FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 10-50632 

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v. 3:10-cr-01707- 

LAB-1 HERIBERTO PEREA-REY,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

Larry A. Burns, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

October 13, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed May 31, 2012

Before: Alfred T. Goodwin and Kim McLane Wardlaw,

Circuit Judges, and William K. Sessions III,

District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Wardlaw

*The Honorable William K. Sessions III, District Judge, United States

District Court for Vermont, sitting by designation. 

6029
COUNSEL

Gregory T. Murphy, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc.,

San Diego, California, for the defendant-appellant.

Laura E. Duffy, United States Attorney, Bruce R. Castetter

and Christopher P. Tenorio, Assistant United States Attorneys, San Diego, California for the plaintiff-appellee.

6032 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
OPINION

WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:

Border Patrol agents watched a man climb over the

Mexico-United States border fence and followed him as he

took a taxi to Heriberto Perea-Rey’s home. An agent watched

the suspected undocumented alien walk through the gated

entrance to the home and knock on the front door. The agent

followed him through the front yard, around the side of the

house and into the carport. He found the suspect there, standing with Perea-Rey in front of a side door entrance to the

home, and detained both men until other agents arrived.

Perea-Rey refused to allow the agents to enter his house. Forgetting for a moment that the Fourth Amendment ordinarily

requires that the government obtain a warrant before it conducts a search or seizure, particularly of persons in their

homes, the agents, pointing their guns at the home, ordered

everyone outside. The individuals who emerged were later

found to be undocumented aliens.

Indicted for harboring the aliens in violation of 8 U.S.C.

§ 1324, Perea-Rey moved to suppress evidence of the aliens

as the fruit of a warrantless search and seizure. Though the

district court found that the agents entered the curtilage of

Perea-Rey’s home and that there were no exigent circumstances that might justify the failure to obtain a warrant, the

court denied the motion. Perea-Rey entered a conditional

guilty plea and filed this appeal. Because the agents physically occupied the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home without

obtaining a warrant, and no exceptions to the warrant requirement otherwise justified the search or seizure, we reverse

Perea-Rey’s conviction and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 19, 2010, border patrol agents observed an

individual—later identified as Pedro Garcia—enter the United

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6033
States by climbing over the United States-Mexico border

fence. Eventually, Garcia traveled by taxi to Perea-Rey’s

home at 257 Hernandez Street, Calexico, California. Border

Patrol Agent Angel Trujillo followed the taxi to Perea-Rey’s

residence. Hernandez Street runs east-west through a residential area more than a mile, as the crow flies, from the international border.1

Agent Trujillo approached Perea-Rey’s home from the west

on Hernandez Street. Parking his car to the west of the house,

Trujillo saw Garcia leave the taxi, enter the front yard through

one of two gates (the larger gate in front of the carport was

closed), and knock on the front door. Perea-Rey opened the

door, spoke to Garcia, and gestured towards the carport on the

east side of the house.2

 From his vantage point to the west of

the house, Agent Trujillo could not see into the carport. Garcia walked along the front of the house, around the corner and

into the carport. Agent Trujillo followed him past the front

door and into the carport, where he confronted Perea-Rey and

Garcia, identifying himself as a border patrol agent. In

response to Perea-Rey’s question as to what was “going on,”

Agent Trujillo instructed him and Garcia to stay where they

were until other agents arrived. Agent Trujillo held Perea-Rey

and Garcia for roughly five minutes in the carport, without

explaining his presence or asking whether Perea-Rey was

willing to speak with him. When the agents arrived, they

arrested and removed Garcia from the property and surrounded the home.

1

We take judicial notice of a Google map and satellite image as a

“source[ ] whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” at least for

the purpose of determining the general location of the home. Fed. R. Evid.

201(b). See also Citizens for Peace in Space v. City of Colorado Springs,

477 F.3d 1212, 1219 n.2 (10th Cir. 2007) (taking judicial notice of online

distance calculations); cf. Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S.

337, 344 (1952) (“We may, of course, take judicial notice of geography.”)

(Jackson, J., dissenting). 2

We attach as an Appendix four photographs of Perea-Rey’s home

introduced as Exhibits 1 to 4 during the suppression hearing. 

