### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Ja nuary 11, 200 5
ST A TE OF TE N N ES SE E v
. BI LL Y R A Y S A N LI N

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. 01-03455, 56, 57, 58 Joseph B. Dailey, P residing Ju dge

No. W2004-00841-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled 6, 2005

The de fendant, Billy Ray Sanlin, wa s convicted by jury of two counts of ag g ravated robbe ry and two
c ou nts of e sp e c ia lly

a g g ra vate d kidn app ing . O n a pp e a l he c on te nd s th a t: (1 ) he was su bs ta nti a lly prejudice d when the trial court improperly allowed the State to call his codef endant to testify

afte r the code fendant previously indicated his unwillingne ss to testify ; (2) the trial court e rre d in refusing to allow his de fense counsel to a rg ue the difficulties inhere nt in c ross-ra cial identification in closing arg ument; and (3) the evidenc e re lating to the de fendant’s identification as the pe rpe t ra tor of the offe nses was insuff

icient to support his convictions. Be cause we de termine that r ev ersible error
oc c ur re d inthe State ’s dir e c t e xami natio n o f the c od e fe nd a nt a s a wi tne ss, we re ve rs e the jud g me nts of the trial c ourt and re mand for a new tria l consistent with this opinion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt s o f theCr im ina l C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded

J.C. M C L IN , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D AVI D G. H AYES and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J J ., joined.

Robert Wils on J ones, Chief Shelby CountyPublic Defe nder and W. Mark Ward, Assistant Shelby CountyPublic Defe nder, f or the a ppellant, B illyRay

Sanlin.

Paul G . Su mme rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; B re nt C . Ch e rry , A ssi stant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ral; and Am y

Weirich, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

. OP IN ION

I. F acts

The de fendant was convic ted by jury of two counts of ag g ravated robbe ry and two counts of
es p e c ia ll y a g g r a v a te d k id n ap p in g

. T h e p r o o f p r e s e n te d at tria l e s ta b li s h e d th a t o n Ju ly 1 1, 2000,
ar o u n d 1 0 : 3 0 p

. m

. , Ke v i n Ho u l i h an wa s ap p ro ac h ed b y a b l ac k m an we ar i n g a b l ac k

n y l o n d o o -r ag,-2-

a wh ite t- sh irt, andblu e je a ns . A t th e tim e , H ou lih a n w a s hea din g fr om the pa rking lot of his fi a nc e e ’s re sid e nc e to h e r a pa rt me nt. As the man app roac hed , the ma n r a ise d a g un a ndtol d Houlihan to g et on the g round or his hea d would be blown off . After taking Houlihan’s wa llet and oth e r va lua

ble s fr om his pe rs on , the ma n a sk e d Ho uli ha n w ho wa s in the apa rt me nt. Ho uli ha n to ld the ma n th a t hi s f

ia nc e e , V ic ki Lloy d, a ndhe r t wo c hil dr e n w e re in the apa rt me nt andple a de d w ith the man not to enter

the apa rtment. The man t h en o rdered Houlihan to unlock the door of the
apa rt me nt. I ns ide the apa

rt me nt, the ma n e nc ou nte re d V ic ki Lloy d o n th e te le ph on e . Lloy d w a s to ld to ge t off the phone, and every one was order ed to lie on the floor. The man then rummag ed ar ound the apa rtment, eve ntually

robbing L loy d of some jewe lry and her purse. Af

ter t h e m an left the apartment, Houlihan called the police.

On July 11 , 20 00 , a

ro un d 1 1:0 0 p .m. , th e po lic e we re inv olv e d ina c ha se wh ic h r e su lte d in
a c oll isi on no t f

ar f ro m L loy d’ s a

pa rt me nt. I t w a s r e po rt e d to the inv e sti g a tin g of fi c e r that a

wh ite
ma le a nda bla c k mal e ha d lef t the c oll isi on sc e ne a ndha d f le d o n f oo t. Lloy d’ s p ur se wa s f

ou ndin the wre cked ve hicle. Also, a g un which had be en disca rded by one of the flee ing suspects wa s found in a nea rby field. While the black ma le suspect e scape d, the white male suspe ct was c aug ht and ide nti fi e d a s Mic ha e l B arn e s. Th e e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e d th a t th e wr e c ke d c ar b e lon g e d to B arn e s. The g un and ammunition found at the collision sce ne wer e also attributed to Barnes. Howe ver, the pu rs e a ndg un we re no t pr oc e sse d f or fi ng e rp ri nts

. Th e ne xt d a y , Ho uli ha n a nd L loy d we re a sk e d to ide nti fy the pe rp e tr ator fr om a ph oto g ra ph ic lineup prepa

re d by police. Houlihan se lected the defe ndant’s photog raph f rom the lineup which sh ow e d s ix ind ivi du a ls, c ir c le d th e ph oto g ra ph , and wro te, “ Th is i s th e ma n th a t pu t a g un to m y h e a d , to o k my w a ll e t, r in g , a n d mo n e y a n d s a id if I try to lo o k a t h im , h e w il l b lo w my head of f.” Thoug h more tentative, L loy d als o i d en tified the def endant f rom the photog raphic lineup and
se le c te d th e pic tur e of

a ma n w ho “ loo ke d sim ila r to the ma n wh o ro bb e d [he r] wi th a g un .” B oth Ho uli ha n a ndL loy d p os iti ve ly ide nti fi e d th e de fe nd a nt at tria l.

On J uly 2 1 , 2 0 0 0 , the police r ece ived information that the de fendant was hiding in an apartment complex. After the police sur rounded the apartment, the defendant wa s observe d jumping from a se cond-story window. The defenda nt then ran to a ca r and f led. The police g ave c hase and eventua lly

stopped the ca

r. The de fendant exi ted the ca r and beg an to run. A f

oot chase ensued wher eupon the de fendant was found hiding under a couch in a

near by house and a

rre sted.

Police O f f ic e r B ar t R a g lan d te s ti f

ie d th a t h e w a s r e s p o n s ib le f o r th e p h o to g r ap h ic li n eup. Ra g la ndstate d th a t H ou lih a n a ndL loy d w e re se pa rate d b e fo re loo kin g a t a ny su sp e c t pic tur e s. B oth Houlihan and L loy d circ led t he defenda nt’s picture. Rag land also stated t hat he interviewed Micha el Ba rnes but did not further

elabor ate. During the course of Rag land’s testimony Ba rnes was re fer

red to as code fendant.

Michae l Ba

rnes wa s called to testify for the State. Howeve r, prior to c alling Ba rnes to the stand , th e tr ia l c ou rt

a ndthe pr os e c uto r f

or the State were inf

orme d th a t B arn e s w a s u nw ill ing to te sti fy . B arn e s st a te d th a t he tho ug ht it wa s a g a ins t his int e re st t o te sti fy a ndwante d to sp e ak w ith-3-

his lawy er. A t this t ime, the def endant objected to the s tate prosecutor calling Barnes t o testify . The objection was pr edicated on the basis that the State wa s calling Ba rnes f or the sole p urpose of attempting to impea ch Ba rnes. The trial court found that B arne s no longe r had a rig ht ag ainst selfinc ri min a tio n b e c aus e he a lr e a dy ple d g uil ty

to the c ri me s. Af

te r d e nying the defe nd a nt’ s r e qu e st to voir dire B arne s, the trial court permitted the State to examine Ba rnes a s a witness.

Once Ba rnes wa s called to the stand, he re fused to testify and told the state prose cutor that

“ wi th a ll d ue re sp e c t, I ’m no t g oin g to s a y a nythi ng .” At

thi s ti me , th e tr ia l c ou rt

tol d B arn e s to
a ns we r the qu e sti on . T he fo llo wi ng c oll oq uy oc c ur re d:

Pr os e c uto r: I s y ou r n a me Mic ha e l B arn e s? Barn es : M s

. W ei ri ch , I

h ea r y o u , m a’ am

. I ’m n o tgo i n g t o s ayan y t h i n g. Prosecutor: Why ? Are y ou afr aid? Def ense Counsel: Objec tion, Your Honor. Pr os e c uto r: Judg e , I

thi nk thi s ju ry ha s a ri g ht t o kno w w hy

he ’s no t g oin g to cooper ate. Cou rt : Mr . B arn e s, y ou , a t thi s po int , d on ’t ha ve the op tio n o f n ot t e sti fying , a ndso y ou’re require d to answer the questions, and I ’ll overr ule the objection. Yo u m ay ask. Pr os e c uto r: Th a nk

y ou , Y ou r H on or . I s y ou r n a me Mic ha e l B arn e s? B arn e s: I un de rs ta nd I do n’ t ha ve a ny ri g hts , that I ’m a c ri min a l a ndI ’m

a n in ma te at TDOC. I ’ve g ot twenty -five y ear s, though. That’s m ypart in this, and I can’ t t e s t i f y. I’ mn o tg o i n g t o

. I’ ms o rr y. Pr os e c uto r: Yo u’ re tw e nty -f ive y e ars in this . Wh a t do y ou me a n inthi s? Barn es : I ’m n o ts ay i n g an y t h i n g. Court: All r i gh t

. L adies a nd g entlemen, I ’m g oing to a sk y ou to return to the jury
room.
Once the jury

was out, the trial c ourt told Ba rnes that he would be found in contempt if he
re fu se d to te sti fy . T he tr ia l cou rt a lso fo un d th a t th e jury wa s e nti tle d to he ar B arn e s’ c on vic tio ns ; there fore , the trial court stated that it would inform the jury of the fa ct that leg ally , Ba rnes h ad no rig ht to refuse to testify . I n addition, the trial court f ound that Ba

rnes might have a chang e of he art and testify

. I n response , the defe nse counsel objected, explaining that forc ing B arne s to testify was prejudicia l to the defe ndant. The de fense counsel arg ued that by calling Ba rnes with knowledge that he won’ t testify , “the [S] tate is allowing infere nces . . . t o [be] put before the jury which [are] actua lly not even pr esente d.” The defe nse counse l also asked f or mistrial. Aft er a re ce s s period, Ba rnes wa s ag ain ca lled to testify . Ag ain, he r efuse d.
The state pr osecutor the n called Ca rry Preston and Brad G ilmartin from the criminal court
c le rk ’s of fi c e . Pr e sto n e xpla ine d th e bo oking pr oc e ss andint ro du c e d B arn e s’ r ecor ds . Gilm art in testified that both the def

endant a nd Ba

rnes we re indicte d for the same offenses. Gilmartin testified that acc ording to Ba

rne s ’ g uiltypleas, he had pled g uiltyto two counts of espe cially ag g ravated kid na pin g a ndtw o c ou nts of

a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

a s r e fl e c te d inthe ind ic tme nts

.-4-

At the close of

the State’s proof, the defense moved for a motion for judgment of a cquittal and ag ain re quested a

mistrial. W ith reg ard to the de fe n s e counse l’s reque st for a mistrial, the de fe ns e c ou ns e l g a ve the fo llo wi ng arg ume nt:

Yo ur Ho no r .

. . Ra g la ndwa s c a lle d a ndte sti fi e d th a t Mr

. B arn e s g a ve a state me nt; and then Mr. B arne s was called as a w itness, refuse d to testify , ref used to answe r qu e sti on s. Th e re fo re , b y c on ne c tin g the se tw o w itn e sse s to g e the r, the on ly implication that can be de rived fro m t h at is that Mr. Ba rnes g ave a

statement implicating [the defe ndant] in t his matter, and this is . .

. b ef ore the jury

by implication without any

proof.

. . . . Also, I m ade an objection to [t he prose cutor’s] questioning of Mr. B arne s about .

. . the fact that he was afr aid. And whil e that may be very well t rue . . . w hy he ’s no t te s t i f

y i n g h e r e t o d a y , t h e i m p r o p e r i m p l i c a t i o n

. . . t h a t g o e s t o t h e j u r yin that is that somehow [ the defendant] has t hreatened or is threatening Mr. B arne s, and that’s why

he’s not testify ing, and I

think that’s an improper c onclusion that can be
rea ched f rom that question that Mr. B arne s subsequently failed to a nswer.
The trial c ourt found no undue prejudice and denied the defe ndant’s request for a mistrial and motion for judgme nt of ac quittal. The defe ndant did not testify and wa s subsequently convicted of t wo co u n t s o f a ggra v at ed ro b b er y an d t wo co u n t s o f e s p ec i al l y aggr av at ed k i d n ap i n g.
II. Ana lys is The pa ramount issue ra ised on appeal is whether the def endant sustained pr ejudicial er ror beca use the S tate was permitted t o question a codefe ndant i n the presence of the jury afte r the trial
c ou rt a ndthe State we re inf

orme d th a t th e c od e fe nd a nt wo uld re fu se to t e sti fy . T he re a ft e r, the Sta te was pe rmitted to introducete stimonyindicating the code fendant was indicted with the de fendant and ple d g uil ty

to the sa me of

fe ns e s. Th e de fe nd a nt c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d r e ve rs ibl e err or violating his constituti onal right to confr ont witnesses ag ainst him. The State contends that the trial court pr operly

allowed the State to question the codef endant be cause he wa s alrea dy convicted
o f t h e c h ar ges n am ed o n t h e j o i n ti n d i ct m en t ; an d t h er ef o re , h ad n o b as i s t o as s er th i s p ri v i l ege ag ainst self-incrimination.
To beg in, we note both federa l and st ate courts have rec og nized the potential pre judice to the defe ndant that re sults from calling a witness who invokes the Fifth Ame ndment as we ll as prejudice resulting from the de nial of the d ef en d an t’s rig ht to confrontation. See g ener ally Annotation: Propriety and Prejudicia l Effe ct of P rosec ution’s Calling as Witnesses, To Ext rac t Claim of SelfI ncrimination Privilege , One Involved in Offe nse Charg ed Ag ainst Acc used. 19 A.L .R.4th 368.

L ooking at the principles discussed in Namet v. United S tates, 373 U.S. 179, 187 (1963), a nd Do ug la s v . A la

ba ma , 3 80 U.S. 4 15 , 4 20 (1 96 5) , w e no te that th e pr a c tic e of e lic iti ng the F if

th Amendment priv il e g ea g ain s t s e lf

- in c rimin ati o nf

rom a witness c losely

associate d with the defe ndant-5-

in r e le va nt c ri min a l a c tiv iti e s r e qu ir e s r e ve rs al i nt w o sit uatio ns : ( 1) wh e n th e pr os e c uto r c on sc iou sly attempts to influe n ce t h e jury by building its case out of infer ence s arising from use of the testimonial privileg e, thus de priving a defe ndant of due proce ss of law; or (2) when infe renc es fr om a witness's refusal to answe r add critica l weig ht to the prosec utor' s case in a manner which denie s op po rtun ity

fo r c ro ss- e xami natio n, a ndthu s u nf a ir ly pr e ju di c e s th e de fe nd a nt b y

pr e c lud ing him from exerc ising his Six th Amendment rig ht to confrontation. See id.

I n determining whe ther pre judicial err or wa s committed by the trial court, t h i s Court has
c on sid e re d th e fo llo wi ng fa c tor s: (1) the pr osecutor' s intent in calling the witness; (2) the number of questions which
e lic it a n a sse rt ion of the privi le g e ; (3) wh e the r e ith e r s ide a tte mpt e d to dr a w a dv e rs e infere nces, in c losing a

rg ument or at a ny time during trial, from the w itness' r efusa l to testify ; (4) whe ther the infere nces relate to centr al issues or collate ral matter s; (5) whether the infer ence s constitute the only evidenc e bea

ring upon the issue or a

re cumulative of othe r evide nce; a nd (6) whe ther the trial court provided c urative ins truc tio ns

. State v. Mara schiello, 88 S.W .3d 586, 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (citing United S tates v. Victor, 973 F.2d 975, 979 ( 1st Cir.1992); United States v. Croz ier, 987 F .2d 893, 901 (2nd Cir.1993)).

