alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Berkemeyer, Appellant, vs. Milwaukee Automobile Insurance Company, Limited, Mutual, and another, Respondents.

*January 12*

February *7, 1950.*

*387
      *Arnold C. Otto*of Milwaukee, for the appellant.

*D. J. Regan*of Milwaukee, for the respondents.

Brown, J.

It is obvious that the plaintiff has made two separate appeals and that the single undertaking in form and intent is security for costs only as to the appeal from the judgment. Therefore, the appeal from the order has not been perfected as required by sec. 274.11 (3), Stats., and it must be dismissed. See *Goerlinger v. Juetten*(1941), 237 Wis. 543, 297 N. W. 361.

The appeal from the judgment confines us to the record as brought to us without a bill of exceptions. It consists of the pleadings, plaintiff’s requests for instructions to the jury, the charge to the jury, the special verdict, the judgment, and the motions after judgment.

The questions posed by the special verdict are within the issues raised by the pleadings and the judgment is in accord with the answers of the jury to those questions. Whether the charge to the jury was adequate and whether the special verdict is sustained by the evidence cannot be determined unless we know what the evidence was. For lack of a bill of exceptions we do not know. It is impossible for us, therefore, *388to discover error and in the absence of error the judgment must be affirmed.

Respondent says the appeals are frivolous and has asked for double costs as allowed by sec. 251.23 (3), Stats. The matter of costs is discretionary and we have determined to allow them as normally taxed under sec. 251.23 (1). Because the costs undertaking is not concerned with the appeal from the order, the clerk will apportion one tenth of the joint costs to the appeal from the order and nine tenths to the appeal from the judgment.

*By the Court.*— Judgment and order affirmed.
---

---

EXHIBIT 13.2

Certification
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 20-F of Retalix Ltd. (the Company)
for the period ended December 31, 2004 (the Report), I, Danny Moshaioff,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

1.                     the
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section           13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.                     the
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in           all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the           Company.

Date: March 21, 2005

| |  | /s/ Danny Moshaioff
Danny MoshaioffChief Financial Officer
| |  | ------------------------------------------------------------------------



---

---
#### Ed Welty, Appellant, v. Des Moines Mutual Insurance Association, Appellee.

No. 40734.

February 17, 1931.

Marks cQ~ Marks, for appellant.

Jopso'm, Struble & Sifford, for appellee.

*1136De GRAff, J.

The defendant, Des Moines Mutual Insurance Association, executed and delivered its policy on May 11,1929, to the plaintiff (appellant), Ed Welty, insuring his share of the crop on certain described real estate in Woodbury County, Iowa, for the year 1929. A hailstorm occurred June 30, 1929.

The petition in this cause was filed on the 18th day of February, 1930. The next term of the district court of Woodbury'County, Iowa, commenced March 3, 1930. On the 10th day of March, the plaintiff took default judgment against the defendant in the sum of $4,000, which represented, as alleged, a total loss of the crops in question through hail damage. On the 25th day of March, 1930, the defendant insurance company filed its application or motion to set aside the default, accompanied by affidavit of merits and its answer to the petition. This was in conformity to the statute. Section 11589, Code, 1927.

It appears from the affidavit of merits filed by the defendant that plaintiff’s original notice was, upon its receipt by the defendant insurance company, sent to the legal firm of Jepson, Struble & Sifford, Sioux City, Iowa. The envelope containing the original notice was lost, and the firm of attorneys to whom it was addressed never received same. The non-delivery of the envelope may not be said to have happened through any fault of the party sending the same.

The proposition involved on this appeal is readily determined. *Barber v. Shattuck,*207 Iowa 842, is *stare decisis*here. In that case the plaintiff commenced action against the defendant for damages growing out of false and fraudulent pretenses. There was a judgment by default. The defendant made application to set aside the default, and relief was granted, and the trial court vacated the judgment. It is said in opinion:

> “From that judicial action, appellant is now attempting to appeal. Does he have the right so to do? We are constrained to answer in the negative. ’ ’

It was held that an order setting aside a default judgment is nonappealable. It must be borne in mind that we are not dealing *1137with, an order that “grants or refuses a new trial,” within the' meaning of Section 12823, Paragraph 3, Code', 1927.

The appeal *is*— Dismissed.

Faville, C. J., and Stevens, Albert, and WagneR, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2





CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report of North Penn Bancorp, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ending March 31, 2011, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Joseph F. McDonald, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
the Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)
the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Date:

May 13, 2011

/s/ Joseph F. McDonaldJoseph F. McDonaldChief Financial Officer
# L_2012258EN.01003101.xml

| 26.9.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 258/31 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

26.9.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 258/31

---

COUNCIL DECISION

of 24 September 2012

appointing two Polish alternate members of the Committee of the Regions

(2012/519/EU)

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 305 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal of the Polish Government,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 22 December 2009 and on 18 January 2010, the Council adopted Decisions 2009/1014/EU (1) and 2010/29/EU (2) appointing the members and alternate members of the Committee of the Regions for the period from 26 January 2010 to 25 January 2015.

| (2) | Two alternate members’ seats have become vacant following the end of the terms of office of Mr Jacek CZERNIAK and Mr Marcin JABŁOŃSKI, |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Two alternate members’ seats have become vacant following the end of the terms of office of Mr Jacek CZERNIAK and Mr Marcin JABŁOŃSKI,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

The following are hereby appointed as alternate members to the Committee of the Regions for the remainder of the current term of office, which runs until 25 January 2015:

| — | Mr Piotr CAŁBECKI, Marszałek Województwa Kujawsko-Pomorskiego, |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Piotr CAŁBECKI, Marszałek Województwa Kujawsko-Pomorskiego,

| — | Mr Jarosław DWORZAŃSKI, Marszałek Województwa Podlaskiego. |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr Jarosław DWORZAŃSKI, Marszałek Województwa Podlaskiego.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 24 September 2012.

For the Council

The President

A. D. MAVROYIANNIS

---

(1)  
  OJ L 348, 29.12.2009, p. 22.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 12, 19.1.2010, p. 11.

2

---
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-1329

ROY SUDDUTH,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v.

BRENDA VASQUEZ; CARMEN BONILLA; ROBERT C. KETTLER; MITCHELL MITCHELL; ZARRICK VENEY; HERNANDO RODRIQUEZ; GLEN WHITE; CRESTVIEW COMMONS, d/b/a Fields of Landmark; WILLIAM DEARMAN; ELIJAH JOHNSON; TERRENCE D. LANGFORD; CYNTHIA THOMPSON; KIMBERLY WADE; TALORI JOHNSON; ROY TRIESE; WILLIAM D. EUILLE; KSI MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED; SCOTT MANAGEMENT INCORPORATED; AMEURFINA BRAGA; MARCELO JORDAN; EVELYN GLEASON; HAROLD MANGOLD; JOHN P. ELLIS; RICHARD V. MINIONIS; NICOLE M. BACON; LEGAL SERVICES OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA; HOPE MAYFIELD; BARBARA DELANDER; MARGARET N. FRENCH; BECKY J. MOORE; DONALD M. HADDOCK, JR.; JEAN KELLEHER NIEBAUER; PAULA A. AVILA-GUILLEN; DAVID MILLER; STEVEN PRESTON; ROSS CONLAN; LEE A. PALMAN; ALEXANDRIA REDEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING AUTHORITY; CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA; JOHN CATLETT; JANNINE PENNELL; ROBERT RODRIGUEZ; RUSSELL FURR; TIMOTHY LAWMASTER; CITY OF ALEXANDRIA OFFICE OF BUILDING AND FIRE CODE ADMINISTRATION; CITY OF ALEXANDRIA, OFFICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS; ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA GENERAL DISTRICT COURT; ALEXANDRIA SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:08-cv-01106-LMB-TCB)

Submitted: September 10, 2009 Decided: September 14, 2009Before KING, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Roy Sudduth, Appellant Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

23 PER CURIAM:

Roy Sudduth appeals the district court’s order denying

his motion to file an amended complaint and dismissing his civil

action. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the

district court. Sudduth v. Vasquez , No. 1:08-cv-01106-LMB-TCB

(E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2009). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented

in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT #18
 
January 29, 1999
(March 19, 1999 as to Note 16)
CCPC Holding Company, Inc.
One Pyrex Place
P.O. Box 1555
Elmira, New York 14902-1555
 
Dear Sirs:
 
    We have audited the consolidated financial statements of CCPC Holding
Company, Inc. as of December 31, 1998 and for the year then ended, included in
your Annual Report on Form 10-K to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
have issued our report thereon dated January 29, 1999 (March 19, 1999 as to Note
16). The consolidated balance sheet as of December 31, 1997 and the consolidated
statements of operations and cash flows for each of the two years in the period
ended December 31, 1997 were audited by other auditors whose report, dated
January 19, 1998 (and March 16, 1998 for the first paragraph of Note 2),
expressed an unqualified opinion on those statements. Note 3 to such financial
statements contains a description of your adoption during the year ended
December 31, 1998 of a change in accounting method from the last-in, first-out
method of inventory valuation to the first-in, first-out method. In our
judgment, such change is to an alternative accounting principle that is
preferable under the circumstances.
 
Yours truly,
 
Deloitte & Touche, LLP
 
                                       64
3. Intercreditor Agreement. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, theexercise of any right, privilege, power or remedy by the Second Priority Trustee and any otherSecond Priority Claimholders hereunder are subject to the provisions of the IntercreditorAgreement, dated as of November 30, 2006 (as amended, restated, supplemented or otherwisemodified from time to time, the “Intercreditor Agreement”), among Satélites Mexicanos, S.A. deC.V., HSBC Bank USA, National Association, as First Priority Collateral Trustee, and Wells FargoBank, National Association, as Second Priority Collateral Trustee, and certain other persons partythereto or that may become party thereto from time to time. In the event of any conflict betweenthe terms of the Intercreditor Agreement and this Agreement, the terms of the IntercreditorAgreement shall govern and control as between the First Priority Collateral Trustee, the FirstPriority Indenture Trustee and any other First Priority Claimholders and the Second PriorityCollateral Trustee, the Second Priority Indenture Trustee and any other Second PriorityClaimholders.4. Effect on Second Priority Indenture. As supplemented by this SupplementalIndenture, the Second Priority Indenture is hereby ratified and confirmed in all respects.5. Counterparts. This Supplemental Indenture may be executed in counterparts, each ofwhich when so executed shall be deemed to be an original, but all such counterparts shall togetherconstitute but one and the same instrument.6. Governing Law. This Supplemental Indenture shall be governed by and construed inaccordance with the laws of the State of New York.[*Signature Pages Follow*]
 
2

 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caused this Supplemental Indenture to be dulyexecuted as of the day and year first above written.      SATÉLITES MEXICANOS, S.A. DE C.V.
Exhibit 99.6

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with the Annual Report of Denison Mines Corp. (the Company) on Form 40-F for the period ended
December 31, 2016, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), each of the undersigned certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, and SEC Rule 13a-14(b), that to the best of my knowledge:



| | 1. | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: March 30, 2017



|       |  |                                       |  |  |  |        |  |                                                    
|------ |  | ------------------------------------- |  |  |  | ------ |  | ---------------------------------------------------
|By:    |  | /s/ David D. Cates                    |  |  |  | By:    |  | /s/ Gabriel McDonald                               
|Name:  |  | David D. Cates                        |  |  |  | Name:  |  | Gabriel McDonald                                   
|Title: |  | President and Chief Executive Officer |  |  |  | Title: |  | Vice President, Finance and Chief Financial Officer
In The 

Court of Appeals 

Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo 

 

No. 07-24-00154-CR 

 

BRIAN TODD WEST, APPELLANT 

V. 

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE 

On Appeal from the 242nd District Court 

Castro County, Texas 

Trial Court No. B4311-2307, Honorable Kregg Hukill, Presiding 

July 12, 2024 

ORDER OF ABATEMENT AND REMAND 

Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ. 

Appellant, Brian Todd West, appeals his conviction for manufacture or delivery of 

a controlled substance1 and sentence to twelve years of confinement. The clerk’s record 

was originally due May 23, 2024, but was not filed. By letter of June 6, 2024, we notified 

the trial court clerk that the record was overdue and directed her to advise this Court of 

the status of the record by June 17. To date, the clerk has neither filed the record nor 

sought an extension of time to do so. 

1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.112.
2

Accordingly, we abate the appeal and remand the cause to the trial court for further 

proceedings. See TEX. R. APP. P. 35.3(c) (“The trial and appellate courts are jointly 

responsible for ensuring that the appellate record is timely filed.”); 37.3(a)(2) (requiring 

appellate courts to “make whatever order is appropriate to avoid further delay and to 

preserve the parties’ rights” when the appellate record is not timely filed). On remand, 

the trial court shall determine the following:

(1) what tasks remain to complete the filing of the clerk’s record;

(2) why the clerk has not completed the necessary tasks;

(3) what amount of time is reasonably necessary for the completion of those 

tasks; and

(4) whether the clerk can complete the tasks within the time the trial court 

finds reasonable.

The trial court is directed to enter such orders necessary to address the 

aforementioned questions. So too shall it include its findings on those matters in a 

supplemental clerk’s record and cause that record to be filed with this Court by September 

10, 2024.

Should the clerk file the record on or before August 12, 2024, she is directed to 

immediately notify the trial court of the filing, in writing, whereupon the trial court shall not 

be required to take any further action.

It is so ordered.

Per Curiam

Do not publish.
Exhibit 10.1
 RESTRICTED STOCK AWARD AGREEMENT UNDER THE
NATIONAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HOLDINGS, INC  2009 STOCK OPTION AND COMPENSATION PLAN
 Name of Grantee:Restricted Stock:  Shares
    
    Grant Date:Fair Market Value on the Date of Grant (Per Share): $____/share
 Agreement Company
 Plan
 Restricted Stock Award Shares
 Restrictions Restrictions
 Performance Targets
 Tax Gross-Up
 Termination Upon Death or Disability
 Other Termination
 Withholding Taxes




---



##### 



Beneficiary Designation
 No Employment Contract
 Status of Participant
 Transferability
 Book Entry Registration of the Shares
 Restrictive Legends
  Section 83(b) Election no later than thirty (30) days




---



##### 



Notices
 Acknowledgment
 NATIONAL AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HOLDINGS, INC.By:Its
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 21.1

                    SUBSIDIARIES OF INFORMATION HOLDINGS INC.


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                STATE OF INCORPORATION
      NAME                                          OR ORGANIZATION
      ------------------------------------      -----------------------

<S>                                             <C>
      CRC Press LLC ......................      Delaware

      MicroPatent LLC ....................      Delaware

      Information Ventures LLC ...........      Delaware

      Optipat, Inc. ......................      Virginia

      MicroPatent (UK) LLC ...............      Delaware

      Master Data Center, Inc. ...........      Michigan

      Transcender LLC ....................      Delaware

      CRC Press Inc. .....................      Delaware

      CRC Press (U.K.) LLC ...............      Delaware

</TABLE>
#### Kastner, Respondent, vs. Weber, Appellant.

*October 22*

November *26, 1946.*

*452For the appellant there was a brief by *Hammersley, Torke & Kelley*of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *William M. Kelley.*

For- the respondent there was a brief by *Rubin, Zabel & Ruppa*of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Nathan Ruppa.*

Fairchild, J.

The appellant’s conduct was clearly tor-tious when he removed two of the porch steps, when he caused rubbish to be dumped where it obstructed the side entrance to the building on lot 6 and plugged the sewer, and when he had holes dug in the respondent’s sidewalk. Fie was at that time a tenant of the respondent.

For injury to the respondent by this conduct on the part of the appellant, the respondent was rightly awarded damages by the trial court in the amount of what it would reasonably cost to restore the property. *Chapleau v. Manhattan Oil Co.*(1922) 178 Wis. 545, 550, 190 N. W. 361.

In his counterclaim the appellant complains of the encroachments on lot 5 and of trespassing on the part of the respondent, her tenants, servants, and agents. In evaluating his counterclaim, it must be remembered that he was not the owner of that lot, but was merely the tenant in possession by virtue of a one-year lease, expiring January 1, 1946.

The estate of the owner of the fee may be directly affected by the encroachments. But she has not as yet seen fit to come into court seeking relief. Appellant knew of the existing con*453dition years before he entered into his lease of lot 5. He cannot avail himself of the cause of action belonging to his landlord as a ground for his counterclaim. 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, p. 2105, sec. 352.

As to any cause of action for disturbing him in the enjoyment of his possession, he has not proven any interference by respondent with his use of the premises as he took them from His landlord. There is no evidence to warrant a finding that the already existing slight encroachments, under the circumstances, have in the hands of the respondent or by reason of her acts, resulted in any damage to his possession considered as an estate. He made his bargain with reference to the lease, knowing of the encroachments which prevent a use of the lot to the very extreme limits of its boundaries. The other persons whom he describes as trespassers are not parties and were not acting in the interest of respondent.

The learned trial judge reached a proper result. There was no injury to enjoyment and occupation of the leased premises for which the respondent is responsible occurring after appellant leased lot 5.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   Exhibit 10.34

                                 ADDENDUM NO. 4

                                     to the

          COMBINED QUOTA SHARE, AGGREGATE AND SPECIFIC EXCESS OF LOSS
                               REINSURANCE TREATY

               (hereinafter referred to as "Reinsurance Treaty")

                                   issued to

                 MEDICAL INTER-INSURANCE EXCHANGE OF NEW JERSEY
                           Lawrenceville, New Jersey

                 (hereinafter referred to as "Ceding Company")

                                       by

                   THE REINSURERS SUBSCRIBING THE RESPECTIVE
                      INTERESTS AND LIABILITIES AGREEMENTS

                   (hereinafter referred to as "Reinsurers")

The Ceding Company and the Reinsurers hereby agree to amend the captioned 
Reinsurance Treaty, effective November 1st, 1998, with respect to business 
ceded for the 1999 Coverage Year and thereafter, as follows:-

                            ARTICLE 27: INTERMEDIARY


Lloyd Thompson Ltd, 6 Crutched Friars, London EC3N 2HT is hereby recognized as 
the intermediary negotiating this Treaty for all business hereunder and through 
whom all communication relating hereto (including but not limited to notices, 
statements and reports) shall be transmitted to both parties. It is understood, 
as regards remittances due either party hereunder, that payment by the Ceding 
Company to the Intermediary, shall constitute payment to the Reinsurers but 
payment by the Reinsurer to the Intermediary shall only constitute payment to 
the Ceding Company to the extent such payments are actually received by the 
Ceding Company. Notwithstanding the foregoing, it is agreed that all payments 
will be direct from the Reinsurer to the Ceding Company, or from the Ceding 
Company to the Reinsurer as appropriate.