2004 D e c i sion s O p inion s of the U nit e d S t at e s C our t of Appe al s for the Thir d C ir c uit

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PRECEDENT IAL

UNIT ED STA TES C OURT OF

APPEALS FO R T HE TH IRD CIR CU IT

Nos. 02-3947/4158

DEN NI S L

. BLA CKHA WK

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNS YLVANI A; PE NNS YL VAN I A GA ME COM MISSION; VERNO N ROSS,

Director; THO MA S R. LITTWIN , Law Enf. Dir ector ; F REDERIC K MERLUZZI, Enf. Offi cer ; BARRY HAMBLEY; DAVID E . O VERCAS H, in their indi vidual and offici al capaci ties

Vernon R oss Tho mas Littw in David E. Overcash,
Appellant s, No. 02- 3947

__________________ 

### DENNIS L . BLACKHAWK,
Appellant , No. 02-4158

v.

COMMONW

EALTH OF PENNSYLVA NIA; PENNSYLVA NIA GAME COMMI SSION; VERNON ROS S, Dir

ector; TH OMAS R. LITTWIN, Law Enf. Director; FREDERICK ME RLUZZI, Enf. Officer; BARRY HAMB LEY; DAVID E . OVERC ASH, in th eir individual and official capacities;

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE MI DDLE DI STRI CT OF PEN NS YL VA NIA

(Dist. Court No. 99-cv- 02048) District Cou rt Judge: H on. Tho mas I.

Va nask ie

Argued: Jul y 21, 2003

Before: AL ITO and FU EN TE S, Circu it Judges , and S URRI CK, * Distri ct Judge

. (Opinion Fi led: August 20, 2004 )

D. MICHAEL FIS HER HOW ARD G. HOPK IRK (Argued) CALVI N R. KOONS JOH N G . KN OR R, III Office of Attorney General Appellat e Liti gation Sec tion 15th Floor , Strawbe rry Square

* Th e H on . R . B ar cla y Surr ick, United States Distric t Judge for the Eastern Distri ct of

Pennsyl vania, sitting by designation.-2-

Harrisburg, Pa. 17120
Counsel for

Appellant

s/Cross- Appellees

GAR Y S. GILDIN (A rgued) 150 South CollegeStreet Carlis le, Pa. 17013

TH OM AS B. SC HM IDT , III PEPPER HAMILTON LLP 200 One Keystone Pl aza No rth Fro nt and M arket S treets Post Office Box 1181 Harrisburg, Pa. 17108- 1181
Counsel for

Appellee/

Cross-Appell

ant

OPINI ON OF THE COURT

AL ITO , Circuit

Judge :
This is an appea l byoffici als of t he Pen nsylvan ia Gam e Commission from an orderperm anen tly enjoinin g t hem from

e nforcing a permit

fee provi sion of

th e state Game and W ildli fe Code against De nnis Blackhawk on the ground t hat the Comm issi on ’s current waiver poli cy violates his ri ght to t

he free exe rci se of reli gion. Blackh awk in turn cross- appe als the Distri ctCou rt’s hol di ng that th e Game Commission officials are not per so nal ly liab le for viol ating hi s right s. We aff ir m the District

Court in both respects.
I.
Lak ota Indians be li eve that black bears pr ot ec t th e E ar th , sa nc tif y r e ligi ous ceremonies, and imbue wor shipe rs with spiri tual streng th. Alth oug h B lackh aw k is

a Lenape Indian by

birt h, he was adopte d by elders of the Og lala Lakota and Seneca tribes, who sc hool ed him in the reli gious tradi tions of the Lakota and Iro quo is people. W hen Blackhawk began to see bears in a r ecu rring dre am , L akot a tribal elders concluded that the dream was a prophesy and predic ted t ha t B la ck ha wk

wou ld d erive s piri tual power f rom the animals.

In 1994, Bl ac kha wk purch as ed two blackbear c ubs , amal e an d a f ema l e named Timber and Tundra. He mo ved to Pe nnsylv ania in 1995 and bega n conducti ng reli gious cerem oni es with t he bears on his prop erty. Memb ers of various American Indian tr ibe s v is it Bl ac kha wk from across t

he country

to partic ipate in these ritua ls. Due to Blackh awk ’s stew ardsh ip of the bears a nd hi s role in these ceremonies , some consi der him to be a holyman.
The Pennsyl vania Game an d Wildli fe Code requires perm its in ord er to

en gage in a va riety of dif feren t activitie s , includi ng such thi ngs as bird banding (34 Pa. Co ns. Sta t. Ann. § 2921), fa lconry(34 Pa. Co ns. Sta t. Ann. § 2925), various types of fiel d dog trial s (34 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 294 3), f ox chas ing (3 4 Pa . Con s. Stat. Ann. § 294 5 ), mai ntaini ng a “menagerie ” (34 Pa. Cons. Stat . Ann. § 2964), and eithe r deali ng in or poss essing “ex otic wil dlife .” 34 P a. Cons. Stat . Ann. §§ 2962, 2963. Annual fees ranging from $25 to $300 are col lect ed for thes e pe rmit s, see 34 Pa. Cons. St at. Ann. § 2904, and th e
revenues from all of these fe es co mp ris e-3-

about on e percentof the G am e Commission’s annual int ake. Although persons wis hing to kee p wildli fe in cap tivity must g enera lly obtain

a menagerie or

exotic wildli fe possess ion perm it and pay th e req uisite fee , see 34 Pa. Co ns. Stat. Ann. §§ 2904, 2964(c) (1), the Code exc ludes from these r equire men ts most zoos and all“[n]ationall y r ecognized circus[es] .” 34 P a. C ons . Sta t. An n. § 2965(a )(1)–(3). In additi on, the director of the Ga me C om missio n is au thorize d to waive a permit

fee “where hards hip or extraordinary circumst ance war r ants,” so long as the w aiver is “ cons istent w ith sound game or wildl ife management acti viti es or the intent of [the Game and Wildli fe Cod e]” 34 P a. C ons . Sta t. An n. § 290 1(d ).
F rom 1995 to 1999, Bl ackha w k obta ined pe rmi ts to own th e b ea rs . A t fi rst, he ac quired a “m enag erie pe rmit , ” but bears ar e cl as si fi ed u nde r the Ga me and Wild life C ode a s “ex otic wildli fe,” see 34 Pa. C ons. S tat. Ann. § 2961, and specia l perm its are req uired f or tho se w ishing to deal in orpos se ss ex ot ic wi ldli fe

. See 34 Pa. Cons. Stat . Ann. §§ 2904, 2962, 2963. Beginning in 1997, t

he Game Com missi on insi sted that Bl ackhaw k obtain an ex otic wildli fe dealer

permit, which costs $200 per year, see 34 P a. C ons . Sta t. An n. § 2904, bec aus e Fr ede rick M erlu zzi, a wildli fe conserva tion officer, belie ved that Bl ac kha wk intende d to breed t he bears and sell their cubs. If B lackh aw k did not wish to deal i n bear s bu t me re lyto kee p them, he needed onlyan exoti c wildli fe possessi on perm it, for which the annual fee is $50

. See 34 P a. C ons . Sta t. An n. § 290 4.
In 199 8, Bla ckha wk soug ht a n exemption from the permit fee on t h e ground that hepossesse d t he be ars for Na ti ve American rel igious purpos es. Af te r making an inq uiry to the Bureau of Indian Af fair s , Mer lu zz i i nf

or med Bl ac kha wk that Native Am ericans who possess a Bureau of Indian Affai rs ide ntifi cati on card ar e en ti tl ed to so me exemptions unde r fe dera l law, but Blackhawk d id not possess such a card. Blackhawk paid the1998 fee under prot e st after cit ing his reli gious purpose and all eging fi nancialhardshi p. He then wrote to his re present ativein the state le gisl ature, Keith McCall, and M cCa ll intervened and asked Commission director Vernon R oss to overse e th e situationpersonal ly . On October 6, 1999, Bl ac kha wk recei ved a letter fro m Commission offici als Thomas Littw in and Da vid Overcash informing him that he did not qualif

y for a waiver under 34 Pa. Co ns. Stat. Ann. § 2901(d) becaus e the Commission regardedthe ke eping of w ild anim als in captivit

y as incon sis tent w ith sound game and wildl if e management acti viti es unless the an imals we re intende d for relea se int o t he wild. Si nce Timber and Tundra had been decl awed and had been kept in captivit

y thei r entire l ives, theycould not be relea sed int o the wild. “Thus, in th e Co mmi ss io n’ s v ie w, Bl ac kha wk [was] not entitl ed to an exemption regardless of his fin ancial circ umst anc es.” Black Hawk v

. Pen nsylvan ia , 225 F. Supp. 2d 46 5, 470 (M. D. P a . 2002 ). The letter fro m L ittwin-4-

and Ov ercash to l d B lackh aw k that, because his pe rmit had expire d on June 30, 1999, if he stillpossesse d the bears he was sub ject to pro sec utio n.
Bl ac kha wk respo nded by again requesting a w aiv er, and in November of 1999, M erluzz i filed cr im ina l charge s ag ai ns t B la ck ha wk f

orfa il in g t o r en ew.
Bl ac kha wk file d an acti on under 42 U.S .C. § 1983, seeki ng to enjoi n the Game Commission fro m assessi ng the fee or confiscating the be ars an d als o seeking money damages from M erluzz i, Overcash, Littwin, Ha mb ley, a n d Ross. Pri or to t he Distri ct Court’s dispositi on of the case , a state magistr ate found Blac khawk guilty of the crimin al char ges and asse ssed a $17 8,4 00 fi ne, w hich h e later re duce d to $6 ,442. However, the Court of Com mo n Pleas st ay ed t

he c ri mi nal case pendi ng a ruli ng on Blackhawk’s § 1983 action.

In Au gust of

200 0, Bl ac kha wk discovered that t

he bears’ enc losu re had been vandali zed, that thelock s o n the enclosure had b een c ut, and th at the anim als w ere miss ing. A nei ghbor encounter ed Tun dra o n his p rope rty a nd

was atte mpting t o lead the bearback to the pen when Tundra bit hi m. The neighbor alerte d the Game Commission, which tracke d the be ars andtr anq ui li zedth em. An offici al who was attem pting to restrain Tund ra was also bitten by the bear, but the Commission su cc eede d in tak ing b oth bears into cu stody. It then soug ht to destr oy th e b ears pur suant t o a regulation requiring wild anim als who have bitt en humans to be decapi tate d in o rd er to be test ed for rab ies. See 28 Pa. Code § 27.103(f )(2). The D istrict Court enjoine d the Commission from destr oyi ng the bears and orde red the ir retu rn. See Black Hawk

v. Pen nsylvan ia , 114 F. Su pp. 2d 327 (M .D. P a. 20 00)

. When th e D istrict Co urt reac hed th e merits of the civil cas e, it held th at the Game Commi s sion’s refusalto exempt religiou sly mo tivated acti vi ties from the perm it fee violated the First Am endm ent’s Free Ex ercis e C laus e. See Bl ac k Ha wk , 225 F. Sup p. 2d at 4 65. T he C ourt h eld that the pe rmit fe e requ ireme nt w as no t a “‘valid and n eutral la w ofgeneral applicability’” under Employ me nt D iv., D ep ’t of Human Resources of Oregon v. Sm ith , 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), because the stat utorywaiver est ablis hed a “‘sy stem of indiv id ualiz ed excepti ons.’ ” Black Hawk , 225 F. Supp. 2d at473. Th e Cou rt

acco rding ly applied stric t scrutiny to the waiver schem e, i d. at 472 –73 , and h eld that the sch eme could not w iths tand stri ct scrutinybecause the Com miss i on was unab le to “demonstr ate a compel ling interest in refus ing to gr ant a re ligi ous
exe mp tion .” Id. at 477. The District Cou rt

acc ordin gly enj oined the Gam e Commission fro m charging Bl ackhawk a perm it fee. However, t he Court decl ined to hold the ind ividua l defe ndan ts liable under § 1983 b ecaus e it f ound that Merluzzi a nd Hambley were not p erson ally respo nsible f or violating B lackhaw k’s rights and t

hat Ross , Li ttw in, and Overcash were enti tled to qualif ied im m un ity.
On appe al, the Commission argues-5-

that the First Amendment does n ot entitle Bl ac kha wk to a waiver , and Bla ck ha wk contends that the Distric t Cou rt erred in granti ng summary j udgment in favor of t he indivi dual defendants . We ex erc ise plen a ry review o ver a gran t of sum mary judgm ent , Northview Motors, Inc. v. Chrysl er Motors Corp. , 227 F .3 d 78, 87–88 (3d Cir. 2000), and l ikewise review de novo the Dist

rict Court’s i nterpretation of t he C ons titutio n. United States v

. Scarfo , 263 F.3d 80, 91 (3d Cir. 2001 ).

