and fact-based conclusions of law, the appeals officer's decision will not be 

disturbed if it is supported by substantial evidence. Manwill, 123 Nev. at 

241-42, 162 P.3d at 879. "Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Wright v. State, 

Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 121 Nev. 122, 125, 110 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2005) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). 

Having considered the parties arguments and the record on 

appeal, we conclude that the district court improperly substituted its 

judgment in this case for that of the appeals officer. Here, the appeals 

officer concluded that CCMSI properly denied Goodin's claim for heart 

disease related workers' compensation benefits because, although Goodin 

was a corrections officer who was generally entitled to the statutory 

presumption that his heart disease arose out of and in the course of his 

employment, NRS 617.457(1), he was precluded from enjoying the benefits 

of that presumption insofar as he had been ordered in writing to correct 

certain predisposing conditions that lead to heart disease, but he had 

failed to correct these conditions even though it was within his ability to 

do so. NRS 617.457(10). 

In support of the appeals officer's conclusion, the record 

evidence demonstrates that, in 2010 and 2011, before he was diagnosed 

with heart disease, Goodin was instructed in writing by his examining 

physician to correct the predisposing conditions of low HDL cholesterol 

and high triglycerides, but that he failed to correct these conditions. 

Moreover, the record shows that, at least with regard to his triglyceride 

level, correction of the condition was within Goodin's ability, as, after 

Goodin's heart disease was diagnosed, he began taking medication and his 

triglyceride level then fell to within the recommended limits. 

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Thus, the appeals officer's conclusion that Goodin could have 

corrected his triglyceride level by consulting a primary care physician and 

taking medication was supported by substantial evidence in the record. 

As a result, the district court was required to defer to this conclusion. See 

Manwill, 123 Nev. at 241-42, 162 P.3d at 879. And because the record 

supports the appeals officer's conclusion that Goodin failed to correct a 

predisposing condition that was within his ability to correct, he was not 

entitled to the benefit of the presumption that his heart disease arose out 

of and in the course of his work. See NRS 617.457(10). Accordingly, the 

district court was required to affirm the denial of benefits, see Manw ill, 

123 Nev. at 241-42,162 P.3d at 879, and we therefore 

ORDER the judgment of the district court REVERSED. 

it-cc 

Hardesty 

J. 

rpc, J. 

Douglas 

CHERRY, J., dissenting: 

Because I profoundly disagree with my colleagues decision to 

reverse the district court's grant of judicial review, thereby depriving 

respondent, corrections officer Frank Goodin, of the benefit of NRS 

617.457(10)'s presumption that his heart disease arose out of and in the 

course of his employment, I must dissent. 

By its terms, NRS 617.457(10) could only preclude Goodin 

from enjoying the benefit of that presumption if he failed to correct a 

predisposing condition that was within his ability to correct. But here, 

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Goodin testified that after being ordered to improve his HDL cholesterol 

and triglyceride levels, he exercised, eliminated virtually all red meat from 

his diet, and began taking fish oil pills in an effort to address these 

concerns. In so doing, he took all of the specific steps that the examining 

physician had directed him to take in order to correct these predisposing 

conditions. 

While it is true that Goodin did not consult a primary care 

physician, this alone cannot be dispositive to exclude him from the 

benefits of NRS 617.457(10)'s presumption. The record demonstrates that 

Goodin had already received the examining physician's advice on how to 

improve his HDL cholesterol and triglyceride levels—advice that, as 

discussed above, he fully complied with—and nothing in the record 

provides any indication that another doctor would have advised him to 

proceed any differently to address these issues. 

In essence then, this court has opted to reverse the district 

court's grant of judicial review based simply on the possibility that a 

second doctor might have prescribed medications to treat these issues and 

that those medications might have improved Goodin's HDL cholesterol 

and triglyceride levels. But when Goodin visited another doctor regarding 

an unrelated matter, he apparently asked that doctor's advice regarding 

how best to address these issues and was once again told that diet and 

exercise were the way to improve his conditions. 

Also worth noting is that while Goodin's HDL cholesterol and 

triglyceride levels did initially worsen in 2011, the record demonstrates 

that these levels did, in fact, improve between 2011 and 2012. The record 

further reveals that, even when Goodin began taking medication following 

his 2012 cardiac episode, his HDL cholesterol had not risen to the 

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recommended level when he was examined again in 2013. Despite the 

improvements in Goodin's conditions between 2011 and 2012, and the 

ultimate failure of his prescribed medication to bring about the necessary 

improvements in his HDL levels, however, this court has opted to 

reinstate the appeals officer's decision to strip Goodin of the benefits of 

NRS 617.457(10)'s presumption solely because he did not seek out a 

primary care physician for further advice regarding his HDL cholesterol 

and triglyceride levels. 

For the reasons stated herein, I believe that thefl appeals officer 

clearly erred in finding that Goodin had failed to correct his predisposing 

conditions within his ability to do so, and I would therefore affirm the 

district court's grant of his petition for judicial review of that decision. See 

NRS 233B.135(3); Manwill v. Clark Cnty., 123 Nev. 238, 241, 162 P.3d 

876, 879 (2007). 

cc: Hon. Abbi Silver, District Judge 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Edward M. Bernstein & Associates/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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