## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

In re B.C.P. , 2013 IL 113908

Caption in S upreme Court: In re B.C.P., a Minor (The People of the State of I llinois
, Appellant, v. B.C.P., Appellee ).

Docke t No. 113908

Filed J une 20, 2013

Held ( Note : Thi s syl l abus

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) T he I llinois Supreme Court exercised its rulemaking authority to all o w t h e State to take an interlocutory appea l from an order suppre s s i n g evidenc e in a juvenile delinquency proce eding —Rule 660(a) modified to incorpora te Rule 604(a) (1), with such appea ls to be expedited under Rule 660A.

Dec ision Under Review Ap p ea l from the Appellate Court for the Third District; hear d in that
court on appea l from the Circuit Court of Henr y County
, the Hon. Ted J

. Hamer , J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Reverse d and re manded.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and Tere nce M. Patton, State’s Attorney
, of Cambridge (Michae l A. Scodro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Michae l M. Gli ck an d Kather ine D. Saunders, Assistant Attorney s Gene ral, of Chicag o, and Patrick Delfino, Stephen E. Norris and Rebec ca E. McCormick, o f the Offic e of the State’s Attorney s Appellate Prosecutor, of

Mt. Vernon, of

counsel), f

or the People.

Michae l J

. Pelletier, State Appellate Def ender
, Peter A. Ca

r u s o n a , D e p uty Def ender
, and Gabr ielle Gre en, Assis t an t Appellate Def ender
, of the Offic e of the State Appellate D efe nder, of Ottawa, f or appe llee.

J ustices J USTI CE THOMAS delivere d the judg ment of the c ourt, with opinion.
Chief J ustice Kilbr i d e and J ustices Fr eema n, Gar man, Kar meier, and Bur ke conc urre d in the judgme nt and opinion.
J ustice Theis dissented, w ith opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 At issue is whether the State should be allowed to take an interlocutory appea l f rom an order g ranting a motion to suppress evidenc e in a proce eding under the J uvenile Court A ct of 1987 (705 I L CS 405/ 1-1 et seq . (West 2010)).

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 T h e S t at e fi led a petition for adjudication of war dship, alleg ing that B. C

. P

. wa s delinquent beca

use he committed two counts of ag g ravated criminal sexual abuse. 720 I L CS 5/12-16(c) (2)( i) (West 2010). B.C.P. moved to suppress his confe ssion on the g rounds that he was not advi s ed o f h i s Miranda rig hts. Following a hear ing, the trial court g rante d the motion to suppress. The State filed a cer tificate of impairment and a notice of appea l. The appellate court dismiss ed the appea l for lack of jurisdiction. 2012 I L App (3d) 100921. The
court rea soned that no supre m e co u rt rule specific ally allowed the State to take an interlocutory appea l from the g ranting of a motion to suppress in a juveni l e delinquency
proce eding

. Id. ¶¶ 8, 9. We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. F eb. 26, 2010).

¶ 4 ANALYSI S ¶ 5 The S tate arg ues t hat i t should have the same right to appea l interlocutory suppression order s in juvenile delinquency case s as i t has i n criminal cases. The State’s right to appea l

an order g ranting a motion to suppress evidenc e in criminal case s i s fo u nd in I llinois

-2-Supreme Court Rule 604(a )(1) (ef f. Jul y 1, 2006), which pr ovides as follows: “(1) W hen Stat e May Appeal . I n criminal cases t he S tate may appea l only from an order or judgme nt the s ubstantive eff ect of which results in dismiss ing a charg e for any of the g rounds enumer ated in section 114-1 o f t h e Code of Criminal Procedur e of 1963; arr esting judgme nt b e c a u s e o f a d e f

e c ti v e in d ictment, information or complaint; quashingan ar rest or se arc h war

rant; or suppre ssing e vidence ***.”
I ll i n o i s Supreme Court Rule 660(a) (ef f. Oct. 1, 2001) covers appeals i n delinquent m inor

case s, but it ex pressly

incorporates the cr iminal appeals rule s only as to final judg ments: “Appe als from final judgme nts in delinquent minor proce eding s, except as otherwise specific ally

provided, shall be g overne d by the rules applicable to criminal ca ses.” 1

I llinois Supreme Court Rule 662 (ef f. Oct. 1, 1975) allows fo r appea ls of cer tain interlocutory order s in juvenile case s, but an order g ranting a motion to suppress is not one of them. ¶ 6 On appea l, the State conce des that these rules do not expressly allow the State to take a n appea l from an interlocutory order suppressi n g evidenc e in a juvenile delinquency
proce eding

