1 

 2023 IL App (5th) 190456 

 NO. 5-19-0456 

 IN THE

 APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT

______________________________________________________________________________ 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) St. Clair County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 14-CF-914 

 ) 

ANTRELL TEEN, ) Honorable 

 ) Zina R. Cruse, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

 JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices Welch and Barberis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 

 OPINION

¶ 1 Defendant, Antrell Teen, files a direct appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction. 

On appeal, he argues that his speedy trial rights were violated, trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to pursue his speedy trial rights, and the court committed reversible error when it prevented 

Krankel counsel from performing his duties by barring him from presenting additional claims and 

evidence at the Krankel hearing (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)). For the following 

reasons, we disagree. 

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On June 29, 2014, defendant was charged by complaint with one count of aggravated 

battery for knowingly discharging a firearm, injuring Shanter Bonner, in violation of section 12-

3.05(e)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-3.05(e)(1) (West 2014)) and one 

NOTICE

Decision filed 11/15/23. The 

text of this decision may be 

changed or corrected prior to 

the filing of a Peti ion for 

Rehearing or the disposition of 

the same.
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count of first degree murder of Cassandra Holman in violation of section 9-1(a)(1) of the Code (id.

§ 9-1(a)(1)). On September 5, 2014, a superseding indictment was issued for the same charges. 

¶ 4 Defendant was apprehended in Missouri on December 11, 2015. He was processed into the 

St. Clair County jail on December 15, 2015, and his arraignment was held on December 23, 2015. 

At that time, Gregory Nester, from the public defender’s officer, was appointed as counsel. 

¶ 5 On December 28, 2015, Mark Peebles, from the public defender’s officer, was assigned to 

defendant’s case. Defense counsel filed a motion to reduce bond and a motion for discovery. A 

status conference was held on February 8, 2016. Defense counsel appeared at the hearing; 

defendant did not. At that time, the court ordered the proceedings to be continued. The written 

order stated the continuance was “by agreement.” 

¶ 6 At two subsequent status hearings—held on March 1, 2016, and March 30, 2016—the court 

again ordered the proceedings continued “by agreement/without objection.” Defense counsel 

appeared at both hearings; defendant did not attend either hearing. 

¶ 7 On April 20, 2016, defendant filed correspondence stating he “originally asked to exercise 

[his] right to a speedy trial December 16, 2015.” He asserted that it had been over 120 days since

his incarceration, and he was still in the county jail with no explanation. Defendant had not heard 

from his attorney, despite calling him several times and leaving a message. He also called his 

attorney’s direct supervisor. Defendant stated, “This letter is to inform the courts and all parties 

involved that I have not agreed to a delay of any kind and object.” The correspondence indicated 

this was the second letter written on that issue and stated it included a copy of the initial 

correspondence; however, the initial correspondence was not included. Defendant also filed a 

pro se motion to dismiss based on the noncompliance with his statutory speedy trial request (725 

ILCS 5/103-5(a), (d) (West 2016)). 
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¶ 8 A status hearing was held on April 28, 2016. Defense counsel and defendant appeared. The 

court acknowledged the demand for speedy trial and motion to dismiss. The court stated defendant 

was taken into custody around December 11, 2015, and the speedy trial period totaled 60 days on 

February 8, 2016. Its calculations revealed they were “at 60 days today,” and the case needed to 

be set and completed “within 60 days.” The State and defense counsel stated this was also their 

understanding. The court inquired, “And your understanding, Mr. Teen?” Defendant responded, 

“I do understand now.” The court clarified the issue stating, “Mr. Teen indicates ‘now,’ because 

off the record we discussed how those numbers are tolled, or not.” 

¶ 9 Thereafter, the court and counsel discussed possible trial dates. The State and defendant 

indicated their acceptance of a May 23, 2016, trial date, but defense counsel stated he did not 

believe he would be ready. The trial court informed defense counsel, “You have no choice. This 

is his demand. He has that right. You’re going to have to get ready.” 

¶ 10 On May 2, 2016, the trial court issued a written order canceling the May 23, 2016, setting. 

The order noted that the State argued it was ready for trial on May 9, 2016, but defense counsel 

needed additional time and requested the May 23, 2016, trial date. The State requested a 

continuance from May 23, 2016, due to witness unavailability and requested the trial be set for 

June 6, 2016, but defense counsel was unavailable at that time and requested a trial date of June 

20, 2016. The court ordered the delay from April 28, 2016, to May 9, 2016, attributable to the 

State; the delay from May 9, 2016, to May 23, 2016, attributable to the defense; the delay from 

May 23, 2016, to June 6, 2016, attributable to the State; and the delay from June 6, 2016, to June 

20, 2016, attributable to the defense. 

