[Cite as State v. Grimes, 2022-Ohio-4526.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 110925

v. :

JEFFREY GRIMES, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 15, 2022

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case Nos. CR-19-639447-B and CR-20-650118-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Jeffrey Schnatter and Carla Neuhauser, 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 

Erin R. Flanagan, for appellant. 

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J.:

Appellant Jeffrey Grimes (“Grimes”) appeals his convictions for 

multiple charges. We affirm. 
I. BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Grimes was indicted on the following counts in Cuyahoga C.P. No. 

CR-19-639447-B on May 6, 2019, charging him and his adult girlfriend, A.R., with

the following: 

COUNT OFFENSE DEGREE 

1 Rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(c) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F1 

2 Rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(1)(c) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F1 

3 Rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F1 

4 Rape in violation of R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F1 

5 Sexual Battery in violation 

of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) with 

a Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F3 

6 Sexual Battery in violation 

of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) 

F3 

7 Sexual Battery in violation 

of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) with 

a Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F3 

8 Corrupting Another With 

Drugs in violation of R.C. 

2925.02(A)(4)(a) 

F2 

9 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter Involving a 

Minor in violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(3) 

F2 
COUNT OFFENSE DEGREE 

10 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter Involving a 

Minor in violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(3) 

F2 

11 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter Involving a 

Minor in violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(3) 

F2 

On May 18 2020, in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-20-650118-A, Grimes 

was indicted for the following: 

COUNT OFFENSE DEGREE

1 Sexual Battery in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.03(A)(5) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A)

F3

2 Pandering Sexually 

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(1) 

F2

3 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(5)

F4

4 Sexual Battery in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.03(A)(5) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F3 

5 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(1) 

F2 
COUNT OFFENSE DEGREE 6 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(5) 

F4 

7 Sexual Battery in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.03(A)(5) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F3 

8 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(1) 

F2 

9 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(5) 

F4 

10 Sexual Battery in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.03(A)(5) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F3 

11 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(1) 

F2 

12 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(5) 

F4 

13 Sexual Battery in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.03(A)(5) with a 

Sexually Violent Predator 

Specification pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.148(A) 

F3 
COUNT OFFENSE DEGREE

14 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(1) 

F2 

15 Pandering Sexually

Oriented Matter 

Involving a Minor in 

violation of R.C. 

2907.322(A)(5) 

F4 

16 Trafficking in violation of 

R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) 

F4 

17 Drug Possession in 

violation of R.C. 

2925.11(A) 

F4 

18 Violating a Protection 

Order in violation of R.C. 

2919.27(A)(1) 

F5 

The 2019 case arose from charges that Grimes made video recordings 

of his adult girlfriend, A.R., engaging in sexual activity with John Doe (“Doe”),

Grimes’s son, who was under the age of 16. A.R. was a codefendant and entered into 

a plea agreement with the state prior to trial. The state argued that Grimes forced 

A.R. to initiate and engage in activities with Doe. Grimes participated in sexual 

conduct with A.R. during A.R.’s interactions with Doe and also provided video 

direction. The videos were stored on Grimes’s cell phone. Doe’s mother (“Mother”)

and stepfather ultimately learned of the sexual activities as well as Doe’s 

consumption of drugs and alcohol at Grimes’s residence. The Parma Police 

Department (“PPD”) was contacted, and Grimes and A.R. were ultimately arrested.

The 2020 case was initiated after additional video recordings and drugs were 
recovered based on Grimes’s recorded jail phone conversations while incarcerated 

pending trial. 

The cases were combined for the September 13, 2021 trial. The state 

presented six witnesses. Doe did not testify.

Mother testified about her history with Grimes and Grimes’s

relationship with Doe. Mother described various events that indicated Doe was not 

properly supervised when he was in Grimes’s care. Mother advised Grimes that she 

would end voluntary visitation, and Grimes became angry. Mother stated, “He is an 

extremely angry person. Most people fear him. He does not show any fear ever. I 

personally have feared him since I met him.” Tr. 401. Shortly thereafter, Mother

learned about the drug use and sexual activity and contacted the police. 

