[Cite as In re A.E.B, 2018-Ohio-2269.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

JEFFERSON COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF: 

A.E.B., 

DEPENDENT CHILD. 

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 17 JE 0030 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Juvenile Court of Jefferson County, Ohio 

Case No. 2017 DN 00010 

BEFORE: 

Carol Ann Robb, Gene Donofrio, Kathleen Bartlett, Judges. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed.

Atty. Gregory J. Wysin, 2037 Brady Lake Road, Kent, Ohio 44240 for Appellant and 

Atty. Amanda J. Abrams, 125 S. 5th Street, Steubenville, Ohio 43952 for Appellee. 

 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: 

May 31, 2018 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

 

Robb, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant-father appeals the decision of the Jefferson County Common 

Pleas Court, Juvenile Division terminating his parental rights and granting permanent 

custody of the child A.E.B. to Children Services. He argues the decision was against 

the manifest weight of the evidence based upon his allegation that the agency failed to 

show the absence of a relative who was able to take legal custody of the child, citing a 

statute pertaining to an orphaned child. For the following reasons, the trial court’s 

decision is affirmed. 

 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

{¶2} When the child was born on March 12, 2017, he tested positive for 

cocaine, benzodiazapene, and Subutex. The child was transferred to a hospital in 

Pittsburgh as he required treatment for withdrawal, which thereafter continued at a 

children’s transitional center until his release on April 30, 2017, when he entered foster 

care. Upon the child’s birth, the mother expressed her wish to permanently surrender 

her parental rights and allow the child to be placed for adoption. She received 

surrender counseling. No father was named on the birth certificate, and the mother said 

the father was unknown. The day after the child’s birth, Appellant called the agency 

stating he may be the father of the child. He did not provide an address or phone 

number. 

{¶3} On March 21, 2017, the agency filed a dependency complaint and sought 

permanent custody or in the alternative temporary custody. The same day, the court 

conducted a shelter care hearing and a probable cause hearing. The mother completed 

the permanent surrender in open court. The court found probable cause the child was 

dependent and granted emergency temporary custody to the agency. The agency filed 

a motion for paternity testing of Appellant. The adjudicatory hearing was set for April 7, 

2017; Appellant was originally served by publication as his address was unknown. On 

March 27, 2017, Appellant appeared at the agency and signed a notice of address and 

phone number, which was filed with the court. At this time, Appellant was personally 

served with the summons, which explained how to obtain court-appointed counsel. 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

{¶4} Appellant appeared unrepresented at the April 7, 2017 hearing and 

agreed to genetic testing, which the court ordered in a judgment entry filed the same 

day. The adjudicatory hearing was continued as Appellant asked for time to obtain 

counsel, but he then appeared unrepresented at the May 5, 2017 rescheduled 

adjudicatory hearing. An agency caseworker testified about the child’s situation. On 

May 9, 2017, the child was adjudicated dependent in a magistrate’s decision, which 

found the agency made reasonable efforts to prevent placement of the child outside of 

the home including a search for relatives. No objection to the magistrate’s decision was 

filed, and the court entered judgment on the dependency adjudication on May 24, 2017. 

{¶5} Appellant presented himself at the agency for genetic testing on May 17, 

2017. However, he did not appear for the dispositional hearing two days later. In a May 

22, 2017 decision, the magistrate granted temporary custody to the agency, stating the 

agency’s reasonable efforts included a search for relatives. No objection was filed, and 

the court entered judgment on the temporary custody disposition on June 6, 2017. 

{¶6} The genetic test result (dated May 19, 2017) confirmed Appellant’s 

paternity and was mailed to Appellant by the agency at the residence he provided in the 

notice of address. The result was filed with the court, and on May 30, 2017, the court 

entered a paternity judgment. The caseworker thereafter repeatedly found Appellant’s 

phone number unreachable and repeatedly attempted to visit the address he provided. 

On one visit, a person told the caseworker Appellant no longer lived there but a 

message would be delivered. Appellant called the caseworker two days later and asked 

why she was looking for him. (Tr. 20). During this June 14, 2017 phone conversation, 

Appellant admitted he received (from his sister) the paternity result mailed to the 

address on file. (Appellant’s sister testified she previously lived at that address.) 

{¶7} On June 15, 2017, Appellant attended a meeting at the agency with his 

girlfriend, and a case plan for reunification and visitation was discussed. When asked 

why he did not contact the agency after receiving the paternity result, he said he had 

been busy and left his phone in a friend’s car. (Tr. 21). He was unemployed and 

occasionally worked for a temporary job service. He reported he was living at his 

girlfriend’s apartment and disclosed this was contrary to the rules of her public housing 

tenancy as a result of his criminal record. (Tr. 22). He was fingerprinted for a criminal 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

background check which showed he was 25 years old and had convictions for: assault 

(charged in 2016, 2014, and 2013); fourth-degree felony carrying a concealed weapon 

(charged in 2011 and 2012), the second of which resulted in him serving time in prison 

in 2013/2014; and fifth-degree felony receiving stolen property for which he served time 

in prison in 2015/2016. (Ex. D). 

{¶8} During the meeting at the agency, Appellant named a clinic in Pittsburgh 

which he said was treating him for opiate addiction by providing him Suboxone. The 

agency instructed him to release his medical information from the clinic, but he never 

provided evidence he was being treated by this clinic. The agency also instructed him 

to submit to urine testing the next day in order to determine whether the Wednesday 

visitations would be supervised or unsupervised, but he never provided a urine test 

result. (Tr. 22, 36-38). At the June 15, 2017 meeting, Appellant informed the agency 

he did not have relatives willing to file for custody or to come speak with the agency 

regarding the child, but he said he was going to file a motion for custody in the juvenile 

court. (Tr. 27, 32). He did not do so, and he did not return to the agency. 

{¶9} The caseworker unsuccessfully attempted a home visit at the girlfriend’s 

apartment and then called the father’s girlfriend on June 26, 2017. Appellant returned 

the call asking why she was calling him. (Tr. 22). She informed him the clinic would not 

release any information to the agency with a faxed release as the clinic’s policy required 

any client to personally present the release to the clinic. When she inquired about the 

urine screen, Appellant claimed to have an appointment with the clinic on July 1, 2017. 

(Tr. 23). 

{¶10} On July 3, 2017, the caseworker approached Appellant while he was at 

the Steubenville Municipal Court. She asked him about the July 1 urine screen, and he 

said the appointment was July 3; he had no response when she advised him that very 

day was July 3. (Tr. 24). The caseworker again asked if he had relatives willing to file 

for custody of the child, and he responded in the negative. (Tr. 32). The caseworker 

obtained a new home address from him, but she thereafter attempted to contact him at 

that address three times to no avail. On one of those times, a woman (whom she 

watched enter the house) would not answer the door. (Tr. 24). Around this time, 

Appellant’s girlfriend told the caseworker they were no longer together. On July 24, 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

2017, the caseworker sent a letter to prompt Appellant to exercise his visitation 

scheduled at the agency every Wednesday at 2:00 p.m., but he never exercised 

visitation. 

{¶11} On August 18, 2017, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody. A 

summary was attached which stated: he did not maintain contact with the agency or 

show his intent to work a reunification plan; he did not provide proof of sobriety, income, 

or housing; he failed without justification to visit the child or complete any aspect of his 

case plan; he said he had no family members interested in filing for custody; he 

thereafter failed to name any family members that may be willing to file for custody; no 

suitable relatives approached the agency regarding placement of the child; and the child 

was presumed to be abandoned under R.C. 2151.011(C) as the father had no contact 

with the child for more than 90 days. 

{¶12} The court appointed counsel for Appellant on August 23, 2017 and set the 

case for dispositional hearing on October 17, 2017. Still, Appellant and his family did 

not contact the agency. The child’s guardian ad litem filed a report noting Appellant’s 

lack of steps toward reunification and the child’s development of a bond with the foster 

family. She recommended permanent custody be granted to the agency. On the day of 

the hearing, Appellant arrived at court with counsel and his sister who spoke to the 

caseworker before the hearing about the child’s placement. 

