RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023

TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2021-SC-0457-DG

MAURICE GASAWAY APPELLANT 

V.

ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS

NO. 2020-CA-0031

HARDIN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 18-CR-00927 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

Maurice Gasaway was convicted of one count of possession of heroin in 

Hardin Circuit Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted discretionary 

review to consider three overarching issues.

First, we must consider the bounds under which the warrantless search 

of a parolee’s vehicle is constitutionally permissible. We adopt the 

reasonableness test for such searches under the Fourth Amendment1 as 

announced by the United States Supreme Court in Samson v. California, 547 

U.S. 843 (2006), and we overrule our decision in Bratcher v. Commonwealth, 

424 S.W.3d 411 (Ky. 2014), to the extent it holds the conditions of parole 

imposed by Kentucky law are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment analysis. 

1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2

The scope of Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution2 is not properly before 

this Court for review. We hold, albeit for different reasons, the Court of 

Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s denial of Gasaway’s motion to 

suppress evidence obtained from a warrantless search of his truck. 

Second, we must consider whether Kentucky should recognize a per se 

rule prohibiting the Commonwealth from introducing, in a subsequent 

proceeding, evidence of a crime for which the defendant has previously been

acquitted. We hold Kentucky does not recognize such a per se rule. 

Nevertheless, we further hold the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial 

court’s admission of evidence, under KRE3 404(b), of methamphetamine for 

which Gasaway had been acquitted, and evidence of marijuana for which 

Gasaway had been found guilty. 

Finally, we must consider whether the trial court improperly permitted 

three witnesses to interpret the contents of a video recording. We hold the 

Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s decision allowing the first 

witness to testify regarding events he did not perceive in real-time. Any 

questions regarding the propriety of the other two witnesses’ testimony were 

not properly preserved for review. 

Therefore, for the following reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals 

is affirmed in part and reversed in part. We remand to the trial court for 

further proceedings. 

2 KY. CONST. § 10. 

3 Kentucky Rules of Evidence. 
3

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Maurice Gasaway, a parolee under active supervision, was employed at

Knight’s Mechanical in Hardin County, Kentucky. On August 30, 2018, 

Gasaway and two other employees were working in the sheet metal shop. At 

some point, one of Gasaway’s co-workers, Austin McClanahan, noticed a small 

plastic bag about the size of a thumbnail on the floor. McClanahan picked up 

the bag just as his supervisor, Josh Bush, entered the room. Bush instructed 

McClanahan to place the bag on the desk in Bush’s office. Bush covered the 

bag with a few sheets of paper and notified his supervisor that he suspected 

the bag contained illegal drugs. Bush’s supervisor informed his supervisor, 

Jeremy Knight,

4 about the situation.

After lunch, Knight went to Bush’s office and secured the bag in another 

container. Knight also reviewed surveillance video from the area where the bag 

was found. Based on the video, Knight suspected the bag fell from Gasaway’s 

pocket when he reached in his pocket to retrieve his cellphone. Knight gave 

the bag to another employee, Brian Tharpe, who then contacted Detective 

Robert Dover of the Greater Hardin County Narcotics Task Force.

The next day, Det. Dover came to Knight’s Mechanical to investigate. 

Det. Dover performed a field test and determined the substance contained in 

the bag was heroin. After speaking with Tharpe and viewing the surveillance 

video, Det. Dover also suspected Gasaway of possessing the heroin. Det. Dover 

4 Jeremy Knight’s father, John Knight, is the owner of Knight’s Mechanical.
4

and two other officers confronted Gasaway inside the workplace. Gasaway 

denied possessing the heroin. Det. Dover then handcuffed and Mirandized5

Gasaway before leading him outside. 

Once outside the building, Gasaway realized parole officers were on the 

scene. At this point, Gasaway launched into a sustained, vulgar tirade directed 

at Det. Dover. Det. Dover then placed Gasaway in the back of a police cruiser. 

Det. Dover searched Gasaway’s person, but did not discover any incriminating 

evidence. However, Det. Dover retrieved a key fob from the search of 

Gasaway’s person.

The key fob opened a truck in the parking lot. Det. Dover ascertained 

the truck was registered to Gasaway’s wife and that Gasaway usually drove the 

truck to work. Det. Dover requested consent to search the truck, which 

Gasaway refused. Apparently, the parole officers commenced the search of the 

truck and Det. Dover subsequently participated. In the console, Det. Dover 

discovered two bags of marijuana and a pill which Det. Dover initially believed 

to contain ecstasy, but was later determined to contain methamphetamine. He 

also discovered a few marijuana “roaches” in a cupholder ashtray with 

marijuana “shake” around it.6 The search also uncovered a Whizzinator—a 

prosthetic penis which illegal drug users frequently use to store and pass clean 

urine when drug testing is required. 

5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 

6 Det. Dover explained that “roaches” are marijuana cigarette butts, and 

“shake” is little pieces of marijuana. 
5

Gasaway was charged with first-degree possession of a controlled 

substance, heroin; second-degree possession of a controlled substance, 

ecstasy7; and possession of marijuana in Hardin Circuit Court. By 

supplemental indictment, he was charged with first-degree possession of a 

controlled substance, methamphetamine. Gasaway filed a motion to suppress 

the evidence obtained from the search, which the trial court denied. Following 

trial, Gasaway was found guilty of possession of marijuana, not guilty of 

possession of methamphetamine, and the jury hung on the heroin charge. 

The Commonwealth elected to retry Gasaway on the heroin charge and 

the jury returned a guilty verdict. His conviction for possession of heroin

rested, in part, upon the evidence of methamphetamine for which he was 

previously acquitted and the evidence of marijuana for which he was previously 

convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. We granted 

discretionary review and heard oral argument on April 19, 2023. 

II. GASAWAY’S BRIEF DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RAP 32(A)(4)

At the outset, Gasaway’s opening brief to this Court does not comply 

with RAP8 32(A)(4), which requires an appellant’s opening brief to “contain at 

the beginning of the argument a statement with reference to the record 

showing whether the issue was properly preserved for review and, if so, in what 

manner.” We have strictly mandated compliance with this rule since its 

inception under the prior Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. Skaggs v. Assad, 

7 The ecstasy charge was later dismissed.

8 Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
6

By & Through Assad, 712 S.W.2d 947, 950 (Ky. 1986) (citing CR9 76.12(4)(c)(iv) 

(“It goes without saying that errors to be considered for appellate review must 

be precisely preserved and identified in the lower court.”). RAP 32(A)(4) does 

not distinguish between this Court and the Court of Appeals when prescribing 

the organization and contents of an appellant’s opening brief. The failure of an 

appellant’s brief to conform to the appellate rules justifies the striking of the 

brief under RAP 31(H)(1). 

Regarding the suppression issue, Gasaway merely noted, “[t]he Court of 

Appeals held it was ‘constrained’ to conclude that Section 10 of the Kentucky 

Constitution would present no impediment against a warrantless and 

suspicionless search of a parolee or his vehicle.” Gasaway then cited the Court 

of Appeals’ opinion.10 This statement neither indicates the fact nor the manner 

of preservation as contemplated by RAP 32(A)(4). It simply refers to an 

observation made by the Court of Appeals. 

Regarding the admissibility of the methamphetamine evidence, 

Gasaway’s brief does not contain any statement of preservation. Regarding 

the marijuana evidence, Gasaway simply quoted the holding of the Court of 

Appeals and then cited to its opinion. Again, merely quoting the decision of the 

Court of Appeals does not tell this Court whether the issue was preserved.

Regarding the interpretation of the surveillance video, Gasaway stated

“three witnesses were permitted to testify, over objection that they could see 

9 Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

10 Id.
7

something drop from Maurice’s hand on the video.” However, while we are 

directed to the allegedly improper testimony, Gasaway failed to specify where 

the objection occurred. Regarding the first witness, there was a relevant 

objection, which was not cited and occurred over ten minutes prior to 

Gasaway’s cite. Regarding the second witness, we were not directed to an 

objection, nor could we find one in the record. Regarding the third witness, we 

were directed to an objection, which the trial court remedied by rephrasing the 

Commonwealth’s question and no further relief was requested. 

The purpose of the preservation statement rule is to assure the reviewing 

court that “the issue was properly presented to the trial court, and therefore, is 

appropriate for . . . consideration.” Cotton v. NCAA, 587 S.W.3d 356, 360 (Ky. 

App. 2019) (quoting Oakley v. Oakley, 391 S.W.3d 377, 380 (Ky. App. 2012)). 

While this procedural rule preserves judicial resources, it also serves an 

important substantive purpose: the fact and manner of preservation generally 

determines the applicable standard of review. Id. Furthermore, it is neither 

the function nor the responsibility of this Court to scour the record to ensure 

an issue has been properly preserved for appellate review. Phelps v. Louisville 

Water Co., 103 S.W.3d 46, 53 (Ky. 2003).

The Court of Appeals addressed each of Gasaway’s claimed errors as if 

they were properly preserved for review.11 Additionally, the Court of Appeals 

urged this Court to consider the applicability of Section 10 of the Kentucky 

11 We except from this statement the unpreserved issue concerning the 

prosecutor’s statements at voir dire which is not presently before this Court. 
8

Constitution. We note the Commonwealth has not challenged the preservation 

of any issues before this Court except for the adequacy of the trial court’s 

admonition concerning the admission of the methamphetamine and marijuana 

evidence. Because preservation determines the appropriate standard of review, 

an appellate court should determine for itself whether an issue is properly 

preserved. We are not bound by the view of the parties. 

Our review of the record indicates Gasaway’s first claim of error before 

this Court regarding the warrantless search was partially preserved for review; 

his claim regarding the admissibility of the methamphetamine and marijuana

evidence was properly preserved; and his claim regarding the improper 

interpretation of the video recording was partially preserved: Gasaway properly 

objected to the testimony of Jeremy Knight, but he did not properly preserve 

any issues regarding the testimony of Brian Tharpe and Det. Dover. Given this 

unusual situation, we elect to impose no sanction here and begin our analysis 

by clarifying the general principles of the preservation rule before turning to

our review of Gasaway’s claimed errors. 

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ERROR PRESERVATION

In the exercise of its inherent power, an appellate court may decide an 

issue that was not presented by the parties so long as the appellate court 

confines itself to the record. Priestley v. Priestley, 949 S.W.2d 594, 597 (Ky. 

1997). This power derives from an appellate court’s supervisory authority over 
9

lower courts. KY. CONST. § 110(2)(a)12; and KY. CONST. § 111(2).

13 Appellate 

jurisdiction “is the power and authority to review, revise, correct or affirm the 

decisions of an inferior court, and, more particularly, to exercise the same 

judicial power which has been executed in the court of original jurisdiction.” 

Copley v. Craft, 341 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Ky. 1960).14 Additionally, KY. CONST. § 

116 authorizes this Court to “to prescribe rules governing its appellate 

jurisdiction . . . and rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice.” 

KRS15 21.050 codifies our appellate jurisdiction and power to establish the 

procedure for appellate review:

(1) A judgment, order or decree of a lower court may be reversed, 

modified or set aside by the Supreme Court for errors appearing 

in the record.

(2) The method of bringing a judgment, order or decree of a lower 

court to the Supreme Court for review shall be established by 

Supreme Court rule. The procedures for appellate review shall 

be established by the Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules of 

12 KY. CONST. § 110(2)(a) provides “[t]he Supreme Court shall have appellate 

jurisdiction only, except it shall have the power to issue all writs necessary in aid of its 

appellate jurisdiction, or the complete determination of any cause, or as may be 

required to exercise control of the Court of Justice.”

13 KY. CONST. § 111(2) provides “[t]he Court of Appeals shall have appellate 

jurisdiction only, except that it may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to 

review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth, and it may 

issue all writs necessary in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or the complete 

determination of any cause within its appellate jurisdiction. In all other cases, it shall 

exercise appellate jurisdiction as provided by law.” 

14 Justice Joseph Story, sitting as Circuit Justice, explained that the appellate 

jurisdiction of American courts derives from the English common law writ of error

rather than the “appeal” procedure used in the English courts of chancery. See United 

States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (C.C. Mass. 1812). The common 

law writ of error was limited to the trial court record while the equitable appeal 

permitted the retrial of factual disputes on review. Id.

15 Kentucky Revised Statutes. 
10

Criminal Procedure and other rules promulgated by the 

Supreme Court.

Under this authority, we generally require a party to properly preserve 

allegations of error at the trial court level and upon every level of appellate 

review. Personnel Bd. v. Heck, 725 S.W.2d 13, 18 (Ky. App. 1986).16 The 

rationale for the preservation rule is that “a court or quasi-judicial body may 

not be found to be in error where it has not been given an opportunity to (1) 

rule on the issue or (2) correct any alleged error.” Id. Beyond the order and 

efficiency imposed by the preservation requirement, the rule ensures the 

essential fairness of appellate proceedings by preventing a party from being 

unfairly surprised by a question upon which he had no prior opportunity to 

develop evidence and argument. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556 

(1941). We would hasten to add the consistent enforcement of the preservation 

rule promotes the equal application of our own decision-making authority. 

While the preservation rule has been universally applied in American 

law, many courts, including this Court, have used imprecise language to 

delineate its contours. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 458 n.13 (2004). 

Strictly speaking, a party preserves “[a]llegations of error . . . for appellate 

review.” RCr 10.12; see also KRE 103(a), (e). In a criminal case, an allegation 

of error is properly preserved when

16 There are certain situations, inapplicable here, where a party may raise an 

issue before this Court that was not raised before the Court of Appeals. Fischer v. 

Fischer, 197 S.W.3d 98, 103 (Ky. 2006). This Court will consider such an issue when: 

(1) the party brought to the attention of the trial court; (2) the party was defending the 

trial court’s ruling on direct appeal; and (3) the party included the issue in the motion 

for discretionary review. Id. 
11

a party, at the time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, 

makes known to the court the action which that party desires the court 

to take or any objection to the action of the court, and on request of the 

court, the grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object 

to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection 

does not thereafter prejudice that party.

RCr 9.22. Formal exceptions, as previously required under the former 

Criminal Code of Practice, are unnecessary and appellate courts do not 

demand the recitation of shibboleths before a preserved allegation of error will 

be considered. Id.; Brewer v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.3d 363, 368 n.2 (Ky. 

2015). However, while the form of the objection does not control, the fact that 

an issue was made known to the trial court is paramount: even if a trial court 

lacks authority to grant immediate relief, such as the power to overrule binding 

precedent, neither our criminal rules nor our caselaw supports a futility 

exception to the preservation requirement.17 See Greer v. United States, 141 

S.Ct. 2090, 2099 (2021). 

This Court has long held that “appeals are taken from judgments, not 

from unfavorable rulings as such.” Brown v. Barkley, 628 S.W.2d 616, 618 

(Ky. 1982). When confronted with a claim of lower court error, appellate courts

“review issues, not arguments.” Brewer, 478 S.W.3d at 368 n.2. An “issue” is 

legally defined as “[a] point in dispute between two or more parties.” Issue, 

17 We recognize our decisions applying a futility exception to exhaustion 

requirements in appeals involving judicial review from administrative decisions. 

Popplewell’s Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 470 (Ky. 

2004). This exception is based on an administrative body’s lack of authority to rule 

upon the constitutionality of a statute. Id. Such considerations are inapplicable to 

ordinary judicial proceedings. City of Louisville v. Coalter, 171 Ky. 633, 188 S.W. 853,

854 (1916)(“the circuit court may first pass on the constitutionality of the statute if the 

question is raised in that court.). 
12

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). For the purposes of appeal, “an issue 

may take the form of a separate and discrete question of law or fact, or a 

combination of both.” Id. By contrast, “argument” is defined as “[a] statement 

that attempts to persuade by setting forth reasons why something is true or 

untrue, right or wrong, better or worse, etc.; esp., the remarks of counsel in 

analyzing and pointing out or repudiating a desired inference, made for the 

assistance of a decision-maker.” Argument, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 

2019). 

Allegations of error (also known as issues, claims, or questions) are 

supported by arguments. Yee v. City of Escondido, Cal., 503 U.S. 519, 534 

(1992). “Once a . . . claim is properly presented, a party can make any 

argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the precise 

arguments they made below.” Id. Indeed, “[a] litigant seeking review in this 

Court of a claim properly raised in the lower courts thus generally possesses the 

ability to frame the question to be decided in any way he chooses, without 

being limited to the manner in which the question was framed below.” Id. at 

535 (emphasis added). Indeed, “appellate review. . . is to be conducted in light 

of all relevant precedents, not simply those cited to, or discovered by” the trial 

court. Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994). 

However, when a party fails to raise an issue or otherwise preserve an 

allegation of error for review, the issue is forfeited. United States v. Olano, 507 

U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court 

than that a constitutional right, or a right of any other sort, may be forfeited in 
13

criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the 

right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.”) (cleaned up). 

Again, while many courts, including this Court, have justified the refusal to 

consider unpreserved errors under a waiver theory, the proper basis is 

forfeiture. Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 458 n.13. “Although jurists often use the 

words interchangeably, forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a 

right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known 

right.” Id. (internal quotations omitted) (cleaned up). The valid waiver of a 

known right precludes appellate review while a forfeited claim of error may be 

reviewed for palpable error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. 

In summation, we echo the wisdom of Justice Palmore on the necessity 

of respecting the rules of procedure:

In the argument of this and other recent criminal appeals we 

detect what appears to be a failure to appreciate the importance of 

and necessity for procedural regularity in the conduct of trials.

Substantive rights, even of constitutional magnitude, do not 

transcend procedural rules, because without such rules those 

rights would smother in chaos and could not survive. There is a 

simple and easy procedural avenue for the enforcement and 

protection of every right and principle of substantive law at an 

appropriate time and point during the course of any litigation, civil 

or criminal. That is not to say that form may be exalted over 

substance, because procedural requirements generally do not exist 

for the mere sake of form and style. They are lights and buoys to 

mark the channels of safe passage and assure an expeditious 

voyage to the right destination. Their importance simply cannot be 

disdained or denigrated. Without them every trial would end in a 

shipwreck.

Brown v. Commonwealth, 551 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1977). Like other 

procedural rules, the preservation requirement serves the orderly 

administration of justice. It cannot be said to elevate form over substance or 
14

otherwise unfairly cut off the rights of litigants. Palpable error review under 

RCr 10.26 and other exceptions18 exist to prevent manifest injustice in the 

event a party fails to preserve an alleged error. We implore appellate litigants

to scrupulously adhere to the rules of procedure for the sake of their own cause

and to ensure the orderly disposition of court proceedings. We now turn to 

Gasaway’s claims of error on the merits. 

III. SEARCH OF TRUCK WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE

For his first claim of error, Gasaway argues the warrantless search of 

his truck violated Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution. He specifically 

urges this Court to interpret Section 10 to provide greater protection against 

unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment. Gasaway 

further asserts this Court’s decision in Bratcher erroneously applied federal 

precedent. 424 S.W.3d at 411.

At this time, we will not consider whether Section 10 provides greater 

protection than the Fourth Amendment because the issue was not properly 

preserved for review. We further conclude the trial court erred by denying the 

motion to suppress under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement

under the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the Commonwealth’s reliance on 

the search incident to arrest exception is without merit. Moreover, we agree 

18 For example, subject-matter jurisdiction, incomplete jury verdicts, and 

sentencing errors may be considered for the first time on appeal. Privett v. Clendenin, 

52 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Ky. 2001) (subject-matter jurisdiction); Smith v. Crenshaw, 344 

S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky. 1961) (incomplete jury verdicts); and Gaither v. Commonwealth, 

963 S.W.2d 621, 622 (Ky. 1997) (sentencing errors). 
15

that our decision in Bratcher was wrongly decided. Nevertheless, the search of 

the truck was constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment. 

Therefore, we conclude the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s

denial of the motion to suppress, albeit for different reasons.

A. SCOPE OF SECTION 10 IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT

Our review of the record indicates the issue of whether Section 10 of the 

Kentucky Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment

against unreasonable searches and seizures was not raised before the trial 

court. The sole issue before the trial court involved the question of whether the 

warrantless search of Gasaway’s truck was reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment. These are discrete legal issues. Further, Gasaway did not raise 

the issue of whether Section 10 provides greater protection than the Fourth 

Amendment before the Court of Appeals.19 

While the Court of Appeals encouraged this Court to consider the

application to Section 10 to parolees, this action does not necessarily preserve 

the issue for further review by this Court. “Courts are not required to decide 

constitutional questions whenever a party makes the suggestion.” Priestley, 

949 S.W.2d at 599. This principle applies equally to suggestions made by 

lower courts because “[c]onstitutional adjudication should be reserved for those 

19 We note Gasaway cited Section 10 in his brief before the Court of Appeals for 

the proposition “[s]ection 10 of the Kentucky Constitution also protects citizens from 

unreasonable searches and seizures by government agents.” Gasaway’s opening

Court of Appeals brief at 4. This was the sole reference in Gasaway’s brief to Section 

10. 
16

cases in which the issue is well-defined and advanced by parties substantially 

affected by the controversy.” Id. (emphasis added). While we acknowledge the 

Court of Appeals’ invitation to consider this important issue,

20 it is not properly 

before us because Gasaway failed to raise the question before the trial court. 

As such, Gasaway has failed to demonstrate a sufficient basis for this Court to 

reconsider our precedent concerning the scope of Section 10. Therefore, we 

decline to address the issue.

B. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCH

The propriety of the trial court’s denial of Gasaway’s motion to suppress 

on Fourth Amendment grounds is properly before this Court as the issue was 

raised and decided by the lower courts. The trial court found the warrantless 

search was justified under the automobile exception and, alternatively, under 

our decision in Bratcher, which Gasaway now asks this Court to overrule. 

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 

their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.” All warrantless searches are unreasonable, per se, under the Fourth 

Amendment unless an established exception applies. Commonwealth v. 

