J-S27024-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMIE M. BROWN 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1468 WDA 2018

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 21, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-04-CR-0000913-2001

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2019

Jamie M. Brown appeals from the order entered September 21, 2018, 

in the Beaver County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing, after a hearing, his 

serial petition for collateral relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”).1 Brown seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of 20 to 40 

years’ imprisonment, imposed on May 29, 2002, following his jury conviction 

of murder. On appeal, he asserts the PCRA court erred in dismissing the 

petition. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from 

our March 24, 2016 opinion and the PCRA court’s September 21, 2018 opinion.

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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This Court previously set forth the factual basis of this case as 

follows:

[On March 15, 2001] Aliquippa Police Officer James 

Naim was on routine foot patrol in the Linmar Housing 

Plan when [Brown] approached him from the rear 

firing a nine millimeter handgun. Two bullets struck 

the officer in the head causing his immediate death. 

Testimony established that [Brown], who was well 

known to the law enforcement community, told 

several people that he was going to kill a police officer 

to “set an example.”

Commonwealth v. Brown, 83 A.3d 1063 (Pa.Super.2013) 

(unpublished memorandum), at 1–2 (internal alterations and 

citation omitted).

The procedural history of this case is as follows. On May 10, 2002, 

[Brown] was convicted of third-degree murder. On May 29, 2002, 

[Brown] was sentenced to 20 to 40 years’ imprisonment. This 

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court 

denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Brown, 850 

A.2d 5 (Pa.Super.2004) (unpublished memorandum), appeal 

denied, 581 Pa. 670, 863 A.2d 1142 (2004).

On June 30, 2005, [Brown] filed a pro se PCRA petition. Counsel 

was appointed and, on February 13, 2008, the PCRA court denied 

[Brown’s] first PCRA petition. This Court affirmed the denial of 

PCRA relief, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. 

Commonwealth v. Brown, 965 A.2d 289 (Pa.Super.2008) 

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 603 Pa. 689, 983 

A.2d 725 (2009).

[Brown] thereafter sought federal habeas relief. Such relief was 

denied. Brown v. Mazurkiewicz, 2012 WL 954628 (W.D.Pa. 

Mar. 20, 2012). On July 12, 2012, [Brown] filed a pro se PCRA 

petition, his second. That petition was denied and this Court 

affirmed. Commonwealth v. Brown, 83 A.3d 1063 

(Pa.Super.2013) (unpublished memorandum).

On June 7, 2013, [Brown] filed his third pro se PCRA petition. 

Thereafter, [Brown] filed an amended petition along with a motion 

to disqualify the Office of Attorney General (“OAG”) and a motion 

seeking the PCRA court’s recusal. On July 15, 2014, the PCRA 
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court denied the motion to disqualify and the motion for recusal. 

On August 12, 2014, the PCRA court issued an amended notice of 

its intent to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing. 

See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. On December 22, 2014, the PCRA court 

dismissed the petition. This timely appeal followed.

Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 495-496 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(footnotes omitted).

On March 24, 2016, this Court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and 

remanded. See id. at 495. While agreeing that Brown’s petition was “patently 

untimely[,]” we found that “there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to 

whether [Brown] pled and proved the applicability of the PCRA’s newlydiscovered fact exception.” Id. at 507-508. This genuine issue of material 

fact concerned an affidavit filed by Angela White. Immediately following 

Officer Naim’s murder, White was the subject of a drug investigation. In 2013, 

she provided an affidavit to Brown in which she stated that, as part of that 

investigation, there were wiretaps and, on one of them, an unknown individual 

confessed to killing Officer Naim. Id. at 502. We therefore remanded the 

matter for consideration solely of whether “Brown acted with due diligence in 

discovering [that there were wiretap tapes and transcripts in an unrelated 

matter that concerned his case]” and whether the wiretaps constituted 

admissible evidence. Id. at 507.

