Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 1 of 8

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana

Angela Hendrix,

Appellant-Defendant

v.

Donald Campbell, et al.,

Appellees-Plaintiffs

May 20, 2024

Court of Appeals Case No.

23A-PL-2234

Appeal from the Owen Circuit Court

The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

60C02-2007-PL-250

Opinion by Judge Tavitas

Judges Mathias and Weissmann concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 2 of 8

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] In the current case on appeal, Donald and Pamela Campbell were awarded a 

judgment against Angela Hendrix.

1 Then, in a separate case, Angela sued 

Pamela alone and was awarded a judgment against Pamela. Angela then filed 

a motion in this case to set off Donald’s and Pamela’s judgment by the 

judgment Angela owned against Pamela in the separate case. The trial court 

denied the motion for set-off. Angela appeals and argues that the trial court 

erred by denying her motion. We are not persuaded by Angela’s arguments, 

and accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Angela raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court erred by 

denying Angela’s motion for set-off.

Facts

[3] This appeal arises out of proceedings supplemental after a judgment was 

awarded in favor of Donald and Pamela against Angela. In 2019, Angela and 

her husband were living in a house in Gosport, Indiana, (the “Gosport house”). 

Hendrix v. Campbell, Case No. 22A-PL-422, slip op. p. 3 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 

1 The judgment was also awarded against Angela’s husband, Ryan, who died on July 2, 2022. For the 

purposes of this appeal, we will simply refer to Angela. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 3 of 8

2022) (mem.). That year, the Campbells agreed to lend Angela money to 

purchase a house in Spencer, Indiana, and in exchange, the Campbells would 

take possession of the Gosport house. Id. at 3-4. The Campbells paid for 

repairs to the Gosport house to make it suitable for Angela’s step-sister, Stacy 

Zehr, to live in. Id. at 6. After Angela stopped making payments on the loan, 

the Campbells sued. Id. The trial court found that no enforceable agreement 

between the parties existed but that Angela had been unjustly enriched by the 

loan and repairs. Id. at 7-9. Accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in 

the amount of $114,796.49 “in favor of separate plaintiffs, Donald Campbell 

and Pamela Campbell” (“Judgment 1”). Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 43. A 

panel of this Court affirmed Judgment 1 on appeal. See generally Hendrix, No. 

22A-PL-422. Following the appeal, the Campbells sought satisfaction of the 

judgment in proceedings supplemental through a sheriff’s sale of the Gosport 

house, which the trial court approved on April 27, 2023. 

[4] Meanwhile, on March 13, 2022, Angela sued Pamela alone in a separate case 

for unjust enrichment and conversion of the Gosport house.

2

 On August 1, 

2023, the trial court awarded judgment of $61,294.50 against Pamela and in 

favor of Angela (“Judgment 2”). Pamela died on August 6, 2023. On October 

9, 2023, Angela petitioned for the appointment of a special administrator for the 

2 Cause No. 60C02-2203-PL-96.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 4 of 8

purposes of collecting Judgment 2 from Pamela’s Estate, which the probate 

court granted. 

[5] On September 11, 2023, Angela filed a motion in this case for a “set off” of 

Judgment 1 by Judgment 2.3

 Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 49. The trial court 

summarily denied this motion in an order issued on September 11, 2023. The 

Gosport house was sold the next day for $50,100. Angela now appeals the trial 

court’s denial of her motion for set-off. 

Discussion and Decision

[6] Angela argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion for set-off. We 

conclude that Angela has not carried her burden of persuasion.4

[7] This case arises out of proceedings supplemental, which our Supreme Court has 

described as follows:

Proceedings supplementary to execution are remedial actions 

authorized by statute. I.C. ch. 34-55-8 (2008 Repl.). They enable 

creditors to enforce money judgments against non-paying 

debtors. Prime Mortg. USA, Inc. v. Nichols, 885 N.E.2d 628, 668 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Because these proceedings merely continue 

3 Angela also requested in her motion that the trial court vacate the order for the sheriff’s sale of the Gosport 

house. The trial court denied this portion of the motion, and Angela does not appeal this ruling.

4 As an initial matter, Donald has filed a motion to dismiss this appeal on mootness grounds. “A case 

is moot when the controversy at issue has been ended, settled, or otherwise disposed of so that the court can 

give the parties no effective relief.” E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. and Health Care Ctr., Inc., 188 N.E.3d 464, 466 

(Ind. 2022). Donald does not allege that Judgment 1 has been satisfied, so we must assume that a portion of 

that judgment remains outstanding and could be affected by our disposition of this case. Accordingly, we 

deny Donald’s motion to dismiss.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 5 of 8

the underlying suit, creditors must initiate them under the same 

case number and in the same court that issued the civil 

judgment. Id. See also Ind. Trial Rule 69(E). A court’s sole 

objective in conducting proceedings supplemental is 

“determining whether an asset is in the judgment debtor’s 

possession or subject to the judgment debtor’s control and can be 

attached to satisfy the judgment.” Prime Mortg. USA, 885 N.E.2d 

at 668 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estep, 873 N.E.2d 

1021, 1029 (Ind. 2007) (Boehm, J., concurring in part and 

dissenting in part)).

Garner v. Kempf, 93 N.E.3d 1091, 1095 (Ind. 2018). As for our review of trial 

court orders in proceedings supplemental,

[o]ur system vests trial courts with broad discretion in conducting 

proceedings supplemental. Com. Credit Counseling Servs., Inc. v. 

W.W. Grainger, Inc., 840 N.E.2d 843, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 

“[I]n proceedings supplemental, we are constrained to treat a trial 

court’s judgment as being general only.” First Bank of Whiting v. 

Samocki Bros. Trucking Co., 509 N.E.2d 187, 192 (Ind. Ct. App.

1987), trans. denied. We will not disturb a trial court’s judgment 

regarding a proceedings supplemental unless the record does not 

provide sufficient support for any theory on which the judgment 

may be sustained. Ill. Founders Ins. Co.[v. Horace Mann Ins. 

Co.], 738 N.E.2d [705,] 708 [(Ind. Ct. App. 2000)]; cf. W.W.

Grainger, 840 N.E.2d at 847 . . . . “We will affirm the trial court’s 

judgment on any legal theory supported by the evidence most 

favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable inferences 

to be drawn therefrom.” Gallant Ins. Co. v. Wilkerson, 720 N.E.2d 

1223, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

Prime Mortg. USA, 885 N.E.2d at 669.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 6 of 8

[8] We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Angela’s motion for setoff. “A set-off is a counterdemand growing out of an independent transaction, 

for which the defendant might maintain an action against the plaintiff, pleaded 

by the defendant to counterbalance the plaintiff’s recovery, either in whole or in 

part, and, as the case may be, to recover a judgment in his own favor.” Duffy v. 

England, 96 N.E. 704, 707 (Ind. 1911) (cited in Zalud v. Ethan Assocs., 418 

N.E.2d 309, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)); see also Setoff, BLACK’S LAW 

DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining a set-off as “[a] defendant’s 

counterdemand against the plaintiff, arising out of a transaction independent of 

the plaintiff’s claim” and “[a] debtor’s right to reduce the amount of a debt by 

any sum the creditor owes the debtor”); 80 C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim § 59

(“The right of setoff allows entities that owe each other money to apply their 

mutual debts against each other.”)

[9] Among other forms of set-offs, our courts have the equitable discretion to set off

one judgment against another. Junker v. Hustis, 16 N.E. 197, 197 (Ind. 1888)

(“It is settled that a set-off of one judgment against another will not be allowed 

unless it is equitable to allow it.”). Generally, however, mutuality must exist 

between the judgments. In other words, the judgments must, at a minimum, be 

reciprocal between the same parties. See Teeters v. City Nat’l Bank of Auburn, 14 

N.E.2d 1004, 1005 (Ind. 1938) (“It is familiar law . . . that mutuality is essential 

to the validity of a set-off, and that, in order that one demand may be set off

against another, both must mutually exist between the same parties.”) (cited in 

25A IND. LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA Set-Off and Counterclaim § 3); Brooks v. Harris, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 7 of 8

41 Ind. 390, 394 (Ind. 1872) (affirming set-off of Brooks’s judgment against 

Harris and others by Harris’s judgment against Brooks in a separate matter); 80

C.J.S. Set-off and Counterclaim § 59 (“Where mutuality of debts and parties 

exists, the trial court may order a set-off.”). The requirement of mutuality may

be excused “in order to prevent irremediable injustice.” Wolcott v. Pierre, 188 

N.E. 596, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 1934) (cited in 25A IND. LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA

Set-Off and Counterclaim § 3).

[10] Here, Pamela is deceased, Donald5 owns Judgment 1 against Angela, and 

Angela owns Judgment 2 against Pamela’s Estate. Angela cannot set off 

Judgment 1 by Judgment 2 because mutuality does not exist between the parties 

owing the judgments. Only Pamela was responsible for Judgment 2. 

Additionally, Angela has not demonstrated that an irremediable injustice 

supports dispensing with the mutuality requirement. On the contrary, equity 

does not support reducing Donald’s award in Judgment 1 by a debt that he does 

not owe. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying Angela’s motion 

for set-off.

Conclusion

[11] The trial court did not err by denying Angela’s motion for set-off. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

5 We need not decide whether Pamela’s Estate or any other persons also have a claim to Judgment 1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PL-2234 | May 20, 2024 Page 8 of 8

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Michael L. Carmin

CarminParker, PC

Bloomington, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES

Paul J. Watts

England Law Office, P.C.

Spencer, Indiana