IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, 

### ) No. 78247-9-I

Respondent, 

### )

) DIVISION ONE v. 

### )

) VILASAK CHUCK PHIMMACHAK, 

### ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION A.K.A. PHIMMACHAK CHUCK 

### ) VILASAK, 

### ) FILED: August 5, 2019

Appellant.
SMITH, J.

— Vilasak Phimmachak appeals his conviction for possession of
a stolen vehicle. He argues thatthe evidence presented bythe State was insufficient fora reasonablejuryto conclude that he knewthe car he possessed
was stolen. Because ajury could reasonably inferthat Phimmachak had knowledge the carwas stolen from the evidence presented attrial, we affirm. FACTS On September 9, 2017, Seattle police officers discovered Phimmachak asleep in the back seat of a stolen car. Phimmachak was subsequently arrested and charged with possession of a stolen vehicle. Attrial, the car’s owner, Rachel Jolly, testified that on September8, 2017, she wentto the Alderwood Mall in Lynnwood to see a movie. After leaving the theater, Jolly returned to where she had earlier parked her carto discover it missing. Concluding that her carwas stolen, Jolly called the Lynnwood Police Department. Jollytestified that her carwas a Honda Accord sedan, which sheNo. 78247-9-1/2

described as a “small little car.” She testified that her child’s car seatwas in the back seat of her Honda. Seattle Police Officer Charles Millertestified thatthe next day, September 9, 2017, he was on patrol with his partner, Officer Marc Powell. Officer Miller spotted a vehicle parked in a very unusual spot. Specifically, the carwas parked in a “no parking” zone in an industrial area nextto an encampment. He further noted thatthe people who work in the area “all park across the street” from where he had spotted the vehicle. He ran the vehicle’s license plate and discovered that it was reported stolen. Officer Miller approached the vehicle and found a man, later identified as Phimmachak, asleep in the back seat. Officer Millertestified that he attempted to open the doors, butthe vehicle was locked. Officer Miller subsequently got Phimmachakto open the door and placed Phimmachak in handcuffs. Officer Powell testified that he searched the vehicle. He removed a child safety seatfrom the driver’s seat, leaned into the vehicle, and saw obvious damage to the ignition. He testified: “That’s when I peeked overthe far side of the steering column and realized the ignition wasn’t there.” He testified thatthe ignition looked as if itwas “punched out,” referring to a process allowing
someone to drive the carwithout a key. He noted this was usually accomplished with a screwdriver and a hammer. After Officers Powell and Millerdiscovered Jolly’s car, the Lynnwood Police Department informed Jollythat itwas being towed. Jollytestified that when she retrieved her car, the ignition was obviously damaged. Jolly further

2No. 78247-9-1/3

stated thatthere were plastic and metal pieces ofthe ignition and a screwdriver
on the floor ofthe caron the driver’s side. Jolly also testified that she found an additional screwdriver and a hammer in the carthat did not belong to her. When Jolly put her key into the damaged ignition, the ignition fell out with the key. Thejury convicted Phimmachak as charged. Phimmachak appeals. ANALYSIS Phimmachak states that mere possession ofa stolen vehicle is insufficient to establish that he knewthe propertywas stolen. He argues thatthe evidence presented bythe State was insufficient for a reasonablejury to find that he knew the carwas stolen. We disagree. It is well settled that knowledge is an element of possessing a stolen vehicle. State v. Plank, 46 Wn. App. 728, 731, 731 P.2d 1170 (1987). “A person knows ofa fact by being aware of it or having information thatwould lead a reasonable person to conclude thatthe fact exists.” State v. Womble, 93 Wn. App. 599, 604, 969 P.2d 1097 (1999). “Although knowledge may not be presumed because a reasonable person would have knowledge undersimilar circumstances, it may be inferred.” Womble, 93 Wn. App. at 604. The State bears the burden to prove knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. McHenry, 13 Wn. App. 421, 424, 535 P.2d 843 (1975), affd, 88 Wn.2d 211, 558 P.2d 188 (1977). Once a

### jury has determined thatthe State has met this burden,
our review is highly deferential to the determination ofthejury. State v. Davis, 182 Wn.2d 222, 227, 340 P.3d 820 (2014). Specifically, a sufficiency-of-the evidence challenge requires thatwe look atthe evidence in the light most

3No. 78247-9-114

favorable to the State. State v. Luther, 157 Wn.2d 63, 77, 134 P.3d 205 (2006). Additionally, “all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor ofthe State and interpreted most strongly againstthe defendant.” State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). Furthermore, “[a] claim of insufficiency admits the truth ofthe State’s evidence and all inferences that reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” Salinas, 119 Wn.2d at 201. Here, the State’s evidence was sufficientfor a reasonablejury to find that Phimmachak knewthatthe car he was sleeping in was stolen. Specifically, Officer Powell testified thatthere was obvious damage to the ignition. Moreover, Jollytestified that the damage to the ignition was “very apparent,” with pieces of it lying on the driver’s side floor. She also testified thatthe damage was “obvious”
even before she tried putting the key into the ignition and that the rims to the ignition were missing. The carwas also described as a “small little car.” Finally, the State presented evidence thatthe car seat had been moved to the front seat and thatthe doors were locked when Phimmachak was found inside. From this evidence, ajury could reasonably inferthat Phimmachakwas the person who moved the carseat and/or locked the car. Furthermore, because the carwas small, ajury could reasonably inferthat Phimmachak sawthe front of the car and therefore the “obvious” damage to the ignition when he moved the
carseat or locked the car. Indeed, because the carwas small, thejury could reasonably inferthat Phimmachak sawthe ignition from the back seat even if he did not move the car seat. Finally, ajury could reasonably inferthat Phimmachak knewthe carwas stolen because, by seeing the state ofthe

4No. 78247-9-115

ignition, Phimmachak had information thatwould lead a reasonable person to conclude thatthe carwas stolen. See Womble, 93 Wn. App. at 604 (“A person knows ofa fact by being aware of it orhaving information thatwould lead a reasonable person to conclude thatthe factexists.”) (emphasis added). For these reasons, Phimmachak’s sufficiency challenge fails. Phimmachak argues that the evidence proves onlythatthe ignition was damaged, notthat Phimmachak sawthe damage or knewthe carwas stolen. He points outthatthe damage was not apparentto Officer Powell until after he moved the child seat. But it was apparentfrom a video ofthe incidentthat Officer Powell was standing outside the driver’s side doorwhen he removed the
carseat. By contrast, Phimmachak was lying in the back seat. When Officer Powell leaned into the car after removing the child seat, the damage became “obvious.” Therefore, even if Officer Powell did not immediately see the damage from his perspective outside the car, a reasonablejuror could inferthat Phimmachak sawthe damage from inside the car. Consequently, the evidence presented was sufficientto support the conviction. We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

.AiJJ 

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