### COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED AND FILED September 16, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff Clerk of Court of Appeals NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports. A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See W IS . S TAT . § 808.10 and R ULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2020AP1908 Cir. Ct. No. 2019ME 25 STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT IV

I N THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF T. W.:
M ARQUETTE C OUNTY , P ETITIONER - R ESPONDENT ,
V . T. W.,
R ESPONDENT - A PPELLANT .

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Marquette County: TERESA S. BASILIERE , Judge. Affirmed

.No. 2020AP1908

2 ¶ 1 BLANCHARD, P.J. 1 In September 2019, the C ircuit C ourt of Marquette County entered an order involuntarily committ ing T.W. for mental health treatment for six months , pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 51.20 . Th e court’s order

was based on jury findings at a trial that T.W. was mentally ill, a danger to himself

or others, and a proper subject for treatment. The petition for commitment by the Marquette County corporation counsel involved alleg ations of violen t conduct by T.W. After hearing additional evidence following the jury trial , the circuit court entered an order for involuntary medication during the mental health commitment

. 2 T.W. appeals both orders , arguing that the court either erroneously exercised its discretion or err ed as a matter of law in allowing the admission of several categories of evidence at trial . Marquette County argues that this appeal is moot, that T.W. forfeited his merits arguments by failing to raise them in the circuit court, that the court did not err in allowing the evidence ( but that , even if it did , any errors were harmless ), and that there was no plain error. I conclude that the County fails to establish that the appeal is moot, but I affirm for the reasons explained below.

BACKGROUND
¶ 2 In July 2019, T.W. was residing in a group home in Madison. A group home ca se manager r eported to police that T.W. had “choked” the case manager after T.W. refus ed to take medications. 3 Based on this incident, T.W.

1 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 752.31( 2)(d) (2019

- 20 ). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019

- 20 version unless otherwise noted.

2 While it is not the focus of this appeal, I note for context that in February 2020 T.W. was recommitted for a term of one year. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 51.20(13)(g)2r. and 3.

3 Expanding on this factual background, t here was testimony at the jury trial in t his case that , on the same day in July 2019 , which was the second day of T.W. refusing to tak e (continued)No. 2020AP1908

3 was detained on an emergency basis under W IS

. S TAT

. § 51.15(1), and venue for the case was transferred to Marquette County. T hrough its corporation counsel, Marquette County sought to involuntarily commit T.W. for six months pursuant to W IS

. S TAT

. § 51.20 . T he circuit court held a probable cause hearing

. After hearing testimony from five witnesses

— the group home case manager, a Madison police officer, an associate manager of a Dane County mental health crisis unit, a psychiatrist employed by the Winnebago Mental Health Institution in Oshkosh, and T.W. himself

— the court determined that ther e was probable cause to support a commitment , allowing the case to proceed to a final hearing

. 4
¶ 3 At the jury trial, the County presented evidence that included expert testimony of psychologist Robert Schedgick and psychiatrist Robert Rawski

. E ach expert testified that he had conducted a mental health examination of T.W., although in each case T.W. declined the expert ’s request for a personal interview

. ¶ 4 Dr. Schedgick testified in part as follows. B ased on his review of various records, he created a report of examination, which was admitted into evidence. T.W. ha s a “ diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, depressive type .” His symptoms include “sudden rapid change of moods accompanying

...

medications : T.W. struck a care provider in the jaw “real hard,” “out of the blue” on the provider’s “blind side” ; later T.W. punched a s econd care provider in the face ; after which T.W. “choked” a case manager who was trying to get him to take his medications, and the case
ma nager called police ; a responding officer testified that T.W. approached the officer “very abruptly” and came “very close,” “very focused o n” the officer, and “loaded his rear leg,” with his hands “clenched in fists,” at which time three officers “required a good deal of force” to place T.W. in handcuffs.

