UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

RONALD BAJUSCAK,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS 

AFFAIRS,

Agency.

DOCKET NUMBER

DA-1221-15-0552-B-1

DATE: November 8, 2022

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL1

Ronald Bajuscak, Mesa, Arizona, pro se.

Chau Phan, Esquire, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the remand initial decision, 

which denied corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA) appeal. 

Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following 

circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact; 

 

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add 

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, 

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not 

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a 

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board 

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2

the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation 

or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative 

judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision 

were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, 

and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material 

evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due 

diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After fully 

considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not 

established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review. 

Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED by

this Final Order to VACATE the administrative judge’s findings concerning 

whether the agency met its clear and convincing burden, we AFFIRM the remand 

initial decision. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 The relevant background information, as recited in the remand initial 

decision, is generally undisputed. On June 5, 2011, the agency appointed the 

appellant to a dentist position in the excepted service under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1). 

Bajuscak v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-

0552-B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 29, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 2; 

Bajuscak v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-

0552-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 87-88. Immediately before his 

June 5, 2011 appointment to the excepted service at the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (VA), the appellant worked as a dentist under a career-conditional 

appointment for the U.S. Navy, beginning on August 30, 2010. RID at 2, 28-29. 

The Standard Form 50 (SF-50) documenting his appointment to the dentist

position in the excepted service at the VA on June 5, 2011, stated in the remarks 

section “initial probationary period completed.” RID at 2; IAF, Tab 10 at 87. 
3

The agency issued a corrected SF-50 on October 17, 2011, changing the remarks 

section to clarify that the appellant’s excepted-service appointment was subject to 

the completion of a 2-year probationary period beginning on June 5, 2011. RID 

at 2; IAF, Tab 10 at 86. The agency described the change as a required correction 

because dentists and doctors appointed to the excepted service under Title 38 of 

the United States Code are required to serve a 2-year probationary period, and the 

appellant’s previous appointment was not to a position in the excepted service. 

RID at 21, 29-30; IAF, Tab 9 at 11; see 38 U.S.C. § 7403(a)(2)(A)-(B), (b)(1).

¶3 On October 27, 2011, the appellant’s supervisor rated him as unsatisfactory 

for the period of June 6 through September 30, 2011, commenting that he “does 

not have potential for advancement to higher clinical and/or administrative 

positions.” RID at 2-3. On November 9, 2011, the Acting Medical Center 

Director detailed the appellant to “voluntary service” and assigned him to 

nonpatient care duties, which included pushing wheelchairs and hospital beds. 

RID at 3. On November 17, 2011, the Acting Chief of Staff recommended a 

summary suspension of the appellant’s clinical privileges, pending the results of a 

Summary Review Board. Id. Her recommendation was based on findings from a 

review of 31 medical charts and adopted on that same day by a 3-member 

Professional Standards Board (PSB). Id.; RF, Tab 22 at 181-82. On 

November 21, 2011, the Acting Medical Center Director issued a letter removing 

the appellant’s clinical privileges pending a comprehensive review of allegations 

that aspects of his clinical practice did “not meet the accepted standards of 

practice and potentially constitute[d] an imminent threat to patient welfare.” RID 

at 3; RF, Tab 22 at 184. Within a week of receiving the letter removing his 

clinical privileges, the appellant initiated contact with the agency’s equal 

employment opportunity counselor on November 29, 2011, alleging that his 

supervisor sexually harassed him and retaliated against him when he rejected her 

advances and began seeking employment elsewhere. RID at 3-4. 
4

¶4 On January 6, 2012, the PSB reviewed the appellant’s conduct and 

performance and concluded that he failed to meet the standards of care expected 

of agency dentists. RID at 5; IAF, Tab 9 at 57-58. The PSB recommended 

terminating the appellant during his probationary period based on its summary 

review of 31 patient records submitted by the appellant’s supervisor, the Chief of 

Dental Service; progress notes and x-rays; and the written and oral responses of 

the appellant. RID at 5; IAF, Tab 9 at 57. The Acting Chief of Staff agreed with 

the PSB recommendation to terminate the appellant, and the Acting Medical 

Center Director approved the recommendation and issued a letter terminating the 

appellant effective January 20, 2012, during his 2-year probationary period. RID 

at 5; IAF, Tab 9 at 15, 19.

¶5 After his termination, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of 

Special Counsel (OSC) (OSC File No. MA-12-2402), alleging that he was 

subjected to the following retaliatory personnel actions: (1) his supervisor had 

changed his SF-50 from permanent to probationary employment; (2) he received 

an unsatisfactory midterm evaluation; (3) he was detailed to voluntary service; 

(4) his dentist privileges were suspended; (5) his transfer to another facility was 

rescinded; and (6) he was ultimately removed from his position. RID at 6; IAF, 

Tab 18 at 44. On July 23, 2012, OSC informed the appellant that it was closing 

its investigation into whether a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) occurred and

that he could seek corrective action from the Board. RID at 6; IAF, Tab 18

at 45-46. 

¶6 In 2015, the appellant filed another OSC complaint (OSC File No. MA-14-

4527), in which he alleged that the agency improperly required him to serve a 

new probationary period and terminated him in retaliation for whistleblowing.

2

 

RID at 6-7, 11; IAF, Tab 18 at 47-48. On April 30, 2015, OSC informed the 

appellant that it was closing its inquiry into his complaint. RID at 7, 11; IAF, 

 

2

The record does not contain a copy of the OSC complaints filed by the appellant in 

OSC File No. MA-14-4527 or in OSC File No. MA-12-2402. RID at 11 n.4.
5

Tab 18 at 47-48. Having exhausted his administrative remedy before OSC, the 

appellant filed the instant IRA appeal with the Board, and he requested a hearing. 

RID at 7, 11-12; IAF, Tab 1. The administrative judge dismissed the appeal as 

untimely filed, but, on review, the Board found a sufficient basis to waive the 

filing deadline and remanded the case for further adjudication. Bajuscak v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-0552-W-1, 

Remand Order (Apr. 29, 2016).

¶7 On remand, the administrative judge found that the appellant met his burden 

of establishing that the Board has jurisdiction over his IRA appeal because he 

exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and made nonfrivolous 

allegations that he made at least one protected disclosure that was a contributing 

factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action.3 RID at 12-14. After 

holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued a remand initial decision

denying the appellant’s request for corrective action. RID at 41-42; RF, Tab 28, 

Hearing Compact Disc. The administrative judge found that the appellant made 

protected disclosures to a human resources (HR) officer in September 2011 when 

he disclosed that his supervisor manipulated and threatened her subordinates and

that she used an illegal leave tracker form in violation of the Federal Service

Labor-Management Relations Act. RID at 17-21.4 The administrative judge 

further found that the appellant did not meet his burden of proving that any of his 

protected disclosures was a contributing factor in any of the six alleged personnel 

actions. RID at 13-14, 27-36. The administrative judge also found that, 

 

3

The administrative judge also found that the Board lacks jurisdiction over an appeal of 

his termination under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 because appointees under 38 U.S.C. 

§ 7401(1) are specifically excluded from the definition of “employee” under 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7511. RID at 8. The administrative judge found, moreover, that the other personnel 

actions that the appellant alleged on appeal were not adverse actions directly appealable 

to the Board, and his allegations could only be reviewed by the Board in an IRA appeal. 

Id. The parties do not dispute these findings on review, and we affirm them. 

4

The administrative judge found that the appellant’s other alleged disclosures were not 

protected whistleblowing as described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). RID at 14-27.
6

assuming arguendo that the appellant had demonstrated that his disclosures were 

contributing factors in the actions taken against him, the agency proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel actions absent the 

protected disclosures. RID at 36-41.

¶8 The appellant has filed a petition for review. Bajuscak v. Department of 

Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-15-0552-B-1, Remand Petition for 

Review (RPFR) File, Tab 1. The agency has responded in opposition to his 

petition, and the appellant has replied. RPFR File, Tabs 4-5.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶9 The appellant submits the following one-paragraph argument in support of 

his petition:

Numerous documents were submitted including specific actions 

against me with timelines from information recorded on the very day 

it occurred. During my hearing many specific occurences [sic] with 

timelines submitted on documents were not considered in my 

opinion. The entire timing of all the falsifications of my hiring 

documents, being placed in charge and then suddenly being removed 

clinically’s [sic] timing is proof within itself of whistleblowing 

retaliation by the Veterans Hospital. Nationally, this attack on 

whistleblowers has been exposed, as I went through, and again the 

system “being broken” is trying to deny me my rights. I want a 

non-biased review of all my submitted documents be cross examined 

paying particular notice to dates of actions against me and the timing 

of final actions taken. I know numerous issues were not expressed 

by me during the hearing and was and am shocked that such 

aggressive actions of retaliation are considered okay!!

