J-A04044-16 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

APPEAL OF: J.F., NATURAL FATHER 

 No. 1230 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Order July 17, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 20068 OF 2013, OC-A 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BENDER, P.J.E., and SHOGAN, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED APRIL 19, 2016

 Appellant, J.F. (“Father”), is the natural father of J.B. who was born in 

2008. Father appeals from the order entered on July 17, 2015, granting a 

petition for the involuntary termination of his parental rights that was filed 

by J.B.’s natural mother (“Mother”). After careful review, we affirm. 

 The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter were set forth 

by the orphans’ court as follows: 

Before the Court for disposition is a Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights, (hereinafter, the “Petition”), 

whereby [Mother] requests this Court terminate the parental 

rights of [Father] to [J.B.]. 

By way of background, the Court will provide a summation 

of the relevant procedural and factual background of these 

proceedings prior to reaching the merits of the Petition. Mother 

currently lives with her son [and daughter, J.B.]. Mother is 

forty-three years old and employed as a mental health specialist 

for Lawrence County Mental Health and Developmental Services. 
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Mother met Father in 2004, and they dated for six years. During 

the course of their relationship, J.B. was born. Following J.B.’s 

birth, Mother and Father were both actively involved in caring for 

J.B. and ensuring that her daily needs were met. J.B. was almost 

two years old when Mother ended her relationship with Father 

and obtained a Protection from Abuse Order against Father 

dated April 5, 2010. The April 5, 2010 Order included a custody 

provision which provided Mother with primary custody of J.B., 

but permitted Father to have visitation as agreed between the 

parties.1 Father subsequently initiated a custody action against 

Mother, and following a Custody Conference, Father enjoyed 

partial custody rights every other weekend, provided that he let 

Mother inspect his residence and ensure that it could 

appropriately accommodate the minor child.2 

1

 The April 5, 2010 Protection from Abuse Order 

permitted Father to have contact with Mother via 

telephone to make arrangements for custody visits. 

2

 Prior to the entry of the April 5, 2010 Protection

from Abuse Order, the parties resided together at 

the Mother’s residence in Bessemer, Pennsylvania. 

Father enjoyed visits with the minor child on May 8, 2010 

and on May 22 through May 23, 2010. This overnight visit on 

May 22, 2010, was Father’s last visit with J.B. because Mother 

learned that the address provided by Father was not his actual 

residence and that Father did not have a permanent address. 

Mother then petitioned for Father’s visits to be supervised at Kids 

in Common. This Court temporarily granted Mother’s request, 

pending a hearing. Prior to the hearing taking place, however, 

Father was found in contempt of court for violating the existing 

Protection from Abuse Order entered against him by Mother. 

Father was sentenced to a period of incarceration, with his 

sentence being suspended, and Father’s periods of partial 

custody were required to be supervised at Kids in Common. 

A second contempt of court was filed by Mother alleging 

that Father again violated the existing Protection from Abuse 

Order; the Court subsequently found Father to be in contempt, 

resentenced Father on the original contempt and extended 

Father’s sentence for the second violation. Father was 

incarcerated from July 16, 2010 through February 11, 2011. 

Three days after Father was released, Father called Mother’s cell 
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phone to try to speak with the minor child and arrange for a 

visit. Father was initially charged with harassment, but the 

charge was converted to a Protection from Abuse Violation. 

Father was found in contempt a third time, and he was 

sentenced to a term of incarceration of six months.

When Father was released on August 28, 2011, he did not 

have contact with the minor child. Father reasoned that he was 

fearful of being in contempt of court if he made any further 

efforts to contact the minor child. Father stated that he did try emailing the minor child’s maternal grandmother [(“Maternal 

Grandmother”)], but his e-mails were not returned. Father also 

attempted to e-mail Mother’s counsel, who requested that Father 

undergo a psychological evaluation. The majority of Father’s 

subsequent e-mails did not prompt a response by Mother’s 

counsel. In 2011, Mother petitioned the Court to change the 

minor child’s last name by removing Father’s surname from the 

child’s hyphenated last name. Following a hearing, this Court 

denied Mother’s request because the Court believed that Father 

intended to resume his relationship with the minor child. 

However, Mother testified that Father has not seen the minor 

child, sent cards or gifts to the minor child, paid support for the 

minor child or initiated supervised contact with Kids in Common 

since May, 2010. Mother opines that there is not a present bond 

between Father and the minor child because the last contact 

occurred when the child was two years old. 

