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# United States Court of Appeals Forthe Seventh Cir c uit

No. 16-1229
J AM E S F RE E MAN

, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

G U Y P I E RC E, Respondent-Appellee.

Appea l fro m the U ni ted S ta tes Di stri ct Co urt fo r the No rthern Di stri ct o f Il l i no i s, Ea stern Di v i s i o n. No . 1 5 C 4 9 9 4 — Sa mue l De r-Ye g hia ya n, Judge.

A RGU E D S E PT E MB E R 28, 2 017

— D E C I D E D D E C E MB E R 27, 2017

Befor e B AU E R

, M AN I ON

, and H AMI L TON

, Circuit Judges

. B AU E R , Cir cuit Judge. For ov er for ty y ear s, th e Supr eme Cour t has r ecogniz e d that the Si xth Amendment i mpli ci tly entai ls a r i ght to self-r epr esentati on. Faretta v
. California , 422 U.S

. 806, 819 (1975). When Peti ti oner James Fr eeman, char ged in Illinoi s state cour t wi th ki dnappin g and mur der , fi led a moti on to pr oceed pr o se, the judge deni ed h i s r e qu est and2 No. 16-1229
found that he d i d not p ossess the necessa ry exper i ence and abi li ti es to r epr esent hi mself. Fr eeman ulti mately pr oceeded to tr i al wi th a lawy er and w as conv i cted. Whi l e acknowledging that the r i ght to self-r epr esentati on cannot be deni ed based on li m i ted edu c a t i o n and legal abi l i ti es, the Illinoi s Appellate Cour t affi r med the deni al of Fr eeman’s

r i ght on the gr ound that hi s r equest w as not unequi v ocal. The tr i al cour t’s d eni al of Fr eeman’s self-r epr esentati on r i ght, and the appellate cour t’s affi r mance of that deci si on, w e r e b o t h contr ar y to, and unr easonable appli cati ons of Faretta

. Fr eeman peti ti oned thi s Cour t for a wr i t of habeas cor pus, and since he has sati sfi ed the str ingent standar d s for h abeas r eli ef under 28 U.S .C. § 2254(d)(1), he i s enti tled to the i s s uance of a wr i t.

I. BACKGROUND A. Freeman’s Initial Request to Proceed Pro Se On Febr uar y 18, 2004, Fr eeman w a s indi cted in Illinoi s i n connecti on wi th the ki dnapping and mur der of a d r ug dealer , Rober t Gr een. Followi ng hi s ar r ai gnment, the cour t appointed publi c d efender K e v in Foster as Fr eeman’s counsel. In June, 2 0 0 4 , the State a nnounced that i t intended to seek the death penalty

. Shor tly ther eafter

, Fr eeman or ally req u e sted to pr oceed pr o se. Th e tr i al cour t gr anted Fr eeman’s r equest, and Foster wi thdr ew as Fr eeman’s counsel. The cour t held a status hear ing on Nov ember 3 , 2006, and inv i ted Foster to atte n d. A t the h ear ing, the cour t a sked Fr eeman whether h e intended to c onti nue r epr esenting hi mself. The cour t repeatedly r eminded Fr eeman of the p er i ls of pr oceeding wi thout a l awy er , par ti cular l y s i n c e the S tateNo. 16-1229 3

w as seeki ng the death penalty

. Fr eeman r emained fi r m in hi s desi r e to pr oceed pr o se despi te the cour t’s str ong encour agement to hav e Foster r eappoi nted. The cour t then mov ed onto other matter s and set a pr etr i al confer ence d ate in tw o months. How ev er , Fr eem a n in for med the j udge that a tw o-month gap betw een hi s cour t appear ances
w ould r esult in hi m being t r ansfer r ed to a j ai l much far ther

