F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

U N I T E D S T A T E S O F A M E R I C A , Plaintiff-Appellee
,

v

.

I S R A E L A R N O L D O C A C E R

E S -O L L A , Defendant-Appellant

. N o. 12-10132

D.C. No. 4:11-cr-02358- DCB -DTF -1

OPI NI ON

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na David C. B ury , District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued J uly

8, 2013 Submitted September 18, 2013 San F rancisco, California

F iled December 23, 2013

B efore: F erdinand F . F ernandez , Richard A. Paez
, and Marsha S. B erz on, Circuit J udg es.
Opinion by J udg e B erz on; Concurrence by

J udg e F ernandezU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 2

SUMMARY *

Crim inal Law

Vacating a sentence and remanding o n a closed record for resentencing
, the panel he l d that a prior felony conviction under F lorida Statutes section 800.04(4)(a) for l e w d o r lascivious battery d oes not qualify as a “cr i me of violence” within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) because the crime does not constitute a “forc i b le sex offense” o r “statutory rape.”

J udg e F ernandez concurred in the result, but not in all o f the reasoning

of the majority

opinion.

COUNSEL

M. Edith Cunning ham (arg ued) and Christopher R. Kilburn, Assistant F e deral Public Defenders; J on M. Sands, F eder al Public Defender, Tucson, Ariz o na, for Defendant-Appellant.

Erica L

. Seg e r (arg

u e d ), Assistant U nited States A ttorney ; J ohn S. L eonardo, U nited States Attorney ; Christia n M. Cabanillas, A ppellate Chief
, Tucson, Ariz ona, for PlaintiffAppellee.

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 3

OP INION

B ERZ ON, Circuit J udg e :

I srael Arno ldo Caceres-Olla pleaded g uilty
, under 8 U.S.C. § 1326, to u nlawful reentry into the U nited S t a t e s

. Sen t e n c e s f

or that offense a

r e g overned by United States Sentencing Guideline ( “Guideline”) 2L 1.2. T hi s c a se presents the question whether a prior felony conviction under F lorida Statutes section 800.04( 4 )(a) for lewd or lascivious battery qualifies as a “crime of violence” for purposes of that Guideline. W e hold that it does not, because the crime does

n o t c o nstitute a “forcible sex offense” or “ statutory rape” within the meaning of the applicable Guideline. B ecause the district court concluded o therwise, we vacate Caceres-Olla’s sentence and remand on a closed record for resentencing

.

I.

The base offense level for a violation o f § 1326 is eig ht. See U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2(a). I f the d efenda nt was previously deported after being convicted o f a f e l ony that constitutes a “crime of violence,” the offense level g oe s u p b y six teen levels. Id . § 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii).

The presentence report (“PSR”) concluded that CaceresOlla’s p ri or conviction for lewd or lascivious battery was a “forcible s ex offense” and, consequently
, qualified as a “crime of v iolence” under Guideline 2 L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Caceres-Olla objected, arg uing that his prior conviction did
not constitute a “forcible sex offense,” because the F lorida
statute did not require a non-consensual act and t h e Guideline’s reference to “consent

. . . [ deemed] not leg ally valid,” U .S.S.G. 2L 1

. 2 cmt. n.1( B) ( i ii), was not intended toU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 4

apply to statutes criminaliz ing sex ual a c tivity due only to the victim’s ag e. The district c ourt disag reed, applied the recommended enhancement, and sentenced Cace r es

- Olla to a 46-month prison term. Caceres-Olla timely appealed.

W e review de novo the di s trict court’s decision that Caceres-Olla’s prior conviction qualifies for a sen t e n cing enhancement under Guideline 2L 1.2(b). See United States v

. Marquez-Lobos , 697 F .3d 759, 761 (9th Cir. 2012).

II.

F or the p urpose of G uideline 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), a “ crime of violence” is defined as

any of the following offenses under fe d eral, state, or local law: murder, manslaug ht e r, kidnapping
, ag g ravated assault, forcible sex offenses (

including where co n s ent to the conduct is n o t given or is not legally valid, such as where consent to the condu c t is i n v o l u n t a r

y, i n c o m

p e t en t
, o r c o e r c e d

)
, statuto r y rape , sex ual abuse of a minor,

r o b b e r y , a r s o n , ex t o r t i o n , e x t o r t i o n a t e

ex tension of credit, burg lary of a dwelling
, o r any other offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an e lement the use, attempted
use, o r threatened use o f p hy sical force
ag ainst the person of another.

U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2 cmt. n.1(B )(iii) (emphasis added). CaceresOlla w as convicted under F lorida law o f “[ l] ewd or lascivious battery ,” which prohibits “[ e] ng ag [ ing ] in sex ual activity with

a p erson 1 2 y ears of ag e or older but less than 16 y ears o fU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 5

ag e.” F la. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a) (2008). The g overnment contends that Caceres-Olla’s conviction constitutes a “ crime of violence” because it qualifies a s e ither a “forcible sex offense” or “statutory

rape.” 1 W e beg in with the former.

A.

To deter mine whether section 8 00.04(4) qualifies as a “crime of violence,” we a pply the framework set f orth in Taylor v. United States
, 4 9 5 U

. S. 575 (1990). Taylor established a “ f

o r mal c ateg orical approach,” id. at 600,

w h e r eby sentencing courts “compare the elements of t h e statute of conviction with a federal definition of the crime to determine wh e t h er conduct p roscribed by the statute is broader than the g eneric f ederal definition.” United States v

. Valencia-Barragan
, 608 F .3 d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2 010) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “To co n s t itute an

‘ e l e m e nt’ of a crime, the particular factor in q uestion needs
to be ‘ a “constituent part” of the off e n s e [ that] must be proved by the prosecut ion in every case to sustain a conviction u nder a gi v e n statute.’” United States v

. Beltran-Munguia
, 489 F

. 3d 1042, 1045 (9th Ci r

. 2 007) (citations omitted) (altera t i o n and emphasis in o r ig inal). I f the statute o f conviction “sweeps more broadly than the
g eneric crime, a conviction under that law cannot count as [ a qualify ing ] p redicate, even if the defendant actually

1 In h i s o p en in g brief

, Caceres- Olla m ain tain s th at h is co n v ictio n d id n o t

co n stitu te “ sex u al ab u se o f a m in o r,” an o th er en u m e r ated “ crim e of

v io len ce” w ith in Gu id elin e 2L 1 .2 (b )(1 )(A ), b ecau se sectio n 8 0 0 .0 4(4 )(a)
p ro h ib its sex u al co n d u ct w ith m in o rs o f

1 4 y ears an d o ld er an d d o es n o t req u ire an elem en t o f “ ab u s e.” T h e g o v ern m en t d id n o t resp o n d to th is
arg u m en t, an d s o h as w aiv ed relian ce o n th at “ crim e o f v io len ce” v arian t. S ee Un ited S ta tes v. Ca stillo -Ma rin , 6 8 4 F.3 d 9 1 4 , 9 19 (9 th Cir. 2 01 2 ).U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 6

committed the offense in its g eneric form

. ” De s camps v

. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013). 2

The Sentencing

Guidelines were amended in 2008 to

include a more detailed d esc r i p tion of the “f o rcible sex offenses” that would constitute crimes of violence. Rather than simply listing “forcible sex o ffenses” as a crime of violence, the new definition lists “forcible sex o ffenses (including w here c o nsent to the c onduct is not g iven or i s not leg ally valid, such as where
consent t o t he conduct is involuntary
, incompetent, or coerced).”

