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*********************************************** 
TALA E. H. v. SYED I.*

(AC 39706)

Lavine, Keller and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgments of the trial court

continuing for six months a civil protective order that had been issued

against him and denying his motions for contempt and clarification.

Pursuant to statute (§ 46b-15 [a]), the plaintiff had filed an application

for relief from abuse from the defendant, whom she identified as a

person to whom she was married and with whom she resided in a

property that he owned. In her affidavit, the plaintiff attested to many

instances that the defendant had harassed, threatened and stalked her.

The trial court granted the ex parte application and ordered the defendant not to assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with or

stalk the plaintiff. The court also scheduled a hearing to determine

whether the protective order should be continued beyond two weeks.

The defendant thereafter filed a fifty-one page affidavit in response to the

plaintiff’s application and numerous requests for the court to subpoena

certain persons to appear at the hearing, and the plaintiff submitted

hundreds of text messages that she had received from the defendant.

During the scheduled hearing, the court, instead of following normal

procedure, had three police officers that the defendant had subpoenaed

testify before the plaintiff presented her case because it anticipated a

lengthy hearing and did not want to inconvenience the officers by having

them wait in court until the end of the plaintiff’s case to testify. After

reviewing the text messages submitted by the plaintiff, the court

described them as obsessive and horribly unpleasant, but stated that

both parties had not been nice to each other. The court also offered to

extend the protective order for sixty days and to permit the parties to

return to court if the conflict between them had calmed down, but the

parties rejected the court’s offer of compromise. At the conclusion of

the hearing, the court continued the protective order for six months,

finding that the defendant had stalked the plaintiff pursuant to § 46b15 (a). The court also ordered the plaintiff to remove all of her belongings

from the defendant’s property by a certain date. Thereafter, the defendant filed a motion for clarification of the court’s order and a motion

for contempt, claiming that that the plaintiff had not removed her possessions by the ordered date. The trial court denied the defendant’s motions

following a hearing, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held:

1. The defendant could not prevail on his unpreserved claim that the manner

in which the trial court conducted the hearing on the continuance of the

protective order constituted judicial misconduct and bias, the defendant

having failed to demonstrate that the court exhibited bias against him

and was guilty of judicial misconduct that affected the integrity of the

proceeding and denied him a fair trial; a review of the record and

transcript of the subject hearing demonstrated that the trial court did

not prejudge the case and that there was a factual basis to continue the

protective order against the defendant for six months, and although the

trial court may have addressed the parties somewhat differently at times,

the substance of its statements, its rulings and its order were predicated

on its need to confine the hearing to relevant issues, to control its docket

and to manage the proceedings in its courtroom.

2. The trial court did not misapprehend the facts or abuse its discretion by

continuing the protective order for six months: that court’s decision to

continue the protective order was predicated on its findings that the

defendant sent the plaintiff hundreds of obsessive text messages, went

to the homes of her male companion and her family, visited her workplace, used security cameras at his property to monitor her and placed

a tracking device on the car he permitted her to use to find her location,

which constituted stalking under § 46b-15 (a), and contrary to the defendant’s claim that the court’s consideration of the security cameras and

the tracking device was improper because he placed them for legitimate

security purposes, the evidence demonstrated that he also used them
to keep track of the times the plaintiff came and went from the room

that they had shared and to monitor her whereabouts, and, therefore,

the court could have found that the defendant’s behavior constituted

stalking; moreover, although the court’s finding that the defendant went

to the home of the plaintiff’s aunt was clearly erroneous, that finding

was harmless error in the face of the overwhelming evidence that the

defendant stalked the plaintiff.

Argued March 14—officially released July 10, 2018

Procedural History

Application for relief from abuse, brought to the

Superior Court in the judicial district of New Haven,

where the court, Goodrow, J., granted the application;

thereafter, following a hearing, the court, Emons, J.,

continued the protective order; subsequently, the court,

Emons, J., denied the defendant’s motions for clarification and contempt, and the defendant appealed to this

court. Affirmed.

Syed I., self-represented, the appellant (defendant).
Opinion

LAVINE, J. This appeal arises out of an order of

protection issued against the self-represented defendant, Syed I., in favor of the self-represented plaintiff,

Tala E. H.1 On appeal, the defendant commingles claims

related to the judgments rendered by the trial court

when it continued the order of protection against him

and thereafter when it denied his postjudgment motions

for contempt and clarification. Specifically, the defendant claims that the trial court (1) was guilty of judicial

misconduct and bias, (2) denied him due process by

failing to rule on his discovery motions, (3) denied him

the right to a public trial, (4) misread the evidence, (5)

abused its discretion by failing to create a record of

certain testimony, and (6) improperly denied his

motions for contempt and clarification.2 The majority

of the defendant’s claims are inadequately briefed, and,

therefore, we address only his judicial misconduct and

evidentiary claims.3 We affirm the judgments of the

trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s reviewable

claims on appeal. See footnote 2 of this opinion. On

September 1, 2016, the then nineteen year old plaintiff

filed an application for relief from abuse from the then

forty-one year old defendant whom she identified as a

person to whom she was married and with whom she

resided in a property owned by him.4 See General Statutes § 46b-15 (a). In her affidavit, the plaintiff attested

that beginning on August 16, 2016, the defendant began

to harass her by sending her a text message that he

was going to have her evicted from her room and that

he would break into her room unless she voluntarily

returned certain of his possessions. The plaintiff feared

for her safety and well-being, and began to stay at

another address. When she returned to her room, she

found that a large number of her belongings were gone,

including a laptop computer, a marriage certificate,

clothing, cosmetics, and jewelry. She reported the

break-in to the police, who told her that nothing could

be done because the defendant, whom she suspected

to be the perpetrator of the theft, was her husband.

