alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Musson and others, Appellants, vs. Industrial Commission and another, Respondents.

*December 6, 1945*—

January *8, 1946.*

*194For the appellants there was a brief by *La France & Edwards,*attorneys, and *Alfred E. La France*of counsel, all of Racine, and oral argument by *Mr. La France.*

For the respondent Industrial Commission there was a brief by the *Attorney General*and *Mortimer Levitan,*assistant attorney general, and oral argument by *Mr. Levitan.*

Rosenberry, C. J.

The sole question for decision is, Was the claimant at the time of the accident in question, performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment ? The court and the commission held that he was. While it is true that the employers made no order requiring the claimant to remain upon the premises during the night, the circumstances were such as to make any other course on his part impractical. The camp was situated four and one-half miles from the nearest place where lodging could be obtained. Claimant had no means of transportation and would have been obliged to walk to Abbotsford in the evening and return from Abbotsford in the morning. It is considere^ that it was fairly within the contemplation of the parties that, under the facts and circumstances of the case, the claimant would sleep in the quarters provided for him by the employers. Food was *195furnished and served to the employees at the camp site, and while they were not prohibited from boarding elsewhere, it was expected that they would, and as a matter of fact they did, board there.

It is argued that the claimant was not compelled to sleep at the camp. That is true. While the circumstances in the case of *Holt L. Co.v. Industrial Comm.*(1919) 168 Wis. 381, 170 N. W. 366, were somewhat more compelling than the circumstances in this case, in other respects the facts were substantially the same.

The appellants contend that this case is ruled in their favor by *Gibbs Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm.*(1943) 243 Wis. 375, 10 N. W. (2d) 130. In that case a traveling salesman was injured while lodging in a tourist camp. The court pointed out that the applicant had a complete and unrestricted choice of sleeping facilities. In that case the claimant had means of transportation at hand and the employer in no way assumed responsibility for providing sleeping quarters. Where he slept was a matter of his own choosing. In this case, as in the *Holt L. Co. Case, supra,*while there was no compulsion in the sense of there being a contract to that effect, it was contemplated by both parties that the employee sleep upon the premises. As a practical matter under the circumstances of this case, as under the circumstances of the *Holt L. Co. Case,*no other choice was open to him.

Under the principles announced in the *Holt L. Co. Case, supra,*in *Gibbs Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm., supra,*and in *State Young Men’s C. Asso. v. Industrial Comm.*(1940) 235 Wis. 161, 292 N. W. 324, it is considered that the court and the commission correctly held that at the time he sustained his injuries the claimant was performing services growing out of and incidental to his employment.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          APR-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-30-2000
<CASH>                                            1946
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                  1946
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    1946
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                         11935
<OTHER-SE>                                      (9989)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      1946
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  5624
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (5624)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (5624)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
#### Will of Paulson: Jones, Appellant, vs. First National Bank & Trust Company of Racine, Respondent.

*January 19*

February *15, 1949.*

*259For the appellant there was a brief by *Beck & DuRocher*of Racine, and oral argument by *Howard J. DuRocher.*

*260For the respondent there was a brief by *Benson, Butchart, Haley & Benson*of Racine, and oral argument by *Donald A. Butchart.*

Fairchild, J.

The prenuptial agreement which the parties made was a valid and binding contract. *Will of Paulson,*252 Wis. 161, 31 N. W. (2d) 182. In view of the later provisions for the widow in the will it is necessary to determine the intent of the parties when they made the prenuptial contract. The provisions of the agreement, itself, show the intent very clearly. It provided in part that the widow would accept it . . in lieu, bargain and satisfaction of and for all homestead, dower and thirds at the common law, or by force of any statute, custom or otherwise which she, said Martha Jones, could or might under any circumstances whatever otherwise have claimed or have been entitled to or out of all ór any of the messuages, lands, tenements and hereditaments whatsoever of which he, said Paul Paul-son, now is or may, during said coverture, be seized for any estate or inheritance, or for other dowable estate or interest whatsoever.” It is evident that the widow expressly gave up any right to the statutory allowance.

Appellant admits the validity of the contract but contends that by the provision made in the will for Martha Paulson, she was thereby given the right to elect between that and the provision made for her by law. His reasoning is that because testator mentioned the prenuptial agreement in the will and said that “nevertheless, it is my request that she share in my estate,” etc., he waived the agreement.

A valid antenuptial agreement is not affected by a party thereto giving by a last will something out of his estate to the other party to the agreement. The agreement continues effective, and a bequest such as made in this instance does nothing more than favor the devisee to the extent provided in the will. *Bibelhausen v. Bibelhausen,*159 Wis. 365, 150 *261N. W. 516; *Wellington v. Rugg,*243 Mass. 30, 136 N. E. 831; 2 Black, Rescission and Cancellation (2d ed.), p. 984, sec. 368.

It seems obvious that the provision in the will cannot destroy the prenuptial agreement. Its effect is just that intended by the testator: To give his widow something in his will regardless of the fact that she had given up all right to it. Elaving no right to the statutory allowance she can make no claim to it. The doctrine of election originates in inconsistent or alternative gifts with the intention either expressed or implied that one shall be the substitute for the other. 1 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (4th ed.), p. 877, sec. 461; 4 Page, Wills (lifetime ed.), p. 2, sec. 1346.

*By the Court.*— Order affirmed.
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 202 (Friday, October 18, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 83826]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-24128]


========================================================================
Notices
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains documents other than rules 
or proposed rules that are applicable to the public. Notices of hearings 
and investigations, committee meetings, agency decisions and rulings, 
delegations of authority, filing of petitions and applications and agency 
statements of organization and functions are examples of documents 
appearing in this section.

========================================================================


Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / 
Notices

[[Page 83826]]



UNITED STATES AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION


Public Quarterly Meeting of the Board of Directors

AGENCY: United States African Development Foundation.

ACTION: Notice of meeting.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. African Development Foundation (USADF) will hold its 
quarterly meeting of the Board of Directors to discuss the agency's 
programs and administration. This meeting will occur at the USADF 
office.

DATES: The meeting date is Tuesday, October 29, 2024, 9 a.m. to 12:00 
noon.

ADDRESSES: The meeting location is USADF, 1400 I St. NW, Suite 1000, 
Washington, DC 20005.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kerline Perry, (202) 233-8805.

(Authority: Pub. L. 96-533; 22 U.S.C. 290h)

    Dated: October 10, 2024.
Wendy Carver,
Business Manager.
[FR Doc. 2024-24128 Filed 10-17-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6117-01-P
# Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Narcotics Traffickers Centered in Colombia

                    On October 21, 1995, by Executive Order 12978, the President declared a national emergency pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701*et seq.*) to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by the actions of significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia and the extreme level of violence, corruption, and harm such actions cause in the United States and abroad.                

The actions of significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States and cause an extreme level of violence, corruption, and harm in the United States and abroad. For this reason, the national emergency declared in Executive Order 12978 of October 21, 1995, must continue in effect beyond October 21, 2024. Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing for 1 year the national emergency with respect to significant narcotics traffickers centered in Colombia declared in Executive Order 12978.

                    This notice shall be published in the                     *Federal Register*                     and transmitted to the Congress.                

[FR Doc. 2024-23965

Billing code 3395-F4-P
Exhibit 31.1

Certification by the Chief Executive Officer

pursuant to Rule 13a-14(a) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as

adopted pursuant to Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

I, James C. Mullen, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on
Form 10-Q of Patheon Inc.;

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects
the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as
defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

(a) Designed such disclosure controls and
procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those
entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

(b) [Paragraph omitted in accordance with Exchange Act
Rule 13a-14(a)];

(c) Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(d) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants
fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial
reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

(a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants
ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date:
September 9, 2011



|                             
|-----------------------------
|/s/ James C. Mullen          
|James C. Mullen              
|Chief Executive Officer      
|(Principal Executive Officer)
#### Wilcox, Respondent, vs. Pethke and another, Appellants.

*September 16*

October *12, 1948.*

For the appellants there was a brief by *Lehner & Lehner, Adolph P. Lehner,*and *Howard N. Lehner,*all of Oconto Falls, and *Byrne, Bubolz & Spanagel*of Appleton,' and oral argument by *Howard N. Lehner.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *William F. Morris,*and oral argument by *Albert S. Vanden Heuvil,*both of West De Pere. .

Rosenberry, C. J.

The principal contention of the defendants upon this appeal is that the evidence does not sustain the findings of the jury, which it is claimed are contrary to the *370physical facts. The defendants moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. The court said:

> “I think the inquiry goes to the position of the cars at the time of the collision as distinguished from the position of the cars at and immediately before the collision, which would involve the question of control and management and lookout of the drivers,” and denied the motion.

We have carefully examined the record and arguments of counsel and no useful purpose would be served by setting out a statement of facts. It is considered that the court was clearly right at the close of all the evidence in submitting the case to the jury and in entering judgment on the verdict.