Codefendant A.R. addressed the charges against her and her decision 

to testify for the state. A.R. agreed to testify truthfully regarding the charged 

activities and to plead guilty to endangering children, a third-degree felony. There 

was no agreement regarding the penalty that could range from probation to a threeyear prison term. 

A.R. testified about her history of oppressive relationships with men 

and drug use purportedly patterned after her mother. A.R.’s history with Grimes 

began with an off-and-on relationship when A.R. was 17, a hiatus of approximately 

nine years, and reengagement in 2016. A.R. moved in with Grimes at his mother’s 

home, and the two engaged in what A.R. described as a swinging sexual lifestyle
though Grimes was sometimes upset with A.R. after the activities. Tr. 590. A.R. 

testified about her drug use with Grimes and his physical aggression toward her.

Doe visited the house several times beginning in 2018 and shortly 

thereafter moved in. A.R. recounted her participation in alcohol consumption and 

sexual activities with Doe who was sometimes noticeably intoxicated. During the 

initial encounter, Grimes ordered A.R. to give Doe a lap dance and perform sexual 

acts. Doe “seemed shocked and nervous.” Tr. 596. “We were all drinking.” Tr. 596.

Activities escalated when Grimes ordered A.R. to have intercourse with Doe. “I told 

him no, and he told me he would beat my ass.” Tr. 601. “I did not want to fight.”

Tr. 606. A.R. stated that she knew there would “be consequences” if she refused 

“[b]ecause of physical abuse” she “was put through by” Grimes. Tr. 606. 

A.R. also knew that Grimes recorded the sexual occurrences and

testified about the video exhibits. Doe did not initiate the sexual activities, and A.R. 

testified that her participation was involuntary. A.R. did not witness Doe using 

drugs, but Grimes told A.R. that he had given Doe drugs because he would rather 

have Doe do drugs with him than in the streets. A.R. also stated she was using heroin 

and cocaine daily during the time she resided with Grimes and sometimes her 

recollection was “cloudy.” Tr. 661. 

Sergeant Kalal of the PPD narcotics unit participated in the 2019 

arrest warrant execution for A.R. and Grimes. Grimes was secured, and Grimes’s

mother gave permission for police to check the house and yard for A.R. During the 

search, a video recording system was observed that was pointed toward the 
basement bed. Police also observed drug paraphernalia in plain view. A search 

warrant was obtained based on the observations. Additional drug paraphernalia 

was discovered including suspected drugs. 

Grimes’s friend, K.B., who acted as the phone liaison between the 

incarcerated Grimes and Doe, testified that she was informed that Grimes’s legal 

issues stemmed from A.R.’s sexual involvement with Doe. Grimes asked K.B. to 

contact various people and to call Doe — not to text. However, K.B. sent a text that 

was read into the record that advised Doe that Doe did not have to say anything that 

was not true. K.B. also had a telephone conversation with Doe to convey the same 

information. Contact ceased when Mother asked K.B. not to contact her son. 

Forensic psychologist Dr. James Eisenberg testified regarding his 

evaluation of A.R., which was requested by the office of the Cuyahoga County Public 

Defender. Dr. Eisenberg was requested to

do an evaluation to determine if she was a victim of domestic violence, 

what I would call intimate partner violence, similar to battered 

women’s syndrome and, secondly, whether or not that was pertinent to 

the issue of duress under the Ohio code regarding participation in an 

alleged criminal act.

Tr. 734. 

Dr. Eisenberg reviewed records and reports. He also met with A.R.,

who had not entered a plea agreement at the time; so at that point, he was 

conducting “a straight evaluation of her regarding her pending criminal case” “to 

determine if in fact she was a battered woman.” Tr. 743. Dr. Eisenberg recounted 

A.R.’s drug abuse issues and reviewed records relating to A.R. and, after A.R. entered 
a plea agreement, reviewed additional records such as jail phone call recordings

between A.R. and Grimes. 

Dr. Eisenberg opined that the phone calls revealed “typical patterns 

of abuse. [Grimes] was telling her certainly that he loved her. On the other hand he 

was yelling and blaming her for cooperating with [the state].” Tr. 749. Dr. Eisenberg 

also opined that Grimes “had enormous control” “through a variety of techniques 

and tactics * * *.” Tr. 749-750. “[A.R.] was afraid of him, whether or not he was with 

her” “and still loved him on the other hand.” Tr. 750. 

