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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

September 22, 2016 

v No. 325834 

Macomb Circuit Court 

ROBERT TAYLOR, LC No. 2009-005243-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and MARKEY and RIORDAN, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Defendant was convicted at a jury trial of first-degree felony murder, MCL 

750.316(1)(b), carjacking, MCL 750.529a, conspiracy to commit carjacking, MCL 750.529a; 

MCL 750.157a, kidnapping, MCL 750.349, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, MCL 750.349; 

MCL 750.157a, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), 

MCL 750.227b. Defendant was originally sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole for the first-degree felony murder conviction, 25 to 50 years’ imprisonment 

each for the carjacking, conspiracy to commit carjacking, kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit 

kidnapping convictions, and two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. On 

defendant’s appeal by right, this Court affirmed defendant’s convictions but vacated his 

mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree 

felony murder conviction and remanded for resentencing on that offense in accordance with 

Miller v Alabama, 567 US ___; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012). People v Taylor, 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 21, 2013 (Docket No. 

303208), pp 1, 7-8. The trial court on remand resentenced defendant to life imprisonment 

without the possibility of parole for the first-degree felony murder conviction. Defendant now 

appeals by right the sentence imposed on remand. We affirm. 

 Defendant argues that the trial court erred in imposing a life without parole sentence on 

remand. We disagree. “[T]he appropriate standard of review in cases where a judge imposes a 

sentence of life without parole on a juvenile defendant is a common three-fold standard . . . .” 

People v Hyatt, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016) (Docket No. 325741); slip op at 

25. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, questions of law are reviewed 

de novo, and the court’s ultimate determination as to an appropriate sentence is reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. Id. 
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 In Miller, 132 S Ct at 2460, the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of 

“mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates 

the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’ ” 

Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile precludes consideration of his 

chronological age and its hallmark features – among them, immaturity, 

impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. It prevents taking 

into account the family and home environment that surrounds him – and from 

which he cannot usually extricate himself – no matter how brutal or 

dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide offense, including 

the extent of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer 

pressures may have affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been 

charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated 

with youth – for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors 

(including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys. . . . 

And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards the possibility of rehabilitation 

even when the circumstances most suggest it. [Id. at 2468.] 

“By making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition of that harshest prison 

sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk of disproportionate punishment.” Id. at 2469. 

The Supreme Court declined to consider the defendants’ arguments for a categorical prohibition 

of life without parole sentences for juveniles but stated that “appropriate occasions for 

sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Id. The Supreme 

Court noted that it was difficult to distinguish “at this early age between the juvenile offender 

whose crimes reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose 

crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). “Although 

we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it 

to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against 

irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” Id. 

 Following the issuance of Miller, our Legislature enacted MCL 769.25, which became 

effective on March 4, 2014. See 2014 PA 22. The statute applies to a defendant who was less 

than 18 years old at the time he or she committed the offense. MCL 769.25(1). The prosecutor 

may file a motion to sentence a defendant convicted of first-degree murder to life without parole. 

MCL 769.25(2) and (3). If the prosecutor files such a motion in conformance with the statutory 

requirements, the trial court must conduct a hearing at which the court considers the factors listed 

in Miller and any other relevant criteria, including the defendant’s prison record. MCL 

769.25(6). At the hearing, the trial court must specify the aggravating and mitigating 

circumstances and the reasons for the sentence imposed; the court may consider evidence 

presented at trial and evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. MCL 769.25(7). If the trial 

court declines to impose a life without parole sentence, the court must impose a sentence in 

which the maximum term is at least 60 years and the minimum term is between 25 and 40 years. 

MCL 769.25(9). 

 Although the trial court’s ultimate determination of the appropriate sentence is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion, “the imposition of a juvenile life-without-parole sentence requires a 

heightened degree of scrutiny regarding whether a life-without-parole sentence is proportionate 
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to a particular juvenile offender, and even under this deferential standard, an appellate court 

should view such a sentence as inherently suspect.” Hyatt, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 26. 

“[A]ppellate review of a juvenile life-without-parole sentence cannot be a mere rubber-stamping 

of the penalty handed out by the sentencing court.” Id. Although such a sentence is not 

presumed to be unconstitutional, a searching inquiry into the record must be undertaken with 

“the understanding that, more likely than not, the sentence imposed is disproportionate.” Id. A 

sentencing court abuses its discretion if it “fails to consider a relevant factor that should have 

received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or 

considers only appropriate factors but nevertheless commits a clear error of judgment by arriving 

at a sentence that lies outside the limited range of choice dictated by the facts of the case.” Id. at 

27, quoting United States v Haack, 403 F3d 997, 1004 (CA 8, 2005). 

 In Hyatt, ___ Mich App at ___; slip op at 27-28, this Court concluded that the trial court 

had failed to adhere to the directives in Miller and its progeny “about the rarity with which a lifewithout-parole sentence should be imposed.” Although the trial court in Hyatt focused on the 

Miller factors, “the court gave no credence to Miller’s repeated warnings that a life-withoutparole sentence should only be imposed on the rare or uncommon juvenile offender.” Hyatt, ___ 

Mich App at ___; slip op at 28. Moreover, the trial court in Hyatt had emphasized the opinion of 

a psychologist that the defendant’s prognosis for change in the next five years was poor; the 

focus on a five-year period was inconsistent with the holding in Miller “that a life-without-parole 

sentence will be proportionate for the juvenile who is irreparably corrupt and incapable of 

change – not one who is incapable of change within the next five years.” Id. This Court 

therefore remanded the case for resentencing and directed the trial court “to not only consider the 

Miller factors, but to decide whether this individual is the truly rare juvenile mentioned in Miller

who is incorrigible and incapable of reform.” Id. 

 In the present case, the trial court did not err in analyzing each of the Miller factors and 

finding that defendant is the rare juvenile offender who is irreparably corrupt. The trial court 

expressed full appreciation of the rarity of the circumstances in which a juvenile offender will be 

deemed incapable of reformation. The court quoted and discussed relevant portions of the 

holding and analysis in Miller, including by noting the admonition in Miller that appropriate 

occasions to sentence juveniles to life without parole will be uncommon. And after analyzing 

the Miller factors, the trial court concluded “that defendant’s case . . . presents precisely what the 

Supreme Court characterized as the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable 

corruption.” Accordingly, the trial court accorded appropriate recognition and made pertinent 

findings regarding the rarity of circumstances warranting a life without parole sentence for a 

juvenile offender. 

 Moreover, the trial court’s conclusion that defendant is the rare juvenile offender for 

whom a life without parole sentence is warranted was supported by the court’s accurate analysis 

of the Miller factors. We will now discuss each of the Miller factors. 

 The first factor concerns defendant’s age and its hallmark features. Miller, 132 S Ct at 

2468. Defendant was 16 years and 10 months old when he committed the offenses (in marked 
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contrast to the 14-year-old defendants in Miller, 132 S Ct at 24601

). The record refutes any 

claim that the hallmark features of adolescence identified in Miller, 132 S Ct at 2468, including 

immaturity, impetuosity, and a failure to appreciate risks and consequences, played any role in 

defendant’s crimes. This was not, as in Miller, 132 S Ct at 2465, a mere botched robbery that 

turned into a killing. Defendant and his codefendant, Ihab Masalmani, brazenly and forcibly 

kidnapped and carjacked Matt Landry in broad daylight outside a restaurant, with defendant 

acting as a lookout while armed with a weapon. Defendant and Masalmani held Landry captive 

for hours, took him to a drug house in a drug-infested area of Detroit where defendant sat on a 

couch with Landry while Masalmani used drugs, and then took Landry to a nearby abandoned 

house at which Masalmani killed Landry in a brutal execution style by shooting him in the back 

of the head. Defendant’s criminal actions over an extended period of time are not reflective of a 

merely immature or impetuous adolescent who fails to appreciate risks and consequences. Dr. 

Daniel P. Keating, defendant’s expert in cognitive and brain development in adolescents, 

testified about a developmental maturity mismatch in which an adolescent’s limbic system 

matures more quickly than the prefrontal cortex. This testimony has minimal bearing on these 

facts, and Dr. Keating did not meet or interview defendant but was only addressing generic brain 

science. The trial court correctly concluded that the factor of defendant’s chronological age and 

its hallmark features does not weigh in favor of mitigation. 

 The next factor concerns defendant’s family and home environment. Miller, 132 S Ct at 

2468. The trial court correctly noted that there was uncontroverted testimony that defendant had 

a difficult family and home environment. Defendant’s mother was 13 years old when she had 

her first child. Defendant was born later, in 1992, and grew up in a very unstable and unsafe 

environment. His family had an active child protective services record that dated back to 1998. 

Defendant’s father was not present, and defendant was exposed to neglect, violence, and 

substance abuse. Defendant’s mother did not provide adequate food and shelter at times. In 

light of these far from optimal circumstances, the trial court properly weighed this factor in favor 

of defendant and against a life without parole sentence. 

 The next factor is “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent of 

[defendant’s] participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have 

affected him.” Miller, 132 S Ct at 2468. The fact that defendant did not personally pull the 

 

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 The Supreme Court in Miller indicated that it is appropriate to take into account the differences 

between juveniles of different ages. In particular, when explaining the flaws of a scheme of 

mandatory life imprisonment without parole for juveniles, the Miller Court said: “Under these 

schemes, every juvenile will receive the same sentence as every other – the 17-year-old and the 

14-year-old, the shooter and the accomplice, the child from a stable household and the child from 

a chaotic and abusive one.” Miller, 132 S Ct at 2467-2468. The Miller majority criticized the 

dissents in Miller for repeatedly referring to 17-year-olds who have committed heinous offenses 

and comparing those defendants to the 14-year-old defendants in Miller. The Miller majority 

explained: “Our holding requires factfinders to attend to exactly such circumstances – to take 

into account the differences among defendants and crimes. By contrast, the sentencing schemes 

that the dissents find permissible altogether preclude considering these factors.” Id. at 2469 n 8. 
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trigger of the gun does not preclude the imposition of a life without parole sentence. There is no 

categorical bar on the imposition of a life without parole sentence on a juvenile convicted of 

felony murder on an aiding and abetting theory. See Id., at 2469, 2471, and People v Carp, 496 

Mich 440, 528; 852 NW2d 801 (2014), vacated on other grounds by Carp v Michigan, ___ US 

___; 136 S Ct 1355; 194 L Ed 2d 339 (2016), and by Davis v Michigan, ___ US ___; 136 S Ct 

1356; 194 L Ed 2d 339 (2016). 

 Defendant actively participated in the crimes. Defendant admitted to fellow jail inmate 

Michael Sadur that defendant and Masalmani were trying to “hit a lick,” which means to rob 

someone, and that they noticed the speaker system in Landry’s vehicle outside a Quiznos 

restaurant in Eastpointe. Eyewitness testimony indicated that defendant possessed a weapon and 

acted as a lookout when Masalmani was trying to force Landry into his vehicle. Defendant told 

Sadur that, because Masalmani and Landry were struggling, defendant went over and helped to 

put Landry in the vehicle. Defendant played a critical role in holding Landry captive for several 

hours before he was murdered, including by sitting on a couch with Landry at a drug house while 

Masalmani was using drugs; witness Frederick Singleton, who was at the drug house, never saw 

defendant leave Landry’s side at the drug house. Taylor, unpub op at 2. Singleton testified that 

defendant was driving the car when defendant, Masalmani, and Landry arrived at the drug house, 

while Masalmani and Landry were in the backseat. After leaving the drug house, defendant and 

Masalmani took Landry to a nearby abandoned house, where either defendant or Masalmani 

punched Landry2

 and then defendant shot Landry in the back of the head. Defendant asserts that 

he did not intend to kill Landry. But defendant told Sadur that when they were in Landry’s 

vehicle after the initial kidnapping, Masalmani pulled out a gun, and defendant and Masalmani 

then told Landry “what time it was[,]” which meant that they were going to shoot him or injure 

him badly. This statement was made early in Landry’s captivity, suggesting that defendant knew 

throughout the long criminal transaction that he and Masalmani were going to shoot or badly 

injure Landry. Defendant told Sadur that, after the shooting, defendant took the murder weapon 

and sold it because he had not yet obtained any money from the crimes. Sadur testified that 

defendant exhibited no remorse when describing what occurred. The evidence supports the 

conclusion that defendant was actively and extensively involved in committing the crimes, and 

there is no indication that defendant was subjected to any family or peer pressure.3

 Therefore, 

the trial court properly concluded that this factor did not weigh in favor of defendant. 