{¶13} The caseworker explained the child was born with an extra digit on each 

hand, which is a hereditary condition; a physician advised surgery should not be 

performed until the child was at least a year old. (Tr. 11-12). Notably, Appellant 

revealed (weeks prior to appearing for paternity testing) how he knew he was the father 

as he was born with this same condition. (Tr. 11, 40). The foster mother noted the child 

has had no family in his life since he was born besides herself and her husband, and 

she expressed they were ready and capable to be the child’s mother and father. (Tr. 

64). During the child’s hospitalization, the foster parents regularly visited the child and 

checked on him via video as well. The caseworker confirmed the seven-month-old child 

was very bonded to his foster parents who were willing to adopt him if permanent 

custody was granted to the agency. (Tr. 41-42). 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

{¶14} The caseworker spoke of the occurrences in the case as set forth supra 

and the requirements of Appellant’s case plan, which included providing evidence of 

suitable housing, a means of support, and compliance with a drug treatment program. 

(Tr. 36). She noted: he never ensured his records were released from the clinic that 

allegedly prescribed him Suboxone; he never provided the results of a urine test; he 

never visited the child; and no home visit was conducted due to the inability to find him 

at shifting addresses. At the time of trial, there was an outstanding warrant for 

Appellant’s arrest on two counts of fifth-degree felony theft issued out of the 

Steubenville Municipal Court. (Tr. 31). 

{¶15} The caseworker disclosed that Appellant’s mother approached an agency 

supervisor at a store two weeks before the hearing and mentioned she thought of 

looking into the child’s custody but did not want to let her son “off the hook.” (Tr. 32, 44-

45). The caseworker explained the paternal grandmother was not someone the agency 

would consider for placement due to her criminal record and history with the agency. 

(Tr. 32-33). The paternal grandmother did not seek custody and was not present for the 

hearing. 

{¶16} The caseworker testified about the sister who did not inquire about 

custody until she arrived at court just before the hearing. The local municipal court 

records showed the sister had a prior conviction for disorderly conduct. (Tr. 33). The 

sister reported living with another sister whom the caseworker knew had a substantial 

history with the agency. For instance, this co-resident had a prior substantiated abuse 

case with the agency due to a child being born addicted to cocaine and a prior neglect 

case with the agency which resulted in a child endangering conviction. (Tr. 33-34). 

{¶17} Appellant did not testify. Appellant’s sister testified she was present 

because: “I was informed that my brother was trying to get his son back and I will have 

to get custody of him.” (Tr. 51). She said Appellant had been telling her “bits and 

pieces about it for the past couple months but I didn’t know this was like the last ending 

of it.” (Tr. 52). He told her he had to provide evidence of treatment to get his son back, 

and she drove him to a facility in Steubenville to make inquiries on treatment. (Tr. 52, 

57-58). She was asked: “did you ever ask him if you could see the baby or have the 

baby with you?” She answered, “Not – visit, no but try to get it, yes.” She estimated 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

she contemplated seeking custody a month before the hearing when he told her he was 

going to lose his rights. (Tr. 56, 62). She did not file a motion in the court or contact the 

agency (besides speaking to the caseworker at the court just before the hearing 

commenced). 

{¶18} Appellant’s sister lived in a rental house in Steubenville with her sister and 

her sister’s four children ranging in ages from three to ten. She said she had 

experience with children as a result of her nieces and nephews. She stayed in the living 

room of the house which had three bedrooms. (Tr. 51). She said the subject child 

could stay in the bedroom with the two male children if she received custody. (Tr. 50). 

