alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 99.20











CONSENT


Ladies and
Gentlemen:





The undersigned
hereby consents to (1) the references to the undersigned’s
name included or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report on
Form 40-F of Denison Mines Corp. in connection with the report
entitled “Technical Report with an Updated Mineral Resource
Estimate for the Waterbury Lake Property, Northern
Saskatchewan” dated December 21, 2018, and (2) all other
references to the undersigned included or incorporated by reference
in the Annual Report on Form 40-F of Denison Mines
Corp.








Dated: March 13,
2020











(signed) "Serdar
Donmez"


__________________________


Serdar Donmez,
P.Geo., E.I.T.


Denison Mines
Corp.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification by the Chief Executive Officer

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted

pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Patheon Inc. (the
Company) for the period ended April 30, 2011 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, James C. Mullen, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby
certifies, to the knowledge of the undersigned, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, that:



|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
|--- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |                                                      
|------------------- |  | -----------------------------------------------------
|Date: June 10, 2011 |  | /s/ James C. Mullen                                  
|                    |  | James C. Mullen                                      
|                    |  | Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)

This Certification is being furnished solely to accompany the Report pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and shall not be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company under
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, whether made before or after the date of this Report, irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been provided to the Company and will be
retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Veridien Corporation (the "Company") hereby certifies
to my knowledge that the Company's annual report on Form 10-KSB for the year
ended December 31, 2004 (the "Report"), as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the on date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and
shall not be deemed to be part of the Report or "filed" for any purpose
whatsoever.

Date: March 31, 2005                Name:  /s/ Sheldon C. Fenton
                                           ---------------------------------
                                           Sheldon C. Fenton
                                    Title: Chief Executive Officer and
                                           Acting Chief Financial Officer
II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2958

To establish a national clearinghouse for youth entrepreneurship education,

and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 27, 2000

Mr. SANTORUM introduced the following bill; which was read twice and

referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

A BILL

To establish a national clearinghouse for youth

entrepreneurship education, and for other purposes.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR YOUTH EN4 TREPRENEURSHIP EDUCATION.

5 (a) NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE.—The Secretary of

6 Education may award a grant or contract to an organiza7 tion or institution, with substantial experience in cur8 riculum-based entrepreneurship education, to establish a

9 national clearinghouse for youth entrepreneurship edu10 cation. The purpose of the clearinghouse shall be to facili-
2

•S 2958 IS

1 tate professional development opportunities for teachers,

2 stimulate community partnerships with businesses, youth

3 agencies, and nonprofit entities (including faith-based,

4 non-profit, and other local organizations), collect and dis5 seminate curricular materials, and undertake other activi6 ties to encourage teacher interest and involvement in en7 trepreneurship education, especially for students in grades

8 7 through 12.

9 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There

10 are authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section

11 $500,000 for each of the fiscal years 2001, 2002, and

12 2003.

13 SEC. 2. USE OF FUNDS FROM OTHER PROGRAMS FOR

14 YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP.

15 For the purposes of each program under the following

16 provisions of law, supporting a curriculum-based youth en17 trepreneurship education program with a demonstrated

18 record of empowering disadvantaged youth with applied

19 mathematics, entrepreneurial, and other analytical skills

20 shall be considered to be an eligible use of funds provided

21 under such program:

22 (1) subparts 1 and 2 of part D, and part E, of

23 title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education

24 Act of 1965;
3

•S 2958 IS

1 (2) subparts 1, 2, and 4 of part A, and part B,

2 of title III of such Act;

3 (3) subparts 1 and 2 of part A of title IV of

4 such Act;

5 (4) parts B and C of title VI of such Act; and

6 (5) part A, and subparts 1 and 2 of part J, of

7 title X of such Act.

Æ
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Seni or Judge Bumgardner

KEVIN MICHAEL COLBURN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1269-10-4 PER CURIAM OCTOBER 12, 2010 E. C. ERNST, INC. AND HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE MIDWEST

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

(Julie H. Heiden ; M. Thomas McWeeny; Koonz, McKenney, Johnson, DePaolis & Li ghtfoot, L.L.P., on br ief), for appellant.

