21

- 1527

- cv Allison Williams v. New York City Housing Authority

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3

____________________ 4
5 August Term, 20 2 1 6
7 (Argued: June 10, 2022 Decided: February 2 3 , 2023 ) 8
9 Docket No. 21

- 1527

- cv 10
11

____________________ 12
13 ALLISON WILLIAMS , 14
15 Plaintiff

- Appellant , 16
17

v. 18
19 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AUTHORITY, NYC COUNCIL SPEAKER 20 MELISSA MARK

- VIVERITO, BRIAN CLARKE, and MICHAEL KELLY , 21
22 Defendants

- Appellees

. 1 23
24

____________________ 25
26 Before: POOLER, LYNCH , and LOHIER , Circuit Judges

. 27
28 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 29 District of New York ( Vernon S. Broderick , J .) granting D efendants’ motion s for 30 summary judgment and dismissing P laintiff’s claims that D efenda nts created a 31 hostile work environment in violation of federal, state, and city law. Because we 32 conclude that a reasonable jury could find that the totality of the circumstances 33

1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.2 established an unlawful hostile work environment, we vacate the district court’s 1 judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 2
3 Vacated and remanded

. 4

____________________ 5

MARCEL FLORESTAL , Florestal Law Firm, PLLC , 6 New York, NY, for Plaintiff

- Appellant

. 7
8 HANH H. LE (Sean

- Patrick Wils on, on the brief ) , for Li s a 9 Bova

- Hiatt, Executive Vice President for Legal Affairs 10 and General Counsel, New York City Housing 11 Authority, New York, NY, for Defendant s

- Appellee s New 12 York City Housing Authority , Brian Clark e , and Michael 13 Kelly

. 14
15 PHILIP W. YOUNG (Richard Dearing, Claude S. 16 Platton , on the brief ) , for Georgia M. Pestana, 17 Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New 18 York , NY, for Defendant

- Appell ee Melissa Mark

- Viverito

. 19
20
21 POOLER, Circuit Judge : 22 Alleging the creation of a hostile work environment in violation of federal, 23
state, and city law, Allison Williams sued the New York City Housing Authority 24
(“NYCHA”) ; Brian Clarke and Michael Kelly , two NYCHA senior officials 25
(collectively, the “NYCHA Defe ndants”) ; and Melissa Mark

- Viverito, the former 26
Speaker of the New York City Council (collectively, “Defendants”)

. The United 273 States District Court for the Southern District of New York ( Vernon S. Broderick , 1
J. ) granted summary judgment to D efendants. See Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth. , 2

No. 16

- cv
- 8193, 2021 WL 2077817 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2021). Because we conclude 3
that a reasonable jury could find that the totality of the circumstances established 4

an unlawful host ile work environment, we vacate the district court’s judgment 5
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 6

BACKGROUND 7

I. Factual Background 8
Williams, an African

- American woman, worked for NYCHA from 1984 9
until her retirement in 2017. After rising through the ranks over two decades, 10

Williams became the h ousing m anager of Mill Brook Houses in the Bronx in 11

2006. As h ousing m anager, Williams could not be fired absent disciplinary 12
charges and a trial (administrative hearing)

. This suit centers on Williams’ s 13
claims that, for several years preceding her retirement, she was subjected to a 14
racially hostile work environment. In reviewing the district cou rt’s grant of 15
summary judgment to D efendants, we construe the evidence in the light most 16
favorable to Williams, “ drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all 174 ambiguities in [ her ] favor. ” See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig. , 597 F.3d 501, 1

504 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)

. 2

A. Williams’ s Allegations 3
Williams alleges that the trouble began on July 1, 2015 when Melissa Mark

4
Viverito, the then

- Speaker of the New York City Council , requested a meeting 5

with NYCHA. Although Mark

- Viverito was not an employee, contractor, or 6
agent of NYCHA, she wielded substantial influence over it in her role as Speaker. 7
The City Council has oversight authority over NYCHA, and roughly s even 8
percent of NYCHA’s budget comes from city funds. 2 I n the lead up to the July 9
2015 meeting that precipitated the events at issue , Brian Honan, NYCHA’s 10

d irector of s tate and c ity l egislative a ffairs, emailed NYCHA’s Chair, Shola 11
Olatoye, stating, “ [t] he manager at Mill Brook is making it very difficult for 12

2 Sarah Gastelum & Emre Edev, The Council o f the City of New York, Report on the 2015

- 2019 Operating and Capital Budget & the Fiscal 2015 Preliminary Mayor’s Management Report, New York City Housing Authority 1 2 (2015) , https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp

- content/uploads/sites/54/2015/06/fy2016

- nycha.pdf

. Though this fact does not appear in the record, the Cour t may take judicial notice of facts “generally known within the territorial jurisdiction” or facts “capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Dixon v. von Blanckensee , 994 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2021) ( internal q uotation marks and citation omitted). Here, the Court takes judicial notice of the percentage of NYCHA’s operating budget that is derived from city funds.5 [Mark

- Viverito] to support [the Optimal Property Management Operating 1
Model] .” App’x at 711. Mill Brook Houses was one of the original properties in 2
the Op timal Property Management Operating Model (“OPMOM”) program , a 3
property

- management pilot program that NYCHA launched in January 2015. 4
Managers of OPMOM properties exercise more control to determine the 5
development’s staffing needs and set their own budgets

. I t is reasonable to infer 6

that NYCHA wished to please Mark

- Viverito and ensure her satisfaction with its 7
management in order to maintain city funding. 8
The meeting took place July 30, 2015 in Mark

- Viverito’s office

. In 9
attendance were Williams; Mark

- Viverito; Honan; Marcela Medina, the s tate 10

l egislative a ffairs o fficer in NYCHA’s City and State Legislative Affairs 11
Department; James Artis, OPMOM’s r egional a sset m anager for the Bronx ; Sybil 12
Colon, OPMOM’s d irector; Princella Jamerson, Mill Brook Houses t enant 13

a ssociation p resident; Diana Ayalau, from Mark

- Viverito’ s office; and Gloria 14
Cruz, Mark

- Viverito’s constituent services liaison. NYCHA’s Senior Vice 15
President, Brian Clarke, attended by phone. NYCHA’s General Manager, 16
Michael Kelly, did not attend. 176 During the meeting , Mark

- Viverito , who identifies as Latina, Mark

1

Viverito Br. at 10, asked Williams how she was “handling [her] Spanish speaking 2

residents at Mill Brook Houses.” App’x at 315

– 16

. Williams , who does not speak 3
Spanish, said she use d the NYCHA language bank to locate a Spanish speaker to 4
provide translation services over the phone. Mark

- Viverito told Williams that 5
using the language bank was unacceptable, and that Mill Brook Houses needed a 6
Spanish

- speaking person in the office

. Williams responded that she also 7

sometimes called the Spanish

- speaking Mill Brook superintendent or the 8
caretakers’ supervisor to translate for her. This too was unacceptable to Mark

9
Viverito, who Williams alleges then “slammed her fist” on the table, “scr eamed” 10

that “ she wanted a Spanish manager about three times,” and was “very hostile, 11
[and] very angry

. ” App’x at 1277

– 78. At this point, Colon added that NYCHA 12
had no job title called “bilingual housing manager [] ” but did have “ bilingual 13
housing assistants

. ” App’x at 157. She offered to contact h uman r esources to try 14
to bring one to Mill Brook Houses

. Mark

- Viverito rejected these 15

recommendations and abruptly stood up, signaling the end of the meeting

. 16
Following the meeting, Williams, Colon, and Artis remained in the office 17
to process what had transpired; Colon was “too shaken to even stand up , ” and 187 Williams had to compose herself as “ she was practically in tears. ” App’x at 1137. 1
They rehashed what happened , all agreeing that the Speaker’s request for a 2
“Spanish m anager” was “racist.” App’x at 1138. Two days later, Williams met 3
with Colon and Artis again, as the July 30 “ meeting did not sit well with [her] , ” 4
and she felt she was being “bullied” for not speak ing Spanish. App’x at 325

– 2 6

. 5

Williams feared the NYCHA D efendants would remove her from her position. 6
Meanwhile, following the July 30 meeting , Clarke met with his supervisor, 7
Kelly, to discuss transferring Williams out of the OPMOM program. Clarke 8

lacked the authority to transfer Williams , but he recommend ed her transfer to 9
Kelly and human resource s

. Kelly did not object to Clarke’s recommendation. 10
The next day , July 31, 2015 , Clarke met with Colon. Clarke asked Colon to 11

work with human resources to transfer Williams; he said he could not do it 12
himself because he was going on vacation. Clarke then asked Colon not to use 13
the words “Spanish m anager” when speaking with Kenya Salaud een, NYCHA’s 14

d irector of human resources. App’x at 171

. Instead, C larke advised C olon to tell 15

Salaudeen that Williams’ s transfer was necessary because of Mill Brook Houses ’ 16
“cultural sensitivity needs.” App’x at 171. The following week, Colon called 17
Salaudeen to tell her that Clarke directed her to transfer Williams and replace her 188 with a Hispanic manager. According to Colon, Salaudeen “raised her voice” and 1
said, “I’m offended by what you’re saying to me as a [ B ] lack woman.” App’x at 2

774

. Colon responded: “Look, Mr. Clark [ e ] wants it done. [He] said to tell you 3
that Melissa [Mark

- ]Viverito wants it done. It has to be and Mr. Kelly wants it 4

done.” App’x at 774

. Salaudeen replied: “I don’t care if Obama wants it done, it’s 5
illegal and you can be sued.” App’x at 774. Later in the conversation, Salaudeen 6
again told Colon that it is “illegal to make race [

- ] based transfers.” App’x at 775. 7

Colon testified that she had a follow

- up phone call with Richard Berna rdo , 8

Salaudeen’s d eputy d irector of human resources , and human resources employee 9
Marla Edmonson, both of whom also told her it would be illegal to replace 10
Williams with a Hispanic manager. 11
Over the next month, several NYCHA employees asked Colon about the 12

status of Williams’s tr ansfer. On August 6, 2015, for instance, Sheila Pinckney, a 13

s enior a dvisor in NYCHA’s Office of the S enior Vice P resident of Operations, 14
emailed Colon on Clarke’s behalf to ask whether the “move [was] complete []

. . . 15
regarding the Property Manager at Mill Brook Houses.” App’x at 1063. Colon 16
responded , 179 HR needs more information from us. There is also an [Inspector General 1 (“ig”) ] investigation going on. HR wants to talk to the ig’s office first. 2 App’x at 1063. Six days later , on August 12, 2015, Colon emailed Clarke to 3
convey that she was 4
experienc[ing] difficulty with the transferring of the Manager at Mill 5 Brook. HR is reques ting information that I am unable to provide.

. . . We 6 reached out to the local political office where we had the meeting at and 7 they did not [] provide complaint documentation or specifics. 8
9 App’x at 986 . Colon and Clarke exchanged more emails on August 2 5, 2015 , after 10

Clarke return ed from vacation. Among other things, Colon told Clarke that she 11

had 12
forwarded HR the development’s resident population data and was 13 informed that this was not enough information. I also contacted the 14 political office where we had the meeting at and they stated they only had 15 one repair complaint for [Williams]. This information was also shared with 16 HR. 17 App’x at 990. 18 On August 28, 2015, there was a monthly meeting for the OPMOM 19
properties in the Bronx. Among the people in attendance were Williams, Clarke, 20
Colon, Artis, Luis Ponce , NYCHA ’s s enior v ice p resident of o perations, and 21

Melania Allen , NYCHA’s d irector of Bronx p roperty m anagement. Williams 22

testified that during this meeting Clarke questioned her about Mill Brook 2310 Houses ’ “stats” and “asked [her] about the Spanish s peaking thing” in a “nasty” 1
manner before the whole group. App’x at 35 0

– 52, 1064. Additionally , during the 2
meeting Colon announced her resignation. As discussed further below, Colon 3
later sued NYCHA, Clarke, Kelly, and Mark

- Viverito, alleging retaliatory 4
discrimination under federal, state, and city law. See Colon v. N.Y.C. Hou s . Auth. , 5

No. 16

- cv
- 4540, 2021 WL 2159758, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2021). 6

U ltimately, Williams was never transferred. According to Clarke, the 7
transfer did not occur in 2015 “because it was recommended to me [by the Law 8
Department] not to transfer at this time.” App’x at 426. Nevertheless, Williams 9
contends, her superiors attempt ed to sabotage her work. Mill Brook Houses had 10
long been allocated four Housing Assistants (“HA”) to assist Williams. 11
Following Colon’s resignation, Williams asserts that the NYCHA D efendants 12
deliberately neglected to timely replace four HAs who all left, for various 13
reasons, between August 2015 and mid

- 2016 . First, HA Rebecca Iyanda 14
requested a transfer and was instructed to report to a different housing program 15
on October 6, 2015; i n November 2015, Iyanda was administratively transferred 16
and replaced with HA Celeste Man g um, whose termination Williams sought and 17
procured two months later. Williams sought to have Mangum replaced, to no 1811 avail. Next, on December 28, 2015, HA Tamika Powel l left a vacancy at Mill 1

Brook Houses when she was promoted to Assistant Housing Manager at Marble 2
Hill Houses. A third HA, Tina McLain, took medical leave from October 22, 2015 3
through December 24, 2015; on her return, according to Williams, she was 4

trans ferred without explanation. Finally, in December 2015, HA Hafiz suffered a 5
death in her family and did not come to work for a period of time. Hafiz did 6
eventually return to work. 7
Saddled with these vacancies, Williams instructed her assistant, Fredericka 8
Dilworth, to contact NYCHA management for replacements. Due to various 9
delays, interviews for HA replacement s were not scheduled until February 2016. 10

In Williams’ s view, the failur e to timely replace the HAs was part of an 11
“orchestrated effort to deprive [Williams] of essential personnel at Mill Brook, 12
setting her up to fail so that [ D efendants] could justify removing her as manager, 13
pursuant to [Mark

- Viverito’s] request.” Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at *6. 14

Williams also alleges that in early 2017, her Spanish

- speaking 15
superintendent, Ralph Martinez, was transferred from Mill Brook Houses and 16
replaced with an assistant superintendent referred to in the record only as 17
“Limo.” According to Williams, while Martinez had been indispensable to her 1812 management team, Limo’s performance was deficient , as he had previously been 1
placed on probation due to his refusal to work . Williams saw Martinez’s transfer 2
as part of D efendants’ scheme to sabota ge her work. 3
Williams resigned as Mill Brook Houses ’ manager two weeks after Limo 4
arrived, on May 1, 2017 because she was “highly stressed, could not do her work 5
with zero [] staff and

. . . suspected that NYCHA Defendants w ere setting her up 6
to fail so they [could] either remove, or terminate, her from Mill Brook.” I d

. at *9. 7

B. The Defendants’ Allegations 8
Unsurprisingly, D efendants do not view these events the same way. They 9
vigorously contest Williams’s description of what occurred during the July 30, 10
2015 meeting with Mark

- Viverito. D efendants claim that the purpose of this 11
meeting was to address significant language barriers between NYCHA 12

em ployees and Mill Brook Houses ’ Spanish

- speaking residents. Mark

- Viverito 13
testified that, in the months leading up to the meeting, she received numerous 14
complaints from her constituents that their needs were not being met. For 15
instance, on October 30, 2014, a Mill Brook House resident complained to Mark

16
Viverito that “[e]very time [the resident] goes to the [Mill Brook] office he feels 1713 like he’s being bullied by management because he cannot speak English , ” 1
making “ him sick and upset.” App’x at 964. 2
On May 14, 2015, Honan, NYCHA’s d irector of s tate and l egislative a ffairs 3
sent an email stating that, 4
[t]he manager at Mill Brook is making it very difficult for [Mark

- Viverito] 5 to support OPMOM. Yesterday I heard from three of her staff members 6 who compl ained about a recent meeting at the development.

. . . [Williams] 7 ma[d]e a very insensitive remark about Spanish [

- ] speaking residents. 8 App’x at 711. Multiple people also allegedly heard Williams make derogatory 9
remarks about Spanish

- speaking residents, in cluding Williams saying during a 10
tenant association meeting that she did not want to hear any “mira mira talk.” 11
App’x at 711. In light of th o se remarks , Mark

- Viverito testified that the Ju ly 30 12
meeting was to “find out from NYCHA what they were doing to address the 13
concerns of the Spanish

- speaking residents of Mill Brook houses.” App’x at 4 61

. 14

D efendants also paint a different picture as to what occurred at the July 30, 15

2015 meeting. Medina, NYCHA ’s s tate l eg islative a ffairs o fficer , took notes in the 16
meeting, observing that the “staff is very rude,” “management must at least 17
represent the language,” and “follow

- up[:] see about hiring a Spanish speaker.” 18
App’x at 978

. A day after the meeting, Medina reported in an email that the 1914 meeting “went okay

— speaker was very upset, the insult thing s didn’t come up 1

but she wants us to address the language barrier issue,” and that “it[ ’ ]s a bi t 2
complicated

. . . but the idea is to bring a housing assistant who can speak 3
[S]panish.” App’x at 1046. D efendants maintain that Mark

- Viverito never uttered 4
the phrase “Spanish manager.” App’x at 418

– 19. 5
As for Clarke’s directions to replace Williams and separately, his 6

comments at the August 28, 2015 meeting, D efendants d eny that th e directions 7

and Clarke’s conduct w ere racially motivated. Clarke testified that although no 8
one requested that he remove Williams as Mill Brook Houses ’ manager, he 9
wanted to transfer her out of the OPMOM program because she “was not a good 10
manager.” App’x at 419

– 20. Specifically, her 11
performance, certainly while I was involved with the program, was 12 not good. She was never prepared for meetings, she neve r had a 13 corrective action plan for whatever the issue was, and frankly I just 14 thought it was just unbelievable that a property manager would 15 ridicule tenants because of their inability to speak English, and 16 violate a Mayoral order for language access for c ity services at a 17 public meeting. That was the straw that really kind of broke the 18 camel’s back for me. This program, the [ O ] ptimal [ P ] roperty 19 [ M ] anagement [ P ] rogram, was supposed to be the vanguard of how 20 we were going to change the way that we were going to manage our 21 properties. Customer service, resident engagement was a key part of 22 that, and for a manager to tell somebody who is limited English

23 speak ing that, you know, don’t communicate with me , . . . t hat was 2415 just it for me, and I wanted to have her removed from the program 1 and then also disciplined for what she did at that meeting. 2

App’x at 4 20. The record reflects that at least some of these performance issues 3

were documented

. On August 3, 2009, Williams entered into a Local Hearing 4
Settlement Agreement, and she agreed to a loss of two days of annual leave in 5
exchange for dismissal of three charges of failure to perform duties; on January 6
20, 2015, Williams was served with three charges of incompetency and/or 7
misconduct and was then found guilty of two of the charges; and, in every year 8
between 2007 and 2014 (except for 2010), she was subject to counseling 9

memoranda for a variety of on

- the

- job deficiencies

. 10

D efendants also cont est that the unfilled HA vacancies were connected to 11
any alleged plan to undermine Williams. Rather, they note, it was Williams’ s 12
responsibility as the h ousing m anager to notify human resources of vacancies by 13

submi tting a PD2 form , used to request employe e replacements

. Defendants 14
point out th at Williams failed to file the required form. Indeed, on December 29, 15

2015, a human resources employee reminded Williams that Mill Brook Houses 16

needed to submit PD2 forms so two of the HA vacancies could be filled, bu t the 17

forms were not submit ted until January 26, 2016. D efendants also point to 1816 Williams ’ s deposition testimony that she 1) never saw a document promising 1
that OPMOM developments would never be understaffed; 2) did not know if 2
other OPMOM developments always had their desired numbers of staff; and 3) 3
did not know if there was any connection between the July 30, 201 5 meeting and 4
any subsequent personnel changes at Mill Brook Houses

. 5
Finally, as to the replacement of Superintendent Martinez with Limo, 6

D efendants note that Williams admitted that she never asked Martinez why he 7

transferred out of Mill Brook Houses , an d that there is no policy prohibiting 8
NYCHA from transferring staff in OPMOM developments

. 9

II. Procedural Background 10
Williams filed the operative amended complaint in this action on October 11

28, 2016. Her claims included : 1) creation of a hostile work environment based on 12
race and national origin, in violation of the New York State Human Rights Law 13
(“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. L. §§ 296, et seq. (Count One); the New York City 14
Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y. C. Admin. Code §§ 8

- 101, et seq. (Count 15
Two); and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count Seven); 2) aiding and abetting violations, 16
through the creation of a hostile work environment, of state law, in violation of 17

NYSHRL § 296(6) (Count Three), and of city law, in violation of NYCHRL § 8

- 1817 10 7(6) (Count Four); 3) conspiracy to deprive Williams of her constitutional 1
rights, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count Five ) and § 1983 (Count Six); 4) 2
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count 3
Eight); and 5) intention al infliction of emotional distress, in violation of state law 4
(Count Nine). 5
On September 10, 2018, the district court granted in part D efendants’ 6
motion to dismiss the amended complaint. See Williams v. City of N ew Y ork , No. 7

16

- cv
- 8193, 2018 WL 4308552 (S.D.N.Y. Sep t . 10, 2018). The court dismissed all 8
the claims against the C ity; the claims against Mark

- Viverito for unlawful 9
creation of a hostile work environment, violation s of Sections 1981 , 1983 , and 10

1985 , the Equal Protection Clause, and inte ntional infliction of emotional distress; 11
and the claim against Clarke and Kelly for violation of Section 1985 and 12

intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at *10. That left 1) the state and city 13
law hostile work environment claims against NYCHA, Clarke, and Kelly; 2) the 14
aiding and abetting claims against Mark

- Viverito, NYCHA, Clarke, and Kelly; 15
and 3) the claims under Section s 1981, 1983, and the Equal Protection Clause 16
against Clarke and Kelly. Id. 1718 Following discovery

— which the district c ourt consolidated with the 1
discovery in Colon’s retaliation suit

— the court granted summary judgment to 2

D efendants on the remainder of Williams’ s claims. See Williams , 2021 WL 3

2077817 , at *1

. Though the district court dismissed Williams’ s hostile work 4

envir onment claims against NYCHA, Clarke, and Kelly , 3 two days after issuing 5

its decision here , it denied, in large part, motions by the same defendants in 6

Colon’s case. The district court concluded that Colon had raised genuine issues 7

of material fact “ concerning whether NYCHA retaliated against” Colon and 8
“whether Defendants Clarke and Kelly participated in such retaliation.” Colon , 9
2021 WL 2159758, at *1. The court grant ed Mark

- Viverito’s motion for summary 10
judgment, d ismissing Colon’s aiding and abetting claim against her. Id. As of 11
today, Colon’s suit remains pending. 12

III. The District Court’s Analysis 13
The district court began by assessing “in isolation” each of the five main 14

sets of incidents that Williams asserted establ ished a hostile work environment: 15
1) the July 30, 2015 meeting at Mark

- Viverito ’s office; 2) Clarke’s directions to 16

3 Williams waived all claims against Kelly in her Memorandum in Opposition to the summary judgment mo tions.19 Colon to transfer Williams from Mill Brook Houses ; 3) the August 28, 2015 1
meeting regarding Williams’ s exchange s with Spanish

- speaking residents at Mill 2

Brook Houses ; 4) NYCHA’s failure to timely fill the HA vacancies; and 5) the 3
transfer and replacement of Mill Brook’s Spanish

- speaking superintendent with 4

Limo

. Williams, 2021 WL 2077817, at *13. 5

As to the first incident , the district court reasoned that, “even if a 6

reasonable trier of fact could find that Defendant Mark

- Viverito asked for a 7
‘Spanish Manager’ at this meeting, this incident alone does not constitute 8
sufficient basis for [Williams’ s ] hostile work environmen t claims,” principally 9

because Mark

- Viverito “had no role, management or otherwise, at NYCHA , ” 10

never communicated with Williams outside of th e July 30 meeting, and because 11

Williams’ s belief that Mark

- Viverito “wanted her replaced is mere conjecture.” 12

Id

. at *14

– 15. 13

As for the second incident

— Clarke’s “aborted attempt to replace 14
[Williams] as Manager of Mill Brook,”

— th e district court determined this too 15

was insufficient to support a hostile work environment claim

. Id . at *15. T he 16

district court observed that the attempt was unsuccessful , and there is no 17
“indication that, during the period that Clark e was attempting to transfer 1820 [Williams, her] work environment was adversely impacted in any way

. ” I d. 1
Moreover, the court noted, outside of Williams’ s “claim that Colon disclosed to 2
her on an unspecified date that she was directed to transfer [Williams] for 3
discriminatory reasons, the record is devoid of evidence of any incidents or 4
correspondences that would have revealed to [Williams] that an effort to replace 5
her as Mill Brook Manager was ongoing,” and “[i]t is axiomatic that acts taken 6
unbeknownst to a plaintiff cannot form the basis for a hostile work environment 7
claim[].” Id. 8

As to the third incident

— Clarke’s allegedly aggressive statements to 9
Williams during an August 28, 2015 meeting concerning Williams’ s 10
communications with “Spanish residents” at Mill Brook

— the district court 11
concluded that although Williams had offered suf ficient evidence to raise a 12
triable issue of fact regarding what occurred during the meeting, Clarke’s 13
“demeanor and comments during this meeting alone [were] insufficient to 14

establish a hostile work environment claim” because “hostile work environment 15

cla ims are not appropriate venues for enforcing general workplace civility 16

codes.” Id. at *16. The fourth incident

— concerning the HA vacancies

— similarly 17
failed, pri marily because the “four HAs [who] were absent from work or 1821 transferred out of Mill Brook durin g this period [did so] for unforeseen reasons 1
largely unrelated to” Williams or D efendants and because Williams introduced 2
no “evidence to show that such delays between vacancies and staffing were out 3
of the ordinary, or that NYCHA offered other residential locations preferential 4
treatment with regards to the speed of staffing or re

- st affing.” Id. Finally, the fifth 5

incident

— concerning the transfer of Martinez, the Spanish

- speaking 6
superintendent

— could not alone constitute a hostile work environment claim, 7
because even if Limo, the replacement superintendent, underperformed during 8

the t wo weeks Limo and Williams worked together, Williams “fail[ed] to identify 9
any evidence in the record that Limo’s alleged underperformance materially 10
altered [Williams’ s ] conditions of employment.” Id. at *18. 11
After analyzing each of the five central even ts in isolation, the district court 12
considered the first three incidents “in their totality” and concluded that “these 13
three incidents combined are also inadequate to support [Williams’ s ] hostile 14

work environment claims.” Id. at *19. The court did not incl ude the fourth and 15
fifth incidents in its totality analysis after concluding that Williams had failed to 16

“establish facts showing that [th o se] two events

. . . are in any way connected to 17
the other three alleged discriminatory events

. . . or otherwise mot ivated by 1822 discriminatory intent on the part of the NYCHA Defendants.” Id

. The court 1

reasoned that the first three events did not alter Williams’ s employment and 2
create an abusive working environment; specifically, it “strains credulity that the 3
August 28, 2015 meeting and Clarke’s unsuccessful attempt to have [Williams] 4
transferred from Mill Brook somehow precipitated or had any connection 5

whatsoev er with [Williams’ s ] retirement almost two years later.” Id. The court 6
dismissed the hostile work environment claims against the NYCHA D efendants 7

and then dismissed the aiding and abetting claims against all Defendants, 8
because “an aiding and abetting clai m is only viable when an underlying 9
violation has taken place.” Id. at *20 (citing Falchenberg v. N.Y. State Dep ’ t of Educ. , 10
338 F. App’x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2009))

. 11

Williams timely appealed

. 12

DISCUSSION 13
This appeal concerns hostile work environment claims under federal law 14
against Clarke and Kelly for violating Section s 1981 and 1983 and the Equal 15

Protection Clause ; under state law against Clarke, Kelly, and NYCHA; and under 16
city law against Clarke, Kelly , and NYCHA. This appeal also concerns state law 1723 claims of aiding and abetting a hostile work environment against Mark

- Viverito, 1
NYCHA, Clarke, and Kelly

. 2

Williams contends that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ 3
motions for summary judgment and in doing so, misapplied the totality of the 4

circumstances standard established in Harris v. Forklift Sys tems , Inc. , 510 U.S. 17 5
(1993). We agr ee. We also conclude that the district court failed to draw “all 6

reasonable inferences” in Williams’s favor when it considered the five incidents 7
underlying her claims, both when viewing the incidents individually and in their 8
totality. See Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc. , 715 F.3d 102, 108 (2d 9
Cir. 2013)

. 10
“We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, 11
construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non

- moving party and 12
drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor.” Id. “ Summa ry judgment is 13
appropriate only when ‘ the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 14
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ’ ” Id

. 15
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) )

. 1624 I. Governing Law 1

To establish a hostile work environment claim under Section s 1981 and 2
1983, and the NYSHRL, a plaintiff must first produce evidence that “ the 3
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, 4
that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the cond itions of the victim’s 5
employment.” Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc. , 202 F.3d 560 , 570 (2d Cir. 2000) , 6
superseded on other grounds by N.Y.C. Local L. No. 85 ( internal quotation marks 7
omitted); see also Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth. , 743 F.3d 11, 20 n.4 8
(2d Cir. 2014) (“The same standards apply to the plaintiffs’ hostile [work] 9
environment claims arising under the NYSHRL and to their claims arising under 10
42 U.S.C. § 1981.” (internal citations omitted)). A hostile work environment is 11

shown when “a single incident was extraordinarily severe, or that a series of 12
incidents were sufficiently continuous and concerted” to be deemed “pervasive.” 13
Alfano v. Costello , 294 F.3d 365, 374 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal citation and quotation 14

marks omitted)

. Th at analysis includes both an objective and a subjective 15
component: “ [a] work environment will be considered hostile if a reasonable 16
person would have found it to be so and if the plaintiff subjectively so perceived 17

it.” Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. , 192 F.3d 310, 318 (2d Cir. 1999). 1825 Next, a plaintiff must show “a specific basis

. . . for imputing the conduct 1

that creat ed the hostile work environment to the employer.” Whidbee v. Garzarelli 2
Food Specialties, Inc. , 223 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2000). Still, an individual defendant 3
may be held liable “only if that individual is personally involved in the alleged 4
deprivation.” Littlejohn v. City of N ew Y ork , 795 F.3d 297, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) 5
(internal citation and quotati on marks omitted). In addition , “when a supervisor 6
wields the authority delegated to him by an employer . . . the supervisor’s 7
conduct is deemed to be that of the employer, and the employer is liable for that 8

conduct.” Perry v. Ethan Allen, Inc. , 115 F.3d 143, 152

– 53 (2d Cir. 1997). 9
A plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment has a lower burden under 10
city law than under its federal or state counterpart s. For a NYCHRL claim to 11
survive summary judgment, the plaintiff need only show that her employer 12

treated her “ less well than other employees,” at least in part for a discriminatory 13

reason. Mihalik , 715 F.3d at 1 1 0 (internal quotation marks omitted)

. “ The 14
employer may present evidence of its legitimate, non

- discriminatory motives to 15
show the conduct was not caused by discrimination, but it is entitled to summary 16
judgment on this basis only if the record establishes

. . . that discrimination 17
play[ed] no role in its actions. ” Id. at 110 n.8 ( internal citation and quotation 1826 marks omitted). “Under this standard, the conduct’s severity and pervasiveness 1
are relevant only to the issue of damages.” Id. at 110. Nevertheless, “the 2
NYCHRL is not a general civility code,” and even if “the plaintiff establishes that 3

she was treated less we ll because of her [protected characteristic], defendants 4
may assert an affirmative defense whereby [they] can still avoid liability if

. . . the 5
conduct complained of consists of nothing more than what a reasonable victim of 6
discrimination would consider p etty slights and trivial inconveniences

. ” I d. at 7

110

– 11 ( internal quotation marks omitted ). 8

II. T he Hostile Work Environment Claims 9
Williams contends that genuine dispute s of material fact preclude 10
summary judgment on her hostile work environment claims under Sections 1981 11
and 1983, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. As an initial matter, although the 12
premise of each of Williams’ s claims is the allegation that D efendants 13
contributed to a hostile work environment, we must analyze the federal

- and 14

state

- law claims separately from the city

- law claims. See Mihalik , 715 F.3d at 109 15
(concluding that courts must “analyze NYCHRL claims separately and 16
independently from any federal and state law claims” and construe its 1727 provisions “broadly in favor of discrimination plain tiffs , to the extent that such a 1
construction is reasonably possible” (internal quotation marks omitted))

. 2

A. The Federal and State Law Hostile Work Environment Claims 3 Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll persons within the 4
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right

. . . to make and enforce 5

contracts

. . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). “This section 6
thus outlaws discrimination with respect to the enjoyment of benefits, privileges, 7

te rms, and conditions of a contractual relationship, such as employment

. . . . ” 8
Patterson v. Cnty

. of Oneida , 375 F.3d 206, 224 (2d Cir. 2004) ; see also Whidbee , 223 9

F.3d at 69 (“Section 1981 provides a cause of action for race

- based employment 10

discriminati on based on a hostile work environment.”)

. 11
Section 1983 allows an action at law against a “person who, under color of 12
[law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States

. . . to the 13
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni ties secured by the Constitution 14

and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although “not itself a source of substantive rights,” 15

Baker v. McCollan , 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979), Section 1983 “constitutes the 16
exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guarante ed in § 1981 by state 17
governmental units,” Duplan v. City of N ew Y ork , 888 F.3d 612, 619 (2d Cir. 2018) 1828 (emphasis omitted) ( quoting Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist. , 491 U.S. 701, 733 1
(1989) )

. Through its application of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 2
Amendment, Section 1983 “protect[s] public employees from various forms of 3
discrimination, including hostile work environment” claims based on race. 4
Littlejohn , 795 F.3d at 320 ( inter nal quotation marks omitted ). Similarly, the 5

NYSHRL makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate , as relevant here, on 6

the basis of “ race, creed, color , [ or ] national origin

. ” See N.Y. Exec. Law § 296

. 7

H ostile work environment claims under the NYSHRL are “ governed by the same 8

standard s” as claims under federal law. Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., Inc. , 445 9

F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 2006)

. 10

The district court erred when it identified several triable issues of fact but 11

concluded that a reasonable juror could not determine that the NYCHA 12
Defendants subjected Williams to a hostile work environment. When looking at 13
the five main incidents that gave rise to Williams’ s claims, the court categorized 14
the first three as ones that “potentially reference race” and categorized the latter 15
two as “facially neutral.” Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at *13. The court then 16
individually addressed the three incidents that “potentially reference race” 1729 before assessing the totality of those incidents , as part of its faulty totality of the 1
circumstances analysis

. See id. at *13

– 20. 2
Beginning with Mark

- Viverito’s comment at the July 2015 meeting that she 3

wanted a “Spanish manager , ” the district court acknowledged that the record 4

raises a triable issue of fact as to whether Mark

- Viverito made the comment in 5
question. See id

. at *14. Mark

- Viverito does not recall making the statement, “I 6
want a Spanish Manager,” and Clarke ’s testimony supports her denial

. App’x at 7

464 , 418

– 19

. Clarke also testified that no one else at the meeting demanded 8

Williams’ s transfer

. See App’x at 418

– 19. Williams , however, testi fied that Mark

9
Viverito insisted Williams be replaced with a “Spanish m anager,” and Colon 10

corroborate d Williams’ s testimony. Colon also testified that after the meeting, 11
she, Williams, and Artis discussed the “racist” incident, in which Mark

- Viverito 12
was “telling [them] that she want[ed] a Spanish m anager.” App’x at 770

. 13
Apart from the conflicting accounts of whether Mark

- Viverito uttered the 14
“Spanish manager” demand , there is also a quest ion as to whether such a 15
statement, if made , was racially motivated. NYCHA argues that because the sole 16
focus of the July 30 meeting was to discuss language

- barrier issues at Mill Brook 17
Houses, no rational jur or could find that Mark

- Viverito demanded NYCHA 1830 replace Williams with a manager who was ethnically “Spanish ” or that she made 1
any demand with respect to the race o r national origin of any individual. 2
Appellee (NYCHA) Br. at 3. The district court concluded th at Williams’ s 3
subjective perception that Mark

- Viverito’s statement was “propelled by racial 4

animus” wa s not controlling , as the term “Spanish Manager does not rise to the 5
level of an epithet ” or “ explicitly reference [ Williams’ s ] race. ” Williams , 2021 WL 6

2077817, at *14

– 15. 4 7

The district court also held that , since Mark

- Viverito was not a NYCHA 8
employee and because this isolated incident was the only time she interacted 9
with Williams, her conduct could not be imputed to NYCHA. Drawing an 10
analogy to situa tions where harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff ’ s 11
coworkers, the district court found Mark

- Viverito ’ s conduct could only be 12
imputed to NYCHA if the agency “ knew of the harassment but did nothing 13

about it. ” See id . at *14 (citing Perry , 115 F.3d at 1 52

– 53 ). I t is undisputed that 14

Williams’ s supervisor, Clarke , attended the July 30 meeting telephonically and 15

4 As noted above, the record contains email communications between NYCHA employees suggesting that the purpose of the meeting was to assign a Spanish speaking housing assistant to Mill Brook House s , not to replace Williams with an ethnically “Spanish” manager.31 remained silent throughout the entire meeting , arguably doing nothing when, as 1
we must assume at this stage, the comment was made

. The details of th is 2
meeting are thus rife with genuine issues of fact, the type that are ripe for a jury’s 3

determination. 4

The district court next turned to the second event, Clarke’s attempt to 5
transfer Williams from her position at Mill Brook Houses and his reasons for 6
doing so . The district court found it unnecessary to discern NYCHA’s rationale 7
for its attempts to transfer Williams because the attempted transfer, alone, wa s 8

insufficient to raise a hostile work environment claim. See id

. at *15. However, in 9
Colon’s companion case, with which discovery in this case was consolidated, the 10

court conc luded that a jury could find that Clarke’s efforts to transfer Williams 11

were mot ivated by unlawful discrimination. See Colon , 2021 WL 215 9 758, at *15. 12

Thus , the court denied the same defendants summary judgment because “a 13
reasonable person in [Colon’s] position might believe that Clarke’s attempt to 14

transfer Williams for so

- called ‘cultural ’ reasons alone was a thinly veiled 15
attempt to hide the discriminatory reason.” See id

. The court observed that Colon 16
has raised sufficient facts that would allow a reasonable jury to infer 17 that Human Resources hesitated and in fact did not approve of the 18 transfer. As the record demonstrates, Williams’s transfer was not 1932 approved of by Human Resources, was delayed and ultimately 1 abandoned

— according to Clarke, “ because it was recommended to 2 me [by the Law Department] not to transfer at thi s time , ” (Clarke 3 June 13, 2019 Dep. Tr. 146:7

- 8)