. Howeve r, the State points out that, in People v. DeJ esus , 127 I ll. 2d 486 (1989), and People v

. Martin
, 67 I ll. 2d 462 (1977), this court allowed the S tate to take appeals in juvenile delinquency proce eding s in situations that wer e not expressly cover ed by the rules. The Stat e then argues that the rea soning in those case s should be extended to cover the
prese nt case

. The State also argues that public policy conce rns should g ive it a rig ht to appea l in this situation, and t h at these conce rns have been made strong er since the 1998 amendments to the J uvenile Court Act. By contra st, responde nt arg ues that no supreme court rule g ives the State the rig ht to appea l in this situation. Respondent acknow ledg es the State’s policy conce rns, but points out that there are policy conce rns on the ot her side as well and
argues that these matters would be be tter consider ed by this court’s rules c ommitt ee. ¶ 7 First, we must clar ify what will g uide our considera tion of this issue. Both parties cite the familiar rule that the same rules apply to the construction of statutes and supreme court rules ( People v. Marke r , 233 I ll. 2d 158, 164-65 (2009))
, and both parties then cite the basic rules of statutory construction—dete rmining the intent of the d ra ft er , not depar ting from plain lang uag e that is c lear

and unambiguous, etc . Howeve r, we do not be lieve that construction of a rule is at issue here

. Even the State fully conce des t h at t h e supreme court rules, as

curr ently written, do not allow for i t to take an interlocutory appea l in this situation. What the State asks for

is, in essence , a modification of the rule to allow for suc h an appe al. ¶ 8 Properly understood, the State’s argument does not ask us to interpre t the supreme court rules, but rathe r to exercise our rulemaking authority under the I llinois Constit ution. See I ll.

T he comm it te e comm ent s to the rul e st at e the pur pos e of the rul e m ore bro adl y: “Rul e 660 1

was add ed in 1975 to cl ar if y the pro ced ure in app eal s fr om det erm ina ti ons unde r the J uvenil e Cour t Act

. I t pro vides si m

ply tha t appe als fr om det ermi nat ion s in del inq uen cy pro cee din gs are gov ern ed by the rul es appl ic abl e to appe als in cri mina l cas es , and al l oth er app eal s unde r the Act ar e gov er ned by the rul es gov ernin g app eal s in ci vil cas es. ” (Emphasi s add ed.) However, the act ual rul e tha t was ado pte d sp eci fi cal ly appl ie s on ly to app eal s f rom fin al j udgm ent s.

-3-Const. 1970, art. VI
, §§ 4(c)
, 16. Although the appellate court was bound to follow the rules

as written, this court ha s the constitutional power to modify the rules if it see s fit. ¶ 9 The State’s argument asks us to invoke our rulemaking authority to modify the supreme
court rules to allow it to appea l an interlocutory order supp ressing evidenc e in a juvenile delinquency case

. By contra st, the defe ndant argues that, if this is what the court wants to do, it should turn the matter ove r to its rules committee. As both parties c oncede that the plain lang uag e of the rules does not allow for suc h an appe al, our a naly sis will not be guided by the principles of st atutory construction. R ather
, we will simply consider wheth er t h e State has made a suff

iciently compelling case for us to modify the rules at this t ime. ¶ 10 As the State notes, this court has previously been willing to rea d Rules 660 and 604(a )(1)

more broadly than their prec ise lang uag e provides. I n Martin
, the State alleg ed that the minor was delinquent in that he commit ted t he offense of rec kless homicide. The State soug ht to

remove the proce eding under section 2-7(3) of the J uvenile Court Act (I ll. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 37, ¶ 702-7(3) ). The t ri al co u rt denied the remova l motion, and the State appea led the interlocutory order

. T he appellate court dismiss ed for lack of jurisdiction, but this court

reve rsed and held that the State could appea l the denial of a remova l motion. Martin
, 67 I ll. 2d at 466. This court noted that Rule 604(a) (1) allows the State to appea l in a criminal case when a court order has the substantive eff ect of dismiss ing a

char g e. The eff

ect of denying the State’s motion to remove the case to criminal court meant that any future indictment under the criminal code for the char g ed offe nse would have to be dismiss ed. Id. at 465. The
court noted that it had previously held that a juvenile could not appea l an interlocutory order allowing a remova l motion ( People v. Jiles
, 43 I ll. 2d 145 (1969))
, bu t ex p l ai n ed t hat the

same considerations did not apply when considering whether the State could ap p eal the denial of such a motion. A juvenile could alw ay s appea l at the end of the case if he was ultimately

convicted, where as the S tate could not appea l at t he end of t he ca se. Martin , 67 I ll. 2d at 465-66. Whil e rec og nizi ng that an interlocutory appea l by the State would delay the
proce eding s, this court explained that it was “of the opinion that the trial court’s denial of a motion to remove oug ht not to be totally immuniz ed fr om review .” Id. at 466. ¶ 11 I n DeJ

esus , proce eding s ag ainst a juvenile wer e instit uted in criminal court pursuant to the automatic t ra n s fer provisions of t he J uvenile C ourt Act. However
, the m inor was later acquitted of murder, but found g uilty of arme d robber y

. I n such a situation, the Act require d that sentenc ing proce eding s be held ag ainst the minor under the Act rathe r t h an u nder the Code of Correc tions. DeJ esus , 127 I ll. 2d at 488-89. The State moved to permit sentenc ing under the Code of Correc tions, but t h e trial court dismiss ed the State’s motion. When considering whether this order was ap p ea l ab le, t his court broadly stated t hat, “Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 660(a) (107 I ll. 2d R. 660(a)), Rule 604(a )(1) also applies in juvenile delinquency proce eding s.” Id. at 495. The court then explained that it found Martin on point. 2

On the one han d, thi s st at ement cou ld be see n as set tl ing the is sue bef ore the cou rt

. T he 2
p r o b l em is tha t the aut hor it y tha t the cou rt ci te d for thi s pro pos it ion

— In re Hers hbe rge r , 132 I ll

. App. 3d 332 (19 85) —a ct ual ly hel d the oppo si te

. Hers hbe rge r hel d tha t int er loc uto ry app eal s in del inq uen cy cas es ar e li m it ed to tho se for whic h the re i s e x p r e s s pro visio ns in the sup re m e cou rt rul es, and the cou rt exp la ine d tha t “Rul e 660 *** re fe rs onl y to fi nal ord er s.” Id

. at 334. T his cou rt

-4-The court found that implicit in Martin was the rec og nition that the State has an appea lable

interest in pursuing a criminal prosec ution, and the court quoted Martin for the proposition that the tr i al court’s action oug ht not to be totally immuniz ed from revie w. Id. at 495-96. Thus, the court deter

mined that the trial court’s order terminated a criminal prosec ution prior to final judg ment and wa s theref ore a ppeala ble. Id. at 498. ¶ 12 Martin and DeJ esus wer e not examples of this court exercising its power to modify the applicable rules beca

use, in those case s , t h e ef fe ct of the trial court’s order s was the termination of criminal proce eding s ag ains t t h e j u venile. Thus, the appea ls wer e arguably

cover ed by the plain languag e of the rules. Neve rtheless, the State contends that some of the

rea soning that the cour

t used in those case s would apply equally to the State’s need to take

an interlocutory appea l from a suppression order in a criminal case

. I n both case s, the court was willing to look pa st the rules’ prec ise languag e, and, in Martin this court relied in pa rt

on the fac t that the State would not be able to appea l the order at the termination of juvenile
proce eding s. That is equally true of the g ranting of a motion to suppress. I f the State is not allowed to take an interlocutory appea l, then the court’s order is insulated from revie w. We
ag ree with the State that Mar t i n an d De Jesus are persua sive, but we do not find them dispositi ve of the question befor e us. ¶ 13 We do, howeve r, ag ree with the State’s policy arguments. Rule 660(a) beca me eff ective

on October 1, 1975, and it ha s rema ined unchang ed since that time. I n the meantime, ther e has been a shift in the way that this state vie ws juvenile delinquenc y proce eding s. I n 1998, th e Ge n eral Assembly “ra dically altere d” the J uvenile Court Act to “provide more

acc ountability for the criminal acts of juveniles and, from all appea ranc es , t o make the juvenile delinquency adjudicator y proce ss look more criminal in nature .” People v. Taylor
, 221 I ll. 2d 157, 165 (2006). When enac ting these amendments, the Gene ral Assembly added

a policy statement to the Act (705 I L CS 405/5- 1 01 (West 2010)), and this court has explained that this statement “re prese nts a fundame ntal shift from t h e s ingula r g oal of reha bilitation to include the overr iding conce rns of pr o te c ting the public and holding juvenile offe nders acc ountable for violations of the law.” Taylor
, 221 I ll. 2d at 167. And, even befor e these ref orms wer e enac ted, this court rec og nized i n 1995 that virtually all of the

c o n s ti tutional require ments of a criminal trial have been introduced into juvenile d e li n q u e n c y proce eding s. In re W

.C. , 167 I ll. 2d 307, 320-21 (1995). ¶ 14 There are conseque nces to making juvenile delinquency proce eding s more like criminal
proce eding s. T h i s court has repe atedly relied on the shift in policy to support providing juveniles with many of t he same protec tions that criminal defendants rece ive. S ee, e.g. , In

re A.G.
, 1 9 5 I l l

. 2d 313, 318 (2001) (Rule 604(d) applies in juvenile delinquency
proce eding s); In re B.L.S.
, 202 I ll. 2d 510, 518-19 (2002) (habitual juvenile offe nders are entitled to rec eive cre dit for time spent in custody prior to sentenc ing)

. I n In re Samantha V.
, 234 I ll. 2d 359, 374 (2009), this court held that the one-a ct, one-c rime rule applies in juvenile
proce eding s, explaining that “[j] uveniles are fac ed with the same potential for prejudice as

m ight have bee n m is le d by Hers hbe rge r ’s blo ck quot e of the comm it te e commen t s to Rule 660, whic h i s br oad erth an t he r ule it sel f. Id

.

-5-adults in the context of future criminal proce eding s and thus deser ve the same protec tions.” ¶ 15 We now hold that another conseque nce of this shift in policy is that we rec og nize that the State has the same interest in appea ling a suppression order in a juvenile case that it does in

a criminal case

. I n People v. Y oung , 82 I ll. 2d 234 (1980), this c ourt explained the need for interlocutory

appea ls by

the State:
“In the absenc e of interlocutory appea ls, the proscr iptions o f t h e d ouble jeopar dy clause s wou l d p rec lude revie wing courts from considering leg al issues that would otherwise be raised by the State. Error s favor ing defe ndants would pass uncorr ecte d, while those which favor ed the State would be rec tified. To the extent that such err ors

rema ined unrevie wed and prolifer ated at the trial court level, the development of the law would be distorted. ***
*** More importantly and more fre qu en t l y , howeve r, err oneous exclusionary ruling s frustra

te the primary purpose of the trial: to asce rtain the truth of the char g es. Social policies embodied in statutory or constitutional provisions m ay justify encumbe ring the fac t-asce rtaining proce ss, but the exclusion of otherwise probative and admissible evidenc e based solely upon an incorre ct interpre tation of those
p rovi sions serve s neither the policy repr esente d by the provision nor the public’s interest in an accur ate resolution of t he factual questi ons involved in the l itigation. Permitting such decisions to esca pe revie w encour ag es their prolifer ation and denies trial courts desirable g uidance

. Allowing interlo cu t o ry revie w ensure s proper application of the g overning rules and at the same time protec ts the ability of the trial court to dete rmine the truth of the fac tual alleg ations involved.” Id. at 244-47.
As we noted above, w e re lied on simil ar r easoningin e x panding the State’s rig ht to appea l in juvenile case s in Martin and DeJ esus

. An d
, i n light of the shift in policy in juvenile delinquency case s, we believe that t h ese conce rns apply equally in juvenile case s. As we noted in In re Lakisha M.
, 227 I ll. 2d 259, 275 (2008), “[w]hi le it may be true that juveniles, beca use of their lack of maturity
, often act impetuously and may be more easily influence d by others, that does not neg ate the fac t that juvenile crime is a serious conce rn of the state.” Thus, we agree with the State that Rule 604(a) (1) should apply in juvenile delinquency
proce eding s. J ust as this court modified Rule 303(a ) in H a r r is b u r g

- R a le ig h Airport Authority

v. Departme nt of

Rev enue , 126 I ll. 2d 326 (1989), in light of the modern policy of permitting filing by mail, we now modify Rule 660(a) to incorporate Rule 604(a) (1) in light of the shift in policy exhibi ted by

the J uvenile Just ice Ref

orm Amendments of 1998. ¶ 16 W e n o t e t h at the Supreme Court of New Mexi co rea ched the same conclusion whe n considering a simil arly worde d provision. I n State v. Jade G.
, 154 P.3d 659 (N.M. 2007), the New Mexi co Supreme Court consider ed wh et h er the State should be allowed to appea l a suppression order in a juvenile delinquency proce eding under a statute that rea d as follows:
“In any criminal proceeding in district court a n appea l may

be take n by the s tate to the supreme court or court of appea ls, as appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law in these cour

ts:

*** (2) within ten day s from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or

-6-excluding evidenc e or requiring the return of seized proper ty , if the district attorney cer

tifies to the di strict court that the appeal i s not taken for purpose of d el ay and that the evidenc e is a substantial proof of a fac t materia l in the
proce eding .” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-3- 3(B )(2) (1972). The court held that this statute allowed the State to take an interlocutory appea l from a suppression orde r in a juvenile de linquency proce eding , rea soning a s follows:
“The S t at e has the same need for an automatic interlocutory appea l of the suppression of evidenc e in delinquency proce eding s as it does in cri m i nal
p ro cee dings beca

use, in many case s, whether or not evidenc e is suppressed will deter mi n e i f t h e State can g o forwa rd with its case

. Be cause juvenile delinquency
proce eding s are sufficie ntly simil ar to criminal proce eding s, we hold that Section 39- 3-3(B )(2) g o v e r

n s in the circ umstances of interlocutory appea ls of suppression order s from a c hildren’s c ourt.” Jade G

. , 154 P.3d at 664. The shift in policy of the J uvenile Court Act makes such rea soning equally applicable here

. ¶ 17 We also do not agree with defe ndant’s sug g estion that we should turn the question over
to the rules committee. I llinois Supreme Court Rule 3 (ef f. Mar. 22, 2010), when setting forth the proce du re s for adopting and amending rules specific ally provides that, “The Supreme Court rese rves the prer og ative of depar ting from the procedure s of t h i s ru l e. ” I ll. S. Ct. R. 3(a) (2). We believe that the State has prese nted a sufficie ntly compelling case that it has the

same need for appea l of suppression order s in juvenile case s as in criminal case s that we do not need to def

er the matter to the rule s committee. ¶ 18 The minor has argued that the delay s cause d by interlocutory appea ls are a bigg er conce rn in juvenile case s than in criminal ca s es an d co ntends that delay s cause d by interlocutory
appea ls could undermine the reha bilitation of minors. This is undoubtedly a s i gn i fi cant

conce rn, but, in light of the shift in policy of the J uvenile Court Act, we do not believe that it outweig hs the State’s interest in being able to appea l a suppression order

. Howeve r, simil ar

conce rns have led the court to a dopt I llinois Supreme Court Rule 660A (ef f. May 1, 2013), which sets forth expedited proce dures for appea ls in juvenile delinquency proce eding s. We thus hold today that, when the State takes an interlocutory appea l f rom a suppression order in a juvenile delinquency proce eding
, the matter should be expedited pursuant to Rule 660A.