The plaintiff also attested that several days later the

defendant reported to the police that the motor vehicle

he had given her as a gift was missing and claimed that

the plaintiff’s friend D had stolen it. The defendant used

a tracking device to locate the car at the address where

the plaintiff was staying.

The plaintiff further attested that the defendant harassed her to find out where she was working. One day,

he appeared at her workplace and misrepresented himself to one of the plaintiff’s coworkers in order to see

her. The defendant made a beverage purchase and, after

paying for it, gave the plaintiff a vulgar, handwritten

note. He remained in the workplace for a while before
leaving. The plaintiff and D worked at the same store,

and the plaintiff told her about the incident. In his effort

to locate the plaintiff, the defendant had been sending

text messages to D ‘‘as a relationship counselor.’’ D

sent a text message to the defendant telling him not to

come to the plaintiff’s workplace. The plaintiff attested

that the defendant, claiming discrimination, sent D’s

message to the corporate headquarters of the store,

which caused D to lose her employment.5

The plaintiff also attested that the defendant installed

cameras outside the door to her room and hired someone to follow her in a car. She also attested that the

defendant verbally abused her and yelled at her in public. In addition, he sent her text messages about sexual

acts that disturbed her. He researched her family in

order to contact her aunt and her uncle at their respective homes in Connecticut and telephone her father in

the country of Lebanon. According to the plaintiff, the

defendant begged her to return to the room they shared

and continued to harass her by sending her text

messages.

The plaintiff averred that she received an e-mail message from her bank stating that she needed to activate

her bank card as soon as possible. She had never

received a bank card so she believed that the defendant

had taken it and used it to take funds from her account.

She claimed that the defendant was interfering with her

everyday life and the lives of her friends. The plaintiff

was terrified of the defendant. Although she asked him

to leave her alone, he continued to send text messages

to her. She attested that the defendant was ‘‘attempting

to ruin [her] life in any way he can.’’

The court, Goodrow, J., granted the ex parte application and ordered the defendant to surrender all firearms

and ammunition and not to assault, threaten, abuse,

harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk the plaintiff, and

scheduled a hearing to determine whether the protective order should be continued beyond two weeks. The

defendant was served with notice of the hearing to be

held on September 14, 2016. The defendant filed a fiftyone page affidavit in response to the plaintiff’s application.6 He also filed numerous requests that the court

subpoena certain persons to appear at the hearing.7

On September 14, 2016, the parties appeared before

the court, Emons, J., and presented evidence and argument. The plaintiff placed into evidence a sheaf of text

messages she had received from the defendant from

mid to late August, 2016, that was, according to the

court, more than one and one-half inches thick. The

court read them and described them as ‘‘[h]orribly, horribly unpleasant exchanges.’’ On cross-examination, the

defendant asked the plaintiff why she felt threatened

by him, and the plaintiff testified: ‘‘[Y]our actions have

proved that time after time, texting me excessively,

showing up at my employers, contacting friends and
family of mine that you have no reason to contact and

showing up at their homes . . . their employers, getting them fired and that’s why I believe so.’’

The defendant stated to the court that he had not

threatened the plaintiff and that he had not intended

to harass her. He explained that he wanted to present

evidence through third parties to discredit the plaintiff’s

credibility and character and that she sought an order

of protection only because he was evicting her from

the room he had rented to her. Although the court

acknowledged that the plaintiff at times may not have

been truthful, it stated that her character was not the

issue under § 46b-15 (a).

During the hearing, the court stated that the parties

needed to leave one another alone and offered to extend

the protective order of no communication for sixty days

and to permit the parties to return to court if the conflict

between them calmed down. The court also stated that,

in the voluminous exchange of text messages, neither

party had been nice to the other. Neither party, however, was willing to accept the court’s offer of compromise.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the court continued

the protection order of no contact for six months,

through March 14, 2017, subject to modification. The

court stated to the defendant that it had considered all

of the evidence, including ‘‘hundreds and hundreds of

obsessive texts, most of which are not particularly very

nice; the fact that you went to her boyfriend’s home or

friend, I don’t know what he is really; the fact that you

went to the aunt’s house; the fact that you went to the

uncle’s house; the fact that you installed cameras in

the house specifically looking at her door and were

texting her on what time she came and went; the fact

that you admitted that you put tracking devices in her

car. This is a stalking type of situation and it, I believe,

the fact that there was testimony about your using other

people’s cars to follow her so that she won’t know who

you are, it is not only stalking and complies with the

statute in that manner, but I believe that the continuous

constant interaction that was clearly not welcome is

sufficient to . . . instill in her a continuous threat or

threatening based upon the statute . . . .’’ The court

also ordered the plaintiff to remove all of her belongings

from the defendant’s property by September 30, 2016,

and that the parties communicate through a third party.

