COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Overton 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

KENNETH O'NEAL JEFFERSON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0716-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER 

 MARCH 31, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 

James E. Kulp, Judge 

 Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes; 

Benjamin & DesPortes, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney 

General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Kenneth O'Neal Jefferson (appellant) appeals his conviction 

of possession of cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. He 

contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to 

suppress (1) evidence obtained during a search of his person on 

the night of his arrest and (2) an incriminating statement he 

made to police shortly after his arrest. For the reasons that 

follow, we reverse and remand. 

 I. 

 FACTS 

 At about 6:00 p.m. on July 25, 1996, Officer Jerome D. Hoyt 

of the Henrico County Police Department received information from 

a known informant that three people were selling cocaine "at the 

corner of Second and Virginia" near 101 North Virginia Avenue. 

The informant identified one of the three sellers as "Kenny 'Boo' 
 2 

Jefferson" and described him as 

 a black male . . . about five ten or five 

eleven inches tall, thin build, short cropped 

hair, had big eyes, two gold teeth, wearing a 

gr[a]y shirt, long blue jeans, and a gold 

chain around his neck. 

The informant told Officer Hoyt that he had seen "Kenny 'Boo' 

Jefferson" exchange money for "actual crack cocaine" several 

times. Officer Hoyt had known this informant for about a month 

after arresting him for a misdemeanor charge, which was still 

pending. The informant was seeking to help himself on the 

misdemeanor charge by cooperating with the police. 

 After completing his phone call with the informant, Officer 

Hoyt called a second known informant and asked him to "go by [101 

North Virginia Avenue] to see what was going on." The second 

informant called Officer Hoyt a little after 6:30 p.m. and told 

him that he saw "Kenny 'Boo'" and two other individuals standing 

on the corner of Second and Virginia in front of 101 North 

Virginia Avenue. The second informant stated that these three 

individuals had "cocaine on their person and for sale" and that 

he witnessed "Kenny 'Boo'" complete at least one sale of crack 

cocaine. The second informant's description of "Kenny 'Boo'" 

matched the description of "Kenny 'Boo' Jefferson" given by the 

first informant. Officer Hoyt had known the second informant for 

"approximately three or four months." The second informant had a 

pending traffic charge against him that was punishable by 

incarceration and was cooperating with the police in several 
 3 

matters in order to obtain leniency in the prosecution against 

him. Officer Hoyt had worked with the second informant "maybe a 

dozen times" and information provided by this informant had led 

to several arrests but no actual convictions as of July 25. 

 Based on the information provided by the two informants, 

Officer Hoyt's supervisor initiated an operation to locate the 

three individuals who were purportedly selling cocaine in front 

of 101 North Virginia Avenue. The police department assembled a 

team that included both "strike force" officers and uniformed 

officers. Prior to leaving the police department, Officer Hoyt 

conveyed the information provided by the informants to the 

officers involved in the operation, which included Officer L. D. 

Harpster. The police did not obtain either arrest warrants for 

the three individuals spotted at the corner of Second and 

Virginia or a search warrant for the house at 101 North Virginia 

Avenue. 

 Officer Harpster, Officer Hoyt, and the other officers 

involved in the operation arrived at the corner of Second and 

Virginia at 10:05 p.m. Officer Harpster testified that, by the 

time he exited his vehicle, several officers had already 

proceeded to the back of the house at 101 North Virginia Avenue. 

 Officer Harpster then heard some of these officers "yelling," 

and he walked to the back of the house to investigate this 

"commotion." 

 When the officer arrived, appellant was inside the house at 
 4 

101 North Virginia Avenue, which was his residence. Appellant 

heard a "commotion" from outside and walked to his back door. 

When appellant opened his back door, he saw "a whole bunch of 

police outside [his] house . . . in [the] back yard." 

 At about this time, Officer Harpster saw appellant and 

realized that he matched the description of "Kenny 'Boo' 

Jefferson" given by Officer Hoyt. Appellant was standing outside 

of the house "right in front" of the back door. Officer Harpster 

approached appellant, "put him on the ground[,] . . . put 

handcuffs on him and took him into custody." The record does not 

indicate whether appellant had moved from his location by his 

back door prior to being taken into custody by Officer Harpster. 

