COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and 

 Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Alexandria, Virginia 

WINSTON JEFFREY WATT 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record Nos. 2409-97-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK 

 and 2600-97-4 JUNE 16, 1998 

PAMELA SUSETTE PARMER WATT 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 

M. Langhorne Keith, Judge 

 Lawrence D. Diehl (Jeanette A. Irby; Walker, 

Jones, Lawrence, Duggan & Savage, P.C., on 

brief), for appellant. 

 James Ray Cottrell (Christopher W. 

Schinstock; Gannon, Cottrell & Ward, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Winston Jeffrey Watt (father) appeals the trial court's 

order granting custody of the parties' child to Pamela Susette 

Parmer Watt (mother). In his thirteen assignments of error, 

father contends the trial court erroneously: (1) ruled on 

several evidentiary matters; (2) found a material change in 

circumstances based on the child's alienation from her mother; 

(3) found changing custody from father to mother to be in the 

child's best interests; and (4) disregarded the testimony of an 

expert. For the following reasons, we affirm. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 -2- 

 I. Background 

 The parties have two children, Suzanne Parmer Watt, born 

April 7, 1981, and Emily Christine Watt, born March 18, 1991. 

Pursuant to the parties' final decree of divorce, entered July 

28, 1995, mother was granted sole custody of Suzanne and father 

was granted sole custody of Emily. In the fall of 1995, the 

parties filed cross-petitions for change in custody, citing 

problems with visitation and communication. Additionally, mother 

alleged that father and his current wife, Beebe Belmore, were 

alienating Emily from her. In September 1995, the trial court 

found changed circumstances based on both parties' relocations 

but ordered that sole custody of Suzanne remain with mother in 

her new home in Florida and sole custody of Emily remain with 

father in Virginia. The trial court set out a visitation 

schedule and expressed concern over the possibility of the 

alienation of Emily from her mother. The trial court 

specifically ordered father to "ensure that Emily does not call 

her stepmother 'mom' or any such derivation of mother." Father 

did not appeal that ruling. Mother appealed the trial court's 

decision on other issues. This Court affirmed the trial judge's 

rulings.1

 See Watt v. Watt, No. 2448-95-4 (May 7, 1996). 

 On May 20, 1997, mother initiated the instant proceedings by 

filing a motion to modify custody with respect to Emily. Mother 

 

 1The issue of the appropriateness of requiring father to 

prevent Emily's use of the term "mom" in reference to her 

stepmother was not appealed and is therefore the law of the case. 
 -3- 

alleged that Emily was having difficulty with the current custody 

arrangement, that Emily was becoming alienated from her, and that 

father had violated the trial court's order with respect to 

furthering mother's relationship with Emily. 

 On July 11, 1997, before the scheduled hearing on mother's 

motion, father filed an emergency motion to change summer 

visitation. Father's motion was based on the opinion of Dr. 

Lynne Hahnemann, a resident in psychology who had testified at 

the 1995 custody hearing. Ruling that Dr. Hahnemann was not 

licensed as a psychologist in Virginia and therefore was not 

permitted to testify, the trial court denied father's motion. A 

hearing on the merits of mother's motion was held before the 

trial judge from September 24 through October 2, 1997. 

 Viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party 

below, see Johnson v. Johnson, 26 Va. App. 135, 144, 493 S.E.2d 

668, 672 (1997), the evidence established the following facts. 

Both mother's and father's witnesses testified that Emily made 

numerous statements indicating that she felt emotionally distant 

from her mother.2

 Emily called Belmore "mom," even after the 

court order requiring father to discourage this behavior. She 

 

 2Both parties' witnesses, including father himself, 

testified concerning Emily's statements. Father first objected 

to this type of evidence during the testimony of Thomas Tomczak 

and Suzanne Watt. After a brief recess, during which the trial 

court reviewed Professor Friend's treatise and cases offered by 

mother's counsel, the court overruled the objections, finding the 

statements were admissible under the state-of-mind exception or 

as verbal fact. 
 -4- 

referred to mother as "Susette" or "birth mother," and indicated 

that she was not her real mother. Emily told Carolyn Pierce that 

mother abused her and did not love her because she spanked her or 

she went to work and left Emily "'at a pre-school or in a 

day-care all of my life.'" Emily told mother on several 

occasions in the presence of Willie Dickson "'Beebe says you 

don't love me; that she's the only one who loves me.'" Emily 

also said she "hated" mother and wished she "had not been born." 

