IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL

IN RE INTEREST OF HAYDEN S. ET AL.

NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).

IN RE INTEREST OF HAYDEN S. ET AL.,

CHILDREN UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE.

STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE,

V.

LATOSHA S., APPELLANT.

Filed September 17, 2013. No. A-13-143.

Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: ELIZABETH CRNKOVICH, 

Judge. Affirmed.

Mary Pat Coe for appellant.

Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Jennifer C. Clark for appellee.

INBODY, Chief Judge, and IRWIN and RIEDMANN, Judges.

IRWIN, Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Latosha S. appeals from the order of the juvenile court which terminated her parental 

rights to her five children: Hayden S., Krystopher S., Krysteena S., Mariannah S., and Fabienne 

S. On appeal, Latosha challenges the juvenile court’s finding that her parental rights should be 

terminated pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(2) and (6) (Cum. Supp. 2012) and the court’s 

finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interests. Upon our de novo 

review of the record, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to warrant termination 

of Latosha’s parental rights. As such, we affirm the order of the juvenile court terminating 

Latosha’s parental rights to her five children.

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II. BACKGROUND

These proceedings involve five children: Hayden, born in October 2003; Krystopher, 

born in July 2006; Krysteena, born in July 2006; Mariannah, born in October 2007; and 

Fabienne, born in November 2009. Latosha is the biological mother of all five children. The 

children’s biological fathers are not parties to this appeal, and thus, their participation in this case 

will not be discussed further.

The current juvenile court proceedings were initiated in August 2011. However, this is 

not the first time that Latosha and her children have been involved with the juvenile court 

system. Latosha’s history with the juvenile court is relevant to the current proceedings because 

such history provides insight into her ability to independently parent her children. As a result, we 

briefly recount that history here.

In December 2008, Latosha’s four oldest children were removed from her home after 

Latosha failed to follow through with voluntary services provided to her by the Department of 

Health and Human Services (the Department). The services provided by the Department were 

designed to assist Latosha in meeting her children’s medical needs. After the children’s removal, 

the Department assisted Latosha with obtaining appropriate housing, seeking employment, and 

learning to utilize community resources. Latosha did not demonstrate consistent cooperation with 

the Department’s efforts, nor did she always appear motivated to achieve reunification with her 

children. The children remained in an out-of-home placement until August 2010.

After the children were returned to Latosha’s home, she continued to be inconsistent in 

her cooperation and participation with the Department’s efforts to assist her in parenting the 

children. Beginning in July 2011, the Department received multiple reports that Latosha was 

neglecting the children.

Ultimately, on August 20, 2011, law enforcement officers were dispatched to Latosha’s 

home to check on the welfare of the children. The officers removed the children from Latosha’s 

care after viewing the conditions of her home. The officers reported that there was no running 

water in the home, that there were no beds or food for the children, and that the home was 

extremely dirty. The officers also reported that Latosha told them that she had discontinued 

providing necessary medication to her youngest child, Fabienne, who had previously been 

diagnosed with sickle cell anemia.

Immediately after the children’s removal from Latosha’s care, the State filed a petition 

alleging the children were within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 2008), 

because Latosha’s home was in a “filthy and unwholesome condition” and, as such, Latosha had 

failed to provide the children with safe, stable, and appropriate housing which put the children at 

risk for harm. This petition is the basis for the current juvenile court proceedings.

After the petition was filed, the juvenile court entered an order placing the children in the 

immediate custody of the Department. The children have remained in the custody of the 

Department and placed outside of Latosha’s home since their removal in August 2011.

On October 26, 2011, Latosha admitted to the allegations in the petition which alleged 

that, at the time of the children’s removal, her home was in a “filthy and unwholesome 

condition” and that this placed her children at risk for harm. As a result of Latosha’s admissions, 

the children were adjudicated to be within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).

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After the children were adjudicated to be within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a), the 

juvenile court held hearings in December 2011 and June 2012 to review the status of the case. At 

these hearings, the juvenile court ordered Latosha to participate in a rehabilitation plan designed 

to reunify her with her children. Specifically, the juvenile court ordered Latosha to submit to a 

psychiatric and a psychological evaluation; to participate in individual therapy and follow the 

recommendations of her mental health care providers; to participate in family support services; 

to investigate her eligibility for community resources; and to submit to random drug testing. In 

addition, Latosha was given the opportunity to have regular visitation with her children.

On August 14, 2012, the State filed a motion for termination of Latosha’s parental rights 

to all five of her children. In the motion, the State alleged that termination was warranted 

pursuant to § 43-292(2), because Latosha had substantially and continuously or repeatedly 

neglected and refused to give her children necessary parental care and protection, and 

§ 43-292(6), because reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the family failed to correct the 

conditions that led to the determination that the children were within the meaning of 

§ 43-247(3)(a). In addition, the State alleged that termination of Latosha’s parental rights was in 

the children’s best interests.

In January 2013, a hearing was held on the State’s motion for termination of parental 

rights. While we have reviewed the evidence presented at the hearing in its entirety, we do not 

set forth the specifics of the testimony and exhibits here. Instead, we will set forth more specific 

facts as presented at the hearing as necessary in our analysis below. We do note that Latosha did 

not attend the termination hearing. The transcript of the proceedings indicates that neither the 

Department workers nor Latosha’s attorney knew Latosha’s whereabouts or how to contact her. 

The State did publish notice of the termination hearing in an effort to make Latosha aware of the 

proceedings.

After the termination hearing, the juvenile court entered an order finding that the State 

proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination of Latosha’s parental 

rights existed under § 43-292(2) and (6) and that termination of her parental rights was in the 

children’s best interests. The court then ordered that Latosha’s parental rights to Hayden, 

Krystopher, Krysteena, Mariannah, and Fabienne be terminated.

Latosha appeals from the juvenile court’s order.

III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Latosha challenges the juvenile court’s finding that her parental rights should 

be terminated pursuant to § 43-292(2) and (6) and the court’s finding that termination of her 

parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

IV. ANALYSIS

1. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Juvenile cases are reviewed de novo on the record, and an appellate court is required to

reach a conclusion independent of the juvenile court’s findings. In re Interest of Jagger L., 270 

Neb. 828, 708 N.W.2d 802 (2006). When the evidence is in conflict, however, an appellate court 

may give weight to the fact that the lower court observed the witnesses and accepted one version 

of the facts over the other. Id.

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For a juvenile court to terminate parental rights under § 43-292, it must find that one or 

more of the statutory grounds listed in this section have been satisfied and that termination is in 

the child’s best interests. See In re Interest of Jagger L., supra. The State must prove these facts 

by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Clear and convincing evidence is that amount of evidence 

which produces in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of the fact to be 

proven. Id.

2. STATUTORY GROUNDS

Latosha assigns as error the juvenile court’s finding that the State presented clear and 

convincing evidence to prove the statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights. 

Specifically, she challenges the juvenile court’s determination that termination of her parental 

rights was warranted pursuant to § 43-292(2) and (6). Upon our de novo review of the record, we 

find that the State presented clear and convincing evidence to prove that termination was 

warranted pursuant to § 43-292(6). As such, we need not specifically address the juvenile court’s 

determination as to § 43-292(2).

Section 43-292(6) provides that a court may terminate parental rights when, “[f]ollowing 

a determination that the juvenile is one as described in [§ 43-247(3)(a)], reasonable efforts to 

preserve and reunify the family . . . have failed to correct the conditions leading to the 

determination.”