When asked about her effort to comply with the June 4, 

2010 Order regarding Father’s visitation at Kids in Common, 

Mother stated that she called on two occasions to initiate her 

intake evaluation. The first time, Mother was advised to wait 

because Father was incarcerated. The second time Mother called, 

she scheduled an appointment and subsequently completed her 

intake and paid her costs. Father did not complete an intake 

evaluation or pay for the costs of services. 

The case remained stagna[nt] until June 11, 2013, when 

Father filed a Petition for Contempt and Modification. Following a 

hearing on August 30, 2013, Father’s Petition was dismissed, 

and Mother subsequently requested modification of Father’s 

custody rights. Mother failed to appear at the scheduled 

conference, however, and Mother’s Petition for Modification was 

dismissed. Father then filed a Petition for Modification of Custody 

on October 23, 2013, and thereafter, an Order was entered 
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providing Father with supervised visits and reunification 

counseling. 

Mother then filed a Petition for Termination of Natural 

Father’s Parental Rights on December 13, 2013. Father 

presented the Court with a Motion to Dismiss Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, which was granted, 

and Mother’s petition was dismissed without prejudice. On 

February 10, 2014, Mother filed an Amended Petition for 

Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights which was also 

dismissed without prejudice upon motion by Father. On May 8, 

2014, Mother filed a Second Amended Petition for Involuntary 

Termination of Parental Rights, which is presently before the 

Court for a determination. . . . 

* * * 

The facts of this case clearly establish that Father faced 

very significant obstacles to exercising custody of the minor 

child. Father was incarcerated from July 16, 2010 through 

August 28, 2011. When Father was released, Father stated that 

he did not try to contact J.B. because he feared doing so would 

result in another violation of the active Protection From Abuse 

Order entered against him by Mother. Father reasoned that he 

did not know what to do to initiate contact with J.B. and that if 

he did he would be incarcerated. Father stated that he did try 

emailing [M]aternal [G]randmother and [M]other’s counsel, but 

these attempts were futile. 

Father additionally testified to the fact that he made 

contact with J.B.’s school to obtain progress reports and weekly 

updates regarding the minor child’s education. . . . 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/17/15, at 1-10. 

 On July 17, 2015, the orphans’ court granted Mother’s petition and 

terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and 

(2). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/17/15, at 13. On August 13, 2015, Father 

filed a timely appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on 
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appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2). The orphans’ court filed a 

supplemental opinion on September 14, 2015. 

 On appeal, Father presents nine issues for this Court’s consideration: 

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 

THE FATHER’S ACTION CLEARLY EVIDENCED A REFUSAL AND

FAILURE TO PERFORM PARENTAL DUTIES. 

ISSUE II: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING

THAT THE PETITIONER/MOTHER HAS MET HER BURDEN OF 

ESTABLISHING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THE 

GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS PURSUANT TO 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511(a)(1). 

ISSUE III: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT THE PETITIONER/MOTHER HAS MET HER BURDEN OF 

ESTABLISHING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THE 

GROUNDS FOR INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL 

RIGHTS PURSUANT TO 23 Pa. C.S.A. §2511(a)(2). 

ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT THE OBSTACLES PRESENTED TO THE FATHER DID NOT 

DEFINITIVELY PRECLUDE HIM FROM MAINTAINING A 

RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS DAUGHTER. 

ISSUE V: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 

FAILING TO FIND THAT THE FATHER UTILIZED ALL RESOURCES 

AVAILABLE TO ATTEMPT TO PRESERVE THE PARENT-CHILD 

RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS DAUGHTER. 

ISSUE VI: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT THE FATHER’S EXPLANATION OF NOT PROVIDING CARDS, 

GIFTS, OR MONETARY SUPPORT OR THAT HE DID NOT CONTACT 

THE CHILD FOR FEAR OF VIOLATING THE PROTECTION FROM

ABUSE ORDER WAS INSUFFICIENT. 

ISSUE VII: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING

THAT THE FATHER AT ALL TIMES HAD THE ABILITY TO INITIATE 

CONTACT WITH J.B. THROUGH KIDS AT [sic] COMMON. 
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ISSUE VIII: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 

THAT THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS WOULD BEST 

SERVE THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF THE MINOR CHILD. 

ISSUE IX: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 

TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION AS PART OF ITS DECISION IN THIS 

MATTER THE POSITION AND OPINION OF THE GUARDIAN AD 

LITEM APPOINTED BY THE COURT FOR THE MINOR. 

Father’s Brief at 6-7. 

 In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we 

adhere to the following standard: 

[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard 

when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for 

termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our 

standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if 

they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 

A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 

A.3d [567, 572 (Pa. 2011)]. As has been often stated, an abuse 

of discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court 

might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also 

Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., [613] Pa. 

[371], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (2011); Christianson v. Ely, 575 Pa. 647, 

654, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (2003). Instead, a decision may be 

reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of 

manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. 

Id. 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012). 

 The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re: R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Moreover, we have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing 
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evidence is defined as testimony that is so ‘clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting

In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). 

The termination of parental rights involves a bifurcated analysis, 

governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if 

the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in 

the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): 

determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the 

standard of best interests of the child. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

In the matter sub judice, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s 

parental rights under sections 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b), which provide as 

follows: 

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination 

 (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds: 

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental 

claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental 

duties. 

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 
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essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his 

physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of 

the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent. 

* * * 

 (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). 

This Court may affirm the orphans’ court’s decision regarding the 

termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section 

2511(a). In re M.T., 101 A.3d 1163, 1179 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc). 

Because we agree with the orphans’ court decision to terminate Father’s 

parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), we need not address the 

other subsections of section 2511(a). See In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 100 

(Pa. Super. 2011) (observing that if we agree with the trial court’s decision 

as to termination of parental rights under any subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a), we need not address the remaining subsections). 

In his first issue, Father argues that the orphans’ court erred in finding 

that Father’s actions clearly evidenced a refusal and failure to perform 

parental duties. We disagree. 
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As noted above, from May 22, 2010, through December 13, 2013, the 

date that the underlying termination petition was filed, Father had no 

contact with J.B. Thus, the last time Father saw J.B. was when she was two 

years old; she is now eight years old. Additionally, Father repeatedly 

violated the PFA that Mother secured against him, he did not have a 

permanent address, and he failed to avail himself of the visitation 

opportunities provided through Kids in Common. 

When Father contacted Kids in Common in 2010, he was informed that 

both Mother and he would need to complete an intake assessment. N.T., 

5/7/15, at 37. Father argues that pursuing visitation through Kids in 

Common would have been futile because he would not have been eligible for 

visitation until Mother perfected her intake assessment, and she did not 

complete it until December 9, 2013. Father’s Brief at 25. However, after 

his initial contact with Kids in Common in 2010, Father did not complete his 

intake assessment or endeavor to compel Mother to complete her 

assessment through the orphans’ court. Father chose not to act. He then 

waited nearly three years to again contact Kids in Common. N.T., 5/7/15, at 

39. 

Mother’s failure to expeditiously complete the assessment in no way 

excuses Father’s absence from J.B.’s life or justifies Father’s failure to 

pursue visitation. We are cognizant that Father was incarcerated on 

separate occasions at the times in question due to the aforementioned 
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violations of the PFA, but his efforts, both while incarcerated and while at 

liberty, were minimal. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in the 

orphans’ court’s finding that Father’s actions clearly evidenced a refusal and 

failure to perform parental duties. 

With respect to Father’s second issue, which is a challenge to the 

orphans’ court’s conclusions under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), we need not 

address it. As we will discuss below, we are satisfied that Father’s parental 

rights were properly terminated under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). In re 

N.A.M. Therefore, we shall proceed to address Appellant’s third issue 

wherein he alleges the orphans’ court erred in finding that termination was 

appropriate under section 2511(a)(2). 

Parental rights may be terminated under section 2511(a)(2) if the 

following conditions are met: “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal must be shown; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or 

refusal must be shown to have caused the child to be without essential 

parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) it must be shown that the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied.” In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). “[S]ection (a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a 

child’s need for a stable home and strong, continuous parental ties, which 

the policy of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect.” Id. 
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Father again argues that the orphans’ court erred in relying on the fact 

that he did not seek visitation through Kids in Common because he would 

not have been eligible due to Mother’s failure to complete her intake 

assessment. Father’s Brief at 26. Father ignores that we are reviewing his 

actions and his conduct. In re L.M., 923 A.2d at 511. As discussed above, 

while it is true Mother did not complete her Kids in Common assessment in 

2010 when she and Father first contacted the agency, Father chose not to 

compel Mother to remedy the situation. For nearly three years, Father 

exerted no effort in pursuing visitation with J.B. through Kids in Common. 