The defendants also contend that the apportionment of negligence by the jury is grossly disproportionate and contrary to the great weight of the credible evidence. We find nothing in the record to support this contention which is based substantially upon the same factual basis as that upon which the defendants claimed that the evidence did not sustain the finding-of the jury. The finding of the jury being sustained as to the negligence of the parties, the contention of the defendants that the apportionment of the negligence is disproportionate also fails.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
Exhibit
32.1
 
 
 CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO
 SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 0F 2002
 
 In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Mountain West Business Solutions, Inc.
(the Company") amendment number 1 on Form 10-QSB/A for the period
ended herein as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
"Report"), I. Matthew Milonas, Chief Executive and Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to
ss.906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, t hat:
 
 (1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 
 (2) The
information contained in the Report fully presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations or the Company.
 
 
 Date:June 12,
      2008
              By:
              /s/Matthew
      MilonasMatthew
      Milonas
                Chief
      Executive Officer
                Chief
      Financial Officer
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-7610

In Re: JOHN WESLEY MILLS,

Petitioner.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus. (CR-96-986)

Submitted: February 10, 2000 Decided: February 17, 2000

Before WIDENER and NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.

John Wesley Mills, Petitioner Pro Se.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

John Wesley Mills has filed a petition for a writ of mandamus

asking this court to compel the district court to expedite its consideration of the Government’s motion for reduction of sentence

pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b). The granting of a writ of

mandamus is a drastic remedy to be used in extraordinary circumstances. See In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 1987). A

petitioner must show that he has a clear right to the relief

sought, that the respondent has a clear duty to perform the act

requested by petitioner, and that there is no other adequate remedy

available. See In re First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 860 F.2d 135,

138 (4th Cir. 1988). Mills has failed to make the requisite

showing for such extraordinary relief. Our review of the district

court docket sheet discloses that there has been no undue delay in

considering the Government’s motion. Although we grant Mills’

motion to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny his petition for writ

of mandamus. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
From: William Charmley/AA/USEPA/US

To: "Achanta, Chandana L." <Ch andana_L._Achanta@ omb.eop.gov>

Cc: james.tamm@dot.gov, rebecca.yoon@dot.g ov, Robin Moran/AA/USEPA/US@EPA, Ken

Davidson/DC/USEPA/US@EPA, Maureen Delaney/DC/USEPA/US@EPA,

Steve.Wood@dot.gov, Kathryn Sargeant/AA/USEPA/US@EPA

Date: 03/31/2010 10:14 AM

Subject

: Re: Summary of interagency working comments on draft rule under EO 12866

Chandana -

We will have fixed the typo identified on page 8/9 of the EPA RIA

Regarding the request for ROCIS - we will not be changing the format of the data for ROCIS.

The EPA data format is consistent with the submission for the NPRM, as well as for all previous

EPA mobile source rules. The EPA standards do not end in MY2016, they continue on into the

future until changed. This is consistent with all of our other mobile source rules and our data

format put into ROCIS for those previous rules, which follows OMB's written guidance for putting

this data into an annualized format.

Thanks

Bill

From: "Achanta, Chandana L." <Ch andana_L._Achanta@ omb.eop.gov>

To: William Charmley/AA/USEPA/US@EPA, Robin Moran/AA/USEPA/US@EPA,

<rebecca.yoon@dot.gov>, <james.tamm@dot.gov>

Date: 03/30/2010 09:05 PM

Subject

: Summary of interagency working comments on draft rule under EO 12866

Please find attached a summary of interagency working comments received under draft joint

rule under EO 12866 review. They are for your consideration and subject to further policy

review.

Thanks. [attachment "Summary of Interagency Working Comments on draft rule under EO

12866.pdf" deleted by Tad Wysor/AA/USEPA/US]
# L_2012198DE.01001901.xml

| 25.7.2012 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 198/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

25.7.2012

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 198/19

---

Berichtigung des Beschlusses EZB/2012/3 der Europäischen Zentralbank über die Notenbankfähigkeit der von der griechischen Regierung begebenen oder in vollem Umfang garantierten marktfähigen Schuldtitel im Rahmen des Angebots der Hellenischen Republik zum Schuldentausch

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 77 vom 16. März 2012
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 77 vom 16. März 2012

In der Inhaltsübersicht auf der Titelseite und im Titel auf Seite 19:

anstatt:

muss es heißen:

---
#### UNDERWOOD v. STATE.

No. 16244.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Nov. 1, 1933.

E. T. Adams, of Dallas, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The offense is arson; the punishment, confinement in the state penitentiary for 6 years.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. No defect either in the indictment or procedure ha3 been pointed out or has been perceived. No question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judgesi of the Court of Criminal Appeals and ap-, proved by the court.