* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determ ined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit 

## FILED May 2, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-20817 Summary Calendar WILSON BROOKS, PetitionerAppellant,

versus NATHANIEL QUARTERMAN, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION, RespondentAppellee.

----------------------------------------------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court fo r the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:03-CV-3029

----------------------------------------------------------- Before DeMOSS, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges: PER CURIAM: * Wilso n Brooks, Texas pri soner # 1089378, pleaded guilt y to one count of aggravated assault and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. After pursuing state avenues of relief, Brooks filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 peti

tion, which the district court dismissed on a mo tion fo r summary judgment by the respondent. A judge of this court granted Brooks a certificate of appealability on one issue: whetherBrooks’s counsel rendered ineffect ive assistance by failing to invest ig ate an d pursue an insanity

defense. Finding no error, we affirm. The Ant it errori sm and Ef

fective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) provides a scheme of deference to be used in reviewing claims in a st ate pri soner’s habeas corpus petition that were adjudicated on the merits in state-court proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); s ee also Hill v. Johnson , 210 F.3d 481, 484-85 (5th Cir. 2000). A federal court must defer to a state court’s resol ution of both pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact unless the state court’s determ inat io n was “contrary to” or an “unreasonable application” of clearly established f

ederal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Hill , 210 F.3d at 485; see also § 2254(d)(1). To obtain relief on grounds of ineffect ive legal assistance, a peti tioner must show both “t hat counsel’s performance was deficient” and “t hat the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To dem onstrate deficiency, a defendant must sho w that “ counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixt h Amendment .” I d. at 687. “[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable prof essional judgment.” Id . at 690. Applying these standards, we conclude th at the district court did not err in determining th at federal habeas relief was not warranted. Under Texas law, an insanity defense is available if, “at the time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know th at his conduct was wrong.” T EX . P ENAL C ODE ANN . § 8.01 (Vernon 2003); see also Ward v. State , 787 S.W.2d 116, 117 (Tex. App. 1990). Brooks’s counsel sought and obtained psychological evaluations fo r Brooks. The first evaluation resulted in Brooks being sent to a hospital for psychiatrictreatm

ent. A subsequent evaluation resulted in a finding that Brooks knew that his conduct was wrong at the time he commit ted the offense, i.e., that he was sane. A reasonable attorney could have made a strategic choice not to pursue a defense that was contradicted by a court-appoint ed psychologist. Thus, the state court’s determ inat io n t hat counsel’s performance was not deficient was neit her contrary to nor an unreason able application of clearly established federal law. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.