IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0246

Filed October 6, 2021

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

TERRENCE MARTEZ GORDON,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M. 

Fangman, Judge.

Terrence Gordon appeals his conviction for failure to appear. AFFIRMED.

Susan R. Stockdale, West Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Katie Krickbaum (until withdrawal) 

and Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
2

MAY, Judge.

Terrence Gordon appeals his conviction for failure to appear. We affirm.

I. Background

On June 5, 2018, Gordon pled guilty to five offenses. The same day, the

district court sentenced Gordon to prison. Consistent with the parties’ plea 

agreement, though, the court granted Gordon a “furlough” from custody and 

ordered him to report to jail on June 7, 2018, at 4:00 p.m. But Gordon did not 

report to jail on June 7 at 4:00 p.m. So the court issued a warrant. Over a year 

later, in September 2019, Gordon was finally arrested. The State charged Gordon 

with failure to appear. The matter proceeded to a jury trial, and Gordon was 

convicted as charged. On appeal, Gordon challenges the jury instructions and the 

sufficiency of the evidence.1

II. Standard of Review

“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of 

errors at law.” State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 490 (Iowa 2017). “Our standard 

of review for rulings on questions of statutory interpretation is also for correction of 

errors at law.” State v. Coleman, 907 N.W.2d 124, 134 (Iowa 2018). “We likewise 

review challenges to jury instructions for correction of errors at law.” Id. 

III. Discussion

First, we address Gordon’s challenge to the jury instructions. Gordon takes 

issue with the marshalling instruction, which provided:

1. On June 5, 2018, the [d]efendant was released in 

connection with a charge which constitutes a felony.

 

1 Gordon also raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. But we may not 

address those claims on direct appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.7 (2019).
3

2. On June 7, 2018, [t]he [d]efendant willfully failed to appear 

before the [c]ourt or its designee, the Black Hawk County Sheriff.

If the State has proven all of the above elements, the 

defendant is guilty of [f]ailure to [a]ppear. If the State has failed to 

prove any of the above elements, the defendant is not guilty.

Gordon claims this instruction was inconsistent with the failure-to-appear statute,

Iowa Code section 811.2(8). It provides in relevant part:

Any person who, having been released pursuant to this section, 

willfully fails to appear before any court or magistrate as required 

shall, in addition to the forfeiture of any security given or pledged for 

the person's release, if the person was released in connection with a 

charge which constitutes a felony, or while awaiting sentence or 

pending appeal after conviction of any public offense, be guilty of a 

class “D” felony.

Iowa Code § 811.2(8). Gordon notes that—although the marshalling instruction

permitted the jury to convict Gordon if he failed to appear before “the [c]ourt or its 

designee, the Black Hawk County Sheriff”—the statute makes no mention of a 

court’s “designee.” Rather, by its plain terms, the statute only prohibits “fail[ure] to 

appear before any court or magistrate.” So, Gordon argues, the instruction 

misstated the law.

But our supreme court has addressed this very issue in State v. Jackson, 

488 N.W.2d 701, 704–05 (Iowa 1992) (en banc). There, a majority of the en banc 

court concluded “the Black Hawk County Jail, or the sheriff are the proper 

designees of the district court and the failure to appear at the jail violate[s] the 

court’s order and subject[s] [a defendant] to criminal liability under 

section 811.2(8).” Jackson, 488 N.W.2d at 705. Given this controlling precedent, 

we must conclude the instruction accurately stated the law. So the district court 

did not err in instructing the jury.
4

Next, we address Gordon’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim. He argues 

there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction because he never “willfully 

fail[ed] to appear before any court or magistrate as required.” See Iowa Code 

§ 811.2(8). As discussed, though, Jackson interpreted section 811.2(8) to also 

criminalize failure to appear to a sheriff or jail as the court or magistrate’s designee

(as Gordon failed to do). Recognizing this, Gordon asks us to overturn Jackson. 

But “[w]e are not at liberty to overturn Iowa Supreme Court precedent.”

2

 State v. 

Hastings, 466 N.W.2d 697, 700 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990). Rather, in all cases, “we

must follow the precedents of our supreme court.” NCJC, Inc. v. WMG, L.C., 

No. 19-0241, 2020 WL 2478670, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. May 13, 2020), aff’d on

further review, 960 N.W.2d 58 (Iowa 2021). Applying Jackson here, we conclude 

there was sufficient evidence to support Gordon’s conviction because he failed to 

appear before the court’s designee. So we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

 

2 Gordon asked the supreme court to retain this case to determine if Jackson

should be overruled. But the supreme court declined to retain the case and 

transferred it to this court.