CLD-172 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 14-4056

___________

JOSEPH OSMOND DANIHEL,

 Appellant

v.

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; UNITED 

STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING & URBAN DEVELOPMENT; OFFICE OF 

UNITED STATES SENATOR OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF UNITED STATES 

FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 

OFFICE OF UNITED STATES SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE 

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF UNITED STATES THIRTEENTH 

CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; THE 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR OF THE 

STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA; OFFICE OF STATE SENATOR OF PENNSYLVANIA 

SECOND SENATORIAL DISTRICT; OFFICE OF THE MAYOR OF THE CITY OF 

PHILADELPHIA; CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF THE CITY COUNCIL 

PRESIDENT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF THE 6TH CITY 

COUNSEL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF 7TH CITY 

COUNCIL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; OFFICE OF 9TH CITY 

COUNCIL DISTRICT OF CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; DEREK GREEN; 

REDEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA; BRIAN 

ABERNATHY, Employee of Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MR. CUORATO, 

Employee of Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MR. SCAFIDI; MS. SMYLER, 

Employee of The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; ROB DUBOW, Employee of 

The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MS. JENNIFER RODRIGUEZ, Employee 

of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority; MR. ALLEN GREENSBERGER, 

Employee of the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civil No. 2-14-cv-01330)

District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro

____________________________________
2

Submitted for Possible Summary Action 

Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

April 23, 2015

Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: June 9, 2015)

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OPINION*

_________

PER CURIAM

Pro se appellant Joseph Danihel appeals the District Court’s order granting the 

defendants’ motions to dismiss his complaint. Several defendants have filed motions to 

summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we will 

grant those motions and summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment as to all 

defendants.1 See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.

Although divided into 543 separately numbered paragraphs, Danihel’s allegations 

are reasonably simple. He claims that in February 1991, he bought a home in the “Logan 

Triangle” neighborhood of Philadelphia, an area where homes were sinking into the 

ground. In October 1993, Danihel allegedly reached an agreement with the Logan 

Assistance Office to permanently vacate his home in exchange for $80,000. As agreed, 

Danihel left his home, but he apparently retained ownership of the land. Later, the City 

 

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent.
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of Philadelphia demolished the home because of its unsafe condition. Both before and 

after the demolition, the Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (RDA) sought to 

purchase the land from Danihel, but the parties were unable to reach an agreement. 

Eventually, the RDA filed a declaration of taking and seized the land. Danihel contends 

that he has not received any compensation from the RDA. It is not clear from his 

complaint whether he received the $80,000 that he was allegedly promised by the Logan 

Assistance Office. 

In March 2014, Danihel filed a complaint against a host of federal and state 

entities and officials. He alleged that the defendants (1) took his property without paying 

just compensation as required by the Fifth Amendment; (2) violated his rights under the 

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) violated his due process 

rights by taking his property without providing him with a jury trial; (4) violated his 

rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act; (5) violated his right to pursue happiness; 

and (6) committed legal and professional malpractice. He sought $4 million in damages 

for each claim. The defendants filed motions to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) &

(b)(6), and the District Court granted those motions, dismissing Danihel’s complaint in its 

entirety. Danihel then filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

 

1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard of 

review. See Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 2013). 
4

We agree with the District Court’s disposition of this case.2 Central to Danihel’s 

complaint is his allegation that the defendants have taken his property without paying 

proper compensation under the Fifth Amendment. However, “[a] plaintiff must first seek

compensation through the procedures the State has provided for doing so before asserting 

a federal takings claim.” Chainey v. Street, 523 F.3d 200, 222 (3d Cir. 2008). Danihel

has admittedly not pursued an inverse-condemnation action through Pennsylvania’s 

Eminent Domain Code; as a consequence, this claim is not yet ripe for our review. See

id. at 222-23.

We likewise conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Danihel’s equalprotection claim. Because Danihel has not claimed to be a member of a protected class, 

his claim must be premised on a “class-of-one” theory. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of 

Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). To make out such a claim, Danihel must “allege[] that 

[]he has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there 

is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 

U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). While Danihel states, without elaboration, that other 

 

2 We note at the outset that several of Danihel’s claims are barred by sovereign immunity. 

This includes Danihel’s constitutional claims against the Commonwealth and its governor 

in his official capacity, see, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl.-Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 

503 (3d Cir. 2001); Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 635 (3d Cir. 1990); his state-law claims 

against those same parties, see 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2310; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 8521–8522; 

and his constitutional claims against the United States Department of Housing and Urban 

Development and the president and members of Congress in their official capacities, see

FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130, n.4 

(3d Cir. 1986). The District Court therefore lacked jurisdiction over these claims. See

FDIC, 510 U.S. at 475.
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individuals were treated better than him, these conclusory allegations are altogether 

insufficient to state a claim. See Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 

159, 171 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of claim resting on similar allegations). 

Next, as the District Court explained, “it has long been settled that there is no 

constitutional right to a jury in eminent domain proceedings.” United States v. Reynolds, 

397 U.S. 14, 18 (1970). Thus, Danihel’s claim that his constitutional right to a jury trial 

was infringed lacks merit. Moreover, we note that, under Pennsylvania law, Danihel was 

entitled to request a jury trial in the eminent-domain proceedings, see 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. 

§ 517(b), but he has not stated whether he invoked that right. 

We likewise agree with the District Court’s analysis of Danihel’s claim under Title 

VI. Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, 

color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or 

be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 

assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Danihel has not alleged that he was harmed due to his 

membership in a Title VI class, and his claim therefore fails as a matter of law. See 

generally Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir. 2002).

Nor did the Court err in dismissing Danihel’s claim that the defendants infringed 

his right to pursue happiness. He has raised this claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

3

“[t]o state a 

 

3 He also relies on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 

Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but this distinction is of no consequence. See generally

Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001) (“A Bivens action, which 
6

claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the 

Constitution and laws of the United States.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 

Danihel has not identified any constitutional provision or federal law that guarantees his 

right to happiness, and his claim therefore will not lie. Cf. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 

57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[t]he Declaration of Independence . . . is not a 

legal prescription conferring powers on the courts”).

We also agree with the District Court that Danihel failed to allege that he 

possessed the requisite relationship with any of the defendants to sustain a malpractice 

claim. See Post v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 691 F.3d 500, 521 (3d Cir. 2012); Cost v. 

Cost, 677 A.2d 1250, 1253–54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).

Moreover, the District Court did not violate Danihel’s right to a jury trial under the 

Seventh Amendment by granting the motions to dismiss. See, e.g., Haase v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 631 n.5 (5th Cir. 2014). Finally, given the 

serious failings in Danihel’s complaint — and the fact that the numerous documents 

Danihel has filed in this Court give no indication that he can cure its deficiencies — we 

are satisfied that amendment would have been futile. The District Court therefore did not 

err in dismissing the complaint without providing leave to amend. See Grayson v. 

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

 

is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action against state actors, will lie where 

the defendant has violated the plaintiff's rights under color of federal law.”).
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Accordingly, we will grant the defendants’ motions and summarily affirm the 

District Court’s judgment. Danihel’s petition for coram nobis, his requests that the Court 

take judicial notice of various facts, and his other pending requests are all denied.