alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
July 26, 1948 

Mr. Joe Skiles, Business Manager 

North Texas State Teachers College 

Denton, Texas 

Opinion No. v-640 

Re: The legality of selecting a bank 

as trustee for bondholders of a 

college revenue bond issue when 

an officer of the bank is also a 

member of the college’s board of 

resents. 

Dear Sir: 

Two letters, one 

William L. Kerr, President 

State Teachers Colleges of 

opinion of this Department 

matter. We have before us 

from you and one from Mr. 

of the Board of Regents, 

Texas, both request an 

upon the abmove subject ^ . 

a copy 0s tne proposea 

contract evidencing an agreement by and between the 

Board of Regents of the State Teachers Colleges of 

Texas for and on behalf of the North Texas State 

Teachers College at Denton and Dallas National Bank, 

Dallas, Texas. The instrument evidences a contract 

which, in legal effect, makes the bank an agent or 

trustee for the benefit of bondholders of certain 

revenue bond issue and likewise for the benefit of 

the Board in divers respects, wherein the Board 

agrees to make and maintain certain deposits with 

the bank and agrees to pay for the bank’s services 

a stipulated monthly sum. The integrity and honesty of the regent-officer is questioned by no one. 

You are interested solely in the legal principle invalved. 

This brief general statement of the nature 

of the contract is sufficient for the purposes of our 

opinion. 

It is contrary to the public policy of the 

State for public officers or boards of the State to 

make contracts of the type above mentioned. This is 

so because such public officers and boards owe to the 
or. Joe Skiles - Page 2 (v-640) 

State their unbiased official discretion in the matter 

of making contracts with others, and especially free 

from personal interest adverse to the State. The contract of the Board of Regents, of which Mr. Thomas is 

a member, with the bank, of which Mr. Thomas is VicePresident, Is in violation of the public policy above 

mentioned. City of Edinburg v. Ellis (Corn. App.) 59 S.W. 

(2d) 99. It is not a question of whether qr not the 

public interest will actually suffer in permitting the 

particular contract, but it is rather one of a sound 

policy as to official conduct where the law will not 

speculate upon the actualities following its violation. 

Many years ago the Supreme Court reversed the judgment 

of a district judge in a case where he was distantly 

related to one of the parties, and sent the cause back 

for another trial, saying, in its judgment of reversal, 

that in truth the judge below had decided the case 

properly. 

A contract between the Board of Regents 

of the State Teachers Colleges with a National 

bank whereby the bank is to act as agent and 

trustee for certain bond proceeds and the 

Board pays to the bank certain monthly payments and keeps and maintains certain deposits, 

is contrary to public policy and should not be 

made. 

Yours very truly, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS 

OS :wb Assistant 

APPROVED :
Exhibit 10.1







Susquehanna Bank


Robert P. Whelen, Jr., Senior Vice President


307 International Circle, 6th floor


Hunt Valley, MD 21030-1376


Tel (410) 316-0214


Fax (410) 316-0016







June 30, 2014







Mr. Jeffery G. Hough


SVP, Chief Financial Officer


GSE Systems


1332 Londontown Blvd.


Sykesville, MD 21784







Dear Jeff:







The purpose of this letter is to confirm that the Bank has agreed to the following:








	
·

	
The Bank has agreed to extend the Revolving Credit Expiration Date until March 31, 2015, as defined in the Master Loan and Security Agreement dated November 22, 2011 in Section 1.1 (a), by and among GSE Systems, Inc., GSE Power Systems, Inc., GSE EnVision, Inc. and Susquehanna Bank.  The Bank will require that cash collateral in an amount equal to any outstanding Letter's of Credit, working capital advances or negative foreign exchange positions, be maintained in a segregated account at Susquehanna.  We will have our counsel prepare a brief modification to the Financing Documents to reflect this change which we will send to you under separate cover.  All other terms and conditions shall remain the same.












Please call me with any questions.







Respectfully,







/s/ Robert P Whelen, Jr.


Rober P Whelen, Jr.


Senior Vice President
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R . 47.5, the Court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

- 1 - UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

_____________________

No. 98-41554

Summary Calendar

_____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JOSE SOTO ZAMARRIPA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

(No. C-98-CR-192-1)

July 20, 1999

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Jose Soto Zamarripa appea ls his conviction and sentence for

being a felon in pos session of a firearm, asserting that: the

district court erred in ruling that he voluntarily consented to the

search of his house and in concomitantly denying his motion to

suppress; he should have received a three-level, as opposed to only

a two-level, reduction for acceptance of responsibility; and the

court did not adequately give him the right of allocution at

sentencing, as required under F ED

. R. C RIM

. P. 32(c)(3)(C).- 2 -

Concerning the voluntariness of a consent to search, we review

this factual finding for clear error. Pursuant to our review, we

find no such error. See United States v. Tompkins , 130 F.3d 117,

121 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied

, 118 S. Ct. 1335 (1998).

Zamarripa could have voluntarily consented even though he may not

have know that he had the right to refuse per mission for the

search. S ee United States v. Watson

, 423 U.S. 411, 424-25 (1976);

United States v. Brown

, 102 F.3d 1390, 1397 (5th Cir. 1996),

overruled on other grounds

, United States v. Brown

, 161 F.3d 256

(5th Cir. 1998)(en banc).

Regarding the di strict court not reducing the reduction for

acceptance of responsibility by another level, pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 3E1.1(b), Zamarripa maintains that such a reduction was

appropriate because he waived his right to a jury trial and

stipulated the facts. On the other hand, he did not plead guilty,

moved to suppress the weapons found during the search of his home,

and retained his right to appeal. Under these circumstances,

Zamarrripa did not satisfy the requirements of § 3E1.1(b)(1); the

district court did not err in denying the three-level reduction.

See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b); see also United States v. Garcia

, 135 F.3d

951, 95 7 n.7 (5th Cir.), c ert. denied

, 118 S. Ct. 2386 (1998);

United States v. Leonard

, 61 F.3d 1181, 1187 (5th Cir. 1995)(“§- 3 -

3E1.1(b) makes it clear that the defendant must timely notify the

government of an intention to plead guilty, not of an intention to

seek a bench trial or to stipulate to certain facts”); United

States v. Maldonado , 42 F.3d 906, 913-14 (5th Cir. 1995).

Finally, the sentencing hearing record reveals that Zamarripa

was given an opportunity to address the district court before

sentence was imposed; there was no Rule 32(c)(3)(C) violation. S ee

United States v. Washington

, 44 F.3d 1271, 1276-77 (5th Cir. 1995).

AFFIRMED
*This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,

res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders

and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and

conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

MAY 29 2003

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ERNEST WELDON YOUNG,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

CONEJOS COUNTY BOARD OF

COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ROBERT

L. BAGWELL; GORDON J. BOSA;

STEPHANE WALTER ATENCIO,

Defendants - Appellees.

No. 02-1559

(D.C. No. 02-N-2149 (BNB))

(D. Colorado)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before KELLY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this

appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.
2

Plaintiff Ernest Young, appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal of

his action for lack of jurisdiction. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291

and affirm.

The Conejos County District Court entered a default judgment against Young for

several violations of the Conejos County land use ordinance. Young failed to comply

with the judgment and the court held him in contempt. Instead of challenging that ruling

within the state court system, Young filed in federal district court a “Verified Complaint

to Vacate a Void Order and Judgment” and various motions alleging constitutional

violations. The district court dismissed the action sua sponte, relying upon the

Rooker/Feldman doctrine. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

We have carefully reviewed Young’s filings with this court, the district court’s

order, and the record on appeal. We agree that the district court lacked jurisdiction to

review purported constitutional violations caused by the state court’s order. See Kiowa

Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1169 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The RookerFeldman doctrine bars a party losing in state court from seeking what in substance would

be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the

losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”

(Internal quotation omitted.)).
3

AFFIRMED. Appellees’ motion to strike appellant’s response to answer brief is

DENIED as moot.

Entered for the Court

Mary Beck Briscoe

Circuit Judge
<PAGE>   1

                                                                   EXHIBIT 10.46

            ATTACHING TO AND FORMING PART OF POLICY NO. 901/LK9905081

            ISSUED BY: HANNOVER RUCKVERSICHERUNGS-AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

               TO: MEDICAL INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE OF NEW JERSEY



ENDORSEMENT NO. 1                                   EFFECTIVE: 1ST JANUARY, 2000


It is hereby understood and agreed that with effect from 1st January, 2000 this
Contract is amended as follows:

i)      Article IV B. Limit Excess of Retention is amended to read:

        Limit Excess of Retention:

        i)      In respect of Medical and Dental Practitioner Liability,
                Umbrella Liability, Hospital and other Healthcare Institution
                Professional Liability and Commercial Liability Business:

                Reinsurers shall be liable for 90% of $25,000,000 of Ultimate
                Net Loss as respects each original policy, or, where applicable,
                each and every Event, plus Pro rata Loss Adjustment Expenses.

        ii)     In respect of Directors and Officers Liability, Fiduciary
                Liability, Managed Care Errors and Omissions Liability,
                Employment Practice Liability, and Miscellaneous Professional
                Indemnity (including but not limited to Lawyers Professional,
                Notary Public and Electronic Data Processors Business--coverage
                subject to agreement by Reinsurers):

                Reinsurers shall be liable for 90% of $15,000,000 of Ultimate
                Net Loss as respects each original policy, or, where applicable,
                each and every Event, plus Pro rata Loss Adjustment Expenses.

ii)     Article VIII: Premium is amended to read:

        The Company shall pay the Reinsurers a Minimum and Deposit Premium which
        is to be agreed upon receipt and review of (a) schedule of accounts
        ceded under the contract for the period: 12 months at 1st January, 1999
        and (b) I.L.F. allocations for the reduced limit of $25,000,000 and
        shall be payable quarterly as follows:-

        31st March, 30th June, 30th September and 31st December.

        The Minimum Premium shall be adjusted upwards at 90% of the net ceded
        premium within 45 days of 31st December.

iii)    This Contract reinsures 10% part of the 90% of the Limit of Liability
        expressed hereunder.



ALL OTHER TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THIS CONTRACT REMAIN UNALTERED.
Intake

Port Slip # 3

Depth = 38ft

Intake Canal

Cross Section Area ~ 945ft

2

PEEC Velocity = 1.0 ft/sec

Existing Units = 2.1 ft/sec

Four 12ft Diameter Culverts (Fully Submerged)

Culvert Cross Sectional Area ~ 452ft

2

PEEC Velocity = 2.17 ft/sec

Existing Units = 4.4 ft/sec

Low Velocity Area

New PEEC Screens

(Old Units 3&4 Screen Bays)

Through Screen Velocity = 2.91 ft/sec

Screen Approach Velocity = 1.75 ft/sec

Old Units 1&2 Screens

No Longer Active

Velocity = 0

G:\PROJECTS\FPL\Port_Everglades\113_87618_PortEvergladesEnergyCenterSCA\G_Biological Assessment\Figures\113-87618G003 VELOCITIES.mxd

REFERENCES

Bing Imagery Supplied by Microsoft

® Virtual Earth Bing MapTM License Under ESRI Inc. ©2010

Microsoft Corporation and its Data Suppliers. Accessed 10/26/2012

Coordinate System: NAD 1983 StatePlane Florida East FIPS 0901 Feet

Projection: Transverse Mercator

Datum: North American 1983

275 0 275

Feet

FPL

PORT EVERGLADES ENERGY CENTER

FIGURE: 2

INTAKE CANAL VELOCITIES

PROJECT NO. 113-87618

KFK 23 Oct. 2012

NRL 26 Oct. 2012

FILE No. 11387618_G002

GIS

REVIEW

DESIGN

CHECK

SCALE: AS SHOWN REV. 0

TITLE

PROJECT

REV. DATE DES REVISION DESCRIPTION GIS CHK RVW
# L_2012256EN.01000301.xml

| 22.9.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 256/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.9.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 256/3

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 23 July 2012

on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the Food Assistance Convention

(2012/511/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 214(4), in conjunction with Article 218(5), thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

Whereas:

| (1) | The Union is a party to the Food Aid Convention 1999 (1) (‘FAC 1999’), which should no longer be in force as from 1 July 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

The Union is a party to the Food Aid Convention 1999 (1) (‘FAC 1999’), which should no longer be in force as from 1 July 2012.

| (2) | On 17 November 2010, the Council authorised the Commission to conduct negotiations with a view to agreeing upon a Food Assistance Convention (‘the Convention’) which was to incorporates and reflects a modernised approach to food assistance, and which was to replace the FAC 1999. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 17 November 2010, the Council authorised the Commission to conduct negotiations with a view to agreeing upon a Food Assistance Convention (‘the Convention’) which was to incorporates and reflects a modernised approach to food assistance, and which was to replace the FAC 1999.

| (3) | The negotiations were successfully concluded on 25 April 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The negotiations were successfully concluded on 25 April 2012.

| (4) | It is in the interest of the Union to sign the Convention as the latter would help to achieve the humanitarian aid objectives referred to in Article 214(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

It is in the interest of the Union to sign the Convention as the latter would help to achieve the humanitarian aid objectives referred to in Article 214(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

| (5) | The Convention is open for signature until 31 December 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

The Convention is open for signature until 31 December 2012.

| (6) | The Convention should be signed on behalf of the European Union, subject to its conclusion, |
| --- | --- |

(6)

The Convention should be signed on behalf of the European Union, subject to its conclusion,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The signing of the Food Assistance Convention (‘the Convention’) is hereby authorised on behalf of the Union, subject to the conclusion of the said Convention (2).

Article 2

The President of the Council is hereby authorised to designate the person(s) empowered to sign the Agreement on behalf of the Union.