4 The Honorable John Jorgensen presided over the hearing and found probable cause, th e Honorable Mark T. Slate issued the order for a final hearing based on the finding of probable cause, and the Honorable Teresa S. Basiliere presided over the jury trial and made the rulings challenged in this appeal.No. 2020AP1908

4 psychotic behavior, typically delusions, and hallucinations.” T.W. “is a danger to others” and is “ a proper subject for treatment ” because medication or other forms of treatment may control and improve his mental health.
¶ 5 Dr. Rawski testified i n part as follows. Based on his review of various records

— including one summarizing an interview that Dr. Rawski ha d conducted with T.W. in April 2019 and “records that summarize [a] 35 to 40 year history of treatable mental illness dating back to the ear ly 1980’s”

— Dr. Rawski created a n examination report that was admitted into evidence. T.W. has “[s]chizoaffective disorder,” which is a “similar condition” to schizophrenia, but “is differentiated by a presence of mood symptoms that rise to the level of ca using clinical distress and interfering with his functioning in addition to symptoms o f schizophrenia.” This has included “episodes” of “mania,” “typically irritable mania,” causing T.W. to exhibit “agitation, impulsivity, reckless behavior, impaired judg ment, clearly acting before thinking,” in addition to “psychotic symptoms such as delusions and hallucinations.” When T.W. stop s taking medication, he becomes “ more paranoid, more agitated[,] more delusional, experience [s] more voices, start [s] losing sle ep, which in turn, fuel s more irritability and agitation and ... almost invariably ” results in him being

“ threatening, intimidating and hostile and final[ly] physically aggressive.” “It is my opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the psyc hotic symptoms and the dangerousness [ that T.W. presents are] direct result[s] of not taking the medications for his mental illness.” T.W. is dangerous because he “refuses to believe” that he has a mental illness that requires treatment. His “symptoms are treatable” and “can be controlled.” He “requires a locked inpatient unit for the safety of himself as well as the safety of staff and peers in the communit y.”No. 2020AP1908

5 ¶ 6 T.W. did not testify at t rial

. Counsel for T.W. called as a witness a physician’s assistant who testified to the follow ing . U rine tests revealed that T.W. appeared to have a urinary tract infection at the time of the incident in the Madison group home and a urinary tract infection can in some cases produce an “[a]ltered

me ntal status .”
¶ 7 In clo sing argument, T.W. primarily argued that the County failed to meet its burden to prove that he was dangerous in light of evidence that T.W. contended raised the following reasonable inferences : (1) he was in fact taking his medications at the time of the incident at the Madison group home that brought a police response ; and (2) at the time of the incident he was suffering from a urinary tract infection that was a contributor to his violent behavior

. ¶ 8 The jury found that T.W. “is” “mentally ill ,” “dangerous to himself or others,” and “a proper subject for treatment

. ” Accordingly, the court filed an order of commitmen t for a term of six months.
¶ 9 After hearing separate testimony shortly after trial from psychiatrist Heidi Lundeen, who had T.W. as a patient at a mental health facility since his admission some weeks earlier, the court separately entered an order for involuntary medication and treatment

. T.W. does not chal lenge this order on any independent ground.
¶ 10 T.W. appeals and the parties have briefed the issues , after significant delays

. 5

5 The parties’ briefing on appeal w as completed on August 5, 2021, even though the challenged circuit court orders were filed nearly two years earlier, in September 2019. On six occasions, this court granted T.W.’s motions to extend deadlines to file a post judgment motion or

(continued)No. 2020AP1908

6 DISCUSSION

I. MOOTNESS
¶ 11 The six

- month period of commitment challenge d by T.W. ha s expired , along with the accompanying order for involuntary medication or
treatment . For this reason, t he County argues, this appeal is moot and it further contends that no exception to the mootness doctrine applies

. I reject this argument based on one position ta ken by T.W. , which the County does not successfully rebut . T.W. contends that the collateral consequences of the costs of car ing for him, for which T.W. is subject to collection under W IS

. S TAT

. § 46.10(2)

- (3) , prevent this appeal from being moot.
¶ 12 Mootness is a question of law that is reviewed on appeal under the de novo standard

. Marathon C n ty. v. D.K. , 2020 WI 8, ¶ 16 , 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d 901. “‘An issue is moot when its resolution will have no practical effect on the un derlying controversy

. ’” Id

. , ¶19 (quoted sources omitted). Moot issues are, as a general rule, not reviewed on appeal unless one or more of five exceptions apply. Id

. I conclude that the County fails to show that the appeal is moot and therefore I do n ot consider any of the exceptions to mootness

. ¶ 13 T.W. points out that , pursuant to statute, he “shall be liable for the cost of the care, maintenance, services and supplies” that were provided to him during his commitment, which are costs that the department “shall” collect

. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 46.10(2), (3). T.W. further notes, without objection on the point

to file a noti ce of appeal, which delayed the filing of his notice of appeal from March 2020 to November 2020. During 2021, this court granted three additional motions by T.W. to extend his briefing deadlines and two motions filed by the County for extensions in its br iefing deadlines.No. 2020AP1908

7 from the County, that the County cannot recover these costs if there was “no valid commitment order,” as could be the case i f T.W. were to prevail in this appeal. See Jankowski v. Milwaukee Cnty

. , 104 Wis. 2d 431, 43 6

- 41 , 31 2 N.W.2d 45 (1981).
¶ 14 On two recent occasions o ur supreme court has explicitly left open the possibility that this statutory obligation of committed persons to pay costs may or may not be a collateral consequence of sufficient import to render an appeal of a commitment order not moot. See D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50 , ¶25 n.7; Portage Cnty. v. J.W.K. , 2019 WI 54, ¶28 n.11 , 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.
¶ 15 Further, as T.W. notes, our supreme court has relied in part on collateral financial consequences of a criminal conviction , given the potential effect of these consequences on related civil proceedings , to determine that a n appeal in the criminal case was not moot, even though the defendant had died while pursuing postconviction relief. See State v. McDonald , 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537

- 38, 424 N.W.2d 411 (1988) (“Because of these potential collateral consequences, it serves the interest of justice to continue the appeal.”). Further,

s ince the release of D.K. and J.W.K. , the court has favorably relied on reasoning in McDonald in the context of determining that an appeal in a mental commitment case was not moot, although the court in its recent opinion did not specifically mention McDonald ’s reliance on collateral financial consequences. See Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W. , 2020 WI 41, ¶26 n.5 , 391 Wis. 2d. 231, 942 N.W.2d 277No. 2020AP1908

8 (determining that appeal was not moot despite the death of the petitioner during the pendency of the appeal). 6
¶ 16 The County does not dispute that T.W. is subject to collection for the costs of his care, nor does it more generally rebut other premises of T.W.’s argument . It makes two points on th is issue , both unproductive

. First, t he County suggests that Jankowski could have no bearing on the mootness issue because it does not address mootness . This misses the point. The County does not dispute that , u nder Jankowski , there could be a well

- defi ned, practical benefit to T.W. if he prevails in this appeal

. Second, t he County surprisingly asserts that our supreme court would have deemed the appeal in D.K. moot if the court “wished to leave the door open to ... non

- constitutional collateral consequences.” This is incorrect . T he court in D.K. explicitly left open this very door , as it had in J.W.K. D.K. , 390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶25 n. 7 ; J.W.K. , 386 Wis. 2d, ¶28 n.11.
¶ 17 M ootness may present a close issue here based on the current state of the law in Wisconsin . B ut to say more would be to venture into potentially complicated legal terrain that extends well beyond the scope of the limited briefing by the parties on this issue

. Under all of the circumstances, I conclude that the County has not shown that this appeal is moot.

6 In fairness to the County, T.W. makes his reference s to State v. McDonald , 144 Wis. 2d 531, 537

- 38, 424 N.W.2d 411 (1988) , and Langlade Cnty. v. D.J.W. , 2020 WI 41, ¶26 n.5 , 391 Wis. 2d. 231, 942 N.W.2d 277 , for the first time in his reply brief on appeal. At the same time, however, T.W. squarely raises this potential collateral consequence in his opening brief as a reason to oppose a mootness determination. Further, the court released D.J.W. well before t he County filed its brief in this appeal.No. 2020AP1908

9 II. EVIDENCE OF AGGRESSIVE AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR
¶ 18 T.W. argues that , before trial , the circuit court should have barred the admission of testimony given by the two experts relat ing to reports of aggressive and violent behavior by T.W. over the years, aside from the specific conduct at the Madison group home triggering the petition for commitment . This is so, T.W. contends , because all such testimony would be inadmissible “other acts” evidence under W IS

. S TAT

. § 904.04 (2)

. 7 I provide additional pertinent background, additional applicable legal standards, and then explain why I reject this argument in discussion that include s references to further background

.
A. Additional Background
¶ 19 T.W. filed three motions in limine in the circuit court that the parties reference in connection with this issue.

“Other Acts” Motion
¶ 20 One w as a broad motion to bar all potential “other acts” evidence , without identify ing any particular evidence for potential exclusion

. It stated in its entirety that it sought an order stating the following :

7 “Other acts” evidence is admissible if : (1) it is offered , not to prove “ the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in conformity therewith ,” but instead is offered for a purpose such as s howing “ opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident ”; ( 2) it is relevant (meaning that is has “ any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence ”); and (3) its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of “ un fair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. ” W IS

. S TAT

. §§ 904.04(2)(a), 904.01, 904.03; State v. Gutierrez , 2020 WI 52, ¶2 9 , 391 Wis. 2d 799, 943 N.W.2d 870.No. 2020AP1908

10 That the County be prohibited from introducing any evidence c oncerning other acts, including but not limited to those underlying past civil commitments that may have been subject to litigation. W IS

. S TAT

. § 904.04(2). The County objected to th is motion , argu ing that T.W. was seeking to exclude evidence that the C ounty should be allowed to offer “to prove a primary element of the County’s case

— that [T.W.] is mentally ill and dangerous,” and not “to show a character trait or [that T.W.] act[ed] in conformity” with a character trait

. The County analogized the situation to that presented in W IS

. S TAT

. ch. 980 cases seeking the commitment of allegedly sexually violent persons. See State v. Franklin , 2004 WI 38, ¶ 24 , 270 Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276 ( § 904.04(2) does not apply to evidence offered in a commitment p roceeding under ch. 980 to prove that the respondent has a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that he or she will commit acts of sexual violence in the future.) . In the ch. 980 context, “‘[p]revious instances of violent behavior are an i mportant indicator of future violent tendencies.’” S ee Franklin , 270 Wis. 2d 271, ¶22 (quoting Kansas v. Hendricks , 521 U.S. 346, 357

- 58 (1997)).

“Prior Commitments” Motion
¶ 21 T.W. separately filed a motion seeking an order providing the following : That although none are known to counsel at this time, that

the County be prohibited from introducing any evidence or making reference to past civil commitments [of T.W.]. Such evidence is of very limited probative value beyond proving that [T. W.] may have acted in conformity with a particular character trait. W IS

. S TAT

. § 904.04(1). Moreover, the probative value of any such evidence is outweighed by the creation of unfair prejudice to [T.W.] and confusion for the jury. W IS

. S TAT

. § 904.03.No. 2020AP1908

11 The County did not object to the “prior commitments” motion, subject to the County’s objection s to the “other acts” motion.

“Otherwise Admissible” Motion
¶ 22 The third potentially related motion was broad like T.W.’s “other acts” motion , in that it also did not identify particular evidence for potential exclusion . It sought an order providing :

That the County be prohibited from eliciting facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible from its expert witnesses, unless the Court has previous ly determined that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert ’ s opinion or inference substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. W IS

. S TAT

. § 907.03. [ 8 ] The County objected to th e “otherwise inadmissible” motion , essentially contending that T.W. was requesting exclusion of evidence that would be “incredibly prejudicial” to the County’s ability to elicit expert testimony regarding T.W.’s alleged mental illness, dangerousness, and amenability to treatment.

8 W ISCONSIN S TAT

. § 907.03 provides , with emphasis now added on a key phrase for the arguments made on appeal :

The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are ot herwise inadmissible may not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert ’ s opinion or inference substantially outweighs their prej udicial effect.No. 2020AP1908

12 Heari ng And Rulings
¶ 23 The circuit court held a hearing to address T.W.’s motions in limine , including the three quoted above . The court invited the parties to address each motion individually and it ruled on them one at a time . However , regarding the three motions just quoted, there was discussion by the parties and the court that overlapped

. T.W. argued that the circuit court should order that evidence regarding any prior conduct of T.W. “should be limited to” events alleged in the

emer gency detention petition filed regarding the July 2019 incident at the Madison group home. Relatedly, T.W. argue d that the court should prohibit the County from eliciting testimony from either of the two experts that referred to any conduct of T.W. that w as referenced in any records created and maintained as part of evaluations and treatments of T.W. over the years that predated the incident at the Madison group home. T.W. characterized his target for exclusion in nearly boundless terms: “anything histor ically asserted.” He generically alleged that “historic information” in the reports of the experts was “irrelevant information arguably,” but did not point to specific irrelevant information in the expert reports.
¶ 24 The court rul ed as follows on the three potentially related motions :

 “ O ther acts” motion
. T.W. failed to show the need for a blanket exclusion of reference to all of his alleged conduct outside of that involving the incident at the Madison group home . The court determined that evidence of T.W.’s “ history of mental illness” should not “be precluded.”

 “ P rior commitments” motion
. The County was precluded from eliciting evidence that T.W. had ever been the subject of a prior mental commitment . The court express ed the view that such evidence “ can be extremely prejudicial” to someone in T.W. ’s position.

 “ O therwise inadmissible” motion
. Rulings withheld . The court deem ed the motion to be “vague

. ” The court also observed that it wasNo. 2020AP1908

13 circular, in that it asked the court to declare a useless generality: no inadmissible evidence would be admitted. The court explained that it would consider T.W.’s objections to specific offered evidence when T.W. made objections at trial

.

Failures To Object At Trial
¶ 25 The County submits that , throughout trial , T.W. raised no objection to testimony or the admission of other evidence on the topics referenced in these three motions

. T.W. does not dispute this . Instead, T.W. takes the position that his motions in limine were sufficient to preserve these issues for appeal

.
B. Legal Standards
¶ 26 “ A decision to admit or exclude evidence is within the circuit court ’s discretion ,” and will be reversed “ only if the circuit court erroneously exercised i ts discretion. ” State v. Gutierrez , 2020 WI 52, ¶ 1 7, 391 Wis. 2d 799, 943 N.W.2d 870. This means that an evidentiary decision is upheld on appeal if “ the circuit court applied the proper legal standard to the relevant facts and reached a reasonable discr etionary decision , ” and an appellate court “ ‘ may not substitute its discretion for that of the circuit court. ’ ” Id

. , ¶27 (quoted source omitted)

. ¶ 27 As to the forfeiture of issues based on a failure to preserve them in the circuit court, “‘ [t] he general rule is that issues not presented to the circuit court will not be considered for the first time on appeal

. ’” State v. Brereton , 2013 WI 17, ¶19, 345 Wis. 2d 563, 826 N.W.2d 369 (alteration in Brereton ) (quoted source omitted)

. W hile appellate courts “ may choose to consider such issues, countervailing considerations of fairness, efficiency, and institutional competency are generally persuasive when det ermining whether an issue raised for the first time on appeal should be addressed. ” Id

. One exception is t he plain error doctrine . This permits appellate courts to review “fundamental” errors that areNo. 2020AP1908

14 otherwise forfeited by the failure to object in the circuit court

. State v. Jorgensen , 2008 WI 60, ¶21, 310 Wis. 2d 138, 754 N.W.2d 77. A plain error is “fundamental, obvious, and substantial , ” such as when “ ‘ a basic constitutional right has not been extended to the accused[.] ’ ” Id. , ¶¶21, 23 ( quoted source omitted). Appellate courts will deem an error to be “ ‘ plain ’ ” only “sparingly.” State v. Bell , 2018 WI 28, ¶12, 380 Wis. 2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750 (quoted source omitted)

. ¶ 28 Regarding circuit court error that might be deemed harml ess, “[t] he court shall, in every stage of an action, disregard any error or defect in the pleadings or proceedings that does not affect the substantial rights of either party.” W IS

. S TAT

. § 51.20(10)(c) ; see also W IS

. S TAT

. § 805.18(2) ; S.Y. v. Eau Clair e Cnty. , 156 Wis. 2d 317, 328, 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990) ( deeming admission of expert’s testimony in involuntary commitment proceeding to be harmless error)

. Applying the harmless error rule in the evidentiary context , in criminal cases, courts consider factors that include : (1) the frequency of the error; (2) the importance of the erroneously included or excluded evidence to the prosecution ’ s or defense ’ s case; (3) the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the erroneou sly included or excluded evidence; (4) whether erroneously excluded evidence merely duplicates untainted evidence; (5) the nature of the defense; (6) the nature of the State ’s case; and (7) th e overall strength of the State’ s case. State v. Martin , 2012 W I 96, ¶46, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270

.
C
. Analysis
¶ 29 I assume without deciding that T.W. did not forfeit the specific positions he advanced in his three motions in limine by failing to preserve them inNo. 2020AP1908

15 the circuit court. See State v . Bergeron , 162 Wis. 2d 521, 529, 470 N.W.2d 322 (Ct. App. 1991) (a motion in limine based on a specific argument is sufficient to preserve, for purposes of appeal, an objection to the admissibility of evidence based on that argument )

. However, to avoid f orfeiture on appeal T.W. ’s arguments on appeal must be limited to the specific arguments that he made in the motions in limine

. See State v. Bustamante , 201 Wis. 2d 562, 573, 549 N.W.2d 746 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[I]f the issue raised by appeal is different in fact or law from that presented by the motion in limine, then [forfeiture] may be found if no objection was made at trial.”) (citing Bergeron , 162 Wis. 2d at 529 )

. As I explain below, when T.W. is held to the particular motions in limine that he actually made, those arguments fail for various reasons, and any new arguments that he may now intend to make based on the plain error doctrine are either undev eloped or unavailing.

1. “Other Acts” Motion
¶ 30 I assume without deciding that , if presented with proper arguments , a circuit court presiding over a W IS

. S TAT

. ch. 51 mental commitment jury trial could be obligated to exercise its discreti on to apply the rule barring character evidence established in W IS

. S TAT

. § 904.04(2) to exclude evidence (in addition to applying the standards contained in W IS

. S TAT

. §§ 904.01, 904.03)

. See W IS

. S TAT

. § 51 .20(10)(c) (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the rules of evidence in civil actions and [ W IS

. S TAT

. § ] 801.01(2) apply to any judicial proceeding or hearing under this chapter.”). Thus, I put to the side the County’s analogy to W IS

. S TAT

. ch. 980 comm itment cases and Franklin , and assume that the circuit court was obligated to exercise its discretion to consider applying § 904.04(2) based on T.W.’s “other acts” motion in limine.No. 2020AP1908

16 ¶ 31 T.W. argues that the circuit court should have ex cluded “any evidence that he was aggressive or violent in the years preceding the emergency detention” based on the incident at the Madison group home because it “was irrelevant and[,] worse, was prejudicial to T.W.” To support this argument, T.W. cites p recedent from the U.S. Supreme Court and our supreme court that, in order to satisfy constitutional requirements, the findings of mental illness and dangerousness in a mental commitment case “ must be current, not retrospective. ” See J.W.K. , 386 Wis. 2d 67 2, ¶16 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana , 504 U.S. 71, 77

- 78 (1992)). I reject T.W.’s argument for the following reason s
. ¶ 32 On this topic, T.W. made sweeping arguments not tied to any specific potential evidence in the circuit court and continues in the same mode on appeal. He does not begin to provide a basis to conclude that the circuit court did
not appl y a proper legal standard to the relevant facts and reach a reasonable discretionary decision as to the admission of any particu lar evidence

. Put differently , he fails to explain why t he circuit court did not have a reasonable basis to deny his pretrial request for a blanket order that would have prohibit ed the County from eliciting any evidence whatsoever about T.W.’s behavior th at did not involve the events alleged in the emergency detention petition regarding the July 2019 incident at the Madison group home.
¶ 33 Much could be said about weaknesses in T.W.’s position that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in denying the broad “other acts” motion . B ut o ne of many example s of potential evidence in the case is sufficient
to illustrate the point

. D r. Rawski’s report was available to the parties and the circuit court as potential evidence at the time the court ruled on the motions in limine

. Dr. Rawski noted in his report that medical records reflect ed the followingNo. 2020AP1908

17 events in June 2018, when auth orized personnel attempted to administer an injection to T.W. :

[T.W.] became combative and attempted to hit and swing at the staff, clench his fists and was resistive to the injection. Once the injection was administered, staff slowly backed away from h im, at which time he lunged at staff and stomped his foot in an intimidating fashion, asking, “You scared?”

At least on its face, this evidence regarding events allegedly occurring not long before the incident at the Madison group home could be highly pro bative in assessing Dr. Rawski’s opinion, also stated in his report, that T.W. “has extremely poor insight into his mental illness, the associated dangerousness, his historical response to adequate and inadequate treatment, and the expectable risks of

remo ving psychotropic treatment altogether.” T he “other acts” motion made no attempt to apply the three

- prong W IS

. S TAT

. § 904.04 to any of the many incidents of this type that were potentially at issue at trial

. ¶ 34 To the extent that T.W. in tends to argue in the alternative that it constituted plain error for the circuit court to have allowed evidence that might be deemed “other acts” to be admitted at trial, without objection by T.W. , any such argument would be completely undeveloped

. In hi s opening appellate brief, T.W. makes generic references to “the other acts evidence,” but fails to point to any particular “other acts” evidence admitted at trial, much less to evidence , the admission of which constituted “fundamental, obvious, and substantial” error. Not until his reply brief on appeal does he allude to specific evidence, but even then he fails to develop an argument based o n the specifics.No. 2020AP1908

18 2
. “ Prior Commitments ” Motion
¶ 35 T.W. argues that the experts , in testify ing at trial , violated the circuit court’s pretrial order prohibiting reference s to the existence of his prior mental commitments. The County contends that the specific references which the experts made to T.W.’s history of treatment failed to identify a prior commitment, and that instead T.W. “tangentially points to instances where witnesses testified about T.W.’s prior hospitalizations and treatment.” In the alternative, the County argues harmless error. I reject T.W.’s argument based on harmless error

. ¶ 36 On a threshold issue , I reject the County’s first argument. I conclude that t he experts ’ trial testimony provided a sufficient basis for a reasonable jury to readily deduce that T.W. had been subject to mental commitments in the past , even if the testimony did not include a specific reference along the lines of, “ T.W. was ordered committed on date X by Judge Y in County Z

. ” 9 I do not construe the

9 N otable was the following testimony by Dr. Rawski, which includes unmistakable references to commitments, even if jurors might not have understood all details regarding associated legal procedur es and standards :

[T.W.] has been in inp atient settings or in community placements for most of the last almost 30 years now and all of the last 15 to 17 years. And so he was moving toward community placement in [the] spring of this year and they finally accomplished that, and I believe it was M ay when he was finally discharged from Trempe [a] leau after having been there for two years[,] which is different than Winnebago. You start in a locked unit but then you eventually move to less restrictive units based up on your behavior and your participat ion and your compliance. The jury had context for the “Trempe a leau” and “Winnebago” references in this testimony . For example , as to “Trempe a leau,” Dr. Rawski had in earlier testimony referred to “inpatient records over the last couple of years at the T rempe [a] leau County Health Care Center

. ” As to “Winnebago,” pertinent prior testimony included Dr. Schedgick stating that he “went to the Winnebago Mental Health Institute on August 12” and “requested to see” T.W., after which T.W. “was brought out by the nurse
. ” These and other references that the jury heard at trial provided a (continued)No. 2020AP1908

19 circuit court’s order to have been limited to precluding only such specific references. 10
¶ 37 Neither side presents a robust argument on the harmless error topic. I conclude that the nature of the references from which jurors could readily deduce prior commitments supports the County’s argument of harmless error, when consid ered in the context of the extensive, consistent, and overlapping testimony of the two experts and the essentially unrebutted testimony about the specific alleged violent conduct at the Madison group home

. ¶ 38 I make three observations in support of that conclusion. First, T.W. fails to point to examples of the County explicitly referring at trial to the fact of prior commitments or otherwise improperly exploiting this testimony during trial

. Second, the testimony of each of the experts conveyed the professional opinion that , in order to properly present their views on the issues at trial, it was necessary for them to explain to the jury T.W.’s long history of mental illness , including facts regarding both successful and unsuccessful atte mpts at treatment , and why the experts concluded that some treatment efforts had failed over the years . If T.W. intends to argue that it was an erroneous exercise of discretion for the circuit court to consider some or all of that history to be relevant, he fails to develop the argument. In that sense, the references made by the experts that strongly

strong basis for the jury to deduce that T.W. had been previously committed and confined in these institutions

.

10 It would appear that the County and its witnesses faced significant potential challenges in conveying relevant treatment and behavioral history at a trial of this type while omitting any references that would allow jurors to readily deduce that T.W. had pr eviously been committed

. But the County failed to raise concerns along these lines when the circuit court was considering and making rulings based on the motions in limine . Further , the County does not now argue that the circuit court erroneously exercis ed its discretion in making this ruling

.No. 2020AP1908

20 suggest ed the existence of prior commitments heavily overlapped with the untainted evidence. Third, the nature of the defense at trial essentially involved a disputed medical

- mental health diagnosis : whether T.W.’s actions at the Madison group home were driven primarily or in substantial part by the urinary tract infection, and not at all or to a lesser degree by mental illness. 11 T.W. fails to persuade me t hat learning of the existence of previous commitments would have clouded the ability of a reasonable jury to give fair consideration to this defense , including the ability to assess what the experts testified to on direct and cross examination regarding po ssible effects of the urinary tract infection

.
3
. “ Otherwise Ina dmissible ” Motion
¶ 39 T.W. ’s briefing on this topic is undeveloped and I reject his argument on that ground

. At best, T.W.’s “otherwise inadmissible” evidence motion invited the circuit court to rule before trial that any and all references to “facts or data” by either expert was presumed to be inadmissible. It is hard to see how the court, in the exercise of its discretion, c ould have granted the motion as it was framed. Now, on appeal, T.W. asserts that the “otherwise inadmissible” evidence at issue was ev idence presented at trial by the experts that he now submits constituted hearsay statements

. H e fails to present an argu ment on appeal involving hearsay that bears any resemblance to the generically phrased motion in limine that he presented to the circuit court

. The word “hearsay” does not appear a single time in the motion in limine , and the word was not used by anyone, even

11 Counsel explained to the jury in opening that T.W. had a urinary tract infection at the time of the incident at the Madison group home, which constituted “the thrust of what we’re talking about here

. ” This prepa r ed the jury to maintain a focus throughout trial on the infection and its possible effects on T.W.’s behavior

.No. 2020AP1908

21 once, in connection with discussion of any motion in limine at the hearing at which the parties presented arguments and the circuit court made its rulings. Given the generic nature of the motion in limine, the circuit court had no reason to think that it was not aimed at issues other than hearsay . For that matter, T.W. gave the circuit court no reason to think that T.W. might be able to identify only some
t estimony in this broad category that would be inadmissible hearsay , while other testimony in the category would be admissible

. T herefore , granting the generic motion would have risked improperly barr ing the County from offering evidence that it should hav e be en allowed to offer

. In sum, T.W.’s motion in limine provided an insufficient basis to support the argument that he now makes on appeal.

III. HEARSAY
¶ 40 A s noted , T.W. failed even to use the word “hearsay” in his motions in limine

. However, d uring the course of trial he made the following four objections that referenced the concept of hearsay :

 After first raising a foundation o bjection to testimony by Dr. Schedgick about a delusion suffered by T.W. at the time of the incident at the Madison group home , T.W. briefly shifted to a hearsay objection, which was overruled on the ground that the testimony was necessary for the expert to explain the nature of the delusion.

 When Dr. Schedgick began to testify that T.W. had assaulted staff of t he group home and at a mental health center, T.W. objected on the ground of hearsay. This was overruled, apparently on the ground that the testimony was not offered for its truth but to explain the expert’s basis for a finding of dangerousness.

 When a po lice officer testified about a caregiver at the Madison group home relating that T.W. had punched him in the face, T.W. objected on the ground of hearsay and the objection was sustained.No. 2020AP1908

22  When a clinical manager at a Madison mental health center testified about evidence of violent acts by T.W. at the Madison group home, T.W. objected on the ground of hearsay, the objection was sustained and the court directed the jury to disregard the witness’s use of the term “violent.”
Thus, T.W. at trial used the word h earsay in objecting only twice during the testimony of expert witnesses and prevailed on two of his hearsay objections.
¶ 41 T.W. does not persuade me that the circuit court’s discretionary decision to overrule the objection to Dr. Schedgick ’s reference in his testimony to a delusion , or its decision to overrule the objection to his reference to evidence that T.W. had been assaultive , could have been clearly erroneous.
¶ 42 T he first objected

- to testimony by Dr. Schedgick was somewhat confusing :
One of the delusions [that T.W. had at the time of

the incident at the Madison group home] was the belief that an ad from the television had told him that prescription drugs he was taking are delusional. The jury separately heard, without objection by T.W., the following , less confusing , testimony from the clinical manager at a Madison mental health center:

[T.W.] informed me that he was told by a television commercial that he could not take medication, and I clarified that with him as to whether it was an advertisement that is frequently on television saying here is this medication and it is wonderful and you have all of these potential side effects. He said, no, it was a commercial that specifically spoke to him telling him not to take medication because it was going to kill him.

T.W. does n o t even begin to explain how it could have been clearly erroneous for the circuit court to overrule a hearsay objection to the expert’s testimony when he raises no concern at all about the same information being related to the jury , muchNo. 2020AP1908

23 more clearly , by the clinical manager. Further, given th e testimony of the clinical
manager , any error in admitting the expert’s testimony would have to be harmless.
¶ 43 Similarly, the substan ce of the second objected

- to testimony by Dr. Schedgick was admitted without objection by T.W., through testimony by the caregiver at the Madison group home, the case manager at the group home, an officer who responded to the incident at the group home, an d the clinical manager
at the Madison mental health center . The clinical manager specifically testified , without objection, that T.W. “freely admitted” that he had been violent toward staff.
¶ 44 A s with the issues above, if T.W. intends to argue that the circuit court committed plain error in allowing particular testimony that the court should have recognized constitut ed hearsay, he fails to develop an argument based on pertinent legal principles as applied to specific references to the r ecord , as opposed
to mere generalities

.

By the Court

. — Orders affirmed

. This opinion will not be published. See W IS

. S TAT

. R ULE 809.23(1)( b)4.