ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS

Appellate Court

Metropolitan Alliance of Police, River Valley Detention Center, Chapter 228 v. Illinois

Labor Relations Board, 2013 IL App (3d) 120308

Appellate Court

Caption

METROPOLITAN ALLIANCE OF POLICE, RIVER VALLEY

DETENTION CENTER, CHAPTER 228, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS

LABOR RELATIONS BOARD; RIVER VALLEY JUVENILE

DETENTION CENTER; and GERALD KINNEY, Chief Judge of the

Twelfth Judicial Circuit, Respondents.

District & No. Third District

Docket No. 3-12-0308

Filed November 8, 2013

Held

(Note: This syllabus

constitutes no part of

the opinion of the court

but has been prepared

by the Reporter of

Decisions for the

convenience of the

reader.)

The dismissal of the unfair labor practice charge filed by employees of a

juvenile detention center based on the rejection of their request for

interest arbitration in the labor negotiations arising from their attempt to

replace their existing collective bargaining agreement was upheld on

appeal, since the employees worked at a juvenile detention center, not a

correctional facility, they were not security employees, they were not

entitled to interest arbitration, and the rejection of their request for

interest arbitration was not an unfair labor practice.

Decision Under 

Review

Petition for review of order of Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel,

No. S-CA-11-055.

Judgment Confirmed.
Counsel on

Appeal

Joseph R. Mazzone (argued), of Joliet, for petitioner.

Lisa Madigan, AttorneyGeneral, of Chicago (Valerie Quinn (argued) and

Evan Siegal, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for respondent

Illinois Labor Relations Board.

Amber L. Stefankiewicz and Mark W. Bennett (argued), both of Laner

Muchin Dombrow Becker Levin & Tominberg, of Chicago, for

respondent Gerald Kinney.

Panel JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Justices Carter and McDade concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Petitioner Metropolitan Alliance of Police, River Valley Detention Center, Chapter 228

(MAP), brought this petition for review of the dismissal of its unfair labor practice charge

against respondents, the Illinois Labor Relations Board (ILRB), the River Valley Juvenile

Detention Center (Center) and Gerald Kinney, Chief Judge of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit,

by an ILRB administrative law judge (ALJ), and affirmance of the dismissal by the ILRB.

We affirm.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 Petitioner MAP is a union comprised of employees at the detention center, including shift

supervisors and nonline supervisors. The bargaining unit engaged in labor negotiations with

respondent River Valley Juvenile Detention Center (RVJDC or Center) to reach a collective

bargaining agreement (CBA) to replace the agreement that expired in 2009. After a failed

mediation, MAP filed a demand for compulsoryinterest arbitration. Respondent Chief Judge

Kinney rejected MAP’s request for interest arbitration and MAP thereafter filed an unfair

labor practice charge against the Center and Kinney. In the charge, MAP alleged that the

Center and Kinney violated sections 10(a)(1) and (a)(4) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations

Act. 5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1), (4) (West 2010) (unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere

with union employees or activities and “to refuse to bargain collectively in good faith”).

¶ 4 Respondent ILRB issued a complaint for hearing. The Center and Kinney answered the

complaint and denied that the employees were “security employees” entitled to interest

arbitration. Both parties filed prehearing memoranda and submitted a joint statement of

uncontested facts. The uncontested facts are as follows. The Center is a public employer;

-2-
MAP is a labor organization; MAP is the exclusive representative of the shift and nonline

supervisors at RVJDC; the MAP unit was certified in 2005; the parties’ CBA expired in

November 2009; the parties have been negotiating a successor agreement since November

2009; MAP filed a demand for compulsory interest arbitration in September 2010; and

Kinney refused the arbitration request on the basis that the bargaining unit was not entitled

to interest arbitration.

¶ 5 A hearing took place before the administrative law judge. MAP elected to stand on its

documentary evidence consisting of its brief and exhibits. The exhibits included, in part,

employee job descriptions; offense and detention statistics; various forms, brochures,

handbooks, policy manuals and website content from the Center; information regarding the

Will County adult detention facility; and juvenile corrections and detention standards. The

statistics revealed that the average population of the Center was 54 juveniles, with an average

stay of 23 days, according to a fiscal year 2009-10 report. In 2010, the average daily

population was 44, with 711 admissions. In the period from January 2009 to June 2011,

juveniles were detained in a range from 763 days for a first degree murder charge to 1 day

for a contempt of court charge.

¶ 6 Thaddeus Zito testified for the Center and Kinney. He is the assistant superintendent of

the Center and employed by the chief judge of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Center is

under the auspices of the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice (IDJJ) and is not governed

by the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). In 2006, the IDOC Juvenile Division was

abolished and the IDJJ was created. 730 ILCS 5/3-2.5-1 et seq. (West 2010). The Center still

uses the IDOC standards because new ones have not been implemented for the IDJJ but the

residents are not in IDOC custody. The Center houses both males and females, generallyages

10 to 16, with some limited statutory age exceptions. There are two ways residents are

detained at the Center. The first way is from a referral by an arresting officer or department.

The juveniles are evaluated byCenter staff who determine whether they should be admitted.

If approved for admittance, the juvenile is thereafter given a detention hearing where the trial

court decides if there is probable cause that the juvenile is delinquent. The other means is

through court order. The “vast majority” of residents have not been adjudicated but are

awaiting disposition of their cases and are not there for a determinate period.

¶ 7 The shift supervisors maintain the secured part of the Center; supervise the juvenile

detention officers, who interact with the Center’s juveniles; schedule the staff; check in

visitors; and provide programs when needed. The nonline supervisors include the court

liaison, the programs manager, the training supervisor, and the technical coordinator. The

shift and nonline supervisors are management personnel required to meet the minimum

standards established by the Illinois Supreme Court as set forth in the definition of probation

officer in the Probation and Probation Officers Act (Probation Act) (730 ILCS 110/9b(3)

(West 2010)). Employment appointments are made pursuant to section 15 of the Probation

Act. 730 ILCS 110/15 (West 2010) (Illinois Supreme Court authorized to establish probation

services). The juvenile detention officers, who are hired by Will County court services,

monitor the health, safety and welfare of the residents; oversee the juveniles’ daily activities;

and attend to the emotional needs of the juveniles. Per the recommendation of the

Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts (AOIC), the Center maintains an 8-to-1 ratio of

-3-
juveniles to staff. The Center is under the AOIC’s probation and court services division,

which sets standards for the juvenile detention facilities.

¶ 8 John Prinzi testified. He is the superintendent of the Center, responsible for the day-today operations and is employed by the chief judge of the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. Juvenile

detention is under the oversight of the AOIC, whose mission, in part, is to “improve and

enhance the probation court services field.” He submits the Center’s annual plan to the

AOIC, including a budget. The AOIC provides the Center’s funding, in part, and the Center

must report its expenditures to the AOIC. The AOIC promulgates standards for hiring and

jobseekers must complete an AOIC application and be found AOIC-eligible prior to being

hired by the chief judge. The AOIC sets salary schedules, as well as compensation criteria

and standards. The Center is accredited through the American Correctional Association,

which provides auditing and oversight for juvenile detention facilities, in addition to

correctional facilities. The IDOC does not provide any funding for the Center.

¶ 9 MAP called rebuttal witnesses. John Hall testified that he is a shift supervisor at the

Center. The Center is designed for direct supervision, similar to the design at the Will County

Adult Detention Center (ADC). Bret Jerkatis, the Center’s technical coordinator, testified.

He was a member of the transition team involved in the design of the Center. It was modeled

off the adult detention center.

¶ 10 The parties filed posthearing briefs wherein they presented their legal arguments. MAP

asserted that the Center is a correctional facility and that the shift and nonline supervisors are

not probation officers. In response, the Center and Kinney argued that the Center is not a

correctional facility and the employees are probation officers and not security employees

entitled to interest arbitration. The ALJ found that the juveniles at the Center were inmates

under the supervision and control of the shift supervisors, who oversee the juvenile detention

officers (JDOs). The ALJ further found that the Center was not a correctional facility, and

accordingly, the supervisors were not security employees entitled to interest arbitration. The

ALJ recommended dismissal of MAP’s unfair labor practice charge. Both parties filed

exceptions to the ALJ’s recommended decision and order. The ILRB adopted and affirmed

the ALJ’s order. MAP appealed.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 The issue on appeal is whether the ILRB erred when it affirmed the ALJ’s dismissal of

MAP’s unfair labor practice charge. MAP argues that the ALJ and ILRB improperly found

that the Center’s supervisors were not security employees entitled to interest arbitration

because they did not work in a “correctional facilit[y].” It complains that the ALJ and ILRB

failed to give the definition of “correctional facilities” its plain and ordinarymeaning and that

their failure to do so renders an absurd result.

¶ 13 The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the

legislature’s intent. Balmoral Racing Club, Inc. v. Topinka, 334 Ill. App. 3d 454, 458 (2002)

(citing People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 348 (2001)). The best indicator of legislative

intent is the statutory language, which is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

Balmoral Racing Club, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 3d at 459. A dictionary may be used as an aid in

-4-
determining the ordinary meaning. Bailey v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm’n, 405 Ill. App.

3d 550, 555 (2010) (citing Cojeunaze Nursing Center v. Lumpkin, 260 Ill. App. 3d 1024,

1029 (1994)). However, statutory definitions control when construing a statute and common

law definitions yield to statutory definitions. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 326-27 (2007)

(citing 34 Ill. L. and Prac. Statutes § 51 (2001)). On review of an ILRB decision, we accord

deference to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing.

Burbank v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 128 Ill. 2d 335, 345 (1989). We review

de novo an agency determination on issues of statutory interpretation. Mingus v. Board of

Trustees of the Police Pension Fund, 2011 IL App (3d) 110098, ¶ 10.

¶ 14 The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) prohibits “security employees” from

striking but provides them the right to interest arbitration. 5 ILCS 315/14(m), (a) (West

2010). The Act defines a security employee as “an employee who is responsible for the

supervision and control of inmates at correctional facilities.” 5 ILCS 315/3(p) (West 2010).

The Unified Code of Corrections defines “correctional facility” as “any building or part of

a building where committed persons are kept in a secured manner.” 730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(d)

(West 2010). A committed person is a person committed to the Department of Corrections.

730 ILCS 5/3-1-2(c) (West 2010). Commitment is “a judicially determined placement in the

custody of the Department of Corrections on the basis of delinquency or conviction.” 730

ILCS 5/3-1-2(b) (West 2010).

¶ 15 The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 defines detention as “the temporary care of a minor who

is alleged to be or has been adjudicated delinquent and who requires secure custody for the

minor’s own protection or the community’s protection in a facility designed to physically

restrict the minor’s movements, pending disposition by the court or execution of an order of

the court for placement or commitment.” 705 ILCS 405/5-105(5) (West 2010).

¶ 16 The Probation Act defines a probation officer as:

“a person employed full time in a probation or court services department providing

services to a court under this Act or the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 [(705 ILCS 405/1-1

et seq.)]. A probation officer includes detention staff *** who meet minimum standards

established by the Supreme Court and who are hired under the direction of the circuit

court. These probation officers are judicial employees designated on a circuit wide or

county basis and compensated by the appropriate county board or boards.” 730 ILCS

110/9b(3) (West 2010).

¶ 17 The Illinois Labor Relations Act does not define “correctional facilities.” MAP urges this

court to adopt a definition of “correctional facility” it found online at uslegal.com and find

that RVJDC is a correctional facility, its supervisors are security employees, and the MAP

unit is entitled to interest arbitration. MAP’s proffered definition of “correctional facility”

is as follows:

“Correctional facility is a term that may be used to refer to a jail, prison, or other

place of incarceration by government officials. They serve to confine and rehabilitate

prisoners and may be classified as minimum, medium, or maximum security facilities,

or contain separate divisions for such categories of prisoners. The prisoners may

participate in educational and vocational programs as well as in paid industries programs

-5-
or a work release program.” US Legal, http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/correctionalfacility/ (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).

¶ 18 In arguing that the Center is a correctional facility, MAP relies extensively, in addition

to the above definition, on aligning the layout and furnishing of the Center, its procedures

and practices, and the nature of the juveniles detained there with the Will County Adult

Detention Center. MAP’s comparison does not aid its position. Even if we were to find

MAP’s comparison with the adult detention center appropriate, and we do not, MAP has not

introduced any evidence that the adult detention center and its supervisors are employed in

a correctional facility as security employees entitled to interest arbitration. Moreover, we

agree with the ALJ’s decision to look to Illinois statutory definitions of “correctional

facilities” instead of a general online definition chosen by MAP.

¶ 19 The ALJ noted that the Board had not yet addressed what constitutes a correctional

facility and whether a juvenile detention center qualifies as one. The ALJlooked to two other

administrative decisions in rendering the decision. Chief Judge of the Fifth Judicial Circuit,

18 PERI ¶ 2057 (ILRB State Panel 2002) (finding juvenile detention centers to be

correctional facilities because they deprive juveniles of liberty and conform to IDOC

standards); International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 330, 18 PERI ¶ 2026 (ILRB State

Panel 2002) (finding juvenile detention centers are not correctional facilities because the

juveniles are detained there and not committed, and the legislature expressly delineated

“detention facilities” from “correctional facilities”). The ALJ relied on the distinction found

in Teamsters, Local 330, distinguishing committed juveniles from detained juveniles and

statutory support for the distinction in reaching her decision.

¶ 20 We consider the ALJ’s reasoning and conclusion correct. We reject MAP’s proffered

definition and instead look to the statutory framework to discern the legislative intent as an

aid in defining “correctional facilities” under the Act. The Juvenile Court Act provides that

a juvenile is detained when he or she is alleged or adjudicated delinquent and requires secure

custody in a restricted facility pending court disposition or execution of a court order for

placement or commitment. 705 ILCS 405/5-105(5) (West 2010). In contrast, under the

Unified Code of Corrections, a correctional facility houses committed persons placed in the

custody of the IDOC by a judicial determination based on delinquency or conviction. 730

ILCS 5/3-1-2(b), (c), (d) (West 2010).

¶ 21 As concluded by the ALJ, the nature of confinement is the critical distinction between

the Center and a correctional facility. The residents who are detained at the Center are

awaiting adjudication and have not yet been found delinquent or sentenced to a term of

incarceration. They are detained under a detention order, not an order of commitment.

Testimony at the hearing established there had been no such commitments in the witness’s

13-yeartenure at the Center and MAP did not present any evidence that committed juveniles

have ever been held at the Center except those juveniles that are awaiting transfer to a

specific type of treatment facility pursuant to a court order. Statistics submitted by MAP

indicate that between June 2007 and June 2011, the Center’s population ranged from 19 to

84 juveniles. In fiscal year 2009-10, the average population was 54 and the average stay at

the Center was 23 days. Days in detention pending trial ranged from 763 days for a first

degree murder charge to 1 day for a contempt of court charge. The statistics offered by MAP

-6-
did not include any information that juveniles had been sentenced to serve a term at the

Center after being adjudicated delinquent.

¶ 22 We are further persuaded that the sweeping changes the legislature made to the nature

of incarcerating juveniles when it created the Department of Juvenile Justice supports our

determination. See 730 ILCS 5/3-2.5-5 (West 2010) (“purpose of this Article is to create the

Department of Juvenile Justice” and directing the IDJJ to “embrace the legislative policy of

the State to promote the philosophy of balanced and restorative justice” as set forth in the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/5-101 (West 2010)). The creation of the IDJJ

separated juvenile justice from the IDOC, which is not involved in the operation of the

Center. The juveniles detained at the Center are not in IDOC custody. Although the Center

operates under IDOC standards because no other standards are in place, it is accredited as a

detention center, not a juvenile correctional facility. At the Center, the supervisors in the

MAP unit direct the juvenile detention officers, who are generally responsible for the safety,

security and supervision of the residents. Contrary to MAP’s assertions, the JDOs serve as

advocates and counselors, not as correctional officers. See 730 ILCS 5/3-2.5-40.1 (West

2010) (detention center staff to be trained “to work with a broad range of youth and possess

the skills necessary to assess, engage, educate, and intervene with youth in its custody in

ways that are appropriate to ensure successful outcomes for those youths”). The distinction

between a detention center and a correctional facility is additionally supported by the

Probation Act, which identifies detention staff, but not correctional staff, as probation

officers. 730 ILCS 110/9b(3) (West 2010). See also 705 ILCS 405/1-4.1 (West 2010)

(distinguishing between detention center and secure correctional facility).

¶ 23 Detention staff are required to meet AOIC standards and are employed by the probation

or court services department. 730 ILCS 110/9b(3) (West 2010). Further distinguishing the

Center from a correctional facility is that it is funded and operated by the AOIC and the Will

County chief judge. 705 ILCS 405/6-6 (West 2010). The AOIC requires applicants for

positions at the Center to pass its eligibility standards, after which the chief judge hires the

Center’s employees under the circuit’s probation and court services department. Had the

legislature intended the staff at juvenile detention homes to be considered correctional

officers and the detention homes to be correctional facilities, it would have done so. Instead,

the legislature expressly differentiated between detention homes and correctional facilities.

¶ 24 Because the supervisors here do not work at a correctional facility, they do not meet the

definition of security employees and are not entitled to interest arbitration. There was no

unfair labor practice in Chief Judge Kinney’s refusal to proceed with interest arbitration.

Accordingly, we find that MAP’s unfair labor practice charge was properly dismissed.

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Illinois Labor Relations Board is

confirmed.

¶ 26 Confirmed.

-7-