[Cite as State v. Mann, 2024-Ohio-2175.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff- Appellee, :

No. 113616

v. :

CORNELIUS D. MANN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

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JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: June 6, 2024

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-22-668715-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Christopher Woodworth, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Law Office of John T. Forristal and John T. Forristal, for 

appellant.
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J.:

Defendant-appellant Cornelius D. Mann appeals from his indefinite 

sentence imposed by the trial court under the Reagan Tokes Law. He argues that 

his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to provide the mandatory 

advisements required by R.C. 2919.19(B)(2)(c) when imposing an indefinite 

sentence. We agree and remand the case to the trial court for the sole purpose of 

providing Mann with the notifications required by the statute. 

Mann pleaded guilty to trafficking in drugs in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), a felony of the second degree; having weapons while under 

disability, a felony of the third degree; and operating a vehicle under the influence, 

a misdemeanor of the first degree. The trial court imposed an indefinite sentence of 

five to seven-and-a-half years for his drug-trafficking offense. It also imposed a 

concurrent 24-month term for his offense of having weapons while under disability

and sentenced him to time served for his offense of operating a vehicle under the 

influence. 

On appeal, Mann raises a single assignment of error, contending that 

his sentence is contrary to law because the trial court failed to comply with 

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). The state filed a notice of conceded error pursuant to 

Loc.App.R. 16(B).

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c) requires the trial court to inform a defendant of 

the following when imposing a non-life felony indefinite term:
(i) That it is rebuttably presumed that the offender will be released 

from service of the sentence on the expiration of the minimum prison 

term imposed as part of the sentence or on the offender’s presumptive 

earned early release date, as defined in section 2967.271 of the Revised 

Code, whichever is earlier;

(ii) That the department of rehabilitation and correction may rebut 

the presumption described in division (B)(2)(c)(i) of this section if, at 

a hearing held under section 2967.271 of the Revised Code, the 

department makes specified determinations regarding the offender’s 

conduct while confined, the offender’s rehabilitation, the offender’s 

threat to society, the offender’s restrictive housing, if any, while 

confined, and the offender’s security classification;

(iii) That if, as described in division (B)(2)(c)(ii) of this section, the 

department at the hearing makes the specified determinations and 

rebuts the presumption, the department may maintain the offender’s 

incarceration after the expiration of that minimum term or after that 

presumptive earned early release date for the length of time the 

department determines to be reasonable, subject to the limitation 

specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised Code;

(iv) That the department may make the specified determinations and 

maintain the offender’s incarceration under the provisions described 

in divisions (B)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) of this section more than one time, 

subject to the limitation specified in section 2967.271 of the Revised 

Code;

(v) That if the offender has not been released prior to the expiration 

of the offender’s maximum prison term imposed as part of the 

sentence, the offender must be released upon the expiration of that 

term.

While the trial court is not required to use the precise wording of the 

statute, it must convey the information required by these notice provisions. State v. 

Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110882, 2022-Ohio-2954, ¶ 13. See also State v. 

Gates, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110615, 2022-Ohio-1666, ¶ 21 (“No specific language 
is required, but the court must impart this information to a defendant at the time of 

sentencing.”). 

Our review of the sentencing transcript indicates that the trial court 

gave none of the advisements required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c). When a trial court 

fails to provide the notifications required by R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(c), we must remand 

the case for the limited purpose of providing the required notifications. State v. 

Bradley, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110882, 2022-Ohio-2954, ¶ 13; State v. Gates, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110616, 2022-Ohio-1666, ¶ 25; and State v. Guzman, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 111153, 2022-Ohio-2414, ¶ 10. 

Consequently, we sustain Mann’s assignment of error, vacate his 

indefinite sentence for the drug-trafficking offense, and remand the case for 

resentencing of that offense for the sole purpose of providing Mann with the 

requisite statutory notifications.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part; case remanded. 

It is ordered that appellant and appellee share the costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, PRESIDING JUDGE

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., and

EMANUELLE D. GROVES, J., CONCUR