### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT J AC KS ON M A Y 23, 2007 Ses s i on CHA RL E S AN D A NN HAL F ORD v . HAR OL D R . GUN N
Di rec t A pp ea l fr om t he Ci rcu it C ou rt f or Gib so n C ou nt y (H um bo ld t) No. H-3587 Allen Wallac e, Judge

No. W2006-02528-COA-R3-CV - Filed August 22, 2007

Th e pla intiff-b uy ers en ter ed int o an in sta llm en t sa les co ntr act in 1 99 1 in

wh ich the y a gre ed

to purchase re al pr op ert y owned by the defendant-sel ler. The contr act provide d that upon the pla int if fs ’ p ay m en t o f the p urc ha se pri ce, th e de fe nd an t w ou ld pro vid e a de ed c onve yin g the pro pe rtyto the m

f ree of en cum branc es. In 2 00 2, a g en era l se ssi on s ju dg m en t w as e nte red ag ain st the de fe nd an t in

anunrel ate d c ase , and

the de fe nd an t ap pealed

that ju dg m en t to the cir cu it c ourt, wh ere that ca se c urr en tlyrem ain s p en din g. Th e ju dg m en t w as f ile d a s a lien o n th e re al p rop erty in 20 02

. In

late 20 04 o r e arl y 20 05 , the p lai nti ff s ha d m ad e all n ece ssary paym en ts on the re al pro pe rty , and

the de fe nd an t co nv ey ed

the pro pe rtyto t

he m bywarranty

de ed . Whil e attem

pti ng to sell the real prope rty in 2005, the plainti ffs discovered the exi stence of the 2002 judgm ent lien on the pro pe rty , and

th eypla ced

fu nd s in esc row in o rde r to sat isf

y th eir int en de d p urc ha ser

that th e li en would be removed or paid. The plaint iffs filed a warrant in ge neral ses sions courtagainst t he de fe nd an t, a lle gin g th at h e w as l iab le f or b rea chof

the co ve nant a ga ins t en cum branc es c on tai ne d in the warra nty dee d. The gener al sessi ons court ent ered judgment in favor of the plaint iffs, and the de fe nd an t a

pp eal ed to th e cir cu it co urt

. T he p lai nti ff s fi led a m oti on f or summ ary

ju dgm ent and so ug ht an award o f r eas on ab le attorney ’s f ees . T he cir cu it c ourt g ranted the m oti on

fo r summ ary jud gm en t, b ut d en ied

the pla int if

fs ’ re qu est

fo r attor ne y’s fe es. O n ap pe al, w e af fi rm in part, rev ers e in part, and

re m an d fo r a

d ete rm inatio n o f r eas on ab le atto rne y’s fe es i nc urr ed be low an d o n a pp eal

.

Te nn . R . A pp . P . 3 ; A pp ea l as of Righ t; J ud gme ntof t he Ci rcu it C ou rt A ffi rme d i n P ar t, Re ve rse d i n P ar t an d R ema nd ed
A LA N E. H I GHERS , J., delivered the opi nion of the court, i n which D AVI D R. F ARM ER , J., and H OLLY M. K I RBY , J., joined. Harold R. Gunn, Hum

boldt, TN, pr o s e David A. Ri dd ick , J ack so n, TN , f or A pp ell ees OP IN ION-2- I. F A C TS & P ROC EDUR AL H I S TO RY The plainti ff-purchasers, Charle s and Ann Halford (“the Halfords” or“Appellees”), and the defendant-sell er, Harold Gunn (“Appell ant”), ent ered into a n in st all ment sales land contr act on January 18, 1991, by which t he Ha lf ords agreed t o purchase re al estat e owned by Mr. Gunn and loc ate d in Gi bs on Co un ty, Te nn ess ee ( “th e su bje ct p rop erty” ). T he co ntr act pro vid ed in p art : Th e se ller hereby ag ree s th at whe n th e sa id p urc ha se p ric e an d a ll other amount to be paid to s eller, a re fully paid a s her ein provided, he wi ll e x e c u te a n d

d e li v e r t o th e b uy e r a

g o o d a n d s u f f ic ie n t d e ed co nv ey ing said rea l pr op erty f ree an d c lear of

all en cum

branc es m ad e, or s uf

fe red bythe sel ler

. In late 2004 or early 2005, Mr. Gunn accepted the last ins tallment payment from the Halfords, and he and his wife conveyed the subject pr operty to t hem by w arranty de ed which was recorde d on Jan uary 1 1, 20 05 . T he de ed

pro vid ed in p art : W e covenant with t he said Grante es, theirheirs and assigns, t hat we are lawfully sei zed and possesse d of said describe d property; that the same is unencumbered and that therefore, we have a good and lawful rig ht t o m ak e th is c onve yanc e.

. . . W e further covenant , bind in g ourselves, ourheirs and our represent atives, t o forever warrantand defend the t itle t o the above de scr ibe d p rop erty, un to t he sai d Grantee s, the ir h eir s an d a ssi gns , ag ain st the law fu l cl aim s o f a ll p ers on s w ho m so ev er. In a previo us act ion , to wh ich the Hal fo rds we re n ot p art ies , a jud gm en t w as e nte red

in Harde m anCo un ty G en era l Sessions Co urt on De cem be r 3, 20 02 , in

favo r of Gr an d V all eyLake s Pr op erty O wn ers ’ A sso ciatio n a ga ins t Mr . Gunn in the am ount of

$ 3, 58 2. 49 , plu s co sts an d inter est

. This j udgment was filed as a lien on the s ubject prope rty in the Gibson County Register’ s Office on Dece mber 1 0, 2 002. Mr. Gunn appea led the judgment to the Har deman County Circuit Court on Decem ber 12, 2002 , w he re, ap parently , th e ca se c urr en tlyrem ain s unh ear d o n th e ci rcu it c ourt do ck et. After obtaining t itle t o the subject property, the Halfords, who desired to sell the propert y, dis co ve red

the 20 02 jud gm en t li enthat ha d b een fi led in G ibs on Cou nty that en cum be red the su bje ct property, t he amount of which was $4,853.81, includi ng court cost s and accrued i nterest through No ve m be r 1, 20 05

. In

th e pro ces s o f s ell ing the pro pe rty , th e H alf ord s p lac ed

$8 ,0 00 in e scr owas anass uranc e to the buye r th at the lie n w ou ld b e re m ov ed o r p aid

. T he H alf

ord s fi led a warrant i n Gibson County General Sessi ons Court on December 13, 2005, against Mr . Gunn for breach of the co ve nant a ga ins t en cum

branc es i n th e warranty

deed . On Mar ch31 , 2 00 6, the ge ne ral ses sio ns co urt entered j udgment in favor of the Halfords.-3-

Mr. Gunn appeale d th e g en era l se ssi on s ju dg m en t to the cir cu it c ourt. Th e H alf ord s f ile d a motion for

summ ary

jud gm en t, r eq

ue sti ng jud gm en t in

the am ount o f $ 4, 85 3. 91 , p lus acc rue d interes t on the 2002 judgment, attor ney’s fees, and costs. In its memorandum and order ent ered on No ve m be r 6, 20 06 , th e tr ial co urt set fo rththe fo llo wi ng m ate ria l un dis puted fa cts : 1) A judgement was en te red against the defendant by the General Sessi ons Court of Hardeman County on Decem ber 3, 2002; 2) De fe nd an t file d an appe al to the Circui t Court of Harde m an Co un ty o n D ece m

be r 12 , 2 00 2; 3) The General Sessi ons judgement was filed as a li en in Gibson Co un ty o n D ece m

be r 10 , 2 00 2; 4) No act ion ha s be en tak en by the defendant to pro sec ute his appeal in t he Circuit Cour t of Hardeman County since the appeal was take n; 5) Th e fi lin g of su ch jud ge m en t in Gi bs on Co un ty co ns tit ute s a cloud upon the ti tle of defendant’ s re al property i n Gibson County; 6) No action has been taken by defendant to remove such cloud fr om the tit le o f h is p rop erty; 7) On January 18, 1991, the parties ente red i nto an i ns ta llment land sales contract , and on December 22, 2004, defendant issued a warr anty deed to the pl aintiffs, free and cl ear of any liens or e ncumbrances; and 8) Pl aintif