II.
A.
Blackh awk ’s free e xercis e claim requires us to app ly the Supreme Cou rt’s decisi on s i n Employment Div. , Dep’t of Human Re sou rces of O reg on v . S mith , supra , and Church of

Lukumi Babalu Aye, In c. v. Hial eah , 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993) (“ Luku mi ”), and our d ecision s in Fraternal Order of Police v . City of New ark , 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999 ) (“ Fraternal Order of Police ” ), a nd TenaflyEruv Ass’n, I nc.
v. Bo roug h ofTen afly , 309 F.3d 144 ( 3d Cir. 2002) (“ T en afly ”). Based on these decisions, we agree with the District Cou rt that Blackh awk ’s free exercise righ ts were vio lated

. In Sm i th , the Suprem e Cou rt opened a new chapter i n the interpret ation of the Free Exercise Clause . Th e Cou rt began by r eaffirming the pri nciplethat t he Clause prohibi ts “al l ‘governmental regulat ion of religious belie

f s as such.’” 494 U.S. at 877 ( quoting S her bert v. Verner , 374 U .S. 398, 402 (1 963) ) (emp hasis in S h erbert ). The Court held, how ever, that most laws that

burden religiousl y mo tivated conduct stand on a differe nt footi ng. Reject ing the argument that such laws must ge nerall y satis fy s tri ct

sc ru tin y, the Court concluded that the First Amendment is not ordinari ly o ffended by “neu tral” and “gen erally ap pl ic ab le ” l aws that mere ly have “the i ncident al effect” of burdening religiou sly moti v ated c ond uct. 494 U.S . 878 , 879 , 881

. The Court recogni zed severa l excepti ons to this rule. Firs t, the C ourt d id not ove rr ule pri or decis ions i n which “hybrid claim s” (i.e., cla ims involving “not the Fre e E xer cise Cla use alon e, but the Free Exercise Clause in c o n junctio n w ith otherconsti tuti onal protecti ons”) had prevail ed again st “neu tral, gen erally applic able law[s ].” Id . at 881 (cit ations omitted). Nor did the C ourt o verru le Sherbe rt and o th er d ecisi ons tha t “inval idate d sta te un employmen t

com pen sati on rules that c onditi oned the availa bility of benefit s upon an applicant’s willingness to work un de r conditions forbiddenby hi s rel igion. ” Id . at 883. Fina ll y, the C ourt o bserv ed tha t even if it “were incli ned to b rea the into Sherbe rt

som e life beyond t

he unemployment

fiel d, [th e Cou rt] would n ot apply it to require exemptions from a gen erally app licable criminal law.” Id . at 8 84. The C ourt wrote:
The Sherbe rt test, it mustbe recal led, was developed in a context that len t its e lf to indivi dualiz ed go vern men ta l

assess ment of the re asons for the relev ant c ond uct. . . .-6- [O]ur decisi o ns in t he une mpl oy me n t

cases stand f or the p r oposit ion th a t whe re the State has in place a s ystem of ind ividua l exemptions, it may not re fu se to extend that system to cases o f ‘relig i o u s ha rdship’ wi thou t compelli ng reason.
Id . at 884 (citation om itted).

In Luku mi , the Cou rt applie d Sm ith to a w eb of city ordinance s that interfered with the prac ticeof Santeri a, a r el igion that em pl oys the sacrific e of anim als in its rituals

. The ordinances proh i bited t he kill ing of animals in Santer ia ri tuals but excl uded almost all other animal killi ngs, i ncluding kill ings thatoccurred i n connecti on with hunting, fishi ng, meat producti on, pest e xter min ation , eutha nasia , and the use of

rabbits to t

rain grey hounds. Id. at 536-37. The Court held that these “gerry mandered” ordinance s were neithe r “neu tral” nor “genera lly applic able, ” id . at 533-46, and that

theycould not wit

hstand strict s cru tiny. Id . at 54 6-4 7.
The Luku mi Co urt’s dis cu ssion of the requirement of

general applic ability is parti cularly i mportant for prese n t purposes. Wh ile the Court did notatte mpt to “def ine w ith precis ion the st andard used to eval uate whether a prohibiti on is of general applic ation, ” id . a t 54 3, the Cou rt’s discuss ion of the re qu ireme nt i s inst ructi ve. The pr i ncipal ordinance s ch a llenge d in Likumi we re claim ed to advance two interests – prev enting cruelty to ani m als and pro tecting public he alth -- but th e Co urt co ncluded that the ordinance s fail ed the gene ral app licability standard because t hey wer e “underinc lusi ve for [their asserted] ends” and “[t]h e underinclusi on [was ] subs tantial, not incons equenti al. ” Id . at 543. The Court explai ne d t hat the ordinance s were “underinclusive” because they“fail[e d] to p rohib it nonreli gious conductthat e ndanger[e d] these in terests in a simil ar orgreate r deg ree tha n Sa nteria sacri fice does .” Id . The Court added:
The ordinance s “ha[ve] every appeara nce of a prohibi tion that soc iety is preparedto impose upon [Santeri a worshippers ] but not upon its elf. ” . . . This precis e evil i s what the requir ement of gen era l applic ability is desig ned to prev ent.
Id

