SUMMARY

June 20, 2019

2019COA91

No. 18CA0534, Martinez v. CSG Redevelopment — Government 

— Colorado Governmental Immunity Act — Immunity and 

Partial Waiver — Public Entity — Instrumentality

A division of the court of appeals addresses whether an entity 

— CSG Redevelopment Partners, LLLP (CSGR) — is an 

“instrumentality” of a public entity entitled to immunity under the 

Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, §§ 24-10-103, -106, C.R.S. 

2018. In holding that it is, the division determines that, despite its 

inclusion of a private entity and partial reliance on funding from a 

private investor, CSGR’s public purpose and the Denver Housing 

Authority’s extensive control over it renders it an instrumentality of 

a public entity. The division also addresses the limits of the waiver 

of immunity for “[a] dangerous condition caused by an 

accumulation of snow and ice which physically interferes with 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
public access on walks leading to a public building open for public 

business,” § 24-10-106(1)(d)(III), and concludes that a low-income 

housing facility is not a “public building open for public business” 

because it is not generally accessible to members of the public. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA91

Court of Appeals No. 18CA0534

City and County of Denver District Court No. 16CV31344

Honorable Jay S. Grant, Judge

Guadalupe P. Martinez,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CSG Redevelopment Partners LLLP, a Colorado limited liability limited 

partnership,

Defendant-Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE J. JONES

Terry and Grove, JJ., concur

Announced June 20, 2019

DiGiacomo, Jaggers & Perko, LLP, Douglas J. Perko, Arvada, Colorado, for 

Plaintiff-Appellant

Harris, Karstaedt, Jamison & Powers, P.C., Susan M. Stamm, Englewood, 

Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
1

¶ 1 Guadalupe P. Martinez, a resident of the low-income housing 

facility Casa Loma Apartments, slipped and fell on a walkway 

leading to the apartment building. Seeking to recover for his 

injuries, Mr. Martinez sued CSG Redevelopment Partners, LLLP 

(CSGR), Casa Loma’s management company and the building’s 

owner, under the Premises Liability Act, § 13-21-115, C.R.S. 2018, 

and (alternatively) for negligence, alleging that CSGR had allowed 

snow and ice to accumulate on the walkway. 

¶ 2 CSGR moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that, as an 

“instrumentality” of a public entity — the Denver Housing Authority 

(DHA) — it is immune from tort liability under the Colorado 

Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), § 24-10-106, C.R.S. 2018. It 

also argued that the exception to governmental immunity in section 

24-10-106(1)(d)(III) for a dangerous condition on a walkway “leading 

to a public building open for public business” doesn’t apply because 

Casa Loma isn’t such a building. Mr. Martinez opposed the motion. 

After a Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 

848 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1993), hearing, the district court granted 

CSGR’s motion, ruling that CSGR is an instrumentality of the DHA 

and that the public building exception doesn’t apply. 
2

¶ 3 We conclude that, because of both DHA’s extensive control 

over CSGR and CSGR’s public purpose, CSGR is an instrumentality 

of a public entity within the meaning of the CGIA, and therefore a 

public entity itself entitled to governmental immunity. We also 

conclude that the record supports the district court’s finding that 

Casa Loma isn’t a public building open for public business, and 

that Mr. Martinez’s alternative contention that immunity doesn’t 

apply because the walkway is part of a “public facility located in [a] 

recreation area maintained by a public entity,” see § 24-10-

106(1)(e), is, on this record, unavailing. The upshot is we affirm the 

district court’s judgment.

I. Background

¶ 4 The following facts were found by the district court with record 

support or are otherwise undisputed.

¶ 5 In 1987, DHA created the Denver Housing Corporation (DHC), 

a nonprofit entity that DHA completely owns and controls. For 

nearly thirty years, DHC (and, by extension, DHA), has owned and 

operated the Casa Loma Apartments. In 2013, to finance the 

renovation of Casa Loma and two other low-income housing 

properties, DHA created CSGR and CSG Housing, Inc. CSG 
3

Housing served as CSGR’s general partner, and another of DHA’s 

instrumentalities, DHA Limited Partner, served as CSGR’s limited 

partner. At that point, CSGR was made up of, and controlled 

entirely by, DHA instrumentalities.1 

¶ 6 But in 2014, as part of CSGR’s effort to secure more funding 

for the renovations, Wincopin Circle LLLP joined CSGR as a limited 

partner.2 It functions mainly as an investor, having contributed 

approximately $12.5 million in equity financing. CSG Housing and 

DHA Limited Partner each contributed $90 and $10, respectively. 

As a result, CSG Housing, as the general partner, retained a 0.01% 

ownership interest in CSGR; DHA Limited Partner, a special limited 

partner, retained a 0.001% ownership interest in CSGR; and the 

investor, the limited partner, received a 99.989% ownership interest 

in CSGR and qualified for tax credits through the Low-Income 

Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) program — a federal program that 

 

1 The parties stipulated that DHA is a public entity and that DHC 

and CSG Housing are instrumentalities of DHA within the meaning 

of the CGIA. 

2 American Express - West Equity Fund Limited Partnership later 

replaced Wincopin. For simplicity’s sake, we’ll refer to them 

collectively as “the investor.” 
4

offers federal tax credits to private investors as an incentive to 

invest in low-income housing projects. See 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2018). 

The partnership is governed by a restated partnership agreement 

(more about which we’ll discuss below).

¶ 7 Around the same time the investor joined CSGR, DHC leased 

the land under Casa Loma to CSGR for sixty-five years; DHC 

transferred its ownership of the structural improvements on the 

property to CSGR (this was also so the investor could qualify for 

LIHTC); and DHA lent CSGR approximately $45.3 million, $21 

million of which was a construction loan that DHA funded by 

issuing private activity bonds (about $15 million was cash directly 

from DHA). CSG Housing, acting in its capacity as the general 

partner, hired DHA as the manager of the property under a written 

management agreement (another agreement about which we’ll talk 

more below). 

¶ 8 Several years later, Mr. Martinez slipped and fell on an 

allegedly icy walkway leading to the building. He sued CSGR, 

claiming over $400,000 in medical expenses. As noted, the district 

court dismissed his complaint based on governmental immunity.
5

II. Discussion

¶ 9 Mr. Martinez contends that the district court erred by (1) 

concluding that CSGR is an instrumentality of DHA; (2) ruling that 

the “public building” exception doesn’t apply; and (3) failing to 

address his argument that the “recreation area” waiver in section 

24-10-106(1)(e) applies. 

A. Standard of Review

¶ 10 To the extent historical facts relevant to the issues Mr. 

Martinez raises on appeal were disputed, we review the district 

court’s findings of fact for clear error, Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 

452 (Colo. 2001); such a finding is clearly erroneous only if there’s 

no support for it in the record, M.D.C./Wood, Inc. v. Mortimer, 866 

P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo. 1994). But to the extent all such facts 

relevant to a particular issue weren’t disputed, we review the issue 

de novo. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, ¶ 10. And 

to the extent that CSGR’s claim to immunity implicates questions of 

law, including statutory interpretation or application of a proper 

legal standard, we review the district court’s conclusions de novo. 

See Corsentino v. Cordova, 4 P.3d 1082, 1087 (Colo. 2000). 
6

B. Analysis

1. CSGR is an Instrumentality of a Public Entity

¶ 11 First, Mr. Martinez contends that his claim isn’t barred by the 

CGIA because CSGR’s status as a private partnership precludes its 

treatment as a “public entity.” He points to the investor’s 

significant capital contributions, the investor’s approval power over 

some of CSGR’s operations, and that much of DHA’s investment 

came from the sale of private activity bonds. While these facts have 

some force, we ultimately conclude that they don’t carry the day.

a. Applicable Law

¶ 12 The CGIA gives public entities immunity from claims “which lie 

in tort or could lie in tort,” subject to certain express exceptions. 

See § 24-10-106(1). It defines “public entity” as 

the state, the judicial department of the state, 

any county, city and county, municipality, 

school district, special improvement district, 

and every other kind of district, agency, 

instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof 

organized pursuant to law and any separate 

entity created by intergovernmental contract or 

cooperation only between or among the state, 

county, city and county, municipality, school 

district, special improvement district, and 

every other kind of district, agency, 

instrumentality, or political subdivision 

thereof.
7

§ 24-10-103(5), C.R.S. 2018. 

¶ 13 Though no statute defines the term “instrumentality,” several 

cases shed light on its meaning. In Robinson v. Colorado State 

Lottery Division, a division of this court held that by including the 

term “instrumentality” with other entities that are public in nature, 

the General Assembly intended that covered instrumentalities be 

“governmental in nature.” 155 P.3d 409, 414 (Colo. App. 2006), 

aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 

2008). The division concluded that Texaco, a private corporation 

that was licensed by the State of Colorado to sell lottery tickets, 

wasn’t an instrumentality since there was “no indication that the 

General Assembly intended to expand the scope of the [C]GIA to 

include any private person or corporation that entered into some 

type of agreement with a public entity.” Id.

¶ 14 Similarly, in Moran v. Standard Insurance Co., 187 P.3d 1162 

(Colo. App. 2008), another division of this court, relying heavily on 

the division’s decision in Robinson, held that Standard Insurance 

Company, a private company, wasn’t an instrumentality merely 

because a public entity, the Public Employees’ Retirement 

Association (PERA), was statutorily required to contract with a 
8

private insurance company (and it chose Standard). “Standard’s 

status as a private corporation,” the division wrote, “even one that 

has entered a contract with a public entity, precludes its treatment 

as a public entity under the CGIA.” Id. at 1166. 

¶ 15 Several years later, in Colorado Special Districts Property & 

Liability Pool v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, another division leaned on 

Robinson and Moran in holding that County Technical Services, Inc. 

(CTSI) was an instrumentality, for four reasons: (1) CTSI was a 

nonprofit corporation formed by Colorado counties “exclusively for 

the purpose of lessening the burden on Colorado county 

governments”; (2) it was founded and maintained by public entities; 

(3) those public entities were involved in CTSI’s management or 

control; and (4) the supreme court had said in another case that 

public corporations like CTSI “are created as subdivisions of the 

state as an expedient device to carry out the functions of 

government.” Id. at ¶¶ 40-43 (quoting Colo. Ass’n of Pub. Emps. v. 

Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Colo., 804 P.2d 138, 143 (Colo. 1990)). 

¶ 16 Each of these cases also drew on the CGIA’s “central legislative 

purpose” of limiting liability to lessen the burden on taxpayers. 

See, e.g., Robinson, 155 P.3d at 414. 
9

b. Analysis

¶ 17 It appears to be undisputed that CSGR is a private 

partnership. But we conclude that fact isn’t dispositive. What is 

dispositive, as Robinson tells us, is that the entity must be 

“governmental in nature.” Id. And Lyons shows us that an entity 

can be governmental in nature if a governmental entity controls it 

and it serves a public purpose. See Lyons, ¶¶ 40-43; accord Walker 

v. Bd. of Trs., 69 F. App’x 953, 957 (10th Cir. 2003) (board of 

trustees of a pension plan wasn’t an instrumentality of the Denver 

Regional Transportation District (RTD) where it was independent 

from RTD, RTD had no authority over it, and it didn’t have any 

obligation to act in RTD’s interests); Plancher v. UCF Athletics Ass’n, 

175 So. 3d 724, 728 (Fla. 2015) (the UCF Athletics Association was 

entitled to governmental immunity because the University of 

Central Florida, a state agency, created the association and 

controlled its board of directors, operations, activities, and 

“continued existence”); Daughton v. Md. Auto. Ins. Fund, 18 A.3d 

152, 163-65 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011) (insurance fund controlled 

by public entities and which provided for the public’s welfare was 
10

an instrumentality of the state despite having a private financial 

and corporate identity). Those elements are present here.

¶ 18 Notwithstanding the investor’s high ownership percentage, 

DHA controls most of CSGR’s operations. Pursuant to CSGR’s 

amended partnership agreement, DHA’s instrumentality, CSG 

Housing (as the sole general partner and manager), has “full and 

exclusive power and right to manage and control the business and 

affairs of the partnership.” And DHA itself acts as CSGR’s property 

manager for Casa Loma. The management agreement requires it to 

maintain, repair, and operate the property — in short, to run Casa

Loma on a day-to-day basis. It was DHA that oversaw and carried 

out the renovation project, selecting the architect and general 

contractor, supervising the renovation work, monitoring compliance 

with the construction documents, and sponsoring the work.

¶ 19 The partnership agreement also provides that the investor, as 

a limited partner, “shall not take part in the management or control 

of the business of the partnership[.]” Nonetheless, we acknowledge 

that that doesn’t mean the investor has no authority at all. The 

investor has approval power over a number of subjects, including 

CSGR’s budget, quarterly financial reports, annual financial 
11

statements, and renovation plans. It also has the right to remove 

the general partner — CSG Housing — for any one of twelve stated 

reasons. And CSG Housing must seek the investor’s consent before 

withdrawing as general partner.

