Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 52975 

CFR part 20 as well as a renumbering of 

those regulations. As such, this revision 

to the regulatory guide aligns with the 

regulatory structure of current 10 CFR 

part 20 by updating the regulatory 

guide’s 10 CFR part 20 cross-references. 

In addition, this revision includes 

additional guidance from operating 

ALARA experience since 1975. It 

provides more details describing 

management responsibilities to ensure 

commitment to ALARA. 

II. Additional Information 

The NRC published a notice of 

availability of DG–8033 in the Federal 

Register on December 24, 2015 (80 FR 

80395), for a 60-day public comment 

period. The public comment period 

closed on February 22, 2016. The public 

comments on DG–8033 and the NRC 

staff responses to the public comments 

are available in ADAMS under 

Accession Number ML16105A137. 

III. Congressional Review Act 

This regulatory guide is a rule as 

defined in the Congressional Review 

Act (5 U.S.C. 801–808). However, the 

Office of Management and Budget has 

not found it to be a major rule as 

defined in the Congressional Review 

Act. 

IV. Backfitting 

This regulatory guide provides 

updated guidance on the methods 

acceptable to the NRC staff for 

complying with the NRC’s regulations 

associated with ALARA. The regulatory 

guide applies to current and future 

applicants for, and holders of: 

• Operating licenses for nuclear power 

reactors under 10 CFR part 50. 

• approvals issued under subpart B, C, E, 

and F of 10 CFR part 52 (‘‘protected 

applicants and licensees’’). 

• licenses issued under 10 CFR part 70 to 

possess or use, at any site or contiguous sites 

subject to licensee control, a formula quantity 

of strategic special nuclear material, as 

defined in 10 CFR 70.4. 

• operating licenses for nuclear non-power 

reactors under 10 CFR part 50. 

• specific domestic licenses to 

manufacture or transfer certain items 

containing byproduct material under 10 CFR 

part 32. 

• specific domestic licenses of broad scope 

for byproduct material under 10 CFR part 33. 

• licenses for industrial radiography under 

10 CFR part 34. 

• licenses for medical use of byproduct 

material under 10 CFR part 35. 

• licenses for irradiators under 10 CFR part 

36. 

• licenses for well logging under 10 CFR 

part 39. 

• licenses for source material under 10 

CFR part 40. 

• certificates of compliance for packaging 

of radioactive material under 10 CFR part 71. 

• licenses for independent spent fuel 

storage installations under 10 CFR part 72. 

The backfitting provisions in 10 CFR 

50.109, 70.76, and 72.62, and the issue 

finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52 do 

not apply to holders of licenses under 

10 CFR parts 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 

40, or 71, or to holders of licenses for 

non-power reactors under 10 CFR part 

50, unless those licensees also have an 

NRC regulatory approval under 10 CFR 

parts 50 or 52 (for a nuclear power 

reactor), 70, or 72. In addition, the 

issuance of this regulatory guide would 

not constitute backfitting under 10 CFR 

50.109, 70.76, or 72.62, and would not 

otherwise be inconsistent with the issue 

finality provisions in 10 CFR part 52. As 

discussed in the ‘‘Implementation’’ 

section of this regulatory guide, the NRC 

has no intention of initiating any 

regulatory action that would require the 

use of this regulatory guide by current 

holders of 10 CFR part 50 operating 

licenses, 10 CFR part 52, subpart B, C, 

E, or F approvals, 10 CFR part 70 

licenses, or 10 CFR part 72 licenses. 

If a licensee protected by a backfitting 

or issue finality provision (a ‘‘protected 

licensee’’) voluntarily seeks a license 

amendment or change, and (1) the NRC 

staff’s consideration of the request 

involves a regulatory issue directly 

relevant to this revised regulatory guide 

and (2) the specific subject matter of this 

regulatory guide is an essential 

consideration in the NRC staff’s 

determination of the acceptability of the 

licensee’s request, then the NRC staff 

may request that the licensee either 

follow the guidance in this regulatory 

guide or provide an equivalent 

alternative process that demonstrates 

compliance with the underlying NRC 

regulatory requirements. Such a request 

by NRC staff is not considered 

backfitting as defined in 10 CFR 

50.109(a)(1), 70.76(a)(1), or 72.62(a), or 

a violation of any applicable finality 

provisions in 10 CFR part 52. 

If a protected licensee believes that 

the NRC is either using this regulatory 

guide or requesting or requiring the 

protected licensee to implement the 

methods or processes in this regulatory 

guide in a manner inconsistent with the 

discussion in the Implementation 

section of this regulatory guide, then the 

protected licensee may file a backfit 

appeal with the NRC in accordance with 

the guidance in NRC Management 

Directive 8.4, ‘‘Management of FacilitySpecific Backfitting and Information 

Collection’’ (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML12059A460); and NUREG–1409, 

‘‘Backfitting Guidelines’’ (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML032230247). 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day 

of August, 2016. 

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

Thomas H. Boyce, 

Chief, Regulatory Guidance and Generic 

Issues Branch, Division of Engineering, Office 

of Nuclear Regulatory Research. 

[FR Doc. 2016–18767 Filed 8–10–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 7590–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2012–0002; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NE–42–AD; Amendment 39– 

18610; AD 2016–16–12] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Continental 

Motors, Inc. Reciprocating Engines 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Continental Motors, Inc., (CMI) San 

Antonio (formerly known as Airmotive 

Engineering Corp. (AEC)), replacement 

parts manufacturer approval (PMA) 

cylinder assemblies marketed by Engine 

Components International Division 

(ECi). On July 17, 2015, AEC was 

purchased by CMI and is now operating 

as ‘‘Continental Motors—San Antonio.’’ 

These cylinder assemblies are used on 

all CMI model –520 and –550 

reciprocating engines, and on all other 

CMI engine models approved for the use 

of model –520 and –550 cylinder 

assemblies, such as the CMI model –470 

when modified by supplemental type 

certificate (STC). This AD was prompted 

by reports of multiple cylinder head-tobarrel separations and cracked and 

leaking aluminum cylinder heads. This 

AD requires removal of the affected 

cylinder assemblies, including 

overhauled cylinder assemblies, 

according to a phased removal schedule. 

We are issuing this AD to prevent 

failure of the cylinder assemblies, which 

could lead to failure of the engine, inflight shutdown, and loss of control of 

the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective September 

15, 2016. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact 

Continental Motors, Inc., San Antonio, 

9503 Middlex Drive, San Antonio, TX 

78217; phone: 210–820–8100; Internet: 

http://www.continentalsanantonio.com. 

You may view this service information 


sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with RULES
52976 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

1An authoritative report that informs readers 

about a complex issue. 

at the FAA, Engine & Propeller 

Directorate, 1200 District Avenue, 

Burlington, MA. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 781–238–7125. It is also available 

on the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0002. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0002; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Jurgen E. Priester, Aerospace Engineer, 

Delegation Systems Certification Office, 

FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, 10101 

Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 

76177; phone: 817–222–5190; fax: 817– 

222–5785; email: jurgen.e.priester@

faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

August 12, 2013—NPRM 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 by adding an AD that would 

apply to certain CMI San Antonio 

replacement PMA cylinder assemblies 

marketed by ECi. These assemblies are 

used on CMI model –520 and –550 

reciprocating engines, and all other CMI 

engine models approved for the use of 

models –520 and –550 cylinder 

assemblies such as the CMI model –470 

when modified by STC. The NPRM 

published in the Federal Register on 

August 12, 2013 (78 FR 48828) (referred 

to herein after as the ‘‘August 12, 2013, 

NPRM’’). The August 12, 2013, NPRM 

proposed to require initial and 

repetitive inspections, immediate 

replacement of cracked cylinder 

assemblies, and replacement of cylinder 

assemblies at reduced times-in-service 

(TIS) since new. The August 12, 2013, 

NPRM also proposed to prohibit the 

installation of affected cylinder 

assemblies into any engine. 

September 26, 2013–March 12, 2014— 

Posting Technical Documents/Extension 

of Comment Period/Initial Regulatory 

Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) 

We received several hundred 

comments to our August 12, 2013, 

NPRM. In response to this high-level of 

public interest, we undertook several 

actions to help the public understand 

and provide further comment on our 

proposed rule. These actions included: 

• Extending the comment period to 

the August 12, 2013, NPRM; 

• publishing an IRFA; and 

• adding several technical documents 

that were posted to Docket No. FAA– 

2012–0002 (see Addresses section of 

this final rule for information on 

locating the docket) on September 20, 

2013. 

Documents added to the docket 

include: 

(1) FAA Safety Recommendations 

08.365, 08.366, and 11.216, which were 

written against the subject ECi cylinder 

assemblies; 

(2) NTSB Safety Recommendation A– 

12–7, also written against the subject 

ECi cylinder assemblies; 

(3) The original ECi AD worksheet for 

2011–NE–42–AD, which documents the 

reasons for the proposed rule; 

(4) A list of separations of ECi 

cylinder assemblies; 

(5) A white paper 1 on failures of ECi 

cylinders by the FAA Chief Scientific 

and Technical Adviser (CSTA) for 

Engine Dynamics; 

(6) Figures showing ECi Dome 

Separation Failures; 

(7) A briefing on ‘‘ECi Cylinder Head 

Failures on Continental IO 520 & 550 

Engines’’; and 

(8) FAA Policy Memorandum on 

‘‘Risk Assessment for Reciprocating 

Engine Airworthiness Directives,’’ dated 

May 24, 1999. 

We notified the public of these 

actions on September 26, 2013, via the 

Federal Register (78 FR 59293). In that 

notification, we extended the comment 

period for the August 12, 2013, NPRM 

to December 11, 2013. This extension 

allowed the public additional time to 

comment on our August 12, 2013, 

NPRM and the additional information 

we had added to the docket. 

We also determined that we needed to 

add to the docket a detailed regulatory 

flexibility analysis to estimate the 

effects of the proposed rule on small 

business entities. We published an 

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis in 

Docket FAA–2012–0002 on March 12, 

2014 (79 FR 13924). 

September 3–4, 2014—Challenge 

Team’s Review of August 12, 2013, 

NPRM 

Because the response to our August 

12, 2013, NPRM was so negative—we 

received over 500 comments, most 

disagreeing with the NPRM—we 

established a Challenge Team to review 

our proposed AD. The Challenge Team 

was an independent, multi-disciplinary 

team, consisting of three FAA CSTAs, 

FAA Aircraft Certification Service (AIR) 

managers, and other FAA technical 

experts from all four Directorates. 

The Challenge Team reviewed the 

technical information that formed the 

basis for our proposed AD and the 

public comments we had received 

concerning our proposal. The CSTA for 

Aircraft Safety Analysis also 

independently computed a new risk 

assessment using the earlier failure 

reports, and the additional failure 

reports that we received from the public 

as comments to our August 12, 2013, 

NPRM. 

Based on their review of this data and 

the new risk assessment of failures of 

affected cylinder assemblies, the 

Challenge Team determined that an AD 

was still required. But, they suggested 

changes to make compliance less 

aggressive and substantially reduce cost. 

Their recommended changes included 

revising the compliance schedule in 

favor of a phased removal schedule, 

clarifying that overhauled cylinder 

assemblies are included in the proposed 

phased removal schedule, eliminating 

the reporting requirement for removed 

cylinder assemblies, and removing the 

requirement for initial and repetitive 

inspection. 

January 8, 2015—First Supplemental 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(SNPRM) 

We adopted the Challenge Team’s 

recommendations, and we then 

published them as an SNPRM in the 

Federal Register on January 8, 2015 (80 

FR 1008) (referred to herein after as the 

‘‘January 8, 2015, SNPRM’’). The 

January 8, 2015, SNPRM proposed to 

modify the schedule for removal of the 

affected cylinder assemblies, added that 

overhauled affected cylinder assemblies 

be removed within 80 hours, eliminated 

a reporting requirement, and removed a 

requirement for initial and repetitive 

inspections. 

We also responded in our January 8, 

2015, SNPRM, to the several hundred 

comments that we received to the 

August 12, 2013, NPRM. Many of these 

comments were repetitious, so we 

grouped the comments and provided 

our responses to the different groups, 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 52977 

depending on the nature of the 

comment. For example, some comments 

claimed that airplanes can operate 

safely with a separated cylinder head; 

others suggested that pilot error was 

causing cylinder head separations; and 

others recommended adopting less 

stringent compliance requirements. 

Each of these groups received our 

response to the group’s comment. 

June 9, 2015—Meeting With National 

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

The NTSB, in its comments to our 

August 12, 2013, NPRM; January 8, 

2015, SNPRM; and in its Safety 

Recommendation A–12–07, did not 

fully support our approach to resolving 

the unsafe condition that is the subject 

of this final rule. Therefore, we met with 

the NTSB on June 9, 2015 to understand 

the technical basis for their 

recommendation and their technical 

objections to our proposed AD. At this 

meeting, we presented the NTSB the 

technical information upon which we 

based our AD as amended. Information 

that was reviewed included failure 

reports, the risk assessment by the 

FAA’s CSTA for Aircraft Safety 

Analysis, FAA safety recommendations, 

and the data supporting our conclusion 

that field inspections had an insufficient 

probability of cylinder failure detection. 

The NTSB noted in this meeting that 

Safety Recommendation A–12–7, and 

the NTSB’s comments to the August 12, 

2013, NPRM and the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM, were based on the information 

available to them at that time. The 

NTSB also indicated it would reassess 

its recommendation and comments to 

our proposed rule based on the 

presentations and the supporting data 

that we had presented. 

June 23, 2015—Additional Technical 

Documents Posted 

We received additional comments to 

our August 12, 2013, NPRM and our 

January 8, 2015, SNPRM, requesting that 

we provide additional information that 

supports this AD. Commenters also 

requested that we identify the data that 

we relied on in drafting this AD and to 

explain why that data supported our 

conclusion that an unsafe condition 

exists. Based on these comments, we 

concluded that further additional public 

participation in our proposed AD was 

appropriate. Specifically, we concluded 

that we would post to the docket the 

additional technical information 

responsive to the comments. So, on June 

23, 2015, we posted the additional 

technical information to Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section 

of this final rule for information on 

locating the docket). These documents 

provide further technical rationale for 

this AD. This additional technical 

information included: 

(1) The risk analysis process 

conducted by the FAA’s CSTA for 

Aircraft Safety Analysis—referenced in 

Docket No. FAA–2012–0002 as the 

‘‘Proposed Airworthiness Directive for 

ECi Cylinders Risk Analysis Process,’’ 

referred to herein as the ‘‘risk analysis’’; 

(2) A risk analysis using the Small 

Airplane Risk Analysis (SARA) methods 

used by the FAA’s Small Airplane 

Directorate (SAD)—referenced in Docket 

No. FAA–2012–0002 as ‘‘SARA 

Worksheet Systems/Propulsion’’; 

(3) A June 2011, presentation by AEC 

to the FAA concerning its ECi cylinder 

assemblies; 

(4) A list of ECi cylinder assembly 

failure reports consisting of only those 

reports where both cylinder serial 

number and time in service are included 

in the reports; 

(5) A list of additional failures of ECi 

cylinder assemblies reported by a 

maintenance organization; and 

(6) AEC Technical Report 1102–13, 

dated April 30, 2011. 

August 28, 2015—2nd SNPRM 

We published a second SNPRM in the 

Federal Register on August 28, 2015 (80 

FR 52212, referred to herein after as the 

‘‘August 28, 2015, SNPRM’’). The 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM retained the 

compliance requirements proposed by 

the January 8, 2015, SNPRM. We 

published the August 28, 2015, SNPRM 

to provide the public a final opportunity 

to comment on the proposed AD and the 

additional technical documentation we 

had added to the docket on June 23, 

2015. 

Also, since many commenters had 

cited NTSB support for their positions, 

we wanted to clarify our rationale for 

disagreeing with the compliance actions 

proposed by the NTSB in its Safety 

Recommendation A–12–7, and the 

NTSB’s comments to the August 12, 

2013, NPRM and the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

The NTSB did submit a final 

comment to our August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM, that was posted to the docket 

on November 23, 2015. In the NTSB’s 

final comment, the NTSB indicated that 

it now considers that our proposed 

compliance actions satisfy the intent of 

Safety Recommendation A–12–7. The 

information we covered with the NTSB, 

including copies of FAA presentations 

to the NTSB, were subsequently posted 

to Docket No. FAA–2012–0002 (see 

ADDRESSES section of this final rule for 

information on locating the docket) on 

April 6, 2016. 

Comments 

Introduction 

We have, through the August 12, 

2013, NPRM; the September 26, 2013, 

posting of additional information; our 

extension of the August 12, 2013, NPRM 

comment period; the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM; and August 28, 2015, SNPRM, 

given the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

public, as noted already, has 

participated deeply in this rule making; 

providing hundreds of comments. 

This final rule includes our responses 

to any previously unaddressed 

comments to the August 12, 2013, 

NPRM and to the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM, that we may have left without 

response, and to the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

To organize comments and facilitate 

their review, we again grouped like 

comments and responses. These 

groupings in this final rule’s comments 

section are: 

(1) Comments to withdraw or revise 

the SNPRMs for technical reasons— 

these comments, and the resulting 

groupings, were similar to those we 

used in responding to the August 12, 

2013, NPRM. They include, for 

example, requests to withdraw the 

SNPRM because the commenters claim 

that ECi cylinder assemblies are not 

unsafe; airplanes can operate safely with 

a separated cylinder head; or the root 

cause of cylinder failure is unknown. 

(2) Comments to the FAA’s risk 

assessment processes and policies— 

these comments generally asserted that 

the SNPRMs should be withdrawn 

because the FAA had not appropriately 

followed its risk assessment processes 

and policies in determining that the 

failure of ECi cylinder assemblies 

represents an unsafe condition. 

(3) Comments to the FAA’s 

rulemaking processes—these comments 

generally requested that the SNPRMs be 

withdrawn, alleging that the FAA had 

failed to follow its rulemaking processes 

and was adopting a rule that is 

‘‘arbitrary and capricious.’’ 

(4) Comments to the cost of 

compliance—these comments indicated 

that the cost of compliance to this AD 

was higher than the FAA has estimated 

and will have a substantial effect on 

small entities. 

(5) Administrative comments—these 

were generally comments that did not 

pertain to the substance of this AD, such 

as requests for names and phone 

numbers of FAA personnel involved in 

this rulemaking. 

(6) Support for the SNPRMs—these 

were comments in support of issuing 

the SNPRMs. 


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A. Comments To Withdraw or Revise the 

SNPRMs for Technical Reasons 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because ECi Cylinder Assemblies Are 

Not Unsafe 

Comment. Several organizations and 

individuals, commenting to the August 

12, 2013, NPRM, commented also to the 

January 8, 2015, and August 28, 2015, 

SNPRMs, that the affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies have an equivalent, or lower, 

failure rate than that of cylinder 

assemblies manufactured by the original 

equipment manufacturer (OEM). The 

commenters also indicated that there 

have been no failures of ECi cylinder 

assemblies in the last 3 years. These 

commenters request the FAA withdraw 

this AD because they believe that the 

ECi cylinder assemblies are not unsafe. 

Response. We disagree. The rate of 

separation for the affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies is at least 32 times greater 

than that of OEM cylinder assemblies 

over the same period. Although there 

are approximately four times as many 

OEM cylinder assemblies in service 

than ECi cylinder assemblies, the ECi 

cylinder assemblies suffered more 

cylinder head separations than OEM 

cylinder assemblies since 2004. This 

data is available for review in Docket 

No. FAA–2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES

section of this final rule for information 

on locating the docket). In addition, we 

have continued to receive field reports 

of failures of the affected cylinders in 

the past three years. We did not 

withdraw the August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Commenters also 

questioned the validity of the data that 

the FAA used to justify the proposed 

AD. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

as suggesting that the data used to 

justify the rule is not valid. We disagree. 

We used warranty reports from ECi and 

RAM Aircraft, which is a major 

overhauler of CMI engines, STC holder 

for an increased horsepower version of 

the affected model engine, and the 

largest user of the affected ECi 

cylinders. We also used service 

difficulty reports (SDRs), and other field 

service reports regarding ECI cylinder 

separations. We did not withdraw the 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. The IPL Group LLC (IPL 

Group) commented that the FAA has 

mischaracterized ‘‘quality 

enhancements’’ in production as 

‘‘design changes.’’ IPL Group noted that 

ECi had applied experience gained 

during manufacturing, as well as 

through service feedback, to make 

quality improvements in production 

and the changes made to the design data 

were not due to design deficiencies. 

Response. We disagree. We correctly 

stated that ECi has made increases in 

the dome transition radius through 

cylinder serial number 33697, and has 

made incremental increases in the headto-barrel interference fit at least through 

cylinder serial number 61177 (see 

Airmotive Engineering Technical Report 

1102–13) to address the two identified 

inherent design deficiencies associated 

with the effected cylinder assemblies. 

These changes are design changes. We 

did not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft commented 

that when it submitted its December 9, 

2013, comment, it calculated the 

likelihood of a cylinder separation. 

RAM Aircraft indicated it provided a 

significant amount of data that proves 

that the likelihood of a cylinder 

separation is ‘‘extremely remote.’’ RAM 

commented that at that time their data 

showed one cylinder separation for 

every: 21,808 multi-engine aircraft flight 

hours, or 172 average years of active 

service; and 42,057 single engine 

aircraft flight hours, or 455 average 

years of active service. Further, that the 

fleet of aircraft using the cylinders 

subject to the January 8, 2015, SNPRM 

have continued to fly for an additional 

14 months since December 9, 2013. 

RAM Aircraft indicated that there is no 

doubt that both the 21,808 multi-engine 

aircraft flight hour number, and the 

42,057 single engine aircraft flight hour 

number, would both be now much 

larger, thereby, further reducing the 

likelihood of a cylinder separation. 

Response. We disagree. RAM 

Aircraft’s data does not substantiate its 

claimed failure rate. Without knowing 

the total number of hours flown on all 

affected cylinders, it is not possible to 

accurately calculate an hours-based 

failure rate. This data is not available for 

general aviation aircraft. We, therefore, 

find RAM Aircraft’s estimate to be 

unreliable. We did not withdraw the 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft also 

indicated that a statement by the FAA 

in the January 8, 2015, SNPRM 

regarding numbers of failures of affected 

cylinder assemblies was grossly 

misleading. RAM Aircraft assumes that 

the FAA is referring to reports entered 

via the SDR system. RAM Aircraft 

indicated that it has provided evidence 

in an earlier comment that not every 

piece of information in the SDR system 

can be taken at face value. With respect 

to this SNPRM, RAM suggested that it 

is very important to distinguish between 

the ‘‘SNPRM failure modes’’ (quotations 

not in original comment) and other 

types of ‘‘nuisance’’ cracks that are 

common occurrences in all 

manufacturer’s air-cooled aircraft 

cylinders. The SNPRM failure modes do 

not include cracks between spark plug 

holes, valve seats, injector ports, etc. 

There is no doubt that the ‘‘hundreds of 

failures’’ referenced by the FAA were 

never researched to determine which 

were of the SNPRM failure mode and 

which were of the ‘‘nuisance’’ variety. 

Response. We disagree. Our response 

in the January 8, 2015, SNRPM is not 

misleading. On the contrary, underreporting of cylinder assembly cracks in 

the SDR system further reinforces the 

need for this AD. Further, the FAA did 

not include the SDR failure reports 

referred to by the commenter as of the 

‘‘nuisance’’ variety in the list of 

separations that were used to 

substantiate the need for this AD. We 

did not base this AD on nuisance cracks 

in the affected cylinder assemblies. We 

did not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

Comment. One commenter stated that 

the separated cylinders that were 

determined to be the precipitating root 

cause events for the two fatal accidents 

cited by the FAA in the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM were overhauled cylinders, so 

they therefore should not be considered 

in the determination as to whether or 

not the proposed corrective action 

should be implemented. 

Response. We disagree. The ECi 

cylinder heads, P/N AEC 65385, of the 

separated cylinder assemblies that 

precipitated the two referenced fatal 

accidents were of the same type design 

and within the same affected cylinder 

assembly serial number range as are 

used in new ECi cylinder assemblies. 

The cast and then machined aluminum 

cylinder head shrink band region has 

the predominant features that define the 

final interference fit of the overall 

cylinder assembly, not the steel barrel. 

This is further supported by the fact that 

the design changes that ECi made to the 

interference fit were accomplished by 

modification of the cylinder head. We 

did not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA should 

withdraw the August 28, 2015 SNPRM 

because the FAA failed to establish that 

the affected product, i.e., the ECi 

cylinder assemblies, do not meet the 

established minimum safety standards 

established by 14 CFR part 33. 

Response. We disagree. The 

operational history of the affected ECi 

cylinder assemblies established that the 

affected ECi cylinder assemblies present 

an unacceptable compromise to safety, 

an unsafe condition, when installed in 

operating aircraft engines. We did not 

withdraw the August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 


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Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

stated that the ‘‘same unsafe condition’’ 

that is addressed by this AD is present 

in the cylinders of all manufacturers 

and that the FAA failed to consider 

similar failures of the OEM cylinders. 

Response. We disagree. The affected 

ECi PMA cylinders have separated at a 

significantly higher rate than the OEM 

cylinders over the same service period 

since the ECi PMA cylinders entered 

service. ECi itself identified two root 

causes for the separations. See AEC 

Technical Report 1102–13 in Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section 

of this final rule for information on 

locating the docket) which recommends 

withdrawal from service of the affected 

ECi cylinders. We compared the number 

of separations of these affected ECi PMA 

cylinders to the number of OEM 

separations over the same service 

period, since the ECi PMA cylinders 

entered service in meaningful numbers. 

Over the same period of time the 

affected ECi PMA cylinders and OEM 

cylinders were in service, the ECi 

cylinders experienced eight times the 

number of OEM separations, even 

though only one-quarter as many ECI 

cylinders were in service as the OEM’s. 

Further, the SDR database does not 

reveal similar separation rates or similar 

failure modes for OEM cylinders. 

Therefore, we have no reason to regard 

the OEM cylinder assemblies as subject 

to the same or similar unsafe condition. 

We did not withdraw the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because Airplanes Can Operate Safely 

With a Separated Cylinder Head 

Comment. Several commenters 

indicated that we should not issue this 

AD because airplanes can continue to 

operate safely even after a cylinder head 

separation. 

