2017 UT App 134

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF C.C., R.T., T.T., AND X.W.,

PERSONS UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.

A.W.,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF UTAH,

Appellee.

Opinion

No. 20160448-CA

Filed July 28, 2017

Second District Juvenile Court, Farmington Department

The Honorable J. Mark Andrus

No. 1102119

Aaron C. Garrett and Virginia Ward, Attorneys

for Appellant

Sean D. Reyes, Carol L.C. Verdoia, and John M. 

Peterson, Attorneys for Appellee

Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred. JUDGE MICHELE M.

CHRISTIANSEN concurred, with opinion.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 A.W. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of 

her parental rights to her four children: C.C., an eleven-year-old 

male; R.T., an eight-year-old male; T.T., a four-year-old male;

and X.W., a three-year-old male. We affirm.
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 2 2017 UT App 134

BACKGROUND

¶2 Mother is a person with a learning disability who also 

suffers from anxiety, depression, agoraphobia, attention 

deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and post-traumatic stress 

disorder. She has a history of illegal substance abuse, 

particularly methamphetamine. She was involved in two 

abusive marriages before her marriage to her current husband, 

L.W. (Husband).

¶3 Mother’s involvement with the Division of Child and 

Family Services (DCFS) that led to termination of her parental 

rights began in March 2014. Mother lived with Husband, her 

mother (Grandmother), and her brother (Brother). DCFS 

investigated a claim of domestic-violence-related child abuse 

against Husband and found it to be factually supported. 

Husband had fractured Mother’s jaw while she was holding 

X.W. At the time, X.W. was still an infant. After the incident, 

Mother and Husband agreed to adhere to a treatment plan that 

included a domestic violence assessment, domestic violence

counseling, and individual counseling. Mother and Husband did 

enter counseling but did not obtain a domestic violence 

assessment or domestic violence treatment.

¶4 Three months later, Husband physically restrained C.C. 

and screamed at Grandmother. A few days later, Husband held 

R.T.’s face against a wall and yelled an obscenity at the child. 

Husband then engaged in an altercation with Brother and 

Grandmother and left the home with X.W. After this incident, 

Mother gathered the other three children and stayed with 

Husband at another family member’s house.

¶5 In June 2014 DCFS placed the children in protective 

custody. One of the foster families with whom C.C. and R.T. 

were placed explained that when the boys arrived they were 

“really wild.” R.T. was developmentally delayed. Both boys had 

frequent bed-wetting accidents. Nor did they know how to wash 

their hands, bathe their bodies, or brush their teeth properly. 

R.T. did not know how to use eating utensils and would “stick 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 3 2017 UT App 134

his head down in the bowl” to eat food. He refused to eat 

anything besides junk food, and C.C. “almost would gorge 

himself” when he ate and “would take food and put it in his 

pockets and save it for later.”

¶6 In September 2014 the juvenile court ordered that a Child 

and Family Plan (the service plan) be developed for the children 

and the parents. In its order, the court stated that Mother “is 

lower functioning and . . . suffers from severe anxiety, 

depression, and agoraphobia.” The court also ordered that 

reunification services be provided to Mother and established the 

primary permanency goal as reunification with Mother with the 

concurrent goal of adoption.

¶7 The service plan contained the following requirements for 

Mother: (1) continue to participate in mental health treatment; 

(2) obtain a domestic violence assessment with Husband and 

comply with its recommendations for treatment or counseling; 

(3) avoid further domestic violence, hostile arguments, and other

unsafe behavior in her relationship with Husband; (4) avoid

criminal behavior; (5) improve her parenting skills through 

parenting classes, counseling, and eventually peer parenting; 

(6) avoid illegal substances; (7) provide a stable home for the 

children and not allow unsafe persons in the home; (8) address 

the children’s various medical and educational needs; and 

(9) have regular and appropriate visits with the children. The 

juvenile court accepted the service plan in October 2014; Mother

did not object.

Reunification Services

¶8 The DCFS caseworker assigned to the case began 

reunification services in September 2014.1 The caseworker had 

 

1. A different DCFS caseworker was originally assigned to the 

case but did not testify at trial, nor is it clear from the record 

what services the original caseworker provided to Mother.
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 4 2017 UT App 134

received training on working with persons with disabilities. She 

was aware that Mother had several special needs and would 

need personalized care to succeed with the service plan. The 

caseworker reviewed the service plan with Mother and 

discussed where Mother could receive the required services. 

