[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. , Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio1727.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2022-O HIO -1727
L EAGUE OF W OMEN V OTERS OF O HIO ET AL
. v . O HIO R EDISTRICTING C OMMISSION ET AL
. B ENNETT ET AL
. v . O HIO R EDISTRICTING C OMMISSION ET AL
. O HIO O RGANIZING C OLLABORATIVE ET AL
. v . O HIO R EDISTRICTING C OMMISSION ET AL
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. , Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1727.] Redistricting—Original actions under Oh io Constitution, Article XI—The Ohio Redistricting Commission readopted a Ge neral Assembly–district plan that this court previously found to violate Article XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution—The readopted plan is invalid—The Ohio Redistricting Commission shall be r econstituted, convene, and draft and adopt an entirely new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution. (Nos. 2021-1193, 2021-1198, and 2021- 1210—Submitted May 17, 202 2— Decided May 25, 2022.)S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 O RIGINAL A CTIONS filed pursuant to Ohio Constit ution, Article XI, Section 9.

_________________ Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission 1 adopted four General Assembly–district plans between September 2021 and March 2022. We invalidated each of those plans because they did not comply with Article XI , Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2 (“ League I ”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 67-68 (“ League II ”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022- Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2 (“ League III ”); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2 (“ League IV ”). Each time, we ordered the commission to be reconstituted a nd to adopt a new plan in conformity with the Ohio Constitution. League I at ¶ 138; League
II

at ¶ 67; League III at ¶ 44; League IV at ¶ 78. In League IV , issued on April 14, 2022, we ordered the commission to adopt by May 6, 2022, an entirely new district plan that complies with the Ohio Constitution. League IV at ¶ 78-79

. {¶ 2} On April 20, a federal district court found that a group of Ohi o voters had shown, at least at the preliminary-injunction phase, that O hio’s failure to implement new General Assembly districts in time for the May 3, 2022 primary election likely infringes on their right to vote. Gonidakis v. LaRose , S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1175617, *14-17 (Apr. 20, 2022). The fed eral court stated

1. The commission is currently composed of Governor Mike DeWine , Secretary of State Frank LaRose, Auditor of State Keith Faber, Senator Robert McColley, Representative Jeffrey LaRe, Senator Vernon Sykes, and House Minority Leader Allison Russo. Each commission member is also a respondent in this matter. On May 11, 2022, Senator McC olley and Representative LaRe notified the court that they had been appointed to the commissi on positions previously held by President of the Senate Matt Hu ffman and Speaker of the House R obert Cupp, respectively.January Term, 2022

3 that if Ohio did not pass a new General Assembly–district plan that satisfies federal law by May 28, it would order the primary election for General Assembly races to be moved to August 2 and order Oh io to use, for the 2022 electi on cycle, the General Assembly–district plan the commission adopted on Februa ry 24, 2022— i.e., the plan we held to be unconstitutional in League III

. Gonidakis at *2-3, 30; see also League III at ¶ 1-2. The federal court called that plan, and we now call it, “Map 3.” {¶ 3} On May 5, the commission readopted Map 3, purportedly only for use in the 2022 election. Petitioners 2 filed objections to the readoption of Map 3 the next day. {¶ 4} The respondents who voted in favor of readopting Map 3 defend t he commission’s action, arguing that Map 3 is the only viable opti on for use in the 2022 election cycle. The fact remains that Map 3 still violates Art icle XI, Sections 6(A) and 6(B) of the Ohio Constitution. See League III . We ordered the commission to adopt “an entirely new General Assembly–district plan that meet s the requirements
of the Ohio Constitution.” League IV at ¶ 78. Neither the current election deadlines, the General Assembly’s inability or unwillingness to alter thos e deadlines, nor the question whether the map would be a viable option for use in th e 2022 election cycle prevented the commission from adopting a new, constitutional di strict plan. The commission’s duty to draft and adopt a constitutional district plan is distinct from considerations regarding the feasibility of implementing that p lan for the 2022
election.

2. Petitioners in case No. 2021-1193 are the League of Women Vo ters of Ohio, the A. Philip Randolph Institute of Ohio, and six individual voters: Tom Harr y, Tracy Beavers, Valerie Lee, Iris Meltzer, Sherry Rose, and Bonnie Bishop. Petitioners in case N o. 2021-1198 are ten individual voters: Bria Bennett, Regina C. Adams, Kathleen M. Brinkman, Ma rtha Clark, Susanne L. Dyke, Carrie Kubicki, Meryl Neiman, Holly Oyster, Constance Rubin, an d Everett Totty. Petitioners in case No. 2021-1210 are the Ohio Organizing Collaborative, the O hio chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the Ohio Environmental Council, and six individual voters: Pierrette Talley, Samuel Gresham Jr., Ahma d Aboukar, Mikayla Lee, Prentis s Haney, and Crystal Bryant.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 5} Therefore, in accord with our opinion in League III , petitioners’ objections are sustained. The plan adopted by the commission o n May 5 is invalid in its entirety, including for the reason that the commission p urported to limit its effectiveness for only the 2022 election even though the Ohio C onstitution provides that a map adopted by the commission will remain in effect for either four or ten years, depending on whether there was bipartisan support for th e map, see Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a) and 8(B). We orde r the commission to be reconstituted, to convene, and to draft and adopt an entirel y new General Assembly–district plan that meet s the requirements of the Ohio Constitution, including Article XI, S ections 6(A) and 6(B). {¶ 6} We further order the commission to file the district plan with the secretary of state no later than 9:00 a.m. on June 3, 2022, and in this court by 12:00 p.m. on the same date. This court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing the new plan. {¶ 7} Petitioners shall file objections, if any, to the new plan, by 12:00 p.m. on June 7, 2022. Respondents shall file responses, if any, by 12:00 p.m. on June 9,
2022. Petitioners shall not file a r eply or any motion for lea ve to file a reply. The
clerk of the court shall refuse to accept any filings under thi s paragraph that are untimely or prohibited. {¶ 8} No requests or stipulations for extension of time for the objec tions or responses shall be filed, and the clerk shall refuse to file an y requests or stipulations for extension of time. For good cause shown, the commission ma y file a motion
for extension of time to file the district plan w ith the secret ary of state. {¶ 9} Petitioners’ requests for additional relief are denied. Objections sustained
and alternative or add itional relief denied.
S TEWART and B RUNNER , JJ., concur.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., concurs, wit h an opinion joined by D ONNELLY , J.January Term, 2022

5 K ENNEDY , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by D E W INE , J.
F ISCHER , J., dissents, with an opinion.

_________________ O’C ONNOR , C.J., concurring. {¶ 10} This court has been placed in a remarkable position. With the reassurance provided by a federal district court in Gonidakis v. LaRose , S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1175617 (Apr. 20, 2022), that continu ing delays and
inaction would be rewarded with the implementation of a previou sly rejected map, respondent Ohio Redistricting Co mmission has, contrary to this court’s clear order, resubmitted an unconstitutional General Assembly–district plan and, in doing so, has engaged in a stunning re buke of the rule of law. {¶ 11} In Gonidakis , the federal court thoughtfully recognized that if it were to act, it must do so only as a last resort. Id. at *4, *8, *10. Indeed, it stated: “We must provide the State as much time as possible to fix its own problems * * *. But at some point, the court must s tep in to provide a map if the S tate’s officials fail to discharge their duties.” Id. at *21. The federal court determined that to avoid jeopardizing Ohioans’ right to vote, it would wait until May 28 before acting. Id. at *2. But the federal court did not “stay [its] hand until Ma y 28,” id ., as it stated it would, and leave the state to fix the crisis created by the commission’s own actions, id. at *8. Instead, the federal co urt provided the Republican com mission members not only a roadmap of how to avoid discharging their du ties but also a green light to further delay these proceedings by stating its i ntention to implement “Map 3” (i.e., the plan this court held to be unconstitutional in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 2 (“ League III ”)), all the while acknowle dging that this court had declared Map 3 to be inv alid and unconstitutional. Id . at *2. {¶ 12} Consider for a moment how the f ederal court described its decis ion: “So the fact that Map 3 does not c omply with the Ohio Supreme C ourt’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 interpretation of state law doe s not prevent this court from im posing it—for one election cycle only—when faced with federal law violations, oth er state law concerns, and concerns about el ection administration on a short timeline.” Id. at *27. Yet, each of the federal court’s concerns was created by the commission’s
lack of action—which is in direct defiance of its constitutiona l duties and this
court’s four prior judgments—and all those c oncerns were then, and are now, fully capable of resolution by the co mmission or the General Assembly

. {¶ 13} Lamentably, the federal court’s optimism that the commission members “are public servants who still view partisan advantage as subordinate to the rule of the law,” Gonidakis , 2022 WL 1175617, at *25, fn. 19, proved to be unfounded. And its hope “that the Commission and the Ohio Supr eme Court can set aside their differences and work together to find a solutio n,” id. at *3, failed to recognize the commission’s utter refusal to comply with this co urt’s orders as rulings of law and the Republican commission members’ insistence that they can act in derogation of the law and against their oaths to uphold it. The Republican dominance of the General Assembly gave rise to a telling boast by President of the
Senate Matt Huffman: “We can kind of do what we want.” Staver, Who’s Matt Huffman? The Lima man running the show at the Ohio Statehouse , Columbus Dispatch (May 20, 2022) , https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2022/05/19/meetmatt-huffman-the-lima-repub lican-who-runs-ohio/7269099001/ (accessed May 20, 2022). 3 Do what we want apparently translates into the Republican-majority members of the redistricting commission ignoring rulings of thi s state’s highest
court and the mandates of Ohio’s Constitution. Americans’ beli ef that no one is above the law—no individual, no organization, no political part y—is a bedrock of our nation’s legal system, and one which makes it the envy of m any other countries.