The state closed with Detective Fullerton of the PPD who investigates

sexual assaults of minors. He met with Mother and Mother’s husband in response 

to a report received on April 10, 2019, and ultimately met with Doe.

Detective Fullerton was able to secure arrest warrants for Grimes and A.R. based on 

the information received. He was also present during the warrant execution and 

confirmed the testimony of Sergeant Kalal. 

The jury viewed the video of Detective Fullerton’s post-arrest 

interview with Grimes. Grimes denied being present during or participating in 

sexual activity between A.R. and Doe. Grimes told Detective Fullerton during that 

interview that the interior security cameras were on a live feed to be viewed in real 

time and were accessible via cell phone. The interview occurred prior to extraction 

of the video evidence that depicted Grimes’s involvement in the activities. 

Grimes advised Detective Fullerton that he would provide access to 

additional videos that would exonerate him. At a meeting with the detective and 
defense counsel, Grimes was allowed to view the videos secured from Grimes’s SD 

card at the time of his arrest. Grimes retracted his offer to provide exonerating 

videos, but the videos were secured by warrant. Grimes also appeared in the new 

videos. Detective Fullerton heard several jail call recordings between Grimes and 

others, including A.R., who connected via three-way connection through Grimes’s

mother. 

Doe did not testify at trial. The defense motion for judgment of 

acquittal under Crim.R. 29 proffered at the close of the state’s case was denied. The 

defense rested, and the renewed acquittal motion was denied. 

Grimes was convicted in Case No. CR-19-639447-B of the following: 

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of rape 

[R.C.] 2907.02(A)(1)(c), [a felony one] with sexual violent predator 

specification(s) as charged in count(s) 1, 2 of the indictment. On a 

former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of rape [R.C.] 

2907.02A)(2) [a felony one] with sexual violent predator 

specification(s) as charged in count(s) 3, 4 of the indictment. On a 

former day of court, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of sexual 

battery [R.C.] 2907.03(A)(5) [felony] with sexual violent predator 

specification(s) as charged in count(s) 5, 7 of the indictment. On a 

former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of sexual battery

[R.C.] 2907.03(A)(5) as charged in count(s) 6 of the indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 

corrupting another with drugs [R.C.] 2925.02(A)(4)(A) [a felony 2] as 

charged in count(s) 8 of the indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 

pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor [R.C.] 

2907.322(A)(3) [a felony 2] as charged in count(s) 9, 10, 11 of the 

indictment. 

JE 118844631 9/28/21
In Case No. CR-20-650118-A, Grimes was convicted of the following:

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of sexual 

battery [R.C.] 2907.03(A)(5) [a felony 3] with sexual violent predator 

specification(s) as charged in count(s) 1, 4, 7, 10, 13 of the indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 

pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor [R.C.] 

2907.322(A)(1) [a felony 2] as charged in count(s) 2, 5, 8, 11, 14 of the 

indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 

pandering sexually oriented matter involving a minor [R.C.] 

2907.322(A)(5) [a felony 4] as charged in count(s) 3,6, 9, 12, 15 of the 

indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 

trafficking offense [R.C.] 2925.03(A)(2) [a felony 4] as charged in 

count(s) 16 of the indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of drug 

possession [R.C.] 2925.11 [a felony 4] as charged in count(s) 17 of the 

indictment.

On a former day of court the jury returned a verdict of guilty of violating 

protection order. Consent agreement. Anti-stalking [R.C.] 

2919.27(A)(1) [a felony 5] as charged in count(s) 18 of the indictment.

JE 118844672 8/28/21, p. 1. 

Grimes was also found guilty of the sexually violent predator 

specifications. Grimes received a total combined sentence of 65 years to life.

Grimes appeals. 

II. Assigned Errors

Grimes asserts the trial court abused its discretion or committed plain 

error when it admitted impermissible character evidence of Grimes’s tendency 

toward aggressive behavior. Grimes secondly claims that the rape convictions are 
against the manifest weight of the evidence absent the impermissible character 

testimony. 

