NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential. 

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit 

__________________________ 

JOAN M. YOUNG, 

Petitioner, 

v. 

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, 

Respondent. 

__________________________ 

2012-3105 

__________________________ 

Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection 

Board in No. AT0752090177-X-1. 

__________________________ 

Decided: September 10, 2012 

__________________________ 

JOAN M. YOUNG, of Columbia, Tennessee, pro se. 

KIMBERLY I. KENNEDY, Trial Attorney, Commercial 

Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for respondent. With 

her on the brief were STUART F. DELERY, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, JEANNE E. DAVIDSON, Director, and 

REGINALD T. BLADES, JR., Assistant Director. 

__________________________ 
YOUNG v. USPS 2

Before RADER, Chief Judge, PROST and REYNA, Circuit 

Judges. 

PER CURIAM. 

Joan M. Young appeals from certain aspects of the final order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (“Board”) 

affirming that the United States Postal Service (“USPS” 

or “agency”) breached the parties’ settlement agreement 

and ordering specific performance. For the reasons set 

forth below, we affirm. 

I. BACKGROUND

Ms. Young was a rural mail carrier in Columbia, Tennessee prior to November 21, 2008. On that date, the 

USPS placed her on enforced leave from her position 

because she was allegedly unable to perform the duties of 

her regular assignment. On December 30, 2008, she filed 

an appeal to the Board challenging her placement on 

enforced leave. The parties, however, reached a written 

settlement agreement on March 31, 2009. 

Through the settlement agreement, the parties agreed 

that the agency would reinstate Ms. Young if a psychiatrist determined that she was medically capable of returning to her former position. If the examination results 

reflected that Ms. Young could not return to her former 

position, the settlement agreement provided that she 

could accept a position as a clerk in the Murfreesboro, 

Tennessee Post Office, provided that the position was still 

available and she was medically able to perform the 

essential duties of the clerk position. The settlement 

agreement permitted Ms. Young to either (1) select a 

psychiatrist at her own expense, or (2) jointly select a 

psychiatrist with the agency, in which case the agency 

would pay for the examination. 
3 YOUNG v. USPS

Ms. Young chose to select a psychiatrist at her own 

expense and her examination was conducted on April 15, 

2009. On that same day, the agency faxed the psychiatrist a letter asking him to evaluate Ms. Young for medical conditions for which she had been previously treated 

or evaluated. The letter also enclosed medical records 

and documentation related to her worker’s compensation 

claim. In a letter dated April 27, 2009, the psychiatrist 

stated that Ms. Young was not capable of returning to her 

prior position. 

On May 14, 2009, Ms. Young filed a petition for enforcement, claiming that the agency’s April 15, 2009 fax 

interfered with the independence of the medical evaluation and breached the settlement agreement. An administrative judge issued an initial decision denying Ms. 

Young’s petition for enforcement on September 11, 2009. 

Following the denial, Ms. Young successfully petitioned 

for review and on May 21, 2010, the Board vacated the 

initial decision and remanded the appeal to the administrative judge for further adjudication. On remand, the 

administrative judge issued a second initial decision 

finding that the agency materially breached the settlement agreement by interfering with the independence of 

the medical evaluation. The administrative judge also 

recommended specific performance of the settlement 

agreement. 

In a January 11, 2012 opinion, the Board agreed with 

the administrative judge’s finding and recommendation. 

Young v. U.S. Postal Serv., AT0752090177-X-1 (M.S.P.B. 

Jan. 11, 2012). Specifically, the Board affirmed that the 

settlement agreement permitted the agency to communicate with the psychiatrist to the extent necessary to 

convey the job requirements of Ms. Young’s former position, but otherwise precluded the agency from communi-
YOUNG v. USPS 4

cating with the psychiatrist. Additionally, the Board 

affirmed that the agency’s April 15, 2009 fax constituted a 

material breach and ordered specific performance of the 

settlement agreement. 

Despite succeeding before the Board, Ms. Young now 

challenges several aspects of its decision. In particular, 

she claims that the Board erred in purportedly adding a 

“new term” to the settlement agreement allowing the 

agency to communicate with her psychiatrist to the extent 

necessary to convey the requirements for her former 

position. Additionally, she argues that the Board erred in 

ignoring her request for “guidelines” to govern the 

agency’s communications with her psychiatrist. She also 

contends that the Board erred in failing to award damages. And lastly, Ms. Young challenges the Board’s holding with respect to the date of her retroactive 

reinstatement, alleging that the Board should have provided a more definite date. 

This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction under 28 

U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9). 

II. DISCUSSION

This court’s review of a decision of the Board is limited by statute. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c); O’Neill v. Office of 

Pers. Mgm’t, 76 F.3d 363, 364-65 (Fed. Cir. 1996). We 

may reverse a decision of the Board only if it is “(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not 

in accordance with law; (2) obtained without procedures 

required by law, rule, or regulation having been followed; 

or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 

7703(c). “The interpretation of a settlement agreement is 

an issue of law. We review the Board’s determinations of 

law for correctness, without deference to the Board’s 
5 YOUNG v. USPS

decision.” King v. Dep’t of the Navy, 130 F.3d 1031, 1033 

(Fed. Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). 

Having considered all of Ms. Young’s arguments, we 

are not persuaded that the Board erred. To be sure, the 

settlement agreement is silent on the issue of what communications were permitted between the agency and Ms. 

Young’s psychiatrist. But consistent with the settlement 

agreement, the examining psychiatrist must be provided 

the complete description of the requirements and duties of 

the rural carrier position in order to make the necessary 

evaluation. Because it is the entity that must determine 

what the job requirements and duties are in the first 

place, the agency is in the best position to provide this 

information. Indeed, Ms. Young has previously recognized this necessity. When she first realized that the 

agency intended to submit her medical information, Ms. 

Young wrote a letter giving the agency permission to 

speak to the examining psychiatrist “only for the purpose 

of determining the job requirements, standards, and 

criteria” of a rural mail carrier. See Young v. U.S. Postal 

Serv., AT0752090177-X-1, slip op. at 5 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 11, 

2012). Accordingly, we conclude that the Board correctly 

interpreted the meaning of the settlement agreement. 

With respect to Ms. Young’s argument that Board 

failed to give sufficient guidance, we conclude that the 

Board sufficiently contained the scope of permissible 

communication when it explained that: 

The agency may communicate with the examining 

psychiatrist to the extent necessary to provide the 

job requirements and standards that the appellant must meet in order to be deemed medically 

capable of returning to her former position. The 

agency is otherwise precluded, however, from pre-
YOUNG v. USPS 6

senting information regarding the appellant for 

consideration and evaluation by the examining 

psychiatrist. 

Id. at 9. 

Ms. Young further argues that the Board erred by 

failing to award her damages for the cost of the April 2009 

examination. She is mistaken. “The Board’s authority 

does not include the award of monetary damages, absent 

an express waiver of sovereign immunity.” Foreman v. 

Dep’t of Army, 241 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing 

Hubbard v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 205 F.3d 1313, 1318 

(Fed. Cir. 2000)). And although Ms. Young requests a 

more definite date for her retroactive reinstatement, the 

Board’s order and the settlement agreement are already 

sufficiently clear to guide the determination of that date 

at the appropriate time. We also note that pursuant to 

the Board’s order and the settlement agreement, a psychological examination must first establish that Ms. 

Young is fit for duty. 

Because the Board properly interpreted the settlement agreement and its decision is otherwise in accordance with the law, we affirm. 

COSTS

Each party shall bear its own costs. 

AFFIRMED