2005 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

2-23-2005 

# U SA v . O r d az

P r e c e de n t i al or N on-P r e c e de n t i al : P r e c e de n t i al
D ocke t N o . 04-1671

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w . vi l l a no va . e du/thir dc ir c uit_2005/1498PRECE DENTI AL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

No. 04-1671

UNITED S TATES OF AMERI CA

v.
COSME ORD AZ, Appellant

On A ppeal from the Un ited States District Co urt for the Easte rn D istrict of P enns ylvania (D.C. No. 98-cr -00587-16)

D ist ric t Ju dg e: H on or ab le A ni ta B . B ro dy

Submitte d Under Third Circ uit LAR 34.1(a)

October 4, 2004

Be for e: S LO VI TE R, B EC KE R, a nd S TA PL ET ON , Circu it Judges (Fil ed February

23, 2005 ) Steven A. Morley M orley, Surin & G riffin Philadelphia, PA l9l06 Attorney for Appellant Kathy A . Stark Office of United St ates Att orney Philadelphia, PA l9l06 Attorney for Appelle e1 The D istrict Court had ju risdiction pursu ant to 18 U. S. C. § 323 1; this Cour t has j urisdi ction pur suant t o 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U .S.C . § 37 42.

2 The United Stat es dismi ssed one of the 21 U.S. C. § 843(b)
coun ts prior to trial.
2

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

SL OV ITE R, Circuit

Judge

. Appellant

Cosme Ordaz appeals fol lowing his convict ion by a jury and senten ce im pose d by the D istrict Co urt. 1 Ordaz ’s arguments bef

ore thi s court

all pe rtain to the s entence he recei ved. This requir es that we consider t

he effect of

the rec ent opinions of the Unit ed State s Supreme Court i n United States v. Booker , __ U.S . __, 125 S . Ct. 736 (20 05).

I. O rd az w as on e o f e ig ht ee n d ef en da nt s c ha rg ed by a federalgrand jur

y i n a superse ding indi ctment wit h various narcoti cs and conspi racy offenses. Specifi call y, the super seding indictm ent ch arged Ord az w ith one coun t of co nspirin g to di st ribute c oc ai ne invi ol at io n of 21 U .S .C . § 846 , and t

wo counts of t

he use of a t elephone i n further ance of thi s conspiracy in violation of 2 1 U.S .C. § 843 (b). 2

Ac cord ing to th e U nited S tates, the in dividu als cha rged in the super seding i ndictment were involve d in a narc otics distribut ion ri ng, which operated from 1992 unt il Octobe r 1998 und er th e so briq uet “ Or daz Co cain e O rga niza tion ” (“O CO ”). The supe rsedin g ind ictme nt alleg ed tha t the O CO wo uld o btain cocaine from a source in Miami, Flori da and transport t he narcoti cs to Pennsylvania . The OCO operated primarily out of a bar near Seve nth and Tioga St reets in North Phi ladelphia. After the ba r wa s close d, the O CO sold o ff the street.3 Lazara Ordaz was sent enced to 420 months incarc erati on. This cour t subse quen tl y affi rmed her convi ction, rejec ting her claim of ineffective assis tanc e of cou nse l. United States v. Ordaz , 111 F ed. Ap px. 128, 13 4 (3d C ir. 2004).

4 The jury also co nvicte d bo th W illiam C olon and B erto Ordaz on v arious coun ts. This court subsequ ently affirmed in pa rt
3 Among the other defendants charged in the superseding indict ment were Lazara Ordaz, Ordaz’s si ster , and Bert o Ordaz, Ordaz’s brot

her. According to the United State s, Lazar a Ordaz was the OCO’s namesake and overal l lea der. Lazara Ordaz
even tually entere d a ple a of g uilty to one coun t of co nspira cy to distribut e cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846, twenty counts of t

he use of variou s com mu nicatio ns fa cilities in fu rtheran ce of this conspir acy, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) , and one count of possess ing a firearm by a con victed felon, 18 U.S.C . § 922(g)(1). 3

In co ntrast to h is sister’s g uilty plea, O rdaz, a long with co-d efen dants William Co lon an d B erto O rdaz, p rocee ded to jury tri al. The evidence es tabli shed that Ordaz was incarce rated beginning in 1991– prior to the c onspira cy’ s inception – and was not rel eased unti l April1998. The United St ates conc eded that Ordaz was not part

of the conspiracy

untilapproximat ely

the fina l six m ont hs o f the sch em e.
Nonetheless , the government pre sented evi dence that Ordaz, immediately

prior to going t o prison in 1991, had prov ided h is sister w ith mo ney and narco tics that sh e had used to start the OCO. More crucial ly , the government al so present ed evidence t

hat, upon his re lease f

rom prison, Ordaz assi sted t he OCO by se lling and trans porti ng drugs. In addition, t he gov ernm ent pre sented wire tap ev idenc e of s evera l pho ne ca lls between Ordaz and other purport ed OCO members and affiliat es.
Af ter a tw o-w eek tria l, the jury con victed Ord az of both the conspiracy

offense, 21 U.S.C. § 846, and the use of a communicati on facil ity

in furt herance of t

he conspir acy off

ense, 21 U .S.C. § 843 (b). 4 Notably , the jury was not asked t o renderand rev erse d in par t Be rto O rda z’s c onv ictio ns, United States v. Ordaz , No. 03-3671, 2005 W L 822 12 (3d C ir. Jan. 14, 2005), and
a ffirmedCo lon ’s co nvi ction s, United States v. Colon , 45 Fed. App x. 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2002 ).

5 For purposes of sentenc ing, t he Distri ct Court “ grouped” Ordaz ’s 21 U .S.C . § 846 and 21 U .S.C. § 843(b) convictions. See gene rally U.S.S.G . § 3D1 .2 (1998).
4 any dec isi on with res pect t o drug weight; likewis e, the jury was not asked to make any determination w ith respect to O rdaz’s pr io r c rim in al h ist or y. In a Supplement al Memorandum of Law R egarding Sentenci ng Issues , Ordaz note d that t he amount of narcotics attributabl e to him had not been found by t

he jury . Relying on Apprendi v. New Jerse y , 530 U.S. 466 ( 2000), Ordaz argued that it w as im pe rm iss ib le for th e D ist ric t C ou rt, a s o pp os ed to a ju ry, to m ake a fin din g as to d rug we igh t for sen tenc ing pur pos es. Indeed, Ordazargued that the Dis tri ct Court c ould not enhance his sen tence on th e bas is of an y factor th at wo uld inc rease h is Gu ideline s rang e if suc h a fa ctor w as no t supp orted b y facts found by a j ury . Ordaz urged t he Distr ict Court

to applya baseoffe nse lev el of tw elve, the low est bas e-offense level a vailab le under the 1998 Edi tion of t he United States Sent encing Guide lines (which controlled O rdaz’s senten cing) for a defend ant c onv icted of a coc aine distr ibu tion offens e. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1( c)(14) (1998). Ordaz further submitt ed that before hi s sente nce could be increased on t he basis of an all eged pre vio us n arco tics c onv ictio n, see 21 U .S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(C); U.S.S.G. § 4B1. 1 (1998), the jur y neede d to find, beyond a reasonabl e doubt, the fact of this prior

convict ion.

At the sent encing hearing held on March 10, 2004, the District Court rej ected Ordaz’s arguments. 5 Inste ad, the Distr ict Court, agreeing with the government, applied a base-offense levelof thir

ty -two, which i s the l evel appl icabl e under the Guide lines whe n five to fifteen kilograms o f cocaine are inv olv ed. See U.S .S.G . § 2D 1.1(c)( 4) (19 98). In additio n to determi ning drug weight , the Distri ct Court f ound that Ordaz6 In addition to his Blak ely arguments, Ordaz argues tha t the District Court made factual error s in applying the Guidelines, an issue we leave to t

he Distr ict Court

on remand.