Hatcher, 199 S.W.3d 124, 126 (Ky. 2006). “The Commonwealth bears the 

burden of establishing the constitutional validity” of a warrantless search. 

20 We adhere to the principle that “[a]ny court, though required to follow 

precedent established by a higher court, can set forth the reasons why, in its 

judgment, the established precedent should be overruled but cannot, on its own, 

overrule the established precedent set by a higher court.” Special Fund v. Francis, 708 

S.W.2d 641, 642 (Ky. 1986). 
17

Commonwealth v. Conner, 636 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Ky. 2021). Each of the 

exceptions to the warrant requirement is “narrow and well-delineated.” Flippo 

v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999). In other words, each exception is 

conceptually distinct. Id. Therefore, the Commonwealth must satisfy every 

element of the claimed exception. Id.; Hatcher, 199 S.W.3d at 126. 

The standard of review from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence 

depends on whether the search or seizure was conducted pursuant to a 

warrant. Commonwealth v. Pride, 302 S.W.3d 43, 48 (Ky. 2010). Because the 

present appeal involves a warrantless search, we review the trial court’s: (1) 

findings of fact for clear error and (2) determinations of reasonable suspicion 

and probable cause de novo. Id. at 49 (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 

690, 698-99 (1996)). The heightened de novo standard of review for probable 

cause reflects this Court’s “preference for searches pursuant to a warrant.” Id.

at 48. Our review of the facts is generally limited to the evidence presented at 

the suppression hearing. Conner, 636 S.W.3d at 472 (“we use the facts elicited 

during [the suppression hearing] as the basis for our analysis.”). We note the 

Commonwealth, throughout its response brief, refers to evidence presented at 

trial to support the trial court’s denial of the motion to suppress. While the 

evidence may have overlapped, the Commonwealth concedes there were “some 

variations.” We have limited to our review of this issue to the evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing. 

Additionally, it is a fundamental precept of appellate review that “[w]hen 

a judgment is based upon alternative grounds, the judgment must be affirmed 
18

on appeal unless both grounds are erroneous.” Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 

724, 727 (Ky. App. 1979). We have applied this rule in the Fourth Amendment 

context by refusing to consider alternative bases to justify the denial of a 

suppression motion after first determining the search at issue was supported 

by probable cause. See Pride, 302 S.W.3d at 51. Accordingly, with the 

foregoing standards in mind, we examine the alternative grounds for the denial 

of the motion to suppress. 

C. SEARCH WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION FOR 

LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE

The trial court first determined the warrantless search of the vehicle was 

proper under the automobile exception. The automobile exception to the 

warrant requirement applies when the vehicle is readily mobile and probable 

cause exists to believe evidence of criminal activity may be contained in the 

vehicle. Hedgepath v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.3d 119, 128 (Ky. 2014). A 

vehicle is considered readily mobile even if it has been secured by law 

enforcement or there is little to no risk a suspect or his accomplices could 

access the vehicle. Id. An independent finding of exigent circumstances is not 

required under the automobile exception because the exception is based upon 

“reduced expectations of privacy” in vehicles. Id. The automobile exception 

may be invoked “[w]hen a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is 

readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly 

used for residential purposes—temporary or otherwise.” California v. Carney, 

471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985).
19

Clearly, Gasaway’s truck was readily mobile and found in a nonresidential location. The question is whether probable cause existed at the 

time the truck was searched. We conclude it did not. Specifically, the 

Commonwealth failed to establish an objective nexus between Gasaway’s truck 

and the information known to the officers at the time of the search.

The impossibility of precisely defining probable cause has often been 

noted by appellate courts. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 695. Reasonable suspicion 

and probable cause are “commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal 

with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which 

reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (citing Illinois v. 

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983)). The Supreme Court described “probable 

cause to search as existing where the known facts and circumstances are 

sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that 

contraband or evidence of a crime will be found” in a particular place. Id. at 

696. In other words, “[t]here must be a fair probability that the specific place 

that officers want to search will contain the specific things that they are looking 

for.” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021). Probable cause 

is a “fluid concept,” rather than “a finely-tuned standard comparable to the 

standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt or of proof by a preponderance of 

the evidence.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). 

Direct evidence of probable cause is not strictly required and reviewing courts 

afford “due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and 

local law enforcement officers.” Conner, 636 S.W.3d at 471 (citation omitted). 
20

The trial court determined probable cause existed based on three specific 

findings of fact: (1) Gasaway drove the same vehicle to work on the previous 

day when he was filmed on video having allegedly dropped the heroin; (2) 

Gasaway was on parole for prior felony controlled substances cases, including 

trafficking; and (3) Det. Dover observed marijuana roaches and shake in plain 

view from outside the vehicle. 

As in several other recent decisions, the trial court’s findings of fact are

contradicted by the record on a point essential to the court’s decision. Conner,

636 S.W.3d at 472; Commonwealth v. Clayborne, 635 S.W.3d 818, 823 (Ky. 

2021); and Turley v. Commonwealth, 399 S.W.3d 412, 420 (Ky. 2013). 

Specifically, the trial court’s finding regarding Det. Dover’s observation of 

marijuana roaches and shake in plain view was clearly erroneous. On crossexamination at the suppression hearing, Det. Dover admitted the roaches and 

shake were not in plain view: 

Defense Counsel: You also found in the ashtray several roaches, 

is that correct?

Det. Dover: It was a cup ashtray, yes.

. . . 

Counsel: Now, with regard to the marijuana and the pill, which 

you believed to be ecstasy, was in the console of the truck?

Det. Dover: Yes.

Counsel: And therefore, they weren’t in plain view, were they?

Det. Dover: Uh no, there wasn’t. . . 

Counsel: And the roaches that we are talking about, they were not 

in plain view were they?
21

Det. Dover: They were in the ashtray, the ashtray was in plain 

view, but there was a bunch of shake next to the ashtray, little 

pieces of marijuana that was next to that.

Counsel: But you didn’t see those, did you, when you looked in 

the window?

Det. Dover: If you look in the window, I believe, well, I don’t know. 

Counsel: Ok. You don’t remember, is that correct?

Det. Dover: That’s correct. 

The trial court also directly questioned Det. Dover concerning his observation 

of the ashtray and the marijuana roaches. Det. Dover described the ashtray as 

a cup with a lid on it that fit into the cupholder between the driver’s seat and

the front passenger seat. The trial court further inquired whether the ashtray 

was easily observable from the outside of the vehicle. Det. Dover responded, “I 

couldn’t observe the roaches, but the ashtray, yes.” Based on this record, we 

cannot accept the finding that marijuana was observed in plain view. 

While the trial court’s remaining factual findings are supported by 

substantial evidence, we cannot conclude they amount to probable cause for a 

warrantless search. The decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 

United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690 (8th Cir. 1994), is instructive.21

In Hogan, a confidential informant reported to federal Drug Enforcement 

Administration (DEA) agents that the defendant was trafficking 

21 We cite this federal decision only as a persuasive example, keeping in mind 

that one court’s determination of probable cause “will seldom be a useful precedent for 

another” given the fact-intensive analysis. Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 698 (citation omitted). 
22

methamphetamine and marijuana at the Chrysler plant where the defendant 

worked. Id. at 691. The informant named two employees who had told the 

informant that the defendant had supplied them with drugs for a long period of 

time. Id. The informant also claimed he had personally observed the

defendant engage in three hand-to-hand drug transactions. Id. According to 

the informant, the defendant only drove a white Dodge truck to and from work 

at the plant. Id. The informant predicted that the defendant would be bringing 

methamphetamine to the plant when he arrived for his shift the next day at 

3:00 p.m. Id. 

Based on this information, the agents obtained a warrant to search the 

defendant’s truck and residence. Id. On the next day, the agents surveilled 

the defendant’s residence and observed the defendant leave his residence in a 

blue Oldsmobile car. Id. at 692. After the defendant travelled between 3-5 

miles from his residence, a state trooper, who was assisting the investigation,

stopped the defendant’s car on the road. Id.

When the DEA agents arrived at the scene, an agent told the defendant 

he had a warrant to search the defendant’s residence and truck. Id. The agent 

requested permission to search the defendant’s car, which the defendant 

refused. Id. At this point, the agent impounded the car until he could obtain a 

warrant. Id. The agent then handcuffed the defendant and placed the 

defendant in the agent’s car before returning to the residence. Id. Another 

agent drove the defendant’s car back to the residence. Id. 
23

After searching the residence and truck, the agents discovered a small 

amount of marijuana, two scales, weapons, a carton of freezer bags, and 

$5,600 in cash. Id. The state trooper then investigated the outside of the car 

with a drug detection dog. Id. The dog alerted at the trunk of the car. Id. The 

agents then formally arrested the defendant for possession of the marijuana 

found in the house. Id. An agent drove the car to the DEA office until a 

warrant could be obtained. Id. After obtaining a warrant, the subsequent 

search of the car revealed a half pound of marijuana and a quarter pound of 

methamphetamine. Id.

The defendant was charged with possession with intent to distribute

marijuana and methamphetamine. Id. at 691. The defendant moved to 

suppress the evidence obtained from the search, which the trial court denied. 

Id. The defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. Id. On direct appeal, the 

Eighth Circuit reversed. Id.

The government argued the initial seizure of the car on the road was 

justified, and further argued the agents could have properly searched the car at 

that time under the automobile exception. Id. at 692. The Court rejected this 

argument after concluding the agents lacked probable cause to stop and seize 

the defendant’s vehicle on the road. Id. at 693. The information provided to 

the agents indicated the defendant only used his truck to the transport drugs. 

Id. Additionally, the agents did not possess sufficient information to determine 

that the defendant was traveling to the plant when the car was stopped and 

seized because of the time of day. Id. On these facts, the Court determined the 
24

agents merely possessed “a hunch that the drugs from the house or truck” 

would be found in the defendant’s car. Id. A hunch does not rise to the level of 

probable cause. Id.

In the present appeal, we acknowledge Gasaway’s criminal history, as 

known by Det. Dover and found by the trial court, is a legitimate factor in the 

probable cause analysis. See Risby v. Commonwealth, 284 S.W.2d 686, 687 

(Ky. 1955). However, a person’s criminal history, taken alone, does not amount 

to probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. Id. Moreover, the fact that 

Gasaway drove the same vehicle the day before, even when considered in 

tandem with Gasaway’s criminal history, does not establish an objective nexus 

between the vehicle and illegal activity. There was no evidence that Gasaway 

was involved in continuous or on-going drug activity or trafficking at the 

workplace. 

The heroin was discovered inside the workplace on the day prior to the 

search. It was not discovered in Gasaway’s vehicle. Gasaway was confronted

and arrested inside the workplace. The search of Gasaway’s person prior to the 

search of the vehicle did not reveal any incriminating evidence. Further,

Gasaway’s vulgar post-arrest tirade carries little weight in our analysis. 

Indeed, this fact was apparently so insignificant that trial court did not make 

any reference to it in its findings. Additionally, any inference linking the 

suspected possession of heroin to Gasaway’s truck is especially tenuous given 

the lack of any concrete evidence showing the truck was used to transport or 

conceal any additional quantities of illegal drugs. Det. Dover testified the 
25

reason he searched Gasaway’s truck was simply that he “believed there [were]

other drugs” located there. Given the lack of objective corroborating evidence 

linking Gasaway’s truck to the heroin found in the workplace, we conclude Det. 

Dover’s belief was based on suspicion, not probable cause. Therefore, the trial 

court's reliance upon the automobile exception was in error. 

Before turning to the trial court’s second ground for denying the motion 

to suppress, we must consider the Commonwealth’s intervening claim that the 

search was justified as a search incident to arrest.

D. SEARCH WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER INCIDENT TO ARREST 

EXCEPTION

The Commonwealth insists, as it did before the Court of Appeals, that 

the warrantless search was justified under the incident to arrest exception. 

This claim was not directly presented to the trial court. 

The Commonwealth asserts that we may consider the issue because our 

caselaw holds that an appellate court may affirm a lower court on any basis 

supported by the record. Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565, 576 (Ky.

2009). While the Commonwealth’s assertion is correct as a general matter, the 

cited rule presumes the alternative basis of affirmance was properly raised 

before the trial court. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 448 S.W.3d 773, 776 n.3 

(Ky. 2014). When the prosecution fails to raise a claimed exception to the 

warrant requirement before the trial court, the Supreme Court has explicitly 

stated

The Government . . . may lose its right to raise factual issues of 

this sort before this Court when it has made contrary assertions in 

the courts below, when it has acquiesced in contrary findings by 
26

those courts, or when it has failed to raise such questions in a 

timely fashion during the litigation.

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 209 (1981). 

The Commonwealth implicitly disclaimed reliance upon the search 

incident to arrest exception in its memorandum filed after the suppression 

hearing:

[t]he search of the defendant’s vehicle comes within two exceptions 

to the warrant requirement. First, the search was proper under 

the automobile exception. Second, the search was proper as the 

defendant was on parole and therefore could be subjected to a 

warrantless and suspicionless search. 

However, while the Commonwealth did not initially claim the search incident to 

arrest exception justified the search, we note that Gasaway asserted at the 

suppression hearing that the search was improper under Arizona v. Gant, 556 

U.S. 332 (2009), a decision dealing with the search incident to arrest exception. 

In response, the Commonwealth stated:

Judge, I appreciate [defense counsel] citing Gant. I’m a big Gant

fan. Gant did not change. . . it changed you can’t search a vehicle 

search [sic] incident to arrest carte blanche. Which used to be the 

rule. Arrest somebody, search the vehicle. What Gant came out 

and said was unless that person has access to that vehicle you can 

no longer search it for your safety. If they are detained, you have 

to get a warrant unless, you have probable cause because a vehicle 

in and of itself, there is, it is well-established, an automobile 

exception. It is exigent circumstances in and of itself and that if 

you have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains 

contraband then you can still search the vehicle, you don’t need a 

warrant, it is exigent circumstances, it doesn’t matter if the person 

is detained. . . There are cases, Commonwealth v. Elliott, 

Hedgepath, as well as Owens v. Commonwealth, all post-Gant 

cases that say this was proper conduct. 
27

The trial court ultimately limited its ruling to the automobile exception and,

alternatively, upon Gasaway’s status as a parolee.

The automobile exception, as set forth above in Hedgepath, 441 S.W.3d 

at 128, is distinct from what this Court has previously described as “Gant’s 

alternative rule” in the search incident to arrest context. See Rose v. 

Commonwealth, 322 S.W.3d 76, 80 (Ky. 2010). Gant’s alternative rule is “that 

an officer may search a vehicle even when the arrestee is secured if he has a 

reasonable suspicion that the vehicle harbors evidence of the crime of arrest.” 

Id. Regardless of how the claim was labeled, it is clear the Commonwealth 

solely and substantively relied upon the automobile exception rather than the 

search incident to arrest exception at the trial court level.

From the argument at the suppression hearing, it appears the parties 

conflated the automobile exception and the search incident to arrest exception

to some extent. We are dubious the search incident to arrest claim was 

properly raised before the trial court. Regardless, any claim concerning the 

search incident to arrest exception may be swiftly rejected because Det. Dover 

plainly testified that he searched Gasaway’s truck looking for “other drugs.” 

This statement indicates the motive for the warrantless search was generally 

investigative, rather than a specific search for evidence of the crime of arrest,

possession of heroin. 

E. BRATCHER WAS WRONGLY DECIDED 

As its second, alternative basis for denying Gasaway’s motion to 

suppress, the trial court ruled that Gasaway was subject to a warrantless and 
28

suspicionless search by virtue of his status as a parolee under our decision in 

Bratcher. Gasaway urges this Court to reconsider Bratcher’s “unduly expansive 

interpretation” of the Supreme Court’s decision in Samson v. California, 547 

U.S. 843 (2006). We agree that Bratcher was wrongly decided. 

a. DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 

RELATING TO PROBATIONERS AND PAROLEES

Before examining the question of whether Bratcher was wrongly decided, 

we must place the decision in proper context by recounting the development of 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to probationers and parolees.

i. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987)

In Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, the Supreme Court held the warrantless 

search of a probationer’s “home satisfied the demands of the Fourth 

Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself 

satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under wellestablished principles.” (Emphasis added). To properly frame the decision, we 

will summarize the facts before summarizing the legal analysis. 

The probationer was subject to a Wisconsin statute that subjects 

probationers to conditions set by the sentencing court and rules and 

regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Social Services. Id.

at 870. The Department established a regulation that permitted any probation 

officer to search a probationer’s home without a warrant upon approval by the 

officer’s supervisor and reasonable suspicion the probationer’s home contains 

contraband. Id. at 870-71. The regulation also set forth various factors that a 
29

probation officer should consider in determining whether reasonable suspicion 

for a warrantless search exists. Id. at 871. Notably, the statute at issue was 

generally applicable and the regulation was established after the court order 

placing the probationer on probation. Id. Additionally, under a separate 

regulation, a probationer’s refusal to consent to a search was deemed to 

constitute an independent probation violation. Id. 

A probation officer received information that the probationer possessed 

firearms in his residence in violation of the conditions of probation. Id. 

Following a search, the probation officer discovered a handgun. Id. The 

probationer was charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. 

He filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the 

warrantless search, which the trial court denied. Id. The probationer was 

convicted following a jury trial. Id. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “to consider whether this search 

violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 870. 

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. Id. at 872. The Supreme 

Court commenced its analysis by recognizing that “[a] probationer’s home, like 

anyone else’s, is protected by the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that 

searches be ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 873 (emphasis added). However, the “special 

needs” exception allows for a warrantless search when “special needs, beyond 

the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause 

requirement impracticable.” Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 

351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The special needs exception permits 
30

governmental employers to conduct warrantless searches of employees’ offices 

and desks without probable cause. Id. Additionally, the exception allows 

school officials to conduct warrantless searches of certain student property 

without probable cause. Id.

In the context of probationers, the Supreme Court held, “that in certain 

circumstances government investigators conducting searches pursuant to a 

regulatory scheme need not adhere to the usual warrant or probable-cause 

requirements as long as their searches meet ‘reasonable legislative or 

administrative standards.’” Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 

523, 538 (1967)) (emphasis added). Application of the special needs exception 

to probationers was justified because “probation is a form of criminal sanction

imposed. . . after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty.” Id. at 874 (citation 

omitted). In other words, “[p]robation is simply one point (or, more accurately, 

one set of points) on a continuum of possible punishments ranging from 

solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of 

mandatory community service.” Id. “To a greater or lesser degree, it is always 

true of probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not 

enjoy ‘the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only. . .

conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] 

restrictions.’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972))

(alteration in original). 

Restrictions upon the liberty of probationers are imposed “to assure that 

the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the 
31

community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.” Id. at 875. 

“These same goals require and justify the exercise of supervision to assure that 

the restrictions are in fact observed.” Id. As such, “[s]upervision, then, is a 

‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy 

that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.” Id. 

Ultimately, the Supreme Court concluded “[t]he search of [the probationer’s] 

residence was ‘reasonable’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment 

because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing 

probationers.” Id. at 880. The validity and meaning of the probation regulation 

is to be fixed by state law. Id. at 875. 

ii. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)

In Knights, 534 U.S. at 122, the Supreme Court held that the official 

purpose of the search of a probationer’s residence is immaterial under the 

Fourth Amendment if the search was “supported by reasonable suspicion and 

authorized by a condition of probation.” Again, we will briefly recount the facts 

before summarizing the legal analysis. 

A probationer agreed to a condition of probation that provided for a 

warrantless search of the probationer’s residence at any time without cause. 

Id. at 114. A police detective suspected the probationer and another individual 

were involved in a series of arsons. Id. A week before the latest arson, a 

sheriff’s deputy stopped the probationer and another individual on the road 

near the scene and observed gasoline and pipes in the bed of the truck. Id. at 

115. Subsequently, the detective began surveillance of the probationer’s 
32

residence and observed the other individual exiting the residence what 

appeared to be pipe bombs. Id. The individual walked across the street to the 

banks of a river. Id. The detective heard a splash and observed the individual 

return without the items. Id. The individual then drove away in his truck. Id.

After the individual parked the truck in a driveway, the detective 

observed a Molotov cocktail and other explosive materials in the bed of the 

truck. Id. The detective then conducted a search of the probationer’s 

residence. Id. The detective was aware of the probationer’s status and believed 

he did not require a warrant. Id. The search of the probationer’s residence 

revealed several incriminating items. Id.

The probationer was charged in federal court with conspiracy to commit 

arson and other charges. Id. at 116. He moved to suppress the evidence of the 

search, which the district court granted. Id. Although the district court 

concluded the officers had reasonable suspicion, the court nevertheless 

suppressed the evidence because the purpose of the search was investigatory 

rather than probationary. Id. The government filed an interlocutory appeal. 

Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the suppression of the 

evidence. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed. Id. at 122.

At the outset of its analysis, the Supreme Court noted that California law 

rejected any distinction between probationary and investigative searches when 

considering the warrantless search of a probationer. Id. at 116. Nevertheless, 

the probationer argued that the Griffin decision limited the special needs 
33

exception to probationary rather than investigative searches. Id. at 117. The 

Supreme Court rejected the “dubious logic” of the probationer’s argument. Id.

The Supreme Court declined to rest its decision of the probationer’s 

agreement to the conditions of his probation or even under the special needs 

exception itself. Id. at 118. Rather, the Supreme Court examined the 

reasonableness of the search under the familiar totality of the circumstances 

standard, “with the probation search condition being a salient circumstance.” 

Id. The test for reasonableness assesses “on the one hand, the degree to which 

[the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree 

to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 

Id. at 119. A search condition attendant to probation “informs both sides of 

that balance.” Id. The Court explained:

It was reasonable to conclude that the search condition would 

further the two primary goals of probation-rehabilitation and 

protecting society from future criminal violations. The probation 

order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights was 

unambiguously informed of it. The probation condition thus 

significantly diminished Knights’ reasonable expectation of privacy.

Id. at 119-20 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 

The Court held “that the balance of these considerations requires no 

more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer’s 

house.” Id. at 121. “When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a 

probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there 

is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the 

probationer’s significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable.” Id. The 
34

Supreme Court expressly left open the question of “whether the probation 

condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, [the probationer’s]

reasonable expectation of privacy . . . that a search by a law enforcement officer 

without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness 

requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 120 n.6. 

iii. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006)

In Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, the Supreme Court held that a warrantless 

search conducted pursuant to a state statute requiring parolees to consent to 

warrantless and suspicionless searches at any time did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment. Before summarizing the legal analysis of the decision, we will 

briefly recount the facts.

A police officer observed the parolee was walking down the street with a 

woman and child. Id. The officer was aware of the parolee’s status and 

believed there was an outstanding warrant for a parole violation. Id. The 

officer confronted the parolee and asked if there was an outstanding warrant. 

Id. The parolee replied that he was in good standing with his parole officer. Id. 

The officer confirmed there was no outstanding warrant. Id. Nevertheless, the 

officer searched the parolee’s person based solely on the parolee’s status and 

discovered methamphetamine. Id. at 847. 

The parolee was charged with possession of methamphetamine. Id. He 

moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search, which 

the trial court denied. Id. The parolee was convicted. Id. The California Court 
35

of Appeal affirmed the denial of the suppression motion. Id. The Supreme 

Court granted to certiorari 

to answer a variation of the question this Court left open in United 

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120, n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 

L.Ed.2d 497 (2001)—whether a condition of release can so diminish 

or eliminate a released prisoner’s reasonable expectation of privacy 

that a suspicionless search by a law enforcement officer would not 

offend the Fourth Amendment. Answering that question in the 

affirmative today, we affirm the judgment of the California Court of 

Appeal.

Id. at 847 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 

The Supreme Court noted the “Fourth Amendment imposes no 

irreducible requirement” of individualized suspicion. Id. at 855 n.4 (quoting 

United States v. Martinez–Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)). The Supreme 

Court examined the reasonableness of the search under the balancing test set 

forth in Knights. Id. at 848 (citing Knights, 534 U.S. at 118). Regarding the 

defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the Supreme Court recognized 

“parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole 

is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.” Id. at 850. 

In addition, California law imposed substantial restrictions on parolees such 

that “[t]he extent and reach of these conditions clearly demonstrate that 

parolees . . . have severely diminished expectations of privacy by virtue of their 

status alone.” Id. at 852. The Supreme Court placed substantial weight on the 

fact that the search condition was “clearly expressed” to the parolee and he was 

“unambiguously” aware of it. Id. In sum, these circumstances indicated the 
36

parolee “did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as 

legitimate.” Id. 

Regarding the government’s interest, the Supreme Court determined “a 

State has an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees because parolees. . 

. are more likely to commit future criminal offenses.” Id. at 853 (quoting 

Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365 (1998)). 

Specifically, “California’s ability to conduct suspicionless searches of parolees 

serves its interest in reducing recidivism, in a manner that aids, rather than 

hinders, the reintegration of parolees into productive society.” Id. at 854. The 

Supreme Court rejected the argument that California’s imposition of 

suspicionless searches as a condition of parole was constitutionally infirm 

because other jurisdictions required reasonable suspicion to search a parolee:

Petitioner observes that the majority of States and the Federal 

Government have been able to further similar interests in reducing 

recidivism and promoting reintegration, despite having systems 

that permit parolee searches based upon some level of suspicion. 

Thus, petitioner contends, California’s system is constitutionally 

defective by comparison. Petitioner’s reliance on the practices of 

jurisdictions other than California, however, is misplaced. That 

some States and the Federal Government require a level of 

individualized suspicion is of little relevance to our determination 

whether California’s supervisory system is drawn to meet its needs 

and is reasonable, taking into account a parolee’s substantially 

diminished expectation of privacy.

Id. at 855 (emphasis added). Likewise, the Supreme Court determined 

California law, rather than the Fourth Amendment, provided sufficient 

safeguards to prevent abusive or harassing searches. Id. at 856. Therefore, 
37

the Supreme Court concluded “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 

police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id. at 857. 

b. BRATCHER MISINTERPRETED SAMSON

With the foregoing legal standards in mind, we will now examine the 

soundness of our holding in Bratcher. In Bratcher, this Court applied Samson

to hold that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless and 

suspicionless search of parolees despite the policy of the Kentucky Department 

of Corrections requiring parole officers to have reasonable suspicion before 

conducting a warrantless search upon a parolee. 424 S.W.3d at 415. Before 

turning to our analysis, we will briefly summarize the facts. 

Police suspected a parolee of manufacturing methamphetamine. Id. at 

412. An informant reported to a police officer that the parolee possessed items 

used to manufacture methamphetamine at the parolee’s residence and was 

planning to “do a cook.” Id. Based on this information and the police officer’s 

personal knowledge of the parolee’s criminal history, the police officer went to

the parolee’s residence and requested permission to search the premises. Id. 

The parolee refused to the police officer’s request for consent. Id. 

The police officer then contacted the parolee’s parole officer by phone. Id. 

He informed the parole officer that he suspected the parolee was involved in 

illegal activity and that the parolee had refused his request for consent to 

search the residence. Id. The police officer then permitted the parolee to speak 

to his parole officer. Id. The parole officer reminded the parolee of his 
38

obligation to allow parole officers to search his residence and that the parolee

should consent to the search. Id. The defendant then consented. Id.

The police officer along with a different parole officer subsequently 

searched the residence and “discovered various items used for the manufacture 

of methamphetamine.” Id. at 412-13. The parolee was charged with 

manufacturing methamphetamine and being a first-degree persistent felony 

offender. Following the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained 

from the warrantless search, the parolee entered a conditional guilty plea and 

was sentenced to twenty-one years’ imprisonment. Id. at 412. 

On direct appeal, this Court affirmed. Id. At the outset, we determined 

the trial court properly concluded the parolee consented to the search. Id. at 

413. Consent to search is a valid and independent exception to the warrant 

requirement. Id. Indeed, we concluded “[t]his finding alone would have been 

sufficient to support the legality of the warrantless search.”

22 Id. 

Despite the sufficiency of the consent justification, this Court considered 

the application of the Samson decision because the defendant’s “parole status 

and the constitutional standards relating thereto” were the “focus of the trial 

court’s analysis and the focal point of the parties’ arguments.” Id. Specifically, 

22 The fact that Bratcher had a correct, alternative holding does not permit us to 

disregard an incorrect holding as dicta or otherwise allow us to simply confine the 

decision to its facts because alternative holdings of an appellate court are treated as 

binding precedent in contrast to the rule that an appellate court may affirm a trial 

court if either of alternative holdings are correct. Bryan A. Garner, et. al., The Law of 

Judicial Precedent 122-23 (2016); compare with Milby, 580 S.W.2d at 727. 
39

we addressed the issue “to highlight the impact of [Samson] on this aspect of 

our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” Id.

We began our analysis by examining the Knights decision. Id. This 

Court recognized the Supreme Court held “a warrantless intrusion upon a 

probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable under the 

Fourth Amendment only when an officer has reasonable suspicion that the 

probationer is engaged in criminal activity.” Id. at 412 (quoting Knights, 534 

U.S. at 121) (cleaned up). We recognized our decisions previously applied the 

reasoning of Knights and its reasonable suspicion standard to cases involving 

parolees. Id. at 414 (citing Riley v. Commonwealth, 120 S.W.3d 622 (Ky.

2003)).

This Court abandoned the reasonable suspicion requirement of Knights, 

and applied the reasoning of Samson because Samson specifically dealt with 

the search of a parolee rather than a probationer. Id. at 415. Relying upon 

Samson, we concluded

it is immaterial whether the information available to the officers 

who searched Appellant’s residence rose to the standard of 

reasonable suspicion. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a 

police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.

Id. We further explained that the conditions imposed on Kentucky parolees

may be seen as more stringent than Samson, they do not alter the 

Fourth Amendment analysis. It is fundamental that by 

administrative rule or statute a state may impose upon its police 

authorities more restrictive standards than the Fourth Amendment 

requires. Such standards, however, cannot expand the scope of 

the Fourth Amendment itself. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 128 

S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008).
40

Id. This Court ultimately held “the Fourth Amendment presents no 

impediment against a warrantless and suspicionless search of a person on 

parole.” Id. (citation omitted). 

After careful consideration, we hold that Bratcher was decided in error. 

While this Court correctly determined the Fourth Amendment does not 

categorically forbid the warrantless, suspicionless search of a parolee, we 

incorrectly determined that the conditions of parole imposed by state law were 

immaterial to the analysis. Samson prescribed the application of the ordinary 

Fourth Amendment balancing test to ascertain the reasonableness of the 

search under the totality of the circumstances, including the conditions of 

parole under state law. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848. While the Fourth 

Amendment does not forbid a rule requiring parolees to submit to 

suspicionless searches, neither does it demand one. In Bratcher, we erred by 

failing to account for the conditions of parole. 

Though the notion that state statutes and regulations impact the

permissibility of a search under the Fourth Amendment seems incongruous, 

“[p]arolee searches are. . . an example of the rare instance in which the 

contours of a federal constitutional right are determined, in part, by the 

content of state law.” United States v. Freeman, 479 F.3d 743, 747-48 (10th 

Cir. 2007). The view of the Tenth Circuit in Freeman prevails in the federal 

courts and we think it sound. See United States v. Sharp, 40 F.4th 749, 756 

(6th Cir. 2022) (“And our sister circuits have specifically rejected the notion 

that Samson authorizes suspicionless parolee searches regardless of the search 
41

condition or background state law.’’).23 Thus, our reliance on Moore, 553 U.S. 

164, 171 (2008) to justify ignoring the conditions of parole and other 

background Kentucky law as part of the Fourth Amendment analysis was 

overbroad. 

In Moore, the Supreme Court stated, “[o]ur decisions counsel against 

changing the [Fourth Amendment] calculus when a State chooses to protect 

privacy beyond the level that the Fourth Amendment requires.” Id. (emphasis 

added). Indeed, one of the primary purposes of the uniformity rule in the 

Fourth Amendment context is to avoid the situation where the actions of state 

and federal officers are judged by different standards. Id. at 176. There is no 

such danger here because federal courts account for parole conditions under 

state law when conducting the balancing test under Samson. Sharp, 40 F.4th 

at 756. Furthermore, the Samson decision itself commands consideration of 

state law factors when determining the reasonableness of a parolee search. 

547 U.S. at 852. In Sharp, the majority recognized the Supreme Court’s 

Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has not always resulted in nationwide 

uniformity. 40 F.3d at 757. 

Having concluded Bratcher was wrongly decided, we must next consider 

whether the decision should be preserved under the principles of stare decisis. 