The PCRA court described the background of the wiretaps, their 

contents, the events following remand, and its findings of fact as follows:

On March 17, 2001, [Brown] was arrested and charged with 

[c]riminal [h]omicide relating to the death of Officer James Naim 
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of the Aliquippa Police Department. Both the City of Aliquippa 

Police Department and the Beaver County District Attorney’s 

Office requested that the offense be investigated by the 

Pennsylvania State Police and prosecuted by the Pennsylvania 

Office of the Attorney General. During the investigation, the 

Attorney General’s Office did file [a]pplications with the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court seeking authorization to intercept 

electronic and wire communications of various individuals known 

to have associations with [Brown]. The Honorable Justin M. 

Johnson of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania approved three (3) 

separate [a]pplications for interceptions at Docket Numbers 12-1 

W.D. 2001 on March 19, 2001; 12-2 W.D. 2001 on March 22,

2001, and 12-3 W.D. 2001 on April 9, 2001. The authorized 

intercepts involved the cellular telephones of Michael Glanton, 

Peris Smith and Michael Bigstaff, Jr. The authorized intercepts 

covered periods of time from March 19, 2001 through April 16, 

2001. The [a]pplications which Judge Johnson authorized all 

related, by their allegations, to the murder of Officer Naim, and, 

further, that [Brown] was associated with Anthony Tusweet

Smith, Perris Smith (both of whom are cousins of [Brown]), 

Michael Glanton and Michael Bigstaff, Jr. in the trafficking of illegal 

drugs.

As a result of the intercepts which were memorialized on thirtyfour (34) cassette tapes at Docket Number 12-1 W.D. 2001; fiftythree (53) cassette tapes at Docket Number 12-2 W.D. 2001, and 

twenty-two (22) cassette tapes at Docket Number 12-3 W.D. 2001 

(109 total cassette tapes), the Office of the Attorney General did 

file additional charges against various individuals, one of whom 

was Angela Y. White, who also happens to be the maternal aunt 

of Michael Glanton. On March 30, 2001, fifteen (15) days after 

the murder of Officer Naim and thirteen (13) days after the arrest 

of [Brown], the Pennsylvania State Police pulled over and 

impounded a pick-up truck which was being operated by Angela 

White with Michael Glanton in the passenger seat, and a 

subsequent search of the truck revealed twelve (12) kilograms of 

cocaine in a hidden compartment under the bed of the truck. On 

November 30, 2001, Ms. White was interviewed by agents of the 

Pennsylvania Bureau of Narcotics Investigation at Fort Hood, 

Texas, where she was stationed in the military.

During the interview, which lasted four (4) hours and twenty (20) 

minutes, the agents did play portions of the taped intercepts for 
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Ms. White to listen to, and follow-up questions were asked. Some 

of the intercepts related to conversations between and among the

aforementioned Michael Glanton, Perris Smith, Michael Bigstaff, 

Jr. and other individuals, including Angela White, and those 

intercepts also led to inquiries by the agents of Ms. White’s 

knowledge of the murder of Officer Naim.

* * * *

Counsel was appointed for [Brown], and [the PCRA court] did 

grant [m]otions of [c]ourt-appointed counsel to acquire the 

wiretaps and logs from the Superior Court. Because the wiretaps 

were then over fifteen (15) years old, and because the Superior 

Court maintained records of that nature pursuant to internal 

operating procedures known only to the Superior Court, the initial 

attempts of [c]ourt-appointed counsel and [the PCRA court] were 

unsuccessful. [Brown] then retained private counsel with 

knowledge of the internal operating procedures of the Superior 

Court who, with and by [o]rder of [the PCRA court], was 

successful in securing release from the Superior Court of 

Pennsylvania archives of, first, the logs and tapes of wiretaps (34 

in total) at Docket Number 12-1 W.D. 2001, and subsequently, 

the logs and tapes of wiretaps at Docket Numbers 12-2 W.D. 2001 

and 12-3 W.D. 2001. As noted previously, Docket Number 12-2 

W.D. 2001 contained 53 cassette tapes and Docket Number 12-3 

W.D. 2001 contained an additional 22 cassette tapes, or 109 total 

cassette tapes at all three (3) Docket Numbers.

