NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0578n.06 F iled: Septem ber 26, 2008 No. 06–6512 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. CHRI S SHUL TS, De fe nd a nt- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE

B e fo re : MA RTI

N, RO GE RS and

SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e s.
SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judge. Chr is Sh

ult s p le a de d g uil ty

to c on sp ir ingto d ist

ri bu te , a nd to possessing w ith the intent to dis t ribute, five or more kilog rams of c ocaine . The district cour t imposed a within-g uidelines sentenc e of 87 months. Be cause the court, in denying Shults’s motion for a downwar d depar

ture, a pprec iated its discretion to g rant the de parture and bec ause the sentenc e
wa s o the rw ise re a so na

ble , w e a ff

ir m.
I.
I n May 20 06 , the g ov e rn me nt c ha rg e d Shu lts wi th c on sp ir ing to dis tr ibute, and with dis tr ibutin g , c oc a ine . H e e nte re d in to a ple a a g re e me nt, on e c omp on e nt o f w hic h r e qu ir e d h im t o cooper ate with law enforce ment ag ents. He later assist ed the g overnme nt by obtaining a kilogr am of coc aine f

rom an individual named D ewe y L y nn Phili ps in a rec orded tra nsaction. A ten-y ear

statutory minimum normally

applies to individuals who possess more than five kilogr am s o f

c o c a in e w it

h th e in te n t t o d is tr ib u te it

. 2 1 U

. S. C. § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( A )

. B u t S h u lt s’s prese ntence repor

t invoked the “sa fety

valve” provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), due to his coope ration with the g overnme nt, and as a result the re port rec ommended a guide line sentenc e ra ng e of 70 to 87No. 06-6512

Un ite d S tat es v . S hu lts

2 months. S hults did not object to the pre sentenc e re port (at lea st with respec t to any issues raised on appea l), and ne ither did the g overnme nt.
Ba sed on Shults’s cooper at i o n , t h e g overnme nt filed a motion for a downwar d depar

ture,
a sk ingthe c ourt

to l ow e r h is s e nte nc e by on e g uid e lin e s le ve l, w hic h w ould hav e re du c e d h is g uidelines rang e to 63–78 months. Shults filed a se parate motion for a downw ard de parture based
on his c oo pe ratio n, a sk ingthe c ourt to r e du c e his se nte nc e to 3 6 mo nth s.
Al tho ug h th e dis tr ic t c ourt un de rs too d its dis c re tio n to g ra nt the mot ion , th e c ourt

ult imate ly denied it for two r easons: Shults had been paid for his cooperation, and he had “ conce al[ed] criminal activity from the g overnme nt during a time when [he wa s] acting . . . a s a conf idential informant.” J A 168. The judg e was particula rly conce rned that Shults ’s continued criminal ac tiviti es would have “g iven enoug h fodder to de fense attorney s to c halleng e [hi s] cr edibility to make it impossibl e for

the g overnme nt to use [hi m] .” JA 168.
Th e c ourt nex t consid e re d w hat se nte nc e wa s “ su ff ic ie nt b ut n ot g re a te r t

ha n n e c e ssa ry to
acc omplish t he g oals of sentencing established by the C ong ress.” J A 167. After acc ounting f

or the §3553(a) fac tors, including the 7 0

– 8 7 m onth guide lines rang e, the c ourt imposed a top-of- theg u i d e l i n e s , 8 7

- m o n t h s e n t e n c e

— i n p a rt d u e t o t h e s e r i o u s n e s s o f t h e o f f e n s e a n d i n p a rtdu e to Shults ’s prior c riminal activity and what the court perc eived to be a high risk of rec idivism

. “Doe s either pa rty ,” the court then asked, “have any objections to the sentenc e just pronounce d that have
no t be e n p re vio us ly

ra ise d?” JA 17 6. Shu lts re ne we d h is o bje c tio ns to s ome fa c tua l a lle g a tio ns in the pr e se nte nc e re po rt , a nd the c ourt g ra nte d the m, no tin g that the y did no t have a n imp act on his proposed se ntence . Neither Shults nor the g overnme nt raised a ny other objec tions to t he sente nce.No. 06-6512

Un ite d S tat es v . S hu lts

3 II.
Shults raises two arguments on appea l: The district cour t should have g rante d his moti on for
a do wnwa rd de pa rt ur e , a nd his 87 -m on th s e nte nc e is unr e a so na ble . N e ith e r a

rgume nt h a s me ri t.
A.
I n challeng ing the district c ourt’s denial of his motion for a downwar d depar ture, Shults face s a serious o b s ta c le

