[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 202 (Friday, October 18, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 83956-83987]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-23866]



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Vol. 89

Friday,

No. 202

October 18, 2024

Part II





 Department of Transportation





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Federal Transit Administration





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49 CFR Part 674





State Safety Oversight; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 89 , No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / 
Rules and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Transit Administration

49 CFR Part 674

[Docket No. FTA-2023-0008]
RIN 2132-AB42


State Safety Oversight

AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration (FTA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Federal Transit Administration (FTA) is publishing a final 
rule for State Safety Oversight (SSO). This final rule implements new 
requirements of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (enacted as the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA)), removes outdated 
references, and simplifies notification requirements.

DATES: The effective date of this rule is January 1, 2025.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For program matters, contact Loretta 
Bomgardner, Office of Transit Safety and Oversight, FTA, telephone 
(202) 577-5896 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#97fbf8e5f2e3e3f6b9f5f8faf0f6e5f3f9f2e5d7f3f8e3b9f0f8e1"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="82eeedf0e7f6f6e3ace0edefe5e3f0e6ece7f0c2e6edf6ace5edf4">[email protected]</span></a>. For legal matters, 
contact Richard Wong, Office of the Chief Counsel, telephone (202) 366-
4011 or <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#53213a303b3221377d243c3d3413373c277d343c25"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="abd9c2c8c3cad9cf85dcc4c5ccebcfc4df85ccc4dd">[email protected]</span></a>. Office hours are from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 
p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary
    A. Purpose of Regulatory Action
    B. Statutory Authority
    C. Summary of Major Provisions
    D. Benefits and Costs (Table)
II. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Response to Comments
    A. Section 674.5--Policy
    B. Section 674.7--Definitions
    C. Section 674.11--State Safety Oversight Program
    D. Section 674.17--Use of Federal Financial Assistance
    E. Section 674.19--Certification of a State Safety Oversight 
Program
    F. Section 674.21--Withholding of Federal Financial Assistance 
for Noncompliance
    G. Section 674.23--Confidentiality of Information
    H. Section 674.25--Role of the State Safety Oversight Agency
    I. Section 674.27--State Safety Oversight Program Standards
    J. Section 674.29--Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans: 
General Requirements
    K. Section 674.31--Triennial Audits: General Requirements
    L. Section 674.33--Safety Event Notifications
    M. Section 674.35--Investigations
    N. Section 674.37--Corrective Action Plans
    O. Section 674.39--State Safety Oversight Agency Annual 
Reporting to FTA
    P. Section 674.41--Conflicts of Interest
    Q. Regulatory Burden
    R. Other Safety Topics
III. Section-by-Section Analysis
IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

I. Executive Summary

A. Purpose of Regulatory Action

    This final rule updates the existing regulations for state safety 
oversight of rail fixed guideway public transportation systems. In the 
Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) (Pub. L. 
112-141, July 6, 2012), Congress directed FTA to establish a 
comprehensive public transportation safety program, one element of 
which is the State Safety Oversight (SSO) Program. (See 49 U.S.C. 
5329). Section 30012 of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law (BIL), 
enacted as the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) (Pub. L. 
117-58, November 15, 2021), amended 49 U.S.C. 5329 and established new 
requirements for FTA's Public Transportation Safety Program. 
Consequently, FTA is revising 49 CFR part 674 to address requirements 
related to the BIL, remove requirements related to the initial 
establishment of this part, and clarify requirements of the existing 
part.

B. Statutory Authority

    Section 5329 of title 49, United States Code, includes several 
provisions that require FTA to establish a comprehensive public 
transportation safety program, the elements of which include a National 
Public Transportation Safety Plan; a training and certification program 
for Federal, state, and local transportation agency employees with 
safety responsibilities; Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans; and 
a strengthened State Safety Oversight Program.

C. Summary of Major Provisions

    This final rule makes the following changes to strengthen the 
existing SSO program:
    <bullet> Updates terminology to reflect current use across 
programs.
    <bullet> Clarifies existing requirements consistent with FTA 
expectations.
    <bullet> Removes language relating to the period of transition from 
49 CFR part 659, FTA's previous SSO regulation, to 49 CFR part 674, the 
current SSO regulation.
    <bullet> Addresses BIL requirements.

D. Benefits and Costs

    The final rule requires additional oversight of safety-related 
activities of rail transit agencies (RTAs) by state safety oversight 
agencies (SSOAs). The rule also has additional costs for SSOAs and RTAs 
to comply with the requirements.
    Table 1 summarizes the economic effects of the rule over the first 
ten years of the rule (2025 to 2034) in 2022 dollars. The benefits of 
the increased oversight are unknown and unquantified. On an annualized 
basis, the rule will have costs of $11.0 million at a 7 percent 
discount rate (discounted to 2024), $10.9 million at 3 percent, and 
$10.9 million at 2 percent.

                                 Table 1--Summary of Economic Effects, 2025-2034
                                           [$2022, discounted to 2024]
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                                            Total
                Item                    (undiscounted)    Annualized (7%)    Annualized (3%)    Annualized (2%)
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Benefits............................       Unquantified  .................  .................  .................
Costs:
    SSOA documentation of                      $118,140            $16,820            $13,446            $12,894
     enforcement authority..........
    SSOA oversight..................         80,338,058          8,093,373          8,058,697          8,050,279
    SSOA safety event tracking......            183,879             18,388             18,388             18,388
    SSOA investigations.............          7,355,168            735,517            735,517            735,517
    SSOA annual reporting to FTA....            609,755             60,975             60,975             60,975
    RTA investigations and reporting         20,456,560          2,045,656          2,045,656          2,045,656
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        Total costs.................        109,061,560         10,970,730         10,932,680         10,923,710
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Net benefits........................       Unquantified  .................  .................  .................
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Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.

II. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Response to Comments

    FTA published the State Safety Oversight NPRM on November 15, 2023 
(88 FR 78269), with the public comment period closing on February 15, 
2024. During this time, FTA received 27 unique and substantive comment 
submissions to the rulemaking docket. Commenters included SSOAs, RTAs, 
labor organizations, trade associations, and individuals. FTA has 
considered these comments and addresses them in the corresponding 
sections below. Some comments expressed support for the NPRM without 
advocating for specific changes, and FTA acknowledges those comments 
were received and considered.
    FTA reviewed all relevant comments and took them into consideration 
when developing the final rule. Below, the NPRM comments and responses 
are subdivided by their corresponding sections of the proposed rule and 
subject matter.

A. Section 674.5--Policy

    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOA commenters regarding 
Sec.  674.5. One commenter questioned how FTA defines the terms 
``resources,'' ``qualified personnel,'' and ``complexity'' and asked 
FTA to clearly define its expectations for SSOAs. Another commenter 
asked why FTA removed the first sentence in 674.5(b) related to funding 
of SSOAs.
    FTA Response: FTA notes that these terms originate in statute and 
defining the terms is not necessary to carry out the statute, as 
evidenced by their use in the rule since 2016. As with previous 
regulatory action, FTA declines to establish formal definitions for 
these terms to avoid conflicts in instances where associated statutes 
or regulations are revised. FTA notes that SSOAs have differing levels 
of State-based authority and resources to oversee the safety of the 
rail fixed guideway public transportation systems in their State. 
Further, FTA notes that the number, size, and complexity of rail fixed 
guideway public transportation systems that SSOAs oversee vary across 
States. The language in Sec.  674.5(a) ensures the SSO program is not a 
``one size fits all'' program and instead provides States the 
flexibility to establish an SSOA sized and resourced to meet the 
State's oversight needs. Ultimately, as defined at Sec.  674.19, the 
FTA Administrator may issue or deny certification of an SSOA based on 
an assessment of whether the SSOA has the authority, resources, and 
expertise to oversee the number, size, and complexity of the rail fixed 
guideway public transportation systems that operate within the State.
    In response to the comment regarding the proposed removal of the 
first sentence in Sec.  674.5(b), FTA removed the first sentence in 
subsection (b) because the availability of funding is addressed in 
Sec.  674.17(a) and is not necessary to repeat here.

B. Section 674.7--Definitions

    FTA received submissions from 14 commenters that included specific 
comments related to Sec.  674.7 and proposed definitions.
1. Accountable Executive
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters suggested FTA revise the definition 
of Accountable Executive to include language that specifies a rail 
transit agency's Agency Safety Plan (ASP) is ``designed and approved by 
the transit agency's board [of directors].''
    FTA Response: FTA declines to revise the definition of 
``Accountable Executive'' to describe the role of a transit agency's 
board of directors or equivalent entity. FTA notes that it may be 
inaccurate to state that a transit agency's board of directors designs 
the transit agency's ASP.
2. Collision
    Comments: Three SSOA commenters and one RTA commenter submitted 
comments related to FTA's proposed definition of ``collision.'' The RTA 
commenter recommended definitional alignment with the NTD program. One 
SSOA suggested that without additional clarification regarding the 
terms ``impact'' and ``object'' used in the definition of 
``collision,'' FTA would see a significant increase in the number of 
events that would require reporting, resulting in an increased burden 
for transit agencies. Both SSOA commenters recommended that FTA replace 
the word ``impact'' with ``contact,'' asserting that ``contact'' simply 
means touching, while ``impact'' implies a certain level of force, 
which could be confusing to SSOAs and RTAs. One SSOA commenter 
requested that FTA clarify whether this definition means that some 
collisions do not require two-hour notification.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the recommendation that definitions 
align with the NTD and notes that FTA has coordinated terminology to 
ensure consistency across programs. As for the use of the terms 
``impact'' and ``object,'' FTA notes that for consistency, the 
definition of ``collision'' in the final rule uses the same terms as 
the NTD, including both ``impact'' and ``object.'' FTA disagrees that 
the term ``impact'' is confusing to RTAs and SSOAs and notes the NTD 
has used this term in its definition of ``collision'' for many years. 
FTA also disagrees that interpretations of the definition will result 
in an increase in collision events that require notification. FTA notes 
that all notification criteria are described at Sec.  674.33 and 
include thresholds for collisions, such as injuries, fatalities, and 
disabling damage, that define the set of collisions that require two-
hour notification. Finally, FTA confirms that not all collisions 
require two-hour notification. Two-hour notifications are required for 
any safety event meeting the notification criteria at Sec.  674.33, 
including any collision between two rail transit vehicles and any 
collision resulting in one or more injuries, a fatality, or disabling 
damage to a rail transit vehicle.
3. Corrective Action Plan
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters recommended FTA revise the proposed 
definition of ``corrective action plan'' and add a definition of 
``safety risk mitigation'' to help distinguish between corrective 
action plans and safety risk mitigations. The commenters pointed out 
the relationship between corrective action plans and safety risk 
mitigations and noted that corrective action plans address compliance 
with requirements and that safety risk mitigations address actual 
performance to ensure an RTA meets the safety intent behind the 
corrective action plan requirements.

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    FTA Response: The proposed rule included a definition of ``safety 
risk mitigation'' and FTA retains that definition in the final rule. 
FTA agrees with the suggestion that FTA revise the definition of 
corrective action plan to support the distinction between safety risk 
mitigations and corrective action plans more clearly. FTA generally 
agrees with the commenter's description that corrective action plans 
focus more on resolving issues related to compliance, whereas safety 
risk mitigations result from safety risk assessments and focus on 
addressing safety risk by reducing the likelihood and/or severity of a 
hazard's potential consequence. FTA has revised the definition of 
corrective action plan in this final rule to reflect this distinction 
by removing the phrase ``minimize, control, correct, or eliminate risks 
and hazards'' and replacing it with ``address an identified deficiency 
or safety concern.'' This change removes language more closely related 
to safety risk mitigations from the definition of corrective action 
plan and adds language that more appropriately describes corrective 
action plans.
4. Derailment
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters suggested clarifications to the 
definition of ``derailment'' and use of the term ``event'' within the 
definition. One of the SSOA commenters suggested the proposed 
definition was insufficient and there was a risk of events not being 
reported that should be (e.g., split switch, run-throughs, etc.). The 
commenter offered an alternative definition that explicitly identified 
and included split switches, switch run-throughs, wheel lifts, wheel 
climbs, flange running, and web running. One transit agency requested 
that the definition of ``derailment'' apply the NTD exclusion for 
events that occur during the engineering or construction phases of a 
new rail transit system or the extension of an existing rail transit 
system unless they involve transit-related activities such as 
operations, testing, simulated service or pre-revenue service, or a 
transit-related maintenance activity.
    FTA Response: On the use of the word ``event'' within the 
definition of ``derailment,'' FTA agrees that, given removal of the 
definition of ``event'' from the rule, use of the term ``safety event'' 
is appropriate, and has made that change for the definition of 
``derailment'' for the purposes of the two-hour notification 
requirements in Sec.  674.33. FTA appreciates the commenter's request 
for clarification regarding the NTD program's exclusion of events that 
occur during the engineering or construction phases of a new rail 
transit system or the extension of an existing rail transit system, 
unless they involve transit-related activities such as operations, 
testing, simulated service or pre-revenue service, or a transit-related 
maintenance activity. FTA confirms that the SSO program applies this 
same exclusion for purposes of safety event notification and 
investigation criteria and notes that FTA has added language at 
subsection Sec.  674.25(c) that establishes, for the purposes of 
Sec. Sec.  674.33 and 674.35, notification criteria are limited to 
safety events that involve transit-related activities such as 
operations, testing, simulated service or pre-revenue service, or a 
transit-related maintenance activity.
5. Designated Personnel
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters suggested non-substantive edits to 
the definition of ``designated personnel'' to match the definition in 
the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program 
(PTSCTP) NPRM.
    FTA Response: FTA has ensured the ``designated personnel'' 
definition at Sec.  674.7 matches the definition from part 672.
6. Disabling Damage
    Comments: FTA received comments from two RTA commenters and two 
SSOA commenters regarding the new term ``disabling damaged'' used to 
support safety event notification criteria. One RTA commenter expressed 
support for the new term and the fact that it is limited to damage that 
physically prevents a rail transit vehicle or train from operating 
under its own power. One RTA commenter suggested FTA modify the 
proposed definition to specify the physical prevention of movement. Two 
SSOA commenters suggested that the definition include additional 
clarification to exclude mechanical failures or other malfunctions that 
may impact operations. One SSOA commenter suggested that FTA modify the 
definition to replace ``preventing the vehicle from operating under its 
own power'' to ``towed from the scene.''
    FTA Response: After consideration of the comments, FTA declines to 
revise the definition. FTA notes the term ``disabling damage'' is 
referring to physical damage preventing operation. For some collision 
examples like mirror strikes, a rail transit vehicle could still 
operate on its own power, and FTA does not consider this disabling 
damage. FTA notes that even in such an example, local policy may 
require taking the rail transit vehicle out of service, but this 
decision could vary agency to agency. It is disabling damage only if 
the damage itself prevents the vehicle from operating under its own 
power. Further, modifying the definition to replace ``preventing the 
vehicle from operating under its own power'' with ``towed from the 
scene'' could include certain collisions that do not result in damage 
that physically prevents rail transit vehicle movement. FTA confirms 
that disabling damage includes damage from a collision that requires 
towing for the rail transit vehicle.
7. Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons
    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs and two RTAs about 
the definition of ``evacuation for life safety reasons.'' One SSOA 
suggested the definition should not include all evacuations of 
passengers into the rail right of way, including for events such as 
mechanical failures, because this would ``skew the data.'' Another SSOA 
requested clarification regarding self-evacuations when the RTA may not 
be aware of certain self-evacuations and the circumstances that 
prompted them. One RTA commenter recommended FTA ensure this definition 
aligns with the definition used by the NTD, specifically relating to 
passenger self-evacuations into the right of way. Finally, one RTA 
commenter requested FTA state these evacuations are not due to 
preceding events, such as collisions, as this could distort data.
    FTA Response: Existing SSO program and NTD reporting policy support 
retaining in the definition the concept that any evacuation into the 
rail right of way is an evacuation for life safety reasons, and thus 
FTA does not believe the definition will skew existing data sets or 
trending. FTA appreciates the opportunity to clarify self-evacuations 
and notes that RTAs cannot notify SSOAs and FTA of events of which they 
are not aware. The inclusion of self-evacuations ensures that 
evacuations resulting from hazards still trigger notification, even if 
the evacuation was not directed by the RTA. FTA agrees with the 
recommendation for alignment with the NTD definition of ``evacuation 
for life safety reasons'' and the treatment of self-evacuations and 
confirms the definition aligns with the NTD definition and treatment of 
self-evacuations. FTA disagrees with the suggestion that evacuations 
for life safety reasons should exclude those evacuations that result 
from preceding events, as evacuations commonly follow preceding events. 
An evacuation for life safety reasons is one of the notification 
criteria described in Sec.  674.33. Further,

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FTA notes that a single safety event may meet multiple notification 
criteria. For example, a single event may involve a collision, 
injuries, fatalities, an evacuation for life safety reasons, and 
disabling damage. This is still considered a single safety event that 
requires notification because it meets at least one of the safety event 
notification criteria described in Sec.  674.33.
8. Fatality
    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs and one RTA 
regarding the definition of ``fatality.'' Two SSOAs expressed concern 
over the 30-day window for confirmation of death, suggesting the word 
``confirmed'' should be replaced with the word ``determined'' because 
confirmation implies that an answer exists, whereas determination 
implies that follow-up is required. The two SSOAs also suggested that 
the 30-day window requires SSOAs and RTAs to solicit information 
protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
of 1996 (HIPAA). One SSOA commenter and one RTA commenter requested 
clarification on the inclusion of homicides in the definition of 
``fatality,'' noting that homicides are considered security events and 
should be excluded from notification and investigation requirements.
    FTA Response: FTA declines to revise the definition of ``fatality'' 
as suggested. FTA confirms that the definition of fatality used by both 
the NTD and part 674 are consistent. Further, FTA notes that it has not 
substantively changed the definition of ``fatality'' that has been used 
by both the SSO and NTD programs for many years and is not aware of any 
situation where the current definition has prevented an SSOA or RTA 
from complying with SSO program notification requirements. Further, FTA 
notes that part 674 does not establish any requirement to solicit 
HIPAA-protected information and reiterates that RTAs are not required 
to notify SSOAs and FTA of events of which they are not aware. However, 
if an RTA becomes aware that a safety event resulted in a fatality as 
defined at Sec.  674.7, the RTA is required to notify the SSOA and FTA 
within two hours of being made aware of the fatality. FTA confirms the 
notification requirements of Sec.  674.33 exclude criminal actions such 
as homicides. These events are excluded from the safety events 
requiring SSOA investigation. Accordingly, the final rule does not 
require RTAs to notify SSOAs and FTA of homicides. FTA notes that the 
final rule does not preclude an SSOA from establishing notification 
requirements in addition to those established at Sec.  674.33. Finally, 
given removal of the definition of ``event'' from the rule, FTA has 
replaced the term ``event'' with ``safety event'' in the definition of 
``fatality'' for purposes of the two-hour notification requirements in 
Sec.  674.33.
9. Hazard
    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs and one RTA 
regarding the definition of ``hazard.'' The RTA commenter recommended 
changing the term ``hazard'' to ``safety hazard'' to parallel the 
change from ``risk'' to ``safety risk.'' The two SSOA commenters 
recommended adding the phrase ``of a public transportation system'' to 
match the definition published in 49 CFR part 673.
    FTA Response: FTA declines to change the term ``hazard'' to 
``safety hazard'' and instead chooses to maintain definitional 
consistency with 49 CFR part 673. FTA agrees with the commenters who 
recommended FTA revise the definition of ``hazard'' proposed in the 
NPRM to match the definition of ``hazard'' published in the final 49 
CFR part 673. FTA has included the phrase ``of a public transportation 
system'' in the definition of ``hazard'' at Sec.  674.7 to mirror the 
definition of ``hazard'' published in 49 CFR 673.5.
10. Injury
    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs, two RTAs, and one 
industry association regarding the definition of ``injury.'' One RTA 
expressed support for the definition of ``injury,'' noting that it will 
help simplify notifications. One RTA commenter requested that FTA 
clarify why the definition uses the words ``medical attention'' instead 
of ``medical transport'' and asked FTA to define the timeframe for 
``immediate'' medical attention. Two SSOAs and an industry association 
asked if ``event'' should be changed to ``safety event.'' One SSOA 
requested an explicit definitional exclusion of injuries resulting from 
security events. Another SSOA suggested that FTA move toward a 
methodology like the one created by the Association of Transportation 
Safety Information Professionals and an approved American National 
Standard via the Manual on Classification of Motor Vehicle Traffic 
Crashes to help promote reporting uniformity. Additionally, the 
commenter suggested that FTA replace ``requires'' with ``results in'' 
to ensure consistent reporting.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the support received regarding the 
definition of ``injury'' and agrees that it provides a simpler 
criterion to support safety event notifications. FTA confirms that the 
term ``immediate medical attention'' as used in the definition of 
``injury'' serves to exclude first aid received onsite and to include 
physical harm that results in medical transport from the safety event 
scene. This excludes medical attention sought by an individual at a 
later time. The definition of ``injury'' used in this rulemaking is 
consistent with the definition of ``injury'' in the NTD. Given that FTA 
removed the definition of ``event'' and instead uses ``safety event,'' 
FTA has made this edit in the final rule, but otherwise retains the 
definition in the NPRM. With respect to the requested clarification 
regarding the definition's application to security events versus safety 
events. FTA declines to revise the definition of ``injury'' to exclude 
those resulting from security events. FTA notes, as stated in other 
comment responses, that criminal actions such as homicides and assaults 
are excluded from RTA notification requirements and SSOA investigation 
requirements. FTA believes it is appropriate to preserve definitional 
alignment with the NTD for the term ``injury'' and to establish 
security event exclusions in the requirements for RTA notification and 
SSOA investigation. FTA notes that the final rule does not preclude an 
SSOA from establishing notification requirements in addition to those 
established at Sec.  674.33.
    FTA appreciates the recommendations regarding crash data 
classifications and will consider these methodologies when evaluating 
data management changes in the future. Finally, FTA appreciates the 
comments suggesting minor changes to the injury definition, including 
replacing ``requires'' with ``results in'' but declines to revise the 
definition, to ensure consistency with the other FTA programs.
    Finally, given removal of the definition of ``event'' from the 
rule, FTA has replaced the term ``event'' with ``safety event'' in the 
definition of ``injury'' for purposes of the two-hour notification 
requirements in Sec.  674.33.
11. Inspection
    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs and one RTA 
regarding the definition of ``inspection.'' One SSOA expressed concern 
that the definition of ``inspection'' did not include personnel. The 
RTA and two SSOAs requested clarification of what is meant by 
``physical observation,'' with two commenters noting inspections may 
include non-invasive inspection methods (ultrasonic, leak tests, video