Over the course of six and one-half (61⁄2) days, counsel for 

[Brown], counsel for the Commonwealth, this [c]ourt and this 

[c]ourt’s [l]aw [c]lerks listened to all 109 cassette tapes while 

simultaneously reviewing all of the handwritten logs maintained 

simultaneously with the wiretaps of the mobile phone 

conversations. Those six and one-half (61⁄2) days were conducted 

in camera in the [c]ourtroom with only those four (4) 

representatives being present. Following review of the logs and 

wiretaps, the [c]ourt did convene a PCRA Hearing in [c]ourt on 

November 29, 2017. At that hearing, the [c]ourt granted 

[Brown’s] counsel’s [m]otion that the testimony of Angela White 

be sealed, after which defense counsel called two (2) witnesses 

who testified in [o]pen [c]ourt.

FINDINGS OF FACT
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1. There is no recording or log of recordings at Docket 

Numbers 12-1,12-2 or 12-3 W.D. 2001 which contain the 

statement of either the caller who initiated the phone call nor the 

recipient who answered the phone call, wherein any person 

claimed responsibility for the “killing of the police officer on 

Linmar, Alliquippa”[.]

2. There is no recording or log of recordings at Docket 

Numbers 12-1, 12-2 or 12-3 W.D. 2001, which contains the 

statement of either the caller nor the recipient of the call wherein 

any person was “the killer that was bragging about what he did”.

3. The affidavit signed by Angela White at the request of 

Caprice Allen, who was retained by the Innocence Project of Point 

Park University to secure the affidavit, states that she was “asked 

about this” (a wiretap) “when I was being interrogated on the 

Army Base in Fort Hood, Texas”.

4. An investigative report authored by Pennsylvania Office of 

Attorney General Narcotics Agent James J. Farmer reveals that an 

interview of Angela White took place at Fort Hood, Texas on 

November 30, 2001.

5. A redacted copy of Agent Farmer’s report was provided by 

the Commonwealth to Erika Kreisman [Brown’s trial counsel] in 

discovery. PCRA Hearing Transcript, Page 10, Lines 2 through 19; 

Page 12, Line 24, “it might have been”. Also, see [Brown’s]

Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 as entered into the record at the PCRA 

Hearing.

6. Attorney Kreisman did not review the discovery she received 

pre trial before coming to testify in the PCRA Hearing.

7. The parties submitted a [j]oint [m]otion to [s]upplement 

[r]ecord well after the PCRA Hearing. The [j]oint [m]otion will be 

granted, and the unredacted report of Agent Farmer will be made 

part of this record, and, as also requested by the parties, kept 

under seal.

8. The report of Agent Farmer is eight (8) pages in length, 

mostly single spaced, and contains only two (2) paragraphs, Nos. 

31 and 32, in which the Agents focused on any knowledge that 

Ms. White may have had concerning the death of Officer Naim. 
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Those two (2) paragraphs were introduced into the record by 

[Brown] as Page 2 of Exhibit 2.

9. A complete review of the eight-page report of Agent Farmer 

reveals that all lines redacted from the report relate to the charges 

filed against Ms. White, and no other references to the death of 

Officer Naim are made elsewhere in the report.

10. Per the report of Agent Farmer, as set forth on Page 2 of 

Exhibit 2, when asked if she knows or has heard any information 

about Jamie Brown, White stated she only knows of him from the 

newspapers and through Charlene (her sister) telling her Brown 

was arrested for killing a cop." She again stated, “she does not 

know Brown. . .”

11. At the PCRA Hearing, Angela White did testify on behalf of 

[Brown], and her testimony, for the most part, was consistent 

with the contents of the affidavit that she provided to Caprice Allen 

some twelve (12) years after the untimely death of Officer Naim.

PCRA Court Opinion, 9/21/2018, at unnumbered pages 1-7.

On September 21, 2018, the PCRA court denied Brown’s serial PCRA 

petition. On October 11, 2017, the PCRA court issued an opinion denying 

Brown’s request for discovery. The instant appeal followed.2

On appeal, Brown raises seven issues. Brown’s Brief, at 5-6. Five of 

those issues contend that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition 

because of his meritorious newly discovered evidence, Brady,

3 and 

____________________________________________

2 The PCRA court did not order Brown to file a concise statement of errors 

complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On November 26, 

2018, the Honorable Richard Mancini, President Judge of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Beaver County, issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion noting that the judge 

who had presided over Brown’s case had retired and adopting its September 

21, 2018 opinion.

