[Cite as In re J.S., 136 Ohio St.3d 8, 2013-Ohio-1721.] 

IN RE J.S. 

[Cite as In re J.S., 136 Ohio St.3d 8, 2013-Ohio-1721.] 

Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 

(No. 2012-0118—Submitted January 9, 2013—Decided May 1, 2013.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 96637, 2011-Ohio-6280. 

__________________ 

{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and KENNEDY, JJ., concur. 

 LANZINGER, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J., dissenting.

{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the decision to dismiss this case as 

having been improvidently accepted. This case, involving as it does a seriousyouthful-offender (“SYO”) sentence under R.C. 2152.13, is one of public or great 

general interest. 

{¶ 3} We accepted the state’s proposition of law: 

A sentencing error that is not timely appealed, and is 

unrelated to a juvenile court’s decision to invoke an adult prison 

sentence against a serious youthful offender, cannot be used to 

nullify the adult portion of the juvenile’s blended sentence. 

In re J.S., 131 Ohio St.3d 1509, 2012-Ohio-1710, 965 N.E.2d 310. 

{¶ 4} The court of appeals itself noted the importance of this case: “We 

are troubled by the fact that J.S. was serving a void sentence when he committed 
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the act constituting rape. We are aware that the SYO law in Ohio is relatively new 

and this case appears to be one of first impression.” 2011-Ohio-6280, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 5} At the very least, we should answer the appellate court’s concern 

over this new type of sentence and explain exactly how the “void/voidable” line 

of cases applies or does not apply. Allowing the opinion of the court of appeals to 

stand without comment leaves many questions unanswered: What exactly is an 

SYO sentence? Is it a single sentence with a juvenile and an adult portion, or is it 

instead separately a juvenile and an adult sentence? If it is a sentence with two 

portions, as characterized by the court of appeals, id. at ¶ 3, does an error in one 

portion cause the SYO sentence to be only partially void, as suggested in State v. 

Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332? 

{¶ 6} This case illustrates again the problems in allowing unlimited 

correction of sentences through collateral attack. Rather than dismissing this 

appeal as having been improvidently accepted, we should attempt to clarify the 

law. 

I. This Court’s “Void/Voidable” Decisions Have Generated Confusion

{¶ 7} Recent history has shown that the court’s decisions in this area 

have been confusing and inconsistent, weakening res judicata and casting serious 

doubt over the jurisdiction of trial courts and courts of appeals. See State v. 

Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 N.E.2d 960, at ¶ 20, fn. 3 

(Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). A prime example of 

inconsistency can be found in Fischer’s overruling of a critical portion of the 

seminal case of State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 

961, and this court’s later citation approving Bezak’s overruled language in 

Billiter. Billiter at ¶ 21 (Lanzinger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

 In Fischer, this court stated that part of Bezak had been decided 

erroneously: 
January Term, 2013 

3 

[W]e now modify the second sentence in the Bezak syllabus as illconsidered. That sentence states that the offender is entitled to a 

new sentencing hearing for the offense for which postrelease 

control was not imposed properly. 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio3250, 868 N.E.2d 961. It does not recognize a principle that we 

overlooked in Bezak: when an appellate court concludes that a 

sentence imposed by a trial court is in part void, only the portion 

that is void may be vacated or otherwise amended. 

Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 28. But even 

though Fischer stated that sentences unauthorized by law are only “in part void,” 

Billiter then directly contradicted this notion: “As we have consistently stated, if 

a trial court imposes a sentence that is unauthorized by law, the sentence is void.” 

(Emphasis added.) Billiter at ¶ 10. It is hard to believe that Fischer has clarified 

the law when a later case states that it is being consistent in directly contradicting 

it. 