III. Discussion

A. Impermissible character evidence

Grimes argues that the admission of evidence regarding Grimes’s

aggressiveness was not relevant except to show disposition and propensity, and the 

prejudicial testimony of Mother and A.R. outweighed its probative value. Thus, 

Grimes argues the testimony was improperly admitted in contravention of 

Evid.R. 404(B). 

To the extent that this argument is raised for the first time on appeal,

it will be reviewed for plain error.

“[A] reviewing court’s analysis is generally limited to reviewing issues 

raised on appeal solely for plain error or defects affecting a defendant’s 

substantial rights pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B). State v. Tisdale, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 74331, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 6143 (Dec. 17, 1988). The 

plain error doctrine should be invoked by an appellate court only in 

exceptional circumstances to prevent a miscarriage of justice. State v.

Cooperrider, 4 Ohio St.3d 226, 227, 448 N.E.2d 452 (1983). Plain error 

will be recognized only where, but for the error, the outcome of the case 

would clearly have been different. Id.”

State v. Bell, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106842, 2019-Ohio-340, ¶ 61, quoting State v. 

King, 184 Ohio App.3d 226, 2009-Ohio-4551, 920 N.E.2d 399, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.).

“The admissibility of other-acts evidence under Evid.R. 404(B) is a 

question of law” that we review de novo. State v. Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 

2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, ¶ 22. However, “the trial court’s weighing of the 

probative value of admissible evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice to the 
defendant under Evid.R. 403(A) involves an exercise of judgment.” State v. Kamer, 

6th Dist. Wood No. WD-20-084, 2022-Ohio-2070, ¶ 132, citing State v. Worley, 164 

Ohio St.3d 589, 2021-Ohio-2207, 174 N.E.3d 754, ¶ 117, citing Hartman at ¶ 30.

“[S]o we review that decision for an abuse of discretion.” Id., citing id. An abuse of 

discretion occurs where “‘the trial court’s attitude, in reaching its decision, was 

arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.’” Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 

427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 34, quoting Celmer v. Rodgers, 114 Ohio 

St.3d 221, 2007-Ohio-3697, 871 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 19 (plurality opinion).

Evid.R. 404(B) provides:

1

(B) Other crimes, wrongs or acts.

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 

character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. 

It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 

motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the proponent of 

evidence to be offered under this rule shall provide reasonable notice 

in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on 

good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends 

to introduce at trial.

Evid.R. 403(A) adds that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not 

admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.” The exclusion of 

relevant evidence under Evid.R. 403(A) rests within the discretion of the trial 

1 “This is the version of Evid.R. 404(B) in effect at the time of the trial. Mostly nonsubstantive changes to division (B) went into effect on July 1, 2022. The quoted provision 

is now split between Evid.R. 404(B)(1) and (2).” State v. Clinger, 12th Dist. Preble No. 

CA2021-11-014, 2022-Ohio-3691, ¶ 15, fn. 2. 
court. State v. Skatzes, 104 Ohio St.3d 195, 2004-Ohio-6391, 819 N.E.2d 215, ¶ 107, 

citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987), paragraph two of the 

syllabus.

The Ohio Supreme Court concurrently issued Hartman, 161 Ohio 

St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, and State v. Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353, 

2020-Ohio-4441, 165 N.E.3d 112, to provide guidance and clarification regarding 

other acts evidence analysis under Evid.R. 404(B). 

We * * * use this case — as well as State v. Smith * * *, another case 

decided today — to help clear up some of the confusion that exists 

regarding the use of other-acts evidence. Thus, we endeavor to provide 

trial courts with a road map for analyzing the admission of other-acts 

evidence and guidance as to appropriate instructions for the jury when 

such evidence is admitted.

Hartman at ¶ 19. 

“Evid.R. 404(B) categorically prohibits evidence of a defendant’s 

other acts when its only value is to show that the defendant has the character or 

propensity to commit a crime.” Smith at ¶ 36, citing Hartman at ¶ 22. “Other-acts 

evidence may, however, be admissible for another non-character-based purpose, 

such as ‘motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident.’” Id., quoting id. “‘The key is that the evidence must 

prove something other than the defendant’s disposition to commit certain acts.’”

Id., quoting id.

“The threshold question is whether the evidence is relevant.” Smith

at ¶ 37, citing Hartman at ¶ 24; Evid.R. 401; see also State v. Williams, 134 Ohio 
St.3d 521, 2012-Ohio-5695, 983 N.E.2d 1278, ¶ 20. “[T]he problem with other-acts 

evidence is rarely that it is irrelevant; often, it is too relevant.” Id., citing Hartman

at ¶ 25; see 1A Wigmore, Evidence, Section 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers Rev.1983). For 

purposes of Evid.R. 404(B), “the relevance examination asks whether the proffered 

evidence is relevant to the particular purpose for which it is offered, as well as 

whether it is relevant to an issue that is actually in dispute.” Id., citing Hartman at 

¶ 26-27; see also Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 

L.Ed.2d 771 (1988).

If the court determines that the evidence is probative of an issue in 

the case and is not based on not grounded on improper character inferences, the 

next question is whether the value of the evidence “‘is substantially outweighed by 

the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.’”

Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353, 2020-Ohio-4441, 165 N.E.3d 112, at ¶ 38, quoting 

Evid.R. 403(A); Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, at 

¶ 29. “Because other-acts evidence ‘“almost always carries some risk that the jury 

will draw the forbidden propensity inference,”’ courts should be vigilant in balancing 

the prejudicial impact of the evidence against its probative value.” Id., quoting
Hartman at ¶ 33, quoting United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845, 857 (7th Cir. 2014) 

(en banc). 

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) governs rape and provides, “No person shall 

engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the 

other person to submit by force or threat of force.” Sexual conduct 

means vaginal intercourse between a male and female; anal 

intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus between persons regardless of 

sex; and, without privilege to do so, the insertion, however slight, of any 

part of the body or any instrument, apparatus, or other object into the 

vaginal or anal opening of another. Penetration, however slight, is 

sufficient to complete vaginal or anal intercourse.

R.C. 2907.01(A). 

“Force is an essential element of rape pursuant to R.C. 

2907.02(A)(2).” State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101863, 2015-Ohio-3027, 

¶ 27. R.C. 2901.01(A) defines “force” as “any violence, compulsion, or constraint 

physically exerted by any means upon or against a person or thing.” “A defendant 

purposely compels another to submit to sexual conduct by force or threat of force if 

the defendant uses physical force against that person, or creates the belief that 

physical force will be used if the victim does not submit.” State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio 

St.3d 51, 55, 600 N.E.2d 661 (1992), paragraph one of the syllabus. 

In fact, 

“Ohio Supreme Court case law demonstrates that the type and amount 

of force necessary to purposefully compel a victim to submit ‘by force 

or threat of force’ depends upon the victim and offender’s relationship.”

State v. Wine, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-12-01, 2012-Ohio-2837, ¶ 41. 

“The force and violence necessary to commit the crime of rape depends 

upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each 
other.” State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d 304 (1988), 

paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘As long as it can be shown that the rape 

victim’s will was overcome by fear or duress, the forcible element of 

rape can be established.’” Id. at 59, quoting State v. Fowler, 27 Ohio 

App.3d 149, 154, 500 N.E.2d 390 (8th Dist.1985).

State v. Whitfield, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111377, 2022-Ohio-4205, ¶ 18. 

We find as a matter of law that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion in allowing the evidence of force because the “evidence is relevant to a 

non-character-based issue that is material to the case.” Smith, 162 Ohio St.3d 353, 

2020-Ohio-4441, 165 N.E.3d 112, at ¶ 38, citing Evid.R. 403(A) and Hartman, 161 

Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, at ¶ 29. The state and Grimes

agree that the focus of the trial was to prove the circumstances surrounding the 

sexual conduct and the element of force for the rape charges, specifically Counts 3 

and 4 of the 2019 indictment. Appellant’s Brief, p. 9; Appellee’s Brief, p. 10.