¶ 19 CONCL USI ON ¶ 20 We hold that Supreme Court Rule 660(a) should be modified to allow the State to appea l

an inte rl o cutory order suppressing evidenc e in a juvenile delinquency proce eding

. Acc ording ly
, the appellate court has jurisdiction to hear the State’s appea l, a nd we rema

nd the matter f

or the a ppellate c ourt to consider the merits of the State’s a ppeal.

¶ 21 Reverse d and re manded.

¶ 22 J USTI CE THEI S, dissenting: ¶ 23 This case involves the State’s at t em p t t o take an interlocutory appea l from an orde r

-7-suppressing evidenc e in a delinquent minor proce eding

. The appellate court held that under

the rules whi ch go vern appea ls in juvenile case s (Rules 660(a) and 662) appea l is not permi t t ed (2 0 1 2 I L App (3d) 100921, ¶¶ 8-11), and declined to addre ss the merits of the suppression order for lack of jurisdiction ( id. ¶ 12). The majority reve rses and re m ands, hol d i n g t hat the portion of Rule 604(a) (1), which permits the State to appea l an order suppressing evidenc e in a criminal case , is now incorporated into Rule 6 60(a)
, which g overns appea ls from final judgme nts in delinquent minor proce eding s. Supra ¶¶ 15, 20. The majority thus allows the State’s interlocutory appea l to proce ed. Supra ¶ 20. Respectf ully
, I disag ree

.

¶ 24 I ¶ 25 Rule 315(c) (3) require s a party to include in its petition for leave to appea l “a statement of the points relied upon in asking the Supreme Court to re v i ew t h e j udg ment of the Appellate Court.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 315(c) (3) (e ff. Feb. 26, 2010). I n the i nstant case , the S tate maintained in its p et i t i on for leave to appea l that “[t] he Appellate Court incorre ctly deter mined that Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (1) does not apply in a delinquent minor
proce eding .” Specifica lly
, the State argued that the appellate court’s construction of our rules produce d an absurd an d unjust result. I n its initial brief befor e this court, the State ag ain
argued that whether the State may appea l from an interlocutory order suppressing evidenc e in a delinquent minor proce eding “is a question that require s the interpre tation of Supreme Court Rules 604(a) (1) and 660.” I n its reply brief, howeve r, the State took responde nt to task for addre ssing this issue, stating that “it is appar ent” that Rule 604(a) (1) “d o es n o t , by its terms, apply to permit interlocutory appea ls in juvenile proce ed i n gs.” The State thus

conce ded not only that the appellate court g ot it rig ht, but that the very rea son set forth in its petition for allowingappea l before this court does not exist

. ¶ 26 T o b e s u re , the State also argued, in its opening brief, that public p o l i cy fa v o rs “ac cording ” the State the rig ht to take an interlocutory appea l from a suppression motion in

a deli n qu en t minor proce eding

. I n other words, the State argued that our rules should be chang ed to acc ommodate its interlocutory appea l. But that issue was not raised in the State’s petition for leave to appea l. “I ssues that a party fails to raise in its petition for leave to appea l,

even if raised in the party ’s appellant’ s brief, are not proper ly before the court and are forf eited.” People v. Fitzpatri ck
, 2013 I L 113449, ¶ 26. As responde nt proper ly argued: “The only issue prese nted in this case is whether
, under the exis ting rules of this Court, the State has the ability to bring an interlocutory appea l of a suppression order in a juvenile case .” The State conce ded that it does not. ¶ 27 The majorit y re co gn i z es t h e S t at e’ s conce ssion ( supra ¶ 7), but attache s no leg al signific ance to it. I nstead, the ma jority decide s that it “will not be guided by the principles of statutory construction” that apply to our rules; it “ will simply consider whether the State has made a suff