The sister said she filled out Section 8 paperwork and was waiting for a meeting on that 

subject. (Tr. 61). She was 22 years old with no children and worked full-time on the 

third shift of a company outside of Pittsburgh. She also said both her name and her 

sister’s name were on a one-year lease for the rental house, and they could not leave 

early. (Tr. 50-51). She estimated they had lived there for six months. (Tr. 51). Other 

evidence suggested it may have been less as she previously lived at an address 

matching the one Appellant originally provided to the agency and he said he received 

from his sister the May 2017 paternity test result sent to that address. (Tr. 62). The 

sister mentioned having prior theft cases in addition to her disorderly conduct 

conviction. (Tr. 61). 

{¶19} On October 19, 2017, the magistrate’s decision found by clear and 

convincing evidence that Appellant’s parental rights should be terminated, permanent 

custody should be granted to the agency, and this was in the child’s best interest. The 

magistrate recited: the father had no contact with the child and failed to appear for 

weekly visits; he failed to comply with the case plan without justification; he failed to 

complete or provide evidence of drug counseling, submit urine test results, or collect 

records from the clinic; his living conditions could not be determined due to his lack of 

contact with the agency; he had a criminal history involving assaults and weapons; and 

he had two felony theft charges pending with a warrant out for his arrest. 

{¶20} The magistrate concluded: the father abandoned the child by not visiting 

for more than 90 days; he demonstrated a lack of commitment by failing to support, 

visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so or by other actions showing an 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the child; the agency made 

reasonable efforts to reunite the child with his father and engaged in reasonable case 

planning and diligent efforts to assist the father in remedying any issues, which he 

continuously and repeatedly failed to remedy. Regarding relatives, the magistrate 

stated: no relatives were identified by the father prior to the day of the hearing; the 

sister knew of the child’s existence for months but took no steps to visit or contact the 

agency; and his sister would not be an appropriate placement as she resides with her 

sister who has substantiated abuse and neglect cases. As to the child, the magistrate 

found: the child was in need of legally secure permanent placement which could not be 

accomplished without granting permanent custody to the agency; the foster parents 

visited the child in the hospital to bond with the child; and the child has been integrated 

into the home of the foster parents who were interested in adopting the child. 

{¶21} The father filed a timely objection to the magistrate’s decision. The 

objection provided: “The father asserts that the agency could not show that no relative 

was able to take legal custody of the child.” The transcript of the magistrate’s hearing 

was prepared for the trial court’s review. On December 1, 2017, the trial court overruled 

the objection, adopted and incorporated the magistrate’s decision which was restated in 

its entirety, and entered judgment granting permanent custody to the agency and 

terminating the father’s parental rights. The father filed a timely notice of appeal. New 

counsel was appointed for the father on appeal. This expedited appeal was submitted 

for decision on May 3, 2018, when briefing closed ten days after the agency’s brief was 

filed. See App.R. 11.2(C)(4); App.R. 18(A). 

 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR: RELATIVE DESIRING CUSTODY 

{¶22} Appellant’s assignment of error contends: 

“THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FINDING THAT 

NO RELATIVE WAS ABLE TO TAKE LEGAL CUSTODY OF THE CHILD, 

AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.” 

{¶23} The father contends the court abused its discretion on the matter of 

whether a relative could have taken legal custody. The court may grant permanent 

custody to the movant if it finds by clear and convincing evidence it is in the best interest 

of the child and any of the following apply: (1) the child cannot be placed with either 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

parent within a reasonable time or should not be so placed; (2) the child is abandoned; 

(3) the child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child who are able to take 

permanent custody; (4) the child has been in the temporary custody of an agency for 12 

or more months of a consecutive 22 month period; or (5) a child in the custody of the 

parents (from whom custody of the subject child was removed) was adjudicated 

abused, neglected, or dependent three separate times. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e). 

Pursuant to R.C. 2151.011(C), “a child shall be presumed abandoned when the parents 

of the child have failed to visit or maintain contact with the child more than ninety days, 

regardless of whether the parents resume contact with the child after that period of 

ninety days.” 

{¶24} “Clear and convincing evidence” is a measure of proof that will produce in 

the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be 

established. State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990), citing 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 477, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954). It is an intermediate 

measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence” 

but less than the certainty required where the burden of proof is “beyond a reasonable 

doubt” as in criminal cases. Id. “Clear and convincing” does not mean “clear and 

unequivocal.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Stafford, 131 Ohio St.3d 385, 2012-Ohio-909, 

965 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 21; Cross, 161 Ohio St. at 477. 

{¶25} The juvenile court’s decision on a motion for permanent custody is subject 

to an abuse of discretion review. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, 862 

N.E.2d 816, ¶ 48. An abuse of discretion occurs if the court’s decision is unreasonable, 

arbitrary or unconscionable; it entails more than an error of judgment. State v. Adams, 

62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). A decision is unreasonable if it is 

unsupportable by any sound reasoning process. See AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place 

Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). A 

decision is not unreasonable merely because a reviewing court would have made a 

different decision if in the trial court’s place. The appellate court is not free to merely 

substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Berk v. Matthews, 53 Ohio St.3d 161, 

169, 559 N.E.2d 1301 (1990). We are guided by a presumption the trial court’s findings 

are correct since the trial court judge is best able to judge credibility of witnesses and 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

occupies the best position for weighing the evidence. Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 

10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984). 

{¶26} Appellant does not contest the best interest finding or the finding that he 

abandoned the child. Rather, he contends the agency made no effort to identify 

paternal relatives. Appellant notes the foster parents desired to adopt the child the 

moment they heard of the mother’s surrender, and he believes the agency never 

intended to make a good faith effort to determine if he had relatives who could take 

custody. As the mother already permanently surrendered her parental rights, it is 

suggested the child became “orphaned” upon the father’s abandonment. Appellant 

relies on division (B) of R.C. 2151.413, which provides an agency who, under R.C. 

2151.353(A)(2), “is granted temporary custody of a child who is orphaned may file a 

motion in the court that made the disposition of the child requesting permanent custody 

of the child whenever it can show that no relative of the child is able to take legal 

custody of the child.” R.C. 2151.413(B).1 

{¶27} Here, the child was found to be abandoned, not orphaned. Although the 

most common use of the word “orphan” means one whose parents are dead, Appellant 

uses an alternative definition which includes a person who has lost his parents or who is 

generally without parental care. See Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.2014). In any 

case, the pertinent statutory provisions discussed herein differentiate between 

“orphaned” and “abandoned.” 

{¶28} It seems Appellant relies on division (B) of R.C. 2151.413 (applicable to an 

orphaned child) because division (A) does not require a showing that “no relative of the 

child is able to take legal custody” and provides that an agency who under R.C. 

2151.353(A)(2) “is granted temporary custody of a child who is not abandoned or 

orphaned” may file a permanent custody motion. R.C. 2151.413(A) (emphasis added). 

The agency was granted temporary custody under R.C. 2151.353(A)(2) which provides: 

“if a child is adjudicated an abused, neglected, or dependent child, the court may * * * 

Commit the child to the temporary custody of * * * a public children services agency.” 

 

1 Even when the former version of this statutory division also contained a provision for an abandoned 

child, the language on relatives only applied to the orphaned child. See 1998 HB 484 amendment to R.C. 

2151.413(B). 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

The dispositional hearing on temporary custody occurred before there arose a 

presumption of abandonment by the father. 

{¶29} In any event, another statute provides: “If after making disposition as 

authorized by division (A)(2) of this section, a motion is filed that requests permanent 

custody of the child, the court may grant permanent custody of the child to the movant 

in accordance with section 2151.414 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2151.353(C).2 The 

statutory findings for granting permanent custody in (a) through (e) of R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) are alternatives so that only one of the five options must be found by the 

court. In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73 at ¶ 23-27. 

{¶30} As aforementioned, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) states the court may grant 

permanent custody to the agency if it finds by clear and convincing evidence it is in the 

best interest of the child and one of the following apply: (1) the child cannot be placed 

with either of the parents within a reasonable time or should not be so placed3 (and the 

child is not abandoned, orphaned, or in temporary custody for “12 of 22” months); (2) 

the child is abandoned; (3) the child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child 

who are able to take permanent custody; (4) the “12 of 22” provision applies; or (5) 

certain prior adjudications exist. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e). These are separate 

options. The option involving an abandoned child does not refer to whether there are 

relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody as does the provision 

regarding a child who was orphaned. 

