  Applicability of the Framework

| (96) | On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’.

| (97) | Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36) |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36)

| (98) | On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service.

| (99) | The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:
  a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;
  b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;
  c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;
  d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;
  e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;
  f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;
  g.   Paragraph 60: transparency. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:

a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;

b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;

c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;

d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;

e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;

f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;

g.   Paragraph 60: transparency.

| (100) | The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (101) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (102) | The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (103) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (104) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules.

| (105) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten.

| (106) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. They are further requested to provide, also within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 4

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, on 9 December 2015.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Svedman

President

Helga Jónsdóttir

College Member

---

(1)  Is-sentenza mogħtija f’Altmark Trans GmbH u Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, il-paragrafi 87-93.

1

Altmark Trans GmbH u Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(2)  Disponibbli fis-sit web http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf

2

(3)  ĠU L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, inkorporata fil-punt 1h tal-Anness XV għall-Ftehim ŻEE.

3

(4)  OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1. See also Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, upholding the Authority's Decision.

4

Hurtigruten

(5)  See www.doffin.no.

5

(6)  If Statistics Norway's cost index is unavailable, Statistics Norway's Consumer Price Index would be used.

6

(7)  As mentioned in the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL ‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’, section 1.2.

7

‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’,

(8)  Doc Nos 748323 and 715314.

8

(9)  The complainants point to the fact that in the call for tender for the 2005-2012 contract period force majeure as a result of extreme weather conditions was defined as wind speeds over 25 m/s (full storm). However, in the current HA, ‘extreme weather conditions’ are defined as ‘conditions where ocean and/or wind conditions are such that the ship's captain judges it to be unsafe to continue the sailing and/or arrive at a specific port’. This, according to the complainants, has resulted in the majority of the cancellations during the period 2012-2013 in select ports to have occurred at wind conditions below 15 m/s.

9

force majeure

(10)  Doc Nos 723002 and 742652.

10

(11)  The Norwegian authorities submit that according to Hurtigruten's reports, ships were out of production for 171 operating days in 2012 and 186.7 operating days in 2013 due to maintenance and unforeseen operational disturbances, for 5 operating days in 2012 and 12.8 operating days in 2013 due to the ships being used for cultural or similar activities, and finally for 87 operating days in 2012 and 99.8 operating days in 2013 due to extraordinary weather conditions.

11

(12)  On 12 December 2014, Hurtigruten paid back to the Norwegian authorities the amount of NOK [24 – 32] million due to cancellations in 2012 and 2013.

12

(13)  The previous NPA of 1984 distinguished between port fees and service charges. There were several different port fees, e.g. quay fees covering quay costs, approach fees covering costs of keeping the fairway and port approach open and safe, passenger fees covering costs of special passenger facilities etc. Ports could additionally levy service charges for services they sold, which were not covered by the port fees.

13

(14)  BDO Memo, ‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’, Oslo 14 January 2015, p. 7.

14

‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’

(15)  Judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11; judgment in Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41; and judgment in Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 75.

15

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7).

16

(17)  The maritime cabotage regulation was incorporated at point 53a in Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 30, 5.2.1998, p. 42).

17

(18)  Norwegian Cruise Line, MSC Cruises, Royal Caribbean, Holland America Line, etc.

18

(19)  Paragraphs 87-93.

19

(20)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15132&1=1.

20

(21)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

21

(22)  Judgment in Alanir and others, C-205/1999, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 34.

22

Alanir and others

(23)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions updating and rectifying the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), COM(2003) 595 final, 22.12.2003, section 5.2.

23

(24)  BDO Memo, page 7.

24

(25)  Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraph 117.

25

Hurtigruten

(26)  Ibid, paragraphs 128-129.

26

(27)  Ibid, paragraph 127.

27

(28)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, judgment in Enirisorse, C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, paragraphs 37-40.

28

Enirisorse

(29)  Section 2.

29

(30)  See footnote 11.

30

(31)  Paragraph 68, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

31

(32)  For background information on the Hurtigruten Agreement, see Decision No 205/11/COL on the Supplementary Agreement on the Hurtigruten service, section 2, OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1.

32

(33)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

33

(34)  OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporated at point 1h of Annex XV of the EEA Agreement.

34

(35)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

35

Italy

Commission

(36)  See also paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Framework for alternative calculation methods.

36

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| 30.6.2016 | MT | Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea | C 236/45 |
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30.6.2016

MT

Il-Ġurnal Uffiċjali tal-Unjoni Ewropea

C 236/45

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Tħabbira min-Norveġja dwar id-Direttiva 94/22/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u tal-Kunsill dwar il-kundizzjonijiet għall-għoti u l-użu ta’ awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-ipprospettar, l-esplorazzjoni u l-produzzjoni ta’ idrokarburi

Tħabbira ta’ stedina għall-applikazzjoni ta’ liċenzji għall-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża (BKN) — Għotjiet f’Żoni Predefiniti 2016

(2016/C 236/12)

Il-Ministeru Norveġiż għaż-Żejt mhux Raffinat u l-Enerġija b’dan qiegħed iħabbar stedina għall-applikazzjoni għal liċenzji għall-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat b’konformità mad-Direttiva 94/22/KE tal-Parlament Ewropew u l-Kunsill tat-30 ta’ Mejju 1994 dwar il-kundizzjonijiet għall-għoti u l-użu ta’ awtorizzazzjonijiet għall-ipprospettar, l-esplorazzjoni u l-produzzjoni ta’ idrokarburi (1), Artikolu 3(2)(a).

Il-liċenzji għall-produzzjoni se jingħataw biss lil kumpaniji rreġistrati fin-Norveġja jew fi stat ieħor imsieħeb fil-Ftehim dwar iż-Żona Ekonomika Ewropea (il-Ftehim ŻEE), jew lil persuni fiżiċi domiċiljati fi stat imsieħeb fil-Ftehim ŻEE.

Kumpaniji li ma għandhomx liċenzja għal fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża jistgħu jingħataw liċenzji għall-produzzjoni jekk ikunu kwalifikati minn qabel bħala detenturi ta’ liċenzja għal fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża.

Il-Ministeru ser jittratta l-kumpaniji individwali u l-kumpaniji li japplikaw bħala parti minn grupp bl-istess mod. L-applikanti li jissottomettu applikazzjoni individwali, jew l-applikanti li jagħmlu parti minn grupp li jissottometti applikazzjoni konġunta, se jkunu kkunsidrati lkoll bħala applikant għal liċenzja għall-produzzjoni. Il-Ministeru jista’, fuq il-bażi ta’ applikazzjonijiet li ġew sottomessi minn gruppi jew applikanti individwali, jgħaqqad il-kompożizzjoni tal-gruppi liċenzjati li jingħataw liċenzja tal-produzzjoni ġdida, inkluż it-tneħħija tal-applikanti f’applikazzjoni ta’ grupp u ż-żieda ta’ applikanti individwali, u l-ħatra tal-operatur għal gruppi bħal dawn.

L-għoti ta’ interess ta’ parteċipazzjoni f’liċenzja għall-produzzjoni se jkun soġġett għad-dħul tad-detenturi ta’ liċenzja fi Ftehim dwar Attivitajiet marbutin maż-Żejt mhux Raffinat, li jinkludi Ftehim Operattiv Konġunt u Ftehim ta’ Kontabbilità. Jekk il-liċenzja għall-produzzjoni tinqasam b’mod stratigrafiku, id-detenturi taż-żewġ liċenzji maqsuma b’mod stratigrafiku jintalbu wkoll jidħlu fi Ftehim Operattiv Konġunt, li jirregola r-relazzjoni ta’ bejniethom f’dan ir-rigward.

Malli jiġu ffirmati l-ftehimiet imsemmija, id-detenturi tal-liċenzji jingħaqdu f’impriża konġunta li fiha d-daqs tal-interess parteċipanti tagħhom dejjem se jibqa’ identiku għall-interess parteċipanti tagħhom fil-liċenzja għall-produzzjoni.

Id-dokumenti tal-liċenzja ser ikunu bbażati prinċipalment fuq dokumenti rilevanti mill-Għotjiet f’Żoni Predefiniti 2015. L-għan hu li l-elementi prinċipali ta’ kwalunkwe aġġustamenti għall-qafas isiru disponibbli għall-industrija qabel iż-żmien tal-applikazzjoni.

Il-kriterji għall-għoti ta’ liċenzja għall-produzzjoni

Fl-interess ta’ ġestjoni tajba tar-riżorsi u biex l-esplorazzjoni u l-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża jsiru b’mod rapidu u effiċjenti, inkluż il-kompożizzjoni ta’ gruppi ta’ liċenzja sabiex jiżguraw dan, għandhom japplikaw il-kriterji li ġejjin għall-għoti tal-interessi parteċipanti fil-liċenzji għall-produzzjoni u għall-ħatra ta’ operatur:

| (a) | L-għarfien ġeoloġiku tal-applikant dwar iż-żona ġeografika inkwistjoni, u kif il-liċenzjati jipproponu li jwettqu l-esplorazzjoni effiċjenti għaż-żejt mhux raffinat. |
| --- | --- |

(a)

L-għarfien ġeoloġiku tal-applikant dwar iż-żona ġeografika inkwistjoni, u kif il-liċenzjati jipproponu li jwettqu l-esplorazzjoni effiċjenti għaż-żejt mhux raffinat.

| (b) | Il-kompetenza teknika rilevanti tal-applikant, u kif din il-kompetenza tista’ tikkontribwixxi b’mod attiv għall-esplorazzjoni ekonomika u, kif inhu xieraq, il-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat fiż-żona ġeografika inkwistjoni. |
| --- | --- |

(b)

Il-kompetenza teknika rilevanti tal-applikant, u kif din il-kompetenza tista’ tikkontribwixxi b’mod attiv għall-esplorazzjoni ekonomika u, kif inhu xieraq, il-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux raffinat fiż-żona ġeografika inkwistjoni.

| (c) | L-esperjenza tal-applikant fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża jew esperjenza rilevanti ekwivalenti f’żoni oħra. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

L-esperjenza tal-applikant fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża jew esperjenza rilevanti ekwivalenti f’żoni oħra.

| (d) | Li l-applikant għandu jkollu l-kapaċità finanzjarja sodisfaċenti biex iwettaq l-esplorazzjoni għaż-żejt mhux raffinat, u, kif xieraq, il-produzzjoni tiegħu fiż-żona ġeografika inkwistjoni. |
| --- | --- |

(d)

Li l-applikant għandu jkollu l-kapaċità finanzjarja sodisfaċenti biex iwettaq l-esplorazzjoni għaż-żejt mhux raffinat, u, kif xieraq, il-produzzjoni tiegħu fiż-żona ġeografika inkwistjoni.

| (e) | Jekk l-applikant huwa, jew kien, detentur ta’ liċenżja, tal-produzzjoni l-Ministeru jista’ jieħu f’kunsiderazzjoni kwalunkwe forma ta’ ineffiċjenza jew nuqqas ta’ responsabilità murija mill-applikant bħala detentur ta’ liċenzja. |
| --- | --- |

(e)

Jekk l-applikant huwa, jew kien, detentur ta’ liċenżja, tal-produzzjoni l-Ministeru jista’ jieħu f’kunsiderazzjoni kwalunkwe forma ta’ ineffiċjenza jew nuqqas ta’ responsabilità murija mill-applikant bħala detentur ta’ liċenzja.

| (f) | Il-liċenzji għall-produzzjoni se jingħataw prinċipalament lil impriża konġunta li fiha minn tal-inqas waħda minn fost dawk li ngħataw liċenzja tkun ħaffret minn tal-inqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollha esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-NCS (il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża). |
| --- | --- |

(f)

Il-liċenzji għall-produzzjoni se jingħataw prinċipalament lil impriża konġunta li fiha minn tal-inqas waħda minn fost dawk li ngħataw liċenzja tkun ħaffret minn tal-inqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollha esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-NCS (il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża).

| (g) | Prinċipalment, ser jinħarġu liċenzji għall-produzzjoni lil żewġ detenturi jew aktar, fejn minn tal-inqas wieħed mill-parteċipanti li jingħataw liċenzja jkollu esperjenza kif imsemmi f’(f). |
| --- | --- |

(g)

Prinċipalment, ser jinħarġu liċenzji għall-produzzjoni lil żewġ detenturi jew aktar, fejn minn tal-inqas wieħed mill-parteċipanti li jingħataw liċenzja jkollu esperjenza kif imsemmi f’(f).

| (h) | L-operatur maħtur għal-liċenzji għall-produzzjoni fil-Baħar Barents irid ikun ħaffer minn tal-inqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollu esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-BKN. |
| --- | --- |

(h)

L-operatur maħtur għal-liċenzji għall-produzzjoni fil-Baħar Barents irid ikun ħaffer minn tal-inqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollu esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-BKN.

| (i) | Għal-liċenzji ta’ produzzjoni f’baħar fond, kemm l-operatur li jinħatar kif ukoll minn tal-anqas detentur wieħed ieħor iridu jkunu ħaffru minn tal-anqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollhom esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-NCS. Fil-liċenzja għall-produzzjoni, entità waħda li tingħata liċenzja trid tkun ħaffret f’ibħra fondi bħala operatur. |
| --- | --- |

(i)

Għal-liċenzji ta’ produzzjoni f’baħar fond, kemm l-operatur li jinħatar kif ukoll minn tal-anqas detentur wieħed ieħor iridu jkunu ħaffru minn tal-anqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollhom esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-NCS. Fil-liċenzja għall-produzzjoni, entità waħda li tingħata liċenzja trid tkun ħaffret f’ibħra fondi bħala operatur.

| (j) | Għal-liċenzji ta’ produzzjoni fejn ikun mistenni li jsir tħaffir ta’ bjar fi pressa għolja u/jew temperaturi għoljin (HTHP), kemm l-operatur li jinħatar kif ukoll minn tal-anqas detentur ieħor iridu jkunu ħaffru minn tal-anqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollhom esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-NCS. Fil-liċenzja għall-produzzjoni, entità waħda minn fost dawk li jingħataw liċenzja trid tkun ħaffret bir HTHP bħala operatur. |
| --- | --- |

(j)

Għal-liċenzji ta’ produzzjoni fejn ikun mistenni li jsir tħaffir ta’ bjar fi pressa għolja u/jew temperaturi għoljin (HTHP), kemm l-operatur li jinħatar kif ukoll minn tal-anqas detentur ieħor iridu jkunu ħaffru minn tal-anqas bir wieħed fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża bħala operatur, jew ikollhom esperjenza operazzjonali rilevanti ekwivalenti barra mill-NCS. Fil-liċenzja għall-produzzjoni, entità waħda minn fost dawk li jingħataw liċenzja trid tkun ħaffret bir HTHP bħala operatur.

Blokok li għalihom tista’ ssir applikazzjoni

L-applikazzjonijiet għal interessi ta’ parteċipazzjoni f’ liċenzji għall-produzzjoni jistgħu jiġu sottomessi għall-blokok li mhumiex liċenzjati fiż-żona ddefinita minn qabel, kif muri fuq il-mapep ippubblikati mill-NPD. Huwa wkoll possibbli li ssir applikazzjoni għal żoni li ġew ċeduti fiż-żona definita minn qabel, wara t-tħabbira skont mapep aġġornati dwar il-Factmaps interattivi tad-Direttorat taż-Żejt mhux Maħdum Norveġiż li jinsabu fuq il-paġna web tal-NPD).

Kull liċenzja għall-produzzjoni tista’ tikkonsisti fi blokka jew aktar jew parti minn blokka/blokok. L-applikanti huma mitluba li jillimitaw id-deskrizzjoni fl-applikazzjoni għal oqsma fejn huma jkunu fasslu prospettivament.

It-test sħiħ tat-tħabbira, li jinkludi mapep iddettaljati taż-żoni disponibbli jinsab fuq il-paġna web tad-Direttorat taż-Żejt mhux Maħdum Norveġiż www.npd.no/apa2016

L-applikazzjonijiet għal liċenzji għall-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux maħdum jintbagħtu lil

| Ministry of Petroleum and Energy |
| --- |
| P.O. Box 8148 Dep. |
| N-0033 Oslo |
| IN-NORVEĠJA |

Ministry of Petroleum and Energy

P.O. Box 8148 Dep.