On September 20, 2016, the defendant filed a motion

for clarification of the court’s order that the plaintiff

remove her belongings from his property. On September 29 and October 3, 2016, he filed motions for contempt claiming, inter alia, that the plaintiff had not

removed her possessions by September 30, 2016. The

court denied the defendant’s motions following a hearing held on October 7, 2016. The defendant filed the

present appeal on October 13, 2016.
We begin with the generally applicable standard of

review. ‘‘[T]he standard of review in family matters is

well settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial

court’s orders in domestic relations cases unless the

court has abused its discretion or it is found that it

could not reasonably conclude as it did, based on the

facts presented.’’ (Footnote omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., 150 Conn.

App. 105, 111, 89 A.3d 896 (2014).8

I

The defendant’s first claim is that the manner in

which the court conducted the hearing on the continuance of the protective order constituted judicial misconduct and bias and caused him ‘‘duress.’’ We have

reviewed the entire transcript of the hearing and disagree that the court was guilty of bias or judicial misconduct.

At no time during the September 14, 2016 hearing

did the defendant ask the court to recuse itself or move

to disqualify the judge. His claim of judicial bias and

misconduct, therefore, is unpreserved and raised for

the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, a reviewing court

will not entertain an issue raised for the first time on

appeal. See Schimenti v. Schimenti, 181 Conn. App.

385, 392, A.3d (2018). Even though his claim

is unpreserved, the defendant did not request review

pursuant to one of the exceptions by which this court

may review unpreserved claims.9

In his appellate brief,

the defendant acknowledged that he did not object to

the court’s statements that he found to be biased ‘‘as

he felt intimidated, and objection would have been fruitless and may have even resulted in further error and

reprimand . . . [which] resulted in harmful error that

affected the integrity of the proceeding and reversible

error leading not to a fair trial on the facts but a trial

on the temper or whimsies of’’ the court.

‘‘[T]he floor established by the Due Process Clause

clearly requires a fair trial in a fair tribunal . . . before

a judge with no actual bias against the defendant, or

interest in the outcome of [a] particular case.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bracy v.

Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–905, 117 S. Ct. 1793, 138 L.

Ed. 2d 97 (1997). ‘‘Judicial impartiality is the hallmark

of the American system of justice.’’ 48A C.J.S. Judges

§ 247 (2018). Following our review of the defendant’s

brief, we construe his alleged judicial bias and misconduct assertions to set forth a claim of plain error. Pursuant to Practice Book § 60-5, we may, in the interest of

justice, notice plain error claims not brought to the

attention of the trial court.

‘‘[A]lthough this court may review an unpreserved

claim of judicial bias for plain error, not every claim

of partiality warrants reversal on the basis of plain

error.’’ Schimenti v. Schimenti, supra, 181 Conn. App.
392. In the present case, we have reviewed the defendant’s claim of judicial bias under the plain error doctrine because it allegedly implicates the basic concept

of a fair trial; see Cameron v. Cameron, 187 Conn. 163,

168, 444 A.2d 915 (1982); but we found no evidence of

bias, misconduct, or impartiality in the record.

The plain error doctrine ‘‘is an extraordinary remedy

used by appellate courts to rectify errors committed at

trial that, although unpreserved, are of such monumental proportion that they threaten to erode our system

of justice and work a serious and manifest injustice on

the aggrieved party. [T]he plain error doctrine . . . is

not . . . a rule of reviewability. It is a rule of reversibility. That is, it is a doctrine that this court invokes in

order to rectify a trial court ruling that, although either

not properly preserved or never raised at all in the trial

court, nonetheless requires reversal of the trial court’s

judgment, for reasons of policy. . . . In addition, the

plain error doctrine is reserved for truly extraordinary

situations [in which] the existence of the error is so

obvious that it affects the fairness and integrity of and

public confidence in the judicial proceedings. . . .

Plain error is a doctrine that should be invoked sparingly.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schimenti

v. Schimenti, supra, 181 Conn. App. 392–93.

When an appellate court addresses a claim of plain

error, the court ‘‘first must determine if the error is

indeed plain in the sense that it is patent [or] readily

discernable on the face of a factually adequate record,

[and] also . . . obvious in the sense of not debatable.

. . . This determination clearly requires a review of the

plain error claim presented in the light of the record.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 393. In addition,

‘‘the reviewing court must examine that error for the

grievousness of its consequences in order to determine

whether reversal under the plain error doctrine is appropriate. A party cannot prevail under plain error unless

it has demonstrated that the failure to grant relief will

result in manifest injustice.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Id.

The standard employed by a court reviewing a claim

of judicial bias ‘‘is an objective one, not the judge’s

subjective view as to whether he or she can be fair and

impartial in hearing the case. . . . Any conduct that

would lead a reasonable [person] knowing all the circumstances to the conclusion that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned is a basis for the

judge’s disqualification.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Carlos C., 165 Conn. App. 195, 207,

138 A.3d 1090, cert. denied, 322 Conn. 906, 140 A.3d

977 (2016).