. So lo n g a s th e d is tr ic t c o u rt a p p r e c iate s it s a

u th o r it y to g r a n t a

d o w n war d de pa rt ur e , th e e xer c ise of

its dis c re tio n in

op tin g wh e the r t o g ra

nt o r d e ny

the mot ion

is unrevie wable. United States v. W heaton , 517 F.3d 350, 370 ( 6th Cir. 2008). Shult s has not made this showing. Nothing in the rec ord sug g ests that the district court did not appre ciate its discre tion to gr ant the motion. To the contra ry , when the district c ourt g ave i t s re as o n s for de ny ing the depar ture, it expressly

acknow ledg ed its authority to gr ant the motion. Appar ently

seekingto sidestep this li mit at i o n o n o u r authority to reviewa district cour

t’s downwar d-depa

rture ruling , Shults argues that, under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we may alway s review a sente nce if

: (1) it was imposed “in violation of law”; (2) it r esulted from an incorre ct application of the g uidelines; (3) it was a n upwar d depar

ture; or ( 4) it was imposed fo r “a n offe nse for which there is no sentenc ing g uideline and is plainly unrea sonable.” Se e Un ite d S tat es v . P uc k

e tt , 422 F.3d 340, 346 (6th Cir. 2005). Fa ir enoug h. But Shults has not made a serious argument that any of the § 3742(a) g rounds for r eview a pply here , save f

or the fa ct that he se ems to argue, and in some pla ces expli citly argues, that his sentenc e was imposed “in violation of law” be cause the proc ess under ly ing it and the leng th of it are un re as on ab le —a point to which we now turn.No. 06-6512

Un ite d S tat es v . S hu lts

4 B.
“In revie wing sentenc es af ter Booke r , we f

irst ensure that the district court commi t t ed no signific ant proc edura l error

. . . [and] then consider the substantive re asonable ness of the se ntence imposed.” United States v. Grossman , 513 F.3d 592, 595 ( 2008) (inter nal question marks omitted). Withre sp e c t to Shu lts ’s pr oc e dura l argume nts , h e did no t r a ise a ny

of the m be fo re the dis tr ic t c ourt , eve n a ft e r b e ingg ive n a

n o pp or tun ity to d o s o. Pla in- e rr or

re vie w t hu s a pp lie s, re qu ir inghim

“ to show (1) e rror

(2) that wa s obvious or clea r, (3 ) t h at aff

ecte d [hi s] s ubstantial rig hts and (4) that aff ecte d th e fa i rn es s , integ rity , or public re putation of the judicial proc eeding s.” United States v. Vonner , 516 F.3d 382, 386 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (interna l quotation marks omitted).
Whil e his brief

is long on g ener alities and short on spec ifics, Shults first say s that the trial court re lied on “unprove n alleg ations and hea rsay” in sentenc ing him. Br

. at 27. But that is all he say s. He ne ver id en t i fi es an y s p ec i fi c u np ro v en al l ega t i o n s o r ( al l ege d l y ) p ro b l em at i c h ea rs ay , which means the a

rg ument is waived on a ppeal. “ [I ]ss ues ave rre d to i n a p er fu n ctory manner , unacco m p an i ed by

some eff

ort at deve loped ar g umentation, are deeme d waived.” Leary v. Liv ing sto n Co un ty , 528 F.3d 438, 449 (6th Cir. 2008) (interna l que stion mar ks omitted). Nor at any rate is there a

ny indication in the rec ord that the trial c ourt relied on “ cl early err oneous fa cts.” United States v. Funk

, 534 F.3d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 2008) (interna l question marks omitted). Shults ’s hear say argument far es no b et t er . Unlike cr iminal trials, the Rules of Evidence and many constitutional prohibiti ons, such as the Confr ontation Clause , d o n o t apply at sentenc ing. See W ill ia ms v. Ne w York , 337 U.S. 241, 246 (1949) (obse rving that “cour ts in thi s country

[have] prac ticed a policy under w hich a se ntencing judge could exercise a wide discre tion in the sources a nd ty pe s of e vid e nc e us e d to a ssi st him in d e te rm ini ng ” se nte nc e le ng ths ); United St ates v. Silverm an , 976 F.2d 1502, 1504 ( 6th Cir

. 1 9 9 2 ) (holding that “a ny information may

be conside red [atNo. 06-6512

Un ite d S tat es v . S hu lts

5 sentenc ing], so long as it ha s sufficie nt indicia of reliability to suppor t its probable ac cu racy ”) (interna l quotations marks and empha sis omit ted).
Shu lts ne xt g oe s d ow n th e we ll- wo rn path o f s a y ingthat th e dis tr ic t court vio la te d th e Sixth Amendment by

relying upon “

judicially found facts

. . . not admitted by Mr. Shults.” Br. at 28. But t h at i s n o tt ru e s o l o n g a s t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt fi n d s s u ch fa ct s i n t h e c o u rs e o f ap p l y i n g ad v iso ry g uidelines. See U