fs the n s old

th e pro pe rtyand

the clo sin g atto rne y the n dis co ve red

the jud ge m en t li en , and

pla int if fs th e n w ere fo rce d to e scr owthe am ount o f t he judgm ent l ien

of $4 85 3. 81 in order to conve y the propert y. The trial court grant ed the Halfords’ motion for summ ary judgment, and enter edj ud gmen t on January 22, 2007, in favor of the Halfords for $4,853.81, pl us intere st acc ru edfr om N ovember 1, 20 05 . T he co urt den ied

the Ha lf ord s’ r eq ue st f or an award o f atto rne y’s fe es, but as ses sed co sts ag ain st M r. Gunn. Mr. Gunn fi led a ti m ely no tic e o f a

pp eal

.

II. I SSUE S P RESENTED Th e is su es b ef

ore thi s C ourt o n a

pp eal , a s p res en ted

bythe parti es, are as f

oll ow s:-4-

1. Whether a l ien, corresponding to a judgm ent of a general sessi ons court, is extinguishe d by the appeal of the gener al sessi ons judgment to the circ uit court

. 2. Whether the Halfords are enti tled to an award of reasonabl e at torney’s fees incur red below and on appeal. For the following rea sons, we affirm in part, reverse i n part, and re mand f or further proc ee dings.
III . S TAND ARD OF REVI EW
Ru le 5 6. 04 of

the Te nn ess ee R

ule s o f C ivi l Procedure p rov ide s th at s um m ary jud gm en t is ap pro pri ate “if

the ple ad ing s, de po sit ion s, an sw ers to i nte rro gator ies , and admissions on fi le, together wit h the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any m ateria l fact and that th e m ov ing partyis e nti tle d to judgm ent a s a m att er o f l aw .” Ou r re vie w o f t

he tri al c ourt’ s grant of sum m ary jud gm en t is de novo on the recor d before this Court, wit h no presumption of correct ness. Wa rre n v

. E sta te o f K irk , 9 54 S. W .2 d 7 22 , 7 23 (T enn. 19 97 ).
IV. D I S CUS S I ON It is cl ear t ha t a vali d judgment lien that i s attache d to the proper ty at the t ime of a conveyance const itutes a n enc umbr ance for pur poses of our analysi s. Se e Wea ks v. Gress , 225 Tenn. 593, 598, 474 S.W .2d 424, 426 (Tenn. 1971). A c ov en an t against enc umbrances “is one wh ich ha s f or i ts o bje ct s ecu

rit y ag ain st tho se rig hts to , or i nte res ts i n, the lan d g ranted wh ich m ay subsist i n third per sons to the di minution in value of the estate although consiste nt with the pas sing of fe e. ” Mu rd

oc k Ac cep tan ce Co rp . v. Aaron , 190 Tenn. 416, 427, 230 S.W.2d 401, 406 (Tenn. 1950) (cit ing 21 C.J.S. Co ven an ts § 42, p.914). The covenant is in effect one of indemnity, whereby the co ve nanto r ag ree s to ind em nif y a ga ins t “an

outs tan din g a dv ers e ti tle , c harge , b urd enor i nte res t co ns tit uti ng anen cum

branc e. ” Id.
Te nn . C od e A nn . § 25 -5- 10 1(b )(1 ) (S up p. 20 06 ) pr ov ide s:
Ex cep t as provide d in

su bd ivi sio n (b )(2 ), j ud gm en ts and de cre es obtained fr om a ndafter J uly 1, 1967, in any court of record and judgments in excess of five hundred dollars ( $500) obtained from and af ter Ju ly 1 , 19 69 , in anyco urt o f g en era l se ssi on s o f t his state s ha ll be liens upon t he debtor’s land from the tim e a certified copy of the judgment or decree shal l be regis tered in t he l ie n book in the reg ist er’ s o ff

ice of the co un ty whe re the lan d is loc ated . If su ch records ar e kept else where, no l ien s hall take effect from the rendition of such judgm ents or decr ees unless a nd until a ce rtified copy of the same is register ed as otherwis e provided by la w.
In You ng v . RA C Ex press, In c. , the Easter n Section of this Court quoted ATS, Inc., v. Kent , 27 S.W .3d 92 3, 924 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) for it s discussi on of judgm ent liens according t o the ap pli cab le s tat

