alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
I 

114TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3607 

To increase from 10 to 15 years the term of office of the judges of the 

district courts of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the United 

States Virgin Islands, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 24, 2015 

Mr. SABLAN (for himself, Ms. BORDALLO, and Ms. PLASKETT) introduced the 

following bill; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To increase from 10 to 15 years the term of office of the 

judges of the district courts of the Northern Mariana 

Islands, Guam, and the United States Virgin Islands, 

and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘U.S. Territorial Fed5 eral Judges Improvement Act of 2015’’. 

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2 

•HR 3607 IH

1 SEC. 2. INCREASE IN TERMS OF OFFICE OF JUDGES OF DIS2 TRICT COURTS OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA 

3 ISLANDS, GUAM, AND THE UNITED STATES 

4 VIRGIN ISLANDS. 

5 (a) NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS.—Section 1(b)(1) 

6 of Public Law 95–157 (48 U.S.C. 1821(b)(1)) is amended 

7 by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘15 years’’. 

8 (b) GUAM.—Section 24(a) of the Organic Act of 

9 Guam (48 U.S.C. 1424b(a)) is amended by striking ‘‘ten 

10 years’’ and inserting ‘‘15 years’’. 

11 (c) VIRGIN ISLANDS.—Section 24(a) of the Revised 

12 Organic Act of the Virgin Islands (48 U.S.C. 1614(a)) is 

13 amended by striking ‘‘ten years’’ and inserting ‘‘15 

14 years’’. 

15 SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 

16 The amendments made by this Act shall take effect 

17 on the date of the enactment of this Act and shall apply 

18 with respect to any term of office of a judge of the district 

19 court of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, or the 

20 United States Virgin Islands— 

21 (1) that has not expired as of such date of en22 actment; or 

23 (2) that begins on or after such date of enact24 ment. 

Æ 

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# EUR-Lex - 32011M6186 - EN

Important legal notice

*|*

# 32011M6186

**Commission Decision of 30/05/2011 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.6186 - ADVENT / TOWERGATE BUSINESSES) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (Only the English text is authentic) **

*

*

|EUROPEAN COMMISSION |

Brussels , 30.5.2011

PUBLIC VERSION C(2011) 3904 final

SIMPLIFIED MERGER PROCEDURE

To the notifying party | |

Dear Madam(s) and/or Sir(s),

Subject: Case No COMP/M.6186 - ADVENT / TOWERGATE BUSINESSES Commission decision pursuant to Article 6(1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [1]

1. On 26/04/2011, the European Commission received notification of a proposed concentration pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation by which certain funds controlled by Advent International Corporation ("Advent", USA) acquire, within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation, control of the whole of the undertakings Towergate Partnership Limited (UK), Cullum Capital Ventures Limited (UK), Countrywide Insurance Management Limited (UK) and Powerplace Insurance Services Limited (together the "Towergate Businesses") by way of purchase of shares.

2. The business activities of the undertakings concerned are:

- for Advent: global private equity investor in various sectors, including financial services, media, communications, information technology, retail, industrial and pharmaceuticals;

- for the Towergate Businesses: insurance intermediary services in the UK [2] .

3. After examination of the notification, the European Commission has concluded that the notified operation falls within the scope of the Merger Regulation and of paragraph 5(b) of the Commission Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain concentrations under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 [3] .

4. For the reasons set out in the Notice on a simplified procedure, the European Commission has decided not to oppose the notified operation and to declare it compatible with the internal market and with the EEA Agreement. This decision is adopted in application of Article 6(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.

For the Commission

(signed) Alexander ITALIANER Director General

[1]OJ L 24, 29.1.2004, p. 1 ("the Merger Regulation"). With effect from 1 December 2009, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") has introduced certain changes, such as the replacement of "Community" by "Union" and "common market" by "internal market". The terminology of the TFEU will be used throughout this decision.

[2] Publication in the Official Journal of the European Union No C140, 11/05/2011, p.13.

