Filed 8/7/23 P. v. Estrada CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MAXIMO GONZALES ESTRADA,

Defendant and Appellant.

B321175

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. KA020112)

THE COURT:

Maximo Estrada purports to appeal from a proceeding 

pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin). 

He contends an appeal is authorized under Penal Code1 section 

1237, subdivision (b) because his substantial rights were violated 

by ineffective assistance of counsel and the superior court’s 

failure to provide him with a Spanish language interpreter. We 

appointed counsel to represent Estrada on appeal. After 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2

examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising 

no issues and asking this court to independently review the 

record and address any arguments raised by appellant in a 

supplemental brief in accordance with People v. Delgadillo

(2022)14 Cal.5th 216, 369–370. Appellant filed his own 

supplemental brief, in propria persona.

Having reviewed the record below, we conclude the 

superior court made no order affecting appellant’s substantial 

rights. Hence, the appeal from the Franklin proceeding on 

May 25, 2022, is not from an appealable order under section 

1237, subdivision (b), and must be dismissed.

BACKGROUND

On June 20, 1994, appellant was convicted by jury of two 

counts of kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (b); counts 1 & 2), 

two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 3 & 4), two

counts of assault with great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); 

counts 5 & 6), and one count of attempt to burn (§ 455; count 7). 

The jury found true the allegation as to each of the seven counts 

that appellant personally used a metal rod in the commission of 

the offense (§ 12022, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced 

appellant to consecutive indeterminate life sentences with the 

possibility of parole plus six years on counts 1 and 2. The court 

also imposed and stayed sentence on counts 3, 4, 5, and 6, and 

imposed a concurrent term of three years on count 7.

On February 8, 2020, appellant filed a motion for a 

Franklin proceeding pursuant to section 1203.01 and In re Cook

(2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), in which he sought the opportunity 

to gather mitigating evidence regarding his youth-related 

characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offenses to be 

presented at a future youthful offender parole hearing before the 
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California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)

regarding appellant’s suitability for parole. Finding that 

appellant was 24 years old when he committed the offenses that 

resulted in his life sentence, the superior court appointed counsel 

to represent appellant and set the matter for a status conference.

Appellant was present with counsel for the Franklin

proceeding, which took place on May 25, 2022. Through counsel,

appellant provided the court with a psychological assessment 

performed by Haig J. Kojian, Ph.D. Dr. Kojian based his 

evaluation of appellant on a clinical interview, cognitive tests,

and a personality assessment inventory. After describing

appellant’s childhood, education, and cognitive development,

Dr. Kojian applied the factors outlined in Miller v. Alabama

(2012) 567 U.S. 460 to recommend that appellant’s particular 

issues arising from a difficult and challenging upbringing along 

with the Franklin factors be considered as factors in mitigation in 

any future parole hearings.

The court also accepted the following documents for 

inclusion in appellant’s mitigation packet to be forwarded to the 

CDCR: a letter from the Amity Foundation dated October 10, 

2019, verifying appellant’s acceptance into its resident program 

in Los Angeles; a document from Circle Tree Ranch, a substance 

abuse treatment program;

2 and summaries of interviews 

2 The appellant’s opening brief describes this document as 

“a letter from Circle Tree Ranch verifying appellant’s acceptance 

into it[s] substance abuse treatment program.” However, the 

document contained in the record on appeal is not a letter, and it

does not pertain to Estrada at all. Rather, it appears to be an 

incomplete printout of a Web site that contains a partial 

description of Circle Tree Ranch’s programs.
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conducted by defense investigator Eduardo L. Hernandez. The

People did not stipulate to the authenticity of the documents or 

agree with any conclusions stated therein, but did not object to 

admission of the documents into the record.

The superior court accepted the mitigation packet pursuant 

to section 3051 and ordered that the original be transmitted to 

CDCR forthwith for use at any future parole hearing. At the 

conclusion of the proceeding, the court assured appellant that the 

Franklin packet would be forwarded to the CDCR immediately. 

The court then advised appellant it was ordering that he be

returned to state prison forthwith or at the earliest opportunity. 

Finally, the court confirmed with appellant’s counsel that there 

was nothing else that appellant wished to include in his 

mitigation packet.

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal in which he alleged 

the Franklin proceeding was flawed and his due process rights 

violated because: (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel 

based on counsel’s failure to meet with him, interview him, or 

explain his rights or what to expect from the proceedings; (2) the 

court failed to provide a Spanish language interpreter at the 

Franklin proceeding, thereby preventing appellant from 

understanding what transpired in his case because he does not 

speak or write English; and (3) appellant understood he would be 

“going home” at the conclusion of the Franklin proceeding, but 

instead was returned to state prison.