United States v. E

spinoza-Morales
, 621 F .3d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2, c mt. n.1(B )(iii)). After

ex p laining that “forcible sex offense s ” include crimes in which there may be “‘assent in fact b ut n o leg ally valid
consent

. . . .’” U.S.S.G. app. C, ame n d

. 722 (citations omitted), the Sentencing Commission cited three ex amples o f scenarios draw n from past cases that the amendment was intended to address, including situations in which consent is procured by (1) threats “ to r eveal embarrassing secrets” o r “fire a subordinate”; ( 2) coercion by a “pub lic servant,” “member of the clerg y ,” or “mental health service provider”;

2 T h e Su p rem e Co u rt h as also “ reco g n ized a ‘ n arro w ran g e o f cases’ in

w h ich sen ten cin g co u rts—ap p ly i n g

. . . th e ‘ m o d i f ied categ o rical
ap p ro ach ’ —m ay lo o k b ey o n d t h e s tatu to ry elem en ts to ‘t h e ch arg in g p ap er an d j u ry in stru ctio n s’ ” to determ in e w h eth er t h e d ef en d an t’ s

co n v ictio n n ecessarily in v o l v ed f acts co rresp o n din g to th e g en eric f ed eral

o f f en se. Id

. at 2 2 8 3

– 84

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 7

or (3) e x ploitati o n o f a known “mental disease or defect” o r “intox ication.” Id. (citations omitted).

Under the amended Guidelines, a “forcible sex offe n s e” thus requires a sex ual act where “consent to the cond uct”: (1) “ is not g iven”; or (2) “is n ot leg ally valid, such as where
consent to the conduct is involuntary
, incompetent, o r coerced.” U .S.S.G. § 2L 1.2, c mt. n.1(B )(iii). A plain r eading of F lorida’s “[ l] ewd and lascivious battery ” offense, F la. Stat. § 800.04(4)(a), makes clear that lack of consent i s not an “element” of the crime. As with statutory rape “ [ i ] n most juri s d i ctions,” section 800.04(4)(a) “is a strict liability crime.” United States v. Gomez-Mendez , 486 F .3d 599, 604 (9th Cir. 2 007). I t criminaliz es “ [ e ] ng ag [ ing ] in sex ual activity with a person 12 y ears of ag e or o lder b u t less than 16
y ears of ag e,” reg ardless of whethe r the victim, in fact, consents. F la. Stat. §§ 800.04(2), (4)(a).

Caceres-Olla’s conviction could only be a “f orcible sex

o f f ense,” therefore, if the victim’s “consent

. . . is [ d e emed]
not leg ally valid, such as where c o ns e nt to the c onduct is involuntary
, incompetent, or coerced.” U.S.S.G. 2L 1.2 cmt. n.1(B )(iii). The g overnment contends that section 800.04(4) is categ o rically a “forcible sex offense” u nder that provision, because consent is not a d e fense to the crime under F lorida law. See F la. Stat. § 800.04(2) (“Neither the victim’s lack o f chastit y nor the victim’s consent is a defense to the crimes proscribed by

this section.”).

W e disag ree for three reasons. F irst, the a b s e n c e of a consent defense to statutory rape is analy tically distinct from situations in which a vi c t i m ’ s “consent

. . . is [ deemed] not leg ally valid, such as w here consent t o t h e conduct is involuntary
, incompetent, or coerced.” U.S.S.G. 2L 1.2 cmt.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 8

n.1(B )(iii). The three ex amples cited by t h e Sentencing Commission, see infra a t pp. 6–7, involve instances in which the victim does not in fact have the state of mind of willing acquiescence

— either b ecause her c onsent is coerc e d
, o r because her actual state of mind is such that she is not capable of willing ly consenting
, as in the case of incompete n ce o r intox ication. W e have acknowledg ed, h o w e ver, that “the assumption that a minor’s leg al incapacity implies that the proscribed sex ual intercours e is n on-consensual” does not alway s “ho l d true[ .] ” V

alencia v. Gonzales
, 4 3 9 F .3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2006). Some mi n o rs are “able to eng a g e in

sex ual intercourse volunt a r i ly
, d espite being leg ally incapable of consent.” Id. I n o ther words, b ecause statutory rape is a strict liability crime, the minor’s actual state of mind does not matter, nor does the m i n or’s actual c apacity f o r mature deliberation.

Application of the familiar e jusdem g eneris canon sug g ests that the g eneral term “consent

. . . not leg ally valid,” U.S.S.G. 2L 1.2 cmt. n.1(B )(iii), should be “ construed to

e mbrace only [ circumstances] similar in nature to th o s e [ c i r cu mstances] enumerated” in the p hrase that follows, Circuit City S

tores, Inc. v

. Adams
, 532 U.S. 105, 1 1 4–15 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted). A state statute that for p o l icy reasons treats a minor’s c onsent as irrelevant does not necessarily r en d e r that minor’s conduct similar to

c onduct that is “involuntary
, incompetent, or coerced[ ,] ” a l l of which depend on the specifi c c ircumstances of the crime and the victi m

. I n stead, statutory rape offenses outlaw conduct based on the minor’s ag e alone; however v o l u ntary and competent the minor, her consent w ill not be a defense to the crime.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 9

Second, reading “forcible sex o f f e nses” to encompass a conviction under sect i o n 8 00.04(4) on the theory that the victim’s consent is “involuntary ” or “incompetent” by v irtue of a statute c ri m i n a liz ing sex ual activity on the basis of the vic tim’s ag e would r ender superfluous the inclusion o f “statutory rape” and “sex ual abu s e of a minor” as other

enu m e rated offenses constituting “ crime[ s] of v iolence.” U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2 cmt. n.1(B )(iii).

“The term ‘statutory rape’ is ordinarily
, c ontemporarily
, and c ommonly understo o d to mean the unlawful sex ual inte rcourse with a minor under the a g e of consent specified by state statute.” Gomez-Mendez
, 486 F .3d at 603. I f a ll sex offenses “where consent

. . . is not leg a lly valid” on the basis of ag e are, by defini t i o n , “ f orcible,” there would b e no need
to separately enumerate “st a t utory rape.” See U.S.S.G. § 2L 1.2 c mt. n.1(B )(iii). The same would be true o f “sex ual abuse of a minor,” whereby “we define the term ‘abus e’

. . . in lig ht of the ag e of the victim in question,” United States v

. Medina-Villa
, 567 F .3d 507, 513 (9th Ci r

. 2009), and have held that “[ s] ex ual conduct with y ou ng er children is per se abusive[
, ] ” Valencia-Barragan , 608 F .3d at 1107.

“A statute should be construed so that effect is g iven to all its provisions, so that no p art w il l be inoperative o r superfluous, void or insig nificant.” Corley v. United States
, 556 U.S. 303, 314 ( 2009) (c i t a t i o n s and quotation marks omitted). This “basic interpretive canon[
, ] ” i d

. , applies to the Sentencin g G u i delines. S ee United States v. W

enner , 3 51 F .3d 969, 974–75 (9th Cir. 2003). Yet, w hen as k e d at arg ument, the g overnment could identify no circumstance in which a “statutory rape” w o u l d not also be a “forcible sex offense” under its interpretation. N or can we. “I t is our duty
to g ive effect, if possi b l e, to every clause and word of aU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 10

s t a tute.” Duncan v. W

alker
, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (200 1 ) (citations and quotation marks omitted). W e are “reluctan[ t]
t o t r eat

. . . a s surplusag e,” id.
, the Guidelines’ enumerati o n of statutory rape and s e x u a l a buse of a minor a s separate crimes of violence.

Third, deeming a s “forcible sex offenses” all sex ual acts with persons under the ag e of maj o r i ty would ig nore contemporary limitations on the c o ncept of statutory rape. I n particular, there has been a move among the states to reform statutory rape laws in case s i n volving partners of a similar
ag e — for instance, foreclosing prosecutions o f 16-y ear-olds for heavy p etting with 1 4-y ear-olds, or reducing sentences o f 19-y ear-olds for sex ual intercourse w ith 17-y e ar-olds. See,
e.g. , Charles A

. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity B e t w e en Teenagers
, 12 Cornell J .L

. & Pub. Pol’y 373, 390–91 (2003). I n recog nition of this
g rowing consensus, we have held that, for federal purposes,

an a g e difference of at least four y ears is a n e lement o f “sex ual a buse of a minor,” Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey
, 546 F .3d 1147, 1158 ( 9 t h C ir. 2008) (en b anc), and o f “statutory rape” as well, United Sta t e s v. Gomez
, 732 F .3d 971, 988–89 (9th Cir. 2013).

Reading the term “forcible sex offenses”

— wh i ch requires n o ag e difference — to e ncompass all sex ual conduct with minors, w ould obliterate those limitations. A so-called “Romeo-and-J uliet offender[ ,] ” Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police
, 490 F .3d 491, 5 03 ( 6t h C i r

. 2007), could be deemed
to have b een convicted of a “forcible sex offense” b y v i r tue of the v ictim’s ag e, despite b e ing ex p ressly a nd intentionally

ex cluded from the g eneric f ederal d efinitions of “statutory rape” and “sex

ual abuse of a minor.”U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 11

F or these reasons, we hold that a conviction under section 800.04(4) is not categ orically a “forcible sex offense.”

Our interpretation accords w ith that o f the F ourth Circuit, which recently addressed th i s issue in United States v

. Rangel- C astaneda
, 709 F .3d 373, 376 (4th Cir. 2 013) (concerning Tennessee’s prohibition on “sex ual pene t r a tion

. . . whe n t h e victim is at least thirteen (13) but less than eig hteen (18) y ears o f ag e and the de f e n dant is at least ten (10) y ears older than the victim.”). “Reading t h e v arious portions of the crime-of-violence enhancement i n c o n tex t,” the F ourth Circuit concluded tha t “the Sentencing C o mmission p urposely jux taposed the neig hboring terms ‘forcible sex o ffense[ ] ’ and ‘ statutory rape,’ with the f ormer intended to c onnote ra p e o r other qualify ing conduct b y compulsion and the latter intended to connote rape on account of the v i c tim’s ag e.” I

d. at 380. F urther, the “Guidelines’ reference

. . . to consent that is ‘not leg ally valid’ by virtue o f being ‘ involuntary
, incompetent, or co er c ed’ was intended simply to c larify that the requisite c o m p u l sion need not be phy sical in nature.” Id. (citing U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 722,
at 302–03). Thus, “the f act that Te n n essee law r enders the
consent of a statutory rape victim formally irrelevant does not

mean that the offense necessarily requires sex ual conduct that is ‘forcible’ . . .—that is, involving actual compulsion.” Id.

J udg e Tashima ex pressed a similar view in U nited States v. Gonzalez-Aparicio
, 663 F

. 3d 419, 437 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011) (Tashima, J
., dissenting ) ( concerning Ariz ona’s statute which criminaliz es “sex ual intercourse or oral sex ual cont a c t withU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 12

any person w ho is under eig hteen y ears of age ” )

. 3 Responding to th e same arg ument advanced by the
g overnment here, J u d g e Tashima asked: “if statutory rape crimes are ‘forcible sex offenses’ simply because the minor’s
consent is invalid under state law
, then why does the commentary list statutor y r ape separately ? ” Id. He

con c l u d e d that “[ t] he parenthetical lang uag e ” describing invalid consent “ does not targ et statutory rape[ ,] ” because such a reading “ would r ender th e term ‘statutory rape’ superfluous.” Id. (emphasis in orig inal).

A conviction under section 8 0 0.04(4) is not categ orically

a “forcible sex offense.” Nor is section 800.04(4) a “divisible statute” with respect to the element o f consent, for which the modified categ orical approach may be o f “assist[ ance]

. . . in identify ing the defendant’s crime of c o nviction.” Descamps
, 133 S. Ct. at 2285, 88.

W e t h e refore proceed to c onsider the g overnment’s alternative arg

ument.

B.

Caceres-Olla’s prior conviction d oes not quali f y as a “crime of violence” under G uideline 2L 1.2(b)(1)(A)’s “statutory rape” alternative. Gomez , 732 F .3d 988, h eld that the g en e r ic definition of “statutory rape” includes “‘an ag e difference of at least four y ears between the defendant a nd the

3 T h e G o n za lez-Ap aricio m aj ority h eld th at d ef en d an t’ s co n

v ictio n

co n stitu ted “ statu to ry

rap e” u n der th e Gu id elin es, an d th u s d id n o t reach th e q u estio n , ad d ressed in J u d g e T ash im a’s d issen t, w h eth er th e

co n v ictio n sep arately c o n stitu ted a “ f o rcib le sex o f

f en se.” Id

. at 4 33 &

n .4

.U N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 13

minor.’” Section 800.04(4) does not have an ag e difference element. A conviction under secti o n 8 0 0.04(4) is therefore
not cat eg orically “statutory rape.” “B e cause the statute is missing a n e lement of the[ ] g eneric crime[ ]
, o ur inquiry ends here—we do not undertake a modified categ orical analy sis.” Id. at 989.

III.

“As a g e neral rule, when the district court errs in sentencing
, we should vacate and ‘remand for re

- sentencing

o n a n o pen record — that is, without limitation on t h e

e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t m a y c o n s i d e r

. ’ ” Espinoza-Morales
, 621 F .3d at 115 2 (quoting United States

v. Matthews
, 278 F .3d 880, 885 (9th Cir. 20 0 2 ) ( e n banc)). “W e may depart f

rom this g ener a l rule, however, when ‘additional e vidence would not [ c h ang e] the outcome’ o r when ‘there was a failure of proof after a full inquiry into the factual question at issue.’” I d. (alteration in orig inal).

The g overnment conceded at o ral arg ument that it produced all available judicially noticeable facts to support its position that Caceres-Olla’ s conviction constituted a “ crime of violence.” W e therefore remand for resentencing on the

ex isting record.

VACATED AND REMANDED.

F ERNANDEZ , Circuit J udg e, concurring :

I concur in the result, but not in all of the r easoning of the majority opinion. I c oncur in part I and in the portion o f partU N I T E D S T A T E S V

. C A C E R E S -O L L A 14

I I before I I A F irst. A s t o p art I I A F irst (majority opinion at pag es 7 to 8 )
, I d o not ag ree. The g uidelin e d e fi n ition indicates that it appl ies to forcible sex offenses, which include those w here “consent

. . . is not leg ally valid.” USSG §2L 1.2, c omment. (n.1(B )(iii)) ( Nov. 2011). W e have d e c l ared that minors are “leg ally incapable of consent.” Valencia v. Gonzales
, 439 F .3d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir. 2 0 0 6 );

see also Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey
, 5 46 F .3d 1 147, 1154 ( 9 t h C i r. 2008) (en banc). As I see it, if a c hild is “le ga l l y incapable of consent,” that child’s “consent

. . . is not leg ally valid,” and no amount of judicial sortileg e will make it so.

That s a id, I do ag ree with the discussion in p arts I I A Second (majority opinion at pag es 9 to 10, insofar as it discusses statutory rape) a n d Third (majority opinion at pag e 10 ). Moreover, I a g ree with part I I B

. See United States v

. Gomez
, 732 F .3d 971, 987–89 (9th C ir. 2013). F inally
, because the g overnment has c onceded t hat it has no more evidence to produce, I ag ree with part I I I

. Thus, I respectfully

concur in the result.