*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that

oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the

record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted July 14, 2006*

Decided July 18, 2006

Before

Hon. RICHARD D. CUDAHY, Circuit Judge

Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 05-3719

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JUAN GONZALEZ IBARRA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Northern District of

Illinois, Eastern Division

No. 05 CR 352

Amy J. St. Eve, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Juan Gonzalez Ibarra pleaded guilty to being in the United States without

permission after his removal to Mexico. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Ibarra faced an

enhanced sentence because his removal followed several convictions for aggravated

felonies, see id. § 1326(b), which yielded a guidelines range of 77 to 96 months. The

district court, exercising its discretion under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 05-3719 Page 2

(2005), went below that range and imposed a 60-month term of imprisonment, but

explicitly rejected Ibarra’s argument that the reduction should be even greater to

conform his sentence to those in other districts that, unlike the Northern District of

Illinois, have implemented “fast-track” programs for § 1326(a) prosecutions. See

Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of

2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 675; U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1. The court

observed that Congress was aware of the potential for disparity when it approved

the fast-track program, that the program is designed to expedite prosecution in

districts with a high number of immigration cases, and that defendants who

participate in the program give up multiple rights to do so. Thus, the court

reasoned, the absence of a fast-track program in the district was not an appropriate

basis for deviating from the advisory guidelines range in Ibarra’s case.

On appeal Ibarra makes the single argument that his prison sentence is

unreasonably high because the district court refused to consider that the guidelines

range might have been lower in a fast-track district. As we have explained,

however, the absence of a fast-track program in the sentencing district is not an

acceptable reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines range. See United

States v. Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d 539, 542 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v.

Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2006). Moreover, contrary to Ibarra’s

contention, the district court did not refuse to consider his argument that the

absence of a fast-track program justified a further reduction in his sentence. 

Rather, the court directed the parties to brief the issue and, for the very reasons we

identified in Galicia-Cardenas and Martinez-Martinez, concluded that the absence

of a fast-track program did not warrant a lower sentence. Thus, even if the lack of a

fast-track program had been a relevant consideration, Ibarra would have no cause

for complaint because a sentence imposed after Booker cannot be deemed

unreasonable whenever the district court’s exercise of discretion does not coincide

with the defendant’s wishes. See United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679

(7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gipson, 425 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 2005).

AFFIRMED.