NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

TAYLOR DANIEL SILJANDER, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 21-0252 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. LC2020-115444-001

The Honorable Daniel J. Kiley, Judge

Appeal from the Hassayampa Justice Court in Maricopa County

No. JC 2020-11544

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Maricopa County Attorney's Office, Phoenix

By Ryan Green

Counsel for Appellee

Taylor Daniel Siljander, Glendale

Appellant

FILED 3-1-2022
STATE v. SILJANDER

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

M O R S E, Judge:

¶1 Taylor Daniel Siljander appeals from the superior court's 

judgment affirming his justice court misdemeanor conviction for violating

a county park rule. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Lake Pleasant Regional Park ("Park") employees and a 

Maricopa County ("County") sheriff's deputy observed Siljander fly an 

ultralight aircraft over portions of the Park, including a dam, "conservation 

area," and campground. Siljander was flying "just barely above [] 

campground campers."

¶3 After Siljander landed, a deputy approached and issued him

a citation for violating a County rule that prohibits "[o]perating any 

passenger aircraft of any nature . . . except in areas designated for such use 

by the [Maricopa County Parks and Recreation] Department or in an 

emergency situation." Maricopa County Parks and Recreation Rule R-116.1

("Rule"). Although Siljander admitted to flying over the Park, he moved to 

dismiss the citation on jurisdiction grounds, arguing federal law preempted 

the County's authority to regulate the Park's airspace. Siljander also 

claimed the Rule is unconstitutionally vague. The justice court denied the 

motion.

¶4 At trial, the evidence established that the areas of the Park 

over which Siljander flew were not designated for such use, and no 

emergency existed that otherwise permitted flights under the Rule. The 

court found Siljander guilty of the misdemeanor offense and imposed a 

fine. Siljander appealed to the superior court and repeated his preemption

and vagueness claims. The superior court affirmed the justice court, and 

Siljander timely appealed. This Court has jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 22-

375. 
STATE v. SILJANDER

Decision of the Court

3

DISCUSSION

I. Preemption.

¶5 Siljander contends the federal government, through the 

Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), has exclusive authority to 

regulate navigable airspace. He asserts the Rule is therefore preempted by 

federal law and unconstitutional. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 

399 (2012) (noting the Supremacy Clause in Art. VI of the Constitution 

provides Congress the power to preempt state law). We review preemption 

claims de novo. City of Scottsdale v. State, 237 Ariz. 467, 469, ¶ 9 (App. 2015).

¶6 When determining whether federal law preempts state 

regulatory authority, courts assume "the historic police powers of the States 

are not superseded unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of 

Congress." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400 (cleaned up). Congress can express its 

intent to preempt state law by enacting legislation that contains a 

preemption provision. Id. at 399. Congressional intent can also be inferred 

through "field" preemption, which exists when "federal law leaves no room 

for state regulation." Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 687-

88 (3d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Finally, state regulation is preempted 

when it conflicts with federal law "such that compliance with both state and 

federal regulations is impossible." Id. at 688. 

¶7 Siljander bears the burden of establishing preemption. See 

United States v. Skinna, 931 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the party 

asserting a preemption defense has the burden of proof). He attempts to 

meet this burden by relying on 49 U.S.C. § 40103, which, in addition to 

granting the FAA authority to regulate the use of airspace, provides: "The 

United States Government has exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the 

United States." 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1), (b). Siljander contends that 

provision of the Federal Aviation Act expressly indicates Congress's intent 

to preempt state regulation of airspace. We disagree. "[T]he Supreme Court 

has construed § 40103(a)(1)'s predecessor provision as 'an assertion of 

exclusive national sovereignty' that 'did not expressly exclude the 

sovereign powers of the states.'" Skysign Int'l, Inc. v. City & County of 

Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002) (footnote omitted) (quoting 

Braniff Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 

595 (1954)).

¶8 Siljander's arguments purporting to establish field or conflict 

preemption also fail. Although the FAA may have exerted its authority 

sufficiently to occupy certain subfields of air commerce, it has not "sought 
STATE v. SILJANDER

Decision of the Court

4

to occupy the field to the full." Id.; see also Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 

F.3d 464, 468, 472-74 (9th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the FAA has exercised 

its authority to regulate pervasively aviation safety as a subfield of air 

commerce such that a state-imposed duty to warn is preempted). Siljander 

does not describe the subfield in which Rule 116.1 lays, let alone any

authority finding that subfield preempted.

¶9 Regarding conflict preemption, Siljander relies on FAA 

regulations that "protect aircraft in commerce." Although Siljander asserts 

Rule 116.1 regulates aircraft in commerce because it prohibits passengercarrying aircraft, he cites no authority to support the proposition that all 

passenger-carrying aircraft are "in commerce" for purposes of determining 

federal preemption of state law.

1

¶10 Finally, we note that the FAA itself has expressly 

contemplated the constitutional propriety of local regulations that similarly 

regulate ultralight aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. § 103.19 ("No person may operate 

an ultralight vehicle in prohibited or restricted areas unless that person has 

permission from the using or controlling agency, as appropriate."). 

¶11 Based on the foregoing, Siljander fails to overcome the 

presumption that Rule 116.1 is not preempted by federal law. To the 

contrary, Rule 116.1 properly regulates recreational flying over the Park, an 

activity that Siljander concedes he was engaged in.

II. Vagueness.

¶12 Siljander argues Rule 116.1 is vague and therefore 

unconstitutional. We disagree. 

¶13 We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. State v. 

McDermott, 208 Ariz. 332, 335, ¶ 12 (App. 2004). "When a statute is 

challenged as vague, we presume that it is constitutional," and the 

1 Siljander states: "The aircraft in this case doesn't carry passengers 

and is not in commerce[,] therefore [Rule 116.1] was incorrectly applied to 

it." We cannot consider the merits, if any, of this argument. When a case 

arising in a justice court is appealed to the superior court, our jurisdiction 

is limited to determining the applicable statutes' facial validity. State v. 

Lindner, 227 Ariz. 69, 70, ¶ 2 (App. 2010) (citing A.R.S. § 22-375). For the 

same reason, we do not address Siljander's suggestion that the trial 

evidence failed to establish he violated Rule 116.1.
STATE v. SILJANDER

Decision of the Court

5

complaining party bears the burden of "demonstrating the statute's 

invalidity." Id. at 335-36, ¶ 12.

¶14 "A statute is void for vagueness if it fails to give the person of 

ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, 

so that he [or she] may act accordingly." State v. Burbey, 243 Ariz. 145, 149, 

¶ 15 (2017) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). "Such laws violate due process because they fail to provide fair 

warning of criminal conduct and do not provide clear standards to law 

enforcement to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement." Id. "Due 

process does not require, however, that a statute be drafted with absolute 

precision." State v. McMahon, 201 Ariz. 548, 551, ¶ 8 (App. 2002). "It requires 

only that the language of a statute convey a definite warning of the 

proscribed conduct." Id. (quoting Fuenning v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 590, 

598 (1983)).

¶15 To support his ambiguity claim, Siljander points to instances 

in this case where law enforcement officers, the prosecutor, and the justice 

court made contradictory statements about the type of aircraft subject to 

Rule 116.1 and whether the altitude of aircraft over the Park determines 

enforcement of the Rule. Siljander also states, "Nothing about the text of R116 indicates it applies to the air." 

¶16 First, whether the "State actors" in this case disagree about 

some aspects of the Rule's application is not dispositive in determining 

whether the Rule is unconstitutionally vague. A statute is not void for 

vagueness "because it can be interpreted in more than one way." 

McDermott, 208 Ariz. at 336, ¶ 13. Second, the Rule's reference to "operating 

any passenger aircraft" necessarily encompasses using an aircraft for its 

inherent purpose, flying. Nothing about the Rule's language indicates a 

reasonably intelligent person would fail to understand that flying an 

aircraft over an area of the park not designated for such activity is 

prohibited, absent an emergency. Siljander's vagueness claim is without 

merit, and he therefore fails to overcome the presumption of 

constitutionality. 
STATE v. SILJANDER

Decision of the Court

6

CONCLUSION

¶17 Siljander's conviction is affirmed.