I n M ara sc hie llo , th is C ou rt c on c lud e d th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in pe rm itt ing the State to c a ll
an ac complice to testify in lig ht of his pr eviously stated intention to invoke his privileg e ag ainst selfincrimination. See i d

. at 6 0 8 . Neve rtheless, this Court determined that such an e rror did not mandate r ever sal of the de fendan t’s convictions bec ause ( 1) the prose cutor a sked only a fe w preliminary

questions, which did not associate the acc omplice with the defe ndant prior to eliciting fro m th e a c c o mp li c e th e p r iv il e g e a g a in s t s e lf

- in c r im in a ti o n ; ( 2 ) th e p r o s e c u to r r e f r a ine d from mentioning the in v ocation of privilege in closing a rg ument; and (3) the impermissible infere nce when view ed cumulatively did not aff

ect the outcome of the trial due to the over whelming evidenc e of the de fendant’s g uilt, including the def endant’ s own statements and te stimony . See id. at 608.

I n the instant case , the r ec o rd re fl ects that the pr osecutor ha d specific knowledg e that codef endant B arne s did not want to t es t ify and desire d to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege

. T h e r e c o r d f

u r t h e r r e f l e c t s t h a tt h e tr i a l c o u r tw a s i n f o r m e d o f B ar n e s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o t e s t i f y. Howeve r, the trial c ourt found that B arne s had no basis for a cla im of privileg e ag ainst selfincrimination beca

use B arne s had alre ady

pled g uiltyto the char g es of e specia lly ag g ravated kidnaping and ag g ravated robbe ry . As the State contends, g ener ally a witness who ha s alrea dy been convicted of

the crimes relevant to the criminal episode n ee d n o t fea r incrimination bec ause no adver se conse quence s can be visited upon that convicted person. See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 326 (1999); R eina v. United S tates, 364 U.S . 507, 513, (1960). The ref ore, a witness who is n ot a c ri min a l de fe nd a nt h a s n o v a lidba sis to c la im s e lf -i nc ri min a tio n a ndma y be c omp e lle d to testify . See g ener ally , Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 326. Howeve r, this g ener al principle is pre mised upon the fa c t th a t th e re c a n be no fu rthe r i nc ri min a tio n. I d. Ac c or din g to the re c or d, B arn e s p le d g uil ty-6-

to the same char g es the defe ndant was indicted for, as well as other offe nses occur ring around the
sam e t i m e. Barnes indicated that testify ing w ould be ag ainst his interest. Whil e we will not speculate as to why Ba

rnes refuse d to testify , we do note that the issue surrounding the validity of Ba rn es ’ claim of privileg e is not as untenable as believe d. I n addition, we question whe ther the vali d i ty or invalidity

of the witness’s c laim of privileg e has any bearing on the prejudice to the defe ndant re sulting fr om the witness’s refusal t o testify

. See P eople v. Poma, 294 N.W.2d 221, 222 (Mich. App. 1980) ; Comm onwea lth v. Davenport, 308 A.2d 85, 87 (Pa. 1973).

Of mor e sig nif

ic a nc e to the iss ue is the pr e jud ic ia l e ffe c t to the de fe nd a nt w he n th e Sta te
c a lle d B arn e s to te sti fy

kn ow ing he wo uldno t c oo pe rate . O f c ou rs e , the pr a c tic e of c a lli ng a wi tne ss with the advanc e knowledge that the wit ness m ay claim t he privil eg e of se lf-incrimination does not
au t o matically

constitute prosec utorial misconduct or re sult in prejudice to the def endant. See Namet, 373 U.S. at 188 ( "[T]he prosec utor nee d not ac ce p t at fac e value every asserted claim of privi le g e , n o matte r h ow frivo lou s. " ). No ne the le ss, wh e n a pr os e c uto r c on sc iou sly c a lls a wi tne ss who is substantially related to the criminal episode for the purpose of eliciting a cla im of privileg e, the def endant is likely

to be prejudice d by

the adve rse infe renc e dra wn from suc h action. See id. at 187; Doug las, 380 U.S. at 420; United S tates v. Compton, 365 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1966) (" I t is an
un fair tr ia l ta c tic if

it a pp e ars that c ou ns e l c a lls su c h a wi tne ss mer e ly

to g e t hi m to c la im h is privi le g e be fo re the jury

to a se ri e s o f q ue sti on s n ot p e rt ine nt t o th e iss ue s o n tri a l or n ot a dmi ssi ble under a pplicable r

ules of evide nce." ). These i n fe renc es ar e admitted without opportunity for the defe ndant to e ng ag e in ne cessa ry confr ontation and cr oss-examination. S ee N amet, 373 U.S. at 188; see g ener ally , Br

uton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); P ointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). There fore , the circ umstances surr ounding this ca se must be examined to determine the prosec utor’s mot ivatio n, a ndthe lik e lih oo d th a t th e jury dr e w i nf e re nc e s p re

jud ic ia l to the de fe nd a nt.

F ro m th e re c or d, it i s re a dil y app are nt that th e pr os e c uto r’ s c a se wa s e nh a nc e d b y the a dv e rs e inf e re nc e s th a t aro se whe n B arn e s r e fu se d to te sti fy . F ir st, the pr os e c uto r s pe c if ic a lly re fe rr e d to Ba rnes a s the cod ef

en d an t during direc t examination of Office r Rag land. Second, the pr osecutor cal le d B ar n e s tw ic e to te s ti f y , k n o w in g h e w o u ldn o t c o o p e r a te

. T h ir d , s o me o f th e p r osecutor’ s questions and st atements during the brief examination of Barne s wer e sugg estive of an infe renc e that Ba rnes’ ref usal to testify

was a product of f

ear and that B arne s’ testimony would link the defe ndant to the crimes. Fourth, t he prosecutor had a witness re ad an indictment na ming B arne s as co- indictee with the defe ndant. Fif

th, the prosec utor impeac hed B arne s with testimonyof B arne s’ re cent convic t ions, though B arne s’ limited answers did not g ive occ asion for impea chment. F inally , the prosec utor made se vera l c omments in closing arg ument, emphasizing the infere nces br oug ht to the jury ’s a tte nti on du ri ng the e xami natio n of B arn e s. Th e be low e xce rp t of the pr os e c uto r’ s c omm e nts in closing a

rg uments is ill ustrative.

We c aug ht the [wh ite ] ma le

. . . M ic ha e l B arn e s.

. . . . We found a g un. Michae l Ba rnes led us to a g un near

by wher e he wa s caug ht in the back of

a y ard. W h a ta c o i n c i d e n c e

. I s i ta

c o i n c i d e n c e o r

i s i tg u i l t y

a s c h ar g e d ?T h e trial c o u rt o ff e re d the fo llo w ing c u ra tive ins tru c tio n : “[T ]h e p ro o f re g a rd ing M r. B a rn e s’ c o n v ic tio n s in 1

t hi s case be fo re you t o d ay was all o wed in f o r t he p urpo se o f e xp l ai ni ng w hy he w as t o l d that he no longer had a ri ght t o re f us e t o t es t i f

y

. A n i ndi vi dual l ose s hi s fi f t h- amendment ri gh t agai ns t sel f i ncr i mi nat i on once he i s conv i ct ed of t hat offens e. N o ot her i nf

er enc e may be dra wn f r om t he proof

of t hos e c onvi ct i ons

. ”
-7- Take all this evidence back and look at it. I s it a coincidenc e t h at the [vi ctims] we re ro bbed her e – the c ar w rec ked her e that Micha el B arne s, the codef endant who y ou saw today – y ou saw that fine citizen take the stand in fr ont of y ou this afternoon – the car that he was driving wre cked rig ht here . The male black that was in the c ar w ith him got away – never appre hended that night. And a g un – a g un wa s f

ou ndri g ht the re

. . . w he re Mic ha e l B arn e s [w a s] arr e ste d – the sa me Mic ha e l B arn e s that y ou sa w t od a y do ing tw e nty -f

ive y e ars fo r w hat he c a lle d th is. ‘I ’m doing twenty -five y ear s on this . . . . Idon’t want to talk.’ F ine. I s it a coincidenc e or is it g uiltyas cha rg ed tha t , ten day s later, of fice rs . . . devised a plan to g et [the defendant] into custody

. . . . Given the pr osecutor’ s relianc e on B arne s’ re fusal to t es t i fy , we c annot but conclude that the prosec u to r c o n s c io u s ly in te n d e d to e n h a n c e it s c a s e o u t o f th e a d v e r s e in f e r e n c e s th a t ar o s e whe n B ar n e s r e f

u s e d t o t e s t i f

y. Turning to the question of pre judice, we determine that the def endant sustained pr ejudice. The re cord indicates that the questions posed to B arne s, the rea ding of the joi n t i n d i ct ment, the
rea ding of Ba rnes’ convictions, and the c omments by the prosecutor i n closing arg ument cre ated the unfavor able infe renc e tha t the defe ndant was g uiltyof the samecriminal ac tivityto which B arne s had alr eady

pled g uilty . Wit h these incriminating irre g ularities in m i n d, it is di fficult to conc lude that the pr os e c uto r’ s c a se wa s n ot s ig nif ic a ntl y str e ng the ne d o r that th e de fe nd a nt w a s n ot u nf a ir ly prej u d i ce d

. No r a re we co n v i n ce d t h att h e t ri al co u rt ’s cu ra t i v e i n s tru ct i o n n eu tra l i z ed t h e p re judice. 1 W e n o t e t h att h e U n i t ed S t at es S u p re m e C o u rt h as co m m en t ed o n s u ch cu ra t i v e i n s tru ct i o n s t at i n g,

“ Th e na ive ass ump tio n th a t pr e jud ic ia l e ff

e c ts c a n b e ov e rc ome by

ins truc tio ns to the jury

. . . a ll prac ticing la wy ers know to be unmitigated f iction.” B ruton, 391 U.S. at 129 (citations omitted).

Moreove r, we note that the manne r in which the codef endant was impeache d via evidenc e of the c od e fe nd a nt’ s ind ic tme nt a ndg uil ty ple a s r a ise s a dd iti on a l Sixth Am e nd me nt c on c e rn s. I t is well-settled that the right to cr oss-examine falls within the S ix th Amendment’s ambit of prote ction. Se e Poi nte r, 38 0 U. S. a t 40 4. Th is c on sti tut ion a l g ua rante e is a pp lie d to the state s v ia

the F ou rt e e nth Amendment. See id. at 403. I n addition, Article I , S ec t i o n 9 o f the Te nnessee Constit ution g uarantees the a ccuse d the rig ht “to meet the witnesse s fac e to f ace .” Although the two provisions
are not identical, the Tenne ssee Supreme Court ha s previously applied the standards of the United States Supreme Court under the Six th Amendment in determining whether there has bee n a violation of the a ccuse d’s constitutional right to conf ront witnesses against him under A rticle I , Section 9. See State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W .2d 317, 332 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Causby , 706 S.W .2d 628, 631 (Tenn. 1986) ; State v. Armes, 607 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tenn. 1980).-8-

