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[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3667 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3667

 To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 
                Nations system, and for other purposes.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 1, 2015

 Ms. Ros-Lehtinen introduced the following bill; which was referred to 
                    the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 
                Nations system, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``United Nations 
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2015''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a 
                            voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States contributions to the 
                            regular budget of the United Nations.
Sec. 104. Report on United Nations reform.
      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Oversight of United States contributions to the United 
                            Nations System.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States Contributions.
Sec. 205. Integrity for United States Contributions.
Sec. 206. Refund of monies owed by the United Nations to the United 
                            States.
Sec. 207. Annual reports on United States Contributions to the United 
                            Nations.
Sec. 208. Report on United Nations procurement practices.
         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the Security Council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Review of United Nations Conventions on Terrorism.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 308. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 309. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 310. Anti-Semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 311. United States policy on Taiwan's participation in United 
                            Nations Entities.
Sec. 312. United States policy on Tier 3 human rights violators.
     TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Statement of policy.
Sec. 403. Implementation.
              TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Sec. 501. Findings.
Sec. 502. Human Rights Council membership and funding.
                       TITLE VI--2014 GAZA REPORT

Sec. 601. Findings.
Sec. 602. Statement of policy.
Sec. 603. Withholding of funds; Refund of United States taxpayer 
                            dollars.
              TITLE VII--BIASED AND COMPROMISED ACTIVITIES

Sec. 701. Withholding of funds.
                           TITLE VIII--UNRWA

Sec. 801. Findings.
Sec. 802. United States Contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 803. Sense of Congress.
              TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sec. 901. Technical cooperation program.
Sec. 902. United States policy at the IAEA.
Sec. 903. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan 
                            of the IAEA.
                         TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING

Sec. 1001. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 1002. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping 
                            operations.
Sec. 1003. Certification.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual 
        who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or 
        senior management of the United Nations, including consultants, 
        contractors, and subcontractors.
            (2) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means 
        the General Assembly of the United Nations.
            (3) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member 
        State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the 
        term ``country''.
            (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of State.
            (5) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General'' 
        means the Secretary General of the United Nations.
            (6) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means 
        the Security Council of the United Nations.
            (7) UN.--The term ``UN'' means the United Nations.
            (8) United nations entity.--The term ``United Nations 
        Entity'' means any United Nations agency, commission, 
        conference, council, court, department, forum, fund, institute, 
        office, organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body, 
        tribunal, trust, university or academic body, related 
        organization or subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies 
        the United Nations flag or is authorized to use the United 
        Nations logo, including those United Nations affiliated 
        agencies and bodies identified as recipients of United States 
        contributions under section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public 
        Law 109-364), but not including the International Bank for 
        Reconstruction and Development, the International Centre for 
        Settlement of Investment Disputes, the International 
        Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, 
        the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, and the World 
        Trade Organization.
            (9) United nations system.--The term ``United Nations 
        System'' means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities, 
        as defined in paragraph (8).
            (10) United states contribution.--The term ``United States 
        Contribution'' means an assessed or voluntary contribution, 
        whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United 
        States Government to a United Nations Entity, including 
        contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by 
        a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include 
        those contributions identified pursuant to section 
        1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
            (11) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs of the Senate.

                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United States pays billions of dollars into the 
        United Nations system every year (almost $7,700,000,000 in 
        2010, according to the White House Office of Management and 
        Budget, the last time a complete report has been provided), 
        significantly more than any other nation.
            (2) The Secretary of State has yet provide to Congress a 
        report on all United States contributions to the United Nations 
        and United Nations Entities as required 90 days after the 
        enactment of the Consolidated and Further Continuing 
        Appropriations Act of 2015 (Public Law 113-235) on December 16, 
        2014, in accordance with House Report 113-499, which 
        accompanied the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
        Appropriations Bill of 2015.
            (3) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is 
        possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for 
        important United Nations budget votes with a group of countries 
        that, taken together, pay approximately 1 percent of the total 
        United Nations regular budget.
            (4) The disconnect between contribution levels and 
        management control creates significant perverse incentives in 
        terms of United Nations spending, transparency, and 
        accountability.
            (5) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably 
        high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair 
        its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
            (6) Amidst the continuing financial, corruption, and sexual 
        abuse scandals of the past several years, American public 
        disapproval of United Nations has reached all-time highs. A 
        2015 Gallup poll revealed that 57 percent of Americans believe 
        that the United Nations is doing a poor job.
            (7) Significant improvements in United Nations transparency 
        and accountability are necessary for improving public 
        perceptions of American support for United Nations operations.
            (8) Because of their need to justify future contributions 
        from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more 
        incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations 
        than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are 
        not tied to performance.
            (9) Catherine Bertini, the former United Nations Under-
        Secretary General for Management and director of the World Food 
        Program (WFP), has stated that ``Voluntary funding creates an 
        entirely different atmosphere at WFP than at the UN. At WFP, 
        every staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, 
        accountable, transparent, and results-oriented as possible. If 
        we are not, donor governments can take their funding elsewhere 
        in a very competitive world among UN agencies, NGOs, and 
        bilateral governments.''.
            (10) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
        which states that ``[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be 
        borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly'', 
        leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of 
        apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary 
        pledges by Member States.
            (11) Unlike United States assessed contributions to the 
        United Nations regular budget, which are statutorily capped at 
        22 percent of the total, there is no cap on voluntary 
        contributions.
            (12) The United States, which contributes generously to 
        international organizations whose activities it recognizes as 
        credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 
        percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded United 
        Nations Specialized Agencies.
            (13) John Bolton, former United States Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations, has stated that ``Moving 
        to voluntary funding would end the UN practice of charging 
        member states for the expenses of the UN and its activities. 
        Member states would instead determine for themselves how much 
        to provide to the UN and, importantly, the specific tasks and 
        activities that those contributions would support. The shift 
        toward a voluntary payment system would impose a stronger 
        market incentive for UN programs and activities to meet their 
        goals and justify continued funding.''.

SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A 
              VOLUNTARY BASIS.

    (a) United States Policy.--
            (1) In general.--It is the policy of the United States to 
        seek to shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of 
        the United Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
            (2) Action at united nations.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the United 
        Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
        States at the United Nations to shift the funding mechanism for 
        the regular budget of the United Nations to a voluntary basis, 
        and to make it a priority to build support for such a 
        transformational change among Member States, particularly key 
        United Nations donors.
    (b) Certification of Predominantly Voluntary UN Regular Budget 
Finding.--A certification described in this section is a certification 
by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees 
that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget (not including 
extra-budgetary contributions) of the United Nations is apportioned on 
a voluntary basis. Each such certification shall be effective for a 
period of not more than 1 year, and shall be promptly revoked by the 
Secretary, with notice to the appropriate congressional committees, if 
the underlying circumstances change so as not to warrant such 
certification.
    (c) Withholding of Nonvoluntary Contributions.--
            (1) In general.--Beginning 2 years after the effective date 
        of this Act and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no 
        funds may be obligated or expended for a United States assessed 
        contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations in an 
        amount greater than 50 percent of the United States share of 
        assessed contributions for the regular budget of the United 
        Nations unless there is in effect a certification by the 
        Secretary, as described in subsection (b).
            (2) Allowance.--For a period of 1 year after appropriation, 
        funds appropriated for use as a United States contribution to 
        the regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from 
        obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be 
        obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification 
        described in subsection (b). After 1 year, in the absence of 
        such certification, those funds shall revert to the United 
        States Treasury.

SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
              REGULAR BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget 
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of 
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the 
United Nations.
    (b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization 
required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) contain information relating to the amounts requested 
        in support of each of the various sections and titles of the 
        regular budget of the United Nations; and
            (2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with 
        the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United 
        States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and 
        titles.
    (c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes 
an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State 
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

SEC. 104. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United 
Nations reform.
    (b) Contents.--The report required under subsection (a) shall 
describe the following:
            (1) Progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for 
        the United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as 
        identified in section 102, and a detailed description of 
        efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials 
        toward that end.
            (2) Progress toward each of the policy goals identified in 
        the prior sections of this title, and a detailed, goal-specific 
        description of efforts and activities by United States 
        diplomats and officials toward those ends.
            (3) The status of the implementation of management reforms 
        within the United Nations and its specialized agencies.
            (4) The number of outputs, reports, or other mandates 
        generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been 
        eliminated.
            (5) The progress of the General Assembly to modernize and 
        streamline the committee structure and its specific 
        recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent 
        with the landmark March 2005 report of the Secretary General 
        entitled ``In larger freedom: towards development, security and 
        human rights for all''.
            (6) The status of the review by the General Assembly of all 
        mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been 
        redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 
        report of the Secretary General and other relevant reports.
            (7) The continued utility and relevance of the Economic and 
        Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural 
        Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those 
        committees and the Economic and Social Council.
            (8) Whether the United Nations or any of its specialized 
        agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of 
        Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement 
        Programs.

      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, 
        fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms 
        within the United Nations system remain significantly 
        deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those 
        initiated by Secretaries General of the United Nations.
            (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any 
        Secretary General of the United Nations to promote 
        institutional transparency and accountability within the United 
        Nations System, the Secretary General lacks the power to impose 
        far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the 
        General Assembly.
            (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the 
        General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional 
        contributions to the United Nations system have repeatedly and 
        successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform 
        proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and 
        scrutiny of United Nations system operations and expenditures.
            (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, 
        including the United States, lack access to reasonably 
        detailed, reliable information that would allow them to 
        determine how their contributions have been spent by various 
        United Nations system entities, further contributing to the 
        lack of accountability within the United Nations system.
            (5) In September 2015, the State Department announced the 
        United States would withhold 15 percent of United States 
        contributions to the World Intellectual Property Organization 
        (WIPO) because the Secretary of State could not certify that 
        WIPO is meeting best practices for the protection of 
        whistleblowers from retaliation in accordance with the 
        Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (Public Law 113-76).

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) Accountability certification.--The term 
        ``Accountability Certification'' means an annual, written 
        affirmation by the head or authorized designee of a United 
        Nations Entity provided to the Secretary of State that the 
        Entity--
                    (A) provides the public with full, complete, and 
                unfettered access to all relevant documentation 
                relating to operations and activities, including budget 
                and procurement activities;
                    (B) implements best practices for the protection of 
                whistleblowers from retaliation, including best 
                practices for--
                            (i) protection against retaliation for 
                        internal and lawful public disclosures;
                            (ii) legal burdens of proof;
                            (iii) statutes of limitation for reporting 
                        retaliation;
                            (iv) access to independent adjudicative 
                        bodies, including external arbitration; and
                            (v) results that eliminate the effects of 
                        proven retaliation;
                    (C) implements and upholds policies and procedures 
                to require the filing of individual annual financial 
                disclosure forms by each of its employees at the P-5 
                level and above and to require that such forms be made 
                available to the Office of Internal Oversight Services, 
                to Member States, and to the public;
                    (D) has established an effective ethics office;
                    (E) has established a fully independent, 
                autonomous, and effective internal oversight body;
                    (F) has adopted and implemented, and is in full 
                compliance with, International Public Sector Accounting 
                Standards;
                    (G) has established a cap on its administrative 
                overhead costs;
                    (H) is not subject to sanctions by the Security 
                Council; and
                    (I) is not subject to sanctions by the United 
                States.
            (2) Oversight information.--The term ``Oversight 
        Information'' includes--
                    (A) internally and externally commissioned audits, 
                investigatory reports, program reviews, performance 
                reports, and evaluations;
                    (B) financial statements, records, and billing 
                systems;
                    (C) program budgets and program budget 
                implications, including revised estimates and reports 
                produced by or provided to the Secretary General and 
                the Secretary General's agents on budget related 
                matters;
                    (D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary 
                analyses for peacekeeping operations;
                    (E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of 
                assessments;
                    (F) databases and other data systems containing 
                financial or programmatic information;
                    (G) documents or other records alleging or 
                involving improper use of resources, misconduct, 
                mismanagement, or other violations of rules and 
                regulations applicable to the United Nations Entity; 
                and
                    (H) other documentation relevant to the oversight 
                work of Congress with respect to United States 
                contributions to the United Nations system.
            (3) Transparency certification.--The term ``Transparency 
        Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the 
        head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity, 
        provided to the Department of State, that the Entity will 
        cooperate with the Department of State and Congress, including 
        by providing the Department of State and Congress with full, 
        complete, and unfettered access to Oversight Information as 
        defined in this title.

SEC. 203. OVERSIGHT OF UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
              NATIONS SYSTEM.

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to enhance oversight 
of United States contributions to the United Nations System and the use 
of those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to 
eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those 
contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater 
transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the 
United Nations System.
    (b) Implementation.--
            (1) In general.--The Department of State shall collect and 
        maintain current records regarding Transparency Certifications 
        and Accountability Certifications by all United Nations 
        Entities that receive United States contributions and submit 
        that information for inclusion in the report required under 
        section 207.
            (2) Notification.--The Department of State shall keep the 
        appropriate congressional committees fully informed of how 
        United Nations Entities are spending United States 
        contributions prior to the President's budget request, and 
        periodically throughout the remainder of the year thereafter.
            (3) Referrals.--
                    (A) In general.--The Secretary of State shall 
                promptly report to the Attorney General and to the 
                appropriate congressional committees when the Secretary 
                of State has reasonable grounds to believe a Federal 
                criminal law has been violated by a United Nations 
                Entity or one of its employees, contractors, or 
                representatives.
                    (B) Notification.--The Secretary of State shall 
                promptly report, when appropriate, to the appropriate 
                congressional committees, and to the Secretary General 
                or to the head of the appropriate United Nations 
                Entity, cases in which the Secretary of State 
                reasonably believes that mismanagement, misfeasance, or 
                malfeasance is likely to have taken place within a 
                United Nations Entity and disciplinary proceedings are 
                likely justified, and shall keep the appropriate 
                congressional committees informed of any relevant 
                actions undertaken by the Secretary General or relevant 
                United Nations Entity.
            (4) Confirmation of transparency by united nations 
        entities.--
                    (A) Prompt notice by department of state.--Whenever 
                information or assistance requested from a United 
                Nations Entity by the Department of State pursuant to a 
                Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary of State, unreasonably refused or not 
                provided in a timely manner, the Secretary of State 
                shall notify the appropriate congressional committees, 
                the head of that particular United Nations Entity, and 
                the Secretary General of the circumstances in writing, 
                without delay.
                    (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the 
                information or assistance being sought by the 
                Department of State in connection with a notification 
                pursuant to subparagraph (A) is provided to the 
                satisfaction of the Secretary of State, the Secretary 
                of State shall so notify in writing to the appropriate 
                congressional committees and the head of that 
                particular United Nations Entity.
                    (C) Noncompliance.--If the information or 
                assistance being sought by the Department of State in 
                connection with a notification pursuant to subparagraph 
                (A) is not provided within 90 days of that 
                notification, then the United Nations Entity that is 
                the subject of the notification is deemed to be 
                noncompliant with its Transparency Certification.
                    (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
                of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide 
                prompt, written notification of that fact and of the 
                restoration of compliance, along with a description of 
                the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the 
                appropriate congressional committees, the head of that 
                United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States contribution during the prior 2 years.
            (5) Confirmation of accountability by united nations 
        entities.--
                    (A) Prompt notice by secretary of state.--Whenever 
                a United Nations Entity that has provided an 
                Accountability Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Secretary of State, not in full compliance with any or 
                all of the provisions of that certification, the 
                Secretary of State shall notify the appropriate 
                congressional committees, the head of that particular 
                United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the 
                circumstances in writing, without delay.
                    (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the United 
                Nations Entity resumes full compliance with its 
                Accountability Certification following the provision of 
                the notification pursuant to subparagraph (A), the 
                Secretary of State shall so notify in writing the 
                appropriate congressional committees and the head of 
                that United Nations Entity.
                    (C) Noncompliance.--If the United Nations Entity 
                named in the notification in subparagraph (A) does not 
                resume full compliance with its Accountability 
                Certification to the satisfaction of the Secretary of 
                State within 90 days of that notification, then the 
                United Nations Entity that is the subject of the 
                notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its 
                Accountability Certification, and the Secretary of 
                State shall provide prompt, written notification of 
                that fact to the appropriate congressional committees, 
                the head of that United Nations Entity, the Secretary 
                General, and any office or agency of the Federal 
                Government that has provided that United Nations Entity 
                with any United States Contribution during the prior 2 
                years.
                    (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Secretary 
                of State, the Secretary of State shall promptly provide 
                prompt, written notification of that fact and of the 
                restoration of compliance, along with a description of 
                the basis for the Secretary of State's decision, to the 
                appropriate congressional committees, the head of that 
                United Nations Entity, the Secretary General, and any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States contribution during the prior 2 years.
            (6) Reporting.--
                    (A) Reporting.--In the report submitted by the 
                Director of the Office of Management and Budget to 
                Congress pursuant to section 207, the Secretary of 
                State shall submit for inclusion a section that, among 
                other things, includes a list and detailed description 
                of the circumstances surrounding any notification of 
                compliance issued pursuant to paragraph (4)(C) or 
                (5)(C) during the covered timeframe, and whether and 
                when the Secretary has reversed such finding of 
                noncompliance.
                    (B) Prohibited disclosures.--Nothing in this 
                subsection shall be construed to authorize the public 
                disclosure of information that is--
                            (i) specifically prohibited from disclosure 
                        by any other provision of law;
                            (ii) specifically required by Executive 
                        order to be protected from disclosure in the 
                        interest of national defense or national 
                        security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; 
                        or
                            (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal 
                        investigation.
                    (C) Privacy protections.--The Secretary of State 
                shall exempt from public disclosure information 
                received from a United Nations Entity that the 
                Secretary of State believes--
                            (i) constitutes a trade secret or 
                        privileged and confidential personal financial 
                        information;
                            (ii) constitutes confidential personal 
                        medical information;
                            (iii) accuses a particular person of a 
                        crime;
                            (iv) would, if publicly disclosed, 
                        constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
                        personal privacy; and
                            (v) would compromise an ongoing law 
                        enforcement investigation or judicial trial in 
                        the United States.

SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) Funding Prerequisites.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to 
any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if--
            (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year a 
        Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(1);
            (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is 
        noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described 
        in section 203(b)(4)(C);
            (3) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Secretary of State within the preceding year an 
        Accountability Certification as defined in section 202(3); or
            (4) the intended United Nations Entity is noncompliant with 
        its Accountability Certification as described in section 
        203(b)(5)(C).
    (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the 
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated 
for use as a United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity 
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because 
of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United 
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered 
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.

SEC. 205. INTEGRITY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) Limitations.--(1) No funds made available for use under the 
heading ``Contributions to International Organizations'' may be used 
for any purpose other than an assessed United States contribution to a 
United Nations Entity or other international organization.
    (2) No funds made available for use under the heading 
``International Organizations and Programs'' may be used for any 
purpose other than a voluntary United States contribution to a United 
Nations Entity or other international organization.
    (3) No funds made available for use under the heading 
``Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities'' may be used 
for any purpose other than a United States contribution to United 
Nations peacekeeping activities, to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia, or to the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda.
    (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the 
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated 
for use as a United States contribution to a United Nations Entity 
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because 
of the restrictions of subsection (a), shall be returned to the United 
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered 
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.

SEC. 206. REFUND OF MONIES OWED BY THE UNITED NATIONS TO THE UNITED 
              STATES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) United States taxpayer funds overpaid to United Nations 
        Entities and payable back to the United States sometimes remain 
        in the hands of the United Nations because the United States 
        has not requested the return of those funds.
            (2) Such funds have been paid into, among other United 
        Nations Entities, the United Nations Tax Equalization Fund 
        (TEF), which was established under the provisions of United 
        Nations General Assembly Resolution 973 (1955), and which is 
        used to reimburse United Nations staff members subject to 
        United States income taxes for the cost of those taxes.
            (3) In recent years, the TEF has taken in considerably more 
        money than it has paid out, with the United States apparently 
        overpaying into the TEF by $24,363,000 in 2014 alone.
            (4) According to the United Nations Financial Report and 
        Audited Financial Statements released on July 23, 2015, ``The 
        cumulative surplus payable to the United States of America at 
        year-end was $27,600,000''.
            (5) That balance was allowed to accrue notwithstanding 
        United Nations Financial Regulation 4.12, which states that any 
        such surpluses ``shall be credited against the assessed 
        contributions due from that Member State the following year.''.
            (6) Allowing the United Nations to regularly overcharge the 
        United States and to retain those overpayments, or to spend 
        them on wholly unrelated activities, is a disservice to 
        American taxpayers and a subversion of the Congressional budget 
        process.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to annually instruct the United Nations to return to 
        the United States any surplus assessed contributions or other 
        overpayments by the United States to any United Nations Entity; 
        and
            (2) to use the voice and vote of the United States to press 
        the United Nations to reform its TEF assessment procedures to 
        reduce the repeated discrepancies between TEF income and 
        expenditures.
    (c) Certification and Withholding.--For each and every fiscal year 
subsequent to the effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of 
State submits to the appropriate congressional committees a 
certification that the United Nations has returned to the United States 
any surplus assessed contributions or other overpayments by the United 
States to any United Nations Entity, the Secretary of State shall 
withhold from the regular budget of the United Nations an amount equal 
to the amount of the funds that the United Nations has yet to return to 
the United States.

SEC. 207. ANNUAL REPORTS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
              NATIONS.

    (a) Annual Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget shall submit to Congress a report 
listing all assessed and voluntary contributions of the United States 
Government for the preceding fiscal year to the United Nations and 
United Nations affiliated agencies and related bodies.
    (b) Contents.--Each report required under subsection (a) shall set 
forth, for the fiscal year covered by such report, the following:
            (1) The total amount of all assessed and voluntary 
        contributions of the United States Government to the United 
        Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
        bodies.
            (2) The approximate percentage of United States Government 
        contributions to each United Nations affiliated agency or body 
        in such fiscal year when compared with all contributions to 
        such agency or body from any source in such fiscal year.
            (3) For each such contribution--
                    (A) the amount of such contribution;
                    (B) a description of such contribution (including 
                whether assessed or voluntary);
                    (C) the department or agency of the United States 
                Government responsible for such contribution;
                    (D) the purpose of such contribution; and
                    (E) the United Nations or United Nations affiliated 
                agency or related body receiving such contribution.
    (c) Scope of Initial Report.--The first report required under 
subsection (a) shall include the information required under this 
section for the previous three fiscal years.
    (d) Public Availability of Information.--Not later than 14 days 
after submitting a report required under subsection (a), the Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget shall post a public version of 
the report on a text-based, searchable, and publicly available Internet 
Web site.

SEC. 208. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PROCUREMENT PRACTICES.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall 
submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on United 
Nations procurement reform.
    (b) Contents.--The reports required under subsection (a) shall 
describe--
            (1) progress toward the goal of donor countries 
        establishing a threshold number for procurement purposes, of 
        which 50 percent of the procurement for donor programs over 
        $1,000,000,000 shall utilize donor vendors;
            (2) the status of the amount and percentage of procurement 
        at the United Nations through United States vendors; and
            (3) the status of examinations and investigations if 
        companies on the Excluded Parties List System are receiving 
        contracts through the United Nations, and the values of such 
        contracts.

         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure the 
United Nations publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable 
Internet Web site, a list of all United Nations subsidiary bodies and 
their functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and 
assessed, sorted by donor.

SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to implement a 
system for the required filing of individual annual financial 
disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P-5 level and above, 
which shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services, to Member States, and to the public.

SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

    It is the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any 
proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion 
would--
            (1) diminish the influence of the United States on the 
        Security Council; or
            (2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security 
        Council.

SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that 
Member States may, upon request, have access to all reports and audits 
completed by the Board of External Auditors.

SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that the 
Secretary General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General 
under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official 
in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. 
In exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret 
the interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or 
prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under 
investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is 
credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.

SEC. 306. REVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS CONVENTIONS ON TERRORISM.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to initiate a 
comprehensive review of United Nations Conventions on Terrorism that 
builds upon the recommendations of the December 2004 report of the 
High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change with the goal of 
providing recommendations to the Security Council.
    (b) Report.--A year from the date of enactment, the Secretary of 
State, in coordination with the United States Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, shall report to the appropriate congressional 
committees on the status of the review under subsection (a).

SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report--
            (1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to 
        modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 
        2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger 
        freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
        all''; and
            (2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
    (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
            (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms 
        at the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
                    (A) tenure;
                    (B) performance reviews;
                    (C) the promotion system;
                    (D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced 
                regulations concerning termination of employment of 
                employees; and
                    (E) the implementation of a code of conduct and 
                ethics training;
            (2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing 
        complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment, 
        including sexual harassment;
            (3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
            (4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to 
        the mission of a member state to the United Nations from 
        transferring to a position within the United Nations 
        Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
            (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in 
        travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to 
        accommodations and airline flights; and
            (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary 
        General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary 
        General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing 
        priorities.

SEC. 308. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

    The United States shall withhold from United States contributions 
to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial 
period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget 
that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
            (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 
        international covenant (without any protocols) to which the 
        United States is not party; or
            (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United 
        States is a party to neither.

SEC. 309. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Department of State Review and Report.--
            (1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding 
        with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in 
        the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary 
        shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act--
                    (A) complete an audit of the functions of the 
                entities listed in paragraph (2); and
                    (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report containing audit findings and 
                conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of 
                such duplicative entities and efforts.
            (2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1)(A) 
        are the following:
                    (A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian 
                Rights.
                    (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 
                Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
                    (C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
                Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative 
                to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
                Palestinian Authority.
                    (D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
                    (E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
                Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian 
                People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
                    (F) Any other entity the Secretary determines 
                results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to 
                ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian 
                issues.
    (b) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 
        United Nations to seek the implementation of the 
        recommendations contained in the report required under 
        subsection (a)(1)(B).
            (2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have 
        been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United 
        States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the 
        United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are 
        proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 
        for such entities.

SEC. 310. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

    The President shall direct the United States permanent 
representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to make every 
effort to--
            (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive 
        by the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate, 
        that--
                    (A) requires the United Nations and its specialized 
                agencies to officially and publicly condemn anti-
                Semitic statements made at any session of the United 
                Nations or its specialized agencies, or at any other 
                session sponsored by the United Nations;
                    (B) requires employees of the United Nations and 
                its specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be 
                subject to punitive action, including immediate 
                dismissal, for making anti-Semitic statements or 
                references;
                    (C) proposes specific recommendations to the 
                General Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to 
                hold accountable employees and officials of the United 
                Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and 
                funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic 
                statements or references in any forum of the United 
                Nations or of its specialized agencies;
                    (D) continues to develop and implements education 
                awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-
                Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to 
                combat intolerance and hatred; and
                    (E) requires the Office of the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop 
                programming and other measures that address anti-
                Semitism;
            (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General 
        Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph 
        (1)(C); and
            (3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-
        Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United 
        Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.

