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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00011-CV

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IN RE CITY OF BEAUMONT, KENNETH R. WILLIAMS, IN HIS 

OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CITY MANAGER, AND EARL WHITE, 

IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FIRE CHIEF

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Original Proceeding

136th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. D-210950

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

The City of Beaumont, Kenneth R. Williams, in his official capacity as City 

Manager, and Earl White, in his official capacity as Fire Chief, filed a petition for a 

writ of mandamus and prohibition. Relators contend the temporary restraining order 

issued by the Judge of the 136th District Court enforces a judgment of the 60th 

District Court that has been superseded due to the City’s appeal from that judgment. 

Relators ask this Court to issue a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to 

dissolve the temporary restraining order. Additionally, they ask this Court to issue a 
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writ of prohibition enjoining the trial court from taking further action that may 

interfere with this Court’s jurisdiction over the appeal. The Real Party in Interest, 

International Association of Firefighters Local 399 (“the Union”), argues the 

mandamus petition is moot because the temporary restraining order expired and it 

will not seek to compel the City and its officials to perform the actions ordered in 

the 60th District Court’s judgment until that judgment is final. 

Background

On December 2, 2022, the judge of the 60th District Court ofJefferson County 

Texas signed two orders in Trial Cause Number B-210244, Caleb Fenter v. City of 

Beaumont, et al. In one order, the judge of the 60th District Court granted the City’s 

plea to the jurisdiction but denied the plea to the jurisdiction of the City Manager, 

Kenneth R. Williams. In the other order, which was expressly made final and 

appealable, the judge of the 60th District Court granted the plaintiff’s motion for 

summary judgment, found the plaintiff, Caleb Fenter, is a “firefighter” as that term 

is defined by the Texas Local Government Code, Chapter 143, and is entitled to all 

the rights and benefits provided under that chapter. In the judgment of the 60th 

District Court, the court found the City Manager failed to provide Fenter with his 

rights and pursuant to Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code, found Fenter is 

entitled to mandamus relief requiring the City Manager to provide Fenter with all 

civil service rights pursuant to Chapter 143 of the Local Government Code, and
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decreed that a writ of mandamus would issue to be served on the City of Beaumont, 

Texas, Kenneth R. Williams, to carry out the court’s order, subject to the City 

Manager’s right to appeal the order. This order decreed that, in the event of an 

appeal, the Clerk of the Court would issue the writ of mandamus when the appeal 

became final. The City and the City Manager perfected an appeal, which this Court 

docketed as Appeal Number 09-22-00413-CV, Caleb Fenter v. The City of 

Beaumont, et al. The judgment prohibits issuance of the writ until the appeal is 

finally decided and the mandate issues. 

After the City filed its notice of appeal in Fenter, the Union filed an 

application for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction on behalf of 

its members. The Union alleged theCity and its officials had announced the creation 

of a new Emergency Medical Services Department to avoid the judgment in Fenter, 

that the functions of the Department are already being performed by classified 

firefighters in the Fire Department, and the actions of the City and its officials should 

be enjoined because they violate the Civil Service Act, collective bargaining, and 

the City Charter. The Union alleged its members were threatened by further injury 

by the creation of a new department that performs firefighting job functions. The 

Union asked the 136th District Court to issue a temporary restraining order and a 

temporary injunction against Relators and their employees from directly or indirectly 

creating, funding, staffing, advertising, marketing, hiring, recruiting, planning, 
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promoting, reporting, or furthering in any way an Emergency Medical Services 

Department without proper authority. The Union asked the 136th District Court to 

order Williams and White to swear in all medics in the Fire Department who have 

not already been so sworn, as civil service employees of that Department. The Union 

asked the 136th District Court to order the City to properly classify the EMT 

positions that have been occupied in the Beaumont Fire Department since March 

2021. 

On December 27, 2022, the trial court issued the temporary restraining order 

as requested by the Union and scheduled a temporary injunction hearing for January 

10, 2023. Upon receiving Relators’ petition and motion for temporary relief, we

temporarily stayed all further proceedings in the trial court and requested a reply

from the Union. The Union contends this proceeding is moot because the temporary 

restraining order expired and was not renewed. Relators contest the suggestion of 

mootness. They argue we should address the merits of their petition because the 

Union requests injunctive reliefin the trial court and Relators’ petition in this Court 

requests that a writ of prohibition issue to enjoin the trial court from taking actions 

that implicate the outcome of the superseded judgment. 

Relators sought mandamus relief from the temporary restraining order. That 

order expired without being extended. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 680. A temporary 

restraining order cannot be extended after it expires. In re Hallas, No. 03-22-00413-
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CV, 2022 WL 3650090, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 25, 2022, orig. proceeding) 

(mem. op.). Accordingly, to the extent Relators requested mandamus relief, the 

petition is moot. See In re Abbott, No. 01-21-00440-CV, 2021 WL 5056616, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

An appellate court can protect the subject matter of an appeal by issuing a writ 

of prohibition that limits or prevents action by a trial court. See Holloway v. Fifth 

Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 682–83 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding). The date 

set for the temporary injunction passed while this Court’s temporary stay was in 

effect. Unless the trial court setsthe Union’s application for a temporary injunction 

for a hearing, we discern no need to issue a writ of prohibition. Accordingly, we lift 

our order granting temporary relief and deny Relators’ petition without prejudice.

All pending motions are denied as moot. 

PETITION DENIED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on January 23, 2023

Opinion Delivered March 9, 2023

Before Golemon, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.