3 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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governmental interference claims. Id. One issue is a challenge to the 

constitutionality of the PCRA’s time-bar; and the remaining challenges the 

denial of Brown’s request for discovery. Id. 

“In reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is supported by the record and free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 141 A.3d 1277, 1283–1284 (Pa. 2016) 

(internal punctuation and citation omitted). Further, because this was on a 

remand, the jurisdiction of the PCRA court was limited. Our Supreme Court 

has stated:

Following a full and final decision by a PCRA court on a PCRA 

petition, that court no longer has jurisdiction to make any 

determinations related to that petition unless, following appeal, 

the appellate court remands the case for further proceedings in 

the lower court. In such circumstances, the PCRA court may only 

act in accordance with the dictates of the remand order. The PCRA 

court does not have the authority or the discretion to permit a 

petitioner to raise new claims outside the scope of the remand 

order and to treat those new claims as an amendment to an 

adjudicated PCRA petition.

Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, 144 A.3d 1270, 1280 (Pa. 2016) (footnotes 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Rivera, 199 A.3d 365, 388-389 (Pa. 

2018) (holding that following remand PCRA petitioner is not entitled to raise 

new claims and citing cases).

Lastly, this Court has previously explained the interplay between the 

newly discovered facts exception to the timeliness requirements and a 

substantive collateral claim of after-discovered evidence as follows:
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The timeliness exception set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) 

requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts 

upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those 

facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. Due diligence 

demands that the petitioner take reasonable steps to protect his 

own interests. A petitioner must explain why he could not have 

learned the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of due diligence. 

This rule is strictly enforced. Additionally, the focus of this 

exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly 

discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts. 

The timeliness exception set forth at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) has 

often mistakenly been referred to as the “after-discovered 

evidence” exception. This shorthand reference was a misnomer, 

since the plain language of subsection (b)(1)(ii) does not require 

the petitioner to allege and prove a claim of “after-discovered 

evidence.” Rather, as an initial jurisdictional threshold, Section 

9545(b)(1)(ii) requires a petitioner to allege and prove that there 

were facts unknown to him and that he exercised due diligence in 

discovering those facts. Once jurisdiction is established, a PCRA 

petitioner can present a substantive after-discovered-evidence 

claim. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(vi) (explaining that to be 

eligible for relief under PCRA, petitioner must plead and prove by 

preponderance of evidence that conviction or sentence resulted 

from, inter alia, unavailability at time of trial of exculpatory 

evidence that has subsequently become available and would have 

changed outcome of trial if it had been introduced). In other 

words, the “new facts” exception at:

[S]ubsection (b)(1)(ii) has two components, which 

must be alleged and proved. Namely, the petitioner 

must establish that: 1) the facts upon which the 

claim was predicated were unknown and 2) could not 

have been ascertained by the exercise of due

diligence. If the petitioner alleges and proves these 

two components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction 

over the claim under this subsection.

Thus, the “new facts” exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii) does not 

require any merits analysis of an underlying after-discoveredevidence claim. 
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Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176–177 (Pa. Super. 2015) (some 

citations and quotation marks omitted, emphases in original), appeal denied, 

125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015). 

With this framework in mind, we now turn to the issues raised by Brown. 

We initially note the following, the prior panel of this Court held that Brown’s 

petition was “patently untimely” and that the White affidavit in and of itself 

was not a newly discovered fact. Brown, supra at 500, 502. Moreover, we 

remanded this matter in order to ascertain if Brown acted with due diligence 

in obtaining the White affidavit,

4

if there was information on the wiretaps that 

was admissible, and, if so, whether it constituted a newly discovered fact 

and/or Brady material. 

