NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2009-3126 

CARLOS A. RAMOS, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

 Respondent, 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Intervenor. 

Carlos A. Ramos, of Brownsville, Texas, pro se. 

Jeffrey A. Gauger, Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Merit Systems 

Protection Board, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With him on the brief were 

B. Chad Bungard, General Counsel, and Keisha Dawn Bell, Deputy General Counsel. 

Stacey K. Grigsby, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, 

United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for intervenor. With her on 

the brief were Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Jeanne E. Davidson, Director, 

and Patricia M. McCarthy, Assistant Director. 

Appealed from: Merit Systems Protection Board
NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

 

2009-3126 

CARLOS A. RAMOS, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD, 

 Respondent 

and 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 

 

 Intervenor. 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection Board decision DA-0752-08-0539-I1. 

______________________________ 

DECIDED: November 6, 2009 

______________________________ 

Before LOURIE, FRIEDMAN, and PROST, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM 

 

The pro se petitioner, Carlos A. Ramos, challenges the Department of Homeland 

Security (“Department”)’s termination of him during what was a probationary 

employment with that agency. The Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) dismissed 

his appeal from that action for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm. 
I 

 Ramos served on active duty with the Navy from 1992 until his honorable 

discharge in 1996. In April 2007, pursuant to the Federal Career Internship Program, 

the Department appointed Ramos to the excepted service as a Customs and Border 

Protections Officer. Appointments under that program, generally, are for two years. 

See 5 C.F.R. § 213.3202(o)(1). The governing regulations state that “service as a 

career intern confers no rights to further Federal employment in either the competitive or 

excepted service upon the expiration of the internship period,” but “[c]ompetitive civil 

service status may be granted to career interns who successfully complete their 

internships and meet all qualification, suitability, and performance requirements.” Id. at 

§ 213.3202(o)(6)–(o)(6)(i). 

 Following an altercation while on duty, the Department terminated Ramos in 

August 2008, after approximately sixteen months of work.

The letter notifying Ramos of his termination erroneously informed him that he 

had “the right to appeal this action to the Merit Systems Protection Board.” Ramos did 

so. The Board, however, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In his initial 

decision, which became final when the Board refused to review it, the Board’s 

administrative judge ruled that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because 

Ramos (1) was a probationary employee and (2) was not a preference eligible. 

II 

 In his appeal documents, Ramos argues the merits of his case. Namely, he 

contends that the Department improperly terminated him and avoids the jurisdictional 

ruling on which the Board based its dismissal of his appeal. As he states in his 

2009-3126 2
response to the Department’s brief: the “actions of the Respondent (MSPB) are not in 

question, but the actions of the Intervenor (DHS) are. . . . [The] jurisdictional issue . . . is 

not in question by Mr. Ramos.” 

 Before an adjudicative tribunal like the Board may consider the merits of the 

case, it first must establish that it has jurisdiction to do so. The Board has “only that 

jurisdiction conferred on it by Congress.” Cruz v. Dep’t of the Navy, 934 F.2d 1240, 

1243 (Fed. Cir. 1991). It may entertain only those appeals authorized by law, rule or 

regulation. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a); Artmann v. Dep’t of Interior, 926 F.2d 1120, 1122 

(Fed. Cir. 1991). The Board’s jurisdiction cannot be expanded by an agency’s 

misstatements or erroneous notice of appeal rights. See Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. 

Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419–20, 432–33 (1990). 

The Board has jurisdiction over appeals by “an employee.” See 5 U.S.C. 

§ 7701(a). With limited exceptions not involved here, only “employees” may appeal to 

the Board. See, e.g., United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 886 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 

For purposes of this appeal, an “employee” is defined as “a preference eligible in the 

excepted service who has completed 1 year of current continuous service in the same 

or similar positions” or “an individual in the excepted service (other than a preference 

eligible) . . . who is not serving a probationary or trial period under an initial appointment 

pending conversion to the competitive service.” See 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(B)–(C)(i). 

Ramos was an individual in the excepted service who had so served for 

approximately sixteen months. Therefore, for the Board to have had jurisdiction over 

his appeal, he must either not have been serving a probationary or trial period under an 

initial appointment pending conversion to the competitive service, or he must have been 

2009-3126 3
a preference eligible. The Board correctly held that Ramos did not come within either 

category. 

Although Ramos’ Departmental appointment was not described as a 

probationary one, it was precisely that. Ramos was hired under the Federal Career 

Internship Program, which, as we have noted, provides for initial appointments for two 

years. Although individuals who successfully complete such internships “may be 

granted” “[c]ompetitive civil service status,” such service “confers no rights to further 

Federal employment in either the competitive or excepted service upon the expiration of 

the internship period.” Indeed, as the Board stated, “[i]n his initial appeal, the appellant 

noted that he was terminated during his probationary period.” The Board thus correctly 

held that because Ramos was terminated during his probationary period, it had no 

jurisdiction over his appeal under 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(C)(i). 

The only other statutory basis for Board jurisdiction would have been that Ramos 

was a “preference eligible” veteran as defined in 5 U.S.C. § 2108(3)(A). That provision 

provides that the term (which incorporates the definition of “veteran” in section 

2108(1)(A)), “means an individual who . . . served on active duty in the armed forces 

during a war, in a campaign or expedition for which a campaign badge has been 

authorized, or during the period beginning April 28, 1952, and ending July 1, 1955; . . . . 

and who has been separated from the armed forces under honorable conditions.” Since 

Ramos did not serve in the Navy during a declared war or during the applicable time 

period, he could be classified as a preference eligible under this provision only if he had 

served in a campaign or expedition for which a campaign badge has been authorized. 

2009-3126 4
2009-3126 5

Ramos seeks such status on the ground that during his military service he was 

awarded the Kuwait Liberation Medal. This medal was not an “authorized” “campaign 

badge” under that statutory provision, however, because it was issued not by the United 

States, but by either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. The statute “does not bestow veteran 

status upon those awarded a badge by a foreign country.” See Perez v. Merit Systems 

Protection Bd., 85 F.3d 591, 594 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 

On this record, the Board correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over 

Ramos’ appeal because (1) he was terminated during his probationary period and (2) 

he was not a preference eligible. For the latter reason, the Board necessarily had no 

jurisdiction over his appeal under the Veterans Employment Opportunity Act, which 

covers only preference eligibles. See 5 U.S.C. § 3330a; Campion v. Merit Systems 

Protection Bd., 326 F.3d 1210, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 

CONCLUSION 

 The decision of the Board dismissing Ramos’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction is 

AFFIRMED.