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Filed 12/21/15 Conservatorship of C.S. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

Conservatorship of the Person of C.S.

SONOMA COUNTY PUBLIC 

CONSERVATOR,

Petitioner and Respondent,

v.

C.S.,

Objector and Appellant.

 A145416

 (Sonoma County

 Super. Ct. No. SPR-87786)

C.S. appeals from an order appointing the Sonoma County Public Conservator 

(Conservator) as conservator of his person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) Act. 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5500 et seq.)1 He argues the judgment must be reversed because 

the evidence was insufficient to support a finding he was gravely disabled within the 

meaning of the LPS Act. (§ 5350.) We affirm the order establishing the conservatorship 

but remand the case for further proceedings to reconsider two special disabilities imposed 

on appellant. (§ 5357.) 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 13, 2015, the Conservator filed a petition to establish an LPS 

conservatorship over appellant. The court issued an order establishing a temporary 

conservatorship, and a court trial on the petition was held on June 4, 2015. 

 

1

 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 
2

The Conservator presented the testimony of Dr. Gary Bravo, a psychiatrist with 

Sonoma County Behavioral Health. Dr. Bravo had been appellant’s treating physician at 

the inpatient unit of the Norton Mental Health Center in 2004 and 2005, and had 

evaluated appellant’s condition several times over the years in conjunction with previous 

conservatorships and his mental health treatment while incarcerated in jail. Appellant’s 

diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, and included symptoms of 

“hyperactivity, accelerated speech, loose associations, grandiose delusions . . . [and]

emotional [l]ability, going from euphoric to angry.”

Appellant had lived on Social Security for many years but because of his mental 

illness and periods of substance abuse, he was “either homeless or in the jail.” He had 

been arrested many times and found incompetent to stand trial. Appellant’s mental 

condition made him generally unable to access homeless shelters or services, and 

although he would sometimes stay at hotels until his money ran out, “he was so 

disorganized, manic, that he couldn’t—couldn’t stay in any shelter or even in a hotel.” 

Appellant had recently been in jail and before that had “several 5150’s.”2

Dr. Bravo testified that in his current state, appellant could not provide food, 

clothing and shelter for himself because he did not believe he had a mental illness. He 

did not recognize he had a psychiatric problem and when he was not under a 

conservatorship he would not engage in treatment. Even on medication, appellant’s 

judgment was not that good. Appellant had improved since being moved from the jail to 

a treatment facility and was taking his prescribed medication. Dr. Bravo believed he 

would not follow up on mental health treatment if he was not placed under a 

conservatorship. 

Appellant claimed to have plans to move to Reno and stay in a hotel there, but 

Dr. Bravo believed this was not viable. Appellant had a son in Reno and said he could 

stay in a board and care home where he had lived six years ago. Appellant still suffered 

 

2

 Section 5150 allows the temporary detention of mentally disordered individuals 

who pose a danger to themselves or others, for treatment and evaluation. (Jacobs v. 

Grossmont Hospital (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 69, 71-72.) 
3

from delusions and would say he had millions of dollars, had graduated from Harvard 

Medical School, and was a lead singer or manager of famous bands such as Stone Temple 

Pilots or Earth, Wind & Fire. These delusions did not themselves render appellant 

gravely disabled, but they were relevant to the issue of his insight and his lack of insight 

made him gravely disabled. Appellant’s last conservatorship had terminated two years 

ago. 

Appellant testified on his own behalf and explained that if he were released, he 

planned to go to Reno and move into a board and care home where he had stayed before. 

He said he had a case manager named “Joe B.,” who had been referred to him by the 

West Hills Hospital. Asked whether he had a mental illness, appellant responded, “In a 

way. I don’t think it’s really all of a mental illness. I think it’s more of a—more of a—

just a—just—just a—just a—what’s it called? With a—a ‘slipnosis.’ ” He defined a 

slipnosis as “[l]ike I kind of go back in time and stuff.”

At the conclusion of the trial, the court issued an order declaring appellant to be 

gravely disabled and appointed the Conservator as the conservator over his person for 

one year with powers to place appellant without his consent in treatment. The court

ordered appellant placed in the least restrictive placement available, which at that time 

was a locked facility. It also ordered that appellant would be denied the privileges of 

possessing a driver’s license, possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon, or refusing 

medical treatment relating to his grave disability. 

DISCUSSION

I. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding Appellant

Was “Gravely Disabled”

The court may appoint an LPS conservator for a person who is found beyond a 

reasonable doubt to be “gravely disabled.” (§ 5350.) As relevant here, the definition of 

“gravely disabled” includes “[a] condition in which a person, as a result of a mental 

health disorder, is unable to provide for his or her basic personal needs for food, clothing,

or shelter.” (§ 5008, subd. (h)(1)(A).) Appellant contends the Conservator failed to 
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satisfy its burden because Dr. Bravo’s testimony did not establish appellant was unable to 

provide for his basic needs. We disagree.

“In reviewing a conservatorship, we apply the substantial evidence standard to 

determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability. The testimony of 

one witness may be sufficient to support such a finding. [Citation.] We review the 

record as a whole in the light most favorable to the trial court judgment to determine

whether it discloses substantial evidence.” (Conservatorship of Carol K. (2010) 188 

Cal.App.4th 123, 134.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “reasonable, credible, and 

of solid value.” (Ibid.) 

At the hearing on the LPS petition, Dr. Bravo testified that appellant was gravely 

disabled as a result of schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, with symptoms that included 

hyperactivity, accelerated speech, loose associations, grandiose delusions and emotional 

lability. In Dr. Bravo’s opinion, appellant’s mental illness rendered him unable to access 

homeless shelters or stay in a hotel. Appellant did not understand he suffered from a 

mental illness and was not likely to obtain the necessary treatment unless he was placed 

under a conservatorship. Appellant’s lack of insight into his condition was evidenced by 

his own testimony that he suffered from “slipnosis.” 

While the failure to voluntarily accept treatment does not by itself establish grave 

disability, an LPS conservatorship may be established where the evidence shows the 

person cannot provide for himself without medication and will not take his medication 

without the supervision of a conservator. (Conservatorship of Guerrero (1999) 69 

Cal.App.4th 442, 446; Conservatorship of Walker (1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1572, 1577

(Walker).) The evidence supports a finding that appellant, particularly when in an 

unmedicated state, was not able to secure housing and was thus unable to provide for his 

basic needs.

Appellant argues that Dr. Bravo’s testimony did not amount to substantial 

evidence of grave disability because it was conclusory in nature and was unsupported by 

facts or reasons. He relies on People v. Bassett (1968) 69 Cal.2d 122, 140-141 (Bassett), 

a criminal case in which the court concluded the psychiatric testimony presented by the 
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prosecution was insufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder against a 

claim that the defendant lacked the mental capacity for premeditation and deliberation.3

Bassett is distinguishable. There, two of the psychiatric experts had not personally 

examined the defendant and had concluded, without explanation and without addressing 

the mass of defense evidence to the contrary, that the defendant would not have been able 

to act as he had if he really had a severe case of paranoid schizophrenia as testified to by 

the defense experts. (Id. at pp. 142-146.) A third psychiatrist offered an opinion based on 

a misunderstanding of the term “premeditation.” (Id. at pp. 146-148.) In contrast,

Dr. Bravo had examined appellant many times, cited a number of facts to support his 

conclusion appellant was gravely disabled, and did not misapprehend the legal standard 

for an LPS conservatorship.

Appellant additionally argues the evidence was insufficient because a lack of 

stable housing does not equate to an inability to provide shelter. He relies on 

Conservatorship of Smith (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 903, 906-907, in which the evidence 

was deemed insufficient to support a conservatorship over a woman with no permanent 

home whose paranoid delusions prompted her to hold an around-the-clock vigil outside a 

church and who occasionally became disruptive enough that she was arrested or taken to 

a mental hospital. (Ibid.) Despite her bizarre behavior, the examining psychiatrist 

testified the woman’s “cognitive intellect and most of her personality was intact and, 

despite the disorder, she could feed and clothe herself and provide for her own place to 

live.” (Id. at p. 907.) Dr. Bravo testified that appellant’s mental illness made him unable 

to provide himself with shelter through homeless shelters or hotels; in other words, this 

was not simply a case in which appellant was choosing a transient or unusual lifestyle

despite his ability to make other arrangements. 

 

3

 Diminished capacity has since been abolished as a defense. (People v. Saille

(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1112.) 
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II. Special Disabilities

In addition to its order establishing an LPS conservatorship, the court imposed 

special disabilities on appellant denying him the privileges of holding a driver’s license,

possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon, and refusing medical treatment related to 

his grave disability. He contends those special disabilities cannot stand because no 

evidence was presented concerning his ability to drive and the evidence that was 

presented did not show he posed a danger to himself or others as is necessary to restrict 

his right to possess a firearm. (§§ 5357, subd. (e), 8103, subd. (e)(1).)

Section 5357 provides that the court may impose certain special disabilities on a 

conservatee, including those ordered in the present case. (§ 5357, subds. (a), (d) & (f).) 

Proof of a grave disability does not “by itself satisfy the evidentiary requirements for the 

imposition of special disabilities under section 5357. A conservatee does not forfeit any 

legal right nor suffer legal disability by reason of the LPS commitment alone.” (Walker, 

supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at p. 1578, fn. omitted.) “ ‘The court must separately determine 

. . . the disabilities imposed on the conservatee . . . . [Citations.] The party seeking 

conservatorship has the burden of producing evidence to support the disabilities sought 

. . . and the conservatee may produce evidence in rebuttal.’ ” (Conservatorship of 

George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 165 (George H.).)

The Conservator agrees that the case should be remanded for further proceedings 

to consider the special disabilities imposed by the court. (See Walker, supra, 206 

Cal.App.3d at pp. 1578-1579.) We agree with respect to the special disabilities 

pertaining to appellant’s right to hold a driver’s license and possess a firearm, issues not 

directly addressed by Dr. Bravo’s testimony and on which the court made no specific 

findings of fact. We express no opinion as to whether the evidence presented at the 

hearing was sufficient to support those special disabilities.4 

 

4

 The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply to conservatorship proceedings. 

(Conservatorship of Baber (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 542, 549-550; contrast People v. Seel

(2004) 34 Cal.4th 535, 542 [in criminal case, finding on appeal that evidence was 

insufficient to sustain a conviction is comparable to an acquittal and bars a second trial].) 
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With respect to the order denying appellant the privilege of refusing medical 

treatment relating to his grave disability, appellant offers no specific argument as to why 

the evidence was insufficient to support such a finding. Applying the general practice of 

presuming on appeal every finding of fact necessary to support the judgment if warranted 

by the evidence, we conclude that appellant’s history of refusing to participate in 

psychiatric treatment or take his medication supported an order suspending his right to 

refuse medical care relating to his grave disability. (See George H., supra, 169 

Cal.App.4th at p. 166.)

DISPOSITION

The order establishing an LPS conservatorship over appellant is affirmed, except 

to the extent it establishes special disabilities pertaining to appellant’s right to possess a 

driver’s license or a firearm or other deadly weapon. With respect to those special 

disabilities only, the order is vacated and the matter remanded to the trial court for further 

proceedings.

NEEDHAM, J.

We concur.

JONES, P.J.

SIMONS, J.