### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y 12, 200 6

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JAC QUE S SHE RR ON

Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Croc kett County No. 3580 Clayburn Pee ples, Jud ge

No. W2005-00903-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled October 17, 2006

The a ppellant, J acque s Sherron, wa s convicted by a jury of criminal responsibilit y for introduc ing

a c on tr oll e d s ub stanc e int o a pe na l in sti tut ion , c on sp ir a c y to i ntr od uc e a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e int o
a penal fac ility
, possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver a nd possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver. The appellant r ece ived an e ffe ctive sentenc e of ten y ear s on Marc h 18, 2 0 0 5

. T h e appellant filed a pr o se notice of appea l on April 6, 2005. On J uly 1, 2005, trial counsel for the appe llant filed a motion for ne w trial alleg ing that the evidenc e wa s insufficient, that the ver dict was ba sed on circ umstantial evidence and that the a ppellant’s sente nce was excessive. The appellant subsequently filed a motion in this Court reque sting dismissal of his appea l without prejudice due to the fa ct that the trial c ourt had not y et ruled on the motion for new tr ial. This Court de nie d th e mot ion . T he app e lla nt f ile d a n a me nd e d p ro se mot ion fo r n e w t ri a l. Th e tr ia l cou rt

he ld a hea ring on the motion for new trial on September 14, 2005, at which time the a ppellant filed a

third amende d motion for new tria l. The trial court denied relief
, and the a ppellant filed a

second notice of appe al on September

14, 2005. On appe al, the following issues are prese nted for our revie w: (1) whether the conspira cy

char g e should have been dismiss ed for failure to state a c rime; (2) w hether the e vid e nc e wa s su ff

ic ie nt t o s up po rt

the ve rd ic t; a nd(3 ) w he the r the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d p la in

e rr or in f a ili ng to g ive a n a c c omp lic e ins truc tio n to the jury . F or the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e re ve rs e and dismiss the cons p i rac y conviction, and a ffirm the c onviction for introducing a contr olled

s u b s t a n c e i n t o a

p e n a l f a c i l i t y.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d in P art; Reve rsed and Dismissed in Par t.

J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C U R W O OD W I TT , J R

. , and J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I L AMS , J J ., joined.

Robert B rooks, Memphis, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, J acque s Sherron.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a nd Reporter ; Sophia A. L ee, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral; Ga

rry G. B rown, District Attorne y Gene ral; and Jerald Campbell, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.-2- OP IN ION

On Dec ember

8, 2003, the appe llant was indicted by the Crocke tt Count y

Gra nd J ury

for one count of criminal responsibility for introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution, one count of c onspiracy

to introduce a

controlled substanc e int o a pena l insti tution, one count of po sse ssi on of c oc a ine wi th the int e nt to se ll or de liv e r an d one c ou nt o f p os se ssi on of mari juana wi th the intent to sell or deliver.

At trial, J eff

rey Allen testified that he w as an inm ate at the Crockett County J ail when he made a rra ng emen ts with severa l people including Chester Allen, Jacques Mc L emore and the appellant to have marijuana and coc aine de livered to him in ja il. Mr. Allen testified that he spoke direc tly with the appellant r eg ard ing the plan, but that he did not know exactly what role the

app e lla nt p la y e d in the de liv e ry of the dr ug s. Mr

. Al le n te sti fi e d that he hid so me mon e y in the ja il for the dr ug s and informe d an outside party wher e the money

would be found.

After talking w ith Mr. Allen, the appellant de livered a brown pa per ba g containing two blue bo x es to Mr. Al len’ s mo the r, Ma rtha Al le n, on Se pte mbe r 7 , 2 00 3. Th e app e lla nt i nf orme d M rs

. Allen that the pac kag e conta ined cig are ttes. Mrs. Allen examined one of the box es and notice d that it was strang e looking , but did not open the box and put it back in the bag

. Mrs. Allen testified that she did not smoke, but that she had ne ver se en cig are ttes in that type of pa ckag ing.

Mr

. A ll e n th e n c a ll e d h is mo th e r f r o m th e jail a n d a s k e d h e r to d e li v e r

th e p a c k a g e of “cig are ttes” to the jail. Mrs. Allen g ave the bag to her son-in-la w, Erne st Brodna x , and instructed him to deliver it to the j ail. Mrs. Allen t estified that she was unawa re that there w ere any

controlled

su bs ta nc e s in the pa c ka g e sh e re c e ive d f ro m th e app e lla nt.

Erne st B ro dn a x te sti fi e d that he a g re e d to de liv e r the pa c ka g e to M r. Al le n a t th e ja il. He a lso purcha sed three additional packs of cig are ttes for the appellant with money from Mrs. Allen. Mr

. Br odnax did not look into the bag until he was pre pare d to deliver it a nd had no knowledg e that the blu e bo xes c on ta ine d a ny ill e g a l mate ri a l. M r. B ro dn a x tur ne d th e pa c ka g e ov e r t o th e ja ile rs , Offic e r s B la

k ePerry and Tina H owell. Off

icer Howell examined the pac kag e and be came suspicious beca use it was “bulg ing and hard” and she “ assumed that ther e was something inside it other than tob a c c o. ” Th e ja ile rs qu ic kly a le rt e d Lie ute na nt Ric ha rd Stit ts, a de pu ty

wi th the Cr oc ke tt Co un ty Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment. Once L ieutenant Stitts arrived, the thre e opene d the packag es and found what appea red to be cocaine and marijuana

. L ieutenant St itts turned the matter over t o Chief S ills of the Sheriff’ s Depa

rtment for f

urther inve stiga tion.

