*

 District Judge of the Western District of Louisiana, sitting by designation.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

__________________

No. 01-20938

__________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

ERNEST SCOTT SHELTON,

Defendant-Appellant,

______________________________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Texas

______________________________________________

March 18, 2003

Before BENAVIDES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges, and WALTER,* District Judge.

BENAVIDES, Circuit Judge: 

Ernest Scott Shelton appeals his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm following a

misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). Shelton challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence on several bases, including whether the predicate offense contains an

element of use of force and whether the predicate offense must contain the element of a domestic

relationship between the defendant and the victim. Guided by the precedent of this and other circuits,
1

 Shelton also argues that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional on its face because it does not

require a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. He recognizes that this claim is precluded

by precedent and raises it only to preserve it for further review. 

2 On motion by the Government, count two of the indictment was dismissed. 

2

we reject these challenges and conclude that (1) causing bodilyinjurynecessarily includesthe element

of use of physical force and that (2) the domestic relationship is not required to be an element of the

predicate offense. We also reject Shelton’s contention that § 922(g)(9) requires knowledge that it

was unlawful to possess a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of violence.1

 

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ernest Scott Shelton was charged with the unlawful possession of a firearm following a

misdemeanor conviction of domestic violence, in violation of § 922(g)(9) (Count 1), and with making

a false and fictitious written statement in connection with the acquisition of a firearm from a licensed

dealer (Count 2). Shelton filed pretrial motions to dismiss, alleging that § 922(g)(9) was

unconstitutional for violating the notice and fair warning requirements of the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment and for failing to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Shelton

also argued that, pursuant to § 921(a)(33)(B)(ii), his prior misdemeanor conviction of assault could

not be used to support the § 922(g)(9) charge since it did not result in the loss of his civil rights.

Shelton’s motions were denied by the district court. 

Shelton waived his right to a jury trial and agreed to proceed to a bench trial on the §

922(g)(9) charge only2 based on the following stipulated facts:
3

1. On or about July 14, 2000 in the Houston Division of the Southern District

of Texas the Defendant, Ernest Scott Shelton, did knowingly possess a firearm,

namely, a Winchester 12 gauge shotgun.

2. Agent Carla Mayfield would truthfully testify at trial that the said firearm

that was possessed by Defendant on July 14, 2000 was manufactured outside the

state ofTexasin the state ofConnecticut and had therefore been transported fromone

state to another prior to the Defendant’s possession of the firearm in the state of

Texas.

3. Prior to Defendant’s possession of the firearm on July 14, 2000, the

Defendant had been convicted in Harris County Criminal Court at Law #8 of the

misdemeanor offense of Assault on March 6, 1998 in cause number 9750538. The

Defendant was represented by an attorney and he pled guilty in the case after

knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to a trial by jury.

4. The alleged victim in cause number 9750538 is Amanda Alvarado. The

assault that the defendant was convicted of in that cause is alleged to have occurred

on December 7, 1997. At that time Amanda Alvarado was the defendant’s live[-]in

girlfriend and had resided with the defendant for approximately two months.

After presentation of the stipulated evidence, Shelton moved for judgment of acquittal.

Among other things, Sheltonargued that his prior Texasmisdemeanor assault conviction did not meet

the definition of “crime of domestic violence” for purposes of § 922(g)(9) because it did not require

proof that the offense involved “the use or attempted use of physical force” by a person “who is

cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person

similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim,” as required by § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii).

During oral argument on his motion, Shelton conceded that, by “grabbing the complainant

by the shirt and throwing the complainant onto a bed,” physical force had been employed during the

commission of the misdemeanor assault. The district court found that, with respect to the domestic

relationship requirement of § 922(g)(9), a “live-in girlfriend” constituted someone “similarly situated

to a spouse” for purposes of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). Accordingly, Shelton’s motion for acquittal was
4

denied, and the district court found him guilty of the § 922(g)(9) charge. 

Shelton filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. He was

sentenced to 21 months of imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term ofsupervised release.

Shelton filed a timely notice of appeal. 

II. ANALYSIS

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Shelton raises several challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction

for possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.

18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(9) and 924(a)(2). This Court reviews a district court's finding of guilt after a

bench trial to determine whether it is supported by "any substantial evidence." United States v.

Rosas-Fuentes, 970 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.1992). Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction

if any rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (1979). In conducting this

inquiry, we examine the evidence as a whole and construe it in the light most favorable to the verdict.

