alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
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                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.41

                                          June 1, 2001

Mr. Joseph L. Mullen
One Berkshire Road
Wellesley, MA 02181

Dear Joe:

   Reference is made to your employment agreement with Bottomline Technologies
(de), Inc. (the "Company") dated as of December 3, 1998 (the "Agreement").

   By delivery and execution of this letter, the Company hereby agrees to
continue the Agreement for an additional 24-month period commencing December 3,
2001 and ending on December 3, 2003, unless sooner terminated in accordance
with the provisions of Section 5 of the Agreement. For all purposes of the
Agreement, such extension shall be deemed a portion of the Employment Period,
as defined in the Agreement.

   In all respects, the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect, as so
extended, provided, however, that:

   1.It is agreed and acknowledged that your current title, for purposes of the
     Agreement, is President, and that the first sentence of Section 2 of the
     Agreement is hereby amended accordingly.

   2.It is further agreed that your current annual base salary is $235,000, and
     that Section3.1 of the Agreement is hereby amended accordingly. Further
     salary, bonus and option adjustments may be made from time to time in
     accordance with the terms of the Agreement as so extended.

   3.It is further agreed that in the event of the termination of your
     employment with the Company other than for "cause", as defined in the
     Agreement, (i) all options held by you shall immediately vest and (ii) you
     shall have a period of two years (or the remainder of the option term if
     less than two years) after the date of termination to exercise all options
     you hold; provided, however, the automatic vesting under this particular
     provision shall not apply to any prior grant of options at a strike price
     less than the closing price of Bottomline's stock on the date hereof,
     unless subsequently provided for at a later date by a vote of the Board or
     the Compensation Committee.

   By execution of this letter, you hereby agree to the foregoing extension of
the Agreement, and reaffirm your obligations under the Agreement.

                                          Very truly yours,

                                          Daniel M. McGurl
                                          Chairman of the Board
                                          and Chief Executive Officer

Agreed to and Acknowledged By:

--------------------------------------

Cc: Mr. Joseph Leo Barry
   Mr. James Zilinski
CERTIFICATION OF
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 I, Richard Hiron, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Bow Valley Ventures, Inc. (the Company), hereby certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge: (i)the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company, for the quarter  ended August 31, 2008, and to which this certification is attached as Exhibit 32 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(ii)the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.  By:/s/Richard HironName:Richard HironTitle:Chief Executive Officer and ChiefFinancial OfficerDate:October 10,, 2008 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request. This certification accompanies the Form 10-QSB to which it relates, is not deemed filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (whether made before or after the date of the Form 10-QSB), irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
#### W. H. Sutherland et al., Appellants, v. Blanche Green et al., Appellees.

WILLS: Remainder — Vested (?) or Contingent (?). A devise of a life estate, with proviso that “from and immediately after the death” of the life tenant, the remainder shall pass to the *“surviving”*children of the life tenant, creates a *contingent*remainder.

*Appeal from Adair District Court.*— Lorin N. Hays, Judge.

May 16, 1921.

This is, in form, a suit in partition of real estate. The defendants denied the interest of the plaintiffs in such real estate. This issue was made by a demurrer to the petition. The demurrer was sustained and the petition dismissed. The plaintiffs *appeal.*—

Affirmed.

*John McLennan,*for appellants.

*Willard L. King*and *Joseph I. Brody,*for appellees.

Evans, C. J.

The real controversy is over the construction *712of Clause 3 of the will of one E. B. Green, which was as follows:

> “Third. I give, devise and bequeath all my real estate of whatsoever kind to my wife, Charlotte Green, to be used and enjoyed by her during the term of her natural life, and from and immediately after her decease, I give and devise the same to the surviving children of my said wife, Charlotte Green share and share alike, to them, their heirs and assigns forever. ’ ’

Charlotte Green survived E. B. Green as his widow. At the time of the death of E. B. Green, Charlotte Green was the mother of five children, some of which were the children of Green and others were her children by a former marriage. One of her children was Mable Green Sutherland, who survived the testator, but predeceased the widow, Charlotte. If she had survived her mother, she would, without question, have taken one fifth of the estate at her mother’s decease. She left surviving her her husband and one child, who are the plaintiffs herein. The question presented is whether the remainder devised to her by Item 3 of the will was a vested remainder or a contingent one. It will be noted that the remainder was devised, not to the surviving children of the testator, but to the surviving children of the life tenant, and was so devised to them as a class. If this provision was intended to describe the class as those children of the mother which should survive the testator, then the remainder was vested. On the other hand, if its effect was to describe the children of the life tenant who should survive her, then the remainder was contingent. We see no escape from the latter construction. Upon such construction, it follows from our previous decisions that a contingent remainder was devised. *Birdsall v. Birdsall*(1912), 157 Iowa 363; *Baker v. Hibbs*(1914), 167 Iowa 174; *Horner v. Haase*(1916), 177 Iowa 115; *McClain v. Capper*(1896), 98 Iowa 145; *Olsen v. Youngerman*1907), 136 Iowa 404; *Fulton v. Fulton*(1917), 179 Iowa 948. The question has been discussed at'considerable length in several of the cited cases, and we can serve no useful purpose in repeating such discussion now. Sufficient to say that the- cited cases are controlling of the present one. The judgment below must, therefore, *be*— Affirmed.

Preston, SteveNS, and De Graee, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32
 
 Certification of Principal Executive and Financial Officer,
 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
 Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 In connection with the Quarterly Report of SN Strategies Corp. a Nevada corporation (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), Michael Hawks, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certifies to the best of his knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:
 
 (1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to SN Strategies Corp., and will be retained by SN Strategies Corp. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
 
 
 
 /s/ Michael Hawks
 Michael Hawks
 Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer
 August 11, 2009
### MA**TERIA LS NOT INCLUDED IN** 

**AI RWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE (A**  **D) DOCKET**

FAA - 2012 - 0222 Docket Number
2011 - SW - 007 -AD Directorate Identifier Name/Description of Item(s) Not Included in DMS Docket and Maintained in the Supplemental AD Docket Eurocopter Ale rt Service Bulletin No. 29.00.13, dated July 26, 2010
**MA Y BE VIEWED AT:**  Federal Aviation Administration

Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region Rules Docket 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663 Fort W orth, Texas 76137 **DURING THE HOURS OF:** 9 a.m. and 3 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 3043

To close loopholes in the firearms laws which allow the unregulated manufacture, assembly, shipment, or transportation of firearms or firearm parts,

and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 13, 2000

Mr. TORRICELLI introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To close loopholes in the firearms laws which allow the

unregulated manufacture, assembly, shipment, or transportation of firearms or firearm parts, and for other

purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Gun Parts Trafficking

5 Act of 2000’’.
2

•S 3043 IS

1 SEC. 2. PROHIBITION AGAINST SHIPMENT OR TRANSPOR2 TATION OF FIREARM PARTS, WITH CERTAIN

3 EXCEPTIONS.

4 Section 921(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is

5 amended by striking ‘‘or (D) any destructive device.’’ and

6 inserting ‘‘(D) any destructive device; or (E) any parts

7 or combination of parts that when assembled on a frame

8 or receiver would constitute a firearm, as defined in this

9 paragraph.’’.

10 SEC. 3. PROHIBITION AGAINST MANUFACTURE OR ASSEM11 BLY OF FIREARMS BY PERSONS OTHER THAN

12 LICENSED MANUFACTURERS.

13 Section 922 of title 18, United States Code, is

14 amended by adding at the end the following:

15 ‘‘(z) It shall be unlawful for any person other than

16 a licensed manufacturer to manufacture or assemble a

17 firearm.’’.

18 SEC. 4. INCREASE IN FEE FOR LICENSE TO MANUFACTURE

19 FIREARMS.

20 Section 923(a)(1)(B) of title 18, United States Code,

21 is amended by striking ‘‘$50’’ and inserting ‘‘$500’’.

22 SEC. 5. PROHIBITION AGAINST POSSESSION OR TRANSFER

23 OF CERTAIN COMBINATIONS OF MACHINE24 GUN REPLACEMENT PARTS.

25 Section 5845(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of

26 1986 (National Firearms Act) is amended in the 2nd sen-
3

•S 3043 IS

1 tence by striking ‘‘designed and intended solely and exclu2 sively, or combination of parts designed and intended,’’

3 and inserting ‘‘or combination of parts designed and in4 tended’’.

5 SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

6 The amendments made by this Act shall apply to con7 duct engaged in after the 60-day period that begins with

8 the date of the enactment of this Act.

Æ
### IN THE UNI TED STAT ES COURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE FIF TH CIRCU IT

No. 08-41133

INTEGRITY COMMUNICATIONS LTD,
Plaintiff-Appellant

v. UNIVERSAL SERVICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 1:08-CV-29
Before OWEN and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges. * PER CURIAM: ** Integrity Communications brought suit in state district court in Cameron County, Texas against the U niversal Service Administrative Company. The U n i te d S ta te s C o u rt o f A p p ea l s

F i ft h C i rc u i t 

### F I L E D March 8, 20 12 Lyle W . Cayce Clerk

Judge Ga rw ood wa s a me mbe r of the pane l at the tim e of oral argum ents

. Hi s dea th *
on July 1 4, 2011, c aus esus t o d ecid e t hisc aseby a qu orum . 28 U .S .C. § 46(d).

