alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-20265

No. 97-20269

Summary Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LARRY HOUSMAN, SR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. H-96-CR-82-1

- - - - - - - - - -

April 15, 1998

Before KING, HIGGINBOTHAM, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Larry Housman, Sr., appeals his guilty-plea conviction for

five counts of trafficking in counterfeit services, conspiracy to

violate the laws of the United States, possession of 15 or more

unauthorized access devices, and possession of device-making

equipment. He argues that the district court abused its

discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He

contends that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary
2

because the Government breached its promise that his sentence

would be based on a $40,000 total loss. The record of the

rearraignment indicates that there was no plea agreement and that

the Government did not promise that Housman’s sentence would be

based on a $40,000 loss. At the rearraignment, Housman stated

that no promises of leniency were made and that he understood his

sentence would be based U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and on the

facts presented in the Presentence Report. Housman’s statements

in open court carry a strong presumption of truth. See

Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). The district

court did not abuse its discretion in denying Housman’s motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. See United States v. Thomas, 13 F.3d

151, 152-53 (5th Cir. 1994).

AFFIRMED.
#### Linden and others, Appellants, vs. Babcock, Director of the Burnett County Pension Department, and others, Respondents.*

*September 17*

October *13, 1942.*

*210For the appellants there were briefs by *S. J. Auringer*and *Arthur I. Ringham,*both of Grantsburg, and oral argument by *Mr. Ringham.*

For the respondents there was a brief by *C. J. Strang,*district attorney of Burnett county, and *Douglas & Omernik*of Spooner, of counsel, and oral argument by *Mr. Strang*and *Mr. Edward J. Omernik.*

*

 Motion for rehearing denied, with $25 costs, on December 8, 1942.

Fairchild, J.

The appellants insist that all county officials are to have their offices at the county seat, but with the exception of the officers named in sec. 59.14 (1), Stats., that has not been the custom; as the statute does not require the office in question to be at the county seat the ruling below was correct. No reason appears for continuing the restraining order. Appellants’ proposition is, in effect, that the amendment of sec. 59.14 (1) by ch. 86, Laws of 1929, did not' recognize that except as to’ those officials specifically named in sec. 59.14 (1) the county board had the power, based on sec. 59.07, to determine where county offices should be. In amending sec. 59.14 (1) by ch. 86, Laws of 1929, the distinction was recognized as existing between the named officials and others. The part of the section referring to sheriff, clerk of the circuit court, etc., is related to the offices of those officials and fixes them at the county seat. The further provision is applicable to other “elective or appointive county officials” whom the county board also may require to1 keep their offices .at the county seat. This law now accommodates the develop*211ments of county needs, making it possible to co-ordinate certain agencies and locate them where the demands upon them can be met most efficiently. That the legislature did not intend a change in an existing practice except as the county board desired is evidenced by the fact that they phrased the amendment in permissive terms.

There would be no meaning to ascribe to the words written into sec. 59.14 (1), Stats., by ch. 86, Laws of 1929, unless it was the intention of the legislature that officers other than the sheriff, the clerk of the circuit court, the register of deeds, county treasurer, register of probate, and county clerk were from time to time to be permitted to have their offices at such places as met with the approval of the county board.

*By the Court.*— -Order affirmed.
UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS 

Before 

WOLFE, SALUSSOLIA, and ALDYKIEWICZ 

Appellate Military Judges 

UNITED STATES, Appellee 

v. 

Private E2 KEITH D. THOMAS 

United States Army, Appellant 

ARMY 20180096 

Headquarters, Fort Carson 

Tiernan P. Dolan, Military Judge 

Colonel Robert A. Borcherding, Staff Judge Advocate 

For Appellant: Major Jack D. Einhorn, JA; Captain Patrick G. Hoffman, JA. 

For Appellee: Pursuant to A.C.C.A. Rule 15.4, no response filed. 

30 November 2018 

-------------------------------- 

SUMMARY DISPOSITION 

-------------------------------- 

Per Curiam: 

In January of 2008, Private Keith D. Thomas reported to Fort Hood, Texas 

where he received an initial counseling from his platoon sergeant. His platoon 

sergeant assigned him a buddy, in-briefed him for two hours, and told appellant 

about the company’s upcoming deployment to Iraq. As the unit had a four-day 

weekend approaching, his platoon sergeant asked appellant if he had any plans. 

Appellant told his platoon sergeant that he had no plans to leave the local area. 

That weekend, on 24 January 2008, appellant left his unit at Fort Hood Texas, 

bought a one-way plane ticket, and flew home to West Virginia. That same 

weekend, appellant suffered a self-inflicted gunshot wound to his foot. Members of 

the unit attempted to contact appellant. Appellant initially answered the calls, but 

then stopped. 

