J. A14013/14

 

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MICHAEL GERA (DECEASED), 

DOROTHY GERA, MICHAEL G. GERA 

AND JOHN M. GERA,

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

 Appellants :

:

v. :

:

MARYLOU RAINONE, D.O., 

ROBERT DECOLLI, JR., D.O., AND 

SCHUYLKILL MEDICAL CENTER

:

:

:

No. 1951 MDA 2013

Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 2, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Civil Division at No. S-641-2013

MICHAEL GERA, DECEASED, 

DOROTHY GERA, MICHAEL G. GERA, 

AND JOHN M. GERA

:

:

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

MARYLOU RAINONE, D.O., 

ROBERT DECOLLI, JR., D.O., 

SCHUYLKILL MEDICAL CENTER

:

:

:

:

APPEAL OF: DOROTHY GERA, 

MICHAEL G. GERA AND JOHN M. GERA

:

:: No. 2163 MDA 2013

:

 Appellants :

Appeal from the Order Entered November 1, 2013,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County

Civil Division at No. S-641-13

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
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MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 06, 2014

Dorothy Gera, Michael G. Gera, and John M. Gera (collectively, 

“appellants”), pro se, initiated this medical malpractice action by filing a 

praecipe for writ of summons on April 5, 2013. Subsequently, on May 7, 

2013, a rule was entered to file a complaint within 20 days or suffer a 

judgment of non pros. Appellants filed their complaint on May 10, 2013, 

bringing numerous claims including for medical malpractice, negligence, 

infliction of emotional distress, and loss of consortium. Appellants alleged 

that the 79-year-old decedent, Michael Gera, presented to Schuylkill Medical 

Center (“SMC”) on April 6, 2011, for an exploratory laparotomy with right 

hemicolectomy for a cecal mass. According to the medical records, he 

tolerated the procedure well and his wounds were intact; however, by April 9 

he was complaining of nausea and had a low grade temperature. A CT scan 

of the abdomen revealed a large amount of peritoneal fluid and the decedent 

was brought to the operating room on April 10, 2011, where he underwent 

an exploratory laparotomy. Post-operatively, the decedent was kept on the 

ventilator. On April 16, 2011, there was a “code blue” and the decedent was 

unresponsive and non-verbal. He was transferred to Geisinger Medical 

Center on May 9, 2011, with diagnoses including sepsis and acute 

respiratory failure. The decedent died on July 1, 2011. Appellants alleged 

that defendants-appellees failed to properly diagnosis and treat the 

decedent’s post-operative condition which led to his death. 
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On June 11, 2013, appellees filed notice of intention to enter judgment 

of non pros for failing to file a Certificate of Merit (“COM”) as required by 

Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3 for professional liability claims. On July 9, 2013, 

appellants filed a COM for each defendant, certifying that expert testimony 

of an appropriate licensed professional was unnecessary for prosecution of 

the claim. See Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3(a)(3). Thereafter, appellees filed motions 

to strike and for entry of judgment of non pros. Appellants filed a 

response, again claiming that expert testimony was unnecessary where the 

defendants’ conduct was so grossly negligent that it was within the common 

knowledge of laypersons. 

On August 26, 2013, the trial court granted appellees’ motions in part, 

and denied them in part. The trial court found that appellants failed to 

comply with Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3(e),1 which the trial court interpreted as 

prohibiting a pro se litigant from filing a COM stating that expert testimony 

is not required in their case under Rule 1042.3(a)(3). According to the trial 

 

1

If a certificate of merit is not signed by an attorney, 

the party signing the certificate of merit shall, in 

addition to the other requirements of this rule, 

attach to the certificate of merit the written 

statement from an appropriate licensed professional 

as required by subdivisions (a)(1) and (2). If the 

written statement is not attached to the certificate of 

merit, a defendant seeking to enter a judgment of

non pros shall file a written notice of intent to enter 

a judgment of non pros for failure to file a written 

statement under Rule 1042.11.

Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3(e).
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court, only an attorney can file a COM pursuant to Rule 1042.3(a)(3). 

(Order, 8/26/13 at 4.)2 However, the trial court denied appellees’ requests 

for judgments of non pros because they failed to comply with 

Pa.R.C.P. 1042.11, requiring written notice of intent to enter a judgment of 

non pros for failure to file a written statement. (Id. at 6.)

Subsequently, appellees filed notices of intent to enter judgment of 

non pros within 30 days for failure to file a written statement from an 

appropriate licensed professional pursuant to Rule 1042.11. On 

September 25, 2013, appellants filed a response to the trial court’s 

August 26, 2013 order striking their COM. Appellants reiterated their claim 

that expert testimony was unnecessary and disagreed with the trial court’s 

interpretation of Rule 1042.3(e) that a pro se plaintiff cannot file a COM 

under Rule 1042.3(a)(3).

On October 1-2, 2013, appellees filed praecipes for entry of judgment 

of non pros for failure to file a written statement from an appropriate 

licensed professional pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1042.12. The prothonotary 

entered judgments of non pros against appellants and in favor of each 

defendant/appellee on October 1 and 2, 2013. Instead of filing a petition to 

open and/or strike off the judgments of non pros, appellants filed a notice 

of appeal on October 31, 2013, which was docketed by this court at 

No. 1951 MDA 2013. By order filed November 1, 2013, in view of the 

 

2 The pages of the order are unnumbered; pagination is by our own count.
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judgments of non pros entered by the prothonotary, the trial court 

denied/dismissed all outstanding motions as moot and discharged the 

defendants.

On November 13, 2013, while the appeal at No. 1951 MDA 2013 was 

pending, appellants filed with the trial court a “petition pursuant to 

Pa.R.C.P. 3051 for relief from judgment of non pros.” Appellants’ petition 

was denied on November 20, 2013, without comment. On December 2, 

2013, this court issued a rule to show cause why the appeal at No. 1951 

MDA 2013 should not be quashed as premature. We noted that a direct 

appeal does not lie from entry of a judgment of non pros; an appellant 

must first seek relief in the trial court, and failure to do so results in waiver. 

Gera, et al. v. Rainone, et al., No. 1951 MDA 2013, per curiam order 

(Pa.Super. filed December 2, 2013), citing Pa.R.C.P. 3051; Womer v. 

Hilliker, 908 A.2d 269 (Pa. 2006); Madrid v. Alpine Mountain Corp., 24 

A.3d 380, 381-382 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 40 A.3d 1237 (Pa. 

2012).

Appellants did not respond to the show cause order; however, on 

December 3, 2013, appellants filed another appeal at No. 2163 MDA 2013, 

appealing the November 1, 2013 order discharging appellees and denying 

and dismissing all of their outstanding motions as moot. Appellants’ appeal 

notice also referenced the trial court’s November 20, 2013 order denying 

their Rule 3051 petition. The trial court filed a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on 
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December 20, 2013, directing this court to its August 26, 2013 order. On 

December 26, 2013, this court discharged the show cause order and 

referred the matter to the merits panel. The appeals at No. 1951 MDA 2013 

and No. 2163 MDA 2013 were consolidated sua sponte.

The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure set forth 

provisions which apply specifically to professional 

liability actions and require a certificate of merit as a 

prerequisite to the action. See Pa.R.C.P. 1042.1-

1042.8. Rule 1042.3, pertaining to the certificate of 

merit, states in relevant part:

(a) In any action based upon an allegation 

that a licensed professional deviated 

from an acceptable professional 

standard, the attorney for the plaintiff 

. . . shall file with the complaint or within 

sixty days after the filing of the 

complaint, a certificate of merit signed 

by the attorney or party that either

(1) an appropriate licensed 

professional has supplied a 

written statement that there 

exists a reasonable 

probability that the care, skill 

or knowledge exercised or 

exhibited in the treatment, 

practice or work that is the 

subject of the complaint, fell 

outside acceptable 

professional standards and 

that such conduct was a 

cause in bringing about the 

harm, or

(2) the claim that the defendant 

deviated from an acceptable 

professional standard is 

based solely on allegations 

that other licensed 
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professionals for whom this 

defendant is responsible 

deviated from an acceptable 

professional standard, or

(3) expert testimony of an 

appropriate licensed 

professional is unnecessary 

for prosecution of the claim.

. . . .

[1] (d) The court, upon good 

cause shown, shall 

extend the time for 

filing a certificate of 

merit for a period not 

to exceed sixty days. 

The motion to extend 

the time for filing a 

certificate of merit 

must be filed on or 

before the filing date 

that the plaintiff seeks 

to extend. The filing 

of a motion to extend 

tolls the time period 

within which a 

certificate of merit 

must be filed until the 

court rules upon the 

motion.

Pa.R.C.P. 1042.3(a), (d) (notes omitted). This rule 

applies to professional liability claims against 

licensed professionals, including ‘a health care 

provider as defined by Section 503 of the Medical 

Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) 

Act[.]’ Pa.R.C.P. 1042.1(b)(1)(i). ‘The rule 

contemplates that a certificate of merit will be filed 

contemporaneously with or shortly after the filing of 

the complaint, and provides a 60-day window after 

the filing of the complaint to accomplish the filing of 

the certificate of merit.’ Varner v. Classic Cmtys. 
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Corp., 890 A.2d 1068, 1073 (Pa.Super.2006) 

(citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets 

omitted). If the rule applies and the plaintiff fails to 

provide the certificate of merit, the prothonotary 

may, on praecipe of the defendant, enter a judgment 

of non pros against the plaintiff. See Pa.R.C.P. 

1042.6.

Ditch v. Waynesboro Hospital, 917 A.2d 317, 320-321 (Pa.Super. 2007).

In Sahutsky v. H.H. Knoebel Sons, 782 A.2d 996 (Pa. 2001), as in 

this case, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of 

non pros and dismissed the plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice; however, 

instead of filing a motion to open the judgment of non pros, the plaintiffs 

filed a notice of appeal. Id. at 997. Our supreme court held that 

Pa.R.C.P. 3051, governing relief from judgments of non pros, requires a 

party to file a petition to open the non pros with the trial court rather than 

seek appellate review. Because the plaintiffs failed to file the petition to 

open as required, their claims were deemed waived pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 302. Id. at 1001.

Similarly, in Krell v. Silver, 817 A.2d 1097 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal 

denied, 830 A.2d 976 (Pa. 2003), the trial court granted the defendant’s 

motion for judgment of non pros. Instead of a petition to open, the plaintiff 

filed a “motion for reconsideration” and an accompanying brief. Id. at 1099. 

The motion was denied, and the plaintiff filed an appeal. Id. Following 

Sahutsky, this court found that the plaintiff’s failure to file a petition to 

open or strike the judgment of non pros waived all claims on appeal. Id. at 
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1101. We also declined to consider the motion for reconsideration as the 

“functional equivalent” of a petition to open or strike, concluding that the 

motion did not substantially comply with Rule 3051. Id.

Instantly, appellants did not file a petition to open or strike the 

judgments of non pros as required by Rule 3051. Although Sahutsky and 

Krell did not involve a failure to comply with the COM requirements of 

Rule 1042.3, the comment to Rule 3051 indicates it applies to all judgments 

of non pros. Sahutsky, 782 A.2d at 999. The Sahutsky court found that 

“there is nothing in Rule 3051 or its Comment to suggest that any 

differentiation between the various types of non pros orders is appropriate.” 

Id. at 1000. Accordingly, Sahutsky controls. 

Instead of filing the requisite Rule 3051 petition, appellants filed an 

appeal directly from judgment of non pros. The failure to file a Rule 3051 

petition with the trial court in the first instance operates as a waiver of any 

claims of error concerning the judgment of non pros entered by the trial 

court. Sahutsky. Therefore, all the issues raised in appellants’ brief are 

waived. While we recognize the fact that appellants are pro se and that this 

case sadly involves the loss of a loved one, it is well established that pro se

status confers no special benefit and “a pro se litigant must comply with the 

procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.” 

Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251-252 (Pa.Super. 2003), 

appeal denied, 879 A.2d 782 (Pa. 2005) (citation omitted). Appellants are 
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charged with knowing the Rules of Civil Procedure the same as a 

represented plaintiff. 

We acknowledge that, subsequent to their October 31, 2013 appeal, 

appellants filed a petition to open pursuant to Rule 3051 on November 13, 

2013. While not binding on this court, we find the case of Dockery v. 

Borough of East Stroudsburg, 24 A.3d 485 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2011), appeal 

denied, 46 A.3d 718 (Pa. 2012), to be illuminating. In that case, the 

Borough filed a motion for judgment of non pros for failure to prosecute, 

which was granted and the plaintiffs’ complaint was dismissed. The plaintiffs 

filed an appeal to this court, followed by a petition to open or strike the 

judgment of non pros with the trial court. The trial court declined to rule on 

the petition due to the pending appeal. Subsequently, the plaintiffs 

voluntarily discontinued their appeal. Id. at 486. 