. at 545-46 ( quoting Flori da Star v. B.J. F. , 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J. concurri ng in part

and c oncu rring in jud gm ent)

. Applyi ng these p reced ents, w e held in Fr aterna l Order of Pol ice that t he Free Exercise Clause w as violated by a city’s practi ce of prohibi ting policeofficer s from wearing beard s for re ligio us reasons but allowing o fficers to wear bear ds for medical reas ons

. See 170 F.3d at 364-67. In reach ing this conc lu sio n, we drew on-7-

both the Cou rt’s discuss ion o f “indivi dualiz ed exemptions” an d the gene ra l app licab ility requ irem ent. Id . at 364-66

. We explai ned that a sy stem that p ermits individ ualiz ed, di scretionar y exemptions provides an o pportuni tyfor the decisi on maker to deci de that “secular motivations are m ore im porta n t than reli gious motivations” an d th us to gi ve dispa rate tr ea tment to case s that are otherw is e co mparable. 170 F.3d at 365. “If anyt hing,” we stat ed , “this co ncern is only furthe r implic ate d wh en th e governmentdoes not m erely c reate a mechanism for individ ualized exemptions, b ut instead, actually creates a categori ca l exemption for ind ividua ls with a secular obje ctionbut n ot for in dividu als w ith a reli gious obj ecti on.” Id . Concludi ng that the policy

i n questi on was suspect f or precis elythis reason, we wrote: [T]he m edicalexemption rais es conc ern b ecau se it indica tes that th e Departmentha s made a value j udgment that

secular (i.e., medical) motivation s for wearing a be a rd are import a n t enough t o
ove rc ome its general inte rest in uni form ity but tha t reli gious motivations a re not.

. . . [W]hen the governmentm akes a val ue judgmentin favor

of secular motiva t ions, but no t reli gious motivations, the govern ment’s actions must survivehe ig ht en ed sc ru tin y. Id

. at 3 66. We therefore appl ied st rict scrutinyand held that theno-beards policy could not satisfythat s tand ard

. Id . at 366- 67.
In Ten afly , we con si dered a l ocal ordinance that was neut ral and gene rally applic able on its face but t hat ha d be en enforced in a d iscrim inato ry ma nne r. See 309 F.3d at 167- 72. The ordi nance banned the placement of

any “‘ sign o r adve rtiseme nt, or other mat te r upon any pole, tree, cur bsto ne, s idewalk o r elsewhere, in any pu blic stree t or pu blic place, excepti ng such as may be authori zed by t his o r any other or dinance of t he Borou gh.’” 309 F.3d at151 (cit ation omitted). The local g over nm ent, how ever, had permitted the pla cem ent on utility poles of many types of signs and sy mbols, includi ng house number si gns, si gns pointi ng the way to area churches, l ost animal signs, holiday

symbol s, and orange rib bo ns signi fyi ng opposition to s chool reg iona lization. Id . at 151 . By con trast, th e lo cal go vern men t refus ed to p ermit Orthodox Jews to pla ce lec his on u tility poles in order

to const

ruct an eruv , a ceremonialdemarcati on of an are a w ithin which Orthodox Jew s m ay push or carry objec ts on the Sab bath

. Id . at 152

. We thus held that “theBoroug h ’s sel ecti ve, discre tio nary applic atio n of [th e ordinance ] violates the neutra lity princip le of Luku mi an d Fraternal Order of Pol ice because it ‘devalues’ Orthodox Jewish

reasons for posti ng items on ut ili ty poles b y ‘ judging the m to be o f lesser impo rt than nonreli gious re asons, ” an d t hus ‘single[s] out’ the plaintiffs’ r eligiou sly-8-

motiva t ed condu ct for discriminato ry treat me nt.” Id . at 168 (quo ti ng Lu kumi , 50 8 U.S. at 537, and Fraternal O rder o f Police , 170 F.3d at 364 -65 (f ootn ote

om itted )).
The teachi ng of Sm ith , Luk umi , Fraternal Order of

Police, and Ten afly may b e summariz ed as fol lows . Th e Fre e Exercise Clause forbi ds any regulat ion of belie fs as su ch. See Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 533; Sm ith , 494 U.S. at 877. On the other hand, wit h th e ex cep tion s no ted a bov e, a “neu tral” and “general l y appl icabl e” law that b urd ens conduct regardle ss of whether it is mo tivated by religiou s or sec ula r
concerns is n ot su bj ec t to str ict sc ru tin y. See Luku mi , 508 U.S

. at 546 ; Sm ith , 494 U.S. at 878 . A la w is “neut

ral” i f it doe s not target

reli giousl y moti vated conduct eithe r on its face or as appliedin pract ice. See Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 533- 40; Ten afly , 309 F. 3d at 1 67. A law fail s the ge nera l applic ability requirement if it burdens a category of religi ouslymotivat ed conduct but exempts or does not reac h a substantial category of conduct that is not religiou sly motivat ed and that

undermines t

he purposes of the law to at le as t t he s ame degree as the c over ed co ndu ct that is religiou sly mo tivat ed. Luku mi , 5 08 U

. S

. a t 543 -46; Fraternal Order of Pol ice , 17 0 F.3d at 364-66

. If

a law burdeni ng religiou sly motivat ed cond uc t is not neutraland general lyapplic ab le it must sati sfy strict s cru tiny. See Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 546 ; Sm it h 494 U.S. at 878. Accordi n gl y, it must

serve a compel ling governmentinterest andmust be narro wly tail ored to se rve that i nter est. Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 546. Similarly , a l aw must sati sfy stri ctscrutiny if i t pe rmits indivi dualiz ed, discretionary exemptions be caus e such a

re gi me cr eates the opp ortunity for a facia lly neutralan d g enera lly applicab le standard to be applie d in pract ice i n a way that discrim inates a gains t r e ligious ly

mo tivate d con duc t. Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 537; Sm ith , 4 94 U

. S . at 88 4, Fraternal Order , 170 F.3 d at 3 64- 65.