 While appellant remained away, appellant’s company deployed to a remote 

combat outpost in Iraq for twelve months in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The platoon deployed at well less than full strength. Appellant’s company 

commander testified that soldiers who were ill were still required to perform duties 

because of shortages in junior enlisted personnel. 
THOMAS—ARMY 20180096 

2 

For his almost ten-year absence, appellant was charged with desertion with 

the intent to avoid hazardous duty in violation of Article 85 of the Uniform Code of 

Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 885 [UCMJ]. Appellant and the convening authority 

entered into an agreement where appellant agreed to plead guilty to the lesser 

offense of being away from his unit for more than thirty days in violation of Article 

86, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 886. The convening authority referred the case to a special 

court-martial. 

At sentencing, the government requested a sentence of six months 

confinement. The military judge sentenced appellant to a bad-conduct discharge, 

confinement for five months, forfeiture of $1,000 pay per month for five months, 

and reduction to the grade of E-1.* The pretrial agreement limited the confinement 

that could be imposed to three months. 

CONCLUSION 

Appellant submitted this case to this Court on its merits. Having completed 

our review under Article 66(c), the findings and sentence are AFFIRMED. 

FOR THE COURT: 

 MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

 

*

 In an act of clemency, the convening authority reduced the period of the forfeitures 

from five months to three. The remainder of the sentence was approved as adjudged. 

MALCOLM H. SQUIRES, JR. 

Clerk of Court 

FOR THE COURT:
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 32

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of International Uranium
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended September 30,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Form 20-F"), I Ron F. Hochstein, President and Chief Executive Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Form 20-F fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

         (2) The information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: February 17, 2004

International Uranium Corporation

/s/ Ron F. Hochstein
-----------------------------------
Ron F. Hochstein
President and Chief Executive Officer

<PAGE>

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

         In connection with the Annual Report of International Uranium
Corporation (the "Company") on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended September 30,
2003, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the "Form 20-F"), I David C. Frydenlund, Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         (1) The Form 20-F fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

         (2) The information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: February 17, 2004

International Uranium Corporation

/s/ David C. Frydenlund
-----------------------------------
David C. Frydenlund
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Annual Report of Service Bancorp, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-KSB for the year ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Dana S. Philbrook, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



This certification is provided solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 and
Item 601(b)(32) of Regulation S-B (Item 601(b)(32)) promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange Act). In accordance with clause (ii) of
Item 601(b)(32), this certification (A) shall not be deemed filed for purposes of Section 18 of the Exchange Act, or otherwise subject to the liability of that section, and (B) shall not be deemed to be incorporated by reference into any
filing under the Securities Act or the Exchange Act, except to the extent that the Company specifically incorporates it by reference.

|                       
|-----------------------
|                       
|/s/ Dana S. Philbrook  
|Dana S. Philbrook      
|Chief Financial Officer
|                       
|September 20, 2005
EXHIBIT 31.1

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                      SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT

I, Craig Lindsay, certify that:

1.   I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-QSB of Yellow Hill Energy
     Inc.;

2.   Based on my knowledge, this quarterly report does not contain any untrue
     statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to
     make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
     statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by
     this quarterly report;

3.   Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial
     information included in this quarterly report, fairly present in all
     material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash
     flows of the registrant as of, and for, the period presented in this
     quarterly report;

4.   I am responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and
     procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-14 and 15d-14) for the
     registrant and have:

     a.   designed such disclosure controls and procedures to ensure that
          material information relating to the registrant, including its
          consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
          entities, particularly during the period in which this quarterly
          report is being prepared;
     b.   evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's disclosure controls
          and procedures as of a date within 90 days prior to the filing date of
          this quarterly report (the "Evaluation Date"); and
     c.   presented in this quarterly report our conclusions about the
          effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures based on our
          evaluation as of the Evaluation Date;

5.   I have disclosed, based on my most recent evaluation, to the registrant's
     auditors and the audit committee of registrant's board of directors (or
     persons performing the equivalent functions):

     a.   all significant deficiencies in the design or operation of internal
          controls which could adversely affect the registrant's ability to
          record, process, summarize and report financial data and have
          identified for the registrant's auditors any material weaknesses in
          internal controls; and
     b.   any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other
          employees who have a significant role in the registrant's internal
          controls; and

6.   I have indicated in this quarterly report whether or not there were
     significant changes in internal controls or in other factors that could
     significantly affect internal controls subsequent to the date of our most
     recent evaluation, including any corrective actions with regard to
     significant deficiencies and material weaknesses.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has executed this certification as of the
3rd day of March, 2008.


