J-A29021-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: CAROL SHINER 

ROSENBLOOM, AN INCAPACITATED 

PERSON

APPEAL OF: RICHARD C. 

ROSENBLOOM, M.D.

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 621 WDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered March 1, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 021604661.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2020

Dr. Richard C. Rosenbloom, M.D., appeals that portion of an order of the

orphans’ court gifting the home of his incapacitated wife, Carol Shiner 

Rosenbloom, Esq., to their daughter, Kate Rosenbloom. The orphans’ court 

has full authority under the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code (“PEFC”)1

to dispose of estate assets in the manner that the orphan’s court believes the 

incapacitated person2 would wish. We therefore affirm its decision to give the 

home to Kate on Ms. Rosenbloom’s behalf.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 20 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101-8815.

2 “‘Incapacitated person’” means an adult whose ability to receive and 

evaluate information effectively and communicate decisions in any way is 

impaired to such a significant extent that he is partially or totally unable to 
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This guardianship matter began August 22, 2016, when Dr. Rosenbloom 

petitioned the Orphans’ Court of Allegheny County to have Ms. Rosenbloom

adjudged an incapacitated person. The court granted his request two months 

later. It simultaneously appointed Aligned Partners Trust Company (“the 

Guardian”) the plenary guardian of Ms. Rosenbloom’s estate.3

The Guardian subsequently petitioned to invalidate certain gifts that Ms. 

Rosenbloom had given to Kate in July of 2016. Ms. Rosenbloom gave Kate 

title to a home (at 153 Hartwood Drive in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania) and 

certain investment accounts worth approximately $283,000. Kate had resided 

in the home for several years and had made substantial improvements to it. 

All told, the home and the accounts had a combined, potential worth of 

$1,000,000.

The orphans’ court found that Kate exerted undue influence over Ms. 

Rosenbloom and negated the transfer of the $283,000 accounts to Kate. 

However, it refused the Guardian’s request to negate the gift of the Hartwood 

Drive home to Kate, because it found that Ms. Rosenbloom wanted to give the

home to Kate, despite any undue influence. The orphans’ court entered an 

order to that effect, and Dr. Rosenbloom, who intervened below, has timely 

appealed.

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manage his financial resources or to meet essential requirements for his 

physical health and safety.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5501.

3 Several other individuals and agencies have served as limited guardians of 

Ms. Rosenbloom’s person. Their identities are irrelevant to the disposition of 

this appeal.
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He raises two claims of error. They are:

1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in upholding the 

transfer of the Hartwood Residence despite finding 

. . . that Ms. Rosenbloom was incapacitated at the 

time she transferred the Hartwood Residence to Kate 

Rosenbloom.

2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred in upholding the 

transfer of the Hartwood Residence despite finding 

. . . that Ms. Rosenbloom was subjected to undue 

influence by Kate Rosenbloom, especially with respect 

to the disposition of Ms. Rosenbloom’s estate, at the 

time of the transfer of the Hartwood Residence.

Rosenbloom’s Brief at 3. Because these two issues are essentially the same 

claim, argued on two different grounds, we address them simultaneously.

Dr. Rosenbloom asserts (and the Guardian agrees)4that the orphans’

court erred when it opined as follows:

Although the [orphans’ court] believes that voiding both the 

deed transfer and the securities transfer would be 

permissible under the law and circumstances, the [orphans’ 

court] finds that [Ms. Rosenbloom’s] desire to transfer the 

residence to [Kate] was a long-standing intention and not a

sudden decision. On the other hand, the transfer of 

$283,000 in securities and the forgiveness of the loans was 

a new decision on the part of [Ms. Rosenbloom] in June-July 

2016, at which time she was cognitively impaired and 

incapable of making an informed decision to transfer 

significant funds to her daughter. As such, the Court 

directed Ms. Rosenbloom to return the sum of $283,188 to 

[the] estate, but did not void the deed [to the home].

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 5/20/19, at 6.

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4 See Guardian’s Application to Allow Participant to Join in Appeal, 8/7/19. 

See also August 21, 2019 Order of Superior Court (granting Guardian’s 

request to join Dr. Rosenbloom’s appeal).
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According to Dr. Rosenbloom, the decision of the orphans’ court to 

uphold the deed transfer to Kate was incorrect, because the court had decreed 

Ms. Rosenbloom incapacitated. In his view, there was no competent evidence 

of record to support the factual finding of the orphans’ court that Ms. 

Rosenbloom had a long-standing desire to give the Hartwood Drive property 

to Kate. See Rosenbloom’s Brief at 15. He also contends that, once the 

orphans’ court concluded Ms. Rosenbloom was incapacitated and Kate exerted 

undue influence over her, “the burden shifts to the person accused of undue 

influence to prove by clear and convincing evidence rebutting the 

presumption.” Id. at 16. Thus, Dr. Rosenbloom’s advances a two-pronged 

attack against the order. The first is factual; the second is legal.

When we review a decision of the orphans’ court:

The findings of a judge of the orphans’ court division, sitting 

without a jury, must be accorded the same weight and effect 

as the verdict of a jury, and will not be reversed by an 

appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion or a

lack of evidentiary support. This rule is particularly 

applicable to findings of fact which are predicated upon the 

credibility of the witnesses, whom the judge has had the 

opportunity to hear and observe, and upon the weight given 

to their testimony. In reviewing the Orphans’ Court’s 

findings, our task is to ensure that the record is free from 

legal error and to determine if the Orphans’ Court’s findings 

are supported by competent and adequate evidence and are 

not predicated upon capricious disbelief of competent and 

credible evidence. However, we are not limited when we 

review the legal conclusions that Orphans’ Court has derived 

from those facts.

In re Estate of Cherwinski, 856 A.2d 165, 167 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation 

omitted).
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This Court must review the orphans’ court’s findings of fact with the 

same degree of deference as we would review a jury’s findings. Regarding 

such findings, we have explained that “as finder of fact, [the judge] is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and this Court will not disturb his 

credibility determinations.” Williams v. Taylor, 188 A.3d 447, 450 

(Pa.Super. 2018) (citing Voracek v. Crown Castle USA Inc., 907 A.2d 1105, 

1108 (Pa.Super. 2006)). A judge of the orphans’ court, who heard and saw

the witnesses testify and who had the sole power to determine their credibility, 

is in a far better position than this Court to decide the truth.

Dr. Rosenbloom asserts that there was no evidence of record to support 

that orphans’ court’s finding that Ms. Rosenbloom had wanted to give her 

Hartwood Drive home to Kate. However, when asked why she decided to 

transfer the home to Kate, Ms. Rosenbloom testified that the home had 

originally belonged to her parents and that she desired “[t]hat my daughter 

would be living in my parents’ house. And I was thrilled that [Kate] wanted 

to.” N.T., 10/4/18, at 121-22. 

Dr. Rosenbloom asserts that this testimony of Ms. Rosenbloom “is of no 

probative value,” because the orphans’ court had declared her incapacitated 

prior to that hearing. Rosenbloom’s Brief at 23. However, he cites to no

authority for that proposition. See id. Nor does our research reveal any.

On the contrary, the general rule is that all persons are competent to 

testify, and the probity of their testimony is for the finder of fact to resolve. 

“Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the fact-finder, it determines the 
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credibility of the witnesses and, on review, we will not reverse its credibility 

determinations absent an abuse of that discretion.” In re Estate of 

Cherwinski, 856 A.2d at 168.5

The pertinent Rule of Evidence provides:

(a) General Rule. Every person is competent to be a 

witness except as otherwise provided by statute or in 

these rules.

(b) Disqualification for Specific Defects. A person is 

incompetent to testify if the court finds that because 

of a mental condition or immaturity the person:

(1) is, or was, at any relevant time, incapable 

of perceiving accurately;

(2) is unable to express himself or herself so 

as to be understood either directly or 

through an interpreter;

(3) has an impaired memory; or

(4) does not sufficiently understand the duty to 

tell the truth.

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 601. 