 Although he had "no reason" to suspect that appellant was armed, 

Officer Harpster patted down appellant for weapons. The 

pat-down, which the record established was not a "full" search of 

appellant's person, yielded a "small bottle of liquor" but no 

incriminating evidence. Appellant later testified that, at this 

point, Officer Harpster told him he was under arrest. Officer 

Harpster later testified that he made no such statement to 

appellant. 

 Officer Hoyt approached appellant following the pat-down by 

Officer Harpster. Officer Hoyt told appellant that the police 

had received information that he was selling drugs and asked 

appellant, "Do you mind if I search you for drugs?" Appellant 

replied, "You might as well, because he's already done it." 
 5 

Officer Hoyt searched appellant and retrieved .9 of a gram of 

crack cocaine and $158 in cash from appellant's "watch pocket." 

After seizing the cocaine and cash from appellant's person, 

Officer Hoyt told appellant he was under arrest. Appellant was 

placed in the custody of Officer Akita Brown, who transported 

appellant to "Dabbs House." At about 11:05 p.m., Officer Hoyt 

arrived at Dabbs House and informed appellant of his Miranda

rights. Appellant signed a "rights waiver form" and made an 

incriminating statement to the police. 

 Appellant was charged with possessing cocaine with intent to 

distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. Prior to his trial, 

appellant moved the trial court to suppress the cocaine and cash 

seized by Officer Hoyt as well as his incriminating statement. 

Following a hearing, the trial court denied appellant's motion. 

It reasoned: 

 The Court finds that the police had probable 

cause to arrest [appellant], based on the 

information from the two informants. . . . 

In this case, the Court finds that 

[appellant] was not in his house when he was 

arrested, but he was outside in the yard and 

that Harpster identified him as the person 

who fit the description. So the Court finds 

they had probable cause to arrest him and, of 

course, the search was incident to the 

arrest. 

 Appellant was subsequently convicted of possession of 

cocaine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. 

 II. 

WARRANTLESS SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
 6 

 Appellant contends the trial court erred when it concluded 

that Officer Hoyt's search of his person was conducted incident 

to a lawful arrest. Appellant argues that Officer Harpster's 

arrest of him was unlawful because (1) Officer Harpster lacked 

probable cause to believe that appellant had committed a criminal 

offense and (2) the arrest was executed within the "curtilage" of 

his home without a warrant. Although we find that Officer 

Harpster possessed probable cause to arrest appellant, we hold 

that the warrantless arrest of appellant in the curtilage of his 

home was unlawful. 

 Generally, evidence obtained by searches and seizures in 

violation of a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights is 

inadmissible at a criminal trial. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 

643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); Weeks v. 

United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93, 34 S. Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 

652 (1914). At a hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress 

evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

the defendant has the burden of establishing standing by proving 

that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place 

searched, Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 135, 360 S.E.2d 

196, 200 (1987) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n.1, 

99 S. Ct. 421, 424 n.1, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978)), and the 

Commonwealth has the burden of proving that the relevant searches 

or seizures did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment 

rights. See Simmons v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 380 
 7 

S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989); Alexander v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 

671, 674, 454 S.E.2d 39, 41 (1995). On appeal, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, 

granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible 

therefrom. See Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 

1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). We review the trial court's 

findings of historical fact only for "clear error," but we review 

de novo the trial court's application of defined legal standards 

to the particular facts of a case, including determinations of 

probable cause. See Shears v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 

398, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996); see also Ornelas v. United 

States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996). 

 In this case, Officer Hoyt recovered the cash and cocaine 

from appellant's person during a warrantless search that followed 

Officer Harpster's warrantless "arrest."1 Although searches 

 

 1The trial court characterized the initial encounter between 

Officer Harpster and appellant as an "arrest." After reviewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, who 

prevailed on this issue, we cannot say this legal conclusion was 

erroneous. Although "[b]rief, complete deprivations of a 

suspect's liberty, including handcuffing, 'do not convert a stop 

and frisk into an arrest so long as the methods of restraint used 

are reasonable to the circumstances,'" Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 

Va. App. 851, 857, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993), aff'd en banc, 18 

Va. App. 454, 444 S.E.2d 275 (1994) (citation omitted), 

appellant's testimony, if believed by the trial court, was 

legally sufficient to establish that he was arrested by Officer 

Harpster. Appellant testified that, after Officer Harpster took 

him into custody and patted him down for weapons, he told 

appellant, "You're under arrest." Although Officer Harpster 

testified that he did not verbally indicate to appellant that he 

was under arrest after handcuffing him on the ground, the trial 

court, in its role as fact finder, was entitled to credit 

appellant's testimony and discount Officer Harpster's testimony 

on this issue. See Mills v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 459, 469, 
 8 

conducted without a judicially-issued warrant are per se

unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, see Katz v. United 

States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 

(1967) (citations omitted), one of the established exceptions to 

the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is for a "search 

incident to a lawful arrest." United States v. Robinson, 414 

U.S. 218, 224, 94 S. Ct. 467, 471, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); see 

also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 

2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Thus, the constitutional validity 

of Officer Hoyt's warrantless search of appellant is contingent 

upon the constitutional validity of Officer Harpster's 

warrantless arrest. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 

223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). 

 A. 

 Appellant first contends he was illegally arrested because 

Officer Harpster lacked probable cause to believe that appellant 

had committed a criminal offense. Specifically, appellant argues 

that the information provided by the two informants that he was 

selling cocaine could not provide probable cause to arrest him 

because the reliability of this information was not sufficiently 

established. We disagree. 

 "Whether [a warrantless] arrest was constitutionally valid 

depends . . . upon whether, at the moment the arrest was made, 

the officers had probable cause to make it . . . ." Id. at 91, 

 

418 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1992). 
 9 

85 S. Ct. at 225. 

 Probable cause exists where "the facts and 

circumstances within [the arresting 

officers'] knowledge and of which they had 

reasonably trustworthy information [are] 

sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of 

reasonable caution in the belief that" an 

offense has been or is being committed. 

Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 

1310-11, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 

267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S. Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). The 

determination of probable cause by police officers depends upon 

"practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable 

and prudent men, not legal technicians, act," Brinegar, 338 U.S. 

at 175, 69 S. Ct. at 1310, and courts must view and weigh the 

evidence supporting probable cause "'as understood by those 

versed in the field of law enforcement.'" Illinois v. Gates, 462 

U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328-29, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) 

(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 

690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). 

 When making a warrantless arrest, an officer "'may rely upon 

information received through an informant, rather than upon his 

direct observations,'" so long as the officer has reasonable 

grounds to believe that the informant's statement is true. Id.

at 242, 103 S. Ct. at 2334 (citation omitted); see also Draper v. 

United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-14, 79 S. Ct. 329, 333, 3 

L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). Because the value and reliability of 

information provided by informants to the police varies greatly, 
 10 

the veracity of an informant and the basis of his or her 

knowledge regarding a particular tip are "relevant 

considerations" in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis 

that guides the determination of probable cause. Gates, 462 U.S. 

at 232-33, 103 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 

U.S. 143, 147, 92 S. Ct. 1921, 1924, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)); see 

also Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 

110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (stating that both the content and 

reliability of information possessed by the police are considered 

when determining whether the totality of the circumstances 

justified an officer's determination of probable cause). When 

reviewing an officer's determination of probable cause based upon 

information provided by an informant, a court should conduct a 

"balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the various 

indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending [the] 

informant's tip." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S. Ct. at 2330; 

see also White, 496 U.S. at 230, 110 S. Ct. at 2416. 

 We hold that, at the time of appellant's arrest, Officer 

Harpster had probable cause to believe that appellant had 

recently committed a drug offense. Prior to appellant's arrest, 

Officer Hoyt told Officer Harpster that a thin African-American 

male with gold teeth wearing blue jeans, a gray shirt, and a gold 

chain was seen by two informants selling cocaine "in the area of 

Second and Virginia" near 101 North Virginia Avenue. Officer 

Harpster proceeded to the backyard of 101 North Virginia Avenue 
 11 

and arrested appellant after verifying that he matched the 

description provided by the two informants. 

 The record indicates that the information provided by the 

two informants was sufficiently trustworthy to justify Officer 

Harpster's belief that appellant had in fact recently sold 

cocaine. The reliability of the informants' information was 

established by their asserted first-hand knowledge, their 

independent corroboration of each other's observations, and one 

of the informant's history of providing accurate information to 

the police. The first informant, whom Officer Hoyt had known for 

about one month, gave a detailed description of appellant's 

appearance and told Officer Hoyt that he personally saw appellant 

selling cocaine. Officer Hoyt then called the second informant 

and told him to "see what was going on" near 101 North Virginia 

Avenue. The record does not indicate whether Officer Hoyt told 

the second informant anything about the first informant's 

observations. The second informant called back about twenty-five 

minutes later and corroborated in detail the information provided 

by the first informant, including his direct observation of 

appellant engaging in transactions involving cocaine. The 

veracity of the second informant was bolstered by his previous 

work with Officer Hoyt during the preceding three or four months 

that had led to several arrests. Based on the totality of these 

circumstances, Officer Hoyt and all of the officers whom he 

briefed prior to the operation, which included Officer Harpster, 
 12 

had probable cause to arrest appellant. 