RPFR File, Tab 1 at 4. We construe the appellant’s arguments as challenging the 

administrative judge’s finding that his protected disclosures were not a 

contributing factor in the following personnel actions: altering his SF-50 to 

require the completion of a 2-year probationary period and his termination. 5 In 

 

5

The appellant does not appear to challenge the administrative judge’s other findings 

concerning the alleged protected disclosures and personnel actions. We affirm those 

findings for the reasons stated in the initial decision. RID at 14-27.
7

his reply brief, the appellant further asserts that he has additional witnesses to 

testify against the agency. RPFR File, Tab 5 at 3. For the following reasons, we 

find that the administrative judge properly found that the appellant failed to prove 

by preponderant evidence that his disclosures were a contributing factor in any of 

the personnel actions.

¶10 When, as here, an appellant exhausts his administrative remedy with OSC 

and establishes the Board’s jurisdiction in an IRA appeal, the appellant then must 

establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by, as relevant here,

proving by preponderant evidence that he made a protected disclosure as 

described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) that was a contributing factor in a personnel 

action taken against him.6 See Lu v. Department of Homeland Security,

122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015). One way of proving that a disclosure was a 

contributing factor in a personnel action is the knowledge/timing test. Shannon v. 

Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 23 (2014). Under that test, 

an appellant can prove the contributing factor element through evidence that the 

official taking the personnel action knew of the whistleblowing disclosure and 

took the personnel action within a period of time such that a reasonable person 

could conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel 

action. Id. If the appellant makes a prima facie showing that his protected 

disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s personnel action, the burden 

shifts to the agency to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it would have 

taken the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure. Lu, 

122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7.

 

6

The Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. 

No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, section 101(b)(1)(A) expanded the grounds for covered 

individuals to bring an IRA appeal with the Board to include reprisal for classes of 

protected activity described at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), and (D). All of 

the alleged retaliatory acts at issue in this appeal occurred prior to the December 27, 

2012 effective date of the WPEA, and thus this expanded grant of jurisdiction does not 

apply here. RID at 9; see Rebstock Consolidation v. Department of Homeland Security, 

122 M.S.P.R. 661, ¶¶ 7-8 (2015).
8

¶11 The remand initial decision reflects—concerning the agency officials who 

took the alleged actions—that the administrative judge considered the elapsed

time between their having had any actual or constructive notice of the appellant’s 

protected disclosures and their taking the personnel actions, but she found no 

evidence that the officials involved in correcting the appellant’s SF-50 and 

terminating him had actual or constructive knowledge of his September 2011 

protected disclosures. RID at 27-30, 34-36. Thus, she found no contributing 

factor under the knowledge/timing test. 

¶12 The administrative judge also recognized that, if the appellant failed to 

satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board should consider other evidence, such 

as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking 

the personnel action, whether the whistleblowing was personally directed at the 

proposing or deciding officials, and whether those individuals had a desire or 

motive to retaliate against the appellant. RID at 27-28; see Stiles v. Department 

of Homeland Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 263, ¶¶ 23-24 (2011). The administrative 

judge found that the officials involved in taking the personnel actions against the 

appellant had strong, nonretaliatory motives for the personnel actions taken, 

including changing his SF-50 to require his completing a 2-year probationary 

period and terminating him during his probationary period. RID at 21, 28-30, 

34-36. Moreover, it is undisputed that the appellant’s whistleblowing was not 

personally directed at the HR specialist who signed the corrected SF-50 requiring 

him to complete a 2-year probationary period, the PSB members that 

recommended his termination, or the Acting Medical Center Director who 

terminated him. RID at 21. Accordingly, the administrative judge found that the 

appellant failed to establish a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation by 

proving that his protected disclosure was a contributing factor in a personnel 

action taken against him. RID at 27-36. The appellant’s general arguments on 

review do not persuade us that there were any errors in the administrative judge’s 

contributing-factor analysis. See Tines v. Department of the Air Force, 
9

56 M.S.P.R. 90, 92 (1992) (finding that a petition for review must contain 

sufficient specificity to enable the Board to ascertain whether there is a serious 

evidentiary challenge justifying a complete review of the record).

¶13 To the extent the appellant argues generally that certain documents related 

to his whistleblowing disclosures were not considered or mentioned, RPFR File, 

Tab 1 at 4, it is well established that an administrative judge’s failure to mention 

all of the evidence of record does not mean that she did not consider it in reaching 

her decision. Marques v. Department of Health & Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 

129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table). 

