IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

November 15, 2023 Session

PRISCILLA SMITH v. SHARON BERRY, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Hawkins County

No. 2020-CH-181 Douglas T. Jenkins, Chancellor

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No. E2023-00281-COA-R3-CV

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Priscilla Smith filed a complaint in the Chancery Court for Hawkins County (“the Trial 

Court”) against multiple neighbors, including Michael and Sharon Berry. She sought 

access to her property by way of an undeveloped road called Hyder Lane. The Berrys’ 

garage was on the undeveloped road. After trial, the Trial Court determined that Hyder 

Lane was a public road and ordered the garage to be removed and the road opened for

Ms. Smith’s use and access to her property. The Berrys appealed. Having concluded that 

certain indispensable parties were never joined to the action, we vacate the Trial Court’s 

judgment and remand for the joinder of these indispensable parties. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Vacated; Case Remanded

D. MICHAEL SWINEY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which THOMAS R.

FRIERSON, II, and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined.

Phillip L. Boyd, Rogersville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Michael Berry and Sharon 

Berry.

George Todd East, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Priscilla Smith.

11/29/2023
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OPINION

Background

On July 17, 2020, Ms. Smith filed a complaint, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 54-

14-101 et seq., against her neighbors in the Trial Court. She stated that she was the 

owner of an 18.40-acre tract of land, which she alleged was enclosed by various tracts of 

property separately owned by the Berrys, Eric Todd Linkous, and Joshua and Micah 

Kegley. Based upon the filings and the testimony present in the record, it appears that 

these properties were part of the “J.E. Clemons Subdivision” and were the result of Mr. 

Clemons’s subdivision of his property in the 1950s.

1

 Ms. Smith alleged that she had 

requested permission from the Berrys to access her property by way of Hyder Lane, a 

purportedly public road that was platted to reach Ms. Smith’s property. Hyder Lane, 

however, was never developed past the Berrys’ property, and the Berrys’ garage sits on 

Hyder Lane, blocking further development of the road and Ms. Smith’s access to her 

property. 

The Berrys refused Ms. Smith access and claimed title by adverse possession to 

the contested portion of Hyder Lane where their garage sits. Ms. Smith explained that 

she did not request access across Mr. Linkous’s property or the Kegleys’ property given 

that the “ingress and egress is neither adequate nor convenient and would occasion 

significant damage” to their properties. Ms. Smith claimed that she was “unable to fully 

enjoy the Property and requires an easement to go on the Property to prepare for the sale 

of Property and do any and all other things incidental to the ownership of the Property.” 

Ms. Smith requested that the Trial Court grant her an easement or right-of-way via the 

contested portion of Hyder Lane.

Ms. Berry filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Ms. Smith’s complaint failed to 

state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that there was already a former suit 

pending.2 She further claimed that her garage had been constructed in 1960, thereby 

rendering Ms. Smith’s requested relief barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-18-109. She further cited Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-102, -103, 

and -105, stating that she and her ex-husband, Mr. Berry, had adversely possessed the 

contested portion of Hyder Lane. She also cited Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-109, stating 

that Mr. Berry and she had paid taxes on the contested portion of property for more than 

twenty years and were accordingly the legal owners. Mr. Berry later filed his own 

separate motion to dismiss.

 

1 Clemons is spelled as “Clemons” in documents in the technical record but as “Clemmons” in the 

transcript. In this Opinion, we spell the last name as it appears in the technical record. 

2 Although not entirely clear from the record, it appears that this former suit was consolidated with the 

present one based upon an “Order to Consolidate.” Ms. Smith testified at trial that this conflict had been 

on-going since 2009.
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On March 15, 2021, the Trial Court denied Mr. Berry’s and Ms. Berry’s motions 

to dismiss. Mr. Berry and Ms. Berry thereafter filed a joint answer and renewed their 

request for dismissal. They also claimed that Ms. Smith’s property once fronted the 

“main road” but that Ms. Smith had sold a portion of her property that gave her access to 

this road. They posited that she could not now claim that her property was landlocked.

The Trial Court conducted a trial on May 23, 2022, and heard testimony from Ms. 

Smith; Lowell Bean, the Hawkins County Road Superintendent; David Pearson, the 

Hawkins County Property Assessor; Timothy E. Scott, an attorney and expert in title 

examinations; Margaret Louise Rimer, a former owner of the Berrys’ property and 

garage; Gerald Ward, Ms. Rimer’s brother; and Ms. Berry.

Ms. Smith testified that she had inherited her property from her father, Bob 

Gilreath, and that her property was located at the end of Hyder Lane. She further 

explained that she does not have access to her property if she cannot use Hyder Lane. 

She acknowledged, however, that if she still owned the parcels she previously sold, then 

her property would not be landlocked without access to a public road. According to Ms. 

Smith, an old plat from 1956 (“1956 Plat”) demonstrated that Hyder Lane was platted to 

“go all the way to the end of the property.” The 1956 Plat was admitted into evidence as 

an exhibit.

Ms. Smith grew up in the subdivision and recalled that Eddie Rimer, Ms. Rimer’s 

husband, built “a little shed like thing to put his car under,” which she described as four 

“sticks with a flat roof.” This is the garage at issue. She agreed that the garage had been 

situated on Hyder Lane for over fifty years. She further explained that she or her 

husband went to the tax assessor’s office to inquire about the garage on one occasion and 

that the tax assessor’s office determined that the garage needed to be removed from the 

Berrys’ “tax roll.” Ms. Smith acknowledged that the tax assessor later reinstated the 

garage to the Berry’s tax roll.

Mr. Bean testified that he has been the Hawkins County Road Superintendent for 

nearly sixteen years. He stated that he was familiar with Hyder Lane and that Hawkins

County (“the County”) has previously plowed snow off the road and patched potholes but 

that only one-tenth of the road is recognized as county property. He further explained 

that he would not pave the unfinished portion of the road if asked, given that he would 

need to get approval from the “road committee” and “county commission” and that those 

two boards would have to “accept it as a county road.” He stated that Hyder Lane was 

not a “county right-of-way,” although he acknowledged that the 1956 Plat shows the 

contested portion as being part of the county road and that, according to the 1956 Plat, it 

is supposed to “go all the way through,” presumably beyond the one-tenth developed

portion.
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Speaking about the unfinished portion of Hyder Lane, Mr. Bean explained:

[I]f the rest of that was to become a county road, then all the property 

owners has to deed that to the County with the now subdivision specs. And 

then it would go before the road committee, the road committee would go 

up and look at section of road, and either recommend or recommend it not 

go before the full commission. Then if it went before the full commission 

and they accepted it as a county road, then I’m free to do whatever . . .

When asked how a road would be dedicated to the County if there was no 

planning commission at the time of its dedication, Mr. Bean stated that the property 

owners would “just make a deed to the County.” However, Mr. Bean clarified that “we 

got a lot of roads in the county that don’t have deeds.”

Through Mr. Bean’s testimony, Ms. Smith offered as evidence a 1959 Resolution 

from the Hawkins County Court (“1959 Resolution”), providing: 

Be it resolved by the County Court of Hawkins County, Tennessee, 

that, as recommended by the County Superintendent of Highways, all 

Streets and Roads which have heretofore been laid out and dedicated to the 

public use, within duly platted subdivisions located in said County, shall be 

taken over by the County Superintendent of Highways and maintained as 

public roads and streets, as expeditiously as the Highway Superintendent is 

able to commence the working and maintenance of said roads and streets.

When asked whether he knew “of any acceptance of any dedications in the county other 

than what shows up in the County rolls and the County minutes,” Mr. Bean answered 

“No.”

Mr. Pearson testified that he was the Property Assessor for the County and had 

worked in that office since 1987. Mr. Pearson stated that taxes were no longer paid on 

the garage as of 2021 or 2022 and opined that this was because it does not sit on the 

Berrys’ property and therefore should not have been charged to the Berrys. He explained 

that the garage had been removed from the property assessment in 2012 but had been put 

back on at the request of the Berrys. 

When asked who requested that it be taken off the property assessment, Mr. 

Pearson explained:

[T]he reason it was taken off when we do our visual inspection cycle, we 

review every parcel in the county, one-fourth of the county, every year. 

