Filed 2/17/23 Ankola v. Ankola CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not 

c ertified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion has not been 

c ertified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a). 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MANISHKUMAR ANKOLA,

Petitioner and Appellant,

v.

PRIYANKA ANKOLA,

Respondent.

B322550, B322558, 

B322562

(Santa Clara County

Super. Ct. No. 15FL173072)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 

Clara County, James E. Towery, Judge. Affirmed.

Manishkumar Ankola for Petitioner and Appellant.

No appearances for Defendant and Respondent.

_______________________________________
2

INTRODUCTION

These are three appeals

1 arising from a judgment of 

dissolution. Petitioner Manish2 Ankola challenges numerous 

rulings by the trial court below; specifically: 1) the court erred in 

its ruling on the parties’ date of separation; 2) the court abused 

its discretion in denying Manish’s motion to compel and request 

for terminating and/or monetary sanctions; 3) the court abused 

its discretion in denying temporary spousal support to Manish; 4) 

the court abused its discretion in denying attorney’s fees to 

Manish as a prevailing party in domestic violence restraining 

order proceedings; and 5) the court exhibited bias against him 

during the trial on property issues, necessitating different orders 

or a remand for a new trial.

3

1 On the court’s own motion, the appeals were ordered to be 

considered together for purposes of briefing, oral argument, and 

disposition. They were then transferred from the Sixth Appellate 

District to the Second.

2 Petitioner refers to himself throughout his brief as “Manish” 

and we do the same. No disrespect is intended.

3 Although Manish sets forth additional rulings in his three 

notices of appeal and three additional amended notices of appeal, 

and references facts relating to some of these other rulings in his 

statement of facts, his opening brief is limited to the issues 

referenced above. An “appellant must present each point 

separately in the opening brief under an appropriate heading, 

showing the nature of the question to be presented and the point 

to be made; otherwise, the point will be forfeited.” (Keyes v. 

Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 656.) “Courts will ordinarily 

treat the appellant’s failure to raise an issue in his or her opening 

brief as a waiver of that challenge.” (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, 

Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 659, 685.) 
3

Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Manish filed a petition for nullity on December 15, 2015

alleging that his marriage to respondent Priyanka Ankola was 

voidable based on fraud.

4 He stated that the date of marriage 

was June 12, 2014, and the date of separation was November 30, 

2015. Priyanka filed her response seeking a dissolution of the 

marriage and claiming the date of separation as October 4, 2015. 

1. Prior appellate proceedings

This case has already resulted in two published opinions

arising from at least four prior appeals. (In re Marriage of 

Ankola (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 560 (Ankola I) and In re Marriage 

of Ankola (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 369 (Ankola II).) As relevant to 

the issues in the present appeals, we will summarize the facts 

from those two opinions briefly.

In Ankola I, the Court of Appeal reversed the grant of a 

mutual domestic violence restraining order where the statutory 

requirements were not met. Priyanka filed a request for a 

domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) in May 2016.

5 

(Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) After several 

continuances, the trial on the DVRO and on Manish’s petition for 

4 Priyanka Gupta was formerly known during the marriage as 

Priyanka Ankola. As with her former husband, we will refer to 

her by her first name for ease of reference, with no disrespect 

intended.

5 The record reveals that while Priyanka filed her first request for 

DVRO in May, a second one was filed by her in July 2016. 

Manish claims the May request was never served. For ease of 

reference, we refer to the one filed in July–which is the first one 

that actually went to hearing–as her “first” DVRO.
4

nullity came on for hearing in September 2016. The trial court 

denied both Manish’s request to declare the marriage a nullity 

and Priyanka’s request for a DVRO. (Ibid.)

In February 2017, Priyanka filed a second request for a 

DVRO, which was granted by the trial court on August 15, 2017 

(the August 2017 DVRO) for the maximum allowable period of 

five years. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) 

The very next day, August 16, 2017, Manish filed his own 

request for a DVRO against Priyanka. (Ankola I, supra, 36 

Cal.App.5th at p. 563.) While Priyanka filed a response, she did 

not file a separate application for another DVRO. (Ibid.) 

Manish’s request for a DVRO came on for hearing in 2018. 

After the matter was submitted, the trial court found “ ‘under 

Family Code section 6305 that each party has committed acts of 

domestic violence’ ” and that neither party was “ ‘primarily acting 

out of self-defense,’ ” and thus ordered mutual restraining orders 

against Priyanka and Manish. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 564.) In April 2018, the trial court entered the second 

DVRO against Manish (the April 2018 DVRO).

6 (Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal reversed the April 2018 DVRO against 

Manish, reasoning that the criteria set forth in Family Code 

section 6305, subdivision (a)(1) had not been met. Specifically, as 

to the second DVRO, Priyanka had not filed a second request for 

restraining order using a Judicial Council restraining order 

application form. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 565–

6 A DVRO was issued against Priyanka the same day. The 

DVRO against her was not referenced in that appeal although 

the record reflects that she separately tried to appeal or set aside 

that order.
5

567.) The appellate court further rejected the argument that the 

April 2018 DVRO was a modification of the August 2017 DVRO,

which was by then the subject of a separate appeal. (Id. at 

p. 567.) The court ordered that “the parties shall bear their own 

costs on appeal.” (Id. at p. 568.)

In Ankola II, the appellate court ruled on three appeals 

relating to various rulings of the lower court as of that date. It 

first affirmed the five-year August 2017 DVRO against Manish, 

finding substantial evidence supported the order.

7 It also

affirmed the trial court’s ruling denying Manish’s petition for

nullity and granting a judgment of dissolution instead. (Ankola 

II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 372.)

The appellate court reversed, however, the trial court’s 

ruling rescinding a prior award of attorney’s fees in Manish’s 

favor.8 (Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at pp. 372–373.) The 

facts leading to this conclusion were as follows. Subsequent to 

the hearing on the first request for DVRO filed by Priyanka,

which was denied by the trial court in September 2016, the court 

7 Among other things, the Ankola II court found that Priyanka’s 

evidence that Manish had stalked her by moving into an 

apartment “ ‘directly next door’ ” to hers after she had moved out, 

as well as sending numerous emails to her after she had asked 

him to stop communicating with her or her family, was 

substantial evidence supporting the issuance of the DVRO. 

While Manish claimed he did not know Priyanka was still living 

in that complex at the time he moved in, the trial court rejected 

his testimony, finding that Manish “ ‘lied repeatedly on 

significant points.’ ” (Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 380.)

8 While Manish is self-represented on appeal, at various times in 

the lower court he had counsel representing him.
6

held a separate hearing on Manish’s request for attorney’s fees as 

a prevailing party in that DVRO action. In March 2017 the court 

granted Manish’s request in the amount of $10,000. (Id. at 

pp. 373–374.)

After Priyanka obtained the August 2017 DVRO against 

Manish, she then moved for attorney’s fees as a prevailing party 

in that proceeding. (Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 374.) 

In October 2017 the court both awarded fees to Priyanka (in the 

amount of $10,562.50) and rescinded the $10,000 fees it had 

previously awarded to Manish. (Ibid.) Explaining its order 

rescinding Manish’s fee award, the trial court had stated that it 

“ ‘recall[ed]’ ” the first DVRO request that Priyanka filed and was 

“ ‘sorry, in retrospect, [that the court] denied it.’ ” (Id. at p. 382.) 

The court further referenced Manish’s “ ‘untruthful testimony’ ” 

on the witness stand in connection with the August 2017 DVRO. 

(Ibid.)

The Court of Appeal held this was reversible error because 

the basis of the trial court’s rescission of Manish’s attorney’s fee 

award was new evidence, rather than the evidence presented at 

the original proceeding. Thus, the court had effectively and 

improperly granted a new trial, sua sponte. (Ankola II, supra, 53 

Cal.App.5th at pp. 383–384.) 

The Ankola II court granted Priyanka her costs on the two 

appeals she prevailed on. But it ordered the parties to bear their 

own costs on the appeal Manish prevailed on. (Id. at p. 390.)

2. Manish’s request for attorney’s fees in connection 

with DVRO proceedings

The opinion in Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 560 was 

issued in June 2019. The following September, Manish filed in 

the trial court a request for order (RFO) for attorney’s fees and 
7

costs in the amount of $36,059 for having prevailed in the DVRO 

against Priyanka (the April 2018 DVRO) and for the mutual 

DVRO “reversed on appeal.”

Manish sought $15,868 in connection with the underlying 

trial on the April 2018 DVRO, $17,900 for attorney’s fees 

expended on the Ankola I appeal, and $2,291 for opposing 

Priyanka’s motion to set aside the DVRO against her. 

The hearing on Manish’s motion for fees was held in 

November 2019. The court denied the motion. At oral argument, 

the court articulated its reasoning as follows: 1) the Court of 

Appeal did not make any order for attorney’s fees on appeal; 2) 

the trial court had already made a finding that neither party was 

a prevailing party at the hearing on the mutual DVRO and did 

not intend for either party to be awarded fees relating to that 

April 2018 DVRO hearing; 3) it would be inequitable to require 

Priyanka to pay Manish’s fees from the second DVRO, given that 

there was at the time a five-year DVRO against Manish; and 4) 

the court had already denied Manish’s request for fees in 

connection with the hearing on Priyanka’s request to set aside 

the DVRO against her.

3. Motion for terminating and monetary sanctions 

While the various appeals were pending, discovery was 

ongoing. Multiple motions to compel were filed. In August 2019, 

Manish filed a motion for terminating sanctions, to compel 

further responses and production of documents, and for monetary 

sanctions against Priyanka and her counsel.

This motion was also heard at the November 2019 hearing. 

The trial court denied the motion on the grounds that it was 

untimely and that Priyanka “used good faith to provide 

reasonable responses to the best of her ability.”
8

4. Manish’s requests for temporary spousal support

Manish first requested temporary spousal support in 

February 2019. The trial court denied the request in March 

2019.

In November 2020, Manish again requested temporary 

spousal support. The trial court again denied the request. 

5. The trial on property issues and date of separation

At a status conference in November 2020, Manish stated he 

was not ready for trial and sought a continuance. The trial court 

granted the request and set trial for January 2021. The court’s 

estimate was two hours. Manish claims that he requested a twoday trial and named four witnesses.

9

Manish then filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude any 

evidence that had not been provided in Priyanka’s discovery 

responses or in her trial brief. The court heard the motion on the 

day of trial and deferred ruling on it until “conclusion of trial.” 

The trial took place over a period of approximately two hours and 

thirty-five minutes with a twenty-minute break. The court 

issued its tentative statement of decision finding the date of 

separation to be December 15, 2015 and making various orders 

regarding property division. Manish filed objections to it, and the 

9 Manish does not cite to anything in the record for this 

proposition, although we assume for the sake of argument that it 

is true. The trial brief Manish filed on January 4, 2021 did state 

an estimate of two days but this was filed after the hearing of 

November 2020. In that same brief, he named both parties as 

witnesses, as well as “Amit Bhatnagar” to testify about “facts 

related Parties’ marital relationship [sic], before and after, and 

characterization of some assets.” 
9

court then issued its final statement of decision, which did not 

differ from the proposed draft.

DISCUSSION

A. Competing Rules of Court

Several of Manish’s contentions on appeal (the date of 

separation and on the character and division of property) involve 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s findings. 

However, in the statement of facts in his opening brief relating to 

these issues, Manish has recited only those facts that are 

favorable to his position. Such conduct is not to be condoned. (In 

re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1530–

1531.) “ ‘It is incumbent upon appellants to state fully, with 

transcript references, the evidence which is claimed to be 

insufficient to support the findings.’ ” (In re Marriage of Fink

(1979) 25 Cal.3d 877, 887.)

Normally, we would find Manish’s claims challenging the 

sufficiency of the evidence waived due to this failure. (Hjelm v. 

Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 

1165–1166; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).)

In this case, however, there is a competing rule under 

which, if the respondent fails to file a respondent’s brief, “the 

court may decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, and 

any oral argument by the appellant.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.220(a)(2).) Under a prior iteration of that rule, courts could 

accept as true the statement of facts in the appellant’s opening 

brief in the absence of a respondent’s brief. (Petrosyan v. Prince 

Corp. (2013) 223 Cal.App.4th 587, 593, fn. 2.) Even in such a 

case, however, the reviewing court must examine the record and 

reverse only if prejudicial error is found. (Ibid.) Although the 

statute’s language has changed, we deem the import of the 
10

competing rules as remaining the same. Therefore, we will not 

deem Manish’s sufficiency of the evidence claims waived in light 

of Priyanka’s failure to file a respondent’s brief.

B. The trial court did not err in finding the date of 

separation to be December 15, 2015

1. Standard of review

“Date of separation is a factual issue to be determined by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” (In re Marriage of Manfer (2006)

144 Cal.App.4th 925, 930.) “ ‘Our review is limited to 

determining whether the court's factual determinations are 

supported by substantial evidence and whether the court acted 

reasonably in exercising its discretion.’ ” (Ibid.)

2. Substantial evidence supports the trial

court’s ruling

The date of separation can be relevant in certain cases 

largely because the “earnings and accumulations” of a spouse 

after the date of separation are the separate property of that

spouse. (Fam. Code, § 771, subd. (a).)

The date of separation occurs “when either of the parties 

does not intend to resume the marriage and his or her actions 

bespeak the finality of the marital relationship.” (In re Marriage 

of Hardin (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 448, 451.) “All factors bearing 

on either party’s intentions ‘to return or not to return to the other 

spouse’ are to be considered. [Citation.] No particular facts are

per se determinative.” (Id. at p. 452.) “The ultimate question to 

be decided in determining the date of separation is whether either 

or both of the parties perceived the rift in their relationship as 

final. The best evidence of this is their words and actions.” (Id.

at p. 453.)
11

The trial took place on January 12, 2021, one of the dates 

for which there is no transcript.

10 In the absence of a transcript, 

we look at the parties’ respective trial briefs. There, Manish 

argued that the date of separation was December 26, 2015 while 

Priyanka argued the date should be October 4, 2015. Manish 

filed his petition for nullity on December 15, 2015, stating the 

date of separation to be November 30, 2015.11 Manish stated in 

his trial brief that he served his nullity petition on Priyanka on 

December 30, 2015. 

The trial court found the date of separation to be December 

15, 2015, rejecting both parties’ proposed dates, but finding it to 

be closer to Manish’s date than Priyanka’s. The trial court noted 

that Priyanka consulted with an attorney prior to December 

2015, never intended to resume her marriage, and moved her 

furniture out of the family residence on October 4, 2015; on the 

other hand, she admitted to having sexual relations with Manish 

on two occasions after that date. The trial court concluded that 

“the testimony of both parties was contradictory on the date of 

separation” and that “[t]here was inconsistent behavior by both 

parties regarding this issue. In considering the evidence as a 

whole, the Court finds the date of separation to be December 15, 

10 As reflected in the clerk’s certificate in B322562 dated 8/5/21:

“per minute orders dated 11/4/20, 12/16/20, and 1/12/21[,] [n]o 

[c]ourt [r]eporter was present at these [h]earing dates” and thus 

the reporter’s transcripts for those dates “will not be part of the 

[r]ecord.” 

11 Recitations in a petition may be considered as evidence but are 

not conclusive as to date of separation. (In re Marriage of 

Umphrey (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 647, 657.) 
12

2015, which was the date that [Manish] filed the Nullity 

Petition.”

12

As noted, there is no reporter’s transcript of the trial 

proceedings. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) [“If an 

appellant intends to raise any issue that requires consideration of 

the oral proceedings in the superior court, the record on appeal 

must include [either a reporter’s transcript, an agreed statement, 

or a settled statement”]; Estate of Fain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th

973, 992 [“Where no reporter’s transcript has been provided and 

no error is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, 

the judgment must be conclusively presumed correct”].) “The 

effect of this rule is that an appellant who attacks a judgment but 

supplies no reporter’s transcript will be precluded from raising an 

argument as to the sufficiency of the evidence.” (Estate of Fain, 

at p. 992.) 

There is no error apparent on the face of the record. In the 

absence of a transcript, the decision reached by the trial court 

must be presumed correct. Moreover, even if we reach the 

question on the merits, and mindful that our job is not to reweigh 

12 Manish contends that 1) the “status only” judgment (which 

adjudicated the status of the marriage being dissolved only) 

which was entered previously in this case improperly included 

October 4, 2015 as the day of separation and 2) a stipulation 

regarding the date of separation being December 15, 2015 was 

entered into by his attorney without his consent in April 2019. 

However, it is evident from the court’s statement of decision that 

the court neither held Manish to the date listed in the status only 

judgment nor referenced the prior stipulation regarding 

December 15, 2015, but rather allowed both parties to present 

evidence that the date of separation was a different date than the 

one entered or stipulated to. 
13

the evidence in the way that appellant believes is most 

persuasive to his claim, but to review the entirety of the available 

record including all evidence presented by both sides, we find 

that the factual determination as to the date of separation by the 

court is supported by substantial evidence. 

Finally, even if substantial evidence did not support the 

trial court’s date of separation, Manish does not set forth any 

consequences to the parties arising from the trial court selecting 

December 15 over December 26—a date only 11 days later. His 

brief contains no reference to any way in which Manish was 

harmed by the court’s selecting the first date over the other. (Cf.

Manfer, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 929 [“[b]ecause ‘[t]he 

earnings and accumulations of a spouse . . . while living separate 

and apart from the other spouse, are the separate property of the 

spouse’ [citation], the date of separation can be of considerable 

consequence with regard to the parties' property rights”].)

An appellant has the burden not only to show error but 

prejudice from that error. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) If an

appellant fails to satisfy that burden, his argument will be

rejected on appeal.

We affirm the trial court’s ruling on the date of separation.

C. Manish’s request for attorney’s fees incurred in 

the DVRO proceedings

1. Standard of review

We apply the abuse of discretion standard when reviewing 

the amount of an attorney’s fees award. (Loeffler v. Medina

(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1509.) “ ‘[A]n experienced trial 

judge is in a much better position than an appellate court to 

assess the value of the legal services rendered in his or her court

. . .’ [Citation.] ‘The only proper basis of reversal of the amount 
14

of an attorney fees award is if the amount awarded is so large or 

small that it shocks the conscience and suggests that passion and 

prejudice influenced the determination.’ ” (Ibid.) Similarly, a 

trial court’s determination of a party’s entitlement to attorney’s

fees is also subject to review for abuse of discretion. (Canyon 

Crest Conservancy v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 

398, 408–409 [“ ‘Whether the statutory requirements have been 

satisfied so as to justify a fee award is a question committed to 

the discretion of the trial court, unless the question turns on 

statutory construction, which we review de novo’ ”].)

We do not review the trial court’s reasoning, but rather its 

ruling. “A trial court’s order is affirmed if correct on any theory, 

even if the trial court’s reasoning was not correct.” (Loeffler v. 

Medina, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504, fn. 11.)

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion

At issue here is Manish’s request for attorney’s fees and 

costs in the amount of $36,059 for having obtained a DVRO 

against Priyanka (the April 2018 DVRO) and for getting the 

mutual DVRO against him reversed on appeal, which had also 

been issued in April 2018.

13 The motion also requested fees for 

opposing Priyanka’s motion to set aside the DVRO issued against 

her. 

13 The underlying attorney’s fees orders that were previously 

granted by the trial court (the $10,000 to Manish that was 

erroneously rescinded and then reinstated by the Court of 

Appeal, as well as the $10,562.50 awarded to Priyanka) are not at 

issue in these appeals and presumably, if they have not already

been offset in part and paid, will be part of the final calculations 

regarding who owes what to whom.
15

Under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act, a court shall 

award attorney fees and costs for a prevailing petitioner, subject 

to a determination that the party ordered to pay has or is 

reasonably likely to have, the ability to pay. (Fam. Code,

§ 6344.)14

As an initial matter, we agree with Manish that the court 

reached some erroneous conclusions. First, we agree that the 

Ankola I court’s decision that each party shall bear their own 

costs is not determinative of whether the trial court could have 

granted attorney’s fees based on Manish’s successful appeal of 

the April 2018 DVRO. California Rules of Court, rule 8.278, 

which sets forth the general rule for costs to the prevailing party 

on appeal, provides that: “In the interests of justice, the Court of 

Appeal may also award or deny costs as it deems proper.” (Id. at 

subd. (a)(5).) It further provides: “Unless the court orders 

otherwise, an award of costs neither includes attorney’s fees on 

appeal nor precludes a party from seeking them under rule 

3.1702.” (Id. at subd. (d)(2).) In other words, the decision about 

costs on appeal is entirely separate from a decision about the 

entitlement to attorney’s fees on appeal. (Butler-Rupp v. 

Lourdeaux (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 918, 927.) To collect appellate 

attorney’s fees, “a party must demonstrate the right to do so 

under either a statute or a contract.” (Ibid.)

14 This code section was amended effective January 1, 2023. 

However, under the version of Family Code section 6344 that was 

in effect at the time of the hearings below, the language, while 

different, still required that in the case of either a prevailing 

petitioner or respondent a court was to consider the parties’ 

respective abilities to pay. (Former Fam. Code, § 6344 subd. (b).)
16

We also agree that, as it relates to the fees sought for 

obtaining his DVRO against Priyanka, as a prevailing petitioner, 

Family Code section 6344, subdivision (c) requires a court to 

consider the parties’ financial circumstances. Here, the court 

considered the issue “irrelevant.” 

However, we do not find either of these errors to require 

reversal of the court’s denial of fees in this case. When we are 

able to determine from the record that even if the lower court had 

applied the correct standard, it would have reached the same 

result, the error does not mandate reversal. (Loeffler v. Medina, 

supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504, fn. 11 [“to the extent the trial 

court erred in applying the wrong standard, that error is 

harmless because . . . the trial court made factual findings that 

we are able to apply to . . . determine that, had the trial court 

applied the correct standard, it would have reached the same 

result”].)

Here, the record reveals that these errors were harmless. 

a. Fees for reversing the DVRO against 

Manish in the Court of Appeal

As for the fees spent in the Court of Appeal reversing the 

mutual restraining order against Manish, we find that the record 

adequately shows that the court would have denied fees even 

without its erroneous conclusion that the appellate court ruled

that each side should bear its own costs.

In the posture of receiving attorney’s fees for successfully 

reversing a DVRO against him, Manish is effectively a prevailing 

respondent. The statutory language thus makes any award of 

fees discretionary. 

The record of the argument is clear that the court found 

that neither party was a prevailing party at the hearing that 
17

resulted in the 2018 mutual DVROs. The court stated this 

conclusion at the November 2019 hearing even after the Court of 

Appeal had reversed the DVRO against Manish.

This conclusion is not an abuse of discretion. As the Court 

of Appeal noted in its opinion reversing the “mutual” restraining 

order as to Manish, there was already a five-year DVRO in effect 

against him when the April 2018 mutual order was erroneously 

granted. (Ankola I, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 567.) That 

August 2017 DVRO was later upheld. (Ankola II, supra, 53 

Cal.App.5th at p. 381.)

The trial court mentioned that preexisting DVRO against 

Manish as an additional basis for denying Manish’s request for 

fees for obtaining a DVRO against Priyanka. Specifically, the 

court stated that “under all of the circumstances here I think it 

would be inequitable to assess [Priyanka] with attorneys fees 

from that second DVRO, given the context that there was and 

remains a five-year DVRO against Mr. Ankola. And I, under the 

circumstances, find it would be vastly inequitable to award fees 

on that basis.” The trial court later stated that “the reason why 

the [c]ourt entered a five-year restraining order is it found your 

conduct to be egregious. So you are now suffering the 

consequences of your behavior. And I’m sorry that that’s the 

case, but that is the case.”15

15 Far from demonstrating bias or prejudice, as Manish argues, 

these statements simply set forth the trial court’s opinion of the 

evidence, which is wholly consistent with the performance of its 

duties. (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 

Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219–1220 [“ ‘[W]hen the state of mind of the 

trial judge appears to be adverse to one of the parties but is based 
18

In essence, even though the April 2018 DVRO against 

Manish had been reversed by the Court of Appeal, as of the date 

of the hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees, there were still 

active restraining orders against both parties—the five-year 

August 2017 DVRO against Manish, which the court itself stated 

was based on “egregious” conduct, and a three-year order against 

Priyanka.

Where a statute providing entitlement to attorney’s fees to 

a prevailing party does not define “prevailing party,” such a 

determination is left to the discretion of the trial court. (See, e.g.,

Galan v. Wolfriver Holding Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1124, 

1128.) The trial court must determine who is the prevailing 

party “ ‘on a practical level.’ ” (Id. at p. 1129.)16 

In this case, it is clear from the record that the court 

concluded that there was no prevailing party after the April 2018 

hearing—even after the second DVRO against Manish was 

upon actual observance of the witnesses and the evidence given 

during the trial of an action, it does not amount to that prejudice 

against a litigant which disqualifies him in the trial of the action. 

. . . The opinion thus formed, being the result of a judicial 

hearing, does not amount to [improper] bias and prejudice’ ”].)

16 Other courts have held that when the statute is silent, the 

general definition of “prevailing party” in Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1032 may be used. (See, e.g., Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 

Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777.) In this case, it amounts to the same 

thing, as Code of Civil Procedure section 1032, subdivision (a)(4) 

provides that when a party recovers “other than monetary relief” 

and in “situations other than as specified, the ‘prevailing party’ 

shall be as determined by the court, and under those 

circumstances, the court, in its discretion, . . . may apportion costs 

between the parties on the same or adverse sides.” 
19

reversed—because the restraining order awarded to Manish was 

offset by the existing five-year DVRO that had been awarded 

against him. 

The trial court is in the best place to observe the testimony 

and the demeanor of the witnesses and to consider over all whose 

attorney’s fees were justified and whose were not. Indeed, 

although we lack the transcripts upon which the DVROs were 

granted, the transcripts that we do have are replete with 

references to Manish’s re-litigation of various matters, ending 

with a warning that he could be declared a vexatious litigant if he 

did not change his litigious ways. (Cf. In re Marriage of 

Nakamoto & Hsu (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 457, 473 [court’s findings 

that party overlitigated his divorce case were supported by 

substantial evidence, so it was not abuse of discretion to deny his 

request for fees].) 

Because the record supports the court’s denial of Manish’s 

fees, this is not a basis to reverse. 

b. Evidence of financial condition

Next we address the trial court’s erroneous statement 

during oral argument that the financial condition of the parties is 

irrelevant to a ruling on a request for fees by a prevailing 

petitioner. Upon the court’s announcing its tentative decision

against him, Manish began to argue that the court should 

consider the parties’ ability to pay. Although the court stated 

that the issue was “irrelevant,” it allowed the argument. In 

response, the court then noted that it had, approximately six 

months previously, denied Manish’s request for spousal support 

and need-based attorney’s fees. The court inquired whether there 

was any change of circumstances since it had ruled on those 

matters, and noted that despite Manish’s alleged hardships, 
20

Manish was in possession of real property that Manish valued at 

$800,000. Thus, to the extent the trial court erroneously 

concluded that evidence of Manish’s finances were irrelevant as it 

related to fees regarding Manish’s having obtained the April 2018 

DVRO against Priyanka, the record adequately demonstrates 

that there is no likelihood that the trial court would have reached 

a different result without that erroneous comment; indeed, 

arguably the court did consider them.

17 Especially in light of 

Manish’s failures to meet his burden either below or on appeal,18

we find that this error was harmless.

17 When it stated that the financial condition of the parties was 

irrelevant, the court did not distinguish between the fees 

incurred by Manish as a prevailing party on his request, or as a 

prevailing defendant in the mutual DVRO that was reversed on 

appeal. Finally, Manish does not make any separate argument 

challenging the court’s ruling that it had already denied the 

$2,291 in fees incurred by Manish opposing Priyanka’s RFO to 

set aside the April 2018 DVRO and so any such argument is 

waived. (Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc., supra, 139 Cal.App.4th 

at p. 685.) 

18 In his brief on appeal, Manish does not cite to his financial 

documents in support of his RFO for attorney’s fees, citing 

instead to documents filed in support of his request for spousal 

support, filed some eleven months later. A court’s ruling at any 

given time can only be based on, and must be reviewed with 

reference to, the facts that were before it at that time. (In re Zeth 

S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [“ ‘an appeal reviews the correctness 

of a judgment as of the time of its rendition, upon a record of 

matters which were before the trial court for its consideration’ ”].) 

Moreover, even looking at the relevant documents filed in 

support of his RFO, Manish failed to file any declaration by an 
21

D. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

denying the motion to compel and denying 

terminating or monetary sanctions 

1. Standard of review

A trial court’s determination of a motion to compel 

discovery is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Costco Wholesale

Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 725, 733.) An order for 

discovery sanctions, including terminating sanctions, is also 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. (R.S. Creative, Inc. v. Creative 

Cotton, Ltd. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 486, 496.)

We affirm a court’s ruling where there is a sufficient legal 

ground to support it, regardless of the grounds relied upon by the 

trial court. (Becerra v. County of Santa Cruz (1998) 68 

Cal.App.4th 1450, 1457.) The order of the trial court is presumed 

correct and all presumptions are indulged to support the order on 

matters as to which the record is silent. It is an appellant’s 

burden to affirmatively demonstrate error and, where the 

evidence is in conflict, this court will not disturb the trial court’s 

attorney or attach any invoices and chose instead to summarize 

them in his own declaration. As the moving party, a prevailing 

defendant seeking fees and costs “ ‘ “ ‘bear[s] the burden of 

establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the 

appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.’ ” ’ ” (City of Colton 

v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) While lack of 

invoices or billing statements is not fatal to a request for fees, 

they can be made up for by a sworn declaration of counsel. (Id. at 

p. 786.) Here, however, all the court had to go on was the 

declaration of Manish, a party it had already found to have 

lacked credibility.
22

findings. (Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 

231 Cal.App.3d 481, 487.) 

2. There is no basis for reversal of the order 

denying the motion to compel

Manish argues that the ruling on the motion denying his 

motion to compel should be reversed because the motion was 

timely filed within 45 days of Priyanka’s supplemental responses. 

However, Manish does not mention the second reason that was 

given by the trial court; namely, that it found the responses 

provided by Priyanka to have been in “good faith,” “reasonable,” 

and to the “best of her ability.”

The record supports this finding. As detailed in Priyanka’s 

counsel’s declaration in support of her opposition to the motion, 

she complied with the terms of a stipulation that had been made 

between her and Manish’s attorney at a prior hearing,19 and then 

19 Though it is not directly at issue in this appeal, Manish claims

that the stipulation entered into by his attorney at a prior 

hearing regarding discovery was not valid because he did not 

consent to or authorize it. We reject this faulty conclusion, as did 

the trial court. (See Blanton v. Womancare, Inc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 

396, 403–408 [attorney is authorized by virtue of his employment 

to bind the client by entering into stipulations on procedural 

matters but not to “ ‘impair the client’s substantial rights or the 

cause of action itself’ ” by, for example, settling the case or 

agreeing to transfer the action to arbitration]; Young v. Rosenthal

(1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 96, 116 [attorneys were acting within their 

authority as attorneys of record in entering into stipulation 

resolving a discovery dispute, noting: “If we were to give any 

credence to [appellant’s] argument, trial courts would no longer 

have the ability to resolve discovery disputes by any means other 

than formal, fully contested motions”].)
23

made numerous subsequent supplemental responses. Among the 

exhibits attached to the declaration was a cordial “meet and 

confer” letter from her counsel noting, among other things, that 

she would be producing certain additional documents, did not 

have other documents, and had already fully responded to yet 

other requests as of the original due date, and thus any further 

motion to compel would be untimely. Another exhibit consisted 

of her verified Fourth Supplemental Responses to the Second Set 

of Demands, served by mail on August 14, 2019. Her 

memorandum of points and authorities contended that as to 

certain documents, the motion to compel was untimely because 

the responses had taken place on May 24, 2019 and there was no 

indication that the response was incomplete or that she was still 

looking for information. Her opposition also argued that 

evidentiary and terminating sanctions should be denied because 

respondent “has no history of violating a discovery order” and due 

to Manish’s failure to fully meet and confer. We find no abuse of 

discretion as it relates to the denial of the motion to compel, even 

assuming the motion was filed timely.

Since we find it reasonable for the court to have denied the 

motion to compel, we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s 

failure to assess the requested monetary sanctions of $10,325 in 

connection with his motion.

Turning to Manish’s request for terminating sanctions, the 

standard for granting a motion for terminating sanctions is quite 

high. Discovery sanctions should be “appropriate to the 

dereliction, and should not exceed that which is required to 

protect the interests of the party entitled to but denied 

discovery.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 793.) 

Despite a court’s broad discretion to select the appropriate 
24

penalty, “the terminating sanction is a drastic penalty and should 

be used sparingly.” (Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of 

New York, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566, 604 [imposition of the 

terminating sanction was an abuse of discretion where it was the 

first and only sanction imposed].)

Indeed, “[a] prerequisite to the imposition of the dismissal 

sanction is that the party has wilfully [sic] failed to comply with a 

court order.” (Laguna Auto Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 

supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 488.) Here, there was no showing 

that Priyanka had failed to comply, willfully or not, with any 

prior court order.

20

Manish also argues the trial court’s bias against him was 

evident when, during a prior hearing on discovery, it mentioned 

that the “context” of the case included that it had ruled against 

him at a prior DVRO hearing and found him to lack credibility. 

He also claims that the court inaccurately recalled the case, 

appeared to be “annoyed” at him during the hearing on the 

discovery sanctions when he requested a statement of decision,

and that while the court agreed to give an oral one at the end of 

the hearing, it did not. None of these points merits reversal of 

the court’s ruling. 

Addressing the latter point first, we note the court was not 

required to give a statement of decision on this matter. Under 

20 Although Manish claimed that Priyanka violated unspecified 

prior court orders on discovery, the record does not support this 

argument. In fact, at the April 2019 hearing, the court issued a 

tentative only, and as Manish concedes, there was no formal 

stipulated order or findings and order after hearing relating to 

that April 2019 discovery hearing. 
25

Code of Civil Procedure section 632, upon timely request, a trial 

court shall issue a statement of decision explaining the factual 

and legal basis for its decision “upon the trial of a question of fact 

by the court.” A hearing on a motion for discovery sanctions is 

not a trial, and thus, no statement of decision was required. 

(Clinton v. Joshua Hendy Corp. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 183, 187–

188 [findings need not be made in proceedings to determine a 

motion even when affidavits are filed on a question of fact and 

testimony is taken to augment the affidavits, because section 632 

only applies to a “trial.”].) There are some notable exceptions to 

this general requirement in family law; for example, where the 

issues are sufficiently important, as in a child custody hearing, a 

statement of decision must be provided upon timely request 

regardless of whether the hearing is based on a motion or takes 

place at trial. (See City and County of San Francisco v. H.H. 

(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 531, 544–547 [court erred in refusing 

request for statement of decision when ordering a visitation 

schedule].) However, Manish cites no case requiring a statement 

of decision for a hearing on a motion for discovery sanctions and 

the caselaw suggests otherwise. (City and County of San 

Francisco, at p. 544 [section 632 “does not apply to an order on a 

motion”].)

Second, although Manish contends the court had an 

inaccurate recollection of the case, Manish does not explain in 

what regard. The two statements quoted in his brief (that 

“mother”

21 had a DVRO and the court ruled in “dad’s” favor, and 

21 We understand the trial court to have been referring to 

Priyanka as “mother” and Manish as “dad.” While there were no 

children in this particular case, it is not uncommon for family 
26

that the court awarded mother attorney’s fees for prevailing on 

her renewed DVRO) do not indicate any error. Specifically, as of 

the April 2019 hearing that Manish references, the court had 

ruled in Manish’s favor on Priyanka’s first DVRO; then, at a later 

hearing, the court granted Priyanka’s subsequent DVRO, found 

Manish to lack credibility, and granted Priyanka fees.

More importantly, a reasonable review of this record does 

not support an inference that the trial court denied the motion for 

discovery sanctions because it was annoyed with Manish or 

because of the prior DVRO history. In fact, despite the court’s 

concerns about Manish’s “litigation tactics” and that his filings 

were unreasonable in their bulk, in their frequency and in their 

attempts to relitigate matters that had already been litigated, the 

court denied (without prejudice) Priyanka’s motion to declare 

Manish a vexatious litigant at the very same hearing that it 

denied his motion for discovery sanctions.

Rather, the facts before the trial court supported a denial of 

the motion based on the court’s reasoning that the discovery 

responses were adequate. (Cf. Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract 

Society of New York, Inc., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 605–606 

[reversing terminating and monetary sanctions where there was 

no evidence that lesser sanctions would have failed to obtain 

compliance with the document production order].) Since we 

affirm on this ground, we need not address any other ground 

raised.

courts to refer to the parties by these monikers (or as “husband” 

and “wife”) rather than by individual names for ease of reference.
27

E. The denial of temporary spousal support to Manish

1. Standard of review

The standard of review that applies to an order for 

temporary spousal support is abuse of discretion. (In re Marriage 

of Lim & Carrasco (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 768, 773.) In 

exercising that discretion, a trial court may properly consider the 

“ ‘big picture’ ” concerning the parties’ assets and income 

available for support in light of the marital standard of living. 

(Ibid.) 

2. The trial court’s ruling was not an abuse of 

discretion

Temporary spousal support is governed by Family Code 

section 3600. That section provides that during the pendency of 

any proceeding for dissolution of marriage, the court may order 

“either spouse to pay any amount that is necessary for the 

support of the other spouse, consistent with the requirements of 

subdivisions (i) and (m) of Section 4320 and Section 4325.” (Fam. 

Code, § 3600.)22

Awards of temporary spousal support do not serve the same 

purpose, nor are they governed by the same procedures, as 

awards for permanent spousal support. “ ‘Temporary spousal 

support is utilized to maintain the living conditions and 

22 Family Code section 4325 does not apply here, as it prohibits 

an award of spousal support to a spouse who has been convicted 

of certain crimes for domestic violence, which did not occur in this 

case. Family Code section 4320, subdivision (i) relates to 

“documented evidence of any history of domestic violence” 

between the parties–which does apply in this case–and 

subdivision (m) relates to a criminal conviction of an abusive 

spouse–which does not.
28

standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as 

possible pending trial and the division of their assets and 

obligations.’ ” (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 

581, 594.) “Awards of temporary spousal support rest within the 

broad discretion of the trial court and may be ordered in ‘any 

amount’ ([Family Code] § 3600) subject only to the moving party’s 

needs and the other party’s ability to pay. [Citation.] Permanent 

support, by contrast, is constrained by numerous statutory 

factors set out in section 4320.” (Ibid.)

In light of this clear distinction, we reject Manish’s 

argument that the court abused its discretion by failing to 

consider the criteria set forth for permanent spousal support 

orders in Family Code section 4320. 

The initial order denying temporary spousal support, filed 

April 2019, noted that with husband currently unemployed and 

in law school, and wife earning $12,900 per month, guideline 

support23 would be approximately $4,000 per month. However, 

the court ruled that in this case there were “additional factors” 

which made application of the guideline formula inequitable.

Specifically, the court noted that:

(1) while the case had been pending since late 2015, the 

first request for spousal support wasn’t filed until February 2019; 

23 In many counties, including Santa Clara, temporary spousal 

support can be calculated according to certain formulas or 

standardized local schedules; however, the appropriateness of 

ordering such “guideline” support can be rebutted. (In re 

Marriage of Wittgrove (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1327–1328.)
29

2) while the parties had been separated over three years,

the marriage itself lasted only fourteen months (or at most, 

eighteen months, as argued by Manish’s attorney); 

3) that during the marriage, both parties were employed, 

each earning between $135,000 and $165,000 per year; 

4) that Manish was laid off in March 2017, over a year after 

separation; and 

5) that although Manish claimed to have made efforts to 

find employment since he was laid off, he enrolled in law school 

the same year and has not worked since. 

Thus, the court concluded: “The amount of time that has 

passed since separation relative to the short duration of 

marriage,24 coupled with Husband’s decision to attend school 

rather than find employment, make application of the guideline 

formula inequitable here.” As the court noted at oral argument: 

“And his decision to go to law school is absolutely fine, but the 

24 Though not directly applicable here, because it relates to 

permanent support, Family Code section 4320, subdivision (l) 

codifies the goal that a supported party shall be self-supporting 

within a reasonable period of time, and that a “ ‘reasonable 

period of time’ ” in the case of a marriage of less than ten years is 

generally one-half of the length of the marriage, subject to the 

court’s discretion. Manish acknowledges in his brief that this 

factor does not apply here, because section 4320 does not apply to 

granting temporary spousal support yet elsewhere argues that 

the court should have granted his “request for temporary spousal 

support under § 4320.” (In re Marriage of Left (2012) 208 

Cal.App.4th 1137, 1153, fn. 11 [“[A party] cannot rely on [section 

4320] when it serves him but deny its applicability when it does 

not. Further, nothing in section 3600 prevents a trial court from 

considering the factors listed in section 4320”].)
30

question is should mother pay for that decision. Should [mother]

be required to pay support while he’s in law school; and [] that is 

not part of the status quo.” 

Manish did not appeal that order. Instead, he filed a 

second request for temporary spousal support in November 2020, 

about eighteen months later. In that request, he renewed his 

request under both Family Code sections 3600 and 4320, stating 

that there was a “substantial change in circumstances, and 

because [his] financial hardships have worsened making it 

difficult to sustain [him]self.” He did not cite any new efforts to 

find employment since his previous filings in March 2019. He 

stated, without corroboration from any third party or any 

documentation, that no law firms would hire him due to the 

DVRO against him “and the pending cases in court.” He stated 

that he had completed law school and had a J.D. as of May 2020, 

but he was still awaiting results from the California bar exam 

and the moral character determination.25 He included numerous 

accusations against Priyanka, including that she had made 

fabricated allegations of abuse, frustrated discovery, and 

disparaged him and deterred third parties from associating with 

him. He stated that he now was in worse financial condition, 

noting debt to the IRS, Franchise Tax Board, mortgage, loans to 

family, attorney’s fees and credit cards. 

25 Although Manish’s opening brief claims that he received an 

“adverse moral character determination from the State Bar,” the 

record citation provided is to Manish’s declaration in support of 

his request for spousal support, in which he stated that the moral 

character determination was “still pending approval.” 
31

What Manish failed to address, however, was the reasoning 

behind the trial court’s prior denial of spousal support to him. 

None of Manish’s allegations in his new round of spousal support 

addressed the grounds provided by the trial court: that the 

marriage was of extremely short duration; that during the brief 

marriage both parties had earned six figures; that over a year 

after separation, Manish became unemployed and had chosen to

enroll in law school; and that it was more than three years after 

separation that he made his first request for support.

The trial court was not persuaded.26 Neither are we. The 

trial court denied the renewed request based on the fact that the 

matter had been previously litigated in March 2019 and there 

were no changes in circumstances, “as well as the Petitioner and 

Respondent’s 15 month marriage being extremely short. The 

trial court also took into consideration the existence of a 5 year 

restraining order in denying the Petitioner’s request.”

Courts will not revise a support order, even a temporary 

one, without a material change in circumstances. (In re Marriage 

of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 638.) The trial court’s 

previous denial of spousal support was reasonable and Manish 

did not address that reasoning in his subsequent request. Put 

simply, the fact that Manish purportedly got into a deeper 

financial hole between 2019 and 2020 does not translate into 

fixing the original problems cited by the trial court regarding the 

duration of the marriage and the passage of time since 

26 The hearing on the motion was set for December 16, 2020, but 

we have neither the reporter’s transcript nor the minute order in 

the record before us. We do, however, have the findings and 

order after hearing filed December 18, 2020. 
32

separation.

27 It is not unreasonable to conclude that granting 

spousal support in this context would have unfairly rewarded one 

spouse of a short-term marriage by making his partner bear the 

burden of his subsequent financial misfortune. 

In the context of domestic violence, the wisdom of denying 

that bid is only more apparent. We reject Manish’s argument 

that the trial court’s reference to the five-year restraining order 

demonstrates an abuse of discretion. To the contrary, the trial

court was obligated to consider the history of domestic violence 

between the two parties. (Fam. Code, § 3600; referencing § 4320,

subd. (i).) While Manish argues that the trial court showed bias 

by considering the five-year DVRO against him but not the threeyear DVRO against Priyanka, we disagree. The same court 

27 Manish cites In re Marriage of Prietsch & Calhoun (1987) 190 

Cal.App.3d 645, 656, fn. 3 in support of his argument, but 

appears to miscite the case. There, the court held that it would 

not always be an abuse of discretion to order a substantive 

stepdown (i.e., a reduction that will take place in the future) of 

spousal support, noting “[a]fter a short-term marriage, where no 

order for long term or ‘permanent’ support would be appropriate, 

such an order [meaning, a step-down order] might be an 

appropriate vehicle for assisting an economically disadvantaged 

spouse to make an orderly and less traumatic transition to selfsupporting status.” Therefore, if anything, Prietsch & Calhoun

cuts the other way, since in the case at bar, Manish as the spouse 

seeking support was self-supporting during the marriage, and 

only became economically disadvantaged some two and a half 

years after separation.
33

granted both DVROs and was in the best position to assess the 

consideration merited by each one.28

F. There is no basis to reverse the orders made at 

trial

Manish argues that he did not obtain a fair trial because the

trial court “exhibited continuous bias against [him] by ruling 

against [him] on practically any and all matters,” and that 

although Manish asked for a two-day trial, the court set a twohour trial which led to an erroneous ruling on the date of 

separation. Manish also contends (under the same general 

heading regarding bias) that the trial court did not rule on his 

motion in limine and allowed Priyanka to look up information on 

her phone; that the trial court unfairly divided up the community 

assets and debts; and that the trial court incorrectly concluded 

that each party sought attorney’s fees, when in fact, neither of 

them made such a request. 

On appeal, we assess whether any judicial misconduct or 

bias was so prejudicial that it deprived a party of “ ‘ “a fair, as 

opposed to a perfect, trial.” ’ ” (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 

1067, 1112.) Moreover, “a trial court’s numerous rulings against 

a party–even when erroneous–do not establish a charge of 

judicial bias, especially when they are subject to review.” (Ibid.)

We examine Manish’s contentions in turn.

28 We decline Manish’s invitation to consider the fact that the 

five-year DVRO against Manish was later terminated with 

Priyanka’s agreement after all three of these notices of appeal 

were filed. Generally, appellate courts disregard matters that 

occur after rendition of an appealed judgment. (Truong v. 

Nguyen (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 865, 882.) 
34

1. Date of separation

As noted in the section, ante, regarding the date of 

separation, Manish has shown no evidence of any prejudice that 

he suffered as a result of the trial court’s determination that the 

date of separation was December 15, 2015 rather than December 

26, 2015. We have already concluded that the trial court’s ruling 

on the date of separation was based on substantial evidence. In 

arguing that the trial court’s bias led to an incorrect decision on 

the date of separation, Manish does not point us to any specific 

witness or piece of evidence that he was unable to introduce.

29 

We see no reason to reverse this finding.

29 Manish’s citation to an admission that Priyanka was trying to 

work out the marriage until she was served with annulment 

papers is akin to rearguing the evidence but it does not reveal 

any evidence that he was prevented from presenting. The minute 

order reflects that in fact the exhibit mentioned, Petitioner’s 

Exhibit 1, was marked as evidence at the trial and that both 

Manish and Priyanka were sworn in and argued at the trial.

There is no evidence that the time frame prevented him from 

utilizing this exhibit or from having it admitted.
35

2. Two-hour trial

As for the issue of Manish’s being given a two-hour trial 

rather than a two-day trial, as his lawyer had apparently 

requested, Manish fails to show prejudice on this issue as well. 

As noted ante, Manish has failed to provide a transcript from the 

trial. He appellate briefing does not proffer who he would have 

called if he had been allowed to, and how it would have made a 

difference, other than stating, without specificity, that he had 

four unnamed witnesses he wanted to call. 

The setting of a shorter trial than is requested by one party 

does not, in itself, manifest bias or prejudice. To the contrary, a

superior court has the inherent authority to “provide for the 

orderly conduct of proceedings before it.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128, 

subd. (a)(3).) This includes a responsibility to “fairly and 

efficiently administer the judicial proceedings before it . . . [and]

the power to . . . guard against inept procedures and unnecessary 

indulgences that tend to delay the conduct of its proceedings. 

[Citation.] In this vein, the court has the power to expedite 

proceedings which, in the court’s view, are dragging on too long 

without significantly aiding the trier of fact. [Citation.] But a 

court need not wait until a trial has been unduly prolonged before 

it takes measures to expedite the proceeding. We believe it is 

clearly within the power of the court to impose time limits before 

the trial commences. [The court’s] ruling will not be disturbed on 

appeal absent an abuse of discretion.” (California Crane School, 

Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 

226 Cal.App.4th 12, 22.)

Indeed, Manish’s suggestion that it is a mark of bias for a 

court not to adopt an attorney’s trial estimate would result in an 

absurd and unmanageable result, tethering the length of trials to 
36

the parties’ discretion, rather than the court’s. Rather, “[i]t is 

incumbent upon trial judges to manage trials efficiently.” 

(California Crane School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification 

of Crane Operators, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) Indeed, 

after obtaining trial estimates from both parties, “the court 

should independently evaluate the estimates based on the 

arguments of the parties, the state of the pleadings, the legal and 

factual issues presented, the number of witnesses likely to testify, 

the court’s trial schedule and hours, and the court’s experience in 

trying similar cases.” (Ibid.)

Manish has cited no specific witness or piece of evidence 

that he was unable to present to the court, nor any other specific 

procedural flaw that reasonably would have made a difference, 

had the court extended the trial beyond two hours, and thus has 

not shown any prejudice or abuse of discretion. We find none.

3. Motion in limine

Manish also complains that he filed a motion in limine 

seeking to preclude Priyanka from producing any documents not 

already produced in discovery responses. He claims that the trial 

court “refused to make a ruling, deferred making a ruling [sic] 

until the conclusion of the trial[,] but never made a ruling.” 

Manish’s motion in limine moved the court to preclude 

Priyanka from presenting at trial “any expert witnesses, expert 

witness reports, or any additional evidence not provided in her 

discovery responses . . . [or] in her trial brief.” 

Again, Manish provides no transcript from the hearing on 

the motion, which took place on the day of trial. The statement of 

decision addressed Manish’s motion in limine as follows: “The 

Court reserved ruling on the motion, so that it could be 

considered in context of evidence produced. Once the trial 
37

commenced, [Manish] never objected based upon the motion in 

limine, which is therefore moot.”

The court’s ruling on the motion in limine was correct. The 

court in Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 

659, was confronted with a similar motion in limine. As the court 

stated there, where no specifics are presented of the evidence to 

be excluded, a trial court is left to guess what may be included 

within the scope of the ruling. In such a case, it is appropriate to 

defer ruling on any exclusion of evidence until the time of trial 

when an objection can be made to the proposed introduction of 

evidence. (Id. at pp. 670–671.)

Manish claims, without any citation to the record, that the 

trial court “allowed Priyanka to verbally assert credit card debts 

in December 2015 by looking up on her phone, against Manish’s 

objections, and taking her word for it, with no documentary 

evidence or proof of the debts asserted.” 

In the absence of a transcript or any other evidence that 

Manish did object to any evidence presented by Priyanka as the 

trial unfolded, we have no reason to doubt the court’s statement 

in the statement of decision that Manish did, in fact, fail to 

object. In fact, we must presume the court’s statement to be 

correct. (See Estate of Fain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992 

[“Where no reporter's transcript has been provided and no error 

is apparent on the face of the existing appellate record, the 

judgment must be conclusively presumed correct as to all 

evidentiary matters. To put it another way, it is presumed that 

the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate the absence of 

error”].) We find no error as to the motion in limine. 
38

4. Rulings on division of property

Family Code section 2550 provides that in a proceeding for 

dissolution of marriage, the court shall “divide the community 

estate of the parties equally.” We review the trial court's 

judgment dividing marital property for an abuse of discretion. 

(In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 

Cal.App.4th 196, 201.)

In addition, we review the trial court's factual findings as 

to the separate or community character of assets by the 

substantial evidence test. (In re Marriage of Trantafello (1979) 

94 Cal.App.3d 533, 546.) We view the evidence in a light 

favorable to the successful party, according the benefit of every 

reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the 

judgment below. (In re Marriage of Mix (1975) 14 Cal.3d 604, 

614.) All issues of credibility are within the province of the trier 

of fact alone. (Nestle v. City of Santa Monica (1972) 6 Cal.3d 920, 

925–926.) 

Manish’s attacks on the court’s findings as they related to 

the parties’ bank accounts, credit card debt, reimbursement for 

life insurance loans, division of interest in the community 

automobiles, are limited to arguing that the trial court’s bias was 

“evident” anytime the court ruled in favor of Priyanka. However, 

as noted above, simply ruling against Manish—even repeatedly—

does not constitute bias. (People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 

p. 1112.) The reason is evident: if such conduct constituted bias, 

then nearly every trial would have to be reversed for bias, since 

in nearly every trial one party loses.

Moreover, Manish omits the court’s rulings in his favor on 

several matters. For example, the trial court ordered that both

parties’ bank accounts at date of separation should remain their 
39

own, because both parties failed to adequately show their 

entitlement to reimbursement for funds spent after the date of 

separation on community debts. However, Manish mentions only 

the unfairness of Priyanka not having to reimburse him funds, 

neglecting the court’s order that he did not have to reimburse 

Priyanka any funds, either. Nor does Manish mention how much 

was in his bank account.

His argument regarding reimbursement for life insurance 

loans also lacks merit. The argument is conclusory and does not 

provide sufficient information for us to conclude that there was 

any bias or prejudice. Contesting the court’s ruling, Manish cites 

only to argument in his trial brief and two exhibits, one setting 

forth the total amount of loans as of December 26, 2015 (his 

preferred date of separation) as well as a document showing a 

separate property loan taken out on May 21, 2012. This does not 

prove false the court’s finding that there is no nexus between the 

parties’ marriage and these loans. Manish does not cite to any 

evidence or testimony as to what any of the loans, whether 

before, during, or after marriage, were spent on. Again, 

“[w]ithout a record, either by transcript or settled statement, a 

reviewing court must make all presumptions in favor of the 

validity of the judgment.” (Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 

Cal.App.5th 929, 935.)

Manish further complains about the court’s decision on the 

amount of Priyanka’s interest in Manish’s separate property 

home. However, the trial court used the calculations made by 

Manish’s own expert.

Manish’s challenge to the court’s order granting Priyanka 

her engagement ring and two other bands given to her in 

anticipation of their wedding (failing to mention that Manish was 
40

also granted his own wedding band) is meritless. Manish’s sole 

argument in support of this contention—that the marriage was a 

“ ‘sham’ ”—has already been fully litigated. His request for 

nullity was denied and that ruling was affirmed on appeal. 

(Ankola II, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 390.) As was noted by the 

trial court, it is not reasonable for Manish to continue to make 

arguments that the courts have already rejected.

Finally, Manish’s argument that the trial court erroneously 

stated that both sides sought need-based fees and sanctions 

pursuant to Family Code section 271 is another example of

argument for argument’s sake. The court did not order any fees 

or sanctions. What is Manish complaining of here? There is no 

prejudice and so there is nothing to correct on appeal. 

In conclusion, it is true that the court credited Priyanka on 

many matters at trial, but it also credited Manish on other 

matters. There is nothing in the record that indicates any bias,30

abuse of discretion, or absence of evidence to support the trial 

30 Manish points out that on February 25, 2021, two days after 

the court issued its final statement of decision, it recused itself 

“from any further role in [this case].” The record does not reflect 

the reason why the court recused itself. However, this does not 

affect our conclusion for two reasons. First, as noted previously, 

generally conduct that takes place after the judgment complained 

of will not be considered on appeal. Second, even were we to 

consider this fact, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3,

subdivision (b)(4), when a judge disqualifies himself or herself 

after making rulings on a case but before the matter is concluded, 

“in the absence of good cause the rulings he or she has made up 

to that time shall not be set aside by the judge who replaces the 

disqualified judge.” 
41

court’s reasoned opinion dividing the parties’ community 

interests concerning this short-term marriage.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their 

own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

RICHARDSON (ANNE K.), J.*

WE CONCUR:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California

Constitution.