iciently compelling case for us to m odify the rules at this t ime.” Supra ¶ 9. I disag ree with this approa ch for two rea sons: (1) it g ives tacit approva l to the State’s failure
, as discussed above, to follow faithfully Rule 315 in identifying the issue raised in this appea l; and (2) as discussed below, it sides t eps, without adequate justification, the more compre hensive rulemaking proce dures adopted by this court. See I ll. S. C t. R. 3 (ef f. Mar.

-8-22, 2010).

¶ 28 I I ¶ 29 Rule 3 expressly states that this court’s rule making proce dures we re a dopted
“to provide for the order ly and timely review of proposed rules and proposed amendments to exis t i n g ru l es of the Supreme Court; to provide an opportunity for
comments and sug g estions by the public, the bench, and th e b ar ; [ an d ] to aid the Supreme Court in discharg in g i t s rulemaking responsibilities; ***.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 3(a) (1). ¶ 30 The participat i o n o f t h e s u p re m e court rules committee fig ures prominently in the
proce ss. The committee, comprised of members of the bench an d b ar from throug hout I llinois
, is tasked with periodica lly revie wing rules in are as wher e no other committee would do so “to ensure that such rules fac ilitate the administration of justice.” I ll. S. Ct. R. 3(b)( 2). I mportantly
, the committee is also responsi b l e for the conduct of public hear ings wher e a proposed rule or rule amendment is rec ommended for adoption by this cour t

. I l l

. S. Ct. R. 3(b)( 3), (d)( 1), (2), (3). The inclusion of a mecha nism for public comment on a proposed rule

or rule amendment is desig ned so that differ ent voices may be hear d. A proposed rule or rule amendment may appea

r eminently rea sonable on paper , but only aft er v et t i n g by a wider audienc e do other considera tions come to light which will impact the proposal under revie w. ¶ 31 Rece ntly adopted Rule 660A (I ll. S. Ct. R. 660A (ef f. May 1, 2013)), which sets forth the
proce dure for expedited appea ls in delinquent minor case s (and which the majority here also modifies ( supra ¶ 18)), was the product of the committee and public hear ing proce ss set forth in Rule 3. Although the nee d for prompt appellate revie w of delinquent minor case s seems self-e vident, we did not simply take the matter fro m t he committee and adopt the rule as proposed by the I llinois State Ba r Association. We allowed t h e p ro ce ss to proce ed, permitting various juvenile justice ag encie s and other stakeholder s, such as the Cook County public g uardia

n and the S t at e Appellate Def ender
, to provide written comments and testimony on the proposal that ultimately aided this court in its decision to adopt Rule 660A. I n the prese nt case , we should simil arly allow the committee to do its job and permit a wider audienc e to weig h in on the conseque nces of acc ording t h e S t at e a new rig ht of appea l in delinquent minor proce eding s. ¶ 32 T h e ma

jor ity ’s treatment of the policy arguments in this case illust rate s prec isely why this
matter should be referr ed to the rules committee. I n line with the State’s arg uments, the majority focuse s on the 1998 amendments to the J uvenile Court Act and the shift in the way this state views juvenile delinquency proce eding s. The majority identifies two conseque nces of trea ting juvenile delinquency proce eding s more like criminal proce eding s: ( 1) this c ourt has relied on this shift to suppor t providing juveniles with many of the same protec tions a s criminal defe ndants rec eive; and (2) this court should rely on this shift to rec og nize that the State has “the same int ere st in appea ling a suppression order in a juvenile c ase that it does in a criminal case .” Supr a ¶¶ 14-15. Whether the State should be acc orded a new rig ht of
appea l in delinquent minor proce eding s is an i ssue separ ate and distinct from whether a minor should enjoy rig hts that criminal d ef en d an t s do. That the latter may be a

