NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-789

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

LAZARO TRIZAN.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Appealing from an order of a Superior Court judge revoking 

his probation and imposing a sentence, the probationer, Lazaro 

Trizan, claims that a series of errors denied him due process of 

law. We affirm.

Background. Following guilty pleas to several offenses on 

November 16, 2011, a judge sentenced the probationer to State 

prison for five to seven years and a concurrent ten years of 

probation. General conditions of probation included the 

following requirement: "You shall obey all local, state and 

federal laws and all Court orders." Nearly ten years later, the

probationer's ex-girlfriend in Florida reported to the police 

that she received over one hundred telephone calls on her work 

telephone from the probationer between July 15-19, 2021. On 

November 19, 2021, a notice of alleged probation violation 
2

issued from the Superior Court, indicating the following basis 

for the violation: "NEW OFFENSE: 11/4/2021 Leon County 

Sheriff's Office Offe[n]se Tracking Number 3703047692: 

Aggravated Stalking, Harassing Communication." After a final 

surrender hearing on March 18, 2022, a judge found the 

probationer violated his probation and sentenced him to two to 

five years in State prison.

At the hearing, the probationer raised only one issue that 

is pertinent here. He unsuccessfully objected on reliable 

hearsay grounds to a four-page exhibit entitled, "SUMMARY OF 

OFFENSES AND PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT" (the exhibit). The 

exhibit consisted of an affidavit prepared by a police detective 

from Florida and alleged facts constituting probable cause to 

charge the probationer with "three counts of harassing phone 

calls and one count of aggravated stalking." A county judge in 

Florida signed the document and found "[p]robable cause 

sufficient." On appeal, the probationer repeats his hearsay 

argument and raises four new, additional claims. We discern no 

error by the judge in overruling the probationer's objection to 

the document on hearsay grounds, see Commonwealth v. Durling, 

407 Mass. 108, 115 (1990), and we discern no error and no 

"substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice" relative to the 

additional claims raised for the first time on appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 564 (1967).
3

Discussion. 1. Reliable hearsay. There is no "per se 

prohibition on the use of hearsay evidence at probation 

revocation hearings." Durling, 407 Mass. at 115. See

Guidelines for Probation Violation Proceedings in the Superior 

Court § 6(B). "Unsubstantiated and unreliable hearsay cannot, 

consistent with due process, be the entire basis of a probation 

revocation. When hearsay evidence is reliable, however, then it 

can be the basis of a revocation." Durling, supra at 118. "The 

probation department may meet its burden of proof to establish a 

violation solely through the admission of hearsay with 

substantial indicia of reliability." Commonwealth v. Hartfield, 

474 Mass. 474, 482 (2016).

We agree with the judge's determination that the challenged 

exhibit was reliable. The exhibit included an affidavit, signed 

under the pains and penalties of perjury, by a detective who 

outlined the steps he took during an investigation. That 

affidavit provided the following information: the victim

identified herself and met with the detective; she reported that 

on July 6, 2021, the probationer appeared at her residence in 

Florida, followed her, and attempted to forcibly stop her car in 

traffic; she provided details of more than one hundred 

unsolicited telephone calls received from the probationer 

between July 15-19, 2021; she was unable to conduct business on 

her office telephone because of the calls; she provided 
4

telephone logs to the detective; she recognized one of three 

numbers that called as belonging to the probationer; telephone 

records obtained by the detective linked the two other numbers

from the telephone logs to the probationer; the telephone 

records of all three telephone numbers confirmed that calls were 

made to the victim's telephone and were consistent with the

dates and times in the call log of the victim's telephone; the 

detective spoke by telephone with the probationer; and the 

probationer admitted in that recorded telephone call with the 

detective that he made the calls. Given the personal knowledge, 

direct observations, the level of factual detail, the consistent 

and corroborated information, and the circumstances supporting 

the veracity of the allegations, the challenged exhibit 

demonstrated the requisite "substantial indicia of reliability." 

Hartfield, 474 Mass. at 484.

2. New claims. For the first time, the probationer raises 

four additional claims. These claims fail to identify an error, 

let alone a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See 

Freeman, 352 Mass. at 564. 

(1) First, the probationer contends that the exhibit "did 

not provide an adequate basis for an independent determination 

of criminality." Based on the detailed factual summary in the 

affidavit, the judge was "capable of making an independent 

finding, at least to a reasonable degree of certainty, that the 
5

defendant had violated a condition . . . of his probation" by 

committing crimes in another jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. 

Maggio, 414 Mass. 193, 198 (1993). See G. L. c. 233, § 70 ("The 

courts shall take judicial notice of the law of the United 

States or of any state, territory or dependency thereof or of a 

foreign country whenever the same shall be material"); Fla. 

Stat. § 365.16(1)(b)-(d) (1995) (prohibiting repeated telephone 

calls); Fla. Stat. § 784.048(3) (2019) (prohibiting repeated 

acts of following or communicating).

(2) The probationer also claims that he did not have "clear 

notice" that the telephone calls risked violating Florida law. 

The probationer was certainly aware that his conduct might 

transgress the law because he had been charged with crimes and 

was the subject of restraining orders under similar 

circumstances in the past. Putting aside his prior interactions

with law enforcement and the courts, the probationer cannot rely 

upon ignorance of the law in Florida, where he previously

resided before moving to Texas. See Haven v. Foster, 26 Mass. 

112, 130 (1829) ("In all civil and criminal proceedings every 

man is presumed to know the law of the land . . .").

(3) The probationer additionally claims that he did not 

have "fair notice of the charges against him," but he took a 

different position at the probation revocation hearing, where 

defense counsel acknowledged that notice was not an issue. "The 
6

[probationer's] contrary position in the trial court bars [his] 

claim on appeal." Rabinowitz v. Schenkman, 103 Mass. App. Ct. 

538, 541 (2023). See Commonwealth v. Ng, 489 Mass. 242, 255-256 

(2022). The record also does not support the probationer's 

current contention that the judge based her decision on the 

probationer's "past history" and effectively denied him an 

opportunity to be heard.

(4) Finally, the probationer contends that the judge erred 

by finding the probationer in violation of his probation after 

his probation term expired. "There can be no violation of 

probation unless committed during the probationary period, but 

it is settled in the Commonwealth that in suitable circumstances 

probation may be revoked after that period. However, it must 

occur within a 'reasonable' time." Commonwealth v. Baillargeon, 

28 Mass. App. Ct. 16, 20 (1989). The record discloses the 

following timeline: following the incidents in Florida detailed 

in the affidavit in the exhibit, the probationer moved to Texas;

process issued from Florida on November 4, 2021; the ten-year 

probation term ended on November 16, 2021; notice of the 

probation violation issued on November 19, 2021; the initial

probation surrender hearing occurred on January 12, 2022; and 

following one continuance the court rescheduled the final

probation surrender hearing to March 2022 "due to [the] State of 

Emergency surrounding the Covid-19 virus." This timeline of 
7

revocation is not unreasonable, especially given the multiple 

jurisdictions, COVID-19 pandemic, and lack of prejudice to the 

probationer.

Order revoking probation and 

imposing sentence affirmed.

By the Court (Green, C.J., 

Hand & Hodgens, JJ.1),

Assistant Clerk

Entered: March 15, 2024.

1 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.