Present: All the Justices 

JAMES EARL PATTERSON 

v. Record No. 001798 OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 

 September 14, 2001 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE GEORGE COUNTY 

James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge 

 James Earl Patterson received a death sentence upon a 

plea of guilty to a charge of capital murder in the commission 

of a rape, Code § 18.2-31(5), in the death of Joyce Sneed 

Aldridge.1 Although Patterson has waived his right of appeal, 

Code § 17.1-313 mandates that we review the imposition of the 

death sentence. We must consider and determine whether the 

sentence of death was imposed "under the influence of passion, 

prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," and whether the 

sentence is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty 

imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the 

defendant." Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) and (C)(2). 

BACKGROUND 

 On October 11, 1987, the Prince George County Police 

Department received a telephone call at approximately 11:35 

 1

 Patterson also pled guilty to charges of abduction with 

intent to defile, Code § 18.2-48, and rape, Code § 18.2-61, 

and entered an "Alford plea," North Carolina v. Alford, 400 

U.S. 25 (1970), to a charge of forcible sodomy, Code § 18.2-

67.1. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life 

imprisonment for the abduction and sodomy convictions. 

Patterson has not appealed those convictions. 
p.m. from a person identifying herself as Joyce Aldridge. Ms. 

Aldridge stated that she had been raped and stabbed. When the 

police arrived at Ms. Aldridge's home, they found the front 

door ajar and a screen "knocked out" of the bathroom window at 

the rear of the house. The officers announced themselves and, 

when there was no reply, they entered the house. They found 

Ms. Aldridge's partially clothed body on the floor of the 

bathroom. Her dress had been ripped from the neck, and cloth 

ligatures, cut from bedding in the room, remained tied to her 

right wrist. She had been stabbed multiple times and could 

not be resuscitated by the emergency medical crew. 

 The police discovered signs of a struggle in the kitchen 

of the home with a chair knocked over, a drawer containing 

knives left open, and Ms. Aldridge's eyeglasses on the floor. 

The door to Ms. Aldridge's bedroom had been kicked open and 

footprints were found on the door. Footprints of the same 

type were found in the blood on the floor of the bedroom. The 

contents of Ms. Aldridge's purse had been dumped on the floor, 

dresser drawers were open and ransacked, and the nightstand 

had been knocked over. There was a large amount of blood on 

the bed and pillows and "[c]ast-off" blood spatters were on 

the wall next to the bathroom. The telephone cord had been 

pulled from the wall and the doorknob to the bathroom door had 

been pulled off the door. Ms. Aldridge's blood was found on 

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the telephone, the bathroom doorknob, and the latch on the 

window screen found in the backyard. These conditions 

indicated that she had attempted to flee her attacker by 

escaping through the window in the bathroom. 

 The medical examiner found seventeen stab wounds. Eight 

of the wounds were to Ms. Aldridge's neck, four to her upper 

back, one in her chest and several clustered in her abdominal 

area. The wounds ranged in depth from two to six inches. Two 

stab wounds to her aorta were fatal. The medical examiner 

also found a number of defensive wounds. 

 Seminal fluid was recovered from the victim's rectum and 

vagina and a semen stain was found on the bed. This evidence 

was preserved for testing. However, the perpetrator of the 

crime was not identified until over ten years later, when in 

1998, the evidence was resubmitted to the Virginia DNA 

Laboratory. The subsequent testing yielded a "cold hit" – a 

match with a DNA profile maintained by the Virginia DNA Data 

Bank. The tested DNA matched that of James Earl Patterson who 

was serving a twenty-five year sentence at the Greensville 

Correctional Center for a rape unrelated to the rape of Ms. 

Aldridge. 

 The police obtained a search warrant for a fresh sample 

of Patterson's blood and additional testing confirmed that the 

DNA material found at Ms. Aldridge's house and that of the 

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defendant were consistent. The probability of finding someone 

else with the same DNA profile was less than 1 in 5.5 billion. 

When confronted with this information by the police, Patterson 

denied knowing Ms. Aldridge or ever being in her house. 

 In March 2000, Patterson agreed to discuss the crime with 

one of the police officers who had been involved in the 

Aldridge investigation if an agreement could be reached 

regarding his ability to see his family at the prison. After 

the family visit was arranged, Patterson confessed to raping 

and murdering Ms. Aldridge. Patterson said he knew Ms. 

Aldridge and went to her home on October 11, 1987 to steal 

money for drugs. He had planned to enter through a basement 

window but the window was locked. While he was looking for a 

utility knife he had dropped in the yard, Ms. Aldridge let her 

dog out in the yard. Patterson went to the door and asked Ms. 

Aldridge if he could borrow a flashlight on the pretext of 

needing it to search for lost car keys. When Ms. Aldridge 

opened the door, he forced his way into the house, kicked the 

door shut and demanded her pocketbook. He pushed her to the 

bedroom to get the purse. When the purse contained only 

coins, Patterson became "even more violent." After tying her 

hands behind her back with strips cut from the bed linen, he 

raped her. 

4
 Patterson went to the kitchen looking for a knife because 

he "wasn't going to leave any witnesses behind." He found a 

knife and stabbed Ms. Aldridge three times in the abdomen. 

 Patterson went back outside to find the lost utility 

knife, but reentered the house to make sure "she's gone." He 

kicked in the bedroom door which was shut and saw a telephone 

cord leading to the bathroom. He forced the bathroom door 

open and Ms. Aldridge came out. Patterson "hit[] her with the 

knife 4 or 5 times." After she "went down the wall," he left 

by way of the front door.

 Prior to the entry of the guilty pleas, Patterson was 

examined by two psychologists, both of whom determined that 

Patterson was competent to tender a guilty plea and to make 

his own decisions in the case. Against the advice of counsel, 

Patterson entered the guilty plea. The trial court found 

Patterson guilty of capital murder and ordered a pre-sentence 

report. 

 At the sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth asserted that 

the killing of Ms. Aldridge was vile in that it involved 

torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated battery. In 

support of this contention, the Commonwealth relied on the 

testimony given at the guilt phase, that the victim did not 

die instantaneously, that the knife attack was carried out in 

a "savage[,] methodical manner," and that many more stab 

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wounds were inflicted than necessary to accomplish the murder 

of the victim. Chabrol v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 327, 335, 427 

S.E.2d 374, 378 (1993); Hoke v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 303, 

316, 377 S.E.2d 595, 603, cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989). 

 The Commonwealth also asserted that Patterson would be a 

future danger to society. In support of this position, the 

Commonwealth presented evidence of felony convictions for rape 

and grand larceny based on a 1988 incident in which Patterson 

asked two women for a ride home from a party. When the driver 

exited the car, Patterson shoved her to the ground, got back 

in the car, and broke the handle of the passenger door to trap 

the other woman in the car. Patterson "punched" the passenger 

in the face, drove the car to another location, and then raped 

her. According to the Commonwealth, these crimes, committed 

after the rape and murder of Ms. Aldridge, along with the 

defendant's extensive juvenile record and fourteen instances 

of institutional offenses, including fighting, assault, and 

possession of drugs and intoxicants, support the conclusion 

that Patterson is a continuing danger to society. 

 Patterson refused to present evidence in mitigation of 

his sentence and instructed his attorney not to do so. In 

exercising his right of elocution, Patterson expressed his 

sorrow and remorse for his actions and requested a sentence of 

death, stating that if he received a life sentence he could 

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not promise that "sometime that I may not spark out and ruin 

more lives." In imposing the death sentence, the trial court 

found that the aggravating factors of vileness in the 

commission of the crime and of future dangerousness to society 

were both supported by the evidence. 

