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******************************************************VILLAGE APARTMENTS, LLC v. STANLEY P.

WARD, JR., ET AL. (AC 38047)
Lavine, Alvord and Bear, Js. Argued September 21—officially released December 13, 2016 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of New

London, Moukawsher, J.)
Matthew G. Berger, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Garon Camassar, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).Opinion BEAR, J. The plaintiff, Village Apartments, LLC, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the defendants Stanley P. Ward, Jr., and Rose Mary Ward, after atrial to the court, quieting title to a claimed easement in the form of a right-of-way (right-of-way) overthe defendants’ realproperty (property).1 The court determined that the Marketable Title Act(act), GeneralStatutes § 47-33betseq., extinguished the right-of-way because it was not preserved in the roots oftitle oftheparties asrequiredbythe actand did not meet the apparent easement exceptions in General Statutes § 47-33h. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding that the act extinguished its right-of-way (1) because it predated and was not properlysetforthin eitherrootoftitle; and (2) although there were visible, physical indicators ofthe existence of the right-of-way. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In the first count of its complaint against the defendants, the church, and Citizens Bank, datedJuly9, 2012, andreturnedtothe courtonAugust 1, 2012, theplaintiff sought to quiet title to the alleged deeded right-of-way
over the defendants’ property and the church’s property.2 The defendants alleged as a special defense, inter alia, thattheactextinguishedanyrightsthattheplaintiff had to the claimed right-of-way. Following atrial to the court,3 the court, Moukawsher, J., rendered judgment in favor of the defendants and Citizens Bank on June 9, 2015, and in favor of the plaintiff, as stipulated between it and the church. This appeal followed.
The following factual findings of the court are relevant to this appeal. In 1877, an easement in the form ofaright-of-waywas created overpropertynow owned separately by the defendants and the church in favor of property now owned by the plaintiff. Pursuant to the act, the plaintiff’s root of title4 is a 1968 deed that conveyed the property ‘‘[t]ogether with and subject to such rights of way, pipe line and other easements and privileges as will of record appear.’’ The defendants’ roots of title are one or two 1944 deeds5 that referred to a ‘‘Frank Calvert’’ ‘‘right of way.’’6 The 1944 deeds did not set forth that the property is subject to the Frank Calvert right-of-way, did not describe the rightof-way’s metes and bounds, and did not incorporate by volume and page the title transaction that created that right-of-way.
The court found that as of the dates of the trial, the alleged right-of-way area showed no evidence of ruts
or marks that might suggest that it had been used as a cart path or track as claimed by the plaintiff. Photographs in evidence showed that the only open area within the alleged right-of-way revealed nothing to suggest its use as a cart path or track. The photographsshowed that much of the disputed area was strewn with boulders, was covered with mature trees, and was incapable of accommodating any kind of path. From this and other evidence, the court concluded that there
were no signs of a cart path or track on the property.
In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded thatthe defendants’muniments oftitle7didnotdescribe the right-of-way sufficiently to enforce it and that the muniments of title did not specifically identify the recorded title transaction that created the right-of-way. Initsanalysis,thecourtrejectedtheplaintiff’sargument that references to the right-of-way in the 1944 deeds
were necessary to determine the location of the five tracts conveyed therein. Consequently, the court concludedthatthe act extinguishedthe right-of-wayunless
an exception applied. The plaintiff argued that merestones8 marking the right-of-way, a wire fence running along it, and signs ofacartpathwere physical evidence sufficient to satisfy one ofthe § 47-33h exceptions. The court concluded that fences and merestones were not included in the list of exceptions contained in § 47-33h and, although roads and tracks were included in the list, there were no signs of a cart path or tracks on the property. Accordingly, the courtfoundthat § 47-33h did not apply. In light of these determinations, the court declared that the defendants’ property was not subject, under General Statutes § 47-31, to the purported rightof-way described in volume 21, page 99, and volume 21, page 100 of the Montville land records.9 This appeal followed.
I
The plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in determining that the act extinguished the right-of-way because the right-of-way predated the roots of title. Specifically, it contends that the reference to the Frank Calvert right-of-way in the 1944 deeds that constitute the defendants’ roots of title is a specific reference satisfying § 47-33h. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that reference to the right-of-way in the deeds puts a reasonable title searcher on notice of the existence of
an easement and that determination of the location of the right-of-waywas necessaryto ascertainthe location of the three parcels constituting the defendants’ property. The defendantsarguethattheirroots oftitle donot specificallyidentifyarecordedtitletransactioncreating the right-of-way and that the description of the rightof-way was too vague to convey it. We agree with the defendants.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standard of review. ‘‘The interpretation of a statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts and circumstances, presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.