A reviewing court is mindful that ‘‘adverse rulings,

alone, provide an insufficient basis for finding bias even

when those rulings may be erroneous.’’ Schimenti v.

Schimenti, supra, 181 Conn. App. 395. ‘‘[O]pinions
formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced

or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis

for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a

deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make

fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during

the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of,

or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases,

ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

In his brief on appeal, the defendant has identified,

in isolation, words and phrases stated by the court that

he contends demonstrate judicial bias and misconduct.

Our reading of the transcript of the September 14, 2016

hearing demonstrates that the defendant has taken the

court’s words and phrases out of context and, in doing

so, has misconstrued and mischaracterized them.

He contends that at the beginning of the hearing, the

court singled him out by admonishing his behavior, but

did not speak to the plaintiff in a similar fashion. The

transcript reveals that when the hearing commenced,

the court asked the plaintiff why the case was before

the court. The plaintiff responded that ‘‘[t]his man has

been harassing me, among my family as well and my

friends, hiring people to follow me, showing up at my

workplace, contacting me excessively when I’ve been

clear that I don’t want to be contacted.’’ The court

informed the defendant that Judge Goodrow had issued

a temporary restraining order against him and asked

him if he had surrendered his firearms and ammunition.

The defendant stated that he did not have any. The

following colloquy transpired:

‘‘The Court: Terrific. And you may not assault,

threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with, or stalk

the complainant.

‘‘[The Defendant]: My response is, I never did.

‘‘The Court: I’m sure that you believe that you never

did, but I’m asking you a question, and I’m going to ask

you to focus on my questions, okay? Are you aware

that the restraining order was granted claiming that you

do not assault, threaten, or ordering, that you do not

assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with,

or stalk the complainant?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Yes.

‘‘The Court: Okay, that’s why we are here. We are

going to have a hearing today. Your hearing is going to

be right now. How many people, sir, did you subpoena

to court today?

‘‘[The Defendant]: Your Honor, I subpoenaed five

people.’’

The court then asked the defendant to identify the

five people, which he did. Three of the five people

were police officers. The court then explained how the
hearing would proceed: ‘‘[N]ormally, when we have a

hearing like this, I allow the complainant to tell me her

side of the story first . . . and you may, if you can

be professional and respectful and I approve of the

questions that you ask, I will allow you to ask her

questions if they’re relevant and they have to adhere

to all of the rules of evidence, all right? Then it’s your

turn to put on your case after she has whoever it is

that she wants to testify. She may call her aunt, her

uncle, she may call the police. Okay? Then it is your turn.

‘‘I’m going to do things a little bit differently today,

because I feel, and I have a little bit of a sixth sense

that we have three officers sitting in court today who

probably shouldn’t be here. So, I’m going to take them

out of order, and I’m going to hear from them subject

to your questions and subject to the plaintiff’s questions

and try to find out what their independent knowledge

is of the complaints in this case. My goal is to get them

out of here as quickly as you got them here. Okay, so

who[m] would you like to start with first?’’

The defendant called three police officers individually who testified briefly about their interaction with

the parties.10 Several times while the defendant was

examining an officer, the court interrupted and stated:

‘‘[L]et me see if I can focus you better because I see

you with reams of paper around you, and I can tell you

before we even begin this hearing, that you are what I

would consider to be very over prepared and by that I

mean that much of what you are focusing on may not

be relevant to why you’re here today. So, let me read

you the statute, okay? And this is the only thing that

I’m going to be listening to today.’’ The court once

informed the defendant that the questions he was asking

were improper because the information he sought to

elicit was not relevant under the statute. After each of

the officers testified, the court excused them and stated:

‘‘I’m going to move this case aside for a little bit right

now and get these people back to their duties and

responsibilities at work rather than here where they

shouldn’t have come to begin with, okay. [The parties

are] going to take a backseat. I’m going to try to get

some other cases dealt with, and then I’m going to

reconvene this hearing and we’re going to start with

[the plaintiff]. I’m going to hear her version. You [the

plaintiff] are free to put on whatever witnesses you

would like and then, sir, you will put on your case, and

I will make a final decision.’’

In our view, the transcript does not disclose that the

court singled out the defendant or treated him differently from the plaintiff. At the beginning of the hearing,

before taking evidence, the court stated its expectations

and the procedure it would follow. In other words, it

set the ‘‘ground rules’’ for the way in which the hearing

would be conducted. Given the court’s experience adjudicating protective orders, the affidavits and informa-
tion in the file, the court’s statement, although directed

toward the defendant, set the parameters for the entire

hearing. It also instructed the self-represented parties

with respect to appropriate courtroom decorum. The

court’s words and instructions would be appropriate

for any hearing on a protective order.

‘‘A judge, trying the cause without a jury, should be

careful to refrain from any statement or attitude which

would tend to deny [a party] a fair trial. . . . It is [her]

responsibility to have the trial conducted in a manner

which approaches an atmosphere of perfect impartiality

which is so much to be desired in a judicial proceeding.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Nathan B.,

116 Conn. App. 521, 525, 977 A.2d 224 (2009).

‘‘[E]ach judge brings to the bench the experiences

of life, both personal and professional. A lifetime of

experience that has generated a number of general attitudes cannot be left in chambers when a judge takes

the bench. Thus, a judge’s average personal experiences

do not generally lead to reasonable questions about the

judge’s impartiality and subsequent disqualification.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Schimenti v. Schimenti, supra, 181 Conn. App. 402 n.9.

The defendant also takes exception to the court’s

having stated, ‘‘I’m going to do things a little bit differently today, because I feel, and I have a little bit of a

sixth sense that we have three officers sitting in court

today who probably shouldn’t be here.’’ In his brief on

appeal, the defendant stated that the court’s use of the

words ‘‘sixth sense’’ to explain why it was going to hear

evidence outside the usual order in which evidence is

presented caused him to believe that the court had

prejudged the case. When the court’s words are read

in the context of the proceeding, however, it is apparent

that the court was anticipating a lengthy hearing. The

court had reviewed the file and stated that the plaintiff

had submitted an affidavit that was one and one-half

pages long and that the defendant had submitted a reply

that was fifty-one pages long. It also knew that the

defendant had submitted numerous requests for the

court to issue subpoenas. Moreover, the court observed

the pile of papers on the desk in front of the defendant

and stated that perhaps he had ‘‘over prepared.’’

By virtue of its experience dealing with protective

orders, the court took steps to manage its docket. There

were multiple cases before the court that day. By permitting the defendant, rather than the plaintiff, to start

by presenting the testimony of the police officers whom

he had subpoenaed, the court enabled the police officers to return to duty relatively quickly without having

to wait until the end of the plaintiff’s case to testify.

The court, therefore, permitted the defendant to present

the evidence he wished with minimal inconvenience to

the police officers and other litigants. The court’s

actions demonstrated reasonable trial management and
concern for the public. We discern nothing improper

about the court’s ‘‘sixth sense’’ about the presence of

police officers and allowing them to testify first. The

court appropriately managed the proceedings in its

courtroom and in no way disadvantaged the defendant.

In further support of his claim that the court was

biased, the defendant argues that the court required him

to make offers of proof with respect to the witnesses

he had subpoenaed. The court explained to the defendant that it wanted him to make offers of proof to

determine whether the evidence was relevant to the

plaintiff’s claim that the defendant was harassing her

and whether the witnesses had firsthand knowledge

of the alleged harassment. The court’s requiring the

defendant to make an offer of proof was done for appropriate evidentiary and trial management purposes.

Before the defendant presented his case, he stated

that the plaintiff ‘‘made a number of allegations . . .

in her conversation . . . [w]hich are not correct.’’ The

court stated in reply: ‘‘[T]he fact that you believe that

she has made allegations that are not correct, they may

be very important to you. It’s probably not as important

to me for the simple reason that two people can be in the

same room at the same time and see things differently.

Okay? I am interested in facts about what happened

when. That’s as much as I’m going to tell you. I’m going

to allow you to question if you can do it properly and

respectfully. If you can’t [do that] or get off the rails,

I’m going to stop you. I’m just telling you that.’’

When the defendant wanted to present evidence that

the plaintiff had his passport and his green card in her

possession, the court asked him how he intended to

prove that assertion. The following colloquy occurred:

‘‘[The Defendant]: I’m just trying to undermine her

credibility, Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Right, but you’re killing me trying to do

that. There’s no nice way of saying that.’’

The defendant claims that the court’s use of the words

‘‘off the rails’’ and ‘‘killing me’’ were threatening to him

and that he was nothing other than polite and respectful

to the court. He claims that such words caused him

duress and that he felt intimidated by the court.11

The court devoted the better part of a day to the

hearing and recessed it on a number of occasions to

hear other matters and to permit the defendant to

secure evidence. Although the court used colloquial

expressions such as ‘‘going off the rails’’ and ‘‘killing

me,’’ ‘‘isolated venting of frustration’’ does not necessarily require reversal. In re Nathan B., supra, 116 Conn.

App. 526. In the present matter, the court made efforts

on numerous occasions to explain to the defendant

what evidence was relevant with respect to § 46b-15

(a) and what was of no consequence. Nevertheless, the

defendant frequently prefaced his questions with his
own view of the facts and sought to present irrelevant

testimony. The court repeatedly tried to make clear to

the defendant that the issue was not whether the plaintiff was not a nice person, but whether he had harassed,

threatened or stalked her. The court’s use of colloquial

language does not in and of itself demonstrate bias.

The defendant also claims that the court was biased

against him because it reprimanded him for referring

to the plaintiff as ‘‘that lady’’ but did not admonish the

plaintiff for referring to him as ‘‘that man.’’ In addition,

the defendant argues that the court described the text

messages he sent to the plaintiff as horribly unpleasant12

but did not similarly describe text messages that he

received from the plaintiff, which he had placed in evidence. Although it did not say so at that time, when it

extended the protective order for six months, the court

stated that ‘‘neither one of you were nice to each other

. . . .’’ While the defendant has cited a few instances

in which the court spoke somewhat differently to the

plaintiff than to him, he has not demonstrated how that

disparate use of language prejudiced him with respect

to the court’s finding that he had stalked the plaintiff

pursuant to § 46b-15. See part II of this opinion. He

acknowledged that he ‘‘badgered’’ the plaintiff with text

messages and that he was controlling. He admitted that

he went to her workplace and gave her a handwritten

message, tracked her when she was operating his motor

vehicle, used surveillance cameras to observe her comings and goings, and visited her friends and family to

ascertain information about her.

The defendant also contends that the court’s offer of

a compromise was a veiled threat that he present no

more evidence. The following facts are related to this

claim. Prior to the midday recess, the defendant wanted

to place a copy of a certain e-mail he had received from

the plaintiff into evidence, but he was unable to find it

among his papers. The court offered to take another

recess until 2 p.m.13 The court also stated: ‘‘This is absolutely absurd. I’ve heard enough. I’m going to let you

talk as much as you want to talk. It is unlikely to alter

what I’m already considering based on the documents

that you’ve given me. Okay. You need to leave each

other alone. . . .

‘‘Would you agree to an order not to communicate

with her and you guys . . . and I can continue this

order for sixty days, and you can come back here in

sixty days to make sure that everything is all quiet?

Would you agree to something like that?’’ The defendant

stated that he was concerned about his reputation in

a small university town and his employment. He referenced the security cameras that he had installed in the

properties he rents to students. The court responded

as follows:

‘‘The Court: Sir, I’m not worried about the cameras.

What I really do have to say is that I think that you’re
becoming very consumed with issues that you worry

that I’m thinking about. I’m not thinking about that. I

am only thinking about the statute; that’s all I’m thinking

about, and I want you to know that based on what you

said in your own texts gives me reason to think that

there should probably be a stay away period for a couple

of months and if you can behave yourself, given the

fact that you’re not married anymore, and if you do not

assault, threaten, abuse, harass, follow, interfere with,

or stalk her, I have no interest in changing and making

this more restrictive. My suggestion is that we continue

it for a little period of time and let things calm down

and stop and then come back and you guys can go your

separate ways.

* * *

‘‘Based on the information I have, I will keep the

restraining order exactly the way it is. If you want to

come back this afternoon and you believe that you have

more information to change my mind and demonstrate

that a restraining order should not exist, I am more

than happy to hear from you and your witnesses. So,

what I’m trying to suggest is . . . [i]f you by agreement,

and by the way, I can continue a restraining order for

one year. . . . My thought is that to quiet things down,

this has gotten way out of control, way out of control.

. . . My thought is to keep the peace for sixty days and

come back and let’s revisit it. If that is unacceptable

to you, I will see you back here at 2 [p.m.].’’14

The defendant argues on appeal that the court was

more restrictive of his questioning of the plaintiff following the midday recess. The record discloses that

the court stated to the defendant that it was going to

be less lenient with his questions in order to move the

case along. The transcript reveals that the evidence the

defendant desired to present did not address harassment and the voluminous text messages, his tracking

the motor vehicle the plaintiff was operating, and his

visiting her workplace and her family and friends but,

rather, whether she had his green card and passport.

The defendant stated that the evidence was an indication of the plaintiff’s character. The court informed the

defendant that the evidence he wished to present was

not relevant to the protective order. We agree with

the court.

On the basis of our review of the record, including

the entire transcript and the many text messages written

by the defendant that were placed into evidence, we

conclude that the court did not prejudge the case and

that there was a factual basis to continue the protective

order against the defendant for six months. Although

the court may have addressed the parties somewhat

differently, the substance of its statements, its rulings,

and its order were predicated on its need to confine

the hearing to relevant issues, to control its docket,

and to manage the proceedings in its courtroom. The
defendant has not persuaded us that the court exhibited

bias against him and was guilty of judicial misconduct

that affected the integrity of the proceeding and denied

him a fair trial.15

II

The defendant’s second claim is that the court misread the evidence. As expressed by the self-represented

defendant, it is not a recognizable appellate claim. We,

however, construe the claim to be that the court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous and that the court

abused its discretion by continuing the order of protection for six months. We are not persuaded by the defendant’s claim.

The defendant’s claim is predicated on the court’s

oral decision to continue the order of protection for

six months subject to modification. At the conclusion

of the hearing the court stated in part to the defendant:

‘‘I believe that given all of the documents that I have

with hundreds and hundreds of obsessive texts, most

of which are not particularly very nice, the fact that

you went to her boyfriend’s home or friend, I don’t

know what he is really, the fact that you went to the

aunt’s house, the fact that you went to the uncle’s house,

the fact that you installed cameras in the house specifically looking at her door and were texting her on what

time she came and went, the fact that you admitted

that you put tracking devices in her car, this is a stalking

type of situation and it, I believe, the fact that there

was testimony about your using other people’s cars to

follow her so that she won’t know who you are, it is

not only stalking and complies with the statute in that

manner, but I believe that the continuous constant interaction was clearly not welcome is sufficient to have

her or instill in her a continuous threat of threatening

based upon the statute and a continuous threat.’’

‘‘In determining whether a trial court has abused its

broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we

allow every reasonable presumption in favor of the

correctness of its action. . . . Appellate review of a

trial court’s finding of fact is governed by the clearly

erroneous standard of review. . . . A finding of fact is

clearly erroneous when there is no evidence in the

record to support it . . . or when although there is

evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire

evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction

that a mistake has been committed.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Joni S. v. Ricky S., 124 Conn. App.

170, 173, 3 A.3d 1061 (2010).

The protective order at issue is governed by § 46b15 (a), which the court read several times to explain

to the defendant what evidence was relevant to the

proceedings. Section 46b-15 (a) provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Any family or household member . . . who has

been subjected to a continuous threat of present physi-
cal pain or physical injury, stalking or a pattern of

threatening, including, but limited to, a pattern of threatening, as described in section 53a-62, by another family

or household member may make an application to the

Superior Court for relief under this section . . . .’’

(Emphasis added.)

‘‘Stalking is defined as [t]he act or an instance of

following another by stealth. . . . The offense of following or loitering near another, often surreptitiously,

to annoy or harass that person or to commit a further

crime such as assault or battery. . . . To loiter means

to remain in an area for no obvious reason. . . . We

interpret the statute in accordance with these commonly accepted definitions, satisfied that the plain

meaning of the statute does not yield an unworkable

or absurd result.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., supra, 150

Conn. App.115.

On the basis of our review of the record and the

court’s oral decision, we conclude that the court did

not abuse its discretion in continuing the protective

order for six months. The court’s decision indicates

that it was predicated upon its findings that the defendant sent the plaintiff hundreds of obsessive text messages, went to the homes of her male companion and

her family, visited her workplace, used security cameras

to keep track of her, sent her text messages questioning

her about the time she came and went, and placed a

tracking device on the car he permitted her to use to

find her location. Such acts constituted stalking under

§ 46b-15. The defendant admitted that he badgered the

plaintiff with text messages and does not deny that he

visited her male friend. He does, however, claim that

the court’s consideration of the security cameras and

the tracking device on the car the plaintiff used was

improper. We disagree.

With respect to the security cameras, the plaintiff

acknowledged that they were placed in the hallways

for security purposes. The evidence demonstrates, however, that the defendant also used them to keep track

of the times the plaintiff came and went from the room

that they had shared. On the basis of that information,

he sent the plaintiff text messages asking her what she

was doing, whom she was with, where she had been

and where she was going.

As to the tracking device on the motor vehicle the

defendant gave the plaintiff to use, the defendant claims

that he put the tracking device on the vehicle on the

advice of his insurance company and that he was permitted to affix a tracking device to his motor vehicle

and to use it in the event the vehicle was stolen. He,

however, used the tracking device to monitor the plaintiff’s whereabouts, and, therefore, the court could find

that the defendant’s behavior constituted stalking.
We agree with the defendant’s claim that the court’s

finding that he went to the home of the plaintiff’s aunt

was clearly erroneous because she testified that she

visited him when the plaintiff did not respond to her

phone calls. We conclude, however, that that finding is

harmless error in the face of the overwhelming evidence

that the defendant stalked the plaintiff when she

requested space and wanted to be away from him. ‘‘In

order to constitute reversible error . . . the ruling

must be both erroneous and harmful. . . . The burden

of proving harmful error rests on the party asserting it

. . . and the ultimate question is whether the erroneous

action would likely affect the result.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cragg v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 160 Conn. App. 430,

443–44, 125 A.3d 650 (2015).

The defendant has failed to demonstrate that the

court’s finding as to his visiting the plaintiff’s aunt at

her home was harmful, as the location of their interaction was not relevant to any of the issues concerning

the continuation of the protective order. The defendant

admitted that he visited the plaintiff’s uncle, her male

friend and her workplace, tracked the motor vehicle

she was using, called her father in Lebanon, and sent

her many text messages that he thought were justified

or permissible because he was in a relationship with

her and he believed that she had been unfaithful to him.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court

did not ‘‘misapprehend the facts’’ and did not abuse

its discretion by continuing the protective order of no

contact for six months.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of family violence, we decline to identify the complainant or others

through whom the complainant’s identity may be ascertained. See General

Statutes § 54-86e.

1 The plaintiff represented herself in the trial court and did not participate

in the present appeal. We therefore decided the appeal on the defendant’s

brief and the record.

2 He also claims that the New Haven Superior Court denied him due

process with respect to the hearing on the protective order because the

public notice board contained an inaccurate list of judge and courtroom

assignments for the day.

3 Although the defendant is a self-represented litigant, ‘‘the [General] [S]tatutes and rules of practice cannot be ignored completely. . . . We are not

required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court

though an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than abstract assertion,

is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the

issue properly. . . . Where a claim is asserted in the statement of issues

but thereafter receives only cursory attention in the brief without substantive

discussion or citation of [relevant] authorities, it is deemed to be abandoned.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lareau v.

Burrows, 90 Conn. App. 779, 780, 881 A.2d 411 (2005).

4 The plaintiff and defendant represented that they were married in a

religious ceremony but that they were not married pursuant to Connecticut law.

