NO. 12-17-00152-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

WALTER REED, 

APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

APPELLEE

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§

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APPEAL FROM THE 349TH 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

HOUSTON COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Walter Reed appeals his sentence following the revocation of his community supervision. 

In a single issue, Appellant argues that his sentence was disproportionate to the crime for which 

he was convicted. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Appellant was charged by indictment with theft in an amount of $1,500 or more but less 

than $20,000.1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pleaded “guilty” and the trial court 

sentenced Appellant to deferred adjudication community supervision for five years. In 2014, 

Appellant’s deferred adjudication community supervision was revoked. He was sentenced to 

imprisonment for two years, but the sentence was suspended and Appellant was placed on 

community supervision for five years.

On December 21, 2016, the State filed a motion to revoke Appellant’s community 

supervision and alleged he had violated certain conditions thereof. On May 1, 2017, the trial 

court conducted a hearing on the State’s motion. Appellant pleaded “true” to several of the 

allegations in the State’s motion. The trial court found all of the State’s allegations to be “true,” 

 

1 See Act of May 9, 2011, 82d Leg., R.S., ch. 120 § 1, 2011 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 449, 609 (West) (current 

version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (West Supp. 2016)).
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revoked Appellant’s community supervision, and sentenced him to imprisonment for twenty 

months. This appeal followed.

CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the twenty month sentence imposed by the trial 

court amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. However, Appellant made no timely objection 

to the trial court raising the issue of cruel and unusual punishment and has, therefore, failed to 

preserve any such error. See Rhoades v. State, 934 S.W.2d 113, 120 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 

(waiver with regard to rights under the Texas Constitution); Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497 

(Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (waiver with regard to rights under the United States Constitution); see 

also TEX R. APP. P. 33.1; Mays v. State, 285 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) 

(“Preservation of error is a systemic requirement that a first-level appellate court should 

ordinarily review on its own motion[;] ... it [is] incumbent upon the [c]ourt itself to take up error 

preservation as a threshold issue[]”). But even despite Appellant’s failure to preserve error, we 

conclude that the sentence about which he complains does not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment.

The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that 

“[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 

punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. This provision was made applicable to the 

states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 

189, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666–67, 82 S.

Ct. 1417, 1420–21, 8 L. Ed. 2d 758 (1962)).

The legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and prescribe penalties. See 

Davis v. State, 905 S.W.2d 655, 664 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1995, pet. ref’d); see also Simmons 

v. State, 944 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Tex. App.–Tyler 1996, pet. ref’d). Courts have repeatedly held that 

punishment which falls within the limits prescribed by a valid statute is not excessive, cruel, or 

unusual. See Harris v. State, 656 S.W.2d 481, 486 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Jordan v. State, 495 

S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Davis, 905 S.W.2d at 664.

In the case at hand, Appellant was convicted of a state jail felony, the punishment range 

for which is between 180 days and two years. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.35 (West Supp. 
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2016). Thus, the sentence imposed by the trial court falls within the range set forth by the 

legislature. Therefore, the punishment is not prohibited as cruel, unusual, or excessive per se. 

Nonetheless, Appellant contends that his sentence is “grossly disproportionate.” Under 

the three part test originally set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 

2d 637 (1983), the proportionality of a sentence is evaluated by considering (1) the gravity of the 

offense and the harshness of the penalty, (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 

same jurisdiction, and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other 

jurisdictions. Id., 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S. Ct. at 3011. The application of the Solem test has 

been modified by Texas courts and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in light of the Supreme 

Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 

(1991) to require a threshold determination that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the 

crime before addressing the remaining elements. See, e.g., McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 

316 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 849, 113 S. Ct. 146, 121 L. Ed. 2d 98 (1992); see also 

Jackson v. State, 989 S.W.2d 842, 845–46 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1999, no pet.).

We first must determine whether Appellant’s sentence is grossly disproportionate. In so 

doing, we are guided by the holding in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L.

Ed. 2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court addressed the proportionality claim of an 

appellant who had received a mandatory life sentence under a prior version of the Texas habitual 

offender statute for a conviction of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. See id., 445 U.S. at 

266, 100 S. Ct. at 1135. A life sentence was imposed because the appellant also had two prior 

felony convictions—one for fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of goods or 

services and the other for passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36. Id., 445 U.S. at 265-

66, 100 S. Ct. at 1134–35. After recognizing the legislative prerogative to classify offenses as 

felonies and, further, considering the purpose of the habitual offender statute, the court 

determined that the appellant’s mandatory life sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment. Id., 445 U.S. at 284-85, 100 S. Ct. at 1144-45.

In the case at hand, the offense committed by Appellant—theft in an amount of $1,500 or 

more but less than $20,000—is more serious than the combination of offenses committed by the 

appellant in Rummel, while Appellant’s twenty month sentence is far less severe than the life 

sentence upheld by the Supreme Court in Rummel. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that if the 

sentence in Rummel was not unconstitutionally disproportionate, then neither is the sentence 
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assessed against Appellant in the present case. Therefore, since the threshold test has not been 

satisfied, we need not apply the remaining elements of the Solem test. See McGruder, 954 F.2d 

at 316; see also Jackson, 989 S.W.2d at 845–46. Appellant’s sole issue is overruled.

DISPOSITION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BRIAN HOYLE

Justice

Opinion delivered September 20, 2017.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(DO NOT PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

SEPTEMBER 20, 2017

NO. 12-17-00152-CR

WALTER REED,

Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,

Appellee

Appeal from the 349th District Court 

of Houston County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. 12CR-005)

THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed 

herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the 

judgment.

It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment 

of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court 

below for observance.

Brian Hoyle, Justice.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.