 Suzanne testified that father and Belmore sent gifts to 

Emily while she was on visitation with mother. They made a "big 

deal" of her return from visitation with banners, balloons, and 

presents. Additionally, father and Belmore gave Emily a 

toll-free number to call them during visitations with mother. 

 Mother testified that Belmore said she considered mother a 

"mother in name only." Suzanne testified that Belmore said 

mother didn't love Emily because she had planned to abort Emily 

and that was one of the reasons she could not be a good mother to 

her. Additionally, Belmore told Dr. Kerman, Carolyn Pierce and 

Jane Lynch that mother abused Emily. Belmore testified as 

follows: "'You know, Susette?' I said, 'Your uncaring 

self-centered behavior toward your child, in my opinion, is that 

of an individual who is mother in name only.'" Belmore 

acknowledged she does not believe mother has the skills or 

genuine love and care required to raise Emily. 

 Dr. Fred Kerman, a clinical psychologist, testified 
 -5- 

regarding the impact on Emily of father's and Belmore's behavior. 

 He stated that, father's and Belmore's efforts to discourage 

Emily from calling her stepmother "mom" notwithstanding, Belmore 

had not done everything she could have to maintain the 

distinction between her role as a stepparent as opposed to a 

mother to Emily. He also acknowledged that giving the toll-free 

number to Emily could imply to the child that she was in danger 

when she was with mother and needed that number to protect 

herself. 

 Mother offered additional evidence related to the criteria 

of Code § 20-124.3. In particular, mother offered evidence that 

she never interfered with father's visitation with Suzanne, 

actively promoted a relationship between Suzanne and father, and 

never refused Emily's requests to phone father while on 

visitation. With regard to her parenting abilities, mother 

presented evidence that Suzanne had excellent grades and was 

thriving under mother's care and protection. 

 The trial court stated that the 1995 order had reflected its 

concern about the possibility of Emily's alienation from mother 

and that father's failure to comply with that order, while not 

the basis for the court's decision, provided "some evidence of 

alienation." The trial court found that "through an effort of 

the father and his wife, there has been an extreme 

marginalization of the mother's role in the child's life." The 

court further found that "mother's witnesses are credible and the 
 -6- 

evidence of continued allegations of abuse, [referring to mother 

as] 'birth mother' and things of that nature, right up until the 

present time, are persuasive to the court that there has been 

alienation." The court "did not extend the same degree of 

credibility or belief to the father's witnesses." The trial 

court concluded that the continued alienation of the child from 

her mother, as well as the mother's fully established home in 

Florida, constituted a change of circumstances from the 1995 

hearing. 

 The trial court reviewed each of the statutory factors in 

Code § 20-124.3, finding specifically that "the developmental 

needs of Emily can be met in Florida." The trial court 

considered "the determinative factor in this case" to be the 

"propensity of each parent to actively support the child's 

contact and relationship with the other parent." See Code 

§ 20-124.3(6). The trial court found that "Emily has been led to 

believe that her mother is nothing more than a birth mother," and 

concluded: 

 I think the long-term interest of Emily, the 

importance of knowing that her mother is her 

mother, is so overwhelming and the evidence 

I've heard is so compelling that that is not 

the case now. . . . [I]t's in her long-term 

interest to make a change in custody. 

The trial court awarded sole custody of the child to mother. 

Father's motion to stay execution of the judgment pending appeal 

was denied on October 14, 1997. 

II. Evidentiary Issues 
 -7- 

 Father contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence 

of the child's out-of-court statements. He argues the evidence 

was hearsay and was not admissible under any exception to the 

hearsay rule. We find no error. 

 Assuming without deciding that testimony describing the 

child's out-of-court statements was not admissible under an 

exception to the hearsay rule, we hold that sufficient evidence 

of her statements was presented without objection to support the 

trial court's findings. Father objected to the testimony of 

Thomas Tomczak and Suzanne Watt regarding Emily's statements, but 

he failed to object to similar testimony of Carolyn Pierce, 

Willie Dickson, Jayne Lynch and mother. This uncontested 

evidence included testimony that Emily called her mother 

"Susette" or "birth mother" and that she said she hated mother 

and mother abused her, abandoned her, and did not love her. 

 Moreover, father introduced evidence of Emily's out-of-court 

statements during his case, including the testimony of Dr. 