6034 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
Perea-Rey did not consent to the agents’ request to enter

the house. From within the carport, Agent Trujillo knocked on

the side door, identified himself as a border patrol agent and

commanded everyone to come out of the house. Four men

emerged. The agents pointed guns at the home and again

ordered everyone out; two more men emerged. Questioning

the men, the agents determined that they were undocumented

aliens, and that there was another person in the home. The

agents searched the home and discovered a seventh alien.

On May 5, 2010, Perea-Rey was indicted on three counts

of harboring undocumented aliens under 8 U.S.C. § 1324. He

moved to suppress the evidence of the aliens gathered at his

residence. After two evidentiary hearings, the district court

found that the carport was within the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s

home, but that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy

because it could be observed from the sidewalk. It therefore

held that Agent Trujillo did not violate Perea-Rey’s Fourth

Amendment rights by entering the carport, knocking on the

side door and ordering people in the house to come out. The

court denied the motion to suppress as to the first four aliens

who emerged in response to Agent Trujillo’s command. The

court granted the motion to suppress evidence and observations from within the home, including the last alien to emerge,

concluding that this evidence resulted from an unconstitutional warrantless entry of Perea-Rey’s home. Perea-Rey

entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of the indictment. This appeal ensued.3

II. DISCUSSION

“We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress.

Whether the exclusionary rule applies to a given case is

reviewed de novo, while the underlying factual findings are

3

The court reserved ruling on the admissibility of evidence of the two

aliens who emerged after agents pointed guns at the home. Because PereaRey thereafter pleaded guilty, the court never decided that issue. 

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6035
reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d

1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citations omitted). Evidence that is derived directly or indirectly from an illegal

search cannot “constitute proof against the victim of the

search.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484

(1963).

Where the government “physically occupie[s] private property for the purpose of obtaining information,” that is a

“ ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).

“[S]earches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are

presumptively unreasonable.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S.

573, 586 (1980). Because the curtilage is part of the home,

searches and seizures in the curtilage without a warrant are

also presumptively unreasonable. See Oliver v. United States,

466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).4

 “[T]he determination that a particular search did (or did not) occur within the curtilage must be

reviewed de novo on appeal.” United States v. Johnson, 256

F.3d 895, 913 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc).

A. Curtilage

[1] The district court found that the carport, which the border patrol agents occupied, was part of the curtilage of PereaRey’s home, and we agree. We examine four non-exhaustive

factors to determine whether an area is part of a home’s curtilage: “the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the

home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area

is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area

from observation by people passing by.” United States v.

4

That officers believe that a suspect or instrumentality of a crime may

be in a residence does not change the calculus. See Agnello v. United

States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (“Belief, however well founded, that an

article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification

for a search of that place without a warrant.”). 

6036 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 307 (1987); see United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 739 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying Dunn factors). “These factors do not yield a definite answer; rather

they guide [us] in determining whether the area is so intimately connected to the home that it should fall under the

umbrella of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.” Johnson,

256 F.3d at 911. Our analysis of the Dunn factors is aided by

the photographs of Perea-Rey’s home introduced at the suppression hearing. Agent Trujillo testified that these photographs accurately show Perea-Rey’s home and that the

lighting at the time of the April 19 arrests was “roughly about

the same.”

[2] The carport more than satisfies the proximity factor. It

is directly adjacent to and shares a common facade and wall

with the one-story stucco home. Inside the carport there is a

side door that opens directly into the home. Agent Trujillo

testified that this door is set back ten to fifteen feet into the

carport, but it appears from photographs to be closer to the

front of the carport. The area near the side door, where Trujillo confronted Perea-Rey and Garcia, is immediately adjacent

to the interior of the home.

[3] The carport also meets the enclosure factor; not only is

it enclosed by walls and a roof, but it is further enclosed by

a wrought iron fence that surrounds the property, including a

small grass front yard. The fence also encloses the driveway

entrance to the carport. The fence is five to ten feet from the

front of the house and allows a relatively unobstructed view

of the front of the home. There are two gates in the fence: a

small gate in front of the main door to the house, and a larger

gate across the front of the driveway. On the day of PereaRey’s arrest, the driveway gate was closed, blocking passersby from entering the driveway and carport.

[4] Perea-Rey also used the carport to store valuable personal belongings. The carport enclosed, among other things,

Perea-Rey’s 1989 GMC pickup truck, his valuable classic

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6037
1970 GMC pickup truck, a rolling chest of automotive tools,

a hand truck and building supplies. The back end of the carport opens into the private, fenced-in rear yard of the home;

thus it was also protected from observation by passers-by.

[5] Perea-Rey went to some measure to protect the carport

from observation from beyond the fence line. A solid roof and

two walls shield the darkened interior from view. Examining

the photographs, the district judge concluded that the area was

so dark that he could not see the side door at all. While the

fence does not fully obscure the carport, its interior is only

readily observed from a position inside the fence line.

[6] Because each of the Dunn factors is satisfied, we agree

with the district court that the agents searched the curtilage of

Perea-Rey’s home when they entered the carport. The carport

is an area so closely connected to his home that it “fall[s]

under the same umbrella of the Fourth Amendment’s protections,” as his home. Johnson, 256 F.3d at 911.

B. Fourth Amendment Protection

[7] Warrantless trespasses by the government into the

home or its curtilage are Fourth Amendment searches. Jones,

132. S. Ct. at 950 n.3 (“Where, as here, the Government

obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area, such a search has undoubtedly occurred”).

The scope of those constitutionally protected areas is rooted

in the protection of private property rights. See id. at 949.

Thus, as Justice Scalia wrote in Jones, “our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass until at

least the latter half of the 20th century.” Id. (citing Kyllo v.

United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)). In Katz v. United

States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), the Court extended the protection against searches and seizures to places outside the

home where a person had a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950. In the intervening years, this

holding in Katz has created some confusion about the interac6038 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
tion between the reasonable expectation of privacy standard

and “the traditional pre-Katz interpretation of the Fourth

Amendment.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 2.3(d)

(4th ed.) (collecting and discussing cases). 

[8] This confusion has persisted for decades. For example,

in United States v. Magana, 512 F.2d 1169 (9th Cir. 1975),

we stated that “ ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy,’ and not

common-law property distinctions, now controls the scope of

the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 1170-71 (citing Katz). Relying

on Magana, we repeated this error in a recent opinion that the

government cited to the district court. See United States v.

Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010), vacated, 132

S. Ct. 1533 (2012). In Pineda-Moreno, despite the government’s admission that agents had, without a warrant, entered

the curtilage of the defendant’s home to place a mobile tracking device on his car in his driveway, our court concluded that

there was no Fourth Amendment violation because PinedaMoreno had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage. Id. at 1215. The Supreme Court recently and emphatically repudiated this reasoning, explaining that “as we have

discussed, the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has

been added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.

[9] After determining that the carport was part of the curtilage to the home, the district court erroneously concluded that

the agents did not violate Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment

rights when they occupied the carport without a warrant. The

Supreme Court has explained that the role of reasonable

expectation analysis in evaluating the constitutionality of

searches of the curtilage is only in determining the scope of

the curtilage, and not the propriety of the intrusion. See Dunn,

480 U.S. at 300 (“[T]he extent of the curtilage is determined

by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably

may expect that the area in question should be treated as the

home itself.”). The district court circularly reasoned that

because the agents were able to freely enter the carport,

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6039
Perea-Rey had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the

carport. Yet, because it was curtilage, it was a constitutionally

protected area, and the warrantless entry, search and seizure

by the agents violated Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights.

See Payton, 445 U.S. at 586 (“It is a ‘basic principle of Fourth

Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home

without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.”). No further showing was required of Perea-Rey.

[10] The district court also conflated the ability to observe

inside the curtilage with the right to enter the curtilage without a warrant. Although a warrant is not required to observe

readily visible items within the curtilage, and “officers [need

not] shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares,” California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986),

a warrant is required to enter the home. In Ciraolo, the

Supreme Court held that warrantless aerial observation of the

curtilage of a home was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that such observations could form the basis for

probable cause to support a warrant to search the curtilage. Id.

at 213-14. Only after obtaining a warrant based on the observations did officers actually enter Ciraolo’s curtilage. The

ability to observe part of the curtilage or the interior of a

home does not authorize law enforcement, without a warrant,

to then enter those areas to conduct searches or seizures. See

Struckman, 603 F.3d at 747 (“[P]olice officers must either

obtain a warrant or consent to enter before arresting a person

inside a home or its curtilage or make a reasonable attempt to

ascertain that he is actually a trespasser before making the

arrest.”). The agents here could observe the curtilage from the

sidewalk and use those observations, as in Ciraolo, as the

basis for a warrant application. But, the ability to see into the

curtilage or the home does not, absent some other exception

to the warrant requirement, authorize a warrantless entry by

the government. Therefore, the district court erred by admitting the evidence simply because the officers could view the

inside of the carport from the street.

