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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45917

W. MARCUS W. NYE, an individual,

 Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TOM KATSILOMETES, an individual,

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Boise, April 2019 Term

Opinion filed: August 26, 2019

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 

Bannock County. Hon. Robert C. Naftz, District Judge.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the award of costs, attorney 

fees, and prejudgment interest to Nye is vacated.

J. Kahle Becker, Boise, for appellant. J. Kahle Becker argued.

Ruchti & Beck Law Offices, Pocatello, for respondent. James D. Ruchti argued.

 _______________________________________________

MOELLER, Justice.

I. NATURE OF THE CASE

In an appeal arising out of Bannock County, Tom Katsilometes challenges the Idaho 

Senate’s order granting over $18,000 in attorney fees to Senator W. Marcus W. Nye, awarded 

after Nye prevailed against Katsilometes in a contest over the results of the 2016 general 

election. The Senate confirmed Nye’s election and awarded him costs and attorney fees. Because

Katsilometes refused to pay the attorney fees, Nye brought an action in district court seeking a 

declaratory judgment ordering Katsilometes to pay him the amount ordered by the Senate. The 

district court granted the declaratory judgment and further awarded Nye costs, attorney fees, and 

prejudgment interest. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the district court’s judgment 

upholding the Senate’s award of attorney fees, and vacate the award of costs, attorney fees, and 

prejudgment interest. 
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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Nye and Katsilometes were opponents in the 2016 general election for the Idaho Senate 

seat in District 29. After Nye defeated Katsilometes in the election, Katsilometes challenged the

election results by filing a Verified Complaint for Contest of Election with the Idaho Senate. The 

basis for the contest was Katsilometes’ allegation that Nye had violated a provision of Idaho 

Code section 67-6603, one of the so-called “Sunshine Laws” that regulate election campaign 

contributions and expenditures. In response, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate issued an 

order entitled “Procedural Order for Contest of Election,” outlining the course of proceedings 

and referring the matter to the Senate State Affairs Committee. 

Following hearings before the State Affairs Committee on January 16 and January 23, 

2017, the Committee presented its findings to the Senate as a whole on January 24, 2017. The 

Senate voted on January 25, 2017, to adopt the Committee’s recommendations that the Senate

uphold Nye’s election and order Katsilometes to pay Nye’s witness fees and costs of discovery.

Additionally, the Senate Journal reflects that the Senate separately approved a motion adopting 

the recommendations and findings1 of the Committee that (1) Katsilometes’ petition contesting 

the election was “brought and pursued frivolously, unreasonably, and without factual or legal 

foundation” and (2) Katsilometes be ordered to pay attorney fees in the amount of $18,060.00. In 

so ordering, the Senate cited Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution as its authority. 

Katsilometes paid Nye the amount owed for the witness fees and discovery costs but did 

not pay the amount owed for the attorney fees. Subsequently, to assist him in collecting on the 

Senate’s attorney fees order, Nye brought an action in district court seeking a declaratory 

judgment ordering Katsilometes to pay the attorney fees that had been awarded by the Senate. 

Following cross motions for summary judgment, the district court granted Nye’s motion for 

summary judgment on the declaratory judgment action and entered judgment against 

Katsilometes for the $18,060.00 in attorney fees the Senate had awarded Nye. In so doing, the 

district court determined the Senate was acting within its authority pursuant to Article III, section 

9 of the Idaho Constitution when it awarded Nye his attorney fees following Katsilometes’ failed 

 1 Other than a conclusory statement noted in the Senate Journal, there were no actual written findings in the record 

on appeal outlining the State Affairs Committee’s factual findings supporting their conclusion that the contest was 

pursued “frivolously, unreasonably, and without factual or legal foundation.” In a judicial proceeding, an award of 

attorney fees under Idaho Code section 12-121 requires that such a finding “must be in writing and include the basis 

and reasons for the award.” 
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election contest. The district court concluded that it could not intrude on such an exercise of 

discretion from another branch of government. 

Following the district court’s entry of judgment, Nye moved for an amended judgment 

awarding him prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees incurred in his declaratory judgment 

action. The district court granted Nye’s motion and awarded costs as a matter of right, denied 

awarding discretionary costs, and awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-

120(1). The district court also awarded prejudgment interest from the date the Senate ordered 

attorney fees until the date the district court entered its judgment in the case. The district court 

entered an amended judgment and awarded Nye a total of $35,372.28. Katsilometes timely 

appealed.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are questions of 

law over which this Court exercises free review.” Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40, 232 P.3d 813, 

818 (2010). When the Court considers such questions in the context of a summary judgment 

order, it reviews the record de novo, applying the familiar standards set forth in I.R.C.P. 56:

[T]he standard of review for this Court is the same standard used by the district 

court in ruling on the motion. The court must grant summary judgment if the 

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is 

appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents on file with the 

court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no 

material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 

matter of law. If the evidence reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact, 

then all that remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 

review.

Lee v. Willow Creek Ranch Estates No. 2 Subdivision Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 164 Idaho 396, 

___, 431 P.3d 4, 7 (2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Because the facts in this 

case are largely undisputed, this case solely presents a question of law.

“An award of attorney fees and costs is within the discretion of the trial court and subject 

to an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 716, 378 P.3d 464, 

506 (2016) (quoting Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 P.3d 367, 375 (2004)). 

When this Court reviews whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the fourpart inquiry is “[w]hether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one 

of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted 

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to 

it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.”
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Dickinson Frozen Foods, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 164 Idaho 669, ___, 434 P.3d 1275, 1281 

(2019) (quoting Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 864, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)). 

IV. ANALYSIS

The election contest at the center of this controversy concerns a disputed Senate seat 

following a general election. It is only the second such contest in Idaho’s history. In addition, in 

129 years of legislative history since statehood, the Senate has never before awarded attorney 

fees against a private citizen contesting the results of an election on the grounds that the contest 

was frivolous. Thus, in addition to the important constitutional principles at stake here, this case 

presents an issue of first impression for the Court. 

A. The Idaho Senate did not have authority to award attorney fees to Nye at the time of 

this election contest.

The primary issue before us is not whether the amount of attorney fees awarded to Nye 

was unreasonable, but whether the Senate had authority under the Idaho Constitution to award 

Nye any attorney fees at all. Katsilometes argues that the Senate did not have authority under 

Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution to award attorney fees to Nye, regardless of the 

Senate’s finding that the Contest of Election was “brought and pursued frivolously, 

unreasonably, and without factual or legal foundation.”2 Accordingly, he argues that the district 

court erred when it determined the Senate had such authority and entered a declaratory judgment 

against him. For the reasons discussed below, we agree that the Senate did not have the authority 

to award attorney fees to Nye in January 2017 and, therefore, the district court erred when it 

entered a declaratory judgment against Katsilometes.

As this Court examines the constitutional authority vested in a co-equal branch of the 

government—in this case, the legislative branch—we are respectfully mindful that this dispute 

involves the interplay of the bedrock principles of separation of powers and checks and balances 

enshrined in the Idaho Constitution. Article II, section 1 of the Idaho Constitution provides that:

The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 

departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or collection of 

 2 The Senate appears to have applied the standard from Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(1), which provides that 

“the court” may award attorney fees when a case is “brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 

without foundation.” This judicial rule of procedure is expressly applicable only to the courts. Although the 

legislature later included this language in the current version of Idaho Code section 12-121 (approved and effective 

March 1, 2017), it did not exist in that statute as worded on January 25, 2017. Additionally, as will be discussed later 

in this opinion, the revised statute for election contests now incorporates a similar standard for imposing attorney 

fees. See I.C. § 34-2118(3)(a) (“Attorney’s fees may be awarded against the contestor if the legislature determines 

the contest of election is frivolous and has no foundation in law or fact.”) (effective July 1, 2017). 
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persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 

departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the others, 

except as in this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 

“The separation of powers doctrine embodies the concept that the three branches of government, 

legislative, executive and judicial, should remain separate and distinct so that each is able to 

operate independently.” Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 139, 804 P.2d 308, 312 (1990). “The 

separation of powers doctrine prohibits ‘judicial review of the discretionary acts of other 

branches of government.’ ” Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 28, 394 P.3d 54, 71 (2017) (quoting In 

re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 629 (1995)). “The question is 

whether this Court, by entertaining review of a particular matter, would be substituting its 

judgment for that of another coordinate branch of government, when the matter was one properly 

entrusted to that other branch.” Id. (quoting Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 639, 778 

P.2d 757, 761 (1989)). 

As an initial matter, we acknowledge that the dissent does not believe that “the Senate’s 

decision to award fees was so egregious as to convert a non-justiciable question into a justiciable 

one.” The district court recognized that “[i]n order to reach a decision in a declaratory action, a 

court must determine whether a justiciable controversy exists . . . .” Thus, if the majority were to 

agree with the dissent that this case presents a non-justiciable controversy, the necessary 

outcome would be to vacate the district court’s judgment granting declaratory relief, effectively 

nullifying the Senate’s award of attorney fees to Nye. Yet, the dissent does not advocate for such 

an outcome. Instead, it describes the declaratory judgment in favor of Nye “as a perfunctory 

enforcement mechanism which perfected the Senate’s award.” The dissent cannot have it both 

ways–this case either presents a justiciable controversy that the courts can address, or it does not.

Neither side has argued that this case presents a nonjusticiable controversy. The Idaho 

Declaratory Judgment Act recognizes that “[c]ourts of record within their respective jurisdictions 

shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is 

or could be claimed. I.C. § 10-1201. As the district court correctly noted, in considering 

“whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the criteria is whether it will clarify and settle the legal 

relations at issue, and whether such declaration will afford a leave from uncertainty and 

controversy giving rise to the proceeding.” Sweeney v. Am. Nat'l Bk., 62 Idaho 544, 115 P.2d 109 

(1941). Because we believe that addressing this case will be helpful in clarifying the extent of the 
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constitutional authority granted to the legislative branch under its plenary powers, we affirm the 

district court’s decision to take up this matter.

Further, we note that by deciding this matter, the Court is not meddling in the affairs of 

the Senate—this case was brought to the district court by a member of the Senate invoking the 

judicial branch’s power to impose an enforceable attorney fee award. As Nye aptly recognized, 

absent a judicial decree, the Senate’s imposition of attorney fees against Katsilometes was 

essentially meaningless. Where, as here, a judgment of the judicial branch is required to create an 

enforceable obligation, we believe that a justiciable controversy exists. 

The Senate cited Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution as its authority for 

awarding Nye his attorney fees following Katsilometes’ failed Contest of Election. The relevant 

portion of this constitutional provision provides: “Each house when assembled shall choose its 

own officers; judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members, determine its 

own rules of proceeding, and sit upon its own adjournments . . . .” Idaho Const. art. III, § 9

(emphasis added). The parties disagree on the interpretation of this language. Nye contends that 

this provision grants the Senate broad discretion as to the rules and procedure in a Contest of 

Election, including the imposition of attorney fees. Katsilometes acknowledges the Senate’s 

broad authority granted to it by the Idaho Constitution, but contends that the provision does not 

allow the Senate to award attorney fees against him. Instead, he asserts that the Senate is bound 

by a statute it enacted concerning monetary awards in contested general elections—Idaho Code 

section 34-2120—which, prior to its amendment in 2017, only provided for an award of costs

and witness fees. 

The version of Idaho Code section 34-2120 in place at the time Katsilometes filed his 

Contest of Election stated as follows:

Security for costs—Assessment of costs. 

(a) The contestant shall file with the secretary of state a bond in the amount of five 

hundred dollars ($500) conditioned to pay the contestee’s costs in case the 

election be confirmed by the legislature.

(b) The contestants are liable for witness fees and the costs of discovery made by 

them respectively. If the election is upheld by the legislature, the legislature may 

assess costs against the contestant. If the election is annulled by the legislature, 

the legislature may assess costs against the contestee. 

. . . .
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Ch. 209, § 28, 1982 Idaho Sess. Laws 580 (emphasis added). In July 2017, approximately six 

months after Katsilometes contested Nye’s election, the entirety of Chapter 21, Title 34 of the 

Idaho Code was repealed and replaced with new statutes containing much of the same language. 

See Ch. 293, § 2, 2017 Idaho Sess. Laws 774. However, the section relating to costs was 

rewritten to expressly allow for an award of attorney fees. Id. It now reads as follows:

Security for costs—Assessment of costs and fees—Assessment of attorney’s fees 

(1) The contestor must file with the secretary of state a bond in the amount of one 

thousand dollars ($1,000) conditioned to pay the contestee’s costs if the election 

be confirmed by the legislature. 

(2) The parties are liable for witness fees and the costs of discovery made by them 

respectively. If the election is upheld by the legislature, the legislature may assess 

costs and fees, other than attorney’s fees, against the contestor. If the election is 

annulled by the legislature, the legislature may assess costs and fees, other than 

attorney’s fees, against the contestee. 

(3) Attorney’s fees. 

(a) Attorney’s fees may be awarded against the contestor if the 

legislature determines the contest of election is frivolous and has 

no foundation in law or fact. 

(b) Attorney’s fees may be awarded against the contestee if the 

election is annulled by the legislature due to misconduct, fraud or 

corruption on the part of the contestee. 

. . . .

I.C. § 34-2118 (emphasis added). Thus, the revision that occurred in 2017 changed the statute to 

provide for attorney fees in cases where, as here, the Senate determines that the “contest of 

election is frivolous and has no foundation in law or fact.” Thus, Katsilometes argues that this

change evinces that the Senate implicitly recognized it was without authority to award attorney 

fees at the time of his election contest. 

Katsilometes further contends that this Court’s decision in Noble v. Ada County Elections 

Board, 135 Idaho 495, 20 P.3d 679 (2000), is dispositive of the attorney fee issue. In Noble, the

losing candidate in a primary election filed a Motion to Contest an Election in district court. Id.

at 497, 20 P.3d at 681. After the district court upheld the election results, Noble appealed to this 

Court. Id. at 498, 20 P.3d at 682. As to attorney fees on appeal, the statute at issue provided that 

“[t]he appellant shall file a bond sufficient to cover the cost of appeal of a primary contest.” Id. at

504, 20 P.3d at 688 (quoting I.C. § 34-2130 (repealed)). Interpreting that same provision, this 

Court stated: “This statute is not a basis for awarding attorney fees . . . .” Id. As we explained:
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The general rule is that costs do not include attorney fees unless attorney fees are 

expressly included in the definition of the term costs. The legislature’s awareness 

of this rule is demonstrated by its authorization of awards of costs and attorney 

fees. When the legislature has intended that the term costs cover attorney fees, it 

has so provided. Therefore, we hold that attorney fees are not appropriately 

awarded under I.C. § 34-2130. 

Id. (citations omitted). Although Noble concerned whether the Supreme Court could award 

attorney fees on appeal after a primary election contest was filed in the district court, our 

explanation of whether attorney fees could be awarded under the statute at issue there applies 

equally to the statute in this case, which is also located in Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code.

As noted, the Senate has the constitutional authority to be the “judge of the election, 

qualifications and returns of its own members” and to “determine its own rules of proceeding . . . 

.” Idaho Const. art. III, § 9. Thus, the Senate had constitutional authority to preside over the 

Contest of Election and determine the rules of proceeding applicable thereto. Pursuant to this

authority, the legislature enacted Idaho Code section 34-2120. As discussed, that statute 

explicitly provided for an award of costs but not attorney fees. That the legislature later clarified 

Chapter 21 of Title 34, only months after Katsilometes’ challenge, to provide for an award of

attorney fees strongly suggests that it recognized it had not provided itself with authority to do so

under the version of Idaho Code section 34-2120 in place at the time of this election contest. See

Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Gooding Cnty., 159 Idaho 84, 89, 356 P.3d 377, 382 (2015)

(“It is the long standing rule in this state that when the legislature amends a statute it is deemed, 

absent an express indication to the contrary, to be indicative of changed legislative intent.”)

(quoting Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18, 23 (1987))); see also

Lincoln Cnty. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 102 Idaho 489, 491, 632 P.2d 678, 680 (1981)

(“When a statute is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning 

different from that accorded to it before the amendment.”).

Nothing we say here should be read to cast doubt on the Senate’s constitutional authority 

to enact its own rules of proceeding in the event of an election contest. We are not intervening in 

the Senate’s constitutionally-delegated powers or even in its power to define its own rules by 

statute. Rather, we merely recognize that where the Senate enacts a law or a rule which does not 

permit it to impose attorney fees in an election contest, it cannot do so on an ad hoc basis.

Although our conclusion regarding the effect of the previous version of Idaho Code 

section 34-2120 is dispositive of this case, we briefly address Katsilometes’ additional argument
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that “[t]he statutory scheme in place at the time this election contest was initiated and decided 

defined the substantive rights of the parties which could be impacted by an adverse decision by 

one house of the legislature.” This assertion implicates important due process concerns. As to 

such matters of constitutional importance, we have previously held:

A procedural due process inquiry is focused on determining whether the 

procedure employed is fair. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

prohibits deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fundamental fairness 

through governmental conduct that offends the community’s sense of justice, 

decency and fair play. Procedural due process is the aspect of due process relating 

to the minimal requirements of notice and a hearing if the deprivation of a 

significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur. A deprivation of property 

encompasses claims where there is a legitimate claim or entitlement to the 

asserted benefit under either state or federal law. The minimal requirements are 

that there must be some process to ensure that the individual is not arbitrarily 

deprived of his rights in violation of the state or federal constitutions. This 

requirement is met when the defendant is provided with notice and an opportunity 

to be heard. The opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner in order to satisfy the due process requirement.

Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). 

The Procedural Order for Contest of Election issued by the Senate and sent to 

Katsilometes indicated that the Senate would be performing its constitutional duty pursuant to 

Article III, section 9 to “judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members” and 

that “[n]othing in this Procedural Order limits or restricts the Senate in the performance of its 

duties as the judge of the election, qualifications and returns of its own members.” However, as 

noted, although the Idaho Constitution allows the Senate to determine the rules of its own 

proceedings, the Senate already did so when it enacted Idaho Code section 34-2120, a statute that 

did not provide the Senate with the power to impose attorney fees in a general election contest.

The ordering of attorney fees against a private citizen on an ad hoc basis, without prior notice, 

raises significant due process concerns.3 Conversely, the Senate had notice of our decision in 

Noble—which concerned a similar provision in Chapter 21, Title 34 of the Idaho Code—for 

more than ten years before it imposed attorney fees against Katsilometes under a statute that did 

not expressly provide for them. We also recognize that, as counsel for Katsilometes averred 

 3 We are mindful, as the dissent has properly noted, that Katsilometes asked for attorney fees when he filed his 

contest of the election in the Senate. However, the mere fact that a party seeks an impermissible form of relief from 

a tribunal does not imbue that body with the legal authority to grant such relief. 
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during oral argument, there is no case law over the last 250 years in the United States affirming 

that a legislative body, through its plenary powers, can impose attorney fees against an individual 

who is not a member of the legislative body without a statutory basis. 

Again, as we have approached this dispute, we have strived to honor the doctrine of 

separation of powers and respect the constitutional role of the legislature—a co-equal branch of 

our government. Therefore, we have not attempted to define or limit the Senate’s constitutional 

authority and discretion in determining its internal “rules of proceeding” and regulating the 

conduct of “members” of the Senate. Idaho Const. art. III, § 9. It is unnecessary for us to do so 

here because in adopting the earlier version of Idaho Code section 34-2120, the Senate defined 

and limited its own power to impose such fees. In essence, we are merely holding that the 

Senate, as part of a bicameral legislative body, cannot ignore laws duly passed by both chambers 

of the legislature and impose attorney fees against a private citizen on an ad hoc basis. 