7 Because i n add ressing Blak ely , the parti es have adeq uately briefe d the iss ues c ontro lling this ap pe al , w e will deny the gov ernm ent’s re ques t to submit addi tionalbriefs regarding the effect of Booker

. 5 wa s a lead er/org anize r of the OC O a nd ad ded four p oints to his offens e lev el, see U.S.S.G. § 3B1. 1(a) ( 1998); t hat Ordaz had used firearm s in comm itting the conspiracy and a dded tw o mo re poi nts, see U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) ( 1998); and t hat Ordaz had obs truc ted ju stice and thu s ad ded ano ther two poi nts, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1. 1 (1998). In tot al, the Dist rict Court cal culat ed th at O rd az ha d a n o ff

en se lev el o f f

or ty.
The Distric t Cou rt also fo und that O rdaz h ad pr eviou sly been convict ed of severalfeloni es rendering him a car eer offender. Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1. 1 (1998), this finding r esult ed in Ordaz havi ng a crimi nal his tory categor y of VI. Combined with his offense le vel of fort y, Ordaz had a Guideli nes range of 360 m onths to life in prison . Ultimately, the District Court senten ced O rdaz to a term of 3 60 m onth s imp risonm ent.
Ordaz there after

file d a timely not ice of appealrais ing severalissues . Fir st, relying on Apprendi and the subs equent decisi on in Blakely

v. Washingt on , 542 U.S.__ , 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (e xtending Apprendi and finding unco nstitution al certain applic ations of State of Washington’s determi nate-s entenci ng scheme), Ordaz argues t hat the Distri ct Court, by fi nding drug weight and applying the other enhancements ( i.e

. , leader/organ izer, use of a firearm , and obstruc tion of justice), violate d his F ifth an d Six th A men dm ent righ t to hav e all fac ts which increase the m aximum punishm ent foun d by a jury beyond a reaso nable dou bt. 6 Ordaz further argues t hat the fact of his purported prior conv ictions needed to be fou nd by a jury befo re the D istrict Co urt cou ld use them to enh ance his sentence

. 78 Justice Gin sburg wa s the o nly Justice w ho jo ined b oth opinions.

9 Justice Breyer , along with Justices K enne dy and O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquis t, di ssente d fr om Justi ce Steven’s opini on e xtending t he Blak ely rule to the Guidelines.
6 II. In United States v. Booker , __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 738 (20 05) , the S upr em e C our t held , inter alia , that “the Sixth Amendment as construe d in Blak ely does apply to th e [F edera l] Sentenci ng Guideline s.” Booker , __ U.S. at __, 125 S. Ct. at 747 (Ste ven s, J.). Booker was decided by two opinions of the Court approved by different majoriti es. 8 In the first opinion, autho red b y Justice S teven s for a majo rity of five , wh ich w e w ill hereafter refer t o as “ Booker (Stevens) ,” the Court rea ffirmed the holding in Apprendi that “ [a]ny fact ( other t

han a prior convict ion) which i s necessaryto support a sentenc e exceeding the maximum author ized by the fact s esta

blis hed by a pl ea of guilt y or a jury verdict must be admitted by

the defendant

or proved to a j urybeyond a r easonable doubt” and ext ended that rule to th e Se nten cing Gu ideli nes
. Booker (Stevens) , U.S . at , 125 S. C t. at 75 6. The second opini on, authored by Justi ce Brey er (her eafter referred to as “ Boo ker (Breyer) ”) for a maj orit y of five, focuse d on the remedy

the Court announced. The Court he ld that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1), the provi sion of t he Sentenci ng Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) that

makes the Guidel ines mandat ory , was incom patible with the C ourt’s c onstitu tional ru ling an d that it must be s evered an d excised. S imilarly, 18 U.S.C. § 37 42(e), “the p rovisio n that se ts forth stand ards o f revie w o n app eal, including de novo review of d epartu res fro m the applic able Gu ideline s rang e,” m ust also be se vered and e xcised beca use it contai ns cri tica l cros s-ref erences to the section making t he Gu ideli nes ma nda tory. Boo ker (Breyer) , __ U. S. at __, 12 5 S. Ct. at 764. The net r esult

was to delet e the mandator y nat ure of the Guidel ines and t

ransform them to advis ory guidelines for t

he informat ion and use of t he dist rict courts in whom discretion has now been reinst ated. 9Si m ila rly, Justi ces Scalia , Souter , Steve ns, and Thomas dissented fro m J ustic e B reyer’ s sev erab ility ana lysis.
7 In applying the de cisi ons in Booker to the de fendant be fo re us , it i s n ec es sary to di st in gui shbe twe en th e two sentencing issues raised by Ord az. With resp ect to Orda z’s chall enge to the Distr ict Court ’s det erminat ion regarding drug weigh t and the en hancem ents (other than for prior conv ictions), the issue is best

determined by the Distri ct Court in the firs t inst ance and we theref

ore vacat e the sent ence and remand for resent encing i n accordance wit h Booker

. We turn to Ordaz’ s chall enge to the enhancement for prior convict ions. In thi s connecti on, it is helpful to s et fort

h the maximum punishments avai lable under the s tatutes of convict ion.