3. The article further notes that “with enough GOP votes to ove rride the governor, [Huffman] can move election days, limit the powers of state officials and dra w districts for 147 state and federal lawmakers.” Id

.January Term, 2022

7 And it is because of that unassa ilable, foundational principle that it is entirely beside the point whether the majority p arty is Republican or Democrat. This concurrence would read the same if the Democratic party held the majority i n the General Assembly and the majority on the commission, and their actions were the same as those of the Republican majority in this case. {¶ 14} The federal court’s statement that this court and the commissio n might “work together to find a solution,” Gonidakis at *3, also erroneously suggests that this court actually has a seat at the commission’s table. Indeed, if Article XI
of the Ohio Constitution allowed for this court to have a seat at the commission’s table, perhaps we would not be where we are today, and a consti tutionally compliant map would be in place. But as we have recognized, th is court’s role in remedying the issue of an unconstitutional map is limited by Ar ticle XI, Section 9(D) of the Ohio Constit ution, which provides:

(1) No court shall order, in any circumstance, the implementation or enforcement of any general assembly district plan that has not been approved by the commission in the manner prescribed by this article. (2) No court shall order the commission to adopt a particular general assembly district pla n or to draw a particular district

.

{¶ 15} This court’s recognition of its limits, however, does not lesse n what
it can do and what it has done within its constitutional author ity: conclude that Map 3 does not comply with Article X I of the Ohio Constitution, whi ch was overwhelmingly approved by Ohio’s voters. League III , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022- Ohio-789, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 2. {¶ 16} As Chief Judge Marbley recognized in Gonidakis , “[t]hese rulings of the Ohio Supreme Court, perta ining to matters of state const itutional law, areS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 controlling.” Id . at *33 (Marbley, C.J., concur ring in part and dissenting from the remedy). The commission’s refusal— on four occasions —to abide by this court’s rulings has created a crisis that it has the ability to resolve . Yet, despite the federalcourt majority’s feigned interest in “buy[ing] Ohio more time t o both make a new map and find ways to shorten th e implementation of that map,” id. at *25, it effectively instructed the Repub lican members of the commission that all they had to do to get their way was to wait out the clock until May 28—d espite the valid order of this court ordering the commission to adopt an entirel y new General Assembly–district plan that complies with the Ohio Constitution by May 6, League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022- Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 78-79 (“ League IV ”)

. {¶ 17} In light of this court’s limited role in the redistricting proc ess, setting aside differences and working together is the responsibility of the commission members in upholding their oaths of office as elected officials —oaths that are taken not to ensure that one political party has a supermajority but to obey Ohio’s
Constitution. 4 Setting aside differences and working together is surely also what

4. This fact has been recogni zed by the commission. As summari zed in Gonidakis :
In [ League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“ League I ”)], with election-related deadlines already looming, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that “the electio n cycle should not proceed with a General Assembly—district map that we have d eclared invalid.” [Id. at] ¶ 136. Following the decision in [ League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“ League II ”)], and the commencement of thi s litigation, Attorney General Yost wrote in a letter to the Gen eral Assembly: “The federal co urt may not order the use of a map that was rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court, w here the underlying provision of the state constitution has not been fou nd to violate the federal constitution.” (ECF No. 91-4 at 2 (Yost Letter of Feb. 22, 2022)). In filings with this Court, Secretary [of State Frank] LaRose has written: “[A]s a statewide elected official who s wore an oath to obey Ohio’s Con stitution, the Secretary cannot agree to Plaintiffs’ motion and ask this court to order the use of a Redistricting Plan [referring there to the third plan] that a majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled violates Article XI of the Ohio Constitution.”January Term, 2022

9 Ohio’s voters envisioned that the commission members would do in exercising their responsibilities as part of the commission. {¶ 18} What was stated in a concurring opinion in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“ League I ”), has, for me, only been reaffirmed:

Despite proponents’ and voters’ best intentions for systemic government change in approving th e ballot measure to amend the state Constitution in 2015, the evidence shows that the leaders of the majority party in Ohio’s veto-proof gerrymandered legislature managed to create a plan through the new bipartisan (as opposed to independent) redistricting commi ssion that would have the effec t of extending their party’s dominance in even more impactful ways t han in 2011—giving their party a supe rmajority of the legislature f or another four years—just by adopti ng the plan by a simple majori ty of the commission vote wit hout bipartisan support. * * * The real takeaway from this four-year plan is that the Ohio Redistricting Commission should not be composed of people for whom the temptation may be t oo great to place political selfpreservation above selfless serv ice, regardless of party affili ation. What is needed in Ohio is an independent redistricting commissi on.