23 We find the reasoning of the majority in Sharp persuasive and decline to 

adopt the reasoning expressed in Judge Batchelder’s concurrence as urged by the 

Commonwealth. 40 F.4th at 758. 
42

F. STARE DECISIS DOES NOT REQUIRE RETENTION OF BRATCHER

This Court is aware of Kentucky’s strong and longstanding commitment 

to stability in the law. Matheny v. Commonwealth, 191 S.W.3d 599, 622 (Ky. 

2006) (Cooper, J., dissenting). A Kentucky precedent may not be overturned 

merely because it was wrong, but because “the principle established . . . is 

clearly erroneous.” Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455, 458 (1922). 

Justice Vance aptly and succinctly characterized our steadfast adherence to 

stare decisis: 

Appellate courts should follow established precedent unless there 

is a compelling and urgent reason to depart therefrom which 

destroys or completely overshadows the policy or purpose 

established by the precedent. 

Schilling v. Schoenle, 782 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1990). Recently, this Court 

reaffirmed that a court should not overrule its own decisions simply because it 

disagrees with them: there must be some additional, special justification for 

doing so. Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 496 S.W.3d 435, 451 (Ky. 2016). 

Concomitant with a high court’s duty to “say what the law is,” is the duty 

to maintain fidelity to the constitutional text as well as to maintain stability 

and consistency in the law. Bryan A. Garner, et al., The Law of Judicial 

Precedent 356-57 (2016) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 

(1803)). Importantly, the force of stare decisis “is at its weakest when we 

interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by 

constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.” Agostini v. 
43

Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235 (1997). Stare decisis does not compel us to disfigure 

the law or perpetuate error.

We acknowledge the direct criticism of Bratcher by the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky in Jones v. Lafferty, 173 F.

Supp. 3d 493 (E.D. Ky. 2016), and the recognition of same by numerous panels 

of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Additionally, we note that Bratcher has been 

cited in a leading Fourth Amendment treatise as an outlier. Wayne R. LaFave, 

5 Search & Seizure § 10.10(c) n.116 (6th ed. 2022). Professor LaFave warned of 

the flattening effect of the law into general rules based upon the imprecise 

application of Supreme Court precedent. Id. (“While it would seem that a 

balancing based upon California’s situation should not automatically convert 

into a general rule applicable everywhere, experience regarding similar issues

suggests Samson may well end up being ‘flattened out’ into such a general 

rule.”). Furthermore, any reliance upon the Bratcher decision appears to be 

minimal. Not least because the Department of Corrections has consistently

maintained its policy requiring reasonable suspicion to justify a parolee search. 

See KDOC24 27-16-01. 

As Justice Jackson famously declared, “we are not final because we are 

infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final.” Brown v. Allen, 344 

U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Indeed, “[w]isdom too often 

never comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late.” 

24 Kentucky Department of Corrections Policy.
44

Henslee v. Union Planters Bank, 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., 

dissenting). Because the freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is 

among the most cherished liberties of our people, we cannot permit a flawed

interpretation to stand. Therefore, we must overrule Bratcher to the extent it 

holds that conditions of parole are immaterial to the Fourth Amendment 

analysis. 

G. SEARCH OF TRUCK SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION

With the proper application of Samson in mind, we must determine 

whether the search of Gasaway’s truck was reasonable under the totality of the 

circumstances. 547 U.S. at 852. This issue is properly before us based on the 

Commonwealth’s reliance on Gasaway’s parolee status and Bratcher before the 

trial court. We conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress 

because the search was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 

When a parolee has been charged with a crime and moves to suppress 

evidence obtained from a warrantless search pursuant to the Fourth 

Amendment, a court must determine whether the search was reasonable under 

the totality of the circumstances by balancing the parolee’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy against the necessity of the search to the promote the 

Commonwealth’s legitimate interests. Samson, 547 U.S. at 848. This is the 

test under Samson and we adopt it here. 

A parolee’s reasonable expectation of privacy should be determined by 

considering the nature of parole itself, the conditions of parole, the place where 

the search occurred, the circumstances giving rise to the search, the manner of 
45

the search, and any other relevant information. Id. Without question, a 

parolee enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy than an ordinary citizen. Id. at 

850. On the continuum of state-sanctioned punishments, a parolee also 

enjoys a lesser expectation of privacy than a probationer. Id. However, parole 

is not tantamount to incarceration. Wayne R. LaFave, 5 Search & Seizure § 

10.10(a) (6th ed.). The likeness of parole to imprisonment does not justify, in 

itself, a parolee’s lessened expectations of privacy in the context of a parolee 

search. Id. Rather, reliance upon the legitimate goals of the state in 

connection with the parole supervision process provides a more coherent 

doctrinal framework. Id. at § 10.10(c). This is where the conditions of parole 

fit into the analysis under Samson. 547 U.S. at 851.

In the present case, it is undisputed that Gasaway was on active parole 

at the time of the search. Gasaway was provided with a document setting forth 

the specific conditions of his parole, which he signed. Gasaway explicitly 

agreed that he would “be subject to search and seizure without a warrant if my 

officer has reasonable suspicion that I may have illegal drugs, alcohol or other 

contraband on my person or property.” We also note KDOC 27-16-01, which 

sets forth the general procedure governing parolee searches.25 KDOC 27-16-01 

25 We have not been directed to where a copy of this policy and the regulation 

that incorporated it into law are included in the record. However, the Commonwealth 

points out that they are publicly available on the KDOC website,

https://corrections.ky.gov/About/cpp/Pages/Chapter-27.aspx. Commonwealth’s

response brief at 16 n.9. While it is the duty of a court to determine the applicable 

law, this appears to be a rare case where the content of administrative regulation and 

policies constitutes an adjudicative fact. See Clay v. Commonwealth, 291 S.W.3d 210, 

219-20 (Ky. 2008). In the present appeal, we are not specifically applying the KDOC 

policies and regulations as law to fact. We are considering how the conditions of 
46

carries the force of law as incorporated by refence into 501 KAR26 6:270 § 

1(1).27 KDOC 27-16-01 II.A states “[a]n offender shall be subject to a search of 

his person, residence, or other property under his control. The basis of any 

search shall be consent, a search warrant, or reasonable suspicion that the 

search will produce evidence of a violation of the offender’s conditions of 

supervision.” 

Under these facts, Gasaway’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his 

person, residence, or property is minimal, but it does exist to the extent that

the minimum legal standard of reasonable suspicion is required to justify a 

warrantless search. See Sharp, 40 F.4th at 753. To be clear, the reasonable 

suspicion standard is generally the minimum standard imposed by courts to 

uphold a warrantless search in the absence of a factual showing that a state’s 

need to perform a suspicionless search outweighs a parolee’s reasonable 

expectation of privacy.28 Samson, 547 U.S. at 851; Sharp, 40 F.4th at 753. 

parole and related background law informs the Fourth Amendment analysis involving 

Gasaway’s reasonable expectation of privacy and the degree of necessity for the search 

to promote the Commonwealth’s legitimate interest. Therefore, we take judicial notice 

of the content of the KDOC policies and associated regulations under the authoritative 

source provision of KRE 201(b)(2).

26 Kentucky Administrative Regulations.

27 The Commonwealth’s argument concerning the validity of 501 KAR 6:270 § 

1(1) and KDOC 27-16-01 are not properly before us.

28 Contrary to the Commonwealth’s argument, such a standard does not give 

the Department of Corrections unrestrained policymaking authority. While the 

conditions of parole imposed by the Department and Parole Board are relevant to the 

analysis, it is solely within the province of a court to determine whether a search is 

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 
47

Once the suspect’s reasonable expectation of privacy has been 

established, the extent to which the search is needed to promote the 

Commonwealth’s legitimate interests must be determined. Id. In the parole 

context, the state’s legitimate interests include the necessity of supervising 

parolees because “parolees . . . are more likely to commit future criminal 

offenses.” Id. at 853. Similarly, “a State’s interests in reducing recidivism and 

thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers 

and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated 

under the Fourth Amendment.” Id.

KRS 439.340(3)(b) requires the Parole Board to “adopt administrative 

regulations with respect . . . to the conditions to be imposed upon parolees.”

29 

Effective December 4, 2015, the policy of the Board regarding the conditions of 

parole is to “avoid unnecessary conditions of parole to reduce or minimize the

potential for failure by the offender based on technical violation of conditions 

that are not substantially related to public safety or reduction of recidivism.” 

KYPB30 11-01A.31 This policy carries the force of law through 501 KAR 1:080 § 

1(1), which specifically incorporated KYPB 11-01 by reference. Clearly, the 

policies concerning the conditions of parole as promulgated by the Parole 

29 The Commonwealth’s claim that KRS 439.340(3)(b) is unconstitutional is not 

properly before this Court. 

30 Kentucky Parole Board Policies and Procedures. 

31 As with KDOC 27-16-01, the content of administrative policies and 

regulations is a question of adjudicative fact rather than a matter of applicable law. 

We, therefore, take judicial notice of KYPB 11-01 under the authoritative source 

provision of KRE 201(b)(2).
48

Board are reasonable and promote the legitimate goals of protecting public 

safety and reducing recidivism. 

On balance, we conclude the search of Gasaway’s truck was reasonable 

under the totality of the circumstances. The Commonwealth clearly has a 

legitimate and overwhelming interest in the supervision of parolees. Gasaway’s 

reasonable expectation of privacy was minimal, requiring only reasonable

suspicion to justify a warrantless search on these facts. In the Fourth 

Amendment context, reasonable suspicion exists when a police officer “has a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” 

Commonwealth v. Marr, 250 S.W.3d 624, 627 (Ky. 2008) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The basis of reasonable suspicion must be 

particularized and objective, but “the likelihood of criminal activity need not 

rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of 

satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002)). 

Here, Det. Dover received a reliable report that drugs were found at 

Knight’s Mechanical. Det. Dover determined the substance was heroin. Upon 

reviewing the surveillance video and speaking with employees, Det. Dover 

suspected Gasaway had possessed the heroin. Det. Dover was aware of 

Gasaway’s criminal history involving controlled substances. It was also 

reasonable for Det. Dover to suspect that Gasaway’s truck contained 

contraband given the totality of the circumstances including Gasaway’s parole 

status. Therefore, we conclude the trial court properly denied Gasaway’s 
49

motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his 

truck. 

IV. EVIDENCE OF METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA WAS 

INADMISSIBLE UNDER KRE 404(B).

For his second contention of error, Gasaway argues the trial court erred 

by admitting the methamphetamine and marijuana evidence into evidence.32 

Gasaway asserts it is fundamentally unfair to allow the use of the 

methamphetamine evidence of which Gasaway was acquitted in the first trial. 

Gasaway further argues the marijuana evidence should have been excluded as 

improper character evidence under KRE 404(b). We hold there is no per se rule 

prohibiting the Commonwealth from introducing, in a subsequent proceeding, 

evidence of a crime for which the defendant was acquitted. Nevertheless, we 

hold the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the admission of this evidence 

under KRE 404(b).

A. EVIDENCE OF ACQUITTED CRIMES NOT PER SE INADMISSIBLE

Gasaway asks this Court to join our sister states in barring the

admission of evidence relating to crimes for which the defendant has been 

acquitted. Contrary to the implication of Gasaway’s argument, we are not 

starting from a clean slate on this issue. 

