### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

JO HN SON CUFFY
, Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA
, Appellee

.

No. 4D 15

- 292

[ March 18, 2015 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Broward County ; Jeffrey R. Levenson , Judge; L.T. Case No. 07

- 12640

CF10B

.

Johnson Cuffy, Arcadia, pro se.

No appearance filed for appellee.

ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

P ER C URIAM

.

We dismissed the defendant’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and issued an order requiring the defendant to show cause why we should not impose sanctions pursuant to State v. Spencer , 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).

The defendant has not shown cause to excuse his continuing abuse of

pos tconviction relief procedures. Therefore, w e impose sanctions.

The defendant has raised the same challenge to his 2008 plea in numerous postconviction motions, appeals, and hab eas corpus proceedings in this c ourt. The essence of the defendant’s claim is that when he entered his plea and was placed on probation, he belie ved that he was pleading to a third

- degree grand theft, not a second

- degree grand

theft. The defendant did not appeal from that plea and sentence . H owever, after the defendant violated probation and was sentenced to eleven years in prison, h e began filin g postconviction motions raising this third

- degree

versus second

- degree issue. The defendant’s claim has been considered and rejected repeatedly on the merits.2

T he defendant first ra ised this claim in a Florida Rule of Criminal

Procedure 3.850 motion whi ch he filed thro ugh counsel in 2009. The

circuit court denied the motion

, ruling that the claim of trial court error was not cognizable in a postconviction motion and that any prejudice from
the defendant’s allegation that he believed he was pleading to t hird

- degree grand theft was cured by the plea form which clearly reflected that he was pleading to second

- degree grand theft as charged in the information. The

defendant acknowledged reading and signing the plea form during the plea colloquy. F ollowing f ull briefing by counsel in case number 4D09

- 413, we
affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the defendant’s motion. Cuffy v. State

, 56 So. 3d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (table).

The defendant repeated a similar claim in another rul e 3.850 motion
he filed in 2 011. The circuit court noted that the defendant previously

raised the same issue

, but again addressed the merits and denied the

motion. The c ourt concluded that the record

– including the information, the written plea form, the scoresheet, the disposition form, and the transcript

– conclusively refute d t he claim. The court also noted the defendant’s acknowledgement during the plea hearing that he wished to enter the plea knowing he could receive fifteen years in prison i f he violated probation. This c ourt affirmed the denial of this motion in case number

4D11

- 4532. Cuffy v. State , 97 So. 3d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (table).

In February 2013, the defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this c ourt in case number 4D13

- 491 again at tempting to challenge his plea and repeating the same claim. We dismissed t he petition as unauthorized as it attempted to raise an untimely, successive, and procedurally barred postconviction challenge. See Baker v. State , 878 So. 2d 1236, 1241 (Fla. 200 4).

In December 2013, the defendant filed another habeas corpus petition

in this c ourt in case number 4D13

- 4660

, once again attempting to

c hallenge his plea on the same grounds. We dismissed the petition , and

we referred the defendant to prison officials for consideration of disciplinary procedures based on his ongoing abusive filing of frivolous proceedings. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2013). We again cautioned the

defendant that continued frivolous filing would result in the sanction of

this c ourt n o longer accepting his pro se filings.

In 2015, the defendant filed the instant habeas corpus pet ition again challenging his plea on the same meritless grounds. We dismissed the petition and ordered the defendant to show cause why we should not impose th e sanction of no longer accepting his pro se filings . The3

defendant’s response asserts that it would be manifestly unju st not to consider his claim again.

The term “manifest injustice,” which has been acknowledged as an exception to procedural bars to postconviction claims in only the rarest

and mos t exceptional of situations, now is abused widely by postconviction litigants. Courts are routinely confronted with untimely and successive postconviction challenges, which cavalierly at tempt to circumvent t he bars simply by asserting “manifest injustice.” However, rule 3.850 contains no “manifest injustice” exception to the rule’s time limitation or bar against filing successive postconviction motions. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850( b); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850( h).

Abuse of postconviction procedures consumes limited court resources and delays access to courts for others by impeding the ability of courts to consider legitimate claims. See Lake v. State , 115 So. 3d 1046, 1047 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (citing McCutcheo n v. State

, 44 So. 3d 156, 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) )

. Accordingly, we impose the sanction of no longer accepting petitioner’s pro se filings directed at his conviction and sentence in lower

tribunal case number 07

- 12640 CF10B . The Clerk of this Court is di rected to reject any such filing unless it has been signed by a member in good standing of The Florida Bar who certifies that a good faith basis exists for each claim presented. Further, we direct the Clerk to forward a certified copy of this opinion to t he appropriate institution for consideration of disciplinary procedures. See § 944.279(1), Fla. Stat. (2014).

Sanctions imposed

.

D AMOORGIAN
, C.J., G ERBER and L EVINE
, JJ., concur

.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.