United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559, 560-61 (5th Cir.1998). The district court’s legal

conclusions are reviewed de novo. United States v. Jones, 172 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Section 922(g)(9) provides as follows: “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been

convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence . . . [to] possess in or affecting

commerce, any firearm or ammunition . . . .” The term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”
5

is defined as a misdemeanor under federal or state law that “has, as an element, the use or attempted

use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former

spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in

common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent,

or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.” 18

U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A). Shelton’s prior conviction for misdemeanor assault was pursuant to §

22.01(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code, which provides that “[a] person commits an offense if the

person . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the

person’s spouse. . . .” Shelton has admitted that the victim of his prior conviction was his “live-in

girlfriend” of two months at the time of the assault. 

1. Whether the predicate offense contains the element of use of force

Shelton first argues that his prior conviction for misdemeanor assault pursuant to §

22.01(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code does not constitute a “crime of domestic violence” within the

definition of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) because the Texas misdemeanor assault statute did not contain

the element of “the use or attempted use of physical force.” 

a. Fifth Circuit Precedent

Although we have not resolved this precise question with respect to Shelton’s offense, this
3

 In pertinent part, § 22.05(a) provides that: “A person commits an offense if he recklessly

engages in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.”

4

 In pertinent part, § 22.07(a) provides that “A person commits an offense if he threatens to

commit any offense involving violence to any person or property with intent to: (1) cause a

reaction of any type to his threat by an official or volunteer agency organized to deal with

emergencies; (2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury . . . .” 

5

 Although the government relies in part on Shelton’s admission in district court that he used

physical force during the assault in question, we look to the elements set forth in the statute-- not

the actual conduct to determine whether the offense qualifies as a crime of domestic violence. See

White, 258 F.3d at 382 (explaining that the “elements of the offense are determined by the statute

defining it). 

6

Court has concluded that the Texas offenses of reckless conduct (§ 22.05)3and terroristic threat (§

22.07)4do not contain the element of “the use or attempted use of physical force.” United States v.

White, 269 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2001). In White, we explained that the offense of “‘recklessly

engag[ing] in conduct that places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury” in violation

of § 22.05(a) “does not require that the perpetrator actually ‘use’ ‘physicalforce’ against another (or

use it at all).” Id. at 382. Immediately after this sentence, in a footnote with a “compare” signal, this

Court set forth the elements of § 22.01(a), the instant predicate offense. The government asserts that

this footnote distinguished the statute at issue in White, which did not require use of physical force,

from the instant statute, which does require use of physical force. Although such an interpretation

of the footnote is quite plausible, because there is no parenthetical explaining why the cite was

preceded by a “compare” signal, it is not entirely clear whether the cite to the instant statute supports

the proposition that the instant offense contains the element of “physical force” necessary to satisfy

§ 921(a)(33)(A)(ii)’s definition of domestic crime of violence. In any event, any such implication

would be dictum.5 

Subsequent to oral argument in the instant case, this Court held that a Texas conviction for
6

 Under the guidelines, “crime of violence” is defined as an “offense under federal, state, or

local law that has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

the person of another . . . .” § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1).

7

 Judge Clement dissented, opining that the holding in Vargas-Duran conflicts with other Fifth

Circuit precedent, including Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2002). Vargas-Duran, at *4-9

(Clement, J., dissenting). Later in the instant opinion, we distinguish the holding in Gracia-Cantu

from the case at bar.

7

intoxication assault qualified as a “crime of violence” for sentence enhancement purposes. United

States v. Vargas-Duran, 2003 WL 131712 (5thCir.Jan. 16, 2003). In that case, the appellant argued

that his prior conviction did not constitute a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii)

because it did not contain the element of intentional use of force against a person.6 We disagreed,

stating that because the appellant’s conviction for intoxication assault required proof that he caused

“‘serious bodily injury to another,’” such offense “has as an element the use of force against the

person of another.” Vargas-Duran, at *1 (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.07 (Vernon 1994))

(emphasis in opinion). More specifically, we explained that “the requirement that the offender

“cause[ ] serious bodily injury” encompasses a requirement that the offender use force to cause that

injury.” Id. (brackets in opinion).7 

Although Vargas-Duran is not on all fours with Shelton’s case in that it involved the

interpretation of the elements of the Texas offense of intoxication assault in the context of a

sentencing guideline enhancement (as opposed to the interpretation of the elements of the Texas

offense of misdemeanor assault in the context of a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) conviction for possession

of a firearm), the discussion certainly informs the instant question. Applying the analysis of VargasDuran to the case at bar, it appears the “bodily injury” element of Shelton’s predicate offense would

also encompass a requirement that Shelton used force to cause the injury. Although Shelton’s
8

misdemeanor offense did not require serious bodily injury, we do not believe that rendersthe analysis

inapplicable.