In Hampton v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 438, 442 (Ky. 2004), this 

Court held an acquittal in a criminal case does not preclude the 

32 Any questions regarding the admissibility of the Whizzinator are not properly 

before us. 
50

Commonwealth from relitigating an issue in a subsequent proceeding that is

governed by a lower standard of proof, such as KRE 404(b). This decision 

represented a change in Kentucky law, which had previously held “the 

Commonwealth is precluded from introducing evidence of issues that must 

have been decided against the Commonwealth at the previous trial.” Id. at 441 

(citing Commonwealth v. Hillebrand, 536 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. 1976)) (quotations 

omitted). The basis of the new rule was this Court’s application of the 

reasoning of the Supreme Court in Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 

(1990). Id. at 442. 

In Dowling, the Supreme Court held that neither the prohibition against 

double jeopardy nor considerations of fundamental fairness under the due 

process clause preclude the admission, in a subsequent proceeding, of 

evidence from a prior proceeding that resulted in acquittal, when the evidence 

is offered under a lower burden of proof. Id. at 354. The reason for the rule is 

that an acquittal does not necessarily prove a defendant is innocent: an 

acquittal merely proves the existence of reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s 

guilt. Id. at 349. Therefore, the admission of such evidence in a subsequent 

proceeding is simply a question of the applicable rules of evidence. Id. at 352. 

Indeed, the Supreme Court held that non-constitutional sources such as a trial 

court’s discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence under FRE 403 

constitute an adequate safeguard against the introduction of fundamentally 

unfair evidence. Id.
51

We are convinced our decision in Hampton was sound and adhere to the 

reasoning of Dowling. The facts in Hampton demonstrate the prudence of 

avoiding a per se rule prohibiting this type of evidence if offered under a lesser 

standard in a subsequent proceeding. In Hampton, the defendant was charged 

with murder, animal cruelty, and tampering with physical evidence. At her 

first trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and tampering, but the trial 

court granted a directed verdict of acquittal on the animal cruelty charge. Id.

at 441. This Court reversed the murder and tampering convictions on direct 

appeal. Id. at 440. The defendant was again convicted of murder and 

tampering after retrial. Id. 

On direct appeal, the defendant argued the trial court erred by allowing 

the Commonwealth to introduce evidence that she shot the family cat, which 

was the basis of the original animal cruelty charge. Id. at 441. This error was 

unpreserved, and the defendant did not request a limiting instruction. Id. We 

reviewed for palpable error and held the evidence was admissible under KRE 

404(b) because it was offered to prove the defendant killed the cat “in an 

attempt to confuse the crime scene and turn suspicion [for the murder] away 

from herself.” Id. at 442. The evidence was admissible “as it related to [the 

defendant’s] commission of the other offenses” and “was not error, palpable or 

otherwise.” Id. However, the Court indicated “a limiting instruction or 

admonition would have been proper if requested.” Id. An appropriate limiting 

instruction in this context emphasizes the limited purpose of the evidence and 
52

the fact that the defendant had been acquitted of the prior act.33 Dowling, 493 

U.S. at 346, 353. 

Gasaway relies upon several decisions of other state courts that do not 

follow the rule as expressed in Dowling. However, these decisions predate our 

decision in Hampton. State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1977); State v. 

Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Minn. 1979); McMichael v. State, 577 P.2d 

398 (Nev. 1978); State v. Scott, 413 S.E.2d 787, 789 (N.C. 1992), and Kerbyson 

v. State, 711 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tex. App. 1986). This Court was aware of the 

state of the law in 2004 at the time it adopted the reasoning of the Dowling

majority. Therefore, we do not find these pre-Hampton decisions persuasive.

Additional post-Hampton authority is similarly unpersuasive. Gasaway 

cites State v. Mundon, 292 P.3d 205, 226-27 (Ha. 2012). In Mundon, the 

Supreme Court of Hawaii declined to follow Dowling in reliance on the double 

jeopardy clause of the Hawaii Constitution, which it interprets more broadly 

than the federal constitution. Id. By contrast, we have interpreted the double 

jeopardy clause of the Kentucky Constitution as co-extensive with the federal 

constitution. Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805, 811 (Ky. 1996). 

Therefore, the reasoning of Mundon is not persuasive. 

33 We note the parties agreed a limiting instruction was necessary. At the close 

of the Commonwealth’s case, the trial court provided an oral admonition, but did not 

reference Gasaway’s acquittal. However, Gasaway did not challenge the sufficiency of 

the admonition until his motion for a new trial. A challenge to the adequacy of an 

admonition may not be raised for the first time on a motion for new trial. Webster v. 

Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1974).
53

Similarly, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts declined to follow 

Dowling in reliance on the right to a fair trial under Article 12 of Massachusetts 

Declaration of Rights, which the Court interprets more expansively than the 

due process provisions of the federal constitution. Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 

37 N.E.3d 566, 576 (Mass. 2015). The right to a fair trial is grounded in due 

process considerations. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). This 

Court has consistently construed due process under Section 11 of the 

Kentucky as co-extensive with the due process provisions under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution. Brashars v. 

Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58, 61-62 (Ky. 2000). Therefore, we do not find the 

Dorazio decision persuasive. 

We adhere to our decision in Hampton. Although we determined there is 

no per se rule prohibiting the introduction of evidence for which a defendant 

has been acquitted, such evidence must be otherwise admissible under the

rules of evidence. 

B. METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA INADMISSIBLE AS 

EVIDENCE OF INTENT UNDER KRE 404(B)

The trial court admitted the evidence of methamphetamine and 

marijuana as relevant to intent under KRE 404(b). This was in error.

Under KRE 404(a), the general rule is that evidence of other crimes is not 

admissible to show that a defendant is a person of criminal disposition. We 

have explained the rule as follows:

The reasons for the rule are salutary. Ordinarily, such evidence 

does not tend to establish the commission of the crime. It tends 
54

instead to influence the jury, and the resulting prejudice often 

outweighs its probative value. Ultimate fairness mandates that an 

accused be tried only for the particular crime for which he is 

charged. An accused is entitled to be tried for one offense at a 

time, and evidence must be confined to that offense. The rule is 

based on the fundamental demands of justice and fair play

O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Ky. 1982). KRE 404(b) 

provides an exception to this salutary rule and provides:

Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, 

or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 

to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 

admissible:

(1) If offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident; or

(2) If so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to 

the case that separation of the two (2) could not be 

accomplished without serious adverse effect on the offering 

party.

While KRE 404(b) is couched as an exception to the general rule prohibiting 

improper propensity evidence, it is still “exclusionary in nature.” Bell v. 

Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 882, 889 (Ky. 1994). This Court has long 

recognized “the application of exceptions to the general rule that evidence of 

prior bad acts is inadmissible should be closely watched and strictly enforced 

because of the dangerous quality and prejudicial consequences of this kind of 

evidence.” O’Bryan, 634 S.W.2d at 156. The admissibility of evidence under 

KRE 404(b) is evaluated under a three-part test: (1) relevance; (2) 

probativeness; and (3) prejudicial effect. Conley v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.3d 
55

756, 772 (Ky. 2019). The appellate standard of review is for abuse of 

discretion. Id.

This Court has “found error in the admission of KRE 404(b) evidence for 

an issue not in genuine dispute.” Minch v. Commonwealth, 630 S.W.3d 660, 

667 (Ky. 2021). “Especially in drug cases like this one, other-act evidence is 

too often admitted almost automatically, without consideration of the 

‘legitimacy of the purpose for which the evidence is to be used and the need for 

it.’” United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 853 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United 

States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2012)). The Seventh Circuit Court 

of Appeals has explained it is “not enough for the proponent of the other-act 

evidence simply to point to a purpose in the ‘permitted’ list and assert that the 

other-act evidence is relevant to it.” Id. at 856. “Rule 404(b) excludes the 

evidence if its relevance to ‘another purpose’ is established only through the 

forbidden propensity inference.” Id. Trial courts are required to conduct the 

full KRE 404(b) analysis. 

Here, the trial court found the methamphetamine and marijuana 

evidence was relevant to the issue of Gasaway’s intent to possess heroin. 

Professor Lawson has warned, “there is a very fine line between the use of other 

crimes evidence to prove intent and the use of such evidence to prove general 

propensity to commit crime, and as a result there is a greater than normal 

potential in this ‘other purpose’ category for abuse of the ‘other crimes’ law.” 

Robert G. Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 2.30[4][b] (2022). 

“Special precautions are critical, to minimize the naked propensity logic.” Id.
56

(quoting 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 827 (3d. 2007)). These 

precautions include an assurance that “intent was genuinely in dispute, and 

the uncharged crime was relevant to prove intent to commit the charged 

crime.” Id. Indeed, the use of other crimes evidence to prove the defendant’s 

knowledge or intent “should await the conclusion of the defendant’s case and 

should be aimed at a specifically identified issue.” Id. at § 2.30[2][b][ii]. 

In his opening statement, Gasaway denied possessing the heroin and did 

not offer any proof in this case. By offering the methamphetamine and 

marijuana evidence during its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth was offering 

such evidence as direct proof of his intent to possess heroin. However, intent 

was not in genuine dispute because Gasaway denied possessing the heroin. 

See Boyd v. Commonwealth, 357 S.W.3d 216, 224 (Ky. App. 2011). 

Although intent may be an element of the crime of possession, “intent is 

not placed in issue by a defense that the defendant did not do the charged act 

at all.” See United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900, 904 (2nd Cir. 1988). “When a 

defendant unequivocally relies on such a defense, evidence of other acts is not 

admissible for the purpose of proving intent.” Id. In this context, intent with 

regard to simple possession is distinct from a trafficking offense which requires 

proof of possession and a specific intent to sell. See Walker v. Commonwealth, 

52 S.W.3d 533, 536 (Ky. 2001). The situation where a defendant denies 

possession is also distinct from situations where a defendant admits or does 

not otherwise dispute the fact of possession, but asserts some innocent mental 

state such as mere presence, accident, mistake, or lack of knowledge. See 2 
57

Wigmore, Evidence § 302 (3d ed. 1940) (“The argument here is purely from the 

point of view of the doctrine of chances—the instinctive recognition of that 

logical process which eliminates the element of innocent intent by multiplying 

instances of the same result until it is perceived that this element cannot 

explain them all.”). 

Because Gasaway’s intent to possess heroin was not genuinely in 

dispute, we conclude the trial court erred by admitting the methamphetamine 

and marijuana as evidence of such intent. Even if the methamphetamine and 

marijuana could be viewed as relevant under the circumstances of this case, 

there was insufficient similarity to justify the admission of the evidence as 

direct proof of guilt of possession of heroin. Unlike possession cases where 

different drugs were found contemporaneously in the same location, Gasaway

was found guilty of possession of heroin based in part upon evidence of 

different drugs that were found in a different location on a different occasion. 

This is precisely the type of propensity logic that our evidentiary rules are 

designed to prevent. 

