AL EX AN DR I A JON ES,

Plaintiff,
v. J ANI CE QUI

NTANA , e t al

. , De fe nd ants
. UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COURT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA

Civil Action No. 08-620 ( CKK)

M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION (September

30, 2009) Plaintiff Alexandria J ones, a f ormer e mploy ee of

the District of Columbia Offic e of Unified Communications (“OU C”), bring s the above -ca ptioned lawsuit ag ainst the District of Col umb ia (“ D. C.” or

the “ Di str ic t” ) a

nd Jani c e Qu int ana , D ir e c tor of the OU C ( c oll e c tiv e ly , w ith D.C., “the De fenda

nts”). She alleg es re taliation in violation of the D.C. W histleblower Protection Act, D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq . (“WPA”) ( Count I ); reta liation in viol ation of the D.C. Workers’ Compensation statute, D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq . (Count I I ); deprivation of her First Amendme nt Rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I I I ); failure to provide a
rea sonable a ccommodation in violation of the Amer icans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq . (“A DA”) (Count I V); and r etaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U .S.C. § 12 20 3( a ) ( Count V ). Cur re ntl y pe nd ingbe fo re the Court is D e fe nd ants ’ [2 0] Mo tio n to Di smi ss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint . After a sea rchingrevie w of the pa

rties’ brie fing , the re levant statut or y pr ov isi on s and

c a se law, and

the re c or d o f t

his c a se a s a

wh ole , th e Court

sh a ll GRANT-I

N-PART and DEN Y-I

N-PART Def

endants’ [20] Mot ion to Dismi ss. Specifica lly , and for the r easons that f

ollow:2

( 1 ) Wit h respe ct t o Count I , D e f e n d an ts ’ mo ti o nis G RA N T E D in s o far as Def endants c ontend that Count Imust be dismis sed as a g ainst Defe ndant Qui nt ana, but

is D EN I ED ins of

ar a s D e fe nd ants c on te nd that Co un t I

mus t be dis mis se d a s a g a ins t th e Di str ic t; (2 ) With re sp e c t to Count I I , De fe nd ants ’ mot ion is GR AN TE D, and Count I Iis d i s m i s s e d i ni t s e n t i r e ty; (3 ) Withre sp e c t to Count I I I , D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on is (a) DENI ED insofar

as De fenda

nts assert that Plaintiff has failed to s uf fi c ie ntl y a lle g e that sh e sp ok e out a s a pr ivate c iti zen ; (b) GRANTED insofar as Def en d an t s co n t en dthat Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quint ana in her off icial c a pa c ity sh ou ld b e dis mis se d a s r e dund ant; ( c ) DE NI ED WI TH O U T P R E JU D I C E i n s o f ar a s De fe nd a nts asser t that Defe ndant Quintana is entitl ed to qualified immun ity ; (D) GRANTED insofar as Def endants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t; ( 4 ) W i th r e s p e c t t o C o un t IV , D e f e n d an t s ’ m o t i o n i s G RA

N T E D , an d C o un tIV is dismi ssed in its entirety ; and (5) Wit h respe ct to Count V, Defe ndants’ motion is DENI ED. Ac c or din g ly , at th is t ime , th e fo llo wi ngtw o c la ims surv ive De fe nd ants ’ [2 0] Mo tio n to Dismiss: Count I(D.C. Whist leblower Protection Act, D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq .) a s a g a ins t the Di str ic t, a

nd Count V(r e ta liatio n in

vio latio n o f t

he AD A, 42 U. S.C. § 1 22 03 (a )) a s a g a ins t the District. With respect to Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, to the extent Plainti ff a sserts that she int e nd e d to a lle g e he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uinta na in h e r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity
as we ll as in her off

icial ca pacity , Plaintiff must amend her c omplaint, by no later tha

n October 16, 2009 , to sp e c if

y that D e fe nd ant Q uintana is b e ingsu e d in

he r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity and toIn s e tti ngfo rt h th e re le va

nt b a c kg ro un d, and

in c on sid e ri ngDe fe nd ants ’ M oti on to 1 Dismiss, t he Court has c onsidered, a s it must , only the “f acts a lleg ed in the complaint, any documents attac hed to or incor porate d in the complaint, matters of which the cour t may take judicial notice, and matters of public re cord.” See E.E.O.C. v. St. Francis Xavie r Parochial Sch. , 11 7 F .3 d 6 21 , 6 24 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 7) ; Ma rsh all Co. He alt

h Ca reAu th. v . S

ha lal a , 988 F.2d 1221, 1226 n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Al tho ug h th e Am e nd e d Co mpl a int is s ile nt a s to wh e n D e fe nd ant Q uintana a lle g e dly 2 pr op os e d th e se c ha

ng e s and a s to wh e n Pl a int if

f h e rs e lf le arn e d o f t

he pr op os e d mo dif

ic atio ns , it is appare nt that Plainti ff, at a minimum, became a war e of the proposed c hang es sometime on or befor e De cembe r 14, 2007. See Am. Compl

. ¶¶ 5- 7. 3 a lle g e fa c ts s uf

fi c ie nt t o s up po rt

he r c la im that D e fe nd ant Q uintana sh ou ld b e he ld p e rs on a lly lia ble . I f P la int if

f d e c lin e s to do so , th e Court sh a ll tre at he r f

a ilure to t ime ly

ame nd a s a
c on c e ssi on

that sh e do e s n ot s e e k to a sse rt he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana in h e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i ty. I. BACKG ROUND A. Plaintif

f’s Employme nt at the OUC and Defendant Quintana’s Proposed Change s to the Emerge ncy 911 Sy

stem As se t f or th i n th e Am e nd e d Co mpl a int , Pl a int if f f ir st b e c ame e mpl oye d b y

the D. C. Metropolitan Police Depa rtment in August 1998. Amended Complaint, Docket No. [19], ¶ 2 (“ Am . Co mpl .” ). Six months late r, Pla int if f w a s p ro mot e d to a

dis patc he r p os iti on

in t he OU C , 1 which provide s centra liz ed mana g ement of both e merg ency and non-e merg ency

calls within the District. Id . ¶

3. Pla int if

f’ s p ri mary

dutie s at th e OU C invo lve d h and lin ge me rg e nc y 91 1 c a lls and tra nsmitt ing inf

ormation to the nec essar

y response teams. Id
. Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nt Quintana, in her

role a s Direc tor of the OU C, proposed
va ri ou s c ha ng e s to the mann e r i n whic h e me rg e nc y and no n- e me rg e nc y

c a lls wo uld

be ro ute d to OU C di sp atc he rs . Id. ¶ 5. Ac cordingto Plainti ff, she was c oncer ned that these chang es, which 2 alleg edly involved the transf

err ing of 311 calls bac k onto the 911 line, “would jeopa rdize thePlaintiff has not specifie d in her Ame nded Complaint the rea son for he r attempted 3 conver sation with May or F enty
. See Am. Compl. ¶ 11. Given her pr evious e-ma ils to May or Fe nty reg ardingthe proposed O UC chang es and he r re quest to meet with him to discuss her c on c e rn s, it i s n on e the le ss r e a so na ble to i nf e r, vie wi ngthe fa c ts i n a

light m os t f

avo ra ble to Plaintiff, that she attempted to spea k to May or F enty

about the OUC proposa l. 4 safe ty of re sidents of the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 7. In particula r, Plaintiff believe d that the chang es would re sult in “putti ngmore c alls in que [ sic ] and it was goingto cause emer g ency calls a de lay

in service .” Id . ¶ 6. Plaintiff furthe r asse rts that Def endant Quintana

misrepre sented to the D.C. Council that “she had e noug h personne l to cover a ll of the phones.” Id. B. Plaintif

f’s Alleged Communications Regarding the Propose d OUC Changes B e tw e e n D e c e mbe r 1 4, 20 07 and Janu ary 24 , 2 00 8, Pla int if

f r e pe ate dly

atte mpt e d to br inghe r c on c e rn s r e g ard ingthe OU C pr op os e d c ha ng e s to the atte nti on

of the D. C. C ounc il, Mayor Adria

n Fe nty and the public in g ener al. Id . ¶¶ 7- 10, 15, 23. Acc ordingto Plainti ff’ s Am e nd e d Co mpl a int , o n D e c e mbe r 1 4, 20 07 , Pl a int if f s e nt a n e -m a il t o me mbe rs of

the D. C. Counc il “ c omp la ini ngthat th e pr op os e d c ha ng e in t he us e of the 91 1 te le ph on e numbe r w ou ld jeopar dize the safety

of re sidents of the District of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 7. Shortly there afte r, on De c e mbe r 1 7, 20 07 , Pl a int if f s e nt a no the r e -m a il t o me mbe rs of the D. C. C ounc il a g a in “expressingher c oncer

ns about the propose d chang es in the use of the 911 emer g ency

telephone number.” Id. ¶ 8 . Pl a int if f a lso se nt a

n e -m a il t o M ay or

F e nty on De c e mbe r 2 8, 20 07 , s imi larl y

“ e xpre ssi nghe r c on c e rn s a bo ut t he pr op os e d c ha

ng e ,” and a g a in o n Jan

ua ry 1, 20 08 , “ a sk ingto meet with him to discuss her conc erns r eg ardingthe proposed c hang e.” Id. ¶¶ 9- 10. Approxim ately

a we ek later , Plaintiff attempted to have a n in-person c onversation with May or Fe nty when he visited the OUC on J anuar y 7, 2008. Id . ¶ 11. A fe w day s later, on January 11, 3 2008, Plaintiff interviewe d with a local tele vision station “to voice her c oncer ns about theThe Ame nded Complaint does not specify the substance of Plaintiff’s testimony befor e 4 the D.C. Council on J anuar y 24, 2008, nor does it indicate whether Plaintiff was testifying a s part of her officia l duties at the OUC. SeeAm. Compl. ¶ 25. 5 proposed c hang e in the 911 eme rg ency number.” Id. ¶ 15. F inally , on J anuar y 24, 2008, Plaintiff te sti fi e d b e fo re the D. C. C ounc il. Id. ¶ 25. 4 C. Alleged Ac tions T aken B y De fendants Against Plaint iff as a Result of Plaintif f’s Communications Regarding the OUC Proposed Changes On J anuar

