-1- 

STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

March 19, 2015 

v No. 317214 

Muskegon Circuit Court 

MARVIN LAVERN CHANDLER, LC No. 12-062596-FH 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: M. J. KELLY, P.J., and MURPHY and HOEKSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial conviction for first-degree retail fraud, MCL 

750.356c. He was sentenced as a fourth-habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to 28 months to 20 

years’ imprisonment. We affirm. 

 Defendant’s conviction arises out of the theft of two laptop computers from a store on 

September 4, 2012. Video footage and still images captured by the store’s closed-circuit 

television security system revealed that defendant entered the store’s electronics department, 

waited until the sales associates were not looking, promptly removed the security devices from 

the two laptops in question, walked out of the electronics department carrying the laptops, and 

then proceeded to the toy department with the laptops in tow. When defendant reached the end 

of a display rack in the toy department with the laptops in his hands, he moved behind the rack 

and was out of the view of the security cameras for approximately 15 seconds. After defendant 

emerged from behind the display rack and entered another aisle, a security camera was able to 

regain surveillance of his movements. At this point, however, defendant was no longer holding 

the laptops in his hands and the laptops were not openly visible. But the video footage did show 

defendant adjusting and holding his shirt and shorts. Defendant then walked directly to the front 

of the store and exited the store without paying for any items. As defendant left the store, the 

security footage revealed a rectangular outline underneath his shirt. The store’s loss prevention 

officer testified that in “[t]he images that we got as [defendant] was leaving the building[,] you 

can clearly . . . [see] that there is something underneath the shirt in the shape of what would be 

the size of the laptops.” This testimony was corroborated by the images from the security 

cameras. Additionally, as defendant left the store, he is seen awkwardly holding his arms up to 

the side of his body instead of letting his arms hang freely at his side; he clearly appears to be 

trying to contain something under his shirt with his elbows. Approximately 20 minutes after 

defendant exited the store, the loss prevention officer checked the toy department and aisles that 
-2- 

defendant had walked through to see if the laptops had been left in these areas, but she could not 

locate the laptops. Afterwards, the police circulated photographs developed from the video 

footage, and multiple tips led to defendant’s apprehension. The police obtained a warrant to 

search defendant’s apartment, and the shorts that defendant is seen wearing in the videotape were 

discovered, but the laptops were never recovered. 

 Defendant’s first argument on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence to support his 

conviction for first-degree retail fraud. More specifically, defendant argues that “the prosecutor 

failed to prove [that] defendant took property from the store with the intent to permanently 

deprive the store thereof.” As defendant develops his argument, it is clear that he is not directly 

challenging the “intent to permanently deprive” element of the crime; rather, he is contending 

that the prosecution “failed to present any evidence that laptops had been taken from the store by 

defendant.”1

 Defendant emphasizes that the laptops were not found in his apartment. He 

suggests that perhaps the laptops remained in the store and were not adequately searched for 

after his departure. With respect to the prosecution’s theory that he concealed the laptops under 

his shirt and left the store with them, defendant argues that there was no evidence that he indeed 

hid them under his shirt. The substance of defendant’s argument is focused on the claim that 

there was insufficient evidence of a theft having actually occurred. 

 We review de novo the issue regarding whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a 

conviction. People v Lueth, 253 Mich App 670, 680; 660 NW2d 322 (2002). In reviewing the

sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence – whether direct or circumstantial 

– in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could 

find that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v 

Reese, 491 Mich 127, 139; 815 NW2d 85 (2012); People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 

NW2d 158 (2002). A jury, and not an appellate court, observes the witnesses and listens to their 

testimony; therefore, an appellate court must not interfere with the jury’s role in assessing the 

weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-

515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise 

from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime. People v 

Carines, 460 Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The prosecution need not negate every 

reasonable theory of innocence, but need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of 

whatever contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 

400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). We resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the prosecution. 

People v Kanaan, 278 Mich App 594, 619; 751 NW2d 57 (2008). 

 MCL 750.356c(1) provides in relevant part: 

 A person who does any of the following in a store or in its immediate 

vicinity is guilty of retail fraud in the first degree . . . . 

