FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

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No. 1D17-5248

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TRAVIS D. MARSHALL,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Martin A. Fitzpatrick, Judge.

August 23, 2019

PER CURIAM.

Appellant, Travis D. Marshall, challenges his convictions and 

sentences for burglary of a dwelling, grand theft, and petit theft, 

offenses he committed at the age of twenty-one. We affirm as to 

both issues Appellant raises on appeal and write only to address 

his argument that the minimum mandatory fifteen-year prison 

sentence he received on the burglary count as a prison releasee 

reoffender (“PRR”) is unconstitutional pursuant to Miller v. 

Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 

48 (2010), for the reason that he qualified for it only because of 

prior crimes he committed when he was a juvenile. 

The constitutionality of a sentence is reviewed de novo. Nelms 

v. State, 263 So. 3d 88, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019); see also Andrews 
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v. State, 82 So. 3d 979, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (explaining that 

constitutional issues are reviewed de novo and “when considering 

Eighth Amendment issues, appellate courts must yield 

‘substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures 

necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 

punishment for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts 

possess in sentencing convicted criminals’” (quoting Solem v. 

Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 

“Prison releasee reoffender” means a defendant who commits 

or attempts to commit an enumerated offense, such as burglary, 

within three years after being released from a correctional facility 

following incarceration for an offense for which the sentence is 

punishable by more than one year. § 775.082(9)(a), Fla. Stat. 

(2017). If the State seeks PRR sentencing and proves that the 

defendant is a PRR, the court must sentence the defendant to at 

least fifteen years of imprisonment for a second-degree felony. Id.

A person sentenced as a PRR may be released only upon expiration 

of the sentence, shall not be eligible for parole or any form of early 

release, and must serve 100% of the court-imposed sentence. § 

775.082(9)(b), Fla. Stat. As such, “[t]he PRR statute is a 

mandatory minimum provision that creates a sentencing floor.” 

Cotto v. State, 139 So. 3d 283, 286 (Fla. 2014). 

In Graham, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of a 

life without parole sentence on a juvenile offender who did not 

commit a homicide constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 560 

U.S. at 74. Juvenile nonhomicide offenders’ limited culpability, 

the severity of the sentence of life without parole, and the lack of 

penological justification for the punishment for such offenders led 

the Court to conclude that the sentencing practice was cruel and 

unusual. Id. (explaining that a state need not guarantee a juvenile 

nonhomicide offender’s eventual release, but it must afford some 

realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of the life 

term based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation). The 

Court drew the “clear line” at the age of eighteen for the purposes 

of its holding. Id. at 74-75 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 

(2005), where the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and 

Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the imposition of the death 

penalty on juvenile offenders and recognized that “[t]he qualities 

that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an 
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individual turns 18,” but concluded that the line must be drawn at 

the age of 18 because that is “the point where society draws the 

line for many purposes between childhood and adulthood”). 

Subsequently, in Miller, the Supreme Court held that a 

mandatory life without parole sentence for a juvenile offender 

violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 

punishment because it prevents consideration of juveniles’ 

lessened culpability and greater capacity for change. 567 U.S. at

465, 479. The Court focused on the fact that “Roper and Graham

establish that children are constitutionally different from adults 

for purposes of sentencing” and on the reasons why “juveniles have 

diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform.” Id. at 

471. The Court again defined juvenile offenders as those under 

the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. Id. at 465, 470-71, 

473, 489. 

In response to Graham and Miller, the Florida Legislature in 

2014 enacted juvenile sentencing laws. The juvenile sentencing 

laws are codified in sections 775.082, 921.1401, 921.1402, Florida 

Statutes, and apply to defendants who are convicted of certain 

offenses they committed when they were under the age of eighteen 

and who are sentenced to a term of life imprisonment or its 

equivalent.

Here, Appellant argues that his mandatory day-for-day PRR 

sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Graham and Miller and 

he should be resentenced under the juvenile sentencing statutes. 

We find Appellant’s argument to be without merit for a number of 

reasons. First, Appellant was sentenced as a PRR for an offense 

he committed as an adult; therefore, Graham, Miller, and the 

juvenile sentencing statutes are inapplicable. Appellant tries to 

avoid this conclusion by contending that while the mandatory 

sentence was not imposed for an offense he committed as a 

juvenile, it was imposed because of offenses he committed as a 

juvenile. While that is true to the extent that he could not have 

received the PRR sentence absent the prior offenses he committed 

as a juvenile, it overlooks the fact that he is not challenging the 

sentences for the offenses he committed as a juvenile and he could 

not have received the PRR sentence had he not committed the new 

offenses as an adult. 
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Indeed, Appellant’s argument ignores and defeats the purpose 

of the PRR statute, which is to punish certain reoffenders to the 

fullest extent and thereby deter recidivism. See § 775.082(9)(d)1., 

Fla. Stat. (“It is the intent of the Legislature that offenders 

previously released from prison who meet the criteria in paragraph 

(a) be punished to the fullest extent of the law . . . .”); State v. 