uto ry s ch em e:-5- The law in Tenne ssee with respect to the manner in which judgment liens are obtained is gove rned by stat ute. Se e Tenn. Code Ann. § 25- 5-1 01 to - 10 9 (1 98 0 & Supp. 199 7). A j ud gm en t ob tai ne d in Tennessee become s a li en on the debtor ’s real property when the judgment is recorded i n the regis ter’s office of the count y where the lan d is loc ated. Se e Te nn . C od e A nn . § 25 -5- 10 1(b ) (S up p. 19 97 ). Upon proper recor dation, th e ju dgment also becomes effective ag ain st anype rso n h av ing or late r acq uir ing an inter est

in t he de bto r’s real prope rty regar dless of whether tha t person was a par ty to the action re sulting i n the judgment. Se e Te nn . C od e A nn . § 25 -5- 10 1(c ) (Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann § 66-24-119 (1993)

. You ng v. RA C E xp res s, In c. , N o. E2 00 5-0 11 65 -C O A -R 3 -C V, 20 06 Te nn . App . L EX IS 41 0, at * 4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 21, 2006).
Th e H alf ord s ci te the af

ore m en tio ne d provis ion , T enn. Co de Ann. § 2 5-5 -10 1(b )(1 ), i n su pp ort of th eir argum en t that the 200 2 jud gm en t fr om Har de m anCou

nty Gen era l Ses sio n C ourt, which was filed as a lien in Gibson County wher e the subjec t propert y is locat ed, constit utes a cloud up on th eir ti tle to th e pro pe rtyc onve ye d to the m b y Mr. G unn. Th e Ha lf

ord s su bm it that th e tr ial court proper ly awarded them summ ary judgment for $4,853.81 as a result of Mr. Gunn’s breach of the co ve nant a ga ins t en cum branc es c on tai ne d in

the warranty deed . T he Ha lf ord s se ek the ir attorney’ s fees incurre d below and as a res ult of this appea l.
It i s und isp ute d th at the Harde m anCo un ty G eneral S ess ion s C ourt j ud gm en t ag ain st M r. Gunn was filed in the Gibs on County Regist er’s Office on December 10, 2002, which satisfied the statut ory pre req uis ite s f or c reatio n o f a

lie n p urs uant t o T enn. Co de Ann. § 25-5-101(b)( 1). Mr. Gun n then fil ed an appeal t o the Hardeman County Circuit Court, but he has apparent ly taken no fu rth er a cti on

in t ha t ca se f or o ve r f our y ear s. On

Jan uary 1 1, 20 05 , M r. Gunn c onve ye d th e su bje ct property, which i s located in Gibson County and therefore encumbered by the j udgment lien, to the Halfords by warranty dee d containing a n expre ss covenant t hat the prope rty was unencumbered. Mr. Gunn’s argument against the validi ty of th e li en i s based upon t he language of Tenn. Code An n. § 2 5-5-105(a) (Supp. 2006). The stat ute reli ed upon by Appellant, ent itled “Per iod all ow ed fo r ex ecutio n, ” p rov ide s in part: Once a judgment lien is cr eated by registr ation as pr ovided i n § 25-5- 101(b), it wi ll last for the t ime rem aining in a t en-year per iod from the date of

final judgment

entry in t he court cl erk’s office. Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-105(a) (Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). Appella nt g ener ally cit es the Te nn ess ee S up rem e Co urt ’s de cis ion inWa re v

. M eh arry M ed . C oll
. , 898 S.W .2d 181, 184 (Tenn. 19 95 ), f or t he pro po sit ion

that a de novo ap pe al t o th e ci rcu it c ourt fr om a g en era l s ess ion s co urt

is no t a r ev iew , b ut “an en tir ely ne w tria l as if

no oth er t

ria l ha d o ccu

rre d and as i f t he cas e h ad originat ed in the ci rcuit cour t.” Mr. Gunn contends , without further c itati on to releva nt authori ty, that the judgment co rre sp on din g w iththe lie n a ff ect ing the su