-9-“conse quence ” of sorts of the evolution of delinquent minor proce eding s does not war rant, without more, the addit ional conseque nce the majority would eff ect in this case

. Fur

ther, althoug h this court has re cog nized, as the majority notes, that the 1998 amendments to the J uvenile C ourt Act “ ‘ra dically altere d’ ” that statute to “ ‘provide m ore acc ountability fo r the criminal acts of juveniles’ ” ( supra ¶ 13 (quoting People v. Taylor
, 221 I ll. 2d 157, 165 (2006)) ), “[ t ]hi s court also has consistently reje cted the argument that the amendments rende red the Act punitive and equivalent to a criminal prosec ution.” In re Jona t hon C.B.
, 2011 I L 107750, ¶ 91. Significa nt differ ence s still exis t betwee n juvenile court proce eding s and criminal prosec utions, as evince d by the leg islature’s purpose and policy statement that informs the entire J uvenile Court Act (705 I L CS 405/1-2 (West 2010)), and the purpose and policy statement specific ally addre ssing itself to delinquent minors (705 I L CS 405/5-101 (West 2010)). Thus, any simil arities betwee n the two proce eding s do not nece ssarily justify

rec og nizi ng a new appea l rig ht in th i s ca s e. Moreove r, I would not so quickly dismiss responde nt’s argument that the delay occa sioned by permitting interlo cu t o ry appea l of suppression order s in delinquent minor proce eding s could undermine the reha bili t ation of minors. Although the ma

jority states that “[t] his is undoubtedly a sig nificant c oncer

n,” the majority conclude s, with virtually no discussion, that the State’s interest in being able to appea l a suppression order outweig hs any such conce r n

. S u p r a ¶ 18. Rehabilitation, howeve r, still rema ins an impo rt an t p u rp o se of our juvenile justice sy stem. See 705 I L CS 405/5- 101(1)( c) ( West 2010). ¶ 33 The point of these observations is that the issue require s further examination and should
not be decide d in the context of this case

. The juvenile justice sy stem, and the thousands of minors that are marshale d throug h that sy stem ever y y ear , would be better serve d by this
court broade ning its perspe ctive and considering the propriet y o f a rule chang e afte r the stakeholder s—minors and their families, the community
, the State, the bench, and the bar—ha ve had an opportunity to consider and comment on the desirability and conseque nces of a r ule cha ng e. ¶ 34 I rec og nize, as the majority does, that this court has rese rved the prer og ative of depar ting from the committee and public hear ing proce dures set forth in Rule 3 (I ll. S. Ct. R. 3(a) (2)) and may utiliz e a case befor e it as a vehicle to ad o p t a ru l e change

. But this court has exercised that proced u re o n l y sparing ly

. The lone case cited by the majority
, HarrisburgRaleigh Airport Authority v. Departme nt of Rev enue , 126 I ll. 2d 326 (1989), provides scant prec edent f

or depa rting from the c ommitt ee a nd public hear ing pr ocess he re. ¶ 35 I n Harrisburg-Raleigh
, this court deter mined when a notice of appea l should be dee med “filed with the cler

k of the circ uit court,” pursuant to Rule 303(a)
, when the notice is mailed. Harrisburg-Raleigh
, 126 I ll. 2d at 339. We rea d, i.e.
, construed, the lang uag e of the rule in light of modern policies and prac tices, and simply confirme d what prior supervisory order s had fore shadowe d. Id. at 339-40. I n contra st, the issue the majority addre sses here does not involve how exis ting lang uag e in our rules should be rea d. No exis ting lang uag e in our rules provides for the interlocutory appea l t h e State seeks. Fur ther, Harrisburg-Raleigh simply clar ified a filing deadline. Her e, the State is reque sting that we acc ord it an entirely new rig ht
to appea l. That decision should be made only afte r considering and weig hing the competing interests at stake and providing “an opportunity for comments and sug g estions by the public,

-10-the benc h, and the ba r.” I ll. S. C t. R. 3(a)(1)

. ¶ 36 For

all these re asons, I

dissent.

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