J-S17037-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

JAMALL JACKSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1337 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered October 13, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0007067-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED: JUNE 14, 2023

Appellant, Jamall Jackson, appeals from the order entered in the 

Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition filed 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm. 

A prior panel of this Court summarized some of the relevant facts and 

procedural history of this case as follows:

At approximately 1:30 p.m. on May 8, 2015, Pittsburgh 

Police received several 911 calls indicating that a firearm 

had been discharged multiple times near the intersection of 

Sacramento Avenue and Minton Street. The shooter was 

described as a bearded African–American man, who had 

fired shots at the feet of a woman just before they entered 

a red car, which the assailant was driving.

Police Officer Jeffrey Brock arrived at the scene. Officer 

Brock found no one and did not see blood, but he did 

retrieve eight shell casings from the sidewalk and a grassy 

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. 
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area near the described intersection, as well as a cell phone 

owned by Jenna Cox, Appellant’s girlfriend. While Officer 

Brock was investigating the area, a bearded AfricanAmerican male drove a red Impala along Minton Street. 

Police unsuccessfully attempted to stop the vehicle in 

question, which was found parked about .2 miles from the 

scene of the shooting. The Impala was registered to Ms. 

Cox.

Several days later, Officer Brock called Ms. Cox, who was 

evasive and appeared frightened. On May 13, 2015, 

Detective Dawn Mercurio called Appellant, who agreed to 

come to the police station for an interview. After being 

given his Miranda[2] warnings, Appellant made a 

statement, which the trial court described:

Appellant told Detective Mercurio that he had been in 

a romantic relationship with Jenna Cox and that he 

had acted as a surrogate father for her five-year-old 

son. The natural father was incarcerated so he was 

acting in that individual’s place. Appellant told 

Detective Mercurio that on the 8th of May, he was 

angry at Cox because he had learned that Cox and the 

natural father of her five-year-old had been talking 

behind his back and that the natural father had 

recently been released from incarceration. Appellant 

found out that Cox had taken her son’s natural father 

to his son’s school so that he could meet with the 

teachers and become more involved in his son’s life. 

Appellant called Cox’s cell phone and confirmed the 

fact that Cox was at her son’s school with the child’s 

natural father and he demanded that she leave him 

there and that she come pick him up at the 300 block

of Minton Street.

When Cox arrived, Appellant got in the passenger seat 

and he was very angry and pulled out a gun from his 

right pocket and set it on his lap while he was talking 

with her. The gun was a nine-millimeter Ruger 

handgun. He was yelling at her, telling her that he 

did not appreciate how deceitful she was and he 

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2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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demanded to know where the natural father was living 

because he needed to die. Cox then got out of the car 

and was walking down the street when Appellant 

followed her, telling her to get back in the car. When 

she refused to listen to him, he fired several rounds 

at her feet and she took off running. Appellant then 

got into the driver’s side of the vehicle and was 

pursuing her down Minton Street. He told her to get 

back into the car and if she did not, he was going to 

harm her. She got back into the car and then they 

drove away. Appellant then drove to his father’s 

house in McKees Rocks so that he could dispose of the 

firearm. After giving the firearm to his father, they 

drove back to Minton Street to look for the cell phone 

that Cox had dropped. Appellant told Detective 

Mercurio that his father still had the gun and then 

agreed to call his father to tell him that they at least 

wanted to obtain the weapon. His father agreed and 

then they rode to his father’s house and his father 

came out to the police car with the gun and magazine 

in a bag and gave it to Detective Mercurio.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/17, at 4-5. The Commonwealth 

also presented evidence that Appellant was previously 

convicted of three counts of robbery [and one count of 

aggravated assault].

In response to this Commonwealth evidence, Appellant’s 

father denied receiving the gun from Appellant and claimed 

that he found it in some bushes. Appellant also denied the 

entirety of the statement that he gave to Detective 

Mercurio.

The jury rejected Appellant’s proof and convicted him of 

[persons not to possess firearms per 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 

6105(a)(1), on March 29, 2016].

