1

The Honorable James E. Gritzner, United States District Judge for the

Southern District of Iowa. 

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 04-2374

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Diane Tuttle, *

*

Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of * [Unpublished]

the Social Security Administration, *

*

Appellee. *

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Submitted: March 14, 2005

Filed: March 17, 2005

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Before WOLLMAN, MURPHY, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Diane Tuttle appeals the district court’s1

 order affirming the denial of disability

insurance benefits. In her July 2000 application, Tuttle alleged disability since

December 1999 from deteriorating lumbar discs. Following a March 2002 hearing,

where a vocational expert (VE) testified, an administrative law judge (ALJ) found

that Tuttle had severe degenerative disc disease and obesity, but her impairments

alone or combined were not of listing-level severity; that her testimony was not
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entirely credible; and that her residual functional capacity (RFC) did not prevent her

from performing either her past relevant work as a receptionist or a full range of

unskilled sedentary jobs, as confirmed by the VE’s response to a hypothetical the ALJ

had posed. After the Appeals Council denied review, the district court affirmed.

Having carefully reviewed the record, see Cunningham v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 496, 500

(8th Cir. 2000) (standard of review), we affirm. 

We reject Tuttle’s challenges to the ALJ’s credibility findings. First, the ALJ

properly discredited Tuttle based on her failure to comply with recommended

treatment: while Tuttle may not have been able to swim year round and was not

specifically told to do so, her testimony suggested that she made a half-hearted effort

to swim during the summer and that she made no effort at all to do home exercises

as directed. Cf. Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004) (ALJ

properly discredited claimant in part based on her cancellation of several physical

therapy appointments, i.e., failure to comply with prescribed treatment). Second,

evidence indicating a lack of motivation to work may be used as a credibility factor

so long as it is not a dispositive one. See Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 581 n.

4 (8th Cir. 2002). Third, while the ALJ did not discuss all the credibility factors

announced in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984), her thorough

summary of the medical evidence and Tuttle’s testimony, and her acknowledgment

of the Polaski factors, indicates she considered them as required. See Eichelberger,

390 F.3d at 590 (ALJ need not discuss each Polaski factor so long as he

acknowledges and considers them). Finally, while the ALJ referenced an argument

Tuttle raised about the RFC findings of a consulting physician, it is unclear whether

the ALJ was using the physician’s comments about weight loss as a basis to discredit

Tuttle. Nevertheless, because the ALJ gave several other valid reasons for finding

Tuttle not entirely credible, we defer to the ALJ’s credibility determination. See

Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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Tuttle also contends that the ALJ did not properly assess her RFC, and should

have adopted the RFC findings of her long-term treating physician, Dr. Alan Fisher.

We disagree. Dr. Fisher did not explain (and we find nothing in the record to

support) many of the limitations he listed, e.g., the need to avoid fumes and noise, and

limitations in overhead reaching and gross manipulation; and Dr. Fisher linked all of

the listed limitations to “chronic lumbar syndrome” and “failed . . . injections.” The

extent of the back-related limitations Dr. Fisher imposed is also inconsistent with the

diagnostic test results and relatively mild examination findings. See Shontos v.

Barnhart, 328 F.3d 418, 426 (8th Cir. 2003) (treating physician’s opinion is entitled

to controlling weight if it is supported by acceptable clinical and diagnostic data and

consistent with other substantial evidence in record); Eichelberger, 390 F.3d at 591

(some medical evidence must support RFC determination). Contrary to Tuttle’s

assertions on appeal, her response to a question the ALJ posed about Dr. Fisher

reasonably supported that Dr. Fisher had based his findings primarily on Tuttle’s

reports; the ALJ was not required to contact Dr. Fisher for clarification, as the

medical records, consultative examination, and Tuttle’s testimony and statements

provided a sufficient basis for determining her RFC, see Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d

801, 806 (8th Cir. 2004) (ALJ need not seek additional clarifying statements from

treating physicians unless crucial issue is undeveloped); and the ALJ did not adopt

the RFC findings of the Social Security Administration reviewing physicians, who

placed fewer limitations on Tuttle than did the ALJ. In summary, because the ALJ

incorporated parts of the findings of Drs. Grinbergs and Fisher, considered the

medical evidence, and properly discounted Tuttle’s subjective complaints, the ALJ’s

RFC findings are supported by substantial evidence. See id. at 807 (in determining

RFC, ALJ must consider medical records, observations of treating physicians and

others, and claimant’s description of her limitations). 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

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