On October 26, 2011, the juvenile court adjudicated all five children to be within the 

meaning of § 43-247(3)(a), after Latosha admitted that her home was in a “filthy and 

unwholesome condition” and that her children were at risk for harm. Pursuant to Latosha’s 

admissions, the juvenile court ordered her to participate in a rehabilitation plan which was 

designed to correct the conditions leading to the adjudication. Throughout the course of the 

juvenile court proceedings, Latosha was ordered to submit to a psychiatric and a psychological 

evaluation; to participate in individual therapy and follow the recommendations of her mental 

health care providers; to participate in family support services; to investigate her eligibility for 

community resources; to submit to random drug testing; and to participate in visitation with her 

children.

The evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that Latosha has not 

consistently or completely abided by any of the court’s rehabilitation orders. As a result, in the 

approximately 17 months between the children’s adjudication and the time of the termination 

hearing, Latosha failed to make any significant progress toward reunification.

(a) Mental Health Evaluations 

and Individual Therapy

The juvenile court ordered Latosha to address her mental health needs. Specifically, the 

court ordered Latosha to submit to a psychological and a psychiatric evaluation, to participate in 

individual therapy, and to follow any other recommendations of her mental health care providers. 

Latosha did submit to a psychological and a psychiatric evaluation. However, she did not attend 

individual therapy, nor did she follow through with any other recommendations related to her 

mental health. As a result, she did not address any of her mental health needs.

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At the termination hearing, Gloria LaCrosse, the family’s caseworker during a majority 

of the juvenile court proceedings, testified that she referred Latosha to a therapist who was 

willing to come to Latosha’s home to conduct the therapeutic sessions. However, Latosha 

refused to cooperate with this referral and did not set up any appointments with the therapist. The 

therapist made several attempts to contact Latosha, but Latosha never returned her telephone 

calls.

Other evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that Latosha’s family 

partner, Deborah Faulkner, attempted to assist Latosha in setting up and attending therapy 

sessions. Faulkner made an appointment for Latosha, and Latosha indicated that she made 

arrangements with her mother to take her to the appointment, but Latosha did not attend the 

appointment. Subsequently, the doctor’s office declined to provide Latosha any services because 

of her failure to attend appointments.

(b) Family Support Services

The juvenile court ordered Latosha to participate in family support services, which were 

designed to assist Latosha with obtaining housing and employment, addressing her mental health 

issues, and improving her parenting skills. Latosha minimally participated with the family 

support services provided to her and consistently failed to stay in contact with her assigned 

family partner, Faulkner.

Almost immediately after the children were removed from Latosha’s home, LaCrosse 

established family support services for Latosha. Two family support workers were assigned to 

assist Latosha. Latosha refused to work with either worker. Ultimately, a third worker, Faulkner, 

was assigned to work with Latosha. Faulkner was able to meet with Latosha on a few occasions, 

but, at the termination hearing, Faulkner testified that Latosha did not make progress toward 

achieving any of her identified goals and that Latosha was simply not ever interested in 

cooperating.

Latosha never obtained consistent, independent housing. During the juvenile court 

proceedings, Latosha was evicted from multiple residences for failing to pay rent and for failing 

to keep the homes in good condition. Latosha sometimes lived with friends or with her mother.

Latosha did not obtain employment. Latosha reported to Faulkner that she had a letter 

from a doctor stating that she was unable to work. However, Latosha did not ever produce this 

letter or verify that she was medically unable to obtain employment. Latosha at one time reported 

that she was working for some type of computer design business, but she did not provide 

verification of this employment. A further investigation of the business did not produce any 

verification that Latosha worked for the business or that the business even existed.

As we discussed more thoroughly above, Latosha did not make any progress toward her 

mental health treatment in spite of Faulkner’s efforts to assist Latosha with making and keeping 

appointments.

Latosha did not make any significant improvements in her parenting skills because 

Latosha failed to consistently attend visits with her children where such skills could be 

addressed.

Latosha also failed to stay in contact with Faulkner. Faulkner testified that she worked 

very hard to maintain contact with Latosha. In fact, Faulkner indicated that she would have to 

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“hunt” for Latosha by driving to various residences where Latosha had previously stayed and by 

speaking with Latosha’s friends and family. Eventually, Faulkner had to terminate her services 

with Latosha in July 2012 because, despite her efforts, she was unable to locate Latosha and 

Latosha had stopped contacting her.

