Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Jose A., 2018 IL App (2d) 180170

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re JOSE A., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellant, v. Jose A., Respondent-Appellee).

District & No. Second District

Docket No. 2-18-0170

Filed October 18, 2018

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake County, No. 17-JD-281; the 

Hon. Christopher B. Morozin, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

Cause remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Michael G. Nerheim, State’s Attorney, of Waukegan (Patrick Delfino, 

David J. Robinson, and Ivan O. Taylor Jr., of State’s Attorneys 

Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.

James E. Chadd, Thomas A. Lilien, and Sherry R. Silvern, of State 

Appellate Defender’s Office, of Elgin, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HUDSON delivered the judgment of the 

court, with opinion.

Justices Schostok and Spence concurred in the judgment and opinion.
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 OPINION 

¶ 1 In a petition for adjudication of wardship, respondent, Jose A., was charged with delivery 

of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(5) (West 2016)) and unlawful possession of a 

controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016)). Respondent filed a motion to 

suppress statements, alleging that at two separate interviews—one at his high school and one at 

a police station—he was subjected to custodial interrogations in violation of section 5-401.5 of 

the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-401.5 (West 2016)). After a hearing, the 

circuit court of Lake County agreed with respondent and granted his motion to suppress 

statements. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed. For the reasons set forth 

below, we hold that the trial court properly suppressed the statement respondent made at the 

police station but erred in suppressing the statement respondent made at the high school. As a 

result, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand this matter for further proceedings.1

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 3 On April 6, 2017, a teacher at Lake Zurich High School suspected that a student was under 

the influence of “something.” The teacher contacted Tiffany Reagan and Matthew Aiello, 

deans at the high school, to investigate the situation. Believing that the student was under the 

influence of alcohol, Deans Reagan and Aiello called Mark Frey, an officer with the Lake 

Zurich Police Department and the resource officer assigned to the school, to bring a 

Breathalyzer machine to the school. Officer Frey was unable to assist at that time, so he 

instructed the deans to call the police department and request another officer for assistance. 

Ultimately, Deans Reagan and Aiello learned that the student had taken Xanax. The student 

informed the deans that respondent provided the substance to her in the school library. During 

the investigation, drugs were seized from other students, some of whom stated that they had 

obtained the substances from respondent. 

¶ 4 When the investigation began, respondent was off the high school’s premises to attend 

classes at the College of Lake County. Deans Reagan and Aiello waited outside the main 

entrance of the high school for respondent to return. When respondent’s bus arrived, Deans 

Reagan and Aiello “retrieved” respondent and brought him to Aiello’s office, where they and 

Assistant Principal Pikul began questioning him. Respondent was told that he was under 

investigation for possessing or delivering Xanax. Respondent initially denied the allegations, 

and a search of respondent’s backpack yielded only an empty tin for mints. After the search of 

respondent’s backpack, Dean Reagan and Assistant Principal Pikul continued questioning 

respondent. Respondent eventually admitted that he had possessed pills and given some to a 

student. Respondent was not allowed to return to class that day and was suspended for two 

weeks. At the time of these events, respondent was six days shy of his seventeenth birthday. 

¶ 5 After respondent’s statement, school personnel waited for Officer Frey so that he could 

conduct a pat-down search of respondent’s person. Officer Frey estimated that he arrived 

between 45 and 60 minutes after respondent was escorted off the bus. Upon Officer Frey’s 

arrival, Deans Reagan and Aiello informed him of their investigation. Respondent was waiting 

 

1Given that we ordered supplemental briefing in this case and held oral argument, we have good 

cause for issuing our decision beyond the 150-day deadline under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660A(f) 

(eff. July 1, 2018). 
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in the student-support center, which Officer Frey described as an “in-school detention room.” 

Officer Frey testified that there is no hallway access to or from the student-support center. To 

exit the area, an individual must walk through a suite of rooms, including the deans’ offices. 

Respondent’s parents and his adult brother were advised of and present for the pat-down. 

According to Officer Frey, Dean Reagan escorted respondent from the student-support center 

to her office for the pat-down. According to respondent’s mother, Officer Frey escorted 

respondent. Prior to the pat-down, Officer Frey told respondent that he was going to search 

him, but he did not ask for his permission. Officer Frey did not find anything on respondent’s 

person, and he did not have a conversation with respondent at that time. 

¶ 6 Deans Reagan and Aiello informed Officer Frey that the delivery of the drugs had occurred 

in the library. Therefore, immediately following the pat-down, Officer Frey went to his office 

in the school, located in the same suite of rooms as the deans’ offices, to search the school’s 

video security system. Officer Frey located a video of the library, showing four individuals 

sitting at a table “looking around anxiously.” Officer Frey testified that the video shows 

respondent from the back. Respondent is seen “playing with something,” looking down, and 

then handing something across the table to the student involved in the morning incident. 

Officer Frey admitted that the video was grainy and that he could not see what was being 

passed, but he claimed that the video corroborated information received from students. Officer 

Frey estimated that it took him 15 minutes to locate the video. 

¶ 7 Officer Frey gave the video to Deans Reagan and Aiello. Officer Frey returned to his office 

while the deans viewed the video with respondent’s parents. Without viewing the video, but 

having been told that there was a video, respondent corroborated the events depicted in the 

video. After being advised that the school’s investigation was complete, Officer Frey returned 

to Dean Reagan’s office. Officer Frey then informed respondent and his family that respondent 

would have to come to the police station for booking. Officer Frey told respondent that he 

would be in contact to arrange a date for those procedures. Officer Frey testified that he wanted 

to book respondent 

“[b]ecause [respondent] was in possession of a controlled substance and distributed it 

to—that I had the evidence and probable cause to have to charge him with those crimes. 

