RECORD IMPOUNDED 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0363-22 

IN THE MATTER OF 

THE EXPUNGEMENT 

APPLICATION OF K.M.G. 

________________________

Argued October 3, 2023 – Decided November 8, 2023 

Before Judges Sumners, Rose and Perez Friscia. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. 

XP-21-002190.

Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the

cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Raymond S.

Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; 

Monica do Outeiro, of counsel and on the brief). 

Tara K. Walsh argued the cause for respondent K.M.G. 

(Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC, attorneys; Robert A. 

Honecker, Jr., and Tara K. Walsh, of counsel and on the 

brief). 

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

SUMNERS, JR., C.J.A.D. 

In this appeal of first impression, we must determine whether the "clean 

slate" statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3, which permits an expungement of a New 

Jersey criminal record if ten years have passed "from the date of the person's 

APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION 

November 8, 2023 

APPELLATE DIVISION 
2 A-0363-22

most recent conviction," applies to a conviction from another state. (Emphasis 

added). The trial court entered an order expunging petitioner's New Jersey 

criminal record after determining her 2017 Virginia misdemeanor conviction did 

not preclude eligibility for expungement under the "clean slate" statute because 

an out-of-state conviction does not constitute a "most recent conviction." The 

State contends the trial court erred in its interpretation of the "clean slate" 

statute, contending petitioner's Virginia conviction must be considered, and 

because it was entered within ten years of her petition for expungement, her 

petition should have been denied. 

We reverse because the text of the "clean slate" statute and related 

expungement statutes do not support the trial court's interpretation to preclude 

consideration of an out-of-state conviction from the phrase "most recent 

conviction." Moreover, such interpretation defies common sense given the 

"clean slate" statute's purpose to expunge a criminal record of an applicant who 

has not violated the law within ten years of their last New Jersey conviction. 

Consequently, petitioner's Virginia offense presently disqualifies her from 

expungement of her New Jersey criminal record under the "clean slate" statute. 

I. 
3 A-0363-22

 On June 15, 2021, petitioner, a Virginia resident, filed an application with 

the Law Division seeking an ordinary expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6, for 

a 1988 arrest for forgery,1 and under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2, for a 1991 conviction for 

third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary and fourth-degree theft resulting in 

a three-year probation sentence. The State objected, claiming petitioner failed 

to include an "out-of-state arrest and/or charge" of unknown disposition. 

On July 15, 2022, petitioner filed an amended petition, explaining that in 

2016, she was arrested and charged in Virginia with "Attempt to Purchase a 

Firearm Without a Permit" and "False History on Criminal History Consent 

Form." Petitioner eventually pled guilty in 2017 to a Class 1 misdemeanor 

"Concealed Weapon" charge, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308(a), resulting in a 

twelve-month suspended jail sentence.2 She professed she innocently affirmed 

1

 No conviction resulted. 

2

 In New Jersey, "[a]n offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction" 

that is punishable by "a sentence of imprisonment of one year or less, but more 

than 30 days, . . . shall be considered in this State to be a disorderly persons 

offense when a reference is made by this code, or by any other statute of this 

State, to such offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a). Disorderly persons offenses 

and "crimes" are distinct. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1). An out-of-state offense 

punishable by more than one year imprisonment "shall be considered in [New 

Jersey] to be a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(2). 
4 A-0363-22

on her handgun purchase application that she had never been convicted of a 

felony. Petitioner claimed she believed her 1991 New Jersey conviction had 

been automatically expunged. 

Petitioner argued before the trial court that "her Virginia conviction 

should not be considered a criminal conviction." She does not repeat that 

argument here. Indeed, her Virginia offense does not qualify as a "crime," see 

N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(2), but as a "disorderly persons offense" under New Jersey 

law, see N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a).3 There is no basis to read "most recent 

conviction" to refer only to convictions for "crimes." 

If not for her Virginia conviction, it appears petitioner would have been 

eligible for ordinary expungement under paragraph three of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), 

which provides that a person may present an expungement application if she has 

been "convicted of multiple crimes . . . all of which are listed in a single 

judgment of conviction," but not if she has "any subsequent conviction for 

another crime or offense in addition to those convictions included in the 

expungement application, whether any such conviction was within this State or 

any other jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). Had she been convicted of only one 

crime in New Jersey, she might have been eligible under paragraph one, which 

requires that the petitioner does not have "any subsequent conviction for another 

crime, whether within this State or any other jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). 

Petitioner's Virginia conviction was not for a "crime," but a "disorderly persons 

offense." See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1). 

3

 This offense has no bearing on the timeliness of petitioner's "clean slate" 

application. As will be discussed later, the "clean slate" statute provides for the 

expungement of disorderly persons offenses, too, not just crimes. N.J.S.A. 

2C:52-5.3. 
5 A-0363-22

Petitioner requested that the trial court consider the "facts and 

circumstances surrounding" her Virginia conviction and "grant [her] 

expungement at the present time, rather than denying [her] application only to 

resubmit" when the 2017 Virginia conviction satisfies the ten-year convictionfree waiting period sometime in 2027. The State objected, arguing petitioner 

was ineligible for ordinary expungement because the Virginia conviction was 

not outside the ten-year window to permit a "clean slate" expungement under 

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b). 

On September 7, 2022, the trial court issued an order and written opinion 

granting petitioner's expungement application. The court determined the 

Virginia conviction did not make petitioner's expungement application 

premature, and that she otherwise satisfied the "clean slate" eligibility 

requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3. 

The trial court reasoned the Virginia conviction did not constitute a "most 

recent conviction" under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3 because it was an out-of-state 

conviction. The court interpreted the "most recent conviction" language of the 

"clean slate" statute's ten-year time requirement to exclude an out-of-state 

conviction. The court explained the phrase "most recent conviction" is used 

twice in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), and the second usage necessarily refers to a New 
6 A-0363-22

Jersey conviction where it states: "The person shall submit the expungement 

application to the Superior Court in the county in which the most recent 

conviction for a crime or offense was adjudged . . . ." The court determined that 

a petitioner could not file for a "clean slate" expungement in another 

jurisdiction, so the phrase "'most recent conviction' . . . in that sentence must be 

referring to a New Jersey conviction." Citing De Flesco v. Mercer County Board 

of Elections, 43 N.J. Super. 492, 499 (App. Div. 1957) (citation omitted), it

relied on "the presumption that a word or phrase is used in the same sense 

throughout [a] statute," finding that "since the phrase 'most recent conviction' in 

the third sentence of subsection (b) is clearly limited to a New Jersey conviction, 

the same phrase in the first sentence regarding the ten-year waiting period must 

also be limited to a New Jersey conviction." The court held "[t]o conclude 

otherwise would require [it] to conclude, which it cannot, that the [L]egislature 

included contradictory language within the subsection of a statute." 

The trial court found further support for disregarding petitioner's Virginia 

conviction by ruling: (1) another "potential starting point[] of the waiting 

period," "the date on which the petitioner made payment of any 'court-ordered 

financial assessment,'" is limited to penalties related to New Jersey convictions, 

as the statute defines "court-ordered financial assessment" to mean any 
7 A-0363-22

"financial assessment imposed by the court as part of the sentence for the 

conviction or convictions that are the subject of the application," N.J.S.A. 

2C:52-5.3(b) (emphasis added); (2) "convictions" in the phrase "a duly verified 

petition as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 praying that all the person's convictions 

. . . be expunged," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), "must be limited to New Jersey 

convictions"; and (3) the Legislature expressly considered out-of-state 

convictions in defining eligibility in the other expungement statutes, but failed 

to include similar language in defining the waiting period in the "clean slate" 

statute. 

II. 

Before us, the State argues the trial court misinterpreted the "clean slate" 

statute. Before addressing the specifics of the State's challenge, we first lay out 

the principles governing statutory interpretation and the "clean slate" statute's

requirements for expungement. 

A. 

Our review of statutory interpretation is "de novo, unconstrained by 

deference to the decisions of the trial court." State v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 

(2015) (citing State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 209 (2007)). In doing so, "[w]e 

'must follow the well-settled rules of statutory construction "to determine and 
8 A-0363-22

give effect to the Legislature's intent."'" In re R.K., 475 N.J. Super. 535, 540-

541 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020)). If "a 

statute's plain language is clear, we apply that plain meaning and end our 

inquiry." Id. at 541 (quoting Garden State Check Cashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of 

Banking & Ins., 237 N.J. 482, 489 (2019)). The Legislature's words and phrases 

are to be construed within the context of "related provisions so as to give sense 

to the legislation as a whole" and given their "generally accepted meaning . . . 

unless that meaning is 'inconsistent with the manifest intent of the 

[L]egislature.'" State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 85 (2020) (first quoting Spade 

v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018); and then quoting N.J.S.A. 

1:1-1). 

We recognize that courts must neither "rewrite a plainly-written 

enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the Legislature intended 

something other than that expressed by way of the plain language." R.K., 475 

N.J. Super. at 543 (quoting State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014)). 

Nonetheless, even though a statute may be clear and unambiguous, we have the 

responsibility to avoid "a literal interpretation [that] would create a manifestly 

absurd result, contrary to public policy, [such that] the spirit of the law should 

control." Frye, 217 N.J. at 575 (quoting Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 162 
9 A-0363-22

N.J. 75, 84 (1999)). This court recently recognized our "rules of construction 

are subordinate to [the] . . . proposition" that legislation should not be construed 

to create an absurd result. State v. W.C., 468 N.J. Super. 324, 331 (App. Div. 

2021) (quoting State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 322 (1961)). Thus "when . . . 

a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd result, we may turn to extrinsic 

evidence, 'including legislative history, committee reports, and 

contemporaneous construction.'" Courtney, 243 N.J. at 86 (quoting State v. 

Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 114 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

B. 

Expungement in New Jersey is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32.1, 

which was "'intended to establish "a comprehensive statutory scheme for the 

expungement of criminal records"' and to create 'an equitable system of 

expungement of indictable and nonindictable offenses as well as of arrest 

records.'" State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 21 (2023) (quoting State v. T.P.M., 189 

N.J. Super. 360, 364 (App. Div. 1983)). Eligibility for expungement depends 

on the record to be expunged: indictable offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2; disorderly 

and petty disorderly persons offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3; local ordinances, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4; and juvenile matters, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4.1. In 2019, our 

Legislature reformed the expungement system, in pertinent part, "including 
10 A-0363-22

'clean slate' expungement for those who had not committed an offense in ten 

years, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3." Gomes, 253 N.J. at 22. 

This appeal centers around the interpretation of the "clean slate" statute, 

which was enacted to make expungement available to those who are "not 

otherwise eligible to present an expungement application pursuant to any other 

section of chapter 52." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a). Primary focus is on N.J.S.A. 

2C:52-5.3(b), which provides: 

The person, if eligible, may present the expungement 

application after the expiration of a period of ten years 

from the date of the person's most recent conviction, 

payment of any court-ordered financial assessment, 

satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or 

release from incarceration, whichever is later. The term 

"court-ordered financial assessment" as used herein and 

throughout this section means and includes any fine, 

fee, penalty, restitution, and other form of financial 

assessment imposed by the court as part of the sentence 

for the conviction or convictions that are the subject of 

the application, for which payment of restitution takes 

precedence in accordance with chapter 46 of Title 2C 

of the New Jersey Statutes. The person shall submit the 

expungement application to the Superior Court in the 

county in which the most recent conviction for a crime 

or offense was adjudged, which includes a duly verified 

petition as provided in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-7 praying that 

all the person’s convictions, and all records and 

information pertaining thereto, be expunged. The 

petition appended to an application shall comply with 

the requirements set forth in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-1 et seq. 

[(Emphasis added).] 
11 A-0363-22

The "clean slate" statute further provides a person may apply to expunge 

any number of New Jersey convictions for crimes, disorderly persons offenses, 

and/or petty disorderly persons offenses, so long as the person has never been 

convicted of a more serious crime listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(b), which are not 

subject to expungement, e.g., sexual assault, or of certain drug offenses 

described in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c). N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a). Additionally, the 

eligibility bar against those who have previously had a conviction expunged 

does not apply to "clean slate" expungements. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a); N.J.S.A. 

2C:52-14(e). 

Compared to the ordinary expungement pathway, "clean slate" 

expungement has softer eligibility requirements but a harsher waiting period of 

ten years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) (imposing a five-year waiting period for 

ordinary expungement); In re LoBasso, 423 N.J. Super. 475, 491 (App. Div. 

2012) (holding the waiting period under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 "was to increase the 

likelihood that a beneficiary of expungement had permanently turned away from 

criminal activity and will not re-offend"). "Clean slate" petitions are otherwise 

subject to much of the same requirements as ordinary expungement petitions. 

While the "clean slate" statute makes expungement available to those who are 

"not otherwise eligible to present an expungement application pursuant to any 
12 A-0363-22

other section of chapter 52 . . . or other section of law," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a), 

it also states that a "clean slate" petition "shall comply with the requirements set 

forth in" chapter 52, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b). Additionally, while N.J.S.A. 2C:52-

14(e) expressly exempts "clean slate" expungement petitions from the previous 

expungement bar, the other grounds for denial of expungement listed in N.J.S.A. 

2C:52-14 do not contain such exemptions. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(a) to (d). 

III. 

The State essentially accepts the trial court's reading as to the plain 

meaning of the statute––out-of-state convictions are excluded from the phrase 

"most recent conviction"––but argues that it is not the best indicator of the

Legislature's intent in this appeal. In particular, the State argues the trial court's 

interpretation should be rejected because it contradicts the purpose of New 

Jersey's expungement statutes—to give "relief to the reformed offender." See 

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32 (emphasis added). Expungement in view of petitioner's 2017 

conviction, according to the State, "leads to inconsistent and absurd results." 

A.

 Initially, we point out our disagreement with the trial court, and for that 

matter, the State's concession that based on a plain meaning interpretation of the 

"clean slate" statute, "conviction" in the phrase "most recent conviction" is 
13 A-0363-22

limited to New Jersey convictions. Because the "clean slate" statute allows for 

the expungement of disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses, not just 

crimes, "conviction" in the phrase "most recent conviction" means a conviction 

of a crime or disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense. When the 

words "crime," "disorderly persons offense," or "petty disorderly persons 

offense" are used in New Jersey statutes, they ordinarily include out-of-state 

offenses. For example, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a) states that "[a]n offense 

defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction" that is punishable by "a sentence 

of imprisonment of one year or less, but more than 30 days, . . . shall be 

considered in this State to be a disorderly persons offense when a reference is 

made by this code, or by any other statute of this State, to such offense." 

While we appreciate the trial court's worthy analysis, we do not interpret 

"most recent conviction" in the ten-year waiting period provision as creating a 

contradiction to exclude out-of-state convictions as the court maintained. At 

most, the statutory language creates an inconsistency—in one provision, it 

includes out-of-state convictions, in another, it does not. But arguably, there is 

no inconsistency because "conviction" simply means "conviction," in New 

Jersey or elsewhere, and "conviction" in the statute's venue provision is 
14 A-0363-22

impliedly qualified to mean "New Jersey conviction," while it is not so qualified 

in the waiting period provision. 

More importantly, while it is the "general rule that a word or phrase should 

have the same meaning throughout the statute in the absence of a clear indication 

to the contrary," Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 105, 116 (1984), courts should 

not "accord controlling significance to a mechanical rule of statutory 

construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the 

foundation of" a statute, State v. O'Connor, 105 N.J. 399, 408 (1987). The trial 

court's reading of the statute failed to consider the Legislature's mandate that 

chapter 52 "be construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the 

reformed offender," but not "persistent violators of the law or those who 

associate themselves with continuing criminal activity." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. To 

be clear, the trial court's interpretation of the statute is not limited to applicants 

like petitioner, who some might say had only a minor additional brush with the 

law. The court's reading would apply equally and give relief to a petitioner with 

a lengthy record of out-of-state convictions in the ten years preceding an 

expungement petition. Reading N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b) to permit the 

expungement of an unlimited number of convictions of a person who has 

continued to violate the law is plainly contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. Had the 
15 A-0363-22

Legislature intended to exclude a person's out-of-state offenses in defining their 

ability to obtain "clean slate" expungement, it would have made that intention 

more explicit, as it did in making the prior-expungement bar inapplicable to 

"clean slate" expungement. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a); see Perez v. Zagami, LLC, 

218 N.J. 202, 216 (2014) (recognizing the Legislature does not "hide elephants 

in mouseholes" (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 

(2001))). 

In her merits brief, petitioner acknowledges "that the legislative intent of 

the '[c]lean [s]late' statute is to provide rehabilitated individuals the opportunity 

to succeed by removing barriers" presented by past convictions. But the 

question here is not whether petitioner is "a rehabilitated individual who . . . 

deserves an expungement," as she argues, but whether this court should accept 

a construction of the "clean slate" statute that would give relief to not only her, 

but also to individuals who have not reformed and have repeatedly violated the 

law out-of-state since their last New Jersey conviction. Our answer is 

unequivocally no. 

B.

 Assuming arguendo the trial court's and petitioner's interpretations of the

"clean slate" statute were a fair reading of its plain language, which excludes 
16 A-0363-22

consideration of her Virginia conviction in expunging her New Jersey 

convictions, we agree with the State that it would "lead[] to inconsistent and 

absurd results." 

Applying the trial court's plain-meaning interpretation is contrary not only 

to the general purpose of the expungement statutes, but also to the apparent 

design of the "clean slate" statute as an alternative to ordinary expungement, one 

that balances comparatively looser eligibility requirements with a stricter 

waiting period. As this court has noted with respect to an ordinary 

expungement, the intended "function of the original ten-year waiting period"—

which was later amended down to five years, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a)—for ordinary 

expungement "was to increase the likelihood that a beneficiary of expungement 

had permanently turned away from criminal activity and will not re-offend." 

LoBasso, 423 N.J. Super. at 491. 

The Legislature's apparent intention in creating the "clean slate" option 

was to expand eligibility while ensuring, with a harsher waiting period, that only 

the least likely to re-offend could benefit from it. Allowing a continuous 

offender to expunge all their New Jersey convictions simply because their most 

recent crimes occurred out of state would completely undermine this design. It 

would also, as the State argues, disadvantage New Jersey residents over non-
17 A-0363-22

New Jersey residents for no conceivable reason. As a matter of common sense, 

petitioner should not be rewarded through an expungement of her New Jersey 

criminal record for what amounts to a disorderly persons offense because the 

offense took place in another state. Had the disorderly persons offense been 

committed in New Jersey, petitioner could not have had it expunged under the 

"clean slate" statute. This belies logic considering the "clean slate" statute's 

purpose. 

Our courts have faced a similar dilemma when interpreting prior iterations 

of the expungement statutes to avoid an absurd result. In State v. Josselyn, 148 

N.J. Super. 538, 539-40 (Law Div. 1977), the trial court interpreted the phrase 

"no subsequent conviction" in the expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28.

4

 

At that time, the statute stated: 

In all cases wherein a criminal conviction has been

entered against any person, and no subsequent 

conviction has been entered against such person, it shall 

be lawful after the lapse of 10 years from the date of 

such conviction or 10 years after the date such person 

completed his term of imprisonment or was released 

from parole, whichever is later, for the person so 

convicted to present a duly verified petition to the court 

wherein such conviction was entered, setting forth all 

4

 "N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28 . . . was the applicable expungement statute prior to the 

enactment of Title 2C of the penal code in 1979." In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 

117, 122 (App. Div. 2008). 
18 A-0363-22

the facts in the matter and praying for the relief 

provided for in this section. 

[Josselyn, 148 N.J. Super. at 539-40 (quoting N.J.S.A. 

2A:164-28 (1977)).]

The court determined that "no subsequent conviction" included out-ofstate convictions. Id. at 540. The court reasoned that the alternative "would 

enable an individual with a single criminal conviction in this State, but . . . 

subsequent judgments of conviction rendered against him within the ten-year 

period in every other jurisdiction of this nation, to petition the New Jersey 

courts" for expungement, an "absurd" result that ran counter to the statute's 

purpose to give relief to the reformed. Id. at 540-41.5

Likewise, we addressed out-of-state convictions in State v. Ochoa, 314 

N.J. Super. 168, 170-73 (App. Div. 1998). We considered whether out-of-state 

disorderly persons offenses impacted expungement eligibility under an earlier 

version of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3, which then provided: 

Any person convicted of a disorderly persons offense 

or petty disorderly persons offense under the laws of 

this State who has not been convicted of any prior or 

subsequent crime, whether within this State or any 

5

 The Legislature effectively validated the court's conclusion in Josselyn two 

years later when it enacted a new expungement statute making explicit that a 

disqualifying "prior or subsequent crime" encompassed crimes "within this State 

or any other jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) (1979). 
19 A-0363-22

other jurisdiction, or of another three disorderly 

persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, may, after 

the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date of his 

conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completion of 

probation or release from incarceration, whichever is 

later, present a duly verified petition as provided in 

section [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-7 hereof to the Superior Court 

in the county in which the conviction was entered 

praying that such conviction and all records and 

information pertaining thereto be expunged. 