Commonwealth v. Jackson, No. 1599 WDA 2016 at 1-3 (Pa.Super. filed 

Nov. 16, 2017) (unpublished memorandum). The court sentenced Appellant 

on June 27, 2016, to four to eight years’ imprisonment plus two years’ 

probation. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 16, 
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2017. See id. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for allowance of appeal 

following reinstatement of his appellate rights nunc pro tunc, but he 

discontinued that filing on May 21, 2019. 

On June 24, 2019, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition. The 

court subsequently appointed PCRA counsel. Following a change of counsel, 

newly-appointed PCRA counsel filed an amended PCRA petition on February 

8, 2021. The court held a PCRA hearing on October 5, 2021. On October 13, 

2021, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal 

on November 10, 2021. On December 3, 2021, the court ordered Appellant 

to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) by January 3, 2022. Appellant timely complied. 

Appellant raises two issues for our review:

Whether appellate counsel gave ineffective assistance for 

failing to raise an issue regarding prior bad acts in violation 

of Pa.R.E. 404(b)? 

Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance for 

failing to properly object to admission of prior bad acts 

evidence in violation of Pa.R.E. 404(b)? 

(Appellant’s Brief at 4). 

“Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under 

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA 

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The 
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PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we 

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater, 

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d 

386 (2021). 

For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant’s issues. Appellant 

argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge on direct 

appeal the Commonwealth’s introduction of improper “prior bad acts”

evidence. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth sought to introduce 

evidence of his prior 2003 conviction for aggravated assault under Rule 

404(b)(2) to demonstrate modus operandi and/or to identify Appellant as 

someone who previously possessed a firearm, alleged to be the same one 

used in the instant case. Appellant maintains that trial counsel objected to 

introduction of this evidence. Appellant claims the court permitted the 

Commonwealth to introduce evidence of the prior conviction but only to show 

that Appellant was a person prohibited from possessing a firearm based on 

the prior conviction, as a required element for the charge on trial of persons 

not to possess firearms. Appellant contends that the court did not admit such 

evidence under Rule 404(b)(2). 

Appellant insists that Commonwealth witness, Deputy District Attorney 

Jan Necessary, then testified not only that Appellant was previously convicted 

of aggravated assault, but also regarding the facts of that underlying 

conviction. Appellant emphasizes that the underlying facts of his prior 
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conviction involved Appellant firing shots at his former girlfriend while she was 

in her car driving away with her four-year-old son in the back seat. Appellant 

contends that Ms. Necessary’s testimony should have been limited to “what 

Ms. Necessary tried Appellant for, what the verdict of the case was, and a 

certified copy of the conviction.” (Appellant’s Brief at 26). Appellant suggests 

that Ms. Necessary’s testimony went beyond what was required to establish 

an element of the offense on trial and, instead, demonstrated that Appellant 

was a person with the propensity to commit crimes as prohibited by Rule 

404(b)(1). Appellant avers that such testimony was inadmissible under a Rule 

404(b)(2) exception, as made clear by the court’s ruling. 

Appellant acknowledges that the court gave a cautionary instruction, but 

he complains that the instruction did not ameliorate the prejudicial effect of 

the testimony. Appellant concedes that the instruction informed the jury to 

consider Appellant’s prior aggravated assault conviction solely as it pertained 

to establishing an element of the offense of persons not to possess firearms. 

Nevertheless, Appellant suggests that the instruction did not remove “the 

passions of the jury regarding the fact that Appellant shot at a former girlfriend 

while a child was in the car, and ultimately, it did not cure the deliberate 

violation of [the court’s] ruling to limit the admissibility of the previous 

conviction to satisfy the element of” the firearms offense on trial. (Id. at 34). 

Appellant asserts that appellate counsel had no reasonable basis for failing to 

raise this issue on direct appeal, and that the failure to do so deprived 
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Appellant of receiving a new trial. 

Alternatively, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in 

failing to raise a proper and timely objection to Ms. Necessary’s testimony. 

Appellant acknowledges that trial counsel objected pre-trial to introduction of 

Ms. Necessary’s testimony and again at trial. Nevertheless, Appellant 

suggests that trial counsel failed to lodge a proper objection to Ms. Necessary 

testifying about the underlying facts of the prior aggravated assault 

conviction during or after Ms. Necessary’s testimony. Appellant highlights trial 

counsel’s testimony at the PCRA hearing that there would have been no 

strategic basis for failing to object to such testimony. Appellant maintains 

that the Commonwealth improperly presented the facts of a prior case under 

the guise of proving an element of the crime for persons not to possess 

firearms. Appellant insists that had trial counsel made a timely objection, the 

facts of the previous conviction would have been stricken from the record, 

removing it from consideration for the jury when rendering a verdict. 

Appellant concludes that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective, and this 

Court must grant him a new trial. We disagree. 

“Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance.” 

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal 

denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020). 

[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, 

ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances 

of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining 
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process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence 

could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to 

prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying 

claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no 

reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; 

and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is 

a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 

proceedings would have been different. 

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), 

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for 

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011). 

“The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth 

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175, 

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524, 

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing 

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski, 

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers, 

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)). 

“Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to 

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his 

client’s interests.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012 

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95). 
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The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable 

basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent 

counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the 

alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater 

potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be 

considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s 

interests. We do not employ a hindsight analysis in 

comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may 

have taken. 

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting 

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44). 

“To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a 

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the 

proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312 

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] criminal 

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious 

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” 

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3, 

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404 provided at the time of Appellant’s 

offense: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove 

a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person 

acted in accordance with the character.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1) (effective March 

18, 2013 to March 31, 2022). Nevertheless, the Commonwealth may 
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introduce such evidence for another purpose, “such as proving motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 

mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) (effective March 18, 2013 to 

March 31, 2022). “When ruling upon the admissibility of evidence under the 

common plan exception, the trial court must examine the details and 

surrounding circumstances of each criminal incident to assure that the 

evidence reveals criminal conduct which is distinctive[.]” Commonwealth v. 

Green, 271 A.3d 393, 402 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 280 

A.3d 329 (2022). “Additionally, in order to use Rule 404(b) evidence to 

establish identity, the crimes must be so similar that logically the same person 

has committed both acts.” Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks 

omitted). Moreover, Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible only if the probative 

value of the evidence outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Pa.R.E. 

404(b)(2) (effective March 18, 2013 to March 31, 2022).3 

We further note that “[a]n appellate court will not attribute error when 

the [t]rial [j]udge provides a [cautionary] instruction that fully explains the 

purpose for which the jury may consider specific evidence.” Commonwealth 

v. Dargan, 897 A.2d 496, 502 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 671, 

916 A.2d 1101 (2007). “[U]nless evidence to the contrary is shown, a 

presumption exists that the jury will obey the trial court’s instructions.” Id.

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3 The current version of Rule 404(b) contains almost identical language as the 

previous version. See Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2) (effective April 1, 2022).
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at 501. 

The Crimes Code defined the offense of persons not to possess firearms 

at the time Appellant committed the crime at issue as follows:

§ 6105. Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, 

control, sell or transfer firearms

(a) Offense defined.—

(1) A person who has been convicted of an offense 

enumerated in subsection (b), within or without this 

Commonwealth, regardless of the length of sentence or 

whose conduct meets the criteria in subsection (c) shall not 

possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain 

a license to possess, use, control, sell, transfer or 

manufacture a firearm in this Commonwealth. 

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) (effective December 16, 2008 to January 2, 2017). 

Aggravated assault is an enumerated offense under subsection (b). 18 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(b) (effective December 16, 2008 to January 2, 2017). 

Instantly, the Commonwealth filed a motion in limine on March 23, 

2016, seeking to present evidence of Appellant’s prior bad acts. Specifically, 

the Commonwealth sought to admit evidence that Appellant previously 

possessed a 9mm firearm and fired approximately three rounds at Naomi King 

on or around September 6, 2001.4 The Commonwealth claimed, generally, 

that such evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b)(2).

On the first day of trial before opening arguments, the parties discussed 

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4 These were the underlying facts of Appellant’s 2003 aggravated assault 

conviction. We note that the victim in that matter, Naomi King, has no familial 

relationship to this authoring jurist.
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the Commonwealth’s motion in limine. The Commonwealth claimed that the 

handgun Appellant used in the 2001 incident was the same handgun Appellant 

possessed in the instant case. The Commonwealth claimed the similarities 

between the past incident and the facts of the instant case demonstrated a 

modus operandi such that the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b)(2). 

Appellant’s trial counsel refuted the Commonwealth’s position, arguing that 

the proffered evidence did not satisfy any exception under Rule 404(b)(2), 

and would be more prejudicial than probative in any event. Trial counsel 

further acknowledged that the Commonwealth would already be introducing 

the fact that Appellant was previously convicted of aggravated assault to 

establish an element of the firearms offense on trial; thus, to introduce 

evidence of the underlying facts of that case would be “in the nature of piling 

on” and prejudicial. (N.T. Trial, 3/28/16, at 9). 

After hearing argument from the parties, the following exchange took 

place:

THE COURT: What conviction disqualifies him

[from possessing a firearm]?

[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Aggravated assault.

THE COURT: Arising out of what?

[THE COMMONWEALTH]: This incident, these 404(b).

THE COURT: You will be permitted to put it in.

[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Thank you, Judge.

THE COURT: It is part of elements of the 
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crime now. It is not 404.

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: Understood.

THE COURT: Anything else?

[THE COMMONWEALTH]: Yes, Your Honor. I would just 

submit to the [c]ourt, and I have explained to defense 

counsel, that I will be calling Deputy District Attorney Jan 

Necessary to testify to the facts underlying that prior 

conviction. I think we were in agreement that rather than 

go through the process of using a transcript, with the 

[c]ourt’s permission I will be calling Deputy Jan Necessary 

because she prosecuted the case and she is available to 

testify.

THE COURT: [Trial counsel].

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: I don’t agree. I don’t disagree. 

I’m not sure there is any better way to introduce that 

testimony but I’m not giving up any objection to hearsay or 

any others as the case may be. 

[THE COURT]: You will be permitted to do so.

(Id. at 11-12) (emphasis added). 

Just prior to Ms. Necessary’s testimony, trial counsel “renew[ed his] 

objection to this line of questioning to preserve the record for purposes of 

appeal.” (Id. at 137). Ms. Necessary testified that she prosecuted Appellant 

in 2003 for aggravated assault based on an incident that occurred in 

September of 2001. Ms. Necessary confirmed that Appellant was convicted 

of aggravated assault at the conclusion of trial, and that a conviction of 

aggravated assault renders you unable to possess a firearm in Pennsylvania. 

(Id. at 139). Ms. Necessary identified a trial exhibit as a certified copy of the 

conviction and judgment of sentence for Appellant in the aggravated assault 
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case. (Id. at 140). The Commonwealth then asked Ms. Necessary to explain 

the underlying facts of Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction. Ms. 

Necessary responded:

The victim in this case was a woman named Naomi King. 

She was 24-years-old. She was the former girlfriend of 

[Appellant]. She was, on the date of the incident, she was 

in her car driving away from her home with her 4-year-old 

son in the back seat when [Appellant] emerged from some 

bushes or trees near the street where she was driving near 

her home and fired several shots at her vehicle while she 

was driving.

(Id. at 140-41). Ms. Necessary identified the gun involved in the aggravated 

assault case as a 9mm handgun. (Id. at 141). Trial counsel did not object at 

any point during Ms. Necessary’s testimony. 

Following the close of all testimony, trial counsel had the following 

exchange with the court:

[TRIAL COUNSEL]: I have one additional matter to 

raise with the [c]ourt. Your Honor allowed the 404(b) 

evidence to come in. We respect the decision. That ship 

sailed to keep it out. What I respectfully request Your Honor 

to do is give a limiting or cautioning instruction that they 

only consider that 404(b) for the purpose laid out in Rule 

404(b)[(2)] knowledge, mistake, the litany that I’m sure 

Your Honor is familiar with.

[THE COMMONWEALTH]: I have no objection to that, Your 

Honor.

THE COURT: It will be covered in the 

information given to them with respect to prior conviction is 

given to them for two purposes with respect to the 404(b) 

violation where it was a disqualification for the weapon but 

part of the elements for a particular crime and use it for that 

purpose to see if, in fact, the Commonwealth met its burden 

of proving the elements of that particular crime. ...
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(Id. at 178-79). 

When instructing the jury, the court stated:

Now you have heard evidence of the fact that [Appellant] 

has convictions for the crimes of aggravated assault and 

robbery. These pieces of information have been given to 

you for a very limited purpose. With respect to the charge 

of aggravated assault, it is an element of the offense that 

has been charged, that is a person not to possess a firearm. 

...

(N.T. Trial, 3/29/16, at 196). Following the instructions, the court asked the 

parties if there were any additions or corrections, to which both parties 

responded negatively. 

Significantly, regardless of whether trial counsel lodged a specific 

enough objection at trial, we cannot agree with Appellant’s assertion that any

failure to properly object to Ms. Necessary’s testimony regarding the 

underlying facts of the aggravated assault conviction resulted in prejudice. As 

this Court explained on direct appeal when analyzing Appellant’s challenge to 

the sufficiency of the evidence:

Herein, Appellant does not contest that he was convicted of 

an enumerated offense... On appeal, Appellant challenges 

that the Commonwealth proved, beyond a reasonable 

doubt, that he was in possession of a firearm. Although 

Appellant confessed to Detective Mercurio that he had a gun 

in possession on the day in question, Appellant suggests 

that his confession must be discounted since it was not 

written or recorded, even though it could have been. [T]he 

jury assesses the credibility of the trial witnesses. Detective 

Mercurio outlined the contents of Appellant’s statement, and 

the jury was free to credit her testimony, regardless of 

whether Appellant’s statement was written or recorded. 

Hence, we reject Appellant’s first position. 
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Jackson, supra at 6. (See also N.T. Trial, 3/28/16, at 86-107) (discussing 

Appellant’s interview with Detective Mercurio).

5

 Additionally, Officer Jason 

Farrell testified at trial that a 911 caller had reported that a vehicle of interest 

involved in the crime was a red Chevy Impala with a black male wearing all 

black. (Id. at 75). When the officer was at the crime scene collecting shell 

casings, he observed a vehicle fitting that same description driving by the 

officers. The officer identified the driver as Appellant. Because the vehicle 

drove off at a high rate of speed, however, the officers were unable to make 

contact with the driver that day. (Id. at 75-76). 

Further, the court gave a cautionary instruction to the jury to consider 

the aggravated assault conviction for the “limited purpose” of analyzing “an 

element of the offense that has been charged, that is a person not to possess 

a firearm.” (See N.T. Trial, 3/29/16, at 196). We can presume the jury 

followed the court’s instruction. See Dargan, supra. In light of the 

overwhelming evidence of Appellant’s guilt, and the court’s issuance of a 

cautionary instruction in this case, we cannot say that the results of 

Appellant’s trial would have been different had Ms. Necessary not testified 

about the underlying facts of Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction, to 

____________________________________________

5 Appellant testified in his own defense at trial and denied implicating himself 

in any statement to Detective Mercurio. (See id. at 158-59). The jury 

obviously rejected this testimony in favor of testimony from the 

Commonwealth’s witnesses.
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establish prejudice on Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims. See Spotz, supra. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order denying PCRA relief.

Order affirmed. 

Judge Lazarus joins this memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/14/2023