And instead of taking him into custody right then, I allowed him the ability if he wanted 

to contact a lawyer or anybody else that he would be able to and set up a meeting at a 

later time.” 

Officer Frey acknowledged that at no point during his involvement at the high school did he 

tell respondent or his parents that respondent was free to leave. 

¶ 8 Respondent’s mother was subsequently contacted by Officer Frey, who requested that she 

bring respondent to the Lake Zurich Police Department to answer some questions and be 

fingerprinted. On April 13, 2017, respondent and his mother went to the police station. Officer 

Frey met respondent and his mother in the lobby of the police station and, at the request of 

respondent’s mother, called for a translator. It took approximately 25 minutes for a police 

officer from the Kildeer Police Department to arrive to translate. Once the translating officer 

arrived, Officer Frey escorted respondent, respondent’s mother, and the translating officer to 

an interview room adjacent to the lobby. 

¶ 9 Officer Frey described the interview room as follows: 

“It was [sic] an unlocked door. It is accessible to the public. It is not in the secured 

area by any means. The door was unlocked. I had to unlock it to get in, but then it was 
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left unlocked while we were in there. There is fingerprint equipment out for other 

purposes in the police department, and there is a table with four chairs. So it is sort of as 

[sic] an area where we can talk with somebody that’s kind of secluded from obviously 

the public lobby area.”

Officer Frey added that the room is typically used when someone comes to the police station to 

make a report or for “private conversation” between a police officer and a member of the 

public. Officer Frey said that he also uses the room to interview suspects before taking them 

into custody. 

¶ 10 Officer Frey explained that respondent was at the police station so that he could be “booked 

and processed for the charges of possession of a controlled substance and the distribution of [a] 

controlled substance.” During the interview, Officer Frey was dressed in plainclothes, the 

same way he dresses while on duty at the high school. In addition, Officer Frey was armed with 

his duty pistol and carrying handcuffs. In the interview room, Officer Frey read respondent the 

juvenile Miranda form (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) and then questioned 

him for 15 minutes regarding the incident at the school.2 Officer Frey testified that he was 

aware of a new statutory recording requirement, effective in 2017 (see 705 ILCS 

405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016)), but that he did not record the interview because he did not 

consider respondent to be in custody. Officer Frey admitted nevertheless that he was seeking 

incriminating information from respondent. After the interview concluded, Officer Frey took 

respondent to the station’s secure area to be booked and fingerprinted. Respondent was 

permitted to leave the station with his mother after further juvenile court procedures were 

explained to him. Officer Frey estimated that respondent was at the station for a total of 50 to 

55 minutes. 

¶ 11 After hearing the evidence, the trial court noted that it had considered People’s exhibit No. 

1 (the juvenile Miranda form) and respondent’s exhibit No. 1 (the library security video) as 

well as the witness testimony. The court first addressed the statement made at the high school. 

The court noted that section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a-5) (West 2016)) 

concerns statements obtained from a minor when subject to a custodial interrogation by “a law 

enforcement officer, State’s Attorney, juvenile officer, or other public official or employee.” 

The statute provides that the minor’s statement is presumed to be inadmissible absent 

compliance with certain procedural safeguards prior to the commencement of a custodial 

interrogation by any of the specified individuals. 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a-5) (West 2016). The 

court found that the dean of a high school is a “public employee” so that, if the questioning 

constituted custodial interrogation, then section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act applied. The court 

noted that, for purposes of section 5-401.5 of the Act, “custodial interrogation” means “any 

interrogation during which a reasonable person in the subject’s position would consider 

himself or herself to be in custody and during which a question is asked that is reasonably 

likely to elicit [an incriminating] response.” See 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a) (West 2016). Based 

on this definition, the court found that the questions asked of respondent by school personnel 

were clearly designed to elicit an incriminating response. 

 

2

People’s exhibit No. 1, the Miranda form Officer Frey read to respondent at the police station, and 

respondent’s exhibit No. 1, the security video of the library, were both admitted during the hearing but 

were withdrawn at the close of the hearing. The State has not made either exhibit part of the record on 

appeal. 
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¶ 12 Further, the court reasoned that a person in respondent’s position would reasonably 

consider himself to be in custody, particularly in view of the facts that the deans waited for 

respondent at the bus stop, they took him to Dean Aiello’s office, they held him for a period of 

time in the room used for student detentions, they escorted him from one room to another, 

Officer Frey patted down respondent without respondent’s consent, and school personnel 

detained respondent while Officer Frey spent an additional 15 minutes obtaining and viewing 

the security video. The court found that, because respondent’s rights were not read to him as 

required by section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act, his statement was presumptively inadmissible. 

¶ 13 The court noted that subsection (f) of section 5-401.5 provides that “[t]he presumption of 

inadmissibility of a statement made by a suspect at a custodial interrogation at a police station 

or other place of detention may be overcome by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.” 705 

ILCS 405/5-401.5(f) (West 2016). The Act defines “place of detention” as 

“a building or a police station that is a place of operation for a municipal police 

department or county sheriff department or other law enforcement agency at which 

persons are or may be held in detention in connection with criminal charges against 

those persons or other allegations that those persons are delinquent minors.” 705 ILCS 

405/5-401.5(a) (West 2016). 