aw ay
. In or der to av oi d the tr ansfer and to set a shor ter status date, Fr eeman agr eed to hav e c ounsel reappoi nted. Fr eeman ask e d wh e ther Foster w ould be reappoi nted, and told the cour t that he “w ai v ed [Foster ] for a r eason.” T he cour t sai d the Publi c Defende r ’ s Offi ce w ould deter mine whi ch p ar ti cular publi c defender w ould be a s si gned. Ulti mately , Foster w as
r eappointed as Fr eeman’s counsel at the next status date. B. Freeman’s Motion to Proceed P ro Se a nd for S t andby Counsel O n S eptember 20, 2007, Fr eeman fi led a moti on ti tled “Moti on to Pr oceed Pr o S e and for S t a ndby Counsel.” In the moti on, Fr eeman agai n stated that he wi shed to pr oceed pr o se due to a “confli ct of inter est” wi th Foster , and that he d i d not beli ev e he w ould “r ecei v e the fu l l effectiv e assi stance of counsel fr om [ F o ster ].” T wi ce in the moti on, Fr eeman stated that he di d not wi sh to be r epr esented by Foster , or any other member of the Publi c Defend e r ’ s Offi ce. Fr eeman a lso a sked the cour t to appoi nt tw o standby c o u n s el. Th e moti on concluded wi th a request that the cour t “ gr a nt thi s moti on for leav e to pr oceed Pr o S e wi th standby counsel a n d a cc e p t thi s
w ai v er as being knowingly , intelli gen t l y and v oluntar i ly

r elinqui shed.”4 No. 16-1229
Fr eeman’s moti on w as taken u p on October 19, 20 0 7

. The
cour t indi ca t e d fo r the r ecor d that befor e i t w as “a pr o se moti on t o pr oceed pr o se a nd for s tandby c ounsel.” After Fr eeman acknowledged that he f i l ed the m oti on, the cour t began questi oni ng Fr eeman about hi s r equest: The Cour t: M r
. F r e e m an, y ou ar e not saying why it is

that y ou say y ou feel Mr

. Foste r cannot gi v e y ou e ffecti v e assi stance of counsel in y our moti on. Fr eeman: I explai ned i t i n ther e. The Cour t: N o
. Y

o u s a y t h a t I be l ie v e t h a t p r e j u d i c e [wi ll] r esult in the outcome w it h t h i s lawy er
r epr esenting y ou and that y ou w on’t r eceiv e the full effect of assi stanc e o f counsel fr om thi s attor ney

. That’s a conclusi on si r
. What facts a r e y ou pr esenting to me that

w ould lead y ou to conclude that? Fr eeman: I mean, based on m e a nd thi s attor ney co m muni cati on and due to t he r epr esentati on that—s i n c e he been on my case, i t hav en’t been—li ke when h e comes and see me, w e
a l w a ys ar guing. Y

ou know he tell me tha t I thi nk I am too smar t. He ki nd of downgr ade
me. He shows si gns of li ke t h is c a s e can’t be

w on and all t h a t

. I don’t beli ev e that he wi ll put hi s full effor t into seein g that I r e cei v e a fai r tr i al.No. 16-1229 5
The cour t deni ed Fr eeman’s r equest to pr oceed pr o se. The
cour t explai ned that Fr eeman had “a b o ut an ei ghth gr ade educati on, that [ he] left school after ei ghth gr ade.” Addi ti onally , the cour t n oted the ci r cumstances of Fr eeman’s ar rest, and stated t h a t h e “di d n ot effecti v ely rai se and exer ci se [hi s] consti tuti onal r i ghts.” The cour t continu ed: Now y ou ar e a sking, after I hav e r uled on the moti on to s uppr ess s tatements, that y ou b e a l

low ed to g o p r o se agai n and that y ou hav e standby counsel. Y

ou don’t hav e an absolute r i ght to r epr esent y our self. Y our r ight to r epr esent y our self i s constr ain ed by cer tai nthings. I h av e al r e ady adv i sed y ou about the p ossi ble pena lti es. I look at what i t i s y ou say for y our
r easons in r epr esenting y our self, and I don’t find that y ou hav e the n ecessar y exper i ence or abi l i ti es, based on what I hav e lear n ed since I r eappoi nted Mr . Foster

, for y ou to r epr esent y our self. Th e c o u r t r e m in d ed Fr eeman that d i sagr eement w i th F o s t e r
w as not ineffecti v e assi stance of counse l, and that “[n]o one guar antees that y ou wi ll hav e a lawy er that y ou get along wi th.” How ev er

, t h e cour t made clear to Fr eeman that i ts deci si on on hi s abi li ty to r epr esent hi mself was final: I find that y our moti on to pr oceed p r o se i s not
w ar r a nted under thi s si tuatio n
. I wi l l not l et y ou pr oceed pr o se any fur ther

. I hav e gi v en y ou an oppor tuni ty to do that once. Y ou hav e asked to hav e counsel r eappoi nted.6 No. 16-1229
Y ou hav e not gi v en me an addi ti onal r eason why y ou should pr oceed pr o se. Based on what y ou told me, based on thi s moti on, I am goi ng to d eny thi s moti on ... Fr eeman obj ected by s tati n g that he w as “not goi ng to tr i al wi th thi s attor ney

.” After fur ther obj ecti ons wer e i gnor ed b y the cour t, Fr eeman w alked ou t o f the cour tr oom befor e the close of the hear in g. C. T rial and Post-Conviction Procedural History On Nov ember 20, 2007, a month after Fr eeman’s moti on to pr oceed pr o se w as deni ed, publi c defe n d er B er nar d S a r ley f il e d a n appear a nce on b ehalf of Fr eeman. Fr eeman m ade no obj ecti on to S ar ley’s r epr esen t a t i on, and nev er made another

r equest to pr oceed pr o se. S ar ley fi l ed a mot io n t o di smi ss the indi c tment, whi ch caused the State to r e-in d ic t Fr eeman on Febr uar y 22, 2008. S ar ley r e p r e sented Fr eeman thr oughout the tr i al, and ulti

mately , a j ur y found Fr eeman gui lty of fi r st-d e g r ee mur der and ki dnapping in Febr uar y , 2009. The cour t sentenced Fr eeman to 60 y ear s in pr i son. Fr eeman a p pe aled on the gr ounds that he w as deni ed hi s S i x t h A m e n d m e n t r i g h t t o s e l f

- r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
. O n Nov ember 18, 2011, the Illinois A p p ellate Cour t a ffi r med the
conv i c t io n, a nd found no er r or in the tr i al cour t’s deni al of Fr eeman’s moti on to pr oceed pr o se because Fr eeman “di d not unequi v ocally inv oke hi s r i ght to self-r epr esentati on.” P eople v
. Freeman , No. 1-09-1148, 2011 WL 9688910, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct.No. 16-1229 7
Nov

. 18, 2011). The Illinoi s S upr eme Cour t deni ed leav e to appeal. Hav ing exhausted hi s state c our t post-conv i cti on r emedi es,
on J u ne 3 , 2 0 15, Fr eeman fi led a pr o se peti ti on for a wr i t of habeas cor pus under 28 U.S .C. § 2 254, r ai sing t e n c lai ms, including that he w as deni ed hi s S i xth Amendment r i ght to
s e l f

- r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
. Th e d i s t r i ct cour t c oncluded th a t F r e e m an’ s self-r epr esentati on clai m w as bar r ed u nder 2 8 U.S .C. § 2254(d) because the Illinoi s Appellate Cour t found he di d not unequi v ocally ev oke hi s r i ght to pr oceed pr o se. The di str i ct cour t also deni ed the clai m on the mer i ts, and di d not gr a nt a cer ti fi cate of appealabi li ty

. On Decemb e r 2 2, 2016, thi s Cour t gr anted Fr eeman a cer ti fi cate of a ppealabi li ty , finding th a t Fr eeman had made a substanti al showin g of th e d e n ial of hi s r i ght to r epr esent hi mself at tr i al. II. DISCUSSION W e r ev i ew a di st r ic t c o u r t’s deni al of a habeas peti ti on de novo
. Stechaune r v
. S m i th , 852 F .3d 708, 7 14 (7th Ci r
. 2017). The Anti ter ror i sm and Effecti v e Death Pena lty Act (AEDP A) pr ov i d es that a feder al cour t may only gr ant habeas r eli ef i f the
s t a te cour t’s adj udi cati on of a pr i soner ’s clai m “r esulted in a de c is i on that w as contr ar y to, or inv olv ed an unr easonable appli cati on of, clear ly establi s hed Feder a l la w , a s deter mined by the S upr eme Cour t of the Uni ted S tates;” or i f the a dj udi cati on “r esulted in a deci si on that w as based on a n unr easonable deter minati on of the facts in li ght of the ev i dence pr esented in the S tate c our t pr oceeding.” 2 8 U.S

. C. § 2254(d)(1) a nd (2). Thi s standar d i s “di ffi cult to meet,” and a pr i soner i s only enti tled8 No. 16-1229

to r e l ief i f the state cour t’s adj udi cati on of the clai m i s “so lackin g in justi fi cati on that ther e w as an er r or w ell under stood and compr ehended in exi sting law bey ond any possi bi li ty for fai r min d e d di sagr eement.” Harrington v
. Richter, 562 U.S

. 86, 102–03 (2011). W

e apply thi s standar d to the Illinoi s Appellate Cour t’s deci si on on di r ect ap peal, as that w as the last state
cour t to adj udi cate Fr eeman’s self-r epr esentati on clai m on the
mer i ts. Jordan v