C. METHAMPHETAMINE AND MARIJUANA NOT INEXTRICABLY 

INTERTWINED WITH POSSESSION OF HEROIN CHARGE

The trial court alternatively determined the evidence of 

methamphetamine and marijuana was admissible under KRE 404(b)(2) 

because the evidence was inextricably intertwined with the possession of 

heroin charge. This was also in error. 

As cited above, KRE 404(b)(2) provides a separate exception to the 

prohibition on improper character evidence when evidence of other crimes is
58

“so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case that 

separation of the two (2) could not be accomplished without serious adverse 

effect on the offering party.” “Two types of ‘other act’ evidence fit the 

description: (1) evidence of part of the transaction on which the criminal charge 

is based and (2) evidence required “to permit the prosecutor to offer a coherent 

and comprehensible story regarding the commission of the crime.” Leslie W.

Abramson, 9 Kentucky Practice Series, Criminal Practice & Procedure § 27:168 

(6th ed.). 

Again, Professor Lawson warns of “the need for extraordinary caution” in 

this use of this exception because the “expanded idea of contextual relevance 

often paves the way to prove acts that are anything but inseparable from the 

charged crime, and this label can become a catchall for admitting acts that are 

far more prejudicial to the defendant than useful in determining guilt of the 

charged offense.” Robert A. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 

2.30 [3][c] (quoting 1 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence 809 (3d. ed. 

2007)). “[T]he key to understanding this exception is the word ‘inextricably.’” 

Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky. 2005) (quoting Funk v. 

Commonwealth, 842 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1992)). “The exception relates only 

to evidence that must come in because it ‘is so interwoven with evidence of the 

crime charged that its introduction is unavoidable.’” Id. (citation omitted). 

Evidence is inextricably intertwined where “two or more crimes are so linked 

together in point of time or circumstances that one cannot be fully shown 

without proving the other.” Id. (quoting Fleming v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 
59

209, 144 S.W.2d 220, 221 (1940)). In other words, the test is whether by 

excluding evidence of the prior offense, it would be necessary to suppress facts 

and circumstances relevant to the commission of the charged offense. Id.

(citation omitted). 

The evidence of the methamphetamine and marijuana was simply not 

inextricably intertwined with the charge of possession of heroin. See United 

States v. Lightly, 616 F.3d 321, 354 (4th Cir. 2010) (“the events occurred at 

different times, at different places, and involved completely different motives, so 

there were no gaps in the government’s case without the evidence”). The 

methamphetamine and marijuana are different substances than heroin, and 

these other drugs were found in a different location on a different occasion. 

Therefore, this other-crimes evidence was neither part of the same criminal 

transaction nor essential to allowing the Commonwealth to offer a complete 

and comprehensible account of the charged crime. 

Further, we disagree with the trial court’s conclusion that the 

methamphetamine and marijuana evidence was necessary to explain 

Gasaway’s post-arrest statements to Det. Dover, “I’m not worried about the 

weed or ecstasy and you damn sure didn’t find no three grams of heroin. And 

in Louisville, that’s just a citation.” As in Metcalf, “it would have been a simple 

matter” for Det. Dover to truthfully testify concerning Gasaway’s statements 

about the heroin without mentioning the portion of the statement relating to 

uncharged crimes. 158 S.W.3d at 744. The exclusion of Gasaway’s statements 

regarding the methamphetamine and marijuana would not have required the 
60

suppression of any facts bearing on whether Gasaway possessed heroin the 

day before. Therefore, the evidence of methamphetamine and marijuana was 

not inextricably intertwined with the heroin charge. The admission of this 

evidence was in error. 

We further conclude the improper admission of the methamphetamine 

and marijuana evidence was highly prejudicial to Gasaway’s defense and 

constitutes reversible error. The evidence of methamphetamine and marijuana 

was referenced on multiple occasions throughout the guilt phase of the trial. 

The direct evidence of heroin possession was not overwhelming. Moreover, the 

impact of the methamphetamine and marijuana evidence clearly influenced the 

jury’s verdict given its request, during deliberation, for the trial court to provide 

a copy of the prior oral admonition in writing. Further, any question 

concerning the adequacy of the trial court’s admonition is irrelevant because 

the evidence of methamphetamine and marijuana was inadmissible for any 

purpose. See KRE 105(a) (“When evidence which is admissible as to one (1) 

party of for one (1) purpose but not admissible as to another party or for 

another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the 

evidence to its proper scope and admonish the jury accordingly.”). Nor does 

this case implicate the situation where an adequate admonition is given after a 

defense objection to inadmissible evidence has been sustained. See Soto v. 

Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 861-62 (Ky. 2004). We cannot consider this 

error harmless. Therefore, reversal for retrial is necessary. 
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V. INTERPRETATION OF VIDEO EVIDENCE WAS ERROR

For his third and final contention of error, Gasaway argues the trial court 

improperly permitted three witnesses to interpret the contents of the 

surveillance video. Although we have already determined reversible error 

occurred, we will nevertheless address this issue because it is likely to recur 

upon re-trial. We conclude that Knight was improperly permitted to interpret 

the video and decline to review the other claimed errors because they were not 

properly preserved for review. 

The rule in Kentucky is that a witness may not interpret the contents of 

a recording. Gordon v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 176, 180 (Ky. 1995). 

Specifically, a witness is not permitted to testify concerning events the witness 

did not perceive in real-time. Boyd v. Commonwealth, 439 S.W.3d 126, 131-

132 (Ky. 2014). In Morgan v. Commonwealth, 421 S.W.3d 388, 392 (Ky. 2014), 

we explained:

[A] lay witness “may not interpret audio or video evidence, as such 

testimony invades the province of the jury, whose job is to make

determinations of fact based upon the evidence.” “It is for the jury 

to determine as best it can what is revealed in the tape recording 

without embellishment or interpretation by a witness.” 

(Internal citations omitted). This rule is based on KRE 701, which limits 

opinion testimony to matters “rationally based on the perception of the 

witness.” Id. Additionally, witnesses must testify based on personal 

knowledge under KRE 602. Id. However, the identification of a person in a 

video recording does not run afoul of the prohibition on interpreting a 

recording because such matter is rationally within a witness’s perception. Id.
62

Gasway first argues the trial court erred by allowing Jeremy Knight to 

interpret the video. This error was properly preserved by objection.

34 The 

Court of Appeals held it was proper for Knight to identify Gasaway on the 

video because he was familiar with Gasaway’s appearance. However, the 

record reflects Knight’s testimony concerning the video went well beyond

identification. While the video clip of Gasaway was playing before the jury, the 

following questioning occurred:

Com.: Now you said you viewed the video and saw him [Gasaway] 

pull a phone out?

Knight: Correct. 

Com.: And where was the item you were talking about falling out?

Knight: So, the white,

Com.: Go ahead.

Knight: Item there. 

Com.: Is that that on the floor there?

Knight: Yes sir. 

Com.: Now, that is eventually what you found, correct?

Knight: Yes.

Com.: You started with what?

Knight: I started with Austin when he found it. 

Com.: Now is that video as well? 

34 Gasaway made a “prophylactic” objection to the line of questioning 

concerning Knight’s interpretation of the video. At that time, he did not mention or 

otherwise preemptively object to the testimony of any other witnesses.
63

(Video clip of Austin and Daniel plays).

Knight: Yes. So Austin and Daniel had just got off break and 

walked in and he picked it up and was like, “huh what’s that?”.

After the video stopped playing, Knight continued to testify about what he 

observed on the video. Knight was clearly interpreting the contents of the video 

clip rather than testifying from personal knowledge, perception, or recollection. 

Therefore, it was improper to allow this line of questioning over Gasaway’s 

objection. 

Gasaway also argues the lower courts erred by allowing Brian Tharpe to 

interpret the video. However, we have not been cited to any specific objection 

in the record concerning this allegedly improper testimony. Our review of the 

record indicates that, following the questioning of Tharpe by the parties, the 

jury raised a question concerning whether the video had been viewed in its 

entirety from the time Gasaway dropped an item and the time the heroin was 

found. The jury also posed a question concerning sequencing of the video

clips. 

Gasaway objected to the question about how much of the video had been 

viewed because it had already been testified to by Knight. Regarding the 

sequencing of the video clips, the parties agreed the trial court could ask 

Tharpe which parts of the video he had personally viewed. While Tharpe 

continued testifying regarding his opinions of what occurred on the video, there 

was no further objection. Gasaway did not request palpable error review of this 

issue and we decline to address it further. 
64

Gasaway finally argues Det. Dover was improperly permitted to interpret 

the video. The Court of Appeals concluded Det. Dover’s testimony was 

improper, but determined the error was harmless under Boyd, 439 S.W.3d at 

132. Gasaway points to three instances where the trial court erred by allowing 

Det. Dover to interpret the video. However, we are cited to only one instance 

where Gasaway made an objection. And then, the objection was sustained and 

Gasaway requested no additional relief. 

Regarding the first instance of Det. Dover’s allegedly improper testimony, 

Gasaway did not object. He has not requested palpable error and we decline to 

review this issue further. 

Regarding the second instance of allegedly improper testimony, the 

Commonwealth approached the bench during its questioning of Det. Dover. 

The Commonwealth apologized because the still photographs from the 

surveillance video that it was intending to introduce had been altered and were 

not ready for introduction into evidence. The Commonwealth asked for a brief 

recess to obtain clean copies of the photographs. Gasaway agreed to allow Det. 

Dover to reference the altered photographs during his testimony, and then 

allow the Commonwealth to introduce the clean copies when they arrived. No 

further objection was made. Gasaway has not requested palpable error review 

and we decline to address this issue further. 

Regarding the third and final instance of allegedly improper testimony, 

the Commonwealth asked Det. Dover, “Do have any question at all that was 

dropped by Mr. Gasaway was what was tested positive for heroin at the lab?” 
65

Gasaway then objected to the question on the basis that it called for a legal 

conclusion. Notably, Gasaway stated, “He can say what he saw on the video.” 

The trial court then proposed an alternative wording of the question to which 

both parties agreed. The Commonwealth then asked Det. Dover, “Do you have 

any question whether the substance found on the floor by Austin McClanahan 

at Knight’s Mechanical was the same substance tested at the Kentucky State 

Police Lab?” Det. Dover answered, “There’s no question.” Gasaway did not 

make any further objection or request additional relief. There was no request 

for palpable error review and we decline to address the issue further. 

VI. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we overrule our decision in Bratcher and reaffirm the 

reasoning of the Samson decision as stated above. We hold, albeit for different 

reasons than the courts below, the trial court properly denied Gasaway’s 

motion to suppress. However, the trial court erred by admitting evidence of 

methamphetamine and marijuana under KRE 404(b) because intent was not at 

issue and the evidence was not inextricably intertwined with the heroin charge. 

Additionally, the trial court improperly allowed a witness to interpret the 

contents of a video recording.

Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and 

reversed in part. We remand to the Hardin Circuit Court for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

All sitting. Conley, Lambert, and Thompson, JJ., concur. VanMeter, 

C.J.; Bisig and Keller, JJ., concur in result only.
66

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Erin Hoffman Yang

Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Christopher Henry

Assistant Attorney General