 After discussing Father’s limited attempts at contact with J.B. and the 

obstacles he faced, the orphans’ court found that: 

The Court, however, cannot reasonably characterize these 

actions as an attempt to establish contact or maintain a 

relationship with the minor child. The Court believes that 

Father’s actions constitute a passive interest in the child’s 

welfare, but they do not create any level of parental bond which 

could contribute to the minor child’s overall well-being. 

As previously stated, the record establishes that Father 

experienced significant obstacles which substantively interfered 

with his ability to maintain a parental bond with the minor child. 

However, [throughout] the course of these proceedings, Father, 

at all times, had the ability to initiate contact with J.B. through 

Kids in Common and the Courts. The prevailing Custody Order 

consistently provided Father with supervised visits at Kids in 

Common, and on the few occasions that Father did contact Kids 

in Common, his own communication with the counselor was 

belligerent and counterproductive. . . . 

After analyzing the testimony presented, the Court is not 

satisfied that the obstacles presented to Father definitely 

precluded him [from] maintaining a relationship with his 

daughter. Father completely failed to provide the minor child 
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with any form of support that would have established his 

presence in the minor child’s life. Specifically, since May of 2010, 

Father has not provided J.B. with any cards, gifts or monetary 

support. Father’s assertion that he did not contact the child for 

fear of violating the existing Protection from Abuse Order is 

incredible given the undeniable fact that the minor child was not 

a protected person under the Order and that the Protection from 

Abuse Order provided Father with a suitable alternative to 

maintaining contact. Therefore, the Court finds that Father’s 

actions clearly evidence a refusal and failure to perform parental 

duties. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/17/15, at 10-11. 

 After review, we conclude the orphans’ court’s decision was amply 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. Father’s continued failure and 

refusal to be a parent to J.B. has remained unabated for the majority of 

J.B.’s life, and Father’s excuses are unavailing. Therefore, we discern no 

error of law or abuse of discretion in the termination of Father’s parental 

rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 

 In Father’s fourth and fifth issues, he asserts that the orphans’ court 

erred in finding that the obstacles he faced did not preclude him from 

maintaining a relationship with J.B. and that the court erred in finding that 

Father failed to utilize all resources available to preserve the parent-child 

relationship. Father’s Brief at 27-31. For the reasons discussed in our 

analysis of Father’s third issue, we conclude his claims of error are meritless. 

The orphans’ court’s conclusion that the obstacles Father faced were not a 

complete impediment and that Appellant failed to avail himself of all 
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available resources to maintain a bond with J.B. is supported by the record. 

Thus, he is entitled to no relief on these issues. 

In his sixth issue, Father avers that the orphans’ court erred in 

rejecting Father’s contention that he did not provide cards, gifts, monetary 

support, or contact J.B. because he feared violating the PFA. We disagree. 

The orphans’ court found that since May of 2010, Father completely 

failed to contact J.B. or provide J.B. with any cards, gifts, or monetary 

support.1 Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/17/15, at 11. The orphans’ court 

concluded Father’s claim that he did not contact J.B. for fear of violating the 

PFA was not believable. Id. “[T]he undeniable fact [is] that the minor child

was not a protected person under the Order and that the Protection from 

Abuse Order provided Father with a suitable alternative to maintaining 

contact.” Id. We agree with the orphans’ court and find that Father’s 

justification for his absence from J.B.’s life is untenable. 

In his seventh issue on appeal, Father avers that the orphans’ court 

erred in finding that he had the ability to initiate contact with J.B. through 

Kids in Common. Father’s argument is merely a restatement of his claim we 

disposed of above, i.e., pursuing visitation through Kids in Common would 

____________________________________________ 

1

 We observe that sending cards or gifts to a child should not be the 

touchstone for maintaining a bond with a child. Other factors, including the 

child’s age should be considered in such a situation. An infant, who is 

unable to grasp the concept of a greeting card or gift, is unlikely to be 

affected positively or negatively by the absence or presence of cards or gifts. 
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have been futile because Mother did not perfect her intake assessment until 

2013. As we concluded previously, this claim is without merit, and we need 

not address it further. 

In his eighth issue, Father asserts that the orphans’ court erred in 

finding that the termination of his parental rights would best serve J.B.’s 

needs and welfare. Father points out that “[a] petition to terminate a 

natural parent’s rights filed by one natural parent against the other . . . is 

cognizable only if an adoption of the child is foreseeable.” Father’s Brief at 

35 (citing In Re: Adoption of L.J.B., 18 A.3d 1098 (Pa. 2011)). 

Here, the proposed adoptive parent is Mother’s stepfather (“Maternal 

Stepfather”). Father argues that Maternal Stepfather’s role will be as a 

grandfather to J.B.; Maternal Stepfather will not adopt the role of a parent 

and create a “new parent-child relationship.” Id. at 36 (citing Adoption of 

L.J.B.). Father suggests that Maternal Stepfather cannot satisfy the 

adoptive parent role because he will maintain his own family in a separate 

household and not become a part of Mother and J.B.’s immediate family; 

thus, there will not be a “new” parent-child relationship. Id. at 37. We are 

constrained to disagree. 

Recently, an en banc panel of our Court decided In re Adoption of 

M.R.D., 128 A.3d 1249, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal granted, ___ A.3d 

___, 19 MAL 2016, 2016 WL 1047869 (Pa. 2016) (filed March 16, 2016). 

M.R.D. addressed this discrete issue: 
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With respect to [f]ather’s contention that the proposed 

adoption will not create a new family unit, we conclude 

“cohabitation” is not the sine qua non of the “new family unit.”2

See In re Adoption of J.M., [991 A.2d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 

2010)]. Neither the Adoption Act nor relevant case law defines 

“new family unit” or “new parent-child relationship” for purposes 

of a proposed adoption in the present circumstances. Further, 

this Court has already rejected the inflexible notion that 

cohabitation is absolutely required for a proposed adoption. In 

other words, the fact that [m]other and [m]aternal [g]randfather 

live in separate residences, both of which are family-owned 

residences, does not by itself thwart the proposed adoption plan 

in this case. See id. . . . 

2 The language “intact family unit” derives from 

those cases involving stepparent adoption where the

natural parent and the stepparent are divorcing, and 

the stepparent (adoptive nominee) has separated 

from the natural parent and no longer wants to 

adopt. 

As the Orphans’ court did, we also focus on the familial 

relationship [m]aternal [g]randfather established with [the 

c]hildren, instead of the superficial, indefinite externals and 

speculations [f]ather suggests, such as what if [m]other should 

marry, which are nothing more than mere conjecture. The 

primary purpose of the Adoption Act is served by securing [the 

c]hildren in the parent-child relationship as proposed with 

[m]aternal [g]randfather, the adoptive nominee. In re E.M.I., 

[57 A.3d 1278 (Pa. Super. 2012)]. The record makes clear 

[m]aternal [g]randfather and [the c]hildren already enjoy a 

healthy, deep emotional bond. Maternal [g]randfather serves as 

a de facto father to [the c]hildren. Formal adoption in this case 

will preserve the stability [the c]hildren already know and still 

create a “new” parent-child relationship, because adoption will 

legalize their respective rights and obligations. This legal 

authorization is what establishes the “new” in the existing de 

facto parent-child relationship. Maternal [g]randfather testified 

he both understands and accepts the legal obligations he will 

have as a parent through the proposed adoption. Therefore, [the 

c]hildren will not become “state-created orphans,” as [f]ather 

insinuates. Based upon the foregoing, we hold the Orphans’ 

court correctly terminated [f]ather’s parental rights to [the 
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c]hildren, under the facts and circumstances of this case; 

[m]aternal [g]randfather qualified as a “good cause” candidate 

to adopt [the c]hildren and his proposed adoption of [the 

c]hildren is both legally feasible and realistically foreseeable; 

thus, termination of [f]ather’s parental rights best serves the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of 

[the c]hildren. Accordingly, we affirm. 

M.R.D., 128 A.3d at 1265-1266. 

 In light of M.R.D., we conclude that Father’s contrary argument in the 

instant case is unavailing. While Maternal Stepfather will maintain a 

separate household, he has a bond with J.B., and nothing on this record or 

in Father’s argument diminishes Maternal Stepfather’s role in J.B.’s life or his 

status as a candidate to adopt J.B. Maternal Stepfather’s adoption of J.B. 

“will preserve the stability [J.B.] already know[s] and still create a ‘new’ 

parent-child relationship, because adoption will legalize their respective 

rights and obligations. This legal authorization is what establishes the “new” 

in the existing de facto parent-child relationship.” M.R.D., 128 A.3d at 

1266. Accordingly, we conclude that Father is entitled to no relief on this 

issue. 

 In his ninth issue, Father asserts that the orphans’ court erred in 

failing to consider that J.B.’s guardian ad litem opposed termination of 

Father’s parental rights. Father’s claim is belied by the record. The orphans’ 

court stated: 

The Memorandum and Recommendation of Guardian ad 

Litem filed in this matter ultimately recommends that the 

termination of parental rights not be granted. In making the 

recommendation, the Guardian ad Litem highlights “Although 
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there exists significant legal issues regarding possible 

termination of Father’s parental rights, the role of the Guardian 

ad litem is merely to recommend what he believes is in the best 

interest of [J.B.].” 

Preliminarily, the Court is unaware of any authority which 

indicates it is definitively bound by the recommendation of the 

Guardian ad Litem. More significantly, the Guardian ad Litem, 

himself, recognizes the legal difficulties Father would need to 

overcome in hopes of not having his parental rights terminated. 

Ultimately, the Court reviewed and considered the Guardian ad 

Litem’s Memorandum and Recommendation prior to issuing the 

Opinion and Order. 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, 9/14/15, at 12-13. 

The orphans’ court is required to make all credibility determinations 

and may believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. In re J.F.M., 

71 A.3d 989, 992 (Pa. Super. 2013). In his brief on appeal, Father concedes 

that there is no authority that requires the orphans’ court to follow the 

recommendation of the Guardian ad Litem. Father’s Brief at 38. We 

conclude contrary to Father’s assertion, that the orphans’ court did consider 

the Guardian ad Litem’s position. Moreover, the orphans’ court considered 

all other relevant information, as evidenced by its opinions filed on July 17, 

2015 and September 14, 2015. Thus, the orphans’ court’s decision is 

supported by the evidence of record. We are not permitted to reweigh the 

evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the orphans’ court. In re 

J.F.M., 71 A.3d at 996. Father’s claim of error is without merit. 

Finally, because we concluded that the orphans’ court committed no 

error of law or abuse of discretion in terminating Father’s parental rights 
J-A04044-16 

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under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), we must address the orphans’ court’s needsand-welfare evaluation under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). To this end, our 

Supreme Court ruled: 

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child 

have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 

791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 

1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s 

“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional 

bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention” 

should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of 

permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 

791. 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). In conducting a bonding 

analysis, the orphans’ court is not required to use expert testimony. In re 

K.H.B., 107 A.3d 175, 180 (Pa. Super. 2014). 

 The orphans’ court addressed section 2511(b) as follows: 

The needs and welfare of a minor child are “essential to 

considerations, but bifurcated from, and not relevant to the 

proof of the statutory requirements for termination of parental 

rights.” As previously stated, the uncontroverted evidence 

establishes that Mother has been the sole caregiver for J.B. since 

her birth. Mother has a normal and healthy parent-child 

relationship with J.B. Father’s last visit with J.B. occurred on May 

22, 2010 when J.B. was two years old. Consequently, J.B. does 

not have a current relationship with Father, and Mother testified 

that J.B. would not recognize Father if they met in passing. All of 

J.B.’s emotional and familiar ties are to Mother and to Mother’s 

family. 

Father argues that termination of his parental rights would 

not serve J.B.’s best interests because Mother is proposing that 

her step-father adopt J.B. Father believes that the relationship 
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J.B. currently enjoys with her maternal grandfather would not 

change, and although it is a strong relationship, there is no 

benefit if maternal grandfather adopts J.B. In considering 

Father’s argument, the Court believes that Mother’s proposed 

adoption does in fact serve J.B.’s best interests because it would 

[preserve] the stability and continuity J.B. presently enjoys while 

fulfilling the legal void created by termination of Father’s 

parental rights. Based upon these findings, the Court concludes 

that terminating Father’s parental rights will best serve the 

needs and welfare of the minor child. 

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/17/15, at 12-13 (internal citations omitted). 

 We find that the orphans’ court amply considered the needs and 

welfare of J.B. along with any bond that may exist between Father and J.B. 

The orphans’ court considered Mother’s testimony regarding the absence of 

a bond between J.B. and Father because the child simply does not know 

him. As the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and 

the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse 

of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to section (b). 

Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827. 

 For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Father is entitled to 

no relief. Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Father’s parental 

rights. 

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 4/19/2016