B.
The fee re quirem ent a t i ssue here fails the general applic ability requirement for two reas ons . Firs t, t he Game Code

cr e ates a regime of i ndividual ized, discretionary ex emptions t hat is not mate rially distinguis hable fr om those that tri ggered stri ct scr utiny in th e
unem pl oy me nt compensati on cases

. Under the la ws involved i n those c ase s, bene fits were general ly denied i f a person had quit or refused work, bu t indivi dualiz ed exemptions w ere av ailable f or persons who had quit or refuse d wor k for “go od c aus e.” See Sm ith , 494 U.S. at 884. Und er34 P a. Con s. St at . A n n. § 2901(d ), a pe r son may obt ain a waiver from the fee requirement if the perso n sh ows “ha r dship” or “ extraordinary cir cumstan ces” and the w aiver i s consistent with “sound game or wil dlife management acti viti es or the inte nt of [the Game and W ildlife C ode] .” Bla ck ha wk does not claim that

he is entitl ed to an exemption from the “har dship ” requ ireme nt, and the reg ulati on’ s remaini ng requiremen ts

– cons iste ncy w ith sound game or wildl ife management acti viti es or the i ntent of Code – ar e-9-

suff ic i ently open-ended t o bring t he reg ulati on within t

he indi viduali ze d

exe mp tion rule

.

The C ommo nwealth contends, how ever, that t

he regulation categ or ically rules out waivers for pers ons, l ike Blackhawk, who w ish to kee p anim als for reli gious reasons. This is so, the Co mm onw ealt h maintai ns, becau s e keeping animal s for re ligious reaso ns is not consistent w ith state wildlife policy. In support of thi s argum ent, th e Co mm onw ealth reli es on the following passage fr om the d ecl ar at io n of a Game Co mm ission o fficial:
The Legislature ha s d e legat e d the Gam e Commission th e respo nsibility to “pro tect, propagate , manage an d pres er ve the game o r w i ldli f e of thi s Common we alth.” 34 Pa. C.S. § 321. The Game Comm issi o n norm all y considers the keeping of live anim als in captivit

y as being incon siste nt w ith s oun d game an d wi l d lif e
mana ge men t, or the o verall p urp ose of the Game Code. This is becaus e in general keeping anim als in cap tivity does not provi de an y posit ive bene fit to th e welfare of populations of wildli fe which li ve in th eir naturalstate within t he Com mo nwealth. The only excepti on wou ld be w here such a cti vity is don e w ith the in tent of

reint roducing those a nima ls - or the ir offspri ng - into the wild; the

an im als are members of an endangered species ; or t he keeping of the anim als in capti vity provides s ome other tang ible be nefit for t

he welfare and surviv al of Pennsyl vania’s existi n g wildli fe population. App . 121-22 (em phasis add ed).
This passa ge is insuffi cient to show that 34 P a. Con s. St at . A n n. § 2 901(d) does no t cr ea te a re gi m e o f d isc re tio na ry, indivi d ualiz ed exemptions unde r which Bl ac kha wk migh t qualif y if his con duct

were not r el igious ly motivat ed. The ital iciz ed phrases s h ow t hat th e Game Commission ’ s polic y does no t categorical ly disfavor

the keepi ng of w ild anim als in cap tivi ty . Although t he de cl arati on suggests that t he keeping of wild anim als is inco nsisten t with s tate wildli fe policy unl ess doing so provides a “tang ible benefit” for the st ate ’s wild animals, this is har dly a self- defini ng
conc ept, an d the Comm onw e alth has not explai ned what the concept means.-10-

Mo reover, und er 3 4 P a. C ons . Sta t. An n. § 2901(d ), a person se eking a w aiver ne ed not show that t

he waiver would be “consis tent

with sound game or wil dlife management acti viti es.” I nstead, a person seeking a w aiver m ay show that it wo uld be “consis tent wit

h . . . the intent of [the Game and Wildli fe Code],” id ., a nd t he Code cle arly does not embodya firm or unif o rm policy ag ainst ke eping wild anim als in cap tivity. For on e thing , it al lo ws anyone to kee p w ild animals i f they pa y a $5 0 or $10 0 fe e. See 34 Pa. Con s

. St at

. Ann. § 2904 . These modest fees, which are comparabl e to many municipal dog lice nse fees, can ha rd ly b e viewed as

ex pre ssing a hard poli cy against the keeping of wild animals. Furthermore, the Code p r ovides categorica l exempti ons from the fee requirement for entiti es such

as zoos and “nationa l lyrecogniz ed circu ses.” S ee 34 P a. C ons . Sta t. An n. § 2965(a )(1)-(3). These ex emptions s erve the Commonw ea lth’s i nterests i n promoting commerce, re creation, and educati on, an d c on se qu en tly, a waiver that furthered these or

analogous i nt e rests mightbe viewed as consi stent with the Cod e’s inten t. I n sum, then, the waiver mechanism set out

in 3 4 Pa. C ons. S tat. Ann. § 2 901 (d) cr eates a regime of indivi dualiz ed, di sc re tio na ry e xemptions that t rigg ers s trict sc rutin y. The categoricalexempt i ons in 34 Pa. Cons. Stat . Ann. § 2 965(a) for zoos and “nationallyrecognized circuses” likewise trigger st

rict scr utiny because at leastsom e of th e exe mp tions av ailable under th i s provis ion underminethe intere sts served bythe fee pr ovisi on to at leastthe same degr ee as would a n
exe mp tion for a pe rson like B lack haw k.
The Common we alth s uggests t hat the fee requi rement serve s two main interest s: it brings in mo ney and it tends to discour age the ke eping of w ild anim als in

ca pt iv ity, wh ich, as n ote d, th e Co mm onw ealth gene rally vie ws a s undesir able. As th e Co mm onw ealth ’ s brief puts it, “‘in gene ral kee ping anim als in capti vity

does not pr ovide anypositive be ne fit to the wel fare of popul ations of wild li fe wh ich live in their n atural sta te with in Pen ns yl vania. ” Appellant s’ Br. at 12.
The exem ptions for “n ationa lly recogniz ed circus es” and zoo s work againstthese in terests to at le as t t he s ame degree as the type of exe mption that Bl ac kha wk seeks. The sta te’s intere st in rais ing money is undermined by any exemption, an d the Commonwealth has not ar gued , much les s shown, that

r e ligious ly based exempti ons, i f grante d,

wou ld exce ed th e exemptions fo r qualif yi ng zoos and circ uses an d indivi dual waivers u nde r 34 P a. Co ns. Sta t. Ann. § 2901 (d) f or persons wit h secular

mo tivat ion s.
The exem ptions for n ationa lly

rec ognized circuses and zoos also w ork againstth e C ommonw ealth’s ass erted goa l of discour agi ng t he ke eping of w ild anim als in cap tivity except w here doing so pr ovides a “tangi ble” benefit fo r Pennsyl v a nia’s wildli fe. Th e Co mm onw ealth has not expl ained how-11-

circuses, whether nationall y r ecognized or

no t, prov ide tan gible b enef its for an imals livi ng in the w ild in Pennsy lvania