 B. 

 Appellant next contends that, even if Officer Harpster had 

probable cause to believe that he was selling or had sold 

cocaine, his arrest was still unlawful because it was executed 

within the "curtilage" of his home without a warrant. We agree. 
 13 

 1. 

 Although the Fourth Amendment permits law enforcement 

officers to make warrantless arrests in public places upon 

probable cause, see United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 

423-24, 96 S. Ct. 820, 828, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976), warrantless 

entries into a suspect's home in order to arrest a suspect 

violate the Fourth Amendment unless justified by exigent 

circumstances or consent. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 

575, 100 S. Ct. 1371, 1374-75, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). In support 

of this "warrant requirement" for entries into the home, the 

United States Supreme Court has stated: 

 In terms that apply equally to seizures of 

property and to seizures of persons, the 

Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the 

entrance to the house. Absent exigent 

circumstances, that threshold may not 

reasonably be crossed without a warrant. 

Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90, 100 S. Ct. at 1382. 

 Consistent with the common law understanding of the extent 

of the "home," the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth 

Amendment protections that apply to the house also apply to the 

"curtilage" of the house. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 

170, 180, 104 S. Ct. 1735, 1742, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984) (stating 

that the curtilage "has been considered part of the home itself 

for Fourth Amendment purposes"); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 

294, 301, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1140, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987) (stating 

that areas within the curtilage are "placed under the home's 

'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection"); Dow Chemical Co. v. 
 14 

United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235, 106 S. Ct. 1819, 1825, 90 

L.Ed.2d 226 (1986) (stating that "the curtilage doctrine evolved 

to protect much the same kind of privacy as that covering the 

interior of a structure"); see also United States v. Van Dyke, 

643 F.2d 992, 993 (4th Cir. 1981); State v. Walker, 154 Wis.2d 

158, 182-83, 453 N.W.2d 127, 137 (1990); cf. Wellford v. 

Commonwealth, 227 Va. 297, 302, 315 S.E.2d 235, 237-38 (1984) 

(citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742).2

 The protection afforded the curtilage is 

essentially a protection of families and 

personal privacy in an area intimately linked 

to the home, both physically and 

psychologically, where privacy expectations 

are most heightened. 

California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-13, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 

1812, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986). Thus, absent (1) exigent 

circumstances and probable cause or (2) consent, law enforcement 

agents cannot enter the curtilage of a person's home either to 

 

 2The concept that the legal protections afforded to a 

dwelling house also extend to the curtilage originated at common 

law. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300 & n.3, 107 S. Ct. at 1139 & n.3. 

 The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he 

[curtilage] concept plays a part . . . in interpreting the reach 

of the Fourth Amendment" -- apparently because the common-law 

understanding of the extent of the home sheds light on the 

Framers' intended meaning of the word "houses" in the text of the 

Fourth Amendment. See id. at 300, 107 S. Ct. at 1139 (citing 

Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59, 44 S. Ct. 445, 446, 68 

L.Ed. 898 (1924)); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178-80, 104 S. Ct. at 

1741-42; cf. Payton, 445 U.S. at 591 n.33, 100 S. Ct. at 1382-83 

n.33 (stating that "[a]n examination of the common-law 

understanding of an officer's authority to arrest sheds light on 

the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, 

consideration of what the Framers of the [Fourth] Amendment might 

have thought to be reasonable"). 
 15 

search or seize without previously obtaining a warrant. See Van 

Dyke, 643 F.2d at 993; Walker, 154 Wis.2d at 182-83, 453 N.W.2d 

at 137 (holding that "Payton and Oliver require that police 

obtain a warrant before entering either the home or its curtilage 

to make an arrest" unless they have both probable cause and 

exigent circumstances). 