¶ 11 Following completion of a four-day trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both 

aggravated battery and first degree murder. The jury also found, regarding the commission of first
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degree murder, defendant was armed with a firearm and personally discharged a firearm that 

proximately caused the death of another. 

¶ 12 On July 21, 2016, defense counsel filed a posttrial motion, raising various errors. Five days 

later, defendant moved, pro se, for a new trial. The pleading alleged defendant was deprived of a 

fair trial by an impartial jury. Defendant’s affidavit stated he was taken into custody on December 

11, 2015, arraigned December 16, 2015, and was only brought back to court on April 28, 2016, 

after writing several letters to the court, his court appointed counsel, and his counsel’s supervisors 

at the public defender’s office. The affidavit stated that the letters objected to any delay and

addressed a violation of speedy trial, a motion to dismiss, undue delay, unprofessional conduct by 

defense counsel, and counsel’s blatant attempt to circumvent the running of the 120-day speedy 

trial clock. Defendant’s affidavit further stated his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to 

seek a discharge on speedy trial grounds and the trial court erred by not acknowledging his motion 

and denying the dismissal on speedy trial grounds. Also attached to the pleading was defendant’s 

motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation. 

¶ 13 On September 19, 2016, the trial court noted that the parties were set for a sentencing 

hearing on August 23, 2016; however, defendant filed pro se motions that included a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court inquired if defendant’s only claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel was based on the failure to pursue the motion to dismiss on speedy trial 

grounds. Defendant stated he also had other claims, which included counsel withholding 

information from him. He stated he did not see discovery until the day before the trial and the 

discovery he saw included only 4 of the 60 DVDs. 

¶ 14 Defendant further stated that he wrote a letter to the court on March 31, 2016, that discussed 

issues regarding a failure to communicate with defense counsel. Defendant confirmed a copy was 
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also sent to defense counsel and the public defender’s office. The court admonished defendant, 

stating that letters do not go in the court file and the court ignores them to avoid an ex parte

communication issue. Defendant averred that the letter addressed the inability to speak with his 

attorney, and the attorney’s failure to bring him to the status conferences after defendant told 

counsel he wanted to go. Defendant stated that his trial should have been held in April and they 

had not prepared for trial. He had not seen any discovery or the grand jury transcript, and counsel 

only came to see him once in jail. The court inquired as to whether defendant had the information, 

and defendant clarified that he kept detailed records about almost everything. 

¶ 15 The trial court explained to defendant that it was continuing the matter to hold a hearing 

on September 29, 2016, pursuant to Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181. The court explained the preliminaryKrankel inquiry and explained it would then determine whether defendant presented a prima facie

case of ineffectiveness. On September 29, 2016, the trial court issued an order continuing the 

Krankel hearing until October 18, 2016. 

¶ 16 At the October 18, 2016, hearing, defendant made several claims of ineffective assistance 

of trial counsel based—inter alia—on the failure to call witnesses, inadequate closing arguments, 

lack of communication, insufficient cross-examination of eyewitness Keveon Frison, withholding 

discovery, and misleading defendant. The court was also again advised of defendant’s March 31, 

2016, correspondence, as it related to his ineffective assistance of trial claim. Defendant claimed 

the correspondence was sent to the circuit clerk. The court found no copy of the correspondence 

in the file. The court stated that defendant’s July pleadings indicated defendant’s belief that defense 

counsel should have sought a discharge on speedy trial grounds. When queried, neither the State 

nor defense counsel had anything to add at that time. The court stated it would take the matter 

under advisement and write up an order giving it another setting so they could “see where we are.” 
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¶ 17 On October 28, 2016, defendant filed a list of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, 

which was consistent with his testimony at the October 18, 2016, hearing. Attached to the 

document was defendant’s June 17, 2016, jail complaint regarding his inability to view the 

discovery DVDs because the officer in charge of viewing did not work weekends and a copy of 

the March 31, 2016, correspondence to the court regarding defendant’s request for a speedy trial

and counsel’s failure to keep defendant “in the loop.” The correspondence indicated that defendant 

advised Judge Clay of his request for a speedy trial during the December 16, 2015, hearing, as well 

as at his video arraignment on December 23, 2015. The letter stated defense counsel assured 

defendant that his request would be honored from the date he was taken into custody. He was later 

assigned to Mr. Peebles, who advised defendant that he verbally confirmed defendant’s desire for 

a speedy trial with the prosecutor. 

¶ 18 On January 24, 2017, the trial court issued a handwritten order finding there may be a basis 

for the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, pursuant to Krankel. The order stated that the 

case would be set for status on February 21, 2017, and would proceed to an evidentiary hearing on 

March 20, 2017, and that counsel would be appointed from the public defendant’s office to 

represent defendant on the claim. 

¶ 19 The matter proceeded to hearing on March 20, 2017. At that time, the court advised 

defendant that the court failed to make the proper findings following the Krankel hearing, and 

therefore it would be entering an order clarifying which claims it found had a basis. The court also 

appointed Rick Roustio of the public defender’s officer to represent defendant. 

¶ 20 On June 1, 2017, the trial court issued an order stating there was a sufficient basis only for 

defendant’s claims that counsel failed to review the DVDs and 1500 pages of discovery and “not 

using interview of Frison for impeachment or exculpatory purposes.” It found there was no basis 
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for the other claims presented in the July 26, 2016, pleading, and at the September 19 and October 

18, 2016, hearings. 

¶ 21 On July 20, 2017, the trial court issued an order stating that counsel needed to be assigned 

to represent defendant and reset the case for a Krankel evidentiary hearing. On September 5, 2017, 

the trial court issued an order appointing Preston K. Johnson IV as attorney for defendant and set 

the case for status on October 9, 2017. 

¶ 22 The Krankel evidentiary hearing was held on April 2, 2018. The State called defendant’s 

trial counsel, Mark Peebles. During his testimony, Mr. Peebles agreed that on April 28, 2016, 

defendant demanded a speedy trial, and the trial was set for June 20, 2016. He testified that he 

received a “huge file” containing approximately 1285 items from the State in discovery, of which 

approximately 150 items were on CD or DVD. Mr. Peebles stated that he typically reviewed all 

the items tendered in discovery before trial, but defendant’s demand for speedy trial made it 

“imperative” that counsel “drop pretty much everything else” to spend as much time as possible 

going through the sizable file. 

¶ 23 On cross-examination, Krankel counsel asked whether there was a theory of felony murder, 

and Mr. Peebles answered affirmatively. Krankel counsel then asked if a felony murder verdict 

form was used in this case. The State objected to the questioning as being outside the scope of 

what the court previously found to be the issues for litigation at that hearing. The court confirmed 

the hearing was limited to the points in the court’s June 1, 2017, order regarding the lack of 

reviewed discovery and the lack of cross-examination as to Frison and asked if Krankel counsel’s 

questioning fit into one of those issues. Krankel counsel argued the verdict forms connected to 

Frison “in a broad sense.” The court then allowed Krankel counsel to continue to the extent that it 

was relevant to the two claims at issue. Thereafter, Krankel counsel inquired as to Mr. Peebles’s
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subsequent review of the case file and discussion of the matter with the State. Following the 

remainder of Mr. Peebles’s testimony and closing arguments, the court took the matter under 

advisement.

¶ 24 On April 11, 2018, defendant, pro se, filed a memorandum, addressing the Krankel

procedures. He complained that he alleged 20 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the 

court reduced his claims to two and barred Krankel counsel from the opportunity to evaluate or 

present the previously raised claims. 

¶ 25 On May 22, 2018, the trial court issued an order on the Krankel hearing, denying 

defendant’s claims. It reasoned that defendant could not show prejudice. Subsequently, after 

defendant was appointed new counsel, the court denied the motion for a new trial. The parties 

proceeded to sentencing, where the court sentenced defendant to 6 years’ incarceration on the 

aggravated battery count to run consecutively to a 50-year term of incarceration on the first degree 

murder count. After the court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence, defendant 

timely appealed. 

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argues that his statutory right to a speedy trial was violated, and trial 

counsel was ineffective for affirmatively misleading defendant about his speedy trial rights and 

failing to file a motion to discharge based on a speedy trial right violation. Defendant also contends 

that the court committed reversible error in barring Krankel counsel’s ability to raise 

ineffectiveness claims at the evidentiary hearing. 

¶ 28 A. Speedy Trial Rights 

¶ 29 While defendant argues his statutory speedy trial rights were violated, he concedes that his 

claim succeeds only if “he has some basis for contesting the time attributed to the defense between 
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February 8 and April 28, 2016.”1 Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution 

guarantee an accused the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, 

art. I, § 8. To effectuate that right, section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 

requires “[e]very person in custody in this State for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court 

having jurisdiction within 120 days from the date he or she was taken into custody unless delay is 

occasioned by the defendant.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2016). “The statutory period begins to 

toll automatically from the day after defendant is taken into custody.” People v. Lilly, 2016 IL App 

(3d) 140286, ¶ 23. However, if a delay is occasioned by the defendant, the statutory period is 

tolled. Id. Defendant is entitled to have the charges dismissed if he can affirmatively establish a 

violation of the speedy trial statute. People v. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d 131, 137 (1990). “The trial 

court’s determination as to who is responsible for the delay of trial is entitled to much deference, 

and should be sustained in the absence of a clear showing of the trial court’s abuse of discretion.” 

Id.

