alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John McElhone v. R. Wilkinson, Appellant.

Quotient Verdict. The fact that each member of the jury stated 1 the amount to -which he thought the plaintiff entitled and divided the sum by twelve to get the average did not constitute a quotient verdict, wliqre the sum so found was not in fact their verdict and there was no agreement that it should be.

New Trial: remittitur. It is not error to refuse a new trial on one 2 count of the petition, the plaintiff, pending the motion, having remitted the amount rceovered thereon. .

*Appeal from Jasper District Gourt.*— Hon. W. Gr. Clements, Judge.

Tuesday, October 20, 1903.

Action to recover damages for the trespass of cattle and for slander. Trial to a jury and verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant *appeals.*

Affirmed.

*L. S. Kennington*for appellant.

*G. M. Tripp*for appellee.

SheRwin, J.

It is contended by the appellant that the verdict in this case was a quotient verdict, and it is conceded by the appellee that if such were the case it should not stand. The petition was in counts — countone alleging damages for slander; count two claiming damages for the trespass of stock. After some deliberation, the jury voted that the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. It was then suggested that each member of the jury note the amount he thought the plaintiff entitled to, and that the several sums so stated be added together and divided by twelve for the purpose, of ascertaining the average. The record conclusively shows that there was no agreement that.the sum so found should be the verdict of the jury, and it was not in fact their verdict.

*430The jury awarded the plain tiff $22.50 on the second count of his petition, and pending the motion for a new trial he remitted $25 of the amount found by the jury, that being the entire sum claimed under the second count of his petition. This left only the damages claimed for slander, a'nd the court was clearly justified in refusing a new trial.

The judgment is therefore affirmed.
# Journal officiel C 146A/26 a

| | ISSN 1977-0936 |
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| Journal officiel
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| Édition de langue française | Communications et informations | 59e année26 avril 2016 |

ISSN 1977-0936

Journal officiel

de l'Union européenne

C 146A

Édition de langue française

Communications et informations

59e année26 avril 2016

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page

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| 26.4.2016 | FR | Journal officiel de l'Union européenne | CA 146/1 |
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26.4.2016

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Journal officiel de l'Union européenne

CA 146/1

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LISTE DE RÉSERVE

(ordre de mérite)

ECA/2015/JUR — Deux postes de juriste (grades AD 8 — AD 9)

Service juridique — Présidence

(2016/C 146 A/01)

Georgios PRANTZOS

Johanne VERMER

Eléonore VON BARDELEBEN

Nunzio BAMBARA

Jan KLEIN

Vassilis KARANTOUNIAS

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EXHIBIT 32

                                  CERTIFICATION
                           Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350
                 (Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Ads In Motion, Inc. (the
"Company") for the period ended November 30, 2009, as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Edward F. Myers III,
as Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby
certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
          of the Company.

Date: 1/11/10                           By: /s/ Edward F. Myers III
                                            ------------------------------------
                                            Edward F. Myers III
                                            Chief Executive Officer &
                                            Chief Financial Officer

This certification accompanies each Report pursuant to ss. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of ss.18
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-20486

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GABRIEL ARAUJO URIBE, also known as Gabriel Humberto Araujo Uribe,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:19-CR-114-1

Before JONES, HIGGINSON, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Gabriel Araujo 

Uribe has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with 

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 

229 (5th Cir. 2011). Uribe has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s 

brief and the relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with 

counsel’s assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 7, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-20486 Document: 00515302482 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/07/2020
No. 19-20486

2

appellate review. Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

GRANTED, counsel is excused from further responsibilities herein, and the 

APPEAL IS DISMISSED. See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 19-20486 Document: 00515302482 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/07/2020
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,

v.

ANTONIO AGUILAR, Petitioner.

No. 1 CA-CR 14-0777 PRPC

Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2005-008712-001

The Honorable M. Scott McCoy, Judge

REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED

APPEARANCES

Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix

By Diane Meloche

Counsel for Respondent

Antonio Aguilar, Phoenix

Petitioner Pro Se

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 
STATE v. AGUILAR

Decision of the Court

2

O R O Z C O, Judge:

¶1 Antonio Aguilar petitions for review of the summary 

dismissal of his second notice of post-conviction relief and his motion for 

rehearing. We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons 

stated, grant review and deny relief.

¶2 A jury convicted Aguilar of theft of means of transportation, 

and he was sentenced as a repetitive offender to a prison term of 11.25 years. 

This court affirmed his conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Aguilar, 

1 CA-CR 06-0175 (Ariz. App. Jan. 25, 2007) (mem. decision).

¶3 The superior court dismissed Aguilar’s first petition for postconviction relief in 2008. In 2014, Aguilar filed an untimely and successive 

notice of post-conviction relief indicating intent to raise a claim of newly 

discovered evidence with respect to a violation of his right against double 

jeopardy. Finding Aguilar failed to state a claim for which relief could be 

granted in an untimely and successive post-conviction relief proceeding, 

the superior court summarily dismissed the notice. 

¶4 We review the summary dismissal of a post-conviction relief 

proceeding for abuse of discretion. State v. Bennett, 213 Ariz. 562, 566, ¶ 17 

(2006). Furthermore, we may affirm the superior court’s ruling “on any 

basis supported by the record.” State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199 (1987).

¶5 The superior court properly dismissed Aguilar’s notice of 

post-conviction relief. Although a claim of newly discovered material facts 

is one that can be raised in an untimely or successive post-conviction relief 

proceeding, Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.2(b), Aguilar’s factual allegations fail to 

meet the requirements for a claim of newly discovered material facts. See

Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e). Specifically, the alleged fact that he was previously 

indicted and arraigned on the same offense was undisputedly within his 

knowledge when he was re-indicted on that offense. Consequently, under

no circumstances can it be said to be a fact that was only “discovered after 

the trial.” See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(e)(1). And because the notice of postconviction relief was properly dismissed, no basis for relief exists for the 

manner in which the superior court addressed Aguilar’s motion for 

rehearing.
STATE v. AGUILAR

Decision of the Court

3

¶6 Accordingly, although we grant review, we deny relief.
Lki , J. , J. 

Douglas Cherry 

considering the fragile medical condition of [I.G.C.] in that he is unable to 

communicate, is legally blind and deaf, and suffers from cerebral palsy, it 

is hard to imagine that [Travis C.] would further injure his son." Thus, 

the court found that "the best interest of [I.G.C.] will be promoted by 

allowing [Travis C.] to return to the home to assist [Marites C.] in caring 

for him, with a Safety Plan in effect that will require [Marites C.], or 

another responsible adult like the maternal great aunt, to supervise 

[Travis C.]'s contact with [I.G.C.] at all times." The court further 

scheduled this matter for a status check in three months so that petitioner 

Clark County Department of Family Services can monitor the situation 

and perform random checks. It is not our place to substitute our judgment 

for that of the juvenile court as to factual findings, and in light of the 

juvenile court's findings, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court's order 

rose to the level of an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. Int? 

Game Tech. Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 

P.3d 556, 558 (2008); Pan, 120 Nev. at 228, 88 P.3d at 844. We also 

conclude that the juvenile court did not exceed its jurisdiction by entering 

the order. NRS 34.320. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED.i 

Parraguirre 

'In light of this order, we vacate our July 10, 2015, temporary stay. 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 2 

(0) 19474 .4t44 
cc: Hon. Frank P Sullivan, District Judge, Family Court Division 

Clark County District Attorney/Juvenile Division 

Aaron Grigsby 

Special Public Defender 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 3 

(0) 1947A )4(tto
PAT McCRORY 

Governor 

N ICHOLAS J. TENNYSON 

Transportation 

December 7, 2015 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Attention: Director, Office of Airport Compliance 

and Management Analysis 

800 Independence Avenue, SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Dear Director: 

Secretary 

This letter is in response to the letter from your office to Governor Pat McCrory, dated November 

24, 2015, requesting an action plan to come into compliance with the FAA Policy and Procedures 

Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue; Proceeds From Taxes on Aviation Fuel Amendment, 

dated February 16, 1999. 

NC House Bill117 was passed September 30, 2015. As a result of this bill, the State of North 

Carolina will be in compliance on January 1, 2016. Below is the applicable excerpt from this bill: 

"SECTION 4.1.(d) Part 8 of Article VofChapter 105 of the General Statutes is amended by adding 

a new section to read: 

§105-164.44M. Transfer to Division of Aviation. 

The net proceeds of the tax collected on aviation gasoline and jet fuel under G.S. 105-164.4 must 

be transferred within 75 days after the end of each fiscal year to the Highway Fund. This amount 

is annually appropriated from the Highway Fund to the Division of Aviation of the Department of 

Transportation for prioritized capital improvements to public airports and time-sensitive 

aviation capital improvement projects for economic development purposes." 

And the bill continues: 

"SECTION 4.1.(t) Subsections (a) through (d) of this section become effective January 1, 2016, 

and apply to sales made on or after that date. The remainder of this section is effective when this 

act becomes Jaw." 

Therefore, based on this newly passed state legislation, on January 1, 2016, North Carolina will be 

in compliance. 