¶ 20 CSGR downplays these provisions, arguing that “such 

purported limitations are meaningless” and that the investor has 

“never technically approved any of the budgets” or “questioned any 

expenditures contained in the proposed budgets.” We reject the 

notion that we should disregard the investor’s contractual power to 

disapprove certain matters merely because the investor hasn’t 

exercised it. 

¶ 21 All that said, however, considering that the investor’s 

authority is mostly limited to certain approval rights, CSG Housing 

manages CSGR, and DHA makes all of the day-to-day operational 

decisions, we conclude that public entities essentially control 

CSGR.3 

 

3 It also appears undisputed that taxing authorities treat CSGR as a 

governmental entity.
12

¶ 22 And CSGR serves a public purpose: providing low-income 

housing. This is a function typically carried out by governmental 

entities, and the use of some private funding doesn’t negate that. 

See Griffin v. City of Detroit, 443 N.W.2d 406, 407 (Mich. Ct. App. 

1989) (ownership and operation of a low-income housing project 

was a “governmental function”). 

¶ 23 Until CSGR brought in the investor as a limited partner, it was 

entirely made up of, and controlled by, DHA and its 

instrumentalities. The investor only became involved because DHA 

wanted to limit its debt and needed more money to renovate and 

operate its properties. One way to do so was to attract private 

investors using the incentive of low-income housing tax credits. We 

decline to hold that any public entity that receives private funds 

through LIHTC, in addition to public funds, thereby loses its status 

as a public entity, particularly when the private investor exercises 

minimal control over the entity’s operations.4 

 

4 We note that CSGR’s structure appears to be typical for entities 

seeking to take advantage of LIHTC: a project sponsor (generally a 

housing authority or other governmental entity) partners with a 

private investor in a limited partnership. The housing authority 

acts as a general partner, maintaining authority over the project, 
13

¶ 24 Our conclusion that CSRG is an instrumentality doesn’t 

conflict with Robinson or Moran. The division in Robinson said that 

instrumentalities must be “governmental in nature,” but it did so in 

the context of holding that Texaco, a purely private corporation, 

wasn’t an instrumentality. See Robinson, 155 P.3d at 414. Moran 

involved similar reasoning. See Moran, 187 P.3d at 1166. 

¶ 25 CSGR has never been “private” in the same sense — as noted, 

it was made up entirely of public entities when founded, and it only 

became a “private” partnership when the investor joined as a 

limited partner. That’s very different from Texaco, whose only 

relationship with a public entity was a license to sell lottery tickets, 

or Standard Insurance Company, which only provided services to 

state employees because of a contract with PERA. And, of course, 

no public entity controlled Texaco or Standard Insurance Company.

¶ 26 We would be remiss, however, if we failed to address Acevedo 

v. Musterfield Place, LLC, 98 N.E.3d 673 (Mass. 2018), on which Mr. 

 

while the investor steps in as a limited partner and has a “passive 

role” despite its high ownership percentage. Mark P. Keightley, 

Cong. Research Serv., RS22389, An Introduction to the Low-Income 

Housing Tax Credit 4 (2019).
14

Martinez relies. Acevedo addressed a question similar to the one we 

consider today — whether an entity created to take advantage of 

LIHTC, made of (1) a managing member controlled by a housing 

authority and (2) a private investor with over a 99% ownership 

interest but little management power, is entitled to governmental 

immunity. The court ultimately concluded that the entity in that 

case, Musterfield Place, wasn’t a “public employer” under 

Massachusetts’ Tort Claims Act, and therefore wasn’t entitled to 

immunity. Id. at 677. 

¶ 27 Acevedo is distinguishable. The Massachusetts Tort Claims 

Act differs from the CGIA in a few key ways. Unlike the CGIA, the 

Massachusetts Tort Claims Act doesn’t grant immunity to “public 

entities.” Instead, it limits immunity to “public employers.” Mass. 

Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2 (West 2009). And while 

instrumentalities are included in the CGIA’s definition of “public 

entity,” they aren’t included in the Massachusetts statute’s 

definition of “public employer.” 

¶ 28 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court relied on the 

Massachusetts statute’s language, including the absence of the 

term “controlled affiliate” (a term used in the LIHTC statute) in 
15

concluding that Musterfield Place and its managing entity, 

Musterfield Manager, weren’t entitled to immunity. See id. at 

676-77. The CGIA’s definition of “public entity,” however, is 

broader, and, as discussed, contemplates entities controlled by 

other public entities. In addition, the managing member of the 

limited liability company — Musterfield Manager — wasn’t itself a 

public employer, but was instead a private contractor. In contrast, 

the entities with management authority over CSGR — DHA and 

CSG Housing — are public entities.