The pena lty provision of 2 1 U .S.C. § 843 (the statu te
cove ring u se of

a telep hon e to fu rther d rug c rime) p rovid es, in releva nt part, th at:

[A ]ny perso n w ho v iolates th is section shall be sen tenced to a term of impris onment of not more t han 4 year s, a fine under Tit le 18, or both;
exce pt that if any pe rson c om mits such a v iolation after one o r more prior convict ions

. . . for viol ation of this secti on, or for

a felony under any other pr ovisi on of this subchapter or subchapter

II of t his chapt er or ot

her law o f the U nited S tates rela ting to
nar cotic drugs
. . . h ave bec ome fina l, such person s hall be sentence d to a te rm of impris onment of not more tha n 8 years , a fine u nder Title 18, or bot

h. 21 U.S.C. § 843(d) (1) (e mphasis added) . Therefor e, due t o the10 In sen tencin g O rdaz, th e D istrict Co urt i mp osed its ultima te sentence of 360 months of inc arceration on both the 21 U.S .C. § 843(b) and 21 U.S .C. § 846 con victi ons
. See App. at 733. Even underthe pre- Booker framework, t his sentence was error

as to the § 843(b) convi ction be cause the maximum penalty under that statute is eig ht yea rs. See United States v. Lee , 359 F.3d194, 209- 10 (3d Cir. 200 4) (“[ T]he Gu ideline s instruc t[] a co urt to apply the
sa me sentence t o each count in t he same group, unless t he statutorily authori zed maximum for that count is les s than the minimum of the gui deline range. . . .” ). However, be cau se t he Distri ctCourt imposed conc urrent sentence s for the § 843(b) and § 846 conv ictions, it is u nlikely that O rdaz w as pre judice d by this
error. Nonet heless , on rem and, th e D istrict Co urt is instru cted to struc tur e th e sentenc e it imposes in a manner c onsist ent with t he statu tory m axim um s. 8 finding by

the Dist rict Court that

Ordaz had a pri or federal narcotics con viction, Orda z was s ubject to a m aximum statutory penalty of ei ght-y ears i mprisonment for his 21 U.S. C. § 843(b) convict ion. 10
The conspira cy s tatute of conviction, t he other of

fense for which Ordaz was sentence d, provi des that “[a]ny person who attem pts or c onsp ires to co mm it any offense defin ed in th is subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescr ibed for t

he offense, the commissi on of which was the object of the attempt or c onspira cy. ” 21 U.S.C. § 846. The object of the conspiracy

for which Ordaz was convic ted was the distribution of cocaine; the penalti es for this substantive offense are set forth at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) and depend upon the t ype and amount of drugs, as well as whether a defendant had prior narcotics convicti ons. The jury convict ed Ordaz of conspiring to di stribute an unspecifi ed amount of cocai ne, a sche dule IIcontrol led sub stan ce. See 21 U .S.C. § 812 (c)(Sched ule II)(a)(4). Unde r § 841(b), the maximum stat utory sentence for Ordaz’s § 846 convict ion would appear to have been t

wenty y ears or

240
mo nth s inc arce ratio n. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1)(C) ( “In the9 case of a cont

roll ed substance in sche dule . . . I I . . . such per son shallbe sentenc ed to a t erm of impri sonment of not more than 20 years. . . .”); see also United States v. Vazquez , 271 F.3d 93, 98 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc) (“In Vazquez’s case, dr ug quantit

y was neith er su bm itted to th e jur y nor r efle cted in its v erd ict. Therefore, § 841(b)(1) (C) define s Vazquez’s pr escribed stat utory maximum sentence as 20 year s.”) . Sect ion 841(b)(1) (C), however, further provides that “ [i]f any

person commits such aviolation aft er a pri or conviction for a fe lony drug offe nse h as be com e fina l, such p erson shall be senten ced to a t erm of impr is onm en t o f n otmor e tha n 30 y ea rs
. . . . ” As found by the District

Court, Ordaz comm itted t he instant offense aft era prio r c onv ic ti on f ora fe lo nydrug o ffe nse hadbec ome final ; thus , Ordaz’s maximum statut orypenalty for the conspiracy convicti on was thirty years, or 360 months.