Response. We disagree. An in-flight 

cylinder head separation is an unsafe 

condition that presents multiple 

secondary effects. For example, in-flight 

fire and loss of aircraft control. Accident 

data confirms that separated cylinders 

have also been a precipitating event in 

fatal accidents. Therefore, the safety 

consequences represented by a cylinder 

head separation in flight are significant, 

and represent an unsafe condition 

appropriate for an AD. We did not 

withdraw the August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Several commenters added 

that airplane engines are designed and 

certified to safely operate with one 

failed cylinder. 

Response. We disagree. Applicants 

are not required to show that their 

engines are designed to operate with 

one cylinder failed or with a separated 

cylinder, nor that doing so constitutes 

safe operation of an engine. We did not 

withdraw the August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

commented that the docket contains 

evidence from RAM Aircraft that valid 

and verifiable testing establishes that a 

head-to-barrel separation results in less 

than 20 percent power loss to the 

engine. 

Response. We disagree. The RAM 

Aircraft testing that is included in 

Docket FAA–2012–0002 only quantified 

the horsepower output per cylinder. The 

RAM Aircraft testing was of an 

uninstalled engine in a test cell and 

RAM Aircraft did not attempt to assess 

the impact of reduced engine 

horsepower output on airplane level 

performance. We estimate that a 20% 

reduction in engine horsepower on a 

single-engine airplane results in a nearly 

40% reduction in aircraft rate of climb, 

which is a hazardous condition. It is 

also a potentially hazardous condition 

for twin-engine airplanes due to the 

resultant asymmetric thrust condition. 

We did not withdraw the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

indicated that FAA guidance material 

does not define this condition as 

‘‘hazardous’’ in the certification process. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

to be that the FAA has no definition of 

hazardous event that includes loss of 

one cylinder in a six-cylinder engine, 

within the engine certification 

regulations (14 CFR part 33). We agree. 

The certification process does not define 

‘‘hazardous events.’’ The FAA 

establishes through the engine 

certification process the minimum 

standards that an engine needs to meet 

to be considered airworthy. For 

example, § 33.19 establishes durability 

standards that are designed to minimize 

the development of an unsafe condition 

between overhaul periods. These 

minimum safety standards must also be 

met by PMA parts, either through 

establishing identicality or through test 

and computation. FAA Policy PS– 

ANE100–1997–00001, provides 

guidance for the certification of PMA 

applications for reciprocating engine 

critical, highly stressed or complex 

parts, including, but not limited to 

crankshafts and cylinder heads. We did 

not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft commented 

that it has run tests that substantiate and 

document the power loss as a ‘‘minor 

power loss’’ in the event of a cylinder 

separation. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

to be that any power loss from cylinder 

head separation is only minor. We 

disagree. The loss of one cylinder’s 

power would equate to approximately a 

17 to 20% reduction in engine 

horsepower output. Further, loss of a 

cylinder at critical phases of flight, for 

example, during climb-out where like 

here, the failure is at increased 

probability of occurring, produces a 

power loss sufficient to result in a 40% 

reduction in airplane rate of climb. This 

would constitute a hazardous condition 

during a critical phase of flight like 

departure/climb. We did not withdraw 

the August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft suggested 

that this minor power loss would be 

classified as a ‘‘minor hazard,’’ based on 

guidance from the FAA’s ‘‘Policy 

Statement on Risk Assessment for 

Reciprocating Engine Airworthiness 

Directives’’ (PS–ANE100–1999–00006). 

According to the FAA policy statement, 

minor hazards are candidates for AD 

action only when the probability of the 

event is very high. 

Response. We disagree. FAA policy 

classifies service problems that do not 

result in a significant power loss, such 

as a partial power loss, rough running, 

pre-ignition, backfire, single magneto 

failures, as ‘‘minor.’’ We found that 

cylinder separations results in a 17 to 

20% reduction in engine horsepower 

output results in an approximately 40% 

reduction in airplane excess power, 

which translates into a 40% reduction 

in airplane rate of climb. This 

constitutes a hazardous condition that is 

not a ‘‘minor hazard.’’ We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft commented 

that Appendix VI of the SAD 

Airworthiness Directives Manual 

Supplement includes examples of 

conditions that potentially have a 

‘‘minor’’ affect. The loss of one engine 

(multi-engine aircraft) is listed as a 

condition with a ‘‘minor’’ effect. Given 

the ‘‘minor’’ effect of the loss of one 

engine and the likelihood of the 

cylinder separation being extremely 

remote, then this AD should not be 

issued against multi-engine aircraft. 

Response. We disagree. By comparing 

the risk analysis computed by the CSTA 

for Aircraft Safety Analysis with either 

the Small Airplane Risk Analysis 

guidelines used by the SAD or the 

Engine and Propeller Directorate (E&PD) 

Continued Airworthiness Assessment 

Process (CAAP) Handbook guidelines, 

demonstrates that an AD is needed for 

both single and twin-engine aircraft. We 

did not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft commented 

that they are not aware of any 

substantiated fact of a ‘‘fire,’’ or any 

other significant consequence of a 


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cylinder head separation. Further, RAM 

Aircraft noted that in its May 12, 2014, 

comment, it had documented the 

research it had done to refute the 

‘‘rumor’’ of a fire resulting from a 

cylinder head separation of an ECi 

cylinder. 

Response. We disagree. RAM Aircraft 

itself submitted data to the FAA 

indicating that a fire could occur from 

cylinder head separation. FAA 

requested to see that information. FAA’s 

subsequent visit to RAM Aircraft 

confirmed that a failed cylinder caused 

an in-flight fire on a Cessna 414 

airplane. We did not withdraw the 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace cited 

FAA documents that indicate that the 

design of an aircraft engine, for 

reciprocating engines, should 

incorporate mitigating features. For 

example, Danbury quoted SAD 

Standards Staff (ACE–110) 

Memorandum, dated May 6, 1986, and 

an E&PD Standards Staff (ANE–110) 

memorandum, dated May 24, 1997. 

Response. We agree. However, the 

regulatory requirement for a designer to 

mitigate a possible reciprocating engine 

failure prior to certification is different 

than correcting an unsafe condition 

found to exist after certification. This 

AD addresses an unsafe condition— 

cylinder head separation, found after 

certification. A regulatory requirement 

to mitigate in the aircraft design an 

engine failure is not the subject of this 

AD. We did not withdraw the August 

28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. IPL Group commented that 

we were misusing the term 

‘‘catastrophic’’ when describing the 

effects of potential cylinder failures. 

Response. We disagree. As to the use 

of ‘‘catastrophic,’’ we did not use the 

term in the August 12, 2013, NPRM, the 

two SNPRMs, or in this final rule AD. 

We did not change the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM based on this comment. 

Comment. IPL Group argued that a 

cylinder head separation does not cause 

an unsafe event and that there is ‘‘zero 

evidence’’ in Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0002 to support the showing that a 

failed cylinder causes an unsafe 

condition. 

Response. We disagree. Cylinder 

separations can cause partial or 

complete engine failure which can 

cause a subsequent loss of power and 

control of the airplane. Loss of control 

of the airplane may result in the loss of 

the airplane and injuries or death. 

Additionally, we note the NTSB has 

stated that cylinder head separations 

could result in a loss of control of the 

airplane (see NTSB’s comment to 

‘‘Docket No FAA–2008–0052; 

Directorate Identifier 2008–NE–01–AD, 

dated September 25, 2009’’). We did not 

withdraw the August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA had not 

provided any information to 

substantiate the FAA’s position that 

cylinder separations have a 

‘‘significant’’ effect on airplane safety or 

that cylinder separations would result 

in a fire. 

Response. We disagree. The impact of 

a cylinder separation in-flight is an 

unacceptable compromise to safety. To 

clarify this point, we changed the AD to 

use ‘‘unacceptable.’’ We disagree that 

cylinder head separations might not 

result in fire. Cylinder separations can 

result in engine failure and/or fire. As 

an example, on November 29, 1987, a 

Piper PA–46 airplane experienced a 

cylinder head separation followed by an 

in-flight fire. We did not withdraw the 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

stated that the FAA did not issue a 

similar AD against the OEM cylinder 

assemblies because the OEM 

manufactured more such cylinder 

assemblies. 

Response. We disagree. The FAA did 

not mandate actions similar to those 

specified in this AD against the OEM 

cylinders because the OEM cylinders do 

not have the inherent design 

deficiencies that the ECi PMA cylinders 

have. Also, the service history of the 

OEM cylinders indicates that the OEM 

separation rate is approximately 32 

times lower than the ECi cylinders. We 

did not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings further 

commented that ADs are never justified 

for any cylinder manufacturer. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

as suggesting that we should not issue 

an AD when engine design deficiencies 

related to cylinders are found. We 

disagree. Cylinders are engine parts 

whose structural failure can result in a 

degradation to or total loss of, engine 

power output, and loss of control of an 

airplane. Cylinder separations aloft can 

also cause an in-flight fire. We will 

exercise our regulatory arm to issue ADs 

when we determine doing so is 

necessary to resolve an unsafe condition 

in a product. We did not withdraw the 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

commented that 14 CFR part 33.43 

requires assessment of crankshaft 

vibration for one cylinder not firing 

because the condition is not an engine 

failure event condition. 

Response. We disagree. As we noted 

in our January 8, 2015, SNPRM, 14 CFR 

part 33 does not require continued safe 

operation following a cylinder 

separation or following any other engine 

structural failure. Section 33.43(d), 

addressing the engine vibration survey 

of § 33.43(a), requires assessment of 

crankshaft vibration for an engine that 

has one cylinder that ‘‘is not firing.’’ We 

require vibration testing with a critical 

cylinder inoperative because it is a 

failure condition where stresses may 

exceed the endurance limit of the 

crankshaft material. We need to know 

the speed ranges where the excessive 

stresses occur so operational 

information may be provided to flight 

crews so they can avoid these speed 

ranges when a cylinder is inoperative. 

We did not withdraw the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because Root Cause of Cylinder Failure 

Is Unknown 

Comment. Several commenters 

indicated that the FAA has failed to 

identify the root cause(s) of cylinder 

head separations. 

Response. We disagree. We have 

identified the root cause of cylinder 

failure as design deficiencies inherent in 

the affected ECi cylinder assemblies. 

These ECi cylinder assemblies have two 

inherent design deficiencies: 

Insufficient dome radius and 

insufficient head-to-barrel interference 

fit. These design deficiencies are 

identified in AEC Technical Report 

1102–13, dated April 30, 2011, that we 

posted to Docket No. FAA–2012–0002 

(see ADDRESSES section of this final rule 

for information on locating the docket). 

We did not withdraw the SNPRMs. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

commented that root cause analysis is 

absolutely essential to determining 

compliance with regulations and if an 

unsafe condition has been created. 

Therefore the agency has not properly 

identified the unsafe condition. 

Response. We disagree. We identified 

the unsafe condition in the engine: 

Cylinder head separation. The purpose 

of this AD is to correct that unsafe 

condition. We also identified that 

cylinder head separations are due to at 

least two inherent design deficiencies. 

All cylinders prior to S/N 33697 have 

insufficient dome transition radius, and 

all cylinders prior to S/N 61177 

insufficient head-to-barrel interference 

fit. ECi characterized both of these as 

‘‘inherent design deficiencies’’ in its 

AEC Technical Report 1102–13. We did 

not withdraw the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM. 


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Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because Pilot Error Is Causing Cylinder 

Head Separations 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace and 

Danbury Holdings commented that 

cylinder head separations involving the 

ECi cylinder assemblies affected by this 

AD were caused by excessive CHTs, 

presumably caused pilot error, rather 

than by design deficiencies of the 

cylinder assemblies. 

One operator observed that operators 

who use the ECi cylinder assemblies 

and operate them within limits and with 

good instrumentation are not having 

issues. This operator noted that 

everyone, with the exception of the 

FAA, believes that overheating beyond 

CHT limits by operators has a direct 

effect on cylinder head separation. 

Response. We disagree. Although 

pilot error may cause excessive CHT, we 

have no data to suggest it is the cause 

of the unsafe condition that is the 

subject of this AD. If pilot error results 

in excessive CHT, which leads to 

cylinder head separation, then we 

would expect to see similar damage in 

engines with other than ECi cylinder 

assemblies installed where the pilots 

exceeded the same limitation(s). 

However, we do not have any such data. 

Also, we have no evidence that either 

intentional or inadvertent exceedance of 

CHT limits has caused cylinder 

separation. Further ECi identified 

several design deficiencies in AEC 

Technical Report 1102–13, dated April 

30, 2011.We did not withdraw the 

SNPRMs. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because of the Risk of Maintenance 

Errors 

Comment. Several commenters 

commented that the FAA should 

withdraw the SNPRMs because the 

removal and replacement of affected 

cylinder assemblies before time between 

overhaul (TBO) would result in 

maintenance errors that would 

adversely affect safety. For example, IPL 

Group indicated that replacement of the 

cylinder assemblies would likely result 

in events of main bearings losing clampup and turning, resulting in cylinder 

through-bolt and flange stud failures, 

which would likely result in total 

engine failure. 

Response. We disagree. Our 

regulatory framework presumes that 

maintenance will be performed 

correctly by experienced personnel 

authorized by the FAA to return aircraft 

to service in an airworthy condition. 

Further, we have not observed any 

negative effects on safety due to removal 

of these cylinder assemblies during 

maintenance. Also, cylinder removal 

and replacement is a maintenance 

action addressed in engine maintenance 

manuals. We did not withdraw the 

SNPRMs. 

Request To Justify 80-Hour Removal 

Requirement for Overhauled Cylinder 

Assemblies 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace and 

Danbury Holdings requested that the 

FAA provide evidence (including 

engineering analysis) supporting its 

conclusion that overhauled cylinder 

assemblies should be removed within 

80 hours after the effective date. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

to be that the commenters disagree that 

the phased removal plan required by 

this AD is appropriate. We disagree. 

This AD mandates a phased removal of 

affected cylinders with the intent to 

retire all affected cylinders by initial 

TBO. The FAA recognizes that some 

cylinders in service may already have 

exceeded their initial TBO. Metal 

fatigue damage is cumulative, and the 

longer a cylinder head remains in 

service, the more likely it will fail due 

to one of the inherent design 

deficiencies. Overhauled cylinders have 

likely experienced more load and 

temperature cycles than lower time 

cylinders and the total time in service 

since new of overhauled cylinders often 

cannot be determined. Our 

determination of 80 hours is supported 

by our Challenge Team’s findings and 

our risk analysis that we uploaded to 

FAA Docket No. FAA–2012–0002 (see 

ADDRESSES section of this final rule for 

information on locating the docket). We 

did not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace and 

Danbury Holdings also stated that the 

FAA had not substantiated that the 

overhaul of a cylinder does not reduce 

the existing fatigue damage that a 

cylinder may have incurred while in 

service. 

Response. We disagree. Fatigue 

strength of metal alloys operated at high 

temperatures continuously decreases 

with cycles until failure. This is 

particularly true for aluminum alloys, 

including the aluminum alloy used to 

cast cylinder heads. Metallic structural 

elements that are operated at high 

temperatures are more susceptible to 

time dependent fatigue. The overhaul of 

a cylinder assembly does not reverse the 

fatigue damage that had been previously 

accumulated in the aluminum cylinder 

head casting. We did not change the AD 

based on this comment. 

Request To Revise Applicability 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA has no 

evidence that all cylinders through S/N 

61176 are at risk for separation in the 

first thread due to insufficient head-tobarrel interference fit. 

Response. We disagree. The SDR 

database and other field reports 

document instances of first-thread 

failures of cylinders manufactured to 

design data applicable to all cylinders 

prior to S/N 61177. For this reason, all 

cylinders through S/N 61176 are subject 

to the corrective actions of this AD. We 

did not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Comment. One commenter stated that 

he has an O–470 engine converted by P. 

Ponk Aviation to the equivalent of an 

O–520 engine. He indicated that those 

engines should not be affected by this 

AD. 

Response. We disagree. The affected 

S/N cylinders are installed on –470 

engines, as well as the –520 and –550 

engine models. Any engine that uses 

one of these affected cylinders is at risk. 

We have received at least one report of 

a separation of these affected S/N 

cylinders on –470 engines. Although the 

unmodified –470 engines have lower 

engine horsepower output, their brake 

mean effective pressure (BMEP) is 

actually higher than that of the –520 and 

–550 engines. BMEP is proportional to 

the ratio of horsepower per cubic inch 

of displacement. Therefore, the actual 

operating stresses in the same cylinder 

wall are even higher when these same 

cylinders are installed in an unmodified 

–470 engines than it would be for either 

the –520 or the –550 engines. The P. 

Ponk Aviation STC increases the 

displacement of the unmodified –470 

engine to –520 cubic inches by 

installing the –520 cylinders on the 

–470 engine. Given that no valid 

sensitivity analysis exists showing the 

relationship of BMEP to fatigue life of 

these cylinders, and since the crack 

propagation rate is also unknown, we 

have included all the –470 engines, 

including those modified by the P. Ponk 

Aviation STC, in the effectivity of this 

AD. We did not change this AD based 

on this comment. 

Request To Adopt Less Stringent 

Compliance Requirements 

Comment. AOPA, RAM Aircraft, as 

well as operators and private citizens, 

requested that we adopt less stringent 

requirements than those in the proposed 

AD. The commenters indicated that the 

affected cylinder assemblies should be 

inspected at regular intervals, but 

removed at TBO. For example, one 


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commenter suggested recurring 

inspections every 60 hours. Several 

commenters cited the NTSB in support 

of its recommendation. RAM Aircraft 

commented that the FAA may be 

jumping to conclusions by eliminating 

these inspections. RAM Aircraft noted 

that the failure of a compression/soap 

test to detect a particular crack in a 

cylinder assembly on several occasions 

does not mean that the test will fail to 

detect cracked cylinders on most 

occasions. By their very nature and 

design compromises, i.e., steel barrels to 

contain the forces of combustion 

combined with lighter cylinder head 

alloys to reduce weight so that aircraft 

engines have commercial viability and 

value, and the harsh conditions, 

altitudes, and temperatures in which 

they operate, reciprocating aircraft 

engine cylinders will inevitably crack. 

RAM Aircraft indicated that there is no 

question but that some cylinders are 

going to crack, and that therefore, they 

must be properly operated, maintained, 

and inspected. 

Response. We disagree. Repetitive 

inspections until TBO, as suggested by 

the commenters, do not adequately 

address the unsafe condition in this 

particular case. Repetitive inspections 

would not detect cracks until they have 

already progressed completely across 

the cylinder head wall thickness. 

Several operators and mechanics have 

reported that they successfully passed 

the compression/soap test with a 

partially separated cylinder. Others 

have reported that they successfully 

passed the compression/soap test and 

then experienced an in-flight separation 

before the next scheduled 50-hour 

inspection. 

Therefore, we conclude that these 

tests are not sufficiently reliable. Also, 

engine overhaul is not a requirement for 

all operators. Therefore, tying the 

proposed recurrent inspection to engine 

overhaul would not resolve the unsafe 

condition. Based on its comment to the 

August 28, 2015, SNPRM, we know that 

the NTSB now considers this rule 

consistent with the rationale they have 

provided in the past in support of NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–12–7 

regarding these affected cylinder 

assemblies (Reference NTSB Comment 

FAA–2012–0002–0653, dated 

September 24, 2015 in Docket FAA– 

2012–0002). We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Comment. One commenter indicated 

it was incorrect to apply the same 

requirement to remove the cylinders at 

specified intervals to different CMI 

engine models. He noted, for example, 

that the TSIO–520–J engine that is 

allowed to produce 36 inches of 

manifold pressure and 310 horsepower 

will produce less stress on a cylinder 

head than a TSIO–520–NB engine that 

is allowed 41 inches of manifold 

pressure and 325 horsepower, as 

installed on a Cessna 414 airplane. 

Response. We disagree. Service 

history indicates that the affected 

cylinder assemblies have cracked on 

–470, –520, and –550 engine models. 

The AD, therefore, applies to all affected 

CMI –470, –520 and –550 engine 

models. We have no engineering 

analysis or test data to justify varying 

compliance times by engine model or 

applying the corrective actions of this 

AD to only the higher power engines. 

We did not change this AD based on 

this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

observed that the average number of 

cylinder assemblies, P/N AEC 631397, 

in the serial number range in the 

January 8, 2015, SNPRM that are still in 

operation have less than 500 hours left 

to TBO. Danbury Aerospace indicated 

that the early removal of these cylinders 

is not justified by a statistical analysis 

developed in accordance with the E&PD 

CAAP Handbook. 

Response. We disagree. We do not 

know the exact number of total hours 

TIS for each affected cylinder assembly. 

We have no data to support the claim 

that the existing fleet of cylinder 

assemblies already has accumulated 

1,200 or more hours TIS. Service history 

also shows that most of the separations 

occurred well before initial TBO. 

Therefore, removal of the affected 

cylinder assemblies before TBO is 

appropriate. We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA had not 

provided evidence that there have been 

separations within the originally 

proposed 50-hour recurrent 

compression test/soap inspection 

interval. 

Response. We disagree. We received 

several field reports of cylinder 

separations occurring within 50 hours of 

passing either the originally proposed 

50-hour recurrent compression test/soap 

inspection in the August 12, 2013, 

NPRM. SDR report No. SQP2011F00000 

was submitted by a part 135 operator 

who operated a Cessna T210N with an 

affected ECi cylinder assembly installed. 

The operator reported that on 

September 9, 2011, that affected ECI 

cylinder head separated at the 5th 

cooling fin on-head. At the time of the 

failure, the engine and failed cylinder 

had 817.6 hours time since overhaul/

time since new, and its last compression 

check inspection was at 19.2 hrs. prior. 

Other field reports also document 

separated cylinders (for example, see 

SDR Report 2010FA0000179) that 

recently passed the compression test/

soap inspections. We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. One commenter 

commented that, based on his 

experience, ECi has an aluminum head 

cracking issue and that these cylinders 

seem to crack more than CMI cylinders. 

The commenter further indicated that 

he believed the number of cylinder 

failures is underreported in the SDR 

database. The commenter further noted 

that in his 30 plus years of aircraft 

maintenance experience, he has never 

seen a cylinder failure rate this high. 

The commenter welcomed an AD that 

requires these cylinders to be inspected 

at around 100 hours and the reports of 

cracks sent to an FAA database. 

Response. We note the comment. We 

agree that the ECi failure rate is much 

higher than the OEM failure rate over 

the same field service period and that 

cylinder cracks are under-reported. For 

example, many of the RAM failures 

listed in the docket were not reported 

under the SDR system or as required by 

14 CFR 21.3. We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft commented 

that, based on its previous comments, 

the FAA should withdraw the SNPRMs. 

RAM Aircraft recommended that the 

FAA consider education and requiring 

inspections of all reciprocating airplane 

engine cylinders on the terms and 

conditions the FAA determines to be 

appropriate. 

Response. We disagree. Our analysis 

indicates that an AD is required to 

resolve the unsafe condition presented 

by installed affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies. We did not withdraw the 

SNPRMs based on this comment. 

Comment. One commenter suggested 

that users of a JPI or other engine 

monitoring system should be subject to 

a different compliance interval. 

Response. We disagree. As noted 

previously, the root cause of these 

cylinder failures are design deficiencies. 

The affected cylinders may fail without 

overtemping. Therefore, use of an 

engine monitoring system like JPI would 

be insufficient to detect the unsafe 

condition. We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Request To Use Mandatory Service 

Bulletin Instead of This AD 

Comment. One commenter requested 

that the FAA use a mandatory service 

bulletin instead of this AD to implement 

corrective action. 

Response. We disagree. Requiring a 

manufacturer to issue a mandatory 

service bulletin is outside the scope of 


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the FAA’s authority. We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

B. Comments to the FAA’s Risk 

Assessment Processes and Polices 

Request That the FAA Follow Its Own 

Risk Assessment Policies and Guidance 

Comment. Multiple commenters, 

including Danbury Aerospace, Danbury 

Holdings, and the Aeronautical Repair 

Station Association (ARSA) commented 

that the FAA did not follow its own risk 

assessment policies and guidance, such 

as FAA Order 8110.107A, Monitor 

Safety/Analyze Data (MSAD), dated 

October 1, 2012, and FAA Order 

8040.4A, Safety Risk Management 

Policy, dated April 30, 2012, and the 

E&PD CAAP Handbook, dated 

September 23, 2010. 

Response. We interpret this comment 

as a comment that we failed to follow 

FAA Order 8110.107A, FAA Order 

8040.4A, and the CAAP Handbook. We 

disagree. We performed the process as 

required by FAA Order 8110.107A, 

Monitor Safety/Analyze Data (MSAD), 

dated October 1, 2012, to analyze data 

and determine corrective action for 

continued operational safety issues. We 

acquired the failure event data from the 

MSAD, SDR, NTSB databases, ECi, and 

outside sources. We conducted a hazard 

criteria analysis where we filtered the 

data to identify relevant events. We 

performed a qualitative preliminary risk 

assessment and determined that this 

safety problem required corrective 

action. We performed risk analyses in 

conjunction with the E&PD risk 

assessment criteria. We identified that 

the ECi model separations have two 

inherent design deficiencies: 

Insufficient dome radius and 

insufficient head-to-barrel interference 

fit. Finally, we coordinated with our 

Corrective Action Review Board, which 

determined and agreed to the proposed 

corrective action in our August 12, 

2013, NPRM. 

Later, as part of the Challenge Team’s 

meeting in September, 2014, the CSTA 

for Aircraft Safety performed a risk 

analysis that confirmed the need for this 

AD and shaped its compliance plan. We 

compared the results of the CSTA’s risk 

analysis to the guidelines used by the 

SAD in its SARA and to the guidelines 

in the E&PD’s CAAP Handbook and 

determined that an AD is required. 

FAA Order 8040.4A requires a risk 

assessment methodology as outlined in 

the Order. FAA Order 8040.4A notes 

that the safety risk is a composite of two 

factors: The potential ‘‘severity’’ or 

worst possible consequence(s) or 

outcome of an adverse event that is 

assumed to occur, and also the expected 

frequency of occurrence or likelihood of 

occurrence (failure rate) for that specific 

adverse event. Each of these factors is 

assessed independent of the other and 

then entered as separate inputs into a 

risk matrix that yields an overall level 

of risk for the event. 

We performed the risk assessment 

required by FAA Order 8040.4A and 

concluded that this AD was necessary. 

Therefore, our August 12, 2013, NPRM, 

as revised by the January 8, 2015 

SNPRM, and as republished on August 

28, 2015, are consistent with FAA Order 

8040.4A, FAA Order 8110.107A, and 

the CAAP Handbook. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Commenters, including 

Danbury Holdings, commented that the 

FAA should not have included the 

failure rate of the affected ECi cylinders 

in the FAA risk assessments that were 

used to substantiate the need for the 

corrective actions in this AD. Danbury 

Holdings indicated that the failure rate 

is irrelevant to the unsafe condition. 

Response. We disagree. We did not 

use the failure rate in the risk analysis, 

however, we used the number of 

reported failures. A risk analysis 

involves using past data; both successful 

operation as well as failures (including 

cracks), to develop a relationship 

between part parameters, including age 

and usage, and risk of failure. Therefore, 

our use of failures was appropriate in 

this risk analysis. We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

commented that the FAA ignored its 

own standards for what constitutes an 

unsafe condition and therefore has 

failed to identify one. 

Response. We disagree. The FAA 

followed its standard risk analysis 

processes in determining that the unsafe 

condition represented by the affected 

ECi cylinder assemblies exists. 14 CFR 

part 39 prescribes that we issue an AD 

when an unsafe condition exists in a 

product and that condition is likely to 

exist or develop in other products of the 

same type design. We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the basis for the FAA’s 

risk analysis is seriously flawed because 

the unsafe condition must be the basis 

for the failure, not one unsubstantiated 

fatality. 

Response. We disagree. The unsafe 

condition in the engine presented by the 

presence of affected ECi cylinders is the 

basis of this AD. We did not change this 

AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings further 

commented that the FAA had failed to 

establish a connection between the 

cylinder separation issue addressed by 

this AD and the official reports of the 

two fatal accidents that the FAA 

references. 

Response. We disagree. Reports by the 

Bahamas Department of Civil Aviation 

and the NTSB establish that these 

accidents in the Bahamas and in 

Swanzey, New Hampshire involved 

separated ECi cylinders (see Report 

AAIPU# A10–01312 and NTSB 

Accident Report No. NYC02FA178, 

respectively). We have determined that 

the separation of the affected ECi 

cylinder assemblies represents an 

unsafe condition. We are not required to 

establish any further connection with 

these accidents. We did not change this 

AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings added 

that the FAA should not have included 

the fatal accident in the Bahamas in the 

FAA’s risk assessments because the 

NTSB full narrative for that accident 

(ERA11WA008) made no mention of a 

cylinder separation. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

as the fatal accident in the Bahamas is 

not relevant to this AD. We disagree. As 

noted in the previous comment 

response, we have determined that the 

separation of the affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies, as occurred in the accident 

in the Bahamas, represents an unsafe 

condition. We did not change this AD. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

stated that the root cause of the other 

fatal accident, the Swanzey, New 

Hampshire, accident (see NTSB 

Accident Report No. NYC02FA178) that 

the FAA included in its risk 

assessments was unsafe and improper 

operation of the airplane by the pilot not 

cylinder separation. 

Response. We disagree. As noted in 

the preceding comment discussion, we 

have determined that the separation of 

the affected ECi cylinder assemblies, as 

occurred in the accident in Swanzey, 

New Hampshire, represents an unsafe 

condition and is therefore relevant to 

this AD. We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace added 

that the accident in the Bahamas should 

not be included in the FAA’s risk 

analysis because: (1) It did not concern 

a U.S.-registered aircraft and therefore 

cannot be used in this rulemaking; (2) 

loss of control and uncontrolled flight 

was cited as the cause; and (3) even if 

the accident could be included, it does 

not meet hazard level thresholds 

required for rulemaking. 

Response. The commenter presents 

three comments, which have three parts. 

We disagree with all three parts. As to 

part one, the Bahamas accident involved 

a U.S.-type certificated product, an 

engine with affected ECi cylinders 


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installed. Therefore, the product is the 

proper subject of this AD. As to part 

two, the accident involved an engine 

with an ECI cylinder separation, a 

failure of a part of the engine, during 

flight. A cylinder separation during 

flight represents an unsafe condition in 

the engine. Therefore, our action in 

issuing this AD is appropriate. As to the 

part three, the cylinder failure presented 

a hazard to the engine and an unsafe 

condition, and therefore, meets the 

threshold for an AD. The need for this 

AD was confirmed by comparing the 

result of the risk analysis to the 

guidelines in the SAD’s SARA and the 

E&PD’s CAAP Handbook. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Request That the FAA Define 

Guidelines Used To Define an Unsafe 

Condition 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA had not 

defined the guidelines that it used to 

establish the existence of an unsafe 

condition. 

Response. We interpret the comment 

to be a request to identify what guidance 

defines an unsafe condition. The 

comment therefore, is not to the 

technical merits of this AD, but a 

request for general guidance. As such, a 

response is unnecessary per the 

Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 

and we recommend that the commenter 

seek his answer through a direct request 

to the FAA Aircraft Certification Service 

or Flight Standards Division. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Request To Withdraw the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM Because Supporting 

Documents Do Not Support Issuing This 

AD 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the documents 

provided by the FAA in Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0002 do not support 

issuance of this AD. The supporting 

documents referred to by Danbury 

Holdings are: (1) The risk analysis 

conducted by the FAA’s CSTA for 

Aircraft Safety Analysis; (2) a risk 

analysis using the Small Airplane Risk 

Analysis (SARA) methods; (3) a June 

2011, presentation by Airmotive 

Engineering to the FAA concerning its 

ECi cylinder assemblies; (4) a list of ECi 

cylinder assembly failure reports 

consisting of only those reports where 

both cylinder serial number and time in 

service are included in the reports; (5) 

a list of additional failures of ECi 

cylinder assemblies reported by a 

maintenance organization; and (6) 

Airmotive Engineering Corporation 

Technical Report 1102–13, dated April 

30, 2011. 

Response. We disagree. The 

supporting documents that Danbury 

Holdings referred to, identified above, 

support that the FAA followed its 

process and were used to help 

determine that an unsafe condition 

exists. We have also uploaded 

additional documents to Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0002 on June 23, 2015 (see 

ADDRESSES section of this final rule for 

information on locating the docket). 

The risk analysis performed by the 

FAA’s CSTA for Aircraft Safety 

Analysis, recommends removal and 

replacement of the affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies as specified in this AD. The 

SARA applied to failures of ECi cylinder 

assemblies confirms that an AD is 

necessary. AEC Technical Report 1102– 

13 states that a root cause for the first 

thread separations was an inherent 

design deficiency in the form of 

insufficient head-to-barrel design 

interference fit. AEC Technical Report 

1102–13 recommended withdrawing 

these cylinder assemblies from service. 

We did not withdraw the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that that the FAA’s risk 

analyses and other technical 

information were ‘‘flawed, improperly 

applied, and replete with 

unsubstantiated conclusions.’’ 

Response. The commenter failed to 

provide any examples of FAA technical 

information that was flawed, improperly 

applied, or replete with unsubstantiated 

conclusions. Without those details, we 

are unable to consider the comment as 

having technical merit. Accordingly, we 

interpret the comment as a general 

objection to the need for the AD. We 

disagree. Our Challenge Team applied 

the risk assessments by the FAA’s CSTA 

for Aircraft Safety Analysis, against the 

SAD’s SARA guidelines and the E&PD’s 

CAAP guidelines and independently 

concluded that an AD is required to 

mitigate the unsafe condition presented 

by installed affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies. We presented both risk 

assessments in Docket No. FAA–2012– 

0002 (see ADDRESSES section of this final 

rule for information on locating the 

docket). We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that it found no relationship 

between the risk analysis using SARA 

methods and any analysis or conclusion 

provided by the agency in this 

rulemaking. We interpret Danbury 

Holding’s comment as suggesting that 

no relationship exists between the risk 

analysis using SARA methods and any 

analysis or conclusion provided by the 

agency in this rulemaking. 

Response. We disagree. In comments 

to the August 12, 2013, NPRM some 

commenters requested that we use the 

SARA to determine if an AD was 

warranted. We used the SARA, and it 

confirmed the need for an AD. We did 

not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that RAM Aircraft had 

concluded, through its own risk 

analysis, that ‘‘the probability of a 

cylinder separation is extremely 

remote’’ and that ‘‘historical data and 

information thus far evident leads to the 

conclusion that there has been no 

physical discomfort to pilots or 

passengers and no damage to any 

aircraft as a result of the subject 

cylinders.’’ 

Response. We interpret the comment 

as two parts; first, that our risk 

assessment reached a wrong conclusion, 

and second, that a cylinder head 

separation does not result in any 

discomfort to pilots or passengers, or 

damage to the aircraft. We disagree. 

FAA Order 8040.4A, ‘‘Safety Risk 

Management Policy’’, dated April 30, 

2012, FAA Order 8110.107A, ‘‘Monitor 

Safety/Analyze Data,’’ and the guidance 

in Engine & Propeller Directorate 

memorandum ‘‘Risk Assessment for 

Reciprocating Engine Airworthiness 

Directives,’’ PS–ANE–100–1999–00006, 

dated May 24, 1999, direct how we do 

a risk assessment. 

We analyze safety risk, per FAA Order 

8040.4A, as a composite of two factors: 

The potential ‘‘severity’’ or worst 

possible consequence(s) or outcome of 

an adverse event that is assumed to 

occur, and also the ‘‘expected frequency 

of occurrence’’ for that specific adverse 

event. FAA Order 8040.4A directs us to 

assess both factors independently, then 

enter each as separate inputs into a risk 

matrix. The matrix yields an overall 

level of risk for the event. The overall 

risk is then categorized as either 

‘‘Unacceptable Risk,’’ ‘‘Acceptable Risk 

with Mitigation,’’ or ‘‘Acceptable Risk.’’ 

The corrective action(s), if any, is driven 

by the assessed overall risk. Table C–1 

of Appendix C of FAA Order 8040.4A 

defines five levels of severity and Table 

C–2 defines five levels of event 

frequency that are used in the 

determination of composite risk. 

The FAA classification for the 

‘‘severity’’ of an engine cylinder head 

separation event, per FAA Order 

8040.4A, is ‘‘hazardous’’ for both singleengine and light-twin airplanes for 

several reasons. Cylinder head 

separations can significantly reduce the 

power of the airplane such that under 

some conditions it may not be able to 

safely takeoff and climb out. It could 


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also create a dangerous asymmetric 

thrust condition for twin-engine 

airplanes. If the separation occurs in 

cruise flight, the airplane may have 

insufficient excess power to continue 

safe flight at any altitude. Cylinder head 

separations have also caused in-flight 

fires. These are all unsafe conditions 

that warrant a ‘‘hazardous’’ severity 

level for risk assessment purposes. 

Table C–2 in FAA Order 8040.4A 

defines ‘‘extremely improbable’’ as ‘‘So 

unlikely that it is not expected to occur, 

but it is not impossible.’’ It defines 

‘‘extremely remote’’ as ‘‘Expected to 

occur rarely.’’ It defines ‘‘Remote’’ as 

‘‘Expected to occur infrequently.’’ It 

defines ‘‘probable’’ as ‘‘Expected to 

occur often.’’ Finally, it defines 

‘‘frequent’’ as ‘‘expected to occur 

routinely.’’ 

Service history failure reports indicate 

that in a population of 43,000 cylinders, 

that 1 of every 1,000 cylinders could 

separate on average; either in the dome 

radius or the first thread. A singleengine airplane has six of these 

cylinders, so the actual risk of a 

separation of any one of those six 

cylinders for any given airplane is 6/ 

1,000: 1 of every 166 engines. Similarly, 

a twin-engine airplane will have 12 

cylinders, so the risk of experiencing a 

separation of one cylinder on a twinengine aircraft is twice that of a single 

engine, 12/1,000, 1 of every 83 twinengine airplanes that use these model 

cylinders. 

Separation event under-reporting 

occurs. This is evidenced by RAM 

Aircraft’s submittal of 23 additional 

reported failures of the subject ECi 

cylinders after the August 12, 2013 

NPRM was issued. Photos of these 

failures are available in Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section 

of this final rule for information on 

locating the docket). The calculated 

separation rate, therefore, is likely 

higher than what we used in our 

analysis. Also based on service 

experience, we expect more ECi 

cylinder head separations in the future. 

Therefore, we concluded that the most 

appropriate assessment for the 

frequency of occurrence for these 

cylinder separations is ‘‘Remote C’’; 

‘‘Expected to occur infrequently.’’ 

Figure C–1 of FAA Order 8040.4A is 

a risk matrix that yields an overall risk 

based on the severity classification and 

the assessed frequency of occurrence. 

Using the FAA severity classification of 

‘‘hazardous’’ and the FAA assessed 

frequency of occurrence ‘‘Remote C’’, 

yields an overall risk that is 

‘‘unacceptable.’’ The corrective actions 

required by this final rule AD are based 

on and consistent with this overall risk 

assessment. 

We, therefore, disagree with claims by 

RAM Aircraft and other commenters 

that a cylinder head separation will 

have a negligible effect on airplane 

safety. Also, several documented inflight fires were precipitated by a 

cylinder head separation. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

commented that AEC Technical Report 

1102–13 was ‘‘disavowed’’ by AEC [now 

CMI San Antonio] since it was obtained 

under questionable circumstances and 

has since been proven incorrect given 

its predictions did not come to fruition. 

Response. We disagree. AEC 

originally provided the analysis to the 

FAA when it was considering a service 

bulletin for the affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies. ECi requested the FAA 

return or destroy ECi Technical Report 

1102–13 after they learned the FAA was 

considering an AD. We found the data 

in this report useful in our 

determination of an unsafe condition. 

We did not change this AD based on 

this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA has not 

substantiated that the affected ECi 

cylinder assemblies have separated at 32 

times the rate of the OEM cylinders. 

Danbury Holdings stated that the FAA 

had not provided any supporting 

documentation to substantiate the 

FAA’s estimate that the OEM has 

produced approximately 4 times as 

many cylinders as ECi did over the same 

period of time. Danbury Holdings 

further commented that that the FAA 

ignores separations of other cylinder 

manufacturers. 

Response. We disagree. We uploaded 

supporting information, including 

service history, to Docket No. FAA– 

2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section of 

this final rule for information on 

locating the docket). We determined the 

comparative failure rate of affected ECi 

cylinders to OEM cylinders through 

comparing the service history of ECi 

cylinders to the OEM’s since ECi 

received their PMA. That service history 

shows that the affected ECi cylinders 

have had approximately eight times as 

many separations over the same period 

of time as that of the OEM cylinders; 

since ECi received its PMA. We 

compared the affected ECi cylinder 

production rates from ECi, to that of the 

OEM since ECi received its PMA. From 

ECi’s and the OEM’s production 

information, we concluded that the 

OEM has produced approximately four 

times as many cylinders as ECi since 

ECi received its PMA. This yields a 

normalized failure rate that is 

approximately 8 (comparative cylinder 

failure rate) × 4 (comparative production 

rate), which showed an overall failure 

rate 32 times higher for ECi cylinders. 

Since we first published that rate 

information, we subsequently learned of 

more failures of affected ECi cylinders. 

Those additional failures would, if 

included, increase the ECi failure rate. 

We did not update the failure rate to 

higher than 32 times that of the OEM’s 

because it did not affect our decision 

regarding this AD. We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

The FAA has also issued ADs against 

other cylinder manufacturers, including 

mandating early retirement of cylinders 

to preclude cracking and separation. For 

example, ADs 2014–05–29 and 2007– 

04–19R1 both apply to certain Superior 

Air Parts cylinder assemblies. We did 

not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

commented that the FAA failed to place 

all information in its purview into the 

docket and that the agency had failed to 

link its analyses to verifiable data. 

Response. We disagree. As previously 

noted, we have uploaded the relevant 

documents used in the decision-making 

process of this AD in Docket No. FAA– 

2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section of 

this final rule for information on 

locating the docket). Our analysis shows 

that the FAA’s actions are based on the 

data that we included in the docket. Our 

analysis is therefore linked to 

‘‘verifiable data.’’ We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA had failed to 

provide any evidence that cylinder 

separations have resulted in engine 

failures, in-flight shutdowns, and/or 

loss of control of an airplane and that 

the agency had included accidents that 

were not the direct result of a cylinder 

separation. 

Response. We disagree. A cylinder 

separating from its engine is an engine 

failure. We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Comment. RAM Aircraft commented 

that it assumes that the failures of ECi 

cylinder assemblies shown in the 

supporting document titled ‘‘ECi AD— 

Additional Failures Reported by RAM 

Aircraft’’ are based on letters RAM 

Aircraft sent to the FAA in 2013. RAM 

Aircraft, therefore, commented that this 

is not new information since the 

issuance of the January 8, 2015, SNPRM. 

Also, of the 38 photographs of damaged 

cylinder assemblies, RAM Aircraft 

noted that only 23 failures actually 

represent ECi cylinder assemblies. 

Response. We partially agree. First, 

we agree that the failed cylinder 


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assemblies identified in the supporting 

document ‘‘ECi AD—Additional 

Failures Reported by RAM Aircraft’’ do 

not represent new information since the 

issuance of the January 8, 2015, SNPRM. 

These failures are not represented in the 

SDR database but are consistent with 

our view that failures of these cylinder 

assemblies are under-reported. 

Second, we agree that some of the 

cylinder photographs uploaded to the 

docket are not cylinder assemblies 

affected by this AD. The FAA sent a 

letter to RAM Aircraft specifically 

requesting any information that RAM 

Aircraft had relative to failures of ECi 

cylinder assemblies, P/N AEC 631397, 

after we learned of possible failures that 

had not been reported as required by 14 

CFR 21.3. RAM Aircraft responded to 

this request with the photographs and 

data that we uploaded into Docket 

FAA–2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section 

of this final rule for information on 

locating the docket). These photographs 

did not have any effect on our decision 

to issue this AD. We did not change this 

AD based on this comment. 

Request To Describe FAA’s Validation 

Process 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

requested that the FAA provide a 

description of the validation process 

that was used for each of the cylinder 

separations that the FAA used to 

substantiate the need for this AD. 

Response. We interpret this comment 

as a request for identification of how we 

found out about the failures of ECi 

cylinder assemblies. We found out 

about the ECi cylinder assembly failures 

from the FAA SDR database and 

warranty information at ECi and RAM 

Aircraft, and failure reports from 

operators. Many of the operator SDR 

reports contained detailed information 

describing the nature and specific 

location of the separation. The findings 

of ECi Technical Report 1102–13 agreed 

with the original failure reports. We did 

not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

C. Comments to the FAA’s Rulemaking 

Processes 

Request To Follow the APA 

Comment. IPL Group, RAM Aircraft, 

and Danbury Holdings commented that 

the FAA had failed to follow the 

requirements of the APA when it 

dispositioned previous comments to the 

August 12, 2013, NPRM, and the 

January 8, 2015, SNPRM. IPL Group 

indicated that the FAA had, for 

example, summarily discounted 

previous comments, failed to conduct 

appropriate investigations of the failed 

cylinder assemblies, and 

mischaracterized hazard levels in the 

proposed ADs. 

RAM Aircraft also commented that its 

previous comments were dispositioned 

in general categories in the January 8, 

2015, SNPRM. RAM Aircraft, however, 

does not believe that the specifics of its 

comments were adequately or properly 

responded to, as required by the APA. 

Response. We disagree. The 

commenters failed to provide any 

examples of where we failed to comply 

with the APA in our handling of 

comments to the August 12, 2013, 

NPRM, and by extension, the January 8, 

2015, and August 25, 2015, SNPRMs. 

We have in our responses to the NPRM 

and the SNPRMs, and herein in this 

final rule, fully responded to all 

comments, including those comments 

concerning our investigation of the 

unsafe condition, hazard levels, and 

conclusions. 

We carefully considered all comments 

we received. In our January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM and August 28, 2015, SNPRM, 

we responded to several hundred 

comments that we had received. Many 

were substantively the same and, 

therefore, as previously discussed we 

grouped them into several categories 

and answered the comments by 

category. The commenters have not 

indicated what, if anything, is improper 

about doing so nor how doing as we did 

might have violated the requirements of 

the APA. In this final rule, we 

responded to all remaining comments. 

We again used categories to group and 

answer comments that were similar if 

not identical. As to improperly 

recognizing affected ECi cylinder 

assemblies, we based our applicability 

of this AD on the reports of failure 

provided by ECi, the manufacturer, the 

reports required by 14 CFR that form the 

basis for the SDR, and the reports of the 

commenters themselves. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because They Are Arbitrary and 

Capricious 

Comment. Danbury Holdings and 

ARSA referred to the proposed rule as 

‘‘arbitrary and capricious’’ because it 

does not apply equally to cylinder 

assemblies manufactured by the OEM. 

Danbury Holdings observed that the 

OEM’s cylinders also separate and that 

the FAA has singled out ECi with this 

AD action. 

Response. We disagree. The FAA is 

not mandating similar corrective actions 

against the OEM’s cylinders because 

OEM service history data is different. 

Our review of OEM service history 

indicates that OEM cylinder assembly 

failures, unlike ECi cylinder assembly 

failures, are not traceable to any specific 

design or manufacturing anomaly. In 

contrast, the ECi PMA cylinder 

separations are traceable to design 

deficiencies, which ECi itself identified 

in ECi Technical Report 1102–13. We 

did not find the ECi cylinder assembly 

design deficiencies in cylinder 

assemblies produced by any other 

manufacturer. Further, ECi’s failure rate 

is some 32 times greater than the OEM’s. 

We did not change this AD based on 

this comment. 

Comment. ARSA also indicated the 

rule is arbitrary and capricious because 

the FAA has failed to ‘‘examine the 

relevant data and articulate a 

satisfactory explanation for its action 

including a ‘rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice 

made.’’ Further, ARSA cites the APA as 

requiring federal agencies to allow 

meaningful public participation in the 

rulemaking process and provide a 

‘‘statement of basis and purpose’’ 

justifying a rule’s issuance.’’ ARSA 

notes the obligation of the FAA to 

demonstrate a sound factual basis for 

the issuance of a rule by specifically 

disclosing to interested parties the 

material upon which a prospective rule 

would be fashioned. 

Response. We disagree. Beyond its 

generalized allegation, the commenter 

did not identify any examples of agency 

shortcoming. We examined the relevant 

data, including the failure rate of the 

ECi assemblies, the ECi cylinder 

assembly design deficiencies, and the 

consequences to the engine and airplane 

when an ECi cylinder assembly failed. 

We reviewed and applied the applicable 

FAA Orders and policies. 

The agency therefore, has articulated 

a satisfactory explanation for its action 

including a ‘‘rational connection 

between the facts found and the choice 

made.’’ 

We provided the public several 

opportunities to participate in this rule 

making; through extending the comment 

period and the two supplemental 

notices with their comment periods. For 

example, we first published an NPRM 

on August 12, 2013 (78 FR 48828), then 

published an extension of the comment 

period on September 26, 2013 (78 FR 

59293) to allow the public additional 

time to comment on the proposed rule. 

We then issued a notice of availability 

of an initial regulatory flexibility 

analysis on March 12, 2014 (79 FR 

13924). We reviewed the over 500 

comments to the proposed rule that we 

had received, determined that we 

needed to review how we proposed to 

address the unsafe condition, formed a 

team to review the technical basis of the 


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proposed rule, the numerous public 

comments, and the additional failure 

information provided by commenters to 

the NPRM. Through this team we 

confirmed that an AD is needed to 

correct the unsafe condition represented 

by the subject cylinder assemblies 

installed in aircraft engines, but that we 

could do so through a lengthier 

compliance interval. We published that 

revised compliance interval in our 

January 8, 2015, SNPRM. 

After publication of the January 8, 

2015, SNRPM, we issued the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM to allow us to explain the 

rationale for this AD action. We also 

added several documents to Docket No. 

FAA–2012–0002 (see ADDRESSES section 

of this final rule for information on 

locating the docket), including the risk 

analyses by our CSTA for Aircraft Safety 

Analysis, and one using SARA methods, 

and various technical documents that 

list failures of ECi cylinder assemblies. 

For each of the documents we 

published, we allowed the public an 

opportunity to provide comments. We 

did not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Comment. ARSA also commented that 

presentation of relevant comments is 

further stymied by the agency’s 

conclusory and unsupported responses 

to the NPRM submissions. ARSA 

commented that the agency stated that 

it was irrelevant that the root cause of 

the cylinder failures is unknown and 

that it ‘‘disagreed’’ that pilot error was 

a factor. 

Response. We disagree. The purpose 

of this AD is to remove an unsafe 

condition in aircraft engines, not to 

identify root cause of cylinder failure(s). 

This AD resolves the unsafe condition 

by removing the affected cylinder 

assemblies from service in the engine 

models listed in this AD. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

commented that the FAA had not 

provided substantiation for a change in 

the design requirement that ensures safe 

operation with one inoperative cylinder. 

Response. The comment is not 

germane to this AD. We direct the 

commenter to the regulations relevant to 

design requirements, as found in 14 

CFR. We did not withdraw the August 

28, 2015, SNPRM. 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA has admitted 

that the SDR database is problematic 

and that the FAA picked and chose data 

to fit a conclusion. 

Response. We disagree. The SDR 

database reflects input received from 

field reporting. The SDR database may 

not reflect all service difficulty 

problems with affected ECI cylinder 

assemblies, but what information it 

contains indicates the need for this AD. 

Moreover, the SDR database is only one 

tool in our decision-making process. We 

did not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Comment. Several commenters 

commented that the FAA should 

withdraw the January 8, 2015, SNPRM 

because it unfairly targets ECi. 

Response. We disagree. This AD does 

not ‘‘target’’ ECi, the PMA manufacturer 

of the affected cylinder assemblies. The 

AD resolves an unsafe condition in a 

product. We did not change this AD 

based on this comment. 

Request To Substantiate That This AD 

Does Not Affect Airplanes Operated by 

Federal or State Agencies 

Comment. Danbury Holdings 

commented that the FAA had not 

provided documentation to substantiate 

that no affected airplanes are operated 

by federal or state agencies. 

Response. The comment is not 

relevant to whether this AD is necessary 

to resolve the unsafe condition 

presented by the engine with the 

affected ECi cylinders installed. We did 

not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

Request To Substantiate That Airplanes 

Operating in Alaska Are Not Affected 

Comment. Danbury Holdings stated 

that the FAA had not provided 

documentation that substantiates that 

remote locations of Alaska are not 

served by airplanes affected by this AD. 

Response. The comment is not 

relevant to the technical basis for this 

AD. Further we state that this AD will 

not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to 

the extent that it justifies making a 

regulatory distinction. We did not 

change this AD based on this comment. 

Request To Send Proposed Rule to 

Office of Information and Regulatory 

Affairs (OIRA) and Small Business 

Administration (SBA) 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace 

commented that per Executive Order 

(E.O.) No. 13272, the FAA should 

provide the draft rule to the OIRA in the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) under E.O. No. 12866 and to the 

SBA’s Chief Counsel for Advocacy. 

Response. We partially agree. We do 

not agree that this rule meets the criteria 

of a significant regulatory action under 

E.O. 12866. Therefore, we did not 

provide the draft rule to the OMB. We 

agree that the rule has a significant 

effect on a substantial number of small 

entities. We, therefore, provided a copy 

of the rule to the SBA’s Chief Counsel 

for Advocacy for comment. We received 

no comments from the SBA. 

D. Comments to the Cost of This AD 

Request To Revise and Provide 

Supporting Data for Number of Affected 

Cylinder Assemblies and Engines 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace and 

RAM Aircraft indicated that the FAA 

has under-estimated the numbers of 

airplanes and engines affected and up to 

11,000 aircraft may be affected based on 

the aircraft registry, or otherwise hasn’t 

provided the data it used to determine 

the affected population of engines and 

cylinders. 

Response. We disagree in part. We do 

not agree that 11,000 aircraft may be 

affected by this AD, or that we haven’t 

provided the data used to determine the 

affected populations. Not all aircraft and 

engines on the aircraft registry use the 

affected ECi cylinder assemblies. 

Further, the commenter hasn’t provided 

any factual basis for its assumption that 

all aircraft on the aircraft registry use 

ECi cylinder assemblies. 

We agree that we could better 

estimate the number of engines affected 

by this AD. We again reviewed our 

estimate. We now estimate that 

approximately 6,200 engines are 

affected by this AD. That number is 

based on our initial estimate of 

approximately 43,000 affected cylinder 

assemblies produced by ECi from 2002 

to 2011. This number is supported by 

AEC Technical Report 1102–13, dated 

April 30, 2011. We then reduced 43,000 

by our estimated number of cylinder 

assemblies that would have been 

removed from service. 

Our review indicates that 

approximately 6,000 of the 43,000 

cylinder assemblies would have been 

retired from service by the time of the 

publication of this AD. Therefore, we 

estimate 37,000 cylinder assemblies 

may be in service, as of June 1, 2016. We 

divided this number by 6 cylinders per 

engine to give us an estimated 6,167 

engines in service. To increase the 

conservatism of our cost estimate, we 

rounded this figure to 6,200 engines. We 

revised our cost estimate to reflect these 

updated calculations. 

Request To Revise the Number of Labor 

Hours to Perform This AD 

Comment. A few commenters, 

including IPL Group, indicated that the 

number of hours to replace 6 cylinders 

would be greater than the 18 hours that 

we estimated in our costs of 

compliance. 

Response. We agree. In the August 12, 

2013, NPRM, and the January 8, 2015, 

and August 28, 2015, SNPRM, we 


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estimated 18 work hours. Although the 

commenters did not provide data to 

support increasing the number of work 

hours, we held discussions with 

manufacturers regarding the number of 

hours they would allow to perform this 

work. Based on these more recent 

discussions, we revised our estimate for 

the number of work hours to replace 6 

cylinder assemblies to 32 hours. 

Request To Revise Cost of Replacing a 

Cylinder Assembly in This AD 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace, 

Danbury Holdings, RAM Aircraft, and 

IPL Group commented that the cost of 

a cylinder assembly, as calculated by 

the FAA, does not accurately represent 

replacement costs. The commenters 

indicated that the FAA’s use of ‘‘prorated cost’’ allows a vast 

underestimation of actual expenses that 

would be incurred by owners. The 

agency must at least provide sound 

reasoning and facts supporting the 

assertion that the pro-rated cost ‘‘more 

accurately reflects’’ replacement cost. 

IPL Group further commented that a 

‘‘pro-rated value’’ is inconsistent with 

FAA policy and the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

Response. We disagree in part. 

Industry, including ECi, uses pro-rated 

cost in its cost estimates. For example, 

ECi, in its MSB 05–8, Revision No. 1, 

dated December 29, 2005, used a similar 

time in service based pro-rated cost 

calculation to determine the discounted 

cost to operators for replacement 

cylinders, instead of providing the 

cylinders to the operators at no cost. 

Further, we typically use pro-rated cost 

for larger, turbofan engines when lifelimited parts are involved. Operators of 

those engines are typically airlines and 

other large operators. Pro rata estimating 

therefore, is an acceptable method of 

estimating cost. 

We agree however, that engines with 

affected ECi cylinders installed may be 

installed on airplanes owned by 

individual operators in the general 

aviation community, who are less 

familiar with the concept of pro-rated 

costs to ADs. In consequence, we 

revised our estimate to use the full 

replacement cost of each cylinder 

assembly even though this will likely 

result in an over-estimate of the total 

cost of this AD. We, therefore, used the 

replacement cost of 6 cylinder 

assemblies in this final rule. This 

resulted in an increase from $4,202 in 

the SNPRMs to $11,520 in this final 

rule. 

Request To Include Additional Costs in 

the Overall Cost Estimate 

Comment. IPL Group and Danbury 

Aerospace requested that we add 

additional costs to our overall cost 

estimate. IPL Group indicated that the 

FAA should include costs for loss of use 

of the aircraft, test flight, and break-in 

expenses. Danbury Aerospace 

commented that we should account for 

loss of overhauled assemblies as 

replacement items and new costs 

associated strictly with their 

replacement. 

Response. We disagree. In 

constructing our cost estimate, we 

followed the guidance of the FAA’s 

Airworthiness Directives Manual, FAA– 

IR–M–8040.1C, dated May 17, 2010, 

which states ‘‘Do not state any costs 

beyond initial work-hours and parts 

costs. . . .’’ The additional costs cited 

by the commenters are not appropriate 

to our cost estimates. We did not change 

this AD based on this comment. 

Request To Withdraw the SNPRMs 

Because of Excessive Overall Cost 

Comment. Several commenters 

commented that the FAA should 

withdraw the January 8, 2015, SNPRM 

and the August 28, 2015, SNPRMs 

because the FAA has underestimated 

the cost of compliance of this AD. These 

commenters represented that the true 

cost is too high and that the FAA has 

ignored the broader impact of this AD 

on industry. Most commenters failed to 

provide any data to support these 

claims, however, IPL Group provided 

some calculations to show that the total 

cost of this AD should be somewhere 

between $168,666,625 and 

$320,360,156. 

Response. We disagree. We 

considered the impact that this AD 

would have on operators. As explained 

in response to the comments above, we 

increased our estimates of inspection 

costs, labor costs, and replacement costs 

of the cylinder assemblies. Although we 

increased our cost estimate, we still 

conclude that the unsafe condition 

represented by the affected cylinder 

assemblies requires an AD. We did not 

withdraw the SNPRMs based on this 

comment. 

Request To Substantiate Record-Keeping 

and Time Estimates 

Comment. Danbury Holdings also 

stated that the FAA had not provided 

documentation to substantiate its 

estimated record keeping cost and time 

estimates. 

Response. We agree in part. We 

interpret this comment as a reference to 

both time spent on checking log books 

and reporting requirements. We 

withdrew our reporting requirement 

when we published the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM, so we have no need to account 

for that cost. We added an inspection 

cost in this final rule for the time 

operators spend determining if they 

own an ECi cylinder assembly affected 

by this AD. The Costs of Compliance 

section now states ‘‘We estimate 0.5 

hours will be needed to check log books 

to determine if an engine is affected by 

this AD.’’ 

E. Administrative Comments 

Request To Clarify Address 

Comment. The Continental Motors 

Group commented that the business at 

the address and telephone number 

listed in the August 28, 2015, SNPRM 

(9503 Middlex Drive, San Antonio, 

Texas 78217, Phone 210–820–8101) is 

now that of Continental Motors Inc., San 

Antonio. Continental Motors Group also 

indicated that the associated company 

Web site (http://www.eci.aero/pages/ 

tech_svcpubs.aspx) listed in the August 

28, 2015, SNPRM is not functional at 

this time. 

Response. We agree. We updated the 

address and Web site information listed 

in the ADDRESSES and ‘‘Related 

Information’’ sections of this AD. 

Request To Provide Names of Those 

Involved in the AD Process 

Comment. Danbury Aerospace and 

Danbury Holdings commented that the 

FAA should provide the names and 

technical positions of each of the 

members of the multi-disciplinary/ 

multi-directorate team that were 

involved in the review of this service 

difficulty problem, along with the dates, 

locations, and minutes for any meetings 

that were held. 

Response. We disagree. The names 

and positions of personnel associated 

with reviewing this AD are not 

necessary to the public’s participation 

in the development of this AD. We did 

not change this AD based on this 

comment. 

F. Support for the SNPRM 

Comment. The NTSB commented that 

it believes that the August 28, 2015, 

SNPRM will satisfy the intent of NTSB 

Safety Recommendation A–12–7. An 

individual commenter indicated that he 

had reviewed the SDR database and 

determined that the separation rate of 

ECi cylinder assemblies is 

approximately 10 times the rate of OEM 

cylinder assemblies. 

Response. We note the comment. 


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Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting this AD 

as proposed. 

Costs of Compliance 

We estimate that this AD affects about 

6,200 CMI model IO–520, TSIO–520, 

IO–550, and IOF–550 reciprocating 

engines and all other CMI engine 

models approved for the use of CMI 

models –520 and –550 cylinder 

assemblies (such as the CMI model –470 

when modified by STC), installed on 

airplanes of U.S. registry. The average 

labor rate is $85 per hour. We estimate 

0.5 hours will be needed to check log 

books to determine if an engine is 

affected by this AD. We estimate that 

about 32 hours will be required to 

replace all six cylinder assemblies of an 

engine during overhaul. We estimate the 

cost of replacement of six cylinder 

assemblies to be, on average, about 

$11,520 per engine. Based on these 

figures, we estimate the total cost of this 

AD to U.S. operators to change all ECi 

cylinder assemblies to be $88,551,500. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Flexibility Determination 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) establishes ‘‘as a principle of 

regulatory issuance that agencies shall 

endeavor, consistent with the objective 

of the rule and of applicable statutes, to 

fit regulatory and informational 

requirements to the scale of the 

business, organizations, and 

governmental jurisdictions subject to 

regulation.’’ To achieve that principle, 

the RFA requires agencies to solicit and 

consider flexible regulatory proposals 

and to explain the rationale for their 

actions. The RFA covers a wide range of 

small entities, including small 

businesses, not-for-profit organizations, 

and small governmental jurisdictions. 

Agencies must perform a review to 

determine whether a proposed or final 

rule will have a significant economic 

impact on a substantial number of small 

entities. If the agency determines that it 

will, the agency must prepare a 

regulatory flexibility analysis as 

described in the Act. The FAA 

determined that this rule will have a 

significant economic impact on a 

substantial number of small entities 

and, accordingly, as required by Section 

603(a) of the RFA, the FAA prepared 

and published an initial regulatory 

flexibility analysis (IRFA) (79 FR 13924, 

March 12, 2014) as part of the NPRM (79 

FR 48828, August 12, 2013) and initial 

SNPRM (80 FR 1008, January 8, 2015) 

for this rule. For the second SNPRM, the 

FAA inadvertently stated that there 

would be no significant impact on a 

substantial number of entities. We also 

omitted the IRFA from the second 

SNPRM because we thought 

republication unnecessary as costs had 

not changed and the IRFA had already 

been published in the first SNPRM. In 

addition to the IRFA, Section 604 of the 

RFA also requires an agency to publish 

a final regulatory flexibility analysis 

(FRFA) in the Federal Register when 

issuing a final rule. 

With this FRFA we correct our 

misstatement in the second SNPRM and 

restate our previous conclusions for the 

NPRM and in the first SNPRM that the 

rule will have a significant impact on a 

substantial number of small entities. 

Accordingly, in the following section 

we undertake the regulatory flexibility 

analysis. 

Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 

Under Section 604(a) of the RFA, the 

Final analysis must address: 

(1) Statement of the need for, and 

objectives of, the rule. 

This final rule AD was prompted by 

failure reports of multiple cylinder 

head-to-barrel separations and cracked 

and leaking aluminum cylinder heads. 

This AD will apply to certain CMI San 

Antonio replacement PMA cylinder 

assemblies marketed by ECi, used on the 

CMI model –520 and –550 reciprocating 

engines, and all other engine models 

approved for the use of CMI model –520 

and –550 cylinder assemblies such as 

the CMI model –470 when modified by 

STC. 

(2) Statement of the significant issues 

raised by the public comments in 

response to the initial regulatory 

flexibility analysis, a statement of the 

assessment of the agency of such issues, 

and a statement of any changes made in 

the proposed rule as a result of such 

comments. 

Danbury Holdings commented that 

the FAA had not provided the raw data 

that was used in the IRFA. We note that 

the provision of raw data is not required 

by the FAA’s rulemaking procedures or 

orders. 

In response to comments about 

problems with the repetitive 

compression/soap test proposed by the 

NPRM, the FAA agrees that these tests 

do not always reliably detect a cracked 

cylinder of this failure mode and 

therefore the costs associated with such 

tests outweigh the safety benefits. In the 

January 8, 2015 SNPRM the FAA 

removed the requirement for repetitive 

compression/soap inspection tests. 

The FAA received comments 

questioning the reduction of the 

estimated number of smaller air service 

businesses (in addition to the estimated 

609 small part 135 operators) that would 

be affected by the rule, from 5,000 in the 

IRFA to 2,000 in the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM. We note that in both cases the 

FAA stated that a substantial number of 

small entities would be affected. Given 

the lack of available data, the FAA is 

unable to make an accurate estimate of 

the number of smaller air service 

businesses that will be affected by this 

rule, but acknowledges that this number 

is substantial. In addition to the 609 

small part 135 operators, we therefore 

estimate in this final rule that the 

number of smaller air service businesses 

affected is substantial. 

After publication of the NPRM and 

after publication of each of the two 

SNPRMs, we also received comments 

from small businesses concerning 

understated compliance costs. Some 

commenters stated that the labor rate 

and the hours required to replace an 

affected engine’s cylinders are 

underestimated. We agree with this 

comment in part and have increased our 

estimate of the labor hours required to 

replace an affected engine’s six cylinder 

assemblies from 18 to 32 hours, with a 

corresponding labor cost increase from 

$1,530 to $2,720. 

In response to comments we have also 

increased our cost of materials estimate 

from a loss-of-service estimate of $4,202 

to the full cost to replace all six 

cylinders, which has increased to 

$11,520. Our estimate of the total cost 

to replace all six cylinders has therefore 

increased from $5,732 to $14,240. 

After publication of the August 28, 

2015, SNPRM, we received negative 

comments concerning the inadvertent 

change from our original determination 

of a significant economic impact on a 


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52990 Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 

2This assessment does not take into account 

record keeping requirement costs. These costs, 

however, are minor and do not affect our 

assessment of the number of small part 121 

operators significantly impacted by the final rule. 

substantial number of small entities in 

the IRFA (and the January 8, 2015, 

SNPRM) to a determination of no 

significant impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. As noted in 

the introductory section, we are 

correcting this oversight in this FRFA. 

(3) The response of the agency to any 

comments filed by the Chief Counsel for 

Advocacy of the Small Business 

Administration in response to the 

proposed rule, and a detailed statement 

of any change made to the proposed 

rule in the final rule as a result of the 

comments. 

The SBA did not submit comments. 

(4) Description and an estimated 

number of small entities to which the 

final rule will apply. 

Of the 610 part 135 operators we 

found to be affected by this rule, we 

identified 609 that meet the Small 

Business Administration (SBA) 

definition of a small entity (entities with 

1,500 or fewer employees) that will be 

affected by this final rule. On this basis 

alone, we conclude that the final rule 

will affect a substantial number of small 

entities. In addition, we estimate that a 

substantial, but undetermined number 

of smaller air services businesses will be 

affected by this final rule. The FAA is 

unaware of the assets or financial 

resources of these businesses. The 

affected part 135 and smaller air 

services fly fixed wing aircraft; employ 

less than 1,500 employees; and conduct 

a variety of air services such as fly 

passengers and cargo for hire. 

(5) Description of the record keeping 

and other compliance requirements of 

the final rule. 

Record Keeping Requirement 

The FAA estimates 0.5 hours will be 

needed to check log books to determine 

if an engine is affected by this AD. At 

a wage rate of $85 per hour, the 

estimated cost will be $42.50 per 

engine. As the affected small part 135 

operators have between one and 88 

affected airplanes, the costs of this 

requirement range from $42.50 to $3740 

per part 135 operator. 

Compliance Requirement To Replace 

Cylinder Assemblies of Affected 

Engines 

This AD applies to certain CMI model 

IO–520, TSIO–520, IO–550, and IOF– 

550 reciprocating engines and all other 

engine models approved for the use of 

CMI models -520 and -550 cylinder 

assemblies (such as the CMI model -470 

when modified by STC), installed on 

airplanes of U.S. registry. For the 

affected engines the AD requires 

replacement of the cylinder assemblies 

at reduced times-in-service. 

As noted above our estimate of the 

total cost to replace all six cylinders has 

increased from $5,732 to $14,240. As 

the number of airplanes held by affected 

small part 135 operators ranges from 

one to 88, the costs of required cylinder 

assembly replacement per operator 

range from about $14.2 thousand to 

about $1.3 million. 

To determine whether compliance 

costs will have a significant economic 

impact, we measured the cost of 

replacing cylinder assemblies of affected 

engines relative to the value of the 

affected airplanes held by the small part 

135 operators. The estimated asset value 

of the affected airplanes held by the 

small part 135 operators ranges from 

$22,000 to $19.6 million. We find that 

the cost of replacing cylinder assemblies 

relative to affected airplane asset value 

is greater than 5 percent for 468 of the 

609 affected small part 135 operators.2

We therefore conclude that the final rule 

will have a significant economic impact 

on a substantial number of small 

entities. 

(6) Steps the agency has taken to 

minimize the significant economic 

impact on small entities consistent with 

the stated objectives of applicable 

statutes, including a statement of the 

factual, policy, and legal reasons for 

selecting the alternative adopted in the 

final rule and why each one of the other 

significant alternatives to the rule 

considered by the agency which affect 

the impact on small entities was 

rejected. 

In response to comments about 

problems with repetitive compression/ 

soap test, the FAA agrees that these tests 

do not always reliably detect a cracked 

cylinder of this failure mode and the 

costs associated with such tests 

outweigh the safety benefit. The FAA 

removed that requirement for repetitive 

compression/soap inspection tests. We 

also considered these following 

alternatives: 

(a) Do nothing—This option is not 

acceptable due to the number of failures 

of ECi cylinder head assemblies and the 

consequences of the failures. 

(b) Periodic inspections only (no 

forced removals)—Though the NTSB 

recommended this option in its 

comments to the NPRM (August 12, 

2013, 78 FR 48828), the service history 

has shown that such inspections may 

not reliably detect existing cracks and 

the rate of crack growth to separation is 

unknown and variable. The NTSB also 

submitted a later comment, in response 

to the August 28, 2015, SNPRM, that the 

revised rule as adopted in this final rule, 

meets the intent of its Safety 

Recommendations A–12–7. 

(c) Forced removal with periodic 

inspections—Periodic inspections may 

not reliably detect cracks and even with 

removal the rate of crack growth to 

separation is unknown and variable. 

Forced removal is the only remaining 

option. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska to the extent that it justifies 

making a regulatory distinction, and 

(4) Will have a significant economic 

impact, positive or negative, on a 

substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2016–16–12 Continental Motors, Inc. 

(formerly Teledyne Continental Motors, 

Inc., formerly Continental): Amendment 

39–18610; Docket No. FAA–2012–0002; 

Directorate Identifier 2011–NE–42–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective September 15, 2016. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 155 / Thursday, August 11, 2016 / Rules and Regulations 52991 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Continental Motors, 

Inc. (CMI) model –520 and –550 

reciprocating engines, and to all other CMI 

engine models approved for the use of model 

–520 and –550 cylinder assemblies such as 

the CMI model –470 when modified by 

supplemental type certificate (STC), with 

Continental Motors Inc., San Antonio 

(formerly Airmotive Engineering Corp.), 

replacement parts manufacturer approval 

(PMA) cylinder assemblies, marketed by 

Engine Components International Division 

(hereinafter referred to as ECi), part number 

(P/N) AEC 631397, with ECi Class 71 or Class 

76, serial number (S/N) 1 through S/N 61176, 

installed. 

(d) Unsafe Condition 

This AD was prompted by multiple failure 

reports of cylinder head-to-barrel separations 

and cracked and leaking aluminum cylinder 

heads. We are issuing this AD to prevent 

failure of the cylinder assemblies, which 

could lead to failure of the engine, in-flight 

shutdown, and loss of control of the airplane. 

(e) Compliance 

Comply with this AD within the 

compliance times specified, unless already 

done. 

(1) Review the engine maintenance records 

to determine if any affected cylinder 

assemblies are installed. 

(2) If you cannot determine based on 

review of engine maintenance records if any 

affected cylinder assemblies are installed, 

comply with paragraph (e)(4) of this AD. 

(3) If you do not have any of the affected 

ECi cylinder assemblies installed on your 

engine, no further action is required. 

(4) Cylinder Identification and Serial 

Number Location 

(i) Check the cylinder assembly P/N and 

Class number. The ECi cylinder assembly, P/ 

N AEC 631397, Class 71 or Class 76, is 

stamped on the bottom flange of the cylinder 

barrel. Guidance on the P/N and Class 

number description and location can be 

found in ECi Service Instruction No. 99–8– 

1, Revision 9, dated February 23, 2009. 

(ii) If you cannot see the cylinder assembly 

P/N when the cylinder assembly is installed 

on the engine, you may use the following 

alternative method of identification: 

(A) Remove the cylinder assembly rocker 

box cover. 

(B) Find the letters ECi, cast into the 

cylinder head between the valve stems. 

(C) Check the cylinder head casting P/N. 

Affected cylinder assemblies have the 

cylinder head casting, P/N AEC 65385, cast 

into the cylinder head between the valve 

stems. 

(D) Find the cylinder assembly S/N as 

specified in paragraphs (e)(4)(iii) or (e)(4)(iv) 

of this AD, as applicable. 

(iii) For ECi cylinder assemblies, P/N AEC 

631397, manufactured through 2008, find the 

cylinder assembly S/N stamped on the intake 

port boss two inches down from the top edge 

of the head. 

(iv) For ECi cylinder assemblies, P/N AEC 

631397, manufactured on or after January 1, 

2009, find the cylinder assembly S/N 

stamped just below the top edge of the head 

on the exhaust port side. 

(5) Removal From Service 

(i) For any affected cylinder assembly with 

680 or fewer operating hours time-in-service 

(TIS) since new on the effective date of this 

AD, remove the cylinder assembly from 

service before reaching 1,000 operating hours 

TIS since new. 

(ii) For any affected cylinder assembly with 

more than 680 operating hours TIS since new 

and 1,000 or fewer operating hours TIS since 

new on the effective date of this AD, remove 

the cylinder assembly from service within 

the next 320 operating hours TIS or within 

1,160 operating hours TIS since new, 

whichever occurs first. 

(iii) For any affected cylinder assembly 

with more than 1,000 operating hours TIS 

since new on the effective date of this AD, 

remove the cylinder assembly from service 

within the next 160 operating hours or at 

next engine overhaul, whichever occurs first. 

(iv) For any affected cylinder assembly that 

has been overhauled, remove the cylinder 

assembly from service within the next 80 

operating hours TIS after the effective date of 

this AD. 

(f) Installation Prohibitions 

After the effective date of this AD: 

(1) Do not repair, or reinstall onto any 

engine, any cylinder assembly removed per 

this AD. 

(2) Do not install any affected ECi cylinder 

assembly that has been overhauled, into any 

engine. 

(3) Do not install any engine that has one 

or more affected overhauled ECi cylinder 

assemblies, onto any aircraft. 

(4) Do not return to service any aircraft that 

has an engine installed with an ECi cylinder 

assembly subject to this AD, if the cylinder 

assembly has 1,000 or more operating hours 

TIS. 

(g) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

The Manager, Delegation Systems 

Certification Office or Fort Worth Aircraft 

Certification Office, may approve AMOCs for 

this AD. Use the procedures found in 14 CFR 

39.19 to make your request. 

(h) Related Information 

(1) For more information about this AD, 

contact Jurgen E. Priester, Aerospace 

Engineer, Delegation Systems Certification 

Office, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, 10101 

Hillwood Parkway, Fort Worth, TX 76177; 

phone: 817–222–5190; fax: 817–222–5785; 

email: jurgen.e.priester@faa.gov. 

(2) For ECi Service Instruction No. 99–8– 

1, Revision 9, dated February 23, 2009, 

which is not incorporated by reference in this 

AD, contact Continental Motors—San 

Antonio, 9503 Middlex Drive, San Antonio, 

TX 78217; phone: 210–820–8101; Internet: 

http://www.continentalsanantonio.com. 

(3) You may view this service information 

at the FAA, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 

1200 District Avenue, Burlington, MA. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the FAA, call 781–238–7125. 

(i) Material Incorporated by Reference 

None. 

Issued in Burlington Massachusetts, on 

July 19, 2016. 

Colleen M. D’Alessandro, 

Manager, Engine & Propeller Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2016–18708 Filed 8–10–16; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 71 

[Docket No. FAA–2016–5856; Airspace 

Docket No. 16–AGL–9] 

Establishment of Class E Airspace; 

Park River, ND 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This action establishes Class 

E airspace in Park River, ND. Controlled 

airspace is necessary to accommodate 

new Standard Instrument Approach 

Procedures developed at Park River-W C 

Skjerven Field, Park River, ND, for the 

safety and management of Instrument 

Flight Rules (IFR) operations at the 

airport. Additionally, to correct airport 

name to correspond with the NASR in 

the header and legal description. 

DATES: Effective 0901 UTC, November 

10, 2016. The Director of the Federal 

Register approves this incorporation by 

reference action under title 1, Code of 

Federal Regulations, part 51, subject to 

the annual revision of FAA Order 

7400.9 and publication of conforming 

amendments. 

ADDRESSES: FAA Order 7400.9Z, 

Airspace Designations and Reporting 

Points, and subsequent amendments can 

be viewed on line at http://

www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/. 

For further information, you can contact 

the Airspace Policy Group, Federal 

Aviation Administration, 800 

Independence Avenue SW., 

Washington, DC, 20591; telephone: 202– 

267–8783. The Order is also available 

for inspection at the National Archives 

and Records Administration (NARA). 

For information on the availability of 

this material at NARA, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federalregulations/ibr_locations.html. 

FAA Order 7400.9, Airspace 

Designations and Reporting Points, is 

published yearly and effective on 

September 15. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Rebecca Shelby, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Operations Support 


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