¶ 29 We also reject Mr. Martinez’s contention that since some of 

DHA’s loans to CSGR were funded by issuing private activity bonds, 

CSGR can’t be a public entity under the CGIA. Under the Internal 

Revenue Code (IRC), a certain percentage of the proceeds from these 

types of bonds must be for “private business use” or must be to 

“persons other than governmental units.” 26 U.S.C. § 141(a), (b), (c) 

(2018). Private business use is defined as “use (directly or 

indirectly) in a trade or business carried on by a person other than 

a governmental unit.” § 141(b)(6)(A). 

¶ 30 But a “governmental unit” under the IRC and a “public entity” 

or “instrumentality” under the CGIA aren’t the same thing. The 
16

Code of Federal Regulations defines a governmental unit as “a 

State, territory, a possession of the United States, the District of 

Columbia, or any political subdivision thereof[.]” 26 C.F.R. 

§ 1.103-1(a) (2018). The term “political subdivision” is further 

defined as “any division of any State or local governmental unit 

which is a municipal corporation or which has been delegated the 

right to exercise part of the sovereign power of the unit.” Id. This is 

much more specific than the term “instrumentality,” which, while 

not defined under the CGIA, encompasses more than states and 

their political subdivisions. See, e.g., Lyons, ¶ 45 (concluding that 

CTSI, a corporation, was an instrumentality). 

¶ 31 We also acknowledge that another relevant consideration is 

whether the taxpayers would bear the burden of any liability 

imposed on the entity. See, e.g., Robinson, 155 P.3d at 414. But 

the record before us is devoid of evidence as to who would bear the 

burden of any liability imposed on CSGR. Mr. Martinez argues on 

appeal that any liability would be covered by CSGR’s insurance 

policy, so no burden would reach the taxpayers; CSGR contends 

that DHA would ultimately be responsible for any liability. The 

district court made no findings on this issue. Given that it was Mr. 
17

Martinez’s burden to show subject matter jurisdiction, see Medina, 

35 P.3d at 452, we can’t conclude that this consideration weighs in 

his favor.5

¶ 32 In sum, we conclude that CSGR is an instrumentality of a 

public entity because of DHA’s extensive control over its operations 

and because of its public purpose. It is therefore itself a public 

entity entitled to governmental immunity, unless some statutory 

exception applies. We now turn to two such exceptions invoked by 

Mr. Martinez.

2. Public Building Open for Public Business

¶ 33 Next, Mr. Martinez contends that even if CSGR is a public 

entity under the CGIA, we should deem its immunity waived 

because Casa Loma is a “public building open for public business.” 

See § 24-10-106(1)(d)(III) (immunity is waived in an action for 

injuries resulting from “[a] dangerous condition caused by an 

accumulation of snow and ice which physically interferes with 

 

5 Mr. Martinez argues that CSGR should have the burden of proving 

governmental immunity applies. But that position seems to be 

contrary to controlling authority.
18

public access on walks leading to a public building open for public 

business”). We aren’t persuaded. 

¶ 34 The term “public building open for public business” isn’t 

defined in the CGIA, nor have any Colorado cases directly 

addressed this term as it is used in this exception. CSGR urges us 

to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, as the district 

court did. See Young, ¶ 11 (“We look first to the language of the 

statute, giving words their plain and ordinary meaning[s].”). 

Looking to dictionary definitions, the district court found that Casa 

Loma can’t be considered a “public building open for public 

business” since only residents and staff have key cards to enter the 

building, no public events take place on the premises, and no 

public business is conducted there.6 We agree, based on these 

findings, that Casa Loma isn’t a public building open for public 

business. Though it’s owned and operated by DHA 

instrumentalities, it functions as private residences, not a public 

building. 

 

6 In fact, residents are prohibited by their lease agreements from 

allowing anyone they don’t know into the building.
19

¶ 35 Other states’ case law on the same issue informs our 

conclusion. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court held, in 

addressing a claim by a student’s mother who had fallen outside a 

University of Michigan dormitory while visiting her daughter, that 

the dormitory wasn’t “open for business by members of the public” 

under the state’s public building exception to governmental 

immunity. Maskery v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 664 

N.W.2d 165, 166 (Mich. 2003). In so holding, the court articulated 

the following test:

To determine whether a building is open for 

use by members of the public, the nature of 

the building and its use must be 

evaluated. . . . If the government has 

restricted entry to the building to those 

persons who are qualified on the basis of some 

individualized, limiting criteria of the 

government’s creation, the building is not open 

to the public.

Id. at 169 (footnote omitted). 

¶ 36 Other cases, taking a similar approach, have held that 

low-income housing facilities don’t qualify under the exception. 

See, e.g., White v. City of Detroit, 473 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Mich. Ct. 

App. 1991) (the plaintiff fell on a publicly accessible patio outside a 

low-income housing facility; that facility wasn’t a “public building” 
20

under the governmental immunity exception); Griffin, 443 N.W.2d at 

407-08 (unit in low-income housing facility wasn’t “open for use by 

members of the public” under the immunity exception because it 

wasn’t used for public offices or for a public purpose). But see 

Moore v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 916 A.2d 1166, 1174-75 (Del. 

1993) (public housing authority apartment building was a “public 

building” for purposes of public building exception to governmental 

immunity).7

¶ 37 The reasoning of these cases is persuasive, and so we 

conclude that Casa Loma isn’t a public building open for public 

business. 

¶ 38 The parties cite cases addressing the meaning of “public 

facility” and “public water facility,” parts of two other exceptions to 

governmental immunity. § 24-10-106(1)(e), (f). These cases 

variously construe “public” in that context as “a place accessible or 

 

7 The court in Moore relied in part on the Michigan Supreme Court’s 

decision in Green v. State Corrections Department, 192 N.W.2d 491 

(Mich. 1971), which it thought conflicted with the Michigan Court of 

Appeals’ later decisions in White and Griffin. But the Michigan 

Supreme Court subsequently approved of both White and Griffin in 

Maskery, without even mentioning Green, in adopting the test we 

recite above.
21

visible to all members of the community,” Rosales v. City & Cty. of 

Denver, 89 P.3d 507, 509 (Colo. App. 2004) (quoting Webster’s 

Third New International Dictionary 1836 (1986)), overruled on other 

grounds by Burnett v. State Dep’t of Nat. Res., 2015 CO 19;

“something that is built or constructed to serve some public 

purpose,” id.; “being accessible and beneficial to members of the 

general public,” City & Cty. of Denver v. Gallegos, 916 P.2d 509, 511 

(Colo. 1996), disapproved of on other grounds by Corsentino, 4 P.3d 

1082; or “for the benefit of the general public,” id. They appear to 

share in common a requirement of public access, and, to that 

extent, though not directly on point, they support our conclusion.8 

In any event, the “public building” exception, unlike the public 

 

8 The parties cite two other cases dealing with the public building 

exception. In Smokebrush Foundation v. City of Colorado Springs, 

2015 COA 80, ¶ 32, aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 

2018 CO 10, the parties conceded that a building housing the 

administrative operations of a city’s gas department was a public 

building, and the division concluded that the record supported the 

district court’s finding that the building was public. Springer v. City 

& Cty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 797 (Colo. 2000), involved a 

city-owned theater; its status as a public building wasn’t at issue. 

Both cases, unlike this case, involved buildings open to the public. 
22

facility exception, is limited to such buildings “open for public 

business.” As discussed, Casa Loma isn’t open for public business.

3. Recreation Area Waiver

¶ 39 Lastly, Mr. Martinez contends that the district court erred by 

failing to address his argument that the “recreation area” waiver to 

CGIA immunity applies in this case. See § 24-10-106(1)(e) 

(immunity is waived in cases claiming injury resulting from a 

dangerous condition of a “public facility located in any park or 

recreation area maintained by a public entity”). We don’t see any 

reversible error. 

¶ 40 Mr. Martinez didn’t present any evidence showing that Casa 

Loma is a “public facility located in a park or recreation area[.]” 

Casa Loma is a low-income housing facility; it’s not in a park, and,

although it includes an area with picnic tables and grills, those 

amenities are for private use by Casa Loma residents and their 

guests only. Those amenities don’t turn this into a facility “located 

in a recreation area.” Accordingly, we discern no reversible error in 

the district court’s failure to address this argument.

III. Conclusion

¶ 41 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
23

JUDGE TERRY and JUDGE GROVE concur.