y 10, 2008, Plaintiff was plac ed on administrative lea ve with pay

by Def endant Quintana. Id. ¶ 12. Plaintiff alleg es that the only rea son g iven for the decision to place her on administrative leave was that “ ‘the Mayor wa s not pleased with Ms. J ones’ a nd indicated she was a disg runtle [ sic ] and disrespectf ul employ ee.” Id . Acc ordingto Plainti ff, howe ver, she was neither r ude or disre spectful to Mayor F enty duringtheir discussion on J anuar y 10, 2008, as Def endant Quintana

claimed. Id. ¶ 11. Early the next morning, on January 11, 2008, Plaintiff told her floor mana g er that she was
su ff e ri ngme nta l anguis h “ fr om b e ingwr on g fu lly pla c e d o n le ave ,” and

re qu e ste d a

c la im number so that she c ould file a wor kers’ compensation claim. Id . ¶ 13. Ac cordingto Plainti ff, her f loor manag er r efuse d to provide her with a claim number

and advise d Plaintiff’s union repr esentative that he had be en orde red by Def endant Quintana

that he wa s not to provide Plaintiff with a worke rs’ c ompensation claim number. Id.¶ ¶ 14, 61. Plaintiff indicates that she
was e ventually

issued a wor

kers’ compensation claim number on January 17, 2008, but only

afte r
a re prese ntative from Plaintiff’s union conta cted he r floor ma nag er on Plaintiff’s be half. Id. ¶¶ 16-19. On J anuar

y 18, 2009, Plaintiff was g iven a 30- day proposed suspension by

Def endant Quintana. Id. ¶ 19. Howe ver, on F ebrua ry 11, 2008, the proposed suspe nsion was found to be6

“not sustained and the char g es we re dismissed without prejudice .” Id. ¶ 28. Although the proposed suspension wa s overr uled, Plaintiff’s status at the OUC a fter J anuar y 18, 2008, is nonetheless uncle ar. In particula r, it appea rs that Plaintiff may

have taken leave from wor

k for some unspe cified pe riod of time as a result of he r alleg ed job-re lated
anxie ty . Pl a int if

f a lle g e s th at on

F e br ua ry 28 , 2 00 8, sh e re qu e ste d th at sh e be a llo we d “ to u se her a nnual leave in lieu of sick leave to cover the time she would be a

way from wor k,” thus sug g esting that Plaintiff had taken le ave at some point after January 18, 2008. Se e id . ¶ 36. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, a lthough he r re quest to use annua l leave w as initially approve d by

her supervisor on F ebrua

ry 29, 2008, Def

endant Quintana

subsequently

denied the r equest on Mar ch 5, 2008, and re quired Plaintiff “to use he r sick time to cover the time she has be en aw ay from work.” Id. ¶¶ 43, 64- 65. D. Plaintif

f’s Alleged “Impairme nt/Disabil ity for Anxiety”and W orkers’ Com pe ns ati on Cla im Be g inning January

17, 2008, Plaintiff visit ed multiple health ca re pr oviders re g ardingher alleg ed job-re lated anxiety
. Id . ¶¶ 18, 24, 46, 49. Spec ifically , Plaintiff alleg es that she wa s “diagnosed with an impairment/disability for a nx iety ,” id . ¶ 24, and w as plac ed on medication for “job re lated anxiety ,” id. ¶ 46. See also id. ¶ 49 (a lleg ing that Plainti ff wa s found to “be suf fer ing from anxiety

depre ssion”). Ac cordingto Plainti ff, “ [t ]he sugg ested re asonable acc ommodation was that [Plainti ff] work 8 hour shifts instead of 10 hour shifts.” Id . ¶ 24. As stated pre viously , Plaintiff was issued a w orker s’ compensation claim number on J anuar y 17, 2008. Id . ¶ 19. Upon re ceipt of the claim number, she spoke with a c laim examiner at the D.C. Off

ice of Risk Manag ement (“ ORM”), who a dvised Plaintiff that ORM would send her the appropr iate for

ms and have an investig ator mee t with her to take he r statement. Id. ¶ 22.Plaintiff has not elaborated furthe r on her alleg ations that she was de nied her “statutory 5 21 day s of continuingpay .” It is therefor e uncle ar f rom the fa ce of

the Amende d Complaint what statute Plaintiff is refe rringto and on what leg al basis she c laims she was e ntitled to “21 day s of continuing pa

y .” SeeAm. Compl. ¶¶ 42-43. 7 Plaintiff met with the investigator on Fe bruar y 8, 2008. Id. ¶ 28. On or a round F ebrua

ry 20, 2008, ORM informed Plaintiff that it had not rec eived he r paper work a nd there fore planned to deny her c laim for wor

kers’ compensation benefits. Id. ¶ 30. Upon beingso advised, Plaintiff contac ted ORM to discuss the missi ngpaper work. Id. ¶ 31. Ac c or din gto P la int if

f, sh e the n c omp le te d th e pa pe rw or k a s r e qu ir e d, su

bmi tti ngthe mate ri a l to the ORM on Fe bruar

y 28, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 32- 34, 35. Nonethele ss, on March 3, 2008, O RM sent Plaintiff a letter a dvising he r that her disability claim had be en denie d due to aba ndonment. Id. ¶ 37. Pla int if

f f ur the r a sse rt s th at sh e vis ite d th e OU C on Ma rc h 5 , 7 and

12 , 2 00 8, in o rd e r t o pr ov ide wo rk

wi th a le ave sli p f

ro m he r d oc tor

and to r e c e ive a dv ic e on

the wo rk e rs ’ compensation claims process. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41. Plaintiff wa s told during these visits t hat Def endant Quintana ha d order ed that Plaintiff could not g o onto the operations floor. Id. ¶¶ 39, 41, 42. Pla int if f a lso c on te nd s th at sh e re qu e ste d a “ c on tin uatio n o f p ay ,” but th at, a s o f t he date thi s lawsuit was filed, she had not y et “r ece ived her statutory 21 day s of continuingpay .” Id. ¶¶ 42- 43. 5 E. Plain tif

f F ile s th e In sta nt L aws uit Plaintiff filed this action on April 10, 2008. See Compl., Docket No. [1] . In her or igina l Com pla int , Pl a int if

f a lle g e d r e ta liatio n in

vio latio n o f t

he D. C. Wh ist le blo we r P ro te c tio n A c t, D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq . ( Count I ); re ta liatio n in vio latio n o f t

he D. C. Wo rk e rs ’ Compensation statute, D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq . ( Count I I ); and de pr ivatio n o f h e r F ir st8

Amendment Rig hts in viol ation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I I I ). Plaintiff’s cla ims were ba sed on the eve nts describe d above oc curr ing f rom Dec ember

of 2007 throug h the filing of the complaint. F. Al le

ge d E v e nts Oc c urring A

fte r th e Fi ling o

f th is La wsu it Plaintiff alleg es that she c ontinued to be subject to illeg al conduc t by Def endants e ven afte r filingthe above -ca

ptioned matter. In particula r, Plaintiff alleg es that on June 6, 2008, she was de nied leave , althoug h such leave had pr eviously been a pproved. A m. Compl . ¶ 47. Plaintiff also asserts that on July 22, 2008, she filed a

complaint with the D.C. Offic e of H uman Rights (“ OHR”), a lleg ing that OUC’s failure to provide her with rea sonable a ccommodations ( i.e. , an 8-hour

shift) constituted a violation of the AD A. Id . ¶ 48. Ac cordingto Plainti ff, a fter filing the complaint with the OHR, she re ceive d a letter from the OU C’s human resour ces depar tment “threateningto fire he r.” Id. ¶ 7 5. Sho rt ly the re a ft e r, at so me un sp e c if ie d ti me in August of 2008, Plaintiff was “pla ced on A WOL .” Id. ¶ 76. Plaintiff asserts that she w as ultimately terminated f

rom her position at the OU C approximately

one month afte r she f

iled her c omplaint with the OHR. Id. ¶¶ 50, 77. Acc ording to P la int if

f, the OU C’ s huma

n r e so ur c e mana g e r a dv ise d h e r t hat “ the y c ou ld n ot d e te rm ine if [she] was suff

eringfrom a disa

bility ,” despite the fac t that Plainti ff ha d provided the O UC with a
me dic a l r e po rt

fr om a do c tor wh o h a d d ia g no se d Pl a int if f t o b e su ff

e ri ngfr om “ anxie ty depre ssion,” and ther efor e “de nied [P laintiff] reasona ble ac commodations and ultimately fired [P laintiff] from her job.” Id. ¶¶ 49, 50. G. Plaintif

f’s Amende d Complaint Plaintiff amended he r orig inal complaint in this action on J anuar y 2, 2009, to include9

additional alleg ations discussed above and to add two a dditional claims to her complaint: (1) a
c la im that D e fe nd a

nts fa ile d to pr ov ide a

re a so na ble a c c omm od atio n f

or he r m e nta l anxie ty

in vio latio n o f t

he AD A ( Count IV) ; and

(2 ) a c la im that D e fe nd ants te rm inate d h e r e mpl oy me nt i n reta liation for filing an EEO c omplaint in viol ation of the AD A (Count V). Currently pendingbefor e the Court is Def endants’ Motion to Dismiss P laintiff’s Amended Complaint. See Def s.’ MTD, Doc ket No. [20] . Plaintiff has since f iled her Opposition, seePl.’s Opp’n, Docke t No. [23] , and De fenda nts their reply , seeD e f

s . ’ R e p l y, Docke t No. [26] . Acc ording ly , Def endants’ motion is fully

briefe d and now r ipe for the Court’s resolution. II. LEGAL STANDARD Th e F e de ra l Ru le s o f C ivi l Pr oc e dure re qu ir e that a c omp la int

c on ta in “ ‘a

sh or t and pla in statement of the c laim showing that the pleade r is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘ g ive the defe ndant fa ir notice of what the . . . cla im is and the g rounds upon which it re sts.’” Be ll A tl. Cor p. v . Two mb ly , 5 5 0 U. S
. 5 4 4 , 5 5 5 (2 0 0 7 ) ( qu o t i n g Conley v. G ibson , 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); accord Eric kson v. Pardus , 5 51 U. S. 8 9, 93 (p e r c ur iam) . A lth ou g h “ de ta ile d f a c tua l a lle g atio ns ”
are not nece ssary

to withstand a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion to dism iss, to provide the “g rounds” of “entitle[ment] to relief,” a plaintiff must furnish “mor e than labe ls and conc lusions” or “a formulaic r ecitation of the elements of a cause of ac tion.” Id . at 19 64 -6 5; see also Papasan v. Al lai n , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). Instead, a complaint must contain sufficient f actua l matter,
acc epted a s true, to “state a cla im to relief that is plausible on its face .” Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A c laim has fac ial plausibilit y when the pla intiff pleads fa ctual conte nt that allows the court to dra

w the re asonable infere nce that the defe ndant is liable for the misconduct alleg ed.”1 0

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , _

_ U. S
. _ _ , 1 2 9 S
. C t
. 1 9 3 7 , 1 9 4 9 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Twom bly , 550 U.S. at 556). In e va luatin ga

Rul e 12 (b )( 6) mot ion

to d ism iss fo r f

a ilure to s tate a

c la im, the c ourt

mus t
c on str ue the c omp la int

in a light m os t f

avo ra ble to t he pla int if

f a nd mus t a c c e pt a s tr

ue a ll
rea sonable fa ctual infe renc es dra wn from we ll-pleade d fac tual alleg ations. In re United M ine W orkers of Am. Em

ployeeBene

fit Plans L itig. , 8 54 F . Su pp . 9 14 , 9 15 (D .D .C. 19 94 ); se e als o Schuler v . United States , 6 17 F .2 d 6 05 , 6 08 (D .C. Cir . 1 97 9) (“ Th e c omp la int mus t be ‘l ibe ra lly construed in f

avor of the plaintiff,’ who must be g rante d the bene fit of all infer ence s that can be derive d from the f

acts a lleg ed.”) . Howeve r, as the Supre me Court rec ently made c lear , a plaintiff must provide more than just “a sheer possibili ty

that a def endant ha s acte d unlawfully .” Iqbal , 12 9 S. Ct. at 19 50 . Wh e re the we ll- ple a de d f a c ts s e t f or th i n th e c omp la int

do no t pe rm it a

c ourt , draw ing on its judicial experienc e and c ommon sense, to infer mor e than the “ mere possibili ty of misconduct,” the c omplaint has not shown that the pleade r is entitled to relief. Id. at 1950. III . D ISC USS ION Def endants have moved to dismiss each of the five c ounts asserted in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. For rea sons that shall become c lear below, the Court first c onsiders Def endants’ a

rguments with respec t to Pl aintiff’s Sec tion 1983 Cl aim (Count I I I ), bef ore the n tur nin gto a dd

re ss P la int if

f’ s c la ims fo r v iol atio n o f t he D. C. WPA(C ount I ), re ta liatio n in violation of the D.C. Workers’ Compensation statute, D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq . (Count I I ), failure to provide a r easona ble ac commodation in violation of the ADA, (Count IV); and reta liation in viol ation of the AD A (Count V). A. Plain tif

f’ s S e c tio n 1 98 3 Claim The Court beg ins its di scussion by consideringCount I I Iof Plaintiff’s Amende d1 1

Com pla int , in wh ic h Pl a int if

f a lle g e s a vio latio n o f h e r F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts purs ua nt t o Section 1983. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68-71. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, she was re taliated ag ainst for
e xer c isi nghe r “ c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht u nd e r t he 1s t A me ndme nt o f t

he U. S. Co ns tit

uti on to s pe ak to the media [and] to voice her c oncer ns about the saf

ety of D.C. re sidents.” Id. ¶ 68. More specific ally , Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nt Quintana plac ed Plaintiff on administrative leave and denie d her pa

y in an “attempt to st op [P laintiff] from talking to the me dia and c ity council.” Id. ¶¶ 68- 69. She now see ks monetary damag es for

the alleg ed violation of her First Amendme nt rig hts pursuant to Section 1983. See id. ¶ 71. In moving f

or dismissal of Plainti ff’ s Section 1983 claim, Def endants set f

orth three principal a

rguments. First, De fenda nts contend that Plaintiff has fa iled to set forth suffic ient fac ts to establish the predicate Fir st Amendment violation. Defs.’ MTD at 7-11. Sec ond, Def endants a ssert that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 cla im as alleg ed ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana sh ou ld b e dis mis se d b e c a us e (a ) t o th e e xtent th e c la im i s a sse rt e d a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana in he r o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity , th e c la im i s d

up lic ativ e of

Pla int if f’ s c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t, a nd (b ) t o the e xtent th e c la im i s a sse rt e d a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana in h e r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity , s he is entitled to qualified immunity
. Id . at 12. Third and f inally , Def

endants a ssert that Plaintiff has fa ile d to pr op e rl y

ple a d mu nic ipa l li a bil ity un de r S e c tio n 1 98 3 a s is re qu ir e d to ma int a in a c la im ag ainst the District. Id . at 11. The Court shall addr ess these a rguments in turn. 1. Pla int if

f h a s Ple d Su ff

ic ie nt F a c ts t o E sta

bli shthat he r D isc los ur e s Enjoy First Amendme nt Protection

“ A p ub lic e mpl oye e lik e [Pla int if f] ‘ do e s n ot r e lin qu ish

F ir st A me ndme nt r ig hts to comment on matters of

public interest by

virtue of g overnme nt employ ment.’” W

ind e r v . E rste , 566 F.3d 209, 214 ( D.C. Cir. 2009) (her einaf ter “ W inder II ”) (qu o t i n g Con nic k

v . M y e rs , 4611 2

U.S. 138, 140 (1983)). “ At the same time, the g overnme nt as employ er must be a ble to preve nt employ ees’ speec h from interf eringwith the ‘ef

ficient provision of public se rvice s.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Garce tti v. Ceballos , 5 47 U. S. 4 10 , 4 18 (2 00 6) ). “ Th e thr e sh old qu e sti on fo r a pu bli c employ ee’ s First Amendme nt claim is ‘whether the employ ee spoke as a c itiz en on a matter of public conce rn.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Ga rc e tti , 5 47 U. S. at 41 8) . “ I f s o, [he r] s pe e c h is pr ote c te d unle ss the g overnme nt can justify treating its employ ees diff ere ntly from other

citizens. But if the employ ee spoke ‘pursua

nt to’ [her] official duties, [s ]he cannot cla im constitut ional protec tion.” Id. (qu o t i n g Ga rc e tti , 547 U.S. at 421). Def endants c ontend that Plaintiff has fa iled to meet this threshold require ment, arguing that Plaintiff, in voicing he r opposition to the OUC proposal, “spoke out dur ing the course of her employ ment as a g overnme nt worker ” and not a s a private citizen. Defs.’ MTD at 8. The Court disag ree s. Although Plaintiff’s a lleg edly protec ted statements “c oncer ned the subjec t matter of [her] employ

ment . . ., this [ ] i s nondisposit ive.” Ga rc e tti , 5 4 7 U. S
. at4 2 0
. S i m i l ar l y , al th o u gh it appear s that some of these a lleg edly protec ted communications may have oc curr ed at Plaintiff’s place of work, this too does not pre clude Plaintiff’s c onstitut ional claim. See id. (“Employ ees in some c ases may rec eive F irst Amendment protec tion for expressions made at work.” ). Rather , the cr itical inquiry is whether Plaintiff spoke “pursua nt to [ her] officia l duties.” Id. For

example, in Ga rc e tti , th e Sup re me Court he ld t hat a state de puty

dis tr ic t atto rn e y

did
no t e njo y F ir st A me ndme nt p ro te c tio n f or a de po sit ion

me mor and

um h e wr ote no tif

yinghis supervisors of ina ccur acie s in an aff idavit used to obtain a sea rch w arr ant. 547 U.S. at 413. The Supreme Court empha siz ed that the memor andum had be en wr itten pursuant to the plaintiff’s1 3

officia l duties. Id . at 414, 421. Simil arly , the D.C. Circuit conclude d in W inder II that the former transportation manag er f or the D.C. Public Schools did not enjoy First Amendme nt protec tion when he r eporte d the District’s fa ilure to comply with court orde rs to his supervisors. 56 6 F .3 d at 21 5. In s o h old ing , th e D. C. C ir c uit e mph a size d th at th e pla int if f, “ [i]n r e po rt inghis supervisors’ a lleg ed obstruction of the [court] order s . . ., was fulfillinghis undisputed duty to see that those order s were implemented.” Id. The D.C. Circuit there fore conclude d that the plaintiff spoke pursua

nt to his official duties and wa s not speakingas a c itiz en whe n he alleg ed noncompliance
. Id
. Ap ply ingthe se pr inc ipl e s to the c a se at ha nd , th e Court

fi nd s th at Pla int if

f h a s su ff ic ie ntl y
a lle g e d f a c ts f ro m w hic h th e re a so na

ble inf e re nc e c an b e dr awn

that sh e wa s sp e akin ga s a private c itiz en and not pur suant to her of ficial duties. Ac cordingto Plainti ff, she was e mploy ed as a dispatc her in the O UC, and her primary duties included handlingemer g ency 911 calls and transmitting information to the necessa ry response teams. Am. Compl. ¶ 3. Plainti ff’ s alleg ed job responsibiliti es did not include makingmanag eria l decisions reg ardingthe handlingof 911 calls nor is there any

sug g estion that Plainti ff wa s require d, let alone invited, to re port her
c on c e rn s r e g ard ingthe ha nd lin gof e me rg e nc y

and no n- e me rg e nc y

c a lls to h e r s up e rv iso rs or to members of

the District g overnme nt. Cf
. W illiams v. Johnson , 537 F. Supp. 2d 141, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2008) ( concludingthat plaintiff’s spee ch wa s not affor ded F irst Amendment protec tion when she testified to Councilpersons re g ardingDistrict-held c ontrac ts beca use her job duties