Based on this definition, the court concluded that, because a school is not a “place of 

detention,” there was no way to overcome the presumption of inadmissibility. The court added 

that, even if the school did constitute a “place of detention,” the State had offered little to no 

evidence concerning the voluntariness of the statement and so the presumption, under the 

totality of the circumstances, was not overcome. 

¶ 14 As for the interview at the police station, the court began by stating that to argue that it was 

“not [a] custodial interrogation is really beyond this Court’s belief.” The court noted that 

respondent was there for booking and fingerprinting and the processing of juvenile charges. 

Respondent had been brought into an interrogation room, he was read Miranda warnings, and 

he was questioned. There was no recording made, although one was required by statute (705 

ILCS 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016)). There was no other evidence presented as to the tone or 

manner of questioning. Thus, the State did not overcome the presumption of inadmissibility. 

As a result, both of respondent’s statements were suppressed.

¶ 15 On February 16, 2018, the State filed a motion to reconsider the court’s ruling. At the 

hearing on that motion, the State argued that the definition of “custodial interrogation” had not 

changed with the amendment to section 5-401.5(a-5) and that the court had misinterpreted that 

definition. The State argued that “custodial interrogation” refers only to police conduct, under 

People v. Travis, 2013 IL App (3d) 110170. Additionally, under People v. Pankhurst, 365 Ill. 

App. 3d 248 (2006), there was no police custodial interrogation and the issue was whether the 

school personnel were acting as agents of the police when they questioned respondent. The 

court denied the State’s motion, remarking:

“I disagree with the State’s interpretation of the new statute. The new statute 

expounded [sic] protections for minors and *** extended those typical Miranda

protections to include not only police officers or police agents but also now public 

officials or employees ***. Even the statute acknowledges that custodial interrogation 

could include by a public official or employee [sic], and that’s what I found here.”
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The court reiterated that, as to both statements, a reasonable person in respondent’s position 

would consider himself to be in custody and the questions asked were designed to elicit 

incriminating statements. On February 28, 2018, the State filed a certificate of impairment and 

a notice of appeal. 

¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS 

¶ 17 On appeal, the State argues that, for various reasons, the trial court improperly granted 

respondent’s motion to suppress the statements he made at both the high school and the police 

station. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a two-part 

standard of review. In re D.L.H., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 46. Under this standard, the trial court’s 

factual findings and credibility determinations are accorded great deference and will be 

overturned only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Richardson, 

234 Ill. 2d 233, 251 (2009); Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 252. A finding is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or if the 

finding is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re Marriage of 

Kavchak, 2018 IL App (2d) 170853, ¶ 65. However, we review de novo the ultimate issue of 

whether the evidence should be suppressed. D.L.H., 2015 IL 117341, ¶ 46; Pankhurst, 365 Ill. 

App. 3d at 252. 

¶ 18 Resolution of the issues presented also requires us to construe statutory language. Statutory 

construction is a question of law, subject to de novo review. People v. Manning, 2018 IL 

122081, ¶ 16. The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the 

intent of the legislature. Village of Lake in the Hills v. Niklaus, 2014 IL App (2d) 130654, ¶ 15. 

The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute itself, which 

should be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Village of Lake in the Hills, 2014 IL App (2d) 

130654, ¶ 15. Only where the language of the statute is ambiguous, or where a literal 

interpretation of the statute would either lead to absurd results or thwart the goals of the 

statutory scheme, may a court look beyond the express language of the statute and consider 

extrinsic aids of construction. Lansing v. Southwest Airlines Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 101164, 

¶ 30; NDC LLC v. Topinka, 374 Ill. App. 3d 341, 359 (2007). With these principles in mind, we 

turn to the State’s first argument.

¶ 19 A. Statement at the High School 

¶ 20 The State first argues that the trial court improperly granted respondent’s motion to 

suppress the statement respondent made at the high school. The State’s argument in this regard 

is twofold. Relying principally on Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d 248, and the cases cited therein, 

the State initially contends that, because the school personnel were not acting as agents of the 

police, respondent was not subject to a custodial interrogation at the high school. The State also 

contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the school personnel were “other public 

official[s] or employee[s]” and therefore required to comply with the procedural safeguards set 

forth in section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act. Because we find the State’s second argument 

dispositive, we confine our discussion to that matter. 

¶ 21 Subsection (a-5) of section 5-401.5 was added to the Act by an amendment effective 

January 1, 2017. Pub. Act 99-882, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5). 

Section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act provides as follows: 
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“(a-5) An oral, written, or sign language statement of a minor, who at the time of 

the commission of the offense was under 18 years of age, is presumed to be 

inadmissible when the statement is obtained from the minor while the minor is subject 

to custodial interrogation by a law enforcement officer, State’s Attorney, juvenile 

officer, or other public official or employee prior to the officer, State’s Attorney, public 

official, or employee: 

 (1) continuously reads to the minor, in its entirety and without stopping for 

purposes of a response from the minor or verifying comprehension, the following 

statement: ‘You have the right to remain silent. That means you do not have to say 

anything. Anything you do say can be used against you in court. You have the right 

to get help from a lawyer. If you cannot pay for a lawyer, the court will get you one 

for free. You can ask for a lawyer at any time. You have the right to stop this 

interview at any time.’; and

 (2) after reading the statement required by paragraph (1) of this subsection 

(a-5), the public official or employee shall ask the minor the following questions 

and wait for the minor’s response to each question:

(A) ‘Do you want to have a lawyer?’

(B) ‘Do you want to talk to me?’ ” 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a-5) (West 2016). 

Thus, in this case, if the school personnel who questioned respondent at the high school were 

“other public official[s] or employee[s]” and respondent was subject to a “custodial 

interrogation,” respondent’s statement is presumed to be inadmissible unless he was read the 

statement and the questions set forth in subsections (a-5)(1) and (a-5)(2) of section 5-401.5. 

While section 5-401.5 of the Act defines “custodial interrogation” (see 705 ILCS 

405/5-401.5(a) (West 2016)), it does not define the phrase “other public official or employee.”

¶ 22 The trial court summarily concluded that school officials are “public employee[s]” for 

purposes of section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act. The State argues that the trial court’s 

determination was incorrect. The State acknowledges that the phrase “other public official or 

employee” as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) “seems *** unambiguous when given its plain and 

ordinary meaning.” The State asserts, however, that because the plain and ordinary meaning of 

the phrase “other public official or employee” cannot be applied without leading to absurd and 

unjust results, the phrase is ambiguous. To resolve this ambiguity, the State invokes the 

doctrine of ejusdem generis and asserts that the word “other” in the phrase “other public 

official or employee” should be interpreted to mean “other such like.” See People v. Davis, 199 

Ill. 2d 130, 138 (2002) (discussing doctrine of ejusdem generis). The State argues that a school 

employee is not like a law enforcement officer, state’s attorney, or juvenile officer in that the 

latter are “directly involved in the criminal justice and/or juvenile delinquency systems, 

whereas the primary role of school officials is the care of the students enrolled at their school.” 

The State concludes that, since the school personnel at issue are not “other public official[s] or 

employee[s]” for purposes of section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act, the trial court improperly 

suppressed the statement respondent made at the high school. 

¶ 23 Respondent argues that the trial court properly found the school personnel in this case to be 

“other public official[s] or employee[s]” for purposes of section 5-401.5(a-5). According to 

respondent, the disputed phrase is not ambiguous, so there is no need to resort to extrinsic aids 

of construction. Respondent contends that the terms “public official” and “public employee” 

mean precisely what the plain language of those terms implies—either an elected or appointed 
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government official or an individual who is employed by a government agency. In support of 

his position, respondent discusses one case—In re J.A., 85 Ill. App. 3d 567, 572-73 (1980) 

(observing that school officials are employees of the State)—and directs us to section 1-206 of 

the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 

10/1-206 (West 2016)), which defines a “local public entity” to include a school district. 

Respondent also points out that public school districts are funded by public monies and that 

persons holding positions within a school district receive paychecks provided by public funds. 

¶ 24 As noted above, section 5-401.5(a-5) does not define the phrase “other public official or 

employee.” In the absence of a statutory definition, a court may consult a dictionary to 

ascertain the plain and ordinary meaning of a term. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 330 

(2007). A “public official” is defined as “[s]omeone who holds or is invested with a public 

office; a person elected or appointed to carry out some portion of a government’s sovereign 

powers.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “official” but noting that the word 

is also termed “public official”). The term “public employee” is defined as “[s]omeone 

employed in a department responsible for conducting the affairs of a national or local 

government.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “civil servant” but noting that 

the phrase is also termed “public employee”). These dictionary definitions are consistent with 

the meanings the legislature has ascribed to these terms in other statutes. See, e.g., 30 ILCS 

245/1(a) (West 2016) (the Payment for Governmental Services Act, defining “public official” 

as “any person who occupies any office, position or employment in the government of the 

State of Illinois or any county, municipality or political subdivision thereof, or any school 

district, or special district, or any authority, commission, board, or any branch or agency of 

public service” and noting that the term “includes persons either elected or appointed”); 720 

ILCS 5/2-17 (West 2016) (the Criminal Code of 2012, defining “public employee” as “a 

person, other than a public officer, who is authorized to perform any official function on behalf 

of, and is paid by, the State or any of its political subdivisions”); 745 ILCS 10/1-206, 1-207 

(West 2016) (the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, 

defining “public employee” as “an employee of a local public entity,” including a school 

district); 775 ILCS 5/5-101(C) (West 2016) (the Illinois Human Rights Act, defining “public 

official” as “any officer or employee of the state or any agency thereof, including state political 

subdivisions, municipal corporations, park districts, forest preserve districts, educational 

institutions, and schools”). 

¶ 25 A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Nowak v. 

City of Country Club Hills, 2011 IL 111838, ¶ 11. Given the plain and ordinary meanings of 

the terms “public official” and “public employee,” as well as the legislature’s consistent use of 

similar definitions for the same terms in other statutes, we conclude that the phrase “other 

public official or employee” is not, on its face, susceptible to more than one reasonable 

interpretation. Quite simply, as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act, an “other public 

official or employee” is an individual, other than those specifically listed, who is elected or 

appointed to hold a government office or who is employed by a government agency. 

¶ 26 That the language of section 5-401.5(a-5) is unambiguous on its face does not end our 

inquiry. Our supreme court has stated that, “ ‘where a literal enforcement of a statute would 

result in great injustice or absurd consequences, courts are bound to presume that such 

consequences were not intended and to adopt a construction which, it is reasonable to assume, 

was contemplated by the legislature.’ ” Penkava v. Kasbohm, 117 Ill. 2d 149, 154 (1987) 
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(quoting People ex rel. Community High School District No. 231 v. Hupe, 2 Ill. 2d 434, 448 

(1954)). According to the State, requiring every public official and employee to comply with 

section 5-401.5(a-5) prior to taking a statement from a minor “would result in absurdity and 

injustice.” We agree. Take the school setting involved in this case. School districts employ 

hundreds of individuals in a wide variety of positions, including superintendent, principal, 

dean, teacher, librarian, administrative assistant, classroom aide, nurse, janitor, bus driver, 

lunchroom personnel, crossing guard, and recess monitor. Under a literal interpretation of the 

phrase, each of these individuals would be required to comply with the procedural safeguards 

set forth in section 5-401.5(a-5). Consider, for example, a bus driver transporting middleschool children home at the end of the school day. While exiting the bus, student A informs the 

bus driver that student B possesses an illegal substance. The bus driver prevents student B from 

leaving the bus until he or she answers questions about the allegation. During their 

conversation, Student B admits to possessing the substance. A literal interpretation of the 

statute would require the bus driver to read the statement and questions set forth in subsections 

(a-5)(1) and (a-5)(2) prior to questioning student B. Likewise, a literal interpretation of the 

statute would require compliance by a janitor who questions a student after observing the 

student falsely pull a fire alarm or a lunchroom employee who questions a student after 

observing the student steal food from the cafeteria. Such an interpretation of the statute would 

create a seismic shift in public policy by placing on individuals outside the realm of law 

enforcement the responsibility of learning and employing procedural safeguards heretofore 

required only of law enforcement officers. We find it implausible that the legislature intended 

the phrase “other public official or employee” as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) to have such a 

broad scope in the absence of an express definition of the phrase. In fact, during oral argument, 

respondent’s attorney conceded that a literal interpretation of the statute “could extend to the 

absurd,” even citing a bus driver as an example. Because a literal interpretation of the statute 

would lead to absurd consequences, we must consider extrinsic aids of construction to 

ascertain the legislature’s intent. See In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43 (1997) (“[W]here the 

meaning of a statute is unclear from the statutory language itself, a court may look beyond the 

language employed and consider the purpose of the law, the evils the law was designed to 

remedy [citation], as well as the legislative history to discern legislative intent [citation].”).

¶ 27 As noted previously, effective January 1, 2017, the General Assembly amended section 

5-401.5 of the Act to add subsection (a-5). Pub. Act 99-882, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017) (amending 

705 ILCS 405/5-401.5). Public Act 99-882 began as Senate Bill 2370 (99th Ill. Gen. Assem., 

Senate Bill 2370, 2016 Sess.). Introduced on January 28, 2016, by Senator Van Pelt, Senate 

Bill 2370, as originally drafted, did not include subsection (a-5). 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate 

Proceedings, January 28, 2016, at 6. During debate on the bill prior to the adoption of the 

amendment adding subsection (a-5), Senator Van Pelt expressed concern about false 

confessions by children at the hands of law enforcement personnel. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., 

Senate Proceedings, April 14, 2016, at 53-56 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). She 

commented: 

“Also to note that currently our police officers are even—are allowed to use deception 

in interrogating children. The courts have upheld waivers of lawyers by children. Even 

when the police misrepresent the evidence and deceive the child, the Supreme Court 

has held that the deception is not per se unlawful and the use of deception or subterfuge 

does not alone invalidate a confession. Now, any of us know that if we have a fourteen-
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year-old that is up against a veteran police officer with twenty years of experience and 

he comes and begins to use psychological interrogation tactics, that our children are 

more likely than not [sic] going to be able to—stand under that type of pressure, and 

being afraid and many of them being intimidated will confess to crimes.” 99th Ill. Gen. 

Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 14, 2016, at 54 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). 

Senator Van Pelt explained that the purpose of the legislation was to “ensure[ ] that all children 

subject to custodial interrogation in a homicide case will have a lawyer.” 99 Ill. Gen. Assem., 

Senate Proceedings, April 14, 2016, at 53 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). Following further 

discussion, Senator Van Pelt agreed to take the bill “out of the record” to discuss possible 

alternative language. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, April 14, 2016, at 56-63 

(statements of Senators Van Pelt, Righter, and Radogno). 

¶ 28 On May 4, 2016, Senator Van Pelt filed senate amendment No. 3 to the bill. Among other 

things, that amendment added subsection (a-5). During debate in the senate the following day, 

Senator Van Pelt reiterated that the General Assembly has a responsibility to protect juveniles 

from being coerced into false confessions. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 5, 

2016, at 53 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). Senator Van Pelt noted that, as originally 

proposed, Senate Bill 2370 would have required a lawyer to be present for a minor between the 

ages of 13 and 17 subject to a custodial interrogation for homicide. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., 

Senate Proceedings, May 5, 2016, at 53 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). As amended, the bill 

required any minor 14 years old or younger who is charged with homicide or a sex offense to 

be represented by a lawyer during a custodial interrogation. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate 

Proceedings, May 5, 2016, at 53 (statements of Senator Van Pelt). Senator Van Pelt further 

noted that the amended bill also provided that “a simplified version of the Miranda warning be 

given to minors under the age of eighteen” and required the videotaping of a custodial 

interrogation of a minor charged with either a misdemeanor sex offense or any felony offense. 

99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 5, 2016, at 54 (statements of Senator Van 

Pelt). Senator Radogno commented that the amended bill would be the first in the country to 

include the juvenile Miranda language. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 5, 

2016, at 55 (statements of Senator Radogno). Senator Van Pelt later remarked that, although 

the simplified Miranda language was included in the final bill, it had “little power” because the 

individual reading the warning would be the same individual prosecuting the juvenile or trying 

to get the juvenile to confess. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 5, 2016, at 57 

(statements of Senator Van Pelt). As amended, Senate Bill 2370 passed the senate 56-0. 99th 

Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 5, 2016, at 57-58. 

¶ 29 The first reading of Senate Bill 2370 in the Illinois House of Representatives occurred on 

May 10, 2016. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 10, 2016, at 17. The only 

reference to subsection (a-5) was from Representative Currie, during the third reading of the 

bill. Representative Currie noted that the bill “simplifies the Miranda warning for people up to 

the age of 18 since a lot of research shows that young people don’t understand the right to 

waive their opportunity to have a lawyer or waive their opportunity to speak. They often think 

that if they do anything like that the judge will hold it against them.” 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., 

House Proceedings, May 26, 2016, at 87 (statements of Representative Currie). The bill passed 

the Illinois House of Representatives 112-0. 99th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 

26, 2016, at 88. 
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¶ 30 As is evident from the discussion in the three preceding paragraphs, the legislative history 

of Senate Bill 2370 reveals that the legislature was concerned about juveniles understanding 

their rights and not being subject to undue influence. And while Senator Van Pelt’s comments 

suggest that the statute was aimed at law enforcement officials, the remarks from the 

legislative debates do not expressly address the intended scope of the phrase “other public 

official or employee” as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) of the Act. 

¶ 31 Because the legislative history is of little assistance, we turn to other tools of statutory 

construction. Respondent posits that the evil to be remedied here is the violation of children’s 

constitutional rights and the possibility that they would be manipulated into making 

incriminatory statements because of their youth and immaturity. Respondent then concludes 

that “[w]here there is the possibility that initial questioning of students accused of committing 

offenses on school grounds falls onto the shoulders of public school officials or employees, 

then it becomes clear that those individuals should be guided by the efforts of the legislature in 

protecting the children from making incriminatory or falsely incriminatory statements.” 

However, we find no express or implied indication in the legislative debates that the phrase 

“other public official or employee” as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) was intended to apply to 

public school officials or employees. 

¶ 32 The State suggests that we invoke the doctrine of ejusdem generis to resolve this 

ambiguity. “The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statutory clause specifically 

describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the 

‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” Davis, 199 Ill. 2d at 138 (quoting Farley v. 

Marion Power Shovel Co., 60 Ill. 2d 432, 436 (1975)). We agree that the use of this doctrine 

brings clarity to the language at issue. 

¶ 33 In listing who is required to provide a Miranda warning to juveniles subject to custodial 

interrogation, the legislature specifically named three classes of individuals—“law 

enforcement officer,” “State’s Attorney,” and “juvenile officer”—followed by an additional 

class labeled as “other public official or employee.” 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a-5) (West 2016). 

Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, the phrase “other public official or employee” would 

refer to individuals “such like” those specifically enumerated in the statute. A law enforcement 

officer, state’s attorney, and juvenile officer all have as their primary duties the protection of 

the public interest and the enforcement of the law. See, e.g., 50 ILCS 727/1-5 (West 2016) 

(defining “law enforcement officer” as “any person employed by a State, county, or 

municipality as a policeman, peace officer, or in some like position involving the enforcement 

of the law and protection of public interest at the risk of the person’s life”); Black’s Law 

Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “law-enforcement officer” as “[a] person whose duty is to 

enforce the laws and preserve the peace”); 55 ILCS 5/3-9005(a)(1) (West 2016) (listing, 

among the duties of the state’s attorney, “[t]o commence and prosecute all actions, suits, 

indictments and prosecutions, civil and criminal, in the circuit court for his county, in which 

the people of the State or county may be concerned”); 705 ILCS 405/1-3(17) (West 2016) 

(defining “juvenile police officer” as “a sworn police officer who has completed a Basic 

Recruit Training Course, has been assigned to the position of juvenile police officer by his or 

her chief law enforcement officer and has completed the necessary juvenile officers training as 

prescribed by the Illinois Law Enforcement Training Standards Board, or in the case of a State 

police officer, juvenile officer training approved by the Director of the Department of State 

Police”); see also In re Navajo County Juvenile Action No. JV91000058, 901 P.2d 1247, 1249 
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(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that law enforcement agents include government employees 

whose primary purpose is to enforce the law); In re Victor F., 169 Cal. Rptr. 455, 458 (Ct. App. 