{¶ 8} While the inconsistency is troubling, the expansion of Fischer

beyond the boundaries it originally established is even more problematic. Fischer 

was explicitly limited to “a discrete vein of cases: those in which a court does not 

properly impose a statutorily mandated period of postrelease control.” Fischer at 

¶ 31. There the majority stated, “[I]t is likely that our work in this regard is 

drawing to a close, at least for purposes of void sentences.” Id. But in spite of 

this reassuring language, the court proceeded to expand Fischer’s holding over 

the course of the next two years in State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-

Ohio-1908, 972 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 15 (applying Fischer in concluding that “[b]ecause 

a mandatory driver’s license suspension is a statutorily mandated term, we hold 

that a trial court’s failure to include this term in a criminal sentence renders the 

sentence void in part”); Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 
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N.E.2d 960, at ¶ 13 (“Billiter’s conviction and sentence for escape based on a 

postrelease-control error do not fall outside the scope of our decision in Fischer. 

Therefore, Billiter is not barred by res judicata from arguing that his plea is void 

due to the trial court’s incorrect imposition of postrelease control”); and State v. 

Moore, 135 Ohio St.3d 151, 2012-Ohio-5479, 985 N.E.2d 432, ¶ 14 (“Because [a 

statutorily mandated] fine is a statutory punishment, the trial court’s failure to 

impose the fine when an affidavit of indigency is not filed with the court prior to 

the filing of the trial court’s journal entry of sentencing renders that part of the 

sentence void”). This expansion of the rule of Fischer from the original cases, in 

which a court does not properly impose a statutorily mandated period of 

postrelease control, to an increasing number of non-postrelease-control cases, in 

which the court failed to comply with a statute, has led to confusion. It is unclear 

whether Fischer truly applies to the “discrete vein of cases” identified in its text, 

subject to certain exceptions as recognized by this court, or whether, contrary to 

its language, Fischer applies to any case in which a court failed to comply with a 

statutory provision. 

{¶ 9} Clearly, our work is not concluded, and despite today’s decision, 

we will continue to be confronted with cases involving sentencing errors. In fact, 

we have recently ordered briefing in a certified-conflict case on the following 

question: 

Does a trial court have jurisdiction to resentence a 

defendant for the purpose of imposing mandatory postrelease 

control regarding a particular conviction, when the defendant has 

served the stated prison term regarding that conviction, but has yet 

to serve the entirety of the aggregate prison sentence, when all of 

the convictions which led to the aggregate sentence resulted from a 

single indictment? 
January Term, 2013 

5 

State v. Holdcroft, 133 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2012-Ohio-4650, 975 N.E.2d 1028. 

Perhaps even more significantly, after oral argument in the present case, a 

majority of this court recognized the confusion surrounding our void-sentence 

jurisprudence when we accepted jurisdiction in Lingo v. State, Supreme Court 

case No. 2012-1774. 134 Ohio St.3d 1448, 2013-Ohio-347, 982 N.E.2d 727, 

appeal accepted from 8th Dist. No. 97537, 2012-Ohio-2391. The second 

proposition of law accepted in Lingo states, “Any attempt by a municipal court to 

impose additional court costs beyond that which is authorized by statute is void 

and not merely voidable.” The possibility of expanding Fischer will continue to 

prompt parties to argue its application in an even wider range of cases. See, e.g., 

memorandum in support of jurisdiction in State v. Mowery, Supreme Court case 

No. 2012-1917, appeal not accepted, 134 Ohio St.3d 1469, 2013-Ohio-553, 983 

N.E.2d 369 (arguing that a sentence that does not include the statutorily required 

determination of allied offenses is void, is not precluded from appellate review by 

principles of res judicata, and may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or 

collateral attack). These cases are not aberrations, but instead signal that this area 

of law is far from settled. 

{¶ 10} In the case now before us, neither party appealed the original and 

erroneous 2007 sentence within 30 days. Although the majority declines to 

consider this case, I believe that it is not entirely clear how precedent should 

apply to J.S.’s situation. We should address the merits of these issues raised on 

appeal and decide what effect, if any, Fischer has on SYO sentences. 

II. The Need to Rectify the “Void/Voidable” Problem 

{¶ 11} A decision in this case could help to provide order to this area of 

the law. Now is the proper time to closely reexamine the void-sentence doctrine 

to reaffirm basic principles of our jurisprudence. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

A. A Sentencing Error Is Voidable and Does Not Mean that the Court Lacked 

Jurisdiction 

{¶ 12} It is axiomatic that a judgment by a court lacking jurisdiction is 

void, and thus subject to collateral attack at any time, while a judgment by a court 

that has made an error in exercising jurisdiction is voidable, and thus subject to 

correction only on direct appeal. State v. Payne, 114 Ohio St.3d 502, 2007-Ohio4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 27. Stated another way, a court with subject-matter 

jurisdiction might impose an erroneous sentence, one that, because it does not 

comply completely with a statute, is contrary to law. That error may be corrected 

(i.e., the sentence is voidable) and then will have no effect once it is vacated. But 

a judgment that is void is rendered by a court without jurisdiction and is of no 

effect from the beginning—it was a nullity. Before the recent void-sentence 

cases, Ohio law provided that errors made by a court having jurisdiction were 

voidable and correctable only on direct appeal, even when the errors involved 

significant matters of criminal procedure. We clearly explained the difference 

between void and voidable judgments when analyzing a court’s failure to convene 

a statutorily mandated three-judge panel in a death-penalty case in Pratts v. 

Hurley, 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992: 

The failure of a court to convene a three-judge panel, as 

required by R.C. 2945.06, does not constitute a lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction that renders the trial court’s judgment void ab 

initio and subject to collateral attack in habeas corpus. It 

constitutes an error in the court’s exercise of jurisdiction that must 

be raised on direct appeal. 
January Term, 2013 

7 

Id. at syllabus. Likewise, we held that a court’s failure to properly obtain a 

waiver of jury trial did not render a sentence void in State ex rel. Waver v. 

Gallagher, 105 Ohio St.3d 134, 2005-Ohio-780, 823 N.E.2d 449, ¶ 7: 

[E]ven if Waver’s claims could be construed to challenge his 1999 

sentence following remand from the court of appeals, his R.C. 

2945.05 jury-trial-waiver claim is not cognizable in mandamus or 

prohibition. Kelley v. Wilson, 103 Ohio St.3d 201, 2004-Ohio4883, 814 N.E.2d 1222, ¶ 7; State ex rel. Billings v. Friedland

(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 237, 238, 724 N.E.2d 1151 (“any failure to 

comply with R.C. 2945.05 may be remedied only in a direct appeal 

from a criminal conviction and not by extraordinary writ”); State v. 

Pless (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 333, 658 N.E.2d 766, paragraph two 

of the syllabus (“The failure to comply with R.C. 2945.05 may be 

remedied only in a direct appeal from a criminal conviction”). 

{¶ 13} The foregoing cases acknowledged the common understanding of 

the terms “void” and “voidable.” The United States Supreme Court has made the 

same distinction: 

A void judgment is a legal nullity. See Black’s Law 

Dictionary 1822 (3d ed.1933); see also id., at 1709 (9th ed.2009). 

Although the term “void” describes a result, rather than the 

conditions that render a judgment unenforceable, it suffices to say 

that a void judgment is one so affected by a fundamental infirmity 

that the infirmity may be raised even after the judgment becomes 

final. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments 22 (1980); see 

generally id., §12. * * * 
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8 

“A judgment is not void,” for example, “simply because it 

is or may have been erroneous. ” Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 6 

(C.A. 1, 1995). 

(Emphasis added.) United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 

270, 130 S.Ct. 1367, 176 L.Ed.2d 158 (2010). 

B. Felony-Sentencing Error Is to Be Corrected Within Statutory Time 

{¶ 14} The principle that a sentence contrary to law may be corrected only 

on direct appeal comports with R.C. 2953.08, a statute that allows the state (R.C. 

2953.08(B)(2)) as well as the defendant (R.C. 2953.08(A)(4)) to appeal a felony 

sentence that is “contrary to law.” What has been overlooked by this court is that 

the General Assembly also determined that time limits still apply for these 

appeals: 

A defendant, prosecuting attorney, city director of law, 

village solicitor, or chief municipal legal officer shall file an 

appeal of a sentence under this section to a court of appeals within 

the time limits specified in Rule 4(B) of the Rules of Appellate 

Procedure, provided that if the appeal is pursuant to division 

(B)(3) of this section, the time limits specified in that rule shall not 

commence running until the court grants the motion that makes the 

sentence modification in question. 

(Emphasis added.) R.C. 2953.08(E).

{¶ 15} Thus, our earlier precedent—as well as the specific language of 

R.C. 2953.08, which broadened the state’s right to appeal felony sentences 

contrary to law—made clear that errors were to be appealed within 30 days by 

either party. Beginning with the postrelease-control cases, however, by holding 
January Term, 2013 

9 

that sentencing errors are subject to collateral challenge, the court has taken the 

word “void,” which has a precise, legal definition referring to instances in which a 

court acts without jurisdiction, and has altered its definition to include certain 

instances in which a court acts contrary to statute. This has led to a slippery 

slope. 

{¶ 16} Neither the state nor defendants can be certain when judgments are 

final and when they are subject to collateral attack. For instance, if a trial court 

fails to convene a three-judge panel as mandated by R.C. 2945.06, is this error 

correctable only on appeal pursuant to Pratts or has that case been overruled by 

Fischer, meaning that it is subject to collateral attack? And if a trial court fails to 

obtain a written waiver of jury trial as mandated by R.C. 2945.05, does the line of 

cases culminating in Waver apply, so the error can be addressed only on direct 

appeal, or is this yet another case in which Fischer applies? This court has placed 

itself in this quandary by explicitly limiting application of Fischer to a “discrete 

vein of cases” but then allowing the decisions in Harris, Billiter, and Moore to 

poke holes into the limitation. In other words, the court’s recent decisions seem 

to imply that Fischer says that all sentencing errors are subject to collateral attack, 

but this implication directly contradicts the express limitation contained within 

Fischer. Thus, no one knows whether the court might find a judgment subject to 

collateral attack from one case to the next, at least until this court makes a 

decision on the particular sentencing error at issue in the case. 

{¶ 17} And if judgments are subject to collateral attack, it often remains 

unclear whether the proper remedy is a de novo resentencing (based upon this 

court’s approving citation of Bezak in the opinion in Billiter), a resentencing 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.191 (based upon State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 

2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958), a limited resentencing by the trial court 

(pursuant to Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332), a 

correction by the court of appeals without remand (pursuant to Fischer, ¶ 29-30), 
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or another method of correction. It should come as no surprise then that in this 

case, the state has taken a completely different position from the one that it 

recently took in oral argument in State v. Harris, 132 Ohio St.3d 318, 2012-Ohio1908, 972 N.E.2d 509. In Harris, the state argued that for those sentencing errors 

in which a court had a duty to act yet failed to act, a sentence was rendered partly 

void pursuant to Fischer. For sentencing errors in which a court issued a sentence 

unauthorized by law, the state argued, the sentence was rendered fully void and 

subject to de novo resentencing pursuant to State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 

2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864. Oral argument in case Nos. 2011-0008 and 

2011-0010 (Nov. 15, 2011). But now in J.S., the state argues that a court’s 

imposition of a sentence unauthorized by law—in this case, a sentence that 

included an unauthorized indefinite prison term—renders the sentence partly void 

pursuant to Fischer. The state’s shifting position stems at least partly from our 

imprecision in this area. 

C. Extension of the Void-Sentence Doctrine Could Have Dire Consequences 

{¶ 18} Continued expansion of the void-sentence doctrine beyond the 

context of postrelease control weakens Ohio law by further calling into question 

the finality of sentences. Besides res judicata, jurisdiction is affected: other 

actions of the courts—for example, arraignments and decisions on allied and 

lesser included offenses—are at risk of being declared void if a trial court fails to 

follow every letter of every statute. This conclusion is almost mandated by 

Fischer, which declares that “a sentence that is not in accordance with statutorily 

mandated terms is void.” Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 

N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 8. Because this court has equated judicial actions that are 

contrary to law or “not in accordance with statutorily mandated terms” to actions 

that are void, the number of judicial actions subject to collateral attack under this 

court’s conception of what is void is limited only by the number of statutes 
January Term, 2013 

11 

mandating that a court act in a specific way and the creativity of the attorney 

challenging the court’s action. 

{¶ 19} The irony is that by allowing collateral challenges to actions not in 

accordance with statutorily mandated terms, this court itself has acted contrary to 

law. This is because R.C. 2953.08, in conjunction with the appellate rules, 

provides that both the state and defendants may challenge court actions that are 

contrary to law only within the 30-day period provided for direct appeal. In 

ignoring this time mandate and allowing for court actions that are contrary to law 

to be collaterally attacked at any time, this court acts in violation of R.C. 2953.08. 

In other words, this court’s decisions allowing for the collateral attack on socalled void sentences are themselves void because they are not in accordance with 

statutorily mandated terms. 

{¶ 20} Clearly, this paradoxical result is not desirable, and it is in our best 

interest to create a resolution. Holding that the principle of voidness allows for 

appellate review of court actions beyond 30 days means holding that the 

sentencing court never had the power to act, when in fact, the court merely acted 

in error while exercising its power. Raising statutory errors to the level of “super 

error” rendering a court’s actions void, as if those actions had not occurred, 

weakens the judiciary and raises a separation-of-powers issue. If statutory errors 

are not voidable, but rather void, then the General Assembly through its statutes 

controls the courts in any number of areas traditionally left to the courts’ 

discretion. 

III. Potential Solutions

{¶ 21} Although the void-sentence doctrine originally began as a way to 

correct errors in the imposition of postrelease control beyond the time allotted for 

direct appeal, the doctrine has expanded to allow correction of other sentencing 

errors. We must limit the misuse of the term “void” before it encompasses any 

number of cases in which a court acts contrary to statute. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

{¶ 22} The best option would be for the court to return to the traditional 

meanings of “void” and “voidable” and require the correction of all errors during 

the 30-day period that the General Assembly has provided for direct appeal. R.C. 

2953.08(E). If this court wishes to allow for appeals of sentences at any time, 

without limitation, it should amend App.R. 4(B), which is specifically referred to 

in R.C. 2953.08(E). 

{¶ 23} I offer this suggestion with the caveat that this system has been 

tried and rejected by the federal courts. As noted in my dissent in Fischer: 

More than two decades ago, language was eliminated from 

the federal rules that allowed courts to correct an “illegal sentence” 

at any time. P.L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2015. Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a) 

now provides, “Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may 

correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or 

other clear error.” However, if a federal sentencing error is not 

correctable under this rule or under Fed.R.Crim.P. 36 as a clerical 

error, it may be corrected only on direct appeal or, in limited cases, 

by a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2255, Title 28, U.S.Code. 

See generally United States v. Collins (Apr. 26, 2010), N.D.Ill. No. 

04 CR 709, 2010 WL 1727852. 

Id., 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 50 (Lanzinger, J., 

dissenting). 

IV. The Procedure for Appealing SYO Sentences 

{¶ 24} R.C. 2152.13 sets forth the requirements for the SYO dispositional 

sentence. The statute states: 
January Term, 2013 

13 

[A] juvenile court may impose a serious youthful offender 

dispositional sentence on a child [under circumstances that require 

the juvenile court to impose upon the child a serious youthful 

offender dispositional sentence under R.C. 2152.11] only if the 

prosecuting attorney of the county in which the delinquent act 

allegedly occurred initiates the process against the child in 

accordance with this division, and the child is an alleged 

delinquent child who is eligible for the dispositional sentence. 

The procedure for invoking the adult portion of an SYO sentence is provided in 

R.C. 2152.14: 

(A)(1) The director of youth services may request the 

prosecuting attorney of the county in which is located the juvenile 

court that imposed a serious youthful offender dispositional 

sentence upon a person under section 2152.121 or 2152.13 of the 

Revised Code to file a motion with that juvenile court to invoke the 

adult portion of the dispositional sentence if all of the following 

apply to the person: 

(a) The person is at least fourteen years of age. 

(b) The person is in the institutional custody, or an escapee 

from the custody, of the department of youth services. 

(c) The person is serving the juvenile portion of the serious 

youthful offender dispositional sentence. 

(2) The motion shall state that there is reasonable cause to 

believe that either of the following misconduct has occurred and 

shall state that at least one incident of misconduct of that nature 

occurred after the person reached fourteen years of age: 
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(a) The person committed an act that is a violation of the 

rules of the institution and that could be charged as any felony or 

as a first degree misdemeanor offense of violence if committed by 

an adult. 

(b) The person has engaged in conduct that creates a 

substantial risk to the safety or security of the institution, the 

community, or the victim. 

 

{¶ 25} I maintain my belief that appeals must be filed within 30 days of 

the judgment that imposes the sentence. The timing of appeals of SYO sentences, 

however, differs slightly from traditional appeals because an SYO sentence has 

two parts: a juvenile portion and a stayed adult portion. Although the juvenile 

portion must be appealed within 30 days after the sentence is originally imposed, 

it is possible that the juvenile need not appeal the adult portion until the court 

actually invokes the prison term at the request of the state. See R.C. 

2152.13(D)(3). In this way, the adult portions of SYO sentences are akin to 

community-control sentences, which may also be appealed if the court imposes a 

prison term for violation of the community-control period. See, e.g., State v. 

Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, ¶ 2-3; State v. 

Fraley, 105 Ohio St.3d 13, 2004-Ohio-7110, 821 N.E.2d 995, ¶ 5-6 (direct 

appeals followed the trial courts’ imposition of prison time for the defendants’ 

violation of community control). 

{¶ 26} In this case, J.S. filed direct appeals each time the juvenile court 

granted the state’s motion to invoke the adult portion of his sentence. On the first 

appeal, the court of appeals reached a proper conclusion when it remanded the 

case because of inconsistencies within the SYO disposition journal entry and 
January Term, 2013 

15 

because that entry contained sentences not authorized by law.1 In re J.S., 8th 

Dist. No. 95365, 2010-Ohio-6199, ¶ 6. However, on the second appeal, the court 

of appeals concluded improperly that the juvenile court erred when it invoked the 

adult portion of J.S.’s sentence. The court of appeals concluded that J.S. had been 

serving a void sentence and that because the sentence was void, the adult portion 

of his sentence could not be invoked. In re J.S., 8th Dist. No. 96637, 2011-Ohio6280, ¶ 16. 

{¶ 27} The fault in the Eighth District’s analysis is that J.S.’s sentence 

was never void. There were errors in the original sentence, but those errors—

which arose during the juvenile court’s exercise of its valid jurisdiction over 

J.S.—made the sentence voidable. In accordance with the proper procedure, J.S. 

appealed the invocation of the adult portion of his sentence when the juvenile 

court first invoked the adult prison term, and the court of appeals properly 

remanded the case so that the errors could be corrected. With the sentence 

corrected, the juvenile court was permitted to invoke the adult portion of J.S.’s 

sentence, and the court of appeals erred when it held that the juvenile court could 

not do so. I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals on its holding that 

J.S.’s sentence was void, and I would hold that the juvenile court had the 

authority to invoke the adult portion of the sentence on remand from the first 

appeal. 

V. Conclusion 

{¶ 28} Given the uncertainties surrounding the application of this court’s 

void-sentence doctrine involving SYO sentences, I dissent from this court’s 

decision to dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently accepted. I would 

take the opportunity to clarify Ohio law regarding void sentences. Because the 

 

1. The Eighth District noted that the sentence included a valid agreed sentence of nine years but 

also included unauthorized indefinite sentences. In re J.S., 8th Dist. No. 95365, 2010-Ohio-6199, 

¶ 7. 
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juvenile court did not lack the authority to invoke the adult portion of J.S.’s SYO 

sentence after he was resentenced on remand following the first appeal in this 

case, I would reverse the decision of the Eighth District and hold that the juvenile 

court properly invoked the adult portion of his sentence. 

FRENCH and O’NEILL, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

 William Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Kristen 

Sobieski, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sheryl A. Trzaska, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellee. 

______________________