1 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont 

__________________ 

NO. 09-21-00408-CV 

__________________ 

IN THE INTEREST OF O.V. JR., J.V., J.V., AND A.V. 

__________________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 

Montgomery County, Texas 

Trial Cause No. 20-06-07075-CV 

__________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

 Following a trial to the bench, Father—a Honduran national—appeals from 

an order terminating his parental relationships with four of his five children—Jack,

Ella, Daniel, and Luke.1

 In three appellate issues, Father argues the evidence is 

1

To protect the identity of any minors the Department wanted to protect by 

terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, we have used pseudonyms for 

their names. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b). Father has a fifth child, but his oldest 

daughter was an adult when the Department filed suit, the Department did not name 

Father’s oldest child as a party to the suit, and Mother, the party the Department 

named as one of the parties in the suit, is not the oldest child’s parent. 
2 

legally and factually insufficient to support the findings the trial court relied upon to 

terminate his parental rights.2

 Because Father’s issues lack merit, we will affirm. 

Background 

 In June 2020, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the 

Department) filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parent-child 

relationships with Jack, Ella, Daniel, and Luke. To support the petition, the 

Department filed an affidavit, signed by one of the Department’s caseworkers. In the 

affidavit, the caseworker stated that on June 5, 2020, the Department received a 

report and learned that Father was in the custody of the Texas Department of 

Corrections, that Mother was homeless, and that the person taking care of Jack, Ella, 

Daniel, and Luke, in only a few days, would no longer be able to care for them over 

concerns the caregiver had for her health. Because no other family members could 

take care of the children, the caregiver told the Department she wanted the 

Department to remove the children from her home within a week. When the 

2

The trial court found that Father violated sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) 

of the Texas Family Code, which authorizes a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights 

upon finding the parent placed the child in conditions or engaged in conduct that 

endangered the physical or emotional well-being of the child, as long as the trial 

court also finds that terminating the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. See 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D) (conduct endangerment); id. § 

161.001(b)(1)(E) (condition endangerment); id. § 161.001(b)(2) (best interest). 
3 

Department investigated, it identified no relative who said they would take care of 

the children in place of their parents.3

 

On June 17, 2020, the trial court signed an order and named the Department 

as the children’s temporary sole managing conservator. Pending a full adversarial 

hearing, the order authorized the Department to take possession of the children. The 

court scheduled the adversarial hearing on June 30, 2020. On June 30, the trial court 

appointed separate attorneys to represent Mother’s and Father’s interests in the 

proceedings. 

Several weeks later, on August 7, the Department filed Family Service Plans 

in the trial court’s record. The stated long-term goal in both plans was “Family 

Reunification.”4 Under the section of the plans that describes the Department’s 

3

The caseworker’s affidavit, which accompanies the petition, reflects the 

Department did not interview Father while he was in prison. According to the 

affidavit, the interview was not accomplished due to “restrictions at the prison.” 

While the affidavit does not expressly state what the “restrictions” the affiant 

referred to, the testimony at trial shows the restrictions related to the Department’s 

investigation were related to the Coronavirus (Covid-19) pandemic restrictions in 

facilities including jails, as the Department’s investigation of this case occurred over 

the summer and fall of 2020. A letter Father sent to the District Clerk in June 2020, 

which was after Father was served with citation, acknowledges the restrictions on 

the facility where he was in prison related to the pandemic. His letter reflects he 

knew the Department attempted to interview him in prison but had not accomplished 

the interview because due to restrictions resulting from the pandemic, it “was not 

possible.” 

4

Father’s signature is not on the Family Service Plan, presumably because he 

was incarcerated, and the Department did not have the opportunity to hand the plan 

to him to sign. The plan reflects Father did not participate in making the group 

decisions reflected in the plan. While Mother’s signature is also not on the plan, she 
4 

concerns about safety, the Department listed that Mother had a history of using pain 

pills and opiates, a concern about Father’s incarceration, and a concern that as of 

July 2020, Father was deported to Honduras. The section of the plan that addresses 

decisions made by the family states: “Father was arrested for kicking in [M]other[’]s 

door and attacking her.” The Department’s August status report reflects the 

Department’s permanency goal remained “Family Reunification.” 

On December 20, 2020, the trial court conducted an initial permanency 

hearing. During the hearing, the trial court found the evidence failed to show that 

Mother and Father had complied with their family service plans. By February 2021, 

the records filed with the court show the Department’s long-term goals for the 

children changed from family reunification to “Unrelated Adoption.” 

In November 2021, the trial court called the case to trial. In November 2021, 

Jack was fifteen, Ella was twelve, Daniel was ten (but nearly eleven), and Luke was 

nine-years old. Three witnesses testified in the trial: (1) Father, who appeared from 

a federal detention facility, which is where he was being held following his arrest 

after he was deported and made an unsuccessful attempt as an illegal alien to reis listed as a primary participant on the original plan. However, Mother is not listed 

as the primary participant on later plans. On the later plans, the oldest child replaces 

Mother as the “primary participant.” Even so, Mother’s attorney is listed among 

those who participated in preparing the later plans. We also note that Father’s 

attorney is not among those listed as having participated in providing information 

use to create any of the plans. 
5 

enter the United States; (2) Leiza Siebert, the supervisor of the caseworker the 

Department placed in charge of the investigation the Department conducted to 

remove the children from the caretaker and to terminate Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights; and (3) a court-appointed guardian ad litem, selected by 

CASA/Montgomery County and assigned to the case responsible for carrying out 

the duties assigned to CASA under the trial court’s order dated June 17, 2020. 

By Father’s account, he is a good parent and protected his children from his 

wife, whom he explained in the trial has suffered with an addiction problem 

throughout much of their marriage. Father testified that he is a native of Honduras, 

explaining he first came to the United States, to California, in 1994. In 1996, Father 

moved to Texas, and he has lived in Texas since then. According to Father, he met 

Mother after moving to Texas. They married in August 2006, shortly before their 

first child was born. 

Father blamed Mother for the incident that led to his arrest and conviction for 

burglary. He blames his conviction for making him unavailable to his children and 

requiring him to leave them with a caregiver while he was in prison. But Father’s 

account about what occurred concerning his arrest and conviction for burglary 

conflicts with the information in the judgment relevant to his conviction, which was 

admitted into evidence in his trial. 
6 

Father’s story about what happened in the burglary in the trial is that in August 

2019, he came home from work and found Mother and her boyfriend inside his 

home. According to Father, his children were there. When Father arrived, Mother 

accused him of breaking into his own home. After he went inside, he found Mother’s 

boyfriend with a knife, so he then had to defend himself from Mother and from her 

boyfriend. Father testified that after that, Mother called the police. Father explained 

that when the police came to the house, they arrested Father even though he told 

them the house was leased to him, not to Mother. Father testified the trial court in 

the criminal case convicted him even though he showed everyone the lease to prove 

he had a legal right to enter his own home. 

But the judgment of conviction told a different story. And the Department 

offered the judgment into evidence, without objection, in the trial. It shows that 

Father was convicted of burglarizing a habitation. The judgment, from Harris 

County, reflects: (1) Father pleaded guilty to burglary; (2) Father was indicted for 

committing a first-degree-felony burglary, but plea bargained to a reduced penalty 

based on the penalty range that applies to convictions for second-degree felonies; 

and (3) the judgment includes an affirmative finding of family violence, as that term 

is defined by section 71.004 of the Texas Family Code.5

 In July 2002, Father 

5

See id. § 71.004 (defining family violence as “an act by a member of a family 

or household against another member of the family or household that is intended to 
7 

completed serving his sentence on the burglary, and he was deported based on his 

status as an alien who had been convicted of committing a felony while living in the 

United States. 

Turning to the evidence about Father’s relationship and knowledge of 

Mother’s drug use, during the trial Father acknowledged that Mother’s problems 

with drugs manifested after they married in many ways.6

 According to Father, they 

were evicted from their home nine or ten times after Mother failed to use the money 

he gave her for rent to instead buy drugs. Eventually, about seven months after their 

youngest child was born, Father left with the children, explaining he was tired of 

Mother stealing from him and stealing from the children, pawning their property so 

that she could buy drugs. Before he left her, Father took Mother to treatment for 

about two months to get her treated for drug abuse. But according to Father, the 

treatment Mother received was a failure. 

Father also testified that he was aware that Mother was neglecting the children 

and taking drugs at home when he was away at work when they were living together 

result in physical harm . . . but does not include defensive measures to protect 

oneself”). 

6

The record is not clear about the exact drugs that Mother generally used. 

From the records in evidence, it appears Mother’s problems relate to her use of pain 

pills, opiates, and methamphetamine. At trial, Father was never asked to explain 

whether he knew what drugs Mother preferred, when to his knowledge her problems 

with drugs began, or whether after leaving Mother he continued to allow Mother to 

visit and see the children without requiring those visits to be supervised. 
8 

and before he left her. During the trial, Father acknowledged he knew Mother was 

bringing people home and that Mother and the people she brought home with her 

while he was at work were taking drugs. According to Father, Mother was 

responsible for the children when they lived together, but she neglected her duties in 

several ways, for example she did not make the children attend school, and she did 

not know where the children were when he came home from work. Even so, Father 

never testified that he filed for a divorce, and he never testified that he asked a court 

to restrict or to terminate Mother’s rights to Jack, Ella, Daniel, or Luke, so that he 

could limit the damages she might cause to them by exposing them to the adverse 

effects of her own decisions to bring others into their home and to abuse drugs. 

So while Father tried to paint himself as the parent who protected his children 

from Mother’s decisions to abuse drugs, the Department viewed Father’s conduct in 

a different light. Leiza Siebert, the supervisor for Child Protective Services and the 

person responsible for handling Mother’s and Father’s case, testified that Mother’s 

and Father’s history with the Department revealed a “consistent pattern of drug use, 

alcohol use, domestic violence, and again, the unknown of whether they’re going to 

be evicted or have food.” According to Siebert, the Department’s long-term goals 

for the children are for the children to be adopted by someone who is not related to 

them, but who is willing to adopt them together as a group. Siebert explained the 

Department has conducted a diligent search for relatives who might take the 
9 

children, but no relatives willing to take the children have been found. In the end, 

Siebert testified that, in her opinion, terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights is in the children’s best interest. 

Like Siebert, the CASA testified that she thought terminating Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. According to the CASA, she 

has spoken to the children many times since she was appointed to the case. The 

CASA explained she visits the children monthly. According to the CASA, she has 

called and left messages for Mother, but Mother never returns her calls. The CASA 

acknowledged she is aware that Father has written letters to the children, and she is 

aware that Father has possibly spoken to the children on the phone. That said, the 

CASA also testified the children don’t talk about their Father with her. 

The only remaining evidence the parties offered during the trial consists of 

several exhibits together with the contents of the district clerk’s file. At the 

Department’s request, the trial court took judicial notice of the district clerk’s file.7

The exhibits in evidence include the judgment of conviction and the family service 

plans, discussed above. 

In the end, the trial court found that Mother and Father endangered Jack, Ella, 

Daniel, and Luke, and the trial court found that terminating Father’s and Mother’s 

7

Tex. R. Evid. 201 (Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts). There were no 

objections to the request, and the trial court granted the request in the trial. 
10 

parent-child relationships with the children is in their best interest.8 On appeal, 

Father contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to the predicate 

findings and to support the best-interest finding.9

 

Analysis 

 On appeal, Father argues the Department failed to establish with clear and 

convincing evidence that he either engaged in conduct or that he created a condition 

sufficient to endanger his children. And he argues the Department failed to clearly 

and convincingly establish that terminating his rights to the children is in their best 

interest. 

As defined by the Family Code, clear and convincing evidence “means the 

degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or 

conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”10 In cases 

parties try to the bench, the trial court acts as the factfinder and determines the 

credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony so the trial 

court is free to resolve any inconsistencies that may exist in the testimony in reaching 

a verdict.11

8

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). 

9

Mother did not appeal the trial court’s findings terminating her rights. See id.

§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (b)(2). 

10Id. § 101.007. 

11See Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. 2011); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 

S.W.3d 802, 819 (Tex. 2005); McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 

1986). 
11 

 Father complains about the trial court’s condition and conduct endangerment 

findings on insufficiency grounds. On appeal, we review the evidence to determine 

whether the trial court, acting reasonably, could have formed a firm belief or 

conviction based on the evidence that the parent violated subsection D or E and 

whether the evidence shows the condition or conduct evidence in the trial allowed 

the trial court, acting reasonably, to find the children were endangered.12 In our 

review, we consider whether the inferences the trial court drew from the evidence 

are “reasonable and logical[.]”13 Since the Department prevailed on both the 

subsection D and E claims, we assume the trial court “resolved the disputed facts in 

favor of its finding” on the findings Father challenges in his appeal.14 To resolve 

Father’s challenge to the predicate findings the trial court relied on under subsections 

D and E, we must resolve two questions: (1) Did Father knowingly place or allow 

the children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered them or (2) Did 

Father knowingly engage in conduct or knowingly place the children with a person 

who endangered them.15

12Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D),(E); In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 

237 (Tex. 2019) (on appeal, the reviewing court reviews the parent’s complaints 

about conduct endangerment and condition endangerment findings based on the 

parent’s right to due process). 

13In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 804 (Tex. 2012). 

14In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). 

15See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005). 
12 

 In a factual-sufficiency review, we “give due deference” to the trial court’s 

findings based on the direct and circumstantial evidence before the factfinder in the 

trial.16 Under the factual-sufficiency standard, we must avoid supplanting the trial 

court’s findings with findings of our own.17 When examining the evidence, we look 

to the evidence as a whole and decide “whether the evidence is such that a factfinder 

could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the 

[Department’s] allegations.”18 To support an argument the evidence is factually 

insufficient to support the verdict, the parent should explain to the Court in his brief 

why the trial court could not have credited the disputed evidence in favor of its 

finding.19 In the end, “[i]f, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a 

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant 

that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction, then 

the evidence is factually insufficient.”20

 

16In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (cleaned up). 

17Id. 18In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). 

19See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. 

20Id. at 267. 
13 

Analysis 

Predicate Findings—Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E) 

Because evidence in cases alleging that a parent violated both subsections D 

and E is related, we discuss Father’s first two issues together.21 Both subsections 

require the Department to prove the child was endangered.22 That said, neither 

subsection requires the Department to prove that the parent engaged in conduct or 

that the parent created a condition that resulted in an actual injury to the parent’s 

child. Instead, the focus at trial is whether the evidence shows the parent engaged in 

conduct or created a condition that created a danger to the child’s physical or 

emotional well-being.23 As defined by the Texas Supreme Court, the term endanger

in section 161.001 means “expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize.”24 Generally, 

conduct by the parent that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability is 

conduct that endangers a child’s physical and emotional well-being.25

The type of evidence used to establish violations of subsections D and E often 

overlaps, as it does in the case before us here. Subsection D does not require multiple 

21See In re J.L.V., No. 09-19-00316-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 2070, at *33 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 

22Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). 

23Id. 24In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 313 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Endanger, 

WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

599 (1976)).

25See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 n.4 (Tex. 2009 (citing In re R.W., 129 

S.W.3d 732, 739 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied)). 
14 

acts or omissions to terminate a parent-child relationship, as a single act or omission 

may suffice.26 When the Department claims that a parent violated subsection D, we 

examine the period before the Department removed the child from the home in 

deciding whether the parent knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in 

conditions that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.27 In contrast 

to subsection D, an endangerment finding under subsection E may be “based on 

conduct both before and after removal.”28 

 Often, trial courts rely on evidence showing that a parent engaged in a pattern 

of drug abuse as conduct that supports an endangerment finding as to that parent 

even when the evidence does not show the child manifested an actual physical or 

emotional injury from the parents abusing drugs.29 A history that a parent abused 

drugs over a period of years, without getting treatment, is conduct relevant to proving 

26In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) 

(citing In re A.B., 125 S.W.3d 769, 776 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)). 

27Id. (citing In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 795 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, 

no pet.)). 

28In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 93 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, 

pet. denied) (citing In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 

Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)). 

29Vasquez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 190 S.W.3d 189, 

196 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied). 
15 

a circumstance that shows the parent is subjecting a child to a life of uncertainty and 

instability based on the parent’s longstanding and untreated abuse of drugs.30 

 Here, the evidence does not show that Father was abusing drugs, but it does 

show that he knowingly allowed his children to remain in Mother’s care for years 

while knowing Mother was abusing them. When Father testified, Father 

acknowledged that before he left Mother and took the children with him, he knew 

Mother was abusing drugs in the home while the children were in her care. The trial 

court heard Father testify that Mother allowed others who used drugs with Mother 

into the home while the children were there. While the conduct occurred many years 

before the Department sued to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights, it 

remains conduct the trial court had the right to credit in favor of its subsection D and 

E findings in deciding whether to terminate Mother’s and Father’s relationships with 

Jack, Ella, Daniel, and Luke.31

While the evidence that shows Father routinely allowed Mother to be around 

the children while she was using was not recent, the evidence showing that Father 

kicked in a door and assaulted Mother while the children were present, conduct that 

30See In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. 

denied); Dupree v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84 

(Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). 

31See In re A.Q.H., No. 09-21-00075-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 8000, at *13 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 30, 2021); In re T.B., No. 09-20-00172-CV, 2020 Tex. 

App. LEXIS 8938, at *26 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. 

op.) (citing Vasquez, 190 S.W.3d at 196). 
16 

resulted in his plea of guilty and resulting conviction for burglarizing a habitation, 

and that conviction was not remote. The judgment evidencing the conviction for 

burglary was admitted into evidence at trial, without objection, and includes a 

family-violence finding. The records from the Department, also in evidence, reflect 

that Father kicked in Mother’s door and attacked her. At trial, Father testified he 

fought with Mother and her boyfriend, and the evidence allowed the trial court to 

infer that the children were present when Father broke into the home and the fight 

occurred. Although Father denied he had a knife during the altercation, which he 

described as an argument, he admitted “they” had a knife, and he testified the 

children were present and crying at the door. 

From the evidence as a whole, we conclude the trial court could have formed 

a firm belief or conviction that terminating Father’s parental rights was proper under 

subsections D and E.32 As the sole factfinder, the trial court could reasonably find 

that Father broke into the home, a home that he did not own or lease, when Mother 

and the children were present. That Father then assaulted Mother while the children 

were present, conduct that when considered in light of conduct that shows for years 

Father had ignored the safety of his children by leaving them in the care of a Mother 

whom he knew was using drugs who was inviting random others to use drugs with 

her into their home is evidence we find sufficient to support the trial court’s 

32See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264-65. 
17 

conclusion that Father violated subsection D and E, endangering the children’s 

physical and emotional health.33 We overrule Father’s first two issues. 

Best-Interest Finding 

Under the Family Code, there is a strong presumption that keeping a child 

with a parent is in the child’s best interest.34 Even so, it is also presumed “the prompt 

and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is...in the child’s best 

interest.”35 When determining whether termination of the parent-child relationship 

is in the child’s best interest, we consider the non-exclusive factors identified by the 

Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. Adams.

36 

33See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, 

pet. denied) (subsections D and E both use the term endanger[,] which means “to 

expose a child to loss or injury or to jeopardize a child’s emotional or physical 

health[]”). 

34Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b); see also In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 

116 (Tex. 2006) (noting that a “strong presumption” exists favoring keeping a child 

with its parent). 

35Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a). 

36In Holley, the Texas Supreme Court used these factors when reviewing the 

best-interest finding: 

• the child’s desires; 

• the child’s emotional and physical needs, now and in the future; 

• the emotional and physical danger to the child, now and in the future; 

• the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody; 

• the programs available to assist the party seeking custody; 

• the plans for the child by the parties seeking custody; 

• the stability of the home or the proposed placement; 

•the parent’s acts or omissions that reveal the existing parent-child 

relationship is improper; and 

• any excuse for the parent’s acts or omission 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). 
18 

In a best-interest analysis, courts focus on the best interest of the child, not the 

best interest of the parent.37 Often, the same evidence supporting the statutory 

ground for terminating a parent’s rights under subsection D and E may support a 

trial court’s best-interest finding.38 And the Department need not present evidence 

proving each of the Holley factors, as the lack of evidence on some factors does not 

preclude the factfinder from forming a strong conviction that terminating the parentchild relationship is in a child’s best interest, particularly when the evidence is 

undisputed that the parent endangered the child.39 As the reviewing court, the 

question we must decide is whether the record as a whole supports the trial court’s 

best-interest finding.40

Turning to the evidence of the Holley factors, we note that none of the children 

testified in the trial. And while Father testified he has been the parent responsible for 

raising the children for the past nine years, the CASA testified Father has not 

provided the children a stable home. Currently, according to the CASA, the children 

are thriving and making progress in foster care. The CASA also testified the children 

do not talk about living with their Father. When Father was asked if he thought the 

37Dupree, 907 S.W.2d at 86. 

38In re T.R.S., No. 09-18-00482-CV, 2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 4913, at *15 

(Tex. App.—Beaumont June 13, 2019, no pet.) (“The same evidence that supports a 

trial court’s findings under subsections D, E, and O may also be relevant to the trial 

court’s best-interest finding.”). 

39In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. 

40Id. at 28.
19 

children should be sent to live with him in Honduras, he testified he did not believe 

that living there would in their best interest. Finally, Father’s testimony reveals he 

has no concrete plans for the children to live with him given his current status as an 

illegal alien who has been deported from the United States and is currently being 

held in federal detention. Father did not describe how he planned to obtain a right to 

legally re-enter the United States, and the trial court could have reasonably inferred 

that if deported again, Father would continually attempt to re-enter the country 

illegally. 

Unlike Father, the Department has a concrete plan for the children. The 

Department’s supervisor, Ms. Siebert, testified the Department’s long-term goal is 

for the children to be adopted as a family unit by a family or individual who is 

unrelated to them. According to Ms. Siebert, by terminating Mother’s and Father’s 

parental rights, the doors would be opened up “for [the children] to be adopted 

together and in a more family-type placement.” 

 We concede (as we must) that Father’s “parental rights are of constitutional 

magnitude.”41 Yet the rights of a parent are not absolute.42 So a parent has no right 

to sacrifice the interests of a child merely to preserve a relationship with a child so 

that the parent may continue to engage in conduct that endangers the child’s physical 

41Id. 42Id. 
20 

safety or emotional well-being. While Father acknowledged he knew Mother had a 

serious problem with drugs and knew she had that problem for many years before 

he left her, he remains married to her and nothing shows that if he ever were able to 

legally re-enter the United States that he would restrict Mother from seeing the 

children, as she apparently exercised that right when Father entered the home where 

Mother lived, kicked in her door, and attacked her while the children were present 

in her home. So while Father claims Mother has had a serious drug problem that she 

cannot control, the record shows Mother still had access to the children as of August 

2020, the date Father was charged with burglarizing the home where Father kicked 

in her door. Although Father claimed the home belonged to him, he never produced 

any documents or other evidence supporting that claim in the trial. And the fact he 

pleaded guilty to the burglary contradicts the testimony he offered in the trial. 

Deferring to the trial court’s role as the sole arbiter of the facts, as we must, 

we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by preferring a stable, safe, and 

permanent placement of the children over the outcome Father preferred. 

Conclusion 

 We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial 

court’s predicate findings terminating Father’s rights and the trial court’s best-
21 

interest finding.43 Given the Court’s resolution of Father’s issues, the trial court’s 

order terminating Father’s parent-child relationship with Jack, Ella, Daniel, and 

Luke is 

AFFIRMED. 

 _________________________ 

 HOLLIS HORTON 

 Justice 

Submitted March 7, 2022 

Opinion Delivered March 31, 2022 

Before Golemon, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ. 

43See Tex. Fam. Code. Ann. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (b)(2), 262.307(a); see 

also In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266; Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371-72.