bje ct p rop erty is no t a “ fi na l-6-

jud gm en t.” He all eg es t

ha t, b eca us e h e ap pe ale d the 20 02 jud gm en t to the Harde m anCo un ty C irc uit Co urt , th e li enco rre sp on din g w iththi s ju dg m en t is no t va lid . F urt he rm ore , M r. Gunn a sse rts that he informed the Halfords of the existence of the 2002 j udgment lien prior to hi s tr ansfer of the property to them, and that he explained to them at that time his belief that the judgm ent lien was not valid.
Mr. Gunn

co nte nd s that an ap pe al of a ju dg m en t o f a ge ne ral s ess ion s co urt , wh ich ha s b een re c o rd e d a s ali e no nad e b to r’ s re a l p ro p e rt y , to th e c ir c u it

c o urt “ e x ti n g u is h e s ” o r o th e rw ise inv ali da tes the jud gm en t li en . Asim ilar ar gum en t w as s uc ces sf ull y p res en ted

to t he Te nn ess ee Supreme Court long ago in Sm ith v. Hol mes , 5 9 T enn. 46 6 (T enn. 18 73 ). P rev iou sly , J am es H olm es ha d ob ta in eda jud gmen t ag ai ns t Da n Abl e in cha nc ery co ur t. Mr . Abl e ap pe al edto t h e S up r eme Co urt , w he re h e w as, at tha t ti m e, en tit led to a d e no vo tr ial, the s am e as if the su it h ad

ori gin all y co mm en ced

the re. Th e S up rem e C ourt a ff irm ed the jud gm en t ag ain st M r. A ble , and Mr. Ho lm es att em pte d to en fo rce a ju dg m en t lien agai ns t pro pe rtythat

Mr. Ab le o wn ed

at t he tim e o f t

he ori gin al judgment, but that Mr. Able had sold before the Supreme Court affirmed. In Sm ith v. Hol mes , the Supreme Court was faced wit h the question of whether the a ppeal from chancery court re leased and de str oy ed the ori gin al j ud gm en t an d li enof th at de cre e, or wh eth er it c on tin ue d in fo rce . T he Co urt rel uc tantlyhe ld t

hat th e li enwa s lo st whe n M r. A ble ap pe ale d. Th e C ourt d isc us sed a st atute, §2983, that provi ded for liens to continue in force upon an appeal in the nature of a writ of err or, but the statut e d id n ot p rov ide fo r li en s to co nti nu e d uri ng all ap pe als , and

th e Co urt

n ote d th at i t w as obligated t o apply the la w as written.
Af ter Sm ith wa s d eci de d, an d p os sib ly i n re sp on se t o it s h old ing, t he Le gis lat ure pa sse d an oth er a ct t o p rov ide that ap pe als fr om ju dg m en ts and de cre es f

rom co urt s o f e qu ity“sh all , no tw it hs ta nd in g s ai d app ea l, be a l ie n upo n t he pro pe rt y of t he defe nd an t ordefe nd an ts to t he sa me ex tent and

in li ke m anne r a s jud gm en ts at lawo r i n c ourts of rec ord .” Fo rt v

. F ort , 118 Tenn. 103, 10 1 S .W . 4 33 , 4 36 (T enn. 19 07 ) (c iti ng Ch ap ter 21 , p .6 8, Ac ts 1 88 5). Th e ef fe ct o f t his ne w a ct w as to m od if y th e co mm on

lawrul e in

res pe ct o f j ud gm en ts and d ecr ees of ch an cer y c ourts “as to continue the m in force upon an appea l, where moneyed or other judgments were pronounced, to the ex tent of pre ser vin g th e li enpe nd ing the ap pe al[ .] ” Id.
Whe n a pp lyi ng the se r

ule s, co urt s h av e o ft ens tat ed th at i n th e ca se o f an a

pp eal , “ the lie n [is] not lost” and can be perfected upon dismissal of the a pp ea l ora n affirmance of the judgment below. Sh ep ard v