 

1

 Defendant is indirectly challenging the “intent” element of the offense in the sense that there 

could not have been any intent to permanently deprive the store of the laptops when there was no 

evidence that the laptops were taken in the first place. 
-3- 

. . . 

 (b) While a store is open to the public, steals property of the store that is 

offered for sale at a price of $1,000.00 or more. 

 With respect to first-degree retail fraud, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable 

doubt that: (1) “the defendant took some property that the store offered for sale;” (2) “the 

defendant moved the property,” with any movement being sufficient regardless of “whether the 

defendant actually got the property past the cashier or out of the store;” (3) “the defendant 

intended to steal the property[,]” meaning that he or she “intended to permanently take the 

property from the store without the store’s consent;” (4) the charged act occurred “while the 

store was open to the public;” and (5) the price of the property was $1,000 or more. M Crim JI 

23.13;2

 see also MCL 750.356c(1)(b); People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 119; 605 NW2d 28 

(1999). 

 Here, taking into consideration the direct and circumstantial evidence, and the reasonable 

inferences arising therefrom, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

prosecution, there was more than sufficient evidence establishing that defendant surreptitiously 

carried the laptops out of the store without paying for them and that he did so with the intent to 

permanently deprive the store of the property. This supporting evidence consisted of: the 

removal of the security devices attached to the laptops while store personnel were not looking; 

the visible handling of the laptops by defendant before entering the toy department; defendant’s 

adjustment of his shirt and shorts after the laptops were no longer openly visible following the 

momentary break in the security footage; the images of defendant exiting the store with a laptopshaped outline protruding from his shirt; the awkward movement or positioning of defendant’s 

arms as he left the store, reflecting an attempt to contain something under his shirt; and the 

subsequent failure to locate the laptops in the store. Reversal is unwarranted. 

 Defendant’s second and final argument on appeal is that the trial court improperly 

admitted prior-bad-acts evidence, MRE 404(b), regarding an act of retail fraud committed by 

defendant in 2001, in which he concealed a nail gun under his shirt and left a hardware store 

without paying for the tool. First, assuming any error in the admission of this evidence, it was 

harmless, as defendant has not shown the requisite prejudice, i.e., that it is more probable than 

not that defendant would have been acquitted absent the presumed error. MCL 769.26; People v 

Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 495; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). As gleaned from our discussion above, the 

evidence of defendant’s guilt was very strong, and admission of the 2001 retail fraud event was 

ultimately harmless. Moreover, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence regarding the 

2001 act of retail fraud. The bad-acts evidence was admitted for a proper purpose, i.e., to show a 

common scheme, plan, or system, and not to support a general propensity theory. MRE 

404(b)(1); People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Further, the 

evidence was relevant to show that, contrary to defendant’s theory of the case, the laptops were 

actually removed from the store by way of defendant hiding them under his shirt, as the current 

 

2

 The trial court instructed the jury consistent with M Crim JI 23.13, and defendant does not raise 

any instructional challenge. 
-4- 

and former acts were sufficiently similar to support an inference that they manifested a common 

plan, scheme, or system. Id. at 59-68; MRE 401 and 402. And the probative value of the 

evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, Sabin, 463 Mich at 

55-56, 70-71; MRE 403, considering that there was little danger that the evidence would be 

given undue or preemptive weight by the jury and that its admission was not inequitable, People 

v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75-76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995). Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury 

not to consider the evidence for purposes of propensity, thereby alleviating any danger of unfair 

prejudice. People v Roscoe, 303 Mich App 633, 646; 846 NW2d 402 (2014).3

 

 Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly 

/s/ William B. Murphy 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

 

3

 Assuming that the trial court erred in admitting the bad-acts evidence for the additional purpose 

of showing identity, this would not have precluded introduction of the evidence to show a 

common plan, scheme, or system. People v Coleman, 210 Mich App 1, 5; 532 NW2d 885 

(1995) (“Evidence that is admissible for one purpose is not inadmissible because its use for a 

different purpose is precluded.”). Also, any presumed associated instructional error was 

harmless. Finally, in light of our ruling, it is unnecessary to address the prosecution’s argument 

that the bad-acts evidence was admissible under MCL 768.27 regardless of MRE 404(b).