A.R. testified that her participation in the activities was unwilling but 

that she did so in fear of Grimes. During Dr. Eisenberg’s testimony regarding A.R., 

the trial court called a sidebar to ensure that Dr. Eisenberg’s testimony was limited 

to his review of A.R.’s information, not that of Grimes, and that the doctor did not 

reach a legal conclusion but would “educate on the effects” of the “relationship on 

the decision-making process of the victim.” Tr. 739. The court asked defense 

counsel whether he objected to the testimony. Counsel responded, “The only 

objection I have is when it comes time for him to opine whether or not duress was 

there.” Tr. 739. Counsel also objected to a jury instruction on duress to which the 
trial court responded there would be no jury instruction on duress and no such 

instruction was given. 

The trial court cautioned the state to “narrowly approach” the report 

and focus on “A.R. and her diagnostic impressions.” Tr. 740. As an expert, “[Dr. 

Eisenberg] can certainly opine from her medical history, but he cannot legally just 

— he cannot come to a legal conclusion because that is the purview of the jury.” Id. 

The court also noted that the jury instructions would address assessing the 

“credibility of A.R. the way they would any other witness.” Tr. 740. 

Dr. Eisenberg explained his review based on his retention prior to 

A.R.’s decision to enter a plea and after the plea agreement, in light of the additional 

evidence he became privy to. Ultimately, Dr. Eisenberg opined that Grimes 

exercised enormous control over A.R. and that she feared Grimes but still loved him. 

“So she was conflicted with her feelings for him as well as the threats that were made 

towards her.” Tr. 750. “My opinion is that she was under his control throughout the 

entire period up until her probably testifying today or yesterday.” Tr. 59. 

Grimes argues that Mother’s testimony was irrelevant and 

inadmissible because she was not present during the alleged rapes and only testified 

to his forceful nature in general. “‘In determining whether to grant a new trial as a 

result of the erroneous admission of evidence under Evid.R. 404(B), an appellate 

court must consider both the impact of the offending evidence on the verdict and 

the strength of the remaining evidence after the tainted evidence is removed from 

the record.’” State v. Marshall, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109633, 2022-Ohio-2666, 
¶ 14, quoting State v. Morris, 141 Ohio St.3d 399, 2014-Ohio-5052, 24 N.E.3d 1153, 

syllabus. 

“Even where a substantial right is impacted, after excluding the 

impermissible evidence, when there is overwhelming evidence of guilt remaining, 

then the admission may be deemed harmless.” Id., citing State v. Tench, 156 Ohio 

St.3d 85, 2018-Ohio-5205, 123 N.E.3d 955, ¶ 177, quoting Morris at ¶ 32. Applying 

this standard to the record before this court, we find that the admission of such 

evidence was harmless. 

Significant here is Grimes’s video interview with Detective Fullerton 

that was played for the jury. The video includes statements by Grimes with no 

recorded objections in the record as to content. Grimes described himself as “a 

[m.f.] you got to fear.” Video exhibit No. 45 at 23:24-24:15). Furthermore, Grimes

appeared to boast about his control over A.R. and claimed to have kicked her out of 

his house repeatedly. “I booted her out and I booted her out, take her right back, 

‘cause she has no one, no one at all, I know what she comes from, the streets, she 

has a f***ing ratchet mother, and that’s it, she has no one, no family at all.” (Exhibit 

No. 45, 32:31-52; 48:56-49:10).

Grimes also claimed that Mother terminated Doe’s visits with Grimes 

“because [Doe] feared me, I was that strictness he needed * * * He thinks her house 
is a joke.” (Exhibit No. 45 at 25:44-49). He also spoke of “snatch[ing Doe’s] ass up, 

beat[ing] his little f***ing ass.” (Exhibit No. 45 at 22:53-23:08).

The jury was instructed on the element of force: 

Force means any violence, compulsion or constraint physically exerted 

by any means upon or against a person or thing. 

Now, force of a parent, ladies and gentlemen. When a relationship 

between the victim and the defendant is one of child and parent, the 

element of force need not be openly displayed or physically brutal. It 

can be subtle, slight and psychological or emotionally powerful.

Evidence of an express threat or harm or evidence of significant 

physical restraint is not required. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt 

that under the circumstances in evidence the victim’s will was 

overcome by fear or duress or intimidation, the element of force has 

been proven. Threat includes a direct or indirect threat. 

Tr. 921-22. 

This court has held: 

“Evidence of physical, emotional, and verbal abuse upon the victim or 

other family members, even if not included in the indictment, has been 

permitted in numerous jurisdictions, including this one.” State v. 

Williamson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80982, 2002-Ohio-6503, ¶ 22. In 

State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 74840, 1999 Ohio App. 

LEXIS 4792 (Oct. 7, 1999), evidence of physical and psychological 

abuse between the abuser and the victim which transpired in the home 

was relevant and probative of a method of control used to force sex 

upon the victim and was inextricably related to the charge of rape and 

gross sexual imposition.

State v. Madsen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82399, 2003-Ohio-5822, ¶ 28. 

This court finds that the evidence is probative of the material issue of 

force in the case and the admission of the evidence is not substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. 
Hartman, 161 Ohio St.3d 214, 2020-Ohio-4440, 161 N.E.3d 651, at ¶ at 25, 29. We 

find no error, plain or otherwise. 

The first assigned error is overruled. 

B. Manifest weight

Grimes captions his error as a manifest weight challenge to the rape 

convictions, but it appears to be an attack from another perspective on the 

Evid.R. 404(B) argument overruled in the first assigned error. 

“The criminal manifest weight of the evidence standard addresses the 

evidence’s effect of inducing belief.” State v. Ryan, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108143, 

2019-Ohio-5339, ¶ 21, citing State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382, 2007-Ohio-2202, 

865 N.E.2d 1264, ¶ 25, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386, 678 

N.E.2d 541 (1997). “Under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard, a 

reviewing court must ask the following question: whose evidence is more persuasive 

— the state’s or the defendant’s?” Id., citing Wilson at id. “Although there may be 

legally sufficient evidence to support a judgment, it may nevertheless be against the 

manifest weight of the evidence.” Id., citing Thompkins at 387.

“‘When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the 

basis that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the appellate 

court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the fact finder’s resolution of the 

conflicting testimony.’” Wilson at id., quoting Thompkins at id. “Reversal on 

manifest weight grounds is reserved for the ‘“exceptional case in which the evidence 
weighs heavily against the conviction.”’” Ryan at ¶ 23, quoting Thompkins at id., 

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.). 

Upon review, this is not an exceptional case in which the evidence 

weighs heavily against the conviction. We have already determined that the 

testimony that Grimes challenges was admissible as a matter of law and the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion in allowing its admission. 

In the instant case, the jury was in the best position to determine the 

credibility of the witnesses and make “observations that are critical to determining 

a witness’s credibility.” Parma v. Singh, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106935, 2018-

Ohio-5235, ¶ 21, citing State v. Clark, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94050, 2010-Ohio4354, ¶ 17. “The trier of fact is free to accept or reject any or all the testimony of any 

witness.” Id., citing State v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93593, 2010-Ohio-4006, 

¶ 16.

The jury not only observed the witnesses, but they also watched video 

evidence of the sexual activities and Grimes’s recorded interview. They also heard 

jail calls regarding the activities and observed testimony from A.R. The jury was also 

instructed: 

Now, ladies and gentlemen, you the jury are the sole judges of the facts 

and the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the 

testimony of each witness. To weigh the evidence consider the 

credibility or the believability of each person testifying, and you will 

apply the tests for truthfulness which you apply in your daily lives.

Tr. 910. The trial court also supplied a nonexhaustive list of tests to apply. 
Instruction was also provided regarding the testimony of A.R. 

including the warning that an “accomplice may have special motives in testifying”

so the jury “should carefully examine an accomplice’s testimony and use it with great 

caution and view it with great suspicion.” Tr. 913. The jury was further instructed 

on the meaning of complicity in the offenses. We presume that the jury followed the 

trial court’s instructions. State v. Walker-Curry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106228, 

2019-Ohio-147, ¶ 35.

Having reviewed the entire record, we cannot conclude that the trial 

court clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice.

Therefore, Grimes’s second assignment of error is overruled.

IV. Conclusion

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s 

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case 

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., and

CORNELIUS J. O’SULLIVAN, JR., J., CONCUR