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C), we must consider "any 

errors in the trial enumerated by appeal" in any case where a 

sentence of death is imposed. Accordingly, the trial court is 

required to forward the trial record of such a case to this 

Court where an appeal of right will be heard. Code § 17.1-

313(B). On October 16, 2000, Patterson through counsel filed 

a Motion Not to Pursue Appeal with this Court. By order dated 

November 15, 2000, this Court ordered the matter returned to 

the trial court for a determination whether Patterson's 

decision not to appeal was made voluntarily and intelligently. 

 At a competency hearing held on January 4, 2001 in 

accordance with this Court's order, Patterson signed a waiver 

under oath, stating he did not want his case reviewed for "any 

alleged errors of the trial" and waived his right "to file an 

opening brief and to have my attorney present any oral 

arguments or to otherwise in any manner pursue appellate 

review." The trial court entered an order finding that 

Patterson knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his 

right to appeal. 

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DISCUSSION 

 While a defendant may waive his rights of appellate 

review and instruct his attorneys to refrain from seeking a 

commutation of his death sentence, a defendant may not waive 

the review process mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C). "[T]he 

purpose of the review process is to assure the fair and proper 

application of the death penalty statutes in this Commonwealth 

and to instill public confidence in the administration of 

justice." Akers v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 358, 364, 535 S.E.2d 

674, 677 (2000). Accordingly, pursuant to our order of 

November 15, 2000, Patterson's counsel has filed a brief 

limited to the issues we must consider pursuant to Code 

§ 17.1-313(C) and participates in this process as an officer 

of the Court. Id. 

 We first consider whether the death sentence in this case 

"was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any 

other arbitrary factor." Code § 17.1-313(C)(1). This crime 

was brutally executed. The victim was bound, raped, and then 

repeatedly stabbed so that there would be no witness to the 

crime. The evidence shows that the victim apparently 

attempted to survive her attack by hiding in the bathroom, 

placing a call to the police, and then, when her attacker 

returned, trying to escape out a rear window in the bathroom. 

We find no indication in the record that, in imposing the 

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death sentence for these acts, the trial court's sentencing 

decision was influenced by passion, prejudice, or any 

arbitrary factor, but rather we find that it was based 

entirely upon a reasonable evaluation of the evidence. 

 We next focus our evaluation on whether the sentence of 

death in this case is "excessive or disproportionate to the 

penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 

and the defendant." Code § 17.1-313(C)(2). We have 

accumulated the records of all capital murder cases reviewed 

by this Court. Code § 17.1-313(E). The records include not 

only those capital murder cases in which the death penalty was 

imposed, but also those in which the trial court or jury 

imposed a life sentence and the defendant petitioned this 

Court for an appeal. 

 In making this proportionality review, we have focused 

specifically on cases in which the facts are similar to those 

of this case – where the predicate offense is rape and the 

death sentence was imposed upon a finding that both 

aggravating factors, vileness and future dangerousness, were 

present. We conclude that, in considering both the crime and 

the defendant, Patterson's sentence is neither excessive nor 

disproportionate to the penalties imposed by other sentencing 

bodies in the Commonwealth for comparable acts. See, e.g., 

Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 509 S.E.2d 293 

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(1999) (forced entry into victim's home; robbery, rape, and 

murder of excessive beating with a hammer); Beck v. 

Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 484 S.E.2d 898 (1997) (beat, raped, 

and murdered victim in her home; sentence imposed upon a plea 

of guilty); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 450 S.E.2d 

365 (1994) (forced entry into victim's home and committed 

robbery, rape, murder, and arson); Hoke, 237 Va. 303, 377 

S.E.2d 595 (1989) (victim bound, stabbed, raped, and murdered 

in home); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116 

(1979) (beat, tortured, raped, and murdered victim in her 

home; sentence imposed upon a guilty plea). 

 Having found no error below and perceiving no other 

reason to commute or set aside the sentence of death, we will 

affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Affirmed.

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