5

In his response to the plaintiff’s application for an order of protection,

the defendant denied that he complained about D, but he acknowledged

that he forwarded D’s message to the corporate headquarters and inquired
whether D’s asking him not to visit the store ‘‘was in line with the corporate policy.’’

6

In his response to the plaintiff’s affidavit, the defendant stated that he

and the plaintiff had a four month boyfriend-girlfriend relationship and

shared a room in one of the properties that he owned. In addition, he stated

that he and the plaintiff had intended to marry and had completed the first

of the two steps toward a Muslim marriage by receiving the blessing of a

sheikh. He admitted to a number of the plaintiff’s allegations of harassment

such as tracking the car she was driving, going to her workplace, taking a

laptop computer from the room they shared, contacting members of her

family, and sending her many text messages, some of which were sexually

explicit. He justified his behavior on the ground that he and the plaintiff

were in a relationship, and, therefore, the communication was normal and

that his reaction to learning that she allegedly had been unfaithful to him

was understandable. He denied that he had stolen some of the plaintiff’s

belongings and blamed their disappearance on third parties. He asserted

that the plaintiff was mentally ill and that she had sought an order of

protection because he was evicting her from the room he had rented to her.

He also stated that he had ended his relationship with the plaintiff by having

a sheikh tell her that the parties were divorced as of August 30, 2016. He

claimed that, except to wish her well, he had not communicated with the

plaintiff since August 30, 2016, when she told him unconditionally that she

did not want to communicate with him. He stated that he would have nothing

more to do with the plaintiff after the separate eviction proceeding was

complete in a week or so.

7 The court, Hon. James G. Kenefick, Jr., judge trial referee, denied most

of the defendant’s subpoena applications.

8

‘‘Section 46b-15 is part of title 46b, Family Law, and chapter 815a, Family

Matters, and, as such, is specifically included as a court proceeding in a

family relations matter. See General Statutes § 46b-1 (5).’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Princess Q. H. v. Robert H., supra, 150 Conn. App. 111 n.3.

9 Under appropriate circumstances, a reviewing court may review unpreserved claims of error pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40,

567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 781, 120

A.3d 1188 (2015), its supervisory powers; see Practice Book § 60-2; or the

plain error doctrine. See Practice Book § 60-5.

10 One of the officers testified about his investigation of the plaintiff’s use

of the defendant’s motor vehicle. The other two officers testified about their

investigation into a break-in of the plaintiff’s room.

11 The defendant’s claim that the court caused him duress is not explained

in his brief, and, therefore, we, do not address it.

12 The court asked the defendant if he had any objection to the text

messages that the plaintiff offered into evidence. He stated that he had

‘‘absolutely no objection.’’ The following colloquy transpired:

‘‘The Court: You have no object[ion]; that’s terrific. I’m going to take all

of those texts, and I’ll represent on the record that there’s at least, from

what I can see here, about an inch to an inch and a quarter’s worth of a

stack of texts. . . . It’s probably bigger than that. It’s probably an inch and

three-quarters. Oh, this is quite telling, actually, sir, as I read through these.

Horribly, horribly unpleasant exchanges. You’re smiling. . . . [Y]ou must

think . . . [t]hat this is very amusing.

‘‘[The Defendant]: No, I beg your pardon, Your Honor. . . . I have similar

texts. These were the things that were happening in [the] relationship.

‘‘The Court: No, sir. No, sir, maybe your relationships, but these are not

things that happen in relationships.’’

We have reviewed the text messages, including personal and intimate

language and sexually explicit photographs, which are part of the record.

We concur with the court’s description of some of them.

13 The plaintiff objected to recessing until 2 p.m., stating that she had to

work at that time. The court ordered her to call and let her employer know

that she would not be in at 2 p.m.

14 Following the midday recess, the court permitted the defendant to speak

at length. He stated, in part, that the plaintiff was a free spirit and probably

was ‘‘not happy . . . getting tied down with’’ him. She had certain habits,

such as smoking marijuana, that he did not approve of. When she did not

return to the room they shared in early August, he tried to find out what

she was up to. He believed that she had a lover and was upset. With respect

to the reams of text messages he sent the plaintiff, he did not believe that

they constituted a threat to her but that they revealed his reaction when

he ‘‘saw that the lady [he] was madly in love with was up to something
. . . .’’ He had given her his car to use, and she was using it for her enjoyment

while he sat at home alone. To find out what was going on, he attached a

tracking device to the car. He stated that he had respected the plaintiff’s

wishes not to be intimate with him before marriage. When he learned of

her male friend, it really hurt him. He told the plaintiff that he was going

to divorce her; he made plans to see the sheikh. He was embarrassed before

his conservative family and could not tell his friends.

The defendant argued that his communication and interaction with the

plaintiff did not constitute threats. He admitted that he may have been

controlling but that it was nothing more than putting the plaintiff on a better

path for a better tomorrow. He found her to be very intelligent for a twenty

year old, and he was in awe of her. He treated the plaintiff like a daughter

in many ways to guide her toward a better path. He concluded that perhaps

he had trespassed and did not realize it.

15 The defendant also claims that the court’s body language and facial

expressions manifested judicial bias. The record is inadequate for us to

review such a claim.