Brown’s first issue is less a separate issue than a compilation of the 

issues that follow it, as he generally states that his petition was timely under 

either the newly discovered facts and/or the governmental interference 

exception. See Brown’s Brief, at 45-52. Therefore, we will discuss the 

majority of the arguments raised in that issue in combination with the related 

claims discussed below. However, to the extent that Brown raises a claim of 

governmental interference in his first issue, we find that it was not properly 

before the PCRA court as Brown raised it for the first time in his post-remand 

amended PCRA petition filed without leave of court on April 28, 2017. See 

____________________________________________

4 The PCRA court held that Brown acted with due diligence. PCRA Ct. Op. at 

7.
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Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, 4/28/2017, at 21. As discussed 

above, our Supreme Court has specifically held that a PCRA petitioner cannot 

raise new claims on remand. Rivera, supra at 388-389. Thus, that portion 

of Brown’s first claim fails.

In part of his first claim, and his second and third claims, Brown 

contends that the PCRA court erred in holding that the information and 

testimony of Angela White neither were facts nor newly discovered. Brown’s 

Brief, at 42-59. However, Brown has waived these claims.

To the extent that Brown is claiming that the White affidavit in and of 

itself constituted a newly discovered fact, this Court has already ruled that it 

does not. See Brown, supra at 502. That decision is binding on this Court

under the law of the case doctrine. This doctrine “refers to a family of rules 

which embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a 

litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that 

same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter.” 

Commonwealth v Starr, 664 A.2d 1326, 1331 (Pa. 1995). “Among the 

related but distinct rules which make up the law of the case doctrine are that: 

. . . (2) upon a second appeal, an appellate court may not alter the resolution 

of a legal question previously decided by the same appellate court. . . .” Id. 

Thus, this Court cannot alter the prior panel’s decision that the White affidavit 

is not newly discovered evidence.
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In any event, while this Court does have the transcript of the PCRA 

hearing, that transcript does not contain the testimony of Angela White, which, 

at Brown’s request, the PCRA court placed under seal. See PCRA Ct. Op., at 

unnumbered page 5; N.T. PCRA Hearing 11/29/2016, at 1-37. Moreover, this 

Court examined the notice of appeal, which does not contain a request for 

transcripts; Brown did not send a copy of the notice of appeal to the court 

recorder, and in the notice he erroneously states, “The complete transcript of 

the proceedings has been lodged of record.” Notice of Appeal, 10/05/2018. 

We have stated “[w]hen the appellant . . . fails to conform to the 

requirements of [Pa.R.A.P.] 1911 [relating to transcript requests], any claims 

that cannot be resolved in the absence of the necessary transcript or 

transcripts must be deemed waived for the purpose of appellate review.” 

Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc), 

appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted). Further, it is the 

appellant’s responsibility to make certain that the certified record contains all 

items necessary to ensure that this Court is able to review his claims. See 

Commonwealth v. B.D.G., 959 A.2d 362, 372 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). 

This Court has stated: 

It is black letter law in this jurisdiction that an appellate 

court cannot consider anything which is not part of the record in 

the case. It is also well-settled in this jurisdiction that it is 

[a]ppellant’s responsibility to supply this Court with a complete 

record for purposes of review. A failure by appellant to insure that 

the original record certified for appeal contains sufficient 

information to conduct a proper review constitutes waiver of the 

issue sought to be examined.
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Commonwealth v. Martz, 926 A.2d 514, 524-525 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal 

denied, 940 A.2d 363 (Pa. 2008) (citations and quotation marks omitted). 

Accordingly, we find that Brown’s failure to ensure that the PCRA court sent 

the sealed portion of the PCRA transcript that contains Angela White’s 

testimony to this Court waived part of his first issue, as well as his second and 

third issues on appeal.

5

In his fourth claim, Brown contends that the PCRA’s time bar is 

unconstitutional as applied to him. Brown’s Brief, at 59-65. However, as 

Brown also raised this claim for the first time in his post-remand April 28, 

2017 amended PCRA petition, and as it is well beyond the scope of our remand 

order, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to consider it. See Sepulveda, 

supra at 1280. Thus, the claim fails.6

____________________________________________

5 Moreover, even if we were in possession of White’s testimony, it is highly 

unlikely that we would have resolved this issue in Brown’s favor. In its 

opinion, the PCRA court stated that White’s testimony “for the most part, was 

consistent with the contents of the affidavit[.]” PCRA Ct. Op., at unnumbered 

page 7. The parties do not dispute that the wiretaps did not corroborate the 

allegations made in the affidavit. Id. at 8. This Court already ruled that the 

affidavit, absent corroboration, did not constitute a newly discovered fact. 

Brown, supra at 502. Therefore, we see no basis upon which we would have 

overruled the PCRA court’s finding that testimony which just repeated the 

same uncorroborated and likely inadmissible information would not have 

constituted a newly discovered fact that would render Brown’s PCRA petition 

timely.

6

In any event, the claim is meritless. Our Supreme Court has stated:
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In part of his first issue, and his fifth issue, Brown maintains that the 

PCRA court erred in not granting him a new trial because the Commonwealth 

failed to turn over to him an unredacted7 copy of Angela White’s 2001 

interview with Pennsylvania Attorney General narcotics agent James J. 

____________________________________________

This Court has held that the PCRA’s time restriction is 

constitutionally valid. See Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 

547, 722 A.2d 638, 643 (1998) (“the PCRA’s time limitation upon 

the filing of PCRA petitions does not unreasonably or 

unconstitutionally limit [an appellant’s] constitutional right to 

habeas corpus relief.”). Furthermore, we have held that the PCRA 

time limits are jurisdictional in nature, implicating a court’s very 

power to adjudicate a controversy. See Commonwealth v. 

Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214 (1999). Accordingly, the 

“period for filing a PCRA petition is not subject to the doctrine of 

equitable tolling;” instead, the time for filing a PCRA petition can

be extended only to the extent that the PCRA permits it to be 

extended, i.e., by operation of one of the statutorily enumerated 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. Id. at 222.

More recently, in Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 

837 A.2d 1157 (2003), we recounted this Court’s rejection of 

“various theories devised to avoid the effects of the one-year time 

limitation” of the PCRA. Id. at 1157 (collecting cases). In 

Robinson, we reiterated the strictly jurisdictional nature of the 

PCRA time-bar and that “the PCRA confers no authority upon this 

Court to fashion ad hoc equitable exceptions to the PCRA time-bar 

in addition to those exceptions expressly delineated in the Act.” 

Id. at 1161 (quoting Commonwealth v. Eller, 569 Pa. 622, 807 

A.2d 838, 845 (2002)).

Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287, 292 (Pa. 2004).

7 The Commonwealth did turn over a redacted copy of the interview to Brown’s 

counsel prior to trial. PCRA Ct. Op., at unnumbered page 6; N.T. PCRA 

Hearing, 11/29/2016, at 10 and 12. The PCRA court held that the portion 

turned over to trial counsel contained the only references in the interview to 

the shooting of Officer Naim. PCRA Ct. Op., at unnumbered page 6.
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Farmer, and also failed to turn over evidence in the form of certain taperecorded statements made in the wiretaps. Brown’s Brief, at 42-52, 65-76. 

Again, Brown waived these claims.

At the request of the parties, the PCRA court entered the unredacted 

White interview report as a sealed exhibit at the PCRA hearing. PCRA Ct. Op., 

at unnumbered page 6. None of the PCRA hearing exhibits, including both the 

redacted and unredacted White interview reports, are contained in the 

certified record, and we see nothing that demonstrates that Brown requested 

that the unredacted interview be unsealed or that any of the PCRA hearing 

exhibits be forwarded to this Court.

Moreover, as per procedure, the PCRA court returned the wiretaps and 

their logs to this Court’s archives, so they are not contained in the certified 

record. Brown could have moved pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5715 to unseal 

them and have them forwarded to this panel. However, he did not do so.

As discussed above, it is the appellant’s responsibility to ensure that this 

Court has all documentation necessary to review this appeal. See B.D.G., 

supra at 372. In the absence of the unredacted White interview report and 

the wiretaps, we are unable to assess the merits of Brown’s claim that failure 

to provide them to him prior to trial either constituted a Brady violation and/or 

newly discovered evidence. Therefore, we find Brown waived part of his first 

claim and his fifth claim. See Martz, supra at 525.
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In part of his first claim and his sixth claim, Brown argues that the PCRA 

court erred in not considering newly discovered facts in the form of affidavits 

from his co-defendant Acey Taylor and former Commonwealth witness Darnell 

Hines. Brown’s Brief at 42-52, 76-86. We disagree. 

