UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 04-7257

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

versus

ALBERT F. IAQUINTA,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (HC-98-764)

Submitted: April 27, 2005 Decided: May 26, 2005

Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.

Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Assistant

United States Attorney, Michelle T. Fuseyamore, Special Assistant

United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
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PER CURIAM:

Albert F. Iaquinta appeals from the district court’s

order determining that he continues to meet the criteria for civil

commitment under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (2000). We affirm.

Iaquinta was charged in the District of New Jersey in

1994 with threatening to kill President Clinton, in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 871(a) (2000). He was never tried. Rather, due to his

“psychotic and disruptive” behavior after being charged, the

District of New Jersey ordered a psychological evaluation under 18

U.S.C. § 4246(b) to determine if Iaquinta should be civilly

committed for being a danger to others or their property. Iaquinta

was eventually transferred to FCI-Butner, North Carolina. On

October 2, 1998, FCI-Butner filed a Certificate of Mental Disease

or Defect and Dangerousness and recommended that Iaquinta be

committed to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246. On

February 16, 1999, the Eastern District of North Carolina agreed

and ordered Iaquinta committed to the custody of the Attorney

General for suffering from a mental defect that makes him a danger

to others or their property.

On February 2, 2000, July 7, 2001, and November 18, 2002,

Iaquinta filed motions to determine if he still met the criteria

for commitment under § 4246. On all three motions, the district

court determined that he still met the criteria for commitment

under § 4246. On March 29, 2004, a fourth motion was filed to
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determine if his commitment was still warranted, the denial of

which is the subject of this appeal. After holding hearings on

this motion, the district court ordered that Iaquinta’s commitment

to the custody of the Attorney General under § 4246 be continued

because he continued to meet the requirements for such commitment.

Under § 4246, if, after a hearing, a district court

determines a person is suffering from a mental disease or defect

that would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another

person or serious damage to property of another, the court may

commit the person to the custody of the Attorney General. Once

committed, an individual may periodically move for a hearing under

18 U.S.C. § 4247(h) (2000) to determine whether the committed

person should be discharged from commitment under § 4246. The

committed person may be released from commitment if the district

court finds that he has recovered from his mental disease or defect

to such an extent that his release would no longer pose a

substantial risk of harm to others. See 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e). This

court will overturn a district court's finding that a substantial

risk of harm exists only if the finding is clearly erroneous.

United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d 1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992). A

finding is clearly erroneous when “the reviewing court is left with

the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been

committed.” Faulconer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir.

1984).
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We have independently reviewed the briefs and joint

appendix and conclude that the district court did not clearly err

in finding that Iaquinta still meets the requirements for

commitment under § 4246. We therefore affirm the order of the

district court continuing Iaquinta’s commitment under § 4246. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED