NOT RECOMMENDED F OR FUL L -TEXT PUB L I CATI ON File Na me: 13a0109n.06
No. 12-3234
UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee , ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE v. ) UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT ) COURT FOR THE N ORTHERN WI L SON DOMI

NGUEZ , ) DI STRI CT OF OH I O ) Def endant- Appellant. )
Be fore : KETHL EDGE a

nd WHI TE, Circuit J udg es; L UDI NGTON , District J udg e. *
L UDI NGTON , District J udg e. Wil son Domingue z was sentenc ed to 30 months in custody
to be followed by three y ear s’ supervised rele ase afte r he pled g uilty to selling 3,000 ecsta sy pills in

v i o l at ion of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)

. After being rele ased and deporte d to the Domi nican Republic i n Aug ust 2008, Domingue z returne d to the United States. I n April 2009, he viol ated the conditions of hi s supervised relea se, admit ted t he viol ations, and was sentenc ed to six months in pris on with

cre dit for time serve d. The court then imposed a term of supervised rele ase until August 2012, stating it was “ext end[ing] for one y ear the t erms of [Domi ng uez’s] supervised relea se.” Oct. 19,
2009 Hr ’g. T r. 9. Twenty -three months later, in September 2011, Domingue z ag ain violated his supervised r elea se whe n he wa s arr ested for traff icking three kilogr ams of coc aine.
F o r h is s e c ond supervised rele ase violation, D o mi n g u e z r e c e iv e d a

n e ig h te e n - mo n th c u s to d ia l
sentenc e. On appea l, he claims the district court did not expressly revoke his supervised rele ase term

The Honor able Thoma s L . L udington, United States D istrict J udg e for the Easter

n * District of Michig an, sitting by desig nation.No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez in October 2009 when the six -mont h cu s t o d i al s entenc e was imposed, and as a result, improperly extended it. Domingue z conclude s he was there fore not subject to supervised rele ase at the time of his a rre st in September 2011. He also arg ues that the eig hteen- month se ntence he rec eived for the second violation is proce durally and substantively unrea sonable beca use the court did not expressly addre ss the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fa ctors. Domingue z’s attack on the October 2009 sentenc e is untimely and there fore ca n n o t b e revie wed. Fur

ther, the district c ourt’s attention to the § 3553(a) fac tors was leg ally sufficie nt, and his 18-month sentence is both procedur ally and substantively

rea sonable. We af

firm.
I
I n 2006, Domingue z pled guilty to selling 3,000 ecsta sy pills. A C lass C felony , the court

was authorized to impose a term of imprison m en t u p t o 2 0 y ears. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)( 1)(C). I n addition, upon any sentenc e of imprisonme nt, the court was require d to establish “a term of supervised rele ase of at least 3 y ear s.” Id

. Pursuant to that authority the court sentenc ed Domingue z to 30 months i n custody

and thre e y ear s of supervise d rele ase. Domingue z’s supe rvised rele ase c ommenced on A ug ust 14, 2008 when he was transfe rre d from the custody of the Fe dera l Bur eau of Prisons into t h e cu s t o d y of I mmigra tion and Customs Enforc ement (ICE ) pending remova l. Domingue z was then deporte d to his native Dominican Republic. At that time, his supervised re lease was slated to e nd on Aug ust 13, 2011.
Do m ingue z then attempted to re- enter the United States, and on April 20, 2009 he was

arr ested and char g ed in the Southern District of Texas with illega l re- entry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. This char g e would later be dismiss ed afte r it was discovere d that Domingue z’s fathe r was 2No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez

a natura liz ed U.S. citizen. Domingue z was, howe v er , alleg ed to have committed two other supervised- rele ase violations: failing to notify the Probation Offic e within 72 hours of his arr est for illega l re- entry , and failing to pay a portion of the specia l assessment fee char g ed fo r his orig inal conviction. Af

t er t h e April arr est in Texas, Domingue z waited five months in custody until a supervised r elea se hea

ring was he ld in Ohio, where the orig inal drug conviction occ urre d.
On S eptember 29, 2009, Do m i n gu ez’s supervised relea se hearing commence d. When the
court raised the two alleg ed supervised rele ase violations, Domingue z acknow ledg ed his g uilt. His counsel ex plained, “Wi th reg ard to the supervise d rele ase violations stemming from the failure t o
pay the specia l assessment and the failure to contac t law enfor ceme nt, we would enter an admission with reg ard to those violations.” Sep. 29, 2009 Hr’g

. Tr. 8. At that time, the investiga tion reg arding
Do m i n gu ez ’s citizenship status was still pending

. The court noted that Domingue z’s citizenship status would weig h heavily on its decision, and the hea ring was c ontinued for thre e we eks.
On October 19, 2009, the parties rec onvened for the continued hear ing. The court beg an by establishing that Domingue z had admitted to the two supervised rele ase violations outlined above, and that the char g e ag ainst him for illega l re- entry had been dismiss ed. Oct. 19, 2009 Hr’g

. Tr. 3–4. The court established that the rema ining violations wer e “both g rade C violations” with a Guidelines
rang e for imprisonment of “three to nine months.” Id . at 10. Def ense c ounsel reque sted the cour t
to impose a sentence of six months, cre d i t i n g t he ti me Domi ng uez had already serve d in custody , with the understanding that “he w ould remain on super vised rele ase” afte rwa

rds. Id . at 5. The court did just that. I t imposed a term of six months’ incar cer ation, with cre dit for time

serve d, and “extend[ed] for one y ear the terms of the defe ndant’s supervised rel ease .” Id

. at 9. 3No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez When the court asked if Domingue z had any thing else to offe r, defe nse counsel r esponded “No, Your
Honor. T h ank y ou very much.” Id

. at 10. I n fac t, no objections wer e raised during the hear ing. Domingue z was then rele ased from the Burea u of P risons on supervised r elea se for a ter m ending on Aug ust 13, 2012.
On September 9, 2010, pursuant to the conditions of his supervised rele ase, Domingue z submitt ed to a drug test. He tested positive for coca ine. Three wee ks later a supervision repor t was filed, indicating that Domingue z had violated the terms and conditions of his supervised rele ase by testing positive for drug s. The Probation Offic e reque sted a modification of the orig inal supervised releas e conditions, sug g esting outpatient drug counseling and testing for Domingue z, as well as continued p er s o n al supervision. The repor t also reque sted a reduc tion of the term of supervised rele ase imposed by the court in October 2009 to confor m with 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)( 2). The United 1

B o t h p a r t i e s a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e t h a t 1 8 U

. S

. C

. § 3 5 8 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) c o n t r o l s D o m i n g u e z ’ s t e r m o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e . 1 H o w e v e r , 2 1 U

. S

. C

. § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) o u t l i n e s t h e p e n a l t i e s f o r t h e c r i m e D o m i n g u e z p l e d g u i l t y t o i n 2 0 0 6

. I t r e a d s i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , “ N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g s e c t i o n 3 5 8 3 o f T i t l e 1 8 , a n y s e n t e n c e i m p o s i n g a t e r m o f i m p r i s o n m e n t u n d e r t h i s p a r a g r a p h s h a l l , i n t h e a b s e n c e o f s u c h a p r i o r c o n v i c t i o n , i m p o s e a t e r m o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e o f a t l e a s t 3 y e a r s i n a d d i t i o n t o s u c h t e r m o f i m p r i s o n m e n t

. ” I d

. ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

. S e c t i o n 8 4 1 ( b ) h a s b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d a s p r o v i d i n g n o c e i l i n g f o r t h e l e n g t h o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e t e r m s u n d e r t h a t s e c t i o n . U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. C h i l e s , 1 3 7 F

. A p p ’ x 8 7 0 , 8 7 4 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 5 ) ( u n p u b l i s h e d t a b l e o p i n i o n ) ; s e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. G i b b s , 5 8 F

. 3 d 3 6 , 3 7

S 3 8 ( 2 d C i r . 1 9 9 5 ) ( § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) p r o v i d e s “ n o m a x i m u m t e r m o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e ” a n d t h e r e f o r e “ t h e s t a t u t o r y m a x i m u m t e r m o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e i s a l i f e t e r m . ” )

. F u r t h e r , t h e S i x t h C i r c u i t h a s c o n s i s t e n t l y c o n c l u d e d § 3 5 8 3 ( b ) w a s n o t m e a n t t o o v e r r i d e t h e s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e r e q u i r e m e n t s i n § 8 4 1 ( b )

. I n U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. P a g e , 1 3 1 F

. 3 d 1 1 7 3 , 1 1 8 0 ( 6 t h C i r . 1 9 9 7 ) , a b r o g a t e d o n o t h e r g r o u n d s b y J o h n s o n v
. U n i t e d S t a t e s , 5 2 9 U

. S

. 6 9 4 , 7 0 0 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , t h e c o u r t h e l d , [ T ] h e s p e c i f

i c p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) p r e v a i l o v e r t h e g e n e r a l p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 3 5 8 3 ( b ) ( 2 ) w h e n t h e r e i s a n a p p a r e n t c o n f l i c t

. I n r e g a r d t o t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , s e c t i o n 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C ) p r o v i d e s f

o r a t e r m o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e o f “ a t l e a s t t h r e e y e a r s , ” n o t s i m p l y “ t h r e e y e a r s . ” W e b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s l a n g u a g e i n d i c a t e s a n i n t e n t o n t h e p a r t o f C o n g r e s s t o a l l o w t e r m s o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e o f m o r e t h a n t h r e e y e a r s . T h e r e i s n o l a n g u a g e i n s e c t i o n 8 4 1 ( b ) t o s u g g e s t t h a t C o n g r e s s i n t e n d e d t h e a u t h o r i z e d t e r m s o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e t o b e l i m i t e d b y s e c t i o n 3 5 8 3 ( b )

. S e e a l s o U n i t e d S t a t e s v
. N e w b o r n , 7 1 F

. A p p ’ x 5 5 7 , 5 6 4 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 3 ) ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) ( “ t h e m a j o r i t y o f t h e o t h e r 4No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez States Attorney ’s Offic e did not object, and Domingue z’s supervised relea se was reduc ed by four months, with a new expiration date of April 18, 2012. On Octo b er 4, 2010, the m odification was dockete d. Domingue z also visited the Probation Offic e on April 26, 2011, was informed about his

new end-da te of supervised rele ase, and signe d a form indicating his acknow ledg ment of the chang e. Fe b. 14, 2012 Hr’g . Tr. 7. Then on September 14, 2011 Do m i n gu ez and three ot hers ga there d in a parking lot to sell

sever al kilogr ams of coca ine to an underc over ag ent for $30,000. When confr onted with the buy er’ s true identity , Domingue z attempted to evade a rre st on foot. Id . at 26. He f ailed, and w as ar

rested and char g ed in the Summi t County Court of Common Pleas with traff icking coca ine in violation of the Ohio Revised Code. Domingue z pled g uilty on Dec ember 5, 2011 and was sentenc ed to seven
y ear s in Ohio s t at e prison. Id

. Domingue z’s state conviction beca me the basis for an additional violation hear ing befor e the district court on J anuar y 9, 2012. There , for the first time, Domingue z questioned the October 2009 sentenc e. He arg ued t hat the court had no authority to “extend” the orig inal supervised rele ase term of three y ea rs , an d that the term of supervised rele ase ended in Aug ust 2011. Domingue z conclude d the court could not impose a sanction for a supervised rele ase violation one month later. The court reque sted briefing on the issue, and the hear ing was continued to Febr uary 2012.

c i r c u i t s t o h a v e a d d r e s s e d t h i s i s s u e h a s h e l d t h a t § 3 5 8 3 ( b ) d o e s n o t l i m i t t h e t e r m o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e a d i s t r i c t c o u r t m a y i m p o s e u n d e r § 8 4 1 ( b ) ( 1 ) ( C )

. ” )

. B u t b e c a u s e D o m i n g u e z ’ s a p p e a l o f h i s O c t o b e r 2 0 0 9 s e n t e n c e i s u n t i m e l y , t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s n o t c r i t i c a l t o o u r a n a l y s i s .
5No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez On Fe bruar

y 1 4, 2012, the supervised rele ase violation hear ing resumed. Although Domingue z admitted to the new supervised rele ase violation, he disputed whether he was lawfully subject t o supervised relea se at the t ime of hi s arr est. The court explained that “w h i l e t h e court’s order does not specific ally note that the defe ndant’s supervised rele ase [was] revoke d, obviously the
court could not have sentenc ed the defe ndant to a term in the Bur eau of Prisons if, in fac t, revoc ation had not occur

red.” Id

. at 16. The court went on, “The re was no objection by counsel to the court’s imposit ion of the order

. So it was obvious to all involved, including counsel for the defe ndant, that the cour t had, in fac t, revoke d the def endant’ s supervised r elea se.” Id . at 16–17. The court also found that while the new supervised rele ase term had orig inally been extended bey ond the 3 6

- mo n th ma

x imum, this was identified by the Probation Offic e and modified to confor m with § 3583(b)( 2). Domingue z was then prope rl y informed of the chang e. Id

. at 17. The court conclude d that at the time of his September 2011 violation, Domingue z was “on supervised rele ase, and as borne out by the testimony , was continuing to be supervised at the time of the new law violation which bring s him before the cour t today for pur poses of sente ncing .” Id . at 18. The court turned to the imposit ion of a s en tence , and indicated it had revie wed the
prese ntence investiga tion repor t from the orig inal sentenc ing, as well as various probation repor ts. Id

. at 23. The court established that the advisory Guidelines rang e was betwee n 12 and 18 months afte r revoking Domingue z’s supervised rele ase beca use of his September 2011 violation. Def ense counsel “ concur [red] wit h the cour t’s analy sis.” Id . at 28. The c ourt was not plea sed with Doming uez’s conduct. He had previously been g iven “the benef it of the doubt” with the hope that his previous transg ression was an “isolated incident and not 6No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez l i k el y to reoc cur. That, unfortunate ly , was not the case .” Id

. at 28–29. The court noted that Domingue z had attempted to sell three kilogr ams of cocaine for $30,000, and then h ad at t em pted
to flee from police. “All of that leads the court to nothing but the conclusion, sir, that y ou have not lear ned from an y ear lier sanction that has been imposed, and there is a need for just punishment, adequate deter

renc e, to protec t the public, for a leng thy term of incar cer ation.” Id

. at 29. For those

rea sons, the court imposed an 18-month sentenc e, at the top of the advisory Guidelines rang e, to run

consec utive and not concur rent to the s tate sentenc e. Id

. Def ense counsel asked the court to

rec onsider the consec utive nature of the sentenc e, b ut did not raise any objections to the court’s application of the § 3553(a) fac tors. Id

. at 30. The court explained that it would not rec onsider the
sentenc e — that a consec utive sentenc e was appropr iate g iven Domingue z’s conduct. Id

. at 30–31. Domingue z was then sentenc ed, and r aised this appea l.
II Domingue z did not protest the term of supervised rele ase imposed on October 19, 2009 until
J anuar y 9, 2012 — well over two y ear s later. The g overnme nt obje cts that the attack is the ref ore 2 untimely . We ag ree . Fe dera l Rule of Appellate Procedur e 4(b) re q u i res that a criminal defe ndant file notice of
appea l w ithin 14 day s afte r “the entry of either the judgme nt or the order being appea led.” Fe d. R. App. P. 4(b)( 1)(A) (i). We are require d to dismiss late-f iled criminal appea ls when the g overnme nt

I n f a c t , D o m i n g u e z a r g u e d t h e s e n t e n c e w a s i m p r o p e r o n l y o n c e h e f a c e d a n a d d i t i o n a l 1 2

– 1 8 m o n t h s i n p r i s o n 2 f o r v i o l a t i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e . W h e n p r e v i o u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o q u e s t i o n t h e s e n t e n c e a r o s e , D o m i n g u e z w a s c o m p l i a n t : h e d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e s e n t e n c e d u r i n g t h e O c t o b e r 1 9 , 2 0 0 9 h e a r i n g ; h e d i d n o t o b j e c t t o t h e c o u r t o r d e r r e d u c i n g h i s s u p e r v i s e d r e l e a s e o n O c t o b e r 4 , 2 0 1 0 ; a n d h e d i d n o t o b j e c t w h e n h e v i s i t e d t h e P r o b a t i o n O f f i c e o n A p r i l 2 6 , 2 0 1 1 t o a c k n o w l e d g e t h e r e d u c t i o n i n w r i t i n g . 7No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez has raised the issue. United States v. Gaytan-G arza , 652 F.3d 680, 681 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curia m).
I n Gaytan-G arza , the defe ndant waited four y ear s to file his appea l to the district court’s judgme nt
ag ainst him, and his appeal wa s sua sponte “dismissed as untimely .” Id

. Severa l sister circ uits ag ree . “When the g overnme nt proper ly objects to the untimeliness of

a defe ndant’s criminal appea l, Rule 4(b) is ma ndatory and inflexi ble.” United States v. Frias , 521 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 2008); see also United States v . W atson , 623 F.3d 542, 544 ( 8th Cir. 2010) (def endant’ s notice of appea l w as untimely , the g overnme nt proper ly objected, and the appea l w as dismiss ed); United States v. Lopez , 562 F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2009) (“B eca use the g overnme nt has not forf

eited it s objection t o L opez’s untimely notice of a

ppeal, we must apply

the t ime limit s of Rule 4(b)

. ”) ; United States v. Byfield , 522 F.3d 400, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (whe re defe ndant’s
appea l was untimely , and the g overnm en t proper ly objected, the appea l was dismiss ed); United
States v. Sadler , 480 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007) (whe re defe ndant’s appea l was untimely and the
g overnme nt objected, the court was “re quired to dismiss [t he] appea l”); United States v. Turner , 88
F. App’x 307, 310 (10th Cir. 2004) (def endant’ s attack on the leg ality of his sentenc e was “cle arly time-barr ed under the Fe dera l Rules of Appellate Procedur e” wher e he did not file an appea l within the limit s of Rule 4(b)) ; Rivera v. United States , 48 F.3d 1222, 1995 WL 94905, at *1 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished tabl e opinion) (re cog nizi ng attack on defe ndant’s sentenc e under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was
proce durally

barr ed whe re de fenda

nt did not file direct appe al).
Her e, Domingue z neve r appea led his O ctober 2009 sentenc e. He did not objec t dur ing the hear ing when the sentenc e was imposed and he did not direc tly appea l the sentenc e. Domingue z first raised the issue on J anuar y 9, 2012, only

afte r he w as fa cing another supervised r elea se violation. 8No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez The g overnme nt, in contra st, timely objects to Domingue z’s attack on the October 19, 2009 sentenc e

— noting that it is late. Be cause the g overnme nt has proper ly o bjected to the consideration of Domingue z’s appea l, and the appea l is more than two y ear s overdue , the require ments of Rule 4(b)
must be enfor ced. Domingue z’s challenge t o the sentenc e imposed on October 19, 2009 and the subsequent t erm of supervised rele ase will be dismiss ed. He was proper ly subject to supervised rele ase a t the time of his September 2011 violation.
III Domingue z asser

ts that even if he violated the t er m s o f his supervised rele ase, the ei g hteen- month sentenc e he rec eived in Fe bruar y 2012 is proce durally and substa n t i v el y

unrea sonable. Domingue z criticizes the court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) fa ctors. Ag ain, Domingue z’s arg ument is without m erit.
A
We revie w “sente nces imposed following revoc ati o n o f s u p e rvised rele ase . . . under the same ab u s e of discretion standard that we apply to sentenc es imposed following conviction.” United States v. Johnson , 356 F. App’ x 785, 793 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Polihonki , 543 F.3d 318, 322 ( 6th Cir. 2008)). This “def ere ntial abuse- of-discr etion standard” includes both a proce dural and a substantive component. United States v. Alexande r , 543 F.3d 819, 821–22 (6t h C i r. 2 0 0 8 ) (quoting Gall v. United States , 552 U.S. 3 8 , 4 0 (2 0 0 7)). A revie w of the proce dural rea sonablene ss of a sentenc e beg ins with ensuring that the district court corr ectly calc ulated the applica b l e Gu i delines rang e. United States v. Bolds , 511 F.3d 568, 579 (6th C i r. 2007). The next consideration is whether the 9No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez district court considere d the § 3553(a) fac tors to deter mine th e ap p ropriate sentenc e, and finally whether the court adequa

tely articula

ted its rea soning for imposing the particula r sentenc e chosen. Id

. Significa

nt proce dural err or includes, am o n g o t h er things, “fa iling to consider the § 3553(a) fac tors.” Gall , 552 U.S. at 51; United States v. Bak er , 559 F.3d 443, 448 ( 6th Cir. 2009).
Un der the standard set forth in United St ates v. Bosti c , 371 F.3d 865 (6th Cir. 2004), after
sentenc ing defe ndants, district courts must “ask the parties whether they have any objections to the
sentenc e just pronounce d that have not pr eviously been r aised.” Id . at 872. I f a pa rty then fa ils to clea rly articula te an objection when g iven this final opportunit y , that party “will have forfe ited its opportunity

. . . and thus will fac e plain err or revie w on appea l.” Id

. at 872–73. When contemplating plain err or, we consider “whethe r (1) there w as an e rror , (2) whic h was plain, (3) that aff ecte d the defe ndant’s substantial rig hts, and (4) that , in our discretionar y view, seriously aff

ects the fundame ntal fairne ss, integ rity , or public reputa tion of j u d i ci al proce eding s.” United States v. Trammel , 404 F.3d 397, 401 (6th Cir. 2005) (ci t i n g Jo h n s o n v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 466 (1997))

. I f the s en t ence is proce durally sound, the next consideration is whether the sentenc e is substantively rea sonable, taking into acc ount the totality of the circ umstances. Alexande r , 543 F.3d at 822; Bake r , 559 F.3d at 448. “District courts are char g ed with imposing ‘a sentenc e sufficient, but not gr eate r t han necessar y , to comply with the purposes’ of sentenc ing.” Alexande r , 543 F.3d
at 822 (quoting § 3553(a) ; United States v. Foreman , 436 F.3d 638, 644 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006)). There is a rebuttable presumption of rea sonablene ss if the sentenc e falls wi t h i n a proper ly -ca lculated

10No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez Guidelines rang e. Bake r , 559 F.3d at 448; Alexande r , 543 F.3d at 822; United States v. Heriot , 496 F.3d 601, 608 ( 6th Cir. 2007).

B Domingue z claims his sentenc e is proce durally unrea sonable. He believes the district court

err ed by not considering the § 3553(a) fac tors and by imposing a sentenc e to run consec utive to his
state sentenc e. His ar g uments can be disposed in short order. Def ense counsel di d not object to the cour t’s rec itation of the § 3553(a) fac tors, even after the court reque sted objectio n s p u rs u an t t o Bostic

. See Fe b. 14, 2012 Hr’g

. Tr. 30. We there fore revie w for plain err or. Bostic , 371 F.3d at 872–73. When imposing a sentenc e, § 3553(a) require s

a court to consider a number of sentenc ing fac tors. But a sentenc ing court need not “re cite the statute in so many words,” or simply invoke a set of “ma g ic words” to achieve a proper sentenc e. United
States v. Bridgewater , 479 F.3d 439, 442 (6th Cir. 2007). I nstead, the court must set forth enoug h
to indicate the sentenc e was “re asoned and proper ly founded.” Id

. See also United States v. Salter , 420 F. App’x 519, 522 (6th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (district court’s consi d er at ion of the defe ndant’s “history and circ umstances,” as well as the n ee d “t o promote respe ct for the law” satisfied its obliga tion under § 3553(a) despite the lack of any “explicit ref ere nce to the listed fac tors . . . as no such r itual incantation is require d”) ( internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted).
A full revie w of the rec ord here reve als that the district court did consider the rele vant fac tors in rea ching a sentenc e that was sufficie nt, but not g rea ter than nece ssary , to “comply with the [sentencing ] pu rp oses set forth” in § 3553. Specifica lly , the court addre ssed the need to deter 11No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez Domingue z’s pattern of uncontrolled behavior , the sever ity of his offe nse, and the important task of protec ting soc iety

. The court first outlined Domingue z’s criminal history , and addre ssed the available sentenc es under the appro p ri at e s entencing rang e. Fe b. 14, 2012 Hr’g

. Tr. 24–27. The court went on to establish that Domingue z had previously been g iven “the benef it of the doubt,” but that he “ther eaf ter chose to violate the law, not in some minor way or some minor fashion, but to be part of

a larg e-sc ale coca ine traff icking org anization.” Id

. at 29. “All of that leads the court to nothing but the conc lusion, sir, that y ou have not le arne d from any ear lier sanction that has been imposed, a nd there is a need for just punishment, adequate deter renc e, to protec t the public, for a leng thy term of incar cer ation.” Id

. The court’s explanation demonstrates that it considere d the § 3553 fac tors befor e imposing t he sentence and articu l ated a rea soned, well-founded basis for its decision. The district court did not err , much less commit plain error in applying § 3553. Domingue z also claims the consec utive sentenc e is pr ocedur ally unrea sonable be cause the
court did not addre ss the rele vant § 3553(a) fac tors when deciding whether the sentenc e should be imposed consec utively or concur rently to h i s s t at e sentenc e. Domingue z did object to the

consec utive nature of the sentenc e, id

. at 30, and there fore that deter mination is revie wed for abuse of discretion. Bolds , 511 F.3d at 575 (quoting United States v. Lalonde , 509 F.3d 750, 769 (6th Cir. 2007)). On r eview, how ever , no such abuse is to be found.
As descr ibed above, the court adequately considere d the applicable sentenc ing fac tors when imposing Domingue z’s sentenc e. The Six th Circuit has “neve r held that a district court is require d to repe at a Sec tion 3553(a) a naly sis in its consideration of the consec utive or conc urre nt nature of

12No. 12-3234

United States v. Dom inguez

a sentenc e.” United States v. Berry , 565 F.3d 332 , 3 4 3 (6th Cir. 2009). I n Berry , the court conclu d ed t hat “[r]equiring district courts to conduct a separ ate Section 3553(a) analy sis for the

concur rent or consec utive nature of the sentenc e would be repe titious and unwar rante d, an d

. . . district c ourts have no such distinct oblig ation.” Id

. The district court’s analy sis of § 3553(a) was sufficie nt in the first instance, and did not bear repe ating when deter mining whether a consec utive
sentenc e wa s appropr iate.
C Domingue z finally claims his s e n te n c e is s u b s tantively unrea sonable, ag ain alleg ing the court failed to consider t h e § 3553(a) fac tors. But as discussed at leng th, the district court considere d Domingue z’s criminal behavior , the nature of the offe nse he had committed, an d the manner in which he had flouted the court’s authority

. The court also expli citly addre ssed the n ee d for deter renc e, and to protec t society from Dom ingue z’s conduct. Dominquez’s contention does not support the proposition that his sentenc e is substantively unrea sonable. His sentenc e of 18 months will stand.
IV We affir m.

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