nited States v. Booke r , 543 U.S. 220, 226-27, 245 (2005). And no one doubts that the District Court appre ciated the advisory nature of the g uidelines.
Shults does no better in hinting that the district cour t misapplied the g uidelines. Be cause he
never identifies any specific calc ulation or application error s, the argument g oes nowhe re. Le ar y , 528 F.3d at 449.
Shults next arg ues that the district cour t ga ve undue w eig ht to the g uidelines by saying that it was g iving “ substantial weig ht, or si g nificant weig ht” to the g uidelines ca lculation. Br . at 39. B ut th i s co n t enti on misapprehe nds the rec ord: The judg e said only that he “ also consider[ed] the advisory g uideline ra

ng e in this case to be signific ant.” JA 1 7 2 (empha sis added). The comment shows only

that the court considere d the g uidelines as one important fac tor among many , which the rele vant statute requires

. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4)

. Shults further

argues that the district judg e improper ly relied on h i s al l eged pr ior criminal conduct ( the subject of the dismiss ed 2001 char g e) in declining to g ive hi m a downwa rd var iance

. He re , to o, we have a

wa ive r p ro ble m, a s h e ra ise s th e a rgume nt f or the fi rs t time in the c a se in h is appellate reply

brief. Un ite d S

tat es v . M oo re , 376 F.3d 570, 576 ( 6th Cir. 2004). Nor at any rate has he sh ow n ( or e ve n att e mpt e d to show ) that the tr ia l c ourt ’s fa c t f ind ing s a bo ut t his c ri min a l a c tiv ity rested on f

alse fa ctual pre mises. N o r i s there any thing in the r ecor d that offe rs any hope for theNo. 06-6512

Un ite d S tat es v . S hu lts

6 po int . N o r e c or d e vid e nc e su g g e sts that Shult s d id n ot t ry to b uy c oc a ine in 2 00 1, a nd

c on sid e ra

ble
rec ord evide nce sug g ests he did. And it rema ins the case that trial j u dg es may rely on char g ed conduct that did not result in a conviction. See U nited States v. Conway , 513 F.3d 640, 645 ( 6th Cir. 2008); U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) (2)( E).
L ater in the sentenc ing he aring , it is true, the trial court perha ps should not have said that “the United States C o u rt of Appe als for the Six th Circuit has now found that a se ntence within an
a dv iso ry g uid e lin e ra

ng e is a pr e su mpt ive ly

re a so na ble se nte nc e .” JA 17 2. Whil e the state me nt i s
acc urate , it errone ously

sug g ests that the trial cour t sa w its job as imposi ng a re asonable sentenc e, as opposed to one that is “sufficient but not g re at er t h an n ece ssary to acc omplish t he g oals of sentenc ing established by the C ong ress.” J A 167. See United States v. Forem an , 436 F.3d 638, 644
n. 1 ( 6th Cir. 20 06 ). Ye t Shult s d isc us se s th e iss ue on ly in h is r e ply

br ie f a nd so ha s w a ive d th is argument as we ll, Mo or e , 3 7 6 F

. 3 d a t 5 7 6

. A t a

n y r a te , n o s u

b s ta n ti a l r ig h ts w e r e a f

f e c te d here

. United States v. Bailey , 488 F.3d 363, 368 ( 6th Cir. 2007). The judg e ca ref ully consider ed the § 3553(a) fac tors, and “he did not take his ey e off the ce ntral sentenc ing c onsiderations bef ore him.” United States v. Cruz , 4 61 F .3 d 752 , 755 (6 th Cir . 200 6)

. Th e re thu s is no re a so n to thi nk that th is inappropriate sug g estion “af fec ted the outcome” of the sente ncing , Bailey , 488 F.3d at 368 (internal quotation marks omitted).
L astly , Shults appea

rs to challeng e the leng th of his sentence , saying it is unduly long in view
o f h i s co o peration with the gove rnment, amongother fa ctors. B eca use the c ourt issued a withing uidelines sentenc e, it rec eives a presumption of re asonable ness, Vonner , 516 F.3d at 389, and, as with all sentence s, we review the court’s application of the §3553( a) f actor s for a

buse of discr etion, Grossman , 5 1 3 F

. 3 d a t 5 9 5

. N o a b u s e o f d is c r e ti o n o c c u r

r e d h e r e : T h e c o u rt f

a ir ly a p p lied the §3553(a) fac tors; the underlying c rime normally rec eives a 10-y ear

mandatory

minimum ; the courtNo. 06-6512

Un ite d S tat es v . S hu lts

7 offe red le g itimate expl anations for not va rying downwar d still further ; and it adequately explained wh y Shu lts ha s o nly

him se lf to b lame —b y

c on tin uin g to e ng a g e in i lle g a l tr a ff ic kin g thr ou g ho ut h is cooper ation eff

orts with the g overnme nt—for not re ceiving more c redit for his effor ts on behalf of the g overnme nt.
III

. F or the se re a so ns , w e a ff

ir m.