¶ 30 Generally, a defendant is bound by the actions of his attorney. People v. Kaczmarek, 207 

Ill. 2d 288, 297 (2003). Accordingly, when defense counsel requests a continuance, such delay is 

attributable to defendant. Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 141. Moreover, the record need not affirmatively 

show that counsel consulted with and received the consent of defendant regarding counsel’s 

request or agreement to a continuance. Id. at 142. A defendant’s failure to promptly repudiate an 

attorney’s unauthorized act, upon receiving knowledge of such act, effectively ratifies the act. Id.

at 143. 

1

By the April 28, 2016, hearing, only 60 days were attributable to the State. Assuming, arguendo, 

that the entire period from April 28 to June 20, 2016—a total of 54 days—should have been attributed to 

the State, defendant would have still been tried within the 120-day statutory period. Thus, in order to 

establish a speedy trial violation, defendant needs to prove at least one of the continuances made by defense 

counsel before the April 28, 2016, hearing should not be attributed to him. 
10 

¶ 31 Defendant argues that applying these principles here ignores the fact that defendants have 

a constitutional right to choose a speedy trial, even if it means sacrificing his right to effective 

assistance of counsel. In support of his argument, defendant cites Bowman (id. at 139-40), where 

the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the contention that a defendant should not have to choose 

between the right to competent counsel and a speedy trial. The Bowman court explained: 

“Defendant cannot contend that it was unfair to force him to choose between a speedy trial and 

effective assistance of counsel. Defendant may have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to 

pursue whichever course he chooses, but the Constitution does not forbid requiring him to choose 

nonetheless.” Id. at 148 (citing People v. Lewis, 60 Ill. 2d 152, 156-57 (1975)). Because the 

defendant in Bowman did not object to the appointment of counsel and delayed in objecting to the 

allegedly unauthorized waiver of his speedy trial right, the court found defendant contributed to 

the delay caused by the continuance. Id. at 142-43. 

¶ 32 Defendant argues that, unlike the defendant in Bowman, he timely objected to trial 

counsel’s decision to continue the case by vigorously objecting to counsel’s actions and any 

continuances as soon as he learned that his attorney tolled the speedy trial period against his 

express wishes. He argues that the record shows (1) he expressed his desire for a speedy trial and 

to be present at all status hearings at his first appearance, (2) he filed a letter on March 31, 2016, 

indicating his desire for a speedy trial, (3) he explicitly told counsel from the outset that he wanted 

a speedy trial, and (4) his statements and actions subsequent to the April 28, 2016, hearing create 

an inference that he would have objected to the prior continuances. We disagree. 

¶ 33 Defendant’s contentions are not supported by the record. While defendant contends he 

asserted his speedy trial right at his first appearance prior to the arraignment, there is no report of 

proceedings for this appearance. It was defendant’s duty, as the appellant, to present a complete 
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record on appeal. In the absence thereof, any doubts will be resolved against him. People v. Leeper, 

317 Ill. App. 3d 475, 482 (2000). Moreover, the December 16, 2015, court order fails to indicate 

any speedy trial demand or objection to any continuance. Even if defendant asserted his rights to 

the court off the record, defendant was required to submit a sufficient record on appeal, including 

a bystander’s report or agreed statement of facts if necessary. Kielminski v. St. Anthony’s Hospital, 

68 Ill. App. 3d 407, 409 (1979); Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). As such, the record 

does not show that defendant asserted his speedy trial rights immediately after being placed in 

custody. 

¶ 34 There is also no indication—other than defendant’s own allegations—that he filed a letter 

on March 31, 2016, indicating his desire for a speedy trial and counsel’s poor communication. We 

disagree that the letter’s absence was due to the court’s refusal to file it as an ex parte

communication. Rather, when defendant noted the letter should be in the file, the court simply 

explained that letters should not come to the judge because they are ex parte communications. 

However, the court never claimed that the circuit clerk refused to file the letter on such basis.

Moreover, at the Krankel hearing, the court further explained that if defendant sent the letter to the 

clerk’s office, it would have a file stamp on it, and there was no copy in the record. As to 

defendant’s claims that he informed Mr. Peebles of his wishes, such conversations occurred 

outside of the record. Consequently, the record is void of any indication that counsel acted without 

defendant’s authorization. 

¶ 35 We also disagree with defendant’s argument that People v. Pearson, 88 Ill. 2d 210 (1981), 

is instructive and allows this court to infer repudiation of counsel’s continuances on February 8, 

2016, March 1, 2016, and March 30, 2016, based on defendant’s statements and actions on April 

20, 2016, and thereafter. In Pearson, defendant filed a postconviction petition arguing, inter alia, 
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that certain continuances made by or agreed to by counsel—who withdrew prior to trial—should 

not be attributed to defendant, and defendant was deprived of his right to self-representation where 

he insisted on proceeding to trial pro se and objected to his previous counsel’s requests for and/or 

acquiescence in continuance of his trial. Id. at 215. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that 

defendant clearly and convincingly attempted to assert his right to discharge his attorney and 

proceed to an immediate trial on July 20, August 19, and August 29, 1977. Id. Under such 

circumstances, it found that any continuance granted thereafter was not properly attributed to 

defendant. Id. It further found that although the record did not disclose whether defendant was 

present when counsel requested a continuance on August 11, 1977, “it is clear that, had defendant 

been in court, he would not have acquiesced in this delay either.” Id.

¶ 36 The stark difference between this case and Pearson is defendant here did not raise any 

concern for his speedy trial right until after the disputed continuances were granted. He also never 

requested to proceed pro se or discharge Mr. Peebles. Accordingly, Pearson is distinguishable. 

¶ 37 We find Kaczmarek, 207 Ill. 2d at 297, instructive. In Kaczmarek, the Illinois Supreme 

Court considered whether defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated where his 

retrial commenced over three years after the appellate court’s mandate was filed. Id. at 295-96. 

During this period, defendant was represented by six attorneys—all of whom required time to 

familiarize themselves with the voluminous record—and there were 39 continuances by agreement 

of the parties and 3 continuances granted on defendant’s motion. Id. Defendant first asserted his 

right to a speedy trial pretrial, but after the court warned of the dangers of proceeding with an 

attorney who was not prepared, defendant stated, “I’ll wait.” Id. at 298. Over a year later, defendant 

made an oral, pro se motion for discharge on statutory speedy trial grounds. Id. Defendant filed a 

written motion about a month later. Id. He was given the opportunity to argue his pro se motion, 
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but admitted he was not ready to do so and requested a continuance. Id. The court denied 

defendant’s request for a “ ‘bar association lawyer.’ ” Id. Defendant later again requested a 

continuance of the hearing on his pro se motion because he was unprepared and there was never a

ruling on the motion. Id. at 298-99. There also was no ruling on a second pro se motion for 

appointment of a “ ‘bar association attorney.’ ” Id. at 299. 

¶ 38 When addressing the third factor of the constitutional test for a speedy trial violation—

defendant’s assertion of his speedy trial right—the court stated, “a defendant is bound by the 

actions of his attorney, unless the defendant clearly and convincingly asserts his right to discharge 

his attorney.” Id. at 297. It also noted that defendant attempted to assert his right to a speedy trial 

at various times, but the decision to continue a case or demand a speedy trial is generally a matter 

left to the sound strategic decision of counsel. Id. at 297-98. The court recognized that the 

constitution does not forbid forcing a defendant to choose between a speedy trial and effective 

assistance of counsel (id. at 298) but found “[d]efendant never attempted to assert his right to 

discharge his attorney and proceed to an immediate trial” (id. at 299). As such, it found “[t]he 

record unequivocally shows that defendant wanted the assistance of counsel in preparing his 

defense for trial,” and therefore “defendant is bound by the actions of his attorneys.” Id. 

¶ 39 As explained above, the record shows defendant first raised concern of his statutory speedy 

trial right when he filed his pro se motion on April 20, 2016. After the court raised defendant’s 

pro se motion at the April 28, 2016, hearing, defendant indicated that he understood the court’s 

calculation and did not object when the trial was scheduled for May 23, 2016. Defendant argues 

that his statement of understanding does not signify agreement with the court’s calculation; 

however, like Kaczmarek, defendant here did not press the matter and seek a ruling on his motion. 

Importantly, defendant never attempted to discharge his attorney and proceed to an immediate 
14 

trial. Accordingly, defendant is bound by counsel’s actions and cannot claim he did not contribute 

to the delay caused by the continuances. Id. at 298-99; Bowman, 138 Ill. 2d at 143. 

¶ 40 Because defendant was bound by counsel’s continuances, only 60 days were attributable 

to the State prior to April 28, 2016. Even assuming all continuances after April 28, 2016, could 

not be attributed to defendant, he was still tried within the statutory speedy trial period. His 

argument in this respect therefore fails.

¶ 41 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 

¶ 42 Defendant alternatively asserts an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, arguing counsel 

caused him to allow the original statutory speedy trial period to lapse by misleading defendant into 

believing he would be tried with the statutory speedy trial period. A criminal defendant has a 

constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 

1970, art. I, § 8. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must 

demonstrate that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and 

counsel’s errors resulted in prejudice. People v. Bailey, 2020 IL App (5th) 160458, ¶ 86. Although 

defendant requests de novo review (People v. Bustos, 2020 IL App (2d) 170497, ¶ 87), his claim 

is not raised for the first time on appeal as he presented this claim during the preliminary Krankel 

hearing, and the trial court determined the claim had no merit. 

