UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2263

CELESTIN NJIBECK NGWA,

Petitioner,

v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals.

Submitted: July 8, 2011 Decided: July 28, 2011

Before WILKINSON, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Danielle L. C. Beach-Oswald, BEACH-OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW 

ASSOCIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Luis E. 

Perez, Senior Litigation Counsel, Kathryn L. Moore, Office of 

Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Celestin Njibeck Ngwa, a native and citizen of 

Cameroon, petitions for review an order of the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing his appeal from the 

immigration judge’s order denying his applications for asylum, 

withholding from removal and withholding under the Convention 

Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for review. 

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes 

the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(a) (2006). The INA defines a refugee as a person 

unwilling or unable to return to his native country “because of 

persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of 

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006). 

“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death, 

torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one 

of the enumerated grounds. . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405 

F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility 

for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 

2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2011), and can establish 

refugee status based on past persecution in his native country 

on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). 
3

“An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject of past 

persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of 

persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 

2004).

Without regard to past persecution, an alien can 

establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected 

ground. Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 187. The well-founded fear 

standard contains both a subjective and an objective component. 

The objective element requires a showing of specific, concrete 

facts that would lead a reasonable person in like circumstances 

to fear persecution. Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 

351, 353 (4th Cir. 2006). “The subjective component can be met 

through the presentation of candid, credible, and sincere 

testimony demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution . . . . 

[It] must have some basis in the reality of the circumstances 

and be validated with specific, concrete facts . . . and it 

cannot be mere irrational apprehension.” Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d 

at 176 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, 

an alien must show a clear probability that, if he was removed 

to his native country, his “life or freedom would be threatened” 

on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see

Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear 

probability” means that it is more likely than not that the 
4

alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 

407, 429-30 (1984). Unlike asylum, withholding of removal is 

mandatory for anyone whose establishes that there “life or 

freedom would be threatened . . . because of [their] race, 

religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, 

or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006). 

A trier of fact who rejects an applicant’s testimony 

on credibility grounds must offer “specific, cogent reason[s]” 

for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir. 1989). 

“Examples of specific and cogent reasons include inconsistent 

statements, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable 

testimony[.]” Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 

2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). This court accords 

broad, though not unlimited, deference to credibility findings 

supported by substantial evidence. Camara, 378 F.3d at 367.

Credibility determinations are to be made based on the 

totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, 

including the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the 

applicant, the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s account, 

the consistency between the applicant’s written and oral 

statements, the internal consistency of each such statement, the 

consistency of such statements with other evidence of record and 

any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements, without 

regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 
5

goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim. 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2006).

A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or 

withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial 

evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Administrative findings of 

fact, including findings on credibility, are conclusive unless 

any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to decide to the 

contrary. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are 

reviewed de novo, “affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s 

interpretation of the INA and any attendant regulations.” Li 

Fang Lin v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This 

court will reverse the Board only if “the evidence . . . 

presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could 

fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.” EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 

n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). Furthermore, “[t]he agency decision that 

an alien is not eligible for asylum is ‘conclusive unless 

manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion.’” 

Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(D)).

We conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

adverse credibility finding. The inconsistencies noted by the 

immigration judge were not minor errors, but were critical to 
6

Ngwa’s claim that he suffered past persecution. See Camara, 378 

F.3d at 369. The immigration judge was not obligated to accept 

Ngwa’s explanations for the inconsistencies. Dankam v. 

Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 122 (4th Cir. 2007). We further 

conclude that substantial evidence supports the finding that 

Ngwa did not establish eligibility for relief based on 

independent evidence. We also conclude that the immigration 

judge properly considered the independent evidence in finding 

that Ngwa was not eligible for relief under the CAT. We find 

the evidence does not support a different conclusion.

Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED