NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

MICHELLE G., DE'VON J., Appellants,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, S.J., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 16-0005

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD27146

The Honorable Kristin C. Hoffman, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

David W. Bell, Attorney at Law, Higley

By David W. Bell

Counsel for Appellant Mother

John L. Popilek, PC, Scottsdale

By John L. Popilek

Counsel for Appellant Father

Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix

By Amber E. Pershon

Counsel for Appellee DCS
MICHELLE G., DE'VON J. v. DCS, S.J.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

G O U L D, Judge:

¶1 Michelle G. (“Mother”) and De’von J. (“Father”) appeal from 

the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights. For the 

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mother and Father are the parents of S.J., who was born in 

March 2013. Mother also has three other young children from a prior 

relationship. In June 2013, Father became intoxicated and held a gun to 

Mother’s head while S.J. and the other children were in the home; two of 

S.J.’s older siblings witnessed the incident. Following an additional report 

of neglect a few months later, DCS removed S.J. from Mother’s home. DCS 

filed a dependency petition, and S.J. was found dependent as to both 

parents. 

¶3 In July 2015, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s 

parental rights on the grounds of six, nine and fifteen months’ time-in-care. 

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-533(B)(8)(a), (b), and (c) (2014). The 

petition also moved to terminate Father’s parental rights on the grounds of 

six and nine months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(a) and (b). In 

December 2015, the court held a contested severance hearing, and on 

January 8, 2016, the court issued an order terminating Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights. Both Mother and Father timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

¶4 Both parents argue insufficient evidence supports the 

statutory grounds for severance. Mother also asserts the court erred in its

best interests finding; Father does not contest this finding. 

¶5 A juvenile court’s decision to terminate a parent’s rights must 

be based on clear and convincing evidence. A.R.S. § 8–537(B) (2014); Jesus 

M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, 280, ¶ 4 (App. 2002). “[W]e will 

accept the juvenile court’s findings of fact unless no reasonable evidence 
MICHELLE G., DE'VON J. v. DCS, S.J.

Decision of the Court

3

supports those findings, and we will affirm a severance order unless it is 

clearly erroneous.” Id. As the trier of fact in a termination proceeding, the 

juvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence, observe the 

parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, and make appropriate findings.” 

Id.

I. Mother

a. Statutory Grounds for Severance

¶6 On appeal, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s termination 

based on fifteen months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c). 

¶7 Termination based on fifteen months’ time-in-care requires 

proof that: (1) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen 

months; (2) DCS has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate 

reunification services; (3) the parent is unable to remedy the circumstances 

causing the placement; and (4) a substantial likelihood exists that the parent 

will be unable to exercise proper and effective parental care and control in 

the near future. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c).

¶8 Mother does not dispute that S.J. was in an out-of-home 

placement for fifteen months or that DCS made diligent efforts to provide 

reunification services. Rather, Mother contends insufficient evidence 

supports the juvenile court’s finding she would be unable to safely parent 

S.J. 

¶9 Based on evidence from counseling that Mother has a

tendency to engage in abusive relationships, Mother’s reunification plan 

focused on making her more independent, and thus less likely to rely on 

abusive domestic partners. As a result, DCS provided services to assist 

Mother in obtaining stable housing and employment. DCS gave Mother 

information regarding GED classes and provided transportation to those 

classes. However, Mother attended only two sessions before being 

dropped from the class for poor attendance. Mother testified that she 

understood the importance of obtaining a GED, but she never attempted to 

re-enroll in the classes. 

¶10 During the dependency Mother was frequently unemployed 

and held eight different jobs; at the time of the hearing she had only recently 

started working at a fast-food restaurant. Mother also testified that she had 

difficulty finding her own apartment because of a prior eviction for nonpayment of rent, and that she was currently living with her cousin and her 

cousin’s three children in a three-bedroom apartment. 
MICHELLE G., DE'VON J. v. DCS, S.J.

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¶11 The record also shows that Mother continues to expose S.J. to 

her abusive relationship with Father.1 Mother testified that Father’s violent

behavior, including the incident where he held a gun to her head, made her 

fear for S.J.’s safety. Nonetheless, Mother believes that S.J. would be safe 

with Father. Mother also admitted to having a relationship with Father as 

recent as two months before the hearing. Indeed, she remains on good 

terms with him, and had contact with him as recently as two days before 

the severance hearing. 

¶12 Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision to 

terminate Mother’s rights based on fifteen months’ time-in-care.

b. Best Interests

¶13 Mother also contends insufficient evidence showed that 

severance was in the best interests of S.J. “To prove that the termination of 

parental rights would be in a child’s best interests, [DCS] must present 

credible evidence demonstrating ‘how the child would benefit from a 

severance or be harmed by the continuation of the relationship.’“ Lawrence 

R. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz. 585, 587, ¶ 8 (App. 2008) (quoting

Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 50, ¶ 19 (App. 2004)). 