In conclusion, it is important to recognize that at its core, this case does not concern a 

rule of the Senate; rather, it concerns the Rule of Law. Contrary to the hyperbolic assertion of the 

dissent, this is hardly an attempt by the judiciary to “muscle” itself into the affairs of the Senate. 

Indeed, this action was initiated by a member of the Senate seeking judicial assistance in 

enforcing a decision of the Senate. This Court is merely responding to a case that has been 

brought before it—and fulfilling its constitutional role—by applying well-settled legal principles 

to an unsettled question of law. This is a judicial function almost as old as our republic. Indeed, 

as Justice John Marshall observed, in perhaps the most notable appellate ruling in the last 230 

years: “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law 

is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). In short, this Court is merely holding that the 

Senate, notwithstanding the provisions of Article III, section 9 of the Idaho Constitution, is 

subject to the very laws it enacts. This is entirely consistent with another renowned statement by 

Justice Marshall contained in Marbury v. Madison: “The government of the United States has 

been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.” Id. at 163. Accordingly, we 

respectfully hold that the Senate’s award of attorney fees to Nye was improper. 

B. Nye was not entitled to recover his litigation costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment 

interest in the district court action.

Following the district court’s entry of the declaratory judgment, Nye sought an award of 

his litigation costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest for bringing his action in the district 

court. The district court awarded Nye, as the prevailing party, attorney fees under Idaho Code 
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section 12-120(1) and costs as a matter of right pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 

54(d)(1)(A); however, no discretionary fees were awarded. Additionally, the district court 

awarded Nye prejudgment interest on the Senate’s attorney fee award.

In light of this opinion, Nye should not have been the prevailing party in the district court

action. Therefore, the district court’s award of costs, attorney fees, and prejudgment interest must 

be vacated. 

C. Neither side is entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

Katsilometes requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-120(1)

and Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Katsilometes further seeks an opportunity on remand to 

recover his attorney fees incurred during the district court proceedings since he should have 

prevailed below. Nye requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code sections 12-120(1) 

or 12-121. 

Section 12-120(1) applies to claims for monetary relief in which the amount pleaded is 

under $35,000, and entitles the prevailing party to an award of reasonable attorney fees. Here, 

Nye’s claim was for a declaratory judgment effectuating the Senate’s award of fees. Although 

this is a claim for money, the gravamen of the action is a dispute concerning the legal authority 

of the Senate to impose attorney fees in January of 2017 under the then-existing statutory 

scheme. As such, this case does not arise under the circumstances contemplated by section 12-

120(1). Rather, it is, at its core, a constitutional issue. As a result, Katsilometes is not entitled to 

attorney fees on appeal under 12-120(1), and may not seek his fees on remand. Nye did not 

prevail on appeal, so he is not entitled to fees on appeal, and his award of fees by the district 

court must be vacated. 

Attorney fees under section 12-121 are only permissible “if the appeal was brought or 

defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” “Fees will generally not be awarded 

for arguments that are based on a good faith legal argument.” Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 

902, 918, 367 P.3d 1214, 1230 (2016). Here, the parties were confronted with a difficult case of 

first impression, one that concerned important constitutional issues. Both sides defended their 

respective positions professionally, reasonably, and in good faith. Accordingly, we decline to 

award either side attorney fees under section 12-121.
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V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we reverse the district court’s order enforcing the award of 

attorney fees to Nye pursuant to the order of the Idaho Senate, and vacate all costs, attorney fees, 

and prejudgment interest awarded to Nye by the district court. Neither side is entitled to attorney 

fees on appeal; however, as the prevailing party, Katsilometes is entitled to his costs on appeal.

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Justices BEVAN, STEGNER, and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL CONCUR.

BURDICK, C.J., dissenting.