(Francis H. Foley; Law Office of Jonathan P. Jester, on brief), for appellees.

Kevin Michael Colburn app eals a decision of the Worker s’ Compensation Commission

finding he failed to adequately ma rket his residual work capacity. We have reviewed the record

and the commission’s opinion and find this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm for

the reasons stated by the comm ission in its final opinion. See Colburn v. E C Ernst, Inc. , VWC

File No. 236-46-16 (May 27, 2010). We dispense with oral argument and summarily affirm

because the facts and legal contentions are adequate ly presented in the materials before the Court

and argument would not aid the decisional process. See Code § 17.1-403; Rule 5A:27.

Affirmed.

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opin ion is not designated for publication.
# L_2012310EN.01005001.xml

| 9.11.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 310/50 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 310/50

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 7 November 2012

appointing a Luxembourg member of the European Economic and Social Committee

(2012/694/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 302 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Luxembourg Government,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 13 September 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/570/EU, Euratom appointing the members of the European Economic and Social Committee for the period from 21 September 2010 to 20 September 2015 (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 13 September 2010 the Council adopted Decision 2010/570/EU, Euratom appointing the members of the European Economic and Social Committee for the period from 21 September 2010 to 20 September 2015 (1).

| (2) | A member’s seat on the European Economic and Social Committee has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Christian ZEYEN, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A member’s seat on the European Economic and Social Committee has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Mr Christian ZEYEN,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Mr Christophe ZEEB, Conseiller à la Chambre de Commerce du Luxembourg, is hereby appointed as a member of the European Economic and Social Committee for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 20 September 2015.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 7 November 2012.

For the Council

The President

A. D. MAVROYIANNIS

---

(1)  
  OJ L 251, 25.9.2010, p. 8.

1

---
#### Waukesha Roxo Company and another, Appellants, vs. Gehrz, Circuit Judge, Respondent.

*November 8*

December *7, 1943.*

*202The cause was submitted for the appellants on the briefs of *Lines, Spooner & Quarles,*attorneys, and *L. S. Clemons*of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and for the respondent on the brief of *James J. Kerwin,*district attorney of Milwaukee county, and *O. L. O’Boyle,*corporation counsel, attorneys, and *Robert P. Russell,*assistant corporation counsel, of counsel.

Fairchild, J.

Appellant’s appeal is from a conclusion in an oral decision, though later reduced to writing by the learned trial judge, but in pursuance of which no* judgment or final order was made and entered. No sentence was passed and no penalty was imposed.

An appeal does not lie from findings and conclusions of law. A judgment or final order being indispensable to the right of appeal, where the record nowhere shows that judgment or final order was ever entered, the supreme court on appeal cannot inquire into the facts. It will be seen by reference to sec. 274.33, Stats., that the question of appeal is a jurisdictional one. *State v. Stone,*37 Wis. 204; *Estate of Lewis,*207 Wis. 155, 240 N. W. 818; *Witt v. Wonser,*195 Wis. 593, 219 N. W. 344. In criminal cases, there is no judgment from which an appeal can lie until final sentence is passed. *State v. Stone, supra; State v. Bongiorno,*96 N. J. Law, 318, 115 Atl. 665; *United States v. Lecato*(2d Cir.), 29 Fed. (2d) 694; *203*Jones & Dickey v. Givens, 77*Iowa, 173, 41 N. W. 608; and *Miller v. Aderhold,*288 U. S. 206, 53 Sup. Ct. 325, *77*L.Ed. 702.

The record shows that the trial court did not regard the evidence as calling for the entering of a judgment and that there was an intentional avoidance of the imposition of any of the consequences that might logically follow had the court determined to go beyond the expression of the trial judge’s opinion disapproving of a course of conduct. Neither of the appellants requested the court to pronounce judgment. *Miller v. Aderhold, supra.*

*By the Court.*— Appeal dismissed.
**EXHIBIT 21.1**

 

 

**SUBSIDIARIES**

**OF**

**AUGUST TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION**

 

 

| **Company**                                        | ** ** | **State or  Place of Organization** |
|----------------------------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------------|
|                                               |       |                                |
| August Technology International LLC                |       | Minnesota                           |
|                                               |       |                                |
| August Technology Limited                          |       | United Kingdom                      |
|                                               |       |                                |
| Semiconductor Technologies & Instruments, Inc. |       | Delaware                            |
|                                               |       |                                |
| August Technology Korea Ltd.                       |       | South Korea                         |

 

----
#### HONEY v. STATE.

(No. 12525.)

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 8, 1929.

H. S. Beard, of Waco, for appellant.

A. A. Dawson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, P. J.

Arson is the offense; punishment fixed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of two yeárs.

Arson is defined as the willful burning of any house. P. G., art. 1304. The burning is complete when the fire has actually communicated to a house, though" it may be neither destroyed nor seriously injured. Article 1306. Article 1316 defines an attempt at arson thus: “Whoever, by any means calculated to effect the object, attempts to commit the offense of arson,” etc.

The subject of the offense was a house belonging to C. S. Appell. There was much testimony to the effect that the building was not burned but merely scorched or smoked. Mattresses were burned, and from them the paper masted on the wall of the house was set • on fire\ but did not burn through. Some testimony\appears that the fire went through the wallpaper to the wood on which the paper was pasted. The owner of the house testified that the fire had not interrupted the collection of rent; that the house was not burned; that only the paper on the wall in one of the rooms had been scorched, but not - burned through.

By exception to the court’s charge and by a special charge the appellant sought to have the court instruct the jury that, if from the evidence they believed that the house was simply scorched or smoked, an acquittal should result. To.such an instruction the appellant was entitled under the law. If the house was not burned, it did not come within the purview of the offense of arson. The attempt to burn was a different offense as is indicated above. Upon the subject the decision of this court in Woolsey v. State, 30 Tex. App. 346, 17 S. W. 546, seems directly in point. To the same effect are the following cases: Moore v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R. 471, 103 S. W. 188; Landers v. State, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 671, 47 S. W. 1008. See also 1 A. L. R., p. 1168, note.

Eor the reasons stated, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
#### Estate of Pardee: Wentink, Claimant, Appellant, vs. Pardee, Administrator, Respondent.

For the appellant: *Catlin & Catlin*of Appleton.

For the respondent: *Joseph Witmer*of Appleton.

*By the Court.*

— Order affirmed.
HD GHG CertificationEPA/NHTSA-Industry MeetingDiscussion SlidesMay 11, 2011Chrysler, Ford, GMBackground• On January 7, 2011, industry presented aproposal to EPA for the Class 2b-3 HD GHGcertification process.• EPA acknowledged industry concerns with thetesting burden associated with the NPRM, butexpressed concerns with the proposal forunlimited Analytically Derived CO2 usage withina base/level test group• The following proposal includes a simplifiedbase level/configuration/sub-configurationstructure as well as restrictions on the use ofanalytically derived CO2 values.Base level, configurations, andsub-configurationsEmissions Certification CategoryEngineTrans TypeCalibrationFDRALVW classTRLHP_50mphExample 6.2L Auto or Manual Federal or California 3.73 9000 31.1VEHICLE CONFIGURATIONVEHICLE SUB-CONFIGURATIONBASE LEVELTest GroupNote: Engine = Basic Engine per LD CAFETrans Type = Trans class minus 2WD/4WDRules for use of AnalyticallyDerived CO2/Fuel Consumption• To make the testing burden per number ofengine/transmission combinationscomparable to that for light duty trucks inCAFE, industry proposes the followingmodified rules for use of AD CO2– 10 Max AD CO2 points from a single data point– Max 40% of tested sub-configs. represented byADFE– Max downward adjustment of 40%Rules for use of Analytically DerivedCO2/Fuel Consumption (continued)• Industry also proposes the following rulemodifications to ease testing burden:– Allow up to 12.4k miles on a test vehicle• Frequently a single truck will cover multiple axle/weightconfigurations.• Allowing only 6.2k miles will result in a need formultiple additionaltest vehicles• 6.2k limit seems low considering extended useful lives of moderntrucks– Adjustments for Fuels• If EPA and/or California go a different directionon fuels, anR-Factor adjustment should be allowed to prevent duplicatetesting.• This would be analogous to the CO2 emission rateadjustments employed for vocational engine test results
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











In connection with the quarterly report of Commercial E-Waste Management, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Anna Chalmers, acting in the capacity as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.








/s/ Anna Chalmers


Anna Chalmers


Chief Executive Officer


Chief Financial Officer




December 1, 2010
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7365

ANTHONY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Formally sued as Rodney Blacknall 

ATF Agent; Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 

Bureau,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 12-7381

ANTHONY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

OFFICER BRIGGS, Officer, CMPD, sued individually and in 

their official capacity; ROBERT J. WISE, Officer, CMPD, 

sued individually and in their official capacity; CHIP R. 

BUSKER, Sergeant, CMPD, sued individually and in their 

official capacity; KYLE J. O'DELL, Officer, CMPD, sued 

individually and in their official capacity; J. E. 

HARTNESS, Officer, CMPD, sued individually and in their 

official capacity,

Defendants - Appellees.
2

No. 12-7386

ANTHONY WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

RICK F. HETZEL, SBI Agent, North Carolina State Bureau of 

Investigation,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, 

Jr., Chief District Judge. (3:11-cv-00594-RJC; 3:12-cv-00097-

RJC; 3:11-cv-00443-RJC)

Submitted: December 13, 2012 Decided: December 20, 2012

Before MOTZ, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Anthony Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Paul Bradford Taylor, OFFICE 

OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina; 

Richard Rustin Perlungher, CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG POLICE

DEPARTMENT, Charlotte, North Carolina; Angel Evon Gray, Jennifer 

Joy Strickland, Assistant Attorneys General, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Williams appeals the district court’s orders

denying relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaints related 

to his 2002 arrest and 2003 conviction and denying his motions 

for reconsideration. We have reviewed the record and find no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated 

by the district court. Williams v. United States, No. 

3:11-cv-00594-RJC (W.D.N.C. June 11, 2012); Williams v. Briggs, 

No. 3:12-cv-00097-RJC (W.D.N.C. May 31 & Aug. 6, 2012); 

Williams v. Hetzel, No. 3:11-cv-00443-RJC (W.D.N.C. July 3 & 

Aug. 6, 2012). We grant Williams’ motion to substitute brief. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
)~\ 

Angelo Richardson, 

Plaintiff, 

v. 

Eleanor Holmes, 

Defendant. 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

Civil Action No. 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

FltED 

NOV - 6 t009 

Clerk, U.S. District and 

Bankruptcy Courts 

09 2090 

This matter is before the Court on plaintiffs pro se complaint and application to proceed 

in forma pauperis. The Court will grant plaintiffs application and dismiss the complaint for lack 

of subject matter jurisdiction. 

The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal district courts is limited and is set forth 

generally at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. Under those statutes, federal jurisdiction is available 

only when a "federal question" is presented or the parties are of diverse citizenship and the 

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. A party seeking relief in the district court must at least 

plead facts that bring the suit within the court's jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Failure to 

plead such facts warrants dismissal of the action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). 

Plaintiff, a District of Columbia resident, sues Eleanor Holmes of the District of 

Columbia "[t]o have congress legal right to expunge Court case .... " The one-page complaint 

neither presents a federal question nor provides a basis for diversity jurisdiction because the 

parties are not of diverse citizenship and no amount in controversy is pleaded. Accordingly, the 

complaint will be dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

(?~ ~-.....-c.- Date: October;2, b, 2009 United States District Judge
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 16

- 00421

- CR

Brian Bradford

v.

The State of Texas §

§

§

§

§ From the 431st District Court

o f Denton County (F

- 2014

- 1621

- F )

December 28, 2017

Opini on by Justice Birdwell

(nfp)



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT O F APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

By

_ /s/ Wade Birdwell

_ ___________ Justice Wade Birdwell