[3] OJ C 56, 5.3.2005, p. 32.
#### Wenzel, Appellant, vs. Meske and another, Respondents.

*September 10*

October *14, 1947.*

*278For the appellant the cause was submitted on the brief of *William E. Burke*of Milwaukee.

For the respondents there was a brief by *Doll, Kinser & Hokanson*of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *R. A. Kinser.*

*279Rector, J.

The quoted agreement could have been intended either to, (1) release from the mortgage such of the original machinery as might be sold, or (2) release the machinery and subject the required replacements to the lien of the mortgage. If we assume most favorably to the appellant that the latter was intended and that the purpose was accomplished (cf. *Chynoweth v. Tenney*(1860), 10 Wis. *397), such a substitution of security was for the sole benefit of the respondents. When in the process of foreclosing their chattel mortgage the respondents obtained a judgment for the return of the original security or for its determined value of $1,500, their rights became fixed by the judgment. The rights of the appellant also became fixed. He no longer held the original machinery subject to the terms of the mortgage as modified by the agreement. He held it subject to the terms of the judgment. Instead of complying with the judgment and turning the property over to the respondents, he elected to dispose of it, and he thereupon became liable by the terms ©f the judgment for its value.

Execution upon a replevin judgment is for the delivery of specific property to the party entitled thereto and specifies the value of such property as determined by the judgment. If delivery cannot be had, the judgment is to be satisfied out of other property to the stated value as in the case of personal judgments. Sec. 272.05 (6), Stats. So far as the replacement machinery can be applied in satisfaction of the personal judgment, in the absence of agreement of the parties, it must be by sale and application of proceeds as in the case of other money judgments.

The complaint stated no cause of action, and the court properly denied the temporary injunction.

*By the Court.*— Order affirmed.
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

March 28, 2007 Clifford W. Taylor,
Chief Justice

131822 Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan Robert P. Young, Jr. SOUTHFIELD JEEP, INC ., d/b/a SOUTHFIELD Stephen J. Markman, CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH-JEEP, JusticesPlaintiff/Counter DefendantAppellee,

v SC: 131822 COA: 256014 Macomb CC: 03-002718-CK 39 th DC: 01-000684-GC PREFERRED AUTO SALES, INC., and MARK ARMENI, Defendants/Counter PlaintiffsAppellants.

________________ _______________ __________/

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 29, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is consid ered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERS E in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the defendant’s failure to appeal the
district court’s denial of its motion to transf er the case to the circ uit court leads to the conclusion that defendant either acquiesced in the district court’s decision that the damages did not exceed the jurisdictional limit, or chose to forfeit an y amount in excess of the jurisdictional limit of the district court. Slip op, p 7. Because the district court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion was interl ocutory, the defendant may appeal that decision as of right, on entry of a final order by the district court disposing of the case.

See People v Torres , 452 Mich 43, 59 (1996) (“[A] party in a civil action may raise previous interlocutory decisions when it brings an appeal of right from a final order.”); MCR Subchapter 7.100 of the Michigan Court Rules. In all other respects, leave to appeal is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should now be reviewed by this Court.

s0321 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

March 28, 2007

Clerk
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. Section 1350,AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report ofRidgestone Resources, Inc.(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ended May 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date here of (the "report"), I, Pardeep Sarai, Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and                                
| | --- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |    
| | (2) | The information contained in this Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| |    

Dated this 14thday of July, 2008.

PARDEEP SARAIPardeep SaraiChief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer












---
# L_2014011DE.01001201.xml

| 16.1.2014 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 11/12 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.1.2014

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 11/12

---

Berichtigung des Beschlusses 2011/166/GASP des Rates vom 23. März 2012 zur Unterstützung von Maßnahmen der Organisation für das Verbot chemischer Waffen (OVCW) im Rahmen der Umsetzung der Strategie der Europäischen Union gegen die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 87 vom 24. März 2012
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 87 vom 24. März 2012

Im Inhalt und auf Seite 49, Titel des Beschlusses:

anstatt:

„2011/166/GASP“

muss es heißen:

„2012/166/GASP“.