SEC. 311. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TAIWAN'S PARTICIPATION IN UNITED 
              NATIONS ENTITIES.

    The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure 
meaningful participation for Taiwan in relevant United Nations Entities 
in which Taiwan has expressed an interest in participating.

SEC. 312. UNITED STATES POLICY ON TIER 3 HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS.

    The Secretary of State shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that no 
representative of a country designated pursuant to section 110 of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) by the 
Department of State as a Tier 3 country shall preside as Chair or 
President of any United Nations Entity.

     TITLE IV--STATUS OF PALESTINIAN ENTITIES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) In 1989, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
        launched an effort to evade direct negotiations for peace with 
        the State of Israel by instead pursuing Palestinian membership 
        in international organizations, which could imply de facto 
        recognition of a Palestinian state by the United Nations.
            (2) The executive branch, with significant support from 
        Members of Congress, successfully stopped the PLO's effort by 
        credibly threatening, as noted in a May 1, 1989, statement by 
        then-Secretary of State James A. Baker, ``that the United 
        States [would] make no further contributions, voluntary or 
        assessed, to any international organization which makes any 
        change in the P.L.O.'s present status as an observer 
        organization.''.
            (3) The United States success in this case demonstrates 
        that withholding contributions and placing conditions on their 
        payment can result in real reforms, stop counterproductive 
        developments, and advance United States interests at the United 
        Nations.
            (4) The Palestinian leadership has continued its effort to 
        evade direct negotiations for peace with the State of Israel by 
        seeking recognition of a Palestinian state from foreign 
        governments and in international forums.
            (5) On September 30, 2015, Abu Mazen declared that 
        Palestinian leadership would no longer be bound by its signed 
        agreements with Israel.
            (6) Further efforts to bypass negotiations and to 
        unilaterally declare a Palestinian state, or to appeal to the 
        United Nations or other international forums or to foreign 
        governments for recognition of a Palestinian state or 
        membership or other upgraded status for the Palestinian 
        observer mission at those forums, would violate the underlying 
        principles of the Oslo Accords, the Road Map, and other 
        relevant Middle East peace process efforts.
            (7) In 2011, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
        and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) granted full membership to 
        the Palestinians, triggering United States law that prohibits 
        United States funding for any United Nations organization that 
        grants membership to the PLO.
            (8) On December 15, 2010, the House of Representatives 
        passed House Resolution 1765, in which, inter alia, the House 
        of Representatives:
                    (A) ``reaffirms its strong opposition to any 
                attempt to establish or seek recognition of a 
                Palestinian state outside of an agreement negotiated 
                between Israel and the Palestinians'';
                    (B) ``supports the Administration's opposition to a 
                unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state''; and
                    (C) ``calls upon the Administration to . . . lead a 
                diplomatic effort to persuade other nations to oppose a 
                unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state and to 
                oppose recognition of a Palestinian state by other 
                nations, within the United Nations, and in other 
                international forums prior to achievement of a final 
                agreement between Israel and the Palestinians.''.
            (9) Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo, former United States 
        Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, stated 
        on July 26, 2011, ``Let there be no doubt: symbolic actions to 
        isolate Israel at the United Nations in September will not 
        create an independent Palestinian state . . . The United States 
        will not support unilateral campaigns at the United Nations in 
        September or any other time.''.
            (10) On September 16, 2011, the Deputy National Security 
        Advisor for Strategic Communications stated that ``We would 
        veto actions through the Security Council and oppose action 
        through the Security Council associated with a unilateral 
        declaration of [Palestinian] statehood.''.

SEC. 402. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to oppose the recognition of 
a Palestinian state by any United Nations Entity, or any upgrade, 
including full membership, in the status of the Palestinian observer 
mission at the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
the Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 
organization or governing entity, at any United Nations Entity, prior 
to the achievement of a final peace agreement negotiated between and 
agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians.

SEC. 403. IMPLEMENTATION.

    (a) In General.--The President shall direct the United States 
Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to advance the 
policy stated in section 402.
    (b) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold 
United States contributions from any United Nations Entity that 
recognizes a Palestinian state or upgrades in any way, including 
granting full membership, the status of the Palestinian observer 
mission at the United Nations, the Palestine Liberation Organization, 
the Palestinian Authority, or any other Palestinian administrative 
organization or governing entity, at that United Nations Entity, prior 
to the achievement of complete and final peace agreement negotiated 
between and agreed to by Israel and the Palestinians. Funds 
appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the United 
Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to this 
section shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury and 
shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations 
Entity.

              TITLE V--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

SEC. 501. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since its establishment in 2006, the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council has failed to meaningfully promote the 
        protection of internationally recognized human rights, and has 
        proven to be even more problematic than the United Nations 
        Human Rights Commission that it was created to replace.
            (2) The United Nations Human Rights Council suffers from 
        fundamental and severe structural flaws present since its 
        establishment by the United Nations General Assembly, such as 
        the fact that it draws its members from the General Assembly 
        without any substantive membership criteria, with the perverse 
        result that a number of the world's worst human rights abusers 
        are members of the council.
            (3) For example, many members of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council are rated ``Not Free'' or only ``Partly Free'' 
        by Freedom House. Only a minority of members were rated 
        ``Free''.
            (4) The structure and composition of the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council have made it subject to gross political 
        manipulation, with the result that, during its almost seven 
        years of operation, the Council has passed over 61 resolutions 
        censuring the democratic, Jewish State of Israel, as compared 
        to relatively few or no resolutions censuring dictatorships or 
        addressing severe, ongoing human rights abuses around the 
        world.
            (5) The United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda 
        contains a permanent item for criticism of the democratic, 
        Jewish State of Israel, but no permanent items criticizing any 
        other state.
            (6) The United Nations Human Rights Council has 
        established, or preserved the existence of, a number of 
        ``Special Procedures'' mechanisms to address country-specific 
        situations or thematic issues. These mechanisms include a 
        number of ``special rapporteurs'' whose expenses and staff 
        support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
            (7) The United Nations Human Rights Council has also 
        established an ``Advisory Committee'' whose expenses and staff 
        support are paid for by contributions to the United Nations.
            (8) Some of these special rapporteurs and members of the 
        Advisory Committee have displayed consistent bias against the 
        United States, Israel, and the Jewish people, while providing 
        support to human rights abusers.
            (9) Miguel D'Escoto Brockmann, a member of the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council Advisory Committee who has 
        previously served as President of the United Nations General 
        Assembly and as foreign minister for the Sandinista regime in 
        Nicaragua, has implicitly accused the United States of 
        terrorism, has called former President Ronald Reagan a 
        ``butcher'', has called for an international boycott of Israel, 
        has stated that the Palestinians were being ``crucified'' by 
        Israel, has called Israel's defensive Operation Cast Lead in 
        the Gaza Strip a ``monstrosity'' and ``genocide'', has urged 
        the United Nations to use the term ``apartheid'' in discussing 
        Israeli treatment of Palestinians, has embraced Iranian leader 
        Mahmoud Ahmadinejad after Ahmadinejad delivered an anti-
        American, anti-Israel address to the United Nations General 
        Assembly, has stated that charges of genocide against Sudanese 
        dictator Omar Hassan al Bashir are ``racist'', and has declared 
        Fidel Castro ``World Hero of Solidarity'', stating that Castro 
        ``embod[ied] virtues and values worth emulation by all of us''.
            (10) The five-year review of the United Nations Human 
        Rights Council concluded on June 17, 2011, and failed to make 
        any significant reforms to its fundamental and severe 
        structural flaws, including its absence of substantive 
        membership criteria, or to remove the permanent agenda item on 
        Israel.
            (11) On June 17, 2011, former John F. Sammis, United States 
        Deputy Representative to the Economic and Social Council, 
        stated that ``The Geneva process [of the five-year review] 
        failed to yield even minimally positive results, forcing us to 
        dissociate from the outcome . . . the final resolution [for the 
        five-year review] also fails to address the core problems that 
        still plague the Human Rights Council . . . The United States 
        has therefore voted `no' on the resolution . . . the Council's 
        effectiveness and legitimacy will always be compromised so long 
        as one country in all the world is unfairly and uniquely 
        singled out while others, including chronic human rights 
        abusers, escape scrutiny . . . The resolution before us today 
        does nothing to address the Council's failures nor move it any 
        closer to the founding values of the UN Charter and the 
        Universal Declaration of Human Rights.''.
            (12) United States membership in the Human Rights Council 
        has not led to reform of its fundamental flaws diminished the 
        Council's virulently anti-Israel behavior. The Council has 
        passed 35 resolutions criticizing Israel since the United 
        States joined in 2009.

SEC. 502. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING.