b. Precedent from other circuits with respect to § 922(g)(9)

Interpreting a state assault statute nearly identical to the one at issue, the First Circuit held

that the phrase “bodily injury” included an element of use of physical force. United States v. Nason,

269 F.3d 10 (1st Cir.2001). The First Circuit held that “bodily injury” or “offensive physical

contact” under the Maine general-purpose assault statute necessarily involved use of force in the

context of a § 922(g)(9) challenge. Id. The Maine assault statute provides that “[a] person is guilty

of assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury or offensive physical

contact to another.” Me.Rev.Stat. Ann. Title 17-A, § 207(1) (emphasis added). The First Circuit

stated that all three types of bodily injury (pain, illness, and impairment) set forth in Maine’s criminal

code are modified by the word “physical.” Nason, 269 F.3d at 20. The First Circuit then opined that

“[c]ommon sense suppliesthe missing piece ofthe puzzle: to cause physical injury, force necessarily

must be physical in nature.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded that physical force is a formal element

of assault under the “bodily injury” portion of the Maine misdemeanor assault statute. Id. 

As stated, the pertinent language of the Maine assault statute is essentially identical to the

Texas assault statute in question at bar. Following the reasoning of the First Circuit, we look to

Texas’s definition of “bodily injury.” Under Texas law, “‘[b]odily injury’ means physical pain, illness,

or any impairment of physical condition.” § 1.07(a)(8) of the Texas Penal Code. Although the Texas

definition modifies “pain” and “impairment” with the term “physical,” it does not use the term
9

“physical” to modify illness. Nonetheless, the term “physical” is implicit in any type of “bodily injury”

inasmuch as “bodily” is defined as “having a body: PHYSICAL” or “of or relating to the body.”

Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 164 (1984). As such, the fact that “illness” is not

modified by the word “physical” in the context of the Texas statute is a distinction without a

difference. 

Shelton’s predicate offense does contain bodily injury as an element. According to Nason,

the force inflicting such injurymust be physical in nature, and thus use of physicalforce is a necessary

element of the crime. 

Additionally, the EighthCircuit hasreached a similar conclusion. United States v. Smith, 171

F.3d 617 (8th Cir. 1999). In Smith, the defendant was convicted pursuant to the federal statute in

question, § 922(g)(9). The predicate offense was an Iowa assault statute that prohibited an act

intended to cause pain, injury or offensive or insulting physical contact. See Iowa Code § 708.1(1).

Smith argued that mere physical contact would not constitute use of physicalforce. Smith, 171 F.3d

at 621 n.2. The Eighth Circuit disagreed, explaining that “physical contact, by necessity, requires

physical force to complete.” Id. 

c. Shelton’s Arguments

Nonetheless, Sheltoncontendsthat the instant misdemeanorstatute isresult-oriented because

it isthe result of the offense (bodily injury) that is proscribed, not the conduct. Thus, Shelton argues

that ifthe statute does not proscribe any conduct, by definition it does not require that the perpetrator

actually use or attempt to use physical force to effect the proscribed result. In support of this
8

 The commentary to § 2L1.2 notes that the definition for “aggravated felony” is set forth in 8

U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Section 1101(a)(43)(F) provides the following definition: “a crime of

violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18 . . .) for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least

one year.” (footnote omitted). Here, we discuss only the definition of “crime of violence” set

forth in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), not the definition in § 16(b).

10

contention, Shelton relies on a recent decision ofthis Court. In Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308 (5thCir.

2002), the appellant argued that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence based on the

incorrect conclusion that his prior felony conviction for injury to a child constituted an “aggravated

felony” under the sentencing guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). To constitute an aggravated

felony pursuant to the applicable sentencing guidelines, the prior conviction must have had “as an

element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of

another . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).8 Gracia-Cantu’s prior conviction for injury to a child was pursuant

to section 22.04(a) of the Texas Penal Code. Section 22.04(a) provides that:

(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally, knowingly,

recklessly, or with criminal negligence, by act or intentionally,

knowingly, or recklessly by omission, causes to a child . . . :

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious mental deficiency, impairment, or injury; or

(3) bodily injury.

We agreed with Gracia-Cantu’s assertion that his prior conviction did not constitute a crime

of violence under § 16(a) because “the statute criminalizing injury to a child[ ] does not require that

the perpetrator actually use, attempt to use, or threaten to use physicalforce against a child. Rather,

section 22.04(a) is results-oriented in that the culpable mental state must relate to the result of a

defendant’s conduct rather than to the conduct itself.” Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d at 311-12 (emphasis

added). At first blush, this broad language seems to support Shelton’s argument that because his

statute of conviction is “result-oriented” it does not require the use of physical force. However,
9

 We note that Texas case law does describe the offense of aggravated assault as resultoriented. Green v. State, 891 S.W.2d 289, 293-94 (Tex.App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1994);

Peterson v. State, 836 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex.App.–El Paso 1992, pet. ref’d). It appears that the

instant misdemeanor offense is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault under §

22.02(a)(1), which provides that “A person commits an offense if the person commits the assault

as defined in Section 22.01 [the instant misdemeanor offense] and the person: causes serious

bodily injury to another, including the persons’s spouse.” Thus, the above interpretation of

“result-oriented” in the Texas cases would apparently apply to the instant offense. In the above

cases, the Texas courts were determining only whether the required mental state applied to the

nature of the conduct or the result of the conduct. In other words, the courts did not address the

question whether “bodily injury” necessarily includes the use of physical force as an element of

assault.

10 See Alexander v. United States, 390 F.2d 101, 108 (5th Cir. 1968) (explaining that this

Court is not bound by an erroneous concession made by the government).

11

because Gracia-Cantu involved the interpretation of a statute that is materially different from

Shelton’s predicate offense, we do not find the “result-oriented” label dispositive of the instant

question.9 

We note that, in Gracia-Cantu, the government conceded that “because the statutory

definition of the offense does not explicitly require the application of force as an element, 18 U.S.C.

§ 16(a)” did not apply. 302 F.3d at 312. Unlike Gracia-Cantu, in the case at bar, the government

does not concede the claim but instead argues that the statutory provision at issue does contain an

element of use of physical force. Although we certainly do not imply that we were bound by the

government’s concession in Gracia-Cantu,

10 such a concession often dispenses with any need for a

detailed analysis of the claim. 

InGracia-Cantu, the government did not raise the contention that the element of bodilyinjury

necessarily entailed the use of physical force. Even had such argument been raised, because of the

material difference between the injury to a child statute and the instant misdemeanor assault statute,

we do not believe it would have made a difference in the analysis or outcome of Gracia-Cantu. More
12

to the point, although both Shelton and Gracia-Cantu’s predicate convictions do contain the element

of bodily injury, the injury to a child statute also proscribes acts of omission perpetrated against a

child, elderly individual or disabled individual. By including acts of omission, the injury to a child

statute encompasses conduct that, unlike the instant case, does not require the use of physical force

by the defendant. Thus, despite the broad “results-oriented” language, because Gracia-Cantu

involves a predicate offense that is materially different from that at issue, it is not controlling. 

Finally, we note that Shelton has proposed various hypotheticals in which he contends an

individual could be charged with misdemeanor assault in Texas without having used physical force.

However, no actual cases were cited to support these scenarios. Thus, we are not persuaded by this

argument. See Nason, 269 F.3d at 20 n.5 (rejecting defense counsel’s “exotic exemplars and

limit[ing] our probing to actual cases”); Vargas-Duran, at *1 (rejecting argument that a defendant

could be convicted of Texas offense of intoxication assault for causing serious bodily injury without

using physical force after noting no cases supported the proposition). 

In conclusion, in light of the Eighth and First Circuits’ holdingsthat bodily injury and physical

contact necessarily included an element of use of force in the context of a § 922(g)(9) challenge, our

analogous reasoning in Vargas-Duran in the context of a sentencing guideline challenge, and the

absence of a Texas case that indicates that a defendant could be convicted of misdemeanor assault

for causing bodily injury without using physical force, we remain unpersuaded by Shelton’s

arguments. Thus, we hold that because Shelton’s predicate offense of misdemeanor assault requires

bodily injury it includes as an element the use of physical force. 

2. Whether the predicate offense must contain the element of a relationship
11

 As previously set forth, the term “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” in § 922(g)(9)

is defined as a misdemeanor under federal or state law that “has, as an element, the use or

attempted use of physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current

or former spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a

child in common, by a person who is cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse,

parent, or guardian, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the

victim.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A)(i) & (ii).

