alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
FIRST AMENDMENT TO LAND SUBLEASE AGREEMENT




This First Amendment to the Land Sublease Agreement made between Signet Maritime Corporation (hereinafter called "LESSOR") and Orion Construction LP. ("LESSEE") as of May 1, 2007 (as amended hereby the "Agreement") is entered into by LESSOR and LESSEE as of
the 8th day of April, 2009.





The Agreement is hereby amended as follows:


1. Recital A. of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety, and the following is inserted in lieu thereof:


"A. Lessor is the current owner of certain property located at 1500 Main Street on


Farm Road 1069 in Ingleside, San Patricio County, State of Texas, described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto and referred to herein as the "Leased Premises".


2. In Section 1 of the Agreement, the second sentence is deleted in its entirety and the following is inserted in lieu thereof:


"Lessor covenants with Lessee that the Lessor is vested with the title to the Leased Premises and has full right and lawful authority to sublease the Leased Premises to Lessee."


3. LESSEE hereby exercises the options granted in Section 2 of the Agreement for both one (1) year extension periods, extending the term of the Agreement through May 1, 2011.


4. Effective May 1, 2009, in Section 3(a) of the Agreement, line 2, the words "Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000) per month," are amended to read "Six Thousand Three Hundred Dollars per month inclusive of monthly mowing and land maintenance costs".


5. There are no other changes to the Agreement and all terms and conditions thereof shall remain in full force and effect except as expressly amended hereby.





IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed and delivered this First Amendment as of the date and year first above written.











ORION CONSTRUCTION L.P.                                                                       SIGNET
MARITIME CORPORATION


/s/ Rob Lewis, VP                                                                        /s/
J. Barry Snyder, President
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

JUDGMENT

No. 04-18-00554-CV

MO-VAC COMPANY OF ALICE,

Appellant

v.

MICHAEL MYANE LP d/b/a Pipeline Measurement Co., LP and Michael Myane 

Management, LLC,

Appellees

From the 79th Judicial District Court, Jim Wells County, Texas

Trial Court No. 15-04-54479-CV

Honorable Richard C. Terrell, Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARION, JUSTICE WATKINS, AND JUSTICE RODRIGUEZ

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, the joint motion filed by the parties is 

GRANTED, and judgment is RENDERED vacating the trial court’s judgment signed on May 14, 

2018 and dismissing the cause in accordance with the parties’ settlement agreement.

We order that appellant and appellee each bear their own costs of this appeal, if any. 

SIGNED May 22, 2019.

_________________________________

Beth Watkins, Justice
#### Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., Appellant, vs. Industrial Commission and another, Respondents.

*January 21*

February *15, 1949.*

*309
      *Adolph I. Mandelker*of Milwaukee, for the appellant.

For the respondent Industrial Commission there was a brief by the *Attorney General*and *Mortimer*Levitan, assistant attorney general, and oral argument by *Mr. Levitan.*

Broadfoot, J.

The employer, appellant, argues that the award of double compensation should not be confirmed for the following reasons: (1) Liability for double compensation where a minor is employed without a permit is predicated on the negligence of the employer; (2) double compensation should be imposed only where failure to have a child-labor permit is a cause in fact of the injury; and (3) double compensation should not be imposed where a minor assumes the risk of working without a permit.

None of the above contentions is sound. The statutes require the imposition of double compensation under the facts in this case. The Industrial Commission had no discretion and properly made the award. The circuit court was correct in confirming it. The liability for double compensation provided for by the Wisconsin statutes is not predicated on the negligence of the employer. *Brenner v. Heruben*(1920), 170 Wis. 565, 176 N.W. 228.

As to the last two contentions, a reading of the statutes and the decisions of this court will show that the legislature based the entire concept of the statutes upon the protection of the child. The duty of obeying the child-labor laws is on the employer and not on the minor. This court has held that the provisions of the statute for double and triple compensation apply even though the minor obtains employment by falsifying his age and practicing deceit. *Bloomer*Brewery, *Inc., v. Industrial Comm.*(1942), 239 Wis. 605, 2 N. W. (2d) 226; *Milwaukee News Co. v. Industrial Comm.*(1937), 224 Wis. 130, 271 N. W. 78.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
| 1.   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13 (a) or 15 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|----------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  May 3, 2011 | By:    | /s/  Abiola L. Lawal    |   |
|------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                         |   | Abiola L. Lawal                                  |   |
|                         |   | Chief Financial Officer                          |   |
|                         |   | (Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)     |
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                             SEP-30-1999
<PERIOD-END>                                  DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                          1,171,746
<SECURITIES>                                            0
<RECEIVABLES>                                     267,624
<ALLOWANCES>                                            0
<INVENTORY>                                             0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                2,549,291
<PP&E>                                            758,115
<DEPRECIATION>                                    519,057
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 11,468,389
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           9,296,009
<BONDS>                                                 0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                   0
<PREFERRED>                                             0
<COMMON>                                              204
<OTHER-SE>                                      2,362,071
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   11,468,389
<SALES>                                         1,134,145
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                1,134,145
<CGS>                                             217,689
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   1,777,137
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  167,683
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                103,221
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (1,028,364)
<INCOME-TAX>                                      (13,248)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              (985,449)
<DISCONTINUED>                                          0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                         0
<CHANGES>                                               0
<NET-INCOME>                                     (985,449)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       (0.06)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       (0.06)
        


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 31.1

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

I, Gerald Diakow, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Ameriwest Minerals
     Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
     statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
     make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
     statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
     this quarterly report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
     material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
     flows of the registrant as of, and for, the period presented in this
     quarterly report;

4.   I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
     procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the
     registrant and have:

     a.   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
          material information relating to the registrant, including its
          consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
          entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly
          report is being prepared;
     b.   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
          this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and
     c.   presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
          evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.   I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the registrant's
     auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or
     persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a.   all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
          controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
          identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
          internal controls; and
     b.   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
          controls; and

6.   I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were
     significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could
     significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most
     recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to
     significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
12th day of October, 2007.


/s/ Gerald Diakow
---------------------------
Chief Executive Officer
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED February 21, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-40580 Summary Calendar

LONNIE GUNN, JR., Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus TOM MANNESS, Prosecuting Attorney; RUTH BOLES, S.O. Registration Clerk; AMY WOODS, Parole Officer; DR. UNKNOWN PARTY, District Attorney; LEONARD GIBLIN, Judge; PAT KNAUTH; BRYAN LAINE, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas USDC No. 1:04-CV-215

-------------------- Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and GARZA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Lonnie Gunn, Jr., Texas prisoner # 644474, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against several defendants whom he alleged participated in his wrongful conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. That conviction was overturned in a judgment dated February 7, 2002. Gunn v. State , No. 13-01-242-CR, 2002 WL 189067, at *1 (Tex. App. Feb. 7, 2002). The defendants argued, and the district court agreed, that Gunn’s complaint, filed inNo. 05-40580 -2- April 2004, was untimely because his cause of action accrued on the date his conviction was overturned. Gunn appeals the dismissal of his complaint, and he moves for the appointment of counsel and the entry of a money judgment in his favor. Gunn argues that the two-year limitation period should have been tolled from February 7, 2002, until June 10, 2002, when he received a letter from appointed counsel informing him that his conviction had been overturned. We will not consider this argument, which is raised for the first time on appeal.
See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co. , 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999). Gunn has not shown that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The appointment of counsel in this civil case is not warranted. See Ulmer v. Chancellor , 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th Cir. 1982). Gunn’s motions for the appointment of counsel and his motion for the entry of a money judgment in his favor are denied. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. The district court’s dismissal counts as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Adepegba v. Hammons , 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996). Gunn is cautioned that if he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed IFP in any civil action or appeal filed while he is incarcerated or detained in any facility unlessNo. 05-40580 -3- he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. See 1915(g).
AFFIRMED; ALL OUTSTANDING MOTIONS DENIED; SANCTION WARNING
ISSUED.
#### Mitler, Appellant, vs. Associated Contractors, Inc., Respondent.

*February 5*

February *28, 1958.*

*332For the appellant there was a brief by *Harvey & Harvey,*attorneys, and *Earle L. Christ*of counsel, all of Racine, and oral argument by *Richard G. Harvey, Jr.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *Foley, Capwell & Foley*of Racine, and oral argument by *Rex Capwell, Jr.*

Currie, J.

The appealability of the order in the instant case is controlled by the provisions of sec. 274.33, Stats.

An order denying an application for summary judgment is expressly made appealable by sub. (3) of such statute. However, an order for entry of judgment is not made appeal-able by such statute, and such an order is not appealable. *Puhr v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co.*(1918), 168 Wis. 101, 103, 169 N. W. 305; *Weiler v. Herzfeld-Phillipson Co.*(1926), 189 *333Wis. 554, 560, 208 N. W. 599; *Witzko v. Koenig*(1937), 224 Wis. 674, 676, 272 N. W. 864; and *Jaster v. Miller*(1955), 269 Wis. 223, 233, 69 N. W. (2d) 265. The reason why such an order for judgment is not appealable is because it does not prevent a judgment from which appeal can be taken.

In the instant appeal counsel for the respondent have raised no issue as to whether the order appealed from is appealable. However, parties cannot, either by failure to raise the question or by consent, confer jurisdiction upon an appellate court to review an order which is not appealable. *Hempel v. Hempel*(1921), 174 Wis. 332, 341, 181 N. W. 749, 183 N. W. 258; *Richter v. Standard Mfg. Co.*(1937), 224 Wis. 121, 126, 271 N. W. 14, 271 N. W. 914; and *Jaster v. Miller, supra,*at page 234. We quote from our opinion in *Jaster v. Miller, supra,*as follows (p. 234) :

> “Neither the waiver or consent of a respondent, nor the willingness of this court to consider a matter in the interests of justice, gives us authority to take jurisdiction where none is conferred by law.”

We are thus confronted on this appeal with a situation in which that part of the order denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is technically appealable, while that part of such order, which directs that judgment be entered upon the pleadings for only the amount contained in defendant’s offer of judgment, is not appealable.

