OAR Box 1142 

Prepped by Ollie Stewart 

Document Number: 

17) IV-F-15 

Docket Number: 

A-87-11 

Printed 4/23/2008 10:21:21 AM Sheet 17 of 30 

P.1 
P.2 

, *-87-// 

J

 IV-F- W 

Oral Testimony of 

William F. O'Keefe 

Chief Operating Officer 

American Petroleum Institute j 

on Onboard Refueling Controls

 nCl - ? 1991 

before the 

Environmental Protection Agency 

Romulus, Michigan 

September 27, 1991 t _ 

Good afternoon. My name is William O'Keefe, Chief Operating 

Officer of the American Petroleum Institute (API). I am 

accompanied today by Bill Upchurch, Vice President of Exxon USA. 

We are here on behalf of the more than 250 API member companies 

engaged in all aspects of the oil industry. I am also offering 

this testimony on behalf of the National Petroleum Refiners 

Association and its 130 members who represent virtually all of the 

domestic refining and petrochemical manufacturing industry. 

Congress has spoken twice on refueling canisters. In 1977, it 

directed EPA to study the canister. In 1990, it directed EPA to 

consult with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA) on safety issues and then phase-in the onboard canister. 

In a phrase, Congress has said "get on with it." 

The debate on refueling controls goes back more than a decade 

to the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act. Since that time, 

objections to the refueling canister have focused on three main 

arguments: 

o First, the lack of technology. 

o Second, the cost of controls. 

o And third, and most important, the safety of the onboard 
P.3 

Sffib 

'••"..' 1 

x*?i 

system. 

At the outset, I want to be clear on one major point. If the 

American petroleum industry believed onboard refueling controls lA'or: 

unsafe or pcsed an unreasonable safety risk to the nation's 

motoring public, we would vigorously oppose them. However, over a 

decade of research, technical data and objective analyses 

demonstrate convincingly the safety of the refueling canister. And 

the canister is an efficient and cost effective way to reduce 

pollution. Our written submission will document the bases for 

these conclusions. 

i 

First, I'll address the technology of the refueling canister. 

It is important to remember that, since its inception, the Clean 

Air Act has been technology forcing. The 1990 Clean Air Act ,' 

/ 

Amendments are no exception. They impose rigid requirements for 

new technologies on many American businesses, including both the 

petroleum and automobile industries. However, the refueling 

canister is readily available technology. The automotive industry ' 

does not have to discover entirely new methods to comply with, 

Congress' mandate. 

We have been working closely with the automobile industry on 

a number of air quality issues over the past several years — 

particularly on joint research to identify the most effective fuel 

and vehicle systems, which is a technology-forcing endeavor. That 
P.4 

3 

cooperation will continue. However, on the refueling canister 

issue we simply disagree. 

Even if EPA issued the onboard regulation today, automakers 

would have four more years to test and perfect their systems. I 

believe that American engineers are more than capable of meeting 

that challenge. They've been able to design closed-loop fuel 

management systems so vehicles can operate at optimal levels under 

any weather conditions. They've designed computer aided steering 

and suspension and other high-tech devices such as air bags. In 

contrast, an onboard vapor recover system is a relatively simple 

design modification of an existing system. It does not require 

comparable technological advances. It requires the use of existing 

knowledge. 

In fact, Toyota has told NHTSA, "if certain safety risks 

appear concretely, our experienced engineers can then modify the 

design to eliminate the problem." If Toyota can provide that 

assurance, I do not understand why others can't do likewise. 

As this panel is well aware, canisters, which trap evaporative 

emissions when a car is parked, added a whole new technology to the 

automobile in 1971. They were tested for only a few years. By 

contrast, the onboard refueling technology is a simple and logical 

extension, for which there is almost 20 years of experience. 
P.5 

The petroleum industry has been developing and testing 

refueling canister systems since 1978. This would typically be a 

subject for research by the automobile industry's research 

laboratories — but vapor recovery systems use charcoal adsorption 

technology — and the petroleum industry has expertise in this 

area. In fact, the existing evaporative canister system in today's 

automobiles is based on research by Exxon. Scientists at Exxon's 

research laboratories are experimenting with a new super-adsorptive 

material that could lead to the development of an even more 

efficient system onboard contained within the fuel tank. 

Second, the refueling canister system does a more costeffective job of reducing ozone-forming emissions than the 

alternative — Stage II vapor recovery units. In fact, the 

regulatory requirements for the enhanced evaporative system should 

mean that the cost of going from the enhanced evaporative canister 

to the refueling canister should be less than previously estimated. 