Dr. Rosenbloom does not contend that Ms. Rosenbloom was disqualified 

from testifying under Pa.R.E. 601(b), nor did he object to her competency in 

the orphans’ court when she appeared to testify. See N.T., 10/4/18, at 103. 

Thus, he may not now claim her testimony was of no probative value, when 

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5 Despite citing In re Estate of Cherwinski, 856 A.2d 165 (Pa.Super. 2004), 

in his Statement of Scope and Standard of Review, Dr. Rosenbloom overlooks 

the case’s holding that an abuse of discretion is required to overturn the 

factual findings of an orphans’ court. Nor does he claim such an abuse of 

discretion occurred when the orphans’ court credited Ms. Rosenbloom’s 

testimony that she wanted Kate to have the home.
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he failed to object under the Rules of Evidence below. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P.

302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised 

for the first time on appeal”).

This Court is not a finder of fact. Any impact that Ms. Rosenbloom’s 

incapacitation may have had on her credibility went to the weight to be 

afforded her testimony, not her competency under Pa.R.E. 601. That was a 

matter of fact for the orphans’ court to resolve, in its sole discretion. It did 

so and found Ms. Rosenbloom credible in this regard. Thus, “[w]e find that 

the orphans’ court’s determinations are supported by competent and adequate 

evidence, and we will not disturb on appeal its credibility determination on this 

basis.” In re Estate of Cherwinski, 856 A.2d at 168.

We now turn to Dr. Rosenbloom’s legal challenge to the decision. He 

believes that, because the orphans’ court deemed Kate to have exerted undue 

influence over Ms. Rosenbloom, to retain the home, Kate must disprove any 

undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. Dr. Rosenbloom relies 

upon Thomas v. Seaman, 304 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1973), for the premise that 

Kate “did not meet her heavy burden” to disprove the elements of undue 

influence. Rosenbloom’s Brief at 26-27.

Any reliance upon Thomas is misplaced. There, two elderly sisters lived 

alone. One sister died, and the other, Beulah Seaman, retained a piece of 

farmland. Their brother, Dewey, began visiting Beulah daily. He eventually 

convinced her to visit an attorney with him, so he could “buy” the farm from 

her. In the attorney’s office, Dewey told Beulah not to worry about signing 
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the deed over to him, because her niece Joan Thomas knew of the deal and 

“was ‘delighted’ by it.” Thomas, 304 A.2d at 136. Beulah insisted on keeping 

a life estate in the property. The attorney revised the deed, and Beulah signed

it, despite there being no purchase price.

Beulah then moved onto the farm with Dewey and his wife, with the 

understanding that her brother and sister-in-law would care for her. A few 

months later, they forced her to leave. Next, Beulah hired a lawyer of her 

own and sued in equity to have the deed voided on the grounds of fraud and 

undue influence. The chancellor granted her relief, Dewey appealed, and the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.

Critically, Thomas was not an orphans’ court proceeding; it was an

equity matter. Thus, the PEFC was not in issue, and the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania did not consider or apply any of its terms. As such, Thomas

says nothing about the powers of the orphans’ court to distribute property 

under its control in an incapacity proceeding. Moreover, unlike the instant 

case, where Ms. Rosenbloom wanted and continued to want to give the 

property to Kate, Beulah never wanted Dewey to own her farm. Thus, the 

facts of Thomas are totally unrelated to those at bar. However, in both cases, 

we note that the court of equity and the orphans’ court each took steps to 

effectuate the desires of the unduly influenced party.6 Thus, if anything, 

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6 We also note that, Thomas v. Seaman, 304 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1973) does not 

hold, as Dr. Rosenbloom suggests, that Dewey lost, because the burden of 
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Thomas’ result supports the actions of the orphans’ court in carrying out Ms. 

Rosenbloom’s desires.

