Filed 6/20/16 In re Rn. M. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re Rn. M. et al., Persons Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROMEO M., 

Defendant and Appellant.

 B267663

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK11268)

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Annabelle Cortez, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part. 

Mitchell Keiter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Office of the County Counsel, Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel and R. 

Keith Davis and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

Appellant Romeo M. (Father) and M.M. (Mother) are the parents of a 14-

year-old boy, “Rn,” and an 11-year-old girl, “Ri.” Jurisdiction was asserted over 

the children based on incidents in which Mother’s male companion: (1) threatened 

Father with a loaded handgun and pushed and struck Rn when he tried to 

intervene; and (2) pushed Rn and threw a pill bottle at him. Mother was found to 

have failed to protect the children. There were no charging allegations against 

Father, whom the court specifically found to be “non-offending” when it released 

the children to him at the detention hearing. Father appeals the juvenile court’s 

dispositional order, which required him, among other things, to participate in a 

high-conflict parenting program and individual counseling. We conclude that 

neither the jurisdictional findings nor the evidence as a whole supports the 

conclusion that Father’s participation in a parenting program or individual 

counseling is necessary to protect the children or eliminate the conditions that led 

to the assertion of jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s dispositional 

order in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Father and Mother separated in May 2012. They were given joint legal 

custody of the children. Mother had physical custody; Father had the children 

every other weekend and on Wednesday evenings. Mother entered into a new 

relationship with Richard F.1 Richard is a veteran, suffering from depression, 

PTSD, and multiple physical disabilities. 

 

1 Mother and Richard are the parents of two-year-old S.F., who was one of the 

subjects of the proceedings below. Neither Mother nor Richard are parties to this appeal. 

S.F. is not a subject of this appeal. References to “the children” herein are to Rn and Ri.
3

On April 17, 2015, Father arrived late at the house Mother and Richard 

shared to pick up the children for a regular weekend visit.2 As Ri was getting into 

Father’s car, Richard came out of the house, calling Father names and swearing. 

Ri started crying. Richard pulled out a handgun, pointed it at Father, and activated

its laser sight. Father saw him cock the gun. Rn stepped in between Father and the 

gun, and began struggling with Richard for control of the weapon. Richard 

knocked the boy down and kneed him in the head before again training the weapon 

on Father. Richard finally backed down when Mother came out of the house and 

begged him to stop. Father and the children left, and police officers arrived to

arrest Richard. When interviewed by authorities, Richard claimed he had the gun 

for protection against Father, and that it was unloaded; however, when police 

officers located the gun, hidden inside the house, it was loaded.3

Interviewed by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) 

caseworker, Ri described herself as “very afraid” and “hysterical[]” when she saw 

Richard with the gun. Both children reported that Richard regularly called them 

“dumb” and “stupid.” Ri said Mother and Richard made her feel like “‘a big waste 

of time’” and that she wrote of her experiences in the home in her “‘diary of 

sadness.’” The children also reported that a few months earlier, Richard swore at

Rn, pushed him, and threw a medication container that missed Rn and hit Mother. 

With respect to where they wanted to live, Rn reported being afraid for his life if

returned to Mother’s home while Richard was living there. Ri, too, said she 

 

2 According to Mother, Father had a pattern of arriving late for scheduled pickups. 

He had texted Mother that day to let her know he was running late and she did not raise 

any issues with him. 

3 No other guns were found inside the house, but Richard admitted having other 

guns in storage. 
4

would not feel safe returning to Mother’s home while Richard was there.

4 Both 

felt safe with Father, and denied any form of abuse on his part.

5

 The children were 

already in monthly therapy, and Father promised to ensure that the children 

continued to participate due to the trauma they received from Richard’s actions. 

Father told the caseworker he was concerned with the well-being of the children if 

they were returned to Mother’s care because she did not seem to appreciate the 

dangerous nature of Richard’s behavior. 