. Hepp , 831 F

. 3 d 837, 843 (7th Ci r . 2016). Under § 2254(d)(1), a deci si on i s contr ar y to S upr eme Cour t pr ece dent “i f i t appli es a r ule that contr adi cts the gov er ning law set for th i n [ t he S upr eme Cour t’s] cases, or i f i t confr onts
a set of facts that i s mater i ally in di stingui shable fr om a deci si on of [the S u pr eme Cour t] but r eaches a di ffer ent r esult.” T atum
v
. Foster , 847 F .3d 459, 464 (7th Ci r
. 2017) (quo t in g Brown v
. Payton , 544 U.S

. 133, 141 (2005)). An unr easonable a p pli cati on of S upr eme Cour t pr ecedent “must be obj ecti v ely u n r easonable, not mer ely in c or r ect.” Blackmon v
. W illiams , 8 23 F .3d 1088, 1099 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 6 ) (ci ti ng W iggins v
. Smith , 5 39 U.S

. 510, 520–21 (2003)). Although the S i xth Amendment to the U.S

. Consti tuti on only gr ants that a defendant s hall “hav e the Assi s t ance of Counsel for hi s defence,” the S upr eme Cour t deter mined in Faretta that the r i ght to self-r epr esentat io n i s “necessar i ly i mpli ed b y the str uctur e of the Amendment.” Faretta, 422 U.S

. at 819. Acc o r d ingly

, the Cour t held that the S tate may not “consti tuti onally hale a per son into i ts cr i minal cour ts and ther e for ce a lawy er upon hi m, ev en when he insi sts that he

w ants to conduct h i s own defe n s e .” Id. at 807. Thi s i mpli ci t consti tuti onal r i ght to self-r epr esentati on belongs to allNo. 16-1229 9
d e f endants, so long as they ar e mentally competent, and c a n knowi ngly and in telli gently w ai v e the r i ght to counsel. I d. a t 835. The Illinoi s tr i al cour t deni ed Fr eeman’s moti on to pr oceed p r o s e a n d for standby counsel, r elyi ng on Fr eeman’s lack o f educati on and legal abi li ti es for i ts r uling. That r u ling w as contr ar y to, and an unr easonable appli cati on of Faretta

. The Illinoi s Appellate Cour t affi r med the deni al of Fr eeman’s r i ght to self-r epr esentati on, but under a di ffer ent basi s: that Fr eeman’s m oti on and r equest w as not u nequi v ocal. That deci si on, too, w as c ont r a r y to, and an unr easonable appli cati on of Faretta

. The S tate a r gues that the a ppellate cour t cor r ectly concluded that Fr eeman’s m oti on w as equi v ocal, b ut a dv ances another basi s for denyi ng the wr i t: that Fr eeman acqui esced to
r epr esentati on when Foster w as r eplaced by S ar l e y as hi s counsel, a nd ther eby

, w ai v ed the ri ght to self-r epr esentati on. Because the appellate cour t di d not make thi s factual finding, i t i s due no AEDP

A defer en c e , a nd the S tate’s a lter nati v e
ar gument i s ther efor e wi thout mer i t. W e addr ess each of these thr ee d i s ti nc t bases for denying Fr eeman’s moti on to pr oceed pr o se intur n. A. I l l i nois T

rial Court’s Denial of Freeman’s M otion t o Proceed Pro Se Based on his Limited Educ a t ion a nd Legal Abilities Faretta m ade clear that a ju d g e ’s inqui r i es into a d efendant’s “techni cal l egal knowledge” ar e “not r elev ant to an assessment of hi s knowi ng exer ci se of the ri ght to defend h i mself.” I d

. a t 83 6

. I n F a r etta’s own c ase, hi s lack of hi gher educati on and unde r s t a n ding of the law w as a n i mpr oper basi s for denying10 No. 16-1229
hi s request to r epr esent hi mself. Id. at 807, 835 ( n o t in g that Far etta had a hi gh school educati on a nd w as “ li ter ate, competent, and under s tanding”). As the S tate concedes, the tr i al cour t’s deni al of Fr eeman’s moti on to pr oceed pr o se w a s plain ly i mpr oper in l ight of Faretta