. . . Furthermore, the meaning of language used in a deed also raises a legal issue such that, when faced with a question regarding the construction oflanguage in deeds, the reviewing court does not give the customary deference to the trial court’s factual inferences.’’ (Citationomitted; internalquotationmarks omitted.)Johnsonv. Sourignamath, 90 Conn. App. 388, 393–94, 877 A.2d 891 (2005). ‘‘Pursuanttotheact, anypersonwhohasanunbroken record chain of title to an interest in land for a period offortyyears, plus any additional period oftime necessary to trace the title back to the latest connecting title instrument of earlier record10 (which is the root oftitle under the act) has a marketable record title11 subject only to those pre-root oftitle matters that are excepted underthe statute or are causedto reappearinthe latest forty year record chain of title.

. . . The act declares null and void12 any interest in real property not specifically described in the deed to the property which it purports to affect, unless within a forty year period, a noticespecificallyrecitingthe claimedinterestisplaced
onthe land records inthe affected land’s chain oftitle.’’ (Footnotes added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Coughlin v. Anderson, 270 Conn. 487, 507, 853 A.2d 460 (2004). ‘‘Even marketable record title, however, may be subject to certain interests. Section 47-33d13 provides in relevant part: ‘Such marketable record title is subject to: (1) All interests and defects which are created by
or arise out of the muniments of which the chain of record title is formed

. . . .’ Thus, if an easement over a subject piece of property arises out of one or more of the muniments, including the deeds, of which the chain of record title is formed, a property owner takes the land subject to that easement. This general provision is subject to a proviso contained in § 47-33d (1), however, which provides that ‘a general reference in the muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictionsorotherinterestscreatedpriortotherootof title are not sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identificationismadethereinofarecordedtitletransaction which creates the easement, use restriction or other interest

. . . .’ ’’ (Footnote added.) McBurney v. Cirillo, 276 Conn. 782, 808–809, 889 A.2d 759 (2006), overruled in part on other grounds by Batte-Holmgren

v. CommissionerofPublicHealth, 281 Conn. 277, 284– 89, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). Section 47-33d therefore requires either a specific reference in the muniments to easements, use restrictions, or other interests or a general reference to such interests accompanied by a specific identification of a recorded title transaction creating the easement. ‘‘The reason that a general reference to pre-root of title interests is not sufficient to preserve and prevent their extinguishment is to avoid any necessity for a search of the record back of the root of title, as well
asto eliminatethe uncertainties causedbysuchgeneral references. Connecticut Bar Association, ConnecticutStandards ofTitle (1999), standard 3.10, comment one. Effectively, it requires one claiming a deeded right-ofway over the property of another to establish conclusively that at some point, some owner in the servient estate’schainoftitleactuallymadeaconveyancevalidly creatingthat right-of-way. Otherwise, an invalid ornonexistent right-of-way could ripen into existence over a period oftime through the mere insertion into the land records of language asserting it.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Sourignamath, supra, 90 Conn. App. 401. ‘‘[T]he ultimate purpose of [the act] is to simplify land title transactions through making it possible to determine marketability by limited title searches over some reasonable period ofthe immediate past andthus avoid the necessity of examining the record back into distant time for each new transaction.

. . . [The act is] designed to decrease the costs oftitle assurance by limiting the period of time that must be covered by a title search.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Il Giardino, LLCv. Belle HavenLand Co., 254 Conn. 502, 537, 757 A.2d 1103 (2000).
In the present case, the parties agree that the defendants’ roots of title are two 1944 deeds that refer to a Frank Calvert right-of-way.14 The two 1944 deeds do not provide that the property is subject to that rightof-way, do not describe the right-of-way’s metes and bounds, and do not incorporate by volume and page the title transaction that created the right-of-way. The reference to the right-of-way is used only to describe the boundaries of certain tracts of land conveyed to the defendants’ predecessor in title. Additionally, the deeds fail to provide any reference to a record title transaction creating the right-of-way as required by § 47-33d; indeed, Frank Calvert is not named in the 1877 deed creating the right-of-way or in any other transaction in the defendants’ chain oftitle.15 See Johnson v. Sourignamath, supra, 90 Conn. App. 401 (purported interests and claims must appear in chain of title of property against which interest or claim is being made). Consequently, the court did not err in concluding that the right-of-way does not burden the defendants’ property unless an exception delineated in the act applies.
II
The plaintiff claims that the court erred in finding thattheactextinguishedtheright-of-waydespitevisible evidence of the right-of-way. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the court erroneously concluded that merestones, the remnants of a fence, and the remnants of
a cart path did not constitute physical evidence exceptedbythe nonexclusive list containedin § 47-33h. Essentially, the plaintiff argues that the statute allowsfor any physical evidence of an easement. The defendants counter that the statute does not include merestones, fenceposts, orcartracks, butislimitedto ‘‘large industrial equipment typically used by public service companies

. . . .’’ Although we disagree with both interpretations advanced by the parties, we conclude that the statutory exception contained in § 47-33h does not apply to preserve the right-of-way claimed by the plaintiff.
We begin by setting forth the applicable standards ofreview. ‘‘The interpretation ofa statute, as well as its applicability to a given set of facts and circumstances, presents a question of law over which our review is plenary.’’ Johnson v. Sourignamath, supra, 90 Conn. App. 393–94. Whethercertainphysicalmarkersandconditions suchas afence, cartpath, ormerestones existed
on the property are questions offact to which we apply
a clearly erroneous standard of review. See Reiner, Reiner & Bendett, P.C. v. Cadle Co., 278 Conn. 92, 107, 897A.2d 58 (2006) (‘‘Questions offactare subjectto the clearly erroneous standard ofreview.

. . . A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the record to support it

. . . or when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left withthe definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

. . . Because it is the trial court’s function to weigh the evidence

. . . we give great deference to its findings.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
Section 47-33h,16 which codifies certain exceptions to the act, provides in relevant part that the act ‘‘shall not be applied to

. . . extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, or any rights granted, excepted or reserved by the instrument creating such easement or interest, including any right for future use, if (1) the existence of such easement or interest is evidenced by the location beneath, upon or above anypart ofthe land described in such instrument of any pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, hole, tower or otherphysicalfacility and whether or not the existence of such facility is observable

. . . .’’ (Emphasis added.)
In the present case, the plaintiff argues that a cart path, fence, and merestones constitute ‘‘other physical evidence’’ of the easement. The court found that there
were no physical signs of a ‘‘cart path’’ running over the contested property, and the evidence presented does not demonstrate that this conclusion was clearly
erroneous. We must determine then, whether merestones and fences, as a matter of law, can be evidence of an apparent easement under § 47-33h that may have preserved the right-of-way and, specifically, whether either of these items is included as an ‘‘other physical facility.’’
Our state courts have not expounded onthe meaningand application of the term ‘‘other physical facility’’ as used in § 47-33h, and, therefore, its interpretation is an issue of first impression. ‘‘When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself andits relationship to otherstatutes. If, afterexamining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Joseph General Contracting, Inc

. v. Couto, 317 Conn. 565, 586, 119 A.3d 570 (2015).
Because ofthe ambiguityofthe statutoryterm ‘‘other physical facility,’’ the doctrine of ejusdem generis is useful in determining its meaning. ‘‘[T]he rule of ejusdem generis, which explains that where a particular enumeration is followed by general descriptive words, the latter will be understood as limited in their scope to

. . . things ofthe same general kind or character as thosespecifiedintheparticularenumeration.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stratford v. Jacobelli, 317 Conn. 863, 871–72, 120 A.3d 500 (2015). ‘‘The principle of ejusdem generis applies when ‘(1) the [clause] contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the members of the enumeration suggest a specific class; (3) the class is not exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference [supplements] the enumeration

. . . and (5) there is [no] clearly manifested intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the doctrine requires.’ 2AJ. Sutherland, Statutory Construction (5th Ed. Singer 1992) § 47.18. Thus, ‘[t]he doctrine of ejusdem generis calls for more than

. . . an abstract exerciseinsemanticsandformallogic. Itrestsonparticularinsights abouteverydaylanguage usage. Whenpeople list a number of particulars and add a general reference like ‘‘and so forth’’ they mean to include by
use of the general reference not everything else but only others of like kind. The problem is to determine whatunmentionedparticularsaresufficientlylikethose mentioned to be made subject to the [clause’s] provisions by force of general reference.’ Id.’’ 24 Leggett Street, Ltd. Partnership v. BeaconIndustries, Inc., 239 Conn. 284, 297, 685 A.2d 305 (1996).
In the present case, the doctrine of ejusdem generis limits the definition of ‘‘other physical facility’’ to the relationship ofthe preceding class ofterms. The defendants argue that the class is limited to the large industrial equipment of public utilities. The list includes however ‘‘road,’’ ‘‘track,’’ and ‘‘hole’’ as physical facili-tiesthatmayevidence an easement. Althoughthe facilities pipe, valve, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, and tower connote a class ofpublic utility items, road, track, and hole are notlimitedto suchuses. This courthas applied the § 47-33h exception for roads to cases not involving
uses by utility companies. See Simonds v. Shaw, 44 Conn. App. 683, 684–85, 689–90, 691 A.2d 1102 (1997) (holding § 47-33h excepted easement in roadway from prohibition of act). Additionally, § 47-33d clarifies that this portion of § 47-33h applies to apparent easements and interests in the nature of easements. Section 47- 33h protects the interest of ‘‘the United States, of this state or any political subdivision thereof, of any public service company as defined in section 16-1 or of any natural gas company’’ apart from the enumeration herein described. Accordingly, the class enumerated in the statute cannot be limited to public utility uses. Defining the class as ‘‘those physical objects that evidence an easement that themselves effectuate the easement itself’’ includes all of the items enumerated in § 47-33h, but not dissimilar items. For example, the location ofa sewer beneath aproperty would evidence
a sewer easement, whereas the location of poles and wires traversing the property would evidence an easement to a telephone company or electrical company forsuch use. Statedthis way, the class does notinclude items that may be found on a property that are not set forth in § 47-33h or otherwise within the class ofthose items, which are only, at best, mere indirect, possible indicators of an easement.17
After setting forth the proper class, it is clear that merestones and fences are not a part of the class of other physical facilities creating an exemption from the application of the act. Merestones are defined as markers of a boundary, but not necessarily of an easement in the form of a right-of-way within or across a parcel ofland. A fence also is not necessarily a marker of an easement in the form of a right-of-way. It is common knowledge that a fence can have many uses aside from marking a boundary ofaparcel ofland; for example, it can separate one interior parcel of land from another, it can restrict pets or livestock to a certain
areawithin aparcel ofland, it can surround andprotect against access to a hazardous condition, or it can be purelydecorative.Afenceoramerestone, evenifvisible
on part on the defendants’ property, is not necessary orintegraltothe definition, use, existence, oridentification of the plaintiff’s claimed right-of-way in this case in the way that a road, sewer, or pipe would identify and carry out the purposes of an easement excepted by § 47-33h. Moreover, although this court and the plaintiffmight be able to imagine other physical evidence that could suggest the possibility, or even probability, of an easement, our legislature made its choice in creating a listof indicators of an apparent easement to achieve its goal of ‘‘simplify[ing] land title transactions through makingitpossibleto determinemarketabilitybylimited title searches oversomereasonableperiodoftheimmediatepastandthus avoidthe necessityofexaminingthe recordbackinto distanttimeforeachnewtransaction.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Il Giardino, LLC

v. Belle Haven Land Co., supra, 254 Conn. 537. To expand the excepted list of items contained in § 47- 33h to include dissimilar items, such as fences and merestones, could expose landowners to stale claims against theirproperties and, thus, counteract the broad remedial purposes of the act. Accordingly, fences andmerestones are not included
as a matter oflaw within the definition of ‘‘other physical facility,’’ and, therefore, the court did not err in concludingthatthepresence ofafence andmerestones
onthedefendants’propertydidnotexcepttheplaintiff’s claims to a right-of-way from application of the act. The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 St. John’s Roman Catholic Church of Montville (church) and Citizens Bank, also known as RBS Citizens, N.A. (Citizens Bank), were also defendants in this action. In accord with a stipulation, the court rendered judgment, quieting title to and confirming a right-of-way over the church’s property. The church and Citizens Bank have not appealed and, therefore, all references to the defendants herein are to Stanley P. Ward, Jr., and Rose Mary Ward.

2 In the second and third counts of its complaint, the plaintiff alleged trespass and interference with its easement rights by the defendants. Because the plaintiff has not raised these claims in its appeal, they are not before us. 3 The trial was held before the court, Hon. Thomas F. Parker, judge trial referee, on June 24, 2014. The parties submitted posttrial briefs and an additional hearing was held before Judge Parker on January 14, 2015, at whichthe parties waivedthe 120 day deadline forthe issuance ofa decision. On April 7, 2015, the court, Cole-Chu, J., transferred the case to the court, Moukawsher, J., without a decision having been rendered by Judge Parker. Judge Moukawsher reviewed the transcripts, exhibits, and briefs, and held

an additional hearing for arguments on June 5, 2015.

4 ‘‘ ‘Root of title’ means that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain oftitle of a person, purporting to create or containing language sufficient to transfer the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies

as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the root of title is the date on which it is recorded

. . . .’’ General Statutes § 47-33b (e).

5 Although the court, Moukawsher, J., stated that the parties agreed that the defendants’ root of title was a 1944 deed, the parties now argue, the chain oftitle reveals, and Judge Parker noted, that the defendants’ roots of title are two deeds from 1944 conveying undivided one-half interests from Rose Sepowitz, individually and as executor ofthe estate ofPeter Sepowitz, toJohnSepowitz. Indescribingtheproperty,thedeedsareidentical. Whether the defendants’ root oftitle was one deed, or two deeds that were identical except forthe parties thereto, it does not affect our analysis or conclusions. For convenience, we will refer to the defendants’ root of title as the two 1944 deeds. The 1944 deeds conveyed five tracts. The defendants purchased onlythree ofthosetractsin 1986withPaulWard, andin 1990, theypurchased Paul Ward’s interest in those tracts.
6 The so-called Frank Calvert right-of-way is not defined, explained, or set forth in the 1944 deeds or any other muniment of title.

7 ‘‘Theterm‘muniments oftitle’isdefined, inrelevantpart, as ‘[t]herecords of title transactions in the chain of title of a person purporting to create the interest in land claimed by such person and upon which he relies as abasis for the marketability of his title, commencing with the root of title and including all subsequent transactions.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed.1990).’’ Johnson v. Sourignamath, 90 Conn. App. 388, 398 n.14, 877 A.2d 891 (2005).

8 A merestone is ‘‘[a] stone that marks land boundaries.’’ Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Ed. 2009).

9 General Statutes § 47-31 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘An action may be broughtbyanyperson claimingtitle to, or anyinterestin, real orpersonal property, or both, against any person who may claim to own the property,

or any part of it, or to have any estate in it, either in fee, for years, for life

or in reversion or remainder, or to have any interest in the property, or any lien or encumbrance on it, adverse to the plaintiff, or against any person inwhomthe landrecords disclose anyinterest, lien, claim ortitle conflicting with the plaintiff’s claim, title or interest, for the purpose of determining suchadverse estate, interestorclaim, andto clearup all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property. Such action may be brought whether or not the plaintiffis entitled to the immediate or exclusive possession of the property.’’

10 GeneralStatutes § 47-33cprovides: ‘‘Anypersonhavingthelegalcapacity to own land in this state, who has an unbroken chain oftitle to any interest in land forfortyyears ormore, shall be deemedto have amarketable record title to that interest, subject only to the matters stated in section 47-33d. A person has such an unbroken chain of title when the land records of the town in which the land is located disclose a conveyance or other title transaction, ofrecord not less than forty years at the time the marketability is to be determined, which conveyance or other title transaction purports to create such interest in land, or which contains language sufficient to transfer the interest, either in (1) the person claiming that interest, or (2)

some other person from whom, by one or more conveyances or other title transactions of record, the purported interest has become vested in the person claiming the interest; with nothing appearing of record, in either case, purporting to divest the claimant of the purported interest.’’

11 General Statutes § 47-33b (a) provides: ‘‘ ‘Marketable recordtitle’ means
a title of record which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existingpriorto the effective date ofthe root oftitle, as are stated in section 47-33e

. . . .’’

12 General Statutes § 47-33e provides: ‘‘Subject to the matters stated in section 47-33d, such marketable record title shall be held by its owner and shall be taken by any person dealing with the land free and clear of all interests, claims or charges whatsoever, the existence of which depends upon any act, transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title. All such interests, claims or charges, howeverdenominated, whetherlegalorequitable, presentorfuture, whether those interests, claims or charges are asserted by aperson suijuris orunder

a disability, whether that person is within or without the state, whether that person is natural or corporate, or is private or governmental, are hereby declared to be null and void.’’

13 General Statutes § 47-33d provides: ‘‘Such marketable record title is subject to: (1) All interests and defects which are created by or arise out of the muniments of which the chain of record title is formed; provided a general reference in the muniments, or any of them, to easements, use restrictions or other interests created prior to the root of title are not sufficient to preserve them, unless specific identification is made therein of a recorded title transaction which creates the easement, use restriction

orotherinterest; (2) allinterestspreservedbythe recording ofpropernotice

orbypossession bythe same owner continuously for aperiod offortyyears
or more, in accordance with section 47-33f; (3) the rights of any person arising from a period of adverse possession or use, which was in whole or in part subsequent to the effective date of the root of title; (4) any interest arising out of a title transaction which has been recorded subsequent to the effective date ofthe root oftitle from which the unbroken chain oftitle ofrecord is started; provided such recording shall not revive or give validity to anyinterestwhichhasbeenextinguishedpriortothetime oftherecording by the operation of section 47-33e; (5) the exceptions stated in section 47- 33h as to rights of reversioners in leases, as to apparent easements and interests in the nature ofeasements, and as to interests ofthe United States, this state and political subdivisions thereof, public service companies and natural gas companies.’’

14 See footnote 5 of this opinion.

15 We have also reviewed the 1986 and 1990 deeds conveying the defen-dants’ propertyto them and Paul Ward. The defendants firstpurchasedtheir property with Paul Ward as tenants in common from John Sepowitz as set forth in a deed recorded on the Montville town records on June 30, 1986. Paul Ward then conveyed his interest in the property to the defendants by

a quitclaim deed recorded on May 24, 1990. The 1986 and 1990 deeds each contain a reference to the ‘‘Plan of the Sepowitz Property Jerome Road, Montville, Connecticut Date July, 1982 Scale: 1’’ = 50’,’’ which was recorded

on the Montville town records. That plan, however, does not depict any alleged right-of-way for the benefit of the plaintiff’s property.
16 General Statutes § 47-33hprovides: ‘‘Sections 47-33b to 47-33l, inclusive, shall not be applied to bar any lessor or successor of the lessor as a reversioner of the right to possession on the expiration of any lease or to bar or extinguish any easement or interest in the nature of an easement, or any rights granted, excepted or reserved by the instrument creating such easement or interest, including any right for future use, if (1) the existence of such easement or interest is evidenced by the location beneath, upon or above any part ofthe land described in such instrument of any pipe, valve, road, wire, cable, conduit, duct, sewer, track, hole, tower or otherphysical facility and whether or not the existence of such facility is observable, or to bar, extinguish or otherwise affect any interest of the United States, of this state or anypolitical subdivision thereof, ofanypublic service company
asdefinedinsection 16-1 orofanynaturalgascompany, or(2) sucheasement

or interest is a conservation restriction, as defined in section 47-42a, that is held by a land trust or nonprofit organization.’’ (Emphasis added.)

17 Thus, bywayofexample, fences, merestones, trees, andshrubs, standing alone, inthe absence ofspecific evidence ofaroad ortrackrunningbetween them, do not satisfy the requirements for a § 47-33h exception.