Father and Mother reported a 2012 incident of domestic violence. Mother 

said Father became enraged and threatened to kill her with a knife after she 

confronted him about an affair. Father claimed he had threatened destruction of 

Mother’s property, not her person. Father was arrested and charged, but the 

charges were dismissed after he completed a 52-week domestic violence program

ordered by the criminal court.6 

At the May 2015 detention hearing, the court vested placement and custody 

of the children with DCFS, and released them to Father. In so doing, the court 

 

4 Richard moved out of Mother’s home in June 2015. However, Mother continued 

her relationship with him, which caused the caseworker to be concerned because Richard 

was not cooperating with DCFS to resolve his mental health issues, and because Mother 

appeared to be in denial about the trauma he had inflicted on the children. Mother 

expressed the belief that the children had an unfavorable opinion of Richard due to 

Father’s influence, rather than acknowledging the effect Richard’s own behavior had on 

them. 

5 Both Father and Mother were employed. There was no evidence of mental illness 

or substance abuse on either parent’s part. 

6 DCFS received two prior referrals, in 2013 and 2014, both alleging Mother left the 

children home alone when she went to work. The allegations were deemed unfounded. 

In investigating these referrals, DCFS learned of the domestic violence incident and 

conducted an investigation, but found no conclusive evidence to support jurisdiction. 
5

stated: “Findings are made as to the Mother and [Richard] only. [Father] is nonoffending.”7

In the report prepared in advance of the August 2015 jurisdictional hearing, 

DCFS reported that the children continued to participate in therapy once a month. 

The report stated that an assessor from the Department of Mental Health had 

recommended more frequent sessions in May 2015, but that Father had yet to act 

on the recommendation. Father allegedly also had ignored a recommendation from

Ri’s teacher that the girl receive tutoring. The caseworker perceived Ri to be 

angry, struggling socially and academically, and to be suffering from low self 

esteem. The report claimed Father and Mother had ongoing conflicts, but 

described only disputes that had occurred between 2007 and 2012, prior to their 

separation. The report stated there was substantial danger to the children from 

Mother’s and Richard’s behavior; it said nothing about any potential danger from 

Father. The report further stated: “Although parents stated that they get along and 

are civil with each other, it does not appear that they have the children’s best 

interest at heart. [Mother] is quick to put blame on [Father] for the children not 

approving of [Richard]. However, [Mother] fails to acknowledge that [Richard’s] 

behavior towards the children affects the children’s emotional health. DCFS 

records indicate that the parents have been playing the blame game for several 

years. . . . . Without[] the Court’s continue[d] jurisdiction [i]n the matter, it does 

not appear that the parents will ensure that the children[’s] emotional needs are 

address[ed] in a therapeutic setting. Further, the parents are in need of developing 

skills that would allow them to co-parent the children.” Accordingly, DCFS

recommended that Father participate in a family maintenance plan to include a 

 

7

Father asked for and received a temporary restraining order to keep Richard away 

from him and the children. 
6

program addressing “high conflict” parenting, individual counseling to address 

“domestic violence and case issues,” and family/conjoint counseling when deemed 

appropriate. 

At the August 27, 2015 jurisdictional hearing, observing that Father “[was]

not named” in the petition, the court found that Richard placed the children in “a 

detrimental and endangering situation” by “brandish[ing] a loaded firearm and 

point[ing] [it] at the children . . . and [Father],” and by physically abusing Rn, 

kneeing him in the head, pushing him and throwing a pill bottle at him. The court 

further found the Mother knew of the physical abuse and failed to protect Rn.8 

When the court turned to disposition, Father’s counsel asked the court to 

terminate jurisdiction, leaving physical custody of the children with him. The 

children’s attorney objected to termination, stating the children needed services to 

deal with both the situation alleged in the petition and their parents’ divorce. She

expressed concern that if the case were to be closed, they would no longer have 

access to services “to help them deal with these issues, which . . . have been very 

traumatizing for them.” She asked that the case remain open “to ensure that the 

children are enrolled . . . in therapy,” to address “the things that have occurred in 

this case, that have occurred between their [parents] and the family dynamics . . . .” 

She also asked that Father be instructed to enroll Ri in tutoring. 

DCFS’s attorney asserted the agency’s position that Father and Mother 

should participate in high-conflict parenting because “[t]he issues regarding what 

happened with the weapon stem from the family law fighting amongst the . . .

 

8

Jurisdiction was asserted under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, 

subdivision (b) (failure to protect) and subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling). Undesignated 

statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
7

parents . . . .”

9 However, a moment later, arguing in favor of granting Father a 

permanent restraining order, counsel stated: “[Father] did nothing to instigate what 

happened.”10

The court found “a need to maintain jurisdiction . . . [to] make sure that [the 

children are] receiving appropriate services” and to assist in obtaining a “different 

family dynamic[] . . . .” The court ordered Father to participate in individual 

counseling to address case issues, conjoint counseling with the children, and a 

high-conflict parenting class. The court also ordered that the children participate in 

counseling with a DCFS-approved therapist. Father noticed an appeal. 

DISCUSSION

“At the dispositional hearing, the [dependency] court must order child 

welfare services for the minor and the minor’s parents to facilitate reunification of 

the family. [Citations.]” (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 

1006.) Section 362, subdivision (a) provides that once a child is adjudged a 

dependent child of the court on the ground that the child is a person described by 

Section 300, “the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the care, 

 

9 Counsel for DCFS submitted a transcript of proceedings in family court to

“provide the Court some insight as to the acrimony between the parents” and demonstrate 

that “Mother and [Father] are going to have to learn how to coparent safely and 

effectively.” In the transcript, Mother expressed doubt about Father’s excuses for failing 

to take the children for scheduled visitation on two occasions. Father explained that he 

missed two visits within a year due to car trouble and medical problems. Mother asked 

the court for funds for childcare because Father had said he did not want Richard taking 

care of the children when she went to work. The court offered Father the option of 

paying for childcare, but Father instead consented to Richard caring for the children the 

three evenings Mother worked. Nothing in the transcript supports the existence of any 

unusual acrimony between Father and Mother.

10 At the hearing, the court issued a permanent restraining order, protecting Father 

and the children from Richard. 
8

supervision, custody, conduct maintenance, and support of the child . . . .” Section 

362, subdivision (d) provides: “The juvenile court may direct any reasonable 

orders to the parents or guardians of the child who is the subject of any 

proceedings under this chapter as the court deems necessary and proper to carry 

out this section . . . . That order may include a direction to participate in a 

counseling or education program, including, but not limited to, a parent education 

and parenting program . . . . The program in which parent or guardian is required 

to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led to the court’s

finding that the child is a person described by Section 300.” (See also § 361.2 

[when considering granting custody to parent with whom child was not residing at 

time of detention, court may “[o]rder that the parent assume custody subject to the 

supervision of the juvenile court,” and “may order that services be provided . . . to 

the parent who is assuming physical custody in order to allow that parent to retain 

later custody without court supervision” (Id., (b)(2)(3))].) As many courts have 

held, these provisions permit the juvenile court to issue dispositional orders that 

affect a non-offending parent. (See, e.g., In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 

297, 311 [“[T]here need not be a jurisdictional finding as to the particular parent

upon whom the court imposes a dispositional order”]; In re I.A. (2011) 201 

Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 [“A jurisdictional finding involving the conduct of a 

particular parent is not necessary for the court to enter orders binding on that 

parent, once dependency jurisdiction has been established”]; In re A.E. (2008) 168 

Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [recognizing juvenile court’s discretion to order non-offending 

custodial parent to participate in counseling].) 

The juvenile court has “wide latitude” in formulating dispositional orders to 

support the well-being of the minors. (In re Jasmin C. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 

177, 180.) On appeal of a dispositional order, the juvenile court’s determination as 

to what would “‘best serve and protect the child’s interests’” cannot be reversed 
9

absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re A.E., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 4.) 

However, as section 362 requires that the programs in which a parent is required to 

participate “be designed to eliminate” the conditions that led to the assertion of 

jurisdiction, there must be substantial evidence to support the court’s implied 

conclusion that the non-offending parent’s participation in the specified program is 

warranted to address the conduct that led the court to sustain the petition. (In re 

Jasmin C., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 180; see In re Drake M. (2012) 211 

Cal.App.4th 754, 770 [imposition of parenting classes “cannot be ‘based on a rote 

assumption that [father] could not be an effective single parent without parenting 

classes’”]; In re Sergio C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 957, 960 [dispositional order 

requiring father to submit to random drug tests reversed where only evidence of 

father’s drug use was “unsworn and uncorroborated allegation”]; In re Basilio T. 

(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 172 [substance abuse component of reunification plan 

reversed where only evidence to support existence of substance abuse problem was 

mother’s occasional odd behavior].) A reunification program cannot be imposed 

without findings or explanation merely because the agency feels the parent would 

benefit. (In re Jasmin C., supra, at p. 181.) Requiring participation in unnecessary 

classes and programs would “‘strain an intact family, let alone a broken one,’” and

when the parent is newly in the position of caring for the children on his or her 

own “‘adds a great deal of stress to an already tragic situation.’” (Id. at p. 182.)

Father challenges the dispositional order in part.

11

 We find no evidence to 

support the portion of the dispositional plan imposed on Father requiring him to 

 

11 We reject respondent’s contention that Father forfeited the right to contest the 

dispositional order by failing to object in the juvenile court. At the commencement of the 

hearing, Father asked the court to terminate jurisdiction. This was sufficient to make 

clear that Father objected to the issuance of any dispositional order requiring him to 

participate in services.
10

participate in a high-conflict parenting program and in individual counseling.

12

 At 

the time of the incident that precipitated DCFS’s involvement, Father was fully 

employed and regularly visiting the children in accordance with the family law 

schedule. The children, who were quick to describe to the caseworker the 

uncomfortable situation in Mother’s home, reported no abuse by Father. There 

was evidence of a past incident of domestic violence, but Father had participated in 

a 52-week program and resolved that situation years earlier. There was no 

evidence of a recent recurrence. In any event, as respondent acknowledges “the 

juvenile court did not premise the order for [F]ather’s participate[on] in a highconflict parenting course on the prior domestic violence incident.” Moreover, 

there was no evidence of any recent discord or conflict between Father and 

Mother. The transcript of the divorce proceedings submitted at the dispositional 

hearing showed nothing unusual. DCFS’s August 2015 report stated that the 

parents “[did not] appear . . . [to] have the children’s best interest at heart,” and 

that they “play[ed] the blame game,” but the only evidence cited was Mother’s 

“fail[ure] to acknowledge that [Richard’s] behavior toward the children affects the 

children’s emotional health.” Indeed, according to the report, “[Father and 

Mother] stated that they get along and are civil with each other . . . .”

Respondent contends, as did the children’s attorney below, that the 

children’s “fragile emotional state” must be attributed in part to their parents’

divorce, and suggests that Father’s participation in a high-conflict parenting 

 

12 Father specifically challenges that portion of the order requiring him to participate 

in a high-conflict parenting program. He does not challenge the requirement that he 

participate in conjoint counseling with the children when appropriate. Although neither 

party expressly addresses the portion of the order requiring Father to participate in 

individual counseling, we find such requirement sufficiently related to the issues raised 

on appeal to address it.
11

program will somehow alleviate that distress.

13

 The children, however, stated that 

their trauma derived primarily from the incident in which Richard threatened to 

shoot their Father in front of them, endangering all their lives, and from the way 

Richard treated them in Mother’s home. Mother theorized that their feelings about 

Richard derived from Father’s speaking ill of him, but no evidence supported her 

theory, and Mother appeared to be in denial about the trauma Richard had inflicted 

on the children. Respondent contends both parents “had a history of placing blame 

on one another,” but cites only the August 2015 report, which made the same 

allegation without supporting evidence. The only “blame” Father placed on 

Mother was in suggesting that she underestimated the threat of Richard’s presence 

in the home -- a prediction that proved all too true. Finally, respondent suggests

that the order will cause Father to “be more motivated to get the children the 

therapeutic services they need.” No one, least of all Father, disputed that the 

children were in need of therapy to deal with the trauma of the April 2015 incident 

and, particularly in the case of Ri, the disparagement received from Richard in 

Mother’s home. Both children had been in monthly therapy prior to DCFS’s

intervention, and Father continued to take them throughout the proceedings. 

Although he had not yet acted on the May 2015 recommendation that therapy be 

more frequent, there was no evidence this was due to conflict between the parents. 

In short, there was no demonstrated need to require Father to undergo high-conflict 

parenting or individual therapy to ensure the children obtained their court-ordered 

therapy. 

 

13 The children’s attorney urged the court to ensure that the children -- not Father --

were provided therapy and other services. 
12

DISPOSITION

The portion of the court’s dispositional order requiring Father to participate 

in a high-conflict parenting program and individual counseling is reversed. In all 

other respects the dispositional order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MANELLA, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

WILLHITE, J.