Article 3

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 23 July 2012.

For the Council

The President

C. ASHTON

---

(1)  
  OJ L 222, 24.8.1999, p. 40.

1

(2)  The text of the Agreement will be published together with the decision on its conclusion.

2

---
# L_2012041EN.01001801.xml

| 15.2.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 41/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

15.2.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 41/18

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 10 February 2012

appointing a Spanish alternate member of the Committee of the Regions

(2012/87/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Spanish Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015.

| (2) | An alternate member’s seat has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Ms Cristina Elena TENIENTE SÁNCHEZ, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

An alternate member’s seat has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Ms Cristina Elena TENIENTE SÁNCHEZ,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following is hereby appointed as alternate member of the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2015:

| — | Ms María Isabel NIETO FERNÁNDEZ, Secretaria Técnica de Acción Exterior de la Junta de Extremadura. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms María Isabel NIETO FERNÁNDEZ, Secretaria Técnica de Acción Exterior de la Junta de Extremadura.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 10 February 2012.

For the Council

The President

C. ANTORINI

---

(1)  
  OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 22.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 12, 19.1.2010, p. 11.

2

---
#### Larson, Respondent, vs. Larson, Appellant.*

*January 8*—

February *15, 1946.*

*354For the appellant there was a brief by *Gold & McCann,*and oral argument by *A. J. Palass,*all of Milwaukee.

*Harvey E. Kaiser*of Milwaukee, for the respondent.

*

 Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on April 12,1946.

RosenbeRRy, C. J.

The appeal presents nothing but a question of law, — Did the circuit court have jurisdiction to insert in the judgment the provisions for enforcing the same by contempt ?

No question is raised as to the amount or to the fact that it is due nor is the finding of the court that the defendant—

> “is guilty of contempt of court for his wilful and contumacious failure to comply with the previous orders and judgment of this court, and failing to make alimony and support-money payments for the support and maintenance of the plaintiff, *Mildred Larson,*and his three minor children,” — questioned.

The question raised on this appeal is answered by reference to sec. 247.32, Stats. 1943, which provides:

> “After a judgment providing for alimony or other allowances for the wife and children, or either of them, or for the appointment of trustees as aforesaid the court may, from time to time, on the petition of either of the parties, revise and alter such judgment respecting the amount of such alimony or allowance and the payment thereof, and also respecting the ap*355propriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in trust, *and may make any judgment respecting any of the said matters which such court might have made in the original action.*. . .”

Sec. 272.02, Stats., provides:

> “A judgment which requires the payment of money or the delivery of property may be enforced in those respects by execution. Where it requires the performance of any other act a certified copy of the judgment may be served upon the party, person or. officer who is required to obey the same, and if he refuse he may be punished for contempt, and his obedience enforced.”

In this case the defendant was required by the original judgment to provide for the support and maintenance of his wife and children. Although of sufficient ability he has contumaciously refused to comply with the judgment. The court now provides that he shall pay it in the manner prescribed and enforcement of the judgment may be made by contempt proceedings, if he' continues to disregard his duty. That the judgment may be enforced by contempt proceedings is held in *Staples v. Staples*(1894), 87 Wis. 592, 58 N. W. 1036. The judgment in this case is not one for a gross sum payable at once. A judgment may be enforced by contempt even though it is a lien upon the property of the husband. *Renner v. Renner*(1906), 127 Wis. 371, 106 N. W. 846.

*By the Court.*— That part of the amended judgment appealed from is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 302 Reported in House (RH)]

                                                Private Calendar No. 17
106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                 S. 302

                          [Report No. 106-906]

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 27, 2000

               Referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

                           September 27, 2000

       Referred to the Private Calendar and ordered to be printed

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
              For the relief of Kerantha Poole-Christian.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CLASSIFICATION AS A CHILD UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND 
              NATIONALITY ACT.

    (a) In General.--In the administration of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, Kerantha Poole-Christian shall be classified as a 
child within the meaning of section 101(b)(1)(E) of such Act, upon 
approval of a petition filed on her behalf by Clifton or Linette 
Christian, citizens of the United States, pursuant to section 204 of 
such Act.
    (b) Limitation.--No natural parent, brother, or sister, if any, of 
Kerantha Poole-Christian shall, by virtue of such relationship, be 
accorded any right, privilege, or status under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.

            Passed the Senate November 19, 1999.

            Attest:

                                                    GARY SISCO,

                                                             Secretary.
                                                Private Calendar No. 17

106th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                                 S. 302

                          [Report No. 106-906]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

              For the relief of Kerantha Poole-Christian.

_______________________________________________________________________

                           September 27, 2000

       Referred to the Private Calendar and ordered to be printed
```