---
#### Nyre, Appellant, vs. Joint School District No. 1, Towns of Modena, Canton, Gilmanton, and Alma, Respondent.

*December 6, 1950*—

January *9, 1951.*

*251
      *Edwin Larkin*of Mondovi, for the appellant.

For the respondent there was a brief by *Weinandy & Schlosstein*of Cochrane, and oral argument by *B. H. Schlos-stein.*

Hughes, J.

Since sec. 40.19 (1), Stats., provides that “. . . No teaching contract with any person not legally authorized to teach the named school or subject shall be valid; and all teaching contracts shall terminate if, and when, the authority to teach terminates,” the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant upon the theory that if plaintiff had a valid contract in April it terminated in June when plaintiff’s 1947 permit to teach expired.

This would have been sound if renewal of plaintiff’s permit had been denied. There was no dispute that her application for permit for the year of the contract here in question was given to the county superintendent of schools, nor that a permit would have been issued to her by the state superintendent if the application had been transmitted to him. The failure of the county superintendent to follow his usual procedure, which normally resulted in issuance of a permit, was due to defendant’s cancellation of plaintiff’s contract. To permit defendant to escape liability on the contract with plaintiff because of her failure to obtain a permit, when the unwarranted cancellation of her contract by the school district made it impossible for her to procure such permit, would be an injustice.

Counsel also contends that plaintiff is not entitled to recover because she did not present herself at the Sisson school *252as her contract required, but rather tendered her services at the Modena school. There is nothing to the point. It was common knowledge that the consolidated district was operating only the Modena school and that the Sisson school was closed. The school districts had a right to consolidate and to operate only one school in the interests of economy. The districts entering into the consolidation, however, cannot thereby escape obligations legally incurred prior to the consolidation.

We conclude that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant. Since the question of whether plaintiff failed to accept similar employment and reduce damages which she sustained is properly a jury issue, it will be necessary to have a new trial.

*By the Court.*— Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial.

Broadfoot, J., took no part.
#### John W. Sherwood, Appellee, v. Greater Mammoth Vein Coal Company, Appellant.

APPEAL AND ERROR: Reversal — -Effect of Reversal. A judgment for damages in a law action, predicated solely on a finding in a prior deeree in equity, must, on appeal, be reversed, when, in the meantime, the said decree in equity has, on appeal, been reversed.

*Appeal from Marion District Court.*— LoriN N. Hays, Judge.

September 26, 1922.

AotioN at law, for damages for alleged trespass. There was a trial to a jury, and judgment upon its verdict for $500. The defendant *appeals.*—

Reversed.

*Stipp, Perry, Bannister & Starzimger*and *W. II. Lyon,*for appellant.

*Vander Ploeg & Johnson,*for appellee.

Evans, J.

The defendant entered upon the land of the plaintiff, and proceeded to construct thereon a railroad, for the purpose of the transportation of coal. The plaintiff challenged its right to so enter, and brought a suit in equity, to restrain and enjoin the defendant from entering upon his premises and from constructing said railway, and in effect sought to set aside *440a certain prior contract, pursuant to which the defendant had made the entry. The equity suit was tried in the district court, with the result that the merits were found against the plaintiff, and his petition was dismissed. The costs, however, were taxed by the court to the defendant, on the ground that it entered the premises prematurely, and in advance of a tender of payment under the contract. Thereupon, this action for damages was brought, and was predicated upon the theory that the defendant was a trespasser, in that it wrongfully entered upon the land, in advance of tender of payment. The trial court instructed the jury, as a matter of law, and pursuant to the decree in the equity case, that the entry of the defendant was wrongful, and was a trespass, and submitted the case to the jury upon the sole issue of measure of damages. In the equity case, both parties appealed to this court. Upon such appeal, the decree below was affirmed on the appeal of the plaintiff and reversed upon the appeal of the defendant. See *Sherwood v. Greater M. V. C. Co.,*193 Iowa 365. The result of the reversal was to hold that the entry by the defendant company was rightful, and that it was, therefore, not a trespasser.

Inasmuch as the judgment for damages in the present action was predicated upon the decree in the equity case as an- adjudication, and inasmuch as the adjudication thus relied upon has been duly reversed, a reversal must also result in this action. Such was the holding in *Poole, G. & Co. v. Seney,*70 Iowa 275. The judgment below is, *accordingly,*— Reversed.

Stevens, C. J., AkthuR and Faville, JJ., concur.-
Exhibit 23.1





[LETTERHEAD OF M&K CPAS, PLLC]




CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS





We hereby consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statements on Form S-8 of Power3 Medical Products, Inc. (the “Company”), Registration Nos. 333-151466, 333-158685 and 333-172504, of our report dated April 13, 2011, relating to the Company’s financial statements appearing in Form 10-K for each of the years ended December 31, 2010 and 2009.





/s/M&K CPAS, PLLC


www.mkacpas.com


Houston, Texas


April 15, 2011
# L_2012189EN.01001101.xml

| 19.7.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 189/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.7.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 189/11

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 16 July 2012

appointing a Slovenian member of the Committee of the Regions

(2012/407/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Slovenian Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015.

| (2) | A member’s seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Ms Barbara ŽGAJNER TAVŠ, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

A member’s seat on the Committee of the Regions has become vacant following the end of the term of office of Ms Barbara ŽGAJNER TAVŠ,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following is hereby appointed as member to the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2015:

| — | Ms Jasna GABRIČ, podžupanja občine Trbovlje. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Jasna GABRIČ, podžupanja občine Trbovlje.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 16 July 2012.

For the Council

The President

S. ALETRARIS

---

(1)  
  OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 22.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 12, 19.1.2010, p. 11.

2

---
| 1.   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| 2.   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented and the consolidated result of operations of the Company for the periods presented. |
|----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| By:    | /s/ Melissa Lopez                                                     |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                  |
| Name:  | Melissa Lopez                                                         |
|   |                                                                  |
| Title: | Principal Executive Officer, Principal Financial Officer and Director |
|   |                                                                  |
| Date:  | September 8, 2009                                                     |
#### WILLIAMS v. STATE.

No. 15491.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 19, 1932.

Paul Petty, of Ballinger, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE, J.

Conviction for burglary; punishment, five years in the penitentiary.

This appeal is taken from an order of the district court setting aside a prior order suspending sentence against this appellant and the entry of judgment final and sentencing of appellant to the penitentiary for a term of five years.

From bill of exception No. 1 we learn that appellant was tried in this case and given a five-year sentence, which, upon the recommendation of the jury, was suspended during the good behavior of appellant. Also that, after said sentence had been so suspended, but before the expiration of the term of appellant’s punishment fixed in said' case, this appellant was again convicted of burglary in February, 1932, and given a. two-year sentence by a jury in the last-mentioned case. From this judgment and sentencé appellant gave notice of appeal in due form, and brought the case upon appeal to this court. Thereafter, and during the month of May, 1932, and before the appeal from appellant’s conviction in February, 1932, had been passed upon or determined by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the trial court, upon due notice to appellant, revoked the suspension of the five-year suspended sentence above referred to, and, over the objection and exception of appellant, sentenced appellant to serve a term of five years in the penitentiary of Texas. Complaining that the judgment and sentence passed upon him in February, 1932, was not such final conviction as would authorize or warrant the trial court to revoke the prior suspension of the sentence in the case at bar, appellant has duly appealed, and now brings his case before us for review, and asks that the judgment revoking his prior sentence, which was. suspended, be set aside and the case reversed. The contention of appellant must be sustained. Calloway v. State, 91 Tex Cr. R. 502, 240 S. W. 553; Ex parte Lawson, 76 Tex. Cr. R. 419, 175 S. W. 698; article 779, C. C. P. 1925.

The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause remanded.