NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 22a0272n.06

No. 21-3129

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FERNANDO ARANDA-AVILEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

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ON PETITION FOR REVIEW

FROM THE BOARD OF 

IMMIGRATION APPEALS 

Before: KETHLEDGE, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Fernando Aranda-Avilez petitions for review of an order of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals denying his cancellation of removal to Mexico. We dismiss 

the petition in part and deny it in part.

Aranda-Avilez and his wife have three children who are United States citizens. The family 

lives together in a house that Aranda-Avilez owns. In October 2013, Aranda-Avilez was arrested 

for driving while intoxicated; soon afterward, the Department of Homeland Security served 

Aranda-Avilez with a notice to appear for removal proceedings, charging him with removability. 

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Aranda-Avilez pled guilty to driving while intoxicated; in his 

immigration case, he later conceded his removability but applied for cancellation of removal. To 

obtain that relief, Aranda-Avilez needed to show that his “removal would result in exceptional and 

extremely unusual hardship” to his U.S.-citizen children. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). At his 

removal hearing, Aranda-Avilez testified that, if he were removed, he would move back to Mexico 

without his family and would not be able to find work there. He also testified that his wife had 
No. 21-3129, Aranda-Avilez v. Garland

2

been sick and unable to work, but was able to work again. He also submitted a social worker’s 

report, which asserted that Aranda-Avilez’s children would suffer “immense loss and tremendous 

harm” if he were removed to Mexico. 

The IJ denied Aranda-Avilez’s application on the grounds that his children would not suffer 

“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” if he were removed to Mexico. The Board denied 

relief for the same reasons. This petition followed. 

Where, as here, the Board issues its own opinion, we review that opinion as the final 

agency determination; we also review the immigration judge’s decision to the extent the Board 

adopted its reasoning. See Zhao v. Holder, 569 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 2009). Although we lack 

jurisdiction to review the IJ’s factual findings, the question whether the facts that the IJ did find

amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” is a mixed question of law and fact that 

we can review. Singh v. Rosen, 984 F.3d 1142, 1150 (6th Cir. 2021). 

As an initial matter, Aranda-Avilez challenges the IJ’s factual findings. We lack 

jurisdiction to review those determinations. Id. More to the point, Aranda-Avilez argues that the 

Board violated its own precedent when it applied the hardship factors in his case. But the Board’s 

precedent says that hardship is “exceptional and extremely unusual” only when it is “substantially 

beyond” the ordinary hardship that would “be expected to result” from removal. In re MonrealAguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 69 (BIA 2001). Here, the situation that Aranda-Avilez’s children 

face is not extremely unusual in a family facing a parent’s removal. The children of removed 

persons often remain in the United States with one parent, and face financial difficulty as a result. 

See, e.g., Lopez-Mejia v. Garland, 2022 WL 1561353, at *2 (6th Cir. May 18, 2022). Moreover,

the IJ found that Aranda-Avilez’s wife and oldest son (age 21 at the time of the hearing) could
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3

work full-time in Aranda-Avilez’s absence. Aranda-Avilez provides us no basis to find that the 

hardship to his children here would be substantially beyond that in similar cases. 

Aranda-Avilez also argues that the Board offered only a conclusory statement and violated 

due process as to why he failed to meet the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard. 

But the Board adopted the IJ’s analysis, which was itself thorough and applied the appropriate 

legal standard. The Board was not required to regurgitate the IJ’s reasoning itself. Zhao, 569 F.3d 

at 246. Nor does the Board “violate an alien’s rights to due process” when it affirms the 

immigration judge without even issuing its own opinion. Denko v. I.N.S., 351 F.3d 717, 729–30 

(6th Cir. 2003). And the Board’s opinion did not hinder our ability to review its reasoning. 

The petition for review is dismissed in part and denied in part.