The person that did that review noticed -- based upon looking at our new 

maps that we have, which have a photo overlayed over the maps, it clearly 
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indicated that building didn’t sit on that parcel. So it actually sits in the 

middle of our right-of-way and it shouldn’t have been charged to anybody, 

so it was taken off at that time.

Mr. Pearson clarified that the Berrys paid taxes on the garage itself, not the land, from 

2011 until 2020 or 2021. He explained that he had decided that the garage should “come 

off the rolls” in 2020 or 2021 because it did not physically reside on the Berrys’ parcel 

and did not have much value. He indicated that the garage was not a valuable building 

and that it was “grown over with a lot of bushes and stuff.”

Next, Mr. Scott testified as an expert witness for Ms. Smith. He testified that he 

was an attorney with expertise in oil, gas, and coal, as well as real estate title 

examinations. The Berrys stipulated to his qualification as an expert witness. Mr. Scott 

reviewed both the 1956 Plat and the 1959 Resolution. The following is an exchange 

between Ms. Smith’s attorney and Mr. Scott: 

Q. The resolution, the 1959 resolution that I had which makes the reference 

to accepting all things that have been platted, is -- does that meet your 

criteria for the County accepting the property? 

A. Yes, sir, it does.

Q. Is there any other document -- you know, Mr. Boyd [the Berrys’ 

attorney] -- you heard him make reference of a deed to the property. At 

that time is that the way that business was conducted? 

A. Based on my review of records in Hawkins County, that’s correct, yes, 

sir. 

Q. Would that be the resolution, is how they are accepted?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is there commonly a deed for the roadway that’s deeded or at the time 

were deeds done in order to . . .

A. Well, I’ve seen those, but as Mr. Bean said, there are a number of county 

roads that are maintained where those deeds are not -- are not found of 

record.

Mr. Scott indicated that “records are pretty bleak” when asked how he determines 

whether a county has accepted a roadway. He further explained: 
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Sometimes it’s hard to find those ordinances where things are either 

-- where roadways are accepted or they’re released back to the adjoining 

property owners. So in the particular case we would have relied on the plat 

that said that the County had accepted that road, Hyder Lane.

When asked whether the unpaved portion of Hyder Lane is still part of the right-of-way, 

Mr. Scott responded: “it’s still part of the . . . plat that shows that it was dedicated.”

With Mr. Scott’s testimony, Ms. Smith rested her case. The Berrys renewed their 

motion to dismiss. The Trial Court denied the motion, noting that it had found Mr. 

Scott’s testimony persuasive. The Berrys proceeded to present their case. 

Ms. Rimer testified that her father, Rowdy Ward, had purchased the property that 

the Berrys now own and built a home for Ms. Rimer. She lived there with her husband, 

Eddie Rimer, who built the garage in approximately 1968. She testified that Bob Gilreath 

told her husband: “If you want to build a garage there, build it. This road will never be 

open.” She reported that “nobody used that road but the ones that lived up there” and 

opined that the road was not supposed to go farther than the Berrys’ property. According 

to Ms. Rimer, when her husband and she moved there, there “wasn’t nothing but a field” 

and they “had to walk all the way up through there.” She stated that they “cleaned it up” 

themselves and “made us a road,” presumably referring to Hyder Lane. Her husband and 

she eventually sold the property to Clarence and Nellie Christian, who then sold the 

property to the Berrys. Her brother, Mr. Ward also testified and stated that Hyder Lane 

was “always private.” 

Lastly, Ms. Berry testified, explaining that she had grown up in the house next 

door to her current home. She testified that Hyder Lane had always been a dead end. 

Her ex-husband and she bought their property, including the garage, from the Christians 

in 1998.

On August 2, 2022, the Trial Court entered an order, finding that Ms. Smith had a 

right to use Hyder Lane and ordering that “all obstructions” be removed. The Court 

made the following findings:

1. That upon Motion of [ ] Eric Todd Linkous, and agreement of the 

Parties, Eric Todd Linkous is hereby dismissed from this case with 

prejudice.

2. That Defendants Joshua T. Kegley and Micah Kegley did not appear for

this trial.

3. That Plaintiff Priscilla Smith has a right to the road which is the subject 

of this case by Warranty Deed of record in Deed Book 403, Page 497 
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which was from the Clemons’ whom created the subdivision that contains 

the road.

4. That the plat which corresponds to Plaintiff’s Warranty Deed, Trial 

Exhibit 2, located in Map Cabinet 3, in Envelope 1100B demonstrates the 

road which is the subject of this case.

5. That Defendant Sharon Berry owns Lots 44, 45, 46 and 47 which do not 

include the portion of land which includes the bed of the road.

6. That an Order of Resolution from the Minutes of the County Court of 

Hawkins County declared, “Be it resolved by the County Court of Hawkins 

County, Tennessee that, as recommended by the County Superintendent of 

Highways, all streets and roads which have been heretofore laid out and 

dedicated to the public use within duly platted subdivisions located in said

county shall be taken over by the County Superintendent of Highways and

maintained as public roads and streets as expeditiously as the Highway 

Superintendent is able to commence the working and maintenance of said 

roads and streets.”

7. That through this resolution, and because the road is platted, the road 

which is the subject of this case is a public road. This fact is additionally 

proven because no private citizen has been paying tax on the property 

which contains the road.

8. That once a road becomes irrevocably dedicated to the public, it cannot 

be lost or forfeited by mere non-use or by the public and is not subject to 

adverse possession. (Varallo v. Met Government of Nashville and 

Davidson County).

9. That no proof was presented by any party indicating that the County 

abandoned the road which is the subject of this case.

10. That the land upon which the Defendant Berry’s garage structure is 

constructed, is a public road.

11. That despite paying County taxes on the building, Defendant Berry 

does not own the land upon which the building was constructed.

12. That Plaintiff has property within the subdivision which utilizes the 

road which is the subject of this case and Plaintiff has a right to use the 

road.
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13. That all obstructions to the road are hereby Ordered to be removed by 

and the road should be opened to the terminus of Plaintiffs’ property for her 

use or her successor in title to use.

The Berrys subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Tennessee Rule of 

Civil Procedure 59. On January 26, 2023, the Trial Court entered an order denying their 

motion to alter or amend. The Berrys timely appealed, and an agreed order staying the 

Trial Court’s judgment pending the outcome of their appeal was entered.

Discussion

The Berrys have presented several issues, but we discern that one issue is 

dispositive of the case and pretermits all the others. This dispositive issue, although not 

stated exactly as such by the Berrys, is whether the Trial Court erred by not including in 

the suit as indispensable parties the County and the Clemons heirs as possible owners of 

Hyder Lane. Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the Trial Court erred by 

adjudicating this case without adding the County and the Clemons heirs as indispensable 

parties.

Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19.01 generally governs the joinder of 

indispensable parties and provides as follows:

A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party if 

(1) in the person’s absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those 

already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject of 

the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person’s 

absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability 

to protect that interest, or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties 

subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise 

inconsistent obligations by reasons of the claimed interest. If the person 

has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. 

If the person properly should join as a plaintiff but refuses to do so, he or 

she may be made a defendant, or in a proper case, an involuntary plaintiff.

This Court has previously explained the operation of Rule 19.01, 

particularly in the context of land disputes, as follows:

We note that the language of Rule 19 is mandatory and directive; 

one who is an indispensable and necessary party “shall be joined as a 

party.” TENN. R. CIV. P. 19.01 (emphasis added). The requirement of 

joinder of indispensable and necessary parties “appears absolute and 

inflexible,” and applies to both trial courts and appellate courts. Pope v. 

Kelsey, No. 86-17-II, 1986 WL 6564, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 13, 1986), 
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no perm. app. (quoting Glickauf v. Moss, 23 Ill. App. 3d 679, 320 N.E.2d 

132, 135-316 (Ill. 1974)). When an indispensable and necessary party has 

not been joined, neither the trial court nor the appellate court may proceed 

further with the matter. Id. The parties are of course obliged to bring to the 

court’s attention the necessity of such a joinder; however, even if the 

parties fail to do so, the trial court or even the appellate court must sua 

sponte enforce this principle of law. Id. (quoting Glickauf, 320 N.E.2d at 

135-36).

Persons whose real property interests may potentially be affected by 

a trial court’s ruling have consistently been recognized as indispensable and 

necessary parties. See Roberts v. England, No. M1999-02688-COA-R3-

CV, 2001 WL 575560, at * 2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001), no perm. app.