Kerman, Anna Lyon, Beebe Belmore, Briar Bogin, Richard Bogin, and 

Jayne Lynch. Father himself testified that Emily called Belmore 

"mom," that she called mother "Susette," and that she said she 

hated her mother and wished she had not been born. A party 

objecting to the introduction of evidence waives his objection 

when he introduces similar evidence on his own behalf. See

McGill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 237, 244, 391 S.E.2d 597, 601 

(1990). 
 -8- 

 Father also contends the trial court erred in admitting a 

letter from the child's school which included a statement that 

Belmore had instructed school officials not to disclose any 

information to mother. He argues the letter was hearsay and its 

authenticity was not established. We disagree. 

 At trial, father objected to the admission of the letter as 

follows: "I'm going to object just based on authenticity. But 

certainly the witness can testify as to the letter." We decline 

to consider father's hearsay objection, which was first raised in 

his brief and is not properly before this Court. See Lee v. Lee, 

12 Va. App. 512, 404 S.E.2d 736 (1991) (citing Rule 5A:18). 

 "'The admissibility of evidence is within the broad 

discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed 

on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion.'" Crews v. 

Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 118, 442 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1994) 

(citation omitted). "Before any writing may be introduced into 

evidence, it must be authenticated, 'which is the providing of an 

evidentiary basis sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude 

that the writing came from the source claimed.'" Ragland v. 

Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 919, 434 S.E.2d 675, 679 (1993) 

(quoting Walters v. Littleton, 223 Va. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 839, 

842 (1982)). "'The amount of evidence sufficient to establish 

authenticity will vary according to the type of writing, and the 

circumstances attending its admission, but generally proof of any 

circumstances which will support a finding that the writing is 
 -9- 

genuine will suffice.'" Id. Here, mother testified that she 

physically went to the school where she was personally handed the 

letter as a response by the school to her request for information 

about Emily. These factual circumstances surrounding the letter 

sufficiently established its genuineness, and its admission into 

evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 
 -10- 

III. Change in Circumstances 

 Father next contends the trial court erred in finding a 

material change in circumstances because there was no alienation 

and the child had no confusion about the identity of her mother. 

 We disagree. 

 The standard to be applied to a modification of a child 

custody decree is well settled: 

 "A trial court, in determining whether a 

change of custody should be made, must apply 

a two-pronged test: (1) whether there has 

been a [material] change in circumstances 

since the most recent custody award; and (2) 

whether a change in custody would be in the 

best interests of the child." 

Wilson v. Wilson, 18 Va. App. 193, 195, 442 S.E.2d 694, 696 

(1994) (quoting Visikides v. Derr, 3 Va. App. 69, 70, 348 S.E.2d 

40, 41 (1986)). "'Whether a change of circumstances exists is a 

factual finding that will not be disturbed on appeal if the 

finding is supported by credible evidence.'" Ohlen v. Shively, 

16 Va. App. 419, 423, 430 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1993) (citation 

omitted). In chancery cases heard ore tenus the trial court is 

the sole judge of the credibility of the testimony of the 

witnesses and all inferences to be drawn therefrom. See Street 

v. Street, 25 Va. App. 380, 387, 488 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1997) (en

banc). This Court will not substitute its judgment in such 

circumstances for that of the trial court. See Ward v. 

Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 144, 148, 408 S.E.2d 921, 923 (1991). 

 In the instant case, the evidence established father's and 
 -11- 

 

Belmore's continued hostility toward mother, Belmore's attempts 

to undermine mother in the eyes of both Emily and Suzanne, 

Belmore's statements to family members perpetuating an unfounded 

allegation of abuse of Emily by mother, and father's and 

Belmore's intrusions into mother's visitation through gifts and 

telephone calls. Based on this evidence, which the trial court 

explicitly found to be more credible than father's evidence,3

 the 

trial court concluded that "through an effort of the father and 

his wife, there has been an extreme marginalization of the 

mother's role in the child's life" and "that Emily has been led 

to believe that her mother is nothing more than a birth mother." 

 Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that since 1995 mother 

had completed the transition in progress at that time, and her 

home in Florida was established. We hold that the evidence 

supported the trial court's findings that the alienation of Emily 

from her mother was ongoing, that mother had a stable home in 

Florida, and that these were material changes in circumstances 

justifying a reexamination of custody.4

 3The trial court found mother's witnesses were "credible" 

but "did not extend the same degree of credibility or belief to 

the father's witnesses." 

