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18-P-486 Appeals Court

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., trustee,1 vs. MARIA BOBADILLA.

No. 18-P-486.

Essex. February 4, 2019. - May 1, 2019.

Present: Maldonado, Singh, & Wendlandt, JJ.

Summary Process. Mortgage, Foreclosure. Real Property, 

Mortgage, Sale. Practice, Civil, Relief from judgment, 

Judicial discretion, Default, Summary process.

Summary Process. Complaint filed in the Northeast Division 

of the Housing Court Department on February 16, 2017. 

The case was heard by Fairlie A. Dalton, J.; a motion for 

relief from judgment was heard by David D. Kerman, J., and a 

motion to reinstate the original judgment was also heard by him.

Lucas B. McArdle for the defendant.

Brian Linehan for the plaintiff.

WENDLANDT, J. This appeal concerns a Housing Court judge's 

(motion judge) discretionary decision to allow, on a limited 

basis, a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Mass. R. 

 

1 For Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-NC2 AssetBacked Pass-Through Certificates.
2

Civ. P. 60 (b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974). Specifically, after a 

trial on the merits, at which the defendant, Maria Bobadilla,

appeared pro se, judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff,

Wells Fargo Bank N.A. (Wells Fargo) on its summary process 

complaint (original judgment). Bobadilla moved for relief from 

the judgment on various grounds, including that a 2010 default 

judgment entered in the Land Court (default judgment) 

erroneously permitted Wells Fargo's predecessor in interest to 

reform the mortgage to add her as comortgagor. The motion judge

allowed the motion for the limited purpose of permitting 

Bobadilla the opportunity to bring a motion in the Land Court to 

vacate the default judgment. After a Land Court judge denied 

Bobadilla's motion to vacate and the time to appeal had expired, 

the motion judge reentered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo. 

Discerning no abuse of discretion in the motion judge's decision 

to limit reopening of the summary process action to the 

collateral Land Court issue, we affirm. 

Background. Bobadilla and Carmelo Francisco acquired the 

subject property as tenants by the entirety by quitclaim deed in 

2004. In 2006, Francisco executed a promissory note secured by 

a mortgage to New Century Mortgage Corporation (New Century). 

Bobadilla was not named on the mortgage. In 2007, Francisco 

defaulted on the loan payments. 
3

In 2010, New Century filed an action in the Land Court to 

reform the mortgage to add Bobadilla as a comortgagor. Although 

Bobadilla received notice of the Land Court action, she did not 

appear. The default judgment entered, and the mortgage was 

reformed to include Bobadilla as comortgagor. Bobadilla did not 

appeal.

In 2012, New Century assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo 

as trustee for Carrington Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2006-NC2 

Asset-Backed Pass-Through Certificates. In 2015, after 

providing notice of the foreclosure sale, Wells Fargo conducted 

a foreclosure sale, at which it was the highest bidder. 

Wells Fargo thereafter commenced the present summary 

process action. Bobadilla received notice of the action,2 and in 

March 2017, a trial on the merits was held. Bobadilla and 

Francisco testified at the trial and presented various defenses. 

Wells Fargo relied on an affidavit of sale, as well as the 

default judgment. Following the trial, a Housing Court judge 

(trial judge) found the defenses raised to be without merit, and 

the original judgment entered in favor of Wells Fargo.

Subsequently, Bobadilla and Francisco obtained counsel and 

filed a motion for relief from judgment. The motion judge (who 

 

2 Wells Fargo dismissed the action against Francisco, who no 

longer lives on the property; he is not a party to the present 

appeal. 
4

was not the trial judge) allowed the motion. The motion judge 

subsequently clarified that the motion was allowed for the 

limited purpose of permitting Bobadilla time to attempt to 

vacate the default judgment. Consistent with that scope of 

relief, Bobadilla filed a motion in the Land Court to vacate the 

default judgment. The motion was denied and Bobadilla did not 

appeal. 

Wells Fargo notified the motion judge of the Land Court

judge's denial of the motion to vacate, and moved to reinstate 

the original judgment. Following a hearing at which the parties 

were present, judgment reentered in favor of Wells Fargo. 

Bobadilla now appeals.

Discussion. On appeal, Bobadilla asserts that the motion

judge abused his discretion in allowing her motion for relief 

from the original judgment for only the limited purpose of 

permitting her to attempt to vacate the Land Court's default

judgment; instead, she contends that she is entitled to reopen 

discovery and to a new trial on the merits on Wells Fargo's 

summary process complaint. 

A judge has substantial discretion when ruling on a motion 

for relief from judgment. See Cullen Enters., Inc. v. 

Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 399 Mass. 886, 894 

(1987), quoting Chu-Kun Woon v. Moy, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 949, 949 

(1983) (judge's ruling on rule 60 [b] motion should be given 
5

"marked deference"). The motion judge did not abuse his 

discretion by tailoring the relief from judgment to the issue of 

the default judgment. Once Bobadilla's efforts to challenge the 

default judgment were exhausted -- after the Land Court judge 

had denied her motion, and she declined to appeal from that 

denial -- the motion judge was not required to reopen the case 

for further discovery and a new trial on the merits, where a 

trial already had occurred in March 2017. At the trial, 

Bobadilla and Francisco presented defenses, including squarely 

raising issues regarding the veracity of some of the statements 

in the affidavit of sale. The trial judge found against 

Bobadilla on these defenses. 

Bobadilla asserts that a new trial is required to allow her 

to raise additional arguments regarding the affidavit of sale. 

Specifically, Bobadilla maintains that the affidavit was 

facially defective because the date entered by the signatory 

precedes the date of sale (by two days).3 Similarly, she 

contends that a new trial is required to afford her the 

opportunity to challenge the default judgment reforming the 

mortgage to add her as a mortgagor. These arguments could have 

been raised at the March 2017 trial, during which Wells Fargo 

 

3 Bobadilla's argument ignores the fact that the notary's

signature acknowledging the Wells Fargo representative's 

signature sets forth that the date of the affidavit (September 

22, 2016,) is after the date of sale (September 24, 2015).
6

relied on both the affidavit of sale and the default judgment. 

Indeed, Bobadilla raised several challenges to the affidavit at 

the trial; there was no abuse of discretion in the motion 

judge's decision declining her relief from judgment to raise 

these additional arguments. See Cullen Enters., 399 Mass. at 

894. 

Furthermore, the issue of the propriety of the mortgage 

reformation was the subject of the 2010 Land Court action that 

resulted in the default judgment as well as Bobadilla's motion 

to vacate that judgment. In denying the motion to vacate, the 

Land Court judge specifically addressed some of the same 

arguments that Bobadilla now seeks to relitigate. Accordingly, 

the doctrine of issue preclusion bars Bobadilla's desired third 

bite at the proverbial apple. See Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 

21, 23 n.2 (1988) (issue preclusion "prevents relitigation of an 

issue determined in an earlier action where the same issue 

arises in a later action, based on a different claim, between 

the same parties or their privies").4

 

4 Bobadilla also asserts that her due process rights were 

violated because, by denying a new trial on the merits, the 

motion judge deprived her of the opportunity to raise arguments 

that the default judgment was improper. Due process affords a 

litigant the right to notice and the opportunity to be heard. 

See Strange v. Powers, 358 Mass. 126, 135 (1970). Here, because 

Bobadilla received notice and had several opportunities to be 

heard, as outlined supra, her due process claims are 

unsupportable. 
7

Judgment affirmed.