“ re qu ir e d h e r t o p ro vid e he r f ind ing s to se nio r e xec uti ve pe rs onne l in the Di str ic t g ov e rnme nt” but that she suffic iently

alleg ed that she w as speaking a s a citizen when she subse quently met with a par ticular Councilmember

and ra ised similar conce rns). Rather , Plaintiff’s position as an1 4

OUC dispatcher

involved “assist[ing] citiz ens whe n they called 911” and “se nd[i ng ] t he information to an off

icer on the stree t.” Am. Compl. ¶ 3. De fe nd ants no ne the le ss a sse rt that Pla int if

f’ s c la im mus t f

a il b e c a us e “ it i s c le ar t

hat in
vo ic ingc on c e rn s a

bo ut t he pr op os e d 9 11 sy ste m c ha ng e , Pl a int if

f w a s sp e akin gout—n ot a s a private c itiz en, but, as a

n employ ee who would have ha d to handle the a dditional calls.” De fs.’ MTD at 10. This ar g ument is based on a misre adingof Plaintiff’s Amende d Complaint. Plaintiff does not alleg e solely that she spoke out bec ause she was wor ried that she w ould be require d to work more or that her job would be come more difficult as a result of the O UC proposed c hang es. Rather , Plaintiff has also alleg ed that she spoke out reg ardingher c oncer ns that the proposed c hang es would detrimenta lly aff ect the public’ s safe ty . Ultimately , Plaintiff will be require d to demonstrate a s much. At this stage , howeve r, the Court finds that Plaintiff has suffic iently

alleg ed fa cts from whic h the re asonable infere nce ma y be dra wn that her communications wer e not made “ pursuant to her officia l duties.” 2. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 Claim Aga inst Defenda nt Quintana Def endants ne x t contend that Plaintiff’s Section 1983 cla im as alleg ed ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana should be dismissed bec ause ( a) to the e x tent the claim is asser ted ag ainst Defe ndant Qu int ana in h e r o ff ic ia l c a pa c ity , th e c la im i s d

up lic ativ e of

Pla int if f’ s c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t,
an d ( b ) t o th e e x t e n tth e c l a i mi s a s s e rt e d a g a i n s tD e f

e n d an tQ u i n t an a

i nh e r i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i ty, she is entitled to qualified immunity
. As an in iti a l matte r, it i s e nti re ly un c le ar t o th e Court

wh e the r P la int if

f i n f a c t inte nd e d to bringher Sec tion 1983 claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r individual capa city , in her officia l capa city , or both. Plaintiff’s Complaint, although not filed pr o s e , is by no me ans a1 5

mod e l of art fu l dr a ft ing . In p art ic ula r, it d oe s n ot i nd ic ate wh e the r P la int if f i nte nd e d to br ingsu it ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r individual or offic ial capa city . In an abunda nce of caution, Def endants, in addr essingPlaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, have presumed that Plainti ff a sserts the cl ai maga i n s tDe fe n d an tQu i n t an a i nb o thh er i n d i v i d u al an d o ff i ci al cap ac i t i es . Al th o u gh Pla int if f h e rs e lf su g g e sts in h e r o pp os iti on that sh e int e nd e d to a sse rt he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana only in her individual ca

pacity , s eePl. ’s Op p’ n at 2- 3, it i s d if fi c ult to d e c iph e r P la int if

f’ s e xac t po sit ion

on thi s is su e a s Pla int if

f’ s b ri e fi ngin o pp os iti on

to Def endant’ s motion i ncludes only a brie f, conc lusory

response that does little to clarify Plaintiff’s intent in filing her

Section 1983 claim. Consequently , the Court cannot c onclude on the r ecor d now bef ore it whe ther Plaintiff mea ns to assert this claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r officia l capa city

and/or individual ca

pacity
. Reg ardle ss, the Court finds that, as a pra ctical matter , this ambiguity in Plainti ff’ s Am e nd e d Co mpl a int

imp a c ts o nly

he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im t o th e e xtent sh e int e nd e d to a sse rt it ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r ind iv idu al capa city . For

the re asons discussed be low, the Court e a sil y c on c lud e s th at, a ssumin gPla int if f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im i s a sse rt e d a g a ins t Def endant Quintana

in her off icial ca pacity , the claim should be dismissed as duplicative. The qu e sti on , h ow e ve r, of

wh e the r P la int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im s ur viv e s D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on to dis mis s— to t he e xtent it

is a sse rt e d a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana in h e r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity —is
more c omplicated, and the Court declines to consider it without further cla

rification from Plaintiff as to the exact nature of her alleg ations ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana w ith respec t to her Section 1983 claim, as e x plained below.1 6 a . Pla int if

f’ s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im i s r e dund ant t o th e e xtent it is a s s e rt e d a g a i n s tD e f

e n d an tQ u i n t an a

i nh e r o f f i c i a l c a p a c i ty. First, eve n assuming Plaintiff intende d to assert he r Section 1983 cla im ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in her

officia l capa city , the Court finds that the claim should be dismissed as duplicative of he r cla im ag ainst the District. “An of ficial c apac ity

suit ‘is not a suit aga inst the officia l personally , for the r eal pa rty in interest is the entity .’” Ro bin so n v . D .C. , 403 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49 (D.D.C. 2005). “ This Circuit has rec og nized that ‘[a] section 1983 suit for dama g es ag ainst municipal officia ls in their official c apac ities is . . . equivalent to a suit ag ainst the municipality

itself.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Atc hin so n v . D .C. , 73 F.3d 418, 424 ( D.C. Cir.1996)).

“ Ac c or din g ly , ‘ a

pla int if f s e e kin gto r e c ov e r o n a

dama g e s ju dg me nt i n a

n o ff ic ia l- c a pa c ity su it must look t o the g overnme nt entity itself.’” Id. (qu o t i n g Kentucky v. Graham , 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985))
. In light of this re ality , district courts in this Ci rcuit routinely dismiss claims broug ht
a g a ins t D istri c t of

fi c ia ls i n th e ir

of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s w he re su c h c la ims are du pli c ativ e of

c la ims broug ht ag ainst the District itself. Al tho ug h ne ith e r the Sup re me Cou rt no r the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia

Cir c uit have he ld that g ov e rnme nt o ff

ic ia ls s ue d in

th e ir of fi c ia l c a pa c iti e s in

c on jun c tio n w ithsu its also filed ag ainst the muni ci pality should be summarily

dismiss ed, this is the overwhelming a

pproac h that has bee n taken by members of this C ourt, as we ll as the position take n by other courts. This a pproac h is ba sed on the theory that reta ining the official as a named def

endant is a “ redunda

nt and an inef

ficient use of

judicial resour ces.” Pr ic e v . D .C. , 5 4 5 F. S u

p p . 2 d 8 9 , 9 4 (D
. D. C
. 2 0 0 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Chisholm v. Superior Court of D. C. , N o. 06 -2 17 4, 20 07 WL16 01 71 8, at *2 (D .D .C. June 4, 20 07 )) (c oll e c tin gc a se s) ; se e als o Ha rd yv . D .C. , 6 01 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 82 , 1 86 -8 7 ( D. D. C. 2 00 9) (“ B e c a us e pla int if

fs make the same
c la ims a g a ins t th e Di str ic t of Col umb ia , th e same c la ims a g a ins t [f or me r D ir e c tor

of D. C.1 7

Depa rtment of Corre ctions] and [ former J ail Warden] in their officia l capa cities are redunda nt
and wi ll b e dis mis se d. ” ); Price , 545 F. Supp. 2d at 94-96 ( dismiss ing Sec tion 1983 and neg lige nce c laims ag ainst District officia ls as “not only redunda nt but also unnece ssary

when the
mun ic ipa lity

is a lso a name d d e fe nd ant” ). Ac c or din g ly , a s Pla int if f’ s o ff ic ia l- c a pa c ity c la im
a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana me rg e s into a

nd is r e dund ant o f h e r c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t, Def endants’ [20] Mot ion to Dismi ss shall be GRANTED to the e x tent it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r off icial ca pacity
. b. Th e Court

de c lin e s to c on sid e r t

he me ri ts o f D e fe nd ant Q uintana ’s qualified immunity

claim at this time. In a n a bund anc e of

c a uti on , D e fe nd ants have a lso argue d th at D e fe nd ant Q uintana is entitled to qualified immunity to the extent P laintiff’s Section 1983 cla im is asserted ag ainst her in her individual ca

pacity . The Court conc ludes, howeve r, that it is unfair to Def endant Quintana to require her to a dvance a cla im of qualified immunity without specific notice as to the exact nature of the fa ctual alleg ations ag ainst her in her persona l capa city . Rather, Plaintiff shall be require d to amend her

complaint to provide the re quisite notice to Defe ndant Quintana be fore the Court sh a ll c on sid e r a

rgume nts wi th r e sp e c t to thi s c la im. Th e Court the re fo re de c lin e s to consider the merits of De fenda nt Quintana’s qua lified immunit y claim at this time. Ac c or din g ly , D e fe nd ants ’ [2 0] Mo tio n to Di smi ss i s D EN I ED WI TH OU T PREJUD I CE with respec t to the issue of qualified immunity . To the extent Pl aintiff intends to alleg e her Section 1983 claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r individual capa city , Plaintiff must amend her c omplaint, by

no later tha

n October16, 2009 , to specify that Def endant Quintana

is being sued in her individual ca

pacity and to alleg e fa cts sufficie nt to support her cla im that Defe ndantThe pa rties ar e advise d that in the event f urther br iefingis require d they should not 8 sim ply re -f ile the ir ins tant b ri e fi ngon

thi s is su e . A lth ou g h th e Court do e s n ot c on sid e r t

he me ri ts of De fenda

nt Quintana’s qua lified immunit y claim, it is readily

appar ent nonethele ss that the parties’ curr ent brief

ing on this issue is inadequate, consisting la rg ely of leg ally -unsupported a

nd conclusory

alleg ations that do litt le to assist the Court in resolving the complicated issue of qualified immunity
. 1 8 Quintana should be he ld personally liable. I f Plaintiff dec lines to do so, the Court shall treat her fa ilure to t ime ly

ame nd a s a c on c e ssi on

that sh e do e s n ot s e e k to a sse rt he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r individual capa city . Plaintiff is further a dvised that if she
c ho os e s to ame nd

he r c omp la int , s he may

ame nd on ly to f ur the r c lari fy

he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im with respec t to Defe ndant Quintana in he r individual capa city and to re move those cla ims the Court has dismissed in thi s Memorandum Opinion and O rder ; Plainti ff may not otherwise amend he r c omp la int

a bs e nt e ith e r D e fe nd ants ’ o r t his Court ’s c on se nt, purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Procedur e 15(a ). Finally , in the event Plaintiff does a mend her complaint to specify

that her Sec tion 1983
c la im i s a sse rt e d a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana in h e r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity , th e Court

sh a ll p e rm it Def endant Quintana

an opportunity

to file a re newe d motion with respect to her claim of qualified immunity , if she dee ms it appropriate. Counsel for both parties ar e her eby

place d on
n o t i ce th atan y

s u ch b ri ef

i n g must include a de tailed and leg ally -supported a naly sis of Defe ndant Quintana’ s qualified immunity claim that spec ifically

examines Pl aintiff’s a lleg ations in light of the re levant qualifie d immunit y case law. 8 3. Pla int if

f’ s h ave F a ile d to Ple a d M un ic ipa l L ia bil ity The Court now turns to De fenda nts’ third and final a

rgument reg ardingPlaintiff’s Section 1983 claim—that Plaintiff cannot pur sue such a claim ag ainst the District bec ause she has fa iled1 9

to plead suff

icient fa cts to support municipal liabilit y . In order to hold a municipality

liable for civil rig hts violations under Section 1983, the municipality must have ac ted in acc ordanc e with a

“ g ov e rnme nt p oli c y

or c us tom , whe the r m a de by its lawm ake rs or

by tho se wh os e e dic ts o r a c ts may fairly be said to re prese nt official policy .” Mo ne ll v . D e p’ t of So c ial Se rv s. , 436 U.S. 658, 694, (1978). Se e als o F

ie rso n v . D .C. , 5 06 , F .3 d 1 06 3, 10 66 (D .C. Cir . 2 00 7) (“ To imp os e liability on the District under

42 U.S.C. § 1983, [ plaintiff] must show not only a violation of rig hts under the Constitution or feder al law, but also that the [District’s] custom or policy cause d the vio latio n” ) ( int e rn a l c itatio n o mitte d) . Pr oo f o f a sin g le inc ide nt o f u

nc on sti tut ion a l a c tiv ity is, in ge nera l, insufficient to impose liability
. Se e Mo ne ll , 436 U.S. at 694. Howeve r, a Sec tion 1983 claim may

withstand a motion to dism iss if the complaint alleg es one instanc e of constitutional deprivation and identifies “ some fac tual basis for the a lleg ation of a municipa l custom or policy” behind that a ctivity
. Atchinson , 73 F.3d at 423. Th e Court

c on c lud e s th at Pla int if

f h a s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y a lle g e d f a c ts t o s up po rt

the c la im that the District had a

municipal custom or policy of re taliating a g ainst employ ees f or exercising their F irst Amendment rig hts. Pl aintiff, in her Amended Complaint, has not pointed to any other employ ee who suffe red similar re taliation nor demonstrate d that the sing le incident of disciplinary

action at issue—Plaintiff’s be ing pla ced on a dminist rative le ave w ith pay —was made pur suant to an established D .C. policy or pra ctice. Se e ge ne ra lly Am. Compl. P laintiff’s only argument to the contra

ry is without m erit. Specific ally , Plaintiff contends that De fenda nt Quintana wa s “clothed w ith authority to make policy” and that when she pla ced Plaintiff on leave , she “ma de the policy to retaliate ag ainst Ms. J ones bec ause of her [F]irst Amendment activity .” Pl.’s Opp’n at 7. Although it is rea sonable to infer from Plaintiff’s Amende d2 0

Complaint t hat Def

endant Quintana

possessed the a

uthority to make employ

ment decisions and discipline OUC employ ees a nd that she exercise d this authority ag ainst Plainti ff, Plaintiff has not proff ere d any fac ts alleg ing that Defe ndant Quintana ha d “the a uthority to set employ

ment policy for the D istrict of Columbia—a distinction t hat is signific ant in consideringthe question of municipal liability .” Tabb , 605 F. Supp. 2d at 96. Se e als o Fo xv . D .C. , 990 F. Supp. 13, 20 (D .D .C. 19 97 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t a mun ic ipa lity

“ c ou ld n ot b e lia

ble un de r § 19 83 wh e n th e of fi c ia ls responsible for

the alleg ed constitutional deprivation...possessed only the authority

to make
e mpl oy me nt de c isi on s ( i.e. , transfe rringor terminatingan ag ency employ ee) , not

the a uth or ity to
se t e mpl oy

me nt policy fo r t h e C i ty . ”) (c i t i n g City of St. L ouis v. Praproptnki , 485 U.S. 112, 128- 30 (1 98 8) (e mph a sis in o ri g ina l) ). No thi ngin t he e vid e nc e pr of

fe re d b y Pla int if f s up po rt s a finding that Def

endant Quintana

was a final dec ision-maker w ith respec t to employ ment policy
o r th atth e mun i c i p a l i ty s an c t i o n e d th e d i s c i p l i n ar

y a c t i o nt ak e na g a i n s tP l a i n t i f f
. A c c o r d i n g l y, Plaintiff has failed to suff iciently alleg e that a municipa l custom or policy deprive d Plaintiff of her c onstitut ional rig hts, and Def endants’ [20] Mot ion to Dismi ss Count I I Ias ag ainst Defe ndant District of Columbia is GRANTED. B. Plain tif

f’ s D .C. W his tle blo we r Pro te c tio n A c t Cla im The Court turns next to P laintiff’s cla im that Defe ndants violated the District’s Whis tleblower Protec tion Act, D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq . (“WPA” or the “ Act”) , as asse rted in Count Iof her

Amended Complaint. More spe cifica lly , Plaintiff alleg es that De fenda nt Quintana’ s decision on J anuar y 10, 2008, to place Plaintiff on a dminist rative le ave w as an a ct of
re ta liatio n a g a ins t he r f

or c omm un ic atin ghe r c on c e rn s r e g ard ingthe OU C pr op os a l to the D. C. Council and to the Mayor. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 53-57. Ac cordingto Plainti ff, De fenda nts’ conductThe WPA defines a “prohibited pe rsonnel ac tion” as including , but not lim ited to, 9 “re commended, thr eate ned, or a ctual ter mination, demotion, suspension, or reprimand . . . .” Id. § 1-615.52(a )(5)
. 2 1 wa s i nv i o l at i o no f t h e W P A, wh i ch p ro h i b i t s a s u p erv i s o r f ro m“t h re at en [ i n g] t o t ak e o r t ak [ i n g] a prohibited pe rsonnel ac tion or otherw ise reta liat[ ing] ag ainst an employ ee be cause of the 9 employ ee’ s protecte d disclosure . . . .” D.C. Code § 1-615.53. De fenda nts have moved f

or dismiss al of Plaintiff’s WPA claim for two re asons. Fir st, Defe ndants contend that Plainti ff cannot maintain he r WPA claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana be cause the WPA does not create a private c ause of

action ag ainst an employ ee’ s supervisor. De fs.’ MTD at 18. Second, Def endants a ssert that Plaintiff fails to state a c laim under the WPA beca use she ha s not alleg ed sufficie nt fac ts to demonstrate either (a) that her public disclosure s enjoy protec tion under the Ac t or (b ) t hat sh e wa s r e ta liate d a g a ins t be c au seof the public disclosures, a s is required. Id . at 18-21. 1. Plaintiff Cannot Pursue a WPA Cl aim Ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in He r

Ind ivi du a l Ca

pa c ity Def endants fir st contend that Plaintiff’s WPA claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana must be dismiss ed bec ause a

n employ ee ma

y not sue his or her supe rvisor individually for a lleg ed vio latio ns of

the WPA. Pla int if

f o pp os e s D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on , a rguin gthat—c on tr ary

to De fe nd ants ’ c on te nti on

—th e Ac t sh ou ld b e re a d to c re ate an im pli e d r ig ht o f a c tio n a g a ins t De fe nd ant Q uinta

na be c a us e the D. C. C ounc il, in e na c tin gthe WPA, de c lare d th at it s p ur po se in doing so w as, in part, to “[h]old publ ic employ ees pe rsonally acc ountable for

failure to enforc e the laws and

fo r n e g lig e nc e in t

he pe rf or manc e of the ir dutie s. ” Pl. ’s Op p’ n at 13 (q uo tin gD. C. Code § 1-615.51(4) (empha sis added by Plaintiff)). The WPA creates an e x press right of ac tion for equitable a nd compensatory

damag esAs explained above in discussion Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim, it is unclear from 10 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint whethe r she intende d to assert he r cla ims—including Count I —ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in he r individual or offic ial capa city . The Court, howe ver, c on c lud e s th at Co un t I

mus t be dis mis se d a s a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana re g ard le ss o f whe the r i t 2 2 a g a ins t th e Di str ic t. D .C. Cod e § 1 -6 15 .5 4( a ); W ind e r v . E rste , Ci v. A. No . 0 3- 26 23 , 2 00 5 U .S. Dist. L EXI S 5190, at *20 (D.D.C. Marc h 31, 2005) rev’d in part on other grounds , 566 F.3d 209 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (he reina fter “ W ind e r I ” ). In a dd iti on , th e WPA e xpre ssl y pr ov ide s f

or se pa rate
reme dies ag ainst supervisors in the for m of limit ed disciplinary

action. The rele vant provision of the WPA s tate s th at, “ [u]po n r e c e ipt of an a dju dic ativ e fi nd ingthat a pr ote c te d a c tiv ity

wa s a
c on tr ibutin gfa c tor

in a n a lle g e d p ro hib ite d p e rs onne l a c tio n, the a pp ro pr iate a g e nc y

he a d s ha ll immediately

instit ute disciplinary

action ag ainst the offe nding supe rvisor.” D .C. Code § 1- 615.58(10). Ba sed upon the a

bove-outlined struc ture of the WP A, cour ts in thi s district have he ld that the Act doe s not crea

te a pr ivate rig ht of ac tion ag ainst individual defenda nts. See, e .g., W

inder I , 20 05 U. S. D ist . L EX I S 51 90 , at *2 7; Tab b v . D .C. , 477 F. Supp. 2d 185, 189 (D.D .C. 2007). As J udg e John D. Bates c oncluded in his well-r easone d decision in W inder I , [t ]he structure of

the statute strong ly

indicates that the r ight of ac t ion set forth in § 1-615.54 was intended to r un only ag ainst the District . . . . Moreove r, the provisions g ov e rn ing di sci pl in ary

pro ceedi ngs agai ns t s up ervi so rs i nd ica te t hatth e D. C. C ou nc il g ave c onsideration to the re medies that should be available ag ainst supervisors, a nd resolved the issue as set for th in D.C. Code § 1-615.58(10) . . . . 2005 U.S. Dist. L EXI S at * 24-25. Upon its own revie w of the r eleva nt statutory

provisions and
case law, the Court agree s with J udg e B ates’ pe rsuasive a naly sis in W

inder I and conc ludes, for the same r easons, that ther e is no implied cause of action ag ainst individual supervisors under the WP A. Acc ording ly , the Def endant’ s Motion to Dis miss is GRANTED insofa r as it see ks dismiss al of Plaintiff’s WPA claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana. 10is asserted a g ainst her in her individual capac ity , officia l capa city , or both, for the rea sons set forth above
. 2 3

2. Plaintiff Sufficiently Alleg es a Claim Ag ainst the District Pursuant to the W P A Def endants ne x t move to dismi ss Plainti ff’ s WP A claim as a sserted a g ainst the Def endant District on the g rounds that she ha s not alleg ed suff icient fa cts to demonstrate e ither (a ) that she eng ag ed in “pr otected disc losures,” a s that term is defined in D.C. Code § 1- 615.52, or (b) that sh e wa s r e ta liate d a g a ins t be c au seof the public disclosures. The Court shall address e ach
asser tion in turn. First, construingthe Amende d Complaint i n a lig ht most favorable to the Plaintiff and
a c c e pti nga s tr

ue a ll r e a so na

ble fa c tua l in fe re nc e s th e re in, the Court fi nd s th at—c on tr ary

to Def endants’ a ssertion—Plaintiff has suffic iently alleg ed that she e ng ag ed in protec ted disclosures
a s d e fi ne d und e r t

he Ac t. T he WPA d e fi ne s “ pr ote c te d d isc los ur e s” a s: any disclosure of information, not specific ally prohibited by

statute, by

an employ ee to a su pe rv iso r o r a

pu bli c bo dy that th e e mpl oye e re a so na bly be lie ve s e vid e nc e s: (A ) Gr os s mi sma

na g e me nt; (B ) Gr os s mi su se or

wa ste of pu bli c re so ur c e s o r f

un ds ; (C ) Ab us e of

a uth or ity in c onne c tio n w ith the a dmi nis tr atio n of a pu bli c pr og ra m or the e xec uti on

of a pu bli c c on tr a c t; (D) A violation of a fede ral, state, or l ocal law, rule, or r egulation, or of a ter m o f a co n t ract betwee n the District g overnme nt and a District g overnme nt contrac tor which is not of a mere ly technica l or minimal nature ; or ( E ) A s u

b s t an t i a l an d

s p e c i f i c d an g e r t o th e p u b l i c h e a l than d

s a f e ty. Id . § 1- 61 5. 52 (a )( 6) . F or purp os e s o f t

he WPA, a

“ pu bli c bo dy” inc lud e s a

me mbe r o f t

he D. C. Council. Id . § 1-615.52(a )(7)
.2 4

As set forth in her

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff specific ally alleg es that she spoke out
a g a ins t th e OU C pr op os a l be c a us e sh e wa s c on c e rn e d th at th e pr op os e d c ha ng e s “ wo uld je op ard ize the sa fe ty

of re sid e nts of

the Di str ic t of

Col umb ia ” and

wo uld “ c a us e e me rg e nc y

c a lls [to e xpe ri e nc e ] a d e lay

in s e rv ic e .” Am . Co mpl . ¶ ¶ 6 , 7 ; see also id. ¶ 40 (Plaintiff “se n[t ] l etters to t he c ity c ounc il r e g ard inghe r c on c e rn s f or the sa fe ty

of the re sid e nts of

the c ity” ); id. ¶ 54 (P la int if f s e nt e ma ils to v ari ou s Co un c ilp e rs on s a nd Ma y or F e nty “ statin ghe r f

e ar f or the sa fe ty of the District of Columbia re sidents if the proposed c hang e occ urre d”). Plaintiff’s a lleg ations
are sufficie nt to sugg est that she “r easona bly believe[d]” her e mails evidence d “[a] subst antial and spec ific dang er to the public he alth and saf ety .” See D.C. Code § 1-615.52(6) . Def endant’ s arguments to the contrar

y are without merit. Accor dingly , the Court finds that Plaintiff has
a lle g e d f a c ts s uf fi c ie nt t o p e rm it the Court to i nf e r, fo r p ur po se s o f D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on to dismiss , that Plaintiff’s disclosures we re “ protec ted disclosures” within the meaningof the WPA. Se c on d, the Court

c on c lud e s th at Pla int if

f h a s a lso su ff

ic ie ntl y a lle g e d th at D e fe nd ants took an alleg edly

prohibited personne l action ag ainst her be c au seof her public disclosure s. To
succe ssfully

alleg e a pr im a fa c iecase under the WP A, an e mploy ee must demonstrate, inte r a lia , that a prote cted disclosure was a “contr ibuting fa ctor” in the employ er’ s decision to take a n adver se ac tion. D.C. Code § 1-615.54(b). Se e als o Crawf or d v . D .C. , 891 A.2d 216, 218-19 (D.C. 2006) (outliningthe burde n shifting f rame work of the causation analy sis under the WPA). The WPA defines a

“contr ibuting fa ctor” as “a ny fac tor which, a lone or in conne ction with other f a c t o r s , t e n d s t o a f

f e c ti nan y w ay th e o u t c o m e o f

th e d e c i s i o n . ” D
. C
. C o d e § 1
- 6 1 5
. 5 2 ( a ) ( 2 )
. In thi s c a se , Pl a int if

f h a s a lle g e d th at, b e g inn ingon or aro un d D e c e mbe r 1 4, 20 07 , s he e ng a g e d in various prote cted disclosure s expressing he r conc erns with the OU C proposal to members of the2 5

D.C. Council and Mayor F enty
. See A m. Compl. ¶¶ 7- 10, 15, 23. Plaintiff also alleg es that, on J anuar y 10, 2008—only

three day s after

Plaintiff’s attempt to speak with the Mayor in person about the propose d chang es—she wa s place d on administrative leave by Def endant Quintana beca use “‘ the Mayor wa s not pleased with Ms. J ones’ a nd indicated she was a

disgr untle [si c] and disrespe ctful employ ee.” Id . ¶ 12. B ased on the se alleg ations, the Court finds that Plainti ff has suffic iently

alleg ed fa cts from whic h it can be r easona bly inferr ed that her

attempts to voice her c oncer

ns reg ardingthe OUC proposa l contributed, at lea st in part, to the decision to place her on administrative leave . Acc ording ly , Def endants’ [20] Mot ion to Dismi ss is DENI ED insofar as De fe nd ants a sse rt

that Co un t I

mus t be dis mis se d a g a ins t th e Di str ic t. C. Plain tif

f’ s W or k e rs’ Com pe ns ati on Ac t R e tal iat ion Cla im Plaintiff next alleg es that De fenda nts retaliated a g ainst Plainti ff f or attemptingto file a worke rs’ c ompensation claim in violation of D.C.’s Workers’ Compensation Act, D.C. Code §§ 32-1501 et seq ., as set for th in CountI Iof Plaintiff’s Amende d Complaint. Am. C ompl. ¶¶ 58- 66. Acc ordingto Plainti ff, De fenda nt Quintana eng ag ed in var ious “discriminating actions ag ainst Ms. J ones af

ter she a ttempted to file a wor

kers’ compensation claim,” and that suc h conduct “ was motivated by animus ag ainst Ms. J ones in violation of . . . D.C. Code § 32-1542.” Id. ¶ 66. De fenda

nts have moved to dismiss CountI I , noting that the a nti-retaliator

y provisions of the D.C. Workers’ Compensation Act do not apply to Plainti ff, a

n employ ee of

the District. De fs .’ MT D at 21 . B e c a

us e De fe nd ants are c or

re c t, P la int if

f’ s c la im und e r t

he Wor ke rs ’ Compensation Act must be dismissed. I t is well-settled law that D.C. Code § 32-1542 “ does not apply to employ ees of

the District of Columbia.” Heasley v. D.C. Ge n. Hosp. , 180 F. Supp. 2d 158, 172-73 (D .D.C. 2002).P l a i n t i f f a l s o a s s e r

t s th atD e f

e n d an t s ar e s o m e h o wb ar r e d b y re s ju dic ata from ar g uing 11 that D.C. Code § 32-1542 does not apply to D.C. employ ees be cause Def endants did not raise the issue at Plaintiff’s administrative wor kers’ compensation hearing
. SeePl.’s Opp’n at 14-15. Th is a rgume nt i s il log ic a l and

wi tho ut m e ri t. 2 6 Although se ction 32-1542 prohibits employ ers a nd their ag ents from discha rg ing e mploy ees f

or pursuingworke rs’ c ompensation claims, the statute e x cludes fr om cover ag e employ ees of the Di str ic t g ov e rnme nt. Spe c if ic a lly , f or purp os e s o f S e c tio n 3 2- 15 42 , “ e mpl oye e ” is d e fi ne d to exclude “employ ee[s] subj ect to the pr ovisions of subchapter XXI I Iof Chapter

6 of Title I .” D.C. Code § 32-1501(9) (B ), which in turn e stablishes a worke rs’ c ompensation scheme for employ ees of

the District of Columbia. Se e ge ne ra lly D.C. Code § 1-623.01 et seq . (cove ring
ever y “employ ee in a

ny branc h of the District of Columbia g overnme nt, including . . . employ ee[s] of an instrumentality wholly owned by

the District of Columbia g overnme nt”). Plaintiff does not dispute that she was a n employ ee of

the District and that this provision
a pp lie s. Rathe r, no tw ith sta nd ingthe c le ar l angua g e of the statut e , Pl a int if

f m e re ly a sse rt s without lega l support that the anti-re taliatory provision at section 32-1542 a pplies. Pl.’s Opp’n at 15. As discussed above , this is pl ainly mistaken. Section 32-1542 does not apply , and

11 Def endants’ [20] Mot ion to Dismi ss shall theref ore be GRANTED w ith respec t to CountI Iof Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Count I Iis theref ore dismissed in its entirety
. D. Plain tif

f’ s A me ric an s wi th D isa bil iti es A c t F ailur e to A c c om mo da teCla im Pla int if f a lso a lle g e s th at D e fe nd ants fa ile d to pr ov ide Pla int if f w itha re a so na ble
acc ommodation and terminated he r fr om her position with the OUC in violation of the ADA, as
se t f or th i n Co un t IV o f P la int if f’ s A me nd e d Co mpl a int . A m. C omp l. ¶ 73 . A c c or din gto Plaintiff, she was “ diag nosed with an impairment/disability for a nx iety ,” id . ¶ 24, and w as plac ed on medication for

“job re lated anxiety ,” id. ¶ 46. See also id. ¶ 49 (a lleg ing that Plainti ff wa sAs the D. C. C ir c uit ’s re c e ntl y e xpla ine d, “ [o]n Se pte mbe r 2 5, 20 08 the Con g re ss 12 enac ted the ADAAmendments Ac t of 2008 (ADA A) in orde r to ‘re instat[ e] a broad sc ope of protec tion’ under the A DA and to ‘ reje ct’ the holding s in Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. W illiams , 534 U.S. 184, 122 S.C t. 681, 151 L .Ed.2d 615 (2002), a nd Sutton v. United Air Lines , 5 27 U. S. 471, 119 S.Ct . 2139, 144 L .Ed.2d 450 (1999).” Lytes v. D.C. W ater and Sewer Auth. , 572 F.3d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quotingADAA § 2( b), Pub.L . No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, 3554). The e ffe ctive date of the AD AA wa s delayed until J anuar y 1, 2009. Id. Th e D. C. C ir c uit there fore conclude d in Lytes that,“ [b]y de layingthe e ff

e c tiv e date of

the AD AA , th e Con g re ss 2 7 found to “be suffe ringfrom anxiety depre ssion”). Plaintiff appa rently reque sted that she be permitted to “wor

k 8 hour shifts instead of 10 hour shifts” as a r easona

ble ac commodation for her a lleg ed disability
. Id. ¶ 24. De fenda nts, however , denied Plaintiff’s r equest a nd terminated her f rom her position at the OU C on J uly 22, 2008, advising Plaintiff “they could not deter

mine if [she] was suff

eringfrom a disa

bility .” Id. ¶¶ 49, 50. Def endants have moved to dismiss P laintiff’s fa ilure to ac commodate c laim, arguing that Pla int if f h a s f a ile d to su ff

ic ie ntl y a lle g e a vio latio n o f t

he AD A. In p art ic ula

r, De fe nd ants contend that Plaintiff has f ailed to alleg e suff

icient fa cts to demonstrate that she is disabled wi thi n th e me anin gof

the AD A b e c a

us e sh e ha s n ot a lle g e d th at he r d isa bil ity su bs tanti a lly

lim its
a ma jor lif e a c tiv ity . D e fs .’ MT D at 15 -1 7. Th e Court a g re e s. Th e AD A p ro hib its dis c ri min atio n o n th e ba sis of dis a bil ity , a nd de fi ne s su c h d isc ri min atio n to include, with ce rtain exceptions, “not makingrea sonable a ccommodations to the known phy sical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applica

nt or employ ee . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)( A). The ADA f urther de fines “disa

bility ” as (A) a phy sical or menta l impairment tha t s u b s t an t ially limit s one or more of the ma jor lif e a c tiv iti e s o f [a

n] in div idu a l; (B ) a r ecor d of such a

n impairment; or (C ) b e ingre g ard e d a s h avin gsu c h a n im pa ir me nt. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). 12clea

rly indicated the statute would apply only from January

1, 2009 forwa

rd.” Id. at 940. Acc ording ly , the Court applies the pre -Amendme nt ADA to Plaintiff’s claims in this case. Be cause Def

endants have not cha lleng ed Plaintiff’s appa rent c ontention that work 13 c on sti tut e s a

ma jor lif e a c tiv ity , th e Court

sh a ll a ssume , w ith out de c idi ng , th at w or k q ua lif ie s a s a major life a ctivity

under the pre- Amendment ADA
. See D uncan v. W ashington Metro. Area Transit Auth. , 2 40 F .3 d 1 11 0, 11 14 n. 1 ( D. C. C ir . 2 00 1) (a ssumin gwi tho ut d e c idi ngthat w or k is a major life activity

under the ADA)
. 2 8 Pla int if f h a s n ot s pe c if

ie d, in e ith e r h e r A me nd e d Co mpl a int or he r o pp os iti on

to De fe nd ants ’ M oti on

to D ism iss , whic h o f t

he se thr e e dis a

bil ity de fi nit ion s sh e a lle g e s a

pp lie s in this case. Reg ardle ss, all three disability definitions require a showingthat the impairment substantially

limit s a major life activity
. Adams v. Ric e , 5 3 1 F
. 3 d 9 3 6 , 9 4 3 ( D
. C
. C i r . 2 0 0 8 )
. In other wor ds, the plaintiff “must show that her alleg ed impairment is, was, or was be lieved to be one that ‘substantially

limit s one or more . . . major life a ctivities.’” Id. Plaintiff’s Amended Com pla int , h ow e ve r, is e nti re ly de vo id o f a

ny a lle g atio n th at he r a lle g e d “ imp a ir me nt/ dis a bil ity for a nx iety ” substantially

limit s any

major life a ctivity . Acc ording ly , even a cce pting Plaintiff’s
a lle g atio n a s tr

ue , s he ha s c le arl y

fa ile d a s a

matte r o f l aw t o s ho w that he r a nxie ty “ su bs tanti a lly lim it[e d]” a

ma jor lif e a c tiv ity —h e re , h e r a

bil ity to w or k. Al tho ug h th e te rm

“ su bs tanti a lly 13 limit s” is not defined in the A DA, the Supre me Court has held that [w] hen the major

life ac tiv i t y

under c onsideration is that of wor king, the statutory phrase “substantially

limit s” re quires, at a

minimum , that p l ai n t i ffs a lleg e they are unable to wor

k in a broad class of jobs
. . . . To be subst antially limit ed in the major life ac tivity

of working , then, one must be pre cluded f rom more than one ty

pe of job, a sp e c ia lize d job , or

a pa rt ic ula r j ob of c ho ic e . I f j ob s util izin gan in div idu a l’ s sk ill s (b ut p e rh a ps no t hi s o r h e r u

niq ue ta le nts ) a

re ava ila ble , one is n ot p re c lud e d f ro m a substantial class of jobs. Simi larly , if a host of di ffe rent ty pes of jobs are a

vailable, on e is n ot p re c lud e d f

ro m a br oa d r ang e of

job s. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 5 27 U. S. 4 71 , 4 91 -9 2 ( 19 99 ). Pla int if f h a s a lle g e d, at mo st, on ly that she wa s unable to work a 10-hour shift as a

dispatcher

at the OUC (a lthough she admits she could have worke d an 8-hour shift). SeeAm . Co mpl . ¶ 24 . A s Sutton make s c le ar, in o rd e r t oDef endants have also a

rgued that Plaintiff’s ADAclaim is prematur e as she has fa iled 14 to exhaust her administrative re medies. See Def s.’ Reply at 2. B eca

use the Court finds that Plaintiff’s ADA c laim must be dismi ssed base d upon her f ailure to suff

iciently alleg e that she ha s or ha d a “ dis a bil ity ,” a s th at te rm

is s tatut or ily

de fi ne d, the Court

ne e d n ot r e a c h th is a

rgume nt i n the alter native, which the Court notes was ra ised for the first time in Defe ndants’ Reply
. Although, a s previously

discussed, Plaintiff has not spec ified whe ther she na med 15 Def endant Quintana

as def endant in her

officia l or individual capa city or both, the Court presumes that Count V is asserted only ag ainst the District and not ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana as the lawis well settled that “ther e is no individual liabili ty under . . . the ADA.” See Sm ith v. Janey , _ _ F. S u p p . 2 d _ _ , 2 0 0 9 W L2 5 8 4 8 2 1 , * (D
. D. C
. Au g. 2 4 , 2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Ho war d v . F e nty , 580 Fu. Supp. 2d 86, 92 (D.D .C. 2008); see a lso DiLe lla v . U niv . o f D .C. , 570 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 n. 8 (same)
. 2 9 demonstrate that an alleg ed impairment substantially limit s an individual’s ability to work, the individual mustprove that he or she is “ prec luded from more than one ty pe of job.” Id. (e mph a sis a dd e d) . B e c a

us e Pla int if

f h a s n ot s uf

fi c ie ntl y a lle g e d f a c ts s up po rt inga

re a so na ble inf e re nc e that he r a lle g e d im pa ir me nt ( i.e , anxiety) pre cluded he r fr om workingany other job be sid e the pa

rt ic ula r o ne fr om whic h s he wa s te rm inate d, Pla int if f h a s f a ile d to state a

c la im
un de r t he AD A. De fe nd ants ’ [2 0] Mo tio n to Di smi ss i s th e re fo re GR AN TE D w ithre sp e c t to Count IV o f P la int if

f’ s A me nd e d Co mpl a int
. 14 E. Plain tif

f’ s Claim for

Re tal iat ion for

Fi ling a n E

EO Com pla int Cla im Finally , in Count V of Plainti ff’ s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she w as fire d from the OU C in retaliation for f iling a c omplaint with the OHR in J uly of 2008, in which she alleg ed that the OU C discriminated ag ainst her in violation of the AD A. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 74- 77. Def endants have moved to dismiss Count V, ar g uing that the claim ca nnot survive a 15 mot ion to d ism iss be c a

us e Pla int if

f h a s n ot i de nti fi e d “ un de r whic h s tatut or y sc he me sh e se e ks to pr oc e e d a g a ins t D e fe nd a

nts ” no r h a s sh e se t f

or th s uf fi c ie nt “ de ta ile d f

a c tua l su pp or t” fo r t his
c la im. De fs .’ MT D at 17 -1 8. Ad mitte dly , Pl a int if

f’ s A me nd e d Co mpl a int

is n ot a s c le ar a s it could be. How ever , construingthe Amende d Complaint i n the light most favor able to Plaintiff,Plaintiff, in her opposition to Defenda nts’ Motion to Dism iss, appear s to contend that 16 her c laim for re taliation in violation of the ADA, as a sserted in Count V of he r Amende d Complaint, i s based on De fenda nts’ ref usal to g ive her

a wor kers’ compensation claim number or to permit her to use a

nnual leave instead of sick le ave a s well as the de cision to serve he r with a 30-day suspension (which wa s later dismissed). SeePl.’s Opp’n at 12. The Court is baf fled by these a ssertions, g iven that these a lleg ed eve nts occurr ed pr ior to J uly 2008— i.e. , befor e Plaintiff filed a c omplaint with the OHR on J uly 22, 2008. Am. Compl. ¶ 48. As such, these a lleg ations clea rly do not support a claim of r etaliation for f iling the c omplaint with the OHR. Moreover , the Court notes that these pa rticular f actua l alleg ations are not included as a basis for Count V, as set forth in Plaintiff’s Amende d Complaint. Def endants have ar g ued for

the first time in their Reply that Count V of Plaintiff’s 17 Amended Complaint must also be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to e x haust her administrative re medies. See Def s.’ Reply at 7. Def endants c ontend that, althoug h Plaintiff alleg es she f

iled a EEO c harg e on Jul y 22, 2008, she has not indicate d whether she re ceive d a rig ht to sue letter or that the OHR has other wise disposed of he r cla im. Id. The Court notes that the exhaustion requireme nts under the AD A ar e not jurisdictional. Se e J oh ns on v . D .C. , 5 72 F. Sup p. 2d 94 , 1 02 (D .D .C. 20 09 ). Ac c or din g ly , a s D e fe nd ants did no t r a ise thi s a

rgume nt i n th e ir openingmotion, the Court declines to consider it at this time. Se e Mc Br idev . M

e rre ll D ow & Pharm., 80 0 F .2 d 1 20 8, 12 11 (D .C. Cir .1 98 6) (“ [c]o ns ide ri ngan a rgume nt a dv anc e d f

or the fi rs t time in a reply

brief . . . is not only

unfair to a

n appellee , but also entails the risk of a n improvident or ill-advised opinion on the leg al issues tender ed”) (interna l citations omit ted). See also Am. W

ildlands v. Kempthorne, No. 07-5179, 2008 WL2651091, at *8 (D.C. Cir. J uly 8, 20 08 ) ( “ We n e e d n ot c on sid e r t his argume nt b e c a

us e pla int if

fs
. . . r a ise d it

fo r t he fi rs t ti me in their re ply

brief.” ). 3 0 it is reasonable to infer that Plaintiff intended to a ssert a c laim for re taliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) , based upon a lleg ations that she was te rminated a pproxi mately

one month after she filed a c omplaint with the OHR on J uly 22, 2008, in which she a lleg ed that the OUC had violated the ADA. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 48, 50, 75-77. Ba sed on this understanding , the 16 Court DENI ES Defe ndants’ [20] Motion to Dism iss with respect to Count V of the Ame nded Complaint t o the extent Defe ndants argue that Plaintiff has fa iled to sufficiently identify the leg al
or fa c tua l ba sis fo r t

his c la im. 17 IV . C ON CL USI ON For the fore g oing r easons, the Court sha ll Court shall GRANT I N-PART and DEN Y I

NPAR T D e fe nd ants ’ [2 0] Mo tio n to Di smi ss a s f oll ow s:3 1

( 1 ) Wit h respe ct t o Count I , D e f e n d an ts ’ mo ti o nis G RA N T E D in s o far as Def endants c ontend that Count Imust be dismis sed as a g ainst Defe ndant Qui nt ana, but

is D EN I ED ins of

ar a s D e fe nd ants c on te nd that Co un t I

mus t be dis mis se d a s a g a ins t th e Di str ic t; (2 ) With re sp e c t to Count I I , De fe nd ants ’ mot ion is GR AN TE D, and Count I Iis d i s m i s s e d i ni t s e n t i r e ty; (3 ) Withre sp e c t to Count I I I , D e fe nd ants ’ m oti on is (a) DENI ED insofar

as De fenda

nts assert that Plaintiff has failed to s uf fi c ie ntl y a lle g e that sh e sp ok e out a s a pr ivate c iti zen ; (b) GRANTED insofar as Def en d an t s co n t en dthat Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim ag ainst Defe ndant Quint ana in her off icial c a pa c ity sh ou ld b e dis mis se d a s r e dund ant; ( c ) DE NI ED WI TH O U T P R E JU D I C E i n s o f ar a s De fe nd a nts aase rt that Def

endant Quintana is entitled to qualified immunit y ; and (D) GRANTED insofar as Def endants seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s Se c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t th e Di str ic t; ( 4 ) W i th r e s p e c t t o C o un t IV , D e f e n d an t s ’ m o t i o n i s G RA

N T E D , an d C o un tIV is dismi ssed in its entirety ; and (5) Wit h respe ct to Count V, Defe ndants’ motion is DENI ED. In a dd iti on , to the e xtent Pla int if f i nte nd s to a lle g e he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im a g a ins t Def endant Quintana

in her individual ca

pacity , Plaintiff must amend her c omplaint, by no later than October16, 2009 , to specify that Def endant Quintana

is being sued in her individual capa city and to alleg e fa cts sufficie nt to support her cla im that Defe ndant Quintana should be he ld p e rs on a lly

lia ble . I f P la int if

f d e c lin e s to do so , th e Court sh a ll tre at he r f

a ilure to t ime ly amend a s a conc ession that she does not see k to assert he r Section 1983 cla im ag ainst Defe ndant Quintana in her

individual capac ity . Plaintiff is further a dvised that if she c hooses to amend he r
c omp la int , s he may

ame nd on ly to f ur the r c lari fy

he r S e c tio n 1 98 3 c la im w ithre sp e c t to3 2

Def endant Quintana

in her individual ca

pacity and to re move those cla ims the Court has dismiss ed in this Memorandum Opinion and Or der; Plaintiff may not otherwise amend her
c omp la int a bs e nt e ith e r D e fe nd ants ’ o r t his Court ’s c on se nt, purs ua nt t o F e de ra l Ru le of

Civ il Procedur e 15(a ). In the eve nt Plainti ff doe s amend he r complaint to specif y that her Sec tion 19 83 c la im i s a sse rt e d a g a ins t D e fe nd ant Q uintana in h e r i nd ivi du a l c a

pa c ity , th e Court

sh a ll permit Def

endant Quintana

an opportunity

to file a re newe d motion with respect to her claim of qu a lif ie d immun ity , if

sh e de e ms i t a

pp ro pr iate . A n a

pp ro pr iate Or de r a c c omp anie s th is Memorandum Opinion. Date: September 30, 2009
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