    (a) In General.--For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the 
effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to 
Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection 
(b) have been satisfied--
            (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United 
        States contribution each fiscal year to a regular budget of the 
        United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of 
        such contribution that the Secretary determines would be 
        allocated by the United Nations to support the United Nations 
        Human Rights Council;
            (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary 
        contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
            (3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council.
    (b) Certification.--The annual certification referred to in 
subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress 
that--
            (1) the United Nations Human Rights Council's mandate from 
        the United Nations General Assembly explicitly and effectively 
        prohibits candidacy for Human Rights Council membership of a 
        United Nations Member State--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council; 
                and
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
            (2) the United Nations Human Rights Council does not 
        include a United Nations Member State--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
                    (C) which the Secretary of State has determined, 
                for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect 
                pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers 
                Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
                section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 
                other provision of law, is a government that has 
                repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism;
                    (D) which the President has designated as a country 
                of particular concern for religious freedom under 
                section 402(b) of the International Religious Freedom 
                Act of 1998;
                    (E) designated by the Department of State pursuant 
                to section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection 
                Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) as a Tier 3 country; or
                    (F) subject to sanctions by the United States; and
            (3) the United Nations Human Rights Council's agenda or 
        programme of work does not include a permanent item with regard 
        to the State of Israel.
    (c) Special Procedures.--The Secretary of State shall withhold from 
a United States contribution each year to a regular budget of the 
United Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such 
contribution that the Secretary determines would be allocated by the 
United Nations to support the United Nations ``Special Rapporteur on 
the situation of human rights in Palestinian territories occupied since 
1967'', and any other United Nations Human Rights Council ``Special 
Procedures'' used to display bias against the United States or the 
State of Israel or to provide support for the government of any United 
Nations Member State--
            (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
            (2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for 
        human rights abuses;
            (3) which the Secretary of State has determined, for 
        purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International 
        Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has 
        repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism;
            (4) which the President has designated as a country of 
        particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b) 
        of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998;
            (5) designated by the Department of State pursuant to 
        section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 
        (22 U.S.C. 7107) as a Tier 3 country; or
            (6) subject to sanctions by the United States.
    (d) Reversion of Funds.--Funds appropriated for use as a United 
States contribution to the United Nations but withheld from obligation 
and expenditure pursuant to this section shall immediately revert to 
the United States Treasury and shall not be considered arrears to be 
repaid to any United Nations Entity.

                       TITLE VI--2014 GAZA REPORT

SEC. 601. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) On January 12, 2009, the United Nations Human Rights 
        Council passed Resolution A/HRC/S-9/L.1, which authorized a 
        ``fact-finding mission'' regarding Israel's conduct of 
        Operation Cast Lead against violent militants in the Gaza Strip 
        between December 27, 2008, and January 18, 2009.
            (2) The resolution pre-judged the outcome of its 
        investigation by one-sidedly mandating the ``fact-finding 
        mission'' to ``investigate all violations of international 
        human rights law and International Humanitarian Law by . . . 
        Israel, against the Palestinian people . . . particularly in 
        the occupied Gaza Strip, due to the current aggression''.
            (3) The mandate of the ``fact-finding mission'' makes no 
        mention of the relentless rocket and mortar attacks, which 
        numbered in the thousands and spanned a period of eight years, 
        by Hamas and other violent militant groups in Gaza against 
        civilian targets in Israel, that necessitated Israel's 
        defensive measures.
            (4) The ``fact-finding mission'' included a member who, 
        before joining the mission, had already declared Israel guilty 
        of committing atrocities in Operation Cast Lead by signing a 
        public letter on January 11, 2009, published in the Sunday 
        Times, that called Israel's actions ``war crimes''.
            (5) The mission's flawed and biased mandate gave serious 
        concern to many United Nations Human Rights Council Member 
        States which refused to support it, including Bosnia and 
        Herzegovina, Cameroon, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
        the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
        Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
        and Northern Ireland, and troubled many distinguished 
        individuals who refused invitations to head the mission.
            (6) On September 15, 2009, the ``United Nations Fact 
        Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' released its report, 
        commonly referred to as the ``Goldstone Report'', which 
        repeatedly made sweeping and unsubstantiated determinations 
        that the Israeli military had deliberately attacked civilians 
        during Operation Cast Lead.
            (7) The Goldstone Report, in effect, denied the State of 
        Israel the right to self-defense, and never noted the fact that 
        Israel had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated 
        violent attacks committed against civilian targets in southern 
        Israel by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations 
        operating from Gaza.
            (8) The Goldstone Report largely ignored the culpability of 
        the Government of Iran and the Government of Syria, both of 
        whom sponsor Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
            (9) On April 1, 2011, Richard Goldstone, the head of the 
        ``United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict'' 
        that authored the Goldstone Report, wrote an op-ed in the 
        Washington Post that renounced the Goldstone Report's claim 
        that the Israeli military deliberately attacked civilians 
        during Operation Cast Lead. Goldstone wrote that the Israeli 
        military's investigations with respect to incidents in 
        Operation Cast Lead ``indicate that civilians were not 
        intentionally targeted as a matter of policy''.
            (10) Three years later, on July 23, 2014, the United 
        Nations Human Rights Council passed Resolution A/HRC/RES/S-21/
        1, which authorized a ``commission of inquiry'' regarding the 
        conflict between Israel and Hamas between July 8, 2014, and 
        August 26, 2014.
            (11) On June 22, 2015, the ``United Nations Independent 
        Commission of Inquiry on the 2014 Gaza conflict'' released its 
        report, hereafter referred to as the ``Gaza report'', which 
        attempted to establish a false moral equivalency between the 
        actions of Israel's military and of Hamas and other Foreign 
        Terrorist Organizations operating from Gaza.
            (12) The Gaza report, in effect, denies the State of Israel 
        the right to self defense, and never notes the fact that Israel 
        had the right to defend its citizens from the repeated violent 
        attacks committed against civilian targets in southern Israel 
        by Hamas and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations operating 
        from Gaza.
            (13) Hamas uses civilian populations as human shields by 
        placing their missile batteries in densely populated areas and 
        near schools, hospitals, and mosques.
            (14) Israel's military went to extraordinary lengths to 
        target only terrorist actors and to minimize collateral damage 
        by warning Gaza residents of imminent attacks.
            (15) Hamas urged the residents of Gaza to ignore the 
        Israeli warnings and to remain in their houses and encouraged 
        Palestinians to gather on the roofs of their homes to act as 
        human shields.
            (16) The Gaza report reflects the longstanding, historic 
        bias at the United Nations against the democratic, Jewish State 
        of Israel.
            (17) The Gaza report is being exploited by Israel's enemies 
        to excuse the actions of violent militant groups and their 
        state sponsors, and to justify isolation of and punitive 
        measures against the democratic, Jewish State of Israel.
            (18) Efforts to delegitimize the democratic State of Israel 
        and deny it the right to defend its citizens and its existence 
        can be used to delegitimize other democracies and deny them the 
        same right.

SEC. 602. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to--
            (1) consider the Gaza report irredeemably biased and 
        unworthy of further consideration or legitimacy;
            (2) strongly and unequivocally oppose any consideration, 
        legitimization, or endorsement of the Gaza report, or any other 
        measures stemming from this report, in multilateral fora;
            (3) lead a high-level diplomatic campaign in support of the 
        revocation and repudiation, by the United Nations General 
        Assembly, of the Gaza report and any United Nations resolutions 
        stemming from the report, including
            (4) lead a high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other 
        responsible countries not to endorse, support, or legitimize 
        the Gaza report or any other measures stemming from the report.

SEC. 603. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS; REFUND OF UNITED STATES TAXPAYER 
              DOLLARS.

    (a) Withholding of Funds.--The Secretary of State shall withhold 
from the United States contribution to the regular budget of the United 
Nations an amount that is equal to the percentage of such contribution 
that the Secretary determines would be or has been expended by the 
United Nations for any part of the Gaza report or its preparatory or 
follow-on activities.
    (b) Refund of United States Taxpayer Dollars.--Funds appropriated 
for use as a United States contribution to the regular budget of the 
United Nations but withheld from obligation and expenditure pursuant to 
subsection (a) shall immediately revert to the United States Treasury 
and shall not be considered arrears to be repaid to any United Nations 
Entity.

              TITLE VII--BIASED AND COMPROMISED ACTIVITIES

SEC. 701. WITHHOLDING OF FUNDS.

    (a) In General.--Until the Secretary of State submits to the 
appropriate congressional committees a certification, on a case-by-case 
basis, that the requirements described in subsection (b) have been 
satisfied, the United States shall withhold from the United States 
contribution to the regular budget of the United Nations an amount that 
is equal to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary 
determines has been allocated by the United Nations for any conference, 
meeting, or other multilateral forum, or the preparatory or follow-on 
activities of any conference, meeting, or other multilateral forum, 
that is organized under the aegis or jurisdiction of the United Nations 
or of any United Nations Entity.
    (b) Requirements.--The certification referred to in subsection (a) 
is a certification made by the Secretary of State to the appropriate 
congressional committees concerning the following:
            (1) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        single out the United States or the State of Israel for unfair 
        or unbalanced criticism.
            (2) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        propagate racism, racial discrimination, anti-Semitism, denial 
        of the Holocaust, incitement to violence or genocide, 
        xenophobia, or related intolerance.
            (3) The specified conference or forum was not used to 
        advocate for restrictions on the freedoms of speech, 
        expression, religion, the press, assembly, or petition, or for 
        restrictions on other fundamental human rights and freedoms.
            (4) The leadership of the specified conference or forum 
        does not include a Member State, or a representative from a 
        Member State--
                    (A) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
                    (B) under a Security Council-mandated investigation 
                for human rights abuses;
                    (C) the government of which the Secretary of State 
                has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the 
                Export Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in 
                effect pursuant to the International Emergency Economic 
                Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, 
                section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or 
                other provision of law, is a government that has 
                repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
                terrorism; or
                    (D) subject to sanctions by the United States.

                           TITLE VIII--UNRWA

SEC. 801. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302 (1949) 
        created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 
        Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) with the temporary, 
        strictly humanitarian mandate to ``carry out . . . direct 
        relief and works programmes'' for Palestinian refugees.
            (2) The total annual budget of the United Nations Relief 
        and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
        (UNRWA), including its core programs, emergency activities and 
        special projects, exceeds almost $1,400,000,000.
            (3) The United States has long been the largest single 
        contributing country to UNRWA.
            (4) From 1950 to 2015, the United States has contributed 
        over $5,000,000,000 to UNRWA, including an average of over 
        $280,000,000 per year between 2009 and 2014.
            (5) UNRWA staff unions, including the teachers' union, are 
        frequently controlled by members affiliated with Hamas.
            (6) The late Representative Tom Lantos, in a May 13, 2002, 
        letter, expressed his concern that--
                    (A) ``UNRWA is perpetuating, rather than 
                ameliorating, the situation of Palestinian refugees'';
                    (B) ``UNRWA officials have . . . failed to prevent 
                their camps from becoming centers of terrorist 
                activity''; and
                    (C) ``for too long, UNRWA has been part of the 
                problem, rather than the solution, in the Middle East . 
                . . UNRWA camps have fostered a culture of anger and 
                dependency that undermines both regional peace and the 
                well-being of the camps'' inhabitants.
            (7) The curriculum of UNRWA schools, which has been known 
        to use the textbooks of their respective host governments or 
        authorities, has a history of containing materials that are 
        anti-Israel, anti-Semitic, and supportive of violent extremism.
            (8) Despite UNRWA's contravention of United States law and 
        activities that compromise its strictly humanitarian mandate, 
        UNRWA continues to receive United States contributions, 
        including $408,751,396 in 2014.
            (9) Assistance from the United States and other responsible 
        nations allows UNRWA to claim that criticisms of the agency's 
        behavior are unfounded. UNRWA spokesman Christopher Gunness has 
        dismissed concerns by stating that ``If these baseless 
        allegations were even halfway true, do you really think the 
        U.S. and [European Commission] would give us hundreds of 
        millions of dollars per year?''.
            (10) Former UNRWA general counsel James Lindsay noted in a 
        2009 report that:
                    (A) ``The United States, despite funding nearly 75 
                percent of UNRWA's national budget and remaining its 
                largest single country donor, has mostly failed to make 
                UNRWA reflect U.S. foreign policy objectives . . . 
                Recent U.S. efforts to shape UNRWA appear to have been 
                ineffective . . .'';
                    (B) ``[T]he United States is not obligated to fund 
                agencies that refuse to check its rolls for individuals 
                their donors do not wish to support.'';
                    (C) ``A number of changes in UNRWA could benefit 
                the refugees, the Middle East, and the United States, 
                but those changes will not occur unless the United 
                States, ideally with support from UNRWA's other main 
                financial supporter, the European Union, compels the 
                agency to enact reforms.''; and
                    (D) ``If the [UNRWA commissioner-general's] power 
                is used in ways that are conflict with the donors'' 
                political objectives, it is up to the donors to take 
                the necessary actions to ensure that their interests 
                are respected. When they have done so, UNRWA--given the 
                tight financial leash it has been on for most of its 
                existence--has tended to follow their dictates, even if 
                sometimes slowly.
            (11) The Government of Canada has placed restrictions on 
        its contributions to UNRWA, demonstrating consequences for 
        UNRWA's malfeasance and setting an example for the United 
        States and other donor governments.
            (12) During Israel's Operation Protective Edge in 2014 in 
        response to Hamas rocket attacks against Israel, UNRWA's 
        Commissioner General gave a press briefing ignoring the 
        extraordinary efforts Israel goes to avoid civilian casualties, 
        and not once in the nearly 1,100 word statement mentioning 
        Hamas or condemning Hamas' use of Palestinian children, women, 
        and men as human shields in violation of international 
        humanitarian law.
            (13) On July 16, 2014, UNRWA reported that it had found 20 
        missiles in one of its schools in Gaza, likely placed there by 
        Hamas, and then instead of dismantling the missiles, UNRWA 
        returned them to the ``relevant authorities'' in Gaza, and 
        since Hamas controls Gaza, it likely turned them back over to 
        Hamas.
            (14) On July 22, 2014, UNRWA reported that it had found a 
        second instance in which missiles were stockpiled in one of its 
        schools in Gaza, and again failed to condemn Hamas publicly.
            (15) On July 29, 2014, UNRWA confirmed that, for the third 
        time in less than a month, a stockpile of Hamas rockets was 
        found in one of its schools in Gaza, establishing a pattern of 
        Hamas weapons being stored in UNRWA facilities, and calling 
        into question UNRWA's claim of being caught unawares to Hamas' 
        actions.
            (16) On July 30, 2014, three Israeli Defense Force soldiers 
        were killed in an explosion at a booby-trapped UNRWA health 
        clinic, which was housing the opening to one of Hamas' 
        underground tunnels.
            (17) On July 30, 2014, John Ging, head of UNRWA from 2006 
        to 2011, when asked if Hamas has been using human shields and 
        using United Nations schools and hospitals to store weapons and 
        as a shelter from which to launch missiles into Israel, stated 
        in an interview, ``Yes, the armed groups are firing their 
        rockets into Israel from the vicinity of UN facilities and 
        residential areas. Absolutely.''.
            (18) During Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, UNRWA 
        repeatedly distorted the facts and accused Israel of targeting 
        Palestinian women and children based off of the casualty 
        numbers provided to it by Gaza's Hamas-run Health Ministry, 
        which has been shown to have deliberately lied about the 
        casualty numbers.

SEC. 802. UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA.

    Section 301 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by 
striking subsection (c) and inserting the following new subsection:
    ``(c)(1) Withholding.--Contributions by the United States to the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA), to any successor or related entity, or to the 
regular budget of the United Nations for the support of UNRWA or a 
successor entity (through staff positions provided by the United 
Nations Secretariat, or otherwise), may be provided only during a 
period for which a certification described in paragraph (2) is in 
effect. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if such a 
certification cannot be made, such contributions shall be made 
available to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
specifically for use by UNHCR Emergency Response.
    ``(2) Certification.--A certification described in this paragraph 
is a written determination by the Secretary of State, based on all 
information available after diligent inquiry, and transmitted to the 
appropriate congressional committees along with a detailed description 
of the factual basis therefor, that--
            ``(A) no official, employee, consultant, contractor, 
        subcontractor, representative, or affiliate of UNRWA--
                    ``(i) is a member of a Foreign Terrorist 
                Organization;
                    ``(ii) has propagated, disseminated, or incited 
                anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic rhetoric or 
                propaganda; or
                    ``(iii) has used any UNRWA resources, including 
                publications or Web sites, to propagate or disseminate 
                political materials, including political rhetoric 
                regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
            ``(B) no UNRWA school, hospital, clinic, other facility, or 
        other infrastructure or resource is being used by a Foreign 
        Terrorist Organization for operations, planning, training, 
        recruitment, fundraising, indoctrination, communications, 
        sanctuary, storage of weapons or other materials, or any other 
        purposes;
            ``(C) UNRWA is subject to comprehensive financial audits by 
        an internationally recognized third-party independent auditing 
        firm and has implemented an effective system of vetting and 
        oversight to prevent the use, receipt, or diversion of any 
        UNRWA resources by any foreign terrorist organization or 
        members thereof;
            ``(D) no UNRWA-funded school or educational institution 
        uses textbooks or other educational materials that propagate or 
        disseminate anti-American, anti-Israel, or anti-Semitic 
        rhetoric, propaganda or incitement;
            ``(E) no recipient of UNRWA funds or loans is a member of a 
        Foreign Terrorist Organization; and
            ``(F) UNRWA holds no accounts or other affiliations with 
        financial institutions that the United States deems or believes 
        to be complicit in money laundering and terror financing.
    ``(3) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(A) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        `appropriate congressional committees' means--
                    ``(i) the Committees on Foreign Affairs, 
                Appropriations, and Oversight and Government Reform of 
                the House of Representatives; and
                    ``(ii) the Committees on Foreign Relations, 
                Appropriations, and Homeland Security and Governmental 
                Affairs of the Senate.
            ``(B) Foreign terrorist organization.--The term `Foreign 
        Terrorist Organization' means an organization designated as a 
        Foreign Terrorist Organization by the Secretary of State in 
        accordance with section 219(a) of the Immigration and 
        Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189(a)).
    ``(4) Effective Duration of Certification.--The certification 
described in paragraph (2) shall be effective for a period of 180 days 
from the date of transmission to the appropriate congressional 
committees, or until the Secretary receives information rendering that 
certification factually inaccurate, whichever is earliest. In the event 
that a certification becomes ineffective, the Secretary shall promptly 
transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a description of 
any information that precludes the renewal or continuation of the 
certification.
    ``(5) Limitation.--During a period for which a certification 
described in paragraph (2) is in effect, the United States may not 
contribute to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) or a successor entity an annual 
amount--
            ``(A) greater than the highest annual contribution to UNRWA 
        made by a member country of the League of Arab States;
            ``(B) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget, 
        exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the 
        United States; or
            ``(C) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of 
        UNRWA.''.

SEC. 803. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the President and the Secretary of State should lead a 
        high-level diplomatic effort to encourage other responsible 
        nations to withhold contributions to UNRWA, to any successor or 
        related entity, or to the regular budget of the United Nations 
        for the support of UNRWA or a successor entity (through staff 
        positions provided by the United Nations Secretariat, or 
        otherwise) until UNRWA has met the conditions listed in 
        subparagraphs (A) through (F) of section 301(c)(2) of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as added by section 802 of this 
        Act);
            (2) citizens of recognized states should be removed from 
        UNRWA's jurisdiction;
            (3) UNRWA's definition of a ``Palestine refugee'' should be 
        changed to that used for a refugee by the Office of the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; and
            (4) in order to alleviate the suffering of Palestinian 
        refugees, responsibility for those refugees should be fully 
        transferred to the Office of the United Nations High 
        Commissioner for Refugees.

              TITLE IX--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 901. TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Prohibition.--No funds from any United States assessed or 
voluntary contribution to the IAEA may be used to support any 
assistance provided by the IAEA through its Technical Cooperation 
program to North Korea and any country that--
            (1) is a country the government of which has been 
        determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 
        6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of 
        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 
        that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism;
            (2) is subject to sanctions by the United States as a 
        proliferation concern or for being in breach of or 
        noncompliance with its obligations regarding--
                    (A) its safeguards agreement with the IAEA;
                    (B) the Additional Protocol;
                    (C) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                    (D) any relevant United Nations Security Council 
                Resolution; or
                    (E) the Charter of the United Nations; or
            (3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 
        with the obligations specified in paragraph (2).
    (b) Withholding of Voluntary Contributions.--Not later than 30 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State 
shall withhold from the United States voluntary contribution to the 
IAEA an amount proportional to that spent by the IAEA on assistance 
through its Technical Cooperation Program to countries described in 
subsection (a).
    (c) Withholding of Assessed Contributions.--If, not later than 30 
days of the date of the enactment of this Act, the amount specified in 
subsection (b) has not been withheld and the IAEA has not suspended all 
assistance provided through its Technical Cooperation Program to the 
countries described in subsection (a), an amount equal to that 
specified in subsection (b) shall be withheld from the United States 
assessed contribution to the IAEA.
    (d) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on the implementation of this 
section.

SEC. 902. UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE IAEA.

    (a) United States Contributions.--
            (1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of 
        the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund 
        activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or 
        activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
            (2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA 
        to--
                    (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections 
                are prioritized for countries that--
                            (i) are or have been in the previous 5 
                        years in breach of or noncompliance with its 
                        obligations with--
                                    (I) its safeguards agreement with 
                                the IAEA;
                                    (II) the Additional Protocol;
                                    (III) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
                                Treaty;
                                    (IV) any relevant United Nations 
                                Security Council Resolution; or
                                    (V) the Charter of the United 
                                Nations; or
                            (ii) have newly established nuclear 
                        programs and are initiating nuclear programs; 
                        and
                    (B) block the allocation of funds for any other 
                IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science 
                assistance or activity to a country--
                            (i) the government of which the Secretary 
                        of State has determined, for purposes of 
                        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
                        of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
                        Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 
                        Control Act, or other provision of law, is a 
                        government that has repeatedly provided support 
                        for acts of international terrorism and the 
                        government of which the Secretary has 
                        determined has not dismantled and surrendered 
                        its weapons of mass destruction programs under 
                        international verification;
                            (ii) that is under investigation for a 
                        breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations; or
                            (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations.
            (3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA 
        to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country 
        of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and 
        nuclear security activities.
    (b) Membership.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
        vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 
        the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a 
        Member State of the IAEA that has not signed, ratified and 
        implemented the Additional Protocol and--
                    (A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
                    (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or 
                the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
                United Nations.
            (2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative 
        to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for 
        Board membership to reflect the principles described in 
        paragraph (1).
    (c) Small Quantities Protocol.--The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every 
effort to ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small 
Quantities Protocol in order to--
            (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;
            (2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously 
        signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and 
        implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for 
        IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to 
        the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
            (3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply 
        with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear 
        material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
        Member State.
    (d) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the implementation of this section.

SEC. 903. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN 
              OF THE IAEA.

    It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of 
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of 
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General 
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

                         TITLE X--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 1001. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have 
        contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability 
        for over 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel 
        who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with 
        honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping 
        has been severely tarnished by operational failures and 
        unconscionable acts of misconduct;
            (2) in response to such failures, successive Secretaries 
        General of the United Nations have launched numerous reform 
        efforts, including the high-level Panel on United Nations Peace 
        Operations, led by former Foreign Minister of Algeria Lakhdar 
        Brahimi, the 2005 report by the Special Advisor on the 
        Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal Highness 
        Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, the 2009 New 
        Partnership Agenda, known as the ``New Horizon'' reports, and 
        the 2015 report by the High-level Independent Panel on United 
        Nations Peace Operations;
            (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had over a 
        decade to implement many of these reforms, nearly 10 years to 
        implement the reforms in the Zeid Report, and the fact that 
        Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, his predecessor Kofi Annan, and 
        the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations repeatedly 
        have expressed their commitment ``to implementing fundamental, 
        systematic changes as a matter of urgency,'' a number of 
        critical reforms continue to be blocked or delayed by Members 
        States who arguably benefit from maintenance of the status quo;
            (4) further, audits of procurement practices in the 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations, conducted by the Office 
        of Internal Oversight Services, and the now-defunct United 
        Nations Procurement Task Force have uncovered ``significant'' 
        corruption schemes and criminal acts by United Nations 
        peacekeeping personnel; and
            (5) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
        reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, 
        management, procurement, training, conduct, and discipline, 
        must be implemented without further delay.

SEC. 1002. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
              OPERATIONS.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
            (1) Planning and management.--
                    (A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased 
                substantially over the past decade, independent audits 
                of each such operation should be conducted annually, 
                with a view toward ``right-sizing'' operations and 
                ensuring that all operations are efficient and cost 
                effective.
                    (B) Procurement and transparency.--The logistics 
                established within the United Nations Department of 
                Field Support should be streamlined and strengthened to 
                ensure that all peacekeeping missions are resourced 
                appropriately, transparently, and in a timely fashion 
                while individual accountability for waste, fraud and 
                abuse within United Nations peacekeeping missions is 
                uniformly enforced.
                    (C) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In 
                conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph 
                (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all 
                United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a 
                view toward identifying objectives that are practical 
                and achievable, and report its findings to the Security 
                Council. In particular, the review should consider the 
                following:
                            (i) Except in extraordinary cases, 
                        including genocide, the United Nations 
                        Department of Peacekeeping Operations should 
                        not be tasked with activities that are 
                        impractical or unachievable without the 
                        cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a 
                        United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which 
                        amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of the 
                        procedures established for such under Chapter 
                        XII of the United Nations Charter, thereby 
                        creating unrealistic expectations and 
                        obfuscating the primary responsibility of the 
                        Member States themselves in creating and 
                        maintaining conditions for peace.
                            (ii) Long-standing operations that are 
                        static and cannot fulfill their mandate should 
                        be downsized or closed.
                            (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
                        that the withdrawal from a country of an 
                        otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operation would result in the resumption of 
                        major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement 
                        that reduces the level of assessed 
                        contributions, similar to that currently 
                        supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping 
                        Force in Cyprus, should be explored and 
                        instituted.
                    (D) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become 
                larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should 
                adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior 
                leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on 
                specific skills and experience, and current senior 
                leaders and managers who do not meet those standards 
                should be removed.
                    (E) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment 
                training on interpretation of the mandate of the 
                operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, 
                civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of 
                Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be 
                mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or 
                rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has 
                received and understands such training as a condition 
                of participation in the operation.
                    (F) Gratis military personnel.--The General 
                Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon 
                the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting 
                restrictions on the utilization of gratis military 
                personnel by the Department so that the Department may 
                accept secondments from Member States of military 
                personnel with expertise in mission planning, 
                logistics, and other operational specialties.
            (2) Conduct and discipline.--
                    (A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A 
                single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of 
                a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel 
                serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                regardless of category or rank, including military 
                personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into 
                legal documents governing participation in such an 
                operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of 
                Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
                    (B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All 
                personnel, regardless of category or rank, should 
                receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to 
                deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition 
                to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
                            (i) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should be provided with a personal 
                        copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 
                        translated into the national language of such 
                        personnel, regardless of whether such language 
                        is an official language of the United Nations;
                            (ii) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should sign an oath that each has 
                        received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
                        each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, 
                        and that each understands the consequences of 
                        violating the Code of Conduct, including 
                        immediate termination of participation in and 
                        permanent exclusion from all current and future 
                        peacekeeping operations, as well as the 
                        assumption of personal liability and victims 
                        compensation, where appropriate, as a condition 
                        of appointment to any such operation; and
                            (iii) peacekeeping operations should 
                        continue and enhance educational outreach 
                        programs to reach local communities where 
                        peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 
                        based, including explaining prohibited acts on 
                        the part of United Nations peacekeeping 
                        personnel and identifying the individual to 
                        whom the local population may direct complaints 
                        or file allegations of exploitation, abuse, or 
                        other acts of misconduct.
                    (C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring 
                mechanisms, such as the Conduct and Discipline Teams 
                already deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations should be present in each operation to 
                monitor compliance with the Code of Conduct, and should 
                report simultaneously to the Head of Mission, the 
                United Nations Department of Field Support, the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and the 
                Associate Director of the Office of Internal Oversight 
                Services for Peacekeeping Operations.
                    (D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and 
                independent investigative body should be established 
                and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations. In particular--
                            (i) the investigative body should include 
                        professionals with experience in investigating 
                        sex crimes and the illegal exploitation of 
                        resources, as appropriate, as well as experts 
                        who can provide guidance on standards of proof 
                        and evidentiary requirements necessary for any 
                        subsequent legal action;
                            (ii) provisions should be included in all 
                        Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model 
                        Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate 
                        Member States that contribute troops to a 
                        peacekeeping operation to designate a military 
                        prosecutor who will participate in any 
                        investigation into credible allegations of 
                        misconduct brought against an individual of 
                        such Member State, so that evidence is 
                        collected and preserved in a manner consistent 
                        with the military law of such Member State;
                            (iii) the investigative body should be 
                        regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and 
                        should be equipped with modern forensics 
                        equipment for the purpose of positively 
                        identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, 
                        for determining paternity; and
                            (iv) the investigative body should report 
                        directly to the Associate Director of the 
                        Office of Internal Oversight Services for 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies 
                        of any reports to the Department of Field 
                        Support, the Department of Peacekeeping 
                        Operations, the Head of Mission, and the Member 
                        State concerned.
                    (E) Follow-up.--The Conduct and Discipline Unit in 
                the headquarters of the United Nations Department of 
                Field Support should be appropriately staffed, 
                resourced, and tasked with--
                            (i) promulgating measures to prevent 
                        misconduct;
                            (ii) receiving reports by field personnel 
                        and coordinating the Department's response to 
                        allegations of misconduct;
                            (iii) gathering follow-up information on 
                        completed investigations, particularly by 
                        focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
                        individual concerned taken by the United 
                        Nations or by the Member State that is 
                        contributing troops to which such individual 
                        belongs, and sharing such information with the 
                        Security Council, the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 
                        and the community hosting the peacekeeping 
                        operation; and
                            (iv) contributing pertinent data on conduct 
                        and discipline to the database required 
                        pursuant to subparagraph (H).
                    (F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
                Although peacekeeping operations should provide 
                immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse 
                or exploitation, the responsibility for providing 
                longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely 
                with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In 
                particular:
                            (i) The United Nations should not assume 
                        responsibility for providing long-term 
                        treatment or compensation under the Sexual 
                        Exploitation and Abuse Victim Assistance 
                        Mechanism by utilizing assessed contributions 
                        to United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                        thereby shielding individuals from personal 
                        liability and reinforcing an atmosphere of 
                        impunity.
                            (ii) If an individual responsible for 
                        misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
                        redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
                        assistance, responsibility for providing 
                        assistance to a victim should be assigned to 
                        the Member State that contributed the 
                        contingent to which such individual belonged or 
                        to the manager concerned.
                            (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member 
                        of a military contingent, appropriate funds 
                        shall be withheld from the troop contributing 
                        country concerned.
                            (iv) In the case of misconduct by a 
                        civilian employee or contractor of the United 
                        Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished 
                        from such individual or fines shall be imposed 
                        against such individual, consistent with 
                        existing United Nations Staff Rules, and 
                        retirement funds shall not be shielded from 
                        liability.
                    (G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which 
                managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by 
                those serving under them should be included in their 
                individual performance evaluations, so that managers 
                and commanders who take decisive action to deter and 
                address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create 
                a permissive environment or impede investigations are 
                penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
                    (H) Database.--A centralized database, including 
                personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, 
                should be created and maintained within the United 
                Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the 
                Department of Field Support, and other relevant United 
                Nations bodies without further delay to track cases of 
                misconduct, including the outcome of investigations and 
                subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel who 
                have engaged in misconduct or other criminal 
                activities, regardless of category or rank, are 
                permanently barred from participation in future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                    (I) Cooperation of member states.--If a Member 
                State routinely refuses to cooperate with the 
                directives contained herein or acts to shield its 
                nationals from personal liability, that Member State 
                should be barred from contributing troops or personnel 
                to future peacekeeping operations.
                    (J) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should 
                continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of 
                welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions 
                of service, while adjustments are made to the 
                discretionary welfare payments currently provided to 
                Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost 
                of operation-provided recreational facilities, as 
                necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 1003. CERTIFICATION.

    (a) No New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations.--Until the 
Secretary of State certifies that the requirements described in 
subsection (b) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the 
voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the United Nations 
to oppose the creation of new, or expansion of existing, United Nations 
peacekeeping operations.
    (b) Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--The 
certification referred to in subsection (a) is a certification made by 
the Secretary to the appropriate congressional committees that the 
following reforms, or an equivalent set of reforms, related to 
peacekeeping operations have been adopted by the United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations or the General Assembly, as 
appropriate:
            (1) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status 
        of a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel serving 
        in United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of 
        category or rank, has been adopted by the General Assembly and 
        duly incorporated into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of 
        Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for 
        training such personnel concerning the requirements of the Code 
        and enforcement of the Code.
            (2) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, serving 
        in a peacekeeping operation have been trained concerning the 
        requirements of the Code of Conduct and each has been given a 
        personal copy of the Code, translated into the national 
        language of such personnel.
            (3) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, are 
        required to sign an oath that each has received a copy of the 
        Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide by the Code, and 
        that each understands the consequences of violating the Code, 
        including immediate termination of participation in and 
        permanent exclusion from all current and future peacekeeping 
        operations, as well as the assumption of personal liability for 
        victims compensation as a condition of the appointment to such 
        operation.
            (4) All peacekeeping operations have designed and 
        implemented educational outreach programs to reach local 
        communities where peacekeeping personnel of such operations are 
        based to explain prohibited acts on the part of United Nations 
        peacekeeping personnel and to identify the individual to whom 
        the local population may direct complaints or file allegations 
        of exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
            (5) The creation of a centralized database, including 
        personnel photos, fingerprints, and biometric data, has been 
        completed and is being maintained in the United Nations 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases of 
        misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations and 
        subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, regardless 
        of category or rank, who have engaged in misconduct or other 
        criminal activities are permanently barred from participation 
        in future peacekeeping operations.
            (6) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the United 
        Nations and each Member State that contributes troops to a 
        peacekeeping operation has been adopted by the United Nations 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations that specifically 
        obligates each such Member State to--
                    (A) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct which shall 
                apply equally to all personnel serving in United 
                Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of category 
                or rank;
                    (B) designate a competent legal authority, 
                preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the area of 
                sexual exploitation and abuse where appropriate, to 
                participate in any investigation into an allegation of 
                misconduct brought against an individual of such Member 
                State;
                    (C) refer to its competent national or military 
                authority for possible prosecution, if warranted, any 
                investigation of a violation of the Code of Conduct or 
                other criminal activity by an individual of such Member 
                State;
                    (D) report to the Department of Field Support and 
                the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on the 
                outcome of any such investigation;
                    (E) undertake to conduct on-site court martial 
                proceedings, where practical and appropriate, relating 
                to allegations of misconduct alleged against an 
                individual of such Member State; and
                    (F) assume responsibility for the provision of 
                appropriate assistance to a victim of misconduct 
                committed by an individual of such Member State.
            (7) A professional and independent investigative and audit 
        function has been established within the United Nations 
        Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of 
        Internal Oversight Services to monitor United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations.
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