13

between the defendant and the victim

Shelton also arguesthat the domestic relationship required by § 922(g)(9) must be contained

as an element in the predicate offense.11 Shelton acknowledges that other circuits have rejected this

argument. Looking to the text of § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii), the First and Eighth Circuits held that because

Congress employed a singular noun (“element”) only the “use of force” was required as an element

in the predicate offense. United States v. Meade, 175 F.3d 215, 218-19 (1st Cir. 1999); United States

v. Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1999). 

The District ofColumbiaCircuit, although “not necessarilyfind[ing]the singular versus plural

rationale determinative,” agreed that a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence includes only the use

of force as an element–not the relationship between the defendant and the victim. United States v.

Barnes, 295 F.3d 1354, 1364 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The District of Columbia Circuit found Congress’s

syntax awkward, but ultimately concluded that “an unnatural reading would result if ‘committed by’

were construed to modify ‘use of force.’” Id. at 1261 & n.7. Additionally, both the District of

Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit gave weight to the consideration that requiring the relationship

to be an element of the predicate offense “would create a ‘significant practical anomaly,’ rendering

the law a nullity in a majority of the states as well as at the Federal level.” Id. at 1364 (quoting

Meade, 175 F.3d at 220). 
14

Very recently, the Second Circuit addressed this issue and discussed the above circuit

precedent. United States v. Kavoukian, 315 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2002). In Kavoukian, the Second

Circuit recognized that several circuits have determined that any possible ambiguity was “clear[ed]

up” by the statute’s legislative history. Id. at 143 (citing Barnes, 295 F.3d at 1365; Smith, 171 F.3d

at 620; Meade, 175 F.3d at 220). The Second Circuit found the following legislative history, a

statement from Senator Lautenberg who sponsored the amendment to § 921(a), to be most

convincing:

[T]he final agreement does not merely make it against the law for

someone convicted of a misdemeanor crime ofdomestic violence from

possessing firearms. It also incorporates this new category of

offenders into the Brady law, which provides for a waiting period for

handgun purchases. Under the Brady law, local law enforcement

authorities are required to make reasonable efforts to ensure that

those who are seeking to purchase a handgun are not prohibited under

Federal law from doing so. Mr. President, convictions for domestic

violence-related crimes often are for crimes, such as assault, that are

not explicitly identified as related to domestic violence. Therefore,

it will not always be possible for law enforcement authorities to

determine from the face of someone’s criminal record whether a

particular misdemeanor conviction involves domestic violence, as

defined in the new law.

 

Id. at 143 (quoting 142 Cong. Rec. S11872-01, *S11878 (1996) (Statement of Sen. Lautenberg))

(other citation omitted; emphasis in opinion). Additionally, Senator Lautenberg stated that “[u]nder

the final agreement, the ban applies to crimes that have, as an element, the use or attempted use of

physical force, or the threatened use of a deadly weapon.” Id. at 144 (quoting 142 Cong. Rec.

S11872-01, *S11877 (1996)). 

In view of the weight of the persuasive authority and the above-quoted legislative history, we

agree that § 922(g)(9) does not require the predicate offense to contain as an element the relationship
12

 See also United States v. Chavez, 204 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that

the appellant’s conviction qualified as a “misdemeanor crime of violence” under § 922(g)(9)

because it was pursuant to a federal assault statute, 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(4), that contained the

element of use of force and the offense was committed against a spouse); United States v. Ball, 7

Fed. Appx. 210, 213 2001 WL 324624 (4th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied., 122 S.Ct. 226

(2001) (finding that § 921(a)(33)(A) does not require the predicate offense to contain as an

element the relationship between the defendant and the victim). Accord United States v. Smith,

56 M.J. 711 (2001) (concluding that “Congress intended that the predicate offense requires one

element: the use or attempted use of physical force”).

15

between the defendant and the victim.12

3. Whether evidence sufficient to prove victimwassimilarly situated to a spouse

In the alternative, Shelton argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish that the victim

of his predicate offense was similarly situated to a spouse. It is undisputed that the entirety of the

evidence isthat Shelton admitted that the victimwas his “live-in girlfriend” oftwo months at the time

of the assault. 

Shelton asserts that the phrases “cohabit as a spouse” and “similarly situated to a spouse”

contained in § 921(a)(33)(A) are not defined in the statute. In support of his argument that his “livein” girlfriend of two months does not qualify as a domestic relationship under the statute, Shelton

relies on the following definition from Black’s Law Dictionary: “Cohabitation” is “[t]he fact or state

of living together, esp[ecially] as partners in life, usu[ally] with the suggestion of sexual relations.”

Black’s Law Dictionary 254 (7th ed. 1999). But Shelton’s admission that the victim was his “live-in

girlfriend” certainly falls within hissuggested definition. “Live-in girlfriend” indicates living together

with the implication that the two were having sexualrelations. Accordingly, Shelton’s admission was

sufficient evidence to prove the victim was similarly situated to a spouse in the context of this
13

 Because Shelton’s admission constituted sufficient evidence, we find it unnecessary to reach

the challenge to the district court’s taking of judicial notice with respect to Shelton’s admission.

14 Section 922(g)(8) provides that: 

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person --

(8) who is subject to a court order that–

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice,

and at which such person had an opportunity to participate; 

(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an

intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person,

or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in

reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and 

(C)(I) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the

physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or

(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened

use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would

reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury[,] 

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce,

16

statute.13 

B. DEFECTIVE INDICTMENT

Shelton contends that his indictment was fatally defective for failing to allege that he knew

it was unlawful to possess a firearm subsequent to his misdemeanor assault conviction. This Court

reviews de novo the district court’s decision with respect to challenges to the constitutionality of a

federal statute. United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997). 

Shelton recognizes that this Court has held that a conviction under §922(g)(8)14 does not
any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped

or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

17

require knowledge that one is violating the law but only of the legally relevant facts. United States

v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 216-17 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 2362 (2002). Shelton

states that, to the extent Emerson forecloses this argument, he raises it to preserve the issue for

further review. We perceive no principled reason for drawing an analytical distinction between §

922(g)(8) and § 922(g)(9).

Moreover, at least four circuits have concluded that § 922(g)(9) does not require proof that

the defendant knew his conduct violated the law. United States v. Denis, 297 F.3d 25, 28-31 (1st Cir.

2002); United States v. Hancock, 231 F.3d 557, 561-63 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hutzell, 217

F.3d 966, 968-69 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Beavers, 206 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2000). 

Shelton recognizes the weight of authority against him but nonetheless argues that he falls

within a due process exception to the generalrule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no

defense. In Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 78 S.Ct. 240 (1957), the petitioner challenged a

provision of the Los Angeles MunicipalCode that prohibited convicted felons from remaining in the

city for longer than five days without registering with the police. Notwithstanding the general rule

that ignorance of the law is no excuse, the Supreme Court held that the ordinance gave such

insufficient notice that due process was violated. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 229-30, 78 S.Ct. 240. Two

factors persuaded the Court. First, the prohibited conduct was “wholly passive.” Second, there was

an absence of “circumstances that should alert the doer to the consequences of his deed.” Id. at 228.

We agree with the other circuits that have rejected the argument that § 922(g)(9) falls within
15

 With respect to the second inquiry, other circuits have indicated that possession of firearm

by one who has been convicted of a violent crime is a highly regulated activity. Denis, 297 F.3d

at 29-30; Hancock, 231 F.3d at 564; Hutzell, 217 F.3d at 969. As such, the courts have

concluded that a domestic violence conviction should alert the defendant of the consequences of

his deed. Shelton contends that one does not associate misdemeanor convictions with the same

sort of loss of privilege as felony convictions. In any event, as set forth above, because

possession of a firearm is not “wholly passive,” Lambert is inapplicable. 

18

the Lambert due process exception. See e.g., Denis, 297 F.3d at 29-30; Hancock, 231 F.3d at 564.

Possession of a firearm is active, not passive, conduct. That alone renders the Lambert exception

inapplicable. Under these circumstances, Shelton has failed to show that his indictment was fatally

defective.15 

C. SUBSTANTIAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Finally, Shelton argues that § 922(g)(9) cannot constitutionally be construed to encompass

the intrastate possession of a firearm simply because the firearm was transported across state lines

at some point. We have repeatedly rejected this claim. See e.g. United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d

513, 518 (5thCir. 2001). Recognizing that this panel is bound by prior precedent, Shelton raisesthis

issue to preserve it for further review.

In the alternative, Shelt on argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove the interstate

commerce element. In the district court, Shelton stipulated that he unlawfully possessed a shotgun

that had been manufactured in Connecticut and traveled in interstate commerce to Houston, Texas.

ThisCourt has “made clearthatstipulated evidence showing that aweaponwasmanufactured outside

of the state in which it was possessed was sufficient to support a conviction.” United States v. Lee,
19

310 F.3d 787, 788 (5th Cir. 2002). This claim must fail.

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.