. The tr i al cour t speci fi cally r eli ed on Fr eeman’s lack of educati on and unaw ar eness of hi s own consti tuti onal r i ghts in finding that he di d not possess the “the nec e s s a r y exper i ence
or abi li ti es.” Y

et, nothi ng d i s ti ngui shes Fr eeman’s educ ati on and legal abi li tie s fr om Far etta’s, whi ch the S upr eme Cour t found w er e i r r elev ant as to whether Far etta could r epr esent hi mself. S o, the tr i al cour t’s r u ling w as both contr ar y to, and an obj ecti v ely unr easonable appli cati on of Faretta

. See T atum , 847 F .3d at 467–69 (finding deni al of self-r epr esen t a t i on based on tenth-gr a de educati on and li mi ted legal knowledge both contr ar y to, a nd an unr easonable appli cati on of Faretta ); Imani
v. Pollard, 826 F .3d 939, 946–47 (7th Ci r
. 2016) (same). T o the extent the appellate cour t’s affi r m ance w as a conclusi on that Fr eeman could b e deni ed the r i ght to r epr esent hi mself based on hi s li mi te d e d u c a t i o nal and l egal abi li ti es, that conclusi on w as also contr a r y t o Faretta

. See Imani, 826 F

. 3d a t 946. The Illinoi s Appellate Cour t acknowledged that denyi ng the r i ght to self-r epr esentati on based on educati on, abi li ty
or legal knowle dge w ould be i mpr oper
. Freeman , 2011 WL 9688910, at *7. How ev er , the cour t di d not expli ci tly r ecogni ze the tr i al cour t’s er r or or find that i t w as har mless. Instead, the
cour t shifted i ts a nalysi s to whether or n ot the r equest w as unequi v ocal , and ther efor e, w e now ev aluate the r easonableness of that analysi s
.No. 16-1229 11
B. T h e I l l i n o i s A ppellate Court’s Holding that F r e e m a n ’ s Motion to Proceed Pro Se was Not Unequivocal The Illinoi s Appellate Cour t affi r med the d e n ia l of Fr eeman’s m oti on because hi s “r equest for self-r epr esentati on di d not consti tute an unequiv ocal inv ocati o n o f hi s r i ght to pr oceed pro se .” Freeman , 20 1 1 WL 9688910, a t *7. The a ppellate cour t gav e thr ee r easons, based on the r ecor d, for concluding that Fr eeman’s mot i o n t o pr oceed pr o se w as not unequi v ocal: ( 1 ) t hat Fr eeman took “v aci l lati ng posi ti ons” on whether to
r epr esent hi mself; ( 2 ) that Fr eeman “also r equested standby counsel”; and, (3) that Fr eeman’s moti on “w as pr i mar i ly based
on hi s obj ecti on to r epr esentati on by cer tain counsel, r ather than a d eci si on to self-r epr esent.” Freeman , 2 0 1 1 WL 9688910, at *7. T h is conclusi on si mply cannot be squar ed wi th ei the r Faretta or the recor d. W e addr ess each of these r e asons for concluding that Fr eeman’s r equest w as equi v ocal. 1. V acillating Positions on Representation In or der to effecti v ely r a i se the r i ght to self-r epr esentati on, the r equest must b e made “ clear ly and unequi v ocally .” See Faretta, 422 U.S

. a t 835; see also United States v
. Campbell , 659 F .3d 607, 612 (7th Ci r
. 2 0 1 1 ) , v a cated on other grounds , 568 U.S

. 802 (2012). Cour ts hav e r equi r ed a clear a nd u nequi v ocal

r equest to ensur e agai nst a defendant losing h i s S i xth Amendment r i ght to c ounsel, as w ell as to pr ev en t a d efendant fr om using a n a mbi guous request a s a w eapon to ov er tur n hi s
conv i cti on on appeal. Id.12 No. 16-1229
N o t h ing in the r ecor d indi cates Fr eeman took v aci llating posi ti ons on hi s desi r e to r epr esent hi mself. Fr eeman’s moti on
w as expli ci tly ti tled “Moti on to Pr oceed Pr o S e and for S tandby Counsel,” and in i t, Fr eeman made a defini ti v e r equest that the
cour t “gr ant thi s moti on for l eav e to pr oceed pr o se.” Mor eov er , nothi ng in t h e r ecor d suggests that the tr i al cour t mi sunder stood Fr eeman’s moti on. The r ecor d i s r eplete wi th statements fr om the tr i al cour t indi c ati ng that i t cl ear ly inter p r eted Fr eeman’s moti on as a r equest for self-r epr esentati on: “I hav e befor e me a mot i o n t o pr oceed pr o se and for standby c ounsel”; “Y

ou don’t hav e an absolute r i g ht to
r epr esent y our self”; “I don’t find that y ou hav e the necessar y exper i ence or abi li ti es
... to r epr esent y our s e l f ”; “I find that y our moti on to pr oceed pr o se i s not w a r r anted under thi s si tuati on.” The Illinoi s App ellate Cour t di d not elabor ate on exactly how Fr eeman took v aci l lati ng posi ti ons, but i t d i d r e fer ence the fact that Fr eeman agr eed to h av e the P ubli c D efender ’s Offi ce
r eappointed to hi s case after ini ti ally pr oceedin g pr o se. How e v e r

, Fr eeman’s wi llin gness to hav e Foster r eappoi nted had no b ear ing on whether h i s moti on to p r oce e d pr o s e ten months later w as u nequi v ocal. Faretta for ecloses any ar gument to the contr a r y

, sin ce the S upr eme Cour t found no v aci llati on
o r e qu iv o c a t i o n in F a r e t t a ’ s r equest for self-r epr esentati on ev en though Far etta had pr ev i ously b e e n a p p o int e d c ounsel. Faretta, 422 U.S

. at 807 (noti ng Far etta ini ti ally w as appointed c ounsel at hi s ar r a ig n ment). A conclusi on that Fr eeman v aci llated on
r e p r e s e n tin g hi m s e l f b e c a u se of p r i or r epr esentati o n i s c o nt r a r y to, and an unr easonable appli cati on of Faretta

.No. 16-1229 13
2. Request for Stand-By Counsel A r equest to pr oceed p r o s e that i s accompani ed by a
r e qu e s t to appoi nt stand-by counsel does not make that r e qu e s t equi v ocal. In f act, Faretta expli ci tly contemplates that a defendant can both inv oke the r i ght to self-r epr esentati on and

r equest stand-by counsel. The Cour t i n Faretta acknowledged that the appoi ntment of stand-by c o u ns e l may be necessary “ev en ov er obj ecti on by the accused

... to ai d t h e accused i f and when t h e a ccused r equests help, and to be av ai lable to
r epr esent the accused in t he ev ent that ter minati on of the defendant’s self-r epr esentati on i s necessary .” Faretta, 422 U.S

. at 834, n. 46; see McKas k le v
. W iggins , 465 U.S

. 168, 170 (1984) (noti n g that Faretta “held that a tr i al c our t ma y appoint ‘standby counsel’ to assi st the pro se d efendant in hi s defense”). Th e I l l in o i s Appellate Cour t’s r eli a nce on Fr e e m an’ s r e qu e s t fo r s t an d

-b y c o u n s e l in r eaching i ts conclusi on of equi v ocati on w a s contr ar y to, and an unr easonable appli cati on of Faretta

. 3. Dissatisfaction with Counsel The S tate r eli es pr i mar i ly on the Illinoi s Appellate Cour t’s conclusi o n th a t Fr eeman’s r equest w as based on hi s d i s sati sfacti on w it h F o s ter

. Agai n, the Illinoi s Appellate Cour t di d not elabor a te on how i t r eached thi s conclusi on other than stati ng i t w as based on the r ecor d

. As an ini ti al matter

, i t w as i mpr oper f o r t he tr i al cour t to
r equi r e Fr eeman to j usti fy why he wi shed to p r oceed p r o se bey ond what he had explai ned in hi s moti on. “It i s u ndeni able that in most cr i minal pr osecuti ons d efendants could b etter defend w i th counsel’s gui d ance than by thei r ow n u n ski lled effor ts.” Faretta, 422 U.S

. a t 834. Y et, a defendant’s choi ce to14 No. 16-1229

exer ci se hi s r i ght to self-r epr esentati on “must be h onor ed out of that r espect for the indi v i dua l w h ic h is the li feblood of the law

. ” I d

. ( ci tati on a n d inter nal quotati on m a r ks omi tted). Vi r tually ev er y ti me a defendant elects to pr oceed pr o s e he i s making a fooli sh choi ce, but “[n]othin g in Faretta or i ts p r ogeny allows the j udge to r e qu ir e the defendant to pr ov e he i s making the choi ce for a r eason the j udge finds s ati sfactor y .” Imani, 826 F .3d at 945. Di ssati sfacti on wi th counsel does not make a self-r epr esentati on r equest equi v ocal, and agai n, Faretta for ecloses such an

ar gument. In that case, Far etta s tated that he no longer wi s hed to be r epr esented by the Publi c Defender ’s Offi ce in h i s r equest to pr oceed pr o se since “he beli ev ed that that offi ce w as ‘v er y loaded down w it h

... a heav y case load.’” Faretta, 422 U.S

. a t 807. The Cour t found that Far etta’s r equest w a s unequi v ocal despi te being pr i mar i ly based on h i s di ssati sfa c t io n wi th hi s publi c defender

. Id. at 835. Fr eem a n ’ s request to pr oceed pr o se, li ke Far etta’s, w as pr i mar i ly based on h i s di ssati sfacti on wi th Foster

. The r i ght of self-r epr esentati on w ould be v i r tually i mpossi ble to inv oke i f di ssati sfacti on wit h counsel meant equi v ocati on since most r equests to pr oceed p r o se ar e pr emi sed on p r e c is ely those gr ounds. See Batchelor v
. Cain , 682 F .3d 400, 408 (5th Ci r . 2012). Mor eov er

, Fr eeman di d n ot open hi mself up to equi v ocati on by r equesting that Foster be r emov ed or replaced as
c o u n sel. See McGhee v
. Dittmann , 794 F .3d 761, 770 (7th C ir

. 2015) (“A r equest to di schar ge counsel, wi thout mor e, or di

nar i ly does n ot si gnal a clear desi r e for s elf-r epr esentati on.”). Fr eeman’s moti on and h is statements on the r ecor d clear lyNo. 16-1229 15

r eflect tha t he n o longer w a n ted to be repr esented by Foster and that he w anted to pr oce ed pr o se. Th e Illinoi s Appellate Cour t’s c o nclusi on that di s sati sfacti on w i th Foster m ade Fr eem an’ s r e qu e s t equi v ocal w as c ontr ar y to, and an u nr easonable appli c ati on of Faretta

. The S tate acknowledge s that Fr eeman’s moti on w as unequi v ocal, b ut ar gues that Fr e eman’s subsequent conduct after h i s moti on w as deni ed m a de hi s r equest eq u iv o c a l

. In par ti cular

, the S tate suggests that Fr eeman’s fai lur e to r e-r ai se hi s moti on or obj ect to r epr esentat io n b y S ar l ey after he

r eplaced Fost e r demonstr ates that hi s r eal m oti v e w as to
r eplace Foster wi th new counsel, not to r epr esent hi mself. In United St a t e s v
. Campbell , w e noted that a d efendant’s subsequent conduct i s r elev ant in d eter minin g wh e ther a
r equest for self-r epr esentati on i s unequi v ocal. 659 F .3d at 613. In that c a se , the defendant wr ote a l etter to the tr i al cour t seeki ng a conti nuance that concluded wi th a r equest for a new lawy er , or alter nati v ely

, to pr oceed pr o se. Id. at 610. Th e tr i al
cour t constr ued i t as a moti on to substi tute c ounsel, and when the cour t asked the defendant whether he r eally intend e d to
r epr esent hi mself, the defendant w av er ed and s ai d he di d not. Id. at 610–11. Whi l e noti ng that hi s ini ti a l letter to the tr i al cour t
w as u nequi v ocal, w e ulti mately found the defendant’s r equest
w as equi v ocal s in c e he later indi cated that he d i d not wi sh to
r epr esent hi mself, whi ch w as “follow ed by the si lence and the subsequent acceptance of r epr esenta ti on thr oughout the tr i al.” Id. at 613. But, Campbell i s mater i a lly di stingui shable. Our finding of equi v ocati on t h er e w as p r i mar i l y based on the d efendant’s16 No. 16-1229

w av er in g posi ti on in cour t on self-r epr esentati on, follow ed b y subsequent conduct that indi cated h e di d not w i sh to r epr esent hi mself. Fr eeman di d not w a v er a s to whether he w a nted to
r epr esent hi mself when the tr i al cour t addr essed hi s c lear ly stated moti on. I n f a c t, Fr eeman w as so emphati c in h i s desi r e to pr oceed pr o se that he left the cour tr oom befor e the end of the hear ing due to the j udge’s r efusal to gr ant the moti on. Impor tantly

, the tr i al c our t in Campbell also c onsid e r e d the defendant’s request to pr oceed pr o se wi thdr awn and moot in li ght of hi s w a v er ing posi ti on. Id. at 611

. Fr eeman nev er wi thdr ew hi s moti on, a s the tr i al cour t clear ly d eni ed i t on the
mer i ts. C. The State’s Argument on Appeal that Freeman Acquiesced t o R epresentation by Sarley , and W aived t h e Right to Self-Representation On a ppeal, the S tate adv ances a di stinct basi s fr om equi v ocati on for denyi ng the wr it that i s not addr essed or found in the Illinoi s A p p ellate Cour t’s opi ni on. Accor ding to the S tate under thi s alter nati v e ar gument, Fr eeman acqui esced to
r epr esentati on by S ar ley by not r e-r ai sin g hi s moti on or obj ecting to S ar ley’s r epr esentati on once he r eplaced Foster , and as a r esult, Fr ee m a n w ai v ed the ri ght to self-r epr esentati on. Whether a d efendant w a ive d hi s r i ght t o s e l f-r epr esentati on thr ough a cqui escence i s a questi on of fac t

. C a i n v
. Peters , 972 F .2d 748, 749 (7th Ci r
. 1992). Because the Illinoi s Appellat e Cour t di d not make such a factual finding of a cqui esce n c e or
w ai v er , w e a ffor d no AEPDA defer ence to the S tate’s alter nati v e ar gument. See 28 U.S .C. § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) (state-cour tNo. 16-1229 17
findings of fact can only be r ebutted by c lear a nd c onv incing
ev i dence). The S tate’s acqui escence and w a i v er ar gument i s wi thout
mer i t; n othin g in the r ecor d suppor ts such a factual finding. In d e n yi ng Fr eeman’s r equest to pr oceed pr o s e, the tr i a l co u r t expli ci tly told Fr eeman that “I w i ll not let y ou pr oceed pr o se any fur ther .” Fr eeman w as under no obli gati on to r easser t hi s moti on or conti nually obj ect to the cour t’s deni a l of hi s moti on after the c our t had clear ly deni ed hi s r equest. Once aga in, Faretta affi r ms w h y t hi s i s so. After Far etta’s request w as deni ed and he pr oceeded t o t r i al wi th counsel, the Cour t di d not fin d that Far etta acqui esced to r epr esentati on by counsel,
or that he w ai v ed the r i ght to r epr e sent hi mself. Faretta, 422 U

. S

. at 810–11. Accor dingly , ev er y other ci rcui t that has encounter ed such an ar gument has r ej ected i t. See Batchelor , 682 F

. 3 d a t 4 12 (stating that a defendant “w as not r equi r ed, i n or der to av oi d w a i v er

, to add anythi ng to the str a i ghtfor w ar d

r equest t h at he had alr eady made plain in wr i ti ng”); Buhl v
. C o o ks e y, 233 F .3d 783, 803 (3d Ci r
. 2000) (noti ng that defen

dant’s fa i l u r e t o obj ect to the d eni al of hi s r equest to pr oceed pr o s e w as a “far cr y fr o m v aci llati on or w ai v er ”); W ilson v
. W alker , 204 F .3d 33, 37 ( 2d Ci r
. 2 000) (stating that a defendant need not conti nually r e a ss er t h i s request to pr oceed p r o se in or d e r “ to av oi d w a i v er of a pr ev i ously inv oked r i ght to selfr epr esentati on”); United States v
. Arlt, 41 F .3d 516, 523 (9th Ci r
. 1994) (“[O]nce a defendant has stated hi s r equest clear ly and unequi v ocally and the j udge has deni ed it in a n equally clear and unequi v ocal fashi on, the defendant i s under no obli gati on to r enew the moti on.”).18 No. 16-1229
The tr i a l cour t’s deni al of Fr eeman’s unequi v ocal moti on to pr oceed pr o se on the basi s that he lacke d t he necessary exper i ence a nd abi li ti es to r epr esent hi mself w as contr ar y to, and a n u n r easonable appli cati on of Faretta

. In a ffi r min g thi s
er r or on the basi s of equi v ocati on, the Illinoi s Appellate Cour t
r eached a c onclusi o n t h a t w a s also both contr ar y to, and an
unr easonable a p pli cati on of Faretta

. Th e S t a te’s a lter nati v e
ar gument of acqui escence and w ai v er , whi ch the a ppellate
cour t di d not r each, does not c hange our analysi s. Thus, Fr eeman’s conv i cti on cannot stand.

III. CONCLUSION The di s tr i ct c our t’s j udgment i s REVERS ED and the case i s REMANDED wi th instr ucti ons to gr ant the wr i t o f habeas
cor p us or der ing that Fr eeman be re t r i ed, or pr omptly r eleased.