DISCUSSION

In his supplemental brief, appellant seeks “resentenc[ing] 

as a youth offender” based upon the allegations set forth in his

notice of appeal. He argues that he has already served 
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substantial time on his sentence and “deserve[s] another chance 

and compassion.”

Appellant characterizes the Franklin proceeding as a 

postjudgment order affecting his substantial rights, which is 

appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b). However, the 

superior court made just two orders at the Franklin proceeding, 

neither of which involved any findings of fact or legal rulings. 

Accordingly, these orders did not affect appellant’s substantial 

rights and are not appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).

The first order was that the original mitigation packet be 

“transmitted to the Department of Corrections forthwith for use 

at any future parole hearing on behalf of Mr. Estrada.” The court 

did not exclude any evidence from the mitigation packet or 

otherwise limit appellant’s ability to gather mitigating evidence 

regarding his youth-related characteristics and circumstances at 

the time of the offenses. (See Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 

p. 284.)

The goal of a proceeding pursuant to Franklin “is to provide 

an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the 

juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time 

of the offense so that the Board [of Parole Hearings], years later, 

may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’

youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether 

the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a 

serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law.’ ”

(Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284; Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 449.) However, a Franklin proceeding is not a “hearing,” and 

as our Supreme Court has explained, the distinction is important. 

“A hearing generally involves definitive issues of law or fact to be 

determined with a decision rendered based on that 
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determination. [Citations.] A proceeding is a broader term 

describing the form or manner of conducting judicial business 

before a court. [Citations.] While a judicial officer presides over 

a Franklin proceeding and regulates its conduct, the officer is not 

called upon to make findings of fact or render any final 

determination at the proceeding’s conclusion. Parole 

determination[s] are left to the Board [of Parole Hearings].” 

(Cook, at p. 449, fn. 3.)

In ordering that the mitigation packet be transmitted 

forthwith to the CDCR, the superior court made no findings of 

fact or legal ruling, but simply discharged the court’s ministerial 

obligation under Franklin to forward the information gathered to 

the CDCR for use in a future parole hearing. The court’s order

therefore did not affect appellant’s substantial rights and was not 

appealable under section 1237, subdivision (b).

The second order the superior court made was that 

appellant “be sent forthwith back to state prison.” Despite 

appellant’s evident misunderstanding of the purpose of a 

Franklin proceeding and his mistaken belief that he would be 

released at its conclusion, the superior court had no authority not 

to return appellant to the custody of the CDCR. The court made 

no findings of fact or legal rulings in ordering appellant back to 

state prison. Accordingly, the court’s order did not affect 

appellant’s substantial rights and was not appealable.

A Franklin proceeding does not reopen a final judgment or 

sentencing, nor does it function as a parole hearing. (People v. 

Lizarraga (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 201, 207.) Indeed, it has no 

bearing whatsoever on the validity of the judgment or sentence. 

(Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 450–451 [“Neither the entitlement 

to a youth offender parole hearing, nor the evidence preservation 
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process ‘disturb[s] the finality of state convictions’ ”].) Thus, 

despite a defendant’s entitlement to a Franklin proceeding, his or 

her original sentence remains in effect. (Franklin, supra, 63 

Cal.4th at pp. 278–279, 284; People v. White (2022) 86 

Cal.App.5th 1229, 1238 [“When a youth offender receives a

Franklin hearing, the offender ‘need not be resentenced’ because 

the sentence remains valid”].) In Cook, our Supreme Court held 

that a prisoner whose conviction is final may seek Franklin’s

evidence preservation remedy under the authority of section 

1203.01, which empowers the superior court, postjudgment, to 

“generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant 

and the crime to the [CDCR].” (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

pp. 446–447.) However, nothing in section 1203.01, Cook, or 

Franklin itself confers jurisdiction on a court to revisit the 

defendant’s sentence or consider his or her eligibility for parole. 

(White, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240.)

Here, contrary to appellant’s expectations, his original 

sentence remained in effect at the conclusion of the Franklin

proceeding. The superior court wholly lacked authority to modify 

appellant’s sentence or consider appellant’s eligibility for parole. 

Because appellant remained committed to the CDCR, the 

superior court’s order that he be returned to the state prison was 

nondiscretionary. It did not affect appellant’s substantial rights 

and was therefore not appealable under section 1237, 

subdivision (b).
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DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J. ASHMANN-GERST, J. HOFFSTADT, J.