Several years ago, it was asserted that the refueling canister 

could add $80 to $100 or more to the cost of an automobile. That 

estimate was never validated by peer review. Indeed, based on our 

critique, it belongs in the category of fiction. EPA's original 

estimate Of the incremental purchase price increase to install 

onboard controls was $19 per vehicle. There's no reason to believe 

that estimate was overly optimistic. 
P.6 

5 

The refueling canister will replace the existing evaporative 

canister, which is expected to be enlarged anyway as a result of 

EPA and California rulemaking. EPA estimated the incremental cost 

of enhanced evaporative emissions controls, including a larger 

canister system, to be about $10 per car. The cost of a refueling 

canister is the incremental cost to take the next step. However, 

EPA's most recent cost estimate shows that moving from the enhanced 

evaporative system to onboard controls could actually result in 

consumer cost savings because of the fuel economy bonus provided by 

onboard systems. 

Excluding California, by the year 2000 the combination of 

canisters and Stage II controls required by law will remove 100,000 

more tons a year of volatile organic compounds than Stage II 

controls alone. That benefit will more than double by the year 

2004. Most of these air quality improvements will come in areas 

not required to use Stage II controls. The cost effectiveness of 

onboard controls along with Stage II in serious and severe nonattainment areas is about $1,450 a ton. This is nearly twice as 

cost effective as the alternative of Stage II controls alone in 

covered non-attainment areas. We will provide an in-depth study 

documenting these numbers for the record. 

At an earlier stage in the rulemaking on this issue, EPA 

concluded that the onboard refueling system was the most costeffective approach for controlling refueling emissions. 
P.7 

6 

However, the rulemaking was held up by an internal dispute within 

the Reagan administration over the cost and benefits of the 

canister and Stage II controls. 

But, the passage of the Clean Air Act Amendments has clearly 

resolved that debate. While the Clean Air Act Amendments require 

service station pump controls in cities with serious and severe 

non-attainment problems, they treat them as an interim measure, 

giving EPA the ability to waive Stage II requirements once onboard 

controls "are in widespread use." Congress properly recognized 

that the refueling canister is a more cost effective method of 

controlling refueling vapors than service station pump controls. 

And Administrator William Reilly recently noted that refueling 

canisters are the "most important modification to motor vehicles 

this agency can require to achieve a genuine air quality 

improvement." 

The third, and most important, factor in the debate is safety. 

The primary purpose of this hearing is to answer the question of 

whether the refueling canister poses an unreasonable risk to 

motorists. I want to reiterate that if the American petroleum 

industry believed the refueling canister was unsafe we would 

actively oppose its introduction. Instead, we believe the 

refueling canister can improve vehicle safety. 

Two independent studies, one conducted by the Battelle 
P.8 

Institute and the other by the Center for Auto Safety, also suggest 

that refueling canisters could actually improve automobile safety. 

The Center for Auto Safety told EPA that "If anything, the EPA 

combined package of fuel volatility (reductions) and ...[refueling 

canisters] will reduce the risk of fires in automobiles." 

Here are the reasons: 

o The current evaporative emissions control system's "external 

vent line" that releases excess refueling vapors outside the 

vehicle would be eliminated, simplifying controls. Refueling 

canisters could easily accommodate the amount of vapors generated 

during refueling. 

o Tank pressures during vehicle operation would be reduced because 

the larger vapor lines and canister would allow the vapors to flow 

from the gasoline tank at atmospheric pressure. In existing 

systems excess vapor is temporarily stored under pressure in the 

gas tank. That pressure could increase the amount of fuel that 

might escape through a break in the fuel system during an accident. 

This pressure can also result in the release of vapors, and even 

liquids at times, when the fuel tank filler cap is removed for 

refueling. 

o The API demonstration refueling canister systems are located at 

the rear of the car, within the vehicle's unibody construction — 
P.9 

8 

outside the crash zone — or integrated into the fuel tank and away 

from the engine. Moving the system away from the engine, where 

most existing evaporative canisters are located, decreases the 

chances of accident-related fires and thereby increases safety. 

Mr. Upchurch of Exxon will discuss the technical aspects of 

these and other related issues in greater detail. Before he does, 

I'd like to address NHTSA's analysis of the safety of refueling 

canisters. 

Despite the data on safety I've just outlined — NHTSA has 

said that it would be "reasonable" for EPA to determine that 

refueling canisters pose an "unreasonable" safety risk. However, 

NHTSA itself did not conclude that the refueling canister posed an 

unreasonable risk or indeed was "unsafe." NHTSA said there was "no 

factual data on which to base the absolute quantification of risk." 

Apart from its study, NHTSA also told the General Accounting Office 

that it could not quantify the risks without testing manufacturerproduced vehicles. 

We do not believe the entire record on this issue points to a 

conclusion of "unreasonable" risk. I believe that NHTSA has not 

thoroughly studied the issue. 

Indeed, when we asked NHTSA for its criteria for defining 

reasonable and unreasonable risks and the methodology they used in 
P.10 

9 

reaching their conclusions, we were told that they didn't exist. 

In other words, the NHTSA findings are not the result of an 

empirical or rigorous analytical process. Without objective 

criteria or an explicit methodology for assessing refueling 

canister risks, their conclusion should be regarded for what it is 

— their judgment, and subjective judgement at that. In the end, 

EPA must have the final decision, taking into account NHTSA's 

views, as well as all other evidence in the record and the 

requirements of law. NHTSA appears to have based its conclusions 

on inaccurate inferences about the complexity of the system, 

concerns about vapor flow, the fact that automobile manufacturers 

were unable or unwilling to provide manufacturer-built systems to 

test and a Study by Arthur D. Little which is seriously flawed. I 

will address each of these issues. 

As I noted earlier, the refueling canister is an expansion of 

existing technology — already proven safe over two decades of use. 

We have found no evidence to suggest otherwise. The Center for 

Auto Safety has conducted a similar review and reached the same 

conclusions. in 1988, the CAS reviewed the 4,276 safety-related 

recalls dating back to 1966 and the 146,000 vehicle safety reports 

filed with NHTSA since 1977. Only two recalls involved postcollision failure of the existing canister system. Six engine 

fires out of 1,501 complaints in the NHTSA data base involved the 

canister. 
P.11 

10 

The CAS study reported that all recalls for fuel system 

pressure problems on vehicles manufactured between 1983 and 1987 

were for motor homes, vans, and ambulances and appear to have been 

related to specific manufacturer or modification problems. 

Commendably, manufacturers have had relatively few problems with 

these systems, particularly since the mid-1980s. In fact, NHTSA's 

data show the fire rates in passenger car crashes since model year 

1975 have dropped, even as vehicle complexity has increased. This 

is -a very important fact for EPA to take into account in reaching 

its decision. NHTSA's opinion rests on a presumed correlation 

between complexity and risks, but their own data abandon them. 

NHTSA has used its data base to conduct a statistical analysis 

comparing the safety of pre-1971 cars with cars that have 

evaporative canister systems. We believe this analysis is severely 

flawed. In fact, we have shown no statistical significance exists 

in the relationships discussed in their study. NHTSA's own data do 

not support its claim of a "statistically significant" increase in 

automobile fires following the installation of evaporative 

canisters. We will include in-depth comments on NHTSA's analysis 

in our written submission. 

I believe EPA can reasonably conclude that the current 

evaporative canister system is not unsafe. Millions of vehicles on 

the road are using it and no concrete evidence has emerged to 

demonstrate that these systems pose an unreasonable risk to the 
11 

motoring public. And, as the Battelle study concluded, cars with 

onboard refueling controls may be safer than cars with evaporative 

canisters. 

The petroleum industry began testing demonstration refueling 

canister systems in the late 1970s and an extensive body of 

research documents their performance and safety. 

More recent demonstration models developed by the petroleum 

industry have focused on addressing safety concerns. The systems 

have been moved from the engine compartment to protected areas near 

the fuel tank. 

These demonstration vehicles have been driven for tens of 

thousands of miles under conditions similar to those encountered by 

most consumers. These vehicles can meet existing federal exhaust 

and evaporative emissions standards. We also believe that once 

production vehicles meeting the 1990 Clear Air Act Amendment 

standards are available they can be equipped with onboard control 

systems and still meet the standards. Vehicles equipped with 

refueling canister systems will also more effectively control 

running losses. 

Moreover, independent blind tests of demonstration vehicles 

over a wide range of temperatures show no significant driveability 

differences between cars using existing systems and those with 
P.13 

12 

refueling canisters. In only one instance did these vehicles have 

problems during testing. Driveability problems did result after a 

NHTSA employee overrode the automatic shutoff feature of a gasoline 

dispensing nozzle 109 times while refueling. 

To no one's surprise, this did cause the system to overflow 

and it did force liquid into the refueling canister, damaging the 

canister. But, this act is so extreme that it should be given 

little weight in safety or driveability considerations. How many 

drivers would stand at a service station for 20 minutes after 

filling the fuel tank, overriding the shutoff feature in continued 

attempts to force more fuel into the vehicle? 

We also later discovered another minor problem with the car 

that had been sent to NHTSA for testing. An .engine control system 

sensor was defective. This failure occurred under wide open 

throttle conditions, which would also contribute to driveability 

problems similar to those found by NHTSA. When this part was 

replaced, the car operated without problems. This faulty part, 

totally unrelated to the refueling canister, could also explain the 

problem NHTSA encountered. This information was sent to NHTSA, and 

API asked that it be included in the Arthur D. Little review of 

canister safety, but there is no evidence that it was considered. 

Let me also note that the only test that has not performed 

with these two demonstration vehicles is crash testing. However, 
P.14 

13 

Ford, Toyota and Honda have reported to NHTSA that their refueling 

canister-equipped test vehicles passed the federal motor vehicle 

crash and rollover standards for fuel system integrity. This 

important fact was also not discussed in the NHTSA report. 

Our tests of demonstration vehicles have never endangered 

drivers. The performance of these vehicles has been comparable 

with other vehicles from the same model year and clearly 

demonstrates that properly designed onboard refueling canisters 

will operate safely and not affect driveability. 

NHTSA has also expressed concerns about vapor flow within the 

system. They have focused on the flammability of the vapors 

generated during refueling. A rather simple observation is in 

order. In the Exxon refueling canister systems, the canister 

itself is located away from the main heat sources in automobiles, 

the engine and the exhaust manifold. Thus, it is, to be generous, 

highly unlikely that an ignition source would be present near these 

canisters during refueling. I might add that in many cases fuel 

tanks are close to the catalytic converter or exhaust pipe, which 

are also major heat sources. Yet nobody considers this vehicle 

configuration to be unsafe and indeed it is not. In short, the 

risk of fires related to refueling canisters during refilling is 

too remote to be a serious consideration in your decision. The 

proper design and placement of refueling canisters should pose no 

safety problems. 
14 

Concerns about the complexity of the refueling canister are 

also ill-founded. The auto industry has progressed from cars with 

carburetors to cars with fuel injection systems. Vehicles now have 

electronic fuel management systems. Onboard computers diagnose 

engine problems, help control steering and level loads. The car 

has become a computer with wheels. As anyone who has looked under 

the hood of a recent model can attest, cars are unquestionably much 

more complex than they used to be. But, in spite of all this 

increased complexity, the fatality rate has actually decreased, 

reaching an all-time low this year. 

I might also note that, despite our overall problems with the 

Arthur D. Little report, even ADL did not support NHTSA's assertion 

that a "complex" canister system would lead to increased risks. 

And I quote "ADL believes that increased complexity does tend to 

increase risks, but does not have to increase risk and can in fact 

reduce risk." 

In fact, the refueling canister is really a simple system. 

While refueling canisters can be larger than existing canister 

systems, and solve other problems such as tank pressure and 

spitback, they are no more complex. And in some cases, they are 

even less complex. They are not nearly as complicated as 

automotive systems with which NHTSA has not taken exception. 

Both California and EPA are engaged in rulemakings that may 
P.16 

15 

require automakers to install a larger, "enhanced" evaporative 

canister system. Nothing that has been submitted to the docket 

from the automakers indicates significant safety concerns with 

these proposed systems. And NHTSA has not questioned the safety of 

the proposed upgraded system. Given this set of facts, NHTSA's 

opposition on the purported complexity of the refueling canister is 

curious at best. 

In conclusion, I would like to mention that I have actively 

followed this issue for the past nine years. I have seen studies 

and papers go back and forth between the agencies and various 

interest groups. I believe Congress and the General Accounting 

Office have made a major contribution to cutting the gordian knot 

and finding a real solution to the problem of seemingly endless and 

unproductive agency review — issue the rule and bring the debate 

to a halt. Given the Congressional mandate, GAO "recommends that 

the Administrator of EPA, and the Secretary of Transportation 

direct that the Administrator of NHTSA to, develop a joint 

approach, or action plan, to perform a safety evaluation of 

manufacturers' onboard systems to identify and correct any safety 

defects or flaws well in advance of the 1996 model year so that an 

orderly phase-in occurs." Such an approach would allow NHTSA to 

resolve its speculative conclusions regarding the safety of onboard 

systems. 

The petroleum industry's experience with Marine Vapor Recovery 
P.17 

16 

Systems demonstrates that this can be done successfully. When 

these systems were first required, the industry had serious 

concerns about their safety. Nevertheless, working cooperatively 

with EPA, the Coast Guard and the states we have developed a system 

and testing procedures that have proven satisfactory. 

I might also suggest that the National Academy of Engineering 

be engaged to oversee engineering development and address NHTSA's 

safety concerns. The Academy would be an appropriate forum for 

reviewing progress as this process unfolds. 

I am firmly convinced that the refueling canister can indeed 

safely meet the goals of the Clean Air Act Amendments. Congress 

has made it clear that it wants to force technology and it wants 

EPA to stop debating and start acting. Issuing the regulation on 

the schedule set by Congress means that dozens of communities 

throughout the United States will benefit from use of what EPA, API 

and NPRA recognize is a cost effective and safe measure for 

reducing gasoline vapor emissions from automobiles. 

Mr. Upchurch of Exxon USA will now provide the panel with 

further details on several technical issues.