(citing Citizens Real Estate & Loan Co., Inc. [v. Mountain States Dev. 

Corp.], 633 S.W.2d [763] at 764-66 [(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981)]; Lee v. Brown, 

No. 89-230-II, 1989 WL 147497, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1989), no 

perm. app.; Stuart v. City of White Pine, No. 57, 1988 WL 86585 (Tenn. Ct.

App. Aug. 19, 1988), no perm. app.; St. Clair v. Evans, No. 829, 1988 WL 

102767, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1988), aff’d on app. after remand, 

872 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993); Carpenter v. Yount, No.14, 1986 

WL 10150, at *3-4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 19, 1986), no perm. app.).

In Roberts, the Court noted that the appropriate inquiry to determine 

if an adjoining landowner is an indispensable and necessary party is 

“whether any resolution of the issues presented in the lawsuit could have 

affected” the adjoining landowner’s real property interest, not whether the 

trial court’s final ruling actually affected the adjoining landowner. Id. at *4 

(emphasis added). Thus, the joinder should occur when there is some 

indication in the record that an identifiable landowner exists whose interests 

might be affected by the lawsuit, even if it appears likely that the third party 

landowner might agree with the trial court’s judgment. See id. at *3 (citing 

Lee, 1989 WL 147497, at *1; St. Clair, 1988 WL 102767, at *2).

In cases in which the appellate court has found that an adjoining 

landowner is an indispensable and necessary party and was not joined in the 

proceedings below, the appellate court has vacated the judgment of the 

court below and remanded the case with instructions to ensure that all 

proper parties are joined before a final determination is made of the 

property owners’ rights. Id. at *3. The purpose of the remand is not for a 

trial de novo; rather, the purpose is to join the absent third parties and give 

them the opportunity to present new evidence as deemed necessary by the 

trial court. See id. at *4.
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Baker v. Foster, No. W2009-00214-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 174773, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. Jan. 20, 2010).

The subject of this dispute is the unfinished portion of Hyder Lane. Based upon 

the evidence at trial, there are at least three potential owners of the property that 

constitutes Hyder Lane: the Berrys, the County, and the Clemons heirs. The Berrys 

claimed ownership by adverse possession of the portion of Hyder Lane upon which their 

garage is situated. Ms. Smith claimed that the County owned Hyder Lane based upon the 

1956 Plat and 1959 Resolution, thereby permitting her public access to her property. 

Lastly, if the County does not own the undeveloped portion of Hyder Lane, it would 

appear that the Clemons heirs may own the property that constitutes that part of Hyder 

Lane.

We recognize that the Berrys argue that the Trial Court’s final judgment is in 

substance a declaratory judgment and that therefore the Declaratory Judgment Act’s 

standard for joinder of indispensable parties should apply. In their appellate briefs, the 

Berrys cite both to the general procedure for joinder in Tennessee Rule of Civil 

Procedure 19.01 and to the Declaratory Judgment Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a). 

We note that this Court has previously explained the difference between Rule 19.01 and 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-14-107(a) as follows:

Rules 19.01 and 19.02 establish general procedural rules for requiring the 

joinder of indispensable parties in all types of cases. Parties seeking 

declaratory relief must also satisfy the more specific requirements of the 

Declaratory Judgments Act before the courts have jurisdiction to grant 

declaratory relief.

Because of the nature of declaratory relief, the Declaratory 

Judgments Act makes it incumbent that every person having an affected 

interest be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before declaratory 

relief may be granted. The Declaratory Judgments Act imposes stricter 

requirements than those imposed generally by Tennessee Rules of Civil 

Procedure 19.01 and 19.02. While joinder may not be required under Rules 

19.01 and 19.02, it is clearly required in a suit for declaratory relief 

pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated, Section 29-14-107(a) which 

provides that: “When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made 

parties who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the 

declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not 

parties to those proceedings.”

Huntsville Util. Dist. of Scott Cnty., Tenn. v. Gen. Tr. Co., 839 S.W.2d 397, 403 (Tenn. 

Ct. App. 1992) (finding that joinder was necessary both under the general principles of 

Rule 19.01 and the Declaratory Judgment Act). We conclude that the County and the 
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Clemons heirs are indispensable parties under either Rule 19.01 or Tenn. Code Ann. § 

29-14-107(a).