. Si m ila rly, exce pt in specialcircumst ances (forexa mp le, if

a zoo is conduc ting

research on animals t

hatare indige nou s to Pen nsylvan ia or is r aisi ng ani mals to be relea sed into the wild in Pe nnsylva nia), it is d iffic ult to see how the activities of a

zoo provide a t angiblebenefit for Pen nsylv ani a’s wild animal s. Yet under the statu te noted ab ove, all zoos are exempted. Ac cord ingly, th e chall enged fee provisi ons are sub s tantiall y “underinc lusi ve” with respe ct to its asserted goals, and they thus fail the req uire me nt o f ge ner al ap plica bility.
Th e Commonw ealth contends t hat the exem ptions for circuse s and zo os are “analogous to th e pres cription exce ption in Sm ith and the under cov e r uniform excepti on” in Fra ternalOrder of Poli ce , but this argument is flawed. Appellants’ Br. at 24 (foot

note omitted). In Sm ith , the state law prohibi ted thekno wi ng or intent ion al possessi on of a contr olled

su bs tance unless t

he substance was prescribed by a doctor

. See 494 U.S. at 874. The purpose of drug laws is to protect public he alth and we lfar e. See id

. at 904 (O ’Co nno r, J ., concurri ng in the j udgm ent). However, when a do cto r prescribes a drug, t

he docto r presu mab ly does so to serve the patien t’s hea lth and in the be lief

that the overall pub lic welfare will be served. Therefore, the pres cription excepti on in S mi th did not undermine the purpose of the state’s dru g law s. The s ame is t rue of the undercover e xcepti on i n Frat ernal Order of Poli ce . The re, polic e officers were prohibi ted from weari ng beards so th at the y would al l pres ent the

sa me general image to t he public . Since officers working undercover are not percei ved by t

he public as police officers, allowing undercover officers t o wear beards did not undermine the pur pose of the no-beard pol icy. See Fraternal Order , 170 F.3d at 366. As explained above, ho w ever, the exempti ons for ci rcuses and

zoos work against

both of the interest s that the p erm it fee is sai d to serv e.

C.
In arguing t

hat thefee provi sion shou ld no t b e s ub jec ted to str ict sc ru tin y, the Commonw ealth takes the position that the fee doe s not vi olateBlackhawk’s free exercise rights b ecau se it doe s not p rohib it him fr om e ngaging in religiousl y motivat ed con duct but mer elyobligates him to paya modest annualfee. The Commonw eal th su gge st s tha t m an y la ws imposing user fees and other s imil ar fees

wo uld be throw n into disarra y i f every person cla i ming a rel igious objection to a fee cou ld obtain a waiver. The Commo nwea lth furthe r argu es that, if it grantedwaivers for

persons who keep wild anim als for rel igi ous reasons, it would be required under the E stablis hm ent C lause to grantcomp arable w aivers for persons who wish to keep such animals for secular

reas ons

. These argum ents ignore the content of the st atute s that

are beforeu s. We a re not presented here with a neutra l and gene rally applic able u ser fe e that is-12-

unifo rmly i mposed without al lowing indivi dualiz ed exem ptions. Un der Sm ith , such a scheme (barring the applic abili ty of

one of the ex ceptio ns no ted ab ove) wo uld not tri gger strict

scrutiny , and a per son seeking to be excused from payi ng the fee

on religiou s grou nds w ould be un likely to prev ail. Here, by con trast, we are confront ed with a scheme t hat feat ures bot h indivi dua lize d and categoricalsecular exemptions, and it is thes e that tri gger stri ct scrutiny . Moreover, because the state stat ute p ermits indivi du aliz e d exemptions forentir ely sec ular reas ons , w e
see no plausi ble groundon w hich it c ould be argued that the Establis hment Clause preclude s equal treatment for persons who wish to keep animals for religious reasons.
The C o m m onw ealth als o misapprehends the nature of Blackh awk ’s cl ai m. Blackhawk did not as k for a waiver simp ly because he possess ed the bears for reli gious reaso ns. R ath er , he asked f or a waiver“because o f his Nati ve American belie fs andbecause the fee wou ld c ause [hi m] har dship. ” 225 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (e mp hasi s added). I n additi on, the Commission d id no t denythe waiver on the ground that

Blackhawk did not esta bli sh financi al hards hip. I nstead, the Commission concluded tha t “ Bl ac kha wk

wo uld n ot be entitl ed to an exempti on

r egar dle ss of his financial cir cumstances .” Id

. (emphasis adde d). Thus, although t he Co mm onw ealth ar gue s a t s ome length t hat Bl ac kha wk could scr ape together the money to p ay the fee, that que sti on is not before us. Fina lly, the Com mo nw ealth argues that the fee pro visions at issue here are simil ar to pr ovisi ons of the I nternal Revenue Clause invol ved in Adams v. C.I .R. , 170 F.3d 1 73 (3d Cir. 199 9). In Adams , a t axpaye r did not pay t axes because she h ad a re ligious objec tion to the use o f tax re venu e for m il ia ry purposes, and the I RS assesse d defici encies and penalties againsther

. Id

. at174-75. The t axpaye r argued t hat requiring her to pay

taxes s ubstan tial ly burdened her free exerci se of reli gion and viol ated a provis ion of the Religi ous Freedo m Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S .C. § 2000 bb-1 , which remained applic able to the f

ederal government desp ite City of

Boerne v. Fl ores , 521 U. S. 507 (1997)

. See 170 F.3d at 175. Under RFRA, a law that

substant iall y bur dens the exercise of re ligi on must repr esent t he leastrestrictive means of furthering a compelli ng g ove rnment interest . 42 U.S .C. § 20 00b b-1. L ook ing to pre- Sm ith

cases invo lving f ree ex ercise c hallen ges to the colle ction of ta xes , A dam s held that the R FRA standard was met. 175 F. 3d at 175-80. The Adams panel the n reject ed the taxpay er’s argument that she had met the statutory req uirem ents n eede d to av oid penalties and a dditi ons to tax

. See id . at 180-81. Under the Internal Revenue Code, these penalties and addi tions could be

avo ided if the taxpa y er sh owe d “reaso nable cause” or “unusu a l circumst ances and unfairne ss.” See 26 U.S .C. § 6651(a) ( no penalty for failure to file if taxp ayer dem onstra tes “rea sona ble cause”); 26 U .S.C. § 665 4(e)(3 ) (no add iti on for underpayment of est imated ta x whe re fail ure is due to “un usual circum sta nces” and addition would be-13-

“against e qu ity and good co nscience” ). Invoking a “w ell establ ished l ine of cas es in volving chall enges to t he coll ecti on of taxes on reli gious grounds ,” 170 F.3d at 181, the panelheld in t he b od y o f its opinion that t

he taxpay er was ineli gible f or reli ef under the provisi ons on wh ic h she reli ed. Id . Th en, in a fo otn ote, Adams quick ly rejec ted thetaxpay er’s c ontenti on that these pr ovisi ons created a mechanism for indivi dual exemptions similar to that in the un employment

co mpensation cases an d tha t “the fai lure t o extend thos e exemptions to a ca se of religiou s hard ship consti tute[ d] discrimination on th e bas is of reli gious belie f.” Id . at 181 n.10. Adams held that the prov isions o f th e Int ernal Revenue Co d e on which the t axpaye r reli ed did not create a sche me of indivi dual

ex emptions und er w hich s he m ight h av e qualif ied if she had refused to fi le for

se cular, as opposed to religious, reasons. Id

. On the contrary , as pr eviousl y noted, Ad ams held that these provis ions a r e categ orically inappli cable t o the taxpayer for fac ially ne utra l reas ons

. Id

. The Adams footnotestands f or the proposit ion that t

he free ex ercise ru le regardi ng indivi dual exempti ons does not apply if the cl ass of per sons who may seek such a n exem ption is defin ed in f acially neutralterms a nd the pers on chall enging the scheme does not fall within that cl ass. In that si tua tion, the pers on chall enging the

sc heme must argue i nsteadth atth e s che me fails the require men t of gen era l applic ability because exempting the class of pe rs ons who fa llwi t hin the statutory exemption und ermin es the s tatu te ’s goa ls to at le a s t the s ame degree as would an exemption for thos e in th e class of the person mo unting th e c halle nge. The Ada ms footnote did not go on to address this latte r argument, but in any event the

a rgumentwas doomed by the pan el’ s discuss ion of the RF RA issu e. The p anel’s discu ssion of tha t issue m ade it c lear th a t the relevant Code provis ions met s tri ct scrutinybecause they s erved a compell ing interest(“ th e ‘ uni for m, mandat or y parti cipation in the Fede ral i ncome tax sys t em,’” 170 F.3d at 178 ( citation omitted), and w ere narrow ly tail ore d to

serve that inter est in the sense releva nt in this c ont ext. See id . at

179-80. Prop erly underst ood, theref ore, t he Adams foo tnote doe s not support the Com mon wealth’s pos ition her e. I n this
case, as previ ouslyexplai ned, 34 Pa. Cons. Sat. An n. § 2901(d) does not categ orically exclude persons wis hing to kee p ani mals for reli gi ous reasons . In addi tion, 34 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2965(a)( 1)-(3) contai ns secular exemptions th at prec lude thefee

sc heme from sati sfy ing the requirement of general applic abil i ty . As a result, t he fee pro visio ns m ust s atisf y strict sc rutin y.

III.
I n orde r to surv ive strict sc rutin y , the fee scheme “must advance i nteres ts of the high est ord er and mu st be n arrow ly tail ored i n pur suit o f tho se in teres ts.” Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 546 ( interna l quotati on marks omitted). In thi s case, the Game Commi ssio n assert s that the fee

sc heme serve s two comp elling interests: (1) “pr omo t[ing] the welfar e an d-14-

prosp erity of wildli fe populati ons” and (2) “maintai ning the fi scal i ntegr ity of its perm it fee system .” Appellants’ Br. at 28.
I t is dou btful th at these interests qualif y as compe llin g. In Luku mi , 508 U.S. at 546 -47 , the Court held t hat “[w]h ere govern ment restri cts onl y conductprotected by the First Amendment and fails t o ena ct fea sible m easu res to rest rict o ther conduc t prod ucin g substant ial harm oral le gedharm o f the

sa me sort, the interest g iven in justific ation of the res tri ction i s notcom pelli ng.” Here, the fee scheme has precisel y thi s f la w. Denying f ee exemptions to otherwise qualif ied persons who wi sh to keep anim als for rel igious reasons may produce

a small dec rease i n the tot al nu mber of wild animals he l d in capti vity , but i f the Co mm onw ealth regarded it as amatter “of the highest

order” to reduce the numberof wild animals i n capti vity , it could do much

more. For one thing, it co uld increa se the fees for menager ie and exoti c wildli fe possessi on perm its, now set at $100 and $50 per year re spe ctive ly , to l evels t hat

wo uld provide a s ubstantial di sincentive for those wh o are n ot po or. Sim ilarly, if the Common we alth be lieve s that persons who cannot afford a $100 or $50 annual perm it fee should n o t keep wild anim als becau se such perso ns are likely to find it di ffi cult to provi de adequate c are for t he animals, the C om monwealth could do away with all “hardsh ip” waivers. Because the Co mm onw ealth sets i ts fees at modest level s and provi des for“hardshi p” waivers, the Commonwealth clearlydoes not regard t

