# Euroopa Liidu C 236/2016

| | ISSN 1977-0898 |
| --- | --- |
| Euroopa Liidu
  Teataja | C 236 |
| | |
| Eestikeelne väljaanne | Teave ja teatised | 59. köide30. juuni 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0898

Euroopa Liidu

Teataja

C 236

Eestikeelne väljaanne

Teave ja teatised

59. köide30. juuni 2016

---

| Teatis nr | Sisukord | Lehekülg |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Teatised |
| | EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDE, ORGANITE JA ASUTUSTE TEATISED |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2016/C 236/01 | Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8039 – Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/02 | Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8049 – TPG Capital / Partners Group / TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2016/C 236/03 | Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8041 – M&G / Anchorage / PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  ) | 2 |
| 2016/C 236/04 | Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8054 – 3i Group / Deutsche Alternative Asset Management / TCR Capvest) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Teatis nr

Sisukord

Lehekülg

II   Teatised

EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDE, ORGANITE JA ASUTUSTE TEATISED

Euroopa Komisjon

2016/C 236/01

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8039 – Freudenberg/Vibracoustic) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/02

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8049 – TPG Capital / Partners Group / TH Real Estate Portfolio) (
  1
  )

1

1

2016/C 236/03

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8041 – M&G / Anchorage / PHS Group Investment) (
  1
  )

1

2

2016/C 236/04

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8054 – 3i Group / Deutsche Alternative Asset Management / TCR Capvest) (
  1
  )

1

2

---

| | IV   Teave |
| --- | --- |
| | TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2016/C 236/05 | Euro vahetuskurss | 3 |
| 2016/C 236/06 | Euro käibemüntide uus liikmesriiki tähistav külg | 4 |
| | Kontrollikoda |
| 2016/C 236/07 | Eriaruanne nr 14/2016 — Romade integratsioonile suunatud ELi poliitikaalgatused ja rahaline abi: viimasel kümnendil on tehtud märkimisväärseid edusamme, kuid kohapeal vajatakse täiendavaid jõupingutusi | 5 |
| | TEAVE LIIKMESRIIKIDELT |
| 2016/C 236/08 | Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 2 lõikes 8 nimetatud piiripunktide ajakohastatud loetelu | 6 |
| 2016/C 236/09 | Ajakohastatud näidised kaartidest, mida liikmesriikide välisministeeriumid väljastavad diplomaatiliste lähetuste ja konsulaaresinduste akrediteeritud liikmetele ning nende pereliikmetele vastavalt Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 20 lõikele 2 | 11 |
| | EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE |
| | EFTA järelevalveamet |
| 2016/C 236/10 | Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 | 21 |
| 2016/C 236/11 | Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 (milles käsitletakse riigiabiküsimusi) I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 seoses võimaliku riigiabi andmisega Hurtigruten ASA-le Hurtigruten mereveoteenuste rannikukokkulepe raames ajavahemikus 2012–2019 | 29 |
| 2016/C 236/12 | Norra teatis, mis käsitleb Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi 94/22/EÜ süsivesinike geoloogilise luure, uurimise ja tootmise lubade andmis- ning kasutamistingimuste kohta — Kutse Norra mandrilava naftatootmislitsentside taotlemiseks – 2016. aastaks kindlaksmääratud piirkonnad | 45 |

IV   Teave

TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT

Euroopa Komisjon

2016/C 236/05

Euro vahetuskurss

3

2016/C 236/06

Euro käibemüntide uus liikmesriiki tähistav külg

4

Kontrollikoda

2016/C 236/07

Eriaruanne nr 14/2016 — Romade integratsioonile suunatud ELi poliitikaalgatused ja rahaline abi: viimasel kümnendil on tehtud märkimisväärseid edusamme, kuid kohapeal vajatakse täiendavaid jõupingutusi

5

TEAVE LIIKMESRIIKIDELT

2016/C 236/08

Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 2 lõikes 8 nimetatud piiripunktide ajakohastatud loetelu

6

2016/C 236/09

Ajakohastatud näidised kaartidest, mida liikmesriikide välisministeeriumid väljastavad diplomaatiliste lähetuste ja konsulaaresinduste akrediteeritud liikmetele ning nende pereliikmetele vastavalt Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 20 lõikele 2

11

EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE

EFTA järelevalveamet

2016/C 236/10

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2

21

2016/C 236/11

Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 (milles käsitletakse riigiabiküsimusi) I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 seoses võimaliku riigiabi andmisega Hurtigruten ASA-le Hurtigruten mereveoteenuste rannikukokkulepe raames ajavahemikus 2012–2019

29

2016/C 236/12

Norra teatis, mis käsitleb Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi 94/22/EÜ süsivesinike geoloogilise luure, uurimise ja tootmise lubade andmis- ning kasutamistingimuste kohta — Kutse Norra mandrilava naftatootmislitsentside taotlemiseks – 2016. aastaks kindlaksmääratud piirkonnad

45

---

| | V   Teated |
| --- | --- |
| | HALDUSMENETLUSED |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2016/C 236/13 | Konkursikutse rahalise toetuse andmiseks üleeuroopalise energiataristu mitmeaastase tööprogrammi raames Euroopa ühendamise rahastust ajavahemikul 2014–2020 (Komisjoni otsus C(2016) 1587) | 47 |
| | KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED |
| | Euroopa Komisjon |
| 2016/C 236/14 | Eelteatis koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8094 – BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium / Sofindev IV / DHAM / Novy International) – Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine (
  1
  ) | 48 |

V   Teated

HALDUSMENETLUSED

Euroopa Komisjon

2016/C 236/13

Konkursikutse rahalise toetuse andmiseks üleeuroopalise energiataristu mitmeaastase tööprogrammi raames Euroopa ühendamise rahastust ajavahemikul 2014–2020 (Komisjoni otsus C(2016) 1587)

47

KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED

Euroopa Komisjon

2016/C 236/14

Eelteatis koondumise kohta (juhtum M.8094 – BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium / Sofindev IV / DHAM / Novy International) – Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine (
  1
  )

1

48

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| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   EMPs kohaldatav tekst |

---

(1)   EMPs kohaldatav tekst

1

| ET | |
| --- | --- |

ET

---

II Teatised

EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDE, ORGANITE JA ASUTUSTE TEATISED

Euroopa Komisjon

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/1

---

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8039 – Freudenberg/Vibracoustic)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2016/C 236/01)

22. juunil 2016 otsustas komisjon loobuda vastuväidete esitamisest eespool nimetatud teatatud koondumise kohta ning kuulutada koondumine siseturuga kokkusobivaks. Otsuse aluseks on nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artikli 6 lõike 1 punkt b. Otsuse täielik tekst on kättesaadav ainult inglise keeles ning see avaldatakse pärast seda, kui sellest on kustutatud võimalikud ärisaladused. Otsus on kättesaadav:

| — | Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri, kuupäeva ja tegevusalade registri kaudu; |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri, kuupäeva ja tegevusalade registri kaudu;

| — | elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex'i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8039 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex'i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8039 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele.

---

(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/1

---

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8049 – TPG Capital / Partners Group / TH Real Estate Portfolio)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2016/C 236/02)

23. juunil 2016 otsustas komisjon loobuda vastuväidete esitamisest eespool nimetatud teatatud koondumise kohta ning kuulutada koondumine siseturuga kokkusobivaks. Otsuse aluseks on nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artikli 6 lõike 1 punkt b. Otsuse täielik tekst on kättesaadav ainult inglise keeles ning see avaldatakse pärast seda, kui sellest on kustutatud võimalikud ärisaladused. Otsus on kättesaadav:

| — | Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri ja kuupäeva järgi ning tegevusalade registri kaudu; |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri ja kuupäeva järgi ning tegevusalade registri kaudu;

| — | elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex’i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8049 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex’i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8049 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele.

---

(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/2

---

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8041 – M&G / Anchorage / PHS Group Investment)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2016/C 236/03)

23. juunil 2016 otsustas komisjon loobuda vastuväidete esitamisest eespool nimetatud teatatud koondumise kohta ning kuulutada koondumine siseturuga kokkusobivaks. Otsuse aluseks on nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artikli 6 lõike 1 punkt b. Otsuse täielik tekst on kättesaadav ainult inglise keeles ning see avaldatakse pärast seda, kui sellest on kustutatud võimalikud ärisaladused. Otsus on kättesaadav:

| — | Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri ja kuupäeva järgi ning tegevusalade registri kaudu; |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri ja kuupäeva järgi ning tegevusalade registri kaudu;

| — | elektronilises vormis EUR-Lex’i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8041 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektronilises vormis EUR-Lex’i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8041 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele.

---

(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1.

---

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/2

---

Vastuväidete esitamisest loobumine teatatud koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8054 – 3i Group / Deutsche Alternative Asset Management / TCR Capvest)

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2016/C 236/04)

24. juunil 2016 otsustas komisjon loobuda vastuväidete esitamisest eespool nimetatud teatatud koondumise kohta ning kuulutada koondumine siseturuga kokkusobivaks. Otsuse aluseks on nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artikli 6 lõike 1 punkt b. Otsuse täielik tekst on kättesaadav ainult inglise keeles ning see avaldatakse pärast seda, kui sellest on kustutatud võimalikud ärisaladused. Otsus on kättesaadav:

| — | Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri, kuupäeva ja tegevusalade registri kaudu; |
| --- | --- |

—

Euroopa konkurentsialasel veebisaidil (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Veebisaidil pakutakse mitut võimalust otsida konkreetset ühinemisotsust, sealhulgas ettevõtja nime, juhtumi numbri, kuupäeva ja tegevusalade registri kaudu;

| — | elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex'i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8054 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele. |
| --- | --- |

—

elektroonilises vormis EUR-Lex'i veebisaidil (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html?locale=et) dokumendinumbri 32016M8054 all. EUR-Lex pakub on-line-juurdepääsu Euroopa õigusele.

---

(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1.

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IV Teave

TEAVE EUROOPA LIIDU INSTITUTSIOONIDELT, ORGANITELT JA ASUTUSTELT

Euroopa Komisjon

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/3

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Euro vahetuskurss (1)

29. juuni 2016

(2016/C 236/05)

1 euro =

| | Valuuta | Kurss |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | USA dollar | 1,1090 |
| JPY | Jaapani jeen | 113,85 |
| DKK | Taani kroon | 7,4376 |
| GBP | Inglise nael | 0,82550 |
| SEK | Rootsi kroon | 9,4311 |
| CHF | Šveitsi frank | 1,0854 |
| ISK | Islandi kroon | |
| NOK | Norra kroon | 9,3065 |
| BGN | Bulgaaria leev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | Tšehhi kroon | 27,114 |
| HUF | Ungari forint | 316,95 |
| PLN | Poola zlott | 4,4261 |
| RON | Rumeenia leu | 4,5253 |
| TRY | Türgi liir | 3,2157 |
| AUD | Austraalia dollar | 1,4911 |
| CAD | Kanada dollar | 1,4407 |
| HKD | Hongkongi dollar | 8,6041 |
| NZD | Uus-Meremaa dollar | 1,5565 |
| SGD | Singapuri dollar | 1,4951 |
| KRW | Korea vonn | 1 283,15 |
| ZAR | Lõuna-Aafrika rand | 16,6016 |
| CNY | Hiina jüaan | 7,3680 |
| HRK | Horvaatia kuna | 7,5273 |
| IDR | Indoneesia ruupia | 14 577,25 |
| MYR | Malaisia ringit | 4,4594 |
| PHP | Filipiini peeso | 52,106 |
| RUB | Vene rubla | 71,0452 |
| THB | Tai baat | 39,028 |
| BRL | Brasiilia reaal | 3,6216 |
| MXN | Mehhiko peeso | 20,7331 |
| INR | India ruupia | 74,9693 |

Valuuta

Kurss

USD

USA dollar

1,1090

JPY

Jaapani jeen

113,85

DKK

Taani kroon

7,4376

GBP

Inglise nael

0,82550

SEK

Rootsi kroon

9,4311

CHF

Šveitsi frank

1,0854

ISK

Islandi kroon

NOK

Norra kroon

9,3065

BGN

Bulgaaria leev

1,9558

CZK

Tšehhi kroon

27,114

HUF

Ungari forint

316,95

PLN

Poola zlott

4,4261

RON

Rumeenia leu

4,5253

TRY

Türgi liir

3,2157

AUD

Austraalia dollar

1,4911

CAD

Kanada dollar

1,4407

HKD

Hongkongi dollar

8,6041

NZD

Uus-Meremaa dollar

1,5565

SGD

Singapuri dollar

1,4951

KRW

Korea vonn

1 283,15

ZAR

Lõuna-Aafrika rand

16,6016

CNY

Hiina jüaan

7,3680

HRK

Horvaatia kuna

7,5273

IDR

Indoneesia ruupia

14 577,25

MYR

Malaisia ringit

4,4594

PHP

Filipiini peeso

52,106

RUB

Vene rubla

71,0452

THB

Tai baat

39,028

BRL

Brasiilia reaal

3,6216

MXN

Mehhiko peeso

20,7331

INR

India ruupia

74,9693

---

(1)  Allikas: EKP avaldatud viitekurss.

---

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/4

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Euro käibemüntide uus liikmesriiki tähistav külg

(2016/C 236/06)

Euro käibemündid on seadusliku maksevahendina kasutusel kogu euroalal. Müntidega ametialaselt tegelevate isikute ja laiema avalikkuse teavitamiseks avaldab komisjon kõikide uute euromüntide kujunduse (1). Vastavalt nõukogu 10. veebruari 2009. aasta järeldustele (2) võivad euroala liikmesriigid ja riigid, kes on Euroopa Liiduga sõlminud euro käibemüntide käibele laskmist käsitleva rahanduskokkuleppe, lasta käibele euro mälestusmünte. Selleks peavad olema täidetud teatavad tingimused, millest peamine on nõue, et mälestusmündina kasutatakse üksnes 2-eurost münti. Mälestusmüntide tehnilised näitajad vastavad tavaliste 2-euroste käibemüntide näitajatele, kuid nende liikmesriiki tähistaval küljel on mälestust jäädvustav motiiv, mis on riigi või Euroopa tasandil sümboolne.

Käibele laskev riik
  : Hispaania

Motiiv
  : UNESCO ülemaailmse kultuuri- ja looduspärandi objektid – Astuuria kuningriigi kirikud

Kujunduse kirjeldus
  : esiplaanil on Santa Maria del Naranco kirik. Siseringi ülaservas on kaarekujuliselt kirjutatud käibele laskva riigi nimi „ESPAÑA” ning selle all paremal käibele laskmise aasta „2017”. Siseringi vasakul küljel on rahapaja tunnus.

Mündi välisringil on kujutatud Euroopa Liidu lipu 12 tähte.

Käibele lastavate müntide arv
  : 4 miljonit

Käibele laskmise aeg
  :

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(1)  EÜT C 373, 28.12.2001, lk 1, kus on esitatud teave kõikide 2002. aastal käibele lastud müntide liikmesriiki tähistava külje kohta.

(2)  Vt majandus- ja rahandusküsimuste nõukogu 10. veebruari 2009. aasta järeldused ning komisjoni 19. detsembri 2008. aasta soovitus euro käibemüntide rahvuslikke külgi ja selliste müntide emiteerimist käsitlevate ühiste suuniste kohta (ELT L 9, 14.1.2009, lk 52).

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Kontrollikoda

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/5

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Eriaruanne nr 14/2016

„Romade integratsioonile suunatud ELi poliitikaalgatused ja rahaline abi: viimasel kümnendil on tehtud märkimisväärseid edusamme, kuid kohapeal vajatakse täiendavaid jõupingutusi”

(2016/C 236/07)

Euroopa Kontrollikoda annab teada, et äsja avaldati kontrollikoja eriaruanne nr 14/2016 „Romade integratsioonile suunatud ELi poliitikaalgatused ja rahaline abi: viimasel kümnendil on tehtud märkimisväärseid edusamme, kuid kohapeal vajatakse täiendavaid jõupingutusi”.

Aruanne on lugemiseks ja allalaadimiseks kättesaadav Euroopa Kontrollikoja veebisaidil http://eca.europa.eu ja EU Bookshopi veebisaidil https://bookshop.europa.eu.

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TEAVE LIIKMESRIIKIDELT

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/6 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/6

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Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 2 lõikes 8 nimetatud piiripunktide ajakohastatud loetelu (1)

(2016/C 236/08)

Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 9. märtsi 2016. aasta määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 2 lõikes 8 nimetatud piiripunktide ajakohastatud loetelu avaldamise aluseks on liikmesriikide poolt kooskõlas Schengeni piirieeskirjade (kodifitseeritud tekst) artikliga 39 komisjonile edastatud teave.

Lisaks Euroopa Liidu Teatajas avaldamisele ajakohastatakse näidiseid käsitlevat teavet kord kuus ka siseasjade peadirektoraadi veebisaidil, kus see on kõigile kättesaadav.

PRANTSUSMAA

ELT C 229, 14.7.2015 avaldatud teabe täiendamine

PIIRIPUNKTIDE LOETELU

Õhupiir

| (1) | Abbeville |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Abbeville

| (2) | Agen-la Garenne |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Agen-la Garenne

| (3) | Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Ajaccio-Campo dell’Oro

| (4) | Albert-Bray |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Albert-Bray

| (5) | Amiens-Glisy |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Amiens-Glisy

| (6) | Angers-Marcé |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Angers-Marcé

| (7) | Angoulême-Brie-Champniers |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Angoulême-Brie-Champniers

| (8) | Annecy-Methet |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Annecy-Methet

| (9) | Annemasse |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Annemasse

| (10) | Auxerre-Branches |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Auxerre-Branches

| (11) | Avignon-Caumont |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Avignon-Caumont

| (12) | Bâle-Mulhouse |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Bâle-Mulhouse

| (13) | Bastia-Poretta |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Bastia-Poretta

| (14) | Beauvais-Tillé |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Beauvais-Tillé

| (15) | Bergerac-Roumanière |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Bergerac-Roumanière

| (16) | Besançon-la Vèze |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Besançon-la Vèze

| (17) | Béziers-Vias |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Béziers-Vias

| (18) | Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Biarritz-Bayonne-Anglet

| (19) | Bordeaux-Mérignac |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Bordeaux-Mérignac

| (20) | Brest-Guipavas |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Brest-Guipavas

| (21) | Brive-Souillac |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Brive-Souillac

| (22) | Caen-Carpiquet |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Caen-Carpiquet

| (23) | Calais-Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Calais-Dunkerque

| (24) | Calvi-Sainte-Catherine |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Calvi-Sainte-Catherine

| (25) | Cannes-Mandelieu |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Cannes-Mandelieu

| (26) | Carcassonne-Salvaza |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Carcassonne-Salvaza

| (27) | Châlons-Vatry |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Châlons-Vatry

| (28) | Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Chambéry-Aix-les-Bains

| (29) | Châteauroux-Déols |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Châteauroux-Déols

| (30) | Cherbourg-Mauperthus |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Cherbourg-Mauperthus

| (31) | Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Clermont-Ferrand-Aulnat

| (32) | Colmar-Houssen |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Colmar-Houssen

| (33) | Deauville-Saint-Gatien |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Deauville-Saint-Gatien

| (34) | Dijon-Longvic |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Dijon-Longvic

| (35) | Dinard-Pleurtuit |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Dinard-Pleurtuit

| (36) | Dôle-Tavaux |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Dôle-Tavaux

| (37) | Epinal-Mirecourt |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Epinal-Mirecourt

| (38) | Figari-Sud Corse |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Figari-Sud Corse

| (39) | Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Grenoble-Saint-Geoirs

| (40) | Hyères-le Palivestre |
| --- | --- |

(40)

Hyères-le Palivestre

| (41) | Issy-les-Moulineaux |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Issy-les-Moulineaux

| (42) | La Môle |
| --- | --- |

(42)

La Môle

| (43) | Lannion |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Lannion

| (44) | La Rochelle-Laleu |
| --- | --- |

(44)

La Rochelle-Laleu

| (45) | Laval-Entrammes |
| --- | --- |

(45)

Laval-Entrammes

| (46) | Le Castelet |
| --- | --- |

(46)

Le Castelet

| (47) | Le Havre-Octeville |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Le Havre-Octeville

| (48) | Le Mans-Arnage |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Le Mans-Arnage

| (49) | Le Touquet-Paris-Plage |
| --- | --- |

(49)

Le Touquet-Paris-Plage

| (50) | Lille-Lesquin |
| --- | --- |

(50)

Lille-Lesquin

| (51) | Limoges-Bellegarde |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Limoges-Bellegarde

| (52) | Lognes-Emerainville |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Lognes-Emerainville

| (53) | Lorient-Lann-Bihoué |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Lorient-Lann-Bihoué

| (54) | Lyon-Bron |
| --- | --- |

(54)

Lyon-Bron

| (55) | Lyon-Saint-Exupéry |
| --- | --- |

(55)

Lyon-Saint-Exupéry

| (56) | Marseille-Provence |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Marseille-Provence

| (57) | Metz-Nancy-Lorraine |
| --- | --- |

(57)

Metz-Nancy-Lorraine

| (58) | Monaco-Héliport |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Monaco-Héliport

| (59) | Montbéliard-Courcelles |
| --- | --- |

(59)

Montbéliard-Courcelles

| (60) | Montpellier-Méditérranée |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Montpellier-Méditérranée

| (61) | Nantes-Atlantique |
| --- | --- |

(61)

Nantes-Atlantique

| (62) | Nevers-Fourchambault |
| --- | --- |

(62)

Nevers-Fourchambault

| (63) | Nice-Côte d’Azur |
| --- | --- |

(63)

Nice-Côte d’Azur

| (64) | Nîmes-Garons |
| --- | --- |

(64)

Nîmes-Garons

| (65) | Orléans-Bricy |
| --- | --- |

(65)

Orléans-Bricy

| (66) | Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel |
| --- | --- |

(66)

Orléans-Saint-Denis-de-l’Hôtel

| (67) | Paris-Charles de Gaulle |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Paris-Charles de Gaulle

| (68) | Paris-le Bourget |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Paris-le Bourget

| (69) | Paris-Orly |
| --- | --- |

(69)

Paris-Orly

| (70) | Pau-Pyrénées |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Pau-Pyrénées

| (71) | Perpignan-Rivesaltes |
| --- | --- |

(71)

Perpignan-Rivesaltes

| (72) | Poitiers-Biard |
| --- | --- |

(72)

Poitiers-Biard

| (73) | Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, ajutiselt:






  — | kolmapäevast, 10. juunist kuni pühapäeva, 14. juunini 2015 kell 10.00–15.30
  Avatud ajutiselt Le Bourget’ lennuväljal toimuva rahvusvahelise lennundusnäituse ajal, kui on vaja Schengeni ala välised lennud ümber suunata Pontoise’i lennujaama; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(73)

Pontoise-Cormeillcs-en-Vexin, ajutiselt:

—

kolmapäevast, 10. juunist kuni pühapäeva, 14. juunini 2015 kell 10.00–15.30

Avatud ajutiselt Le Bourget’ lennuväljal toimuva rahvusvahelise lennundusnäituse ajal, kui on vaja Schengeni ala välised lennud ümber suunata Pontoise’i lennujaama;

| — | esmaspäevast, 15. juunist kuni pühapäeva, 21. juunini 2015 kell 06.00–16.30
  Avatud ajutiselt ajaks, kui lükatakse käima Schengeni ala väline hooajaline liin (Quimper-London). |
| --- | --- |

—

esmaspäevast, 15. juunist kuni pühapäeva, 21. juunini 2015 kell 06.00–16.30

Avatud ajutiselt ajaks, kui lükatakse käima Schengeni ala väline hooajaline liin (Quimper-London).

| (74) | Quimper-Cornouailles, avatud ajutiselt 19. maist kuni 4. septembrini 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

Quimper-Cornouailles, avatud ajutiselt 19. maist kuni 4. septembrini 2016.

| (75) | Rennes Saint-Jacques |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Rennes Saint-Jacques

| (76) | Rodez-Marcillac |
| --- | --- |

(76)

Rodez-Marcillac

| (77) | Rouen-Vallée de Seine |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Rouen-Vallée de Seine

| (78) | Saint-Brieuc-Armor |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Saint-Brieuc-Armor

| (79) | Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Saint-Etienne-Bouthéon

| (80) | Saint-Nazaire-Montoir |
| --- | --- |

(80)

Saint-Nazaire-Montoir

| (81) | Strasbourg-Entzheim |
| --- | --- |

(81)

Strasbourg-Entzheim

| (82) | Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Tarbes-Ossun-Lourdes

| (83) | Toulouse-Blagnac |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Toulouse-Blagnac

| (84) | Tours-Saint-Symphorien |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Tours-Saint-Symphorien

| (85) | Troyes-Barberey |
| --- | --- |

(85)

Troyes-Barberey

| (86) | Vichy-Charmeil |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Vichy-Charmeil

Merepiir

| (1) | Ajaccio |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Ajaccio

| (2) | Bastia |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Bastia

| (3) | Bayonne |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Bayonne

| (4) | Bonifacio |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Bonifacio

| (5) | Bordeaux |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Bordeaux

| (6) | Boulogne |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Boulogne

| (7) | Brest |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Brest

| (8) | Caen-Ouistreham |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Caen-Ouistreham

| (9) | Calais |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Calais

| (10) | Calvi |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Calvi

| (11) | Cannes-Vieux Port |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Cannes-Vieux Port

| (12) | Carteret |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Carteret

| (13) | Cherbourg |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Cherbourg

| (14) | Dieppe |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Dieppe

| (15) | Douvres |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Douvres

| (16) | Dunkerque |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Dunkerque

| (17) | Granville |
| --- | --- |

(17)

Granville

| (18) | Honfleur |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Honfleur

| (19) | La Rochelle-La Pallice |
| --- | --- |

(19)

La Rochelle-La Pallice

| (20) | Le Havre |
| --- | --- |

(20)

Le Havre

| (21) | Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Les Sables-d’Olonne-Port

| (22) | L’Ile-Rousse |
| --- | --- |

(22)

L’Ile-Rousse

| (23) | Lorient |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Lorient

| (24) | Marseille |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Marseille

| (25) | Monaco-Port de la Condamine |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Monaco-Port de la Condamine

| (26) | Nantes-Saint-Nazaire |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Nantes-Saint-Nazaire

| (27) | Nice |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Nice

| (28) | Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Port-de-Bouc-Fos/Port-Saint-Louis

| (29) | Port-la-Nouvelle |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Port-la-Nouvelle

| (30) | Porto-Vecchio |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Porto-Vecchio

| (31) | Port-Vendres |
| --- | --- |

(31)

Port-Vendres

| (32) | Roscoff |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Roscoff

| (33) | Rouen |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Rouen

| (34) | Saint-Brieuc (maritime) |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Saint-Brieuc (maritime)

| (35) | Saint-Malo |
| --- | --- |

(35)

Saint-Malo

| (36) | Sète |
| --- | --- |

(36)

Sète

| (37) | Toulon |
| --- | --- |

(37)

Toulon

Maismaapiir

ÜHENDKUNINGRIIGIGA

(regulaarne ühendus üle La Manche’i väina)

| (1) | Gare d’Ashford International |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Gare d’Ashford International

| (2) | Gare d’Avignon-Centre |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Gare d’Avignon-Centre

| (3) | Cheriton/Coquelles |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Cheriton/Coquelles

| (4) | Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Gare de Chessy-Marne-la-Vallée

| (5) | Gare de Fréthun |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Gare de Fréthun

| (6) | Gare de Lille-Europe |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Gare de Lille-Europe

| (7) | Gare de Paris-Nord |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Gare de Paris-Nord

| (8) | Gare de St-Pancras International |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Gare de St-Pancras International

| (9) | Gare d’Ebbsfleet International |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Gare d’Ebbsfleet International

| (10) | Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, avatud 1. juulil 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Gare TGV Haute-Picardie, avatud 1. juulil 2016.

ANDORRAGA

| (1) | Pas de la Case |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Pas de la Case

Eelmiste väljaannete loetelu

| | ELT C 316, 28.12.2007, lk 1 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 316, 28.12.2007, lk 1

| | ELT C 134, 31.5.2008, lk 16 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 134, 31.5.2008, lk 16

| | ELT C 177, 12.7.2008, lk 9 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 177, 12.7.2008, lk 9

| | ELT C 200, 6.8.2008, lk 10 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 200, 6.8.2008, lk 10

| | ELT C 331, 31.12.2008, lk 13 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 331, 31.12.2008, lk 13

| | ELT C 3, 8.1.2009, lk 10 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 3, 8.1.2009, lk 10

| | ELT C 37, 14.2.2009, lk 10 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 37, 14.2.2009, lk 10

| | ELT C 64, 19.3.2009, lk 20 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 64, 19.3.2009, lk 20

| | ELT C 99, 30.4.2009, lk 7 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 99, 30.4.2009, lk 7

| | ELT C 229, 23.9.2009, lk 28 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 229, 23.9.2009, lk 28

| | ELT C 263, 5.11.2009, lk 22 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 263, 5.11.2009, lk 22

| | ELT C 298, 8.12.2009, lk 17 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 298, 8.12.2009, lk 17

| | ELT C 74, 24.3.2010, lk 13 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 74, 24.3.2010, lk 13

| | ELT C 326, 3.12.2010, lk 17 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 326, 3.12.2010, lk 17

| | ELT C 355, 29.12.2010, lk 34 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 355, 29.12.2010, lk 34

| | ELT C 22, 22.1.2011, lk 22 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 22, 22.1.2011, lk 22

| | ELT C 37, 5.2.2011, lk 12 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 37, 5.2.2011, lk 12

| | ELT C 149, 20.5.2011, lk 8 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 149, 20.5.2011, lk 8

| | ELT C 190, 30.6.2011, lk 17 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 190, 30.6.2011, lk 17

| | ELT C 203, 9.7.2011, lk 14 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 203, 9.7.2011, lk 14

| | ELT C 210, 16.7.2011, lk 30 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 210, 16.7.2011, lk 30

| | ELT C 271, 14.9.2011, lk 18 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 271, 14.9.2011, lk 18

| | ELT C 356, 6.12.2011, lk 12 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 356, 6.12.2011, lk 12

| | ELT C 111, 18.4.2012, lk 3 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 111, 18.4.2012, lk 3

| | ELT C 183, 23.6.2012, lk 7 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 183, 23.6.2012, lk 7

| | ELT C 313, 17.10.2012, lk 11 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 313, 17.10.2012, lk 11

| | ELT C 394, 20.12.2012, lk 22 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 394, 20.12.2012, lk 22

| | ELT C 51, 22.2.2013, lk 9 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 51, 22.2.2013, lk 9

| | ELT C 167, 13.6.2013, lk 9 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 167, 13.6.2013, lk 9

| | ELT C 242, 23.8.2013, lk 2 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 242, 23.8.2013, lk 2

| | ELT C 275, 24.9.2013, lk 7 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 275, 24.9.2013, lk 7

| | ELT C 314, 29.10.2013, lk 5 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 314, 29.10.2013, lk 5

| | ELT C 324, 9.11.2013, lk 6 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 324, 9.11.2013, lk 6

| | ELT C 57, 28.2.2014, lk 4 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 57, 28.2.2014, lk 4

| | ELT C 167, 4.6.2014, lk 9 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 167, 4.6.2014, lk 9

| | ELT C 244, 26.7.2014, lk 22 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 244, 26.7.2014, lk 22

| | ELT C 332, 24.9.2014, lk 12 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 332, 24.9.2014, lk 12

| | ELT C 420, 22.11.2014, lk 9 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 420, 22.11.2014, lk 9

| | ELT C 72, 28.2.2015, lk 17 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 72, 28.2.2015, lk 17

| | ELT C 126, 18.4.2015, lk 10 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 126, 18.4.2015, lk 10

| | ELT C 229, 14.7.2015, lk 5 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 229, 14.7.2015, lk 5

| | ELT C 341, 16.10.2015, lk 19 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 341, 16.10.2015, lk 19

| | ELT C 84, 4.3.2016, lk 2. |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 84, 4.3.2016, lk 2.

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(1)  Vt eelmiste väljaannete loetelu käesoleva dokumendi lõpus.

---

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/11

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Ajakohastatud näidised kaartidest, mida liikmesriikide välisministeeriumid väljastavad diplomaatiliste lähetuste ja konsulaaresinduste akrediteeritud liikmetele ning nende pereliikmetele vastavalt Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 20 lõikele 2 (1)

(2016/C 236/09)

Näidised kaartidest, mida liikmesriikide välisministeeriumid väljastavad diplomaatiliste lähetuste ja konsulaaresinduste akrediteeritud liikmetele ning nende pereliikmetele vastavalt Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 9. märtsi 2016. aasta määruse (EL) 2016/399 (mis käsitleb isikute üle piiri liikumist reguleerivaid liidu eeskirju (Schengeni piirieeskirjad)) artikli 20 lõikele 2 avaldatakse teabe alusel, mille liikmesriigid edastavad komisjonile vastavalt Schengeni piirieeskirjade (kodifitseeritud tekst) artiklile 39.

Lisaks Euroopa Liidu Teatajas avaldamisele ajakohastatakse näidiseid käsitlevat teavet kord kuus ka siseasjade peadirektoraadi veebisaidil, kus see on kõigile kättesaadav.

ŠVEITS

Väljaandes ELT C 133, 1.5.2014 avaldatud teabe asendamine

VÄLISMINISTEERIUMI VÄLJASTATUD ERIELAMISLOAD

Šveitsi välisministeeriumi väljastatavad isikutunnistused (elamisload):

| — | Carte de légitimation « B » (à bande rose) : chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Isikutunnistus „B” (roosa triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide juhid, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kõrgema juhtkonna liikmed ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « B » (à bande rose) : chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „B“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Missionschefs der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, leitende Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „B“ (a banda rosa): Chefs de mission diplomatique, permanente ou spéciale, membres de la haute direction des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Isikutunnistus „B” (roosa triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide juhid, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kõrgema juhtkonna liikmed ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « C » (à bande rose) : membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „C” (roosa triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide diplomaatiline personal, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kõrgemad ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « C » (à bande rose) : membres du personnel diplomatique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, hauts fonctionnaires des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „C“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Mitglieder des diplomatischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „C“ (a banda rosa): membri del personale diplomatico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „C” (roosa triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide diplomaatiline personal, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kõrgemad ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande bleue) : membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „D” (sinise triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide haldus- ja tehniline personal ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande bleue) : membres du personnel administratif et technique des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit blauem Streifen): Mitglieder des Verwaltungs- und technischen Personals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda blu): membri del personale amministrativo e tecnico di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „D” (sinise triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide haldus- ja tehniline personal ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande brune) : fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „D” (pruuni triibuga): rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kutseliste ametnike kategooriasse kuuluvad ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « D » (à bande brune) : fonctionnaires de la catégorie professionnelle des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „D“ (mit braunem Streifen): Beamte der Kategorie Berufspersonal internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „D“ (a banda marrone): funzionari appartenenti alla categoria del personale di carriera di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „D” (pruuni triibuga): rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kutseliste ametnike kategooriasse kuuluvad ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « E » (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „E” (lilla triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide abipersonal, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide üldtalituste ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « E » (à bande violette): membres du personnel de service des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires des services généraux des organisations internationales et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „E“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des Dienstpersonals der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, Beamte der allgemeinen Dienste internationaler Organisationen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „E“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari dei servizi generali di organizzazioni internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „E” (lilla triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide abipersonal, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide üldtalituste ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « F » (à bande jaune) : domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali / Isikutunnistus „F” (kollase triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide ja konsulaarasutuste kutseliste liikmete erateenistuses töötavad koduabilised ning rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide ametnike erateenistuses töötavad koduabilised; |
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Carte de légitimation « F » (à bande jaune) : domestiques privés des membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales et des postes consulaires de carrière et domestiques privés des fonctionnaires des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „F“ (mit gelbem Streifen): private Hausangestellte der Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen und der von Berufs-Konsularbeamten geleiteten konsularischen Vertretungen sowie private Hausangestellte der Beamten internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „F“ (a banda gialla): personale domestico privato di membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali e di rappresentanze consolari dirette da funzionari consolari di carriera nonché personale domestico privato di funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali / Isikutunnistus „F” (kollase triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide ja konsulaarasutuste kutseliste liikmete erateenistuses töötavad koduabilised ning rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide ametnike erateenistuses töötavad koduabilised;

| — | Carte de légitimation « G » (à bande turquoise) : fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme ») et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „G” (türkiissinise triibuga): rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide tähtajalise töölepinguga ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « G » (à bande turquoise) : fonctionnaires des organisations internationales (contrat de travail « court terme ») et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „G“ (mit türkisem Streifen): Beamte internationaler Organisationen mit Arbeitsvertrag von begrenzter Dauer und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „G“ (a banda turchese): funzionari di organizzazioni internazionali con contratto di lavoro a durata determinata e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „G” (türkiissinise triibuga): rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide tähtajalise töölepinguga ametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « H » (à bande blanche) : collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales. / Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali / Isikutunnistus „H” (valge triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide, konsulaatide ja rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide töötajad, kellel ei ole ametniku staatust, samuti privileegide ja immuniteetideta isikud, kes on volitatud saatma diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste, erimissioonide, konsulaatide ja rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide liikmeid; |
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Carte de légitimation « H » (à bande blanche) : collaborateurs non-fonctionnaires des missions diplomatiques permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales, ainsi que les personnes sans privilèges et immunités autorisées à accompagner les membres des missions diplomatiques, permanentes ou spéciales, des consulats et des organisations internationales. / Legitimationskarte “H” (mit weissem Streifen): Mitarbeiter ohne Beamtenstatus der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen, sowie Personen ohne Privilegien und Immunitäten, die ermächtigt sind, Mitglieder der diplomatischen, ständigen oder Spezialmissionen, der konsularischen Vertretungen und der internationalen Organisationen zu begleiten. / Carta di legittimazione „H“ (a banda bianca): collaboratori senza statuto di funzionari di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali così come persone senza privilegi e immunità autorizzate a accompagnare membri di missioni diplomatiche permanenti o speciali, di consolati e di organizzazioni internazionali / Isikutunnistus „H” (valge triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide, konsulaatide ja rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide töötajad, kellel ei ole ametniku staatust, samuti privileegide ja immuniteetideta isikud, kes on volitatud saatma diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste, erimissioonide, konsulaatide ja rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide liikmeid;

| — | Carte de légitimation « I » (à bande olive) : membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „I” (oliivrohelise triibuga): Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti Komitee töötajad, kes ei ole Šveitsi kodanikud, ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « I » (à bande olive) : membres du personnel non suisse du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „I“ (mit olivem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit des Internationalen Komitees vom Roten Kreuz und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „I“ (a banda oliva): membri del personale non svizzero del Comitato internazionale della Croce Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „I” (oliivrohelise triibuga): Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti Komitee töötajad, kes ei ole Šveitsi kodanikud, ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande rose) : chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „K” (roosa triibuga): konsulaarasutuste kutselised juhid, kutselised konsulaarametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande rose) : chefs de poste consulaire de carrière, fonctionnaires consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit rosafarbigem Streifen): Berufs-Postenchefs und Berufs-Konsularbeamte der konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda rosa): capiposto consolari di carriera e funzionari consolari di carriera di rappresentanze consolari e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „K” (roosa triibuga): konsulaarasutuste kutselised juhid, kutselised konsulaarametnikud ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande bleue) : employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „K” (sinise triibuga): kutselised konsulaartöötajad ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande bleue) : employés consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit blauem Streifen): Berufs-Konsularangestellte und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda blu): impiegati consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „K” (sinise triibuga): kutselised konsulaartöötajad ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande violette) : membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „K” (lilla triibuga): konsulaaresinduste kutselised abitöötajad ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande violette) : membres du personnel de service des représentations consulaires de carrière et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit violettem Streifen): Mitglieder des dienstlichen Hauspersonals von berufs-konsularischen Vertretungen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda viola): membri del personale di servizio di rappresentanze consolari di carriera e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „K” (lilla triibuga): konsulaaresinduste kutselised abitöötajad ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande blanche) : chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari / Isikutunnistus „K” (valge triibuga): aukonsulid; |
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Carte de légitimation « K » (à bande blanche) : chefs de poste consulaire honoraire / Legitimationskarte „K“ (mit weissem Streifen): Honorar-Postenchefs von konsularischen Vertretungen / Carta di legittimazione „K“ (a banda bianca): capiposto onorari di rappresentanze consolari / Isikutunnistus „K” (valge triibuga): aukonsulid;

| — | Carte de légitimation « L » (à bande de couleur sable) : membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „L” (beeži triibuga): Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti ja Punase Poolkuu Seltside Föderatsiooni töötajad, kes ei ole Šveitsi kodanikud, ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « L » (à bande de couleur sable) : membres du personnel non suisse de la Fédération internationale des Sociétés de la Croix-Rouge et du Croissant-Rouge et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte „L“ (mit sandfarbigem Streifen): Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der Internationalen Gemeinschaft der Roten Kreuz- und Roten Halbmond-Gesellschaften und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di legittimazione „L“ (a banda color sabbia): membri del personale non svizzero della Federazione internazionale delle Società della Croce Rossa e della Mezzaluna Rossa e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „L” (beeži triibuga): Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti ja Punase Poolkuu Seltside Föderatsiooni töötajad, kes ei ole Šveitsi kodanikud, ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « P » (à bande bleue) : personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « P » (mit blauem Streifen) : wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « P » (à banda blu) : personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „P” (sinise triibuga): CERNi teadustöötajad, kes ei ole Šveitsi kodanikud, ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus; |
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Carte de légitimation « P » (à bande bleue) : personnel scientifique non suisse du CERN et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « P » (mit blauem Streifen) : wissenschaftliches Personal des CERN nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « P » (à banda blu) : personale scientifico non svizzero del CERN e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „P” (sinise triibuga): CERNi teadustöötajad, kes ei ole Šveitsi kodanikud, ja nende perekonnaliikmed, kellel on sama staatus;

| — | Carte de légitimation « R » (à bande grise) : membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « R » (mit grauem Streifen) : Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « R » (a banda grigia) : membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „R“, halli triibuga): rahvusvaheliste või poolriiklike organisatsioonide või muude rahvusvaheliste asutuste muud kui Šveitsi kodanikest personaliliikmed ja nende pereliikmed, kellel on sama staatus. |
| --- | --- |

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Carte de légitimation « R » (à bande grise) : membres du personnel non suisse des organisations internationales quasi gouvernementales ou des autres organismes internationaux et membres de famille qui jouissent du même statut / Legitimationskarte « R » (mit grauem Streifen) : Personal nicht schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit von quasizwischenstaatlichen Organisation oder anderen internationalen Organen und Familienmitglieder, die den gleichen Status besitzen / Carta di Legittimazione « R » (a banda grigia) : membri del personale non svizzero di organizzazioni internazionali quasi intergovernative o di altri organismi internazionali e familiari che beneficiano dello stesso statuto / Isikutunnistus „R“, halli triibuga): rahvusvaheliste või poolriiklike organisatsioonide või muude rahvusvaheliste asutuste muud kui Šveitsi kodanikest personaliliikmed ja nende pereliikmed, kellel on sama staatus.

| — | Carte de légitimation « S » (à bande verte) : membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali / Isikutunnistus „S” (rohelise triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide Šveitsi kodakondsusega töötajad, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide Šveitsi kodakondsusega ametnikud; |
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Carte de légitimation « S » (à bande verte) : membres du personnel de nationalité suisse des missions diplomatiques, permanentes et spéciales, fonctionnaires de nationalité suisse des organisations internationales / Legitimationskarte „S“ (mit grünem Streifen): Mitglieder des Personals schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit der diplomatischen, ständigen und der Spezialmissionen, Beamte schweizerischer Staatsangehörigkeit internationaler Organisationen / Carta di legittimazione „S“ (a banda verde): membri del personale di nazionalità svizzera di missioni diplomatiche permanenti e speciali, funzionari di nazionalità svizzera di organizzazioni internazionali / Isikutunnistus „S” (rohelise triibuga): diplomaatiliste ja alaliste esinduste ning erimissioonide Šveitsi kodakondsusega töötajad, rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide Šveitsi kodakondsusega ametnikud;

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „B”

| — | Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: esinduse juht |
| --- | --- |

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Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: esinduse juht

| — | Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: kõrgema juhtkonna liige



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on diplomaatiline staatus |
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Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: kõrgema juhtkonna liige

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on diplomaatiline staatus

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „C”

| — | Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: diplomaatilise personali liige |
| --- | --- |

—

Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: diplomaatilise personali liige

| — | Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: kõrgem ametnik



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on diplomaatiline staatus |
| --- | --- |

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Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: kõrgem ametnik

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on diplomaatiline staatus

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „D”

| — | Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: haldus- ja tehnilise personali liige



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on diplomaatiline staatus, välja arvatud tsiviil- ja halduskohtulik puutumatus, mis antakse vaid ametiülesannete täitmiseks |
| --- | --- |

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Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: haldus- ja tehnilise personali liige

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on diplomaatiline staatus, välja arvatud tsiviil- ja halduskohtulik puutumatus, mis antakse vaid ametiülesannete täitmiseks

| — | Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kutseliste ametnike kategooriasse kuuluv ametnik



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
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Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide kutseliste ametnike kategooriasse kuuluv ametnik

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „E”

| — | Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: abitöötaja ja kohapeal palgatud töötaja |
| --- | --- |

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Saatkonnad ja alalised esindused: abitöötaja ja kohapeal palgatud töötaja

| — | Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: üldtalituste ametnik



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
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Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: üldtalituste ametnik

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „F”

| — | Saatkonnad, alalised esindused ja rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: töötaja erateenistusesse palgatud koduabiline



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust |
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Saatkonnad, alalised esindused ja rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: töötaja erateenistusesse palgatud koduabiline

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „G”

| — | Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: ajutine (tähtajalise töölepinguga) ametnik ja lähetatud töötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
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Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: ajutine (tähtajalise töölepinguga) ametnik ja lähetatud töötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „H”

| — | Saatkonnad, konsulaadid, alalised esindused ja rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: privileegide ja immuniteetideta isik



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust ega juurdepääsu Šveitsi tööturule |
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Saatkonnad, konsulaadid, alalised esindused ja rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: privileegide ja immuniteetideta isik

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust ega juurdepääsu Šveitsi tööturule

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „I”

| — | Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti Komitee (RPRK): RPRK töötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus. Tal ei ole tollisoodustusi. |
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Rahvusvahelise Punase Risti Komitee (RPRK): RPRK töötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus. Tal ei ole tollisoodustusi.

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „K”

| — | Konsulaadid – punane K-kaart: konsulaarasutuse kutseline juht ja kutseline konsulaarametnik



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
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Konsulaadid – punane K-kaart: konsulaarasutuse kutseline juht ja kutseline konsulaarametnik

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

| — | Konsulaadid – sinine K-kaart: kutseline konsulaartöötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
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Konsulaadid – sinine K-kaart: kutseline konsulaartöötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

| — | Konsulaadid – lilla K-kaart: abitöötaja ja kohapeal palgatud töötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust |
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Konsulaadid – lilla K-kaart: abitöötaja ja kohapeal palgatud töötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust

| — | Konsulaadid – valge K-kaart: aukonsul



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on kohtulik puutumatus üksnes konsulaarülesannete täitmisel |
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Konsulaadid – valge K-kaart: aukonsul

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on kohtulik puutumatus üksnes konsulaarülesannete täitmisel

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „L”

| — | Rahvusvaheline Punase Risti ja Punase Poolkuu Seltside Föderatsioon: föderatsiooni töötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus. Tal ei ole tollisoodustusi. |
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Rahvusvaheline Punase Risti ja Punase Poolkuu Seltside Föderatsioon: föderatsiooni töötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus. Tal ei ole tollisoodustusi.

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „P”

| — | Euroopa Tuumauuringute Organisatsioon (CERN): CERNi teadustöötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
| --- | --- |

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Euroopa Tuumauuringute Organisatsioon (CERN): CERNi teadustöötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „R”

| — | Rahvusvaheliste või poolriiklike organisatsioonide või muude rahvusvaheliste asutuste muud kui Šveitsi kodanikest personaliliikmed ja nende pereliikmed, kellel on sama staatus.



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust |
| --- | --- |

—

Rahvusvaheliste või poolriiklike organisatsioonide või muude rahvusvaheliste asutuste muud kui Šveitsi kodanikest personaliliikmed ja nende pereliikmed, kellel on sama staatus.

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul ei ole kohtulikku puutumatust

Välisministeeriumi väljastatav isikutunnistus „S”

Šveitsi kodanikest töötajatele väljastatakse üldjuhul isikutunnistus „S”, olenemata sellest, milliseid ülesandeid nad välisesinduses või rahvusvahelises organisatsioonis täidavad. Saatkondade ja konsulaatide kohapeal palgatud Šveitsi kodakondsusega töötajatele kaarti ei väljastata. Rahvusvaheliste organisatsioonide Šveitsi kodakondsusega ajutistele (tähtajalise lepinguga) ametnikele kaarti ei väljastata.

| — | Saatkonnad ja konsulaadid: Šveitsi kodakondsusega kutseline töötaja |
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Saatkonnad ja konsulaadid: Šveitsi kodakondsusega kutseline töötaja

| — | Alalised esindused: Šveitsi kodakondsusega töötaja |
| --- | --- |

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Alalised esindused: Šveitsi kodakondsusega töötaja

| — | Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: Šveitsi kodakondsusega ametnik/töötaja



  Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus |
| --- | --- |

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Rahvusvahelised organisatsioonid: Šveitsi kodakondsusega ametnik/töötaja

Image

Käesoleva kaardi omanikul on ametiülesannete täitmisel kohtulik puutumatus

Eelmiste väljaannete loetelu

| | ELT C 247, 13.10.2006, lk 85 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 247, 13.10.2006, lk 85

| | ELT C 153, 6.7.2007, lk 15 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 153, 6.7.2007, lk 15

| | ELT C 64, 19.3.2009, lk 18 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 64, 19.3.2009, lk 18

| | ELT C 239, 6.10.2009, lk 7 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 239, 6.10.2009, lk 7

| | ELT C 304, 10.11.2010, lk 6 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 304, 10.11.2010, lk 6

| | ELT C 273, 16.09.2011, lk 11 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 273, 16.09.2011, lk 11

| | ELT C 357, 7.12.2011, lk 3 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 357, 7.12.2011, lk 3

| | ELT C 88, 24.3.2012, lk 12 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 88, 24.3.2012, lk 12

| | ELT C 120, 25.4.2012, lk 4 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 120, 25.4.2012, lk 4

| | ELT C 182, 22.6.2012, lk 10 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 182, 22.6.2012, lk 10

| | ELT C 214, 20.7.2012, lk 4 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 214, 20.7.2012, lk 4

| | ELT C 238, 8.8.2012, lk 5 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 238, 8.8.2012, lk 5

| | ELT C 255, 24.8.2012, lk 2 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 255, 24.8.2012, lk 2

| | ELT C 242, 23.8.2013, lk 13 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 242, 23.8.2013, lk 13

| | ELT C 38, 8.2.2014, lk 16 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 38, 8.2.2014, lk 16

| | ELT C 133, 1.5.2014, lk 2 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 133, 1.5.2014, lk 2

| | ELT C 360, 11.10.2014, lk 5 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 360, 11.10.2014, lk 5

| | ELT C 397, 12.11.2014, lk 6 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 397, 12.11.2014, lk 6

| | ELT C 77, 27.2.2016, lk 5 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 77, 27.2.2016, lk 5

| | ELT C 174, 14.5.2016, lk 12 |
| --- | --- |

ELT C 174, 14.5.2016, lk 12

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(1)  Varasemate väljaannete loetelu on esitatud käesoleva dokumendi lõpus.

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EUROOPA MAJANDUSPIIRKONDA KÄSITLEV TEAVE

EFTA järelevalveamet

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/21 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/21

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Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu riigiabi käsitleva protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2

(2016/C 236/10)

Vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 teatas EFTA järelevalveamet Norra ametiasutustele oma otsusest algatada, kasutades otsust nr 489/15/COL, mis on esitatud käesolevale kokkuvõttele järgnevatel lehekülgedel autentses keeles, eespool nimetatud meetme suhtes menetlus.

Huvitatud isikud võivad esitada kõnealuse meetme kohta oma märkused ühe kuu jooksul alates käesoleva teatise avaldamisest järgmisel aadressil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard 35 / Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35 / Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Märkused edastatakse Norra ametiasutustele. Märkused esitanud huvitatud isiku andmeid käsitletakse konfidentsiaalselt, kui ta esitab selle kohta kirjaliku taotluse, milles esitab nõude põhjendused.

KOKKUVÕTE

Menetlus

Norra ametiasutused teatasid sotsiaalkindlustussüsteemi piirkondlikult diferentseeritud sotsiaalmaksetest aastateks 2014–2020 protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõike 3 kohaselt 13. märtsi 2014. aasta kirjaga (1). Kõnealuse teate ja pärast seda esitatud teabe (2) alusel kiitis järelevalveamet teatatud abikava heaks oma 18. juuni 2014 aasta otsusega nr 225/14/COL.

Oma 23. septembri 2015. aasta otsusega kohtuasjas E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS vs. ESA
   (3) tühistas EFTA kohus osaliselt järelevalveameti otsuse.

15. oktoobri 2015. aasta kirjas (4) palus järelevalveamet Norra ametiasutustelt teavet. Norra ametiasutused vastasid teabenõudele 6. novembri 2015. aasta kirjaga (5).

Meetme kirjeldus

Diferentseeritud sotsiaalkindlustusmaksete üldkava eesmärk on vähendada või vältida elanikkonna lahkumist Norra kõige vähem asustatud piirkondadest tööhõive ergutamise abil. Tegevusabi kavaga korvatakse tööjõukulusid, vähendades teatavates geograafilistes piirkondades sotsiaalmaksemäärasid. Tavaliselt sõltub abi osatähtsus geograafilisest piirkonnast, kus ettevõtja on registreeritud. Norra seadustega nõutakse ettevõtjatelt allüksuste registreerimist iga eraldi äritegevuse kohta (6). Kui ettevõtja äritegevus on mitut laadi, tuleb registreerida eraldi allüksused. Lisaks sellele tuleb registreerida eraldi üksused, kui tegevus toimub erinevates geograafilistes asukohtades.

Erandina registreerimise põhireeglist kehtib kava ka ettevõtjate suhtes, kes on registreeritud väljaspool abikõlblikku piirkonda, kui nad vahendavad töötajaid abikõlblikku piirkonda ja kui nende töötajate töö on abikõlblikus piirkonnas liikuva iseloomuga (käesoleva otsuse kohaldamisel nimetatakse neid „rändteenusteks”). See ongi erandisäte, mida kõnealuses otsuses vaadeldakse. Sama kava õiguslik alus riiklikus õiguses on riikliku kindlustusseaduse paragrahv 23–2 (7). Erandi riiklik õiguslik alus on esitatud riikliku kindlustusseaduse raames maksumäärade kindlaksmääramist jne käsitleva Norra parlamendi 5. detsembri 2013. aasta otsuse nr 1482 paragrahvi 1 lõikes 4.

Erandit kohaldatakse üksnes siis, kui töötaja veedab vähemalt poole oma tööpäevast abikõlblikus piirkonnas. Lisaks on vähendatud maksumäär kohaldatav üksnes seal tehtud tööosa suhtes.

Meetme hindamine

Järelevalveamet peab EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 3 punkti c kohaselt ja järelevalveameti aastateks 2014–2020 ette nähtud regionaalabi suuniste kohaselt (edaspidi „regionaalabi suunised”) hindama, kas erandisäte on kooskõlas nimetatud lepingu toimimisega (8).

Regionaalabi võib edukalt soodustada ebasoodsas olukorras olevate piirkondade majandusarengut üksnes juhul, kui seda antakse selleks, et soodustada lisainvesteeringuid või majandustegevust nendes piirkondades (9). Regionaalabi suhtes saab kohaldada EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 3 punkti c üksnes juhul, kui seda antakse ebasoodsas olukorras olevates piirkondades asuvate ettevõtjate eriprobleemide lahendamiseks (10).

Ei ole kahtlust, et kava geograafiline kohaldamisala piirdub ebasoodsas olukorras olevate piirkondadega. Käesoleva otsuse kohaldamisala piirdub erandisättega. Küsimus on selles, kas see säte, mis näeb ette, et väljaspool kavaga hõlmatud ebasoodsas olukorras olevaid piirkondi registreeritud ettevõtjad võivad saada kava raames abi sel määral, mil nende majandustegevus toimub ebasoodsas olukorras olevates piirkondades, on kooskõlas riigiabi eeskirjadega. Ehk teisisõnu, kas erandisäte lahendab ettevõtjate konkreetseid või püsivaid probleeme ebasoodsas olukorras olevates piirkondades?

Norra ametiasutuste ülesanne on tõendada elanikkonna lahkumise riski erandisätte puudumise korral (11). Norra ametiasutused on rõhutanud erandisätte kasulikkust kohalike ettevõtjate jaoks. Neile on kättesaadav madalama hinnaga spetsialiseerunud tööjõud, mis muidu ei oleks kättesaadav. Lisaks suurendab erandisäte rändteenuste omavahelist konkurentsi abikõlblikes piirkondades, mis on jällegi kasulik kohalikele ettevõtjatele (kes ei ole rändteenuste pakkujad), kuna rändteenuste väiksemad kulud muudavad ettevõtja tegutsemise abikõlblikus piirkonnas atraktiivsemaks ja kasumlikumaks. Selle kava alusel abi kasutamine kujutab endast kaudset vahendit, kuna seda kasutatakse töötajate töölevõtmisega seotud kulude vähendamiseks kui meedet, millega vähendada või vältida elanikkonna lahkumist. Mõte on selles, et tööturg on kõige tähtsam tegur, mis mõjutab seda, kus inimesed elavad.

Norra ametiasutused on veel väitnud, et väljaspool abikõlblikku piirkonda registreeritud ettevõtjad palkavad vahel töötajaid abikõlblikes piirkondades. Seejuures loovad need ettevõtjad töökohti, mis on küll ajutisemat laadi, kuid aitavad sellest hoolimata kaasa abikõlblike piirkondade palgatulu suurenemisele. Ka see soodustab majandustegevust. Peale selle väidavad Norra ametiasutused, et abikõlblikus piirkonnas ajutiselt viibivad töötajad ostavad kohalikke tooteid ja teenuseid ning panustavad niiviisi kohalikku majandusse. See kehtib eriti töötajate kohta, kes eelkõige lühiajalises ja keskpikas perspektiivis reisivad sellesse asukohta, sest nad elavad tõenäoliselt hotellides, einestavad restoranides jne. Norra ametiasutused on hinnanud, et erandisättest tuleneva abi summa on kaks protsenti abi kogusummast 2015. aastal, rõhutades, et see hinnang on ebakindel. Kaks protsenti on ligikaudu 19 miljonit eurot (12). Järelevalveamet kutsub Norra ametiasutusi esitama täpsemat teavet sätte finantsmõju kohta.

Jättes arvestamata eespool esitatud üldist laadi märkused, ei ole Norra ametiasutused tõestanud asjaomase piirkonna puhul elanikkonna lahkumise ohtu erandisätte puudumise korral. Järelevalveamet leiab, et niisugusel meetmel peab regionaalabi suuniste nõuete täitmiseks olema rohkem mõjusid, mis lisanduvad ajutiste tööhõivevõimaluste ja ostuvõime marginaalsele suurenemisele abikõlblikus piirkonnas. Selle põhjal kutsub järelevalveamet Norra ametiasutusi üles esitama rohkem teavet, et tõendada elanikkonna lahkumise riski erandisätte puudumise korral.

Seoses erandisätte mõjuga konkurentsile ja kaubandusele väidavad Norra ametiasutused, et erandisäte loob võrdsed võimalused kõikidele ettevõtjatele, kes tegutsevad ebasoodsate tingimustega piirkondades, sest seda kohaldatakse võrdselt kõikide EMPs asuvate ettevõtjate suhtes. Selle tulemusena tagatakse konkurentsile põhjendamatu negatiivse mõju tekkimise vältimine. Järelevalveamet leiab, et see on positiivne joon, pidades silmas regionaalabi suuniste punkte 3 ja 53. Siiski võivad abikõlblikes piirkondades registreeritud ettevõtjad üldjuhul seista silmitsi püsivamate raskustega kui need ettevõtjad, kes saadavad oma töötajad üksnes ajutiselt sellesse piirkonda tööle. Norra ametiasutused väidavad, et väljaspool abikõlblikku piirkonda registreeritud ettevõtjad võivad olla ebasoodsas konkurentsiolukorras võrreldes kohalike ettevõtjatega, muu hulgas töötajate transpordi- ja majutuskulude tõttu. Norra ametiasutused ei ole selle eelduse kinnituseks esitanud mingeid andmeid ega lisapõhjendusi. Järelevalveamet kutsub Norra ametiasutusi üles täiendavalt selgitama, miks sellel erandisättel ei ole lubamatut kahjulikku mõju konkurentsile, ja esitama lisateavet selle kinnitamiseks.

Norra ametiasutused on rõhutanud, et erandisätte ergutav mõju on ilmne. Abi ergutavat mõju ei saa siiski lihtsalt eeldada. Ehkki ei ole vaja esitada üksikasjalikke tõendeid, et kava raames antav abi tagab igale abisaajale individuaalse ergutava mõju tegevuseks, mida ta vastasel juhul poleks ette võtnud, peab ergutav mõju siiski põhinema vähemasti usaldusväärsel majandusteoorial. Ei piisa lihtsalt viitamisest, et tegu on väidetavalt ilmselge asjaga. Kuigi on tõsi, et erandisäte, mis kehtib väljaspool abikõlblikku piirkonda registreeritud ettevõtjate suhtes, vähendab rändteenuste kulusid abikõlblikus piirkonnas, ei ole Norra ametiasutused esitanud tõendeid või argumente selle kohta, et abi puudumisel majandustegevus asjaomases piirkonnas väheneks märkimisväärselt probleemide tõttu, mida abiga lahendada kavatsetakse (13).

Norra ametivõimud on selgitanud, et ettevõtjad, kes teatavas ulatuses osutavad rändteenuseid, saavad registreerida allüksusi abikõlblikus piirkonnas. Pealegi on nad kohustatud seda tegema, kui vähemalt üks töötaja teeb peaüksuse jaoks tööd teises piirkonnas ja ettevõtjat saab seal külastada.

Norra ametiasutused väidavad, et kui abikõlblikus piirkonnas ei ole rändteenuste jaoks erandisätet, tekiks põhjendamatu erisugune kohtlemine sõltuvalt sellest, kas teenust osutav ettevõtja on asutanud abikõlblikus piirkonnas allüksuse või mitte.

Esiteks ei ole järelevalveameti jaoks selge, mida tähendab nõue „kui vähemalt üks töötaja teeb peaüksuse jaoks tööd teises piirkonnas ja ettevõtjat saab seal külastada”. Seetõttu palub järelevalveamet Norra ametiasutustel seda selgitada.

Teiseks on võrdse kohtlemise põhimõte EMP õiguse üldpõhimõte. Siiski ei saa see iseenesest olla erandisätte aluseks. Erandisäte peab olema kokkusobiv EMP lepingu toimimisega.

Kokkuvõttes viib eespool kirjeldatud asjaomase teabe puudumine selleni, et järelevalveametil tekib kahtlusi erandisätte kokkusobivuses EMP lepingu toimimisega.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 489/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening a formal investigation into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020

(Norway)

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Article 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1(2) of Part I and Articles 4(4) and 6(1) of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Norwegian authorities notified the regionally differentiated social security contributions scheme 2014-2020 pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 by letter of 13 March 2014 (14). On the basis of that notification and information submitted thereafter (15), the Authority approved the notified aid scheme by its Decision No 225/14/COL of 18 June 2014.

| (2) | By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

By its judgment of 23 September 2015 in case E-23/14 Kimek Offshore AS v ESA
   (16) the EFTA Court annulled, in part, the Authority's decision.

| (3) | By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 15 October 2015 (17), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 6 November 2015 (18), the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request.

2.   The scheme as such is not the subject of the formal investigation

| (4) | By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

By its judgment the EFTA Court partly annulled the Authority's decision approving the aid scheme. The aid scheme as such is not subject to the renewed scrutiny carried out by the Authority in the present formal investigation. The subject of this formal investigation is merely the part of the scheme (an exemption rule for ambulant services) for which the Authority's approval was annulled.

3.   The scheme

3.1   
  Objective

| (5) | The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The objective of the general scheme on differentiated social security contributions as such is to reduce or prevent depopulation in the least inhabited regions in Norway, by stimulating employment. The operating aid scheme offsets employment costs by reducing the social security contribution rates in certain geographical areas. As a main rule, the aid intensitites vary according to the geographical area in which the business unit is registered. The rules on registration are explained in greater detail below.

3.2   
  National legal basis

| (6) | The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The national legal basis for the scheme as such is Section 23-2 of the National Insurance Act (19). This provision sets out the employer's general obligation to pay social security contributions calculated on the basis of gross salary paid to the employee. According to paragraph 12 of that section, the Norwegian Parliament may adopt regionally differentiated rates, as well as specific provisions for undertakings within certain sectors. Thus, it is the National Insurance Act, in conjunction with the annual decisions of the Norwegian Parliament, that forms the national legal basis for the scheme.

| (7) | For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

For further detail on the aid scheme as such, reference is made to the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

3.3   
  Rules on registration

| (8) | As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

As a main rule, aid eligibility depends on whether a business is registered in the eligible area. As noted above, the main rule of the scheme is that aid intensities vary according to the geographical area in which the business is registered.

| (9) | Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Norwegian law requires undertakings to register sub-units for each separate business activity performed (20). If an undertaking performs different kinds of business activities, separate sub-units must be registered. Moreover, separate units must be registered if the activities are performed in different geographical locations.

| (10) | According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

According to the Norwegian authorities, the ‘separate business activitiy’ criterion is met when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. Each sub-unit forms its own basis for the calculation of the differentiated social security contribution, depending on their registered location. Thus, an undertaking registered outside the area eligible for aid under the scheme will be eligible for aid if, and in so far as, its economic activities are performed within a sub-unit located within the eligible area.

3.4   
  Ambulant services – the measure under scrutiny

| (11) | By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

By way of exemption from the main rule on registration, the scheme also applies to undertakings registered outside the eligible area where they hire out workers to the eligible area and where their employees are engaged in mobile activities within the eligible area (for the purposes of this decision, this is referred to as ‘ambulant services’). This is the exemption rule under scrutiny in the decision at hand. The national legal basis for that exemption is provided for by section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014.

| (12) | The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

The exemption applies only when the employee spends half or more of his working days in the eligible area. Further, the reduced rate is only applicable for the part of the work carried out there. As a principal rule, the tax registration period is one calendar month.

| (13) | This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

This entails that if an employee of an Oslo-registered entity (Oslo is in Zone 1, an ineligible zone, where the rate therefore is the standard 14,1 %) completes 60 % of his work one calendar month in Vardø (which is in Zone 5 where the applicable rate is 0 %) and the rest in Oslo, the undertaking will be eligible for the zero-rate on the salary to be paid for the work carried out in Vardø, but not for the work carried out in Oslo.

4.   The judgment of the EFTA Court

| (14) | The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21). |
| --- | --- |

(14)

The EFTA Court annuled the Authority's decision in so far as it closed the preliminary investigation as regards the aid measure in section 1(4) of the Norwegian Parliament's Decision No 1482 of 5 December 2013 on determination of the tax rates etc. under the National Insurance Act for 2014. Section 1(4) is drafted in such a way as to conflate, together with the exemption rule (which is the subject of the present decision), an anti-circumvention measure designed to prevent undertakings from claiming aid under the scheme by virtue of simply registering their business within an area with a lower rate of social security contributions, even if they then proceed to conduct ambulatory activities or hire out their employees to work in an area with a higher rate. The anti-circumvention measure is not subject to the present procedure (21).

5.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities

| (15) | The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22). |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule for ambulant services is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) and that it is in line with the Authority's Guidelines on Regional State Aid for 2014-2020 (the RAG) (22).

| (16) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that the exemption rule accounts for about two percent of the total aid granted under the scheme for 2015. They stress that this calculation is based on uncertain estimates.

| (17) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that in Norway, access to employment is the most influential factor when it comes to peoples' choice of residence. The social security contribution is as a main rule calculated on the basis of the rate applicable in the zone in which the employer is considered to carry out business activity. This rule is based on the premise that only undertakings performing economic activity in the eligible area should receive aid, and only to the extent that they are performing business activities in that area. This is a fundamental premise for the aid scheme.

| (18) | Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Where a company is registered, is not, and should not be, decisive. There are many sectors that frequently provide ambulant services. As an example, it would be too burdensome to require all construction firms to register their activities locally wherever they were to carry out work in order to be eligible for reduced social security rates. Neither Article 61(3)(c) nor the RAG or the GBER (23) contain requirements on where regional aid beneficiaries need to be registered. A formalistic approach where the registered location of the beneficiary is decisive in all cases has no basis in Article 61(3)(c). To the contrary, it would be difficult to reconcile with the RAG which focusses on whether the aid promotes economic activity in disadvantaged areas and not whether beneficiaries are registered within the area covered by the scheme. The underlying realities, i.e. whether the undertaking carries out economic activity within the eligible area, should be decisive. Furthermore, undertakings performing ambulant services can to some extent register sub-units in the eligible area. In the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant serices in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (19) | The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

The Norwegian authorities contend that the exemption rule contributes to an objective of common interest in a number of ways. They firstly note that undertakings in the eligible area can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Secondly, the rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in eligible areas. This is beneficial for local undertakings, other than those providing ambulant services, as lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. Thirdly, employees with a temporal stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially in the short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants etc. Fourthly, undertakings located in central areas may also hire personnel residing in the area where the ambulant services are performed. Even if the jobs are temporary in nature, they will contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions, which also stimulates economic activity. Finally, undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel.

| (20) | In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In the view of the Norwegian authorities, it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect as it reduces labour costs for ambulant services.

| (21) | Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

Finally, the Norwegian authorities stress that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantages areas. The rule applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. This ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided.

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

| (22) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (23) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled: (i) there must be an intervention by the state or through state resources, (ii) that intervention must confer a selective economic advantage on the recipients, (iii) it must be liable to affect trade between EEA States and (iv) it must distort or threathen to distort competition.

| (24) | In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In Decision No 225/14/COL, the Authority concluded that the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 constitutes an aid scheme. The Authority refers to its reasoning in paragraphs 68-74 of that decision. The exemption rule for ambulant services is part of the provisions providing for that aid scheme. It increases the scope of the scheme in the sense that it widens the circle of potential beneficiaries to undertakings that are not registered in the eligible areas. As with the other aid granted under the scheme, extending the scheme to the undertakings registered outside of the eligible areas results in state resources conferring selective advantages on undertakings. These advantages are liable to affect trade and distort competition.

2.   Procedural requirements

| (25) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. ... The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (26) | The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

The Norwegian authorities implemented the exemption rule after the Authority approved it by Decision No 225/14/COL. With the annulment of the Authority's approval of the rule by the EFTA Court, the aid has become unlawful.

3.   Compatibility of the aid

| (27) | The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Authority must assess whether the exemption rule is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement on the basis of its Article 61(3)(c) in line with the RAG.

| (28) | The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

The exemption rule for ambulant services entitles undertakings that are not registered in the eligible area to benefit from reduced social security charges when and to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the registered area. Neither Article 61(3)(c) EEA nor the RAG (nor the regional aid rules in the GBER) formally require that regional aid beneficiaries are registered in the assisted areas.

| (29) | Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25). |
| --- | --- |

(29)

Regional aid can be effective in promoting the economic development of disadvantaged areas only if it is awarded to induce additional investment or economic activity in those areas (24). Regional operating aid can only fall under Article 61(3)(c) EEA if it is awarded to tackle specific or permanent handicaps faced by undertakings in disadvantaged regions (25).

| (30) | There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions? |
| --- | --- |

(30)

There is no question that the geographical scope of the scheme as such is restricted to disadvantaged regions. The scope of this decision is limited to the exemption rule. The question is whether that rule, which entails that undertakings registered outside the disadvantaged regions covered by the scheme can benefit from aid under the scheme to the extent that they carry out economic activities in the disadvantaged regions is compatible with the state aid rules. In other words, does the exemption rule tackle specific or permanenet handicaps faced by undertakings in the disadvantaged regions?

| (31) | It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

It is for the Norwegian authorities to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule (26). The Norwegian authorities have underlined the benefits of the exemption rule for local undertakings. They can access, at a lower cost, specialised labour that would otherwise not be available. Moreover, the exemption rule leads to increased competition between ambulant services in the eligible areas, which again is beneficial for local undertakings (other than those providing ambulant services) since lower costs for ambulant services make it more attractive and more profitable to run a business in the eligible area. The use of aid under the scheme is an indirect tool in the sense that it is used to reduce the cost of employing workers as a measure to reduce or prevent depopulation. The idea is that the labour market is the most important factor influencing where people live.

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities have further argued that the firms registered outside the eligible area occasionally will hire workers in the eligible areas. Thereby the firms will provide jobs that, although of a more temporary nature, will nevertheless contribute to increased wage income in the eligible regions. This also stimulates economic activity. The Norwegian authorities furthermore argue that employees who temporarily stay in the eligible area will buy local goods and services and thereby contribute to the local economy. This applies in particular to employees commuting to the location especially on short or medium term as they are likely to stay in hotels, eat in restaurants, etc. The Norwegian authorities have estimated the amount of aid resulting from the exemption rule to be two percent of the total aid for 2015 which they stress is an uncertain estimate. Two percent amounts to approximately EUR 19 million (27). The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more precise information about the financial effect of the rule.

| (33) | Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Apart from the above remarks of a general nature, the Norwegian authorities have not demonstrated the risk of depopulation of the relevant area in the absence of the exemtion rule. It is the view of the Authority that a measure, in order to meet the requirements of the RAG, must have effects exceeding a marginal increase of temporary employment possibilities and spending in the eligible area. On this basis, the Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to provide more information to demonstrate the risk of depopulation in the absence of the exemption rule.

| (34) | In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

In terms of effect on competition and trade of the exemption rule, the Norwegian authorities argue that the exemption rule creates a level playing field for all undertakings active in the disadvantaged areas as it applies equally to any EEA-based undertaking. The consequence is that it ensures that undue adverse effects on competition are avoided. It is the view of the Authority that this is a positive feature in light of paras. 3 and 53 of the RAG. However, the undertakings registered within the eligible area may, in general, face more permanent difficulties than the undertakings that merely send their employees to work in the area on a non-permanent basis. The Norwegian authorities argue that undertakings registered outside the eligible zone may have a competitive disadvantage compared to local firms due to i.a. costs of transporting and lodging of personnel. The Norwegian authotities have not presented any data or further reasoning to back up this assumption. The Authority invites the Norwegian authorities to further clarify why it is that the exemption rule does not have undue adverse effects on competition and to submit further information to back this up.

| (35) | The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28). |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Norwegian authorities have stressed that it is evident that the exemption rule has an incentive effect. Incentive effect of an aid cannot merely be assumed. While it is not necessary to provide individual evidence that aid under a scheme provides each beneficiary with an incentive, on an individual basis, to carry out an activity it would not otherwise have carried out, the incentive effect must, at the least, be based on sound economic theory. It is not sufficient merely to refer to an alleged obviousness. While it is true that the exemption rule for companies registered outside the eligible areas reduces labour costs for ambulant services in the eligible areas, the Norwegian authorities have not provided evidence or arguments to the effect that it is likely that, in the absence of aid, the level of economic activity in the area would be significantly reduced due to the problems that the aid is intended to address (28).

| (36) | The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

The Norwegian authorities have explained that undertakings performing ambulant services to some extent can register sub-units in the eligible area. Moreover, they are required to do so when at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there.

| (37) | The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The Norwegian authorities argue that in the absence of the exemption rule for ambulant services in the eligible area, there would be an unjustified difference in treatment depending on whether the service providing undertaking had established a sub-unit in the eligible area.

| (38) | Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

Firstly, it is not clear to the Authority what the requirement that ‘at least one employee carries out work for the parent unit in a separate area, and the undertaking may be visited there’ entails. The Authority therefore invites the Norwegian authorities to clarify this.

| (39) | Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Secondly, the the principle of equal treatment is a general principle of EEA law. However, this cannot in and of itself serve as a basis to justify the exemption rule. The exemption rule must itself be compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (40) | In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

In conclusion, the absence of the relevant information, as described above, leads the Authority to have doubts about the compatibility of the exemption rule with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

4.   Conclusion

| (41) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (42) | Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

Consequently, and in accordance Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the measure is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (43) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, by 10 January 2016 their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the measure in light of the state aid rules.

| (44) | The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

The Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted to the beneficiaries will have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law, such as the protection of legitimate expectations.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the exemption rule for ambulant services under the scheme on differentiated social security contributions 2014-2020.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure by 10 January 2016.

Article 3

The Norwegian authorities are requested to provide by 10 January 2016, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 4

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 5

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done in Brussels, on 9 December 2015

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Erik SVEDMAN

President

Helga JÓNSDÓTTIR

College Member

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(1)  Dokumendid nr 702438-702440, 702442 ja 702443.

1

(2)  Vt otsuse nr 225/14/COL punkt 2, kättesaadav aadressil: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf.

2

(3)  Seni avaldamata.

3

(4)  Dokument nr 776348.

4

(5)  Dokumendid nr 779603 ja 779604.

5

(6)  Juriidiliste isikute koordineerimisregistrit käsitlev seadus (LOV-1994-06–03-15).

6

(7)  LOV-1997-02–28-19.

7

(8)  ELT L 166, 5.6.2014, lk 44 ja EMP kaasanne nr 33, 5.6.2014, lk 1.

8

(9)  Regionaalabi suuniste punkt 6.

9

(10)  Regionaalabi suuniste punkt 16.

10

(11)  Regionaalabi suuniste punkt 43.

11

(12)  2013. aasta eelarve alusel, vt järelevalveameti otsuse nr 225/14/COL punkt 49.

12

(13)  Regionaalabi suuniste punkt 71.

13

(14)  Documents No 702438-702440, 702442 and 702443.

14

(15)  See paragraph 2 of Decision No 225/14/COL, available online: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid/Consolidated_version_-_Decision_225_14_COL__NOR_Social_Security_contributions_2014-2020.pdf

15

(16)  Not yet reported.

16

(17)  Document No 776348.

17

(18)  Documents No 779603 and 779604.

18

(19)  LOV-1997-02-28-19.

19

(20)  The Act on the Coordinating Register for Legal Entities (LOV-1994-06-03-15).

20

(21)  See Order of the EFTA Court of 23.11.2015 in Case E-23/14 INT Kimek Offshore AS v ESA (not yet reported).

21

Kimek Offshore AS

ESA

(22)  OJ L 166, 5.6.2014, p. 44 and EEA Supplement No 33, 5.6.2014, p. 1.

22

(23)  The General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER). Commission Regulation (EU) No 651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty (OJ L 187, 26.6.2014, p. 1), incorporated into the EEA Agreement by EEA Joint Committee Decision No 152/2014 (OJ L 342, 27.11.2014, p. 63 and EEA Supplement No 71, 27.11.2014, p. 61) at point 1j of Annex XV to the EEA Agreement.

23

(24)  Para. 6 of the RAG.

24

(25)  Para. 16 of the RAG.

25

(26)  Para. 43 of the RAG.

26

(27)  Based on the notified 2013 budget, see para. 49 of the Authority's Decision No 225/14/COL.

27

(28)  Para. 71 of the RAG.

28

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| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/29 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/29

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Kutse märkuste esitamiseks vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 (milles käsitletakse riigiabiküsimusi) I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 seoses võimaliku riigiabi andmisega Hurtigruten ASA-le Hurtigruten mereveoteenuste rannikukokkulepe raames ajavahemikus 2012–2019

(2016/C 236/11)

Vastavalt järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamise kohta sõlmitud EFTA riikide lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2 algatas EFTA järelevalveamet menetluse 9. detsembri 2015. aasta otsusega 490/15/COL, mis on esitatud käesolevale kokkuvõttele järgnevatel lehekülgedel autentses keeles. Norra ametiasutustele on sellest teatamiseks saadetud otsuse koopia.

Käesoleva teatisega palub EFTA järelevalveamet EFTA riikidel, ELi liikmesriikidel ja huvitatud isikutel saata märkused kõnealuse meetme kohta ühe kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva teatise avaldamist järgmisel aadressil:

| EFTA Surveillance Authority |
| --- |
| Registry |
| Rue Belliard 35 / Belliardstraat 35 |
| 1040 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

EFTA Surveillance Authority

Registry

Rue Belliard 35 / Belliardstraat 35

1040 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Märkused edastatakse Norra ametiasutustele. Märkused esitanud huvitatud isiku andmete konfidentsiaalset käsitlemist võib nõuda kirjalikult, esitades nõude põhjendused.

KOKKUVÕTE

Taust

Hurtigruten ASA (Hurtigruten) tegeleb reisijate- ja kaubaveoteenuste osutamisega piki Norra rannikut Bergenist Kirkenesi.

Pärast pakkumismenetlust allkirjastati 13. aprillil 2011 ettevõtjaga Hurtigruten hankeleping teenuste osutamiseks rannikuäärsel marsruudil Bergen–Kirkenes ajavahemikus 1. jaanuar 2012 kuni 31. detsember 2019 (edaspidi „leping”). Selle lepingu alusel sõidab Hurtigruten aastaringselt iga päev marsruudil Bergen–Kirkenes, tehes vahepeatusi 32 kindlaksmääratud sadamas. Marsruutidel Tromsø–Kirkenes ja Kirkenes–Tromsø pakutakse ka kaubaveoteenust. Teenuseid osutatakse kooskõlas teatavate tonnaaži ja laevu käsitlevate nõuetega, mis on sätestatud lepingus. Rannikuliinil kasutatavate laevadel peab olema vähemalt 320 reisijakohta, kajuteid vähemalt 120 reisijale ning kaubaveomaht 150 euroalust tavapärase laadimiskõrgusega lastiruumis. Samuti peavad need vastama hanke tehnilise kirjelduse punkti 4.4. õiguslikele ja tehnilistele nõuetele.

Lepinguga hõlmatud teenuste eest maksavad Norra ametiasutused lepingu kehtivuse kaheksa aasta jooksul hüvitist kogusummas 5 120 miljonit Norra krooni.

Hüvitise hindamine riigiabi seisukohalt

Riigiabi mõiste ainus kriteerium on küsimus, kas lepinguga on antud Hurtigrutenile valikuline põhjendamatu majanduslik eelis.

Valikuline majanduslik eelis ettevõtjale Hurtigruten

Järelevalveamet hindas Altmarki kohtuotsuse (1) nelja tingimust ja leidis, et praeguse seisuga ei näi ükski neist olevat täidetud, ning seega on antud ettevõtjale Hurtigruten valikuline eelis EMP lepingu artikli 61 lõike 1 tähenduses.

Seoses esimese tingimusega, mis on selgelt määratletud avaliku teenindamise kohustus, kahtleb järelevalveamet, kas Norra saab liigitada lepingu punkti 4–2 reservvõimsuse nõuet üldist majandushuvi pakkuva teenusena, ja kutsub Norra ametiasutusi üles esitama objektiivseid põhjendusi avaliku teenindamise kohustuse (ATK) vajaduse kohta, võttes arvesse hooajalisi kõikumisi reisijate kommertsveos.

Mis puudutab teist tingimust ning asjaolu, et parameetrid, mille alusel hüvitist arvutatakse, peavad olema eelnevalt kehtestatud objektiivsel ja läbipaistval viisil, on järelevalveametil praeguses etapis kahtlus, kas reservvõimsuse nõue on seotud ATK tegeliku reisijatearvuga. Näiteks ei ole objektiivset ja läbipaistvat meetodit, millega arvutada eelnevalt välja reisija/kilomeetri kohta tekkiv kulu. Ettevõtja on võtnud kasutusele eraldi eelarve, millesse on koondatud kõik kulud ja tulud, mis on seotud ATK liinidega. Selle eraldi arvepidamise eesmärk ei ole siiski eelnevalt kindlaks teha hüvitise parameetrid, mis on otseselt seotud Hurtigruteni tegeliku kahjumi ja kuludega (mahutavuse ja reisijatega seotud kulud).

Kolmanda tingimuse puhul on järelevalveametil kahtlused seoses sellega, kas Norra ametiasutused on taganud, et hüvitis ei ületa hädavajalikku summat, mis kataks kõik või osa avaliku teenindamise kohustuse täitmisel kantud kuludest, võttes arvesse asjaomast tulu ja mõistlikku kasumit nende kohustuste täitmise eest.

Järelevalveamet ei saa praeguse seisuga välistada, et Hurtigruten on saanud ülemäärast hüvitist avaliku teenuse osutamise eest. Selle esialgse järelduseni jõudmiseks hindas järelevalveamet järgmist:

| i) | Hurtigruten ei reserveeri veomahtu avalikku teenust tarbivate reisijate jaoks, vaid pigem müüb veomahtu ristlusreisijatele, säilitades samal ajal avalike teenuste hüvitamise samal tasemel; |
| --- | --- |

i)

Hurtigruten ei reserveeri veomahtu avalikku teenust tarbivate reisijate jaoks, vaid pigem müüb veomahtu ristlusreisijatele, säilitades samal ajal avalike teenuste hüvitamise samal tasemel;

| ii) | hüvitis avaliku teenuse osutamise eest on oluliselt suurenenud võrreldes eelmise lepingu kehtivusajaga; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

hüvitis avaliku teenuse osutamise eest on oluliselt suurenenud võrreldes eelmise lepingu kehtivusajaga;

| iii) | Hurtigruten saab jätkuvalt hüvitist teenuste eest, mida ei ole osutatud; ning |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten saab jätkuvalt hüvitist teenuste eest, mida ei ole osutatud; ning

| iv) | Hurtigruten üritab ikka veel välja kaubelda madalamaid sadamatasusid ja samas säilitada avalike teenuste hüvitamise samal tasemel; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten üritab ikka veel välja kaubelda madalamaid sadamatasusid ja samas säilitada avalike teenuste hüvitamise samal tasemel;

Mis puudutab viimast, neljandat tingimust, mille kohaselt algatatakse pakkumismenetlus ja võrdlus tõhusa ettevõtjaga, kahtleb järelevalveamet läbi viidud pakkumismenetluse taustal, mille tulemuseks oli vaid üks, nimelt Hurtigruteni pakkumus, kas sellist hankemenetlust saab pidada piisavaks, et tagada teenused „üldsusele vähima kuluga”. Neid kahtlusi toetab asjaolu, et Hurtigrutenil oli oluline konkurentsieelis, mis tugevdas pakkumismenetluses tema positsiooni, kuna tema valduses olevad laevad olid juba kohandatud tehnilise kirjelduse nõuetega.

Lisaks kuulutati tehnilise kirjelduse kohaselt avaliku teenindamise kohustuse täitmise määramine välja kolme võimalusena. See osutab täiendava teabe ja/või kaalumiskriteeriumide olemasolule kõnealuste võimaluste puhul. Arvestades asjaolu, et sellist teavet pakkumisdokumentides ei esitatud, kahtleb järelevalveamet, kas sellisel kujul esitatud pakkumuse puhul oleks peale Hurtigruteni olnud stiimulit osaleda ka teistel sellistel võimalikel pakkujatel, kes oleksid soovinud teha pakkumuse kolme eri võimaluse nõuete kohaselt ning teistsuguse võimaluse jaoks kui see, mis tegelikult valiti.

Norra ametiasutused ei ole esitanud mingit teavet tõhusat ettevõtjat käsitleva võrdlusuuringu kohta.

Siseturuga kokkusobivuse hindamine

Mereveo avalike teenuste eest makstava hüvitise siseturuga kokkusobivuse hindamise aluseks on EMP lepingu artikli 59 lõige 2 koostoimes järelevalveameti raamistikuga riigiabi kohta, mida antakse avaliku teenuse eest makstava hüvitise vormis (edaspidi „raamistik”) (2).

Raamistikus esitatud põhimõtteid kohaldatakse avaliku teenuse osutamise hüvitise suhtes üksnes juhul, kui see kujutab endast riigiabi, mis ei ole hõlmatud komisjoni otsusega 2012/21/EL Euroopa Liidu toimimise lepingu artikli 106 lõike 2 kohaldamise kohta üldist majandushuvi pakkuvaid teenuseid osutavatele ettevõtjatele avalike teenuste eest makstava hüvitisena antava riigiabi suhtes (üldist majandushuvi pakkuvate teenuste otsus) (3).

Järelevalveamet ei ole saanud Norra ametiasutustelt mingit teavet kokkusobivusega seotud kaalutluste kohta ja kahtleb praeguse seisuga, kas leping on kokkusobiv EMP lepinguga.

Kokkuvõte

Eelnevatele kaalutlustele toetudes otsustas järelevalveamet algatada ametliku uurimismenetluse vastavalt EFTA riikide vahelist järelevalveameti ja kohtu asutamist käsitleva lepingu protokolli nr 3 I osa artikli 1 lõikele 2. Huvitatud isikuid kutsutakse üles esitama oma märkused ühe kuu jooksul pärast käesoleva teatise avaldamist Euroopa Liidu Teatajas.

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY DECISION

No 490/15/COL

of 9 December 2015

opening the formal investigation procedure on the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019

(Norway)

[NON-CONFIDENTIAL VERSION]

The EFTA Surveillance Authority (‘the Authority’),

HAVING REGARD to:

the Agreement on the European Economic Area (‘the EEA Agreement’), in particular to Articles 59(2) and 61,

Protocol 26 to the EEA Agreement,

the Agreement between the EFTA States on the Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice (‘the Surveillance and Court Agreement’), in particular to Article 24,

Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement (‘Protocol 3’), in particular to Article 1 of Part I and Articles 4(4), 6 and 13 of Part II,

Whereas:

I.   FACTS

1.   Procedure

| (1) | On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 28 April 2014 the Authority received by e-mail a complaint about alleged incompatible aid to Hurtigruten ASA (‘Hurtigruten’) under the Coastal Agreement for the Bergen – Kirkenes route (‘Hurtigruten Agreement’ or ‘HA’) for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019.

| (2) | A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A second complaint referring to the same Coastal Agreement was received on 9 July 2014. The two complaints are independent, but there are certain overlapping issues. Given that both complaints refer to the same HA, the present decision will treat them jointly and refer to them as ‘the complaints’ (reference will also be made to ‘the complainants’) throughout the text.

| (3) | By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

By letter dated 13 June 2014 (supplemented by a subsequent letter of 10 July 2014), the Authority requested information from the Norwegian authorities. By letter dated 22 September 2014, the Norwegian authorities replied to the information request. An additional request for information was sent to the Norwegian authorities on 21 November 2014, to which the Norwegian authorities replied by letter dated 16 January 2015.

2.   Background – the Hurtigruten Agreement

| (4) | Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

  Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Hurtigruten operates transport services consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes, as illustrated in the diagram below:

Diagram 1 – The Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route

| (5) | The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The operation of the service for parts of the period 1 January 2005 to 31 December 2012 was the subject of the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL. (4) In that Decision the Authority concluded that the measures involved entailed state aid that was incompatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement in so far as they constituted a form of overcompensation for a public service obligation, and ordered the recovery of the aid.

| (6) | The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5) |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The operation of the service for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was the subject of a tender procedure initiated on 30 June 2010, when the tender specifications were published on Doffin (online database for public procurement). (5)

| (7) | Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Following this tender procedure, and on the basis of a bid submitted on 8 November 2010, a contract for the procurement of services for the Bergen – Kirkenes coastal route for the period 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2019 was signed with Hurtigruten on 13 April 2011. Under this contract, Hurtigruten shall perform daily sailings throughout the year with calls at 32 intermediate defined ports between Bergen and Kirkenes. For the Tromsø – Kirkenes and Kirkenes – Tromsø routes, freight transport shall also be provided. The services shall be operated in line with certain capacity and vessel requirements, as stipulated in the contract. Vessels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets in a cargo hold with a normal load height. They shall also meet legal and technical requirements as indicated in section 4.4 of the tender specifications.

| (8) | The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

The maritime services for the Bergen – Kirkenes route are based on maximum fares as regards port-to-port passengers (i.e. public service passengers), which must be approved by the Norwegian authorities. According to the HA, ‘“[p]ort-to-port passengers” are passengers who purchase tickets for travelling on a chosen route in accordance with the normal tariff, with any supplement for cabins and/or meals at their option. Prices for supplementary services must correspond to published prices for the selected standard of cabin and meal. The overall price must in such cases equal the sum of the ticket price and individual prices of the selected supplementary services.’ An approved fare is taken to mean the normal fares tariff that applied on this route on 1 October 2004, adjusted in line with the Consumer Price Index. Any subsequent changes to the normal tariff must be approved by the Norwegian authorities.

| (9) | For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

For other passengers, Hurtigruten is free to set its prices. According to the HA, ‘“[o]ther passenger” are those who are not “port-to-port passengers”. In other words, they are passengers who purchase travel products for specific routes, defined by the supplier, and which include at least one overnight cabin stay and at least one meal on board, where the supplier has published a combined price for the items included and which cannot be broken down into the individual published prices for the same items, including that the passengers will not be entitled to defined discounts on the travel component of the product. Other passengers also include those purchasing a travel product, defined by the supplier, with at least the above-mentioned supplementary services at a combined price, specified per day, but where the passengers themselves select the route where these conditions apply.’ The same applies to cabin and meal prices, as well as to freight transport.

| (10) | For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

  Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA







  2012 | NOK 700 million |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 2013 | NOK 683 million |
| 2014 | NOK 666 million |
| 2015 | NOK 649 million |
| 2016 | NOK 631 million |
| 2017 | NOK 614 million |
| 2018 | NOK 597 million |
| 2019 | NOK 580 million |

(10)

For the services covered by the HA, the Norwegian authorities pay a total compensation of NOK 5120 million for the eight years' duration of the agreement, expressed in 2011 prices, in accordance with Statistics Norway's cost index for domestic sea transport. (6) The compensation allocation for each individual year is as follows:

Table 1 – Annual Compensation under the HA

2012

NOK 700 million

2013

NOK 683 million

2014

NOK 666 million

2015

NOK 649 million

2016

NOK 631 million

2017

NOK 614 million

2018

NOK 597 million

2019

NOK 580 million

| (11) | According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

According to the HA, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the activities on the Bergen – Kirkenes route and other activities and routes outside the scope of the HA. (7) In addition, Hurtigruten is obliged to keep separate accounts for the public service obligation routes (‘PSO routes’) of the Bergen – Kirkenes main coastal route and the commercial part of the same route.

3.   The complaints
   (8)

| (12) | Both complainants have requested confidential treatment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Both complainants have requested confidential treatment.

| (13) | The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:






  1. | The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(13)

The complainants' argument that Hurtigruten receives state aid in the form of overcompensation, violating thus Articles 61 and 59 of the EEA Agreement, is centred around the following allegations:

1.

The compensation for providing the PSO routes has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period.

| 2. | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:






  a. | Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services. |
| --- | --- | --- |

2.

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered:

a.

Hurtigruten has cancelled all sailings to and from the port of Mehamn from 6 January 2014 onwards without any objective justification or professional verification, after having itself partially demolished the terminal quay in April 2012, which Hurtigruten was actually using to dock for over 20 months. At the same time, the corresponding compensation granted by the Norwegian authorities has not been reduced, enabling Hurtigruten to receive monthly cost savings amounting to NOK 314 500. As a result, both the second and third Altmark conditions would not be fulfilled. The second condition is not fulfilled because the Norwegian authorities have not established a framework or policy for objectively and professionally evaluating loss of service after technical or operational claims by the company, and have not engaged any agency to verify the contested claims. The third condition would not be fulfilled, according to the complainants, because Hurtigruten is paid full compensation for PSO routes where it enjoys a substantial cost reduction as a result of the interruption of the services.

| b. | Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.
  The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.
  In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions. |
| --- | --- |

b.

Numerous complaints from several ports and regional authorities regarding frequent and arbitrary Hurtigruten cancellations have been dismissed by the Norwegian authorities and have not resulted in any reduction of the compensation. According to the complainants, certain ports are especially plagued by cancellations due to low passenger numbers and low profitability, especially during the winter season.

The complainants particularly question the force majeure definition of section 8 of the HA referring to ‘extreme weather conditions’ without the use of objective criteria. (9) They also refer to such conditions as not constituting force majeure in line with section 8 of the HA, which particularly states that ‘[o]bstacles that the contracting party should have considered upon entering into the agreement, or could reasonably be expected to avoid or circumvent, shall not be considered to constitute force majeure’. At the same time, the complainants question Hurtigruten's discretion to abuse the absolute sovereignty of the master of the ship, when justifying cancellations that are not due to scheduled maintenance or technical reasons pursuant to section 4-1(3) of the HA.

In conclusion, the complainants submit that the cancellations that do not result in any reduction of the compensation have an adverse effect on the performance of the PSO routes and do not fulfil the second and third Altmark conditions.

| 3. | Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Hurtigruten has shown reluctance to pay port fees, rent and service charges. It stopped paying from January 2014 until May 2014. Furthermore, it attempts to secure special price agreements and seeks repayments of such costs from all relevant ports going back to 2011, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level.

| 4. | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the berth capacity to cruise passengers. Hence, Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same capacity, which provides it with an advantage of NOK 50 to 100 million per year.

4.   Comments by the Norwegian authorities
   (10)

| (14) | On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

On the allegation that the compensation for the PSO routes under the HA is much higher than under the former agreement of 2005-2012, the Norwegian authorities submit that this reflects the actual costs of running the service with the conditions set in the tender specifications. In this regard, it is also submitted that Hurtigruten suffered considerable losses in the period 2005-2010 while running its PSO routes.

| (15) | Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Nevertheless, as there was only one bid after the call for tenders, the Norwegian authorities made use of their right to initiate subsequent negotiations, resulting in the reduction of the compensation by NOK [400 - 1200] million in relation to the initial offer, i.e. from NOK [6320 – 5520] million to NOK 5120 million.

| (16) | Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

Concerning the allegations regarding Hurtigruten cancellations not resulting in any reduction of the compensation, the Norwegian authorities submit that the HA indeed foresees, in section 3, cancellations within the agreed quotas for technical reasons or cultural events, or due to extraordinary weather conditions in line with the force majeure clause of section 8, which do not lead to reductions in the compensation nor to liquidated damages. (11) It is submitted that the benefit gained by Hurtigruten in 2012 and 2013 by not having the compensation reduced in case of extreme weather conditions is significantly lower than a proportional part of the reduction in compensation of NOK [400 – 1200] million so far (i.e. the benefit was NOK [14 – 19] million in 2012 and around NOK [16 – 22] million in 2013).

| (17) | As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

As regards in particular the cancellations due to extreme weather conditions, the Norwegian authorities note that the guiding principle is the safety of the passengers, the crew and the ship, irrespective of whether such conditions are expected. Moreover, also in accordance with section 135 of the Norwegian Maritime Act of 24 June 1994 no. 39, the master of the vessel has the sole responsibility and absolute sovereignty when deciding to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions.

| (18) | Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12). |
| --- | --- |

(18)

Nevertheless, the HA also provides in section 9.2 that cancellations for other reasons, including cancelled calls at ports, will result in reduced compensation and possible liquidated damages (or claim for compensation in cases of negligence or intent) (12).

| (19) | In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

In any case, according to the Norwegian authorities, the cancellations do not represent savings for the company as such cancellations involve several additional costs in changing the passengers' bookings, and finding alternative transportation of passengers and cargo.

| (20) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, the Norwegian authorities consider that the decision to leave out the port of Mehamn as from January 2014 and until the port was repaired, was a result of a risk assessment made by Hurtigruten, taking into account the challenging port and weather conditions in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA. The passengers were informed in advance and a land-based transport of cargo was also established between Mehamn and Kjøllefjord. The question of reduction of compensation must be assessed in line with the force majeure provision of section 8 of the HA, pursuant to the accounting and other reporting requirements of section 4-4 of the HA. The repairs of the port of Mehamn were completed on 9 September 2014, and Hurtigruten has resumed its sailing.

| (21) | As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

As far as the allegations regarding the port fees, rent and service charges are concerned, the Norwegian authorities state that their level is based on the new Norwegian Ports Act (NPA) in force as from 1 January 2012 for most ports, replacing the previous NPA of 1984 (13). As from that date onwards, the ports can sell services at fair and non-discriminatory prices on a normal contractual basis.

| (22) | The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

The Norwegian authorities acknowledge that Hurtigruten has indeed approached some of the ports arguing that it is overcharged. This is because, as explained, some ports have conceived the new NPA as giving them the legal basis to increase radically their prices.

| (23) | It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

It is further stressed that the HA is a net contract, which means that Hurtigruten has the risk for costs and revenues during the period of the agreement and is therefore free to influence its costs, including the port fees, in such a way as to operate the service in the most cost efficient manner. The price adjustment clause of section 5-2 of the HA covers only the compensation under the HA. Any amendments of the port fees and charges to Hurtigruten do not thus lead to compensation reduction.

| (24) | In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In this context, the Norwegian authorities point to the mechanism provided in section 7 of the HA for avoiding overcompensation under particular circumstances. This mechanism ensures that each of the parties may demand renegotiations concerning extraordinary adjustment of the compensation, a change in production or other measures, in the event of amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders, which the parties could not have reasonably foreseen when signing the contract and which entail material extra costs or savings for the contract procuring the service.

| (25) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the requirement of section 4-2, paragraph 1 of the HA for a minimum capacity is understood to mean that Hurtigruten is obliged to have sufficient capacity available for the public service passengers up to the set capacity requirements. On the other hand, Hurtigruten is allowed to sell tickets to other passengers e.g. cruise passengers, in order to avoid sailing with empty berths and to the extent that this does not prejudge the rights of the public service passengers. In any case, as submitted, it has seldom occurred that there is not enough capacity for the public service passengers as the vessels' capacity for other passengers is higher than the actual demand.

| (26) | For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

For the contingency, when access is denied to public service passengers, Hurtigruten has introduced a travel guarantee to ensure that these passengers may require either a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship, or alternative transport free of charge.

4.1   
  The BDO report

   (14)

| (27) | The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services). |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The Norwegian authorities commissioned a report from the consultancy BDO, which looked at Hurtigruten's budgeted and actual financial performance in 2012 and 2013, for, separately: a) the services purchased by the government on the Bergen-Kirkenes route and, b) the totality of services provided by Hurtigruten on the same route (i.e. including both commercial and government-procured services).

| (28) | In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

In this exercise, BDO distinguished between capacity costs, passenger costs, and costs relating to marketing and sales activities. Capacity costs were then allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of capacity reserved by the government compared to the total capacity of the fleet, whereas passenger costs were allocated on the basis of actual passenger kilometres sailed by distance travellers over the total number of passenger kilometres for all travellers on the fleet. The marketing and sales costs were allocated to the government-procured services on the basis of the share of actual net passenger revenue relating to the PSO passengers compared to the total number of travellers.

| (29) | [...] |
| --- | --- |

(29)

[...]

II.   ASSESSMENT

1.   The presence of state aid

1.1   
  The concept of state aid

| (30) | Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:
  ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’ |
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(30)

Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement reads as follows:

‘Save as otherwise provided in this Agreement, any aid granted by EC Member States, EFTA States or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Contracting Parties, be incompatible with the functioning of this Agreement.’

| (31) | This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

This implies that a measure constitutes state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement if the following conditions are cumulatively fulfilled. The measure: (i) is granted by the State or through state resources; (ii) confers a selective economic advantage on the beneficiary; (iii) is liable to have an impact on trade between Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

1.2   
  State resources

| (32) | The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The Norwegian authorities, following a tender procedure, concluded a contract with Hurtigruten for the performance of maritime services over the period 2012-2019 against remuneration, as stipulated in detail in the HA. It is thus not disputed that the aid measure has been granted by the State or through state resources.

1.3   
  Impact on trade and distortion of competition

| (33) | The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The measure in question must be liable to have an impact on trade between the Contracting Parties and to distort competition.

| (34) | According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States. |
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(34)

According to established case law, when the financial support granted by a Member State strengthens the position of an undertaking compared to other undertakings competing in intra-EEA trade, then there is at least a potential effect on trade between Contracting Parties and on competition (15). In this regard, the Authority is of the view that any potential economic advantage granted to Hurtigruten through state resources would fulfil this condition. As the Authority stated in its Decision No 205/11/COL the market for domestic maritime services (maritime cabotage) (16), within which Hurtigruten operates, was opened to EEA-wide competition in 1998 (17). Moreover, Hurtigruten is also engaged in the tourism sector, in particular through the offer of cruises/round trips along the Norwegian coast. Other operators offer cruises along the same parts of the Norwegian coast (18). Moreover, Hurtigruten also operates a number of cruises in various European States.

| (35) | The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten. |
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(35)

The only criterion of the notion of state aid that is thus in question is whether the HA has conferred a selective undue economic advantage on Hurtigruten.

1.4   
  Selective economic advantage on Hurtigruten

| (36) | The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget. |
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(36)

The aid measure must confer on Hurtigruten an advantage that relieves it of charges that are normally borne from its budget.

| (37) | It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:






  i. | ‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined; |
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(37)

It follows from the Altmark judgment that where a State measure must be regarded as compensation for services provided by the recipient undertakings in order to discharge public service obligations, such a measure is not caught by Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. In the Altmark judgment, the Court of Justice held that compensation for public service obligations does not constitute state aid when four cumulative criteria are met:

i.

‘First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge and such obligations must be clearly defined;

| ii. | Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...]; |
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ii.

Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be established in advance in an objective and transparent manner [...];

| iii. | Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations; |
| --- | --- |

iii.

Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of the public service obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations;

| iv. | Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19) |
| --- | --- |

iv.

Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow for the selection of the tenderer capable of providing those services at the least cost to the community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations.’
   (19)

1.4.1   The first Altmark condition

| (38) | The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel. |
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(38)

The fulfilment of the first Altmark condition must be assessed with regard to Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which sets out the specifications that should be part of the definition of a public service obligation, namely: ports to be served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and manning of the vessel.

| (39) | Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20). |
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(39)

Further, in accordance with section 9 of the Authority's Maritime Guidelines, ‘[p]ublic service obligations may be imposed or public service contracts may be concluded for the services indicated in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92’ (20).

| (40) | In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21). |
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(40)

In the absence of specific EEA rules defining the scope of the existence of a service of general economic interest (SGEI), the Norwegian authorities have a wide margin of discretion in defining a given service as an SGEI and in granting compensation to the service provider. The Authority's competence in this respect is limited to checking whether Norway has made a manifest error when defining the service as an SGEI (21).

| (41) | However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23). |
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(41)

However, according to the case law, PSOs may only be imposed if justified by the need to ensure adequate regular maritime transport services, which cannot be ensured by market forces alone. It is important for the national authorities therefore to demonstrate that there is a real public service need (22). The Communication on the interpretation of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation confirms that ‘[i]t is for the Member States [...] to determine which routes require public service obligations. In particular, public service obligations may be envisaged for regular (scheduled) island cabotage services in the event of market failure to provide adequate services’ (23).

| (42) | The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service. |
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(42)

The Norwegian authorities submit that the public service pursuant to the HA relates to the capacity reserve requirement as defined in section 4-2, and that the public service should not be assessed at the level of the actual use of the service.

| (43) | Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower. |
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(43)

Based on the information provided to the Authority (24), it appears however that in both 2012 and 2013, less than [10 – 30] per cent of the passenger capacity reserved for public service passengers was utilised. This would indicate that the compensation received by Hurtigruten for reserving capacity for PSO passengers in those two years vastly exceeded actual demand for PSO passenger services. Moreover, the BDO report shows that the capacity utilisation for commercial passengers amounted to [35 – 65] per cent and [35 – 65] per cent in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Given this level of spare capacity for commercial passengers (and the low level of capacity utilisation for PSO passengers), the Authority cannot exclude that a capacity reservation provision for PSO passengers may be unnecessary, especially during the winter season, where the utilisation by commercial passengers would naturally be much lower.

| (44) | For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation. |
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(44)

For these reasons, the Authority doubts whether the reserve capacity requirement of section 4-2 of the HA can be classified by Norway as an SGEI and invites the Norwegian authorities to provide objective justification regarding the need for such a PSO, taking into account the seasonal fluctuations of commercial passengers transportation.

| (45) | The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

The Authority has not received any information on berth utilisation. As regards the cargo transportation for the Tromsø – Kirkenes – Tromsø route, this is not price regulated and according to section 4-3 of the HA, Hurtigruten has full freedom to set the fares. It is doubtful therefore whether the cargo transportation is in compliance with Article 4(2) of the Maritime Cabotage Regulation, which explicitly mentions the elements needed for an adequate definition of a PSO, i.e. among others the rates to be charged.

| (46) | In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA. |
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(46)

In light of the above, the Authority doubts whether the PSO for cargo transportation has been clearly defined under the HA.

| (47) | The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The Authority however, does not doubt that other obligations are clearly defined in section 4-1 of the HA, as regards the supplier obligations in terms of route production requirements, in section 4-2 of the HA, as regards the vessel requirements and in section 4-3 of the HA, as regards fare and discount requirements, with the exception of cargo transportation.

| (48) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met. |
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(48)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the first Altmark condition is met.

1.4.2   The second Altmark condition

| (49) | The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations. |
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(49)

The Norwegian authorities must define ex ante the methodology to calculate the compensation for discharging the PSO obligations.

| (50) | Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’. |
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(50)

Pursuant to section 4-2 of the HA ‘[v]essels used on the coastal route shall as a minimum have a passenger capacity for 320 passengers, berth capacity in cabins for 120 passengers and freight capacity for 150 euro pallets (in cargo hold with a normal load height)’.

| (51) | It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

  Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service







  A: | Total revenues distance passengers |
| --- | --- | --- |
| B: | Passengers cost distance passengers |
| C: | Net passenger revenues (A+B) |
| D: | Revenues from on board sales |
| E: | Net revenues from goods and cars |
| F: | Other revenues |
| G: | Total own revenues (C+D+E+F) |
| H: | Government procurement of service |
| I: | Total revenue (G+H) |
| J: | Safety crew |
| K: | Oil and fuel |
| L: | Repairs and maintenance |
| M: | Port costs |
| N: | Insurance costs |
| O: | Depreciation own vessels/bareboat |
| P: | Net financial costs |
| Q: | Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P) |
| R: | Cost of goods sold |
| S: | Crew not included in the safety crew |
| T: | Marketing costs and sales provision |
| U: | Administration costs |
| V: | Other costs |
| W: | Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V) |
| X: | Total costs public service (Q+W) |
| Y: | Net result before taxes (I-X) |

(51)

It is the view of the Norwegian authorities that this condition has been satisfied given that the compensation is calculated on the basis of the elements specified in Annex D to the tender specification, which provides the following:

Table 2 – The elements in the budget scheme for the public service

A:

Total revenues distance passengers

B:

Passengers cost distance passengers

C:

Net passenger revenues (A+B)

D:

Revenues from on board sales

E:

Net revenues from goods and cars

F:

Other revenues

G:

Total own revenues (C+D+E+F)

H:

Government procurement of service

I:

Total revenue (G+H)

J:

Safety crew

K:

Oil and fuel

L:

Repairs and maintenance

M:

Port costs

N:

Insurance costs

O:

Depreciation own vessels/bareboat

P:

Net financial costs

Q:

Total capacity costs (J+K+L+M+N+P)

R:

Cost of goods sold

S:

Crew not included in the safety crew

T:

Marketing costs and sales provision

U:

Administration costs

V:

Other costs

W:

Total passenger costs (R+S+T+U+V)

X:

Total costs public service (Q+W)

Y:

Net result before taxes (I-X)

| (52) | In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts. |
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(52)

In concluding that the parameters were established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, the Norwegian authorities asked the independent consultant BDO to study Hurtigruten's financial accounts for 2012-2013 and compare the accounts for the public service and the total accounts.

| (53) | According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

According to the Norwegian authorities, it is thus ensured that the PSO passengers do indeed receive their transport within the capacities set by the HA and that that capacity should be available to the extent that there is actual demand from PSO passengers.

| (54) | At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

At this stage, it is not clear to the Authority whether the capacity reserve requirement is linked to actual PSO passenger numbers. For example, there seems to be no objective and transparent methodology to calculate in advance the cost per passenger/kilometre.

| (55) | Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs). |
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(55)

Hurtigruten, in compliance with the tender specifications, has established a separate budget incorporating all costs and revenues attributed to the PSO routes. According to section 4.9.2 of the tender specifications, this separate accounting aims at ensuring predictability of which cost additions/savings/extra revenues/shortfalls form the basis of any renegotiation, as provided for in sections 6 and 7 of the HA. A further aim is to document that the public procurement process does not entail any unlawful cross-subsidisation. The separate accounting however does not aim at establishing in advance the parameters of the compensation, which shall be directly linked to the actual losses and costs (capacity and passenger costs) incurred by Hurtigruten. (25) Instead, the HA has only fixed the annual compensation to be paid for the maritime services for each individual year from 2012 to 2019 based on a minimum commitment for passengers/kilometres per year, without this having any link to the fixed costs (i.e. the capacity costs).

| (56) | In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26). |
| --- | --- |

(56)

In addition, although the compensation is based on the elements stipulated in table 2, as mentioned above, the Authority has not received any information as to how these costs have been calculated. For instance, sections 6 and 7 of the HA contain certain provisions on the adjustment of compensation in case of changes in production or in case of unforeseen events. Even though certain indications are provided, i.e. a calculation based on the costs and revenues ensuing from the changes in production or an aggregated calculation in the case of unforeseen events, the exact parameters of these adjustments are not known in advance and there are no limitations on how much extra compensation can be granted (26).

| (57) | In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27). |
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(57)

In this context, as the EFTA Court pointed out in the Hurtigruten case, the principle of transparency could have been observed: ‘[...] Norway could, if necessary, have made provision, in the notice of invitation to tender, for the possibility of amending the conditions for payment of the successful tenderers in certain circumstances by laying down in particular the precise arrangements for any supplementary compensation intended to cover unforeseen losses and costs’ (27).

| (58) | In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn). |
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(58)

In addition, section 4-1, item 3 of the HA, provides that ‘[o]mission of up to 10 days of operation in agreed production per ship per annum due to planned maintenance and unforeseen operational disruption linked to agreed production (off-hire) is considered to be proper fulfilment and shall not entail a deduction in the agreed remuneration in accordance with section 9-2’. The Authority fails to see how this loss in production is calculated and certified in advance in a transparent and objective manner. The 10 days ceiling appears arbitrary and as such does not appear to qualify as an objective estimate of provable loss (e.g. cancellations of service to the port of Mehamn).

| (59) | The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service. |
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(59)

The Authority notes that neither HA nor the tender specifications specify whether the compensation awarded includes any profit margin for Hurtigruten, and if so, what the methodology used to calculate this profit margin is, taking into account the risks incurred by the operator in the provision of the service.

| (60) | Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition. |
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(60)

Lastly, concerning Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, the Authority underlines that the amount of compensation awarded should be fully reflected in the parameters established in advance including a reasonable profit. As mentioned above, the Authority is of the preliminary view that no parameters have been established to calculate a reasonable profit margin. Therefore, any attempts by Hurtigruten to get lower prices on the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level would seem not to satisfy the second Altmark condition.

| (61) | As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled. |
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(61)

As a result, in view of the above, it is the Authority's preliminary opinion that the second Altmark condition is not fulfilled.

1.4.3   The third Altmark condition

| (62) | When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

When granting compensation, the Norwegian authorities should ensure that it does not exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in discharging the PSO, taking into account relevant receipts and a reasonable profit.

| (63) | In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

  ‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28). |
| --- | --- |

(63)

In this regard, the EFTA Court already held in the Hurtigruten case:

‘If it is shown that the compensation paid to the undertakings operating the public service does not reflect the costs actually incurred by that undertaking for the purposes of that service, such a system does not satisfy the requirement that compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs incurred in the discharge of public services obligations, taking into account the relevant receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging those obligations’
   (28).

| (64) | Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:






  i) | Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(64)

Briefly, according to the complainants' arguments, presented in further detail in paragraph (13) above:

i)

Hurtigruten does not reserve capacity for public service passengers, but rather sells the capacity to cruise passengers, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| ii) | The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period; |
| --- | --- |

ii)

The compensation for providing the public service has increased substantially as compared to the previous contract period;

| iii) | Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly |
| --- | --- |

iii)

Hurtigruten continues to receive compensation for services that are not rendered; and, lastly

| iv) | Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level; |
| --- | --- |

iv)

Hurtigruten further attempts to get lower prices for the harbour fees, while maintaining the public service compensation at the same level;

| (65) | As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

As regards the first point, the Authority reminds the Norwegian authorities that under the third Altmark condition, only the costs incurred in discharging the PSO shall be covered. Any compensation granted to cover costs outside the public service remit cannot be held to constitute compensation for PSO. Therefore, when the capacity (passengers and berth) for PSO passengers is sold to commercial cruise passengers, and given that the BDO report does not provide any information on the capacity utilisation to justify the opposite, it appears that Hurtigruten is paid twice for the same service, which would in principle constitute a form of overcompensation.

| (66) | The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Authority is conscious that the figures presented in the BDO report are annual figures and therefore correspond to average capacity utilisation throughout the year. Accordingly, there may be periods of the year where capacity utilisation for public service passengers is higher, and where it is indeed also necessary to have in place a capacity reservation mechanism. The Authority, however, cannot rule out that the mechanism used in the HA overcompensates Hurtigruten in that it does not take into account different (e.g. seasonal) levels of capacity utilisation during the year.

| (67) | The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(67)

The Authority takes note of the travel guarantee subsequently introduced, as mentioned above in paragraph (26), to ‘compensate’ the public service passengers for their lost travel and correct any alleged overcompensation. However, until the introduction of that travel guarantee, public service passengers appear at times to have been unable to benefit from the public service, although the costs were evidently covered by the compensation already granted to Hurtigruten. Also, at this stage it is not clear to the Authority whether the cost of providing a free travel without berth on the planned journey or a travel with berth on the next scheduled ship or alternative transport free of charge equals the compensation that Hurtigruten has received to cover the cost of public service berth capacity, which is sold to commercial cruise passengers. It appears therefore that such a mechanism, due to the limited (on average) capacity utilisation in both the PSO and cruise segment, is an ineffective and relatively costless service for Hurtigruten that does not offset the advantage gained through the excess capacity reservation, which is freely sold to cruise passengers.

| (68) | Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

Concerning the second point, as noted above in paragraph (13), and as evident from the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL, the Norwegian authorities paid Hurtigruten a total compensation of NOK 1 899.7 million to carry out the same PSO routes during the period 2005-2012. More specifically, the annual compensation for the year 2011 amounted to NOK 236.8 million (29). Taking into account that the compensation for 2012 under the current HA amounted to NOK 700 million, the Authority expresses its doubts as to whether the increase in compensation is justified under the HA. The Norwegian authorities claim that there have been considerable losses for Hurtigruten in the period 2005-2012 to justify the increase of the compensation. However, the Authority is of the preliminary view that due to the fact that the previous HA had not envisaged separation of accounts, it is not possible to determine whether these losses were caused by commercial or PSO activities. In any case, it is questionable how such a higher compensation can be justified, when the scope of the PSO remains the same as in the previous contract period (in terms of sailing frequency and number of ports served) and the capacity reservation has decreased from 400 passengers to 320 and from 150 berths to 120.

| (69) | In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(69)

In relation to the third point, the Authority notes that when Hurtigruten keeps on its books compensation that has been granted to cover the costs of transporting PSO passengers, without however rendering the service to them (or when the service is not required), overcompensation cannot be excluded.

| (70) | Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

Particularly, section 8 of the HA provides for the operator to keep the compensation granted in case of interruptions of sailings due to events that constitute force majeure. It is generally accepted that the decision to avoid servicing ports of call due to extreme weather conditions lies with the master of the vessel. However, the Authority questions at this stage the fact that, as provided for in section 8 of the HA, ‘[...] any cancelled production ensuing from force majeure shall not be considered as a non-conformity in the production under section 4-1, item 3’ and thus not lead to any reduction in the compensation.

| (71) | On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

On the basis of the information provided (30), it appears to the Authority that the phenomenon of extreme weather condition constitutes a normality in the maritime business along the Norwegian coast. It might thus be considered as a foreseen event. However, it is not reflected as such in the compensation calculations. The compensation has been calculated as a lump sum ex ante for the whole contract period, without taking into account an objective estimate of a provable loss due to foreseen extreme weather conditions.

| (72) | In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted. |
| --- | --- |

(72)

In reference to the cancellation of services to the port of Mehamn, which, according to the complainant, resulted in Hurtigruten receiving monthly cost savings at the amount of NOK 314 500 over a period of around 8 months, the Authority is not at this stage convinced by the Norwegian authorities' suggestion that this situation should be assessed in the context of the force majeure provision of the HA. According to the information provided by the complainants, the port was damaged in 2012 by Hurtigruten itself, which nevertheless continued serving the port until January 2014. Therefore, the Authority cannot see at this stage how this cancellation could be held to have taken place due to unforeseen events, which would entitle the operator to keep the compensation granted.

| (73) | Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

Finally, concerning the last point and Hurtigruten's attempts to negotiate lower port fees whilst the Norwegian authorities maintain the compensation at the same level, it should be noted that there should not be any overcompensation above the level of a reasonable profit. Therefore, a reduction in port fees should result in lower compensation, whereas higher port fees would respectively mean a higher compensation. In light of this, at this stage the Authority is of the opinion that any attempts by Hurtigruten to get better prices of the port fees while maintaining the compensation at the same level, would not ensure that overcompensation is excluded.

| (74) | The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

The Norwegian authorities point to section 7 of the HA as establishing a mechanism to avoid overcompensation. Section 7, however, refers to unforeseen costs resulting from events that are independent of Hurtigruten's management decisions, such as amendments to acts, regulations or statutory orders. To claim compensation for such costs, it must be proved by the operator that those costs are genuinely incurred in the discharge of the PSO, and the costs must be well documented, so as to ensure that the ultimate compensation received by Hurtigruten does not exceed its actual costs. The Authority at this stage cannot see how section 7 of the HA can ensure that overcompensation is avoided.

| (75) | Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Lastly, the contract does not contain any claw back clause such that if any agreed profit margin is exceeded, the surplus must be returned to the State or deducted from the compensation paid in the next year or perhaps over the contract period.

| (76) | In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

In view of the above, the Authority cannot exclude that Hurtigruten has been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. As a result, the Authority doubts whether the third Altmark condition has been fulfilled.

1.4.4   The fourth Altmark condition

| (77) | Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013). |
| --- | --- |

(77)

Referring to the tender procedure carried out which resulted in only one bid, Hurtigruten's, the Norwegian authorities argue that the tender was designed in such a way as to attract more bidders. In this respect, it is argued that the tender was widened to include maritime services that would not run on a daily basis throughout the year and that the required minimum capacity was reduced from 400 to 320 passengers and from 150 to 120 berth bunks. Additionally, the deadline for submitting the bids was extended from 30 September until 8 November 2010 on request from an interested operator, whereas overall there was sufficient time allowed from the deadline for submitting bids (8 November 2010) until the date of commencement of the services (1 January 2013).

| (78) | Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below. |
| --- | --- |

(78)

Despite the above arguments as well as the fact that subsequent negotiations took place between the Norwegian authorities and Hurtigruten, which resulted in a reduction of the compensation for the whole contract period in relation to the initial offer, see paragraph (15), the Authority at this stage doubts whether a tender procedure such as the one at issue, where only one bid is submitted, can be deemed sufficient to ensure ‘the least cost to the community’ (31), for the reasons listed below.

| (79) | Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

Hurtigruten had already run this particular maritime service consisting of the combined transport of persons and goods along the Norwegian coast from Bergen to Kirkenes for years (32). As the incumbent operator, Hurtigruten thus had a significant competitive advantage that reinforced its position in the tender procedure, given that it had already in its possession vessels adapted to the requirements of the tender specifications.

| (80) | Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:








  i. | : | Alternative 1 | : | Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports; |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ii. | : | Alternative 2 | : | Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and |
| iii. | : | Alternative 3 | : | Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports. |

(80)

Furthermore, according to the tender specifications, the assignment for carrying out the PSO was advertised as three alternatives:

i.

:

Alternative 1

:

Daily sailing throughout the year to 34 ports;

ii.

:

Alternative 2

:

Sailings 7 days a week in summer (8 months), 5 days a week in winter (4 months), to 34 ports; and

iii.

:

Alternative 3

:

Sailings 5 days a week throughout the year to 34 ports.

| (81) | However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1). |
| --- | --- |

(81)

However, the tender specifications do not provide any clarifications as to the criteria used to award the service. The Procurement Notice refers to the lowest price as the sole award criterion used for the service in question. Although, in itself the ‘lowest price’ criterion could satisfy the fourth Altmark condition, nevertheless in the case at hand, this reference is very abstract and cannot be assessed in isolation. The fact that there were three alternatives would indicate the existence of further information and/or weighting criteria among those alternatives. In view of the fact that such information was not included in the tender documents, the Authority doubts whether the tender as designed has provided incentives to potential bidders, apart from Hurtigruten, that would have been willing to bid in accordance with the requirements of the three different alternatives and for a different alternative than the one actually chosen (i.e. alternative 1).

| (82) | The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

The Norwegian authorities have not submitted any information on the second leg of the fourth Altmark condition, concerning whether the level of compensation needed is determined on the basis of an analysis of the costs of a typical undertaking, well run and adequately equipped.

| (83) | In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

In view of the above, the Authority doubts that the fourth Altmark condition is met.

1.4.5   Conclusion on the Altmark conditions

| (84) | Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

Based on the information submitted, the Authority cannot, at this stage, conclude that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 complies with all the four conditions in the Altmark judgement. The Authority thus cannot exclude the presence of an advantage within the meaning of Article 61(1) EEA, granted to an undertaking for performing public service obligations.

2.   Conclusion on the presence of aid

| (85) | The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

The Authority takes the preliminary view that the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 may entail state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

3.   Procedural requirements

| (86) | Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

Pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3: ‘the EFTA Surveillance Authority shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid. [...] The State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until the procedure has resulted in a final decision’.

| (87) | The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Norwegian authorities did not notify the HA to the Authority. Should the Authority therefore conclude that the Norwegian authorities have not respected their obligations pursuant to Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3, there would be a breach of the standstill obligation, without prejudice to the application of the SGEI Decision as below mentioned.

4.   Compatibility of the aid

4.1   
  The legal framework

| (88) | The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33). |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The compatibility of public service compensation for maritime transport is assessed on the basis of Article 59(2) of the EEA Agreement in conjunction with the Authority's Framework for state aid in the form of public service compensation (‘the Framework’) (33).

| (89) | The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The principles set out in the Framework apply to public service compensation only in so far as it constitutes state aid not covered by Commission Decision 2012/21/EU on the application of Article 106(2) of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union to state aid in the form of public service compensation granted to certain undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest (‘SGEI Decision’) (34).

| (90) | According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(90)

According to the case-law of the Court of Justice, it is up to the Member State to invoke possible grounds for compatibility and to demonstrate that the conditions of compatibility are met (35). The Norwegian authorities consider that the measure at hand does not constitute state aid pursuant to the Altmark jurisprudence, and therefore has not provided any grounds for compatibility.

4.2   
  Applicability of Decision 2012/21/EU

| (91) | The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The SGEI Decision lays down the conditions under which certain types of public service compensation are to be regarded as compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement pursuant to its Article 59(2) and exempt from the requirement of prior notification under Article 1(3) of Part I of Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and Court Agreement.

| (92) | There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:







  ‘(d) | compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(92)

There is one exception from the notification requirement of Article 2 of the SGEI Decision, which might be relevant in the present case:

‘(d)

compensation for the provision of services of general economic interest as regards air or maritime links to islands on which the average annual traffic during the 2 financial years preceding that in which the service of general economic interest was assigned does not exceed 300 000 passengers’;

| (93) | The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

The Authority has not received any information from the Norwegian authorities as regards the applicability of the said exception. The Authority therefore doubts whether the Bergen – Kirkenes public service route concern an annual traffic not exceeding the threshold of 300 000 passengers.

| (94) | In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In light of the doubts expressed above under paragraphs (49) to (85) on alleged overcompensation, the Authority further doubts whether the Norwegian authorities have ensured, pursuant to Article 5 of the SGEI decision, that Hurtigruten does not receive compensation in excess of the amount needed to cover the net cost incurred in discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit.

| (95) | The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Authority additionally invites the Norwegian authorities, in the event of the measure falling under the above exception, to justify whether the provisions of Article 4 (entrustment), Article 6 (control of overcompensation) and Article 7 (transparency) of the SGEI Decision are complied with.

4.3   
  Applicability of the Framework

| (96) | On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

On the basis of the provisions of the Framework, one of the compatibility conditions that must be fulfilled is that the entrustment act which specifies the public service obligation, in this case the HA, shall include ‘[a] description of the compensation mechanism and the parameters for calculating, monitoring and reviewing the compensation’.

| (97) | Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36) |
| --- | --- |

(97)

Further, according to the Framework, ‘[t]he amount of compensation must not exceed what is necessary to cover the net cost of discharging the public service obligations, including a reasonable profit’. The Framework also clarifies that ‘[t]he net cost necessary, or expected to be necessary, to discharge the public service obligations should be calculated using the net avoided cost methodology [...]’.
   (36)

| (98) | On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

On the basis of the considerations in paragraphs (49) to (85), at this stage the Authority considers that Hurtigruten may have been overcompensated for the provision of the public service.

| (99) | The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:
  a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;
  b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;
  c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;
  d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;
  e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;
  f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;
  g.   Paragraph 60: transparency. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The compatibility of the HA shall also be assessed against the following conditions as provided for by the Framework:

a.   Paragraph 14: proper consideration to the public service needs;

b.   Paragraph 19: compliance with EEA public procurement rules;

c.   Paragraph 20: absence of discrimination;

d.   Paragraph 24 to 38: calculation of the net cost necessary to discharge the PSO;

e.   Paragraphs 39 to 50: efficiency incentives;

f.   Paragraphs 51 to 59: no affectation of trade development to an extent contrary to the interests of the EEA;

g.   Paragraph 60: transparency.

| (100) | The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Norwegian authorities have not put forward any compatibility considerations. Therefore at this stage, the Authority raises doubts as to whether the compensation awarded under the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services for the period 2012-2019 is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

5.   Conclusion

| (101) | As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

As set out above, the Authority has doubts as to whether the HA entails state aid within the meaning of Article 61(1) of the EEA Agreement.

| (102) | The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

The Authority also has doubts as to whether the HA is compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (103) | Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Consequently, and in accordance with Article 4(4) of Part II of Protocol 3, the Authority is obliged to open the formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3. The decision to open a formal investigation procedure is without prejudice to the final decision of the Authority, which may conclude that the HA does not constitute aid or that it is aid compatible with the functioning of the EEA Agreement.

| (104) | The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

The Authority, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3, invites the Norwegian authorities to submit, within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, their comments and to provide all documents, information and data needed for the assessment of the HA in light of the state aid rules.

| (105) | The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten. |
| --- | --- |

(105)

The Authority requests the Norwegian authorities to forward a copy of this decision to Hurtigruten.

| (106) | The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law. |
| --- | --- |

(106)

The Authority must remind the Norwegian authorities that, according to Article 14 of Part II of Protocol 3, any incompatible aid unlawfully granted will in principle have to be recovered, unless this recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EEA law.

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The formal investigation procedure provided for in Article 1(2) of Part I of Protocol 3 is opened into the Coastal Agreement for Hurtigruten Maritime Services 2012-2019.

Article 2

The Norwegian authorities are invited, pursuant to Article 6(1) of Part II of Protocol 3, to submit their comments on the opening of the formal investigation procedure within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision. They are further requested to provide, also within one month of the date of receipt of this Decision, all documents, information and data needed for assessment of the compatibility of the aid measure.

Article 3

This Decision is addressed to the Kingdom of Norway.

Article 4

Only the English language version of this decision is authentic.

Done at Brussels, on 9 December 2015.

For the EFTA Surveillance Authority

Sven Svedman

President

Helga Jónsdóttir

College Member

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(1)  Kohtuotsus C-280/00 Altmark Trans GmbH ja Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg vs. Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, punktid 87–93.

1

Altmark Trans GmbH ja Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark),

(2)  Kättesaadav aadressil: http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

2

(3)  ELT L 7, 11.1.2012, lk 3; inkorporeeritud EMP lepingu XV lisa punkti 1h.

3

(4)  OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1. See also Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, upholding the Authority's Decision.

4

Hurtigruten

(5)  See www.doffin.no.

5

(6)  If Statistics Norway's cost index is unavailable, Statistics Norway's Consumer Price Index would be used.

6

(7)  As mentioned in the Authority's Decision No 205/11/COL ‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’, section 1.2.

7

‘[i]n addition to the service covered by the Hurtigruten Agreement, Hurtigruten is a commercial operator and offers round trips, excursions, and catering on the route Bergen – Kirkenes. Moreover, in connection with this route, Hurtigruten also provides transport services in the Geiranger fjord, outside the scope of the Hurtigruten Agreement. Furthermore, Hurtigruten operates a number of different cruises in different European states, Russia, Antarctica, Spitsbergen and Greenland’,

(8)  Doc Nos 748323 and 715314.

8

(9)  The complainants point to the fact that in the call for tender for the 2005-2012 contract period force majeure as a result of extreme weather conditions was defined as wind speeds over 25 m/s (full storm). However, in the current HA, ‘extreme weather conditions’ are defined as ‘conditions where ocean and/or wind conditions are such that the ship's captain judges it to be unsafe to continue the sailing and/or arrive at a specific port’. This, according to the complainants, has resulted in the majority of the cancellations during the period 2012-2013 in select ports to have occurred at wind conditions below 15 m/s.

9

force majeure

(10)  Doc Nos 723002 and 742652.

10

(11)  The Norwegian authorities submit that according to Hurtigruten's reports, ships were out of production for 171 operating days in 2012 and 186.7 operating days in 2013 due to maintenance and unforeseen operational disturbances, for 5 operating days in 2012 and 12.8 operating days in 2013 due to the ships being used for cultural or similar activities, and finally for 87 operating days in 2012 and 99.8 operating days in 2013 due to extraordinary weather conditions.

11

(12)  On 12 December 2014, Hurtigruten paid back to the Norwegian authorities the amount of NOK [24 – 32] million due to cancellations in 2012 and 2013.

12

(13)  The previous NPA of 1984 distinguished between port fees and service charges. There were several different port fees, e.g. quay fees covering quay costs, approach fees covering costs of keeping the fairway and port approach open and safe, passenger fees covering costs of special passenger facilities etc. Ports could additionally levy service charges for services they sold, which were not covered by the port fees.

13

(14)  BDO Memo, ‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’, Oslo 14 January 2015, p. 7.

14

‘An assessment of Hurtigruten's reported income statements’

(15)  Judgment in Philip Morris Holland BV v Commission, 730/79, EU:C:1980:209, paragraph 11; judgment in Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia v Commission, T-288/97, EU:T:2001:115, paragraph 41; and judgment in Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark), C-280/00, EU:C:2003:415, paragraph 75.

15

Philip Morris Holland BV

Commission

Regione Friuli Venezia Giulia

Commission

Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg

Nahverkehrsgesellschaft Altmark GmbH (Altmark)

(16)  Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 of 7 December 1992 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) (OJ L 364, 12.12.1992, p. 7).

16

(17)  The maritime cabotage regulation was incorporated at point 53a in Annex XIII to the EEA Agreement (OJ L 30, 5.2.1998, p. 42).

17

(18)  Norwegian Cruise Line, MSC Cruises, Royal Caribbean, Holland America Line, etc.

18

(19)  Paragraphs 87-93.

19

(20)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/?1=1&showLinkID=15132&1=1.

20

(21)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

21

(22)  Judgment in Alanir and others, C-205/1999, EU:C:2001:107, paragraph 34.

22

Alanir and others

(23)  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions updating and rectifying the Communication on the interpretation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), COM(2003) 595 final, 22.12.2003, section 5.2.

23

(24)  BDO Memo, page 7.

24

(25)  Joined Cases E-10/11 and E-11/11 Hurtigruten [2012] EFTA Ct. Rep. 758, paragraph 117.

25

Hurtigruten

(26)  Ibid, paragraphs 128-129.

26

(27)  Ibid, paragraph 127.

27

(28)  Paragraph 170. See for comparison, judgment in Enirisorse, C-34/01 to C-38/01, EU:C:2003:640, paragraphs 37-40.

28

Enirisorse

(29)  Section 2.

29

(30)  See footnote 11.

30

(31)  Paragraph 68, http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Compensation-granted-for-the-provision-of-services-of-general-economic-interest.pdf.

31

(32)  For background information on the Hurtigruten Agreement, see Decision No 205/11/COL on the Supplementary Agreement on the Hurtigruten service, section 2, OJ L 175, 5.7.2012, p. 19 and EEA Supplement No 37, 5.7.2012, p. 1.

32

(33)  Available at http://www.eftasurv.int/media/state-aid-guidelines/Part-VI---Framework-for-state-aid-in-the-form-of-public-service-compensation.pdf.

33

(34)  OJ L 7, 11.1.2012, p. 3, incorporated at point 1h of Annex XV of the EEA Agreement.

34

(35)  Judgment in Italy v Commission, C-364/90, EU:C:1993:157, paragraph 20.

35

Italy

Commission

(36)  See also paragraphs 27 and 28 of the Framework for alternative calculation methods.

36

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| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/45 |
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30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/45

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Norra teatis, mis käsitleb Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu direktiivi 94/22/EÜ süsivesinike geoloogilise luure, uurimise ja tootmise lubade andmis- ning kasutamistingimuste kohta

Kutse Norra mandrilava naftatootmislitsentside taotlemiseks – 2016. aastaks kindlaksmääratud piirkonnad

(2016/C 236/12)

Norra nafta- ja energeetikaministeerium esitab Euroopa Parlamendi ja nõukogu 30. mai 1994. aasta direktiivi 94/22/EÜ (süsivesinike geoloogilise luure, uurimise ja tootmise lubade andmis- ning kasutamistingimuste kohta (1)) artikli 3 lõike 2 punkti a kohaselt kutse naftatootmislitsentside taotlemiseks.

Tootmislitsents antakse üksnes Norras või mõnes muus Euroopa Majanduspiirkonna lepingu (EMP leping) osalisriigis registreeritud aktsiaseltsile või füüsilisele isikule, kelle alaline elukoht on EMP lepingu osalisriigis.

Ettevõtjad, kes ei ole litsentsisaajad Norra mandrilava tsoonis, võivad saada tootmislitsentsi, kui nad vastavad Norra mandrilava tsoonis litsentsi saamise tingimustele.

Ministeerium kohtleb võrdsetel tingimustel üksikettevõtjaid ja ettevõtjaid, kes esitavad taotlusi rühma osana. Tootmislitsentsi taotlejana käsitatakse nii üksiktaotlejaid kui ka taotlejaid, kes on osaks ühistaotluse esitavast rühmast. Ministeerium võib rühmade või üksiktaotlejate esitatud taotluste alusel koostada litsentsirühmad, kellele antakse uus tootmislitsents, sealhulgas võib ministeerium litsentsirühmast taotlejaid eemaldada ja sinna lisada ning nimetada selliste rühmade operaatorid.

Osalus tootmislitsentsis tingib litsentsisaajate ühinemise naftaoperatsioonide lepinguga, sealhulgas ühistegevuse lepingu ja raamatupidamise lepinguga. Juhul kui tootmislitsents jagatakse stratigraafiliselt, peavad kahe stratigraafiliselt jaotatud litsentsi saajad samuti ühinema asjaomase ühistegevuse lepinguga, mis reguleerib nende suhteid seoses litsentsiga.

Nimetatud lepinguid alla kirjutades moodustavad litsentsisaajad ühisettevõtte, kus nende osaluse suurus on alati samaväärne nende osalusega tootmislitsentsis.

Litsentsi dokumendid põhinevad peamiselt 2015. aasta kindlaksmääratud piirkondade asjaomastel dokumentidel. Eesmärk on, et asjaomasele tööstusele oleksid raamistikku tehtavate muudatuste peamised aspektid kättesaadavad enne taotluse esitamist.

Tootmislitsentsi andmise kriteeriumid

Vahendite heaks haldamiseks ning Norra mandrilava tsoonis nafta kiireks ja tulemuslikuks uurimiseks ja tootmiseks, muu hulgas litsentsiomanike rühmade loomise teel, lähtutakse tootmislitsentsides osaluse andmisel ja operaatori nimetamisel järgmistest kriteeriumidest:

| a) | taotleja geoloogilised teadmised kõnealuse geograafilise piirkonna kohta ja kuidas litsentsisaajad kavatsevad teostada tõhusat uurimist nafta saamiseks; |
| --- | --- |

a)

taotleja geoloogilised teadmised kõnealuse geograafilise piirkonna kohta ja kuidas litsentsisaajad kavatsevad teostada tõhusat uurimist nafta saamiseks;

| b) | taotleja asjaomane tehniline pädevus ja see, kas kõnealust pädevust aktiivselt kasutades saab asjaomases geograafilises piirkonnas soodustada nafta kulutõhusat uurimist ja tootmist; |
| --- | --- |

b)

taotleja asjaomane tehniline pädevus ja see, kas kõnealust pädevust aktiivselt kasutades saab asjaomases geograafilises piirkonnas soodustada nafta kulutõhusat uurimist ja tootmist;

| c) | taotleja Norra mandrilava tsoonis saadud eelnev kogemus või muudes piirkondades saadud samaväärne asjaomane kogemus; |
| --- | --- |

c)

taotleja Norra mandrilava tsoonis saadud eelnev kogemus või muudes piirkondades saadud samaväärne asjaomane kogemus;

| d) | taotlejal on rahuldav finantssuutlikkus nafta uurimiseks ja tootmise korraldamiseks kõnealuses geograafilises piirkonnas; |
| --- | --- |

d)

taotlejal on rahuldav finantssuutlikkus nafta uurimiseks ja tootmise korraldamiseks kõnealuses geograafilises piirkonnas;

| e) | sellise taotleja puhul, kellel on või on olnud tootmislitsents, võib ministeerium võtta arvesse tõhususe vähesust ja puudusi aruandekohustuse täitmisel; |
| --- | --- |

e)

sellise taotleja puhul, kellel on või on olnud tootmislitsents, võib ministeerium võtta arvesse tõhususe vähesust ja puudusi aruandekohustuse täitmisel;

| f) | tootmislitsentsid antakse peamiselt ühisettevõtjale, kus vähemalt üks osaline on operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või tal on samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus; |
| --- | --- |

f)

tootmislitsentsid antakse peamiselt ühisettevõtjale, kus vähemalt üks osaline on operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või tal on samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus;

| g) | tootmislitsents antakse eelkõige rühmale, mille moodustavad vähemalt kaks osalejat, kellest vähemalt ühel on punktis f nimetatud kogemus; |
| --- | --- |

g)

tootmislitsents antakse eelkõige rühmale, mille moodustavad vähemalt kaks osalejat, kellest vähemalt ühel on punktis f nimetatud kogemus;

| h) | Barentsi mere tootmislitsentside eest vastutav operaator peab olema operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või tal peab olema samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus; |
| --- | --- |

h)

Barentsi mere tootmislitsentside eest vastutav operaator peab olema operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või tal peab olema samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus;

| i) | süvamere tootmislitsentside puhul peavad nii vastutav operaator kui ka vähemalt üks teine osaline olema operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või neil peab olema samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus. Üks tootmislitsentsi osaline peab olema operaatorina puurinud süvameres; |
| --- | --- |

i)

süvamere tootmislitsentside puhul peavad nii vastutav operaator kui ka vähemalt üks teine osaline olema operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või neil peab olema samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus. Üks tootmislitsentsi osaline peab olema operaatorina puurinud süvameres;

| j) | tootmislitsentside puhul, kus puuraukude puurimine uuringute eesmärgil eeldab kõrget rõhku ja/või kõrgeid temperatuure, peavad vastutav operaator ja vähemalt üks teine osaline olema operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või neil peab olema samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus. Tootmislitsentsi üks osaline peab olema operaatorina puurinud puuraugu, millega kaasneb kõrge rõhk ja/või kõrged temperatuurid. |
| --- | --- |

j)

tootmislitsentside puhul, kus puuraukude puurimine uuringute eesmärgil eeldab kõrget rõhku ja/või kõrgeid temperatuure, peavad vastutav operaator ja vähemalt üks teine osaline olema operaatorina puurinud vähemalt ühe puuraugu Norra mandrilava tsoonis või neil peab olema samaväärne väljaspool Norra mandrilava tsooni saadud kogemus. Tootmislitsentsi üks osaline peab olema operaatorina puurinud puuraugu, millega kaasneb kõrge rõhk ja/või kõrged temperatuurid.

Väljad, mille kohta saab taotlust esitada

Tootmislitsentsides osalemise taotlusi võib esitada kindlaksmääratud piirkonnas litsentsimata väljade kohta, nagu on näidatud Norra naftadirektoraadi avaldatud kaartidel. Samuti on võimalik esitada taotlusi väljade kohta, millest on kindlaksmääratud piirkonnas loobutud, vastavalt Norra naftadirektoraadi uuendatud kaartidele, mille võib leida Norra naftadirektoraadi veebilehelt.

Iga tootmislitsents võib hõlmata üht või mitut välja või välja osa. Taotlejail palutakse piirduda taotluses aladega, kus nad on kaardistanud nafta võimaliku olemasolu.

Teatise tervikteksti, sealhulgas piirkondade üksikasjalikud kaardid, saab Norra naftadirektoraadi veebisaidilt www.npd.no/apa2016.

Naftatootmislitsentside taotlused tuleb esitada järgmisel aadressil:

| Ministry of Petroleum and Energy |
| --- |
| Box 8148 Dep. |
| N-0033 Oslo |
| NORWAY |

Ministry of Petroleum and Energy

Box 8148 Dep.

N-0033 Oslo

NORWAY

Taotluse kaks koopiat tuleb esitada aadressil

| The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate |
| --- |
| Box 600 |
| N-4003 STAVANGER |
| NORWAY |

The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate

Box 600

N-4003 STAVANGER

NORWAY

Tähtaeg: 6. september 2016 kell 12.00

Norra mandrilava tsooni naftatootmislitsentsid 2016. aastaks kindlaksmääratud piirkondade jaoks on kavas välja anda 2017. aasta esimeses kvartalis.

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(1)  ELT L 164, 30.6.1994, lk 3.

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V Teated

HALDUSMENETLUSED

Euroopa Komisjon

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/47 |
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30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/47

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Konkursikutse rahalise toetuse andmiseks üleeuroopalise energiataristu mitmeaastase tööprogrammi raames Euroopa ühendamise rahastust ajavahemikul 2014–2020

(Komisjoni otsus C(2016) 1587)

(2016/C 236/13)

Euroopa Komisjoni energeetika peadirektoraat avaldab konkursikutse, et anda Euroopa ühendamise rahastust aastatel 2014–2020 toetusi vastavalt üleeuroopalise energiataristu mitmeaastases tööprogrammis määratud prioriteetidele ja eesmärkidele.

Taotlusi oodatakse järgmisele konkursile:

CEF-Energy-2016-2

Käesoleva konkursikutse raames väljavalitud taotlustele eraldamiseks on esialgu ette nähtud 600 miljonit eurot.

Taotluste esitamise tähtpäev on 8. november 2016.

Konkursikutse täistekst on avaldatud veebiaadressil:

https://ec.europa.eu/inea/en/https%3A//ec.europa.eu/inea/en/connecting-europe-facility/cef-energy/calls/second-2016-cef-energy-call-proposals-2016-2

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KONKURENTSIPOLIITIKA RAKENDAMISEGA SEOTUD MENETLUSED

Euroopa Komisjon

| 30.6.2016 | ET | Euroopa Liidu Teataja | C 236/48 |
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30.6.2016

ET

Euroopa Liidu Teataja

C 236/48

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Eelteatis koondumise kohta

(juhtum M.8094 – BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium / Sofindev IV / DHAM / Novy International)

Võimalik lihtsustatud korras menetlemine

(EMPs kohaldatav tekst)

(2016/C 236/14)

| 1. | 21. juunil 2016 sai komisjon nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artiklile 4 vastava teatise kavandatava koondumise kohta, mille raames BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV („BNPPF PE”, Belgia), Sofindev IV NV („Sofindev”, Belgia) ja DHAM NV („Korys/Colruyt Group”, Belgia) omandavad ühiskontrolli ühinemismääruse artikli 3 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses ettevõtja Novy International NV („Novy”, Belgia) üle aktsiate või osade ostu teel. |
| --- | --- |

1.

21. juunil 2016 sai komisjon nõukogu määruse (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (1) artiklile 4 vastava teatise kavandatava koondumise kohta, mille raames BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium NV („BNPPF PE”, Belgia), Sofindev IV NV („Sofindev”, Belgia) ja DHAM NV („Korys/Colruyt Group”, Belgia) omandavad ühiskontrolli ühinemismääruse artikli 3 lõike 1 punkti b tähenduses ettevõtja Novy International NV („Novy”, Belgia) üle aktsiate või osade ostu teel.

| 2. | Asjaomaste ettevõtjate majandustegevus hõlmab järgmist:
  —   BNPPF PE: börsivälistesse ettevõtetesse investeerimine ja vahefinantseerimine. Tema portfooliosse kuuluvad ettevõtjad on tegevad valdkondades nagu metalli ja plastiku tarnimine ja tootmine, ülikoolide seemnekapitalifondid, pagaritooted, tööstusteenuste pakkumine ning kinnisvara;
  —   Sofindev: Belgia väikestesse ja keskmistesse börsivälistesse ettevõtetesse investeerimine. Tema portfooliosse kuuluvad ettevõtjad on tegevad katuse- ja fassaadimaterjalide jaotamisel ning asukohapõhise tarkvara arendamisel;
  —   Korys/Colruyt Group: jae- ja hulgikaubandus ning toitlustusteenused. Samuti tarkvaralahendused, säästva- ja taastuvenergia projektid ning meditsiin/loodusteadused;
  —   Novy: kõrgema hinnaklassi köögiseadmete, peamiselt pliidi õhupuhastite, disain, tootmine ja turustamine. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Asjaomaste ettevõtjate majandustegevus hõlmab järgmist:

—   BNPPF PE: börsivälistesse ettevõtetesse investeerimine ja vahefinantseerimine. Tema portfooliosse kuuluvad ettevõtjad on tegevad valdkondades nagu metalli ja plastiku tarnimine ja tootmine, ülikoolide seemnekapitalifondid, pagaritooted, tööstusteenuste pakkumine ning kinnisvara;

—   Sofindev: Belgia väikestesse ja keskmistesse börsivälistesse ettevõtetesse investeerimine. Tema portfooliosse kuuluvad ettevõtjad on tegevad katuse- ja fassaadimaterjalide jaotamisel ning asukohapõhise tarkvara arendamisel;

—   Korys/Colruyt Group: jae- ja hulgikaubandus ning toitlustusteenused. Samuti tarkvaralahendused, säästva- ja taastuvenergia projektid ning meditsiin/loodusteadused;

—   Novy: kõrgema hinnaklassi köögiseadmete, peamiselt pliidi õhupuhastite, disain, tootmine ja turustamine.

| 3. | Komisjon leiab pärast teatise esialgset läbivaatamist, et tehing, millest teatatakse, võib kuuluda ühinemismääruse reguleerimisalasse, kuid lõplikku otsust selle kohta ei ole veel tehtud. Vastavalt komisjoni teatisele lihtsustatud korra kohta teatavate koondumiste menetlemiseks vastavalt nõukogu määrusele (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (2) tuleks märkida, et käesolevat juhtumit on võimalik käsitleda kõnealuses teatises sätestatud korra kohaselt. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Komisjon leiab pärast teatise esialgset läbivaatamist, et tehing, millest teatatakse, võib kuuluda ühinemismääruse reguleerimisalasse, kuid lõplikku otsust selle kohta ei ole veel tehtud. Vastavalt komisjoni teatisele lihtsustatud korra kohta teatavate koondumiste menetlemiseks vastavalt nõukogu määrusele (EÜ) nr 139/2004 (2) tuleks märkida, et käesolevat juhtumit on võimalik käsitleda kõnealuses teatises sätestatud korra kohaselt.

| 4. | Komisjon kutsub huvitatud kolmandaid isikuid esitama oma võimalikke märkusi kavandatava toimingu kohta.
  Komisjon peab märkused kätte saama kümne päeva jooksul pärast käesoleva dokumendi avaldamist. Märkusi võib saata komisjonile faksi (+32 22964301) või elektronpostiga (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) või posti teel järgmisel aadressil (lisada viitenumber M.8094 – BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium / Sofindev IV / DHAM / Novy International):





  European Commission |
| --- | --- |
| Directorate-General for Competition |
| Merger Registry |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |

4.

Komisjon kutsub huvitatud kolmandaid isikuid esitama oma võimalikke märkusi kavandatava toimingu kohta.

Komisjon peab märkused kätte saama kümne päeva jooksul pärast käesoleva dokumendi avaldamist. Märkusi võib saata komisjonile faksi (+32 22964301) või elektronpostiga (COMP-MERGER-REGISTRY@ec.europa.eu) või posti teel järgmisel aadressil (lisada viitenumber M.8094 – BNP Paribas Fortis Private Equity Belgium / Sofindev IV / DHAM / Novy International):

European Commission

Directorate-General for Competition

Merger Registry

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

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(1)  ELT L 24, 29.1.2004, lk 1 („ühinemismäärus”).

(2)  ELT C 366, 14.12.2013, lk 5.

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