In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 18-3200 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

JESUS MALAGON, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. 

No. 17 CR 326 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2019 — DECIDED JULY 9, 2020 

____________________ 

Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and RIPPLE and ROVNER, Circuit 

Judges. 

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Jesus Malagon of 

conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of 

cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). 

The district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 60 

months’ imprisonment, which reflected the statutory minimum. Malagon now appeals the conviction, arguing that the 

district court improperly admitted testimony, which tainted 
2 No. 18-3200 

the conviction. He asserts that absent the improperly admitted testimony, there was insufficient evidence to support the 

conviction. 

At trial, the government introduced cell phone records, 

audio and video recordings and their transcripts, as well as 

witness testimony, including from undercover officers. The 

evidence centered around two meetings which took place at 

the home of Edilberto Ramirez-Sanchez. The first occurred on 

May 11, 2017. In recorded telephone conversations prior to 

that meeting, Ramirez-Sanchez told the informant that his 

“buddy” would arrive in ten minutes. Tr. Transcript Vol. 1 at 

R. 127, p. 88. Ramirez-Sanchez agreed with the informant’s 

request that he call the informant when he had the “part,” and 

later that day did so, telling the informant that he had “already opened the part” and would wait for the informant at 

his home. Id. at 92. The informant and DEA Task Force Officer 

Mario Elias met Ramirez-Sanchez at his home, and RamirezSanchez took them into his garage and showed them a half a 

kilogram of cocaine. Ramirez-Sanchez told them he was going 

to bring “one,” but was told they wanted “half,” so his 

“buddy” split it, and said “[h]ey, look at the quality.” Id. at 

114. They discussed a price of $18,000 for the “half” or $34,000 

for a “whole one.” Id. at 106. Ramirez-Sanchez engaged in 

phone calls with the defendant both before and after that 

meeting. 

The second meeting that formed the crux of the case 

against Malagon occurred at Ramirez-Sanchez’ residence on 

May 17, 2017, involving a transaction for two kilograms of cocaine. Prior to that meeting, the informant again engaged in a 

number of recorded telephone conversations with RamirezSanchez confirming that his “buddy” was ready and the “two 
No. 18-3200 3

parts” were already ready, and with Ramirez-Sanchez seeking confirmation from the informant that he had “everything 

ready ... all the tickets.” Id. at 152. The informant and DEA 

Task Force Officer Angel Amador, posing as Elias’ partner, 

arrived at the Ramirez-Sanchez residence at around 4:00 in 

the afternoon, and Malagon was waiting there in the backyard. Malagon told them “don’t worry, twenty minutes,” and 

when Amador expressed frustration at the wait, Malagon responded that the next time he would know that they are safe 

or trusted people and would have “the cars ready” so that 

Amador could “arrive, check it, and leave.” Id. at 173–74, 176, 

178, 181–83. At one point, Malagon received a phone call and 

following the call he told Amador that he “called all the way 

down right now,” that he “called to little Mexico, to make sure 

that this happens, that this doesn’t fail.” Id. at 188. 

After waiting for another hour, Amador again complained 

about the delay, and he and the informant left temporarily to 

get food. After they left, surveillance officers saw Malagon 

leave the residence in a black Toyota. DEA Task Force Officer 

Donald Stone followed him and observed Malagon driving in 

a zig-zagging pattern. At one point, Malagon pulled over, engaged his hazard lights, and opened the trunk of his car. He 

then walked to the front of the car with a blue and white 

cooler, lifted the hood of the car, and then closed the hood and 

placed the cooler in the trunk of the car. Immediately following those actions, he drove back to Ramirez-Sanchez’ residence, removed the cooler from the trunk of the car, and 

brought the cooler into the residence. Ramirez-Sanchez called 

the informant at the restaurant and the informant and Amador returned to the residence. Malagon led Amador, the informant, and Ramirez-Sanchez into the garage, and in the garage they observed two kilograms of cocaine on a table 
4 No. 18-3200 

wrapped in blue and gray tape. The informant wore an audiovideo recording device which captured the defendant at various points. Inside the garage, Malagon handled the kilogram 

packaging and stated “there it is,” “what I say? what I say?,” 

and told them it was “guaranteed” and that “if you have any 

problem, you all come and tell me what you want.” Id. at 194, 

196–98. Malagon then told them he would leave them there 

and to “call me when you have the money.” At that point, 

surveillance officers moved toward the garage. Hearing them, 

Malagon tried to hide the cocaine by the wall. Officer Stone 

who entered the garage observed the kilograms against the 

garage wall and the blue cooler that Malagon had previously 

been observed carrying. They arrested Malagon, and on one 

of his cell phones that they seized, they found a photograph 

of the two kilograms of cocaine with blue tape. 

Malagon argues that DEA Agent Reynolds was improperly allowed to present expert testimony as to drug trafficking 

practices and the use of drug code, and that DEA Task Officer 

Amador was improperly allowed to present lay opinion testimony. He asserts that, absent the problematic testimony, the 

evidence against him was largely circumstantial and would 

not necessarily have resulted in a conviction. 

Prior to trial, the government informed the court and defense counsel that it intended to call a drug trafficking expert 

to testify about use of coded language, the price of cocaine in 

the Chicago area, and common tactics used by drug traffickers. Malagon filed a motion in limine seeking to bar any law 

enforcement witness from testifying as to unrecorded conversations outside their direct observations but raised no other 

objection to the testimony and never objected to the expert 

witness testimony by Reynolds. Accordingly, we review the 
No. 18-3200 5

objection on appeal only for plain error. Under the plain error 

standard, Malagon must demonstrate an error that was not 

intentionally waived, which was plain and affected his substantial rights, and that the error affects the fairness, integrity 

or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States 

v. Thomas, 897 F.3d 807, 812 (7th Cir. 2018). Malagon’s challenge to Reynolds’ testimony cannot meet that standard. In 

fact, he fails to meet the first requirement—that of demonstrating that an error occurred. 

Malagon points out that in United States v. Mamah, 332 F.3d 

475, 478 (7th Cir. 2003), we recognized that “[i]t is critical under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702 that there be a link between the facts or data the expert has worked with and the 

conclusion the expert’s testimony is intended to support.” See 

also Smith v. Illinois Dep't of Transportation, 936 F.3d 554, 559 

(7th Cir. 2019). Malagon argues that the district court erred in 

allowing Reynolds to testify as to the meaning of code words 

based on his experience as a law enforcement officer, without 

requiring Reynolds to explain his methodology and link his 

conclusions to his experience. “We have routinely held that 

‘narcotics code words are an appropriate subject for expert 

testimony.’” United States v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 421, (7th Cir. 

2009), citing United States v. Farmer, 543 F.3d 363, 370 (7th Cir. 

2008). According to Malagon, however, Reynolds “never once 

pointed to his training or experience as a basis for his conclusion that certain words in the transcripts actually meant cocaine, let alone explained how his experience led to the conclusions that he reached.” Appellant’s Brief at 24. That is not 

an accurate representation of Reynolds’ testimony. Reynolds 

testified as to the use of code language by drug traffickers, 

explaining that very rarely will drug traffickers use the term 

“cocaine.” Tr. Transcript Vol. 2 at R. 128, p. 325. Instead, he 
6 No. 18-3200 

noted that they routinely substitute code words to reference 

drugs and drug quantities in order to conceal their activities 

because they recognize the potential that the conversations 

are being recorded. Id. Reynolds testified that in his work as a 

special agent and group supervisor, he was involved in hundreds of narcotics-related investigations and was familiar 

with codes used in such transactions and with drug prices in 

the Chicago area. Id. at 327. Reynolds testified how the context 

of the language used in the conversation over the course of 

the investigation can indicate that the words are drug code, 

and that such words can vary such as the buyer or seller asking for “work”—where “work” references drugs—or referring to instruments such as guitars to represent drugs. Id. at 

340. Reynolds noted, for instance, that in one investigation the 

person repeatedly discussed “guitars, and they were watching the person and knew he was not a musician or guitar 

teacher, and over time it became apparent that the word “guitar” was code for drugs—which was further confirmed when 

they seized a kilogram of cocaine which had the imprint of a 

guitar on it. Id. at 340–41. He noted that code words were also 

used to discuss the price of narcotics, including the same 

words such as “work,” or other words such as “tickets” or 

“dough.” Id. at 341. Similarly, in discussing the quantity of 

narcotics to be sold, he testified that in his experience they 

typically would use words like “work,” “pieces,” or “parts” 

to refer to kilograms. Id. at 342. He then testified that he read 

the transcripts of the conversations in this case, and that based 

on his training and experience, he formed the opinion that the 

parties were discussing narcotics. Id. at 343. He specifically 

noted that the word “part” was used for drug code to reference narcotics being delivered. Id. at 344–45. He pointed to 

factors such as the repetition of the word, referring to the 
No. 18-3200 7

same thing over and over, and the context of the word. Id. at 

346. As to the context, for instance, Reynolds noted that in the 

conversation the statement “I already ... opened the part and 

it’s, yes, yes, it’s that one, the one I tell you,” used language 

that he typically hears as far as kilogram quantities where it 

is opened to verify the quality of the narcotics. Id. Similarly, 

he concluded that the query ”[d]o you already have everything ... ready, all arranged? All the tickets?” was drug code 

in that “tickets” referenced the payment for the narcotics. Id. 

at 347. Malagon mistakenly believes that Reynolds’ opinion is 

not based on his training and experience because he relies on 

the context and recurrence of words in determining whether 

they reflect drug code, but Reynolds testified that based on 

his training and experience, the context and recurrence are 

used in determining whether the words are drug code. Just as 

the repeated discussion of “guitars” by a person with no apparent connection to musical instruments indicated an alternative meaning for the word, the repeated discussion of the 

delivery of parts and cars in this case signaled drug code 

where the context and surrounding language mirrored that of 

drug transactions, and the recurrence indicates that the reference is to something other than actual automotive-related 

transactions. The argument here—that Reynolds “never once 

pointed to his training or experience as a basis for his conclusion that certain words in the transcripts actually meant cocaine, let alone explained how his experience led to the conclusions that he reached”—is belied by Reynolds’ trial testimony in the record. 

Malagon’s other evidentiary challenge is also unavailing. 

He asserts that the district court improperly admitted the 

opinion testimony of Amador even though he was a lay witness and not an expert witness, in contravention of Federal 
8 No. 18-3200 

Rule of Evidence 701. Rule 701 provides that “[i]f a witness is 

not testifying as an expert, testimony in the form of an opinion 

is limited to one that is: (a) rationally based on the witness's 

perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness's 

testimony or to determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based 

on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within 

the scope of Rule 702.” 

Malagon challenges Amador’s testimony relating to the 

meaning of words Malagon used in a conversation with Amador, including, for instance, the word “cars” as referring to 

kilograms of cocaine and “next time” as meaning the next order for cocaine. Amador’s understanding of the meaning of 

the words used in those conversations to which he was a 

party fall within the proper scope of lay testimony, and there 

was no error in allowing the admission of the testimony. 

Malagon argues that, as we recognized in United States v. Gaytan, 649 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 2011), a law enforcement officer’s 

testimony is a lay opinion if limited to that officer’s observations or other facts derived exclusively from a particular investigation, whereas it is expert testimony if the officer brings 

the wealth of his experience as an officer to bear on those observations and makes connections based upon that specialized knowledge. See id. at 582, citing United States v. Oriedo, 

498 F.3d 593, 603 (7th Cir. 2007). In Gaytan, the officer testifying was not a party to the conversation but rather listened to 

a recording of the conversation, and we held that his familiarity with the terminology could have been attributable to the 

Gaytan investigation in particular or to his training and experience as a narcotics officer in general. Id. In contrast, Amador 

testified as to the meaning of the words used in a conversation 

between himself and Malagon. As a party to the conversation, 

his testimony as to the meaning of the words used by the 
No. 18-3200 9

parties in the conversation falls within Rule 701 as lay testimony in that it is rationally based on his perception as a witness and helpful to understanding his testimony and determining a fact in issue. Nothing in his testimony indicates that 

his testimony is based on specialized knowledge, as opposed 

to his understanding of the conversation as a participant in it. 

Because there is no basis to conclude that Amador provided 

expert as opposed to lay testimony, Malagon has failed to 

demonstrate that the district court committed plain error in 

allowing such testimony. 

We note that, even if Malagon had succeeded in establishing plain error, any such error would be harmless. The challenged testimony addressed whether Malagon was referring 

to cocaine in his discussions, but any possible ambiguity as to 

whether the words referred to a narcotics deal was set to rest 

when Malagon brought Amador and the informant into the 

garage to reveal the two kilograms of cocaine and referred to 

it as the promised delivery. 

The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.