 As a general proposition, the curtilage of the home 

protected by the Fourth Amendment is the area immediately 

surrounding the home "to which extends the intimate activity 

associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies 

of life.'" Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S. Ct. at 1742 (citation 

omitted). Although the United States Supreme Court has set forth 

a general standard defining the extent of the curtilage, whether 

a particular place is within the curtilage of the home is 

determined on a case-by-case basis. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301 

n.4, 107 S. Ct. at 1139 n.4 (declining the invitation to adopt a 

"bright-line rule" regarding the extent of the curtilage and 

stating that a court is required to define the extent of the 

curtilage by assessing the factors outlined in Dunn). "[T]he 

extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon 

whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in 

question should be treated as the home itself." Id. at 300, 107 

S. Ct. at 1139; see Wellford, 227 Va. at 302, 315 S.E.2d at 238. 

 [C]urtilage questions should be resolved with 

particular reference to four factors: the 

proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage 

to the home, whether the area is included 

within an enclosure surrounding the home, the 
 16 

nature of the uses to which the area is put 

and the steps taken by the resident to 

protect the area from observation by people 

passing by. 

Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139. Courts applying these 

factors should bear in mind that they are intended as flexible, 

analytical tools to structure an "extent-of-curtilage" analysis 

and that the "centrally relevant consideration" is always 

"whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home 

itself that it should be placed under the home's 'umbrella' of 

Fourth Amendment protection." Id. at 301, 107 S. Ct. at 1139-40. 

 2. 

 After analyzing the evidence in the record relevant to the 

four Dunn factors, we conclude that Officer Harpster entered the 

curtilage of appellant's home prior to arresting him. First, the 

proximity of the place where Officer Harpster arrested appellant 

was extremely close to appellant's house and could not be viewed 

by pedestrians and drivers passing in front of the house. The 

record established that the back door of appellant's house opened 

"directly" into the backyard. The trial court found that 

appellant was not in his house when Officer Harpster arrested 

him, and this factual finding is supported by Officer Harpster's 

testimony that appellant was standing "right in front" of this 

door when Officer Harpster first saw him. The record does not 

indicate whether appellant moved from this location before 

Officer Harpster arrested him.3

 Officer Harpster's testimony 

 

 3Although the trial court found that appellant was "outside 
 17 

indicated that appellant's back door was not visible from the 

street and that the officer was required to walk behind 

appellant's house before the back door came into his view. 

Regarding the "nature of the uses" of the location of appellant's 

arrest, the area of a residential backyard immediately adjacent 

to the home's back door is commonly understood as "an area . . . 

to which the activity of home life extends." Oliver, 466 U.S. at 

182 n.12, 104 S. Ct. at 1743 n.12 (stating that the concept of 

the curtilage "is a familiar one easily understood from our daily 

experience"). Based on this evidence, we conclude that the area 

in which appellant was arrested was so intimately tied to the 

home that appellant could reasonably expect it to be treated as 

part of his home. 

 Because Officer Harpster's arrest of appellant was executed 

after the officer entered the curtilage of appellant's home 

without a warrant, we hold that the arrest violated the Fourth 

Amendment. Although Officer Harpster had probable cause to 

arrest appellant, nothing in the record indicates that his 

intrusion into appellant's curtilage was justified by exigent 

circumstances. In addition, the record does not prove that 

appellant consented to the officer's entry into the curtilage. 

 

in the yard" at the time of his arrest by Officer Harpster, this 

factual finding is not supported by any evidence in the record 

and is thus "clearly erroneous." Instead, the evidence, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, indicates 

that appellant was "right in front" of his back door at the time 

of the arrest. 
 18 

 We disagree with the Commonwealth's argument that this case 

is controlled by United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 96 S. Ct. 

2406, 49 L.Ed.2d 300 (1976). In Santana, the defendant was 

spotted by the police "standing in the doorway of her house" 

after they had probable cause to arrest her. Id. at 40, 96 

S. Ct. at 2408. The doorway in question was positioned so that 

it "exposed [the defendant] to public view, speech, hearing and 

touch as if she had been standing completely outside her house." 

Id. at 42, 96 S. Ct. at 2409. As the officers approached, the 

defendant "retreated into the vestibule of her house" where the 

officers arrested her. Id. at 40-41, 96 S. Ct. at 2408-09. The 

United States Supreme Court held that the warrantless arrest 

executed inside the defendant's home did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment because it was justified by an exigent circumstance: 

the arresting officer had "hotly pursued" the defendant into her 

home after spotting her in a "public place." See id. at 42-43, 

96 S. Ct. at 2409-10. The Supreme Court concluded that the 

defendant's doorway was a "public place" because its proximity to 

direct interaction with the public rendered it "not . . . an area 

where [the defendant] had any expectation of privacy." Id. at 

42, 96 S. Ct. at 2409. In an apparent reference to the curtilage 

doctrine, the Court stated: 

 While it may be true that under the common 

law of property the threshold of one's 

dwelling is "private," as is the yard 

surrounding the house, it is nonetheless 

clear that under the cases interpreting the 

Fourth Amendment [the defendant] was in a 

"public" place. 
 19 

Id.

 This case is distinguishable from Santana because it did not 

involve the hot pursuit of a fleeing felon from a "public place" 

into an area protected by the Fourth Amendment's warrant 

requirement.4 Although appellant was standing just outside of 

his back door, his door was not situated so that it exposed him 

to "public view, speech, hearing, and touch." Id. The record 

established that appellant's back door was behind his house and 

not visible from the street. As previously discussed, appellant 

was within the curtilage of his home when Officer Harpster first 

saw him, and the extent of the curtilage is by definition the 

area surrounding the home that "an individual reasonably may 

expect . . . [to] be treated as the home itself." Id. at 300, 

107 S. Ct. at 1139. Thus, unlike the defendant in Santana, 

appellant did not retreat into his "home" following a knowing 

exposure to the public. He was within his "home" for Fourth 

Amendment purposes at all times prior to Officer Harpster's 

physical intrusion into the curtilage. See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 

 

 4After deciding Santana, the Supreme Court has consistently 

stated that this case represents one of the exceptions to the 

rule that warrantless entries into the home or curtilage violate 

the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the Court has stated that 

Santana stands for the proposition that "hot pursuit of a fleeing 

felon" from a public place is one of the "exigent circumstances" 

justifying a warrantless arrest inside the home. See Segura v. 

United States, 468 U.S. 796, 811-12, 104 S. Ct. 3380, 3389, 82 

L.Ed.2d 599 (1984); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750, 104 

S. Ct. 2091, 2097, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Steagald v. United 

States, 451 U.S. 204, 221, 101 S. Ct. 1642, 1652, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 

(1981). 
 20 

301, 107 S. Ct. at 1140 (stating that areas within the curtilage 

are "placed under the home's 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment 

protection"). 

 Because Officer Harpster's arrest of appellant was unlawful, 

the warrantless search incident to this arrest performed by 

Officer Hoyt likewise violated the Fourth Amendment. As such, 

the trial court erred when it refused to suppress the cocaine and 

cash seized during this search.5

 We also hold that the trial court erred when it declined to 

suppress appellant's incriminating statement because its 

occurrence was not sufficiently attenuated from the unlawful 

arrest and search to permit its use at trial. Although appellant 

was given his Miranda warnings and signed a written waiver, it is 

well established that such a waiver alone does not sever the 

causal connection between a Fourth Amendment violation and an 

otherwise voluntary confession. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 

590, 603-05, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). 

Based on the close proximity in time between the unlawful arrest 

and the confession -- about one hour -- and the lack of 

 

 5The Commonwealth argues in its brief that Officer Hoyt's 

search was lawful because it was conducted pursuant to 

appellant's consent. Assuming that appellant did consent to the 

search, the cash and cocaine still should have been suppressed 

because appellant's consent was "obtained by exploitation of the 

illegality of his arrest." Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 600, 

95 S. Ct. 2254, 2260, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975); see Hall v. 

Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 226, 229, 468 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1996); 

Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 757-58, 407 S.E.2d 681, 

689-90 (1991). 
 21 

intervening circumstances, we conclude that appellant's 

confession is rendered inadmissible by its relationship to the 

initial illegalities. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 

218-19, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2259-60, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979); Brown, 

422 U.S. at 604-05, 95 S. Ct. at 2262; Hart v. Commonwealth, 221 

Va. 283, 287-89, 269 S.E.2d 806, 809-10 (1980); Watson v. 

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 659, 665-66, 454 S.E.2d 358, 362 

(1995); Corey v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 281, 286 n.1, 381 

S.E.2d 19, 21 n.1 (1989). 

 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the conviction of 

possession of cocaine and remand for further proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.