Hearns, 961 So. 2d 211, 217 (Fla. 2007) (“The PRR statute . . . is 

intended to deter recidivism by imposing longer sentences on 

repeat offenders.”); Mobley v. State, 983 So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2008) (explaining that the legislative intent behind the PRR 

statute is to punish certain reoffenders to the fullest extent of the 

law). 

Regardless, courts have consistently declined to extend the 

holdings of Graham and Miller and the applicability of the juvenile 

sentencing statutes to offenders eighteen years of age or older. See 

Romero v. State, 105 So. 3d 550, 551-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012)

(rejecting the eighteen-year-old offender’s argument that his 

sentence of life without parole for murder was unconstitutional 

pursuant to Graham because of his youth and the attendant 

factors; holding that for Graham to apply, the offender must have 

been a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offense; and 

noting that “[n]ot a single court in this country has extended 

Graham to an adult offender. On the contrary, several courts have 

reaffirmed that Graham is inapplicable to adult offenders.”); see 

also McCray v. State, 247 So. 3d 721, 722 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (per 

curiam affirming with a citation to Romero as holding that 

Graham does not apply to a defendant eighteen years of age or 

older); Wilson v. State, 249 So. 3d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (same); 

Jean-Michel v. State, 96 So. 3d 1043, 1045 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) 

(rejecting the appellant’s argument that his three consecutive life 

sentences for nonhomicide crimes were unconstitutional pursuant 

to Graham because he was nineteen years old at the time of the 

offenses and emphasizing that in both Roper and Graham, the 

Supreme Court expressly drew the line at the age of eighteen). As 

we have stated, “[w]e apply Graham as written. We decline to take 

the extreme act of extending Graham to adult offenders in the 

absence of a clear and explicit directive from the Supreme Court.” 

Romero, 105 So. 3d at 554.
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Second, even if Graham and Miller could be extended to an 

adult offender, they would be inapplicable because Appellant was 

not sentenced to life imprisonment or its equivalent. See Romero, 

105 So. 3d at 553 (explaining that for Graham to apply, the 

offender must have been sentenced to life and the sentence must 

not provide him with any possibility of release during his lifetime); 

see also McCrae v. State, 267 So. 3d 470, 471 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019)

(finding that the appellant’s thirty-year prison sentence was not 

inconsistent with Graham or Miller because “there was no life 

sentence—de facto or otherwise. Indeed, McCrae will still be in his 

forties when released.”); Hart v. State, 255 So. 3d 921, 927-28 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2018) (finding that the appellant could not demonstrate 

that his aggregate fifty-year prison sentence violated Graham

because “[he] was not sentenced to a life sentence or a de facto life 

sentence. Consistent with the requirements of Graham, [his] fiftyyear sentence affords him a meaningful opportunity for release 

during his natural life.”); Davis v. State, 214 So. 3d 799, 799 (Fla. 

1st DCA 2017) (concluding that the appellant’s aggregate thirtyfive-year prison sentence did not violate Graham or Miller because 

he “was not sentenced to a life, mandatory life, or a de facto life 

sentence”). Appellant’s fifteen-year sentence is considerably

shorter than sentences we have found not to constitute life 

sentences. 

Lastly, Appellant contends that the juvenile sentencing laws 

should be applied to his situation. However, those statutes do not 

apply to the circumstances this case presents because there is not 

an original sentence that violates Graham or Miller. See Hart, 255 

So. 3d at 924-27 (“[T]he Florida Supreme Court very narrowly 

defined the class of offenders entitled to resentencing under the 

new juvenile resentencing laws; specifically, those defendants who 

originally received life sentences and who were resentenced after 

their sentences were vacated pursuant to Graham but before the 

July 1, 2014 effective date of the new juvenile sentencing laws.” ); 

see also McCrae, 267 So. 3d at 471-72 (explaining that “[w]ithout 

an unconstitutional sentence to start with, McCrae is not entitled 

to resentencing under the new statute” and “[u]nless and until the 

Florida Supreme Court announces that every juvenile defendant 

is entitled to a sentence under the new laws—regardless of when 

the defendant was sentenced or whether the original sentence 

violated Graham or Miller—we will follow the rule that 
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resentencing only applies when there was a Graham or Miller

violation”).

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Appellant’s PRR 

sentence does not violate Graham, Miller, or the Eighth 

Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 

Accordingly, we affirm Appellant’s convictions and sentences.

AFFIRMED.

LEWIS, OSTERHAUS, and M.K. THOMAS, JJ., concur.

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Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

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Andy Thomas, Public Defender, and Kathleen Stover, Assistant 

Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Tabitha Herrera, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.