When Mother had questions about a requirement, the two 

would “talk about it [at] length,” discussing “why it was put into 

place [and] what the steps are to follow through with it.” 

Although the DCFS caseworker did not “normally go out to the 

parent’s home and go quite as in-depth or spend quite as much 

time with the families,” the caseworker “spent numerous hours, 

several times a month” with Mother. The caseworker noticed 

that Mother “seemed to lack a lot of skills. For example, . . . her 

house was very messy, [Mother] did not know how to keep the 

children entertained and safe while she cleaned up the kitchen or 

gave one of the children a bath or played with one of them.” The 

caseworker “helped show [Mother] how to clean her house, how 

to take care of the children while she was cleaning her 

house, . . . how to . . . make a grocery list, cut coupons, [and] go 

to the store.”

¶9 When the caseworker worked with Mother, she noticed 

that Mother “would do very well at taking the skills and 

applying them to the situation” but tended to get side-tracked 

easily, causing the caseworker to “constantly . . . redirect her 

back to the skill-building.” The caseworker noticed that Mother 

“did very well hands-on”; as a result, the caseworker modeled 

different skills, which Mother then repeated on her own. The 

caseworker prepared charts for Mother to help her manage her 

time, to budget, and to help care for herself and her children. 

Mother “did well on those for the most part, but after . . . two or 

three weeks, she would get side-tracked with something else and 

then everything [she] worked on was gone.”

¶10 In addition to working with the DCFS caseworker, 

Mother received 41 in-home family therapy sessions starting in 

December 2014, each lasting one to two hours. The DCFS

caseworker arranged the in-home therapy to accommodate 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 5 2017 UT App 134

Mother’s agoraphobia. Mother disclosed her learning 

disabilities, agoraphobia, and trauma history to the therapist at 

intake. Because of her disclosed disabilities, the therapist 

“slowed things down [and] did a very individualized family 

approach.” The therapist also noted that Mother responded well 

to hands-on learning and integrated it into the skill-building by 

demonstrating example behavior for Mother and then observing 

Mother follow the example. The therapist worked with Mother 

to create a victim personal safety plan to address the domestic 

violence issues involving Husband. However, toward the end of 

reunification efforts, Mother stopped implementing the skills she 

had acquired in the therapy sessions.

¶11 Mother also completed a domestic violence class. The 

instructor was aware that Mother had a disability and requested 

that Mother repeat the class to help reinforce the concepts, which 

she did. The instructor also met with Mother one-on-one to help 

her complete homework assignments and ensure that Mother 

comprehended her reading assignments. After Mother repeated 

the class, the instructor recommended that Mother take three 

additional domestic violence courses, but Mother either did not 

complete the courses or did not provide verification that she had 

completed them. After Mother expressed discomfort with the 

group setting of the classroom due to her agoraphobia, the 

caseworker suggested a domestic violence course that was 

taught in a one-on-one classroom setting. Mother did not follow

through with this referral.

¶12 Mother submitted to a mental health assessment but 

failed to provide documentation and verification of the 

assessment to DCFS. Mother maintained that her mental health 

diagnoses were controlled by medication. Mother attended 

regular individual therapy sessions throughout the pendency of 

reunification services.

Termination

¶13 In April 2015 Mother let two homeless men stay in her 

house. Once, Mother arrived with the two men to pick up C.C. 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 6 2017 UT App 134

and R.T. for an unsupervised visit. C.C. and R.T.’s foster mother 

alerted the caseworker about the men. Mother did not tell DCFS 

about her guests until the caseworker confronted her about it. 

Mother admitted to the caseworker that she had used one of the 

guest’s e-cigarettes that contained THC oil.

¶14 In May 2015 Husband attempted to follow the domestic 

violence safety plan by leaving the home during an argument, 

but Mother blocked him by sitting in the doorway and asked

him not to leave. Husband broke the door off of its hinges and 

bruised Mother’s tailbone in the process. Immediately following 

the door incident, Mother punched herself in the face and hit 

herself in the stomach with a table. Later that day, the children 

came for an unsupervised visit. The broken door fell on twoyear-old T.T., who began crying. Mother went to the hospital in 

an ambulance to have her injuries assessed; Husband walked the 

children to the hospital in a stroller.