[Id. at 170 (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-

3 (1981)).]

The issue centered on the qualifier phrase, "whether within this State or any 

other jurisdiction," which followed "subsequent crime" but seemed not to apply 

to "or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses." 

Id. at 170-71 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). We concluded "[i]t would be 

manifestly inconsistent with this legislative intent to expunge the New Jersey 

convictions of a habitual petty offender who has committed numerous petty 

offenses in other jurisdictions but no more than three such offenses in New 

Jersey." Id. at 172 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). 

We also rejected the notion that "a literal reading" of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 

supported such a result, reasoning that the statute barred "expungement of 

convictions for disorderly persons and petty disorderly offenses if the petitioner 

has 'another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses,' 
20 A-0363-22

without specifying that such offenses must have been committed within this 

State." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). Notwithstanding that the 

statute expressly referred to convictions for crimes "'whether within this State 

or any other jurisdiction,' without repeating this phrase in regard to other 

convictions for disorderly persons and petty disorderly persons offenses," the 

court declined "to construe this omission as an affirmative expression of a 

legislative intent that convictions of disorderly persons and petty disorderly 

persons in other jurisdictions should be disregarded." Id. at 172-73. The current 

version of the statute now makes clear that disorderly persons convictions 

"whether within this State or any other jurisdiction" are counted in determining 

eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3. 

As in Ochoa, the "clean slate" language does not specify that the 

conviction in question includes out-of-state convictions, but it also does not 

specify "that such offenses must have been committed within this State." 314 

N.J. Super. at 172; cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3. Like in Ochoa, there also is a strong, 

if not conclusive, textual argument that the disputed language nevertheless 

excludes out-of-state convictions. See Goldhagen v. Pasmowitz, 247 N.J. 580, 

600 (2021) ("When 'the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place 

and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded.'" (quoting 
21 A-0363-22

In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable Hous., 214 N.J. 444, 470 

(2013))). Furthermore, similar to Ochoa, that argument must fail given the 

Legislature's clear directive that the expungement statutes be construed to give 

relief to the reformed "but not to create a system whereby persistent violators of 

the law . . . have a regular means of expunging their police and criminal records." 

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. 

Our Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]he Legislature is presumed to 

be 'thoroughly conversant with its own legislation and the judicial construction 

placed thereon.'" Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, 135 N.J. 209, 239-40

(1994) (quoting Quaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 14 (1975)). When our Legislature 

has not specified whether out-of-state convictions are considered regarding the 

availability of expungement, the courts have construed the expungement statutes 

to declare that they do. E.g., Ochoa, 314 N.J. Super. at 172-73; Josselyn, 148 

N.J. Super. at 539-40. We should not assume the Legislature intended we would 

rule any differently here. 

Finally, nothing in the history of the "clean slate" statute's enactment 

supports the trial court's interpretation. Statements from the Governor's Office 

and legislators in support of the enactment are consistent with the purpose of the 

expungement statutes as expressed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. The Governor's 
22 A-0363-22

Office's press release refers to the "clean slate" expungement process as for 

those "who have not committed an offense in ten years." Senate President 

Stephen M. Sweeney, who sponsored the "clean slate" bill, S. 4154 (2018), said 

that "clean slate" was for "former offenders." Assemblywoman Verlina 

Reynolds-Jackson stated the process would "bring us a step closer to social 

equity and social justice for offenders who have not committed a law violation 

in years." We are thus convinced that, given the clear intent of the "clean slate" 

statute, expunging petitioner's New Jersey criminal record would result in an 

absurd result because her Virginia conviction occurred within ten years of her 

petition for expungement. 

Reversed and remanded to the trial court to enter an order vacating its 

expungement order.