J-S32045-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.M.P., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: S.J.P., MOTHER

No. 3113 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Decree and Order September 17, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000584-2015

CP-51-DP-0001751-2014

FID: 51-FN-002762-2011

BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2016

S.J.P. (Mother) appeals the decree and the order, entered in the Court 

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on September 17, 2015, that, 

respectively, terminated her parental rights to her son, A.M.P. (Child), born 

in April of 2014, and changed his goal to adoption.1 We affirm.

Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services (DHS) has had contact 

with this family since 2011 because of reports of Mother’s drug and alcohol 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights to Child of C.P.Q. 

(Father). Father did not appeal that termination. 
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use and her lack of appropriate care and supervision of her children. (See 

Statement of Facts (SoF), at para. a).2

In late April of 2014, DHS learned that Mother had given birth to Child 

at Albert Einstein Medical Center. At the time, there was an outstanding 

bench warrant for Mother who was transient and believed to be concealing 

the whereabouts of another child with an open dependency proceeding. 

(See SoF, at para. b, c, and d). 

On July 21, 2014, Child’s paternal aunt (Paternal Aunt) told DHS that 

Mother had been found unresponsive at the Roosevelt Inn, allegedly from 

the abuse of drugs and alcohol, and that Child was with her. Police 

responded, had Mother transported by ambulance to Nazareth Hospital, and 

entrusted Child to the care of Paternal Aunt. (See SoF, at para. e and f).

DHS evaluated Paternal Aunt’s home, found it appropriate and 

obtained an order of protective custody for Child who remained with Paternal 

Aunt in kinship care. 

____________________________________________

2 At the September 17, 2015, hearing on the termination of Mother’s 

parental rights, DHS entered Mother’s stipulation that, if she were called to 

testify, DHS social worker, Catherine Paczkowski, would testify in accordance 

with the statement of facts contained in DHS’ goal change/termination 

petitions with the exception of paragraphs e, f, and g. (See N.T. Hearing, 

9/17/15, at 13, 23). The facts set forth in those paragraphs were contained 

in Child’s dependency petition and are part of the record of Child’s 

adjudication hearing on July 28, 2014, at which Mother and her counsel were 

present.
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The trial court adjudicated Child dependent and committed him to the 

care of DHS on July 28, 2014. The trial court referred Mother to the Clinical 

Evaluation Unit (CEU) for a dual diagnosis assessment and forthwith drug 

screen. Mother has a mental health diagnosis of bipolar disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder for which she receives Social Security Income 

benefits. (See N.T. Hearing, 9/17/15, at 19; SoF, at para. o).

At a family service plan (FSP) meeting on August 21, 2014, DHS 

established goals for Mother, including: 1) receive mental health and drug 

and alcohol treatment and comply with all treatment recommendations; and, 

2) obtain suitable housing and maintain visitation with Child. (See N.T. 

Hearing, 9/17/15, at 15).

Throughout Child’s placement, the trial court referred Mother to the 

CEU for drug screening, assessment and monitoring. Mother participated in 

mental health counseling at Community Council through the Achieving 

Reunification Center (ARC) program, but did not stay in counseling. (See 

id. at 20). 

At Child’s January 20, 2015, review hearing, the trial court referred 

Mother to Behavioral Health Services (BHS) for monitoring and anger 

management counseling and ordered her to sign releases for DHS to obtain 

her ARC and BHS records and reports. 

Mother’s compliance with mental health counseling and the ARC 

program was short-lived. (See id.). Further, she failed to submit to a drug 
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and alcohol assessment and had tested positive for benzodiazepine on April 

22, 2015 and June 15, 2015. (See SoF, at para. z).

At Child’s June 25, 2015, permanency review, the trial court found 

Mother not in compliance with any of her FSP objectives or Child’s 

permanency plan. She was non-compliant with mental health services; noncompliant with drug and alcohol counseling; had been discharged from the 

ARC due to lack of participation in the program; and was not visiting Child 

on a regular basis.

DHS filed its petition to change Child’s goal to adoption and its petition 

to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 21, 2015. The trial court 

held a hearing on those petitions on September 17, 2015. At the hearing, 

DHS presented the testimony of its social worker, Catherine Paczkowski, and 

entered Mother’s stipulation to the SoF. Mother, despite adequate notice, 

failed to appear for the hearing. Ms. Paczkowski testified that she had 

spoken to Mother on September 16, 2015, and that Mother was aware of the 

hearing. (See N.T. Hearing, 9/17/15, at 6-8; 14-15). 

The trial court entered its order changing Child’s goal to adoption and 

its decree terminating Mother’s parental rights, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), on September 17, 2015. Mother filed her 

notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on 

October 13, 2015.

Mother raises the following question on appeal:
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Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and abuse its 

discretion when it terminated Mother’s parental rights and 

changed [Child’s] goal to adoption where [DHS] failed to present 

clear and convincing evidence that Mother had not relieved the 

circumstance [sic] which brought [Child] into care; failed to 

present clear and convincing evidence that Mother evidenced a 

settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to [Child]; and 

failed to present clear and convincing evidence that [Child] 

would not be harmed by termination of [Mother’s] parental 

rights?

