suffer unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or (b) be placed in a 

situation where she may suffer physical pain or mental suffering; (3) due 

to abuse or neglect; (4) resulting in substantial bodily or mental harm. See 

NRS 200.508(4)(a) (defining "abuse or neglect" in part as negligent 

treatment or maltreatment of a child under the age of 18 years, as set 

forth in NRS 432B.140), (b) (defining "[a]llow"), (c) (defining "[p]ermit"); 

see also Smith v. State, 112 Nev. 1269, 1277, 927 R2d 14, 18 (1996) 

(explaining that a defendant must know or have reason to know of the 

abuse or neglect yet permit or allow the child to be subject to it), abrogated 

on other grounds by City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 118 

Nev. 859, 862-63, 59 P.3d 477, 480 (2002). 

Trial testimony indicated that on the morning of September 

27, 2010, Carrigan was home caring for his 3-year-old stepdaughter 

Rochelle and his 1-year-old son Eric, in the apartment he shared with his 

wife Leah, the mother of both children. At some point that morning, 

Carrigan found Rochelle nonresponsive.' Rather than call 9-1-1, Carrigan 

left Rochelle and his son unattended and went to a neighbor's residence. 

Serina Cottiero testified that she lived "[a] block or two away," and that 

Carrigan arrived between 8:45 a.m. and 9:00 an., saying, "he needed 

somebody over at his house with him right then," though he did not 

specifically say why. Cottiero followed Carrigan back to his apartment. 

Cottiero testified that they arrived at Carrigan's apartment approximately 

1Carrigan's accounting varied dramatically: he told various 

witnesses that after either hearing a "thump" or a "thud" or no sound at 

all, he found Rochelle either slumped over looking at him, about to fall, or 

unconscious either in her bedroom, the bathroom, or lying across his lap or 

chest as he sat on the couch in the living room. 

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30 seconds later and she found Rochelle lying on the couch in her 

underwear, looking "really pale," with "mucus or snot like stuff coming out 

of one of her nostrils." Rochelle was not responsive and did not appear to 

be breathing. Cottiero attempted "chest compressions and mouth to 

mouth" in order to resuscitate Rochelle even though Carrigan was trained 

in CPR due to health issues related to his son. 

Rochelle was not breathing and Cottiero told Carrigan to call 

for an ambulance, however, he refused. Cottiero testified: 

I believe that what was said between us when I 

asked him to first call an ambulance was that he 

didn't want to because he had previously, I 

believe, the night before spanked her for some 

reason, peeing on him while they were watching a 

movie or something . . . and he spanked her, and 

he didn't want someone to think that he did 

something to her. 2 

Cottiero yelled at Carrigan "over and over" to call for an ambulance and he 

refused, so she lied and told Carrigan that Rochelle was breathing—"I 

figured maybe if he thought she was okay more than she was okay that he 

wouldn't be so worried about calling." Carrigan then called 9-1-1. 

Cottiero could not be sure but estimated that 3 to 4 minutes elapsed after 

they arrived at Carrigan's apartment and before he finally called 9-1-1. 

The 9-1-1 operator instructed Carrigan on how to properly perform CPR 

and, according to Cottiero, he continued doing that at least until she went 

outside to get the paramedics' attention. Although Cottiero testified that 

Carrigan arrived at her house between 8:45 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., and that 

2No evidence of physical trauma or fractures were found by 

examining doctors at either Renown Children's Hospital (Renown) or 

Carson-Tahoe Regional Medical Center (Carson-Tahoe). 

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possibly only 3 to 4 minutes elapsed after they returned to Carrigan's 

residence and before he called 9-1-1, evidence presented at trial indicated 

that the 9-1-1 dispatch center did not receive Carrigan's call until 9:53 

a. m. 

Tori Riches, a firefighter-paramedic with the Carson City Fire 

Department, testified that she and other first responders arrived at 

Carrigan's residence five minutes after being dispatched. Riches found 

Rochelle "lying motionless on the ground unconscious, unresponsive." 

Rochelle was not breathing and did not have a pulse. There was no 

electrical activity in Rochelle's heart, meaning, "that her heart has not 

been beating for a period of time, quite awhile." After approximately six 

minutes performing CPR and administering a second dose of epinephrine, 

electrical activity resumed and Rochelle's heart began to beat, although 

she was still unable to breathe on her own. 

Meanwhile, as the emergency responders attended to Rochelle, 

Captain Dan Albee of the Carson City Fire Department made contact with 

Carrigan to determine what happened and to get as much information as 

possible in order to provide the most appropriate care. Capt. Albee 

testified that Carrigan never informed him that between the time he 

found Rochelle nonresponsive and the time he called 9-1-1 that he left his 

apartment and the two children unattended, went down the street to 

Cottiero's residence, returned, and then initially refused to call 9-1-1 

before eventually calling after Cottiero insisted. Capt. Albee stated that 

the omitted information would have been helpful to determine a course of 

action, especially because "anytime that somebody's gone—is down for up 

to or more than six minutes, your brain starts to die from lack of oxygen." 

Sergeant Darren Sloan of the Carson City Sheriffs Department 

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encountered Carrigan outside the apartment and overheard Carrigan 

talking to himself, saying "that he was screwed." A bit later, Carrigan 

looked at Sgt. Sloan and asked "if he was in trouble." 

