DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

JOHNSON CUFFY,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D15-292

[March 18, 2015]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, 

Broward County; Jeffrey R. Levenson, Judge; L.T. Case No. 07-12640 

CF10B.

Johnson Cuffy, Arcadia, pro se.

No appearance filed for appellee.

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

PER CURIAM.

We dismissed the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and 

issued an order requiring the defendant to show cause why we should not 

impose sanctions pursuant to State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999). 

The defendant has not shown cause to excuse his continuing abuse of 

postconviction relief procedures. Therefore, we impose sanctions.

The defendant has raised the same challenge to his 2008 plea in 

numerous postconviction motions, appeals, and habeas corpus 

proceedings in this court. The essence of the defendant’s claim is that

when he entered his plea and was placed on probation, he believed that 

he was pleading to a third-degree grand theft, not a second-degree grand 

theft. The defendant did not appeal from that plea and sentence. However, 

after the defendant violated probation and was sentenced to eleven years 

in prison, he began filing postconviction motions raising this third-degree 

versus second-degree issue. The defendant’s claim has been considered 

and rejected repeatedly on the merits.
2

The defendant first raised this claim in a Florida Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 3.850 motion which he filed through counsel in 2009. The 

circuit court denied the motion, ruling that the claim of trial court error 

was not cognizable in a postconviction motion and that any prejudice from 

the defendant’s allegation that he believed he was pleading to third-degree 

grand theft was cured by the plea form which clearly reflected that he was 

pleading to second-degree grand theft as charged in the information. The 

defendant acknowledged reading and signing the plea form during the plea 

colloquy. Following full briefing by counsel in case number 4D09-413, we 

affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s motion. Cuffy v. State, 

56 So. 3d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (table).

The defendant repeated a similar claim in another rule 3.850 motion 

he filed in 2011. The circuit court noted that the defendant previously 

raised the same issue, but again addressed the merits and denied the 

motion. The court concluded that the record – including the information, 

the written plea form, the scoresheet, the disposition form, and the 

transcript – conclusively refuted the claim. The court also noted the 

defendant’s acknowledgement during the plea hearing that he wished to 

enter the plea knowing he could receive fifteen years in prison if he violated 

probation. This court affirmed the denial of this motion in case number 

4D11-4532. Cuffy v. State, 97 So. 3d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (table).

In February 2013, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas 

corpus in this court in case number 4D13-491 again attempting to 

challenge his plea and repeating the same claim. We dismissed the 

petition as unauthorized as it attempted to raise an untimely, successive, 

and procedurally barred postconviction challenge. See Baker v. State, 878 

So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Fla. 2004).

In December 2013, the defendant filed another habeas corpus petition 

in this court in case number 4D13-4660, once again attempting to 

challenge his plea on the same grounds. We dismissed the petition, and 

we referred the defendant to prison officials for consideration of 

disciplinary procedures based on his ongoing abusive filing of frivolous 

proceedings. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). We again cautioned the 

defendant that continued frivolous filing would result in the sanction of 

this court no longer accepting his pro se filings.

In 2015, the defendant filed the instant habeas corpus petition again 

challenging his plea on the same meritless grounds. We dismissed the 

petition and ordered the defendant to show cause why we should not 

impose the sanction of no longer accepting his pro se filings. The 
3

defendant’s response asserts that it would be manifestly unjust not to 

consider his claim again.

The term “manifest injustice,” which has been acknowledged as an 

exception to procedural bars to postconviction claims in only the rarest 

and most exceptional of situations, now is abused widely by postconviction 

litigants. Courts are routinely confronted with untimely and successive 

postconviction challenges, which cavalierly attempt to circumvent the bars 

simply by asserting “manifest injustice.” However, rule 3.850 contains no 

“manifest injustice” exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against 

filing successive postconviction motions. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(b); 

Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h).

Abuse of postconviction procedures consumes limited court resources 

and delays access to courts for others by impeding the ability of courts to 

consider legitimate claims. See Lake v. State, 115 So. 3d 1046, 1047 (Fla. 

4th DCA 2013) (citing McCutcheon v. State, 44 So. 3d 156, 161 (Fla. 4th 

DCA 2010)). Accordingly, we impose the sanction of no longer accepting 

petitioner’s pro se filings directed at his conviction and sentence in lower 

tribunal case number 07-12640CF10B. The Clerk of this Court is directed 

to reject any such filing unless it has been signed by a member in good 

standing of The Florida Bar who certifies that a good faith basis exists for 

each claim presented. Further, we direct the Clerk to forward a certified 

copy of this opinion to the appropriate institution for consideration of 

disciplinary procedures. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Sanctions imposed.

DAMOORGIAN, C.J., GERBER and LEVINE, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.