1The HONORABLE PAUL A. MAGNUSON, Chief Judge, United States

District Court for the District of Minnesota.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 98-2338

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of Minnesota

Cleophus Jordan, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: February 1, 1999

 Filed: March 19, 1999

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Before McMILLIAN, LOKEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

After a jury found Cleophus Jordan guilty of possessing cocaine base with

intent to distribute, the district court1 sentenced him to 240 months imprisonment and

ten years supervised release. Jordan appeals his conviction and sentence, and we

affirm.

Jordan first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to

suppress physical evidence. We review for clear error the facts supporting a district
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court’s denial of a motion to suppress, and review de novo the legal conclusions

based upon those facts, see United States v. Cunningham, 133 F.3d 1070, 1072 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1823 (1998), giving due weight to inferences drawn by

resident judges and local law enforcement officers from such historical facts, see

United States v. Ball, 90 F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1996). At the suppression hearing,

the government’s witnesses testified as follows.

On August 29, 1997, Minneapolis Police Sergeant James Murphy, a twentyfour year veteran of narcotics enforcement, received an anonymous tip that a Chevy

Blazer with tinted windows and Michigan plates had just arrived from Detroit with

over $80,000 in crack cocaine in hidden compartments, and that the Blazer was

parked behind a specified address and was to depart soon. Sergeant Murphy and

several narcotics officers immediately went to the address, and noticed a Chevy

Tahoe with tinted windows and Michigan plates parked behind the address. The

address was associated with drug activity, and was in the vicinity of “a lot” of crack

houses; moreover, police knew that “Detroit Boys”--small, tightly knit groups that

brought drugs from Detroit--actively sold drugs in the area. Shortly after the officers’

arrival, a person later identified as Jordan drove the Tahoe in a manner that in

Sergeant Murphy’s experience suggested Jordan was trying to determine whether he

was being followed.

After a marked squad car stopped the Tahoe, uniformed officers asked Jordan

to step out of the vehicle. The officers then placed Jordan against the Tahoe, ordered

him to put his hands over his head, and escorted him towards the squad car. When

Sergeant Murphy looked through the Tahoe’s passenger window and noticed a digital

scale, Jordan was arrested and during an ensuing search, over $1,000 in $10 and $20

bills was seized from his person. The Tahoe was then subjected to a canine sniff,

which indicated the presence of drugs. After obtaining a warrant, authorities found

over 120 grams of crack cocaine hidden along the Tahoe’s running boards.
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At a minimum, the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle based

on information verifying the anonymous tip, as well as Sergeant Murphy’s knowledge

about drug activity in the area and his belief that Jordan was engaging in countersurveillance. See United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1124-25 (8th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1139 (1996). The subsequent plain view of the digital scale in

the Tahoe provided probable cause to believe contraband was present in the vehicle

or on Jordan, and thus to arrest and search Jordan, and to subject the Tahoe to a

canine sniff. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); Conrod v. Davis,

120 F.3d 92, 96 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1531 (1998). We also

conclude the officers’ treatment of Jordan in the moments between the stop and

discovery of the scale did not amount to a de facto arrest, because such treatment was

consistent with the officers’ right to insure their safety and was not more intrusive

than necessary. See United States v. Beck, 140 F.3d 1129, 1134 (8th Cir. 1998).

Jordan also argues that his 1989 conviction for being a prisoner in possession

of contraband, see Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 800.281(4) (West 1998)--for which he

had been sentenced to serve between one and five years imprisonment--was not a

prior “felony drug offense” for purposes of sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(b)(1)(A). See 21 U.S.C. § 802(44). We disagree. Jordan’s reliance on United

States v. Pazzanese, 982 F.2d 251 (8th Cir. 1992) (“catch-all” offense not directly

prohibiting or restricting drug conduct, and involving no mental culpability with

respect to substantive narcotics offense was not “felony drug offense”) is misplaced.

See United States v. Henderson-Durand, 985 F.2d 970, 975 n.8 (8th Cir.) (prior

conviction for introducing drugs at penal institute was prior “felony drug offense”;

Pazzanese distinguishable because Henderson-Durand violated law which specifically

prohibited drug activity), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 856 (1993).

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.
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Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.