By striking down the Senate’s award of attorney’s fees, I believe the majority muscles the 

Judiciary into becoming a second judge in a proceeding where the Constitution requires the 

Legislature to sit as the sole arbiter. See Burge v. Tibor, 88 Idaho 149, 154, 397 P.2d 235, 237 

(1964). In my view, the Senate’s power to assess attorney’s fees is well within its 

constitutionally granted power to adjudicate election contests. I also believe Katsilometes’s 

due-process rights were adequately protected because he brought himself within the jurisdiction 

of the Senate and asked for attorney’s fees in his petition. For these reasons, I respectfully 

dissent. 

1. The Senate’s award of attorney’s fees was within its broad constitutional power to 

judge election contests and is consistent with Idaho Code section 34-2120. 

The separation-of-powers doctrine prohibits “judicial review of the discretionary acts of 

other branches of government.” In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 261, 912 P.2d 614, 

629 (1995). While the Idaho Constitution confers the power to adjudicate almost all matters in 

controversy to the Judiciary, it gives the exclusive power to adjudicate general-election contests 

to each house of the Legislature. Idaho Const. art. III, § 6; Burge, 88 Idaho at 154, 397 P.2d at

237 (“This provision makes each house of the legislature the sole judge of the election and 

qualification of its members.”) (emphasis added); Beitelspacher v. Risch, 105 Idaho 605, 606, 

671 P.2d 1068, 1069 (1983) (“Art. 3, § 9, of our Constitution gives each house of the legislature 

the power to determine its own rules of proceeding. Thus, this power is specifically reserved to 

the legislative branch by the Constitution, and we cannot interfere with that power.”).

 4 Although Katsilometes asked for a remand so that he could be awarded attorney fees below, he did not ask for a 

remand on the issue of costs.
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In my view, Article III, Section 9 is a “textually demonstrable constitutional 

commitment” which assigns election contests to the Legislature and implicates its discretionary 

authority. Tucker v. State, 162 Idaho 11, 29, 394 P.3d 54, 72 (2017). This Court is “bound to 

respect the reasonable exercise by the legislature of powers expressly delegated to it by the 

constitution of this state, and in the absence of other constitutional offense cannot interfere with 

it.” Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 696, 718 P.2d 1129, 1134 (1986); see also

Barry v. U.S. ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 620, (1929) (“Here the question under 

consideration concerns the exercise by the Senate of an indubitable power; and if judicial 

interference can be successfully invoked, i[t] can only be upon a clear showing of such arbitrary 

and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of due process of law.”).

I do not think the Senate’s decision to award attorney’s fees was so egregious as to 

convert a non-justiciable question into a justiciable one. First, I do not infer from section 

34-2120’s repeal and replacement that the Senate lacked the power to award attorney’s fees 

under the predecessor statute. That the new enactment clarified that attorney’s fees may be 

awarded does not alter the Senate’s underlying constitutional power to assess them in the first 

place. The award of attorney’s fees serves the same purpose as the bond requirement and 

assessment of court costs under the same statute. These measures ensure the swift and proper 

resolution of an election by deterring unfounded attacks on election results which might 

undermine or unreasonably delay them. 

In addition, because election contests are a constitutionally distinct species of 

adjudication, the Senate may choose to interpret the applicable statutes as it sees fit so long as the 

interpretation is reasonable. Here, the Senate did not craft the award out of whole cloth. At the 

hearing, both the Attorney General’s Office and the Senate signaled their understanding that 

attorney’s fees were awardable as “costs” under Idaho Code section 34-2120. That this Court has 

imposed a limiting construction on “costs” to exclude attorney’s fees is persuasive to the Senate 

tribunal, but not binding. See Burge, 88 Idaho at 154, 397 P.2d at 237 (stating that this Court’s 

decision denying a writ of mandamus to compel the counting of absentee ballots under Idaho 

Code §§ 34-1105–1109 was “not binding” on the Legislature but “may be considered . . . for 

what weight or effect the senate may see fit to give it, in the final determination of the 

election . . . should a proceeding for that purpose be initiated . . . .”). 
14

The majority’s reasoning that the Senate “cannot ignore laws duly passed by both 

chambers of the legislature” subverts the plain words of the Idaho Constitution. Section 9 

provides that “each house” acts with autonomy; the power is not subject to bicameral or 

Executive approval. The Legislature cannot diminish a constitutional power by statutory fiat just 

as one session of the Legislature cannot tie the hands of the Senate in a future session by 

rewriting the scope of its power. See Johnson v. Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 620, 57 P.2d 1068, 1075 

(1936) (“A legislative session is not competent to deprive future sessions of power conferred on 

them, or reserved to them, by the constitution.”). Likewise, the language in Noble relied on by 

the majority has no application to the present case because that decision that involved a 

primary-election contest, rather than a general election. Noble v. Ada Cty. Elections Bd., 135 

Idaho 495, 497, 20 P.3d 679, 681 (2000). This is not a distinction without a difference—primary 

contests are determined in the district court, rather than the Senate, and their jurisdiction is 

statutory, rather than Constitutional. Compare I.C. § 34-2123 with I.C. § 34-2105; Idaho Const. 

art. III, § 9. So when the majority notes that the Legislature is aware that the courts interpret 

“costs” to exclude attorney’s fees, this has no bearing on whether the Legislature intended 

“costs” to exclude attorney’s fees when the forum charges each house with interpreting the 

statute. Interpreting “costs” to include attorney’s fees is not so unreasonable an interpretation to 

require this Court’s intrusion into the Senate’s adjudication. See Black’s Law Dictionary 423

(10th ed. 2014) (defining “legal costs” as “[a]ttorney’s fees and other expenditures related to a 

lawsuit.”). 

2. The Senate’s award of attorney’s fees did not violate Katsilometes’s due-process 

rights.

Because section 34-2120 only stated “costs,” the majority characterizes the Senate’s 

award of attorney’s fees as an ad hoc assessment of fees against private citizens without prior 

notice. I cannot view this case through such a broad lens and believe that Katsilometes received 

procedural due process under the circumstances. 

The Legislature must still comply with procedural due process even when it is acting 

within its constitutional power. Cf. In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 128 Idaho 246, 255, 912 P.2d 

614, 623 (1995). The due-process requirement “is met when the defendant is provided with 

notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Council, 136 Idaho 63, 72, 28 

P.3d 1006, 1015 (2001) (quoting Aberdeen–Springfield Canal Co., 133 Idaho 82, 91, 982 P.2d 

917, 926 (1999)). It must be remembered that due process “is not a concept to be applied rigidly 
15

in every matter.” Id. Rather, it is “a flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as 

are warranted by the particular situation.” Id.

We should not lose sight of the fact that neither the Senate, nor Nye, instigated the 

election contest. Katsilometes filed the petition. Katsilometes voluntarily submitted himself to 

the Senate’s jurisdiction and its Section 9 powers. Katsilometes was aware that this was a unique 

judicial proceeding subject to special rules. Katsilometes specifically asked for attorney’s fees in 

his petition. And Katsilometes was provided “with notice and an opportunity to be heard” when 

the Senate gave him the procedural order and a hearing. Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 

1015. The Senate informed Katsilometes that it would operate under Article III, section 9 and 

that the procedural order did not “limit[] or restrict[]” the performance of that duty. Katsilometes 

persisted in his claim and received a hearing. Katsilometes submitted a brief and was given time 

to present his case. As mentioned, the Attorney General’s Office gave a summary of the 

governing law and stated that attorney’s fees were a matter of discretion and the Senate could 

determine how to interpret “costs” in the statute. If the Attorney General’s Office was able to 

research and come to this conclusion, then Katsilometes either failed to research this fact or 

simply disagreed with it. Either way, Katsilometes had notice that assessment of attorney’s fees 

was a possibility. 

Given these considerations, I cannot say that the Senate “arbitrarily deprived” 

Katsilometes of his rights by failing to meet the “minimal requirements” of procedural due 

process when it awarded attorney’s fees against him. Bradbury, 136 Idaho at 72, 28 P.3d at 1015.