alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 311 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 311

    To authorize the Disabled Veterans' LIFE Memorial Foundation to 
 establish a memorial in the District of Columbia or its environs, and 
                          for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 26, 1999

 Mr. McCain (for himself, Mr. Coverdell, Mr. Cleland, and Mr. Kerrey) 
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the 
               Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To authorize the Disabled Veterans' LIFE Memorial Foundation to 
 establish a memorial in the District of Columbia or its environs, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH MEMORIAL.

    (a) In General.--The Disabled Veterans' LIFE Memorial Foundation is 
authorized to establish a memorial on Federal land in the District of 
Columbia or its environs to honor disabled American veterans who have 
served in the Armed Forces of the United States.
    (b) Compliance With Standards for Commemorative Works.--The 
establishment of the memorial authorized by subsection (a) shall be in 
accordance with the Act entitled ``An Act to provide standards for 
placement of commemorative works on certain Federal lands in the 
District of Columbia and its environs, and for other purposes'', 
approved November 14, 1986 (40 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.).

SEC. 2. PAYMENT OF EXPENSES.

    The Disabled Veterans' LIFE Memorial Foundation shall be solely 
responsible for acceptance of contributions for, and payment of the 
expenses of, the establishment of the memorial authorized by section 
1(a). No Federal funds may be used to pay any expense of the 
establishment of the memorial.

SEC. 3. DEPOSIT OF EXCESS FUNDS.

    If, upon payment of all expenses of the establishment of the 
memorial authorized by section 1(a) (including the maintenance and 
preservation amount provided for in section 8(b) of the Act referred to 
in section 1(b)), or upon expiration of the authority for the memorial 
under section 10(b) of such Act, there remains a balance of funds 
received for the establishment of the memorial, the Disabled Veterans' 
LIFE Memorial Foundation shall transmit the amount of the balance to 
the Secretary of the Treasury for deposit in the account provided for 
in section 8(b)(1) of such Act.
                                 <all>
```
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

JUDGMENT

Jeremy Jerome Green, Appellant

No. 06-13-00182-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 76th District Court of 

Titus County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 18,377). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Moseley, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Carter participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find no error in the judgment of the court 

below. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We further order that the appellant, Jeremy Jerome Green, pay all costs of this appeal.

RENDERED JULY 17, 2014

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
#### Peterson and wife, Respondents, vs. Eberl and wife, Appellants.

*September 15*

October *12, 1948.*

*328
      *Elliot N. Walstead*of Milwaukee, for the appellants.

For the respondents there was a brief by *Bernard*J.'Hankin, attorney, and *Bendinger,'Hayes & Kluwin*of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Mr. Hankin.*

Rosenberry, C. J.

The defendants state the question jn-volved as follows:

> “Can the trial court order that a contract between the parties be reformed and decree specific performance of the contract as so reformed in the absence of any testimony from plaintiffs to show that the original contract did not correctly state the intention and agreement of the parties, and in the face of defendants’ positive and uncontradicted testimony that the original contract represented the agreement and intention of the parties ?”

Instead of stating the question involved the defendants made a short summary of their argument and position in the case. The real question involved is whether the evidence sustains .the finding of the trial court. An examination of the appellants’ appendix discloses that there was ample evidence offered and received in the case to sustain each one of the court’s findings. For instance, the defendant claims that his testimony to the effect that the original contract represented the agreement and intention of the parties was positive and uncontra-dicted. The-plaintiff testified: “I thought I was buying a twenty-five-foot lot and, a foot from lot No. 1. . . . Mr. Eberl told me that the lot was too narrow and that he had purchased a foot of lot No. 1. . . . At the time I negotiated for the sale *329of this property I intended to purchase both of the buildings on lot 2 and the lot and one foot of lot No. 1.”

There is other testimony to the same effect. What the defendants really claim is that on the basis of their contention the contract did not represent the agreement between the parties.

It is undisputed in the case that the defendants have never offered an abstract of the title to the west one foot of lot No. 1, as the contract requires them to do, although they allege in their answer that the buyers have refused to waive the defects in title. As it is in this, so it is in relation to other controverted questions of fact. It is quité apparent from a considef-ation of the record that the defendants are attempting to repudiate their contract, and have made no good-faith effort to comply with its terms.

Upon the whole record it is considered that the findings of the trial court are sustained, and that the findings made sustain the judgment, and the judgment should be affirmed.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
October 2, 2015

Mr. Bryton J. Tomcek

412 Harvest Hill Drive

Denmark, WI 54208

Dear Mr. Tomcek :

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your petition for an exemption from

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we cannot process your

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can n o t Process Your Request

We received your exemption request filed in D ocket No

. FAA− 20 15

− 2818 on July 9, 2015

, but we are unable to process your request any further. Your petition does no t comply with the

requirements of § 11.81 (copy enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must

send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief, the extent of the

relief you seek, and the reason you seek relief.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would

benefit the public as a whole.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html . This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal

Aviation A dministration (FAA) requirement outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any

questions you may have.

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requ ested information

within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption

at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption.2

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further.

If you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267

- 2999.

Sincerely,

/ s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

Airspace Rules Division

Enclosure s34
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-1265

ALLAN L. GANT, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Defendant - Appellee.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Charles H. Haden II, Chief District Judge. (CA-95-948-2) Submitted: July 2, 1998 Decided: July 21, 1998 Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and HALL, Senior Circuit Judge. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Allan L. Gant, Appellant Pro Se. Rebecca A. Betts, United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:Appellant appeals the district court’s order denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. We have reviewed the record and thedistrict court’s opinion accepting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. Gant v. FBI , No. CA-95-948-2 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 12, 1998). We dispense with oral argument becausethe facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Hersha Hospitality Trust (the “Company”) for the period ending December 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Jay H. Shah, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and





(2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.







March 4, 2010
/s/ Jay H. ShahJay H. ShahChief Executive Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7276

JAMES BELLS, JR.,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

MICHAEL MOORE, Director of South Carolina Department of Corrections; CHARLES M. CONDON,

Attorney General, State of South Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. C. Weston Houck, Chief District

Judge. (CA-98-2589-6-12-AK)

Submitted: January 25, 2000 Decided: February 7, 2000

Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James Bells, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Derrick K. McFarland, OFFICE OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina,

for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

James Bells seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Respondents on his petition filed under

28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the

record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and

dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See

Bells v. Moore, No. CA-98-2589-6-12-AK (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 1999). We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### GLOBAL AMERICAN INSURANCE MANAGERS, A NEW JERSEY CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. PERERA COMPANY, INC., A CORPORATION AND PERERA-DEAK & CO., A CORPORATION, DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division

Argued September 21, 1976

Decided September 29, 1976.

Before Judges Halpern, Allcorn and Botter.

*Mr. Merritt T. Viscardi*argued the cause for appellant *(Messrs. Apruzzese & McDermott,*attorneys).

*Mr. Morris B. Zuclcer*argued the cause for respondents *(Messrs. Zuclcer, Lowenstein, Gurny, Facher & Zuclcer,*attorneys).

Per Curiam.

The judgment is affirmed essentially for the reasons stated by Judge Antell in the Chancery Division, 137 *N. J. Super.*377.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 19-10553

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 0:18-cv-60912-BB

TROPICAL PARADISE RESORTS, LLC,

a Florida limited liability company,

d.b.a. Rodeway Inn & Suites, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

CHOICE HOTELS, INC.,

 Defendant-Appellee,

versus

POINT CONVERSIONS, LLC

a Delaware limited liability company, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

________________________

(May 26, 2020)

Case: 19-10553 Date Filed: 05/26/2020 Page: 1 of 2
2

Before JORDAN, TJOFLAT and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

After careful review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we 

find no reversible error in the district court’s October 9, 2018 order, dismissing 

without prejudice Point Conversions’ amended counterclaims against Rodeway Inn 

& Suites and Choice Hotels. For the reasons outlined in the district court’s wellreasoned order, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Point Conversions’ 

claims arising under Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act are 

preempted by federal patent law. As to Point Conversions’ declaratory judgment 

claims, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of these claims, which in 

any case it was under no obligation to entertain under the Declaratory Judgment 

Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201.

AFFIRMED.

Case: 19-10553 Date Filed: 05/26/2020 Page: 2 of 2
Exhibit 99.20











CONSENT


Ladies and
Gentlemen:





The undersigned
hereby consents to (1) the references to the undersigned’s
name included or incorporated by reference in the Annual Report on
Form 40-F of Denison Mines Corp. in connection with the report
entitled “Technical Report with an Updated Mineral Resource
Estimate for the Waterbury Lake Property, Northern
Saskatchewan” dated December 21, 2018, and (2) all other
references to the undersigned included or incorporated by reference
in the Annual Report on Form 40-F of Denison Mines
Corp.








Dated: March 13,
2019











(signed) "Serdar
Donmez"


__________________________


Serdar Donmez,
P.Geo., E.I.T.


Denison Mines
Corp.
Exhibit 32.2
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Form 10-Q fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the Company.
 /s/ Rao UppaluriRao UppaluriOctober 22, 2009
    Treasurer, Principal Financial Officer and
Principal Accounting Officer
**Exhibit32.2**

**CERTIFICATIONPURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002SUBSECTIONS (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATESCODE**

Pursuant tosection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of section1350, chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officers ofCorgenix Medical Corporation, a Nevada corporation (the “Company”), does herebycertify with respect to the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-KSB for theyear ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities an Exchange Commission(the “10-KSB Report”) that:

iii.               the 10-KSB Reportfully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of theSecurities Exchange Act of 1934; and

iv.              the informationcontained in the 10-KSB Report fairly presents, in all material respects, thefinancial condition and results of operations of the Company.

 

Dated:      September 29, 2006

**ThisCertification is made solely for purposes of 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, subject tothe knowledge standard contained therein, and not for any other purpose.**

**A signedoriginal of this written statement required by Section 906 of theSarbanes-Oxley Act has been provided to the Company and will be retained by theCompany and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staffupon request. This written statement shall not be deemed to be “filed” as partof the quarterly report on Form 10-QSB that it accompanies.**
| /S/William H. Critchfield |   |
|---------------------------|--------|
| Chief Financial Officer   |

 

1

----
FORTH DIVISION

RICKMAN, C. J.,

DILLARD, P. J., and BROWN, J.

NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be

physically received in our clerk’s office within ten

days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.

https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

July 26, 2022

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

A20A0993. GEORGE v. THE STATE. 

RICKMAN, Chief Judge.

Thisisthe second appearance of this case before us. In an unpublished opinion,

we affirmed Harold George’s 2018 convictionsfor child molestation, enticing a child

for indecent purposes, and sexual battery. George v. State, 357 Ga. App. XXIV (Case

No. A20A0993) (Oct. 23, 2020) (unpublished). In Division 1 (b) of our opinion, we

rejected George’s claim that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to

suppress evidence seized during a search when that evidence was not specifically

listed in the search warrant. Id. at *8 (1) (b). 

On certiorari, the Supreme Court of Georgia overruled the line of authority on

which we had relied, including Walsh v. State, 236 Ga. App. 558, 560 (1) (b) (512

SE2d 408) (1999), and McBee v. State, 228 Ga. App. 16, 21 (3) (491 SE2d 97)

(1997), and concluded that we had “erred in considering the relevance of evidence
alone as justifying its seizure outside the scope of a search warrant, without

considering whether the requirements of the plain view doctrine have been met.”

George v. State, 312 Ga. 801, 807 (865 SE2d 127) (2021). The Supreme Court then

vacated our opinion and remanded to this Court “with instructions for it to vacate the

trial court’s order on George’s motion for new trial and remand the case to the trial

court with direction to reconsider the motion consistent with the law set forth in this

opinion.” Id. Based on our review of George v. State, 312 Ga. 801, we conclude that

the rulings in that decision implicate only Division 1 (b) of our opinion in George v.

State, 357 Ga. App. XXIV. Accordingly, we vacate Division 1 (b) of our prior

opinion in George v. State, 357 Ga. App. XXIV, and adopt the opinion of the

Supreme Court in George v. State, 312 Ga. 801, with respect to that division.

Divisions 1 (a), 2, 3, and 4 of our opinion were not affected by the Supreme Court’s

decision and thus remain in effect. See Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563-

564 (1) (554 SE2d 465) (2001). We also vacate the trial court’s order denying

George’smotion for new trial and remand with direction that the trial courtreconsider

that motion consistent with the law stated in the Supreme Court’s opinion. 

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with

direction. Dillard, P. J., and Brown, J., concur. 

2
#### Banking Commission, Appellant, vs. Magnin, Respondent.

*October 8*

November *4, 1941.*

*41For the appellant there was a brief by *Aik, Kresky, Cohen & Hughes*of Green Bay, and oral argument by *James A. Hughes.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *Lehner & Lehner, Adolph P. Lehner,*and *Howard W. Eslíen,*all of Oconto Falls, and *Orville S. Luckenbach*of Shawano, and oral argument by *Mr. Eslíen.*

Fairchild, J.

The essential facts in this case are identical with those in *Banking Comm. v. Magnin, ante,*p. 36, 300 N. W. 740, and the rules of law applicable there are likewise decisive of this case. Both cases were briefed and argued together. The order must be reversed.

*By the Court.*— Order reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings according to law.
EXHIBIT 32.2

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Yellow Hill Energy Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending July 31, 2007 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Craig
Lindsay, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

     (1)  The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
          15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

     (2)  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
          material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
          the Company.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
7th day of September, 2007.


/s/ Craig Lindsay
----------------------------
Chief Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-6680

ROBERT PAIGE-EL,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

THEODIS BECK; G. J. HAYES; PAMELA ALSTON;

BARRY J. ANDERSON,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,

District Judge. (CA-03-38-5-H)

Submitted: August 5, 2003 Decided: February 12, 2004

Before LUTTIG, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Robert Paige-El, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Robert Paige-El, a North Carolina inmate, filed a

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000), alleging prison

officials searched his locker and discarded his legal books and

papers and his religious books. Paige-El appeals from the district

court’s order dismissing his § 1983 action as frivolous under 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (2000). While we affirm on the reasoning

of the district court, see Paige-El v. Beck, No. CA-03-38-5-H (E.D.

N.C. March 25, 2003), we modify the district court’s order to

reflect that the dismissal is without prejudice. We dispense with

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Secure America Acquisition Corporation
(the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I,
Harvey L. Weiss, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my knowledge:





(1) The
report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




August
      14, 2009
                    
                    /s/
      Harvey L. WeissHarvey
      L. WeissPrincipal
      Executive Officer