alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 10.44
                                                                   -------------

                                December 7, 2000

Mr. Michael L. Baur
ScanSource, Inc.
6 Logue Ct.
Greenville, SC 29615


Dear Mike:

This letter will amend the Employment Agreement between you and ScanSource, Inc.
dated July 1, 1999 to reflect the change in your Base Salary from $125,000 to
$175,000 per year.

Effective January 1, 2001, Paragraph 3.A. of the Agreement titled "Base Salary",
is hereby amended to read as follows:

     3.   Compensation. As compensation for the services to be rendered by
          ------------
     Employee for Employer under this Agreement, Employee shall be compensated
     on the following basis:

               A.   Base Salary. An annual Base Salary of One Hundred
                    -----------
     Seventy-five Thousand and No/100 ($175,000.00) Dollars, plus any raises or
     other compensation approved by the Board of Directors of Employer, payable
     in pay periods as determined by Employer, but in no event less frequently
     than monthly.

Except as herein expressly modified and amended, the terms and conditions of the
Agreement shall continue in full force and effect without change.

Please signify your agreement to this amendment by signing below.

For ScanSource:                          Agreed to by Michael L. Baur:


--------------------------               ----------------------------------
Signature                                      Signature

--------------------------
Name and Title
<TABLE> <S> <C>
    
<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM FORM 10-Q 
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                                       0000925178                        
<NAME>                             MOVIE GALLERY, INC.
<MULTIPLIER>                                     1,000
       
<S>                                       <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         JAN-03-1999
<PERIOD-START>                            JAN-05-1998
<PERIOD-END>                              JUL-05-1998
<CASH>                                          1,216
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     665
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                     9,756
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               15,647 
<PP&E>                                        270,595<F1>
<DEPRECIATION>                                135,339<F2>
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                241,619
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          19,267
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                           13
<OTHER-SE>                                    148,951
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  241,619
<SALES>                                        21,130
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                              134,153
<CGS>                                          14,197
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                 129,045
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              2,968
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 2,140
<INCOME-TAX>                                      813
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             1,327
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                    1,327
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    0.10
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    0.10

<FN>
<F1> INCLUDES $191,681 OF VIDEOCASSETTE RENTAL INVENTORY.
<F2> INCLUDES $103,446 OF ACCUMULATED AMORTIZATION ON VIDEOCASSETTE RENTAL
     INVENTORY.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  U NITED S TATES OFA MERICA ,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. M ICHAEL B ROWN , a/k/a Michael No. 01-4611



#  Haseem Brown, a/k/a Rasheem Jamal Russell, a/k/a Hakeem Brown, a/k/a Rasheem Russell,

Defendant-Appellant. 

# 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge; Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge.

(CR-01-23-A) Submitted: January 18, 2002 Decided: February 8, 2002 Before TRAXLER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSELPeter L. Goldman, O’REILLY & MARK, L.L.C., Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Paul J. McNulty, United States Attorney, Kathleen M. Kahoe, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION
PER CURIAM: Michael Brown appeals his conviction following his conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000). On appeal, Brown asserts the district court improperly denied his motion to suppress a firearm found in his shoe following his arrest. We affirm. Brown was arrested for public intoxication, and the firearm in question was discovered during a subsequent custodial search of Brown’s person. Accordingly, unless the arrest was illegal, that search does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (holding police officers may conduct warrantless search of suspect’s person after arrest to remove weapons that could be used to resist arrest or escape). Reviewing evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to the government, see United States v. Seidman , 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4thCir. 1998) (providing standard of review), we find there was an adequate basis for Brown’s arrest for public intoxication, and that that basis existed prior to the frisk conducted by the arresting officer. See Ker v. California , 374 U.S. 23, 37 (1963) (noting the legality of arrest for state offense that does not otherwise implicate the Constitution is to be judged by state law); Fierst v. Virginia , 173 S.E.2d 807, 810 n.2(Va. 1970) (providing statutory definition of intoxicated). Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s denial of Brown’s motion to suppress.In light of the foregoing, we affirm Brown’s conviction and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 2 U NITED S TATES v. B ROWN
#### Walker *&*Co. v. Stone et al.

1. Injunction: practice: dissolution on answer. "Where the *gravamen*of a petition for an injunction is fraud, the preliminary injunction will not be dissolved upon the answer, even though it fully denies the allegations of the petition. *(Stewart v. Johnson,*44 Iowa, 435, followed.)

2. -: Refusal to dissolvb: DISCRETION of couet. The ruling of a court continuing a preliminary injunction to the hearing is largely a *104matter of discretion, and not to be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.

8. Assignment for Benefit of Creditors: suspension on assignee: Receiver. Where the functions of an assignee for the benefit of creditors were suspended by injunction, it was proper to appoint a receiver to take charge of the property.

*Appeal^from Decatwr District Court.*

Thursday, October 28.

ActioN for an injunction restraining the assignee from proceeding under an assignment for the benefit of creditors, and for the appointment of a receiver. An injunction was granted as prayed for, and a receiver appointed. • The defendants answered, and filed a motion to dissolve the injunction and to remove the receiver. The motion was overruled, and the defendants appeal from the order overruling the motion.