. L an ier , 192 Tenn. 608, 616, 241 S.W .2d 587, 591 (Tenn. 1951) (citi ng Br ink ley v. Welch , 7 5 T enn. 27 8; Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Ewing , 80 Tenn. 598). See also Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Ewing , 8 0 T en n. 59 8 ( Te nn
. 18 83 ) (o ri gi na l ju dg ment l ie n “w ou ldb e ke pta li ve ” du ri ng t he ti me that f urt he r pr oc eed ing s p rev en ted its en fo rce m en t); Sw eet

wa ter Ba nk & T ru st C o. v. How ard , 16 Tenn. App. 91, 66 S.W .2d 225, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1932) (an appeal extends the t ime for execution so as t o c on tin

ue the lie n). The applicabl e statut e today governi ng judgment li en s is Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-106 (20 00 ), e nti tle d “ Ap pe als – C om m en cem en t of

tim e f or s ale ,” wh ich

pro vid es:A gai n, T enn. C od e A nn
. § 25

- 5-105 ( S up p. 20 06 ) pr ov i des t hat once a j ud gm ent l i en i s cr eat ed as 1 p ro v id e d in § 2 5 -5 -1 0 1 (b ), “ it w ill las t fo r th e ti m e r em ai ni ng i n a t en- year per i od f r om t he da t e of

f i nal j udgm ent e n try in th e c o u rt cle rk ’s o ffic e .” -7-

If anap pe al i s take n f

rom any ju dg m ent f

or whic h th e li enpro vid ed by this chapter would apply, the t ime for sale provided in § 25-5- 105 sh all co mm en ce u

po n th e f ina l de ter m inatio n o f s uc h c ase
. 1
W e find no autho rity to su gg est that § 2 5-5 -10 6 s ho uld be co ns tru ed

dif fe rentlythan it s predecessor s, which “kept alive” or “preserved” judgment liens pe nding an appeal, s o that the l iens were “not lost ” during that time. Se e Lincoln Sav. Bank v. Ewing , 80 T enn. at 59 8; Fo rt , 1 01 S. W. at 4 36 ; Sh ep ard , 2 41 S. W .2 d a t 59 1. Th ere fo re, Mr. Gunn’ s ar gum en t th at t he lie ns we re “ex tin gu ish ed ” p en din g a pp eal is w ith out m eri t.
Mr. G unn co nv ey ed

th e pro pe rtyw itha

co ve nant a ga ins t en cum

branc es, an d h e co ve nante d to “for ev erwa rr ant a nd defend the titl e[.]” Regardless of Mr. Gunn’s beli efs as to the val idity or inv ali dit y o f t he jud gm en t li en , it

rem ain s att ach ed

to the prop erty to the de tri m en t of the Ha lf ord s. A c ov en an t ag ain st e nc um branc es i s se curity “ ag ain st tho se r ights t o, o r i nte res ts in, th e land grante d wh ich m ays ub sis t i n thi rd pe rso ns to th e dim inutio n in va lue o f the estate,” see Mu rd oc k Acceptance Corp. , 19 0 T enn. at 4 27 , 23 0 S .W .2 d at 40 6, an d w e f ind that th e ju dg m en t li en constitut es an encumbrance on the proper ty. Additionall y, we find Mr. Gunn’s defense t o his breach of the covenant , specificall y that the Ha lf ord s k ne w a bo ut t he lie n o n th e p rop erty a t th e ti m e o f t he co nv ey an ce, to b e w ith out le ga l su pp ort . K no wl ed ge on

the part o f t

he purch ase r of

the e xis ten ce of

e nc um branc es o n th e land

wi ll no t pr ev en t hi m

fr om rec ov eri ng dam ag es o n a ccount o f i t, whe re h e p rot ect s h im sel f b y p rop er co ve na nt s in h is deed. Murdock Acceptance Corp. , 190 Tenn. at 426, 230 S.W.2d at 405 (citing Brown v. Taylor , 115 Tenn. 1, 5, 88 S.W . 933, 934 (Tenn. 1905)). “[T]he existenc e of a known enc umbr ance might be the very re ason for taking a cove nant within t he scope of which the encumbrance was included, ther eby obtaining a ssurance t ha t the vendor would dis charge the en cum be rin g ob lig ati on

o ut of th e purch ase m on eypa id b y th e v en de e. ” Id. at 426 , 23 0 S. W .2 d at 405-406.
Th e integ ral qu est ion

