20-1955-cv

United States v. Bedi

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit ________

AUGUST TERM 2020

ARGUED: MAY 20, 2021

DECIDED: SEPTEMBER 30, 2021

No. 20-1955-cv

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Counter-Defendant – Appellee,

v.

VICKRAM BEDI and DATALINK COMPUTER PRODUCTS, INC.,

Defendants – Counter-Claimants – Appellants.*

________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of New York

________

Before: WALKER, CABRANES, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.

________

Datalink Computer Products, Inc. (Datalink) and its president, 

Vickram Bedi, appeal from a judgment of the Northern District of 

* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
2 No. 20-1955-cv

New York (Hurd, J.) granting summary judgment to the Government 

on its claim to collect approximately $341,000 in back wages on behalf 

of Helga Ingvarsdóttir, a native of Iceland and former Datalink 

employee. The back wages were owing to Ingvarsdóttir under federal 

law governing the H-1B visa program, which requires employers to 

pay H-1B workers no less than the “prevailing” or “actual” wage in 

their area of employment. After Bedi and Datalink refused to comply 

with an order from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to remit the 

wages, the Government brought this action to collect the unpaid 

wages under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA), 

28 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq.

On appeal, Bedi and Datalink principally argue that the 

Government may not use the procedures of the FDCPA to collect the 

unpaid wages. They contend that an administrative award of back 

wages is not an amount “owing to the United States” under the 

FDCPA, and that our circuit’s contrary decision in NLRB v. E.D.P. 

Medical Computer Systems, Inc., 6 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 1993), should be 

reconsidered. For the reasons that follow, we agree. We hold that the 

Government may not rely on the FDCPA to collect back wages on 

Ingvarsdóttir’s behalf. We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the 

district court, overrule E.D.P., and restore the reach of the FDCPA to 

the limits enacted by Congress.

________

JESSE Z. GRAUMAN, Senior Attorney (Stanley E. 

Keen, Deputy Solicitor for National Operations, 

Jennifer S. Brand, Associate Solicitor, Rachel 

Goldberg, Counsel for Appellate Litigation, on the 

brief), United States Department of Labor, 

Washington, District of Columbia, for Plaintiff –

Counter-Defendant – Appellee United States of 

America. 
3 No. 20-1955-cv

ALAN LEWIS (Leonardo Trivigno, on the brief), 

Carter Ledyard & Milburn LLP, New York, New 

York, for Defendants – Counter-Claimants –

Appellants Vickram Bedi and Datalink Computer 

Products, Inc. 

________

JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:

Datalink Computer Products, Inc. (Datalink) and its president, 

Vickram Bedi, appeal from a judgment of the Northern District of 

New York (Hurd, J.) granting summary judgment to the Government 

on its claim to collect approximately $341,000 in back wages on behalf 

of Helga Ingvarsdóttir, a native of Iceland and former Datalink 

employee. The back wages were owing to Ingvarsdóttir under federal 

law governing the H-1B visa program, which requires employers to 

pay H-1B workers no less than the “prevailing” or “actual” wage in 

their area of employment. After Bedi and Datalink refused to comply 

with an order from the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) to remit the 

wages, the Government brought this action to collect the unpaid 

wages under the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA).1

On appeal, Bedi and Datalink principally argue that the 

Government may not use the procedures of the FDCPA to collect the 

unpaid wages. They contend that an administrative award of back 

wages is not an amount “owing to the United States” under the 

FDCPA, and that our circuit’s contrary decision in NLRB v. E.D.P. 

Medical Computer Systems, Inc.2 should be reconsidered. For the 

reasons that follow, we agree. We hold that the Government may not 

rely on the FDCPA to collect back wages on Ingvarsdóttir’s behalf. 

We therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court, overrule 

1 See 28 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq.

2 6 F.3d 951 (2d Cir. 1993). 
4 No. 20-1955-cv

E.D.P., and restore the reach of the FDCPA to the limits enacted by 

Congress.3

BACKGROUND

This appeal turns on a question of statutory interpretation: 

whether the FDCPA authorizes the United States to collect on an 

administrative order requiring a private employer to remit back pay 

to its former employee. While this question is a purely legal one, we 

begin with a brief discussion of the facts and procedural history to 

explain how this dispute originated. 

From 1995 to 2010, Bedi was the president and sole shareholder 

of Datalink, a small company that sold and serviced computers. In 

2005, Bedi sought to hire an employee through the H-1B visa program 

to speak with customers and to handle administrative work. The H1B visa program allows U.S. employers to bring temporary workers 

to the United States to perform “specialty occupation[s].”4 To 

participate in the program, employers must comply with certain labor 

standards, including by paying H-1B workers no less than the 

“actual” or “prevailing” wage in their area of employment.5 In this 

case, Bedi obtained approval from the Department of Homeland 

Security to hire Ingvarsdóttir, a native of Iceland. In doing so, he 

3 This opinion has been circulated to all active judges of the court prior 

to filing.

4 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b). 

5 Specifically, the H-1B visa program requires participating employers 

to pay workers the greater of (a) “the actual wage level paid by the 

employer to all other individuals with similar experience and qualifications 

for the specific employment in question,” or (b) “the prevailing wage level 

for the occupational classification in the area of employment.” Id. 

§ 1182(n)(1)(A)(i)(I), (II).
5 No. 20-1955-cv

certified to the DOL that he would pay her no less than the prevailing 

wage of $61,152 per year to work as an “Account Executive.” 

Ingvarsdóttir’s employment with Datalink did not go 

smoothly. According to Ingvarsdóttir, Bedi abused and manipulated 

her, paid her only “sporadic[ally],” and forced her to perform 

“continuous servant work” for him and his mother.6 The two also 

engaged in criminal activity. In November 2010, Bedi and 

Ingvarsdóttir were arrested and charged in New York State court in 

connection with an elaborate scheme to defraud one of Datalink’s 

clients, Roger Davidson. Bedi pled guilty to first-degree grand 

larceny and was sentenced to three to nine years’ imprisonment. 

Ingvarsdóttir pled guilty to second-degree grand larceny and was 

sentenced to five years’ probation.

In March 2012, while Bedi and Ingvarsdóttir’s criminal 

proceedings were pending, Ingvarsdóttir filed a complaint with the 

DOL’s Wage and Hour Division alleging that she “receiv[ed] virtually 

no wages” from Datalink for her work from 2005 to 2010.7 The DOL 

has authority to determine whether an H-1B employer has failed to 

pay wages as required by the H-1B visa program.8 Pursuant to that 

authority, the agency issued a written determination on August 6, 

2012, finding that Bedi and Datalink failed to pay Ingvarsdóttir 

$237,066.06 in wages required by the H-1B statute and regulations. 

The determination ordered them to pay the required back wages 

within 15 days, unless either party requested a hearing before an 

administrative law judge (ALJ). 

Following the DOL’s August 6 determination, Bedi and 

Ingvarsdóttir both requested hearings before an ALJ. The ALJ held 

6 Supp. App. at 24–25, 32–33. 

7 Supp. App. at 119. 

8 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 655.705(a)(2), 655.805(a)(2).
6 No. 20-1955-cv

two hearings in the summer of 2013 and received post-hearing 

briefing from the parties. On August 4, 2014, the ALJ issued a final 

written decision holding Bedi and Datalink jointly and severally liable 

to Ingvarsdóttir for $341,693.03 in back wages, plus pre- and postjudgment interest (the Administrative Order).9 Although Bedi and 

Datalink appealed to the Administrative Review Board (ARB), the 

ARB substantially affirmed the Administrative Order on February 29, 

2016.10

Bedi and Datalink failed to comply with the Administrative 

Order and did not remit back wages to Ingvarsdóttir. Ingvarsdóttir 

sought to collect on the debt in state court, but her action was 

dismissed because she failed to establish that the court could grant 

her that relief.11 Shortly thereafter, the Government initiated this 

action to collect the back wages under the FDCPA. As relevant here, 

the FDCPA authorizes the Government to recover judgment on a 

“debt,” which the law defines as “an amount that is owing to the 

United States” on account of several enumerated “source[s] of 

indebtedness to the United States.”12 Although the text of the 

Administrative Order awarded back wages to “Ingvarsdottir,” not 

“the United States,” the Government claimed that the unpaid sum fell 

within the definition of “debt” such that the Government could collect 

the wages on Ingvarsdóttir’s behalf.

On January 29, 2018, Bedi and Datalink moved to dismiss the 

9 The Administrative Order states: “IT IS ORDERED that . . . Datalink 

and Vickram Bedi pay Complainant Helga Ingvarsdottir $341,693.03 in 

back wages.” Joint App. at 119.

10 The ARB reduced the award of back wages from $341,693.03 to 

$340,987.43 to account for three days in 2006 when Ingvarsdóttir was unable 

to work.

11 See Ingvarsdóttir v. Bedi, No. 155571/2016, 2017 WL 1438265, at *3–4 

(N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. Apr. 24, 2017).

12 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B).
7 No. 20-1955-cv

Government’s complaint, arguing that the agency’s award of back 

wages was not “owing to the United States” as required by the plain 

text of the FDCPA.13 The district court denied the motion. Relying 

on our prior decision in E.D.P., it explained that a federal agency’s 

award of back wages may qualify as a debt “owing to the United 

States” when the agency “act[s] ‘in the overall public interest’ of 

preventing unfair labor practices.”14 While the district court 

acknowledged that E.D.P. was a split-panel decision and that other 

circuits have ruled to the contrary, it determined that it was bound by 

E.D.P., which remained “the law of the Second Circuit.”15

On December 13, 2019, when the parties moved for summary 

judgment, Bedi and Datalink renewed their argument that 

Ingvarsdóttir’s back wages were not “owing to the United States”

under the FDCPA. The district court again rejected the argument, 

reiterating its prior conclusion “that the Second Circuit’s decision in 

E.D.P. permitted the Government to use the FDCPA to pursue the 

back pay awarded to Ingvarsdóttir.”16 After disposing of Bedi and 

Datalink’s remaining arguments, the district court entered judgment 

in favor of the Government.17 Bedi and Datalink timely appealed. 

13 See id. § 3002(3)(A), (B). 

14 See United States v. Bedi (Bedi I), 318 F. Supp. 3d 561, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 

2018) (quoting E.D.P., 6 F.3d at 954). 

15 Id. at 567 & n.6. Bedi and Datalink moved to certify the 2018 opinion 

for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The district court denied 

the motion on January 28, 2019, concluding that “the controlling law of this 

Circuit is not fundamentally uncertain but simply unfavorable to 

defendants.” United States v. Bedi (Bedi II), No. 17cv1168, 2019 WL 356546, 

at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019).

16 United States v. Bedi (Bedi III), 453 F. Supp. 3d 563, 567 (N.D.N.Y. 2020). 

17 Id. at 574. 
8 No. 20-1955-cv

DISCUSSION

We review a district court’s decision granting summary 

judgment de novo, drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party.18 Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows 

that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”19 The interpretation of a 

statute is a question of law, which we review de novo.20 

On appeal, Bedi and Datalink argue that the district court erred 

in granting summary judgment to the Government because the 

Administrative Order awarding back wages was not a debt “owing 

to the United States” as required by the FDCPA.21 They urge us to 

overrule E.D.P. as contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and as 

inconsistent with the decisions of our sister circuits and the Supreme 

Court. In the alternative, Bedi and Datalink contend that, even if the 

FDCPA could apply to the Administrative Order, the district court 

erred by rejecting their affirmative defense of in pari delicto.22

Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, we agree that 

the FDCPA does not authorize the Government to collect on the 

Administrative Order and conclude that E.D.P. was wrongly decided. 

Accordingly, without objection by the active judges of the Second 

Circuit, we overrule the majority opinion in E.D.P. and, in so doing, 

restore the reach of the FDCPA to the limits enacted by Congress. 

18 Fischer v. Forrest, 968 F.3d 216, 219 (2d Cir. 2020).

19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

20 Roach v. Morse, 440 F.3d 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2006).

21 See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(A), (B). 

22 “The doctrine of in pari delicto, a term meaning ‘of equal fault,’ reflects 

the principle that a plaintiff who has participated in wrongdoing equally 

with another person may not recover from that other person damages 

resulting from the wrongdoing.” Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG, 768 F.3d 145, 

160 (2d Cir. 2014).
9 No. 20-1955-cv

Because our interpretation of the statute resolves this appeal, we 

decline to address Bedi and Datalink’s affirmative defense of in pari 

delicto. 

When resolving a dispute over a statute’s meaning, our 

principal task is “to afford the law’s terms their ordinary meaning at 

the time Congress adopted them.”23 When the statutory text is plain 

and unambiguous, our “sole function” is “to enforce it according to 

its terms.”24 “Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory 

interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable light on the 

enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous 

terms.”25 After all, “[i]f judges could add to, remodel, update, or 

detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources 

and our own imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside 

the legislative process reserved for the people’s representatives.”26 

We thus begin with the statutory text, exhausting “all the textual and 

structural clues” bearing on its meaning27 and construing each word 

“in its context and in light of the terms surrounding it.”28

The FDCPA “provides the exclusive civil procedures for the 

United States to recover a judgment on a debt.”29 The statute applies 

23 Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480 (2021). 

24 See Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (quoting Hartford 

Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000)); see 

also BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (“[O]ur inquiry 

begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is 

unambiguous.”). 

25 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 

26 Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020). 

27 Wisc. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018).

28 Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004). 

29 28 U.S.C. § 3001(a)(1).
10 No. 20-1955-cv

only to an amount qualifying as a “debt,”30 which it defines in two 

subparts: 

(A) an amount that is owing to the United States on 

account of a direct loan, or loan insured or guaranteed, 

by the United States; or

(B) an amount that is owing to the United States on 

account of a fee, duty, lease, rent, service, sale of real or 

personal property, overpayment, fine, assessment, 

penalty, restitution, damages, interest, tax, bail bond 

forfeiture, reimbursement, recovery of a cost incurred by 

the United States, or other source of indebtedness to the 

United States, but that is not owing under the terms of a 

contract originally entered into by only persons other 

than the United States[.]31

Because our decision turns on the scope of the FDCPA’s definition of 

“debt,” these two subparts are the focus of our analysis. 

The text and structure of these provisions lead us to identify 

both a primary requirement and a limitation to the definition of 

“debt.” First, to qualify as a “debt,” the amount must always be 

“owing to the United States.”32 This primary requirement is present 

at the beginning of both subparts (A) and (B), and it carries through 

each of the twists and turns in the ensuing statutory text. The 

language that follows the phrases “on account of” describes 

permissible sources of indebtedness but does not modify the prior 

30 See id. § 3001(c) (“This chapter shall not apply with respect to an 

amount owing that is not a debt or to a claim for an amount owing that is 

not a debt.”).

31 Id. § 3002(3)(A), (B). 

32 Id.
11 No. 20-1955-cv

condition requiring the debt to be “owing to the United States.”33 

Thus, the Government may not use the FDCPA to collect any “fee,”

“rent,” or “damages” owing to anyone.34 Only when such amounts 

are owing to the “United States” may the statutory authority apply.35 

Second, while this primary requirement is a necessary condition, a 

limitation in subpart (B) provides that it is not always sufficient. Even 

if the debt is “owing to the United States” on account of a permissible 

source, the Government may not collect under subpart (B) of the 

FDCPA if the amount is “owing under the terms of a contract 

originally entered into by only persons other than the United 

States.”36 

We next consider the ordinary meaning of the phrase “owing 

to the United States” and its subsequent limitation in subpart (B). In 

the context of the provisions here, a reasonable reader would 

understand the phrase “owing to the United States” to place the 

United States in the position of a creditor seeking to recover a debt.37 

In other words, the ordinary meaning of this phrase requires the 

United States to be the holder of the debt—i.e., the one “to whom [the] 

debt is owing”38—such that it has a direct financial stake in the debt 

33 Id.

34 See id. § 3002(3)(B).

35 The statute defines “United States” as: 

(A) a Federal corporation;

(B) an agency, department, commission, board, or other 

entity of the United States; or

(C) an instrumentality of the United States.

Id. § 3002(15).

36 Id. § 3002(3)(B). 

37 See FHFA v. UBS Ams. Inc., 712 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2013) (“We must 

attempt to ascertain how a reasonable reader would understand the 

statutory text, considered as a whole.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

38 See Creditor, Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990) (in circulation at 

time of FDCPA’s enactment in 1990). 
12 No. 20-1955-cv

itself. This interpretation flows not only from the plain meaning of 

the words “owing”39 and “indebtedness”40 but also from other 

textual clues embedded in the definition.41 For example, the sources 

of indebtedness identified in subparts (A) and (B) reflect 

circumstances in which the federal treasury holds a direct financial 

interest in recovering the sum. That is true regardless of whether the 

Government holds the debt in its capacity as sovereign (e.g., with 

respect to a “duty,” “fine,” or “tax”) or as a party to a business or 

financial transaction (e.g., with respect to a “loan,” “rent,” or “sale of 

. . . property”).42 The scope of the limitation in subpart (B) is plain as 

well. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Sobranes Recovery Pool I, LLC v. 

Todd & Hughes Construction Corp., the limitation simply “pulls out 

from the definition those amounts owing to the United States that find 

their genesis in contracts where the United States was not an original 

party.”43

Applying the ordinary meaning of the statute to the question 

presented, we are unable to conclude that the DOL’s award of back 

wages to Ingvarsdóttir created an indebtedness “owing to the United 

States.” Ingvarsdóttir, not the United States, was deprived of fair 

wages during the term of her employment, and the Administrative 

Order requires Bedi and Datalink to pay “Ingvarsdóttir,” not “the 

39 See Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1989) (defining 

“owe” as “to be under obligation to pay” or “to be indebted to”).

40 See id. (defining “indebtedness” as “something (as an amount of 

money) that is owed”). 

41 See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 9 (“[W]e construe language in its context and in 

light of the terms surrounding it.”). 

42 See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(A), (B).

43 509 F.3d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing the limitation in subpart 

(B) of 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)). 
13 No. 20-1955-cv

United States.”44 As these facts make clear, the Government has no 

claim to the debt itself. Any wages it collects will be remitted to 

Ingvarsdóttir, the only party to whom the debt is owing. 

The Government argues that Bedi and Datalink’s debt is 

“owing to the United States” because the Government’s collection 

efforts preserve fair wages in the United States and vindicate the 

broader interests of the American public. It further argues that the 

limitation in subpart (B) presents no barrier to collection because Bedi 

and Datalink’s debt derives from federal regulations rather than any 

employment agreement that Ingvarsdóttir may have signed. We do 

not dispute the premise of either argument: the Government may 

serve the public interest when it acts as a vehicle for Ingvarsdóttir to 

collect the wages she is due, and federal law requires H-1B employers 

to pay the required wage regardless of whether the employee signs 

an agreement accepting lower compensation.45 But neither of these 

facts transform the debt itself into one that is “owing to the United 

States,” which is the statute’s primary requirement.46 Thus, while we 

acknowledge the Government’s strong interest in promoting 

compliance with the H-1B visa program, we conclude that the 

Government may not use the procedures of the FDCPA to collect the 

Administrative Order on Ingvarsdóttir’s behalf.

Although the text is unambiguous, our conclusion is fortified 

by the legislative history. As the House report makes clear, the 

FDCPA was intended to address the growing problem of delinquent 

debt owing to the United States, in great measure due to high rates of 

44 As noted above, the Administrative Order requires “that . . . Datalink 

and Vickram Bedi pay Complainant Helga Ingvarsdottir $341,693.03 in 

back wages.” Joint App. at 119.

45 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(n)(1)(A)(i) (requiring employer to certify that it will 

pay the required wage).

46 See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(A), (B).
14 No. 20-1955-cv

default in various government loan programs.47 In describing the 

purpose and structure of the bill, the House report refers only to 

“debts owed to the United States government,” “Federal debts,” and 

“government-owned debts,” emphasizing that the goal of the FDCPA 

was to “lessen[] the effect of delinquent debts on the massive federal 

budget deficit [then] undermining the economic well-being of the 

Nation.”48 As the First Circuit explained in United States v. Bongiorno, 

the procedural tools granted to the Government through the FDCPA 

serve the legislative purpose “when [they] operate[] in regard to a 

debt whose recovery will directly augment the public coffers.”49 Put 

differently, Congress intended the FDCPA to apply to only those 

debts “in which the government has a direct pecuniary stake.”50 

The Government gives short shrift to this abundant historical 

evidence. It argues that, while the FDCPA certainly applies to debts 

that “fill the public coffers,” we should also consider the importance 

of effective collection for the enforcement of federal labor laws.51 

According to the Government, “Congress surely did not intend to 

have DOL go through years of investigations, administrative 

hearings, and appellate review leading to final agency action to 

enforce a federal labor law, only to have enforcement of its own order 

. . . be left to the disparate collection regimes that the FDCPA was 

specifically enacted to avoid.”52 Again, the Government’s argument 

misses the mark. Nothing in the legislative history indicates that 

Congress enacted the FDCPA to aid in the enforcement of federal 

labor laws or to promote compliance with other obligations that are 

47 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-736, at 23–25 (1990), reprinted in 1990 

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6631–33.

48 Id.

49 106 F.3d 1027, 1039 (1st Cir. 1997).

50 Id. at 1037. 

51 Appellee’s Br. at 35–36 (citing E.D.P., 6 F.3d at 955).

52 Id. at 38.
15 No. 20-1955-cv

regulated by the Government but owed to private parties. While 

these could have been valid objectives of Congress, it is not the job of 

judges to effectively rewrite the statute to achieve them.53 

Our decision also accords with an analogous decision of the 

Supreme Court. Nearly seventy years ago in Nathanson v. NLRB, the 

Supreme Court held that an award of back pay by the National Labor 

Relations Board (NLRB) was not a “debt owing [to] the United States” 

under the Bankruptcy Act.54 The Court explained that, while the 

Bankruptcy Act allowed the NLRB to file a claim for the back pay “as 

agent for the injured employees,” it did not follow that any debt owed 

was entitled to priority as a debt “owing [to] the United States.”55 The 

Court emphasized that any funds collected would not flow to the 

federal treasury, but rather to “wage claimants who were 

discriminated against by their employer.”56 And although the 

Government tries to distinguish Nathanson, its analysis is 

unpersuasive. The bankruptcy provisions addressed in Nathanson 

parallel the FDCPA in terms of both their text and the legislative 

purpose that Congress sought to achieve.57 

Despite the plain meaning of the statute, its legislative history, 

and the Supreme Court’s guidance in Nathanson, the Government has 

one last argument: in E.D.P., a split panel of our court held that the 

Government could rely on the FDCPA to collect an NLRB award of 

53 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.

54 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952) (construing 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (West Supp. 1952) 

(repealed 1978), which prioritized “debts owing to . . . the United States”). 

55 Id.

56 Id. at 28. 

57 See id. at 27–28 (explaining that “[t]he priority granted by [the 

Bankruptcy Act] was designed to secure an adequate public revenue to 

sustain the public burthens and discharge the public debts” (internal 

quotation marks omitted)). 
16 No. 20-1955-cv

back pay owing to a private employee.58 Applying that decision here, 

the Government argues that it may also collect the DOL’s award of 

back wages notwithstanding the fact that the wages are ultimately 

owing to Ingvarsdóttir.

We reject the Government’s argument because E.D.P. was 

wrongly decided. Shirking both the statutory text and the weight of 

the legislative history, the majority in E.D.P. structured its opinion 

around a single sentence in a statement offered by Congressman 

Brooks, one of the bill’s sponsors in the House. Specifically, the 

majority seized on the Congressman’s pronouncement that the 

FDCPA “will not apply to obligations which begin as purely private 

loan or contract obligations.”59 From this, the majority reasoned that, 

if an obligation is not “purely private,” it must fall within the reach of 

the FDCPA.60 In other words, the majority construed the 

Congressman’s statement as delineating the only condition required 

for the FDCPA to apply without according any significance to the 

primary requirement in the statutory text: that the debt to be enforced 

must be “owing to the United States.”61 

Even if we were to set aside the plain text of the statute (which 

undoubtedly we must not do), the Congressman’s statement simply 

cannot bear the weight the majority opinion assigned to it. In his full 

statement on the House floor, the Congressman explained that “[t]he 

definition of ‘debt’ was carefully written to make clear that the [A]ct 

58 E.D.P., 6 F.3d at 954–55.

59 Id. at 954 (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. H13288 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) 

(statement by Congressman Brooks)). 

60 See id. at 955. 

61 See 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(A), (B).
17 No. 20-1955-cv

will not apply to obligations which begin as purely private loan or 

contract obligations.”62 He then provided an example: 

[I]f one of our constituents goes to his neighborhood 

bank or thrift and takes out a business or personal loan, 

that transaction is between him and the bank or thrift. . . . 

This is true even if the bank or thrift later fails and is 

taken over by Federal regulators. If the Federal 

Government seeks to recover these loan or contract 

obligations, it may do so in exactly the way it proceeded 

in the past; it is not eligible to use the new procedures in 

this [A]ct.63

Viewed in context, it seems clear that Congressman Brooks was 

addressing nothing more than the limitation in subpart (B), which 

simply “pulls out from the definition those amounts owing to the 

United States that find their genesis in contracts where the United 

States was not an original party.”64 There is no evidence that the 

Congressman believed that the limitation dispensed with the primary 

requirement that all debts must be “owing to the United States” for 

the FDCPA to apply. Even if that result were the unstated aim of his 

remarks, the Congressman could not achieve on the House floor what 

he failed to attain in the text itself. “After all, only the words on the 

page constitute the law adopted by Congress and approved by the 

President.”65

62 136 Cong. Rec. H13288 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).

63 Id. 

64 Sobranes, 509 F.3d at 223.

65 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738. 
18 No. 20-1955-cv

Moreover, while E.D.P. has only once been cited within our 

circuit for the relevant proposition,66 two of our sister circuits have 

expressly rejected E.D.P., creating a circuit split in need of 

remediation. In Bongiorno, the First Circuit held that the Government 

could not use the FDCPA to collect unpaid child support ordered as 

restitution in a criminal case.67 While collection of the debt would 

promote the public interest, the court emphasized that the 

Government “[was] not the holder of the debt in any legally 

cognizable sense” because it sought “to collect restitution not to its 

own behoof but for the benefit of a private party.”68 Looking to the 

statutory text, the legislative purpose, and the Supreme Court’s 

decision in Nathanson, the court rejected the majority opinion in 

E.D.P., concluding that a debt does not come within the FDCPA’s 

grasp “if the United States is neither the formal owner nor the direct 

beneficiary of it.”69 

The Fifth Circuit endorsed a similar construction of the FDCPA 

in Sobranes, holding that the Government could not rely on the Act to 

66 See NLRB v. Kadouri Int’l Foods, Inc., No. 13mc0251, 2013 WL 3893330, 

at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 24, 2013) (adopting the report and recommendation of 

the magistrate judge). This single citation to E.D.P. illustrates that there are 

virtually no reliance interests that would weigh against overruling E.D.P.

67 106 F.3d at 1036. As the First Circuit explained in United States v. 

Witham, Congress remedied this deficiency by passing the Mandatory 

Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), which expressly authorized the 

Government to use the procedures of the FDCPA to enforce private-victim

restitution orders in criminal cases. 648 F.3d 40, 44–48 (1st Cir. 2011); see 

also United States v. Mays, 430 F.3d 963, 965 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); United 

States v. Phillips, 303 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). While we agree 

that Congress may expand the reach of the FDCPA through separate 

statutory enactments, Congress has not provided the Government with any 

separate authority to use the procedures of the FDCPA to collect an 

administrative award of back pay like the one at issue here. 

68 Bongiorno, 106 F.3d at 1039. 

69 Id. at 1037.
19 No. 20-1955-cv

collect an FDIC judgment because the underlying notes were 

“originally entered into by only persons other than the United 

States.”70 As in Bongiorno, the panel refused to follow E.D.P. The 

court observed that E.D.P.’s “textual analysis is brief at best and 

spends nary a word on the limiting clause in [subpart (B)] . . . . 

Looking past the text saps persuasive force from the majority’s 

opinion.”71 The compelling analyses in Bongiorno and Sobranes give 

us yet another reason to abandon E.D.P.

Of course, we recognize that E.D.P. is controlling precedent, 

and we readily acknowledge that a panel of our court is ordinarily 

“bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are 

overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme 

Court.”72 In this case, however, we have circulated our opinion to all 

active judges of the court prior to filing and received no objection.73 

And, “[w]hile stare decisis is undoubtedly of considerable importance 

to questions of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court ‘ha[s] 

never applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling . . . 

earlier decisions determining the meaning of statutes.’”74 Our 

principal duty, we believe, is to faithfully interpret the law Congress 

enacted.75 Accordingly, we overrule E.D.P. as wrongly decided and

inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the FDCPA.

70 509 F.3d at 221–24 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 3002(3)(B)).

71 Id. at 226. 

72 In re Zarnel, 619 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. 

Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004)). 

73 See, e.g., Shipping Corp. of. India Ltd. v. Jaldhi Overseas Pte Ltd., 585 F.3d 

58, 67 & n.9 (2d Cir. 2009) (reversing prior panel holding through notice to 

all active judges). 

74 Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 310 (2d Cir. 2007) (en 

banc) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978)). 

75 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
20 No. 20-1955-cv

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the 

district court and REMAND with instructions to enter judgment in 

favor of Bedi and Datalink.