*Melniire Bros,*and *M. L.*Temple, for appellants.

*Young c& Parrish*and *E. W.*Curry, for appellees.

Adams, Ch. J.

The plaintiffs are creditors of the defendant W. E. Stone, who, in February, 1886, made an assignment to the defendant Gemmill. They brought this action to set aside the assignment, and to restrain the assignee, Gemmill, from proceeding under it. They averred that the assignment was made by Stone for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, and set out in what the fraud consisted. The answer of Stone and Gemmill denies the fraud. In *Stewart v.*Johnson, 44 Iowa, 435, it was said: “The general rule, doubtless, is that where all the material allegations of a petition for an injunction are fully and satisfactorily denied in the answer, upon the personal knowledge of the defendant, the preliminary injunction, if one has been allowed, will be dissolved upon motion. But to this rule there are some exceptions, and one of them is where the *gravamen*of the *105petition is fraud.” Citing *Sinnett v. Moles,*38 Iowa, *25,*and *Dent v. Summerlin,*12 Ga., 5. It was also beld that tlie ruling of a court continuing a preliminary injunction to tlie bearing is largely a matter of discretion, and not to be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.

We cannot, in the case at bar, say that there has been an abuse of discretion. The ruling, therefore, continuing the injunction to the heai'ing cannot be disturbed. Gemmill’s functions as assignee having been suspended, on the allegation that the assignment was void, he could not, we think, during such suspension, properly be charged with any duty in relation to the property-, and the court, we think, did not err in appointing a receiver.

AFFIRMED.
EXHIBIT 31.2

                                  Certification

         I, Robert J. Twyman, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify
that:

1.   I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-KSB of Gouverneur Bancorp,
     Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain any untrue
     statement of material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
     make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
     statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
     this report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in the report, fairly present in all material respects
     the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the small
     business issuer as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.   The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I are
     responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
     procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for
     the small business issuer and we have:

     a) designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such
     disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to
     ensure that material information relating to the small business issuer,
     including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
     within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report
     is being prepared;

     b) evaluated the effectiveness of the small business issuer's disclosure
     controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about
     the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures as of the end
     of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

     c) disclosed in this report any change in the small business issuer's
     internal controls over financial reporting that occurred during the small
     business issuer's second fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or is
     reasonably likely to materially affect, the small business issuer's
     internal control over financial reporting; and

5.   The small business issuer's other certifying officer(s) and I have
     disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over
     financial reporting, to the small business issuer's auditors and the audit
     committee of small business issuer's board of directors (or persons
     performing the equivalent functions):

     a) all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or
     operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably
     likely to adversely affect the small business issuer's ability to record,
     process, summarize and report financial information; and

     b) any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
     employees who have a significant role in the small business issuer's
     internal control over financial reporting.


DATE:  December 23, 2004

/s/ ROBERT J. TWYMAN
------------------------------
ROBERT J. TWYMAN
CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
#### Garfield Investment Company, Respondent, vs. Town of Oconomowoc, Appellant.

*March 9*

April *12, 1949.*

*501
      *Alvin G. Brendemuehl*of Oconomowoc, for the appellant.

For the respondent there was a brief by *Clayton A. Cramer*and *Robert T.*McGrow, both of Waukesha, and oral argument by *Mr. Cramer.*

Hughes, J.

Both plaintiff and defendant moved for summary judgment. On October 15, 1948, the circuit court filed a decision and order by which it denied both motions.

Upon motion of the defendant the circuit court under sec. 252.10 (1), Stats., reviewed its order of October 15, 1948, and on October 30, 1948, filed a decision and order. The order portion of this document is as follows :

> “It is ordered and determined that said purported assessment is void ;

> “It is further ordered that this action be and the same is hereby continued to the 31st day of December, 1948, to permit a reassessment of the property affected by said void assessment under the provisions of sec. 74.74 of the statutes.

> “It is further ordered that the order entered herein on the 15th day of October, 1948, be and the same is hereby vacated.”

It thus appears that the order denying motions for summary judgment is no longer in existence.

The order of October 30th, while it permits the defendant to make a reassessment, does not compel anything. It amounts to little more than an order of adjournment. Certainly it does not finally dispose of the rights of either party, and is not an appealable order.

At any event the appeal is not from this order, but from the one denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. This order having been vacated and set aside by the circuit court, no appeal therefrom lies.

*By the Court.*— Appeal dismissed.
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002











In connection with the quarterly report of Commercial E-Waste Management, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended June 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Anna Chalmers, acting in the capacity as the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify to the best of our knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.