The plaintiffs then filed a second petition to open or strike the 

judgment of non pros, which was denied. They filed a second appeal to this 

court, which transferred the matter to Commonwealth Court. Id. First, the 

Commonwealth Court found that the trial court properly declined to consider 

the plaintiffs’ first petition, filed while the appeal was pending. Id., citing 

Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (after an appeal is filed, the trial court may no longer 

proceed further in the matter); Sahutsky, 782 A.2d at 1001 n.3 (a 

judgment of non pros is not interlocutory and is a final, appealable order 

because it fully disposes of the case). Second, once judgment of non pros 
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had been entered, the case in the trial court was terminated, and even 

though they discontinued their appeal, the plaintiffs could not revive it by 

filing a second petition to open or strike. Id. at 487, citing Sahutsky, 

supra (additional citation omitted). Therefore, the Dockery court 

determined that because the plaintiffs failed to file a petition to open or 

strike the judgment prior to filing the appeal, they waived all claims of error. 

Id.

Thus, in the matter sub judice, the trial court should not have 

considered appellants’ November 13, 2013 petition to open, filed after an 

appeal was taken from the October 1-2, 2013 judgments of non pros. 

Appellants’ failure to file a petition to open or strike the judgments of 

non pros before filing an appeal results in waiver of all substantive claims. 

Sahutsky, supra; Dockery, supra. Furthermore, even if we were to 

consider the November 13, 2013 petition, it is woefully inadequate. As 

stated in Krell, supra, three factors must be established in order to have a 

judgment of non pros opened: First, the petition is promptly filed; second, 

there is a reasonable explanation for the delay that preceded the entry of 

judgment of non pros; and third, there are facts supporting a meritorious 

cause of action. Krell, 817 A.2d at 1101, citing Stephens v. Messick, 799 

A.2d 793 (Pa.Super. 2002). Appellants failed to address any of these three 

factors.
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Finally, we note in passing that, clearly, this is a medical malpractice 

claim requiring a written statement from an appropriate licensed 

professional stating that the case has merit. Appellants’ argument that their 

claims sound in ordinary negligence is easily dismissed. 

A medical malpractice claim is distinguished by two 

defining characteristics. First, medical malpractice 

can occur only within the course of a professional 

relationship. Second, claims of medical malpractice 

necessarily raise questions involving medical 

judgment. Claims of ordinary negligence, by 

contrast, raise issues that are within the common 

knowledge and experience of the [fact-finder]. 

Therefore, a court must ask two fundamental 

questions in determining whether a claim sounds in 

ordinary negligence or medical malpractice: 

(1) whether the claim pertains to an action that 

occurred within the course of a professional 

relationship; and (2) whether the claim raises 

questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of 

common knowledge and experience. If both these 

questions are answered in the affirmative, the action 

is subject to the procedural and substantive 

requirements that govern medical malpractice 

actions.

Varner v. Classic Communities Corp., 890 A.2d 1068, 1074 (Pa.Super. 

2006), quoting Grossman v. Barke, 868 A.2d 561, 570 (Pa.Super. 2005), 

appeal denied, 889 A.2d 89 (Pa. 2005), in turn quoting Bryant v. 

Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr., 471 Mich. 411, 684 N.W.2d 864, 871 (2004) 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Obviously, appellants’ claim that appellees acted negligently with 

respect to performance of the laparotomy and in dealing with the decedent’s 

post-surgical complications would require expert medical testimony 
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regarding the decedent’s condition and care. Such issues are not within the 

common knowledge and experience of a layperson. Cf. Merlini v. Gallitzin 

Water Authority, 934 A.2d 100 (Pa.Super. 2007), affirmed, 980 A.2d 502 

(Pa. 2009) (the plaintiff was not required to file a COM against a defendant 

engineer where the plaintiff was essentially alleging a negligent trespass 

onto her property during the placement of a waterline); Smith v. Friends 

Hospital, 928 A.2d 1072 (Pa.Super. 2007) (plaintiff not required to file a 

COM where she alleged she sustained injuries during her hospitalization 

when she was sexually assaulted, physically assaulted, and beaten by 

hospital employees; nothing in her complaint was predicated on substandard 

medical treatment or deviation from an acceptable professional standard, 

and her cause of action was based solely upon her allegations that she was 

assaulted and beaten). As such, we need not address the trial court’s 

conclusion that Rule 1042.3(e) requires pro se plaintiffs to attach a written 

statement to the COM and that only an attorney can file a COM without 

attaching a written statement. 

Appeals dismissed.

Olson, J. joins this Memorandum.

Strassburger, J. files a Dissenting Statement.
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Judgment Entered.

JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/6/2014