¶15 Later that month during another domestic violence 

incident, Husband threatened to choke Mother. Mother called 

her stepfather to pick her up. When her stepfather arrived, 

Husband head-butted him and caused his nose to bleed. Mother 

called the police, and Husband was arrested. Mother obtained a 

no-contact order after the incident but voluntarily lifted it 

several days later.

¶16 In July 2015 a neighbor called the police because they 

could smell marijuana coming from Mother’s home while 

Mother was home alone. Mother’s caseworker visited Mother’s 

home and found marijuana sitting in a cup on the television. The 

caseworker called the police, and Mother was charged with

possession of marijuana.

¶17 At the end of July, the caseworker requested a 90-day 

extension for reunification services at a permanency hearing. The 

caseworker felt that due to Mother’s “small strides” in progress, 

if Mother had more time and access to other resources, she might 

qualify for increased visitation with the children. The juvenile 

court granted the extension with a “zero-tolerance” compliance 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 7 2017 UT App 134

policy. Later that same day, the caseworker received a tip that 

Mother had been using methamphetamine. Mother admitted to 

the caseworker that she had used drugs “almost daily” during 

June and July 2015 and that she had used methamphetamine 

about ten times recently. After the visit, police arrested Mother 

on several outstanding warrants. Police found needles 

containing methamphetamine on Mother’s person, and she 

admitted the needles were for personal use. Mother spent twelve 

days in jail for possessing methamphetamine.

¶18 In August 2015 DCFS filed a petition to terminate

Mother’s parental rights. The month before the termination trial, 

Husband choked Mother and threw her into a wall hard enough 

to cause damage to the wall and injure her. Mother filed for 

divorce a few weeks later. She enlisted the help of an abusive exhusband to move her belongings from the apartment. At the 

time of the termination trial, Mother admitted to seeing 

Husband several times since filing for divorce.

¶19 At the termination trial, Mother argued for the first time 

that DCFS had failed to meet its obligations under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act. Mother also filed a motion to 

dismiss on the ground that “she was not provided reasonable 

reunification services tailored to her individual needs as a 

person with a disability under federal law.” The juvenile court 

denied her motion and found that the “DCFS caseworker did 

conduct an assessment of [Mother’s] individual needs, . . . she sat 

down with [Mother] and asked her what her particular needs 

were, adapted services to those specialized needs, and then 

repeated this process throughout the case.” Additionally, the 

court noted that “[a]s additional needs of [Mother] were 

discovered, they were incorporated into the way services were 

provided.” The juvenile court concluded that there were not 

“any additional services which DCFS could have provided to 

accommodate [Mother’s] disabilities; the treatment plan was 

tailored to her needs.” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s 

parental rights.
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 8 2017 UT App 134

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶20 Mother raises three claims of error on appeal. First, she

contends that this court should adopt a heightened standard of 

review in cases involving the termination of parental rights

given the fundamental liberty interests at issue.

¶21 Second, Mother contends that “the State’s efforts at 

reunification in this case were insufficient and unreasonable” 

under the ADA. “[J]uvenile courts have broad discretion in 

determining whether reasonable reunification efforts were 

made.” In re K.F., 2009 UT 4, ¶ 52, 201 P.3d 985. A determination 

of whether reasonable modifications under the ADA could be 

appropriately made is “a mixed determination on a factintensive question not meriting a hard look by an appellate 

court.” In re K.C., 2015 UT 92, ¶ 14, 362 P.3d 1248.

¶22 Third, Mother contends that there is insufficient evidence 

to support an order terminating parental rights. We “review the 

juvenile court’s factual findings based upon the clearly 

erroneous standard.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ¶ 11, 21 P.3d 

680. A finding of fact is only clearly erroneous when it is 

“against the clear weight of the evidence.” See id. Therefore, to 

overturn the juvenile court’s decision to terminate a person’s 

parental rights, “the result must be against the clear weight of 

the evidence or leave the appellate court with a firm and definite 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, 

¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (brackets, citation, and internal quotation 

marks omitted). Further, we give the juvenile court “a wide 

latitude of discretion as to the judgments arrived at based upon 

not only the court’s opportunity to judge credibility firsthand, 

but also based on the juvenile court judges’ special training, 

experience and interest in this field.” In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, 

¶ 11 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, 

“[w]hen a foundation for the court’s decision exists in the 

evidence, an appellate court may not engage in a reweighing of 

the evidence.” In re B.R., 2007 UT 82, ¶ 12.
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 9 2017 UT App 134

ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

¶23 Mother contends that we should “apply a heightened 

standard of review when considering termination of parental 

rights cases . . . that would give little deference to the findings of 

the trial court.” She argues that “the Utah Constitution should be 

interpreted to provide a special priority for parental rights.”

¶24 This argument is not adequately briefed. An adequately 

briefed argument must “contain the contentions and reasons of 

the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 

grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, 

with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 

relied on.” Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). Case law applying this rule 

makes clear that adequate briefing “requires not just bald

citation to authority but development of that authority and 

reasoned analysis based on that authority.” State v. Green, 2004 

UT 76, ¶ 13, 99 P.3d 820 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). An issue is inadequately briefed “when the overall 

analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of 

research and argument to the reviewing court.” State v. Thomas, 

961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).

¶25 Although Mother argues that this court should adopt a 

heightened standard of review in parental rights termination 

cases, she fails to articulate specifically what standard of review 

we should adopt. She merely suggests the standard should “give 

little deference to the findings of the trial court” and urges this 

court to interpret the Utah Constitution to “provide a special 

priority for parental rights.” Although Mother cites cases that 

establish the fundamental right to parent one’s child under the 

United States and Utah constitutions, she fails to explain how 

our current standard of review implicates this fundamental 

right. Mother has not developed the authority she relies on, nor 

has she provided a reasoned analysis of why we should adopt a 

heightened standard of review based on that authority. See

Green, 2004 UT 76, ¶ 13.
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 10 2017 UT App 134

¶26 Most importantly, Mother fails to cite a decision in which 

this court addressed and rejected a materially identical claim. See

generally In re S.Y.T., 2011 UT App 407, 267 P.3d 930. In S.Y.T., 

we rejected an argument that “the current standard of review 

affording the juvenile court a wide latitude of discretion violates 

their due process rights because such a standard eliminates any 

purpose to appeal since there is no meaningful review of the 

challenge.” Id. ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Generally, this court is bound by its prior decisions. “Horizontal 

stare decisis . . . requires that a court of appeals follow its own 

prior decisions.” State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 

1994). Nevertheless, “a panel may overrule its own or another 

panel’s decision where the decision is clearly erroneous or 

conditions have changed so as to render the prior decision 

inapplicable.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Mother has not cited S.Y.T., let alone shown it to be 

clearly erroneous or no longer applicable due to changed 

conditions. Accordingly, we reject this claim of error.

II. Reasonable Accommodations

¶27 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred in 

determining that the State’s reunification efforts were sufficient 

and reasonable under the ADA. Specifically, Mother argues that 

to comply with the ADA, the State “must make an 

individualized assessment of a person’s needs at the outset of 

the provision of reunification services.” Mother also argues that 

reunification efforts were insufficient because the State failed to 

take into account the “complex relationship between [her] 

disabilities and her status as a victim of domestic violence.”

¶28 Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from 

discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12132 (2015). Specifically, section 12132 provides that “no 

qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, 

or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. “[T]he 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 11 2017 UT App 134

ADA applies to the provision of reunification services under 

Utah Code sections 78A-6-312 and 78A-6-507 . . . .” In re K.C., 

2015 UT 92, ¶ 1, 362 P.3d 1248.

¶29 The ADA “requires only reasonable modifications,” and 

does not establish a “right to extend [a] reunification plan 

indefinitely.” Id. ¶ 23. The juvenile court is charged with 

identifying any modifications to the reunification plan that 

might be reasonable. Id. ¶ 27. In assessing what types of 

modifications to the plan might be reasonable, the juvenile court 

is “entitled to take into account the core principles and policies 

of our Termination of Parental Rights Act—including, of course, 

‘the paramount concern,’ which is the best interests of the child.” 

Id. ¶ 23 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(19)(c) (LexisNexis 

2012)). A parent “may assert a right to reunification services for 

the first time at the termination hearing,” and “she may likewise 

seek a modification of a reunification plan under the ADA at that 

stage.” Id. ¶ 25. However, “[a] parent who waits until the 

eleventh hour to request a modification under the ADA may 

thoroughly undermine her ability to establish that such 

modification is reasonable, particularly once the best interests of 

the child are taken into account.” Id. ¶ 27.

¶30 In K.C., a mother with disabilities raised the ADA as an 

affirmative defense to a termination petition. Id. ¶ 9. The mother 

in K.C. made an argument identical to the one Mother makes 

here—that DCFS “failed to make reasonable efforts to provide 

sufficient disability-related reunification services.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). Our supreme court noted that “a wide 

variety of modifications had already been made [for the 

mother]—such as adoption of various recommendations of 

mental health professionals, provision of extra peer parenting 

sessions, and allowing [the mother] extra time to complete 

tasks.” Id. ¶ 29. The court affirmed the juvenile court’s finding 

that “there were no additional services DCFS could have 

provided to accommodate the mother’s disabilities.” Id. ¶¶ 28–29

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 12 2017 UT App 134

¶31 Here, as in K.C., Mother raised the ADA as an affirmative 

defense at the termination hearing. See id. ¶ 9. And as in K.C., by 

that time the juvenile court and DCFS had made a wide variety 

of modifications for Mother. Mother argues that she was entitled 

to an individualized assessment of her disabilities at the outset 

of the case and asks us to reverse the juvenile court’s 

determination that reunification services were sufficient. The 

juvenile court concluded that Mother did not identify “any 

specific accommodation or modification to the treatment plan 

which she requested that was denied or not provided by DCFS 

or by the Court; nor were there any additional services which 

DCFS could have provided to accommodate [Mother’s]

disabilities; the treatment plan was tailored to her needs.” We 

agree, “finding ample support in the record for the juvenile 

court’s decision.” See id. ¶ 29.

¶32 Before it ordered reunification services, the juvenile court 

was aware that Mother was a person with disabilities. And in its 

termination order, the juvenile court found that the DCFS 

caseworker conducted an assessment of Mother’s individual 

needs based on her disabilities. The caseworker was aware of 

Mother’s disabilities and tailored her sessions with Mother to 

accommodate Mother’s needs. For example, although the 

caseworker did not “normally go out to the parent’s home and 

go quite as in-depth or spend quite as much time,” the 

caseworker spent “numerous hours, several times a month” with 

Mother. The caseworker referred Mother to a domestic violence 

course that was taught in a one-on-one classroom setting and

arranged for Mother to have an in-home therapist to 

accommodate her agoraphobia.

¶33 Mother’s in-home therapist was aware of Mother’s 

disabilities and tailored her services to accommodate Mother’s 

needs. The instructor of Mother’s domestic violence course was 

also aware of Mother’s disabilities and spent time outside of 

class with Mother to accommodate her needs. Mother attended 

regular individual therapy sessions to comply with the mental 

health treatment requirement of her service plan.
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 13 2017 UT App 134

¶34 The juvenile court also made accommodations for 

Mother’s disabilities. At the end of July 2015, the juvenile court 

provided Mother with a 90-day extension for reunification 

services to provide her with more time to comply with her 

service plan and the ability to access to other resources. 

However, that same day Mother was arrested and found with 

methamphetamine needles on her person, which led the court to 

terminate reunification services.

¶35 Given the myriad services and modifications provided to 

Mother throughout the pendency of the case, we “cannot fault 

the juvenile court for concluding that any further modifications 

would be unreasonable—particularly given the stage of the 

proceedings in which the ADA was invoked and the appropriate 

concern for the best interests of the [children] in question.” See In 

re K.C., 2015 UT 92, ¶ 29.

¶36 Mother also argues that the juvenile court failed to take 

into account her status as a domestic violence victim and how 

that status may have influenced her disabilities. However, the 

DCFS caseworker and the in-home therapist both provided 

services to Mother tailored to her status as a domestic violence 

victim, including the creation of a “victim safety plan” to 

address the ongoing domestic violence in her relationship with 

Husband, referrals to multiple domestic violence courses, and a 

referral to a trauma therapy program.

¶37 “In determining ‘reasonable efforts’ to be made with 

respect to a minor, and in making ‘reasonable efforts,’ the 

minor’s health, safety, and welfare shall be the paramount 

concern.” Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-312(19)(c) (LexisNexis Supp. 

2016). Although the juvenile court provided Mother services 

based on her status as a domestic violence victim, it found that 

she repeatedly “failed to protect [the] children from being 

exposed to domestic violence perpetrated by the various men 

she has brought into the family home,” several of whom also 

physically abused the children. The juvenile court was “entitled 

to take into account the core principles and policies of our 

Termination of Parental Rights Act—including . . . the 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 14 2017 UT App 134

‘paramount concern,’ which is the best interests of the child.” See 

In re K.C., 2015 UT 92, ¶ 23 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

312(19)(c) (LexisNexis 2012)). Accordingly, given the juvenile 

court’s “broad discretion in determining whether reasonable 

reunification efforts were made,” we agree with the juvenile 

court’s conclusion that the modifications made to Mother’s 

service plan to accommodate her disabilities and her status as a 

domestic violence victim were sufficient. See In re K.C., 2015 UT 

92, ¶ 14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Sufficient Evidence

¶38 Finally, Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient 

to support an order terminating parental rights. Specifically, 

Mother argues that the juvenile court “failed to give the proper 

weight to [Mother’s] changes in the months preceding trial, 

instead choosing to focus on the bad acts of [Husband] and 

using her relationship with him largely as the grounds for 

terminating her parental rights.”

¶39 “[I]f there is sufficient evidence to support any of the 

grounds for termination found by the juvenile court, the 

termination of [a parent’s] rights is appropriate.” In re K.K., 2017 

UT App 58, ¶ 3 n.1 (per curiam). The juvenile court “may 

terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent if the court 

finds,” by clear and convincing evidence, “any one of” the 

enumerated circumstances contained in Utah Code section 78A6-507(1). See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-506(3), -507(1) (LexisNexis 

2012). In determining whether a parent is unfit, the court shall 

consider, inter alia, “habitual or excessive use of intoxicating 

liquors, controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render 

the parent unable to care for the child.” Id. § 78A-6-508(2)(c)

(LexisNexis Supp. 2016). If the court finds the parent “to be unfit 

or incompetent based upon any of the grounds for 

termination . . . the court shall then consider the welfare and best 

interest of the child of paramount importance in determining 

whether termination of parental rights shall be ordered.” Id.

§ 78A-6-506(3) (LexisNexis 2012).
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 15 2017 UT App 134

¶40 One of the requirements of Mother’s service plan was to 

refrain from using illegal substances. Relying on Utah Code 

sections 78A-6-507(1)(c) and -508(2)(c), the juvenile court found 

that Mother’s “habitual or excessive use of controlled substances 

or dangerous drugs render her unable to properly care for her 

children.” The court explained that Mother’s conduct “clearly 

shows that drugs have interfered with her parenting while being 

supervised during the pendency of this case, and her choice to 

begin using methamphetamine heavily for several 

weeks . . . clearly indicates a need of substance abuse counseling 

and monitoring of drug use.” Because Mother failed to do either, 

the court reasoned, “her children would continue to be at risk 

because of her substance abuse problems if they were returned 

to her.”

¶41 We cannot conclude that the juvenile court’s findings 

about Mother’s substance abuse were “against the clear weight 

of the evidence,” nor are we left with “a firm and definite 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” See In re B.R., 2007 UT 

82, ¶ 12, 171 P.3d 435 (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Mother acknowledged a history of substance abuse 

problems. In October 2012 DCFS investigated Mother for fetal 

exposure to drugs and found the allegation to be factually

supported. And at the termination trial, she admitted to using 

methamphetamine during one of her pregnancies. In May 2015 

police responded to a call that Mother was using drugs in the 

home. In June 2015 Mother refused to submit to a drug test. In 

July 2015, the DCFS caseworker visited Mother’s home and 

found marijuana sitting in a cup on the television. Mother was 

later charged with possession of marijuana as a result. Later that 

month, Mother also admitted to the caseworker that she had 

used methamphetamine ten times recently. That same day, 

police arrested Mother and found needles containing 

methamphetamine on her person. Mother admitted the needles 

were for personal use; she spent twelve days in jail as a result.

