NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

NICOLE ANN DAVIS, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0780

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR 2013-448616-003

The Honorable Christopher T. Whitten, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Chris DeRose

Counsel for Appellee

Ballecer & Segal, Phoenix

By Natalee E. Segal

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. DAVIS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Patricia A. Orozco and Judge Maurice Portley joined.

D O W N I E, Judge:

¶1 Nicole Ann Davis appeals her conviction for child abuse. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PRCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Davis, her husband, mother-in-law, and seven-year-old 

daughter, S.P., were sitting in a Jehovah’s Witness Kingdom Hall 

courtyard. Hall elders began receiving complaints that Davis’ husband 

was causing a disturbance. The elders contacted Scottsdale Police and 

requested assistance. Officers arrived and asked the family to leave the 

property several times, but they refused. Davis’ husband stated only 

“Jehovah” could make them leave and “it would be war” if the officers 

tried to make them leave. The officers again warned the family they were 

trespassing and asked them to leave; they again refused. A Hall elder also

told the family they were trespassing and asked them to leave. 

¶3 Officers decided to take Davis’ husband into custody and 

attempted to separate him from the rest of the family. Lieutenant

Rasmussen placed himself between the husband and other family 

members. Davis then punched Lieutenant Rasmussen in his neck. 

Lieutenant Rasmussen grabbed Davis by the arm, attempted to take her to 

the ground, and both of them fell to the ground. Davis continued to fight, 

punching and kicking Lieutenant Rasmussen as he tried to gain control of 

her arms. Lieutenant Rasmussen told Davis to stop resisting, but she did 

not comply and was “screaming at the top of her lungs.” Lieutenant

Rasmussen eventually pinned Davis, holding her down until another 

officer could assist with handcuffing her. Davis continued resisting and 

trying to kick the officers. 

¶4 S.P. appeared “extremely upset” during the incident, and 

Davis yelled “[l]ots of times” for the child to hit Lieutenant Rasmussen. 

S.P. was screaming “not to hurt her mommy.” Davis continued yelling at 

S.P. to hit Lieutenant Rasmussen, whereupon S.P. began hitting him in the 
STATE v. DAVIS

Decision of the Court

3

face, head, and shoulders. Lieutenant Rasmussen asked S.P., “[w]ould 

you please stop hitting me[?]” and S.P. complied. The officers gained 

control of the situation and placed the three adults in handcuffs. When 

officers attempted to put S.P. in a patrol car, Davis and her husband again 

yelled at the child several times to “fight” the officers. S.P. did not comply 

this time and got into the patrol car. 

¶5 Davis was charged with one count of aggravated assault, a 

class five felony in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) 

sections 13-1203(A)(3), -1204(A)(8)(a); one count of resisting arrest, a class 

six felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-2508(A)(1); and child abuse, a class 

four felony, in violation of A.R.S. § 13-3623(B)(1).

1 A four-day jury trial 

ensued. At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Davis moved for a 

judgment of acquittal on the child abuse count, which the court denied.

The jury found Davis guilty of resisting arrest and child abuse but not 

guilty of aggravated assault. The court sentenced her to two years’ 

probation for each count, to run concurrently. 

¶6 Davis timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 

12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and -4033(A).

DISCUSSION

¶7 Davis argues the court should have granted her motion for 

judgment of acquittal on the child abuse count. We review de novo the 

sufficiency of evidence, viewing it in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the verdict. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 15, 250 P.3d 1188, 1191 

(2011). The trial court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if “no 

substantial evidence supports the conviction.” State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 

191, 212, ¶ 87, 84 P.3d 456, 477 (2004).

¶8 The record includes substantial evidence of guilt as to the 

child abuse charge. See State v. Tison, 129 Ariz. 546, 552, 633 P.2d 355, 361 

(1981) (In reviewing for sufficiency of evidence, “[t]he test to be applied is 

whether there is substantial evidence to support a guilty verdict.”).

“Substantial evidence is proof that reasonable persons could accept as 

sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a 

 

1 The indictment alleges child abuse in violation of A.R.S. 

§ 13-3623(F)(B)(C) — a subsection that does not exist. The jury was 

instructed under § 13-3623(B)(1), and Davis has not asserted any error 

associated with this issue.
STATE v. DAVIS

Decision of the Court

4

reasonable doubt.” State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290, 908 P.2d 1062, 1075 

(1996). Substantial evidence “may be either circumstantial or direct.”

State v. Henry, 205 Ariz. 229, 232, ¶ 11, 68 P.3d 455, 458 (App. 2003).

¶9 As charged, the offense of child abuse required proof that:

(1) under circumstances other than those likely to produce death or 

serious injury, (2) Davis intentionally or knowingly, (3) caused or 

permitted a child to be placed in a situation where the person or health of 

the child was endangered, while having the care or custody of the child. 

See A.R.S. § 13-3623(B)(1). Endanger means “to expose to potential harm”

that is more than the ordinary danger to which children are exposed on a 

daily basis. State v. Mahaney, 193 Ariz. 566, 569, ¶ 15, 975 P.2d 156, 159 

(App. 1999).

¶10 By refusing to leave the church property, Davis escalated a

situation that necessitated police intervention, all while her seven-year-old

daughter was present. Davis repeatedly refused to comply with officers’ 

commands and was physically aggressive. In the midst of this chaotic and 

violent scene, which included use of a Taser on Davis’ husband, Davis

ordered her young daughter to join in the fracas by assaulting officers. 

S.P. complied with her mother’s directives and began hitting the armed 

officer.

¶11 Although Lieutenant Rasmussen exhibited restraint as to the 

child, who was uninjured, endangerment includes situations that subject a

child to potential harm. Id. Substantial evidence exists from which

reasonable jurors could find that S.P. was subjected to potential harm 

beyond an ordinary danger of everyday life. Her involvement in a chaotic 

melee between six uniformed and armed officers and three adults in a 

small courtyard could easily have resulted in harm to her. In addition to 

the obvious risks of injury, the jury heard testimony about dangers 

inherent in approaching an officer who is engaged with another 

individual and how standard police equipment such as a gun, Taser, and 

pepper spray, can come loose during a ground fight. 
STATE v. DAVIS

Decision of the Court

5

CONCLUSION

¶12 For the reasons stated, we affirm Davis’ convictions and 

sentences.