 4Father also contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to strike because mother failed to establish a change in 

circumstances. "'When the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence 

is challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court should 

resolve any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the 

evidence in plaintiff's favor.'" Butler v. Yeats, 222 Va. 550, 

553, 281 S.E.2d 905, 906 (1981) (citation omitted). In light of 

this standard and our holding that the evidence supported the 

trial court's finding of a change in circumstances, the denial of 

the motion to strike was not error. 
 -12- 

IV. Change in Custody 

 Father challenges the trial court's award of custody to 

mother. He contends the child flourished in his home and the 

trial court's conclusion that mother was capable of meeting 

Emily's developmental needs was contrary to the evidence and 

speculative. 

 "'[I]n determining custody, the court shall give primary 

consideration to the best interests of the child.'" Sargent v. 

Sargent, 20 Va. App. 694, 701, 460 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1995) 

(quoting Code § 20-124.2). The court must consider the factors 

in Code § 20-124.3 in deciding what custody arrangement is in the 

child's best interests, including: 

 [t]he propensity of each parent to actively 

support the child's contact and relationship 

with the other parent, the relative 

willingness and demonstrated ability of each 

parent to maintain a close and continuing 

relationship with the child, and the ability 

of each parent to cooperate in matters 

affecting the child. 

Code § 20-124.3(6). "As long as the trial court examines the 

factors, it is not 'required to quantify or elaborate exactly 

what weight or consideration it has given to each of the 

statutory factors.'" Sargent, 20 Va. App. at 702, 460 S.E.2d at 

599 (quoting Woolley v. Woolley, 3 Va. App. 337, 345, 349 S.E.2d 

422, 426 (1986)). 

 In the instant case, the trial court acknowledged Emily's 

success and happiness in father's household, but found "it's also 
 -13- 

obvious that the mother can meet the needs of the child. Suzanne 

is probably the best evidence of that fact in that Suzanne has 

prospered." After reviewing and weighing all of the statutory 

factors, the trial court considered "the determinative factor in 

this case" to be the "propensity of each parent to actively 

support the child's contact and relationship with the other 

parent." Based upon the evidence of an ongoing pattern of active 

alienation of Emily from mother and a finding that this was not 

in the child's best interests, the trial court awarded sole 

custody to mother. We hold that credible evidence supported this 

finding and the decision to award a change in custody was not 

error. 

V. Expert Testimony 

 Father also argues the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to follow the recommendation of the expert custody 

evaluator. He contends the trial court had no reason not to be 

persuaded by Dr. Kerman's testimony and opinions. Father's 

argument lacks merit. 

 "[T]he fact finder is not required to accept the testimony 

of an expert witness merely because he or she has qualified as an 

expert." Street, 25 Va. App. at 387, 488 S.E.2d at 668. The 

trier of fact ascertains a witness' credibility, determines the 

weight to be given to his testimony, and has the discretion to 

accept or reject any of the testimony. See id. In determining 

the weight to be given to expert testimony, the fact finder may 
 -14- 

consider the basis for the opinion. See id. at 388, 488 S.E.2d 

at 668-69; Gilbert v. Summers, 240 Va. 155, 393 S.E.2d 213 

(1990). 

 In the instant case, the trial court considered that Dr. 

Kerman never interviewed any of mother's witnesses and was 

unaware of their information. Furthermore, the trial court could 

also consider Dr. Kerman's testimony that he did not normally 

testify when he could not involve both parents in the evaluation, 

but nevertheless he elected to do so in this case. In light of 

these facts and the evidence supporting the trial court's 

rulings, we hold the trial court did not err in rejecting the 

recommendation of the expert.5

 Both parties have requested an award of costs and attorneys' 

fees for this appeal. We find no evidence that either party 

created unnecessary delay or expense, and the issues raised were 

not unreasonable. Accordingly, the requests are denied. 

 For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's custody order 

is affirmed. 

 Affirmed. 

 5Father also contends the trial court erred in denying his 

motion to stay execution of the order in light of overwhelming 

evidence that the change in custody would have a detrimental 

effect on the child. We hold the trial court did not err in 

failing to order the child to remain in the environment which it 

had just determined was not in her best interests. The trial 

court noted in its ruling that any anticipated transition 

difficulty was properly before the court during the trial, and 

the court had "taken it into consideration in making my 

decision." The trial court's denial of father's motion to stay 

was well within its discretion.