N-0033 Oslo

IN-NORVEĠJA

Għandhom jintbagħtu żewġ kopji lil

| The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate P.O. |
| --- |
| Box 600 |
| N-4003 Stavanger |
| IN-NORVEĠJA |

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate P.O.

Box 600

N-4003 Stavanger

IN-NORVEĠJA

Data ta’ skadenza: is-6 ta’ Settembru 2016, f’12.00 (nofsinhar).

L-għoti ta’ liċenzji għall-produzzjoni taż-żejt mhux maħdum fl-“Għotjiet f’Żoni Predefiniti għall-2016” fuq il-Blata Kontinentali Norveġiża huwa ppjanat li jseħħ fl-ewwel kwart tal-2017.

---

(1)  ĠU L 164, 30.6.1994, p. 3.

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V Avviżi

PROĊEDURI AMMINISTRATTIVI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

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Sejħa għall-proposti f’konformità mal-programm ta’ ħidma multiannwali għall-għoti ta’ għajnuna finanzjarja fil-qasam tal-infrastruttura trans-Ewropea tal-enerġija fil-kuntest tal-Faċilità Nikkollegaw l-Ewropa għall-perjodu 2014-2020

(Id-Deċiżjoni tal-Kummissjoni (C(2016)1587))

(2016/C 236/13)

Id-Direttorat Ġenerali għall-Enerġija tal-Kummissjoni Ewropea, qiegħed b’dan jiftaħ sejħa għall-proposti sabiex jitqassmu għotjiet f’konformità mal-prijoritajiet u l-għanijiet definiti fil-programm ta’ ħidma multiannwali fil-qasam tal-infrastruttura trans-Ewropea tal-enerġija fil-kuntest tal-Faċilità Nikkollegaw l-Ewropa għall-perjodu 2014–2020.

Qed jintlaqgħu proposti għal din is-sejħa:

CEF-Energy-2016-2

L-ammont indikattiv disponibbli għall-proposti magħżula fil-kuntest ta’ din is-sejħa għall-proposti huwa ta’ EUR 600 miljun.

L-iskadenza għall-preżentazzjoni tal-proposti hija t-8 ta’ Novembru 2016.

It-test sħiħ tas-sejħa għall-proposti huwa disponibbli fuq:

https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/https%3A//ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/calls/second-2016-cef-energy-call-proposals-2016-2

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PROĊEDURI DWAR L-IMPLIMENTAZZJONI TAL-POLITIKA TAL-KOMPETIZZJONI

Il-Kummissjoni Ewropea

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Notifika minn qabel ta’ konċentrazzjoni

(Il-Każ M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International)

Każ li jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal proċedura ssimplifikata

(Test b'rilevanza għaż-ŻEE)

(2016/C 236/14)

| 1. | Fil-21 ta’ Ġunju 2016, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV (“BNPPF PE”, il-Belġju), Sofindev IV NV (“Sofindev”, il-Belġju) u DHAM NV (“Korys/Colruyt Group”, il-Belġju jakkwistaw, fit-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll konġunt tal-impriża Novy International NV (“Novy”, il-Belġju) permezz ta’ xiri ta’ ishma. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Fil-21 ta’ Ġunju 2016, il-Kummissjoni rċeviet notifika ta’ konċentrazzjoni proposta skont l-Artikolu 4 tar-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (1) li permezz tagħha BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV (“BNPPF PE”, il-Belġju), Sofindev IV NV (“Sofindev”, il-Belġju) u DHAM NV (“Korys/Colruyt Group”, il-Belġju jakkwistaw, fit-tifsira tal-Artikolu 3(1)(b) tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet, il-kontroll konġunt tal-impriża Novy International NV (“Novy”, il-Belġju) permezz ta’ xiri ta’ ishma.

| 2. | L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:
  —   għal BNPPF PE: ekwità privata u finanzjament intermedju. Il-kumpaniji portafoll tagħha joperaw f’setturi bħal dawk li jissupplixxi u jimmanifatturaw il-metall u l-plastik, il-fondi b’kapital inizjali tal-università, il-prodotti tal-forn, il-forniment tas-servizzi industrijali u l-proprjetà immobbli,
  —   għal Sofindev: investimenti ta’ ekwità privata f’intrapriżi żgħar u ta’ daqs medju Belġjani. Il-kumpaniji portafoll tagħha huma attivi fid-distribuzzjoni ta’ materjal għas-soqfa u l-faċċati u l-iżvilupp ta’ soluzzjonijiet ta’ software bbażati fil-post,
  —   għal Korys/Colruyt Group: is-swieq bl-imnut, bl-ingrossa u ta’ servizzi tal-ikel. Hija għandha wkoll attivitajiet f’soluzzjonijiet ta’ software, proġetti tal-enerġija sostenibbli/rinnovabbli u s-suq tax-xjenzi mediċi/tal-ħajja,
  —   għal Novy: id-disinn, il-manifattura u l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta’ tagħmir tal-kċina ta’ kwalità għolja, prinċipalment cooker hoods. |
| --- | --- |

2.

L-attivitajiet kummerċjali tal-impriżi kkonċernati huma:

—   għal BNPPF PE: ekwità privata u finanzjament intermedju. Il-kumpaniji portafoll tagħha joperaw f’setturi bħal dawk li jissupplixxi u jimmanifatturaw il-metall u l-plastik, il-fondi b’kapital inizjali tal-università, il-prodotti tal-forn, il-forniment tas-servizzi industrijali u l-proprjetà immobbli,

—   għal Sofindev: investimenti ta’ ekwità privata f’intrapriżi żgħar u ta’ daqs medju Belġjani. Il-kumpaniji portafoll tagħha huma attivi fid-distribuzzjoni ta’ materjal għas-soqfa u l-faċċati u l-iżvilupp ta’ soluzzjonijiet ta’ software bbażati fil-post,

—   għal Korys/Colruyt Group: is-swieq bl-imnut, bl-ingrossa u ta’ servizzi tal-ikel. Hija għandha wkoll attivitajiet f’soluzzjonijiet ta’ software, proġetti tal-enerġija sostenibbli/rinnovabbli u s-suq tax-xjenzi mediċi/tal-ħajja,

—   għal Novy: id-disinn, il-manifattura u l-kummerċjalizzazzjoni ta’ tagħmir tal-kċina ta’ kwalità għolja, prinċipalment cooker hoods.

| 3. | Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta’ ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (2), ta’ min jinnota li dan il-każ jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal trattament skont il-proċedura stipulata f’dan l-Avviż. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Wara eżami preliminari, il-Kummissjoni tqis li t-tranżazzjoni notifikata tista’ taqa’ fil-kamp ta’ applikazzjoni tar-Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet. Madankollu, id-deċiżjoni finali dwar dan il-punt hija riżervata. Skont l-Avviż tal-Kummissjoni dwar proċedura simplifikata għat-trattament ta’ ċerti konċentrazzjonijiet skont ir-Regolament tal-Kunsill (KE) Nru 139/2004 (2), ta’ min jinnota li dan il-każ jista’ jiġi kkunsidrat għal trattament skont il-proċedura stipulata f’dan l-Avviż.

| 4. | Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil terzi persuni interessati biex jibagħtulha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.
  Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bin-numru ta’ referenza M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, f’dan l-indirizz:





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Il-Kummissjoni tistieden lil terzi persuni interessati biex jibagħtulha l-kummenti li jista’ jkollhom dwar l-operazzjoni proposta.

Il-kummenti jridu jaslu għand il-Kummissjoni mhux aktar tard minn għaxart ijiem wara d-data ta’ din il-pubblikazzjoni. Il-kummenti jistgħu jintbagħtu lill-Kummissjoni permezz tal-faks (+32 22964301), permezz tal-email lil COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu jew permezz tal-posta, bin-numru ta’ referenza M.8094 — BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium/Sofindev IV/DHAM/Novy International, f’dan l-indirizz:

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  ĠU L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 (ir-“Regolament dwar l-Għaqdiet”).

(2)  ĠU C 366, 14.12.2013, p. 5.

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