Evidence showing a child is adoptable is sufficient to satisfy a finding that 

the child would benefit from the termination of parental rights. Maricopa 

County Juv. Action No. JS–501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 352 (App. 1994). In 

addition, the juvenile court may also consider whether the child’s existing 

placement is meeting the child’s needs. Audra T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,

194 Ariz. 376, 377, ¶ 5 (App. 1998).

¶14 During the hearing, the DCS caseworker testified S.J. is 

adoptable. She also testified that the maternal grandmother was meeting 

S.J.’s needs and was willing to adopt her. The caseworker further stated

that S.J. has been with her maternal grandmother since she was six months 

old, that she is with her siblings, and that she is able to maintain family 

relationships in that placement. We find no error.

II. Father

¶15 Father contends insufficient evidence supported his 

severance based on six and nine months’ time-in-care. See A.R.S. § 8-

 

1 This has been a longstanding problem for Mother. For example, in 2008 

Mother’s former boyfriend broke the arm and ribs of her child A.T. when 

she was an infant. Although this led to a DCS investigation, Mother went 

on to have two more children with A.T.’s father. 
MICHELLE G., DE'VON J. v. DCS, S.J.

Decision of the Court

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533(B)(8)(a), (b). Although Father’s parental rights were terminated on 

multiple grounds, if sufficient evidence supports termination on any one 

ground, we need not consider his arguments on any other grounds. Michael 

J. v Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 251, ¶ 27 (2000).

¶16 Section 8-533(B)(8)(b) provides for termination of parental 

rights when: (1) a child under three years of age has been in an out-of-home 

placement for six months; (2) DCS has made diligent efforts to provide 

appropriate reunification services; and (3) the parent has substantially 

neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances causing the 

child to be in an out-of-home placement. In providing reunification 

services, DCS must provide a parent “with the time and opportunity to 

participate in programs designed to help [him] become an effective parent.”

JS–501904, 180 Ariz. at 353.

¶17 Termination based on six months’ time-in-care “focuses on 

the level of the parent’s effort to cure the circumstances rather than the 

parent’s success in actually doing so.” Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec.,

214 Ariz. 326, 329, ¶ 20 (App. 2007). However, “[t]ermination is not limited 

to those who have completely neglected or willfully refused to remedy such 

circumstances.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS–501568, 177 Ariz. 571, 

576 (App. 1994) (construing A.R.S. § 8–533(B)(6)(a), the predecessor to 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(b)) (emphasis in original). Parents are required to 

“make appreciable, good faith efforts to comply with remedial programs 

outlined by [DCS]” to remedy the circumstances that caused the out-ofhome placement. Id.

¶18 Father does not challenge the juvenile court’s findings that S.J.

was under three years of age or that she was in an out-of-home placement 

for a period of six months or longer. Rather, Father asserts DCS did not 

prove he willfully refused or was substantially negligent in addressing the 

circumstances causing S.J. to be dependent; namely, incarceration,2

substance abuse, and domestic violence. 

¶19 The record supports the juvenile court’s determination. 

While it is true Father is no longer incarcerated, the record shows that 

Father substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy his problems 

with alcohol and domestic violence. 

 

2 At the time the petition was filed, Father was incarcerated on an unrelated

charge of misconduct involving weapons. He was released from prison in 

October 2014. 
MICHELLE G., DE'VON J. v. DCS, S.J.

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¶20 Father has not addressed his alcohol problem. Father asserted

he no longer drinks, but refused to submit to any urinalysis tests after his 

release from parole in April 2015. Father testified that he knew he was 

required to complete the tests, but chose not to because he felt it was

“unnecessary,” as he had already completed negative tests while on parole. 

Further, although Father claims he participated in alcohol treatment while 

in prison, he did not provide any documentation to DCS. 

¶21 Father’s unwillingness to address his alcohol problems also 

impeded his ability to remedy his domestic violence issues. Mother 

testified that when Father drank, he often became violent and erratic. 

Father acknowledged that drinking makes it difficult for him to control his 

anger. 

¶22 Although Father ultimately completed counseling, he did not

attend the required domestic violence, anger management, or parenting 

classes. Further, the record shows that Father sent harassing text messages 

to Mother as late as November 2015, and engaged in aggressive and 

intimidating behavior towards DCS employees. 

¶23 The juvenile court also noted concerns regarding Father’s 

participation in his visitations with S.J. DCS closed out Father’s first parent 

aide referral because he failed to contact the parent aide. DCS then referred 

Father for parent aide services a second time, but Father’s first four 

scheduled visits were cancelled because he failed to confirm them. When 

Father did finally participate in a visit, it had to be terminated early due to 

Father’s inappropriate behavior. Specifically, the parent aide reported that 

during this parenting session Father had bloodshot eyes and erratic 

behavior and had tried to intimidate her by insinuating he had a gun. As a 

result of this incident, the court suspended Father’s visitation. 

¶24 Accordingly, we conclude the record supports the juvenile 

court’s termination of Father’s rights. 
MICHELLE G., DE'VON J. v. DCS, S.J.

Decision of the Court

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CONCLUSION

¶25 For the reasons above, we affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to S.J.