Having distinguished Thomas on both its facts and law, we now review 

the statute applicable in the orphans’ court – the PEFC. When interpreting 

any statute, we are mindful that:

“The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes 

is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General 

Assembly,” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). The Act counsels that 

“when the words of a statute are clear and free from all 

ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the 

pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). When 

the words of a statute are not explicit, the General 

Assembly’s intent is to be ascertained by considering 

matters other than statutory language, like the occasion and 

necessity for the statute; the circumstances of its 

enactment; the object it seeks to attain; the mischief to be 

remedied; former laws; consequences of a particular 

interpretation; contemporaneous legislative history; and 

legislative and administrative interpretations. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 

1921(c). 

____________________________________________

proof shifted to him. See Rosenbloom’s Brief at 26-27 (citing Thomas, 304 

A.2d at 138). The Supreme Court said, “the burden of proving undue influence 

rests upon the party asserting it, unless that party can prove a confidential 

relationship between the grantor and grantee, in which case the burden of 

proof must shift to the party asserting the validity of the deed to prove it was 

obtained by the free, voluntary and intelligent act of the grantor.” Id. at 138. 

The High Court did not resolve the question of whether a confidential 

relationship existed. However, it ultimately concluded that Beulah “adduced 

sufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support a finding of undue 

influence.” Id. In short, the burden of proof never shifted to Dewey. As 

such, Dr. Rosenbloom’s attempt to shift a “heavy burden” onto Kate by 

analogizing her to Dewey fails. Rosenbloom’s Brief at 27. We therefore are 

unpersuaded that any burden shifted to Kate to disprove undue influence, in 

order to retain the home.
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In re Admin. Order No. 1-MD-2003, 936 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. 2007) (case 

citations and some punctuation omitted).

Here, the Guardian petitioned the orphans’ court to invalidate the deed 

that transferred the Hartwood Drive home from Ms. Rosenbloom to Kate, 

pursuant to Section 5536 of the PEFC. That statute provides, in relevant part, 

that the orphans’ court:

upon petition and with notice to all parties in interest and 

for good cause shown, shall have the power to

substitute its judgment for that of the incapacitated 

person with respect to the estate and affairs of the 

incapacitated person for the benefit of the incapacitated 

person, his family, members of his household, his friends 

and charities in which he was interested. This power shall 

include, but is not limited to, the power to:

(1) Make gifts, outright . . . .

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5536(b) (emphasis added). 

The wording of Section 5536(b)(1) is clear and unambiguous. The 

General Assembly authorized the orphans’ court to make gifts of any asset in

an estate by substituting its judgment for that of an incapacitated person. 

Such gifts must be “for the benefit of the incapacitated person, his family, 

members of his household, his friends and charities in which he was 

interested.” Id.

Here, the orphans’ court exercised its statutory power to give the 

Hartwood Drive property to Kate, for her benefit, from Ms. Rosenbloom. The 

orphans’ court gifted the home outright to Kate on behalf of Ms. Rosenbloom, 

because it found that making that gift would effectuate Ms. Rosenbloom’s 
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desire for Kate to live in the home that once belonged to Ms. Rosenbloom’s 

parents. Kate was a family member (i.e., the daughter) of Ms. Rosenbloom 

(i.e., the incapacitated person). 

Based on the testimony of Ms. Rosenbloom, the orphans’ court found 

that she truly wanted to give that home to Kate. Under Section 5536(b)(1), 

the orphans’ court could do so pursuant to its power to substitute its

judgment, even though it previously found that Kate unduly influenced Ms. 

Rosenbloom.

We know of no case – and Dr. Rosenbloom cites none – holding that a 

finding of undue influence deprives the orphans’ court of its statutory power 

to distribute the property from the estate thereafter, as the court sees fit. We 

decline to so hold now. 

In sum, Dr. Rosenbloom instituted this proceeding to have his wife 

deemed an incapacitated person. The orphans’ court granted his petition, but 

that does not mean Dr. Rosenbloom may now dictate Ms. Rosenbloom’s affairs 

for her. Effectively, pursuant to Section 5536 of the PEFC, he asked the 

orphans’ court to substitute its judgment for hers in that regard. The court 

did so, and we find no error of law or abuse of discretion in it fulfilling Ms. 

Rosenbloom’s wish that Kate own the Hartwood Drive home.

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/14/2020