Keeping in mind the legal principle already set forth that parties “whose real 

property interests may potentially be affected by a trial court’s ruling have consistently 

been recognized as indispensable and necessary parties,” see Baker, 2010 WL 174773 at 

*5, we conclude that the County and the Clemons heirs were necessary parties to this 

suit. The effect of the Trial Court’s judgment is that the County, whether it wanted to be

or not, has now been confirmed as the owner of Hyder Lane. The County, of course, may 

not be interested in or desire ownership of Hyder Lane. Even assuming that the County 

is content with the outcome of this litigation and its ownership of Hyder Lane, its 

interests could have been adversely affected if the Trial Court had determined that Hyder 

Lane was not a public road. See Roberts v. England, No. M1999-02688-COA-R3-CV, 

2001 WL 575560, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 30, 2001) (“The appropriate inquiry is not 

whether the court’s final decision affected a nonparty’s real property interest; the 

question is whether any resolution of the issues presented in the lawsuit could have 

affected another landowner.”). As this Court noted in Baker, joinder should occur “even 

if it appears likely that the third party landowner might agree with the trial court’s

judgment.” Baker, 2010 WL 174773, at *5. Yet, here, the County was not a party and 

therefore did not have the opportunity to present evidence to support its interests one way 

or another.

With respect to the Clemons heirs, we note the Trial Court’s oral ruling and 

apparent struggle with this issue. The Trial Court rightly noted that if the County had 

never accepted the offer to make Hyder Lane a public road, then “that land that was never 

conveyed in any of those Clemmons deeds [land platted as Hyder Lane] is still owned by 

the Clemmons heirs” and “if there is a claim of adverse possession to the bed of that road 

it would have to be asserted against the Clemmons heirs instead of Ms. Smith.” The 

Court, clearly concerned that the County and the Clemmons heirs were not parties, also 

noted:

Let’s say that I find that the attempted dedication to public use did

not take, so to speak . . . and that it -- that land since it was never deeded to 

anybody, the record owners of same would be the heirs of Clemmons.

They’re not parties to this. And then I would have to find under Ms. 

Berry’s theory of the case I would have to find that she adversely -- she and 

her predecessors in title adversely possessed successfully against the heirs 

of Clemmons. And then I would have to find that your client is entitled to 

condemn a statutory road down across that. I mean, there’s more twists and

turns in this thing than anything I ever saw. 
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But I guess as I’ve gone through this the Court’s become 

increasingly worried that we don’t have the County and the Clemmons 

heirs in -- in this thing.

As indicated on the 1956 Plat, a portion of the Clemons subdivision is platted as Hyder 

Lane. Therefore, if the County is not the owner, then the Clemons heirs likely would be 

the owners and obviously have an interest at stake that “may potentially be affected by 

[the] trial court’s ruling.” See id. We further note that given that this lawsuit involved an 

adverse possession claim by the Berrys, it is necessary for the true owner of the property 

that constitutes the undeveloped portion of Hyder Lane, which may or may not be the 

Clemons heirs, to be a party to the lawsuit. Milledgeville United Methodist Church v. 

Melton, 388 S.W.3d 280, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he party who is in actual 

possession of the property must bring a suit against the true owner, an indispensable 

party, to quiet title by proving that the elements of adverse possession have been met.”).

Because the County and the Clemons heirs are parties whose potential property 

interests were the subject of this lawsuit and trial, we conclude that they are indispensable 

parties, without which “no valid decree” “settling the rights between the parties that are 

before the Court” could be entered. Brewer v. Lawson, 569 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tenn. Ct. 

App. 1978). We therefore vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the joinder 

of the County and the Clemons heirs in order that they may have the opportunity to 

present evidence in support of their interests as explained in Baker v. Foster.

Conclusion

Having concluded that the County and the Clemons heirs are indispensable parties, 

we vacate the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for the joinder of the County and the 

Clemons heirs to allow them an opportunity to present evidence. Costs on appeal are 

taxed equally to the appellants, Michael Berry and Sharon Berry, and to the appellee, 

Priscilla Smith.

 _________________________________

 D. MICHAEL SWINEY, CHIEF JUDGE