Sincere ly, 

I 

1!:!fL.: Director, Division of ~EAvW~ iation 

~Nothing Comp es ~ 

State of Nonh Carolina 1 Depanment ofTransponation J Di,ision of A'~a ion 

1050 Meridian Drive, Monis,~ll , NC 27560 I 1560 Mail Scr\~ce Center, Raleigh, NC 27699·1560 

919 814 0550 T I 9 19 840 9267 F
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 278

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain lands to the county

of Rio Arriba, New Mexico.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21, 1999

Mr. DOMENICI (for himself and Mr. BINGAMAN) introduced the following bill;

which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

A BILL

To direct the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain

lands to the county of Rio Arriba, New Mexico.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. OLD COYOTE ADMINISTRATIVE SITE.

4 (a) CONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY.—Not later than one

5 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary

6 of the Interior (herein ‘‘the Secretary’’) shall convey to

7 the County of Rio Arriba, New Mexico (herein ‘‘the Coun8 ty’’), subject to the terms and conditions stated in sub9 section (b), all right, title, and interest of the United

10 States in and to the land (including all improvements on
2

•S 278 IS

1 the land) known as the ‘‘Old Coyote Administrative Site’’

located approximately 1 2 ⁄2 mile east of the Village of Coy3 ote, New Mexico, on State Road 96, comprising one tract

4 of 130.27 acres (as described in Public Land Order 3730),

5 and one tract of 276.76 acres (as described in Executive

6 Order 4599).

7 (b) TERMS AND CONDITIONS.—

8 (1) Consideration for the conveyance described

9 in subsection (a) shall be—

10 (A) an amount that is consistent with the

11 special pricing program for Governmental enti12 ties under the Recreation and Public Purposes

13 Act; and

14 (B) an agreement between the Secretary

15 and the County indemnifying the Government

16 of the United States from all liability of the

17 Government that arises from the property.

18 (2) The lands conveyed by this Act shall be

19 used for public purposes. If such lands cease to be

20 used for public purposes, at the option of the United

21 States, such lands will revert to the United States.

22 (c) LAND WITHDRAWALS.—Land withdrawals under

23 Public Land Order 3730 and Executive Order 4599 as

24 extended in the Federal Register on May 25, 1989 (54
3

•S 278 IS

1 F.R. 22629) shall be revoked simultaneous with the con2 veyance of the property under subsection (a).

Æ
II

106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 327

To exempt agricultural products, medicines and medical products from U.S.

economic sanctions.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 28, 1999

Mr. HAGEL (for himself, Mr. DODD, Mr. DORGAN, Mr. GRAMS, Mr. HARKIN,

Mr. LUGAR, Mr. ROBERTS, and Mr. WARNER) introduced the following

bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

A BILL

To exempt agricultural products, medicines and medical

products from U.S. economic sanctions.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Food and Medicine

5 Sanctions Relief Act of 1999’’.

6 SEC. 2. PURPOSE.

7 It is the purpose of this Act to exempt agricultural

8 products, medicines and medical equipment from U.S. eco9 nomic sanctions.
2

S 327 IS

1 SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

2 (a) Prohibiting or otherwise restricting the donations

3 or sales of food, other agricultural products, medicines or

4 medical equipment in order to sanction a foreign govern5 ment for actions or policies that the United States finds

6 objectionable unnecessarily harms innocent populations in

7 the targeted country and rarely causes the sanctioned gov8 ernment to alter its actions or policies.

9 (b) For the United States as a matter of U.S. policy

10 to deny access to United States food, other agricultural

11 products, medicines, and medical equipment by innocent

12 men, women and children in other countries weakens the

13 international leadership and moral authority of the United

14 States.

15 (c) Sanctions on the sale or donations of American

16 food, other agricultural products, medicine or medical

17 equipment needlessly harm American farmers and workers

18 employed in these sectors by foreclosing markets for these

19 United States products.

20 SEC. 4. EXCLUSION FROM SANCTIONS.

21 (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the

22 President shall not restrict or otherwise prohibit any ex23 ports (including financing) of food, other agricultural

24 products (including fertilizer), medicines or medical equip25 ment as part of any policy of existing or future unilateral

26 economic sanctions imposed against a foreign government.
3

S 327 IS

1 (b) EXCEPTIONS.—Section 4(a) of this Act shall not

2 apply to any regulations or restrictions of such products

3 for health or safety purposes or during periods of domestic

4 shortages of such products.

5 SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE.

6 (a) The provisions of this Act shall become effective

7 upon the enactment of this Act.

Æ
#### Raymond ADAMS v. STATE.

No. 20230.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 25, 1939.

Edmond C. Yates, of Abilene, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

The offense is theft, a felony; penalty assessed at confinement in the penitentiary for a period of two years.

Upon the written motion of the appellant, duly verified by his affidavit, the appeal is dismissed.
#### Recknagle v. Schmaltz, Adm’r.