[[Page 83960]]

review, other inspection methods, etc.) that may be conducted via other 
means that do not require the physical onsite presence of the person 
conducting the inspection.
    FTA Response: The definition of ``inspection'' does not include 
personnel in the list of items observed during an inspection. FTA 
agrees with this commenter and has added the term ``personnel'' within 
the definition of ``inspection,'' which would include the inspection of 
training records and the observation of an RTA's designated personnel. 
FTA appreciates the request for clarification on the use of ``physical 
observation'' in the definition of ``inspection'' and notes this term 
is intended to distinguish an inspection, which would involve 
observation of physical system elements, from other types of activities 
that do not rely on physical observations, such as a document review. 
Physical observation, therefore, may include virtual observation or 
other observation of system elements.
12. Investigation
    Comments: An SSOA asserted the proposed definition of 
``investigation'' is too limited and conflicts with the use of the term 
in Sec.  674.25(e), specifically the investigation of allegations of 
noncompliance with an RTA's ASP.
    FTA Response: FTA first notes the definition is the same as the 
2016 definition, except FTA has replaced ``accident, incident, or 
hazard'' with ``safety event.'' Further, Sec.  674.25(e) is the same as 
Sec.  674.25(d) in the 2016 rule. Thus, FTA disagrees the purpose is 
too narrow or that the definition would not encompass investigations of 
noncompliance required by Sec.  674.25(e). FTA notes that hazards may 
include procedural noncompliance, which are within the purpose of an 
investigation, so FTA declines to amend the definition.
13. Person
    Comments: Two SSOAs requested that FTA define the terms 
``volunteer,'' ``official worker,'' and ``associated infrastructure'' 
used in the definition of ``person.''
    FTA Response: FTA does not believe it is necessary to define 
commonly understood terms such as ``volunteer,'' ``official worker,'' 
and ``associated infrastructure'' to ensure understanding of the rule.
14. Potential Consequence
    Comments: Two SSOAs asserted the definition of ``potential 
consequence'' was confusing and recommended that FTA restate the 
definition.
    FTA Response: FTA disagrees that the definition requires revision. 
Further, FTA notes that the definition of ``potential consequence'' at 
Sec.  674.7 mirrors the definition of ``potential consequence'' 
published in 49 CFR 673.5.
15. Rail Fixed Guideway Public Transportation System
    Comments: FTA received comments from one RTA, one SSOA, and one 
industry association about the definition of ``rail fixed guideway 
public transportation system.'' The RTA commented that including the 
phrase ``or any such system in engineering or construction'' may cause 
conflict with State occupational safety regulators. The industry 
association and SSOA recommended that FTA edit the definition to 
explicitly refer to streetcar systems.
    FTA Response: The phrase ``or any such system in engineering or 
construction'' has been a part of the definition since the original 
part 674 was published in 2016, and FTA is not aware of any conflict 
this definition has for the purposes of State safety regulators. As for 
the inclusion of streetcar in the definition, the list of transit modes 
in the definition is not exhaustive and includes the text, ``. . . 
include but are not limited to . . .'' Further, FTA notes this 
definition mirrors FTA's definition of ``rail fixed guideway public 
transportation system'' published in 49 CFR 673.5.
16. Safety Committee
    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs, one RTA, and one 
industry association related to the definition of ``safety committee.'' 
The RTA commenter suggested that FTA provide more clarity in the 
definition because their agency includes different safety committees. 
The two SSOAs and industry association suggested that FTA use the term 
``Joint Labor-Management Committee'' instead of ``Safety Committee'' to 
provide additional specificity.
    FTA Response: FTA understands RTAs may have a variety of safety-
related committees. FTA notes that the term ``safety committee'' is not 
used in this final rule and has been removed from Sec.  674.7.
17. Safety Event
    Comments: FTA received comments from four RTAs, four SSOAs, and two 
industry associations related to the proposed definition of ``safety 
event.'' Several commenters, including one RTA and the two industry 
associations, commented on FTA's simplification of event categorization 
and the elimination of the terms ``accident,'' ``incident,'' and 
``occurrence,'' which were used by FTA in the previous rule to 
establish criteria for event notification and investigation. Two SSOAs 
and one industry association expressed support for the simplification 
of existing terminology related to safety events. The two industry 
associations and one RTA commenter noted that the previous event tiers 
can be useful for analysis and trending purposes. Two RTAs and an 
industry association commented that FTA should not remove the three 
event subcategories from the rule and asserted that agencies are 
accustomed to using these terms to support existing SSOA notification 
activities and that the proposed definition of ``safety event'' is 
insufficient to determine which events require notification to FTA and 
the SSOA. One SSOA recommended that FTA retain the definition of the 
word ``incident'' because the word is used in 49 U.S.C. 5329.
    One RTA requested additional clarity on whether the definition was 
intended to be limited to events related to or affecting transit 
operations. One SSOA commented that the use of the term ``damage to the 
environment'' would result in the need for additional SSOA personnel 
with very specific expertise. Two RTAs and one industry association 
commented that FTA should ensure the definitions in part 674 align with 
NTD definitions to reduce confusion and to avoid the underreporting of 
events.
    One RTA and one SSOA commented on the use of the term 
``unexpected'' in the ``safety event'' definition. The RTA suggested 
replacing the term ``unexpected'' with ``unintentional.'' The SSOA 
requested clarification on FTA's use of the phrases ``unexpected 
outcome'' and ``general criminal action'' and questioned whether it was 
the responsibility of the RTA to determine intent when applying this 
definition. One SSOA commented that FTA's focus should be on the 
reduction of safety events that can be realistically prevented by an 
RTA and asserted FTA should not use data that includes safety events 
that could not realistically be prevented by an RTA as the sole 
determination of the safety of an RTA or the effectiveness of an SSOA.
    FTA Response: FTA agrees with the commenters that noted safety 
event stratification can be useful to support safety performance 
analysis and encourages RTAs and SSOAs to conduct data analysis to 
support safety performance monitoring and safety oversight activities 
as necessary but notes the final rule does not establish

[[Page 83961]]

any requirement that necessitates the definition of additional safety 
event tiers. As to the sufficiency of the ``safety event'' definition 
to define events requiring notification, FTA notes the definition of 
``safety event'' in Sec.  674.7 does not establish criteria for SSOA 
and FTA two-hour notifications or SSOA investigations. Instead, FTA 
describes safety event notification criteria at Sec.  674.33. FTA does 
not believe the statutory usage of the term ``incident'' warrants a 
severity-based stratification of safety events, nor does it require FTA 
to define the term in part 674.
    FTA confirms that safety events generally are related to or affect 
operations. Further, FTA notes that neither the definition of safety 
event nor the notification criteria at Sec.  674.33 would necessitate 
SSOA staff to obtain specialized skills related to assessing 
environmental damage. FTA has coordinated terminology to ensure 
consistency across programs.
    FTA considered the suggestion to replace the word ``unexpected'' 
with ``unintentional,'' and declines to make the suggested revision. 
The word ``unexpected'' is used to distinguish planned outcomes from 
unexpected outcomes. FTA notes the definition in Sec.  674.7 mirrors 
the definition of ``safety event'' published in 49 CFR part 673. FTA 
confirms the exclusion of criminal actions such as homicides and 
assaults from the two-hour notification requirements in Sec.  674.33 
and notes that the final rule does not preclude an SSOA from 
establishing notification requirements in addition to those established 
at Sec.  674.33. FTA confirms the RTA is responsible for making this 
determination as well as determinations regarding all notification 
criteria established at Sec.  674.33. FTA agrees the determination of 
the effectiveness of an RTA or an SSOA should not be made solely on the 
use of data related to safety events that could not ``realistically be 
prevented by an RTA.''
18. Unintended Train Movement
    Comments: FTA received comments from six commenters regarding the 
proposed definition of ``unintended train movement,'' including three 
SSOAs, two RTAs, and one industry association. One RTA recommended that 
FTA align this definition with the NTD definition of ``Runaway Train.'' 
Two SSOAs, one RTA, and one industry association recommended that FTA 
replace the word ``driver'' in the definition with the word 
``operator,'' noting that the definition excludes non-revenue vehicles, 
so the term ``operator'' would be more appropriate. One SSOA 
recommended that FTA not exclude non-revenue vehicles from the 
definition. One RTA asked for clarification on whether a runaway train 
would still meet the two-hour notification criteria. Two SSOAs 
requested clarification on the application of unintended train movement 
to the automated guideway mode.
    FTA Response: FTA declines to change ``driver'' to ``operator'' or 
to broaden the definition to include non-revenue vehicles as the 
definition is consistent with the 2024 NTD Safety & Security Policy 
Manual definition of runaway train. FTA confirms that under this final 
rule, the term ``runaway train'' has effectively been replaced by the 
term ``unintended train movement.'' This means that an event involving 
a runaway train according to past terminology would now be said to 
involve an unintended train movement and would trigger the two-hour 
notification requirements at Sec.  674.33. Further, the definition of 
``unintended train movement'' applies to automated guideway systems 
when a revenue vehicle of the automated guideway system experiences 
uncontrolled movement and is no longer under the control of the 
automated control system.
19. Additional Comments
    Comments: In addition to comments related to specific definitions, 
described above, FTA received general comments related to definitions. 
Several comments were related to part 672, including requests for 
additional definitions or text in part 672. Other commenters asked 
whether definitions amended by this rulemaking would be amended in the 
NTD. Those comments are outside the scope of this rulemaking and are 
not addressed. Commenters generally recommended that definitions align 
with the NTD and other safety rulemakings and FTA has aligned 
definitions where needed.
    Some commenters requested that additional terms be defined, 
including ``project,'' ``State Safety Oversight Program,'' and 
``audit.'' FTA declines to define ``project'' as it is a commonly 
understood term. FTA believes it is unnecessary to add a definition for 
``State Safety Oversight Program'' and notes the final rule describes 
the scope of and requirements for a State Safety Oversight program, 
including the minimum expectations for a State Safety Oversight 
program. Similarly, the term ``audit'' does not need to be defined as 
Sec.  674.31 describes requirements for SSOA triennial audits of rail 
transit agencies.

C. Section 674.11--State Safety Oversight Program

    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs related to Sec.  
674.11. One commenter asked FTA to clarify in this section that only 
rail fixed guideway public transit systems that receive Federal funding 
must have an SSOP. Both commenters asked for clarification regarding 
whether FTA can evaluate an SSOA's staffing level after FTA has issued 
an initial certification. The commenters also requested that FTA define 
its process and criteria for auditing an SSOA. One SSOA commenter 
requested clarification on FTA SSOA audits, including State Management 
Reviews and the FTA SSO Audit Program, asking what the difference is 
between these audits/reviews and what the specific requirements are 
that must be met for compliance. Further, the SSOA noted that State 
leadership, not the SSOA, should be FTA's point of contact because the 
SSOA does not have the authority to change State law.
    FTA Response: Section 674.3 describes the entities to which this 
rule applies, and FTA declines to restate part 674 applicability 
criteria within Sec.  674.11. With respect to SSOA staffing levels, FTA 
certified the compliance of every SSOA in 2018. FTA notes that 49 
U.S.C. 5329(e)(9) requires FTA to continually evaluate an SSOA's 
implementation of its State Safety Oversight program, which is not 
limited to staffing levels, but how effectively those staff resources 
are used. The NTSB, through their investigations, has also identified 
SSOA staffing levels as a potential concern. Therefore, FTA will 
continue to conduct audits to confirm SSOAs are staffed at appropriate 
levels. If FTA identifies a pattern of SSOA noncompliance, it will 
consider the impact of SSOA resourcing on the agency's noncompliant 
status.
    The rule does not define FTA audit procedures for the SSO program 
or other programs identified by the commenter, such as State Management 
Reviews. FTA believes it is not practicable to publish criteria that 
would govern the audit or evaluation process, given the diversity of 
the 31 SSOAs currently under the program, and the number, size, and 
complexity of the fixed guideway systems under their oversight. FTA 
notes that FTA SSO program audits are performed to confirm compliance 
with 49 CFR part 674, and each SSOA is evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis. Finally, FTA appreciates the comment received regarding FTA SSO 
audit points of contact and will consider this

[[Page 83962]]

recommendation during future SSO audit program updates.

D. Section 674.17--Use of Federal Financial Assistance

    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs, three 
individuals, and one industry association regarding the use of Federal 
financial assistance. Three individuals recommended FTA establish 
additional requirements that limit the amount of Federal financial 
assistance SSOAs can use to procure contractor support and encouraged 
strengthening SSOA internal capabilities. Two of these commenters 
suggested that FTA require that no more than 10% of annual SSO grant 
funding should be used for contractor support. The third commenter 
suggested FTA require that no more than 15% be used for contactor 
support. Four commenters, including two SSOAs, one industry 
association, and one individual commented on the revised, broader 
reference to 49 U.S.C. 5329 generally instead of the specific reference 
to section 5329(e)(4) and sought clarification on whether this change 
means that SSO funds are now eligible for States to expend on PTASP-
related activities that were previously prohibited, such as drafting 
ASPs for small public transportation providers. One SSOA recommended 
that FTA adjust the Federal share of 80% to 85% to help SSOAs implement 
SSO programs at a faster rate. Finally, one SSOA recommended that FTA's 
apportionment for 49 U.S.C. 5329 take into consideration the number, 
size, and complexity of the rail fixed guideway public transportation 
systems in the State to ensure adequate funding is available to the 
State to best meet the Federal requirements.
    FTA Response: FTA does not have the authority to place restrictions 
on the percentage of SSOA grant funds that can be used for contractor 
support and FTA encourages the professional development of internal 
SSOA staff. FTA confirms the reference to 49 U.S.C. 5329 is no longer 
limited to subsection (e) as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law amended 
section 5329 and established additional SSOA-related requirements at 49 
U.S.C. 5329(k). The revised reference incorporates the requirements at 
both 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) and (k), and ensures the rule remains valid even 
if Congress further amends the law. This change does not mean that SSO 
grant funds are now eligible for States to expend on PTASP-related 
activities that were previously, and remain, prohibited (e.g., drafting 
ASPs for small public transportation agencies). FTA does not have the 
authority to increase the Federal share for SSOA grants, as that is 
established by statute (49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6)(C)). Finally, the 
apportionment formula in 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6)(B) specifically takes 
into consideration the number, size, and complexity of the rail fixed 
guideway public transportation systems in the State to ensure adequate 
funding is available to the State to best meet the Federal 
requirements. FTA published an explanation of the formula and basis of 
calculation in a March 10, 2014, Federal Register Notice (79 FR 13380).

E. Section 674.19--Certification of a State Safety Oversight Program

    FTA received comments from four commenters regarding certification 
of a State Safety Oversight program, including three SSOAs and one 
industry association.
1. Section 674.19(a)--Administrator's Determination
    Comments: One SSOA commenter asked for clarification regarding 
FTA's National Public Transportation Safety Plan (National Safety 
Plan). Specifically, the commenter asked if the National Safety Plan 
established a ceiling for requirements that an SSOA can establish. The 
commenter expressed concerns over potential situations where 
information in the National Safety Plan conflicts with a State's SSO 
program. The commenter requested clarification on what elements within 
the SSO program and an RTA's ASP require consistency with the National 
Safety Plan. Further, the commenter asked if a State's SSO program 
would require recertification in light of the updates to the National 
Safety Plan. Finally, the commenter asked about any timelines that FTA 
has defined related to updating program documentation to address the 
updated NSP. The SSOA also asked for clarification on certification in 
relation to the RTA development process and at which phase of RTA 
development a State needs to have an approved State Safety Oversight 
program.
    FTA Response: In response to comments regarding the National Safety 
Plan, FTA confirms that Sec.  674.19(a) states, ``the Administrator 
must determine whether an SSO program is adequate to promote the 
purposes of 49 U.S.C. 5329, including, but not limited to, the National 
Public Transportation Safety Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 
Certification Training Program, and the Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plans.'' The National Safety Plan presents (1) safety 
performance criteria for all recipients that must develop ASPs under 49 
CFR part 673, including safety performance measures related to the 
safety risk reduction program, and (2) voluntary minimum safety 
standards and recommended practices to support mitigation of safety 
risk and to improve safety performance. FTA confirms the National 
Safety Plan does not establish a ceiling related to a State's SSO 
program requirements and reiterates that the standards and recommended 
practices presented in Chapter III of the National Safety Plan are 
voluntary in nature. In terms of standards with which an SSO program 
must be consistent, FTA notes Chapter II of the National Safety Plan 
outlines the safety performance measures required of all agencies 
subject to the PTASP regulation for which each RTA must set safety 
performance targets and document them in their ASP. Finally, if any 
changes are needed to program documentation, FTA expects SSOAs and RTAs 
to make any needed changes to program documentation through the 
organizations' next review and update cycles based on existing SSO and 
ASP review processes. FTA confirms that the publication of a revised 
National Safety Plan does not require a new certification for each 
State. A State must have a certified State Safety Oversight Program by 
the time a rail fixed guideway public transit system reaches the 
engineering or construction phase.
2. Section 674.19(c) and (d)--Issuance of Denial
    Comments: An industry association requested that FTA provide 
criteria in the rule for how FTA or the FTA Administrator would make a 
determination regarding certification, including a determination of 
whether an SSOA is ``inadequate'' or ``incapable,'' as described in 
statute at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(8)(A). Two SSOAs requested clarification 
on the timeframe for certification or denial of certification and any 
related follow-up timeframes. One SSOA expressed support for the 
regulatory language that accommodates an SSOA developmental plan and 
schedule to support the FTA Administrator's evaluation of the SSOA. The 
commenter recommended that such a plan and schedule should be able to 
accommodate related processes such as hiring that may involve a 
different group and/or agency. Two SSOAs asked for clarification on the 
term ``cognizant.''
    Two SSOAs expressed concern that withholding of funds for SSOAs 
that are unable to meet the requirements for certification may be 
counterproductive. One SSOA commenter expressed the need for 
clarification regarding the distinction between the terms SSO

[[Page 83963]]

program, SSOA, and State as they relate to the requirements of Sec.  
674.19(d) and 49 U.S.C. 5329.
    FTA Response: FTA first notes Sec.  674.19 of this rule is 
substantially similar to the 2016 rule. With respect to the request to 
define criteria in part 674 that FTA would use to evaluate SSO agency 
capabilities, FTA declines to establish additional criteria beyond the 
requirements established in this final rule. In an instance where an 
SSO program does not meet the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329, the 
Administrator will provide a written explanation and allow the State an 
opportunity to modify and resubmit SSO program documentation for the 
Administrator's approval. FTA has not defined a set timeframe for 
issuing a certification or denial of certification or deadlines for any 
necessary follow-up activity. FTA appreciates the support for the 
regulatory language addressing the developmental plan and schedule to 
support the FTA Administrator's evaluation of an SSOA and notes that 
the developmental plan and schedule should include and address the 
issues identified by the commenter, including hiring and interagency 
communications. The term ``cognizant SSOA'' is used to refer to the 
relevant or recognized SSOA and means the entity is aware of its role 
as an SSOA for the State. Further, FTA notes that this language has 
been used in part 674 since its promulgation in 2016.
    In response to the comments received regarding the effectiveness of 
withholding funds, FTA confirms that the withholding of funds is an 
option available to the Administrator under 49 U.S.C. 
5329(e)(7)(D)(ii), 5329(e)(8)(C), and 5329(g). Further, FTA notes that 
statutory and regulatory language does not require the Administrator to 
withhold funds but states that the Administrator ``may'' withhold 
funds.
    As to the relationship between a State, SSOA Program, and SSOA, the 
SSOA is the agency within a State that carries out the State's SSO 
Program. Necessarily, FTA monitors SSOA compliance with regulatory 
requirements in addition to other inputs to ensure a State is meeting 
its statutory requirements to establish an SSO Program that is adequate 
to promote the purposes of 49 U.S.C. 5329.

F. Section 674.21--Withholding of Federal Financial Assistance for 
Noncompliance

    Comments: FTA received comment submissions from two SSOAs and one 
industry association regarding the withholding of funds for non-
compliance and the requirement for an SSO program to be approved by the 
FTA Administrator prior to a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system entering the engineering or construction phase in a State 
without any rail fixed guideway public transit systems (new entrants). 
All three commenters noted that with the previous transition from part 
659 to part 674, States were afforded three years to develop compliant 
programs and achieve certification. The commenters asserted the 
proposed change to base the timeline on the developmental progress of 
an RTA does not afford a new SSOA sufficient time to achieve SSO 
program certification. The commenters recommended FTA establish a 
three-year timeframe for a new State to establish a compliant SSO 
program.
    FTA Response: The statute at 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(2) requires States 
to provide safety oversight for any rail fixed guideway public 
transportation system in the engineering or construction phase of 
development within the jurisdiction of the State that will not be 
subject to regulation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 
This is not new. Therefore, a State without any rail transit systems is 
obligated to stand up an SSO program before a new rail transit system 
enters the engineering or construction phase of development. FTA notes 
the three-year timeframe defined in the previous part 674 was 
established by statute to support the transition of existing SSO 
programs to a new rule (from part 659 to part 674). To ensure a State 
meets its statutory requirement to provide safety oversight for any 
rail fixed guideway public transportation system in the engineering or 
construction phase of development, a three-year certification process 
is not feasible. FTA encourages States without an SSOA and with a new 
rail transit project in the planning stage to coordinate with FTA and 
the rail transit project sponsor early in the project development 
process to support the development of compliant SSO programs.

G. Section 674.23--Confidentiality of Information

    Comments: One SSOA commenter requested clarification on the 
criteria that a State or RTA should use to withhold a report from being 
admitted as evidence or used in a civil action for damages resulting 
from a matter mentioned in the report. The commenter also asked for 
clarification on the use of the term ``security'' in Sec.  674.23(b).
    FTA Response: Section 674.23(b) provides that part 674 does not 
require security-sensitive information to be publicly available. This 
language is unchanged from the previous version of part 674 and stems 
from FTA's relationship with the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) and the elimination of requirements for System Security Plans 
previously required under 49 CFR part 659. As FTA noted in the 
publication of the original part 674 in 2016, TSA, an agency of the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), has the 
prerogative and responsibility for all rulemakings on security in 
public transportation. Specifically, under the Implementing the 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53), 
the September 2004 Memorandum of Agreement between DOT and DHS, and the 
September 2005 modal annex between FTA and TSA, DHS is tasked with the 
responsibility for carrying out a national strategy for public 
transportation security to minimize security threats and to maximize 
the ability of public transportation agencies to mitigate damage from 
terrorist attacks and other major incidents. While this does not 
preclude RTAs from implementing measures securing their assets, it is 
no longer the responsibility of the SSOAs to oversee those measures. 
FTA recognizes, of course, that some of the steps an RTA takes to 
ensure the personal safety and security of its riders and employees 
will overlap with steps it takes to secure its system from a terrorist 
attack, such as the steps an agency takes that are part of a threat and 
vulnerability assessment.

H. Section 674.25--Role of the State Safety Oversight Agency

    FTA received comments from twelve commenters regarding Sec.  
674.25, including seven SSOAs, two RTAs, one industry association, one 
individual, and one contractor.
1. General
    Comments: One RTA commenter recommended that FTA consider 
acknowledging the role of the SSOA engaging in active assistance of the 
RTA. The commenter noted that FTA's transition away from the ``system 
safety'' approach codified within the former part 659 to the current 
SMS approach of part 674 relies on the design of workable and effective 
processes to manage safety risk and evaluate the results of those 
efforts. To achieve success, the commenter asserted, SSO programs 
should not only entail compliance-based processes but should include 
engagement in continuous improvement processes, best practices, and 
other assistance.

[[Page 83964]]

    FTA Response: FTA agrees that effective SSO programs will focus on 
more than just compliance. FTA encourages SSOAs to develop and 
implement oversight practices that support an SMS and that apply 
continuous improvement principles and best practices. FTA notes that 
new SSOA requirements related to risk-based inspections, oversight of 
safety risk mitigations, and data to support oversight of safety risk 
management activity align with this focus.
2. Section 674.25(a)--Minimum Standards
    Comments: Two SSOAs and one industry association requested that FTA 
clarify the meaning of the term ``minimum standards for safety'' in 
Sec.  674.25(a), asserting that without a clear understanding of this 
term, SSOAs would not know what baseline or criteria FTA would use to 
audit SSOA compliance. One SSOA commenter requested clarification on 
whether the National Safety Plan reference in Sec.  674.25(a) means 
that SSO program standards cannot go beyond the requirements 
established within FTA's National Safety Plan. Further, the commenter 
expressed concerns over potential situations where information in the 
National Safety Plan conflicts with a State's SSO program. The 
commenter requested clarification on what elements within the National 
Safety Plan require consistency with the SSO program and an RTA's ASP.
    FTA Response: Subsection 674.25(a) remains unchanged from the 2016 
rule and FTA is not aware of any difficulties in SSOAs implementing the 
rule. FTA defines the requirements for SSO programs and SSO program 
standards in this final rule, with Sec.  674.27 describing the required 
components of an SSO program standard. FTA notes that in this way the 
regulation establishes minimum safety requirements and confirms that an 
SSOA may establish standards and requirements beyond the minimum 
requirements of part 674 in their SSO program standard. FTA will audit 
SSOAs to ensure that the SSO program standard meets the requirements of 
part 674 and that the SSO program standard is being carried out as 
written.
    FTA confirms that Sec.  674.25(a) requires an SSOA to establish 
minimum standards for the safety of all rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems within its oversight that are consistent with 
the National Safety Plan. As noted in section E.1 of this preamble, the 
National Safety Plan presents (1) safety performance criteria for all 
recipients that must develop ASPs under 49 CFR part 673, including 
safety performance measures related to the safety risk reduction 
program and (2) voluntary minimum safety standards and recommended 
practices to support mitigation of safety risk and to improve safety 
performance. The National Safety Plan does not establish a limit or 
ceiling related to a State's SSO program requirements and the standards 
and recommended practices presented in Chapter III of the National 
Safety Plan are voluntary in nature. FTA notes that Chapter II of the 
National Safety Plan outlines the safety performance measures required 
of all agencies subject to the PTASP regulation for which each RTA must 
set safety performance targets and document them in their ASP.
3. Section 674.25(b)--Agency Safety Plan Review and Approval
    Comments: One RTA commenter asked if Sec.  674.25(b) establishes a 
requirement for an annual ASP review and approval. One SSOA commenter 
recommended that FTA revise regulatory text to include a reference to a 
State's ``SSO program'' and suggested that the use of general terms 
makes compliance difficult if not impossible. Further, the commenter 
recommended that FTA revise the existing regulatory text in Sec.  
674.25(b) from ``enforce the execution'' to ``enforce the compliance,'' 
asserting that execution is the responsibility of the RTA's Accountable 
Executive and the SSOA is responsible for compliance.
    FTA Response: Subsection 674.25(b) is substantially unchanged from 
the 2016 rule. Subsection 673.25(b) does not establish timeframe 
requirements for an RTA's ASP review process. FTA notes that the PTASP 
regulation at Sec.  673.11(a)(5) requires each transit agency to 
conduct an annual review of its ASP. Subsection 673.25(b) requires an 
SSOA to review and approve an RTA's ASP and subsequent updates to the 
ASP that may result from the required annual review. FTA disagrees with 
the commenter who suggested the language in Sec.  673.25(b) makes 
compliance difficult if not impossible and notes the language at Sec.  
673.25(b) remains unchanged from the original publication in 2016 and 
to date has not resulted in compliance issues. Further, FTA declines to 
replace the word ``execution'' with ``compliance'' and notes SSOAs are 
charged with overseeing compliance, which means ensuring that an RTA 
executes its ASP. Subsection 673.25(b) suggests that SSOAs can do this 
through a CAP or other enforcement means based on which type of 
enforcement tool would be appropriate or necessary given the specifics 
of the compliance issue.
4. Section 674.25(c)--Engineering and Construction
    Comments: Six SSOAs, one RTA, and one contractor submitted comments 
related to Sec.  674.25(c) and the requirement for SSOAs to provide 
oversight of an RTA's project(s) in the engineering and construction 
phase to verify compliance with Federal and State safety requirements.
    Two SSOA commenters requested that FTA develop guidance on the 
SSOA's role in oversight of major capital projects, including instances 
where FTA is utilizing its Project Management Oversight (PMO) program. 
One contractor commented that the project phase terminology used in the 
rule is not the same as the project phases of the PMO program.
    One SSOA commenter requested clarification on the SSOA's 
responsibilities to ensure proper compliance during engineering and 
construction and whether the SSOA is responsible for overseeing all 
aspects of a capital project. One contractor and one SSOA commenter 
asserted the phrase ``applicable Federal and State safety 
requirements'' is very broad. These commenters and an additional SSOA 
commenter sought clarification on the scope of oversight, including 
clarification that FTA does not intend for SSOAs to perform the 
oversight functions of FTA's PMO contractors for certain rail projects, 
including things that are normally outside of the purview of the SSOA, 
such as budgeting, financial planning, social and economic equity, and 
environmental protection. Three SSOA commenters recommended that there 
be a clear distinction between the roles and responsibilities of FTA's 
PMO contractors and the SSOA and clarity regarding SSOA responsibility.
    Two SSOA commenters recommended that FTA extend oversight 
responsibility earlier in the life of an RTA project, to the planning 
phase. One SSOA commenter and one individual objected to the 
requirements for oversight of projects in the engineering or 
construction phase. The SSOA commenter asserted the language of Sec.  
674.25(c) is too vague, impractical, and duplicative of existing 
processes, including FTA's PMO program. The SSOA commenter recommended 
FTA convene an industry working group to evaluate the provision before 
implementation. The SSOA commenter requested FTA provide additional 
clarification regarding applicable projects, scope for compliance, and 
relationship with existing oversight

[[Page 83965]]

programs. Further, the SSOA commenter disagreed with FTA's assertion 
that the language in this subsection parallels the statutory language 
in 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(2)(B) and clarifies FTA's intent that SSOAs take 
an active oversight role during a project's pre-revenue phases. 
Instead, the commenter suggested, the terminology is used in statute 
only to define ``eligible states'' and should not be interpreted by FTA 
to define the scope of safety oversight.
    One RTA commenter requested revising the language of Sec.  
674.25(c) to add ``on a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system'' to add additional qualifying language for the term ``RTA 
project.''
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the request for additional guidance 
related to the SSOA's role in oversight of engineering and construction 
of major capital projects, including instances where FTA is utilizing 
its PMO program, and will consider this topic for future guidance and 
technical assistance. FTA confirms that the terminology ``engineering 
or construction phase'' is not the same as the terminology used in 
FTA's PMO program. The terminology at Sec.  674.25(c) comes from 49 
U.S.C. 5329(e)(2)(B) whereas the PMO phases are based on project 
development standards. FTA is not establishing a new interpretation but 
is using existing statutory language. Under the original 49 CFR part 
659, FTA established revenue service as the start of State safety 
oversight. Under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act 
of 1991 (ISTEA, Pub. L. 102-240), Congress moved the start of State 
oversight to planning and design phases. Under Moving Ahead for 
Progress in the 12st Century Act (MAP-21, Pub. L. 112-141), Congress 
moved the start of State oversight to the construction or engineering 
phase where it remains today. FTA's understanding of Congressional 
intent establishes the engineering or construction phase as the start 
of required safety oversight responsibility for States. However, States 
may choose to oversee the safety of rail projects earlier in the 
process at their discretion. FTA notes Sec.  674.25(c) provides SSOAs 
flexibility, and SSOAs should address the determination of 
``engineering or construction phase'' in the SSO program standard. 
Criteria examples may include triggering events such as project 
groundbreaking, solicitation of bids for construction activity, a 
finding of no significant impact under the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA), etc.
    FTA confirms that an SSOA is not responsible for overseeing aspects 
of a project that are traditionally addressed through FTA's PMO 
program, including areas such as budgeting, financial planning, social 
and economic equity, and environmental protection, and notes the SSOAs 
oversight responsibilities are limited to safety. FTA agrees with 
commenters who recommended a clear distinction between the roles and 
responsibilities of FTA's PMO contractors and the SSOA and notes that 
SSOAs are not expected to conduct PMO reviews of grantees or recreate 
such processes. Instead, FTA expects SSOAs to work with RTAs to ensure 
the development of necessary program elements, processes, and 
documentation that address the requirements of 49 CFR part 673, 49 CFR 
part 674, and the State's SSO program standard.
    As for the comments that recommended extending a State's oversight 
responsibility to earlier in the life of an RTA project, to the 
planning phase, FTA declines to make this change and notes that, as 
mentioned above, ISTEA provided SSOAs with this authority, but under 
MAP-21, Congress moved the start of oversight from the design phase to 
the construction or engineering phase where it remains today. Further, 
FTA notes that mandating an earlier involvement would represent a 
significant change from existing requirements and would require 
additional notice and comment.
    FTA declines to remove of the requirement for States to ensure the 
safety oversight of projects in the engineering or construction phase 
and notes the requirements and language of Sec.  674.25(c) are 
established in statute and are not new. Further, FTA reiterates the 
requirement for a State to oversee safety of a rail project during the 
engineering or construction phase is not duplicative of the PMO process 
and is not intended to recreate PMO-related processes. FTA does not 
believe it is necessary to establish an industry working group to 
evaluate the provision before implementation. As mentioned earlier in 
this section, FTA will consider the topic of the SSOA's role in 
oversight of major capital projects and the relationship to the PMO 
program for future guidance and technical assistance. Further, FTA 
disagrees with the commenter's assessment that the statutory language 
should not be used to establish the scope of safety oversight. FTA 
notes that this interpretation has been applied by FTA since the 
publication of the first Section 5329 apportionment on March 10, 2014 
(79 FR 13380) and this was reiterated in the publication of the 
original 49 CFR part 674 in 2016 (81 FR 14256).
    Finally, declines to add the phrase ``on a rail fixed guideway 
public transportation system'' to Sec.  674.25(c) as FTA does not 
believe such a change serves to clarify the existing requirement.
5. Section 674.25(d)--Agency Safety Plan Requirements
    Comments: One SSOA commenter recommended FTA amend Sec.  674.25(d) 
to reflect the requirements in 49 U.S.C. 5329(k) for SSOAs to conduct 
risk-based inspections, asserting that ASPs should address an SSOA's 
risk-based inspection program. One SSOA commenter requested 
clarification on SSOA jurisdiction over transit systems and projects 
that are not related to rail transit, noting that currently SSOAs have 
no such jurisdiction unless they are granted that authority on a State 
level.
    FTA Response: This provision is in Sec.  675.25(b) of the 2016 
rule. The intent of Sec.  674.25(d) is to address the SSOA's obligation 
to assure the RTA is in compliance with PTASP provisions at 49 U.S.C. 
5329(d) and the PTASP rule at 49 CFR part 673. Part 673, at Sec.  
673.11(a)(6) addresses the new requirement in 49 U.S.C. 5329(k) so is 
already captured in regulatory text. Further, FTA has revised the 
definition of ``State Safety Oversight Agency'' at Sec.  674.7 to 
include the reference to 49 U.S.C. 5329(k) to incorporate the risk-
based inspection requirements established by the BIL. FTA confirms that 
part 674 does not establish any requirement for SSOAs to oversee the 
safety of bus systems, even bus services operated by transit agencies 
that also provide rail service applicable under part 674. SSOAs are 
responsible for overseeing an RTA and ensuring its ASP meets the 
requirements for part 673. FTA notes that some ASPs address both rail 
and bus operations. Part 674 does not require SSOAs to evaluate part 
673 compliance for bus services. However, this final rule does not 
prevent SSOAs from performing additional oversight activities at their 
discretion pursuant to their State laws.
6. Section 674.25(e)--Allegations of Noncompliance
    Comments: One SSOA commenter expressed concern at the language 
within Sec.  674.25(e) that assigns the SSOA with the primary 
responsibility for investigating ``any allegation of noncompliance,'' 
asserting this puts undue responsibility on an SSOA and fails to 
address the RTA's responsibility to address and respond. The commenter 
also noted there is no SSOA notification or reporting requirement in 
the

[[Page 83966]]

proposed rule or other FTA regulations for allegations of 
noncompliance. One individual requested that FTA add a reference to 49 
U.S.C. 5330 when describing the Administrator's authority.
    FTA Response: This subsection is identical to Sec.  675.25(d) of 
the 2016 rule. The final rule continues to require SSOAs to investigate 
allegations of noncompliance when those allegations are brought to the 
attention of the SSOA. Further, FTA does not believe that the 
requirement for SSOAs to investigate allegations of noncompliance 
absolves an RTA for carrying out its own processes to address such 
safety concerns according to processes defined in the RTA's ASP. FTA 
declines to add a reference to 49 U.S.C. 5330, noting the statute was 
repealed in 2019 in accordance with section 20030(e) of MAP-21, and 49 
U.S.C. 5329(f) provides the Administrator's authority.
7. Section 674.25(f)--Investigations
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters suggested that Sec.  674.25(f) 
include additional language explicitly authorizing the SSOA to delegate 
investigation authority to the RTA. One individual commenter suggested 
FTA include an additional requirement in Sec.  674.25(f) for 
investigation reports to clarify corrective actions to prevent 
recurrence and assign a corrective action plan identification number.
    FTA Response: FTA declines to add additional language to Sec.  
674.25(f) regarding the delegation of investigation responsibility to 
the RTA and notes this is addressed at Sec.  674.35(b). FTA declines to 
require CAPS to be included in investigation reports and notes FTA has 
established requirements for CAPs at Sec.  674.35. Further, nothing in 
the rule prevents an SSOA from requiring the documentation of CAPs 
within a final investigation report.
8. Section 674.25(g)--Contractor Investigation Support
    Comments: One individual commenter suggested FTA add additional 
text to Sec.  674.25(g) to reference incidents and occurrences and to 
note that the SSOA is responsible for the investigations.
    FTA Response: FTA declines to revise Sec.  674.25(g) and notes that 
part 674 has eliminated references to incidents and occurrences with 
the transition to the new definition of ``safety event'' in parts 673 
and 674. Further, FTA it is not necessary to restate the SSOA's primary 
responsibility for investigation, as that is stated in Sec.  674.25(f).
9. Section 674.25(h)--SSOA Compliance With PTSCTP
    Comments: One commenter noted that FTA has removed the PTSCTP 
curriculum in the proposed revisions to 49 CFR part 672 (88 FR 73573). 
The commenter asked where they could find guidance on PTSCTP to ensure 
minimum standards are developed consistent with PTSCTP. The commenter 
also recommended FTA revise the language of Sec.  674.25(h) to include 
the term ``designated personnel'' or simply state, ``SSOAs must comply 
with Part 672.''
    FTA Response: FTA notes that information on PTSCTP can be found at 
FTA's safety training website: https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/safety/safety-training. FTA has revised Sec.  674.25(h) to 
include the term ``designated personnel.''

I. Section 674.27--State Safety Oversight Program Standards

1. Section 674.27(a)(3)--Disposition of RTA Comments
    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs, two RTAs, and one 
individual related to Sec.  674.27(a)(3). The three SSOA commenters 
generally agreed with FTA's proposal. Two of these SSOA commenters 
requested clarification that SSOAs would not be required to accept all 
suggestions made by the RTA. The other SSOA commenter noted that the 
process described in Sec.  674.27(a)(3) is already being implemented 
and documented in SSO program standards. One RTA commenter requested 
FTA define additional minimum requirements for this process, including 
specifically how comments are submitted, request and response 
timeframes, expectations, and approval processes. One RTA commenter 
supported the proposed requirement and urged FTA to formalize its role 
in settling jurisdictional questions and interpretations of FTA 
regulations by establishing a process for SSOAs and RTAs to bring 
matters of disagreement before a hearing with FTA. Similarly, one 
individual commenter suggested FTA needs to collaborate with SSOAs to 
develop and formalize a conflict resolution and escalation process for 
FTA and SSOAs.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates commenters' support for the 
provisions at Sec.  674.27(a)(3) and thanks those SSOAs and RTAs that 
are already implementing this process. FTA confirms the requirement at 
Sec.  674.27(a)(3) does not require the SSOA to accept all suggestions 
made by the RTA. FTA declines to establish additional minimum 
requirements related to this process and preserves the flexibility of 
SSOAs to define these aspects but notes that an SSOA is responsible for 
defining how it will address the requirements and documenting this in 
the SSO program standard. FTA declines to establish a hearing process 
for conflicts between SSOAs and RTAs, noting that is outside the scope 
of this regulation. Further, FTA notes that it does not serve in a 
mediator role between RTAs and SSOAs and can use existing mechanisms to 
support intervention with RTAs and SSOAs if necessary. Similarly, 
developing a conflict resolution process is outside the scope of this 
current regulatory effort. However, FTA will consider these suggestions 
for SSOAs and RTAs as topics for future rulemakings.
2. Section 674.27(a)(5)--Oversight of RTA Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plans and Internal Safety Reviews
    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs and one contractor 
related to Sec.  674.27(a)(5). One SSOA commenter noted that SSOAs are 
already implementing the activities required in the proposed rule. Two 
SSOA commenters requested clarification on the use of the term 
``internal safety review'' and noted that in the past, FTA had referred 
to these activities as ``internal audits.'' Further, the two commenters 
noted that State Safety Oversight Reporting Tool (SSOR) uses the phrase 
``internal audit'' and that other programs, such as PTSCTP, refer to 
``audits and examinations,'' and pointed out that the Transportation 
Safety Institute (TSI) delivers courses titled ``Transit Safety and 
Security Audits.'' The commenters sought clarification on whether the 
terminology change in the rule is intended to ``lower the bar'' for 
internal safety reviews. One contractor suggested the phrase ``the SSOA 
will receive and evaluate all material submitted under the signature of 
an RTA's Accountable Executive'' was too broad and, taken literally, 
could mean any document the Accountable Executive signs. The contractor 
also commented that 49 CFR part 673 does not include the specific 
internal safety review requirements established in Sec.  
674.27(a)(5)(i-iv) and that FTA should require RTAs to document the 
associated processes in their ASP.
    FTA Response: Paragraph 675.27(a)(5) is substantially similar to 
paragraph 675.27(a)(4) of the 2016 rule, so FTA is encouraged to know 
SSOAs and RTAs are complying with the 2016 rule. FTA notes that under 
part 659, FTA referred to this activity as ``internal safety and

[[Page 83967]]

security audits.'' With the transition to 49 CFR part 674 in 2016, FTA 
used the term ``internal safety reviews'' to describe this activity at 
Sec.  674.27(a)(4). With this final rule, FTA continues to use the term 
``internal safety review,'' and the terminology does not ``lower the 
bar'' for this RTA function. To the contrary, FTA has defined explicit 
requirements for internal safety reviews at Sec. Sec.  674.27(a)(5)(i-
iv). FTA confirms the SSOR uses the terminology ``internal safety 
review.'' Finally, FTA confirms that Sec.  674.27(a)(5) does not 
require the SSOA to evaluate all material that an Accountable Executive 
may sign. Instead, in alignment with the title of the paragraph, the 
requirement at Sec.  674.27(a)(5) applies to the oversight of RTA ASPs 
and internal safety reviews and includes documents the RTA submits to 
the SSOA under signature of the Accountable Executive to address SSO 
program requirements, such as an RTA's ASP and the RTA's annual report 
on internal safety reviews. Further, FTA confirms that Sec.  
673.27(d)(1)(iii) requires RTAs to address any specific internal safety 
review requirements established by their SSOA in the ASP.
3. Section 674.27(a)(6)--Oversight of Safety Risk Mitigations
    Comments: FTA received comments from three SSOAs and one RTA 
related to Sec.  674.27(a)(6) and the requirements for the oversight of 
RTA safety risk mitigations. One SSOA commenter noted that SSOAs are 
already implementing the activities required in the proposed Sec.  
674.27(a)(6). Two SSOA commenters noted that under the requirements of 
49 CFR part 673, RTAs determine mitigation effectiveness through their 
safety assurance processes. Further, the commenters noted the SSOA 
receives and reviews information on RTA safety risk mitigations for 
oversight of compliance, but the RTA Accountable Executive and Chief 
Safety Officer are empowered to dictate the action of the RTA. One RTA 
commenter noted their safety risk mitigation processes have been 
documented, approved by the SSOA, and implemented since 2020, but if 
the SSOA were to establish new requirements related to safety risk 
mitigations, it could be disruptive to the maturation of the RTA's SMS 
and burdensome. The commenter recommended FTA encourage SSOAs to review 
existing mitigation processes instead of establishing completely new 
requirements. One SSOA commenter asked for confirmation that the 
requirements of Sec.  674.27(a)(6) were considered in the rule's cost 
estimate.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the support for this provision and 
thanks SSOAs that currently oversee the safety risk mitigations of an 
RTA as required at Sec.  674.27(a)(6). FTA generally agrees with the 
statement that while an SSOA receives information regarding safety risk 
mitigations, it is RTA's Accountable Executive and Chief Safety Officer 
that are empowered to direct the action of the RTA, and notes it is not 
in conflict with the requirements at Sec.  674.27(a)(6). FTA notes that 
these requirements do not charge SSOAs with monitoring the 
effectiveness of safety risk mitigations but instead require SSOAs to 
define a process in the SSO program standard for reviewing information 
and data related to safety risk mitigations to ensure that the RTA is 
developing, implementing, and monitoring safety risk mitigations 
according to the documented and approved processes in their ASP. FTA 
confirms that nothing in this final rule establishes new requirements 
for how an RTA identifies, implements, and monitors safety risk 
mitigations, nor does the rule require SSOAs to establish new 
requirements for how an RTA identifies, implements, and monitors safety 
risk mitigations. Finally, FTA confirms that Sec.  674.27(a)(6) was 
considered when developing the rule's cost estimate. FTA notes that 
Sec.  674.27(a)(6) does not establish a new oversight requirement but 
explicitly identifies existing oversight responsibility. Safety risk 
mitigations are an existing required element of an SMS that must be 
addressed in an ASP and are included in SSOA oversight 
responsibilities. As such, this provision does not create additional 
oversight burdens.
4. Section 674.27(a)(7)--Oversight of RTA Compliance With the Public 
Transportation Safety Certification Training Program
    Comments: FTA received comments from five SSOAs, one RTA, one 
industry association, and one contractor related to Sec.  674.27(a)(7) 
and the requirements for the oversight of RTA compliance with the 
PTSCTP. One SSOA commenter noted that SSOAs are, for the most part, 
already implementing the activities required in Sec.  674.27(a)(7). The 
remaining four SSOAs, one RTA, and one industry association expressed 
concern with language that seems to require the SSOAs to formally 
review and approve each RTA designation for the purposes of PTSCTP 
designated personnel and to formally review and approve each refresher 
training administered by the RTA. Three SSOA commenters and one 
industry association commenter disagreed that SSOAs should be approving 
these PTSCTP designations and trainings, noting that this should be the 
responsibility of the RTA. One RTA commenter noted that under part 672, 
this responsibility is given to the RTA. Several commenters also noted 
that this would place an additional burden on SSOAs and would be 
duplicative of existing efforts, and one SSOA asked for confirmation 
that required approvals were considered in the estimate of burden.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the support for this provision and 
acknowledges those SSOAs that currently oversee the RTA compliance with 
the PTSCTP consistent with Sec.  674.27(a)(7). FTA appreciates the 
concerns raised by commenters regarding the proposed language that 
seemed to require the SSOAs to formally review and approve each RTA 
designation for the purposes of PTSCTP designated personnel and to 
formally review and approve each refresher training administered by the 
RTA. FTA has revised the language in this final rule to address the 
concerns raised by these commenters. FTA clarifies that Sec.  
674.27(a)(7) requires SSOAs to oversee RTA compliance with PTSCTP 
requirements and that SSOAs may define in their SSO program standard 
how they will oversee RTA compliance. FTA confirms that the rule's cost 
estimate does not include costs associated with formal SSOA approval of 
designations and refresher training development because the final rule 
does not require these approvals.
5. Section 674.27(a)(8)--Triennial SSOA Audits of RTA Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plans
    Comments: One SSOA commenter requested clarification on the use of 
the term ``agree'' and whether that meant if an RTA does not agree to 
an ongoing review over the three-year period, would the SSOA be forced 
to perform one triennial audit, or could the SSOA determine, at its own 
discretion, to do audits on an ongoing basis.
    FTA Response: The language in paragraph 674.27(a)(8) is identical 
to Sec.  674.27(a)(5) of the 2016 rule and FTA believes this language 
is sufficient to support SSOA audit scheduling with RTAs. The 
scheduling of the SSOA's triennial audit is expected to be cooperative 
between the SSOA and RTA while recognizing the SSOA is responsible for 
conducting triennial audits in compliance with part 674 and as 
specified in the SSO program standard. If an RTA takes issue with the 
triennial audit schedule as outlined in the SSO program standard, the 
RTA

[[Page 83968]]

may provide a comment or suggestion to the SSOA as permitted under 
Sec.  674.27(a)(3).
6. Section 674.27(a)(9)--Safety Event Notifications
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters requested clarification on the 
notifications referenced in Sec.  674.27(a)(9) and suggested that FTA 
not require the notification of events that do not meet the 
notification criteria in Sec.  674.33.
    FTA Response: Except for changing ``accident'' to ``safety event'' 
and adding FTA as an entity the RTA needs to report to, this provision 
is the same as the provision at Sec.  674.27(a)(6) of the 2016 rule. 
FTA has designated safety events in Sec.  674.33 as minimum 
requirements and does not want to limit SSOAs if they wish to have RTAs 
report on safety events that do not appear in Sec.  674.33.
7. Section 674.27(a)(10)--Investigations
    Comments: Two SSOA commenters requested FTA clarify that an SSOA 
may delegate investigation responsibility to the RTA and adopt the 
final report as its own. One of the SSOA commenters noted that it may 
be difficult to detail the role of the SSOA in supporting any safety 
event investigation conducted by the NTSB or FTA as those entities will 
be leading the safety event investigation and utilize the resources of 
the SSOA on a case-by-case basis.
    FTA Response: More detail on this requirement is in Sec.  
674.35(b), ``The SSOA is ultimately responsible for the sufficiency and 
thoroughness of all investigations, whether conducted by the SSOA or 
RTA. If the SSOA requires an RTA to investigate a safety event, the 
SSOA must conduct an independent review of the RTA's findings of 
causation.'' Further, Sec.  674.35(b) states, ``The SSOA must formally 
adopt the report of a safety event . . .''
    FTA recognizes the involvement of the NTSB and FTA in safety event 
investigations processes may vary based on the investigating body and 
defining the role of the SSOA may be difficult. Given this 
circumstance, the regulation deliberately does not define the SSOA's 
role and processes in the regulation with respect to the NTSB or FTA 
role in leading safety event investigations. Safety event 
investigations are not always routine, and agencies, particularly the 
SSOA and RTA, may need to be flexible during the investigation process 
when the NTSB and FTA are involved.
8. Section 674.27(a)(11)--Corrective Actions
    Comments: One SSOA questioned FTA's use of the word ``order'' and 
recommended that SSOAs use wording within their SSOA's authority to 
outline how an RTA must develop and carry out a CAP. Further, the 
commenter noted the conflict management language proposed in Sec.  
674.27(a)(11) would also be useful for other required SSO program 
activity.
    FTA Response: FTA acknowledges the commenter's concern with the use 
of the phrase ``the SSOA must order the RTA to develop and carry out a 
CAP.'' In this case, the term ``order'' is a synonym used in place of 
the word ``require.'' Moreover, this language is identical to that 
found in the 2016 rule at Sec.  674.37(b).
9. Section 674.27(a)(12)--Inspections
    Comments: The NTSB, one SSOA, two RTAs, and two individuals 
commented on the proposed requirements at Sec.  674.27(a)(12). The NTSB 
commented that effective risk-based inspection programs rely on 
adequate staffing and noted that it is reviewing whether staffing 
shortages at an SSOA may have played a role in a 2023 rail safety event 
in Chicago. Further, the NTSB expressed support for the proposal for a 
risk-based inspections program but noted that FTA should develop and 
issue minimum inspection requirements for a basic list of safety topics 
that SSOAs should have in their risk-based inspection programs, which 
would include required topics such as roadway worker protection, hours 
of service, and fatigue risk management.
    One SSOA commenter suggested FTA retitle this paragraph from 
``Inspections'' to ``Risk-Based Inspections'' because the specific 
requirements are associated with risk-based inspections programs. One 
RTA commented that an SSOA's risk-based inspection program should 
follow the principles of SMS in utilizing safety risk information to 
prioritize oversight action and stated that an SSOA's risk-based 
inspection program procedures should include presenting the transit 
agency with the SSOA's basis for conducting any given inspection, and 
this basis should be expressed in safety risk terms. The RTA noted that 
focus on areas that are not risk-based or not associated with the 
highest levels of safety risk can result in an inappropriate allocation 
of transit agency resources as the agency pursues corrective actions or 
other responses that may not effectively mitigate safety risk.
    One SSOA commenter asked for FTA to define the terms ``resources,'' 
``qualified personnel,'' and ``complexity,'' asserting FTA will 
evaluate SSOAs based on these criteria and SSOAs need to understand 
these terms to ensure compliance. One individual commented that SSOAs 
should have the authority to enter rail transit facilities without 
prior notice to perform safety inspections to show ``normal'' 
conditions, that inspections should be proactive to confirm or improve 
safety, and that there should be no punitive consequence for the 
transit agency unless inspections show little or no improvement.
    One RTA commenter requested that FTA add language in Sec.  
674.27(a)(12)(iii) requiring SSOAs to design risk-based inspections 
programs in consultation with the RTA to parallel language at 49 U.S.C. 
5329(k)(1)(B). One SSOA commenter asked FTA to consider adding language 
to Sec.  674.27(a)(12)(iii) that addresses announced inspections. The 
SSOA commenter also asked FTA to consider additional language requiring 
RTAs to grant SSOA personnel access for inspections. One individual 
commented that while the proposed rule ensures that SSOAs have the 
authority to enter rail transit facilities without prior notice to 
perform safety inspections, FTA should also develop consequences for 
RTAs that refuse to allow FTA officials to enter their right of way 
that include fines to individuals and the RTA. In addition, FTA should 
require RTAs to share track charts to provide FTA with an understanding 
of the right of way they are accessing and require FTA officials to 
carry a radio compatible with the RTAs they inspect to communicate with 
dispatchers regarding their presence and itinerary.
    FTA Response: FTA agrees that adequate staffing is critical to 
ensuring the effectiveness of an inspection program. Proper staffing 
for SSOA programs, including inspection responsibilities, is also 
covered at Sec.  674.11(d) and is examined during initial certification 
and regular audits of the SSOAs. In the instance an SSOA is discovered 
to be short of staffing or in need of increased resources, FTA may 
address this through issuing special directives. With respect to the 
comment asking for clarity of defining and setting expectations on 
appropriate SSOA staffing levels and resources, FTA recognizes that all 
SSOA programs are unique and face different challenges. Additionally, 
SSOA oversight responsibilities may change over time, requiring a 
modification in staffing resources. For instance, the opening of

[[Page 83969]]

a new rail transit system, major extension of a system, or significant 
safety challenges at a system may require additional SSOA staffing 
resources to support more oversight. Further, the closing of a rail 
transit system may require less SSOA staffing resources. FTA declines 
to amend the regulatory text, to ensure the regulation can accommodate 
everchanging circumstances at rail transit agencies and allow the SSOA 
programs to adjust staffing resources and oversight responsibilities as 
necessary.
    FTA appreciates the request for more specific and/or minimum SSOA 
risk-based inspection requirements, such as roadway worker protection, 
hours of service, and fatigue management. FTA will maintain the risk-
based inspection program as practice driven and prioritized by SSOA and 
RTA risk management rather than prescribing areas for the inspection 
program to regularly examine. However, FTA will keep this comment in 
mind as safety programs continue to be developed, including current and 
future rulemakings (see, e.g., 88 FR 74107 and 89 FR 20605).
    FTA declines to change the heading from ``Inspections'' to ``Risk-
based Inspections'' in order to recognize other types of inspections 
that may be appropriate for oversight, such as CAP verification 
inspections, field inspections for audits, and others. FTA notes that 
SSO program standards should document or incorporate by reference risk-
based inspection processes.
    FTA agrees with the comment that risk-based inspections should 
follow the principles of SMS. FTA expects risk-based inspection 
activities to synchronize and be built into an RTA's existing SMS 
activities. This information will be considered as a topic for FTA 
guidance and workshops. FTA has determined it is unnecessary to revisit 
the definition of ``risk-based inspections,'' ``SMS,'' or ``safety risk 
management'' in this section of the regulation.
    The importance of cooperation between the SSOA and RTAs with 
respect to facility and location access will be defined in the SSO 
program standard and, as required at Sec.  674.27(a)(3), the RTA is 
provided the opportunity to comment on the SSO program standard through 
the comment disposition process.
    FTA appreciates the several comments received related to facility 
access and inspection activities and agrees that these inspections are 
designed to improve a rail transit agency's safety. Actions taken by 
the SSOA in response to RTA non-compliance are not prescribed by this 
rule and such actions will be determined by the SSOA. As a matter of 
defining when or how the RTA will grant access to the SSOA for 
inspection, this detail shall be developed by the SSOA in concert with 
what is appropriate for each rail transit agency and memorialized in 
the SSO program standard or related procedure. In response to the 
commenter that suggested FTA add language requiring RTAs to grant SSOA 
personnel access for inspections, FTA notes this is included in the 
regulation and referenced as ``unannounced'' inspections.
    FTA recognizes that each RTA has developed track right-of-way 
access protocols for their systems to ensure the safety of personnel 
and transit operations. SSOA and FTA officials must adhere to the rail 
transit agency's access protocols, including radio practices and 
specialized training as determined by the rail transit agency. FTA will 
address access restrictions faced specifically by FTA officials on a 
case-by-case basis. FTA will not issue citations directly to an RTA if 
violations are found while FTA officials are on-site. However, FTA 
shall enforce authority granted in 49 U.S.C. 5329 and 49 CFR part 670 
when appropriate.
10. Section 674.27(a)(13)--Vehicle Maintenance and Testing
    Comments: Four SSOAs, two RTAs, one contractor, and the NTSB 
commented on the proposed requirements of Sec.  674.27(a)(13) related 
to vehicle maintenance and testing requirements. Two SSOA commenters 
and one RTA commenter sought clarification on who is being required to 
perform the periodic testing of rail transit vehicle braking systems, 
the RTA or the SSOA. Two RTA commenters expressed serious concerns if 
the new requirements mean that the SSOA will direct the RTA to 
undertake a new vehicle maintenance or brake testing regime or change 
the frequency of its testing instead of following manufacturer 
recommendations and established RTA procedure (unless or until the need 
for such changes is demonstrated through the agency's own testing or 
the oversight process). One commenter requested that FTA consider 
developing additional guidance to support SSOA compliance with this new 
requirement, issuing a Safety Advisory that addresses the NTSB 
recommendation R-17-04 and providing additional detail to support RTA 
and SSOA compliance. Further, the contractor suggested the proposed 
requirement appears to go beyond rail vehicle braking system testing to 
address the entire RTA vehicle maintenance program. Two SSOA commenters 
recommended against FTA establishing vehicle maintenance inspections as 
a distinct program area for the SSOA's program standard. Both SSOA 
commenters recommended allowing the SSOA the flexibility to determine 
how often and to what depth it reviews these aspects of the RTAs it 
oversees. One of these SSOA commenters recommended that FTA remove this 
proposed requirement from the SSO program standard and instead allow 
SSOAs to address this issue through the risk-based inspections program 
because of the burden associated with conducting such inspections.
    The NTSB urged FTA to develop minimum brake system test and 
inspection criteria and require SSOAs to perform rail transit vehicle 
brake system tests and inspections.
    FTA Response: To clarify, the rail vehicle brake system maintenance 
and testing program is established and implemented by the RTA, not the 
SSOA. It is the SSOA's responsibility to oversee that the RTA brake 
system maintenance and testing program is effectively established and 
implemented as written.
    FTA appreciates the suggestion to develop guidance or issue a 
Safety Advisory to better inform SSOAs and RTAs of the scope and 
expectations for this new requirement. FTA will take this suggestion 
under consideration.
    This requirement does not change oversight responsibilities but 
specifies that RTAs are required to perform periodic brake system 
testing and maintenance activities. It is the SSOA's purview, now as it 
has been in the past, to verify that the RTA is implementing these 
activities. It is not the SSOA's responsibility to perform the brake 
system testing. Further, FTA notes that SSOAs may incorporate vehicle 
brake system maintenance into their risk-based inspection program.
    Regarding NTSB's suggestion that FTA provide minimum inspection 
standards for braking system maintenance and testing, this is outside 
the scope of this regulation, but FTA will consider this suggestion in 
future action.
11. Section 674.27(a)(14)--Data Collection
    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs, two RTAs, and one 
individual in response to the proposed requirements at Sec.  
674.27(a)(14). One SSOA commenter recommended against

[[Page 83970]]

FTA establishing data collection as a distinct program area for the 
SSOA's SSO program standard and asserted the SSOA should be allowed the 
flexibility to determine how often and to what depth it reviews these 
aspects of the RTAs it oversees. One RTA requested that FTA add 
language to Sec.  674.27(a)(14) that specifies that data collection 
policies and procedures will be developed in consultation with the RTA. 
One individual commenter recommended that SSOAs should be allowed to 
collect data from RTAs with safeguards to protect personal information 
and rules similar to FRA's 49 CFR part 225. One SSOA commenter asked 
FTA if data access requirements should be included in the SSO program 
standard with consideration for cyber security precautions. One RTA 
commenter recommended revisions to the proposed requirement, suggesting 
the SSO program standard define how the SSOA will use RTA data to 
support the SSOA's oversight of the RTA's safety risk management 
activities.
    FTA Response: The regulation does not require any particular data 
collection. Instead, the regulation requires ``policies and procedures 
for collecting and reviewing data that the RTA uses when identifying 
hazards and assessing safety risk''. The regulation does not detail 
``how'' (scaling, frequency, depth) the SSOA is to conduct these 
activities. This will be left to the SSOA to determine and memorialize 
in policies and procedures as applicable.
    FTA acknowledges the importance of cooperation between the SSOA and 
RTAs with respect to data sharing and access. This practice will be 
defined in the SSO program standard and, as required in Sec.  
674.27(a)(3), the RTA is provided the opportunity to comment on the SSO 
program standard through the comment disposition process.
    FTA agrees the protection of sensitive SSOA and RTA information and 
employee personal information is important. Section 674.23(b) provides 
protections for SSOA and RTA security-sensitive information. FTA 
expects SSOAs and RTAs to follow and apply existing laws that protect 
personal information for employees and contractors.
    FTA agrees with the commenter that suggested the SSOA should define 
how the SSOA will use RTA data to support the SSOA's oversight 
activities. FTA has added the following language, shown italicized, to 
the final rule to address this comment: ``The program standard must 
include policies and procedures for collecting and reviewing data that 
the RTA uses when identifying hazards and assessing safety risk and 
explain how the SSOA uses collected data to support oversight of the 
RTA's safety risk management process.''
    FTA recognizes data access and cyber security practices will be 
different for each SSOA and respective RTAs. The regulation purposely 
does not specify nor prescribe methods for data sharing and cyber 
security. Each SSOA and respective RTA are to define policies and 
practices that work amongst the agencies for ensuring secure data 
access and sharing.

J. Section 674.29--Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans: General 
Requirements

    Comments: Two SSOA commenters expressed confusion regarding the 
language at Sec.  674.29 related to the National Safety Plan. Both 
commenters requested clarification on what elements within the National 
Safety Plan require consistency with the RTA's ASP. Both SSOA 
commenters also requested clarification on the removal of subsection 
(b), which is in the 2016 rule.
    FTA Response: As clarified in section E.1 above, the National 
Safety Plan presents (1) safety performance criteria for all recipients 
that must develop ASPs under 49 CFR part 673, including safety 
performance measures related to the safety risk reduction program, and 
(2) voluntary minimum safety standards and recommended practices to 
support mitigation of safety risk and to improve safety performance. 
The National Safety Plan does not establish a ceiling related to a 
State's SSO program requirements and the standards and recommended 
practices presented in Chapter III of the National Safety Plan are 
voluntary in nature. In terms of requirements defined in the National 
Safety Plan, FTA notes that Chapter II of the National Safety Plan 
outlines the safety performance measures required of all agencies 
subject to the PTASP regulation for which each RTA must set safety 
performance targets and document them in their ASP. With respect to the 
removal of subsection (b), FTA notes that because the 2016 version of 
part 674 was published prior to part 673, FTA provided a list of the 
expected PTASP elements in subsection (b) as an interim measure to 
guide SSOAs. With the publication of part 673 in 2018, the list is no 
longer necessary.