¶ 43 The Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, developed a commonlaw procedure to address pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In re 

Johnathan T., 2022 IL 127222, ¶ 23. “This procedure allows the trial court to decide whether 

independent counsel is necessary to argue a defendant’s pro se posttrial ineffective assistance 

claims at a full Krankel [evidentiary] hearing.” Id. Once a defendant raises a pro se posttrial 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the trial court must determine whether defendant’s pro se
15 

allegations show possible neglect of the case. People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 97. If the court 

finds the claims pertain to matters of trial strategy or lack merit, it need not appoint new counsel. 

Id. However, if the allegations show possible neglect, new counsel should be appointed to 

independently evaluate defendant’s pro se claims and represent defendant at the Krankel 

evidentiary hearing on the pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.

¶ 44 In conducting this evaluation, the trial court may inquire into the facts and circumstances 

of the alleged ineffective assistance from counsel or defendant. People v. Crutchfield, 2015 IL App 

(5th) 120371, ¶ 29. The court can base its determination on “its knowledge of the defense counsel’s 

performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” Id.

Defendant need only raise a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the 

preliminary Krankel hearing to warrant further proceedings. See People v. Cook, 2018 IL App 

(1st) 142134, ¶ 104. We review the court’s preliminary Krankel hearing determination for a 

manifest error. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98. “Manifest error is error that is clearly evident, 

plain, and indisputable.” Id.

¶ 45 Assuming, arguendo, that counsel misled defendant into believing counsel would not 

request or acquiesce in continuances, any prejudice is speculative. The failure to establish either 

prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984), precludes a finding of 

ineffectiveness. People v. Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 318 (2000). To establish prejudice, “defendant 

must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” People v. Valdez, 2016 IL 119860, ¶ 29 (quoting 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
16 

¶ 46 Defendant here does not argue prejudice under Strickland and instead requests this court 

to presume prejudice as in People v. Mooney, 2019 IL App (3d) 150607. We decline to follow 

Mooney, as it is inconsistent with Illinois Supreme Court precedent. 

¶ 47 In Mooney, counsel twice continued the case—the second of which occurred on the date 

of trial due to the State’s late discovery disclosure—although he informed the court that he was 

ready for trial. Id. ¶¶ 5, 7. The court found such actions objectively unreasonable under prevailing 

norms because the continuances were not factually attributable to defendant, where the first 

occurred after one of the State’s witnesses was unavailable and counsel informed he was ready for 

trial and the second was caused by the State’s late filing of discovery. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25. 

¶ 48 Mooney found the issue of prejudice the more difficult question. Id. ¶ 26. The court

admitted that “[d]etermining whether [a motion to dismiss based on a speedy trial violation] would 

be meritorious, had counsel not agreed to toll the speedy trial clock, inevitably involves a certain 

amount of speculation.” Id. ¶ 27. It determined “there is no perfect way to reconstruct what would 

have happened had counsel acted appropriately.” Id. Mooney relied on People v. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d 

423, 426, 428-29 (1977)—which outright reversed a defendant’s conviction where the court 

improperly attributed a continuance to defendant resulting in a speedy trial violation—to come to 

the same conclusion regarding an ineffectiveness claim based on the failure to protect defendant’s 

speedy trial right. Mooney, 2019 IL App (3d) 150607, ¶¶ 28-29. Mooney found “[t]o hold the 

inevitable speculation against a defendant would be to hold that counsel’s actions in agreeing to 

the continuances or agreeing to toll the speedy trial clock are, essentially, unreviewable.” Id. ¶ 30. 

We disagree.

¶ 49 While defendant only needs to show possible neglect at this stage of the Krankel

proceedings (Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 97), prejudice cannot be shown by mere conjecture or 
17 

speculation. People v. Hills, 78 Ill. 2d 500, 505-06 (1980). Mooney acknowledged that finding 

prejudice in that case required “a certain amount of speculation.” Mooney, 2019 IL App (3d) 

150607, ¶ 27. But, instead of adhering to the legal principles applicable to a prejudice analysis 

under Strickland, Mooney mistakenly relied on Beyah to presume prejudice. 

¶ 50 Beyah involved a statutory speedy trial violation that stemmed from the court’s error in 

incorrectly attributing a delay to defendant. Beyah, 67 Ill. 2d at 428. Because the court’s error led

to the speedy trial violation and defendant raised the issue before the lower court, such error was—

at most—subject to harmless error review in which the State bears the burden of persuasion 

regarding prejudice and had to prove the result of the proceedings would have been the same absent 

the error. See People v. Harris, 2022 IL App (1st) 192509, ¶ 76. Defendant in Beyah therefore was 

not required to show prejudice. Conversely, the defendant in Mooney, and in this case, asserted 

ineffective assistance of counsel claims that required them to demonstrate prejudice. People v. 

Johnson, 2021 IL 126291, ¶ 53. 

¶ 51 We acknowledge that the Illinois Supreme Court identified three exceptional 

circumstances when a court may presume prejudice from counsel’s deficient performance. People 

v. Cherry, 2016 IL 118728, ¶ 25.2 However, none were at issue in Mooney or argued in this appeal.

Accordingly, presuming prejudice here is inappropriate. E.g., People v. Willis, 235 Ill. App. 3d 

1060, 1067, 1069 (1992) (required defendant to show prejudice for his ineffectiveness claim based 

on a violation of his speedy trial rights and rejected the claim where there was no showing of 

prejudice). 

2

The three circumstances in which prejudice is presumed are where (1) defendant is denied counsel 

at a critical stage, (2) counsel entirely fails to provide meaningful adversarial testing, or (3) counsel 

represents a client in circumstances under which no lawyer could prove effective assistance. Cherry, 2016 

IL 118728, ¶ 25.
18 

¶ 52 Defendant in no way claimed, and the facts do not support, that a reasonable probability 

exists that the result of the proceedings would have been different had counsel informed defendant 

that he intended to continue the case. There is no indication that the delay somehow negatively 

affected the ability to present his defense or provided some benefit to the State’s prosecution. 

Further, defendant fails to argue, or explain, how the State would have failed to bring defendant to 

trial within the statutory period had defendant been able to object to the continuances. Because 

any argument of prejudice is speculative (see People v. Johnson, 2023 IL App (4th) 220833-U, 

¶ 19),3 the trial court’s finding that defendant’s claim lacked merit was not manifestly erroneous. 

¶ 53 C. Krankel Hearing

¶ 54 Defendant further argues that the trial court committed reversible error where it barred 

posttrial counsel from presenting any other claim of ineffective assistance of counsel than what 

the court deemed nonfrivolous at the preliminary Krankel inquiry. Whether the court conducted 

proper Krankel proceedings by limiting the claims presented at the evidentiary hearing to those 

claims it found had merit presents a legal question that we review de novo. See People v. Cardona, 

2013 IL 114076, ¶ 15 (legal question is reviewed de novo); Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98 

(reviewed whether a court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel hearing de novo). 

¶ 55 The State argues that defendant did not preserve this argument by failing to object to the 

court’s limitation. We disagree. First, the State has not provided, nor has this court found, authority 

for the position that a defendant forfeits any error in the Krankel procedures by failing to object. 

Further, the State’s argument is factually inaccurate. After the preliminary Krankel hearing, the 

court took the matter under advisement. The court did not provide any type of limitation until June 

1, 2017, when it explained which of defendant’s claims had a sufficient basis. While Krankel

3

Citing as persuasive authority pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023).
19 

counsel did not request the court to consider other claims at the Krankel evidentiary hearing, on 

April 11, 2018, defendant filed a pro se memorandum in which he complained that Krankel

counsel was not allowed to evaluate all of defendant’s claims and present any claim with arguable 

merit. This memorandum was filed after the Krankel evidentiary hearing and while the court still 

had jurisdiction. We therefore will consider defendant’s arguments the court erred by both limiting 

the scope of the Krankel evidentiary hearing and preventing Krankel counsel from performing his 

duties. 

¶ 56 The law is clear that appointment of Krankel counsel is not required in every case. People 

v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35; People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29; People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 

2d 68, 77 (2003); People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134 (1991). The court must appoint Krankel

counsel only where the allegations show possible neglect of trial counsel. People v. Ayres, 2017 

IL 120071, ¶ 11 (citing Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29); Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134-35. The court here 

appointed counsel for the claims that showed possible neglect. E.g., Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 133. 

Counsel was only precluded from arguing the pro se claims the court found without merit. As 

such, the court did precisely what Krankel requires. 

¶ 57 While defendant contends this situation is similar to postconviction proceedings where the 

entire postconviction petition advances to a second stage proceeding if any of the claims therein 

have merit (People v. Montgomery, 327 Ill. App. 3d 180, 189 (2001)), such rule is based on the 

plain language of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). 

People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 370-72 (2001). There is no similar statutory support applicable 

here.

¶ 58 We further find defendant’s cited authority—People v. Horman, 2018 IL App (3d) 160423, 

and People v. Downs, 2017 IL App (2d) 121156-C—distinguishable. Horman is inapposite, as it 
20 

did not address whether a trial court could limit the issues presented at an evidentiary hearing. 

Rather, Horman only found that the court was required to conduct an additional Krankel inquiry 

of defendant’s claims raised after the court already conducted a preliminary Krankel hearing. 

Horman, 2018 IL App (3d) 160423, ¶¶ 29-30. 

¶ 59 Downs also fails to support defendant’s arguments. The Downs court found Krankel

counsel’s representation fell below the professional norm by failing to present one of defendant’s 

nonfrivolous pro se ineffectiveness claims to the trial court. Downs, 2017 IL App (2d) 121156-C, 

¶ 65. Defendant here, unlike Downs, attempts to reassert claims that the court already found 

without merit and additional claims not presented at the preliminary Krankel hearing. While, in 

explaining the duties of Krankel counsel, the Downs court broadly stated that Krankel counsel is 

required “to independently evaluate the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel and present those with merit to the trial court” (id. ¶ 49), we do not find this precludes 

a court from limiting Krankel counsel’s representation to the claims it found meritorious. 

¶ 60 We note defendants are not completely without recourse in this situation. Defendants may 

still challenge any preliminary Krankel determination on appeal, as defendant has done in this 

appeal for his claim regarding his statutory speedy trial rights, albeit unsuccessfully. 

¶ 61 We further find the court did not prevent Krankel counsel from completing his duties by 

barring him from raising additional claims. Defendant again relies on Horman to argue that if the 

court there allowed defendant to raise additional claims after the preliminary Krankel hearing, 

Krankel counsel should be able to raise any additional claims he believed had merit. 

¶ 62 The Krankel procedure was developed to address pro se posttrial claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 34. The appointment of different counsel avoids 

the conflict that trial counsel would have in trying to justify his or her actions while also presenting 
21 

defendant’s claims of his or her ineffectiveness. Id. ¶ 36. “[T]he goal of any Krankel proceeding 

is to facilitate the trial court’s full consideration of a defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel and thereby potentially limit issues on appeal.” Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, 

¶ 29. As such, Krankel imposes duties on appointed counsel only for defendant’s pro se ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel claims. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78; Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 36. Counsel 

thus had no duty under Krankel to present additional claims. Moreover, because defendant is 

entitled to Krankel counsel only where he shows claims of possible neglect (Roddis, 2020 IL 

124352, ¶ 35) and there was no such determination made for any claim not presented at the 

preliminary Krankel hearing, defendant has not yet shown that he is entitled to representation on 

such claims. We therefore fail to see how the court prevented counsel from completing his Krankel

duties. 

¶ 63 Defendant further argues that, because there is no rule precluding Krankel counsel from 

raising new claims, Krankel counsel here should have not been prevented from raising the 

additional claims he clearly wanted to present at the evidentiary hearing. However, the record is 

void of any evidence that Krankel counsel wished to raise additional claims. 

¶ 64 During the questioning of Mr. Peebles at the evidentiary hearing, Krankel counsel inquired 

about the verdict forms used in this case. The court reminded counsel that the hearing was limited 

to the two issues regarding the lack of reviewed discovery and the lack of cross-examination as to 

Frison. Krankel counsel argued the verdict forms connected to Frison “in a broad sense.” Although 

the court allowed Krankel counsel to continue questioning about the verdict forms to the extent 

that it was relevant to the two relevant issues, Krankel counsel moved on and questioned Mr. 

Peebles about his review of the case. 
22 

¶ 65 Krankel counsel’s argument that the verdict forms broadly relate to a claim the court 

determined had merit falls short of requesting the court to consider an additional ineffectiveness 

claim. There is no indication in the record that Krankel counsel made any request to expand the 

scope of the hearing, present new ineffective assistance of counsel claims, or reconsider a 

previously rejected claim. Thus, the court did not prevent Krankel counsel from performing his 

duties. 

¶ 66 We note that defendant is again not without recourse. He does not forfeit ineffectiveness 

claims not presented at the Krankel hearing. People v. McGee, 2021 IL App (2d) 190040, ¶ 41; 

see People v. Jefferson, 2021 IL App (2d) 190179, ¶ 26 (ineffective assistance of counsel claims 

may be brought for the first time on direct appeal); People v. Hammons, 2018 IL App (4th) 160385, 

¶ 14 (same). Accordingly, he may assert such claims on direct appeal or through the PostConviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). 

¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 68 For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s speedy trial rights were not violated, the court’s 

denial of defendant’s Krankel claim that counsel misled defendant into believing that he would be 

tried within the statutory speedy trial period was not manifestly erroneous, and the court did not 

prevent Krankel counsel from performing his duties or improperly limit the Krankel evidentiary 

hearing. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

¶ 69 Affirmed. 
23 

People v. Teen, 2023 IL App (5th) 190456 

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, No. 14-CF914; the Hon. Zina R. Cruse, Judge, presiding. 

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

James E. Chadd, Ellen J. Curry, and Richard J. Whitney, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant. 

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Brendan F. Kelly, State’s Attorney, of Belleville (Patrick 

Delfino, Patrick D. Daly, and Sharon Shanahan, of State’s 

Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the 

People.