J-S71019-15 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA 

 Appellee 

v. 

MARTIN J. PATTERSON, 

 Appellant No. 366 WDA 2015 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 3, 2015 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Venango County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-61-CR-0000232-2014 

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and OTT, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 22, 2016 

 Appellant, Martin J. Patterson, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his conviction for driving under the influence (“DUI”). 

We affirm. 

 The trial court summarized the factual history of this case as follows: 

Jason Hodgkiss, an employee at Klapec Trucking Company, was 

working on the night of February 17, 2014. At 1:00 a.m., 

Mr. Hodgkiss received a call from his girlfriend stating that an 

inebriated man appeared to be stuck in his vehicle in the ditch 

across the road from their residence. Mr. Hodgkiss left work 

immediately and began traveling home. When Mr. Hodgkiss 

arrived at his residence, he attempted to help [Appellant] 

remove his car from the ditch, but upon drawing closer to 

[Appellant], Mr. Hodgkiss noticed the odor of alcohol emanating 

from [Appellant]. [Appellant] had relayed to Mr. Hodgkiss that 

he was “just going to get some burgers to bring back to his 

kids.” When Jason Hodgkiss first made contact with [Appellant], 

the engine of the car was still on. Once Jason Hodgkiss noticed 

the odor of alcohol, he called the Titusville police. Because 

Mr. Hodgkiss lived in Venango County, the Titusville Area Police 
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informed Mr. Hodgkiss that he would instead have to contact the 

Pennsylvania State Police. As a result, Mr. Hodgkiss was 

informed that the police might take as long as an hour to arrive. 

Trooper Shawn Armagost was dispatched to [Appellant’s] 

location at 1:32 a.m. Trooper Armagost testified that 

[Appellant’s] location was approximately fifty miles away, and 

the roads “weren’t in the best of shape” due to snow. 

Trooper Armagost arrived to the scene at around 2:23 a.m. 

Trooper Armagost then approached [Appellant’s] driver’s 

side door and asked [Appellant] what was going on, [Appellant] 

stated that he was “on his way to McDonalds” and he went off 

the road into the ditch. Contrary to what [Appellant] told 

Mr. Hodgkiss and Trooper Armagost, [Appellant] does not have 

any kids at home. In fact, his kids live in Alabama. Trooper 

Armagost observed a strong odor of alcohol emitting from 

[Appellant’s] breathe [sic], slurred speech, and bloodshot eyes. 

[Appellant] was then asked to perform field sobriety tests. 

Thereafter, Trooper Armagost determined that [Appellant] was 

under the influence of alcohol such that he was incapable of safe 

driving. [Appellant] was arrested, and ultimately transported to 

the Titusville Hospital, arriving at 2:59 a.m. The phlebotomist 

was unavailable when Trooper Armagost first arrived, and 

Trooper Armagost needed to wait an additional twenty minutes 

for [Appellant’s] blood to be drawn. The blood was drawn from 

[Appellant] at 3:22 a.m. The blood was transported back to the 

police station and entered into evidence on February 17, 2014, 

at 5:15 a.m. The results of the blood test revealed [Appellant’s] 

BAC[1] to be 0.298%. 

[Appellant’s] version of events differs from the facts 

elicited from Trooper Armagost and Jason Hodgkiss. [Appellant] 

testified that, while driving to Wal-Mart, his car slid off the road. 

According to [Appellant], the car became stuck in a ditch at 

approximately 10:05 p.m. [Appellant] attempted to move the 

car forward and backward, but he claims there was no traction 

and the car would not move from the ditch. After realizing the 

car would not move, [Appellant] called for a tow truck. 

[Appellant] proceeded to sit in his car awaiting the tow truck for 

approximately three hours. While waiting for the tow truck, 

____________________________________________ 

1

 Blood alcohol concentration. 
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[Appellant] claims to have drank an entire thirty-two ounce 

Gatorade bottle filled with sixty-six proof fireball cinnamon 

whiskey. Once Jason Hodgkiss arrived at the scene, [Appellant] 

again attempted to remove his car from the ditch by accelerating 

the car backward and forward; however, the tires spun in place 

and did not move from the ditch. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 5-7 (citations omitted). 