K. Section 674.31--Triennial Audits: General Requirements

    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs and one RTA related 
to the requirements for triennial audits proposed at Sec.  674.31. Two 
SSOA commenters recommended FTA add language to this section regarding 
the SSOA and RTA agreeing to schedule ongoing audits. One SSOA 
commenter requested guidance to support the SSOA's analysis of the 
effectiveness of an RTA's ASP. The SSOA commenter also asserted that it 
is the RTA's job to monitor effectiveness and it is the SSOAs job to 
monitor compliance. One SSOA commenter also asked if FTA is defining 
requirements for what should be included in the annual audit report in 
situations where an SSOA conducts triennial audits in an ongoing 
fashion over the three-year period.
    An SSOA commenter and an RTA commenter requested clarifications 
related to the requirement for the SSOA to allow the RTA to comment on 
the findings and recommendations in the report. The RTA recommended 
that FTA require the SSOA to provide written response to the RTA's 
comments. The SSOA commenter questioned whether the RTA could comment 
on the audit report or only on the findings and recommendations within 
the report.
    FTA Response: This section omits language included in Sec.  
674.27(a)(8) regarding the SSOA and RTA ``agreeing'' to conduct an on-
going rather than an audit once every three years as repetitious and 
notes the Sec.  674.31 language does not conflict with Sec.  
674.27(a)(8). Further, FTA expects SSOAs and RTAs to cooperate on the 
scheduling of the SSOA's triennial audit while recognizing the SSOA is 
responsible for conducting triennial audits in compliance with part 674 
and as specified in the SSO program standard.
    In response to the commenter seeking guidance for analysis of the 
effectiveness of an RTA's ASP, given the diversity of SSO programs, SSO 
program standards, and ASPs, this language is purposely not 
prescriptive. The SSOA shall design a triennial audit program so that 
it complies with the regulation and examines the RTA's implementation 
of its ASP to identify corrections or improvements.
    As detailed in the Sec.  674.31 language, the audit report shall 
include the following: (1) analysis of the effectiveness of the RTA's 
efforts to implement the ASP; (2) findings and recommendations 
resulting from this analysis; and (3) recommendations for improvement 
and/or a corrective action plan(s), if necessary. At a minimum, the 
SSOA shall issue provisional triennial audit reports annually if it is 
auditing on an ongoing basis.
    FTA acknowledges the importance of outlining and administering a 
process

[[Page 83971]]

for RTAs to comment on the SSOA triennial audit report, findings, and 
recommendations. RTA comments may be made to both the report language 
and the resulting findings and recommendations. RTA comments are 
expected to be resolved through formal or informal communications 
between the agencies. This regulatory language is purposely not 
prescriptive, allowing the SSOA to include in the SSO program standard 
a review and comment process for collaborating with each audited RTA. 
An RTA may identify issues with the SSO program standard, including the 
comment resolution practice for triennial audits, per Sec.  
674.27(a)(3).

L. Section 674.33--Safety Event Notifications

1. General
    Comments: FTA received comments from seven commenters regarding 
FTA's proposed notification criteria at Sec.  674.33, including one 
SSOA, four RTAs, one industry association, and one anonymous commenter. 
One RTA commenter recommended that FTA eliminate the requirement for 
RTAs to notify FTA directly of safety events, asserting that ideally 
RTAs would only have one set of reporting requirements and one entity 
to whom they report.
    One RTA commenter and one industry association commenter 
recommended FTA extend the two-hour notification requirement to provide 
RTAs with more time to make the required notification to the SSOA and 
FTA. The RTA commenter recommended extending the timeframe to at least 
four hours to provide the RTA with sufficient time for an RTA 
investigator to arrive on the scene and assess the situation. The 
industry association commenter recommended FTA extend the notification 
window to four or six hours after the event occurs. The commenter noted 
that SSOAs rarely dispatch to the scene and that the notification 
timeframe would make sense if the SSOAs would commit to being on-site 
within two hours of the event's occurrence. An individual commenter 
suggested that the two-hour requirement did not ensure timely 
notifications and recommended that FTA require RTAs to notify the FTA 
and the SSOA as soon as possible as opposed to two hours so FTA and the 
SSOA can evaluate the response needed.
    One RTA commenter and one SSOA commenter expressed concern at the 
potential burden associated with changes in notification criteria. The 
RTA commented that the number of events requiring notification may 
increase to near the levels required under part 659 and increase agency 
burden. One SSOA commenter noted that by using the same injury 
definition as the NTD, which is based on individuals receiving 
immediate medical transport away from the scene, the number of events 
requiring SSOA and FTA two-hour notification may increase.
    One RTA commenter requested that FTA provide a grace period for the 
industry to address the criteria changes through the necessary updates 
to policies, procedures (across multiple departments), and 
intergovernmental agreements/contracts, and to provide time to execute 
configuration changes to internal databases and other tools used to 
track and manage event records, such as computer-aided dispatch (CAD) 
systems. The commenter also recommended that FTA work to develop a 
single comprehensive safety and security glossary.
    FTA Response: FTA is authorized to oversee and, when necessary, 
investigate rail transit agency safety events. To uphold this authority 
and activate investigations, FTA must be informed of events as they 
occur.
    FTA declines to lengthen the minimum notification timeframe as it 
ensures that FTA and SSOAs receive timely information upon which they 
may base their decisions regarding response. RTAs should be able to 
easily determine if a safety event meets the notification criteria 
defined at Sec.  674.33. FTA declines to shorten the notification 
timeframe from two-hours to ``as soon as possible,'' as the change 
would fail to establish a defined expectation for notification 
timelines.
    As to whether the reporting criteria may result in an increase in 
notifications and burden to reporting agencies, FTA expects the revised 
criteria will simplify and ease the burden on reporting agencies in 
comparison to past regulation notification requirements. For example, 
the elimination of the ``serious injury'' criteria in the previous 
regulation will eliminate the need to assess the condition of injured 
passengers before recognizing when and what meets reporting criteria 
and therefore lessen the burden of safety event notifications as 
compared to the previous rule.
    FTA recognizes that notifications will likely increase due to the 
definition of ``injury'' to include ``harm to persons as a result of an 
event that requires immediate medical attention away from the scene.'' 
FTA revised this term and definition for several reasons, including to 
clarify reporting criteria and lessen the burden of reportable event 
notifications as previously mentioned. FTA is aware the reportable 
events may increase with this revised definition, and this has been 
factored into workload estimates.
    FTA agrees that changes to terms and definitions in the regulation 
language have a broad impact and will need a grace period for SSOAs and 
RTAs to realign policies and practices. FTA designates January 1, 2025, 
as the effective date for the final rule. This date allows SSOAs and 
RTAs time to modify processes and inform employees and contractors. 
Further, this date aligns with the launch of the 2025 NTD reporting 
year and the associated NTD Safety & Security Policy Manual. FTA 
appreciates the comment regarding a comprehensive glossary and will 
take this recommendation into consideration for future data management 
efforts.
2. Notification Criteria
    Two RTA commenters, one SSOA commenter, and one industry 
association commenter requested confirmation regarding their 
understanding of the proposed notification criteria and associated 
requirements or suggested changes to the proposed criteria.
    An RTA commenter asked about the collision damage threshold and 
requested confirmation that a rail transit vehicle collision occurring 
at a grade crossing or intersection would no longer be reportable to 
FTA and SSOA within two hours unless the rail transit vehicle suffered 
disabling damage regardless of the damage suffered by the privately 
operated vehicle. Similarly, an SSOA commenter requested confirmation 
that collisions that result in disabling damage to a privately owned 
vehicle but that do not result in a fatality, injury, or disabling 
damage to the rail transit vehicle do not require two-hour notification 
under the proposed thresholds.
    An SSOA commenter asked for confirmation that under the proposed 
criteria, notification is required for two or more injuries except for 
collisions which require notification if there is one or more injury. 
An industry association commenter recommended changing the collision 
injury criteria from one or more to two or more, asserting the proposed 
criteria would cause confusion and potentially misreporting. An SSOA 
commenter asked for FTA to confirm that ``serious injury'' is no longer 
relevant for purposes of safety event notifications as required by the 
proposed criteria. An RTA commenter asked FTA to confirm if the 
notification of safety events includes fatalities and injuries 
resulting from illness and/or

[[Page 83972]]

other natural causes and whether notifications include criminal 
assaults that are not related to a collision with a rail transit 
vehicle.
    An SSOA asked for confirmation from FTA regarding the notification 
requirement when a single safety event meets more than one of the 
notification criteria defined in Sec.  674.33.
    FTA Response: Under the revised regulation, a rail transit vehicle 
collision occurring at a grade crossing or intersection with a 
privately owned vehicle requires notification if the rail transit 
vehicle suffers from disabling damage, regardless of the damage 
suffered by the privately owned vehicle. A collision between a rail 
transit vehicle and a privately owned vehicle which results in 
disabling damage to only the privately owned vehicle, yet no fatalities 
or injuries, does not require notification.
    There is no longer a distinct definition for ``serious injury.'' 
Injuries and fatalities resulting from illness or natural causes do not 
trigger the two-hour notification requirements of Sec.  674.33. 
Further, injuries or fatalities from criminal assaults and homicides do 
not trigger the two-hour notification requirements of Sec.  674.33, 
even if the homicide or assault involved a collision with a rail 
transit vehicle. FTA notes the final rule does not preclude an SSOA 
from establishing notification requirements in addition to those 
established at Sec.  674.33.
    In circumstances where a single safety event meets more than one 
reporting criteria, the notification should share all the reporting 
criteria met, given the information available at the time of 
notification. For instance, if is the RTA knows at the time the 
notification is made that a collision between two rail transit vehicles 
resulted in a derailment and three injuries, all this information is 
expected to be shared with the SSOA and FTA. All three of these 
consequences meet the two-hour notification threshold and must be 
communicated.
    A safety event with two or more injuries is reportable and a rail 
transit vehicle collision that results in one or more injuries (instead 
of two or more) is also reportable. A commenter requested the latter 
situation match the two or more injuries threshold for uniformity. 
However, FTA is interested in any rail transit vehicle collisions 
resulting in injuries. With the injuries metric alone, setting the 
threshold to two or more will eliminate isolated safety events 
resulting in injuries, like slips and falls.

M. Section 674.35--Investigations

    Comments: One SSOA provided four unique comments. The SSOA 
commenter requested that FTA revise the language at Sec.  674.35(b) to 
reiterate that SSOAs can give authority to perform investigations to an 
RTA because the rule does not explicitly state it. Further, the 
commenter disagreed with the word ``coordinate'' when describing 
situations where the SSOA is investigating. The commenter asked FTA to 
clarify if the language at Sec.  674.35(c) requires an SSOA to issue a 
separate investigation report from the adopted RTA investigation report 
and asked FTA to clarify how the review must be conducted. The 
commenter also asked for clarification on the PTSCTP requirements for 
investigators, including SSOA investigators and RTA investigators 
conducting investigations on behalf of the SSOA. Finally, the commenter 
asked if the impact of the requirements of Sec.  674.35 were included 
in the regulation's cost estimates.
    FTA Response: FTA first notes that FTA proposed no substantive 
changes to the 2016 version of Sec.  674.35. When an RTA investigates 
safety events that meet the criteria of Sec.  674.33, the RTA must 
conduct these investigations in accordance with the SSO program 
standard and any subsequent procedure developed or adopted by the SSOA. 
Any issues or concerns identified with the SSOA investigation practices 
and RTA roles and responsibilities may be shared during the SSO program 
standard comment disposition process per Sec.  674.27(a)(3).
    FTA expects the SSOA to document the adoption of an RTA's 
investigation report in a manner that works for both agencies and 
satisfies the requirements of Sec.  674.35.
    Stakeholders interested in training requirements for investigators 
should review part 672 for more information. Further, nothing precludes 
the SSOA from establishing unique requirements for SSOA and RTA 
investigators for technical experts and subject matter experts.
    As to the impact of these requirements to cost estimates, FTA does 
include activities associated with Sec.  674.35 in the regulation cost 
estimate and notes again this is not a new requirement.

N. Section 674.37--Corrective Action Plans

    Comments: FTA received comments from one SSOA and three RTAs 
regarding the requirements in the proposed Sec.  674.37. Two RTA 
commenters expressed concern at the inclusion of findings of non-
compliance from internal safety reviews in the list of items for which 
the SSOA must require the development of a CAP. One RTA commenter asked 
FTA to clarify if it is requiring the SSOA to approve CAPs from 
internal safety reviews and conduct spot checks on the implementation 
and effectiveness of the internal safety review CAPs. Further, the 
commenter contended that this would be inappropriate for RTA internal 
reviews and would slow down the process of developing and implementing 
CAPs. The RTA further asserted that the SSOA triennial audit cycle is 
the appropriate venue to review CAPs related to an RTA's internal 
safety reviews. Another RTA commenter asserted that requiring the 
development of a CAP for findings of non-compliance from internal 
safety reviews is a significant expansion to the scope of CAPs. The RTA 
commenter suggested that internal safety review CAP development and 
monitoring responsibility rests with the RTA and these processes are 
managed independently from SSOA oversight activities. Further, the RTA 
commenter expressed concern that this requirement focuses more on 
compliance and less on a scalable, performance-driven methodology, and 
that it could have a negative impact on RTA safety culture. The RTA 
commenter also recommended FTA use the term ``non-conformance'' instead 
of ``non-compliance'' because the latter is potentially misleading.
    One SSOA commenter noted Sec.  674.37(a)(2) requires CAPs to 
address findings of non-compliance from safety reviews and inspections 
performed by the SSOA but does not use the word ``audit.'' The 
commenter also recommended that CAPs should also address longer-term 
monitoring of the corrective actions. Finally, the RTA commenter 
expressed concern about use of the word ``order'' in Sec.  674.37(d) 
and recommended that SSOAs use wording within their SSOA's authority to 
outline how an RTA must develop and carryout a CAP.
    An SSOA commenter recommended that the rule should clearly outline 
how the Administrator will conduct independent investigations of any 
safety events and under what general circumstances they would review an 
SSOA's or RTA's findings of causations of a safety event. An RTA 
commenter noted that Sec.  674.37(d) requires the SSOA to evaluate 
whether FTA investigation findings require a CAP by the RTA. The 
commenter suggested that if FTA recommendations must be considered for 
determining CAPs, then other sources should be as well, such as

[[Page 83973]]

recommendations from the Safety Committee.
    FTA Response: Except for subsection (a), which outlines when an 
SSOA must require the RTA to develop a CAP, the language in this 
section is identical to the 2016 version of the rule. One of the items 
in subsection (a) is, ``Results from investigations, in which the RTA 
or SSOA determined that causal or contributing factors require 
corrective action.'' SSOA oversight does not distinguish between CAPs 
developed to address issues identified through RTA internal processes 
as opposed to SSOA processes. The SSOA continues, as in the past, to 
have the authority to require the development of, review, approve, and 
monitor CAPs to address a deficiency identified from activities 
described in the regulation and the SSO program standard, regardless of 
whether the source is RTA or SSOA reviews. Any conflicts in CAPs should 
follow the documented conflict resolution process. Further, the RTA may 
raise concerns with or make suggestions to revise the SSOA CAP 
requirements and process upon review of the SSO program standard as 
described in Sec.  674.27(a)(3).
    FTA understands an SSOA will use the triennial audit as a forum to 
verify an RTA's internal audit program is being implemented in 
accordance with the ASP. Recommendations for improvements and CAPs, if 
necessary, will be issued out of triennial audits per Sec.  674.31.
    FTA recognizes a concern with terminology, particularly the use of 
``non-compliance'' instead of ``conformance'' or ``non-conformance'' as 
related to internal safety reviews. For purpose here, ``non-
compliance'' refers to instances where the SSOA identifies areas of 
non-conformance with processes outlined in the ASP.
    With respect to the assertion that a focus on compliance-based 
activities may degrade an RTA's safety culture, the application of the 
Safety Management System for rail transit systems is focused on safety 
performance to support agency safety improvements and risk reduction. 
The implementation of SMS does not negate the usefulness of compliance 
focused activities. An effective SMS will incorporate compliance-based 
programs and support overall risk management to strengthen the agency's 
safety culture. CAPs may be generated, as needed, from performance-
based and compliance-based activities.
    CAPs may be generated from audits, safety reviews, and inspections. 
The list in Sec.  674.37(a) represents a minimum and is not exhaustive.
    FTA appreciates the comment to support the monitoring of longer-
term CAPs implementation. The regulation does not distinguish the 
length of time for monitoring of CAPs but is focused on the progress to 
carry out the CAP to completion. As written, the regulation includes 
the monitoring of longer-term CAPs.
    As for the concern with the use of the phrase ``the SSOA must order 
the RTA to develop and carry out a CAP,'' the term ``order'' is a 
synonym used in place of the word ``require'' and is in the 2016 
version of the rule.
    FTA acknowledges the suggestion to outline how FTA may conduct an 
investigation and separately the circumstances for occasions when FTA 
may conduct an independent review of safety event causations and 
findings revealed through SSOA and RTA investigations. FTA will 
consider the suggestion on FTA safety event investigation practices 
while developing future guidance and workshops for training and sharing 
information with SSOAs and RTAs. FTA may review safety event 
investigations and findings of causations at any time per Sec.  
674.33(e).
    As to whether the regulation should include FTA as an entity that 
may conduct investigations which may result in CAPs for the SSOA or 
RTA, FTA has the statutory authority under 49 U.S.C. 5329 to perform 
independent investigations to determine causal and contributing factors 
as stated in Sec.  674.35(e). Out of FTA's investigations, like other 
investigations, findings may necessitate the development of CAPs.
    As for the recommendation to incorporate in the regulation, 
language that considers recommendations from other sources, such as the 
Safety Committee, to be considered for CAP development, FTA again notes 
the list in Sec.  674.37(a) is a minimum and is not exhaustive. The 
SSOA may require the development of a CAP from investigations conducted 
by the RTA and SSOA, which includes the review of hazards for causal 
and contributing factors. Hazards may be identified by any number of 
sources within an SSOA and RTA, such as the Safety Committee.

O. Section 674.39--State Safety Oversight Agency Annual Reporting to 
FTA

    Comments: FTA received comments from two SSOAs and one industry 
association regarding the annual reporting requirements of the proposed 
Sec.  674.39. Two SSOA commenters recommended that FTA redesign SSOR so 
that it is organized according to the subsections of Sec.  674.39. One 
industry association commenter recommended that FTA remove requirements 
associated with technical training plans (TTP) from 49 CFR part 672 and 
incorporate them into this rule. The commenter asserted that since TTPs 
are associated with SSOAs, the related requirements belong in 49 CFR 
part 674. The industry association commenter also requested 
clarification on the ``publicly available report'' required under Sec.  
674.39(a)(3) and specifically requested clarification to differentiate 
between the safety status report that the SSOA is required to send to 
the Governor, FTA Administrator, and RTA board of directors and the 
annual reporting submission that the SSOA makes through the SSOA and 
clarify the expected level of effort for this requirement. One SSOA 
commenter asked for clarification from FTA if it requires the publicly 
available report required at Sec.  674.39(a)(3) to include causal 
factors of events in totality or if trending sufficient.
    One industry association commenter recommended against the 
requirement for SSOAs to submit final investigation reports to FTA, 
asserting this requirement would be burdensome. The commenter also 
questioned the usefulness of such reports in supporting FTA analyses. 
One SSOA commenter asked for clarification on the certification 
requirement at Sec.  674.39(a)(8) and confirmation on whether the 
requirement is for submission of a self-certification or the submission 
of a certification from FTA that the SSOA is compliant with part 674.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the suggestions for improving the 
SSOR and encourages SSOAs to provide feedback to their assigned FTA PM 
regarding suggested enhancements to the SSOR. Further, FTA notes that 
the SSOR data collection forms are currently designed to meet all the 
annual reporting submission requirements of part 674. However, to 
support the most efficient and accurate collection of Annual Reporting 
data, SSOR uses categories and collection sequencing that may vary from 
the regulatory text organization while ensuring comprehensive 
collection of required data.
    FTA recognizes the comment to incorporate training requirements 
currently found in 49 CFR part 672 into the revised 49 CFR part 674. 
However, FTA notes that 49 CFR part 672 does include SSOA-specific 
requirements and disagrees that removing TTP-related requirements from 
part 672 is advantageous for the industry.
    The ``publicly available report'' required under Sec.  
674.39(a)(3)--a requirement since 2016--refers to the

[[Page 83974]]

safety status report the SSOA is required to send to the Governor, FTA 
Administrator, and RTA board of directors. The language at Sec.  
674.39(a)(3) does not establish any new submission requirement that was 
not already in place under existing reporting requirements and 
therefore confirms that no additional level of effort is required to 
address the requirements of Sec.  674.39(a)(3) in this final rule. FTA 
has not established specific requirements for the details of the report 
required at Sec.  674.39(a)(3) beyond the elements identified in the 
rule and offers flexibility to the SSOA to determine how it may best 
present ``causal factors of safety events identified through 
investigation,'' be it trending or other methods.
    SSOAs are already required to submit final investigation reports to 
FTA through SSOR and Sec.  674.39(a)(4) does not establish any new 
programmatic requirement or new burden. Further, final investigation 
reports submitted by SSOAs have been instrumental in FTA safety risk 
assessments and other safety analyses routinely performed by FTA. FTA 
confirms that Sec.  674.39(a)(8) requires an SSOA to submit a 
certification attesting that the SSOA has complied with the 
requirements of 49 CFR part 674. This is not a certification issued by 
FTA.

P. Section 674.41--Conflicts of Interest

    Comments: Two labor union commenters, one SSOA commenter, and one 
industry association submitted comments related to the conflicts of 
interest provisions proposed at Sec.  674.41. Two labor union 
commenters submitted a recommendation that FTA add a requirement that 
explicitly prohibits an SSOA from including, as executive or governing 
personnel, any appointees from a political office also responsible for 
appointing executive or governing personnel to any transit provider 
overseen by the SSOA.
    One industry association commenter voiced concern that some former 
employees of RTAs now work for the SSOA that oversees their past 
employer and now oversee many of the areas of their previous 
employment. The commenter recommended that FTA should require a 
``cooling-off period'' of at least 12 months between when an employee 
leaves or retires from an RTA and then oversees the exact same area in 
which they previously worked in at an RTA to preserve integrity and to 
avoid conflicts of interest.
    One SSOA commenter expressed concerns about FTA's conflict of 
interest provisions at Sec.  674.41(c) that preventing a contractor 
from providing services to both an RTA and the SSOA that oversees the 
RTA, unless granted an exemption by FTA. The SSOA commenter noted that 
their SSOA struggles to compete with an overseen RTA for contractors 
because the RTA is large and can provide more lucrative business 
opportunities for the contractors, limiting the availability of 
contractor expertise for the SSOA. The commenter recommended that FTA 
revise the proposed Sec.  674.41(c) to allow RTAs and SSOAs to 
determine appropriate mitigations of conflicts of interest, such as 
organizational firewalls, so that SSOAs can work with the contractors 
of their choice, rather than whatever contractors remain following RTA 
contracting.
    FTA Response: Regarding the recommendation to add a provision that 
would prohibit an SSOA from including, as executive or governing 
personnel, any appointees from a political office also responsible for 
appointing executive or governing personnel to any transit provider 
overseen by the SSOA, FTA believes a prescriptive ban is not necessary 
at this time, as FTA believes Sec. Sec.  674.11 and 674.13 of the 
regulation provide sufficient financial and legal independence between 
an SSOA and the RTAs it oversees.
    Regarding the recommendation for cooling-off period, although 
Federal post-employment laws establish post-employment restrictions on 
former Federal employees (18 U.S.C. 207), these restrictions do not 
extend to local employees of rail transit agencies and SSOAs who are 
more appropriately covered under State employment laws. Former 
employees of an RTA transferring to work for an SSOA should also be 
aware that employment contracts may contain post-employment 
restrictions.
    Regarding the proposal by the SSOA who sought the authority to 
determine whether a conflict of interest existed between itself and the 
RTAs it oversees in the hiring of support contractors, FTA believes 
that the conflict of interest provision at Sec.  674.41(c) that 
prevents an SSOA from hiring a contractor that also provides services 
to an RTA overseen by the same SSOA is essential to maintain the 
independence between the entity preparing and implementing the PTASP 
and the SSOA overseeing that entity. FTA notes that Sec.  674.41(c) 
includes an opportunity for an SSOA to petition FTA for a waiver from 
this prohibition if. FTA is persuaded that any potential conflict of 
interest has been adequately mitigated. Because the current prohibition 
is an essential safeguard, FTA declines to revise the provision. FTA 
believes a sufficient number of contractors with qualified personnel 
available exist regardless of compensation competition; moreover, FTA 
has not received a request to waive this provision during the past 
eight years when the waiver provision has been available.

Q. Regulatory Burden

    Comments: Two SSOA commenters submitted comments related to the 
burden estimates published in the NPRM. One SSOA commenter noted that 
oversight requirements related to engineering and construction phases, 
RTA compliance with the PTSCTP, vehicle maintenance and testing, data 
collection, and annual reporting may increase the regulatory burden.
    Another SSOA commenter requested clarification if FTA had 
quantified the impacts of the proposed rule on RTAs and SSOAs. The same 
SSOA commenter asked how FTA calculated the estimated number of events 
used to support burden estimates, asking for clarification on the 
occupation groups, codes, and titles that were used in conducting FTA's 
burden analysis.
    FTA Response: Some SSOAs have been providing oversight of rail 
fixed guideway public transportation systems in engineering or 
construction phases when they were directed to do so in section 20021 
of MAP-21 (Pub. L. 112-141) and this final rule does not establish an 
additional responsibility. Further, where there are new requirements 
related to RTA compliance with the PTSCTP, vehicle maintenance and 
testing, data collection, and annual reporting, FTA has analyzed those 
costs to SSOAs and RTAs.
    In the NPRM, FTA estimated the economic impacts of the proposed 
rule on the industry as described in ``Regulatory Analyses and 
Notices.'' Table 4 and the accompanying discussion identify the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics occupational categories and codes used. To quantify 
the impact of the notification criteria change on RTAs and SSOAs, FTA 
analyzed safety event data reported to the NTD from 2017 to 2021 and 
identified events that would become reportable under the new criteria.

R. Other Safety Topics

    Comments: FTA received comments from the NTSB related to safety 
concerns affecting the transit industry, including fatigue, fitness for 
duty, and roadway worker protection. The NTSB recommended that FTA 
establish roadway worker protection (RWP) rules including requirements 
for job briefings; establish a national inspection program

[[Page 83975]]

that specifically includes roadway worker activities; develop a work 
scheduling program for RTAs that incorporates fatigue science, provides 
for the management of personnel fatigue risks, and is implemented 
through the state safety oversight program; establish hours-of-service 
regulations that set limits on hours of service, provide predictable 
work and rest schedules, and consider circadian rhythms and human sleep 
and rest requirements; identify the necessary training and 
certification needs for work schedulers in the rail transit industry 
and require the transit agencies to provide additional training or 
certification for their work schedulers; and require rail transit 
employees who develop work schedules to complete initial and recurrent 
training based on current fatigue science to identify and mitigate work 
schedule risks that contribute to operator fatigue.
    FTA Response: FTA appreciates the comments received from the NTSB 
and notes that FTA is currently engaged in a rulemaking addressing rail 
transit roadway worker protection (RIN 2132-AB41). On March 25, 2024, 
FTA published a notice of proposed rulemaking that would establish 
minimum safety standards for rail transit RWP to ensure the safe 
operation of public transportation systems and to prevent accidents, 
incidents, fatalities, and injuries to transit workers who may access 
the roadway in the performance of work (89 FR 20605). FTA is currently 
reviewing public comments received in response to the publication of 
the proposed rule.
    On October 30, 2023, FTA published an advanced notice of proposed 
rulemaking (ANPRM) addressing transit worker hours of service and 
fatigue safety risk management (88 FR 74107). FTA is considering 
proposing minimum safety standards to provide protections for transit 
workers to obtain adequate rest thereby reducing the risk of fatigue-
related safety incidents and sought public input in two areas: hours of 
service; and fatigue risk management programs. FTA is reviewing 
collected information to better understand current industry practices, 
priorities, requirements, and the costs and benefits of Federal 
requirements to assist FTA as it considers potential regulatory 
requirements.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

Subpart A--General Provisions

674.1--Purpose
    This section explains that the purpose of this regulation is to 
carry out the mandate of 49 U.S.C. 5329 for States to perform oversight 
of rail fixed guideway public transportation systems within their 
jurisdictions. This represents an expansion from the purpose stated in 
the previous Sec.  674.1, ``this part carries out the mandate of 49 
U.S.C. 5329(e).'' The removal of ``(e)'' acknowledges the additional 
obligations for inspections and data collection required by SSO 
Agencies in section 5329(k), as amended by the BIL, and better reflects 
the connection among all elements of FTA's public transportation safety 
program.
674.3--Applicability
FTA has not changed this section.
674.5--Policy
    This section removes the term ``sufficient'' in subsection (a) to 
eliminate subjectivity regarding the requirements for State Safety 
Oversight Agency (SSOA) authorities. FTA also removes the first 
sentence in subsection (b), as the availability of funding is addressed 
in the existing language in Sec.  674.17(a).
674.7--Definitions
    This section replaces the terms ``accident,'' ``incident,'' 
``occurrence,'' and ``event'' with the inclusive term ``safety event,'' 
which includes events such as collisions, derailments, fires, and 
unintended train movements for purposes of meeting the two-hour 
notification requirement in Sec.  674.33. The ``safety event'' 
notification requirements of Sec.  674.33 exclude criminal actions.
    FTA also removes the definition of ``serious injury.'' These 
revisions are consistent with changes that FTA published in the Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plans (PTASP) final rule) (89 FR 25694) 
and are intended to simplify requirements related to safety event 
notifications and investigations.
    This section establishes new terms and definitions for 
``collision,'' ``derailment,'' ``evacuation for life safety reasons,'' 
``fatality,'' ``injury,'' ``public transportation,'' ``rail transit 
vehicle,'' ``revenue vehicle,'' and ``unintended train movement,'' and 
removes the general term ``vehicle'' in recognition of these new 
definitions, which will be consistent with FTA's National Transit 
Database (NTD) reporting manuals and support the notification and 
investigation thresholds defined in Sec. Sec.  674.33 and 674.35. FTA's 
definition of ``injury'' restores the threshold under FTA's previous 
part 659 regulation and is consistent with the NTD reporting manuals. 
The definition of ``injury'' includes damage or harm to persons that 
requires immediate medical attention away from the scene. An individual 
who declines transportation away from the scene for medical attention 
should not be counted as an ``injury'' for two-hour notification 
purposes. This definition allows for an immediate, on scene 
determination of injuries by the RTA without the need to await a formal 
diagnosis or determination from an off-site medical professional.
    FTA also includes a new definition for ``disabling damage'' to 
support the notification and investigation thresholds. ``Disabling 
damage'' is limited to damage resulting from a collision that 
physically prevents a vehicle or train from operating under its own 
power. Disabling damage does not include mechanical failures or other 
malfunctions that may impact operations.
    FTA established new terms and definitions for ``potential 
consequence,'' ``safety committee,'' ``safety risk,'' and ``safety risk 
mitigation'' as well as revised definitions of ``Accountable 
Executive'' and ``safety risk management'' for consistency with 
definitions 49 CFR part 673.
    This section revises the definition of ``corrective action plan'' 
to help distinguish corrective action plans from safety risk 
mitigations.
    This section revises the definition of ``investigation'' to reflect 
the replacement of the terms ``accident'' and ``incident'' with 
``safety event'' as described above.
    This section includes new terms and definitions for ``inspection'' 
and ``risk-based inspection program'' to support new SSOA requirements 
mandated by the BIL.
    This section revises the definition of ``Public Transportation 
Agency Safety Plan'' to remove reference to the transition from the 
requirements under 49 CFR part 659, the previous State Safety Oversight 
regulation, to the present requirements under 49 CFR part 674. This 
revision is consistent with the end of the transition period, which 
occurred in early 2019, and FTA's subsequent rescission of part 659 (87 
FR 6783).
    This section revises the definition of ``Public Transportation 
Safety Certification Training Program'' to remove reference to the 
interim provisions for this program. This section also adds a new term 
and definition for ``designated personnel'' to recognize individuals 
subject to the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training 
Program regulation (49 CFR part 672).
    This section reorders the clauses in the definition of ``rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system'' for clarity. This change aligns 
with the

[[Page 83976]]

definition that the PTASP regulation and does not reflect a change in 
FTA's implementation or interpretation.
    FTA also makes a minor revision to the definition of ``State Safety 
Oversight Agency'' to add a citation referencing the SSOA inspection 
requirement in 49 U.S.C. 5329(k), which was added by the BIL.
674.9--[Reserved]
    FTA removes and reserves this section. Previously, this section 
provided requirements for the transition from 49 CFR part 659, the 
previous State Safety Oversight regulation, to part 674. This removal 
acknowledges the end of the transition period, which occurred in early 
2019, and FTA's subsequent rescission of part 659.

Subpart B--Role of the State

674.11--State Safety Oversight Program
    FTA eliminates the deadlines established for States' initial 
compliance with the requirement, as all States must have an FTA-
approved SSO program for rail transit agencies in their State to be 
eligible for FTA financial assistance. This initial compliance date, 
which was three years after April 15, 2016, has already passed. FTA 
also makes a minor technical correction to the statutory citation 
regarding FTA triennial audits of SSO programs.
674.13--Designation of Oversight Agency
    FTA revises the statutory citation in Sec.  674.13(a) to reflect 
new statutory requirements. In Sec.  674.13(a)(5), FTA includes 
inspection authorities in the list of authorities an SSOA must have, 
reflecting the new requirements in 49 U.S.C. 5329(k) that SSOAs must 
conduct risk-based inspections of the rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems that the SSOA oversees.
    In Sec. Sec.  674.13(a)(4) and (a)(6), FTA includes a new reference 
to 49 CFR part 673, Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans, which 
did not exist when FTA published the current part 674 in 2016.
674.15--Designation of Oversight Agency for Multi-State System
    FTA has not changed this section.
674.17--Use of Federal Financial Assistance
    FTA deletes the term ``parts'' as superfluous.
674.19--Certification of a State Safety Oversight Program
    FTA removes ``(e)'' from ``5329(e)'' in this section for the 
reasons mentioned above and adds language in Sec.  674.19(d) to clarify 
the Administrator's determination to issue a certification or a denial 
of certification for an SSO program. This does not reflect a change in 
FTA's application of the statutory and regulatory criteria.
674.21--Withholding of Federal Financial Assistance for Noncompliance
    When FTA published its final rule in 2016, States with existing 
rail fixed guideway public transportation systems were provided a 
three-year transition period. Now that the transition period has 
expired, FTA updates Sec.  674.21(b) to adopt FTA current practice, 
which is to require a State to establish an SSO program and have that 
program approved by the FTA Administrator prior to a new rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system entering the engineering or 
construction phase of development. FTA also replaces the word 
``apportioned'' with ``authorized'' for accuracy.
674.23--Confidentiality of Information
    FTA has not changed this section.

Subpart C--State Safety Oversight Agencies

674.25--Role of the State Safety Oversight Agency
    In Sec.  674.25, FTA adds a new subsection (c) to explicitly 
acknowledge an SSOA's authority to provide safety oversight of projects 
in the engineering or construction phase of development. This parallels 
the statutory language in 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(2)(B) and clarifies FTA's 
intent that SSOAs take an active oversight role during a project's pre-
revenue phases. FTA also moves from the current subsection (b) into a 
new subsection (d) the requirement that SSOAs ensure that an ASP meets 
the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 673, a non-substantive 
change that will provide clarity and improve readability. Consequently, 
FTA redesignates existing subsections 674.24(c) through (f) as 
subsections (e) through (h).
    In addition, FTA makes minor conforming edits in these subsections 
to reflect the definitions in Sec.  674.7 as discussed above and to 
remove references to 49 U.S.C. 5330, which has been repealed.
674.27--State Safety Oversight Program Standards
    In Sec.  674.27, FTA adds a new paragraph (a)(3) to require an SSOA 
to develop a process to address comments from an RTA regarding an SSO 
program standard. This reflects industry concerns that some SSOAs do 
not formally respond to RTA comments. This addition requires SSOs to 
establish a process by which SSOAs will address RTA comments regarding 
the SSO program standard. Because of the addition of paragraph (a)(3), 
the remaining paragraphs are renumbered.
    FTA expands the renumbered Sec.  674.27(a)(5) to include specific 
requirements for SSOA oversight of RTA internal safety reviews. 
Internal safety reviews are distinct from the existing annual review 
and update requirement in 49 CFR 673.11(a)(5). Internal safety reviews 
monitor the actual implementation of the ASP. However, the results of 
the internal safety reviews may inform the RTA's annual ASP document 
review and update process. The previous 49 CFR 659.19 included explicit 
requirements for these internal safety reviews; however, part 674 
removed the prescriptive requirements in Sec.  659.19 with the 
expectation that they would be addressed in the PTASP final rule. The 
PTASP final rule did not address internal safety reviews, prompting 
some RTAs to ask whether they were no longer required by FTA, even 
though SSOAs continued to require them under their SSO program 
standards. To provide clarity, the language confirms the requirement 
that the SSO program standard must define internal safety review 
requirements, which are addressed in Sec.  673.27(d)(1)(iii). The 
language establishes minimum requirements for internal safety reviews, 
including the requirement that RTAs must verify the implementation of 
all elements of the ASP over a three-year period, with the expectation 
that RTAs will be conducting internal safety reviews on an ongoing 
basis. Further, the RTA must notify the SSOA thirty days before it 
conducts an internal safety review of any aspect of the rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system and provide any checklists or 
procedures it will use during the review. Finally, the RTA must submit 
a report to the SSOA annually documenting the internal safety review 
activities and the status of subsequent findings and corrective 
actions.
    A new Sec.  674.27(a)(6) relating to the oversight of safety risk 
mitigations establishes requirements for the SSOA to define the process 
it will use to oversee an RTA's development, implementation, and 
monitoring of safety risk mitigations. The SSO program standard must 
specify the frequency and format for how the SSOA will receive and 
review information about an RTA's safety risk mitigation status and 
effectiveness.

[[Page 83977]]

    Although 49 CFR part 673 established specific requirements for 
safety management, including the development, implementation and 
monitoring of safety risk mitigations, part 674 was published prior to 
part 673 and did not include specific oversight requirements related to 
safety risk mitigation. Therefore, FTA is including these requirements 
in part 674 to ensure that SSOAs have a documented process to oversee 
the safety risk mitigation processes required of RTAs.
    A new Sec.  674.27(a)(7) regarding oversight of the safety 
certification training program requires an SSOA to oversee the RTA's 
compliance with the Public Safety Certification Training Program 
regulation (49 CFR part 672). This role was not made explicit in the 
previous part 674 and this new language clarifies FTA's expectation 
that SSOAs oversee RTA compliance with 49 CFR part 672 requirements.
    The renumbered Sec.  674.27(a)(9) is also renamed from ``Accident 
notification'' to ``Safety event notification,'' consistent with the 
discussion above in Sec.  674.7, where FTA replaces the term 
``accident'' with the term ``safety event'' and the conforming edits in 
the renumbered Sec.  674.27(a)(10). FTA also requires the SSO program 
standard to establish requirements for RTAs to notify the SSOA and FTA 
of safety events to ensure that the notification requirement in Sec.  
674.33 is addressed in an RTA's ASP, as the current paragraph omitted 
any reference to FTA.
    In the renumbered Sec.  674.27(a)(11), FTA inserts the term ``SSO'' 
before ``program standard'' for consistency with the rest of this 
section.
    FTA adds a new Sec.  674.27(a)(12), ``Inspections,'' to incorporate 
the requirement that SSOAs conduct risk-based inspections of the RTAs 
they oversee. On October 21, 2022, FTA issued Special Directives to 
each SSOA directing them to develop and implement a risk-based 
inspection program as required by the BIL. The Special Directives 
require SSOAs to include policies and procedures for Risk-Based 
Inspection in their SSO program standards and develop and begin 
implementing their Risk-Based Inspection program by October 21, 2024.
    FTA adding a new Sec.  674.27(a)(13), ``Vehicle Maintenance and 
Testing,'' requiring SSOAs to amend their SSO program standard to 
include a new requirement that SSOAs ensure that rail transit agencies 
conduct maintenance and testing procedures of braking systems, 
consistent with NTSB Recommendation R-17-004 (https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/sr-details/R-17-004).
    Finally, a new Sec.  674.27(a)(14), ``Data Collection,'' 
establishes specific data collection requirements for collecting data 
that the RTA uses when identifying hazards and assessing safety risk. 
This responds to industry feedback regarding the role of the SSOA in 
overseeing safety risk management of the RTAs under their jurisdiction.
674.29--Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans: General Requirements
    Section 674.29 adds a reference to 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and 49 CFR 
part 673 in subsection (a) for clarity and the removes subsection (b). 
Because part 674 was published prior to part 673, FTA provided a list 
of the expected ASP elements in subsection (b) as an interim measure to 
guide SSOAs. With the publication of part 673 in 2018, the list is no 
longer necessary. Consistent with the removal of the current subsection 
(b), FTA renumbers subsection (c) as subsection (b).
674.31--Triennial Audits: General Requirements
    Section 674.31 clarifies that SSOAs who elect to audit an RTA's 
compliance with its ASP on an ongoing basis must issue interim audit 
reports at least annually. This clarification does not reflect a change 
in FTA's current implementation of this requirement.
674.33--Notifications of Safety Events
    This section replaces the term ``accident'' with ``safety event.'' 
This replacement streamlines definitions used in requirements related 
to event notification and investigation.
    This section establishes specific notification criteria that 
replace the Appendix in the current part 674. This replacement text 
clarifies FTA's minimum requirements for two-hour notifications to FTA 
and SSOAs and reflects changes to reporting thresholds suggested by 
SSOAs and RTAs, who found it difficult to quickly determine the scope 
of one's ``serious injuries'' as defined in the Appendix within two 
hours of a safety event, specifically, injuries resulting in bone 
fractures, nerve or muscle damage, injuries to internal organs, or 
hospitalizations exceeding 48 hours. Additionally, FTA removes the 
requirement in subsection (b) that required RTAs to notify FTA and 
SSOAs of safety events triggering FRA's notification requirements under 
49 CFR part 225, as notification on FRA-regulated trackage is already 
reported to the USDOT and received by FTA via the National Response 
Center. In subsection (b) FTA has added an exclusion to the 
notification requirement for criminal actions such as assaults or 
homicides.
674.35--Investigations
    Section 674.35 replaces the term ``accident'' with ``safety 
event,'' and clarifies that this includes any safety event that meets 
one or more thresholds in Sec.  674.33. FTA also divides the 
requirements in Sec.  674.35(a) into a new Sec.  674.35(a) and Sec.  
674.35(b) for clarity. These changes do not reflect a change in the 
implementation of the current requirements.
674.37--Corrective Action Plans
    In Sec.  674.37, FTA includes a new subsection (a) and redesignates 
subsections (a) through (c) as subsections (b) through (d).
    The new subsection (a) clarifies the basis for the development of a 
corrective action plan (CAP). The language requires the development of 
a CAP to address investigations that determined causal or contributing 
factors require corrective actions, findings of non-compliance from 
safety reviews and inspections performed by the SSOA, or findings of 
non-compliance from internal safety reviews performed by the RTA. This 
language does not reflect a change in current practice.
    In the renumbered Sec.  674.37(c), FTA revises language clarifying 
CAP requirements to ensure alignment with Safety Management System 
terminology. In the renumbered Sec.  674.37(d), FTA adds ``FTA'' as an 
agency authorized to conduct investigations, reflecting FTA's authority 
to investigate public transportation accidents and incidents under 49 
U.S.C. 5329(f)(5), with the SSOA expected to evaluate whether the 
findings or recommendations by FTA or the NTSB require a CAP by the 
RTA.

[[Page 83978]]

674.39--State Safety Oversight Agency Annual Reporting to FTA
    Section 674.39(a)(2) clarifies language regarding ``designated 
personnel'' for consistency with the Public Transportation Safety 
Certification Training Program in 49 CFR 672 and does not reflect a 
change in purpose or intent.
    Section 674.39(a)(3) replaces the term ``accident'' with ``safety 
event,'' consistent with the explanation provided above. Section 
674.39(a)(4) specifies that SSOAs must submit final investigation 
reports as part of their annual reporting to FTA. This reporting is 
already required through the current reporting process and this 
language does not reflect a change in FTA's practice.
    Section 674.39(a)(5) specifies that SSOAs must provide a summary of 
the internal safety reviews conducted by RTAs during the previous 12 
months and RTA progress in carrying out CAPs arising from the SSOA's 
oversight of RTA ASPs and any related safety reviews. This reporting is 
already required through the current reporting process and this 
language does not reflect a change in FTA's practice.
674.41--Conflicts of Interest
    FTA has not changed this section.

Removed--Appendix to Part 674--Notification and Reporting of Accidents, 
Incidents, and Occurrences

    FTA removes the table addressing the notification and reporting 
requirements for accidents, incidents, and occurrences, as FTA 
addresses this requirement in Sec.  674.33, Notifications of safety 
events.

IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), Executive Order 
13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review)

    Executive Order 12866 (``Regulatory Planning and Review''), as 
supplemented by Executive Order 13563 (``Improving Regulation and 
Regulatory Review''), directs Federal agencies to assess the benefits 
and costs of regulations, to select regulatory approaches that maximize 
net benefits when possible, and to consider economic, environmental, 
and distributional effects. It also directs the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) to review significant regulatory actions, including 
regulations with annual economic effects of $100 million or more. OMB 
has determined that the proposed rule is not significant within the 
meaning of Executive Order 12866 and has not reviewed it under that 
order.
Overview
    The final rule, which implements amendments made by the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law, will add requirements for state safety oversight 
agencies (SSOAs) and the rail transit agencies (RTAs) they oversee. The 
rule will require SSOAs to conduct risk-based inspections, oversee 
safety risk mitigations, and investigate a larger number of safety 
events. The rule will also require RTAs to conduct additional accident 
investigations and prepare additional reports. Finally, the rule will 
clarify existing requirements, update terminology, and remove interim 
provisions that no longer apply.
Updates From the NPRM
    The analysis for the final rule adds calculations using a discount 
rate of 2 percent, following guidance in the November 2023 update to 
OMB Circular A-4.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Office of Management and Budget (2023). ``Circular No. A-
4.'' https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/CircularA-4.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To give RTAs time to modify safety event notification and 
investigation processes and SSOAs time to review those changes, FTA is 
setting an effective date of January 1, 2025, for RTAs and SSOAs to 
comply with new notification criteria. The analysis uses 2025 to 2034 
as the updated ten-year analysis period for the rule.
Benefits
    The final rule will lead to increased oversight of RTA safety-
related activities, although the benefits of the oversight are unknown 
and unquantified in the analysis. The rule may also benefit SSOAs and 
rail transit agencies by clarifying requirements and reducing costs to 
ensure compliance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Federal Transit Administration. August 3, 2022. ``State 
Safety Oversight Contacts.'' https://www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/safety/state-safety-oversight-contacts.P>\3\ Average events calculated using FTA's State Safety 
Oversight Reporting system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Costs
    SSOAs and RTAs will incur economic costs to meet the new oversight 
and increased reporting requirements of the final rule. The 31 SSOAs in 
operation as of March 1, 2024, will be required to document their 
enforcement authority, adjust their SSO program standards, and to 
comply with new oversight and reporting requirements beginning on 
January 1, 2025. To estimate the costs of meeting the requirements, FTA 
estimated the number of entities affected, the number and type of staff 
involved, and the time needed for the first year and subsequent years 
(Table 2).\2\

                    Table 2--Staff and Hours Needed for SSOAs To Meet Oversight Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Requirement                                 Staff                Annual hours     Total hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSOA documentation of enforcement authority     31 SSOA staff...................              40           1,240
 (first year only).
SSOA oversight (first year)
Establish disposition process.................  31 SSOA staff...................              80           2,480
Define requirements for internal safety         31 SSOA staff...................              80           2,480
 reviews.
Document oversight of safety risk mitigations.  31 SSOA staff...................              80           2,480
Document oversight of RTA training compliance.  31 SSOA staff...................              20             620
Develop risk-based inspection programs........  62 SSOA staff (2 staff per SSOA)             160           9,920
Establish thresholds for safety event           31 SSOA staff...................              10             310
 notifications.
Document data collection procedures with RTAs.  31 SSOA staff...................              20             620
SSOA oversight (later years)
Oversee safety risk mitigations...............  31 SSOA staff...................             500          15,500
Oversee RTA training compliance...............  31 SSOA staff...................              20             620
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FTA analysis.

    Under the current thresholds for reporting safety events, RTAs had 
an average of 618 reportable events per year from 2017 to 2021.\3\ 
Under the new thresholds, RTAs would have had an average of 811 
reportable events per

[[Page 83979]]

year for an increase of 193 reports, resulting in additional reporting 
costs for SSOA and RTA employees (Table 3).

            Table 3--Annual Staff and Hours Needed for SSOAs and RTAs To Meet Reporting Requirements
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                     Hours for
                  Requirement                                 Staff                   single        Total hours
                                                                                     activity
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSOA safety event tracking (annual)...........  SSOA staff; 193 reports.........               1             193
SSOA safety event investigations (annual)
Prepare investigation reports.................  SSOA safety event investigators;              22           4,246
                                                 193 reports.
Review and approve reports....................  SSOA safety event investigators;              10           1,930
                                                 193 reports.
SSOA reporting to FTA (annual)
Submit investigation reports..................  SSOA staff; 193 reports.........               5             320
Submit summary of internal safety reviews.....  SSOA staff; 193 reports.........               5             320
Investigation and reporting (annual)
Conduct accident investigations...............  RTA safety event investigators;               47           9,071
                                                 193 reports.
Prepare event investigation reports...........  RTA safety event investigators;               30           5,790
                                                 193 reports.
Make submissions to SSOA......................  RTA safety event investigators;               12           2,316
                                                 193 reports.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: FTA analysis.

    To estimate the value of staff time spent on the requirements, FTA 
used occupational wage data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics as of 
May 2021 (Table 2).\4\ For general SSOA and trail transit agency staff, 
the closest occupational category is ``General and Operations 
Managers'' (code 11-1021) in the ``Transit and Ground Passenger 
Transportation'' industry (North American Industry Classification 
System code 485000). FTA used median hourly wages as a basis for the 
estimates, multiplied by 1.62 to account for employer benefits, for a 
cost estimate of $95.27 per hour.\5\ For safety event investigators, 
who do not have a close analogue in the occupational wage data, FTA 
assumed a 25 percent wage and benefit premium for a cost estimate of 
$119.09 per hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2024. ``May 2022 National 
Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates: United States.'' https://www.bls.gov/oes/2022/may/oes_nat.htm.
    \5\ Multiplier derived using Bureau of Labor Statistics data on 
employer costs for employee compensation in December 22 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.htm). Employer costs for state and 
local government workers averaged $57.60 an hour, with $35.69 for 
wages and $21.95 for benefit costs. To estimate full costs from 
wages, one will use a multiplier of $57.60/$21.95, or 1.62.

                       Table 4--Occupational Categories and Wages Used To Value Staff Time
                                                     [$2022]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                   Median hourly     Wage with
                 Staff                    Occupational category        Code            wage          benefits
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSOA and RTA general staff............  General and Operations           11-1021          $59.07          $95.27
                                         Managers.
SSOA and RTA safety event               N/A.....................  ..............           73.84          119.09
 investigators.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2021 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates.

    The requirements of the final rule have estimated costs of $9.8 
million (in 2022 dollars) for the first year and annual costs of $10.7 
million for later years (Table 5). The largest annual costs are for 
SSOA oversight ($7.9 million) and RTA activities ($2.0 million).

    Table 5--First-Year Costs and Annual Costs for Rule Requirements
                                 [$2022]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Requirement              First-year costs    Annual costs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSOA documentation of enforcement             $118,140  ................
 authority..........................
SSOA oversight......................         9,655,277        $7,853,642
SSOA safety event tracking..........            18,388            18,388
SSOA investigations.................           735,517           735,517
SSOA annual reporting to FTA........            60,975            60,975
RTA investigations and reporting....         2,045,656         2,045,656
                                     -----------------------------------
    Total...........................        12,633,954        10,714,179
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.

Summary
    Table 6 summarizes the economic effects of the final rule over the 
first ten years of the rule (2025 to 2034) in 2022 dollars. On an 
annualized basis, the rule will have net costs of $11.0 million at a 7 
percent discount rate (discounted to 2024), $10.9 million at 3 percent, 
and $10.9 million at 2 percent.

[[Page 83980]]



                                 Table 6--Summary of Economic Effects, 2025-2034
                                           [$2022, discounted to 2024]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                            Total
                Item                    (undiscounted)    Annualized (7%)    Annualized (3%)    Annualized (2%)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benefits Costs......................       Unquantified  .................  .................  .................
SSOA documentation of enforcement              $118,140            $16,820            $13,446            $12,894
 authority..........................
    SSOA oversight..................         80,338,058          8,093,373          8,058,697          8,050,279
    SSOA safety event tracking......            183,879             18,388             18,388             18,388
    SSOA investigations.............          7,355,168            735,517            735,517            735,517
    SSOA annual reporting to FTA....            609,755             60,975             60,975             60,975
    RTA investigations and reporting         20,456,560          2,045,656          2,045,656          2,045,656
                                     ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Total costs.................        109,061,560         10,970,730         10,932,680         10,923,710
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net benefits........................       Unquantified  .................  .................  .................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) 
requires Federal agencies to assess the impact of a regulation on small 
entities unless the agency determines that the regulation is not 
expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities.
    The rule will require SSOAs and rail transit agencies to meet 
additional administrative requirements. Under the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act, local governments and other public-sector 
organizations qualify as small entities if they serve a population of 
less than 50,000. State agencies do not qualify, and no rail transit 
agency serves an urbanized area with a population of less than 50,000. 
FTA has therefore determined that the rule will not have a significant 
effect on a substantial number of small entities.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    FTA has determined that this rule does not require a written 
statement under the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 
1532) because it does not impose a Federal mandate that may result in 
the expenditure of $100 million or more in any 1 year (when adjusted 
annually for inflation using the base year of 1995) for either State, 
local, and tribal governments in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector.

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism Assessment)

    Executive Order 13132 requires agencies to assure meaningful and 
timely input by State and local officials in the development of 
regulatory policies that may have a substantial direct effect on the 
States, on the relationship between the national government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government. This action has been analyzed in 
accordance with the principles and criteria contained in Executive 
Order 13132, and FTA determined this action will not have a substantial 
direct effect or sufficient federalism implications on the States. FTA 
also determined this action will not preempt any State law or 
regulation or affect the States' ability to discharge traditional State 
governmental functions.

Executive Order 12372 (Intergovernmental Review)

    The regulations implementing Executive Order 12372 regarding 
intergovernmental consultation on Federal programs and activities apply 
to this program.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    In compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 
U.S.C. 3501 et seq.), and the White House Office of Management and 
Budget's (OMB) implementing regulation at 5 CFR 1320.8(d), FTA is 
seeking approval from OMB for a currently approved information 
collection (OMB Control Number 2132-0558) that is associated with this 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. The information collection (IC) was 
previously approved on April 7, 2023. However, this submission includes 
changes in requirements applicable to the SSO program affecting various 
respondents.

National Environmental Policy Act

    Federal agencies are required to adopt implementing procedures for 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) that establish specific 
criteria for, and identification of, three classes of actions: (1) 
Those that normally require preparation of an Environmental Impact 
Statement, (2) those that normally require preparation of an 
Environmental Assessment, and (3) those that are categorically excluded 
from further NEPA review (40 CFR 1507.3(b)). This rule qualifies for 
categorical exclusions under 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4) (planning and 
administrative activities that do not involve or lead directly to 
construction). FTA has evaluated whether the rule will involve unusual 
or extraordinary circumstances and has determined that it will not.

Executive Order 12630 (Taking of Private Property)

    FTA has analyzed this rule under Executive Order 12630, 
Governmental Actions and Interference with Constitutionally Protected 
Property Rights. FTA does not believe this rule affects a taking of 
private property or otherwise has taking implications under Executive 
Order 12630.

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)

    This rule meets applicable standards in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) 
of Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to minimize litigation, 
eliminate ambiguity, and reduce burden.

Executive Order 13045 (Protection of Children)

    FTA has analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13045, Protection 
of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks. FTA 
certifies that this action will not cause an environmental risk to 
health or safety that might disproportionately affect children.

Executive Order 13175 (Tribal Consultation)

    FTA has analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13175, and 
believes that it will not have substantial direct effects on one or 
more Indian Tribes; will not impose substantial direct compliance costs 
on Indian Tribal

[[Page 83981]]

governments; and will not preempt Tribal laws. Therefore, a Tribal 
summary impact statement is not required.

Executive Order 13211 (Energy Effects)

    FTA has analyzed this action under Executive Order 13211, Actions 
Concerning Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 
Distribution, or Use. FTA has determined that this action is not a 
significant energy action under that order and is not likely to have a 
significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of 
energy. Therefore, a Statement of Energy Effects is not required.

Executive Order 12898 (Environmental Justice)

    Executive Order 12898 (Federal Actions to Address Environmental 
Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations) and DOT 
Order 5610.2(a) (https://www.transportation.gov/transportation-policy/environmental-justice/department-transportation-order-56102a) require 
DOT agencies to achieve Environmental Justice (EJ) as part of their 
mission by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, 
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental 
effects, including interrelated social and economic effects, of their 
programs, policies, and activities on minority and low-income 
populations. All DOT agencies must address compliance with Executive 
Order 12898 and the DOT Order in all rulemaking activities. On August 
15, 2012, FTA's Circular 4703.1 became effective, which contains 
guidance for recipients of FTA financial assistance to incorporate EJ 
principles into plans, projects, and activities (http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/FTA_EJ_Circular_7.14-12_FINAL.pdf).
    FTA has evaluated this action under Executive Order 12898, the DOT 
Order, and the FTA Circular, and FTA has determined that this action 
will not cause disproportionately high and adverse human health and 
environmental effects on minority or low-income populations.

Regulation Identifier Number

    A Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) is assigned to each regulatory 
action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The 
Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in 
April and October of each year. The RIN number contained in the heading 
of this document can be used to cross-reference this rule with the 
Unified Agenda.

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 674

    Grant program--transportation, Mass transportation, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Safety.

Veronica Vanterpool,
Deputy Administrator.


0
In consideration of the foregoing, and under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 
5329, the Federal Transit Administration revises and republishes 49 CFR 
part 674 to read as follows:

PART 674--STATE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

Subpart A--General Provisions
Sec.
674.1 Purpose.
674.3 Applicability.
674.5 Policy.
674.7 Definitions.
674.9 [Reserved].
Subpart B--Role of the State
674.11 State Safety Oversight Program.
674.13 Designation of oversight agency.
674.15 Designation of oversight agency for multi-state system.
674.17 Use of Federal financial assistance.
674.19 Certification of a State Safety Oversight Program.
674.21 Withholding of Federal financial assistance for 
noncompliance.
674.23 Confidentiality of information.
Subpart C--State Safety Oversight Agencies
674.25 Role of the State safety oversight agency.
674.27 State safety oversight program standards.
674.29 Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans: general 
requirements.
674.31 Triennial audits: general requirements.
674.33 Notifications of safety events.
674.35 Investigations.
674.37 Corrective action plans.
674.39 State Safety Oversight Agency annual reporting to FTA.
674.41 Conflicts of interest.

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 5329; 49 CFR 1.91.

49 CFR Part 674

Subpart A--General Provisions


Sec.  674.1   Purpose.

    This part carries out the mandate of 49 U.S.C. 5329 for State 
safety oversight of rail fixed guideway public transportation systems.


Sec.  674.3   Applicability.

    This part applies to States with rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems; State safety oversight agencies that oversee 
the safety of rail fixed guideway public transportation systems; and 
entities that own or operate rail fixed guideway public transportation 
systems with Federal financial assistance authorized under 49 U.S.C. 
Chapter 53.


Sec.  674.5   Policy.

    (a) In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329, a State that has a rail 
fixed guideway public transportation system within the State has 
primary responsibility for overseeing the safety of that rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system. A State safety oversight agency 
must have the authority, resources, and qualified personnel to oversee 
the number, size, and complexity of rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems that operate within a State.
    (b) FTA will certify whether a State safety oversight program meets 
the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329 and is adequate to promote the 
purposes of the public transportation safety programs codified at 49 
U.S.C. 5329.


Sec.  674.7   Definitions.

    As used in this part:
    Accountable Executive means a single, identifiable person who has 
ultimate responsibility for carrying out the Public Transportation 
Agency Safety Plan of a transit agency; responsibility for carrying out 
the transit agency's Transit Asset Management Plan; and control or 
direction over the human and capital resources needed to develop and 
maintain both the transit agency's Public Transportation Agency Safety 
Plan, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329(d), and the transit agency's 
Transit Asset Management Plan in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5326.
    Administrator means the Federal Transit Administrator or the 
Administrator's designee.
    Collision means any impact between a rail transit vehicle and any 
other vehicle, object, or any person.
    Contractor means an entity that performs tasks on behalf of FTA, a 
State Safety Oversight Agency, or a Rail Transit Agency, through 
contract or other agreement.
    Corrective action plan means a plan developed by a rail transit 
agency that describes the actions the rail transit agency will take to 
address an identified deficiency or safety concern, and the schedule 
for taking those actions. Either a State Safety Oversight Agency or FTA 
may require a rail transit agency to develop and carry out a corrective 
action plan.
    Derailment for the purposes of this part means a safety event in 
which one or more wheels of a rail transit vehicle unintentionally 
leaves the rails.
    Designated personnel means:
    (1) Employees and contractors identified by a recipient whose job

[[Page 83982]]

functions are directly responsible for safety oversight of the public 
transportation system of the public transportation agency; or
    (2) Employees and contractors of a State Safety Oversight Agency 
whose job functions require them to conduct reviews, inspections, 
examinations, and other safety oversight activities of the rail fixed 
guideway public transportation systems subject to the jurisdiction of 
the agency.
    Disabling damage means damage to a rail transit vehicle resulting 
from a collision and preventing the vehicle from operating under its 
own power.
    Evacuation for life safety reasons means a condition that occurs 
when persons depart from transit vehicles or facilities for life safety 
reasons, including self-evacuation. A life safety reason may include a 
situation such as a fire, the presence of smoke or noxious fumes, a 
fuel leak from any source, an electrical hazard, or other hazard to any 
person. An evacuation of passengers into the rail right of way (not at 
a platform or station) for any reason is presumed to be an evacuation 
for life safety reasons.
    Fatality means a death confirmed within 30 days of a safety event. 
Fatalities include suicides, but do not include deaths in or on transit 
property that are a result of drug overdose, exposure to the elements, 
illness, or natural causes.
    FRA means the Federal Railroad Administration, an operating 
administration within the United States Department of Transportation.
    FTA means the Federal Transit Administration, an operating 
administration within the United States Department of Transportation.
    Hazard means any real or potential condition that can cause injury, 
illness, or death; damage to or loss of the facilities, equipment, 
rolling stock, or infrastructure of a public transportation system; or 
damage to the environment.
    Injury means any harm to persons as a result of a safety event that 
requires immediate medical attention away from the scene. Does not 
include harm resulting from a drug overdose, exposure to the elements, 
illness, natural causes, or occupational safety events occurring in 
administrative buildings.
    Inspection means a physical observation of equipment, facilities, 
rolling stock, operations, personnel, or records for the purpose of 
gathering or analyzing facts or information.
    Investigation means the process of determining the causal and 
contributing factors of a safety event or hazard, for the purpose of 
preventing recurrence and mitigating safety risk.
    National Public Transportation Safety Plan means the plan to 
improve the safety of all public transportation systems that receive 
Federal financial assistance under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53.
    NTSB means the National Transportation Safety Board, an independent 
Federal agency.
    Person means a passenger, employee, contractor, volunteer, official 
worker, pedestrian, trespasser, or any other individual on the property 
of a rail fixed guideway public transportation system or associated 
infrastructure.
    Potential consequence means the effect of a hazard.
    Public transportation has the meaning found in 49 U.S.C. 5302.
    Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan (PTASP) means the 
documented comprehensive agency safety plan for a transit agency that 
is required by 49 U.S.C. 5329 and part 673 of this chapter.
    Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program 
(PTSCTP) means the certification training program that is required by 
49 U.S.C. 5329(c) and part 672 of this chapter.
    Rail fixed guideway public transportation system means any fixed 
guideway system, or any such system in engineering or construction, 
that uses rail, is operated for public transportation, is within the 
jurisdiction of a State, and is not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Railroad Administration. These include but are not limited to 
rapid rail, heavy rail, light rail, monorail, trolley, inclined plane, 
funicular, and automated guideway.
    Rail transit agency (RTA) means any entity that provides services 
on a rail fixed guideway public transportation system.
    Rail transit vehicle means any rolling stock used on a rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system, including but not limited to 
passenger and maintenance vehicles.
    Revenue vehicle means a rail transit vehicle used to provide 
revenue service for passengers. This includes providing fare free 
service.
    Risk-based inspection program means an inspection program that uses 
qualitative and quantitative data analysis to inform ongoing inspection 
activities. Risk-based inspection programs are designed to prioritize 
inspections to address safety concerns and hazards associated with the 
highest levels of safety risk.
    Safety event means an unexpected outcome resulting in injury or 
death; damage to or loss of the facilities, equipment, rolling stock, 
or infrastructure of a public transportation system; or damage to the 
environment.
    Safety risk means the composite of predicted severity and 
likelihood of a potential consequence of a hazard.
    Safety risk mitigation means a method or methods to eliminate or 
reduce the severity and/or likelihood of a potential consequence of a 
hazard.
    State means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, 
Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and 
the Virgin Islands.
    State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) means an agency established by 
a State that meets the requirements and performs the functions 
specified by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) and (k) and the regulations set forth in 
this part.
    Unintended train movement means any instance where a revenue 
vehicle is moving and is not under the control of a driver (whether or 
not the operator is physically on the vehicle at the time). This 
applies regardless of whether the event occurred in revenue service.


Sec.  674.9   [Reserved]

Subpart B--Role of the State


Sec.  674.11   State Safety Oversight Program.

    Every State that has a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system must have a State Safety Oversight (SSO) program that has been 
approved by the Administrator. FTA will audit each State's compliance 
at least triennially, consistent with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(10). At 
minimum, an SSO program must:
    (a) Explicitly acknowledge the State's responsibility for 
overseeing the safety of the rail fixed guideway public transportation 
systems within the State;
    (b) Demonstrate the State's ability to adopt and enforce Federal 
and relevant State law for safety in rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems;
    (c) Establish a State safety oversight agency, by State law, in 
accordance with the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329 and this part;
    (d) Demonstrate that the State has determined an appropriate 
staffing level for the State safety oversight agency commensurate with 
the number, size, and complexity of the rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems in the State, and that the State has consulted 
with the Administrator for that purpose;
    (e) Demonstrate that the employees and other personnel of the State 
safety oversight agency who are responsible for the oversight of rail 
fixed guideway public transportation systems are qualified to perform 
their functions,

[[Page 83983]]

based on appropriate training, including substantial progress toward or 
completion of the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training 
Program; and
    (f) Demonstrate that by law, the State prohibits any public 
transportation agency in the State from providing funds to the SSOA.


Sec.  674.13   Designation of oversight agency.

    (a) Every State that must establish a State Safety Oversight 
program in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329 must also establish an SSOA 
for the purpose of overseeing the safety of rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems within that State. Further, the State must 
ensure that:
    (1) The SSOA is financially and legally independent from any public 
transportation agency the SSOA is obliged to oversee;
    (2) The SSOA does not directly provide public transportation 
services in an area with a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system the SSOA is obliged to oversee;
    (3) The SSOA does not employ any individual who is also responsible 
for administering a rail fixed guideway public transportation system 
the SSOA is obliged to oversee;
    (4) The SSOA has authority to review, approve, oversee, and enforce 
the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan for a rail fixed guideway 
public transportation system required by 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 673 
of this chapter;
    (5) The SSOA has investigative, inspection, and enforcement 
authority with respect to the safety of all rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems within the State;
    (6) At least once every three years, the SSOA audits every rail 
fixed guideway public transportation system's compliance with the 
Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan required by 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) 
and part 673 of this chapter; and
    (7) At least once a year, the SSOA reports the status of the safety 
of each rail fixed guideway public transportation system to the 
Governor, the FTA, and the board of directors, or equivalent entity, of 
the rail fixed guideway public transportation system.
    (b) At the request of the Governor of a State, the Administrator 
may waive the requirements for financial and legal independence and the 
prohibitions on employee conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) 
and (3) of this section, if the rail fixed guideway public 
transportation systems in design, construction, or revenue operations 
in the State have fewer than one million combined actual and projected 
rail fixed guideway revenue miles per year or provide fewer than ten 
million combined actual and projected unlinked passenger trips per 
year. However:
    (1) If a State shares jurisdiction over one or more rail fixed 
guideway public transportation systems with another State, and has one 
or more rail fixed guideway public transportation systems that are not 
shared with another State, the revenue miles and unlinked passenger 
trips of the rail fixed guideway public transportation system under 
shared jurisdiction will not be counted in the Administrator's decision 
whether to issue a waiver.
    (2) The Administrator will rescind a waiver issued under this 
subsection if the number of revenue miles per year or unlinked 
passenger trips per year increases beyond the thresholds specified in 
this subsection.


Sec.  674.15   Designation of oversight agency for multi-state system.

    In an instance of a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system that operates in more than one State, all States in which that 
rail fixed guideway public transportation system operates must either:
    (a) Ensure that uniform safety standards and procedures in 
compliance with 49 U.S.C. 5329 are applied to that rail fixed guideway 
public transportation system, through an SSO program that has been 
approved by the Administrator; or
    (b) Designate a single entity that meets the requirements for an 
SSOA to serve as the SSOA for that rail fixed guideway public 
transportation system, through an SSO program that has been approved by 
the Administrator.


Sec.  674.17   Use of Federal financial assistance.

    (a) In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6), FTA will make grants 
of Federal financial assistance to eligible States to help the States 
develop and carry out their SSO programs. This Federal financial 
assistance may be used for reimbursement of both the operational and 
administrative expenses of SSO programs, consistent with the uniform 
administrative requirements for grants to States under 2 CFR parts 200 
and 1201. The expenses eligible for reimbursement include, 
specifically, the expense of employee training and the expense of 
establishing and maintaining an SSOA in compliance with 49 U.S.C. 5329.
    (b) The apportionments of available Federal financial assistance to 
eligible States will be made in accordance with a formula, established 
by the Administrator, following opportunity for public notice and 
comment. The formula will take into account fixed guideway vehicle 
revenue miles, fixed guideway route miles, and fixed guideway vehicle 
passenger miles attributable to all rail fixed guideway systems within 
each eligible State not subject to the jurisdiction of the FRA.
    (c) The grants of Federal financial assistance for State safety 
oversight shall be subject to terms and conditions as the Administrator 
deems appropriate.
    (d) The Federal share of the expenses eligible for reimbursement 
under a grant for State safety oversight activities shall be eighty 
percent of the reasonable costs incurred under that grant.
    (e) The non-Federal share of the expenses eligible for 
reimbursement under a grant for State safety oversight activities may 
not be comprised of Federal funds, any funds received from a public 
transportation agency, or any revenues earned by a public 
transportation agency.


Sec.  674.19   Certification of a State Safety Oversight Program.

    (a) The Administrator must determine whether a State's SSO program 
meets the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329. Also, the Administrator must 
determine whether an SSO program is adequate to promote the purposes of 
49 U.S.C. 5329, including, but not limited to, the National Public 
Transportation Safety Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 
Certification Training Program, and the Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plans.
    (b) The Administrator must issue a certification to a State whose 
SSO program meets the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329. The Administrator 
must issue a denial of certification to a State whose SSO program does 
not meet the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329.
    (c) In an instance in which the Administrator issues a denial of 
certification to a State whose SSO program does not meet the 
requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329, the Administrator must provide a 
written explanation, and allow the State an opportunity to modify and 
resubmit its SSO program for the Administrator's approval. In the event 
the State is unable to modify its SSO program to merit the 
Administrator's issuance of a certification, the Administrator must 
notify the Governor of that fact, and must ask the Governor to take all 
possible actions to correct the deficiencies that are precluding the 
issuance of a certification for the SSO program. In his or her 
discretion, the Administrator may also impose

[[Page 83984]]

financial penalties as authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e), which may 
include:
    (1) Withholding SSO grant funds from the State;
    (2) Withholding up to five percent of the 49 U.S.C. 5307 Urbanized 
Area formula funds appropriated for use in the State or urbanized area 
in the State, until such time as the SSO program can be certified; or
    (3) Requiring all rail fixed guideway public transportation systems 
governed by the SSO program to spend up to 100 percent of their Federal 
funding under 49 U.S.C. chapter 53 only for safety-related improvements 
on their systems, until such time as the SSO program can be certified.
    (d) When determining whether to issue a certification or a denial 
of certification for an SSO program, the Administrator must evaluate 
whether the cognizant SSOA has the authority, resources, and expertise 
to oversee the number, size, and complexity of the rail fixed guideway 
public transportation systems that operate within the State, or will 
attain the necessary authority, resources, and expertise in accordance 
with a developmental plan and schedule.


Sec.  674.21   Withholding of Federal financial assistance for 
noncompliance.

    (a) In making a decision to impose financial penalties as 
authorized by 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) and determining the nature and amount 
of the financial penalties, the Administrator shall consider the extent 
and circumstances of the noncompliance; the operating budgets of the 
SSOA and the rail fixed guideway public transportation systems that 
will be affected by the financial penalties; and such other matters as 
justice may require.
    (b) If a State fails to establish an SSO program that has been 
approved by the Administrator prior to a rail fixed guideway public 
transportation system entering the engineering or construction phase of 
development, FTA will be prohibited from obligating Federal financial 
assistance authorized under 49 U.S.C. 5338 to any entity in the State 
that is otherwise eligible to receive that Federal financial 
assistance, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(3).


Sec.  674.23   Confidentiality of information.

    (a) A State, an SSOA, or an RTA may withhold an investigation 
report prepared or adopted in accordance with these regulations from 
being admitted as evidence or used in a civil action for damages 
resulting from a matter mentioned in the report.
    (b) This part does not require public availability of any data, 
information, or procedures pertaining to the security of a rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system or its passenger operations.

Subpart C--State Safety Oversight Agencies


Sec.  674.25   Role of the State safety oversight agency.

    (a) An SSOA must establish minimum standards for the safety of all 
rail fixed guideway public transportation systems within its oversight. 
These minimum standards must be consistent with the National Public 
Transportation Safety Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 
Certification Training Program, the rules for Public Transportation 
Agency Safety Plans and all applicable Federal and State law.
    (b) An SSOA must review and approve the Public Transportation 
Agency Safety Plan for every rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system within its oversight. An SSOA must oversee an RTA's execution of 
its Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan. An SSOA must enforce the 
execution of a Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan, through an 
order of a corrective action plan or any other means, as necessary or 
appropriate.
    (c) An SSOA has the responsibility to provide safety oversight of 
an RTA's project(s) in the engineering or construction phase to verify 
compliance with all applicable Federal and State safety requirements. 
For purposes of Sec. Sec.  674.33 and 674.35, this is limited to safety 
events that involve transit-related activities such as operations, 
testing, simulated service or pre-revenue service, or a transit-related 
maintenance activity.
    (d) An SSOA must ensure that a Public Transportation Agency Safety 
Plan meets the requirements at 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 673 of this 
chapter.
    (e) An SSOA has primary responsibility for the investigation of any 
allegation of noncompliance with a Public Transportation Agency Safety 
Plan. These responsibilities do not preclude the Administrator from 
exercising their authority under 49 U.S.C. 5329(f).
    (f) An SSOA has primary responsibility for the investigation of a 
safety event on a rail fixed guideway public transportation system. 
This responsibility does not preclude the Administrator from exercising 
his or her authority under 49 U.S.C. 5329(f).
    (g) An SSOA may enter into an agreement with a contractor for 
assistance in overseeing safety event investigations and performing 
independent safety event investigations; and for expertise the SSOA 
does not have within its own organization.
    (h) All designated personnel employed by an SSOA must comply with 
the requirements of the Public Transportation Safety Certification 
Training Program.


Sec.  674.27   State safety oversight program standards.

    (a) An SSOA must adopt and distribute a written SSO program 
standard, consistent with the National Public Transportation Safety 
Plan and the rules for Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans. This 
SSO program standard must identify the processes and procedures that 
govern the activities of the SSOA. Also, the SSO program standard must 
identify the processes and procedures an RTA must have in place to 
comply with the standard. At minimum, the program standard must meet 
the following requirements:
    (1) Program management. The SSO program standard must explain the 
authority of the SSOA to oversee the safety of rail fixed guideway 
public transportation systems; the policies that govern the activities 
of the SSOA; the reporting requirements that govern both the SSOA and 
the rail fixed guideway public transportation systems; and the steps 
the SSOA will take to ensure open, on-going communication between the 
SSOA and every rail fixed guideway public transportation system within 
its oversight.
    (2) Program standard development. The SSO program standard must 
explain the SSOA's process for developing, reviewing, adopting, and 
revising its minimum standards for safety, and distributing those 
standards to the rail fixed guideway public transportation systems.
    (3) Disposition of RTA comments. The SSO program standard must 
establish a disposition process that defines how the SSOA will address 
any comments the RTA makes with respect to the SSO program standard.
    (4) Program policy and objectives. The SSO program standard must 
set an explicit policy and objectives for safety in rail fixed guideway 
public transportation throughout the State.
    (5) Oversight of RTA Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans and 
internal safety reviews. The SSO program standard must explain the role 
of the SSOA in overseeing an RTA's execution of its Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plan and any related safety reviews of the 
RTA's fixed guideway public transportation system. The SSO program 
standard must

[[Page 83985]]

describe the process whereby the SSOA will receive and evaluate all 
material submitted under the signature of an RTA's Accountable 
Executive. The SSO program standard must define baseline RTA internal 
safety review requirements including, at a minimum, the following 
requirements:
    (i) The RTA must develop and document an ongoing internal safety 
review process to ensure that all elements of an RTA's Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plan are performing and being implemented 
as intended.
    (ii) The RTA's internal safety review process must ensure that the 
implementation of all elements of its Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plan are reviewed within a three-year period.
    (iii) The RTA must notify the SSOA at least thirty (30) days before 
the RTA conducts an internal safety review of any aspect of the rail 
fixed guideway public transportation system and provide any checklists 
or procedures it will use during the review.
    (iv) The RTA must submit a report to the SSOA annually documenting 
the internal safety review activities and the status of subsequent 
findings and corrective actions.
    (6) Oversight of safety risk mitigations. The SSO program standard 
must explain the role of the SSOA in overseeing an RTA's development, 
implementation, and monitoring of safety risk mitigations related to 
rail fixed guideway transportation, including how the SSOA will track 
RTA safety risk mitigations. The SSO program standard must specify the 
frequency and format whereby the SSOA will receive and review 
information on RTA safety risk mitigation status and effectiveness.
    (7) Oversight of RTA compliance with the Public Transportation 
Safety Certification Training Program. The SSO program standard must 
explain how the SSOA will ensure that the RTA satisfies the 
requirements of the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training 
Program, including the RTA's designation of personnel and the RTA's 
identification of refresher training.
    (8) Triennial SSOA audits of RTA Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plans. The SSO program standard must explain the process the 
SSOA will follow and the criteria the SSOA will apply in conducting a 
complete audit of the RTA's compliance with its Public Transportation 
Agency Safety Plan at least once every three years, in accordance with 
49 U.S.C. 5329. Alternatively, the SSOA and RTA may agree that the SSOA 
will conduct its audit on an on-going basis over the three-year 
timeframe. The program standard must establish a procedure the SSOA and 
RTA will follow to manage findings and recommendations arising from the 
triennial audit.
    (9) Safety event notifications. The SSO program standard must 
establish requirements for RTA notifications of safety events occurring 
on the RTA's rail fixed guideway public transportation system, 
including notifications to the SSOA and to FTA. SSOA safety event 
notification requirements must address, specifically, the time limits 
for notification, methods of notification, and the nature of the 
information the RTA must submit to the SSOA.
    (10) Investigations. The SSO program standard must identify safety 
events that require an RTA to conduct an investigation. Also, the 
program standard must address how the SSOA will oversee an RTA's own 
internal investigation; the role of the SSOA in supporting any 
investigation conducted or findings and recommendations made by the 
NTSB or FTA; and procedures for protecting the confidentiality of the 
investigation reports.
    (11) Corrective actions. The program standard must explain the 
process and criteria by which the SSOA may order an RTA to develop and 
carry out a corrective action plan (CAP), and a procedure for the SSOA 
to review and approve a CAP. Also, the program standard must explain 
the SSOA's policy and practice for tracking and verifying an RTA's 
compliance with the CAP and managing any conflicts between the SSOA and 
RTA relating either to the development or execution of the CAP or the 
findings of an investigation.
    (12) Inspections. The SSO program standard must include or 
incorporate by reference a risk-based inspection program that:
    (i) Is commensurate with the number, size, and complexity of the 
rail fixed guideway public transportation systems that the State safety 
oversight agency oversees;
    (ii) Provides the SSOA with the authority and capability to enter 
the facilities of each rail fixed guideway public transportation system 
that the SSOA oversees to inspect infrastructure, equipment, records, 
personnel, and data, including the data that the RTA collects when 
identifying and evaluating safety risks; and
    (iii) Include policies and procedures regarding the access of the 
SSOA to conduct inspections of the rail fixed guideway public 
transportation system, including access for inspections that occur 
without advance notice to the RTA.
    (13) Vehicle maintenance and testing. The SSO program standard must 
include the process by which the SSOA will review an RTA's rail transit 
vehicle maintenance program, including the RTA's periodic testing of 
rail transit vehicle braking systems to ensure performance and to 
detect potential latent system failures.
    (14) Data collection. The program standard must include policies 
and procedures for collecting and reviewing data that the RTA uses when 
identifying hazards and assessing safety risk and explain how the SSOA 
uses collected data to support oversight of the RTA's safety risk 
management process. The frequency of collection shall be commensurate 
with the size and complexity of the rail fixed guideway public 
transportation system.
    (b) At least once a year an SSOA must submit its SSO program 
standard and any referenced program procedures to FTA, with an 
indication of any revisions made to the program standard since the last 
annual submittal. FTA will evaluate the SSOA's program standard as part 
of its continuous evaluation of the State Safety Oversight Program, and 
in preparing FTA's report to Congress on the certification status of 
that State Safety Oversight Program, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329.


Sec.  674.29   Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans: general 
requirements.

    (a) In determining whether to approve a Public Transportation 
Agency Safety Plan for a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system, an SSOA must evaluate whether the Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plan is compliant with 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 673 of this 
chapter; is consistent with the National Public Transportation Safety 
Plan; and is in compliance with the SSO program standard set by the 
SSOA.
    (b) In an instance in which an SSOA does not approve a Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plan, the SSOA must provide a written 
explanation and allow the RTA an opportunity to modify and resubmit its 
Public Transportation Agency Safety Plan for the SSOA's approval.


Sec.  674.31   Triennial audits: general requirements.

    At least once every three years, an SSOA must conduct a complete 
audit of an RTA's compliance with its Public Transportation Agency 
Safety Plan. Alternatively, an SSOA may conduct the audit on an on-
going basis over the three-year timeframe. If an SSOA audits

[[Page 83986]]

an RTA's compliance on an ongoing basis, the SSOA shall issue interim 
audit reports at least annually. At the conclusion of the three-year 
audit cycle, the SSOA shall issue a report with findings and 
recommendations arising from the triennial or ongoing audit, which must 
include, at minimum, an analysis of the effectiveness of the Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plan, recommendations for improvements, 
and a corrective action plan, if necessary or appropriate. The RTA must 
be given an opportunity to comment on the findings and recommendations.


Sec.  674.33   Notifications of safety events.

    (a) An RTA must notify FTA and the SSOA within two hours of any 
safety event occurring on a rail fixed guideway public transportation 
system that results in one or more of the following:
    (1) Fatality
    (2) Two or more injuries
    (3) Derailment
    (4) Collision resulting in one or more injuries
    (5) Collision between two rail transit vehicles
    (6) Collision resulting in disabling damage to a rail transit 
vehicle
    (7) Evacuation for life safety reasons
    (8) Unintended train movement.
    (b) The two-hour notification requirement excludes criminal actions 
that result in fatalities or injuries, such as homicides and assaults.


Sec.  674.35   Investigations.

    (a) An SSOA must investigate or require an investigation of any 
safety event that requires notification under Sec.  674.33.
    (b) The SSOA is ultimately responsible for the sufficiency and 
thoroughness of all investigations, whether conducted by the SSOA or 
RTA. If an SSOA requires an RTA to investigate a safety event, the SSOA 
must conduct an independent review of the RTA's findings of causation. 
In any instance in which an RTA is conducting its own internal 
investigation of the safety event, the SSOA and the RTA must coordinate 
their investigations in accordance with the SSO program standard and 
any agreements in effect.
    (c) Within a reasonable time, an SSOA must issue a written report 
on its investigation of a safety event or review of an RTA's safety 
event investigation in accordance with the reporting requirements 
established by the SSOA. The report must describe the investigation 
activities; identify the factors that caused or contributed to the 
safety event; and set forth a corrective action plan, as necessary or 
appropriate. The SSOA must formally adopt the report of a safety event 
and transmit that report to the RTA for review and concurrence. If the 
RTA does not concur with an SSOA's report, the SSOA may allow the RTA 
to submit a written dissent from the report, which may be included in 
the report, at the discretion of the SSOA.
    (d) All personnel and contractors that conduct investigations on 
behalf of an SSOA must be trained to perform their functions in 
accordance with the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training 
Program.
    (e) The Administrator may conduct an independent investigation of 
any safety event or an independent review of an SSOA's or an RTA's 
findings of causation of a safety event.


Sec.  674.37   Corrective action plans.

    (a) The SSOA must, at a minimum, require the development of a CAP 
for the following:
    (1) Results from investigations, in which the RTA or SSOA 
determined that causal or contributing factors require corrective 
action;
    (2) Findings of non-compliance from safety reviews and inspections 
performed by the SSOA; or
    (3) Findings of non-compliance from internal safety reviews 
performed by the RTA.
    (b) In any instance in which an RTA must develop and carry out a 
CAP, the SSOA must review and approve the CAP before the RTA carries 
out the plan. However, an exception may be made for immediate or 
emergency corrective actions that must be taken to ensure immediate 
safety, provided that the SSOA has been given timely notification, and 
the SSOA provides subsequent review and approval.
    (c) A CAP must describe, specifically, the actions the RTA will 
take to correct the deficiency identified by the CAP, the schedule for 
taking those actions, and the individuals responsible for taking those 
actions. The RTA must periodically report to the SSOA on its progress 
in carrying out the CAP. The SSOA may monitor the RTA's progress in 
carrying out the CAP through unannounced, on-site inspections, or any 
other means the SSOA deems necessary or appropriate.
    (d) In any instance in which a safety event on the RTA's rail fixed 
guideway public transportation system is the subject of an 
investigation by the NTSB or FTA, the SSOA must evaluate whether the 
findings or recommendations by the NTSB or FTA require a CAP by the 
RTA, and if so, the SSOA must order the RTA to develop and carry out a 
CAP.


Sec.  674.39   State Safety Oversight Agency annual reporting to FTA.

    (a) On or before March 15 of each year, an SSOA must submit the 
following material to FTA:
    (1) The SSO program standard adopted in accordance with Sec.  
674.27, with an indication of any changes to the SSO program standard 
during the preceding twelve months;
    (2) Evidence that its designated personnel have completed the 
requirements of the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training 
Program, or, if in progress, the anticipated completion date of the 
training;
    (3) A publicly available report that summarizes its oversight 
activities for the preceding twelve months, describes the causal 
factors of safety events identified through investigation, and 
identifies the status of corrective actions, changes to Public 
Transportation Agency Safety Plans, and the level of effort by the SSOA 
in carrying out its oversight activities;
    (4) Final investigation reports for all safety events meeting one 
or more of the criteria specified at Sec.  674.33;
    (5) A summary of the internal safety reviews conducted by RTAs 
during the previous twelve months, and the RTA's progress in carrying 
out CAPs arising under Sec.  674.37(a)(3);
    (6) A summary of the triennial audits completed during the 
preceding twelve months, and the RTAs' progress in carrying out CAPs 
arising from triennial audits conducted in accordance with Sec.  
674.31;
    (7) Evidence that the SSOA has reviewed and approved any changes to 
the Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans during the preceding 
twelve months; and
    (8) A certification that the SSOA is in compliance with the 
requirements of this part.
    (b) These materials must be submitted electronically through a 
reporting system specified by FTA.

[[Page 83987]]

Sec.  674.41   Conflicts of interest.

    (a) An SSOA must be financially and legally independent from any 
rail fixed guideway public transportation system under the oversight of 
the SSOA, unless the Administrator has issued a waiver of this 
requirement in accordance with Sec.  674.13(b).
    (b) An SSOA may not employ any individual who provides services to 
a rail fixed guideway public transportation system under the oversight 
of the SSOA, unless the Administrator has issued a waiver of this 
requirement in accordance with Sec.  674.13(b).
    (c) A contractor may not provide services to both an SSOA and a 
rail fixed guideway public transportation system under the oversight of 
that SSOA, unless the Administrator has issued a waiver of this 
prohibition.

[FR Doc. 2024-23866 Filed 10-17-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-57-P


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