/s/ Craig Lindsay
---------------------------
Chief Executive Officer
# L_2012077EN.01001801.xml

| 16.3.2012 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | L 77/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.3.2012

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

L 77/18

---

COUNCIL DECISION 2012/152/CFSP

of 15 March 2012

amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (1). |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 26 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/413/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Iran (1).

| (2) | On 23 January 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/35/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP (2), in response to its serious and deepening concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear programme. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 23 January 2012, the Council adopted Decision 2012/35/CFSP amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP (2), in response to its serious and deepening concerns over the nature of Iran's nuclear programme.

| (3) | In this context, the application of targeted financial measures by providers of specialised financial messaging services should be further developed, consistent with Decision 2010/413/CFSP. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

In this context, the application of targeted financial measures by providers of specialised financial messaging services should be further developed, consistent with Decision 2010/413/CFSP.

| (4) | Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Decision 2010/413/CFSP should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

In Article 20 of Decision 2010/413/CFSP, the following paragraph is added:

‘12.   Without prejudice to the exemptions provided for in this Article, it shall be prohibited to supply specialised financial messaging services, which are used to exchange financial data, to the persons and entities referred to in paragraph 1.’.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

Done at Brussels, 15 March 2012.

For the Council

The President

N. WAMMEN

---

(1)  
  OJ L 195, 27.7.2010, p. 39.

1

(2)  
  OJ L 19, 24.1.2012, p. 22.

2

---
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the report of Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-K for the period
ended September 30, 2010 (the "Report"), I, Samuel S. Lee, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:



December 17, 2010

/s/ SAMUEL S. LEE Samuel S. Lee Chief Executive Officer


---



QuickLinks
Exhibit 32.1  CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002   We the undersigned, Barry J. Lucas, President (Principal Executive Officer) and Michael J. Malbourne, Treasurer (Principal Financial Officer) of Elray Resources, Inc. (the "Company"), certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:  (1) The Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the quarter ended September 30, 2009 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of § 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of and for the periods covered in the Report.  /s/Barry J. Lucas Barry J. Lucas President (Principal Executive Officer)  /s/Michael J. Malbourne Michael J. Malbourne 
Treasurer (Principal Financial Officer)  November 11, 2009  A signed original of this written statement required by § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
[No. 24730.

Department One.

December 23, 1933.]

#### The State of Washington, *on the Relation of Claude G. Bannick, as Sheriff of King County, Respondent,*v. Clarence W. Pierce, *as Justice of the Peace, Appellant.*
      *1*

*H. F. Foster,*for appellant.

*Robert M. Burgunder*and *Ben A. Maslan,*for respondents.

Reported in 28 P. (2d) 110.

Per Curiam.—

The petition of Claude G. Bannick, sheriff for King county, to the superior court for King county, for a writ of prohibition to prevent Clarence W. Pierce, a justice of the peace for Morningside precinct, King county, from holding the petitioner in contempt of court, was granted. The justice of the peace has appealed.

This is a companion case to that of *State ex rel. Maslan v. Pierce, ante*p. 676, 28 P. (2d) 109, just decided, and, upon the authority of that case, the order from which the appeal is prosecuted is affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                EXHIBIT 10.22(D)

                             ________________, 2001



Mr. James H. Heagle




Dear Mr. Heagle:

         The terms of your employment with National Service Industries, Inc.
("NSI") are currently covered a letter agreement ("Agreement") dated March 28,
2000, between you and NSI. As you are aware, effective _____________, 2001, NSI
is spinning-off the lighting and chemicals businesses currently held by NSI's
subsidiary, L & C Spinco, Inc. ("Spinco"). In connection with the spin-off, you
will become an employee of Spinco or one of its affiliates. Spinco hereby agrees
to assume the Agreement and to perform all of the obligations of NSI under the
Agreement.


                                            Sincerely,

                                            L & C SPINCO, INC.



                                            By:
                                               -------------------------------
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 99-7276

JAMES BELLS, JR., Petitioner - Appellant, versusMICHAEL MOORE, Director of South Carolina Department of Corrections; CHARLES M. CONDON, Attorney General, State of South Carolina, Respondents - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Greenville. C. Weston Houck, Chief District Judge. (CA-98-2589-6-12-AK) Submitted: January 25, 2000 Decided: February 7, 2000Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. James Bells, Jr., Appellant Pro Se. Derrick K. McFarland, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM:James Bells seeks to appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Respondents on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999). We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. See Bells v. Moore , No. CA-98-2589-6-12-AK (D.S.C. Sept. 7, 1999). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED