The Honor able J. Ronni e Gr eer , United States District J udg e for the Easter

n District of * Tenne ssee, sitting by

desig nation

. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 07a0539n.06 Filed: August 1, 2007 No. 06-3323
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee,
v. JEF F RE Y J . M OF F IE, Defendan t-Appellant. / ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

BEFORE: CLAY and S UTTON, Circuit Judges; and GREER, District Judge. * CLAY, Circ uit Jud ge. Def endant, Jeffre y

J . Moffie, a

ppeals his conviction and se ntence
. Def endant wa s convicted of

bank fr aud, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 1344, for providing false a

nd fra udulent financ ial information to Ba nk One in connec tion with five loan applications. Defenda nt
was se n te n c e d

to a te r m o f im p r is o n me n t o f

th ir ty
- s e v e nmo n th s an d

to thr e e y e ar s o f

supervised rele ase. F or the re asons set for th below, we AF F IRM Def endant’ s conviction and sente nce.No. 06-3323

2 BACK GR OUND Def endant a nd Dale D elg ado (“ Delg ado”) met in 1993 while workingas sec urities broker s with Dean Witter. Defenda nt and Delga do left Dean Witt er to for m Cambridge Investment Group, I nc. (“ Cambridg e”) , a fina ncial and investment service s company . Def endant beg an to g et involved in the “consulting and investment bankingbusin es s , ” (J

. A. 1024), but “in the fall of 1994 . . . . decide d not to renewhis brokera g e license , [and] all of hi s cl i ents g ot transfe rre d to [ Delg ado],” (J.A . 1 01 5) . D e fe nd ant

ha[d] an idea

of helpingpeople g et l o an s t h at had trouble g etting loans, had be en turne d down many times before either for c ash-f low problems or c ollatera l problems or cr edit problems, and he thought if [C ambridg e] bought Tr easur y Bonds and put them up as c ollatera l for people, the bank would be more apt to a pprove that l o an . And the n [Cambr idg e ] co uld

take fe e s. (J.A. 604) Defe ndant’s bankingand fina ncing business focuse d on purcha sing “ the[ ] bonds on marg in,” at ten percent of the bonds ’ m arke t value, and pledg ing the bonds as collateral in support
o f loans approve d by

Ba nk One. Id. C amb r i d g e “ p r e p ar e [d ] f i n an c i a l s t a t e m e n t s , an d

[ ] w o u ld prepa re the loan application to the bank, basica lly asking for a

loan for [a] particular

client.” ( J .A. 610) In the application proce ss, Cambridg e’s clients and Ba nk One officia ls w ere led to believe that the collater al bonds wer e owned outrig ht by Def endant, rathe r than on mar g in. Cambridge char g ed “fe es for closing

. . . . took a document prepa ration fee , . . . a closing fee

. . . [and] points on [ ] the amount borrowe d.” (J.A. 608) In support of this sec urity arr ang ement, Cambridg e’s c lients were require d to sign “ a sec urity ag ree ment, . . . a pledge ag ree ment,
. . . a promiss ory note, .
. . [and] an actua l L ever ag ed Asset Prog ram a g ree ment.” (J.A. 609)No. 06-3323

3 Def endant’ s fra

udulent scheme induced Ba nk One to g rant numer ous loans for substantial amounts. I ndeed, B ank One made f ive lo an s b et ween J anuar y 20, 1994, and Nove mber 7, 1994, rang ing f rom $27,000 to $724,500. On Novembe r 17, 200 4 , a grand jury indicted Def

endant a nd De lg a do , c ha

rg ingthe m, u

nd e r 1 8 U .S. C. § § 3 71 and 13 44 , w ithon e c ount of c on sp ir ingto c omm it bank fr aud; one c ount of knowing ly providing false a

nd fra udulent financ ial informa t i o n to Ba nk One in c o n n e c ti o n

w it hlo ana p p li c a ti o n s ; a

n d tw o c o un ts o f

tr an s mi tt in g f

r a u d u le n t f in ancial statements to Ba

nk One. On Dec ember 1, 2004, Def endant pled not guilty . On September 20, 2005, the c a se pr oc e e de d to a

jur y tr ia l. At trial, the g overnme nt presente d evidenc e that Cambridg e continuously mi srepr esente d the
ow ne rs hip of

the bo nd s and

fa ile d to dis c los e that th e bond s w e re purc ha se d o n ma rg in. At tr ia l, Delg ado and