However, it would be a useless gesture for us to pass upon the issue, of whether it was error for the trial court to have denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, so long as the judgment entered pursuant to the order is permitted to stand. The present appeal does not reach such judgment, and such judgment is *res adjudicata*on the issue of the amount of commission plaintiff is entitled to recover from the defendant. We, therefore, deem that the issue, of whether *334it was error to deny plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, to be moot, and one that this court should not pass upon. *Hogan v. La Crosse*(1899), 104 Wis. 106, 80 N. W. 105.

It does not appear from the record before us on this appeal when, if ever, judgment was entered as directed by the order appealed from. However, the plaintiffs only remedy is to appeal from such judgment.

*By the Court.*— Appeal dismissed.
---

LOGO

March 12, 2015

Consent of independent auditor

We hereby  consent to the incorporation by reference in this Annual Report on Form 40-F  for the year ended 31 December 2014 of Denison Mines Corp. of our report dated  March 5, 2015, relating to the consolidated financial statements and the  effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting, which appears in  the Exhibit incorporated by reference in this Annual Report.

We also consent to  the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements on Forms S-8 (No.  333-48174, No. 333-148915 and No. 333-190121) of our report dated March 5, 2015  referred to above.

(Signed) PricewaterhouseCoopers LLPChartered Professional Accountants, Licensed Public Accountants
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP
PwC Tower, 18 York Street, Suite 2600, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5J 0B2
T: +1 416 863 1133, F: +1 416 365 8215, www.pwc.com/ca
PwC refers to PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, an Ontario limited liability
partnership,

---
EVENT
    
    FEEAnnual Retainer (Board Chairman)
    
    $100,000Annual Retainer (excluding Board Chairman)
    
    $35,000Board Meeting Attended
    
    $2,000Annual Committee Chair RetainerAudit Committee
    
    $20,000Compensation Committee
    
    $15,000Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee
    
    $15,000Strategic Planning Committee
    
    $15,000Yodlee Board Representative
    
    $15,000Committee Meeting Attended
    
    $1,500Annual Stock Option Grant
    
    10,000 shares(quarterly vesting)Annual Restricted Stock Grant
    
    6,000 shares(quarterly vesting)
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-21-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1998
<CASH>                                         175,344<F1>
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    2,697
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 484,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           210
<OTHER-SE>                                     443,489
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   484,000
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                26,536
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                15,858
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                 906
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  9,054
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              9,054
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     9,054
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                      .44
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .44
<FN>
<F1>Includes restricted cash of $697
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
# FILED JUl 162009 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

### Clerk, U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts CARLTON B. CHATMON, Petitioner,
v. Civil Action No. 

# 09 1319 UNITED STATES, Respondent. 

### MEMORANDUM OPINION Petitioner states that he is serving a term of20 to 60 months' imprisonment imposed by the Superior Court ofthe District ofColumbia on January 25,2008. Pet.**~** 10. He alleges that he is unlawfully held in custodybecause the sentence imposed violates the Sentencing Reform Act of2000, 

### id., which in relevant part requires that "[a] sentence ... shall be for a definite term." D.C. Code § 24-403.01(c). A challenge ofthis nature must be brought bymotion in the Superior Court under D.C. Code § 23-11

### O. In relevant part D.C. Code § 23-110 provides: [An] application for a writ ofhabeas corpus in behalfofa prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by ... any Federal. .. court ifit appears ... that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears thattheremedybymotionisinadequate orineffectiveto test the legality ofhis detention. D.C. Code 

### § 23-11O(g). "Section 23-110 has been found to be adequate and effective because it is coextensive with habeas corpus." 

### Saleh v. Braxton, 788 F. Supp. 1232 (D.D.C. 1992). It is settled that "aDistrict ofColumbia prisoner has no recourse to a federaljudicial forum unless the local remedy is 'inadequate or ineffective to test the legality ofhis detention'" 

### Byrd v. 1 

# J, 

# . Henderson, 119 F.3d 34,36-37 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (internal footnote omitted); 

### Garris v. Lindsay, 794 F.2d 722, 726 (D.C. Cir.), 

### cert. denied, 479 U.S. 993 (1986). A prisoner's lack ofsuccess in his previous attempts to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence bymeans ofa motion under D.C. Code § 23-110(g) does not render this remedy inadequate or ineffective. 

### See Wilson v. Office a/the Chairperson, 892 F. Supp. 277,280 (D.D.C. 1995). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice. 

### An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion will be issued separately on this date.



### Date:

# 1-\'it0 

# 1 United States District Judge



### 2
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

The undersigned officer of Veridien Corporation (the "Company") hereby certifies
to my knowledge that the Company's annual report on Form 10-KSB for the year
ended December 31, 2004 (the "Report"), as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the on date hereof, fully complies with the requirements of
Section 13(a) or 15(d), as applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
as amended, and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company. This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and
shall not be deemed to be part of the Report or "filed" for any purpose
whatsoever.

Date: March 31, 2005                Name:  /s/ Sheldon C. Fenton
                                           ----------------------------
                                           Sheldon C. Fenton
                                    Title: Chief Executive Officer