(ECF No. 113 at 8). In his post-hearing brief, the Secretary m ade a similar acknowledgement with respect to the fourth plan. Despite notin g its practical benefits “from the point of view of ease of elections administr ation,” the Secretary wrote: “If the Supreme Court were to rule [as now it has] that the Fourth Plan violates Art. XI, then the Secret ary, as a statewide official w ho swore an Oath to obey Ohio’s Constitution, should no longer advocate for the ado ption of the Fourth Plan.” (ECF No. 164 at 7 & n.2).
(First three brackets added.) Gonidakis , 2022 WL 1175617, at *33 (Marbley, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting from the remedy).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 Then, no matter who holds the pen, the district lines drawn wil l more likely be fair and reflect popula tion changes of the state overtenyear swaths of time based on ch anges identified by the decennia l
United States Census.

Id . at ¶ 179-180 (Brunner , J., concurring). {¶ 19} The latest actions by the commi ssion make clear that without th e federal court’s April 20 opini on, there might have been a chanc e at getting Ohioans a fair map. The federal-court majority brushed off Chief Judge Marbley’s supposition that the Republican m embers of the commission would “wait out the
clock rather than work with the legislature and the Ohio Suprem e Court to figure out a new map and, if necessary, a revised election timeline.” Gonidakis , 2022 WL 1175617, at *25, fn. 19. But as Chief Judge Marbley predicted, they did just that. On April 14, this court ordered the commission to draft and ado pt an entirely new General Assembly–district plan a nd file it with the secretary o f state no later than 9:00 a.m. on May 6. League IV , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-1235, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 78-79. On April 16, the two Democratic members of the com mission— respondents Senator Vernon Syke s and House Minority Leader Alli son Russo— began sending letters to the ot her commission members requestin g that the commission reengage the independent map drawers and reconvene a s soon as possible. Senator Sykes has stated that Speaker of the House R obert Cupp, who was then a cochair of the commission, notified him that the Rep ublican commission members would not agree to meet until after the federal court i ssued its decision in
Gonidakis . Later, after the federal c ourt issued its decision, the Repu blican commission members reportedly told Senator Sykes that they woul d not agree to meet until after the May 3 primary election. The commission di d not meet until May 4—20 days after this court’s opinion in League IV , 14 days after release of theJanuary Term, 2022

11 federal court’s decision, and 2 days before the commission’s deadline to file a new General Assembly–district plan

. {¶ 20} The Ohio Supreme Court and the Ohio Constitution should not be held hostage by a redistricting commission acting according to partisan directives and a legislature that has created a crisis due to its own inac tion. Any threat to Ohioans’ right to vote in this scenario stems entirely from the commission’s repeated failures to comply with this court’s rulings and the G eneral Assembly’s refusal to set a workable prima ry date. The remedy, then, shou ld not be the approval of an unconstitutional map that rewards those who crea ted the crisis to begin with. The remedy, instea d, must be to craft a resolution of the manufactured crisis by those with the authority to do so—the commission and the legislature. {¶ 21} Despite the deliberate intransigence of the supermajority party that has permeated these proceedings, I remind Ohioans that “the pow er rests at all times with the people,” Adams v. DeWine , __ Ohio St.3d __, 2022-Ohio-89, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 1. Those elected to office may be granted transitory aut hority to discharge their responsibilities under the Constitution and the laws of t his state, but the
citizens of Ohio retain the t rue power of self-governance. Id

. {¶ 22} Having witnessed the ways in which constitutional reforms may b e frustrated by hyper-partisanship and the power of inertia, Ohio ans have the power to change those dynamic s. That opportunity must not be squande red.
D ONNELLY , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ K ENNEDY , J., dissenting. {¶ 23} We stand now in late May, looking back at a General Assembly– primary election that never was. From that result, it would be easy to say that the General Assembly–redistricting process instituted by Article XI of the Ohio Constitution just does not work and to blame respondent Ohio Re districting
Commission or individual members of the commission. But what h appened inS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 these cases has little to do with the redistricting system that Ohioans voted for in 2015. This redistricting process was highjacked by a majority of this court—a majority that chose to ignore th is court’s constitutional role, unmoor itself from the plain language of the Ohio Constitution, and name itself the fi nal arbiter of electoral fairness, including how Democratic-leaning a legislative seat m ust be to be chalked up as a Democratic win, even t hough that is not a r equirement o f Article XI. {¶ 24} The majority here blames the commission. But Article XI includ es an impasse procedure—a solution for when intransigent factions within the commission cannot agree on a bipartisan plan. See Ohio Constitution, Article XI, Section 8. There is a political price to pay in that instance— a plan that the commission passes by a partisan vot e remains in effect for only two election cycles, not for five election cycles as district plans have historicall y stood. See Section 8(C)(1)(a). {¶ 25} But there is no solution in Article XI for when a majority of t his court expands the court’s limited role and ignores the Constitution’s plain language. The Constitution assigns this court the role of determining whetherthe objective linedrawing rules in Article XI, S ections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7 have bee n followed. The majority, however, has assigned itself an all-powerful role as a super-commission with veto power over an adopted plan and the authority to rewri te the Ohio Constitution. The people of Ohio should be forgiven for not se eing that result coming—it is hard to see what is not there. Article XI does no t contemplate this court’s taking on the role that it has, and therefore, there is no procedure for when an errant court reaches an imp asse with the commission. There is only impasse after impasse after impasse. T hat is where we are today. {¶ 26} Article XI established an easy- to-understand process. It contr ols who draws a General Assembly–di strict plan, establishes subject ive and objective map-drawing requirements, prescribes the length of time a distr ict plan may last, and authorizes but limits judicial review of an adopted plan. For a more detailedJanuary Term, 2022

13 analysis of those provisions, see League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 193- 200 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). {¶ 27} Article XI, Section 1 establishes the redistricting commission and provides the procedures that the commission must follow. The o bjective mapdrawing requirements that the commission shall apply are contained in Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. Section 2 establishes the number of legislator s per district. Section 3 sets forth the population and line-drawing rules for all dist ricts and the composition and numbering of House of Representatives districts , and Section 4 prescribes the composition and num bering of Senate districts. Section 5 regulates
district boundaries for senators who have unexpired terms, and Section 7 establishes the government al-unit boundaries to be used. {¶ 28} Section 6 contains subjective cr iteria that the commission “sha ll attempt” to apply. The require ments of Section 6 relating to a n attempt to create proportional districts and distri cts that do not primarily favo r a political party are examples of these subjective criteria. {¶ 29} A General Assembly–district plan remains in place for ten years if it is adopted by a bipartisan vote that includes at least two memb ers from each of the two largest political parties, unless it is invalidated by this court or a federal court. Article XI, Sections 1(B)(3), 3(A ), and 8(B). Section 8 provide s an impasse procedure: when the commission fails to adopt a plan by a bipar tisan vote, it may adopt a plan that lasts only f our years by a simple majority vo te. In that situation, in the intervening four years before a new map is drawn, electi ons will occur, and
the outcomes of the elections m ay change who sits on the redist ricting commission. {¶ 30} A district plan may be challenge d in this court, but our author ity to review the plan is limited. Section 9(D)(3) requires a predica te violation of the objective map- drawing requireme nts of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 before this court may invalidate a plan. The deter mination whether a plan is inva lid or may beS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 amended by the commission depends on whether the violation or v iolations of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 are isolat ed, Section 9(D)(3)(a), more widespread, Section 9(D)(3)(b), or significant and m aterial, Section 9(D)(3)(c). {¶ 31} The entire General Assembly–redistricting process is displayed in the following flowchart:January Term, 2022

15 {¶ 32} As in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___ (“ League III ”), no party here argues that the district plan t he commission adopted on Februar y 24, 2022—i.e., the plan that the majority held to be unconstitutional in League III (hereinafter, “Map 3”)—violates any of the obj ective map-drawing rules contai ned in Article XI, Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7, so this court has no authority to dec lare the plan
unconstitutional. In League III , the majority read Article XI, Section 9 as allowing
this court to consider whether the commission had violated Sect ion 6, League III at ¶ 35—but nothing in Section 9 gives this court that authority. And the majority in that case found a supposed viola tion of Section 6 in declaring Map 3 unconstitutional. Today, the majority again declares that map unconstitutional, following its readoption. But the majority was wrong in League III , and it is wrong again today. {¶ 33} The majority’s role in this electoral chaos is based on its interpretation of the factors listed in Article XI, Section 6 a s being mandatory. But
Article XI creates a distinct difference between factors the co mmission should
consider and factors the commission must follow . It makes that distinction clear in at least two ways. First, in regard to the factors in Section 6, the commission is told
that it shall attempt to comply with those considerations. With respect to Sections 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7, the language contains no equivocation. For example:

 “Each house of representatives district shall be entitled to a single representative in each general assembly. Each senate district shall be entitled to a single senator in each general assembly.” (Empha sis added.)
Section 2.

 “Every general assembly distri ct shall be composed of contiguou s territory, and the boundary of each district shall be a single nonintersecting continuous line.” (Emphasi s added.) Section 3(B)(3).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16  “Counties having less than one s enate ratio of representation, but at least one house of representatives ratio of representation, shall be part of only one senate district.” (Empha sis added.) Section 4(B)(2).

 “If more than one senator whose term will not so expire would r epresent the same district by following the provisions of this section, the plan shall designate which senator shall represent the district and shall designate which district the other senator or senators shall represent fo r the balance of their term or terms.” (E mphasis added.) Section 5.

 “Notwithstanding the fact tha t boundaries of counties, municipa l corporations, and townships with in a district may be changed, d istrict
boundaries shall be created by using the boundaries of counties, municipal corporations, and townships as they exist at the time of the fe deral decennial
census on which the redistricti ng is based, or, if unavailable, on such other basis as the general assembly ha s directed.” (Emphasis added.) Section 7. {¶ 34} The second way that Article XI distinguishes between what is mandatory and what is not is in the authority it gives this cou rt. Section 9(D)(3) states that if this court “determines that a general assembly d istrict plan adopted by the commission does not comply with the requirements of Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of [Article XI],” then certain remedies are available, includin g ordering the commission to adopt a new General Assembly–district plan. The fact that ordering full compliance with Section 6 is conspicuously absent from thi s court’s constitutionally outlined authority cements the fact that the c riteria of Section 6 are nonmandatory. {¶ 35} Does the majority ever wonder how we got to this place of impas se? Does the majority wonder what part of the districting process p assed by the people
of Ohio in 2015 did not work the way it was designed? Did the people account for partisanship? Yes, they require d bipartisanship in order to pa ss a ten-year plan.
See Section 1(B)(3). Anything less than bipartisanship would yiel d a four-yearJanuary Term, 2022

17 plan. See Section 8(C)(1)(a). Did they a ccount for impasse among the com mission members? Yes, they resolved it with the possibility of a four- year plan and instituted rules for when such a plan expires. See Section 8(C)(1)(b). Did the people account for controlling gerrymandering? Yes, they limit ed the number of times a political subdivision could be split, established rules requiring that districts consist of contiguous political subdivisions, and made the popu lation in each district essentially equal. See Section 3. Did the people ensure that the linedrawing rules would be met? Yes , they gave this court authorit y to resolve disputes
over whether the rules establis hed to prevent gerrymandering we re followed. See Section 9(D). {¶ 36} And did the people give this c ourt the power to overturn distri ct plans
for a standalone violation of S ection 6’s undefined and advisor y criteria for compactness, proportionality, a nd limited partisan intent? No. That purported power, which the majority claims in reaching its decision, is n ot in the plain language of Article XI. The fede ral court reviewing these case s agrees that the majority’s claim of that power i s not rooted in the language of the Ohio
Constitution: “[T] he Commission’s maps were rejected under a strict proportionality test that cannot easily be found in the text of Ohio’s Constitution.”
Gonidakis v. LaRose , S.D.Ohio No. 2:22-cv-0773, 2022 WL 1175617, *27 (Apr. 20, 2022). But the majority simply d eclares that the authority exists. {¶ 37} Does the majority ever wonder whether its claim of that power i s why the map-drawing process ha s broken down, i.e., whether its exercise of power that is not explicitly given to it but that it has claimed has led us to the place where we are? This court’s power is limited to what is enumerated in the Ohio Constitution. That which is not enumerated is not a power that belongs to us . See League III , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 136 (Kennedy and DeWine, JJ., dissenting).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 {¶ 38} The people of Ohio need look no further than this court for the sole cause of the debacle of the missing primary. We had a limited role to review the objective map-drawing requirement s set forth in Article XI, Sec tions 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7. The majority’s purposeful misreading of Section 9 is the ro ot cause of the issue. Only one entity in the redistricting process has failed to main tain its constitutionally defined place: this court. Instead of adhering to the words of the Constitution, the majority has unmoored itself from the Constitution to achieve a particular outcome. It is apparent in the words of the concurring opinion. The con currence despises the supermajority of Republicans in the General Assembly and has so ught to break it up through this series of cases. The redistricting process is always political. The people ratified Article XI and in doing so assigned this court a limited role in the

process. {¶ 39} The concurrence points fingers. It blames individual members o f the commission and takes specific a im at respondent President of th e Senate Matt Huffman, who was not even a member of the commission when Map 3 was readopted. He removed himself from the latest proceedings and appointed another senator in his place. Perhaps h e appointed the other senator b ecause he knew of the majority’s contempt for him, as set forth in League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm ., ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 12-
27. {¶ 40} The concurrence accuses the commission’s majority of “a stunnin g rebuke of the rule of law.” Concurring opinion, ¶ 10. But the majority in these cases is the body that rebuked the rule of law. The concurrenc e forgets that because of this extended redistricting process, for which it is respons ible, this court is no longer the only court weighing in on Ohio’s redistricting plan. Is it truly stunning that the commission would readopt a district plan that a federa l court has already deemed worthy of establishi ng legislative districts?January Term, 2022

19 {¶ 41} The concurrence reveals the actual motivation behind the majori ty’s
continuous invalidation of the c ommission’s General Assembly–di strict plans, stating, “The Republican dominance of the General Assembly gave rise to a telling boast by President of the Senate Matt Huffman: ‘We kind of do w hat we want.’ ”
Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Staver, Who’s Matt Huffman? The Lima man running the show
at the Ohio Statehouse , The Columbus Dispatch, https://www.dispatch.com /story/news/2022/05/19/meet-matt- huffman-the-lima-republican-wh o-runs-ohio /7269099001/ (accessed May 23, 2022). S o the concurrence must demonize Senate President Huffman, and the majority must demolish the Republica n dominance of the General Assembly, so that the elected representatives of th e people cannot control the legislation that is passed in this state. In my vi ew, the concurrence urges Ohio’s citizens to stop voting for Republicans and to go out an d gather petition signatures calling for an indepe ndent redistricting commission. {¶ 42} The majority concludes by setting another artificial, arbitrary deadline for a new district plan that it has no power to set wh ile again retaining jurisdiction that it has no power to retain. By the time the m ajority opinion is released, the commission will have about eight days in which to create a new district plan. To what end? By that time, the primary election will be set and the districts divided according to Map 3. Any new plan passed by June 3 woul d not be used for a General Assembly election until 2024. A new plan passed duri ng the pendency of a primary election could only sow confusion. Why limit the commission to an eight-day negotiation process? Can the majority not bear to be out of the limelight for much longer than that? {¶ 43} Because no party claims that the district plan at issue violate s the requirements of Article XI, Section 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of the Ohi o Constitution, this court lacks any authority t o declare it unconstitutional. I di ssent.
D E W INE , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

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20 F ISCHER , J., dissenting. {¶ 44} I respectfully dissent. {¶ 45} As I have explained previously, these cases are governed by the impasse procedures set forth in Article XI, Section 8 of the Oh io Constitution. See League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 280 (“ League I ”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022- Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 150-152 (“ League II ”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-789, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 195 (“ League III ”) (Fischer, J., dissenting); League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Ohio Redistricting Comm. , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 109 (“ League IV ”) (Fischer, J., dissenting). That issue is undisputed and forms the foundational basis for a ll three lawsuits, as each of the original complaints in these cases refers to that s ame provision. League
I at ¶ 280. {¶ 46} From the start of these cases, all allegedly brought under Sect ion 8’s impasse procedure, I have emphasi zed that the plain language of Article XI, Section 8(C)(1)(a) precludes this court from reviewing a four-year dist rict plan adopted pursuant to the Section 8 impasse procedures. League I at ¶ 314 (Fischer, J., dissenting). Accordingly, this c ourt has never had the constit utional authority to review the plans that have bee n presented throughout this litig ation. In League IV , I stated that “it is this subvers ion of the wording of Article XI that is the reason the majority opinion today continues to create more and more proble ms for Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 110 (Fischer, J., dissenti ng). Today’s majority opinion o nly exacerbates those problems. {¶ 47} Today’s majority opinion acknowle dges the escalating problems facing this state, all resulting from the majority opinion’s fl awed constitutional interpretation. See majority opinion, ¶ 2. As the majority opinion notes, the lat estJanuary Term, 2022

21 wrinkle in these cases is that respondent Ohio Redistricting Co mmission has purported to limit the effectiveness of the newest plan to only the 2022 election, which, as the majority opinion correctly recognizes, the commis sion has no authority to do. Id. at ¶ 5; see also Article XI of the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 48} But this is only one problem among many. Most significantly, a
federal court has now s tepped into this court’s self-created re districting mess, and Ohioans will in all likelihood be voting for state representati ves in a special election imposed on this state by a pane l of federal judges. As I have stated before, I wish
this were not the case. League IV at ¶ 114 (Fischer, J., dissenting). By not following the text of Article XI, Section 8, the majority opinions in the se cases have effectively handed Ohio’s author ity over its own elections to a federal three-judge panel—a panel that Ohioans did not select. This development is contrary to the will of Ohioans who, in enacting Article XI, mandated that redi stricting be conducted by a commission c omprised of Ohio’s elected officials who are directly accountable to the people of Ohi o. These, and many other probl ems, have been
created and continue as a result of the majority opinions’ cont inuing disregard for
the text of the Ohio Constitution. {¶ 49} Today’s majority opinion continue s the pattern of first reviewi ng a General Assembly–district plan without the constitutional autho rity to do so and then, also without the constituti onal authority to do so, order ing the commission to act in a certain way and on a specific schedule. Today’s major ity opinion does not cite any authority to support its v arious orders to the commiss ion. Starting with League I , this court has retained juris diction over these cases through its majority opinions, which have ordered the commission to act in certain w ays and within certain specified time frame s, without relying on any Ohio cons titutional authority under which this court may issue such orders. See League I , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-65, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 139; League II , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022- Ohio-342, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 68; League III , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 789, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 44-45; League IV , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2022-Ohio-1235, ___ N.E.3d ___, at ¶ 78-79. This is because there is no such authority to do s o under Article XI of t he Ohio Constitution. {¶ 50} Under Article XI, Section 9, this court’s authority is limited to, at most, “order[ing] the commission to adopt a new general assembl y district plan in accordance with [Article XI].” Article XI, Section 9(D)(3)(b) and (c). This court
is not authorized to order the commission to adopt any particul ar plan. Article XI, Section 9(D)(2). The majority opinions in League II , League III , League IV , and herein have ordered an “entirely new” plan. League II at ¶ 67; League III at ¶ 44; League IV at ¶ 78; majority opinion at ¶ 5. This court has no constitut ional authority to order an “entirely” new plan, just a “new” plan. {¶ 51} Moreover, the commission’s task is a legislative one, as acknowledged by the majority opinion in League I