1980) (holding that a school principal and teacher were not officials whose interrogation of a 

criminal suspect must be preceded by an admonition of Miranda rights in that such individuals 

are not employed by a governmental entity whose primary mission is to enforce the law). Thus, 

applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis in this case, we hold that the phrase “other public 

official or employee” as used in section 5-401.5(a-5) is intended to refer to an elected or 

appointed government official or an employee who works for a government agency and who 

has as his or her primary duties the protection of the public interest and the enforcement of the 

law. While Deans Reagan and Aiello and Assistant Principal Pikul are undoubtedly 

responsible for administration and discipline within Lake Zurich High School (see 105 ILCS 

5/24-24 (West 2016) (granting educators in loco parentis status, which extends to both 

disciplinary and nondisciplinary matters); In re E.M., 262 Ill. App. 3d 302, 307 (1994)), they 

do not have as their primary mission the same duties as the individuals specifically listed in 

section 5-401.5(a-5). See People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 221-22 (1996) (Nickels, J., 

dissenting) (recognizing that school districts and law enforcement authorities have different 

missions); Pankhurst, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 255 (emphasizing that, although school officials are 

charged with maintaining order and discipline in their schools, the fact that these duties 

occasionally entail the investigation of criminal conduct does not alone make the school 

officials agents of the police); see also 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.10(c) 

(4th ed. 2017) (noting that courts have generally held that government agents not primarily 

charged with enforcement of the criminal law are under no obligation to comply with 

Miranda); Commonwealth v. Ira I., 791 N.E.2d 894, 900-01 (Mass. 2003) (holding that school 

officials acting within the scope of their employment rather than as agents of law enforcement 

are not required to give Miranda warnings prior to questioning a student in conjunction with a 

school investigation); Navajo County, 901 P.2d at 1249 (concluding that school principals are 

not law enforcement agents); Victor F., 169 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (finding that school personnel 

have no more powers to enforce the law than private persons). Under this interpretation, the 

scope of the phrase “other public official or employee” goes from extremely broad to 

reasonably focused. Thus, applying this definition, we hold that the school personnel in this 

case were not “other public official[s] or employee[s]” and therefore not required to precede 

their questioning of respondent with the statement and questions set forth in section 

5-401(a-5). 

¶ 34 Respondent contends that the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis renders the 

phrase “other public official or employee” superfluous. According to respondent, the statute 

already lists the relevant law enforcement personnel who would be involved in a criminal 

investigation of a juvenile—the police, the state’s attorney, and juvenile officers. As 

respondent correctly notes, one tool of statutory construction instructs that a statute must be 

interpreted so that each word, clause, and sentence is given reasonable meaning and not 

rendered superfluous. Oswald v. Hamer, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 10. Nevertheless, we disagree with 

respondent’s argument that the application of the doctrine of ejusdem generis renders the 

phrase “other public official or employee” superfluous. There are other public officials or 

employees who are not expressly enumerated in the statute, whose primary duties involve law 

enforcement, and who could be involved in a criminal investigation of a juvenile, such as a 

state’s attorney investigator or an arson investigator with the Office of the State Fire Marshal 
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(see 20 ILCS 2910/1(b) (West 2016)). Accordingly, we reject respondent’s argument that our 

interpretation of the phrase “other public official or employee” renders the phrase superfluous.

¶ 35 In short, we find that, although the phrase “other public official or employee” as used in 

section 5-401.5(a-5) is not ambiguous on its face, a literal reading of the phrase renders the 

absurd result of applying the statute to every individual who is elected or appointed to hold a 

government office or who is employed by a government agency. Employing the doctrine of 

ejusdem generis, however, we hold that the phrase “other public official or employee” as used 

in section 5-401.5(a-5) was intended to apply to an elected or appointed government official or 

an employee who works for a government agency and who has as his or her primary duties the 

protection of the public interest and the enforcement of the law. Because the school personnel 

in this case did not have as their primary duties the protection of the public interest and the 

enforcement of the law, they were not “other public official[s] or employee[s]” for the 

purposes of section 5-401.5(a-5) and they were not required to comply with the procedural 

safeguards set forth in the statute. Accordingly, we reverse that portion of the trial court’s 

judgment suppressing the statement respondent made to the school personnel at the high 

school. 

¶ 36 B. Statement at the Police Station 

¶ 37 The State also argues that the trial court improperly granted respondent’s motion to 

suppress the statement he made at the police station, on the basis that respondent was not “in 

custody” when he spoke to Officer Frey. 

¶ 38 The recording requirement set forth in section 5-401.5(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 

405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016)) applies only to a custodial interrogation conducted at a police 

station or “other place of detention.” Specifically, the statute provides:

“(b) An oral, written, or sign language statement of a minor who, at the time of the 

commission of the offense was under the age of 18 years, made as a result of a custodial 

interrogation conducted at a police station or other place of detention on or after the 

effective date of this amendatory Act of the 99th General Assembly shall be presumed 

to be inadmissible as evidence against the minor in any criminal proceeding or juvenile 

court proceeding, for any act that if committed by an adult would be a misdemeanor 

offense under Article 11 of the Criminal Code of 2012 or any felony offense unless: 

 (1) an electronic recording is made of the custodial interrogation; and 

 (2) the recording is substantially accurate and not intentionally altered.” 705 

ILCS 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016). 

Subsection (f) of section 5-401.5 allows for the presumption of inadmissibility to be overcome 

“by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, 

based on the totality of the circumstances.” 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(f) (West 2016). 

¶ 39 In this case, it is undisputed that respondent was under the age of 18 years when the alleged 

offenses were committed and that the statement at issue was made at a police station. It is also 

undisputed that the petition for adjudication of wardship charged respondent with acts that, if 

committed by an adult, would be felony offenses. See 720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2016) 

(categorizing unlawful possession of a controlled substance as a Class 4 felony); 720 ILCS 

570/407(b)(5) (West 2016) (categorizing delivery of a controlled substance as a Class 2 

felony). Thus, if respondent’s statement at the police station was made as a result of a 
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“custodial interrogation,” the statement is presumptively inadmissible against him in any 

criminal or juvenile court proceeding unless an electronic recording was made of the custodial 

interrogation. 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(b) (West 2016). 

¶ 40 The State maintains that the statutory recording requirement did not apply in this case 

because respondent was not “in custody” when Officer Frey and respondent spoke at the police 

station. In support of its argument, the State observes that the interview was “set in advance,” 

respondent’s mother was present during the entire interview, the questioning lasted for less 

than an hour, and Officer Frey was dressed in plain clothing. The State further asserts that the 

only fact that lends itself to a finding that respondent was in custody was that respondent was 

booked. The State’s position lacks merit.

¶ 41 Whether someone is “in custody” is a question of fact. People v. Calhoun, 382 Ill. App. 3d 

1140, 1146 (2008); People v. Wheeler, 281 Ill. App. 3d 447, 458 (1996). As such, we must 

defer to the trial court’s finding unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d at 251. As noted above, a finding is against the manifest weight of the 

evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or if it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

not based on the evidence presented. Kavchak, 2018 IL App (2d) 170853, ¶ 65. In this case, the 

trial court found that Officer Frey’s interview constituted a custodial interrogation. Given the 

applicable standard of review, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding is against the 

manifest weight of the evidence. Subsection (a) of section 5-401.5 defines “custodial 

interrogation” as “any interrogation (i) during which a reasonable person in the subject’s 

position would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is 

asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(a) 

(West 2016). The factors relevant to determining whether an individual is in custody include 

(1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of questioning; (2) the number of police officers 

present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of family and friends of the 

individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, such as the show of weapons or use of 

force, physical restraint, booking, or fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual 

arrived at the place of questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the 

individual. People v. Slater, 228 Ill. 2d 137, 150 (2008). 

¶ 42 Turning to the evidence before us, the record establishes that, on April 6, 2017, respondent 

was a 16-year-old high-school student. Following questioning at the high school, Officer Frey 

informed respondent and his family that Officer Frey would be in contact to arrange a date for 

respondent to come to the police station for booking. Respondent’s mother testified that 

Officer Frey later contacted her to request that she bring respondent to the police station to 

answer some questions and to be fingerprinted. In accordance with this request, respondent and 

his mother reported to the police station on April 13, 2017. At that time, respondent had just 

turned 17. Once the translating officer arrived, Officer Frey escorted respondent, his mother, 

and the translating officer to an interview room adjacent to the lobby of the police station. 

Officer Frey then read respondent the juvenile Miranda form and questioned him for 15 

minutes regarding the incident at the school. Although Officer Frey testified that the interview 

room was unlocked and accessible to the public, he acknowledged that he uses this particular 

room to interview suspects before taking them into custody. Two officers were present during 

the questioning (Officer Frey and the translating officer), and there was fingerprinting 

equipment in the room. Moreover, although Officer Frey was dressed in plainclothes, he was 
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armed with his duty pistol and carrying handcuffs. At the conclusion of the interview, Officer 

Frey took respondent to a secure area for booking and fingerprinting. 

¶ 43 Under the totality of these circumstances, a reasonable person would have considered 

himself to be in custody and not free to leave. In particular, we observe that Officer Frey 

directed respondent’s mother to bring respondent to the police station to answer some 

questions and be fingerprinted. Although respondent’s mother was present during the 

questioning, so were two police officers. At least one of the officers was armed with his duty 

pistol and had handcuffs. Officer Frey read respondent the juvenile Miranda form prior to the 

questioning. At the conclusion of the interview, respondent was booked and fingerprinted. We 

also observe that Officer Frey admitted that he was seeking incriminating information from 

respondent and that respondent was at the police station so that he could be booked and 

processed on two drug-related felony charges. Given the foregoing, we find ample evidence to 

support the trial court’s finding that respondent was subject to a custodial interrogation at the 

police station. Since this finding is not against the manifest weight of the evidence and since 

the custodial interrogation was not electronically recorded as required by section 5-401.5(b) of 

the Act, the statement respondent made at the police station is presumptively inadmissible. 

¶ 44 The State alternatively asserts that, even if respondent was “in custody” when he spoke to 

Officer Frey at the police station, the statement he provided was voluntary. As noted, 

subsection (f) of section 5-401.5 allows for the presumption of inadmissibility to be overcome 

“by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, 

based on the totality of the circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-401.5(f) (West 

2016). In this case, although the State argues that the statement respondent provided at the 

police station was voluntary, it makes no claim that the statement was reliable. See People v. 

Whitfield, 2017 IL App (2d) 140878, ¶ 97 (noting that the issue of reliability must be 

considered separately from voluntariness); People v. Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 100678, ¶ 66 

(emphasizing that whether the defendant’s statement was reliable is a separate inquiry from 

whether it was voluntary). The failure to provide argument as to both prongs of subsection (f) 

results in forfeiture of the State’s claim that it had overcome the presumption of 

inadmissibility. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017) (providing that an appellant’s brief 

must include “[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons 

therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on”); In re Marriage 

of Woodrum, 2018 IL App (3d) 170369, ¶ 63 (noting that failure to develop an argument and 

provide any authority in support of a contention results in forfeiture of the issue on appeal). 

¶ 45 III. CONCLUSION 

¶ 46 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm that portion of the judgment of the circuit court 

of Lake County granting respondent’s motion to suppress the statement respondent made at the 

police station but reverse that portion of the judgment granting respondent’s motion to 

suppress the statement respondent made at the high school. This cause is remanded for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

¶ 47 Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 

¶ 48 Cause remanded.