Purs uant to 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 , the court has det erm ined that this opi nion sho uld not * * be publ ish ed and is not pr ece dent excep t unde r the lim ite d cir cum st ance s se t forth in 5 T H C IR

. R. 47.5 .4. Case: 08-41133 Document: 00511781673 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/08/2012No. 08-41133

defendant USAC is a non-profit corporation authorized by regulations of the Federal Communication Commission to administer what is called the E

- R a te Program. The lawsuit clai m e d U SA C h a d erroneously determined that Integrity

was not in compliance with the program, notified Integrity’s present and prospe c t iv e clients of that determination, and stopped payments to Integrity. The suit requested a declarat o ry j udgment, an injunction, and other relief. Integrity simultaneously sought review of USAC’s actions by the FCC. The state court suit was removed to the United Stat e s D i s t rict Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court dismissed on the bas i s t h at Integrity had not exhausted the administrative process at the FCC. Integrity appealed. On August 28, 2008, three days before oral argument s i n t h is court, the FCC released its initial decision. Af t e r o ral argument, we placed further proceedings in this court in abeyance until completion of the FCC’s review. On January 10, 2012, the FCC issued its final order in this case and ruled in favor of USAC. On February 15, 2012, Integrity informed us that it would not petition for review of the FCC’s order. Both parties agree that at most, all that is left in the case are the state law claims. Although USAC urges us to resolve Integrity’s state law claims now, we decline. Because th e di s t r i c t court has not yet ruled on them, we vacate and remand for further proceedings. VACATED and REMANDED.

2 Case: 08-41133 Document: 00511781673 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/08/2012
II

Calendar No. 794

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 3021

To provide that a certification of the cooperation of Mexico with United

States counterdrug efforts not be required in fiscal year 2001 for the

limitation on assistance for Mexico under section 490 of the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961 not to go into effect in that fiscal year.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

SEPTEMBER 7, 2000

Mrs. HUTCHISON (for herself, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. DODD, and Mrs.

FEINSTEIN) introduced the following bill; which was read the first time

SEPTEMBER 8, 2000

Read the second time and placed on the calendar

A BILL

To provide that a certification of the cooperation of Mexico

with United States counterdrug efforts not be required

in fiscal year 2001 for the limitation on assistance for

Mexico under section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act

of 1961 not to go into effect in that fiscal year.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

•S 3021 PCS

1 SECTION 1. COUNTERDRUG COOPERATION CERTIFICATION

2 UNDER FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961

3 NOT REQUIRED WITH RESPECT TO MEXICO

4 IN FISCAL YEAR 2001.

5 Notwithstanding paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection

6 (a) of section 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

7 (22 U.S.C. 2291j), no certification shall be required under

8 subsection (b) of that section with respect to Mexico in

9 fiscal year 2001 in order that the limitations on bilateral

10 assistance and multilateral assistance under subsection (a)

11 of that section not apply to Mexico in fiscal year 2001.

Calendar No. 794

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 3021

A BILL

To provide that a certification of the cooperation of

Mexico with United States counterdrug effortsnot be required in fiscal year 2001 for the limitation on assistance for Mexico under section 490of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 not to gointo effect in that fiscal year.

SEPEMBER 8, 2000

Read the second time and placed on the calendar
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the report of Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period
ended September 30, 2008 (the "Report"), I, Samuel S. Lee, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



December 26, 2008

/s/ SAMUEL S. LEE Samuel S. Lee Chief Executive Officer


---



QuickLinks
**Exhibit12.1**
**Mediacom LLC**
Schedule of Computation of Ratio of Earnings to Fixed Charges                           **For the years ended December 31,**     **2005**  **2004**  **2003**  **2002**  **2001**       **(in thousands, except ratio amounts)**     Earnings:                    (Loss) income before income taxes $(4,294) $8,976  $(42,490) $(105,107) $(125,682)Interest expense, net  102,000   97,790   98,596   102,458   93,823 Amortization of capitalized interest  1,525   1,356   1,580   497   1,365 Amortization of debt issuance costs  3,009   5,642   3,320   3,754   3,984 Interest component of rent expense (1)  2,776   2,623   2,342   2,136   1,850                      Earnings available for fixed charges $105,016  $116,387  $63,348  $3,738  $(24,660)                                          Fixed Charges:                    Interest expense, net $102,000  $97,790  $98,596  $102,458  $93,823 Capitalized interest  2,106   1,545   3,532   2,723   3,912 Amortization of debt issuance costs  3,009   5,642   3,320   3,754   3,984 Interest component of rent expense (1)  2,776   2,623   2,342   2,136   1,850                      Total fixed charges $109,891  $107,600  $107,790  $111,071  $103,569                      Ratio of earnings to fixed charges  —   1.08   —   —   —                      Deficiency of earnings over fixed charges $(4,875) $—  $(44,442) $(107,333) $(128,229)                      (1) A reasonable approximation (one-third) is deemed to be theinterest factor included in rental expense.
82
106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2942

AN ACT

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction

of certain hydroelectric projects in the State of West

Virginia.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 2942 ES

1 SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF TIME FOR FEDERAL ENERGY

2 REGULATORY COMMISSION PROJECT.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the time period

4 specified in section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16

5 U.S.C. 806) that would otherwise apply to the Federal En6 ergy Regulatory Commission projects numbered 6901,

7 6902, and 7307, the Commission may, at the request of

8 the licensee for each project, respectively, and after rea9 sonable notice, in accordance with the good faith, due dili10 gence, and public interest requirements of that section and

11 the Commission’s procedures under that section, extend

12 the time period during which the licensee is required to

13 commence the construction of the project for 3 consecutive

14 2-year periods.

15 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—Subsection (a) takes effect

16 on the date of the expiration of the extension issued by

17 the Commission before the date of the enactment of this

18 Act under section 13 of the Federal Power Act (16 U.S.C.

19 806).

20 (c) REINSTATEMENT OF EXPIRED LICENSE.—If the

21 period required for commencement of construction of any

22 of the projects described in subsection (a) expired before

23 the date of the enactment of this Act—

24 (1) the Commission shall reinstate the license

25 effective as of the date of its expiration; and
3

S 2942 ES

1 (2) the first extension authorized under sub2 section (a) shall take effect on the expiration date.

Passed the Senate October 5 (legislative day, September 22), 2000.

Attest:

Secretary.

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2942

AN ACT

To extend the deadline for commencement of construction of certain hydroelectric projects in the

State of West Virginia.
#### Mahoney, Respondent, vs. Thill and another, Appellants.

*October 13*

November *10, 1942.*

*361For the appellants there was a brief by *Dougherty, Arnold & Kivett,*and oral argument by *Glenn R. Dougherty*and *Clifford C. Kasdorf,*all of Milwaukee.

For the respondent there was a brief by *Max P. Kufalk*and *Gold & McCann,*all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Ray T. McCann.*

Fairchild, J.

The conflict between the jury’s finding that respondent was free from all negligence and the finding that twenty pér cent of the damages is attributable to his negligence in and of itself would not require the granting of a new trial. As was said in *McGeehan v. Gaar, Scott & Co.*122 Wis. 630, 634, 100 N. W. 1072, where the effect of a question and answer contained in the special verdict entirely inconsistent with the answer to- a preceding question in the verdict was considered:

> “To our minds the question is not important. The fifth question was only submitted to the jury in a certain contingency, *i. e.,*if they had already answered the fourth question and answered it in the affirmative. Inasmuch as it appears that they answered the fourth question in the negative, it is evident that the fifth question was never submitted to them by the court, and the question and answer drop entirely from the case and may be disregarded.”

That this is a sound doctrine has been demonstrated by experience. It has been followed by this court. *Forbes v. Forbes,*226 Wis. 477, 277 N. W. 112. The difference between these cases and cases where the court found the jury was confused as to causation is explained in *Bodden v. John H. Detter Coffee Co.*218 Wis. 451, 456, 261 N. W. 209.

The trial court in considering this phase of the case concluded that the respondent was negligent as a matter of law and changed the answer to that particular question from “No” to “Yes.” We agree that the evidence is such that there must be a finding of some negligence on respondent’s *362.part contributing to the collision between him and the defendant’s or whosever car struck him, and that it was necessary to change the answer as was done. With that finding set aside, then and not.until then did occasion exist for a comparison of negligence. Under the rule the jury legally left the verdict in such a state that the finding on comparison amounted to nothing, and that condition as it related to the comparison question cannot now be changed. When the court directed the finding of negligence on respondent’s part, a different set of facts was presented. But the jury was no longer at hand and a ruling by the court that gave vigor to a lifeless finding would result in the trial of that question by the court without a jury. As a practical matter, who can say what the answer to the comparison question would have been had the jury been advised of the existence of causal negligence on respondent’s part. In this state of the case we cannot consider that the jury passed upon the facts and made findings warranting judgment.

*By the Court.*— Judgment reversed, with directions to grant a new trial.