Rece ntly in Crawfor d v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct .1354 (2004), the U nited States Supreme Court held that the Confr ontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimo n i al hea rsay a g a ins t a c ri min a l defe nd ant wi tho ut a sh ow ing that th e wi tne ss w ho ma de the state me nt i s unavailable , and that the de fendant had a prior opportunity to cross-e x amine the witness. Crawf ord, 12 4 S. Ct. a t 13 74

. Al tho ug h th e Sup re me Cou rt e xpre ssl y re fu se d to c le arl y

a ndc omp re he ns ive ly define what constitutes te stimoni al or non-testimonial he arsay , the Supreme Court did explain that the te rm te sti mon ia l app lie d g e ne ra lly to the fo llo wi ng c a te g orie s:
[ E ] x pa rte in-court t est imony or its functional equiva lent . . . such as aff idavits, custodial examinations , prior testimony that the def

endant wa s un able to c ro ss- e xami ne , or sim ila r p re tr ia l st a te me nts that de c larants wo uld
re a sonab ly e xpe c t to be us e d p ro se c uto ri a lly , . . . e xtra jud ic ia l st a te me nts
c on ta ine d i nf orma lize d te sti mon ia l mate ri a ls, su c h a s a ff ida vit s, de po sit ion s, prior testimony , or confes s i o n s . . . statements that wer e made under circ umstances whic h would lead an objective witness reasona bly to believe that th e state me nt w ou ld b e a va ila ble fo r u se a t a

la te r t ri a l.

I d. at 1364 (c i t at i o n s and interna l quotations omi tted). The Supre me Court also mentions plea allocutions when discussing the core t estimonial statements that would trigg er a Confrontation Clause problem. I d. at 1372-73.
As previously

stated, afte r Ba

rnes r efuse d to testify , the prosec ution was permitted to bring in a witnesses fr om the criminal court cler k’s offic e, who testified that the defe ndant was indicte d
a lon g wi th B arn e s, a nd that Ba rn e s ple d g uil ty to t wo c ou nts of a g g ra vate d r ob be ry

a ndtw o c ou nts of espe cially

ag g ravated ki dnaping – the s ame offense s for which the def endant wa s being char g ed. Suc h e vid e nc e is o f d ub iou s re le va nc e a nd is p re jud ic ia l. B e c aus e B arn e s r e fu se d to te sti fy , n o b a sis
was e s ta b li s h e d to a d mi t B ar n e s ’ in d ic tm e n t a n d g u il ty p le a s

. M o r e o v e r , c lo s e e xa mi nation of Crawf ord, indicate s that a codefendant’s g uilty pleas are testim onial in nature . See id. at 1372-73; see also, United S tates v. Massino, 319 F.Supp.2d 295, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2004); People v. Car rieri, 778 N.Y.S.2d 854, 871-72 (N.Y . Sup. 2004); Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 600 (D.C. 2004). As on e c ou rt

re c e ntl y state d:
[A] plea is pre cisely

the kind of formalize d co n fe s sion that constitutes qu i n t es s en t i al l y

"t es t i m o n i al " m at er i al u n d erC rawford. Crawford e x plicitly included
a ff ida vit s, de po sit ion s, a ndc on fe ssi on s w ith in the c or e de fi nit ionof " te sti mon ia l" statements. .

. . Much l ike an aff idavit, deposition, confe ssion, or prior testimony , a g uil ty ple a pr ov ide s su bs ta nti a l inf

orma tio n abo ut the a c c us e d' s c ri min a l c on du c t: a g uil ty ple a is an a c kn ow le dg me nt that a de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d c e rt a in c ri min a l a c ts. . . . [A] g uiltyplea is, at its heart, a c onfession b yan ac cused that he or she ( 1) committed specific c riminal acts, (2) possessed the requisite criminal intent, and (3)
cause d the re sults embodied in the elements of the c harg e. Massino, 319 F.Supp.2d at 298. As testimonial e vidence , Ba rnes’ g uilty pleas we re not a dmissibl e.T he bur den of s howi ng un ava i l ab i l i t y of a w i t nes s t y pi cal l y r es t s upon t he propo nen t of t he wi t nes s

. See 2
St at e v

. H owa r d, N o. W 2002- 01680- CC A- R3C D , 2004 W L 2715346, a t * 9 (T enn. C ri m. App. a t J ac k s on , N ov

. 18, 2 0 0 4 ).

O nce co nst i t ut i o nal err o r i s estab lishe d , t he b urden i s up o n t he Stat e t o pro ve t hat t he co nst i t ut i o nal ri ght

3
vi o l at i o n i s harm l ess b e yo n d a r e asonab l e d o ub t

. See M o m o n v. Stat e, 18 S.W

. 3 d 15 2 , 16 7 (T enn. 19 9 9 ) ( ci t at i o ns
o m itt e d ). A vio la tio n o f t h e rig h t t o c o n fro n ta tio n m a y b e d e e m e d ha rm le ss " if the re v ie w ing c o u rt m a y c o n fid e n tly sa y,
on t h e wh ol e r ec or d, t h at t h e con s t i t u t i on al e r r or w as h ar ml es s be y on d a r ea s on abl e dou bt

. " St at e v

. Sa y l es , 49 S. W

. 3d 2 7 5 , 28 0 (T enn. 20 0 1 ) ( q uo t i ng D el aware v. V an A rs d al l , 47 5 U

. S. 67 3 , 68 1 (19 8 6 ))

. -9- “Where testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the S ix th Amendment demands what the common law require d: unavailability

and a prior opportunity

for c ro s s -e x am ination.” Crawf ord, 124 S.Ct. at 2 1374. There fore , the g ravity of the trial court’s e rror is one of constitutional dimensions insom uch that th e a dmi ssi on of

the c od e fe nd a nt’ s g uil ty ple as cle arly

vio la te d th e de fe nd a nt’ s rig ht t o confr ontation of wi t nesses. Ac cording ly , it cannot be sa id that infere nces de rived fr om the codef endant’ s ref

usal to testify , and the subseque nt rea ding o f the code fendant’s indictment and g ui l t y p leas did not prejudice the jury ’s ver dict. Consequently , we c onclude that r ever sible err or 3

occur red de ny ing the defe ndant a f air trial, a nd there fore , the defe ndant must be acc orded a new one

.
Be cause of the possibilityof further appellate review by our supreme court, we revie w the defe ndant' s rema ining arg uments on appea l. The def endant’ s second c halleng e re lates to whethe r the tr ia l c ou rt

e rr e d in re fu sin g to al low the de fe ns e c ou ns e l to arg ue the dif fi c ult ie s in he re nt i n c ro ssrac ial identification in closing arg ument. During closing arg ument the trial court ruled that the defe n s e counsel c ould not make ref ere nce to c ross rac ial identification studies bec ause the re w as no proof of these studies submitted by the def endant

. T h e t ri al court stated that the defe nse counse l could arg ue the f act that the de fe nd a nt w a s b la c k an d the vic tim ’s we re wh ite , b ut a sse rt e d th a t th e de fe ns e c ou ns e l w a s to re fr a in from mentioning any

studies discussing c ross-ra cial identification problems.

Citi ng State v. Coley , 32 S.W .3d 831 (Tenn. 2000) for support, the defe ndant contends that his c ou ns e l sh ou ld h a ve be e n g ive n latitud e to a dd re ss the pr ob le ms o f c ro ss- ra c ia l id e nti fi c a tio n in closing arg ument. Acc ording to the defe ndant, our supreme court sug g ested that closing arg ument be the pr oper f

orum to addre ss the problems of cr oss-rac ial identification. Howe ver, w e dete rmine that the def

endant’ s relianc e on Coley is mispl ace d.

I n Coley , our supreme court held that expert testimonyreg arding ey ewitness identification was misleading , confusing , and failed to substantially assist the j ury as t he trier of fact. I d. at 837-38. Th e re fo re , s uc h e xpe rt

te sti mon y

wa s per se inadmissible unde r Rule 702 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Evidence. I d. at 838. I n rea ching its holdi ng , our supre me court cited seve ral c ases f rom other jurisdictions, whic h had also prec luded expert testimony on ey ewitness identificati o n fo r v arious
re a so ns . Se e id. at 83 6- 38

. Ou r su pr e me c ou rt wa s sp e c if ic a lly us ing the ratio na le s of oth e r c ou rt s as a ve hicle to expl ain its own rationale f or excluding e x pert testimony on ey ewitness identification.-10-

As ill us tr a tio n, ou r s up re me c ou rt qu ote d th e fo llo wi ng la ng ua g e fr om the Kans a s Su pr e me Cou rt : We believe that the pr oblem can be alleviated by a prope r cautionary

instruction to the j u r y w h i c h s e t s f

o r t h t h e f a c t o r s t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i n e v a l u a t i n g e ye w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y. Such instruction, coupled with vig orous cr oss-examination and persuasive argume nt by defe nse counsel dealing rea listi cally with the shortcoming s and trouble spots of the ide nti fi c a tio n p ro c e ss, sh ou ld pr ote c t the ri g hts of the de fe nd a nt anda t th e sa me tim e enable the courts to avoid problems involved in the admission of expert testimony on this subject.

I d. at 837 (quoting State v. Gaines, 260 K an. 752, 926 P. 2 d 6 4 1 , 6 4 7 (1996)) (emphasis adde d) (citations omitted).

L ooking at this quot ation within the context of it s holding, it is rea dily appar ent that our
su pr e me c ou rt did no t c re a te or e ve n s ug g e st a

ru le wh e re the tr ia l c ou rt mu st pe rm it r e fe re nc e to
cross ra cial identification studi es in closing arg ument. In fac t, as previously stated, Coley ’s holding
re je c ts the a dmi ssi on of

“ g e ne ra l a ndun pa

rt ic ula ri zede xpe rt

te sti mon y

c on c e rn ing e y e wi tne ss t es t i m ony , which is not specific to the witness whose testimony is in question . . . .” I d. at 838. Th e re fo re , if expe rt te sti mon y c on c e rn ing the re lia bil ity of e y e wi tne ss i de nti fi c a tio n is ina dmi ssi ble pe r se under Coley ’s holding, c erta inly it is wi t h i n the trial court’s discretion to pre clude a ny comments based upon g ener alized studies of ey ewitness identification difficulties.

I t has long been r ecog nized that while both defense counsel a nd prosec utor hav ew id ela ti tude in making t h ei r ar gu m en t s to the jury , the scope of closing arg ument is subject to the trial court’ s discreti o n a n d w il l n o t b e r e v e r s e d ab s e n t a c le ar s h o w in g o f

ab u s e o f d is c r e ti o n

. Se e St a te v. Cauthern, 967 S.W.2d 726, 737 (Tenn. 1998); Smit h v. State, 527 S.W .2d 737, 739 (Tenn. 1975)

. Mo re ov e r , c l o s i n g a

r g u m e nts “ mus t be te mpe rate , p re dic a te d o n e vid e nc e int ro du c e d d uring the tr ia l, rele vant to the iss u es b ei n g t ri ed , and not otherw ise improper unde r the fa cts or law.” State v. Mid dle br oo ks , 9 95 S.W. 2d55 0, 55 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 9)

. We c on c lud e that th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t a bu se its dis c re tio n w he n r e fu sin g to a llo w the de fe ns e c ou ns e l to c omm e nt o n th e dif fi c ult ie s in he re nt i n c ro ss- ra c ia l id e nti fi c a tio n b a se d u po n g e ne ra lize d s tud ie s. Th e re fo re , th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.

The de fendant’s final ar g ument on appea l is a chal l en ge t o the suffic iency of the ident if ic a ti o n e v id e n c e p r e s e n te d a t tria l. Wh e n th e s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e is c h a ll e n g ed on appea l, the standard of

revie w is whether , co nsidering the evidenc e in fa vor of the State, any re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d a ll the e sse nti a l e le me nts of the c ri me be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virg inia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); S tate v. Evans, 108 S.W .3d 231, 236 (Tenn. 2003). Once a jury finds the defe ndant g uilty , his or her presumption of innocenc e is remove d and re place d with a pre sumption of guilt. State v. Bla ck, 815 S.W .2d 166, 175 (Tenn. 1991) . As a re sult, the convicted de fendant has the burde n of demonstr at i ng to this C ourt why the evidenc e will not support the jury ’s ver dict. State v. Carruthe rs, 35 S.W .3d 516, 557 -58 (Tenn. 2000) ; State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). I n contra st, the State is entitled to the strong est leg itimate view of the e vidence along with all rea sonable infe renc es which ma y be-11-

dr a wn fr om that e vid e nc e . I d. Th e jury ve rd ic t app ro ve d b y

the tr ia l ju dg e a c c re dit s th e Sta te s’ witnesses and r esolves all conf licts in favor of the State. State v. Har ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 19 92 ); State v. She ff

ie ld, 67 6 S.W. 2d 54 2, 54 7 (T e nn . 1 98 4) . Q ue sti on s c on c e rn ing the c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, c on fl ic ts i n tria l te sti mon y , th e we ig ht andva lue to be g ive n the e vid e nc e , an d a ll fac tual issues raised by

the evidenc e ar e re solved b y t h e trier of fa ct and not this Court. St ate v. Bla nd, 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997). We do not attempt to re- weig h or re- evaluat e the
e vid e nc e , n or

do we su bs titute ou r i nf e re nc e s d ra wn fr om the c ir c ums ta nti a l e vid e nc e fo r tho se d r a w n b y th e trie r o f f

a c t. St a te v

. E lkin s , 1 0 2 S. W. 3 d 5 7 8 , 5 8 2 ( T e n n

. 2 0 0 3 ) ; St a te v. Reid, 91 S.W .3d 247, 277 (Tenn. 2002) ; Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 659.

I t is well-established that the identific ation of a de fendant as the perpe trator of the c riminal offe nses is a question of fa ct for the jury

. See State v. Vaug hn, 29 S.W .3d 33, 40 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Phill ips, 728 S.W .2d 21, 25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986); Whit e v. State, 533 S.W .2d 735, 744 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1975) . Acc ording l y , t he we ight a nd cre dibilit y of the testimony

of a wi tne ss andthe re c on c ili a tio n o f co nf lic ts in te sti mon y , if

a ny , a re ma tte rs e ntr

us te d e xclu siv e ly

to the jury . State v. Wil liams, 623 S.W .2d 118, 120 (Tenn. Crim

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 1 ). Moreover, the te sti mon y of a vic tim id ent if

y ing the de fe nd a nt a s th e pe rp e tr a tor is s uf fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

a conviction. State v. Strickland, 885 S.W.2d 85, 87-88 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

L ooking at t h e evidenc e in a lig ht most favorable to the State, we c onclude that the ide nti fi c a tio n e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt f or a ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t to ha ve fo un d b e y on d a re a so na ble do ub t th a t the de fe nd a nt c omm itt e d th e of fe ns e s. I n th e pr e se nt c a se , b othvic tim s p os iti ve ly identified the de fendant as the per petrator, first from a

photogr aphic l i n eu p and later during the
c ou rs e of the tr ia l. I n ad dition , the e vid e nc e e sta bli sh e d tha t both vic tim s saw the de fe nd a nt i n w e lllighted a rea s. Furthe rmore, the defe nse counse l cross-e x amined the victims conce rning the ac cura cy and re liabilityof their testimony . Her e, the jury , by its verdic t, chose to acc redit the testimony of the victims. According ly , this iss ue is without merit.

III. Conclusi on

I n ac co rd an ce wi t h t h e fo re go i n g au t h o ri t i es an d re as o n i n g, we re v er s e t h e d ef en d an t 's
c on vic tio ns a ndre ma ndthe c a se fo r a ne w t ri a l.

___________________________________ J .C. McL IN, J UDGE