On November 20, 2014, following a bench trial, the court found 

Appellant guilty of one count of Driving Under the Influence - Highest Rate 

of Alcohol, first offense, in violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). On February 3, 

2015, Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment in the Venango County jail 

for seventy-two hours to six months. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on 

February 27, 2015. Appellant and the trial court complied with the 

requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents the following issue for our review: 

Whether the [trial] court erred as a matter of law or 

abused its discretion in determining that there was sufficient 

evidence to establish that [Appellant] had driven under the 

influence with the highest rate of alcohol pursuant to 75 

Pa.C.S.A. 3802(C), when the Commonwealth failed to establish 

when [Appellant] was operating the vehicle on a trafficway or 

highway in [correlation] to when [Appellant’s] blood being drawn 

for testing for the amount of alcohol, additionally the 

[C]ommonwealth failed to establish good cause on why 

[Appellant’s] blood was not drawn within two hours or that the 

Commonwealth proved that [Appellant] did not imbibe alcohol 

within the two hour period before the blood was drawn. 

Appellant’s Brief at 5. 

 Appellant first contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict 

him of this crime because the Commonwealth failed to establish that he was 
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operating the vehicle on a trafficway or highway while intoxicated. 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. Appellant maintains that the evidence establishes 

that the vehicle was not on a highway, but instead, was off the highway in a 

ditch. Id. at 12-13. Accordingly, Appellant argues the Commonwealth has 

not established evidence sufficient to support his DUI conviction. Id. at 13. 

Appellant further avers that the Commonwealth failed to establish “good 

cause” as to why Appellant’s blood was not drawn within two hours of his 

operation of the vehicle on a highway. Id. at 12. Additionally, Appellant 

maintains that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he did not imbibe 

alcohol “within the two hour period before the blood was drawn.” Id. at 8. 

 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine 

whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn 

therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa. 

2009). “It is within the province of the fact finder to determine the weight 

to be accorded to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa. 

Super. 2008). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every 

element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011). 

Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and 
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substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v. 

Kelly, 78 A.3d 1136, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2013). 

 The Vehicle Code provides, in pertinent part, that: 

(c) Highest rate of alcohol.--An individual may not drive, 

operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a 

vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that 

the alcohol concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 

0.16% or higher within two hours after the individual has driven, 

operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of 

the vehicle. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). The prohibition applies “upon highways and 

trafficways throughout this Commonwealth.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3101(b). A 

highway is defined as: “[t]he entire width between the boundary lines of 

every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of 

the public for purposes of vehicular travel....” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102. A 

trafficway is defined as “[t]he entire width between property lines or other 

boundary lines of every way or place of which any part is open to the public 

for purposes of vehicular travel as a matter of right or custom.” Id. “The 

term ‘operate’ requires evidence of actual physical control of either the 

machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of the vehicle’s 

movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was in motion.” 

Commonwealth v. Johnson, 833 A.2d 260, 263 (Pa. Super. 2003). 

As noted, in this case Appellant argues that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction because “the evidence is clear that the 
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vehicle was not on the highway but off the highway in a ditch.” Appellant’s 

Brief at 13. This argument lacks merit. 

This Court has observed, “[T]he suspect location of an automobile 

supports an inference that it was driven . . . a key factor in the finding of 

actual control.” Commonwealth v. Woodruff, 668 A.2d 1158, 1161 (Pa. 

Super. 1995) (citation omitted). The testimony at trial established that the 

front and rear right wheels of Appellant’s vehicle were in the ditch off the 

side of the roadway, and the left-side wheels of the vehicle were located on 

the right-side shoulder of the road. N.T., 11/20/14, at 8-9. Thus, the fact 

that Appellant’s vehicle was found in a ditch alongside the highway supports 

the inference that it was, in fact, driven on the highway before stopping in 

the ditch. Additionally, when Mr. Hodgkiss arrived on the scene where 

Appellant’s vehicle was stuck in the ditch, he noticed a strong odor of alcohol 

on Appellant and contacted police. Id. at 7-9. When officers arrived on the 

scene, Trooper Armagost testified that based on his training and experience, 

he concluded that Appellant was intoxicated. Id. at 23-25. Thus, the 

evidence of record supports the conclusion that Appellant was operating his 

vehicle on the roadway while under the influence of alcohol. 

Appellant attempted to rebut this inference by asserting that he 

consumed alcohol only after his vehicle stopped in the ditch. Appellant 

testified that after realizing he could not get the car out of the ditch, he 

contacted his insurance company for a tow truck. N.T., 11/20/14, at 45. 
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Appellant maintained that while waiting for the tow truck, he drank an entire 

thirty-two-ounce Gatorade bottle filled with sixty-six proof fireball cinnamon 

whiskey. Id. at 46-49. The trial court, however, found Appellant’s account 

of events to be incredible. Id. at 69; Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 10. 

As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and substitute our 

judgment for that of the fact-finder. Kelly, 78 A.3d at 1139. Thus, 

Appellant’s claim fails. 

Furthermore, the trial court provided the following analysis regarding 

evidence of record establishing that Appellant operated the vehicle while 

under the influence of alcohol: 

 Evidence adduced at trial showed that [Appellant’s] engine 

was on, and [Appellant] repeatedly attempted to remove his 

vehicle from the ditch by stepping on his vehicle’s accelerator. 

Emerging from this collection of evidence is a clear illustration of 

the very type of public safety danger that the DUI statute was 

designed to combat: a drunken driver behind the wheel with the 

engine running, having driven when he ought not and where he 

ought not. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence 

established beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] was 

operating or in actual physical control of this car while 

intoxicated for purposes of the DUI statute. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 9 (citations omitted). 

 

 Thus, the evidence of record supports a second basis for the 

conclusion that Appellant operated his vehicle while intoxicated. Evidence 

that Appellant operated or was in control of the vehicle in the ditch, and not 

on the highway, while Appellant was intoxicated was sufficient to establish 
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commission of this offense. It is of no relevance that Appellant was unable 

to move the vehicle from the ditch. 

The term “operate” requires evidence of actual physical control 

of either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management 

of the vehicle’s movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was 

in motion. Our precedent indicates that a combination of the 

following factors is required in determining whether a person had 

“actual physical control” of an automobile: the motor running, 

the location of the vehicle, and additional evidence showing that 

the defendant had driven the vehicle. A determination of actual 

physical control of a vehicle is based upon the totality of the 

circumstances. The Commonwealth can establish through wholly 

circumstantial evidence that a defendant was driving, operating 

or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. 

Commonwealth v. Williams, 871 A.2d 254, 259 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

(internal citations omitted). 

 This Court addressed a similar claim in Williams, where the defendant 

was convicted of two counts of driving under the influence (DUI). 

Wiilliams, 871 A.2d at 257. In that case, the defendant argued that the 

evidence was insufficient to support his DUI convictions because the 

Commonwealth failed to establish that he was in “actual physical control” of 

the vehicle while intoxicated because the vehicle was off the roadway and 

was not moving. Id. at 258. The trial evidence disclosed that police found 

the defendant at 4:00 a.m. in his car with the headlights and radio on and 

the engine running; the car was parked diagonally across two handicapped 

spaces in front of an establishment that did not serve alcoholic beverages; 

the defendant’s employer owned the car, and only the defendant had 

permission to drive it; and the defendant was in the driver’s seat with his 
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hands and head on the steering wheel. Id. at 260-261. The defendant 

showed visible signs of intoxication, admitted drinking, failed several field 

sobriety tests, and had a BAC of .138%. Id. at 261. The court specifically 

rejected as incredible the defendant’s defense that someone else had been 

driving the vehicle. Id. This Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion 

that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the defendant was in actual 

control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated and found irrelevant the fact that 

the vehicle did not move. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Yaninas, 722 

A.2d 187, 188-189 (Pa. Super. 1998) (court found the appellant was in 

actual physical control of vehicle for purposes of DUI conviction where 

Appellant was found behind wheel of vehicle, on the berm of a highway, with 

engine running and lights on, despite the car not moving). 

 Thus, there is no requirement that Appellant actually succeed in 

moving the vehicle for a determination to be made that Appellant operated 

or was in actual physical control of the vehicle for purposes of the DUI 

statute. Here, the totality of circumstances established that Appellant 

operated or was in actual physical control of the vehicle when he attempted 

to move the vehicle from the ditch. The record reflects that while 

Appellant’s vehicle was in the ditch, the engine of the vehicle was on, 

Appellant sat behind the steering wheel in the driver’s seat and depressed 

the accelerator in an attempt to get the vehicle out of the ditch. N.T., 

11/20/14, at 7-8, 16, 48, 60. Mr. Hodgkiss was with Appellant during 
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Appellant’s efforts to move the vehicle and testified that when he 

approached Appellant, he could smell alcohol on Appellant’s breath. Id. at 

7-8. Moreover, in his version of events, Appellant explained that he 

consumed alcohol after becoming stuck in the ditch but before attempting to 

move the vehicle from the ditch with Mr. Hodgkiss’s assistance. Id. at 46-

48. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the evidence established beyond 

a reasonable doubt that Appellant was operating or was in actual physical 

control of his car while intoxicated for purposes of the DUI conviction. 

Next, we address Appellant’s assertion that the Commonwealth failed 

to establish “good cause” as to why Appellant’s blood was not drawn within 

two hours of Appellant operating the vehicle on a highway. Appellant’s Brief 

at 12. Relatedly, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth failed to prove 

that he did not imbibe alcohol “within the two hour period before the blood 

was drawn.” Id. at 8. 

In this case, the evidence of record establishes that Appellant was in 

control of the machinery of his vehicle at some point after 1:30 a.m., when 

he was attempting to remove it from the ditch. N.T., 11/20/14, at 7-10. As 

noted previously, the fact that Appellant could not move the vehicle from the 

ditch is irrelevant to a determination as to whether he operated the vehicle 

for purposes of the DUI statute. Williams, 871 A.2d at 261. Additionally, 

the record reflects that Appellant’s blood was drawn at 3:22 a.m. at 

Titusville hospital and at that time, his blood alcohol level measured 
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0.298%. N.T., 11/20/14, at 26-28. Thus, the evidence of record reflects 

that Appellant’s blood was drawn within two hours from his operation of the 

vehicle, and the blood alcohol level measured in excess of 0.16%. 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). 

 To the extent that testimony regarding the times of the blood draws 

was not exact and allowed for the possibility that more than two hours 

elapsed from when Appellant operated the vehicle until the blood draw and 

measurement of Appellant’s blood alcohol level occurred, the legislature has 

provided an exception to the two-hour timeframe. Section 3802(g) provides 

as follows: 

(g) Exception to two-hour rule.--Notwithstanding the 

provisions of subsection (a), (b), (c), (e) or (f), where alcohol or 

controlled substance concentration in an individual’s blood or 

breath is an element of the offense, evidence of such alcohol or 

controlled substance concentration more than two hours after 

the individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical 

control of the movement of the vehicle is sufficient to establish 

that element of the offense under the following circumstances: 

(1) where the Commonwealth shows good cause 

explaining why the chemical test sample could not be 

obtained within two hours; and 

(2) where the Commonwealth establishes that the 

individual did not imbibe any alcohol or utilize a 

controlled substance between the time the individual 

was arrested and the time the sample was obtained. 

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(g). 

 The trial court provided an alternative analysis, assuming arguendo 

that Appellant’s testimony and related claim that the blood draw was taken 
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two hours after operation of his vehicle was accurate. In that analysis, the 

trial court found that the Commonwealth established good cause for any 

such delay: 

[W]e did not believe [Appellant’s] testimony to be credible in the 

least, but even if we did find [Appellant’s] testimony to be true, 

we believe the Commonwealth has shown “good cause” as to 

why there was a delay in testing [Appellant’s] BAC level. The 

officers in this case acted diligently throughout the investigation, 

and especially under the circumstances of an early-morning 

accident on a snowy road. The area in which [Appellant’s] 

accident occurred happened to be fifty miles away from 

Trooper Armagost’s location - something beyond his control. 

Trooper Armagost determined that [Appellant] was under the 

influence of alcohol and transported him to the hospital in a 

timely manner. Trooper Armagost testified that he was “at the 

will of the hospital,” and needed to wait more than twenty 

minutes for a phlebotomist to draw [Appellant’s] blood. The 

delay in obtaining [Appellant’s] blood could not be attributed to 

any dilatory tactics on the part of law enforcement, but rather it 

was due to the unavailability of the phlebotomist. More 

significantly, the delay was due to the unavoidably long distance 

Trooper Armagost needed to travel in order to find [Appellant’s] 

stationary vehicle. The court finds that the police actions vis-avis this [Appellant] were reasonable under the circumstances, 

and that the Commonwealth has shown good cause for the delay 

in securing a sample of [Appellant’s] blood. We will not reward 

[Appellant] for being “fortuitous” enough to drive under the 

influence a great distance away from a police barracks. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/15, at 14-15 (internal citations omitted). 

Additionally, the trial court concluded that the Commonwealth established 

the second necessary element under this exception. Specifically, the 

Commonwealth proved that Appellant had not imbibed any alcohol or used 

any substance between the time that he was arrested and the time the blood 

sample was obtained, as follows: “[Appellant] was placed into the rear seat 
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of the responding officers’ patrol car after failing his sobriety tests. Directly 

after that, [Appellant] was transported to the Titusville Hospital, where he 

was monitored by both Corporal Bunyak and Trooper Armagost.” Trial Court 

Opinion, 6/22/15, at 15. 

The record supports the trial court’s analysis, and we agree with the 

trial court’s conclusion. Thus, even assuming arguendo that more than two 

hours elapsed between Appellant’s operation of the vehicle and the drawing 

and measuring of Appellant’s blood, such delay is excused pursuant to 75 

Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). Therefore, we conclude there is sufficient evidence of 

record to support Appellant’s conviction under section 3802(c). 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered. 

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. 

Prothonotary 

Date: 1/22/2016