During the course of the investigation, it was soon discovered 

that Carrigan was less than forthcoming about what transpired on the day 

in question. Carrigan told emergency responders, investigators, family 

and friends that after finding Rochelle nonresponsive, he performed CPR 

and called 9 - 1 -1. Carrigan never told anyone that he left the apartment 

and his kids unattended and sought out Cottiero after finding Rochelle 

nonresponsive or that he initially refused to call 9-1-1. It was only while 

reviewing the 9 - 1 -1 recording that Detective Dina Lacy of the Carson City 

Sheriffs Department heard a female voice in the background, eventually 

leading her to discover Cottiero's involvement and the omitted portion of 

Carrigan's accounting of events. 

Dr. Jack Schmurr, an emergency physician at Carson-Tahoe, 

testified that when Rochelle arrived at the hospital on the morning of the 

incident, her heart was beating, "[Nut neurologically, she had no function 

whatsoever." Dr. Schmurr testified that "any delay of getting oxygen to 

the brain tissue is going to be catastrophic. . . . In four minutes, it starts to 

die; in six minutes, damage is done; eight minutes brain death." Dr. 

Edwin Peters, a pediatric intensive care doctor at Renown, testified that 

when Rochelle was discharged after two months in the hospital, "[s]he was 

still severely impaired," "was not communicative," and "unable to eat by 

herself." Leah Carrigan testified that Rochelle was presently living in a 

24-hour nursing home and that she will need supportive care for the rest 

of her life. 

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Circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction. 

Buchanan v. State, 119 Nev. 201, 217, 69 P.3d 694, 705 (2003). It is for 

the jury to determine the weight and credibility to give conflicting 

testimony, McNair v. State, 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992), and 

a jury's verdict will not be disturbed on appeal where, as here, sufficient 

evidence supports the verdict, Bolden v. State, 97 Nev. 71, 73, 624 P.2d 20, 

20 (1981); see also NRS 200.508(2)(a)(2), (4). Therefore, we conclude that 

Carrigan's contention is without merit. 

Second, Carrigan contends that the district court violated NRS 

173.095(1) and his right to due process by allowing the State to file an 

amended criminal information which increased the number of charges. 

Carrigan claims that the amendment of the original criminal information, 

which charged alternative theories in one count, violated his right to due 

process "because it cannot be said that the magistrate at the preliminary 

examination would have found probable cause on Count II"—the count on 

which he was ultimately convicted. 3We disagree with Carrigan's 

contention. 

A district judge may allow the prosecution to amend the 

charging document in a criminal case any time before the verdict so long 

as "no additional or different offense is charged and [the] substantial 

rights of the defendant are not prejudiced." NRS 173.095(1). We defer to 

the district court's decision except when it "manifestly abuses" its 

considerable discretion. State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 116 Nev. 

374, 379, 997 P.2d 126, 129 (2000). Here, there is no indication in the 

3The original criminal information charged Carrigan with violating, 

in one count, both NRS 200.508(1)(a)(2) and NRS 200.508(2)(a)(2). 

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record that Carrigan objected to the amended criminal information. 4 See 

Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 120, 178 P.3d 154, 161 (2008) ("Failure to 

object below generally precludes review by this court; however, we may 

address plain error and constitutional error sua sponte." (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, defense counsel expressly stated at 

the hearing on his motion to dismiss prior to the filing of the amended 

information that "[nth/ common sense tells me that the solution is to make 

them divide that single count into two alternative counts." The amended 

information did not charge Carrigan with an "additional or different 

offense," the two counts incorporated the same elements as alleged in the 

original charging document, and Carrigan fails to demonstrate that his 

substantial rights were adversely affected. Therefore, we conclude that 

the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing for the amending 

of the criminal information. 

Third, Carrigan contends that NRS 200.508(2) and (4)(b) are 

facially void for vagueness "because they fail to delineate the boundaries of 

unlawful conduct" and unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of 

this case. "We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo, presuming 

that a statute is constitutional." Clancy v. State, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 

89, 313 P.3d 226, 231 (2013). We have previously rejected challenges to 

the constitutionality of Nevada's child-abuse-and-neglect statute, and 

here, Carrigan fails to demonstrate that NRS 200.508(2) did not provide 

him with adequate notice that his conduct, as detailed above, "was 

proscribed by law." Smith, 112 Nev. at 1276, 927 P.2d at 18. Additionally, 

4We further note that the amending of the criminal information 

occurred prior to Carrigan's first trial. The State proceeded with the same 

charging document, without objection, during Carrigan's second trial. 

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Saitta 

PieAdu 

Gibbons Pickering 

Carrigan fails to demonstrate that NRS 200.508 is unconstitutionally 

vague as applied to his case because a person of ordinary intelligence 

would have fair notice that the delay, as described in this case, in seeking 

medical attention for an unconscious 3-year-old is allowing the child to 

suffer unjustifiable physical pain as a result of neglect and is placing her 

in a situation where she may suffer unjustifiable physical pain. We 

conclude that Carrigan fails to overcome the statute's presumed 

constitutionality. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of' conviction AFFIRMED. 

(271_ , J 

cc: Hon James Todd Russell, District Judge 

Robert B. Walker 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Carson City District Attorney 

Carson City Clerk 

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