¶14 Although the appellant asks the Board to review all of the documents that 

he submitted on appeal to take notice of “the dates of actions against [him] and 

the timing of final actions taken,” we find that his petition for review is not 

sufficiently specific to enable the Board to ascertain whether there is a serious 

evidentiary challenge justifying a complete review of the record. See Tines, 

56 M.S.P.R. at 92; Weaver v. Department of the Navy, 2 M.S.P.R. 129, 133 

(1980) (determining that, before the Board will undertake a complete review of 

the record, the petitioning party must explain why the challenged factual 

determination is incorrect and identify the specific evidence in the record which 

demonstrates the error), review denied, 669 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1982) (per 

curium).

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we will not disturb the administrative judge’s 

explained finding that the appellant failed to prove that his protected disclosures 

were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take any of the contested 

personnel actions. RID at 27-36. Because we agree with the administrative 

judge’s finding that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant evidence that 

his protected disclosures were a contributing factor in the actions taken, it is 

unnecessary to determine whether the agency proved by clear and convincing 

evidence that it would have taken the actions at issue in the absence of the 

disclosure. See Clarke v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 
10

n.10 (2014), aff’d, 623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Accordingly, we vacate 

the administrative judge’s findings concerning whether the agency met its clear 

and convincing burden.

¶16 We have considered the appellant’s assertion on review that he had 

numerous witnesses who could have testified at the hearing on his appeal but he 

did not want to overwhelm the proceeding. RPFR File, Tab 5 at 3. We also have 

considered his contention that unnamed individuals, who have been “fired or 

forced to resign from this same VA medical center,” could provide new testimony 

against the agency. Id. However, the appellant offers no specific evidence or 

argument to explain what the unidentified potential witnesses might testify about 

that would have changed the outcome of his appeal. Moreover, the appellant

waited until after the record closed below and the initial decision was issued to 

come forward with these unnamed witnesses, and he cannot now complain that 

these witnesses were not allowed to testify. 

¶17 The Board will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the 

petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before the record was 

closed despite the party’s due diligence. See Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 

3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115. In this case, the appellant has

failed to establish that he could not reasonably have known that these alleged 

witnesses had information relevant to his appeal prior to the close of the record 

below or that he could not find the same or similar information elsewhere. See 

Pangarova v. Department of the Army, 28 M.S.P.R. 652, 656 (1985) (finding that 

an affidavit from a witness who had previously not come forward, about a subject 

that the appellant knew was at issue, was not “new” evidence when he failed to 

show that he could not find the same or similar information elsewhere); Williams 

v. General Services Administration, 22 M.S.P.R. 476, 479 (1984) (finding that 

affidavits from witnesses known to the agency but previously unwilling to testif y 

were not “new” evidence), aff’d, 770 F.2d 182 (Fed. Cir. 1985). We therefore 

find that the appellant’s assertions on review do not provide a sufficiently sound 
11

reason for overturning the thorough, well-reasoned findings stated by the 

administrative judge in the remand initial decision.

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS7

The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the 

Board’s final decision in this matter. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113. You may obtain 

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of 

your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate 

forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following 

summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not 

provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d 

the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule 

regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of 

this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your 

claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file 

within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your 

chosen forum. 

Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review 

below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions 

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you 

should contact that forum for more information. 

(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking 

judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S. 

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court 

within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(A). 

 

7

Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated 

the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the 

Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
12

If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 

Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of 

discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you 

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action 

was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain 

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination 

claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you 

receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems 

Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a 

representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before 

you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days

after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of 
13

discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling 

condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and 

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a. 

Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective 

websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx. 

Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment 

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding 

all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the 

EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive

this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case, 

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file 

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives

this decision. 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the 

address of the EEOC is: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

P.O. Box 77960 

Washington, D.C. 20013 

If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or 

by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to: 

Office of Federal Operations 

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 

131 M Street, N.E. 

Suite 5SW12G 

Washington, D.C. 20507 

(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection 

Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised 

claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or 
14

other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D). 

If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s 

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section 

2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), 

(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of 

competent jurisdiction.8The court of appeals must receive your petition for 

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7703(b)(1)(B). 

If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for 

the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the 

following address: 

U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

717 Madison Place, N.W. 

Washington, D.C. 20439 

Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 

Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular 

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is 

contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11. 

If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to 

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at 

http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation 

for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The 

 

8

The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain 

whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on 

December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on 

July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of 

MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195, 

132 Stat. 1510. 
15

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that 

any attorney will accept representation in a given case. 

Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their 

respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below: 

http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

Washington, D.C.

 /s/ for 

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board