. Id. at ¶ 76. It is fundamental that, in order to preserve the integrity of the legislative fun ction, this court must refuse to interfere in the legislature’s—or any similar legisla tive body’s—exercise of the legislative prerogative. See Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. v. Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 208 , 37 Ohio St.3d 56, 62, 524 N.E.2d 151 (1988). Thus, not only does this court lack author ity under Article XI, Section 8 to review any fouryear plan the commission submits, but it also lacks authority t o do anything other
than order the commission to conve ne and adopt a plan that comp lies with the Constitution. Article XI, Section 9. In summary, the majority opinions include orders that they have no constitutional authority to make and s et specific time
frames without constitutional aut horization, and they do so in derogation of longstanding Ohio Supreme Court d ecisions declaring that this c ourt stay out of legislating. See, e.g. , Cent. Ohio Transit Auth. at 62. {¶ 52} As one judge summarized in the federal decision related to this case, “As Plaintiffs have maintained from the start, the perpetual tu rmoil and uncertainty during this redistricting cycle has harmed candidates, election officials, and theJanuary Term, 2022

23 Ohio polity.” Gonidakis v. LaRose , ___ F.Supp.3d ___, ___, 2022 WL 1175617, *40 (S.D.Ohio 2022) (Marbley, J., concurring in part and dissen ting from the remedy). By violating the plain terms of Article XI, Section 8 , and by compounding this violation through the further, improper exercise of extrac onstitutional authority, the majority opinions have created this perpetual tu rmoil and uncertainty in Ohio’s elections for members of the General Assembly and oth er public offices. These majority opinions are an em barrassment, a “scar” on Ohio’ s constitutional history, and they have created s tatewide-election chaos. {¶ 53} For these reasons, I continue to have deeply significant concer ns about the approach f ollowed in the majority opinions in these c ases. I respectfully
dissent and would overru le the objections.

_________________ ACLU of Ohio Foundation, Inc., Freda J. Levenson, and David J. Carey; American Civil Liberties Union, Alora Thomas, and Julie A. Eben stein; and Covington & Burling, L.L.P., Robert D. Fram, Donald Brown, Josh ua González, David Denuyl, Alexander Thoms on, Anupam Sharma, and Yale Fu, fo r petitioners
in case No. 2021-1193. McTigue, Colombo & Clinger, L.L .C., Donald J. McTigue, and Dere k S. Clinger; and Elias Law Group, L.L. P., Abha Khanna, Ben Stafford , Jyoti Jasrasaria, Spencer W. Klein, Harleen K. Gam bhir, and Raisa M. Cramer, for petitioners in
case No. 2021-1198. Reed Smith, L.L.P., Peter M. Ellis, M. Patrick Yingling, Brian A. Sutherland, Ben R. Flie gel, Brad A. Funari, and Danielle L. Ste wart; and Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, Alicia L. Bannon, Yurij Rudensky, and Harry Black, for petitioners in case No. 2021-121 0. Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Organ Law, L.L.P., Erik J. Cla rk, and Ashley T. Merino, special counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost , for respondent Ohio Redistricting Commission.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

24 Dave Yost, Attorney General, a nd Zeiger, Tigges & Little, L.L.P ., John W. Zeiger, Marion H. Little Jr., and C hristopher J. Hogan, special counsel to Attorney General Dave Yost, for responde nt Ohio Governor Mike DeWine. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Jonathan Blanton, Deputy Attorney General, Michael J. Hendershot, Deputy So licitor, and Julie M. Pfeiffer and Michael A. Walton, Assistant Attorneys Gene ral, for respondent Ohio Secret ary of State Frank
LaRose. Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., W. Stuart Dornette, Beth A. Bryan, and Philip D. Williamson; and Nels on, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, L.L.P., Phillip J. Strach, Thomas A. Farr, John E. Branch III, and Alyssa M. Ri ggins, for respondents Senator Robert McCo lley and Representative Jeffrey LaRe. Cooper & Elliott, L.L.C., C. Benjamin Cooper, Charles H. Coope r Jr., and Chelsea C. Weaver, for respondents Senator Vernon Sykes and Hou se Minority
Leader Allison Russo. Mark G. Kafantaris; and Center for Competitive Democracy and O liver Hall, in support of petitioners ’ objections for amici curiae Ce nter for Competitive Democracy, Professor Ruth Colke r, and Professor Mark Brown. Belinda Spinosi, pro se, in support of petitioners’ objections as amicus curiae, in case No. 2021-1193.

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