Ga ry C er as i (“ C er as i ”) , a l i ce n s edce rt i fi edp u b l i c a cc o un t an t , t es t i fi edth at th ey wo rked with Defe ndant to implement the bank fr aud sche me. Ver onica F ear s (“F ear s”), the owner of 15449 Euclid Avenue , I nc., a c ompany based in Clevela

nd, Ohio, also testified that she ar rang ed to borrow $ 6 8 0 , 4 0 0 fr o mBa n k On e th ro u ghC am b ri d ge, an d th at s h e s i gn eda p ro m i s s o ry n o t e t o C am b ri d ge for $760,000 be cause Def endant r epre sented that Cambridg e owne d the collater al for the loan and that the value of

the bonds was “ 700-some thousand dollars.” (J.A. 116) A B ank One commerc ial loan re prese ntative, Ma r ia Ca h il l ( “ Ca h il l” ) , te s ti f

ie d th a t D efe ndant applied for

loans and that the loa

ns were secur ed by

bonds purportedly

own ed b y C ambridge that
wer e alleg edly

of equa l to, if not gre ater than, the value of the loans. Cahi ll affirme d that she
rec eived monthly

financ ial statements from Cambridg e conc erningthe alleg ed marke t value of theNo. 06-3323

4 collater al bonds. Cahill indicated that if B ank One had known that the e quitable value of the collater al bonds was less than the loan amount, a loan w ould not have bee n approve d. For his pa

rt, Def endant offe red the testimony of Kenne th L apine (“L apine ”) , an attorney associate d with Cambridge who spec ializes in banking a nd commerc ial law. L apine a sserted that Ba nk One should have known that the collate ral bonds we re pur chase d on marg in beca use “the re w[ere] indications that marg ined bonds wer e g oing to be involved as the c o l l at er al i n t he[ ] loan transac tions.” (J.A. 975) Notwithstanding L apine’ s testimony , the re cord indicates that Ba nk One discovere d Def

endant’ s scheme a ccide ntly

. The re cord shows tha t De fe n dant objecte d to two evidentiary ruling s at trial. Fir st, the district c ourt allowed the g overnme nt to introduce as e vidence portions of Def endant’ s deposition testimony from a c ivil case to re cover loan assets that wa s fi led by Ba nk One in the Court of Common P leas of Cuy ahog a C ounty , Ohio. In connec tion with the civil case , Ba nk One subpoe naed Def endant a nd order ed him to appea r for a deposition. In his depos i t i o n t es t i m ony , Def endant
c on c e de d th a t th e c oll ate ral bo nd s w e re purc ha se d o n ma rg in a nd that he fa ile d to dis c los e thi s materia l f act to B ank One. Over Def endant’ s objection, the district court a llowed the g overnme nt to introd u ce portions of the deposition testimony as evide nce at trial. Second, over Def endant’ s objection, the district cour t allowed th e g o v e r nme nt t o a d

mi t into evide nce F eder al Deposit Insuranc e C o rp o ra t i o n(“ FD I C ”) ce rt i fi ca t es t o s h o w t h a t B a n k O n e w as i n s ure d b y t h e F DIC t h ro u gh September 30, 1997. Def endant made motions for judg ment of ac quittal on September 28, 2005, and O ctober 3, 2005. These motions we re denied by the district c ourt. At the conc lusion of the trial, the jury foundNo. 06-3323

5 Def endant guilty

of bank f raud. The district court sentenc ed Defenda nt to an imprisonment term of thirty -seve n months and three year s of supervise d rele ase. D efe ndant was al s o o rd er ed to pay restitution in the total amount of $1,145,989. On appea l, Defe ndant challeng es his c onviction and sentenc e, and the district court’s e videntiary ruling s. DI SCU SSIO N I. Reasonableness of Defendan t’s Sentence Def endant c halleng es the re asonable ness of his sentenc e. This Court review s a sentenc e imposed by

a district cour

t for re asonable ness. Rita v. United States , No. 06-5754, – S. Ct. –, 2007 WL 1772146, at *9 (June 21, 2007); United States v. Book er , 5 43 U. S. 22 0, 26 1- 62 (2 00 5) ; United Sta te s v . H arris , 397 F .3 d 4 04 , 4 09 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) ; United States v. Cage , 45 8 F .3 d 53 7, 54 0 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 6) . T he Co ur

t r e vie ws the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s int e rp re tatio ns of the se nte nc ingg uid e lin e s de

novo and its fac tual finding s for c lear err or. United States v. W illiams , 411 F.3d 675, 677 ( 6th Cir. 20 05 ); United States v. Burk e , 345 F.3d 416, 428 (6th Cir. 2003). The Court def ers to the district court’s application of t he sentencing g uidelines to the facts. United States v. Charles , 138 F.3d 257, 266 (6th Cir. 1998). I n thi s c a se , the dis tr ic t c ourt ma de a fi nd ingof

fa c t c on c e rn ingB ank

On e ’s tot a l lo an lo ss
amou nt. B a se d o n th is f

ind ing , th e c ourt

inc re a se d D e fe nd ant’ s b a se of fe ns e le ve l f

ro m le ve l si x to le ve l ele ve n. De fe nd ant ar g ue s that the inc re a se d off e ns e le ve l viol a te s his Sixth A me ndme nt r ig hts beca use the loan loss a

mount wa s never submitt ed to the jury

. We find Defe ndant’s ar g ument to be unpersua sive.No. 06-3323

6 “Booke r did not eliminate judicial fac t-finding .” United States v. Coffee , 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir. 2005). “It is clear unde r the lawof this Circuit that a d i s t ri ct co u rt may make its own fa ct u al fi n d i n gs re gar d i n g re l ev an t s en t en ci n g fa ct o rs , an d co n s i d er t h o s e f ac t o rs i nd et erm i n i n g a defe ndant’s sente nce[.]” United States v. Gardiner , 4 6 3 F. 3 d 4 4 5 , 4 6 1 (6 thC i r. 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Coffee , 434 F.3d at 897-98). “ [W ]hen a trial judg e exerc ises his discretion to select a specific sentenc e wi t h i na d ef

i n edra n ge, t h e d ef

en d an th as n o ri gh t t o a j ury d et erm i n at i o no f t h e f

ac t s th at th e j u d ge deems re levant.” Booke r , 543 U.S. at 233. Sim ply put, Booke r does not bar the district court fr om calc u l at i ng and conside ring a loan amount provided that the sentenc ing guidelines are used as

a dv iso ry and no t ma nd a tor y . Po st- Booke r , a district c o urt may enhanc e a de fenda

nt’s sentenc e “base d upon fac ts not found by a jury , provided they do not consider themselves required to do s o.” Un ite d S tates v . D av is , 3 97 F .3 d 3 40 , 3 52 (6 th C ir . 2 00 5) (C oo k, J., c on c ur ri ng ); se e als o Un i ted States v. Kosinski , 480 F.3d 769, 777 ( 6th Cir. 2007). I n the instant case , the rec ord clea rly indicates that the district c ourt proper ly considere d the g uidelines as advisory , and calculated the loan loss amount based on e vidence in the rec ord. (J.A. 11 30 ) Th e re fo re , we fi nd that the dis tr ic t c ourt pr op e rl y c a lc ulate d De fe nd ant’ s lo an lo ss a mou nt. II. F DI C C e r ti fic at e s The re cord shows that the g overnme nt presente d FDI C certific ates at trial to show that Ba nk One was insured by the FD I C through Septe mber 30, 1997. De fenda nt objected to the c ertificates
ar guing that the cer

tificates f ailed to cove r all re levant per iods beca use “a lleg ations in th[ e] indictment run fro m J an u ar y 1 9 9 4 throug h some time in 1998.” (J.A. 906) The district court admitted the ce rtificate s over De fenda nt’s objection. On appea l, Defe ndant ar g ues that the pe riodNo. 06-3323

7 of the conspirac y exceeds the period cover ed by the FD I C certific ates, a nd that “[w]i thout evidence [t hat] Bank One was a fede rally insured org anization f or all of the pe riods alleg ed in the Indictment the district court would have no jurisdiction to reviewand dec ide this matter.” ( Def . Br . at 20) An essential e lement that the g overnme nt must prove “for a conviction for bank fra ud under section 1344(1) ” is “that the f inancial institution was insured by the FD I C.” Uni t ed S tates v. Hoglund , 1 7 8 F. 3 d 4 1 0 , 4 1 3 (6 t hC i r. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g United States v. Brandon , 17 F.3d 409, 424- 25 (1 st Cir . 1 99 4) ); Cf

. United States v. Sandles , 469 F.3d 508, 513 ( 6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t] he Gover nment must prove that the deposits of the ba nk wer e insured by

the FD I C at the time that [Defenda nt] robbed the bank.”)

. Since this Court has found that “a n FDI C certific ate is kept in the ordinary course of a ba

nking busine ss an d

. . . is an admissible business rec ord,” the district court p ro p er l y ad m i t t edt h e F DIC c er t i fi ca t es t o s h o w t h at Ban k On e w a s i n s ure d

b y th e F DIC t h ro u gh September 30, 1997. United States v. Rowan , 518 F.2d 685, 693 ( 6th Cir. 1975). I n this case, a ll material conduc t in furthera nce of the bank f

raud took plac e bef

ore Septe mber 30, 1997, except for a “telephonic discussion w ith . . . B ank One ” on De cembe r 22, 1997. (J.A. 23) This Court has repe atedly found that ce rtificate s of FD I C coverage t h at p re- date or post-date the criminal incident may

be suff icient to prove a

bank’s F DI C-insured status. See, e .g. , United States v. Couch , No. 94-6019, 1995 WL583386, at *8 (6th Cir. Oct. 3, 1995) (unpublished c ase) (holding that testimony

from bra nch manag er and the i ntroduction of post -date d FDI C cer tificate is sufficient evidenc e); see also Rowan , 518 F.2d at 693 (holding that testimony from bra nch mana g er a

nd the introduction of pre -date d FDI C c ertificate is suf ficient evidenc e, even thoug h the bra nch mana g er

“ did no t kn ow[ba se d o n] hi s own per so na l kn ow le dg e that th e pr e miums w e re pa id” ); but seeNo. 06-3323

8 Sandles , 469 F.3d at 516-17 (findingthat “[t] he Gove rnment pre sented only one piec e of c ompetent evidenc e as to the ba

nk’s insured status,” na

mely , an af

fi d av i t , “and that [ the af fidavit] was insufficient to establish a ne cessa ry element of

a fe dera l bank-robbe ry

char g e.”) ; Un ite d S

tates v . A li , 266 F.3d 1242, 1245 ( 9th Cir. 2001) (noting that “‘[d] espite the fact that FDI C-insured status is an express require ment of the a pplicable statutes, a

n essential par

t of a va lid indic t m en t , and an indispensable item of proof of an o ffe nse, prose cutors have been e x tremely lax i n the treatment
ac co rd edt h i s el em en t
. ’” ) ( qu o t i n g Un ite d S tates v . P late nb ur

g , 657 F.2d 797, 799 ( 5th Cir. 1981) (alter ation in orig inal). Al tho ug h D e fe nd ant’ s b ank fr a ud c on tin ue d a ft e r S eptem

be r 3 0, 19 97 , th e re c or d c le arl y shows that all loans wer e reque sted, proce ssed or procur ed by September 30, 1997. In s h o rt , the principal criminal activities which form the basis of De fenda nt’s conviction over

whelming ly

took place befor e September

30, 1997. Since t his Court is char g ed with “[c]onst ruing the evidenc e and dr awi ngre a so na

ble inf e renc e s in

the lig ht m os t f

avo ra ble to t he Go ve rnme nt, ” we fi nd that it is
rea sonable to infer that the branch wa s FDI C-insured duringthe re levant time per iods. Rowan , 518 F.2d at 693. Acc ording ly , we f ind that Defe ndant’s ar g ument with respec t to the FDI C certific ates to be without merit. III. Motions for Jud gm ent of Acquittal De fe n d an t argues that the district cour t erre d in denying his motions for judg ment of acquittal. The standard of revie w for a

challeng e to the suff

iciency of the e vidence is “whethe r, af ter viewing the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the prosec ution, any ratio na l tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld have f ound the essential e lements of the c rime beyond a rea sonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 443No. 06-3323

9 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ; se e als o Un ite d Sta te s v . D av is , 473 F .3 d 680 , 681 (6 th Cir. 2007). Def endant maintains that “ [r] epre sentatives fr om the b an k were made awa re, a lbeit by
acc ident, [t hat] the bonds pledg ed as collater al had been purcha sed on marg in a nd wer e not owned
outr ig ht. ” (D e f. B r. a t 24 ) D ur ingthe tr ia l, D e fe nd ant m a de tw o mo tio ns fo r j ud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l. The fir st moti on was made when the prosec ution r ested its c ase. In support of this motion, P laintiff argued that employ ees at the bank either knew or should ha ve known that the collater al bonds wer e purcha sed on marg in. This moti on was ba sed primar ily on the testimony o f a fo rmer B ank One employ ee, Judith Kuc lo, which indicated that Cambridg e inadver tently reve aled that the c ollatera l bonds were purcha sed on marg in in one of the mont hly financ ial statements. Def endant r enew ed the motion for judgme nt of ac quittal after all proofs ha d been e ntere d. The sec ond motion relied on L a pin e ’s te sti mony , whi ch in dic a te d th a t B ank On e sh ou ld h ave be e n a

wa re of the us e of

marg in bonds based on infor

mation contained in fina

ncial stateme nts. The dis t ri ct co u rt found, and w e
a g re e , th a t th e mot ion s f

or jud g me nt o f a c qu itt a l w e re me ri tle ss. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1344: Whoever knowin gl y executes, or attempts to ex ecute , a sche me or artifice

-- (1) to def raud a financ ial instit ution; or (2) t o o b t ai n any

of the money s, funds, cre dits, assets, securities, or other prope rty

owned by , or under

the custody

or c o n t ro l of, a fi nan cia l insti tut ion , b y

me ans of

fa lse or fr a ud ule nt p re te ns e s, re pr e se ntatio ns , o r p ro mis e s; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or i mprisoned not more than 30 y ear s, or both.No. 06-3323

10 18 U.S.C. § 1344. “The three el em en t s re quired for a convic tion for bank f

raud unde r sec tion 1344(1) a re: (1) that the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a sc heme to def raud a fina n ci al i nstitut ion; (2) that the def endant did so with the intent to defr aud; and ( 3) that the financ ial instit ution was insured by the FD I C.” Hoglund , 178 F.3d at 413 (citing Brandon , 17 F.3d at 424-25. I n this case, the g overnme nt introduced ample evidenc e that Defenda nt intentionally

devised

a fr a ud ule nt s c he me by pr ov idi ng fa lse fi na nc ia l inf or ma tio n to B ank

On e . D e fe nd ant i nte nti on a lly misrepre sented that Cambridg e wa s holding va luable bonds as c ollatera l for loans. Nume rous g overnme nt witnesses consistently descr ibed i n detail how bonds purc hased at marg in were pledg ed as collate ral for

loans and that Cambridg e overstate d the value of the bonds in loan applications and monthly financ ial statements. Since t he gover nment prese nted ample testim ony and evide nce, w e find that “a

ny rational trier

of fa ct could have fo u n d t h e essential elements of the cr ime beyond a
rea sonable doubt.” Da v is , 473 F.3d at 681 (internal quotation mar ks and citation omitted). There fore , the district court prope rly denied De fenda

nt’s motions for judgme nt of ac quittal. IV. Deposition Testim ony L ast, Def endant c halleng es the district cour t’s evidentiar

y ruling in co n n ec tion with the ad m i s s i b i l i t y

o f h i s d ep o s i t i o nt es t i m o n y . T h i s C o urt re v i ew s a d i s tri ct co urt ’s ev i d en t i ary ru l i n gs for a buse of discr etion. Un ite d S tates v . Ch am be rs , 441 F.3d 438, 455 ( 6t h C ir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Dix on , 413 F.3d 540, 544 ( 6th Cir. 2005). “[T] his Court does not dist urb ruling s on the admissibilit y

of evide nce unle ss the Court is lef t w ith the definite and firm c onviction that the [di strict] court . . . c ommitt ed a clea r err or of judgme nt in the c onclusion it reac hed.” Id. (interna lNo. 06-3323

11 quotation marks and c itation o mitted). “An a buse of discr etion will be found if the district cour t relies on c lear ly

err oneous finding s of fa ct, improperly applies t h e l aw o r uses a n err oneous leg al standard.” Id. (citation om itted). “B road discr etion is give n to district courts in determinations of admissibili ty

based on c onsiderations of r eleva nce a nd prejudice , and those de cisions w i l l n o t be lightly overr uled.” Id. (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). “A new trial is not re quired unless the er

ror a ffe cts substantial rig hts.” Id. (citing Fe d. R. Crim. P . 52). Def endant a rgues that his d ep o s i tion testim ony from a c ivil case in Ohio state c ourt was inadmissible in this c ase beca use the deposition w as not sig ned by the deponent as require d under Ohio R. Civ. P . 30(E). N otably , Def endant c ites no case law in support of thi s argument. We find Def endant’ s ar gu m en t is unpersuasive. I nsofar as this case was litigated under fede ral lawin the No rt he rn Di str ic t of

Oh io – and no t un de r s ta

te law i n a

n O hi o st ate c ourt

– O hio state c ivi l proce dure r

ules are simp ly

not applicable. “ Although state law may be borr owed if a

ppropriate , specific aber

rant or hostile state r

ules do not provide appropriate standards f or fe dera l law.” Nor th Dakota v. United States , 460 U.S. 300, 318 (1983) (interna l quotation marks and citation omitted). In t h i s c a s e , t h e g o v e r

n m e n tar g u e s th a tD e f

e n d an t ’ s d e p o s i t i o ntr a

n s c r i p t i s a d m i s s i b l e p artya dmi ssi on

e vid e nc e un de r F e d. R. E vid . 8 01 (d )( 2) (A ). In p e rt ine nt p art , th is R ule pr ov ide s: A statement is not hear say if -- . . . The statement is offe red a g ainst a par ty and is (A) the par

ty ’s own st ate men t, in eit her an ind iv idual or a r epre sen tat iv e capa cit y or ( B) a stateme nt of which the pa rty has manife sted an a doption or belief in its t ruth . . . . F e d. R. E vid . 801 (d )( 2)

. Th e re c or d indi c a te s that De fe nd ant te sti fi e d in hi s d e po sit ion a s f oll ow s: Question: . . . Were the bonds mar g ined? De fe nd ant: Ye s.No. 06-3323

12 Question: So do y ou rec all how much the bonds we re ma rg ined fo r, wh a t th e amou

nt o f m arg in w a s? De fe nd ant: 90 pe rc e nt. Question: Did y ou know . . . that 90 per cent of the bonds had been ma rg ined? Def endant: Yes Question: When were they marg ined? De fe n d an t : P re t t y

mu ch at th e b egi n n i n g. Question: Did y ou t el l any one fr om Ba nk One that the bonds wer e mar g ined? Def endant: No. (J.A . 8 90 ) L ike the dis tr ic t c ourt , w e fi nd that Defen dan t’ s te sti mony is a dmi ssi ble be c a

us e it constitutes a

party admission. See, e .g , Schweitzer v. Team ster Local 100 , 413 F .3 d 5 33 , 5 38 (6 th Cir . 200 5)

. Th e re fo re , the dis tr ic t court did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a llo wi ngthe g ov e rnme nt t o
rea d portions of Def

endant’ s deposition to the jury

.

CO NC LU SION For the fore g oing r easons, we AF F IRM Def endant’ s conviction and sente nce.