in t his cas e is wh eth er the ju dg m en t, fi led a s a lie n in

Gi bs on Co un ty in 2002 pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 25-5-10 1(b)(1), ope rated as a n encumbrance or cloud on the title of the subject pr operty. We believe thatthis question must be answered affirmatively. Upon discovery of the exi stence of the judgment lien, and in order to se ll the subj ect proper ty, the Halfords were compelled to place funds in e scrow to sati sfy their int ended purchaserthat the lien w ould be removed or paid, and these damages serve as the basis for theirunderlying ac tion agains t Mr. Gunn. As the tri al c ourt no ted , Mr. G unn ha s tak enno a cti on to p ros ecute h is a

pp eal in t he Ci rcu it C ourt of Hardem an County since the appeal was take n, nor has he take n any action t o otherwise r emove the cloud on the t itle. The Halfords are enti tled to r eimbursem ent of their ac tual loss as a resul t of Mr. Gunn ’s b rea chof

the co ve nant a ga ins t en cum brances. T he ref

ore , w e af

fi rm the tri al c ourt’ s-8-

grant of summ ary judgment in favor of the Halfords in the am ount $4,853.91, the undisput ed amount of the judgment lien.
Fi na lly , th e H alf

ord s co nte nd

that th eyare en tit led

to an award o f attorn ey ’s f ees inc urr ed at the pro cee din gs be low , and on appeal. In su pp ort of thi s ar gu m en t, t he y re ly o n th e T enne sse e Supreme Court’s decision i n Dickin so n v . B ain , 921 S.W .2d 189, 193 (Tenn. 1996), in which t he Co urt ad op ted “th e m ajo rity rul e that u

nd er a co ve nant to warrant an d de fe nd ti tle th e g rantee m ay recover r easonable attorney’ s fees incurred in defending the ti tle when the gr antor had noti ce of the pendency of the acti on and refused to defend.” In an affidavit ac companying the Halfords’ motion fo r summ ary

jud gm en t f

ile d in the trial court, Mr. H alf

ord stat ed : “I have ma de dem an d u po n H aro ld Gunn to pay the lien

or ge t it s re lea se b ut h e h as f ail ed an d re fu sed

to h av e th e li enrel eas ed .” Th is fact appears t o be undisputed by Mr. Gunn. In its amended final order , entered on Ja nuary 22, 2007, the tri al c ourt r

ule d “ [t ]h at n o a tto rne y’s fe es are g ranted to t he Pl aintif

fs he rei n. ” An award of appellate a tt or ne y’ s fees is a matter withi n this Court’ s sound discre tion. Ch aff in v . E lli s , 211 S.W .3d 264, 294 (Tenn.Ct.App.,2006) (cit ing Arch er v . A rch er , 907 S.W .2d 41 2, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App . 19 95 )). Whe n co ns ide rin g a req ue st f or atto rne y’s fe es o n a

pp eal , w e al so co ns ide r th e re qu esting party’s ab ili ty t o p aysu chfe es, the req ue sti ng party ’s s uc ces s o n a pp eal , whether the r equesting par ty sought the appeal in good faith, and any other equit able factors r elevant in a given cas e. Id. (citi ng Darvarmanesh v. Gharacholou , No. M2004-00262-COA-R3-CV, 2005 W L 1684050, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 19, 2005))

. W e co nc lud e th at the Ha lf ord s ar e entit led

to r eco ve r th eir

rea sonable att orn ey ’s f

ees incurred bel owas a

res ult of the ir b rin gin g s uit

ag ain st M r. Gunn f

or h is b rea chof

the co ve nant ag ain st e nc um

branc es i n th e warranty

deed . Add iti on all y, we f ind that th e H alf

ord s ar e entit led

to the ir r eas on ab le atto rne y’s fe es i nc urr ed on ap pe al. Th ere fo re, the ju dg m en t of the tri al c ourt de ny ing the Hal fo rds requ est for atto rne y’s fee s is rev ers ed , an d th e ca se i s re m an de d to the cir cu it court for deter mination of the reasonable a mount of such fees.

V. C ONCL US I ON
Fo r th e f ore go ing rea so ns , th e ju dg m en t of the tri al c ourt i s af

fi rm ed in par t, re ve rse d in p art , an d re m an de d f

or f urt he r pr oc eed ing s. Cos ts ar e ass ess ed ag ain st A pp ell an t, H aro ld Gunn, an d h is surety, for which exec ution may issue, if necessar y.

ALAN E. H IGHERS, JUD GE-9-