Brown raised these claims for the first time in his post-remand April 28, 

2017 amended PCRA petition. Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, at 

10-12. As stated above, following a limited remand, an appellant cannot raise 

new claims exceeding the scope of the remand. See Sepulveda, supra at 

1280; see also Rivera, supra at 388-389. Here, as discussed above, the 

remand was limited to the White affidavit and the wiretaps. Taylor and Hines’ 

recantation affidavits are completely unrelated to White or to the wiretaps. 

Moreover, we find Brown’s attempts to both limit the scope of the holding in 

Sepulveda and to distinguish it utterly unpersuasive. The PCRA court was 

without jurisdiction to consider Brown’s new and unrelated claims of newly 

discovered evidence. Thus, the remainder of his first claim and his sixth claim

fail.

In his seventh and final issue, Brown avers that the trial court erred in 

denying his request for discovery. Brown’s Brief, at 86-89. In his request, 

Brown sought:

. . . any investigative files maintained by the Aliquippa Police 

Department, Beaver County detectives, the Office of Attorney

General, the Pennsylvania State Police, and any information 

provided by the F.B.I. to the aforementioned state or local law 

enforcement as it relates to an investigation of Anthony Tusweet 

Smith, Michael "Mike-Mike" Glanton, and Peris Smith and their 
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involvement in the murder of Officer Nairn, including but not 

limited to any statements provided by Anthony “Ali” Dorsett.

In addition, counsel requests copies of any police files maintained

by the Aliquippa Police Department, Office of Attorney General,

Pennsylvania State Police, Beaver County detectives, and any

information provided by the F.B.I. to the aforementioned state or

local law enforcement pertaining to a parallel drug investigation 

of the Smith brothers and Michael Glanton.

Counsel also seeks discovery of any investigative files maintained

by the Aliquippa Police Department, Beaver County detectives, the

Office of Attorney General, the Pennsylvania State Police, and any

information provided by the F.B.I. to the aforementioned state or

local law enforcement as it relates to an investigation into possible

Aliquippa police corruption at the time of Officer Naim’s death, not

limited to grand jury information.

Request for Discovery Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E), 9/25/2017, at 4-5 

(paragraph enumeration omitted).

The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure proscribe discovery during 

collateral proceedings “except upon leave of court after a showing of 

exceptional circumstances.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 902(E)(1). “We review the denial of 

a discovery request in post-conviction proceedings for abuse of discretion.” 

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011), cert. denied, 568 

U.S. 1091 (2013). “An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment. 

Instead, it is a decision based on bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest 

unreasonableness, or misapplication of law. Moreover, we recall that the 

appellant has the duty to convince us an abuse occurred.” Commonwealth 

v. Frey, 41 A.3d 605, 611 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 413 (Pa. 

2013).
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Here, Brown has not persuaded us that the PCRA court abused its

discretion. In its decision denying Brown’s request, the PCRA court detailed 

the extent of the information already provided to Brown prior to trial about 

the possible involvement of Anthony Tusweet Smith in the murder of Officer 

Naim, and that Angela White, Michael Glanton and others in their circle might 

have information about the incident. PCRA Court Opinion, 10/11/2017, at 

unnumbered pages 2-3. It then found that Brown failed to identify “specific 

documents or items that were not disclosed pre-trial or during the trial.” Id. 

at 4. It concluded that Brown’s exceedingly broad request was “speculative 

and a baseless fishing expedition.” Id. Having reviewed the record, which 

supports its findings, we discern no abuse of discretion. See Frey, supra at 

611. Brown’s final claim fails.

Accordingly, for the reasons discussed above, we affirm the denial of 

Brown’s third PCRA petition.

Order affirmed.

Judge Colins joins in this memorandum.

Judge Olson concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary
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Date: 7/16/2019