UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

COREY WAYNE KILGORE, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 20-5059 

(D.C. No. 4:20-CR-00015-GKF-1) 

(N.D. OK) 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before MORITZ, SEYMOUR and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges 

 Corey Wayne Kilgore entered a conditional guilty plea for violating 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1), Distribution and Receipt of a Visual Depiction of a Minor 

Engaged in Sexually Explicit Conduct. He preserved this appeal from the district court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress. We affirm.

Facts 

On January 7, 2020, the Tulsa Police Cyber Crimes Unit obtained a warrant to 

search Mr. Kilgore’s home in Rogers County. The search warrant was initiated based on 

a tip from Homeland Security Investigations agents who learned that IP addresses 

assigned to Mr. Kilgore had been used to upload two images of child pornography 

*

This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of 

the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

May 21, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

through a social messaging application called Kik. A criminal history check revealed 

that Mr. Kilgore was a registered sex offender, having previously been convicted of a 

crime involving child pornography, and that he had recently moved to an address in 

Rogers County, Oklahoma. The affidavit in support of the search warrant offered the 

foregoing facts as probable cause for issuing the search warrant. 

 The warrant was executed by detectives on January 9, 2020. Detectives knocked 

on Mr. Kilgore’s door and, when he answered, they explained that he was not under 

arrest and that he did not have to talk to them. A consensual interview followed, during 

which Mr. Kilgore ultimately admitted that he had used the Kik application to send and 

receive messages containing images of child pornography.1

 Thereafter, a federal grand 

jury charged Mr. Kilgore with distribution and receipt of child pornography. Mr. 

Kilgore moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained through the search of his 

home, challenging the sufficiency of the affidavit. The district court denied that motion 

and this appeal followed. 

Standard of Review 

When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, the court’s 

factual findings are reviewed for clear error and the evidence is considered in the light 

most favorable to the government. United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th 

Cir. 2008). Determinations relating to the sufficiency of a search warrant are 

1

 The discussion with the detective at Mr. Kilgore’s home was recorded and submitted as 

evidence in support of the government’s Response in Opposition to Motion to Suppress. 

See Government’s Exhibit 1, Rec., vol. I at 42.
3 

conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo. Id. Determinations of probable cause 

by a judge are not reviewed de novo. Such decisions are instead entitled to great 

deference, and the reviewing court “need only ask whether, under the totality of the 

circumstances, the [issuing] judge had a substantial basis for determining that probable 

cause existed.” Id. (quoting United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 

2004)). 

Analysis

 Mr. Kilgore raises two viable issues on appeal.2 First, that the affidavit failed to 

establish probable cause and, second, that the affidavit failed to establish a sufficient 

nexus between the crime and his new address. 

Mr. Kilgore first argues that the affidavit was insufficient to establish probable 

cause because it described the images as “child exploitation” instead of “child 

pornography.”3

 But, as the district court subsequently explained, “in [its] experience” 

the term “known image of child exploitation,” which was used several times in the 

2 Because we conclude it was not error for the district court to determine that the affidavit 

was sufficient to establish probable cause, we do not reach the third issue relating to 

whether, in the absence of probable cause, the good faith exception applies. 

3

 In support of this argument, Mr. Kilgore relies heavily upon United States v. Edwards, 

813 F.3d 953 (10th Cir. 2015). The district court distinguished that case in its order 

denying the motion to suppress by highlighting the fact that Mr. Edwards was not a 

convicted sex offender and that he was alleged to have possessed “child erotica” (which 

includes a separate category of material that is legal to possess). Rec., vol. I at 57-60. 

Here, Mr. Kilgore had both a prior conviction as a sex offender involving child 

pornography (for which he is still registered as a sex offender) and possessed 

photographs depicting “child exploitation.” When considered together, in this case, 

these facts established probable cause for the warrant. 
4 

affidavit for search warrant, referred to the “government’s files of child porn that are 

maintained by law-enforcement authorities.” Rec., vol. II at 9. The district court 

simply noted that the term “child exploitation” has a specific meaning in the context of 

child pornography. 

For the purposes of issuing a search warrant, a finding of probable cause relates to 

the degree of suspicion created by the government’s evidence. All that was required was 

a substantial basis for concluding there was a “fair probability” that evidence of criminal 

activity would be found in Mr. Kilgore’s home. United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 

1102, 1108 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). “Courts should not invalidate a warrant 

by interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.” 

Id. at 1109 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965). It was not 

clear error for the district court to find that the terms “child exploitation” and “child 

pornography” are used interchangeably by law enforcement in the context of child 

pornography. 

The affidavit in support of the search warrant contained sufficient information 

linking Mr. Kilgore to the receipt and distribution of child pornography. The affidavit 

specified that IP addresses assigned to Mr. Kilgore’s had been linked to images of child 

 
5 

exploitation, identified him as a convicted sex offender (child pornography),4 and stated 

that he was currently registered at a new address in Rogers County which was the subject 

of the warrant. When considered together these facts established probable cause for the 

warrant. 

With respect to whether the affidavit established a sufficient nexus between the 

crime and the new address, Mr. Kilgore argues that the images were uploaded when he 

lived at a previous address and that there was no nexus between the crime and his current 

address, which was the target of the warrant. In response to this, the district court cited 

United States v. Potts, 586 F.3d 823, 829 (10th Cir. 2009), and noted there is no 

requirement that the affidavit contain “direct evidence that contraband is in the place to 

be searched.” Rec., vol. I at 52. The court further explained that determining whether a 

sufficient nexus exists between suspected criminal activity and a residence depends on 

the facts, including the type of crime, the opportunity to conceal evidence, the type of 

evidence, and reasonable inferences about where a person would likely keep that 

evidence. Id. The court found that “the affidavit provided a sufficient nexus between 

the defendant’s suspected criminal activity and his new address,” noting that “‘images of 

child pornography are likely to be hoarded by persons interested in those materials in the 

privacy of their homes.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Haymond, 672 F.3d 948, 959 

4 Mr. Kilgore contends the affidavit lacked information which would establish whether 

the prior conviction was stale. But our caselaw counters the argument that an undated 

conviction for possession of child pornography cannot be used to support a search 

warrant for child pornography. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1205-06 

(10th Cir. 2008) (citing cases). 
6 

(10th Cir. 2012); see also Perrine, 518 F.3d at 1206. Based on the foregoing, the district 

court reasonably concluded that because Mr. Kilgore possessed child pornography on his 

personal computer at his previous residence, it was likely he would have maintained that 

material on his personal computer when he moved. Thus, the affidavit provided a 

sufficient nexus between Mr. Kilgore’s suspected criminal activity and his new residence. 

Viewing the totality of the evidence in a light most favorable to the government, 

we are not persuaded that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress. 

Accordingly, we affirm. 

 Entered for the Court 

 Stephanie K. Seymour 

 Circuit Judge