(Mother’s Brief, at 3).

Our standard of review is as follows:

In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, our 

scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the evidence 

presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings and legal 

conclusions. However, our standard of review is narrow: we will 

reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude that the trial 

court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or lacked 

competent evidence to support its findings. The trial judge’s 

decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result. 

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 

conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.
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In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). In order to affirm the 

termination of parental rights, this Court need only agree with any one 

subsection of Section 2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). 

Requests to have a natural parent’s rights terminated are governed by 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

* * *

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

It is well settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard which requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). Further, 

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve the 

parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness in 

resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the parentchild relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by waiting 

for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

The Adoption Act provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The Act does not make 

specific reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and child but 

our case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 

is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).
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Here, our review of Mother’s brief reveals that she has waived her 

claim that the trial court erred or abused its discretion when it terminated 

her parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2). In support of her claim 

that the trial court erred when it terminated her rights pursuant to section 

2511(a)(2), Mother states: 

Mother was visiting with [Child.] She also attended 

domestic violence classes and housing workshop orientation. 

Furthermore, [M]other had enrolled in both drug and alcohol and 

mental health treatment programs. Mother took these steps in 

an attempt to parent and to eventually reunite with [Child]. 

Therefore, termination of Mother’s parental rights under 

§[]2511(a)(2) would be against the weight of the evidence. 

(Mother’s Brief, at 12) (record citations omitted). That is Mother’s complete 

argument. 

Mother’s argument contains no citation to any legal authority and she 

makes no effort whatsoever to link the facts of her case to the law. In sum, 

Mother makes no attempt to develop a coherent legal argument to support 

her conclusion that the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights, 

and she has, therefore, waived that argument. “The failure to develop an 

adequate argument in an appellate brief may [] result in waiver of the claim 

under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.” Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 

(Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 982 A.2d 509 (Pa. 2007) (case citation 

and internal quotation mark omitted). “[A]rguments which are not 

appropriately developed are waived. Arguments not appropriately 

developed include those where the party has failed to cite any authority in 
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support of a contention.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 29-30 (Pa. 

Super. 2006) (citations omitted).

Moreover, our examination of the record reveals that it supports the 

trial court’s determination to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 

section 2511(a)(2). 

Mother’s FSP goals were to undergo drug and alcohol and mental 

health treatment, obtain suitable housing, and visit successfully with Child. 

Ms. Paczkowski testified that Mother failed to complete successfully a drug 

and alcohol program, and that she had not completed any mental health 

treatment. (See N.T. Hearing, 9/17/15, at 15-16). Ms. Paczkowski also 

testified that Mother failed to secure adequate housing. (See id. at 16). In 

regard to visitation, Ms. Paczkowski testified that Mother had made attempts 

to visit, and that, while her behavior at some visits was, “appropriate,” at 

one visit she fell asleep and at another “was acting somewhat irrational.” 

(Id. at 19). DHS presented sufficient, credible evidence to support the trial 

court’s determination to terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

Mother makes a similar argument in support of her claim that the trial 

court erred in terminating her rights pursuant to section (b):

Mother and [Child] share a beneficial bond that should not 

be destroyed though termination of Mother’s parental rights as 

evidence[d] by DHS Social Worker Ms. Paczkowski’s testimony 

that Mother and [Child] had a good relationship. As such, [DHS] 

has failed to establish that [Child] would not suffer irreparable 

harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated.
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(Mother’s Brief, at 15) (record citation omitted). Mother has also waived this 

issue for her failure to develop it. See Lackner, supra at 29-30. 

Moreover, our review of the record in this matter reveals that it 

supports the trial court’s determination to terminate Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). At the hearing, the following exchange 

took place between Ms. Paczkowski and counsel for DHS:

Q. Ms. Paczkowski, again, if you were asked—well, let me 

just ask you: Who does [Child], in your opinion, share his 

primary parental bond with? Who does he look to primarily as 

his parent, his caregiver, his provider; [M]other or [Paternal 

Aunt and Uncle]?

A. Paternal [A]unt and [U]ncle.

Q. Thank you very much. Do you believe [Child] will 

suffer permanent emotional harm if [M]other’s rights are 

terminated and [Child] isn’t allowed to see [Mother] anymore?

A. No, I do not.

(N.T. Hearing, 9/17/25, at 17-18).

The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion when it terminated 

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(b). 

Finally, we find that Mother has waived her argument that the trial 

court erred by changing Child’s goal to adoption in that she fails to mention, 

no less argue the issue in her brief. See Lackner, supra at 29-30.

With the above standard of review in mind, we have thoroughly 

reviewed the record, briefs, and the applicable law, and determined that the 

evidence presented is sufficient to support the trial court’s order changing 
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Child’s goal to adoption and its decree terminating Mother’s parental rights 

to Child.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decree and order, each entered 

September 17, 2015, terminating Mother’s parental rights and changing 

Child’s goal to adoption.

Decree and order affirmed.

Judge Mundy joins the Memorandum.

Judge Bowes concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2016