¶42 Mother admitted to “almost daily” methamphetamine use 

during June and July 2015. Although Mother later claimed that 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 16 2017 UT App 134

she lied about her June 2015 drug use because she felt 

“harassed,” she did not submit to random drug testing, did not 

attempt to receive substance abuse counseling, and provided no 

verification for her claims that she had been drug-free for the 

months preceding her termination trial.

¶43 At her termination trial, Mother acknowledged that her 

drug use had interfered with her ability to parent her children. 

This was apparent from the state of the older children when they 

arrived with their foster family. C.C., the eleven-year-old, and 

R.T., the eight-year-old, had frequent bed-wetting accidents. Nor 

did they know how to wash their hands, brush their teeth, or 

bathe their bodies properly. R.T. did not know how to use eating 

utensils and would “stick his head down in the bowl” to eat 

food. He refused to eat anything besides junk food, and C.C. 

“almost would gorge himself” when he ate and “would take 

food and put it in his pockets and save it for later.”

¶44 Ample evidence exists in the record to support the 

juvenile court’s conclusion that Mother’s substance abuse 

rendered her an unfit or incompetent parent. Therefore, the 

juvenile court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights was 

appropriate. See In re K.K., 2017 UT App 58, ¶ 3 n.1.

CONCLUSION

¶45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the juvenile 

court is affirmed.

CHRISTIANSEN, Judge (concurring):

¶46 A parent’s right to the care and custody of her child is 

among the oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental 

liberty interests protected by the due process clauses of both the 

United States and Utah constitutions. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 

57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); D.A. v. 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 17 2017 UT App 134

D.H., 2014 UT App 138, ¶ 11 n.2, 329 P.3d 828.

But parental rights, although fundamental and constitutionally 

protected, are not absolute, and the State has a moral and 

statutory obligation to step in and protect children when those 

children are suffering from neglect or abuse. Here, given the 

ample evidence of Mother’s continuing substance abuse issues 

and lack of basic parenting skills, I agree with the majority that 

the juvenile court correctly determined that Mother was an unfit 

parent pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-6-507(1)(c)–(d) and 

section 78A-6-508(2)(c), and that the court properly terminated 

her parental rights. I therefore concur in the majority opinion.

¶47 However, I write separately to highlight Mother’s concern 

that current law fails to account for the myriad psychological, 

social, and economic constraints that undermine abused 

women’s efforts to leave their abusers and protect their children 

from exposure to domestic violence. I remain concerned that a 

victim of domestic violence who is trapped in a pattern of abuse 

may not be offered resources adequate to truly break that cycle. 

See In re S.B., 2003 UT App 303U, paras. 9, 14 (affirming the 

termination of the mother’s parental rights where she had a 

history of associating with abusive men “to prevent any further 

abuse [of her children] from the men that [she] chose to bring 

into the home”); In re J.B., 2001 UT App 33U, para. 2 (per curiam) 

(affirming the termination of the parents’ parental rights “based 

upon a history of violent behavior by and between the parents” 

and observing that the mother “was unfit because she had failed 

to protect [the child] from the effects of domestic violence”); In re 

C.B., 1999 UT App 293, ¶¶ 8–12, 989 P.2d 76 (affirming the 

juvenile court’s conclusion that the child was neglected because 

the mother had “voluntarily” returned to an abusive relationship 

with the child’s father). 

¶48 Our law should reflect reality. The unfortunate reality is 

that the choices and options available to victims of domestic 

violence to enable them to escape the abusive relationships are 

limited, and may even be non-existent. I do not question that the 

best interest of the child must be paramount. But I also believe 
In re C.C.

20160448-CA 18 2017 UT App 134

that the best interest of many children would be served by a 

system that provides sufficient support to help women break the 

cycle of abuse, rather than blaming those women for the abuse 

they have suffered.