6040 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
C. Reasonableness of the Search

[11] Because Agent Trujillo did not have a warrant, his

entry into the carport was presumptively unreasonable in violation of Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights. “There are

two general exceptions to the warrant requirement for home

searches: exigency and emergency.” United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). The district court

did not clearly err when it found that there were no exigent

circumstances justifying the search and the government does

not challenge this finding on appeal.

Instead, the government invokes the so-called “knock and

talk” exception to the warrant requirement to justify Agent

Trujillo’s incursion into the curtilage. We have held that

“[l]aw enforcement officers may encroach upon the curtilage

of a home for the purpose of asking questions of the occupants.” United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th

Cir. 2001). This doctrine has its origins in Davis v. United

States, 327 F.2d 301, 305 (9th Cir. 1964). In Davis, plainclothes police officers visited a home simply “for the purpose

of talking to Davis.” Id. at 303. A child let them into the

house, where they observed marijuana plants; this led to a further search, arrest and prosecution. Id. at 302. We relied on

the subjective intent of the officers when they knocked on the

door to conclude that the officers did not violate Davis’s

rights. Id. at 303 (“[I]t was not their intention to arrest the

defendant nor to search the premises.”).

Four decades later, in Hammett, which presented similar

circumstances, we also relied on the subjective intent of the

officers to conclude that they did not violate Hammett’s

Fourth Amendment rights. In Hammett, officers flew in a helicopter over a home in an isolated area of Hawaii. 236 F.3d

at 1056. They observed what appeared to be marijuana plants

in pots through the translucent plastic roof of the home. Id.

The officers landed the helicopter in a nearby field and

approached the home. Id. When their knocks on one door

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6041
were not answered, the officers circled the home and eventually observed marijuana through a gap in its walls. Id. at

1056-57. The police obtained a warrant to enter the home

based on those observations. Id. at 1057. The Hammett court

held that the initial approach to the home was a permissible

“knock and talk,” id. at 1059, and that “an officer may, in

good faith, move away from the front door when seeking to

contact the occupants of a residence,” id. at 1060.

Although it has not addressed the knock and talk exception,

the Supreme Court has unequivocally disallowed reliance on

the good faith or subjective beliefs of officers as part of the

analysis of whether they violated the Fourth Amendment. See

Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011). In King, the

Court rejected an exigent circumstances test that looked to

bad faith of police officers in creating exigent circumstances,

reasoning that only objective factors lend themselves to analysis under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard.

Id. (“‘Our cases have repeatedly rejected’ a subjective

approach, asking only whether ‘the circumstances viewed

objectively, justify the action.’ ”) (quoting Brigham City v.

Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)). “The subjective intent of

the law enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining

whether that officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment.”

Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 n.2 (2000).

[12] The Supreme Court’s rejection of good faith, subjective intent tests to gauge Fourth Amendment violations

implicitly overrules some of the reasoning of cases like Davis

and Hammett, which turned in part on the officer’s subjective

intent. Accordingly, we can no longer rely on the good faith

belief of law enforcement officers in our analysis of whether

an incursion into the curtilage for a knock and talk violates

the Fourth Amendment. See Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889,

900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (We are “bound by the intervening higher authority and [must] reject the prior opinion of this

court as having been effectively overruled”). To be clear, it

remains permissible for officers to approach a home to con6042 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
tact the inhabitants. The constitutionality of such entries into

the curtilage hinges on whether the officer’s actions are consistent with an attempt to initiate consensual contact with the

occupants of the home.

[13] Officers conducting a knock and talk also need not

approach only a specific door if there are multiple doors

accessible to the public. “[T]he law does not require an officer

to determine which door most closely approximates the Platonic form of ‘main entrance’ and then, after successfully

completing this metaphysical inquiry, approach only that

door. An officer [initiating] a ‘knock and talk’ visit may

approach any part of the building . . . where uninvited visitors

could be expected.” United States v. Titemore, 335 F. Supp.

2d 502, 505-06 (D. Vt. 2004), aff’d, 437 F.3d 251 (2d Cir.

2006). However, once an attempt to initiate a consensual

encounter with the occupants of a home fails, “the officers

should end the knock and talk and change their strategy by

retreating cautiously, seeking a search warrant, or conducting

further surveillance.” United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405,

410 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that border patrol agents violated

the Fourth Amendment when they conducted a warrantless

search of the curtilage after there was no response to a knock

and talk attempt) (internal quotation omitted).

[14] Here, Agent Trujillo watched Garcia approach the

house from a vantage point where he was unable to see the

side door entrance in the carport. Garcia knocked on the front

door, which was visible to Agent Trujillo. Perea-Rey then signaled Garcia to walk around the house and into the carport

area. Therefore Garcia was not a trespasser. Agent Trujillo, in

contrast, did not enter the yard and knock on the front door

to initiate a consensual contact with Perea-Rey. Agent Trujillo

admitted at the evidentiary hearing that he was not invited

into the carport, but that he simply followed Garcia onto the

property, bypassing the front door and walking around the

side of the house into the carport. It was not objectively reasonable as part of a knock and talk for Agent Trujillo to

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6043
bypass the front door, which he had seen Perea-Rey open in

response to a knock by Garcia, and intrude into an area of the

curtilage where uninvited visitors would not be expected to

appear.

[15] The events that followed after Agent Trujillo entered

the carport further undermine the government’s argument that

he merely attempted a consensual knock and talk. When

Perea-Rey saw Agent Trujillo and asked him what was “going

on,” Trujillo did not answer, and instead instructed Perea-Rey

to wait until backup arrived. Perea-Rey never had an opportunity to simply ignore a knock on the door to his home by

police. See Troop, 514 F.3d at 410 (“It is hardly surprising

that the aliens chose not to answer the door, given that Border

Patrol agents were waiting to arrest them on the other side.”).

Agent Trujillo did not seek Perea-Rey’s consent to enter the

property or even to speak with him. He simply identified himself and ordered Perea-Rey not to move. We conclude that

Trujillo did not engage in a consensual “knock and talk.”

Rather, Trujillo’s initial detention of Perea-Rey was, at a bare

minimum, a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

We have held, however, that “the Terry exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to in-home searches and seizures.” Struckman, 603 F.3d at 738.5

 Therefore, by

5

Our statement in United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th

Cir. 2007), that “[i]f an arrest in the doorway is allowed, certainly the

lesser intrusion of a Terry stop in the hallway is also permissible” is not

inconsistent with our holding. The Terry stop there occurred in a public

area of a motel, and not in the curtilage of a home. United States v. Vaneaton, 49 F.3d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir. 1995), the case relied on by the Crapser

court, also involved an arrest at the threshold of a motel room. Further, in

both Crapser and Vaneaton, the suspects knowingly and voluntarily

exposed themselves to police officers. Unlike a private yard or carport,

“tenants in an apartment building [or motel] have no justified expectation

of privacy as to a portion of the home which all residents and visitors must

use to enter, the common yard open to the public or the parking lot open

to all users of the apartment building.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 2.3(f) (4th ed.) (quotations omitted). The encounter here was neither consensual nor in a public area of a motel or apartment building. 

6044 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
trespassing on the curtilage and detaining Perea-Rey, Agent

Trujillo violated Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights.

[16] The government relies exclusively on the knock and

talk exception to excuse the warrantless entry into PereaRey’s curtilage. An expansion of that exception to allow for

Terry stops or searches and seizures within the curtilage is

wholly inconsistent with Oliver and Dunn. At most, the knock

and talk exception authorizes officers to enter the curtilage to

initiate a consensual conversation with the residents of the

home. If we were to construe the knock and talk exception to

allow officers to meander around the curtilage and engage in

warrantless detentions and seizures of residents, the exception

would swallow the rule that the curtilage is the home for

Fourth Amendment purposes. We hold that the warrantless

incursion into the curtilage of Perea-Rey’s home by border

patrol agents and the resulting searches and seizures violated

Perea-Rey’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court’s

denial of Perea-Rey’s motion to suppress the fruits of Agent

Trujillo’s warrantless search was reversible error. See Wong

Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment

and REMAND.

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6045
APPENDIX

6046 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
Exhibit 1

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6047
Exhibit 2

6048 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY
Exhibit 3

UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY 6049
Exhibit 4

6050 UNITED STATES v. PEREA-REY