Ord az arg ues th at the fact of prior c onv ictions s hou ld hav e be en s ubm itted to th e jur y. We rejec t that cha lleng e. Ordaz’s ar gument that

the fact of a prior

convict ion must be fou nd b y a jury was rejected by the S upre me C ourt in Almendarez-Torr es v. Unit ed State s , 523 U.S. 224, 244 (1998) (stating t hat “t o hold that

the Consti tuti on requir es that recidiv ism b e dee med an ‘ele men t’ of pe titioner’s o ffen se w ould mark an abrupt

departur e from a longstanding traditi on of treating reci divis m as ‘go[ing] to the puni shment only ’”) (quoti ng Gra ham v. W est V irginia , 224 U.S . 616 , 629 (19 12) ). Further more, i n Apprendi the Court s pecifi call y exempt ed prior
conv ictions f

rom its hold ing, statin g that “ [o]ther than the fact of a prior convict ion , anyfac t t

hat in cr eas es th e pe nal ty

for a crime beyond t he prescribed st atutor

y maximum must be s ubmitt ed to a jury , and proved be yond a r easonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490 (em pha sis ad ded ). Ordaz argues t

hat becaus e of the deci sion i n Blak ely , “it is clear th at Almendarez-Torr es cannot st and.” Br. of Appellant at 38. However, the Supreme Court has made clear

that “ [i]f a precedent

of this Court has di rect a pplication in a case, yet appears t o rest

on reasons r eject ed in some othe r li ne of decisi ons, t

he Court of Appeals should fol low the case which directly control s, l eaving t o this Court the prerogative of10 overrul ing it s own decisi ons.” Rodriguez de Quij as v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. , 490 U .S. 477 , 484 ( 198 9); see also Agostini v. Felton , 521 U.S . 203 , 237 (19 97)

. We do not gainsay

that t here is a tensi on between the spirit of Blak ely and Booker that a ll fa cts t hat inc rease t

he senten ce sh ould be fo und by a jury and the C ourt’s d ecision in Almendarez-Torr es , wh ich up hold s sente nces base d on facts fou nd b y judg es ra ther than jurie s. Cf. United States v. Mack , 229 F .3d 226, 23 8 n.5 (3d C ir. 2000) (Be cker, J., concurring). Nonetheless , as an inferior federalcourt we have t he responsibility to follow directly applicable S uprem e Cou rt dec ision s. See Un ited Sta tes v. M arseille , 377 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir . 2004) ( “Marseill e asks this court to extend Apprendi ’s rati onale and over

rule Almendarez-Torr es . . . . [H]is w ish is beyond our p ow ers to g rant.”); United States v. Losoy a-Mancias , 332 F . Supp. 2d 1261, 12 65 (D . N.D. 20 04) (“Th is Court acknowledges that the soundness of t he prior convict ion exception under Almendarez-Torr es has again be en questi oned in li ght of Blak ely . Neverthe less, the Almendarez-Torr es excepti on remains t

he law of the l and untilthe Unite d States Suprem e Cou rt chooses to rev isit the matter.”). The holding i n Almendarez-Torr es re mai ns bi nding l aw, and nothing in Blak ely or Booker holds otherwise. Thus, be ca us e w e a re bo un d b y Almendarez-Torr es , we hold that the District Cou rt’s determination reg arding the fa cts of O rdaz’s prior c onv ictions d id no t violate th e Six th A men dm ent, notw ithstand ing tha t the sen tence s we re bas ed, in p art, on facts fo un d b y a ju dg e r ath er th an a ju ry.
III. For the reaso ns stated abo ve, we w ill affirm Ord az’s
conv iction, v acate h is sente nce, a nd re man d fo r resen tencin g in conform ance with the op inion o f this co urt.

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