(c) Investigation of Eligibility 

for Community Resources

The juvenile court ordered Latosha to investigate her eligibility for housing and 

employment assistance through an organization called Community Alliance. Latosha simply 

refused to even contact Community Alliance.

(d) Random Drug Testing

In June 2012, the juvenile court ordered Latosha to submit to random drug testing. 

Latosha did not submit to any drug tests. LaCrosse testified that she was not even able to 

establish any type of drug testing for Latosha because she did not know how to contact Latosha 

any time after June 2012.

(e) Visitation

The juvenile court provided Latosha with the opportunity to participate in supervised 

visitation with her children. During the course of the juvenile court proceedings, Latosha’s 

participation in visitation was inconsistent and sporadic.

In September 2011, very soon after the children were removed from Latosha’s home, 

LaCrosse established a regular visitation schedule between Latosha and the children. Visitations 

were to be conducted through Beneficial Behavioral Health, an agency which provided workers 

to monitor visits between parents and their children. Initially, Latosha attended all of the visits 

offered to her and appropriately parented the children during these visits. She provided the 

children with food and activities and exhibited attention and affection toward each child.

However, by the end of October 2011, Latosha’s participation in visits began to dwindle. 

During one visit, Latosha did not interact much with any of the children and appeared to fall 

asleep. Latosha then asked the visitation worker if it would be possible to decrease the duration 

of the visits. By November 2011, Latosha stopped attending visitation sessions. She did not stay 

in contact with her visitation workers, and when she did contact them, she provided various 

excuses for why she could not attend a visit.

In November 2011, Beneficial Behavioral Health terminated its services with Latosha 

because visitation workers were struggling to stay in contact with Latosha and because Latosha 

was not consistently attending visits. LaCrosse then engaged another visitation agency, Capstone 

Behavioral Health, to facilitate the visitation sessions. Latosha continued to be inconsistent in her 

attendance at visitation sessions. In addition, when she did attend, her behavior during visitation 

sessions was often inappropriate. One visit was terminated early because the visitation worker 

believed that Latosha was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. And, this was not the only 

time that a visitation worker expressed concern about Latosha being under the influence or 

exhibiting “odd” behaviors during visits. During another visit, Latosha had a verbal altercation 

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with a visitation worker and “banned” that worker from her home. Soon after this visit, Capstone 

Behavioral Health terminated its services with Latosha.

In March 2012, Beneficial Behavioral Health agreed to facilitate visits between Latosha 

and her children again. The agency established such visitation on a call-and-confirm status. As a 

result, Latosha had to confirm that she was going to attend a visit in advance of the visit 

occurring. If Latosha did not confirm, the visit would not be held. Latosha did attend a few 

visitation sessions between March and June 2012. However, her attendance continued to be 

sporadic, and although she did demonstrate love for her children, she also continued to 

demonstrate inappropriate behaviors during the visitation sessions she did attend. Latosha 

struggled to balance her time between all of her children and often gave her youngest child, 

Fabienne, a lot of attention while ignoring the other children.

Latosha completely stopped attending visitation sessions with her children in June 2012.

She has not seen any of her children since that time.

Taken together, the evidence presented at the termination hearing revealed that Latosha 

had not made any progress toward reunification with her children from the time of their removal 

in August 2011 to the time of the termination hearing in January 2013. She did not make any 

genuine progress toward addressing her mental health needs because she failed to attend 

individual therapy. She did not cooperate with her family support worker and, as a result, did not 

make any progress toward obtaining and maintaining housing and employment or toward 

improving her parenting skills. She refused to apply for assistance from a community 

organization, and she did not submit to any drug tests because she would never stay in contact 

with the workers assigned to her case. Perhaps most significant, Latosha was not consistent in 

her attendance at visitation with her children. In fact, by the time of the termination hearing, 

Latosha had not had a visit with her children in over 6 months.

Based on our review of the record, we find that Latosha did not make significant progress 

toward reunification with her children despite the efforts of the Department and the juvenile 

court. As such, we affirm the decision of the juvenile court which determined that termination of 

Latosha’s parental rights was warranted pursuant to § 43-292(6). Given this finding, we do not 

address the sufficiency of the evidence demonstrating that termination was also appropriate 

pursuant to § 43-292(2). Latosha’s assertions regarding the sufficiency of the statutory authority 

to support termination of her parental rights is without merit.

3. CHILDREN’S BEST INTERESTS

Latosha also assigns as error the juvenile court’s finding that termination of her parental 

rights is in the children’s best interests. Specifically, Latosha argues that she has a strong bond 

with her children and that if her parental rights are terminated, “it would leave her children with 

a sense of abandonment.” Brief for appellant at 19. Upon our de novo review of the record, we 

affirm the determination of the juvenile court that termination of Latosha’s parental rights is in 

the children’s best interests. Latosha failed to make significant progress toward reunification 

with her children despite the efforts of the Department and the juvenile court. Latosha continues 

to be unable or unwilling to provide stability for her children, and the children need and deserve 

permanency in their lives.

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When a parent is unable or unwilling to rehabilitate himself or herself within a reasonable 

period of time, the child’s best interests require termination of parental rights. In re Interest of 

Walter W., 274 Neb. 859, 744 N.W.2d 55 (2008). Children cannot, and should not, be suspended 

in foster care or be made to await uncertain parental maturity. Id.

As we discussed more thoroughly above, Latosha has failed to make any significant 

progress toward reunification with her children despite the length of time the children have been 

out of her home. The children were removed from Latosha’s care in August 2011. The 

termination hearing was held in January 2013. During the 17 months that the children were in an 

out-of-home placement, Latosha did not address her mental health needs by attending therapy, 

did not cooperate with the efforts of her family partner, did not obtain safe and stable housing, 

did not obtain employment, did not attempt to obtain any community resources, did not submit to 

drug testing, and did not consistently attend visitation with her children. In fact, Latosha stopped 

attending visitation with the children in June 2012 and, by the time of the termination hearing, 

had not seen her children in over 6 months. This evidence reveals that Latosha was no closer to 

reunification with her children in January 2013, than she was in August 2011.

Moreover, this is not the first time that Latosha and the children have been involved with 

the juvenile court, nor is it the first time that the children have been placed outside of Latosha’s 

home. At the termination hearing, LaCrosse testified, “Those five children [have] been out of 

home more months than they’ve been in home over the course of the last four and a half years.” 

LaCrosse also testified that it is in the children’s best interests to “have a secure and stable home 

where they know they will be cared for until they reach majority.”

Upon our review of the record, we agree with LaCrosse. Latosha has been provided with 

reasonable time to comply with the rehabilitation plan. She has shown very little, if any, 

willingness to comply with the court’s orders or to cooperate with all of the efforts of her service 

providers. In addition, she has demonstrated a lack of interest in being reunited with her children. 

She stopped attending visitation with them in June 2012, and at this same time, she stopped 

having any contact with LaCrosse or any other service provider. Latosha did not even attend the 

termination hearing to explain why termination was not appropriate. Contrary to Latosha’s 

assertions in her brief to this court, Latosha had effectively “abandoned” her children long before 

the juvenile court ordered termination of her parental rights.

The children need stability in their lives and parental figures upon whom they can 

depend. Latosha is simply unable to provide the stability that the children require. We affirm the 

juvenile court’s order which found that termination of Latosha’s parental rights is in the 

children’s best interests.

V. CONCLUSION

Upon our de novo review of the record, we find that the State presented sufficient 

evidence to warrant termination of Latosha’s parental rights. As such, we affirm the order of the 

juvenile court terminating her parental rights to Hayden, Krystopher, Krysteena, Mariannah, and 

Fabienne.

AFFIRMED.

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