### In The Matter Of:
COMAIR, INC. Respondent 

## SERVED: July 30, 2014 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS WASHINGTON, DC ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) 

### DocketNos. FAA-2014-0318 FAA-2014-0319 Case Nos. 2011 S0271013 2011S0271015

ORDERDENYING RESPONDENT'S AND FAA'SMOTIONS .. I ;' :· ": l ;



### On June 2, 201,4, the FAA filed two Complaints against the Respondent, Comair, Inc., under DocketNos. FAA-2014-0318 and FAA-2014-0319. 1

### The two Complaints charge Comair with multiple violations ofthefederal aviation regulations, and request a total proposed civil penalty in the amount of$487,500. On July 2, 2014, in lieu offiling an answer, the Respondent filed a Motionto Dismiss of Comair, Inc. [sic] ("Motion to Dismiss"). On July 11,2014,the FAA filed one document containing two motions and a response. This document was entitled Motion to Strike, Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted, and Response in Oppositionto Motion to Dismiss. The document in its entirety will be referred to as the FAA's "Response." The individual Motions in this FAA Response will be referenced by shorttitle (e.g., "Motionto Strike" and "Motionto Deem"). On July 17, 2014, the Respondent filed one document containing one answer and a reply. This document was entitled Answer In Oppositionto Complainant's Motion to Strike and Motion to Deem Admitted, and Reply to Complainant's Response In Opposition To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. The document in its entirety will be referred as the Respondent's Reply. The individual

1There has been no order ofconsolidation ofthe two actions. Nevertheless, the actions appearto be linked for these motions, since the parties have filed identical motions in both case files. As aresult, the Order issued here is identical for each case. Therefore, both docket numbers have been listed on this Order, buttwo separate Orders

- one for each separate file- have been issued.Answer in Opposition to the FAA Motions in this FAA Response will be referenced by shorttitle (e.g., "Opposition"). OnJuly 23,2014, the FAA filed its Reply In Support ofMotion to Strike and Motion to DeemAdmitted ("FAA Replies"). Inreviewing the parties' Motions, Responses, Opposition, and Replies, all evidence, arguments and legal authority have beenread and considered. However, only certain highlights are addressed inthis Order. 

### A. General Factual Summary The Respondent alleged that Comair, Inc. ceased all revenue flight operations on September 29, 2012. How.ever, it maintained its Air Carrier Certificate in orderto continue operating and allow itselftime to conduct an "orderlytransfer ofaircraft" to leaseholders and other entities. (Mot. Dismiss, Exh. 1). OnDecember 13, 2011 the FAA served the Respondent with two Notices of Proposed Civil Penalty ("NPCP"). (Mot. Dismiss 2.) Four (4) days later, on December 17, 2012, the Respondent contactedthe FAA and voluntarily surrendered its Air Carder Certificate. (Mot. Dismiss, Exh. 1.) That same day, December 17, 2012, the FAA served the Respondent with notice that the "effective date" ofits Certificate surrender was December 27, 2012. (ld. at Exh. 2.) On December 28, 2012, the day immediately following the Respondent's effective date ofCertificate surrender, the Respondent was merged into DeltaAirlines, Inc. (Mot. Dismiss, 1 fn. 1.) Approximately five months later, onMay 17, 2014, the FAA servedthe Respondentwith two Final Notices ofProposed Civil Penalty. (Complaints, 1.) Four (4) days later, the Respondent served the FAAwith Requests for Hearing (Requests for Hearing, 1.) On June 2, 2014,the FAA filedthetwo Complaints atissue here. The Respondent's Answer was due on orbefore July 3, 2014. On June 27,2014, the FAA declined to agree to an extension ofthe July 3, 2014 deadline. On July 2, 2014, one day before the filing deadline, the Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss. 

### B. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 1. BriefSummary ofParties' Arguments The Respondent asserted that once the FAA accepted its Air Carrier Certificate surrender, the FAA was estopped from pursuing a civil penalty action, because the FAA had not "reserve[d] Page 2 of 11

### the right to pursue this enforcement action". (Mot. Dismiss 2.) As legal grounds supporting its Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent asserted that the language ofFAA Order 2150.38 was controlling. "The FAA is barred by its own internal rules and policies from prosecuting the Complaint filed against Comair inthis matter" because the FAA had accepted the Respondent's voluntary surrender ofits Air Carrier Certificate. (Mot. Dismiss 2.) As part ofits Response, the FAA asserted that FAA Order 2150.38 was not relevant to the facts in this case, because the Respondent's certificate surrenderhad not involved a certificate action? (Response 2.) In addition, the language ofFAAOrder 2150.38 was guidance for FAA employees only, and did not prohibitpursuit ofa civil penalty action. (Response 2.) 2. Applicable Section ofFAA Order 2150.38 The overall purpose ofFAA Order 2150.38, 5-14,**~10(b)** 

### (May 1, 2012) is to provide "guidelines"to FAA employees for "handling a certificate holder's voluntary surrender ofa certificate." FAA Order 2150.38, 5-14,**~10(a)** 

### (May 1, 2012). As part ofthese guidelines, FAA employees are directed to be "alert" for indications a certificate holder is attempting to "avoid certificate action." 

### !d. at**~10(b).** 

### The FAA employees are also directed to "refuse the voluntary surrender ofa certificate" ifthere is an investigative or enforcement action pending. (!d.) 

### Consequently, before determining whether to accept a certificate holder's voluntary surrender ofa certificate, FAA investigative personnel review actions in the EIS and other databases showing investigative or enforcement activity. Ifthe EIS or any other database reveals thatthe certificate holder is the subject ofan enforcement investigation or enforcement action, FAA investigative personnel refuse the certificate holder's attemptto voluntarily surrender a certificate and continue with an investigation and recommend enforcement action, ifappropriate. FAA Order 2150.38, 5-14,**~10(b)** 

### (May 1, 2012). 3. Discussion and Analysis In essence, the Respondent argues that FAA Order 2150.38, which is the FAA's Compliance and EnforcementProgram, covers all enforcement actions, notjustcertificate actions.

2 The word "certificate" is typically used as a short-hand reference to an air carrier's certificate ofpublic convenience and necessity, which is issued by the U.S. Department ofTransportation ("DOT") pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §41101. An air carrier's "certificate" grants the air carrier economic authority to conduct air transportation. An air carrier's failure to comply with regulations may result in a "certificate action" by the DOT that might limit, suspend, or revoke the air carrier's authority to conduct air transportation. Page 3 of 11(Mot. Dismiss, 1.) Accordingto the Respondent, the language ofFAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14,**~lO(b)** is broad-based, and serves to estop the FAA from bringing or pursuin.g any civil penalty actions against any air carrier after·the FAA accepts the surrender ofan air carrier's Certificate. In this case, itwould meanthatthe FAA's service ofthetwo December 13,2011 NPCPs onthe Respondent wouldbe "trumped" orrendered moot bythe FAA's subsequent acceptance, effective December 27,2011, oftheRespondent's voluntary surrender ofits certificate. In cases as a whole, it means that an air carrier could potentially avoid enforcement action, ifan FAA employee fails to follow the guidelines in FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14,**~10(b),** or in the alternative, fails to exercise sufficient diligence in following internal agency guidelines. Even ifit is assumed that FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14,**~10(b)** covers all FAA enforcement actions (instead of justcertificate actions, as asserted by the FAA), there is no language in Chapter 5, paragraph 1O(b) that prohibits the FAA from initiating or pursuing civil penalties after an air carrier voluntarily surrenders its certificate. In fact, the FAA Administrator has held that "the surrender ofthe air carrier operating certificate does not obviate the need for the imposition of

# a substantial civil penalty with punitive and deterrent effect wherethere is a finding ofregulatory violations." In re Folsom'sAirService, Inc., FAA-2004-17277, FAA OrderNo. 2008-11 at 19-20 (Nov. 6, 2008). See In re Lifelite, FAA OrderNo. 200-28 (Dec. 21, 2000) (an air carrier's surrender ofits operating certificate does not shield it from a civil penalty action). Part ofthe rationale for the Administrator's positionis thatthere is nothing inthe regulations thatprecludes an air carrier, who voluntarily surrenders its operating certificate, from applying for a new operating certificate. The Administrator seeks to estop such air carriers from trying to avoid civil penalties for pastviolations while continuing to operate inthe future. See Folsom's, FAA OrderNo. 2008-11 at 20. The Respondent argued for a reasoned interpretation ofFAA Order 2150.3B, but did not provide any further authority in support ofits position. While the Respondent's arguments regarding the scope and application ofthe FAA's internal guidelines are certainly creative and zealously made, they are notpersuasive.

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### C. FAA's Motion to Strike 1. BriefSummary ofParties' Arguments In its Response, the FAA moved to strike the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss on several grounds. The FAA asserted that "[ n]o reasonable person, much less a reasonable attorney, could conclude that Paragraph 10(b) ofChapter 5 ofFAA Order 2150.3B has the meaning Respondent asserts." (Response, 3.) The FAA also asserted that the Motion to Dismiss was a "frivolous" motion thathad been "filedfor purposes ofdelay". (Response 4.) As support for this argument, the FAA demonstratedthatthe Motionto Dismiss was filed shortly afterthe FAA had declined the Respondent's request for a waiver ofthe deadline to file an answer. 

### (!d. at Ex. 

### A.) The Respondent did not dispute this evidentiary proffer. However, in its Opposition and Reply, the Respondent asserted thatthe FAA's Motionto Strike shouldbe denied in its entirety, because the Respondent's Motionto Dismiss "was proper in all respects." (Reply, 1.) 2. Legal Authority Citedbythe Parties The FAA cited 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) as authority for its Motionto Strike the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. Section 13.218(±)(4) provides in part: Any party may make a motion to strike any insufficient allegation or defense, or any redundant, immaterial, or irrelevant matter in apleading. 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) (emphasis added). Section 13.202 defines a pleading as "acomplaint, an answer, and any amendment ofthese documentspermittedunderthis subpart." 14 C.F.R. § 13.202. In its Opposition andReply, the Respondent argued that its Motionto Dismiss was properly filed under 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.209(a) and 13.218(f)(2)(ii), which specifically allow a respondent to file a motion to dismiss in lieu offiling an answer (i.e., a defensive pleading). 3. Actual Scope of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(f)(4) As identified above, the FAAcited 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) as authority for its Motion to Strike, butthe language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) is specific to pleadings. It is clear thatthe Respondent's Motionto Dismiss is not a defense pleading. Instead, it is a motion filed in lieu ofa

Page 5 of 11defense pleading. Thus, 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.218(f)(4) does not appear on its face to bethe proper support for the FAA's Motionto Strike. To help determine the scope ofreliefoffered by 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4), the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure maybe utilized as helpful guidance. See In re Boris Kirola, FAA OrderNo. 94- 39, 1994 WL 899655 at *3 (Dec. 9, 1994). The language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4) appears to generally follow the language inFederal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(f), whichprovides inpart: The courtmay strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f). Like the language of 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(±)(4), motions to strike pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f) are specifically limited to the pleadings. See, e.g., Sidney-Vinstein v. A.H. Robins Co., 697 F.2d. 880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983); UnitedStates v. Crisp, 190 F.R.D. 546, 550-51 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 1999). Striking a pleadingis the "primaryprocedure for objectingto an insufficient defense," and
was "designedto reinforce therequirementthatpleadings be "simple, concise, and direct." 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1380 (3d ed.) Itisthe equivalent ofa Rule 12(b)(6) motionto dismiss for legal insufficiency. Steven Baicker-McKee, Federal Civil Rules Handbook 487 (Test for Striking Defenses) (2013). Thus, extrinsic material outside ofa pleading, such as "motions, affidavits, briefs, and other documents" is not subjectto Rule 12(f). 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1380 (3d ed.) Even when a Rule 12(f) motion is properly raised against a pleading, striking such a pleading is considered a "drastic remedy" which shouldberarely granted. 35A C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 471 (2014). See also 61A Am.Jur.2d Pleading §446 (May2014). However, some federal courts have expandedthe use ofRule 12(f) to strike pre-trial affidavits and other motion materials, because ofthe "legal insufficiency" ofthe materials. 5C Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1380 (3d ed.) In essence, these courts have expanded the use ofRule 12(f), in partbecause the reviewofmaterial under Rule 12(f) is the same as in a summaryjudgmentmotion, i.e., "ina lightmost favorable tothe non-movingparty." Brown v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc. 913 F.Supp.2d 881, 888 (N.D. Cal. 2012). This expansive use ofRule 12(f) remains controversial, however, andhas notbeenwidely adopted. Martin v. Town ofWestport, 558 F.Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D.Conn. 2008)(Rule 12(f) is limited to pleadings). Instead, courts have recommended that a motion to strike a pre-hearing motion or other extrinsic material be considered as either an Page 6 of 11oppositionto the pre-hearing motion, Bondv. ATSI/JacksonvilleJob Corps Center, 811 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (D.D.C. 2011) (amotionto strike is an improper vehicle for challenging a motion), or as a motion for summaryjudgment, Steven Baicker-McKee, Federal Civil Rules Handbook 493 (Extrinsic Materials) (2013). 4. Other Applicable Legal Authority -14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.207(b) and (c) Based onthe substance oftheFAA's argument and its reference to Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 11(b)(1) (Response, 3), the FAA's Motionto Strike is bettertakenunder 14 C.F.R. § 13.207(b), (c) which provides in relevant part: (b) Effect of signinga document. By signing a document, the attorney of record

... certifies that the attorney
... has read the document and, based on reasonable inquiry and to the best ofthat person's knowledge, information, and belief, the document is- 

## * * * (2) Warrantedby existing law or that a good faith argument exists for extension, modification, orreversal ofexisting law; and (3) Notunreasonable orunduly burdensome or expensive

... notmadeto cause unnecessary delay

..., orfor any other improperpurpose. (c) Sanctions. Ifthe attorney ofrecord

... signs a document in violation ofthis section, the administrative lawjudge

... shall: (1) Strike the pleading signed in violation ofthis section; 

## * * * (3) Denythe motion orrequest signed in violation ofthis section; (4) Exclude the document signed in violation ofthis section from the record; 

## * * * 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.207(b) and (c). 5. Discussion and Analysis a) Motion to Strike Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(1)(4) As noted earlier, the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is not a defensive pleading. Rather, it is a pre-hearing motion filed in lieu ofdefense pleading, pursuantto 14 C.F.R. § §§ 13.209(a) and 13.218(f)(2)(ii). The court is limitedto striking only pleadings under 14 C.F.R. § 13.218(£)(4), and such strike action against a party'spleadings shouldbe granted sparingly. Utilizing the caselaw and guidance found underRule 12(f), FAA's Motion to Strike is best considered as an "Opposition" to
Page 7 of 11

### the Respondent's pre-hearing Motion to Dismiss. For ease inreview, however, the FAA's Opposition will continueto be called a Motion to Strike. b) Motion to Strike Pursuant to14 C.F.R. § 13.207(c) 

### In its Motion to Strike, the FAA asserted that the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss was both "frivolous" (i.e., "unreasonable") and filed solely to cause unnecessary delay. The FAA requested sanctions provided under 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.207(c)(3) and (4), i.e., denial ofthe Motionto Dismiss, and its exclusionfrom the record. The FAA Administratorhas previouslyrecognized the similaritybetween 14 C.F.R. § 

### 13.207 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(l), which provides similar sanctions for material filed without merit orto cause unnecessary delay. In re Boris Kirola, 

### FAA Order No. 94-39, 1994 WL 899655 at *3 (Dec. 9, 1994). Courts have provided various standards ofreview for alleged violations ofFed. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(l), such as, whether the legal position has "no chance ofsuccess," Fisho.ffv. Coty, Inc., 

### 634 R.3d 647, 654 (2d Cir. 2011) (citingMorley v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 

### 66 F.3d 21,25 (2d Cir. 1995)), whether areasonable attorney in like circumstances could not have believed his actions
were legallyjustified,Burns v. George Basilikas Trust Trust, 

### 599 F.3d 673, 677 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing In re Sargent, 

### 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1998)), and whetherthe frivolous nature ofthe claim is unequivocal, Carter v. ALKHoldings, Inc., 

### 605 F.3d 1319, 1324-25 (Fed. Cir. 2010). Baicker-McKee, supra, 

### at 401-02. See also, Steven**Baicker~McKee,** Federal Civil Rules Handbook 

### 401-402 (Standard ofCulpability) (2013)(Rule 11(b)(1) intended to regulate bad faith filings-such
as "actions 'akinto contempt"'). Thus, to address the FAA'srequests for sanctions under Section 13.207(c), a review ofthe merits and timing ofthe Respondent's Motion to Dismiss is needed. c) Merits of the Respondent'sMotion to Dismiss 

### As noted earlierherein, this court does not find the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss ultimately persuasive. That does not mean, however, that the motion was unreasonable, orthat it did not have merit. It

### is well-established, in the history ofour adversarial system, that even when an

Page 8 of 11attorney vigorously advocates3 for a client, not all the motions or new legal theories raised will be successful. To sanction a party for raising newissues would create an untenable "chilling" effect in the adversarial system. See, e.g.,

### Ario v. 

### UnderwritingMembers of Syndicate 53 atLloydsfor 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 297 (3d Circ. 201O)(sanctions should be applied only in "exceptional circumstances" where a motion is "patently unmeritorious.") Clearly the Administratorhas generally expressed the need to pursue civil penalty actions against air carriers who have surrendered their operating certificate. Butthere has been no decision directly addressing the scope or applicability ofthe language contained in FAA Order 2150.3B, 

## 5- 14,**~10(b).** The guideline language states that ifthe FAA seeks to "continue" an enforcement action, thenthe air carrier'sproffer ofvoluntary certificate surrender should be "refuse[d]." (ld.) The guideline language is broadly written, and could easily be perceived by the public to encompass all "enforcementinvestigation or enforcement action." FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14,**~lO(b).** This court does not agree withthe FAA's assertion thatthe Respondent's Motionto Dismiss
was "frivolous." A frivolous motion is one without basis infact or law. A "frivolous" motion should be firmly distinguished from a motion thatraises a new issue or defense. Indeed, an attorney has a professional duty to creatively issue-spot the facts and law in each case. 7 Am. Jur. 2d

### Attorneys at Law§ 139; Model Rules ofProfl Conduct R. 1.1. Good advocacy often requires persistent examination ofrules and caselaw, as well as the proffer ofnovel legal arguments. Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for correcting litigation abuse and should not be "appliedto adventuresome, thoughresponsible, lawyering which advocates creative legal theories." Steven Baicker-McKee,

### !d. at 402, citing

### MaryAnnPensiero, Inc. v. 

### Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94 (3d Cir. 1988). In this case, the language ofFAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14,**~10(b)** indicates a potential broad scope ofinclusion, with a course ofaction that "should" be taken by the FAA

- indicating a potential finality ifan air carrier's certificate surrender is accepted (and notrefused). Inthe absence ofany bright line rule, definitive case, or an express statement in FAA Order 2150.3B, 5-14,**~1**O(b)

3 Vigorous advocacy may occur during all phases oflitigation. This means that an advocate may engage in settlement discussions while at the same time preparing and advancing legal positions that may narrow or resolve issues in preparation for trial. Page 9 of 11

### regarding other future enforcement actions, it was well within good advocacy for the Respondent to have raised this issue in its Motion to Dismiss. d) FAA 'sAssertion of PurposefulDelay It

### was undisputed that the Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss after the FAA declined to agree to an extension oftimefor the Respondentto file an Answer. 4

### The FAA characterized this litigation choice as a deliberate attemptto cause unnecessary delay. The Respondent's deadline for filing an Answer was July 3, 2014. (Response, Exh. A at 

### 1.) On Friday, June 27, 2014, the FAA told the Respondent it was declining to agree to an extension of the July 3, 2014 deadline. (Jd.) 

### The FAA was perfectly free to exercise that choice on its own behalf. The Respondentthen had several choices. Itcould file an Answer on or before July 3, 2014,

.seek an extension oftime over the FAA's objectionpursuantto 14 C.P.R.§13.213(b), orfile a Motion to Dismiss pursuantto 14 C.P.R.§§ 13.209(a) and 13.218(f)(2)(ii). The Respondent chose to file a Motion to Dismiss on July 2, 2014 pursuant to 14 C.P.R. § 13.209(a) and 14 CF.R. § 13.218(f). Itwas free to exercise that choice on its own behalf. Based on the facts inthis case, there has been no showing of"unnecessary delay" pursuantto 14 C.P.R. § 13.207(b). The Respondent's Motionto Dismiss was a legal option authorized by the regulations,
was properly filed bythe Respondent within specified time limits, and raised a creative legal theory that was withinthe scope ofgood advocacy. D. 

### FAA's Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted 

### The FAA's Motion to Deem was contingent upon its Motion to Strike being granted. (FAA Response, 4; FAA Reply, 4-5.) Pursuant to 14 C.P.R.§ 13.207(c), the FAA sought to exclude the Respondent's Motionto Dismiss from the record. Ifsuch exclusion were granted, then the Respondent's failure to file an Answer on orbefore July 3, 2014 would have placed the Respondent in default status inthe proceeding, pursuantto 14 C.P.R. § 13.209(f). Because the Motion to Strike is denied, the Motionto Deem must also be denied.

4The parties referto this agreed extension as a "waiver oftime." (Response, Exh. A at 1.) Pursuant to 14 C.F.R. §13.213(a), the parties may "agree to extend for areasonable period the time for filing a document under this subpart." Such agreements should be submitted in the form ofa draft order for the Judge's approval. 14 C.F.R. §13.213(a). Absent an agreement, the movant may file a written motion for extension oftime, "not later than 7 days before the document is due unless good cause for the late filing is shown." 14 C.F.R. §13.213(b). Page 10 of 11

### E. Conclusion and Order Pursuantto 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.205(a)(6), (8), and 13.207, and afterreviewing all relevant caselaw, regulations, statutory authority, and being fully advised;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The Respondent's Motionto Dismiss is denied. 2. The FAA's Motion to Strike is denied. 3. The FAA's Motion to Deem Allegations Admitted is denied. 4. Pursuantto 14 C.F.R. 

### § 13.218(f)(2)(ii), the Respondent shall file an answer to the · Complaint and shall serve a copy ofthe answernot later than 1 0 days after the date of receipt ofthis Order.

ivan U.S. Administrative Law Judge Attachment: Service List

Page 11 of 11

### DocketNo. FAA-2014-0319 (Civil Penalty Action) SERVICE LIST- BY U.S. MAIL ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

### Federal Aviation Administration 800 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, DC 20591 Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC--430 Wilbur Wright Building-Suite2W10005



### Mr. Christopher R. Stevenson Complainant's Counsel 

### Office ofthe Regional Counsel, AS0-7 ONE COPY



### Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region 1701 ColumbiaAvenue College Park, GA 30337 TEL: 404-305-5200 FAX: 404-305-5223 Mr. Robert P. Silverberg Respondent's Counsel 

### 1101 30th Street, N.W. Suite 120 Washington, DC 20007 Mr. Ryan Gumm, VP ofFlight Operations Comair, Inc., Respondent 

### 82 Comair Blvd. Erlanger, KY 41018 Judge J.E. Sullivan US. Administrative LawJudge 

### Office ofHearings, M-20 U.S. Department ofTransportation 1200 NewJersey Avenue, S.E. (E11-310) Washington, DC 20590 TEL: 202-366-6941 FAX: 202-366-7536 Mr. James McClain DeltaAir Lines, Inc. P.O. Box 20706 Dept. 982 Atlanta, GA 30320

5 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W1000, Washington, DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430.