1. Specific Performance: conveyance oe land: evidence. Action to enforce the specific performance of an alleged contract to convey land in consideration of maintenance; but *held*thát the evidence (see opinion) failed to establish any contract.

2. Statute of Frauds: contract to convey land : possession. One who is in possession of land at the time of an alleged oral contract to convey the land to him, cannot rely on his possession to take the contract out of the statute of frauds.

*64*Appeal from Benton District Cov/rt.*

Friday, June 17.

Action to enforce the specific performance of a contract to convey land. There was a decree in the district court granting the relief prayed for by plaintiff’. Defendant appeals.

*Traer &*Voris, for appellant.

*Gilchrist &*Haines, for appellee.

Beck, J.

I. The plaintiff seeks to enforce the specific performance of an oral contract to convey land entered into between him and defendant’s intestate. The consideration ot the contract was plaintiff’s undertaking to take care of the intestate during his life. No payment was made upon the land.

II. • We think the evidence fails to show with sufficient distinctness and certainty an agreement of the parties which would be binding upon them. The intestate was in bad health, and was living on the farm in question, with plaintiff and his family. The plaintiff had either rented the farm, or was occupying the premises under a contract with intestate of some other kind. While plaintiff was so in possession of the property, it is claimed that the intestate agreed that, if plaintiff and his family would stay with him, they u should have the farm.” Other declarations or statements of the intestate, equally indefinite and general, are shown by the evidence. The evidence utterly fails to show any promise or agreement of plaintiff to perform any service, or make any payment, in consideration of intestate’s agreement, if the evidence could be so interpreted as to show one. Nor did plaintiff, if the intestate’s declarations be understood to amount to a proposition, accept it. The most liberal construction of the evidence shows that whatever was said by intestate amounted to nothing more than loose expressions *65of intention and purposes. There is nothing which shows a contract between the parties.

III. But should it be held that there was an oral contract between the parties for the conveyance of the land, plaintiff did not enter into possession under it. He was occupying the land as a tenant or employe of intestate at the time of the alleged contract. He cannot, therefore, rely upon his possession to take the contract out of the operation of the statute of frauds.

IY. Numerous declarations and acts of the plaintiff, after the death of the intestate, are shown, which are inconsistent with, the claim he now makes. Some of them he attempts to explain. But it is needless to consider these matters, for the reason that the evidence wholly fails to establish the contract relied upon by plaintiff.

The petition of plaintiff will be dismissed.

REVERSED.
# • RCRA REVISION CHECKLIST 17 F Liquids inLandfills I
Note thatthe final rule addressed bythis checklist inadvertently reserved 265.314(d). This errorwas corrected on May 28, 1986 (51 FR19176),the technical correction addressed by Revision Checklist 25. 265.314(d)

### waS corrected 

### to read asit

### was originally promulgated on April 30, 1985 (50 FR 18370, Revision Checklist 16).

FEDERAL REQUIREMENT FEDERAL RCRA CITATION ANALOGOUS STATE CITATION STATE ANALOG IS:EQUIVALENT MORESTRINGENT. BROADERIN SCOPE PART 264 - STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES WAC 173-303
SUBPART N- LANDFILLS
SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR LIQUID WASTE 

## t . redesignate paragraph (b1to (d1 264.314 140(41(b1 

### X 

# • introductorv paragraph 5/8/85 free liquids ban non-hazardous liquids ban 11/8/85 264.314(a1 264.314(b1 264.314le1 140(41(b1(i1 140(41(b1(i) 140(41(b1Ov) 

### X X X 

## t exemptions: only alternative 264.314(e1(11 140(41(b1(i\!1(A1 

### X 

## t not a

### risk 264.314(e}(2) 140(41(blOv1(B) 

### X PART 265 - INTERIM STANDARDS FOR OWNERS AND OPERATORS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT, STORAGE, AND DISPOSAL FACILITIES
SUBPART N- LANDFILLS

July 15, 1985 - Page 9of25· RCRA REVISION CHECKUST 17F: Liquids inLandfills (confd)

# C~

. FEDERAL REQUIREMENT FEDERAL RCRA CITATION ANALOGOUS STATE· CITATION STATE ANALOG is: MORE EQUIV- 

### STRINALENT GENT BROAD

### ERIN SCOPE 

## t exemptions: only alternative 265.314(Q11l 400(3)(a) 

# x t notarisk 265.314(Q(2) 400(3)(a) 

# x PART 270 - PERMlnlNG REQUIREMENTS

SUBPART B- PERMIT APPLICATION
SPECIFIC INFORMATiON REQUIREMENTS FOR LANDFILLS bulk liquids inlandfills; 5/8/85 270.211h) noanalog' 

# x

July 15, 1985 - Page 10of25 

# c



# c