/s/ Anna Chalmers


Anna Chalmers


Chief Executive Officer


Chief Financial Officer


August 14, 2009
**EXHIBIT 21.9**Subsidiaries of Veridien Corporation A) Rost Inc. — incorporated in Florida (dormant)  B) Rost Medical Development, Inc. — incorporated in Delaware (dormant)  C) Marquit Manufacturing Specialties, Inc. — incorporated in Delaware (dormant)  D) Veridien.com Inc. — incorporated in Delaware (dormant)  E) Norpak (U.S.), Inc. — incorporated in Delaware  F) The SunSwipe Corporation, L.L.C. — incorporated in Delaware  G) Communications Gear, Inc. — incorporated in Delaware (dormant)  H) Viraguard (Canada), Inc. — incorporated in Canada [Federal corporation]The above-named subsidiaries which are operational conduct business solely under the listed names.
72
EXHIBIT 10 (b)


                       AMMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT



      AGREEMENT made effective as of the ___ day of December, 2000, by and
between Legal Club of America Corporation with its principal offices at 1601 N.
Harrison Pkwy., Bldg. A, Suite 200 Sunrise, Florida (the "Company") and Brett
Merl, an individual residing at 10213 Vestal Court, Coral Springs, Florida 33071
(the "Executive").

Effective January 1st 2001, the executive hereby agrees to amend the following
section of his employment agreement to be as follows:

Section (3) "Compensation" shall be changed so that effective 01/01/2001 the
annual salary of the executive will be reduced to reflect an annual pay scale of
$250,000.00. In addition, on a go forward basis the minimum annual increase will
be reduced from 20% to 10%.

Additionally, Section (5) "Benefits" shall be amended to included the following
sentence: "The executive will also be entitled to receive Long Term Disability
at the expense of the Company. "


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunder set their hands and seals
the day and year first above written.

                   LEGAL CLUB OF AMERICA CORPORATION



                   By: /s/ Michael Samach
                       -----------------------------
                       Chief Financial Officer
                       -----------------------------
                       (Title)



                   Executive


                   /s/ Brett Merl
                   ---------------------------------
                   Brett Merl


                                       51
Exhibit 32.1Certification of Chief Executive Officer pursuant to Rule 13a-14(b) of the Exchange Act and 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the quarterly report on Form 10-Q
of Advant-e Corporation (the Company) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the report), the undersigned, Jason K. Wadzinski, Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certifies pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:

(1) The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The
information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |     |  |                        
|---------------------- |  | --- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 14, 2008 |  | By: |  | /s/ Jason K. Wadzinski 
|                       |  |     |  | Jason K. Wadzinski     
|                       |  |     |  | Chief Executive Officer
#### E. H. Ash v. R. M. Ash *et al.,*Appellants.

Appeal by Part of Coparties: necessity op notice op appeal. The appeal of part of defendants must Toe dismissed where they fail to serve notice of appeal upon their codefendants. Entry of appearance on part of the latter, in this court, will not cure the omission to serve such notice. Bobinson, J., taking no part.

*Appeal from Buena Vista District Court.*— Hon. Lot Thomas, Judge.

Friday, February 2, 1894.

This is a suit in equity for the partition of certain real estate. There was an issue made as to the extent of the interests of the respective parties to the land which is the subject of the suit. The court entered a decree fixing the shares of the parties in accord with the claim made by the plaintiff. A part of the defendants in the action *appealed.*

Appeal *Dismissed.*

*J. E. Buland*for appellants.

*E. F. Calpin*for appellee.

Eothbock, J.

It .appears from the record that one H. C. Ash was at one time the owner of the land in controversy, and that he died seized of the same, leaving Mary A. Ash, his widow, and three children. Mary A. Ash subsequently married E. M. Ash, and afterward died. The contest arises over the. question whether, after the death of H. C. Ash, his widow took a distributive share of his real estate, or a homestead therein. The court found that she did not elect to take a homestead interest in the land, and that the shares of the parties should be adjusted and fixed on the theory that she took a distributive share or dower in the land. It appears that certain mortgagees were *230made parties defendant to the suit, for the purpose of adjusting their liens on the land. These mortgagees were codefendants with the appellants. They were not served with a notice of appeal to this court. A motion to dismiss the appeal was submitted with the ease, on the ground that the disposition of the case in this court may be prejudicial to their interests. It appears to us that the motion must be sustained. The mortgages were not made by H. C. Ash, the ancestor of the parties, seeking a partition of the land. They were the mortgages of parties having an undivided interest in the land. Appellants seek to avoid the omission to serve notice on these parties by filing in this court certain papers, signed by them, in which they enter an appearance here. This is an appellate court, and it acquires jurisdiction of the parties by the service of a notice of appeal. There is no other method provided by law. There can be no appeal by consent of the parties. It is provided by statute that “a part of several coparties may appeal, but in such case they must serve notice of .appeal upon all the other parties, and file proofs thereof with the clerk of the supreme court.” Code, section 3174. See *Hunt v. Hawley,*70 Iowa, 183, 30 N. W. Rep. 477; *Laprell v. Jarosh,*83 Iowa, 753, 49 N. W. Rep. 1021; *Michel v. Michel,*74 Iowa, 577, 38 N. W. Rep. 422. . The appeal must be dismissed.

Eobinson, J., took no part in the decision of this case.