he objective of di scou raging the possessi on of wild ani mals as a matter “of the h igh est o rde r.”
Much the sa me is t

rue with respect t o the Com mon wealth’s asse rt ed interest i n the financi al integrity of t he fee sy st em. Because the Common wealth m ake s waive rs avail able for

persons s eek ing to keep animals f

or secul ar reas ons, the Co mm onw ealth plainlydoes not regard

wa ivers a s a gre at threa t.
Further mor e, even if th e Com mon wealth’s as se rted interests are compelli ng, the fee sche me is n ot narr ow ly tail ored to f

ur ther t hem. If the Commonw ea lt h wishes to reduce the number of wild anim als held in cap tivity

o r to reduce the number held bypersons who ca nnot afford a $100 or $50 annual fee (and thes e are the onlyeffect s tha t denyi ng the exempti ons atissue can hav e), the sche me is substant

iall y underinclus ive for the r eas ons alrea dy set o ut. As a result, the s che me can not satis fy stric t scru tiny.
We therefore af firm the injunct ion is sued by the Dis trict C our t.

IV.
We proc eed to address t he questi on of th e in di vi du al d ef en da nt s’ l iab ilit y fo r money dam ages . The Distric t C our t grantedsum mary ju dg ment to Merluzzi and Ha mb ley on the grou nd th at they “d id not par tic ipatein the de cisi on to deny Black H awk an exemption” and di d not “‘direct [] others to violate’” his right s. Black Hawk , 225 F. S upp. 2d at 479 (brack ets in o rigin al). The Court exclude d Ross, Li ttwin, a nd O verca sh fro m this-15-

analysi s, because Ross “had ‘ actual knowledge’ and acquiesc ed in thedecisi on to d e ny Blac k Hawk an exemption,” and because Littwin and Overcash conceded that they“were personal lyinvolved i n the decisi on to denyBlack H awk an

exe mp tion .” Id. ( citi ng Andrews v. Cityof Philad elphia , 895 F .2d 1469 , 1478 (3d Cir. 1990) (holdi ng that sup erviso r liability can b e establ ished “‘ through al legations o f personaldirect

ion orof actualknowledge and acqu ie sce nce’”) ( quoting Rode v. De llarcipre te , 845 F.2d 11 95, 1207 (3d Ci r

. 1988))). N evertheless, the C ourt determi ned that all t hree remai ning indivi dual defendants were ent itl ed to qu ali fie d i m m un ity.
We hol d tha t all of the defe ndan ts

were entitle d t o qu al if

ie d i mm unit y, and

we theref ore af fir m t he order of t he Distri ct Court on this b asis. A government officer defendant s ued for a consti tuti onal violat ion is entitled to qualif ied im mu nity if a reaso nable officer

could have belie ved that th e c ha ll en ge d c ond uc t wa s lawful under the ci rcu mst anc es. Anderson v. Creighton , 483 U.S. 63 5, 641 (19 87). Qualifi ed immunity“provides a mp le protect ion to all bu t the pla in l y incompetent

or tho se w ho k now ingly violate the la w.” Malley v. Briggs , 475 U.S. 335 , 341 (19 86)

. See also Saucier v. Ka tz , 533 U.S . 194 , 202 (20 01)

. In this cas e, the governi ng prece dents were complex and developi ng. Although we now hold that the waiver procedu re in34 P a. Con s. St at . A n n . § 2901(d) is s uf fic ien tly ope n-en ded to

con stitute a sy stem of i ndividua l exemptions, a reasonabl e officer in the position of the defendants could have concluded otherw is e . Sectio n 29 01(d ) is

more structu re d than theunemployment

co mpensationstat

utes, which permitted exemptions for “good cause, ” see Sm ith , 494 U.S. at 884, and a reason able o fficer could have viewed § 2901(d) as analogous for present

purposes to the Internal Revenue Code provisi ons that Adams held did not provide for individual exemptions. See 170 F.3 d at 1 81 n .10.
The meaning of the ge neral applic ability princi ple was also n ot clea rly developed in the gove rning cas es at t he ti me in q ues tion

. Sm ith d i d no t expla in how to iden tif

y laws that

fail the te st, and Luku mi , while provi ding useful gui dance, explic itly discl aimed any intent ion of “defin[i ng] with p r ecision . . . whether a prohibi tion is of

general applic ation. ” 508 U.S. at 543. Moreover, our decisi ons on March 3 and 4, 1999, in Fraternal Order of Police and Adams could have reaso nably been inter

preted a s sendi n g confli cting signals. As just di scussed, the provi sions of the Inte rnal R even ue C ode a t is sue i n Adams coul d have been reaso nably regardedas simil ar to t

he provisi ons of the Pen ns ylvania Game and W ildl ife Code involvedhere, but

we held that

the Internal Revenue Code provisi ons did not creat e a
re gi me of indivi dual exempti ons. The previous day, in Fraternal Orderof Police , we had explai ned that the indi vidual exemption ru le i s s im pl y o ne a pplication of the bro ader g enera l-applic abilit y requ ireme nt. See 170 F.3 d at 365-66. Thus, readi ng Adams in li ght of Fraternal-16-

Order of P olice, a re ason able o ffice r cou ld have been led t o read Ad ams as holding that the Internal Revenue Code provisi o n also s at isfied th e gen eral ap plicab ility requ ireme nt. Not su rp ris in gl y, Adams is a centerpiece of the Commonwea l th’s argumentin thi s app ea l in s upport of t he consti tuti onal ity of t he de nial o f Blackh awk ’s waiverre que st . A lt hou gh w e find Adams to be di sti nguishabl e for the

reasons explained above , a re a sona ble officer in the p ositio n of the defendants, aft er r eviewing Adams and the other leadi ng cases that ha d been decidedat the time, could have concluded that the deni al

wa s con stitutiona l.
IV.
After considering allof the arg u men ts raised in the appeal and crossappe al, we affirm the j udg ment of the District Court i n all respects.