Chief Sills testified that he called Mrs. Allen and asked her if Mr. Brodnax had deliver ed a packa g e to the jail. M rs

. Allen coope rate d fully , g iving Chief Sills Mr. Br odnax’s cell phone

nu mbe r. Chi e f S ill s c on ta c te d M r. B ro dn a x a nd re turne d to the ja il i mme diate ly . T hat e ve nin g , M rs

.-3-

Al le n, Mr . B ro dn a x, a ndMr . B ro dn a x’s w if e sp ok e wi th C hie f S ill s a t th e S heri ff’s De pa rt me nt. Neither Mr. B rodnax nor Mrs. Allen wer e cha rg ed in conne ction with the delivery of the c ontrolled substances to the j ail. Ba sed on the i nformation rece ived from Mrs. Allen and Mr. B rodnax, Chief S il ls char g e d th e app e lla nt i n c on ne c tio n w ith the inc ide nt. Mr . A lle n u lti ma te ly ple d g uil ty

to conspirac y

to introduce c ontraba nd into a penal institution.

Dana Rose of t he Tennessee Bur eau of I nvestig ation testified that the two boxes delivered to the jail contained 23.3 g rams of ma rijuana a nd .3 g rams of c ocaine

. The boxes were not tested for f inge rprints. The a

ppellant did not take the stand in his own def ense.

At the c on c lus ion of the jury tr ia l on De c e mbe r 8 , 2 00 4, the app e lla nt w a s c on vic te d o n a ll counts.

At a sente ncing hearing he ld on March 18
, 2 0 0 5 , the trial court sentence d the appe llant as a Rang e I standard of

fende r to ten y ear s for the conviction for criminal responsibility for introduc ing

a c on tr oll e d s ub sta nc e int o a pe na l ins tituti on

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt me rg e d the c on sp ir a c y c on vic tio n w ith the criminal responsibilit y conviction. The trial court a lso sentence d the appe llant to ten y ear s for the possession of coc aine with the intent to s el l o r d eliver c onviction and two y ear s for the possession of marijuana

with the intent to sell or del i v er co n v iction. The trial court ordere d the

se nte nc e s to be se rv e d c on c ur re ntl y , f or a tot a l e ff e c tiv e se nte nc e of

te n y e ars

. On April 6, 2005, the appellant filed a pro se notice of a ppeal. On July1, 2005, trial counsel for the a ppellant filed a

motion for new tria l challeng ing the sufficie ncy of t he evidence at trial and the appe llant’s sentenc e. On July27, 2005, the appe llant filed a motion in this C ourt re q u es ting dismiss al of his appe al without pr ejudice due to the fac t that the trial court had not y et ruled on the mot ion fo r n e w t

ri a l. T his Cou rt

de nie d th e mot ion , d e te rm ini ng that the c ou rt wo uld be re mis s in dismiss ing the appea l based on ba re a lleg ations because the “ rec ord fa ils to conta in a motion for new trial pleading ,” the rec ord i s “abse nt an order deny ing a motion for new trial” and the appellant ha s not shown with proper doc umentation that a motion for new trial was a ctually pending befor e the trial court. The appellant ne x t filed an a mended pr o se motion fo r n ew t ri al i n the trial court on Aug ust 10, 2005, in which he c halleng ed the suff iciency of the e vidence and soug ht dismi ssal of the indictments. The trial court held a hea ring on the m o t i o n for ne w trial on September 14, 2005, at which time the appe llant filed a third pro se amende d motion for new trial in which he arg ued that the tr ia l c ou rt

faile d to g ive a n in str

uc tio n o n a c c omp lic e te sti mon y , f a ile d to g ive fu ll a ndc omp le te jury ins truc tio ns , a nd faile d to g rant a ne w tr ia l ba se d o n v iol a tio ns of B ra dy v. Ma ryla nd , 3 73 U. S. 83 (1963). During the hearing on the motion for new tria l, trial counsel for the appe llant expl ained that he was reta ined by

friends a nd family

members of

the appe llant to repre sent the appe llant at trial

on ly . T ri a l c ou ns e l e xpla ine d th a t at some po int the app e lla nt at te mpt e d to “ g e t a no the r l a wy e r” in J ack s o n , b u t t

r ia l c o u n s e l l a te r

a s s u me d th a t th e ap p e ll a n t h a dn o t h ir e d a n o th e r a tt o r n e y

. T rial counsel then rece ived cor responde nce f

rom the appe llant in which it appear ed that the a ppellant intended to pursue the appea l pro se. Trial counsel stated that he filed a “ perf unctory ” motion for

ne w tri a l. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

app oin te d th e pu bli c de fe nd e r’ s o ff ic e to r e pr e se nt the pe tit ion e r o n a pp e a l. The trial c ourt denied r elief at the conclusion of the hearing and enter ed an or der de ny ing the motion-4-

for ne w trial on Oc tober 19, 2005. The appellant filed a second notice of appea l on September 14, 2005.

An a ly sis

I nitially , we must brief

ly addre ss the proce dural hist ory of the c ase he rein. The appellant’ s
m o t i o n fo r n ew tri al wa s fi l ed o n J u l y 1
, 2 0 0 5
, m o re t h an t h re e m o n t h s af t ert h e s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g. A m oti on fo r n e w t

ri a l “ sh a ll b e ma de

. . . wi th in thirty da y s o f the da te the or de r o f s e nte nc e is enter ed.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 33( b). I t is appar ent from the rec ord on appea l that t h e a p p el l an t ’s motion for new tria l was untimely

.

Te nn e sse e Rul e of

Ap pe llate Pr oc e du re 3( e ) p ro vid e s in pe rt ine nt p art :
An appe al as of right to the Supre me Court, Court of Appea ls, or Court of Criminal Appea ls shall be taken by timely filing a notice of appea l

. . . . Provided, howeve r, that in all case s tried by

a jury , no issue prese nted for r eview sha ll be predic ated upon

err or in the admission or exclusion of e vidence , jury instructions gr anted or

ref used,

m i s co n d u ct of jurors, pa rties or c ounsel, or other action committed or oc curring du ri ng the tr ia l of

the c a se , o r oth e r g ro un d up on wh ic h a ne w t ri a l is so ug ht, un le ss the same w as spec if

i ca l ly stated in a motion for a

new tria l; otherwise such issues will be trea ted as wa ived.
“Unlike the untimely

filing of the notice of

appea l, this C ourt does not have the authority to waive the untimely

filing of a motion for new trial.” See Tenn. R. App. P. 4(a) ; State v. Patterson, 966 S.W .2d 435, 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. A panel of t his Court has previously held that pursuant to Rule 3(e) “the failure t o file a motion for a new trial, the late filing of a motion for a new tria l, and the failu re to i nc lude an is su e in a mot ion fo r a ne w t ri a l r e su lts in w a ive r o f a ll i ssu e s w hic h, if found to be meritorious, would result in the g ranting of a new trial.” State v. Kee l, 882 S.W .2d 410, 416 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (footnote omitted). This waiver does not apply

howeve r, if the issue is found to be meritorious and would result i n the di smissal of t he prose cution ag ainst the ac cused. I d. at 416 n.5 (c iting State v. Da vis, 748 S.W .2d 206, 207 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) ; State v. Moore, 713 S.W .2d 670, 673-74 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1985); State v. Durha m, 614 S.W .2d 815, 816 n.1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)). I n addition, we also may consider error s aff ecting the s ubstantial rig hts of the defe ndant i f review is nece ssary to do substantial just ice, i.e. “ plain err or.” Te nn. R. Crim. P . 52(b); State v. J ohnson, 980 S.W .2d 414, 418 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998) ; State v. May nard, 629 S.W2d 911, 913 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981)

.

I n the ca se her ein, the trial court considered and ruled on the appellant’s motion for new tria l despite the fa ct that it was untimely . Be cause a trial c ourt does not have jur i s d i ct i o n t o hear and determine the merits of an untimely motion for new trial, the trial court’s “ err oneous consider ation [and] ruling on a motion for new trial not timelyfiled . . . does not validate the motion.” State v. Martin, 940 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tenn. 1997) (c iting State v. Dodson, 780 S .W.2d 778, 780 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989)). Consequently , we may only addre ss issues which may result in the dismissal of-5-

the pr os e c uti on of the app e lla nt, na me ly the su ff ic ie nc y of the e vid e nc e , o r i ssu e s th a t e vin c e pla in

err or on the pa

rt of the trial court. See Dodson, 780 S.W .2d at 780; Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The appellant a

rg ues on appeal t hat t he indi ctment s hould be dis missed for f ailure to state a

crime, tha t the evidenc e is insufficient to support his conviction, and that the t rial court committed plain error by faili ng to i ns truc t th e jury on a c c omp lic e te sti mon y . B e c a us e a ll o f the se iss ue s, if me ri toriou s, would either r esult in a dismissal of the prosec ution or could result in a finding of plain er ror on the part of the trial court, we will a ddress the appellant’ s issues in spite of the untimeliness of the motion fo r n e w t ri a l.

I ndictment

The a ppellant al l ege s that the indictment for c onspiracy in Count Two failed to alleg e an overt a ct in further ance of the a g ree ment. Consequently , the appe llant a rg ues that the conviction was

a “nullity ” and should be dismiss ed. The State disag ree s, contending initially that t h e a p p el lant waived the issue for failure to ra ise it in a timely -filed motion for ne w trial. I n the alternative, the State arg ues that he w aived the issue f or fa ilure to raise it pri o r t o t ri al
, that any defe ct in the indictment does not rise to the leve l of plain err or, and, in the alternative, that any possi b l e def

ect in the ind ic tme nt wa s c ur e d wh e n the app e lla nt “ ple a de d to the ind ic tme nt, we nt t o tria l on the me ri ts and had the jury

rende r its verdict.”

Or din ari ly
, de fe ns e s a nd ob je c tio ns ba se d on de fe c tiv e ind ic tme nts mus t be raise d p ri or to trial or they

are waived. T en n

. R . Crim. P. 12(b)(2); State v. Wy att, 24 S.W .3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 20 00 ). I t is un dis pu te d th a t th e app e lla nt h e re in f ail ed to ob

je c t to the ind ic tme nt p ri or to t ri a l. Howeve r, the wa iver rule does not apply when the indictment fails to alleg e an e ssential element of the offe nse, as the a

ppellant ar g ues her ein. State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Thus, if the indictment fa ils to st ate an offe nse, the a ppellant has not wa ived the issue by failing to object to the indictment prior to trial.

As a g ener al matter, “ [t ]he indictment must state the fa cts constituting the of fense in ordinary and conc ise l an guag e, without prolix ity or re petition, in such a manner as to ena ble a pe rson of

c omm on un de rs ta nd ing to kno w w hat is int e nd e d, a nd wi th that de g re e of c e rt a int y wh ic h wi ll e na ble the cou rt, on conviction, to pronounce the prope r judg ment . . . .” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-13- 202. I t is well-settled that a n indictment must provide sufficient information: “(1) to ena ble the ac cused to know the ac cusation t o which answer is require d, (2) to furnish the c ourt ade quate ba sis for the entry of a pr oper judg ment, and (3) to protec t the accused from double j eopar dy .” S tate v. Hill, 954 S.W. 2d72 5, 72 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 7) . In St a te v. Me nc e r, 79 8 S. W.2 d 5 43 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 90 ), thi s Court held that the re quirement that ove rt ac t is an essential ele ment of t he offense. The a lleg ation and proof of an ove rt ac t was dee med an e ssential element of the offe nse of c onspiracy

. To allow a pr osecutor or court to make a subseque nt gu ess as to what was in the

m i n d s o f t he g rand jury

at the time they

returne d the indictment would deprive the de fe nd a nt o f a

ba sic pr ote c tio n th a t the g rand jury wa s de sig ne d to se c ur e , b e c a us e-6-

a def endant c ould then be convicted on the basis of fa cts not found by , and per haps not even pr esente d to, the g rand jury that indicted him.

United States v. Cecil, 608 F.2d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir.1979) (quoting United States v. Keith, 605 F.2d 462, 464 (9th Cir.1979)).

There fore the appe llant’s failure to raise this issue prior to trial does not constitute a w aiver

. I n St a te v. Pe rkins on , 8 67 S.W. 2d1 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 92 ), the ind ic tme nt fo r c on sp ir a c y to commit first deg ree murder w as found to insuffic iently describe an ove rt ac t in furt h er an ce o f t he

c o n s p i r a c y w h e r e t h e i n d i c t m e n ta l l e g e d t h a tt h e d e f e n d a n ta n d c o

- c o n s p i r a t o r “ d i d u n l a w f u l l y, knowing ly , and fe loniouslyconspire w ith each othe r to com m i t fi rs t deg ree murder thr oug h the actions of a nother whom they ag ree d to f eloniously move, incite, counsel, hire, command or pr ocure to willfully , deliberately , maliciously , and with pre meditation kill Gil bert Pee ler.” I d. at 5. The

c on sp ir a c y

c ou nt h e re in r e a ds a s f

oll ow s:

And the Gr and Jurors afor esaid, upon their oath a fore said, prese nt further that [t he app el l an t ] on or about Septembe r 7, 2003, and in the a fore said county , and within sa id jurisdiction, a nd befor e the finding of this indictment, did unlawfully and knowing ly

conspire and ag ree with J eff rey Allen t o co m mit the offense of introduction of contra

band into a pena l insti tution, to wit: by conspiring to introduce

certain controlled s u b s tance s, namely , Cocaine, a Schedule I I

controlled substanc e
as c l as s i fied in T.C.A. 39-17- 408, and Marihuana, a Schedule VI

controlled

su bs ta nc e a s c la ssi fi e d in T. C.A . 3 9- 17 -4 15 , in to the Cr ock ett Cou nty Jail , in vio la tio n o f 3 9- 12 -1 03 a nd39 -1 6- 20 1, a ll o f w hic h is a g a ins t th e pe a c e a nddig nit y of the State of T ennesse e.

We co nc lud e ba se d on Per kin so n tha t the c ou nt in the ind ic tme nt f or c on sp ir a c y

is i ns uf fi c ie nt. Th is C o u r t h a s r e v i e w e d t h e i n d i c t m e n t a n d c o n c l u d e s t h a ti td o e s n o ta l l e g e a n o v e r ta c t

. C o n s e q u e n t l y, the conviction for

conspirac y

is rever sed and dismissed.

Sufficienc y

of the Evidenc e
Next, the appellant cha lleng es the suff iciency of the e vidence

. Specifica lly , the appe llant arg ues that the State failed to e stablish any ag ree ment betwee n the appe llant and Mr. Allen a nd that there was no proof

that the appellant “knowing ly ” possessed the contra band in the sea led boxes that

we r e d e li v e r e d to th e jail

. T h e St a te ar g u e s th a t th e e v id e n c e w a s s u f f ic ie n t to sustain the

c on vic tio ns

.
When a def

endant c halleng es the sufficiency of t he evidence, this Court is obliged to r eview that claim ac cording to certain we l l -settled princ iples. A verdic t of g uilty , rende red by a jury and

“ app ro ve d by th e tr ial jud g e , a c c re dit s th e te sti mon y of the ” Sta te ’s wi tne sse s a ndre so lve s a ll-7-

conflicts in the testimony in f avor of the State. State v. Cazes, 875 S.W .2d 253, 259 (Tenn. 1994) ; State v. Har

ris, 839 S.W .2d 54, 75 (Tenn. 1992) . Thus, althoug h the ac cused is orig inally cloake d with a pre sumption of innocence
, the jury verdic t of g uilty remove s this pre sumption “a nd repla ces i t wi t h o ne of g uilt.” State v. Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). He nce, on a ppeal, the burden of proof rests with the def

endant to demonstrate the insuffic iency of the c onvicting e vidence

. I d. Th e re le va nt q ue sti on the re vie wi ng c ou rt mus t a ns we r i s w he the r any ratio na l trie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have f ound the ac cused g uiltyof eve ry element of

the offe nse bey ond a reasonable doubt. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13(e); Ha

rris, 839 S.W.2d at 75. I n making this decision, we ar e to ac cord the State “the strong est leg itimate view of the evidenc e as w ell as all re asonable and leg itimate infere nces tha t may be dra wn there from.” See Tug g le, 639 S.W.2d at 914. As such, this C ourt is p re cluded from reweig hing or

rec onsidering the evidenc e whe n evaluating the c onvicting pr oof. State v. Morg an, 929 S.W. 2d38 0, 38 3 ( Te nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 96 ); Sta te v. Ma tth e ws , 8 05 S.W. 2d77 6, 77 9 (T e nn . Crim. App. 1990). More over, w e may not substit ute our own “inferenc es for those draw n by

the trier of fac t from circ umstantial evidence .” Matthew s, 805 S.W .2d at 779.

Further, que stions concerning the cre dibilit y of t he witnesses and the weig ht and value to be g iven to evidenc e, as w ell as all fa ctual issues ra ised by such evide nce, a

re r esolved by

the trier of fac t and not the appe llate courts. State v. Pruett, 788 S.W .2d 559, 561 (Tenn. 1990) . Moreove r, a
c on vic t i o n m a y

b e b a s e d e n t i r e l y

o n c i r c u m s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e w h e n t h e f a c t s ar e “ s o c l e ar ly interwove n and conne cted that the f inge r of g uilt is pointed unerringly at the defenda nt and the defe ndant alone.” State v. Smit h, 868 S.W .2d 561, 569 (Tenn. 1993) (quoting State v. Dunca n, 698 S.W .2d 63, 67 (T en n

. 1 985)). I f the trier of fa ct ca n determine from the pr oof that all other

re a so na ble the orie s e xce pt that of g uil t are e xclu de d, the e vid e nc e is s uf fi c ie nt.

The appellant here in w as convicted of criminal responsibility for introducing a c o n trolled

s u b s t a n c e i n t o a p e n a l i n s t i t u t i o n , c o n s p i r a c y t o i n tr o d u c e a c o n tr o l l e d s u b s t a n c e i n t o a p e n a l f a c i l i t y, possession of coc aine with the intent to sell or deliver and possession of

marijuana

with the intent to sell or deliver. The appellant c halleng es all of his convic tions.

A. Cr imi na l Re sp on sib ili ty

Cr imi na l r e sp on sib ili ty

fo r the a c ts o f ano the r i s d e fi ne d a s, “ [a]c tin g wi th i nte nt t o p ro mot e or assist the commiss i o n of the off ense, or to benef it in the procee ds or re sults of the offe nse, the person solicits, direc ts, aids, or attempts to aid another person to commit the offense . . . .” Tenn. C o d e A n n

. § 3 9

- 1 1

- 4 0 2 ( 2 )

. C r i m i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i s n o ta s e p a r a t e c r i m e ; r a t h e r , i ti s “ s o l e l y a theory by which the State may

prove the defe ndant’s g uilt of the alleg ed offe nse

. . . based upon the conduct of another person.” State v. L emac ks, 996 S.W .2d 166, 170 (Tenn. 1999) . Under a theory of c r im in a l r e s p o n s ib il it y , a n in d iv id u a l’ s p r e s e n c e a n d c o mp a n io n s h ip w ith th e p e rp e tr a to r of a felony befor e and a fter the commission of an offe nse ar e cir cumstance s from which his or her participation in the crime may be infe rre d. See State v. B all, 973 S.W .2d 288, 293 (Tenn. Crim. App. 19 98 ). No pa

rt ic ula r a c t ne e d b e sh ow n, a ndthe de fe nd a nt ne e d no t ha ve take n a ph y sic a l pa rt in the c ri me in o rd e r t o b e he ld c ri min a lly re sp on sib le . Se e id. To be c ri min a lly re sp on sib le fo r the a c ts

o f a n o t h er , t h e d ef

en d an tm u s t“‘ i n s o m e w ayas s o ci at e h i m s el f w i t h t h e v en t u re , ac twi t h k n o wl ed ge-8-

that a n o ff

e ns e is t o be c omm itt e d, a ndsh are in the c ri min a l in te nt o f the princ ipa l in the fi rs t deg ree .’” State v. Ma x ey , 898 S.W .2d 756, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting Hembre e v. State, 546 S.W .2d 235, 239 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976) ).

L ooking to the e videncein the light most fa vorable to the State, the evidenc e at tria l showed that the appe llant “associated” himself with Mr. Allen by speaking with him on the phone a bout the delivery o f d ru gs to the Crockett County J ail. Further, the e vidence showed that the a ppellant ultimately

delivere d both coca ine and marijuana conc eale d in tobacco pa ckag es to Mr. Allen’s mother for

delivery to the jail. Whi le the appe llant did not him self deliver the drugs to the jail, the

app e lla nt a sso c ia te d h ims e lf wi th the ve ntu re by

pr ov idi ng the dr

ug s to Mr s. Al le n f

or de liv e ry int o the jail. The e vidence was suff i ci ent t o convict the a

ppellant of c riminal responsibilityfor introduction of contra

band into a pena l insti tution.

B. Conspirac y
Criminal conspiracy

is committ ed whe n tw o o r more pe ople, ea ch having the culpable mental state re qu ir e d f

or the of fe ns e wh ic h is the ob

je c t of the c on sp ir a c y

a nde a c h a c tin g fo r the pu rp os e of pr omo ting o r fa c ili ta tin g the c omm iss ion of a n o ff e ns e , a g re e that on e or

mor e of the m w ill eng ag e in conduct which constitutes the offe nse. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-103. T o prove the

ex i s t en ce o f a co n s p i ra t o ri al re l at i o n s h i p , t h e S t at e ma y s h o w t h at a “m u t u al i m p l i ed u n d er s t an d i n g” exis ted betwe en the pa

rties. State v. Shrops h i re , 8 74 S.W .2d 634, 641 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)

. The c onspiracy

need not be proved by

production of a n officia l or forma l a g ree ment, in w riting or otherwise. I d. The c onspiracy may be demonstrated by

circ umstantial evidence and the c onduct of the participa nts w hile undertaking illeg al ac tivity . I d. The ve ry conce pt of a c onspiracy

connotes some harmonization of desig n, not equal participation in every individual compo n ent of every criminal off

ense. I d. Additionally , “[t] he commission of an overt a ct in further ance of the consp ir a c y

is a n e s s e n ti a l e le me n t o f th e o f f e n s e

. ” St a te v

. T h o r n to n , 1 0 S. W. 3 d 2 2 9
, 2 3 4 ( T e nn. 1999).

L oo kin g a t th e pr oo f i ntr od uced a t tria l, w e c on c lud e that th e jury c ou ld h a ve re a so na

bly inferr ed the ex istence of

an ag ree ment betwee n the appe llant and Mr. Allen to introduce the coc aine

a ndmari juana int o the ja il. Th e te sti mon y pr e se nte d at tri a l indi c a te d tha t the app e lla nt s po ke wi th Mr. Allen on the tele phone, then de livered the tobacc o packa g es filled with coc aine a nd marijuana to Mr. Allen’s mother f

or their de livery

to the jail. See, e.g ., Sta t e v

. Ya s m o n d Fe nderson, No. 03C01-9711-CR-00496, 1999 WL 28 4 0
, at * 4 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, J an. 6, 1999) (d e te rm ini ng that a lth ou g h th e Sta te pr e se nte d no dir e c t pr oo f of a n a g re e me nt b e tw e e n c on sp ir a tor s, a jury may rea sonably

infer the exis tence of such a n ag ree ment from the c onspirators’ a cts).

C. Poss ession of Cocaine and Marijuana with I ntent to Sell or Deliver-9-

I n the ca se her ein, the appe llant w as convic ted of two c ounts of violating Te nnessee Code An no ta te d s e c tio n 3 9- 17 -4 17 (a )( 4)

. Te nn e sse e Cod e An no ta te d sec tio n 39- 17 -4 17 (a )( 4) make s it unlawful to “posse ss a controlled substanc e with intent to m an u fa ct u re , deliver or sell such controlled substance.” Thus, in order to c onvict the appe llant, the State was re quired to show: (1) a knowing mental state; (2) possession of coc aine a nd marijuana ; (3) an intent to sell or de liver that

cocaine and marijuana; and ( 4) that the wei g ht of the coc aine wa s .5 g rams or le ss and the we ight of the marijuana wa s not less than 14.175 g rams nor more than ten pounds. Tenn. Code Ann. 39-17- 417. The State unque stionably proved be y ond a re asonable doubt that the substances f ound in the packa g es deliver ed to the jail wer e coc aine a nd marijuana and that the weig ht of the coc aine wa s .3 g rams and the weig ht of the m arijuana was 23.3 g rams of marijuana. Thus, the que stion is whether the app e lla nt kno wi ng ly

po sse sse d th e c oc a ine a ndmari juana wi th the int e nt t o s e ll o r d e liv e r i t.
“[A] person . . . acts knowing ly with respec t to the c onduct or to circumstanc es surrounding the conduc t when the pe rson is awa re of the nature of the conduct or that the circ umstances e x ist.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39- 11-302(b) . A conviction for possession of c ocaine and/or marijuana may be based upon e ither ac tual or construc tive possession. Sta t e v

. S haw, 37 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Br own, 823 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Cooper, 736 S.W.2d 1 2 5
, 1 2 9 (T en n

. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1 9 8 7 ). Be fo re a p er s o n ca n b e f o u n d t o co n s tru ct i v el y

p o s s es s a d ru g, it must appe ar that the person ha s the power and intention at any

g iven time to exercise dominion and control over the drug s either direc tly or throug h others. State v. Patterson, 966 S.W.2d 435, 445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ; State v. Wi lliams, 623 S .W.2d 121, 125 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981). The

mere prese nce of

a per son in an are a whe re dr ug s are discovere d is not, alone, sufficie nt to support a finding that the per son possessed the drug s. Cooper, 736 S.W.2 d at 129. Likewise, mer e association with a pe rson who does in fa ct control the d ru gs o r property wher e the dr

ug s are discovere d is insufficient to support a finding that the per son possessed the drug s. State v. Transou, 928 S.W .2d 949, 956 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). Howeve r, as stated a bove, cir cumstantial evidenc e alone may

be suff icient to support a convic tion. State v. Tharpe , 726 S.W .2d 896, 899-900 (Te nn. 1987); State v. Gre g ory , 862 S. W

. 2 d 574, 577 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) . The c ircumstantial evidenc e must be not only consistent with the guilt of the ac cused, but it must also be inconsistent wi th i nn oc e nc e a ndmus t e xclu de e ve ry oth e r re a so na ble the ory or hy

po the sis e xce pt that of

g uil t. Tharpe
, 726 S.W .2d at 900. I n addition, “‘it m ust establish such a c erta inty of g uilt of the acc used as to convince the mind bey ond a re asonable doubt that [the defe ndant] is the one w ho committed the crime.’” I d. (quoting Pruitt v. State, 460 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970)). F urther, the trier of

fac t may infer f rom the amoun t of the drug s, along with releva nt fac ts surrounding the

arr est, that the drug s wer e possessed for the purpose of selling them. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-17-419.

I n the ca se her ein, the proof indicated that, a fter be in g co ntacted by Mr. Allen in jail, the appellant de livered the tobacc o packa g es fill ed with .3 g rams of c ocaine and 23.3 g rams of ma rijuana t o M r s

. A l l e n a t h e r r e s i d e n c e

. N e i t h e r M r s

. A l l e n n o r

M r

. B r o d n a x a l t e r e d t h e p a c k a g e s i n a n y w a y. Neither Mrs. Allen nor Mr. B rodnax knew that the pa ckag es conta ined drug s. The trier of fa ct was prese nted with sufficie nt evidence to convict the appe llant of possession of marijuana and coc aine with the in te n t to s e ll o r d e li v e r w h e n th e r e w a s u n d is p u te d e v id e n c e in tr o d u c e d a t tria l a s to the-10-

qu a nti ty of the dr ug s a ndthe de liv e ry

of the dr ug s b y the app ell a nt t o M rs . A lle n f or ult imate delivery to the jail.

We determine that the evidenc e is sufficie nt to s u s t ain the appe llant’s convictions. The

e vid e nc e is s uf

fi c ie nt to sup po rt the jury ’s de te rm inatio n in tha t “it fa ir ly a ndle g iti ma te ly

te nd s to

connec t the defe ndant wit h t h e co m m i s s ion of the crime[s] char g ed.” See State v. Big bee, 885 S.W .2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1994)
, s u p er ce d ed by statute as stated in State v. Stout, 46 S.W .3d 689 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he app e lla nt’ s a rg ume nt r e g ard ing the we akn e ss of the e vid e nc e po int s p ri mari ly to the we ig ht o f the e vid e nc e , w hic h w a s to be de te rm ine d b y the jury . O ur

ro le on app e a l is simply to determine w hether

the evidenc e wa s leg ally sufficie n t for any

trier of fac t to have found the

e sse nti a l e le me nts of

the of fe ns e s b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t. We c on c lud e that it wa s.

J ury I nstruction on Acc omplices

L astly , the appe llant complains that the trial court committed p l ain er ror by failing to give the jury an instruction on ac complice testimony beca use there was “ ample evide nce from which the jury could infer

that Martha A llen and Erne st Brodna x wer e ac complices.” The a ppellant acknow ledg es that def

ense c ounsel failed to r equest a n acc omplice instruction at trial, but insists that the tr ia l c ou rt c omm itt e d plain e rr or by faili ng to g ive the ins truc tio n de sp ite the wa ive r. Th e Sta te arg ues that the a

ppellant waive d the issue for f ailure to reque st the jury

instruction at trial and, in the alternative, that the trial court was under no obligation to instruct the jury on acc omplices wher e the te sti mon y didno t in dic a te that Mr s. Al le n a ndMr . B ro dn a x we re a c c omp lic e s.

I n this case, the a

ppellant challeng es the testimony of Mrs. Allen and Mr. B rodnax, arg uing that they wer e acc omplices whose testimony had to be c orrobor ated. It is well-settled in Tennesse e that a def endant c annot be c onvicted solely upon the uncor

roborated testimony

of an a cc o mp lice. See State v. Ba ne, 57 S.W.3d 411, 419 (Tenn. 2001); Mont s v. State, 379 S.W .2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1964)

.
There must be some fac t testified to, entirely independe nt of the ac complice’ s testimony , which, take n by itself, leads to the infe renc e, not o n l y t h at a crime has been c ommitt ed, but also that the de fenda nt is im plicated in it; and thi s independe nt

corr oborative te stimonymust also include some fac t establishing the de fenda nt’s ide nti ty . T his c or

ro bo rativ e e vid e nc e ma y be dir e c t or e nti re ly c ir c ums ta nti a l, andit need not be adequate, in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficie nt to mee t the re quirements of the rule if it fairly and leg itimately tends to connec t the defe ndant with the commission of the crime c harg ed.

Ba ne, 57 S.W.3d at 419 (quoting State v. B igbe e, 885 S.W.2d 797, 803(Ten n. 1994)). An

acc omplice is one who knowingly , voluntarily , and with common intent participates with the princ ipal off

e nd e r i n th e c omm iss ion of a c ri me . St a te v. L e wi s, 36 S.W. 3d88 , 9 4 ( Te nn . Crim. App. 2000); Conner v. State, 531 S.W.2d 119, 123 (Ten n

. C ri m. App. 1975). To satisfy the de fi nit ion of

a n a c c omp lic e , it

is n ot e no ug h th a t th e witne ss m e re ly po sse ss g uil ty

kn ow le dg e , is morally delinquent, or e ven participated in a distinct but relate d offe nse. See State v. L awson, 794-11-

S.W .2d 363, 369 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). Rather, the test for whether a witness is a n acc omplice is whether the witness could have been convicted of the offe nse. I d. Whil e Mrs. Allen r ece ived the dr ug s in the tob a c c o p a c ka g e s f ro m th e app e lla nt fo r de liv e ry to the ja il, a ndMr . B ro dn a x ulti ma te ly delivere d those pac kag es to the jail for r ece ipt by Mr. Allen, ea ch witness’s test i m o n y s h o ws that

no ne of the wi tne sse s we re a c tual a c c omp lic e s to the c on du c t of the app e lla nt o r M r. Al le n. I n f a c t, the testimony

is uncontradicte d that both Mrs. Allen and Mr. Brodna x testified that they thought the packa g es contained tobacc o. The e vidence is clear that none of the m “knowing ly , voluntarily , and with common intent participate[d] with the principal off ender in the commission of [ the] offenses.” L ewis, 36 S.W.3d at 94.

I n any event, the a

ppellant neve r re ques t ed a s pecia l jury instruction on acc omplice

corr oboration, as he was re quired to do when the trial court did not g ive one. In State v. Ander son, 985 S.W .2d 9 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)
, this Court held t hat bec ause the defe ndant fa iled to make

a re quest for a n acc omplice instruction, the def endant waived the issue.

[O] ur supre me court has held that an instruction on the rule re quiring corr oboration of a n a c c omp lic e ’s te sti mon y is no t fu nd a me nta l. Up on the tr ia l c ou rt ’s failu re t o instruct the jury

reg arding acc omplice testimony and t h e requirement of

c or ro bo ratio n, it b e c ome s th e ob lig a tio n o f the de fe nd a nt t o ma ke a sp e c ia l r e qu e st for the instruction. I n the absence of a special reque st, the trial court does not err by failing to instruct the jury about ac complice testimony even if the circ umstances of the ca se wa

rra nt such an instruction.

Ander son, 985 S.W .2d at 17 (c itations omi tted). Likewise, be cause the appe llant in this case failed to reque st a specia l jury

instruction on acc omplice testimony , he wa ived the issue.

Ag ain, this issue is also normally waive d i f n o t ra i s ed in a timely new tria l motion. Here, howeve r, the a

ppellant ra ises that issue in the contex t of pl ain error. Trial errors rising to t he leve l

o f p l a i n e rr o r

ar e n o tw a i v e d b y

a n u n t i m e l y

m o t i o n f o r n e w tr i a l

. S e e T e n n

. R

. C r i m

. P

. 5 2 ( b )

. In

or de r t o d e te rm ine that pl a in e rr or e xists :
(a) the re cord must c lear ly establish what occur red in the trial court; (b) a cle ar a nd

une q u iv o c a l r

u le o f la w mu s t h a v e b e e n b r e a c h e d ; ( c ) a s u b s tan ti a l rig h t o f

the

acc used must have been adver sely aff ecte d; ( d) the acc used did not waive the issue for tac tical re asons; and (e) consideration of the err or is “ nece ssary to do substantial justice.”

State v. Smit h, 24 S.W .3d 274, 282 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) ). All five f actor s must be established bef ore pla in error

will be rec og nized. I d. at 282-83. Consideration of all of t he fa ctors is unnec essary when the r ecor d demonstrates tha t

a t le a st o ne of

the fa c tor s c a nn ot b e e sta bli sh e d. I d. at 28 3. Furt he rm or e , th e “ ‘p la in e rr or ’ m us t [have bee n] of such a great mag nitude that it probably chang ed the outcome of the trial.” I d. (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W .2d at 642).-12-

I n our view, the re ha s been no br eac h of a c lear an d u n equivocal rule of law . Be cause we determine that Mrs. Allen and Mr. Brodna x wer e not ac complices, ther e wa s no rea son for the tria l court to g ive an instruction on ac complice testimony . Moreove r, as state d ab o ve, the tria l court “does not e rr by

failing to instruct the jury about ac complice testimony even if the circ umstances of the ca se wa

rra nt such an instruction” if the defe ndant does not make a speci al re q u es t for the instruction. Anderson, 985 S.W.2d at 17. Further, the appellant has waived this issue throug h an untimely filing of the motion fo r n ew t rial and by failing to reque st a specia l instruction on

a c c omp lic e te sti mon y . Pl a in e rr or is n ot p re se nt.

Conclusion

For the fore g oing r easons, the judg ment of the trial court is r ever sed and dismissed in part

a nda ff ir me d in pa

rt

.

___________________________________ J ERRY L . SMI TH, JUDGE