 The next Miller factor is whether defendant “might have been charged and convicted of a 

lesser offense if not for incompetencies associated with youth – for example, his inability to deal 

with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his 

own attorneys.” Miller, 132 S Ct at 2468. The trial court correctly noted that there is no 

 

2

 Although the prosecutor contends that defendant punched Landry, it is unclear from Sadur’s 

use of the pronoun “he” whether it was defendant or Masalmani who punched Landry. 

3

 Kathleen Schaefer, a defense expert, claimed that peer pressure was a significant issue in this 

case but declined to elaborate on the specifics of this case, instead asserting only generally that 

children are susceptible to peer pressure because their brains are not yet fully developed. 
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evidence of any incapacities of youth that rendered defendant unable to participate in his defense 

or that led him to implicate himself. This factor therefore did not weigh in favor of mitigation. 

 The final factor is the possibility of rehabilitation suggested by the circumstances. 

Miller, 132 S Ct at 2468. Dr. Keating explained that a person’s prospects for rehabilitation are 

associated with his or her developmental history. Negative experiences and behaviors during a 

person’s developmental period increase the probability that the person will not succeed in rising 

above difficulties. Some people do not change; the worse the circumstances, the more likely that 

the person will not overcome their circumstances. 

 Kathleen Schaefer, the defense expert on parole and probation, testified generally that 

people have the capacity to change over time and asserted that defendant could make positive 

changes. Schaefer agreed with Dr. Keating that there is no test that will determine whether a 

person can be rehabilitated. Schaefer indicated that a percentage of juveniles will continue on a 

path of chronic violent behavior. Schaefer agreed with a study indicating that a large proportion 

of those involved in violent behavior at an early age eventually become chronic violent 

offenders. She noted that impaired development as well as psychological and emotional 

difficulties can arise from child abuse and neglect, and such conditions can exist on a long-term 

basis. Schaefer agreed that some people change and some people do not change. Schaefer was 

aware that defendant’s juvenile record included arrests for truancies, curfew violations, trespass, 

assaults, entry without permission, and unarmed robbery. Defendant was then convicted in the 

present case of first-degree felony murder, kidnapping, carjacking, and felony-firearm, and 

Schaefer agreed that this reflected a type of progression which is not uncommon. Schaefer was 

not making a prediction about defendant but said that people have the capacity to change. 

Schaefer said that defendant was introspective in meetings and seemed to understand the gravity 

of what occurred. Schaefer hopes defendant will build on these developments but lacked proof 

that he would do so. Her interview of defendant took place in the structured prison setting, and 

she has not met him on the street where defendant would have to make his own way. 

 The trial court correctly concluded that this factor did not favor mitigation. Although the 

difficulty of defendant’s upbringing weighs in his favor, it also indicates that he faces significant 

challenges in improving himself, as reflected in the testimony of Dr. Keating and Schaefer. 

Although Schaefer made vague allusions to defendant purportedly demonstrating introspection, 

the record is bereft of evidence that defendant has accepted responsibility or shown genuine 

remorse for his crimes. No basis exists to conclude that he has made any substantial progress in 

rehabilitating himself in the many years that he has been incarcerated since committing the 

offenses, nor is there any discernable basis to conclude that he is likely to do so in the future. 

Sadur’s testimony indicated that defendant demonstrated no remorse when describing the crimes. 

Defendant has received five misconduct tickets during his incarceration. Defendant’s central 

role in holding Landry captive for many hours, the brutal execution style of the murder, 

defendant’s subsequent selling of the murder weapon, and his failure to accept responsibility or 

exhibit remorse in the many years since the crimes were committed lend considerable support to 

the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s prospects for rehabilitation are negligible. The trial 

court properly concluded that this factor did not favor mitigation. 

 Overall, our review of the record indicates that the trial court accurately analyzed each of 

the Miller factors and correctly concluded that defendant is the rare juvenile offender whose 
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crime reflects irreparable corruption. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 

determining that defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. 

 Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in imposing attorney fees without 

conducting an inquiry into defendant’s ability to pay. We disagree. This Court reviews de novo 

questions of law, including issues of statutory interpretation. People v Martin, 271 Mich App 

280, 286-287; 721 NW2d 815 (2006). 

 MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iv) authorizes the trial court to impose at sentencing “[t]he expenses 

of providing legal assistance to the defendant.” MCL 769.1l provides for the deduction of funds 

from an incarcerated defendant’s prison account: 

 If a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the department of corrections has 

been ordered to pay any sum of money as described in [MCL 769.1k] and the 

department of corrections receives an order from the court on a form prescribed 

by the state court administrative office, the department of corrections shall deduct 

50% of the funds received by the prisoner in a month over $50.00 and promptly 

forward a payment to the court as provided in the order when the amount exceeds 

$100.00, or the entire amount if the prisoner is paroled, is transferred to 

community programs, or is discharged on the maximum sentence. . . . 

MCL 769.1k “allows for the imposition of a fee for a court-appointed attorney irrespective of a 

defendant’s ability to pay, and [MCL 769.1l] allows the trial court to order that a prisoner’s 

prison account be reduced to satisfy costs imposed under [MCL 769.1k]. This is usually 

accomplished by a remittance order, which also does not require an ability-to-pay analysis.” 

People v Jackson, 483 Mich 271, 286; 769 NW2d 630 (2009). In Jackson, 483 Mich at 294, our 

Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k and held that “there 

is no constitutionally required ability-to-pay analysis until the fee is actually enforced.” The 

Jackson Court noted that MCL 769.1l provided a procedure for enforcing the fee without an 

ability-to-pay assessment but concluded that this procedure was constitutional “because the 

statute’s monetary calculations necessarily conduct a preliminary, general ability-to-pay 

assessment before the prisoner’s funds are taken.” Id. at 295. 

 MCL 769.1l inherently calculates a prisoner’s general ability to pay and, 

in effect, creates a statutory presumption of nonindigency. The provision only 

allows the garnishment of a prisoner’s account if the balance exceeds $50. 

Although this amount would be insufficient to sustain a defendant living among 

the general populace, it is uncontested that a prisoner’s “living expenses” are nil, 

as the prisoner is clothed, sheltered, fed, and has all his medical needs provided 

by the state. The funds left to the prisoner on a monthly basis are more than 

adequate to cover the prisoner’s other minimal expenses and obligations without 

causing manifest hardship. Thus, we conclude that [MCL 769.1l’s] application 

makes a legitimate presumption that the prisoner is not indigent. [Id.] 

“[I]f a prisoner believes that his unique individual financial circumstances rebut [MCL 769.1l’s] 

presumption of nonindigency, he may petition the court to reduce or eliminate the amount that 

the remittance order requires him to pay.” Id. at 296. 
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[W]hen reviewing a prisoner’s claim, lower courts must receive the prisoner’s 

petition and any proofs of his unique and extraordinary financial circumstances. 

Further, the lower courts should only hold that a prisoner’s individual 

circumstances warrant amending or reducing the remittance order when, in its 

discretion, it determines that enforcement would work a manifest hardship on the 

prisoner or his immediate family. The trial courts are under no obligation to hold 

any formal proceedings. They are only required to amend the remittance order 

when [MCL 769.1l’s] presumption of nonindigency is rebutted with evidence that 

enforcement would impose a manifest hardship on the prisoner or his immediate 

family. Beyond these basic parameters, we leave it to the trial courts, in their 

sound discretion, to decide how to adjudicate a prisoner’s claim that his individual 

circumstances rebut [MCL 769.1l’s] presumption of nonindigency. [Id. at 296-

297.] 

 Defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in imposing attorney fees without 

conducting an assessment of defendant’s ability to pay is devoid of merit. An ability-to-pay 

assessment is required only when the assessment is enforced and the defendant contests his 

ability to pay. Id. at 298. After imposing the fees, the trial court entered a remittance order in 

conformance with MCL 769.1l, requiring the Department of Corrections to collect 50% of funds 

received by defendant over $50 each month. Defendant argues that the trial court should not 

have entered this order because “[d]efendant remains indigent, serving a non-parolable life 

term.” Defendant has not followed the proper procedure under Jackson. Defendant has not filed 

a petition or any proofs in the trial court setting forth his unique financial circumstances.4

 Under 

Jackson, it is for the trial court in the first instance to exercise its discretion in considering 

whether defendant has established that his individual financial circumstances rebut the statutory 

presumption of nonindigency. Defendant’s appellate argument is thus premature, and he has 

failed to establish any error on the part of the trial court. 

 We affirm. 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Jane E. Markey 

/s/ Michael J. Riordan 

 

4

 In his appellate brief, defendant also fails to set forth any unique financial circumstances.