UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4911

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CESAR VARGAS-TORRES, a/k/a Cotonete Cotono,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., District Judge. (3:11-cr-00003-RJC-2)

Submitted: August 29, 2014 Decided: September 9, 2014

Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Eric J. Brignac, 

Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Cesar Vargas-Torres appeals his conviction and 

sentence for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent

to distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine, in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). Vargas-Torres pled guilty pursuant 

to a written plea agreement and was sentenced to 121 months’ 

imprisonment and five years of supervised release. On appeal, 

counsel for Vargas-Torres has filed a brief pursuant to Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no 

meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether VargasTorres’ sentence was reasonable. Vargas-Torres has filed a 

supplemental pro se brief arguing that his sentence was 

unreasonable and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective 

assistance. We affirm Vargas-Torres’ conviction and sentence.

Vargas-Torres contends that the district court 

erroneously sentenced him to 121 months’ imprisonment rather 

than to the statutory minimum of 120 months. We review his 

sentence for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion 

standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We

must first ensure that the district court did not commit any 

“significant procedural error,” such as failing to properly 

calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to consider 

the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failing to adequately 

explain the sentence. Id. The district court is not required 
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to “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every subsection,” 

United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006), but

“must place on the record an individualized assessment based on 

the particular facts of the case before it.” United States v. 

Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Only if we find the sentence procedurally 

reasonable can we consider its substantive reasonableness. Id.

at 328.

In assessing substantive reasonableness, we must “take

into account the totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. 

at 51. We presume on appeal that a sentence within the properly 

calculated Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United 

States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 261 (4th Cir. 2008). Such a

presumption is rebutted only when the defendant shows “that the 

sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) 

factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 

(4th Cir. 2006). We have reviewed the record before us and 

conclude that Vargas-Torres’ sentence is both procedurally and 

substantively reasonable. 

In his pro se supplemental brief, Vargas-Torres avers 

that counsel’s representation was deficient in several respects. 

However, the record does not conclusively establish any 

deficiencies. See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 435

(4th Cir. 2008) (providing standard). We therefore conclude 
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that the challenges to counsel’s performance are not cognizable 

on direct appeal, but rather, must be pursued, if at all, in a

proceeding for post-conviction relief. United States v. 

Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Vargas-Torres, in writing, of the 

right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Vargas-Torres requests that a petition be 

filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be 

frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that 

a copy thereof was served on Vargas-Torres.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 

before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED