Michigan Supreme Court Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly, Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanag h
Elizabeth A. Weave r

Maura D. Corriga n Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markma n Diane M. Hathaway,
J ustices 

# Order

December 2, 2009

137527

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF CHICAGO, as Trustee for BANKBOSTON HOME EQUITY LOAN TRUST 1998-1, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 137527 COA: 272431 Ct of Claims: 03-000057-MT DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY and DEPARTMENT OF NA TURAL RESOURCES, Defendants-Appellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application fo r leave to appeal having been granted and the briefs and oral arguments of the partie s having been considered by the Court, we hereby REVERSE the September 9, 2008 judgment of the Co urt of Appeals. For the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals di ssenting opinion, we find that BankBoston received constitutionally sufficient notice. We REMAND this case to the Court of
Claims for consideration of the issues raised by the plaintiff but not addressed by that court during its initial cons ideration of this case.

C ORRIGAN , J. ( concurring )

.

I concur in the order reversing the j udgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding to the Court of Claims for considera tion of plaintiff’s remaining issues. I also concur with Justice Young that any additi onal inquiry regarding the quality of notice given to plaintiff’s assignor is unnecessary . I write separately to underscore my agreement with the well-reasoned analysis of the Court of Appeal s dissenting opinion concerning why plaintiff lacks standing to assert BankBoston’s right to notice. A thorough review of the stipulated facts an d exhibits fails to show how the mortgage assignment from BankBoston to plaintiff, which occurred after the certificate of forfeiture had already been recorded, left BankB oston with any residual property interest. See MCL 211.78i(6). Moreover, “it is well settled that the ri ght to notice is personal and cannot be challenged by a nyone other than the pers on entitled to notice.” In re AMB , 248I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

_______________________________________ __ Clerk December 2, 2009

p1124 2

Mich App 144, 176 (2001). Ther efore, plaintiff’s status as th e trustee for a separate legal entity, BankBoston Home Equity Loan Trust 1998-1, does not magically fulfill the statutory and constitutional prerequisites for plai ntiff to file suit on behalf of a party that previously transferred its entir e interest. See MCL 600.2041; Lee v Macomb Co Bd of

Comm’rs , 464 Mich 726, 740 (2001). Accordingl y, I agree with the Court of Appeals
dissent that “there is no evidence that th e single, isolated mortgage assignment imbued plaintiff with any continuing associati on with BankBoston, endowed it with any
derivative entitlement to know BankBoston’s affairs, or enab led it to raise BankBoston’s legal claims, if any still existed.” First Nat’l Bank of Chicago v Dep’t of Treasury , 280 Mich App 571, 593 (2008).

M ARKMAN , J., joins the statement of C ORRIGAN , J.

Y OUNG , J. ( concurring ).

I concur in the order reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanding the case to the Court of Claims for consideration of plaintiff’s remaining
issues. I would further note that the co nstructive notice provid ed by recording a certificate of forfeiture pursu ant to MCL 211.78g(2) provide s constitutionally adequate notice for those property intere sts that are unknown and not of record at the time the property is forfeited to th e county treasurer. See Mullane v Central Hanover Bank &

Trust Co , 339 US 306, 317 (1950); Mennonite Bd of Missions v Adams , 462 US 791, 798 (1983). Moreover, this particular method of notice “is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than ot her of the feasible and customary substitutes,” Mullane , 339 US at 315, and is given in addition to other met hods of constructive notice required by law. MCL 211.78i(3)(d) and (5). Because plain tiff has received constitutionally adequate notice, I believe that any further inquiry into the quality of notice given to plaintiff’s assignor is wholly unnecessary.

C ORRIGAN and M ARKMAN

, JJ., join the statement of Y OUNG , J.