{¶31} In any event, Appellant twice expressly told the agency he had no 

relatives willing to seek custody. He is the only party on appeal. A party who twice tells 

an agency he has no relatives who could take custody cannot then argue the agency 

failed to investigate the status of his own relatives where no relatives approached the 

agency prior to the hearing. We also note Appellant’s mother considered his situation 

but voiced she did not want to let her son “off the hook” and apparently decided against 

 

2 See also R.C. 2151.415(A)(4) (motion for termination of parental rights to be filed at least 30 days 

before temporary custody expires), (F) (a motion for a dispositional order can be filed by the agency, the 

court, the guardian ad litem, or a party). 

3 The court also made specific findings in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (4), and (10), which require a conclusion 

that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be so placed. 
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Case No. 17 JE 0030

seeking custody as she did not do so. Furthermore, she was judged by the agency to 

be an unsuitable placement due to a criminal history and her history with the agency. 

Regardless, she was not at the hearing, and it is his sister Appellant asks this court to 

consider. 

{¶32} Appellant contends the court abused its discretion by not giving his sister 

the opportunity to demonstrate she would be a suitable placement, pointing out there 

was still time on the one-year temporary custody clock. First, we note Appellant’s 

sister’s statement as to why she was there suggested she wished to help her brother 

“get his son back.” This may indicate she would have been asking for temporary 

custody, rather than legal custody. The statutes cited by Appellant refer to a relative 

who can take permanent legal custody. See R.C. 2151.413(B) (speaking of a relative 

who can take “legal custody” of orphaned child); R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(c) (speaking of a 

relative who can take “permanent custody” of orphaned child).4 The juvenile court could 

rationally conclude it was not convinced she was not offering the child the legally secure 

permanent placement that he needed. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d) (a best interest 

factor for the court to weigh in its discretion). 

{¶33} Moreover, Appellant’s sister did not file a motion seeking custody and did 

not voice to the agency a desire to seek custody until just prior to the commencement of 

the hearing even though she knew about the child’s birth for months and knew for a 

month that Appellant believed he would lose his parental rights. In addition, Appellant’s 

sister did not contact the agency to inquire as to visitation or the child’s well-being at 

any time. The juvenile court found her last-minute expression of interest significant. 

The sister also gave no indication of who would take care of the child while she worked 

the third shift at a company in Pittsburgh. Appellant had not completed the 

requirements for unsupervised visitation, and he showed himself to be unreliable when 

it came to involving himself in the child’s life. Furthermore, the court concluded 

 

4 See also R.C. 2151.42(B) (legal custody intended to be permanent in nature, including that granted 

under R.C. 2151.415). We also note, under the statute governing the initial disposition, a person must file 

motion for legal custody prior to the dispositional hearing or be identified in a party’s motion prior to the 

hearing; in the latter case they must sign a statement of understanding that they assume legal 

responsibility for the child until the child reaches the age of majority or longer if the child is still in high 

school). R.C. 2151.353 (A)(3). 
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Appellant’s sister was not an appropriate placement because she lived with her sister 

who was not considered an appropriate co-resident for the child due to her past history 

with the agency and a child endangering conviction as discussed supra. 

{¶34} The court heard Appellant’s sister testify and could evaluate the sincerity 

of her wish to obtain custody, the credibility of her statements at the hearing, and the 

weight of the evidence on her ability to take custody. It is not for this court to substitute 

our judgment for that of the juvenile court on these factual matters. For all of the 

foregoing reasons, Appellant’s argument as to whether a relative could have taken 

custody is without merit, and his assignment of error is therefore overruled. 

{¶35} In accordance, the juvenile court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Donofrio, J., concurs. 

Bartlett, J., concurs. 
[Cite as In re A.E.B, 2018-Ohio-2269.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is 

overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County, Ohio, Juvenile Division is affirmed. Costs 

waived.