— raising questions about the 4 propriety of the request. 5

Id. at *15 n.33. Moreover, “[g]iven Williams’s lack of any apparent disciplinary 6
history that could substantiate the claim that she was underperforming, Human 7
Resources employees were leery of effectuating her transfer on ‘cultural’ reasons 8

alone.” Id

. at *15

. Ultimately, the district court reasoned that “[t]hese impressions 9
could certainly support an inference that race was a motivating factor in 10
requesting the transfer that a trier of fact could reasonably make.” Id

. (citing 11
Abrams v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety , 764 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that 12
phrases such as “better fit or fitting in ” may “have been about race” and at the 13
summary judgment phase, when construing the facts in a light most favorable to 14

the non

- moving party, such phrases could create a reasonable question of fact for 15
a jury) (inter nal quotation marks omitted))

. 16
By contrast , t he district court here denie d Williams the benefit of this 17
interpretation of events even though the record at summary judgment was 18
materially similar to Colon’s

. Instead, the district court granted NYCHA 19
summary judgment because “Clarke’s aborted attempt to replace 2033 [Williams]

. . . did not come to fruition” ; “during the period that Clark e was 1
attempting to transfer [Williams, her] work environment was [not] adversely 2
impacted in any way,” and because Williams introduced no evidence that “she 3
was aware of the NYCHA Defendants’ attempt to remove her before Colon 4
allegedly told” her

— on an un specified date

— that s he had been “directed to 5
transfer [Williams] for discriminatory reasons.” Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at 6

*15. W hat the court calls an “aborted attempt”

— suggesting that Clarke himself 7
stopped the effort

— a jury could reasonably conclude w as a stymied attempt, 8
halted only because human resources employees repeatedly told Clarke and 9

others it was illegal to make transfers on the basis of race , and the Law 10
Department ultimately advised against the transfer

. Another basis from which a 11
jury cou ld conclude that Clarke’s motivation for the transfer was race

- based can 12
be gleaned from the fact that Clarke stopped pursuing the transfer after human 13

resources told him it flowed from illegal motivation. If the transfer was based on 14

Williams’s performance , as Clarke claims, then it is odd that he stopped 15
pursuing the transfer. Given that some NYCHA employees characterized the 16
transfer as racially motivated , and the Law Department advised Clarke against 17

the transfer , a jury could surely draw a re asonable inference to that effect. 1834 T he district court found that Williams did not know of the ongoing effort s 1
to replace her based on Williams ’s failure to specify the date on which Colon told 2
her of the transfer request. Id

. But at summary judgment, the court must “view 3
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non

- moving party and dra w all 4
reasonable inferences in its favor.” Allen v. Coughlin , 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995) 5
(emphasis added). E ven if Williams did not know at the time of the efforts to 6
remove her, that fact alone would not be dispositive . See, e.g. , Cruz , 202 F.3d at 7
571 (“[E]ven if [ the p laintiff ] herself were not present or were not the target of 8
some of [the] racial remarks, a jury plausibly could find that [the] persistent ly 9
offensive conduct created an overall ‘hostile or abusive environment,’

. . . which 10

exacerbated the effect of the harassme nt [ the p laintiff] experienced individually

. ” 11
(quoting Harris , 510 U.S. at 21) ); Schwapp v. Town of Avon , 118 F.3d 106, 112 (2d 12
Cir. 1997) (“Whether [ the p laintiff] was aware of [harassment directed at others] 13
during his employment, and, more significantly, whether in light of these 14
incidents, the incidents [ the p laintiff] experienced more directly would 15
reasonably be perceived, an d [were] perceived, as hostile or abusive,

. . . are 16
factual issues that should be resolved by a trier of fact.” ( internal quotation 17

marks omitted)). In other words, a jury could reasonably find that the staffing 1835 issues that followed the two racially dispa raging meetings caused Williams to 1

suffer a hostile work environment . Moreover, a jury could consider Clarke’s 2
racially motivated effort to transfer Williams as evidence that the staffing issues 3

were indeed racially motivated

. 4

The third incident the district court examined as “potentially referenc [ ing ] 5
race” was the August 28, 2015 meeting, in which Clarke allegedly made 6
aggressive statements regarding Williams’ s communications with “Spanish 7

residents” at Mill Brook House s

. See Williams , 2021 WL 20778 17, at * 14

– 16. Clarke 8

maintains that he did not attend that meeting, nor did he ever ask Williams in 9
any meeting how she “spoke to Spanish people.” App’x at 693. B ut b oth 10

Williams and Artis testified that Clarke was at the August 28 meeting. Williams 11

stated , “it was just horrible the way that man spoke to me ,” App’x at 346, and 12

“ everyone was shocked at how [Clarke] spoke to me

. ” App’x at 348. Artis 13
acknowledged that “[Clarke] was kind of rough with her” and spoke to her 14

“ with contempt

. ” App’x at 898. Williams testified that during the meeting Clarke 15
asked her about the “Spanish speaking thing.” App’x at 350. Despite finding that 16

Williams proffered sufficient evidence to raise triable issue s of fact regarding 17
whether the meeting occurred and what was said, the court concluded that 1836 Clarke’s “ demeanor and comments during [ the ] meeting [ were ] alone 1

insufficient alone to establish a hostile work environment claim. ” Williams , 2021 2
WL 2077817, at * 16. 3
This was error. Again, at summary judgment a district court must credit all 4
factual inferences that could rationally be drawn in Williams’ s favor , and the 5

court failed to do so

. See Allen , 64 F.3d at 79

. D espite acknowledging that 6

Williams raised a triable issue as to whether the meeting took place, the district 7

court failed to consider that there is also a question of material fact as to whether 8
Clarke’s demeanor and conduct, at a meeting he claims he did not attend, could 9

establish a hostile work environment claim. Moreover, Clarke ’s testimony that he 10
was not present at the meeting because he was “extremely busy” that day since it 11
“was the day that Ms. Colon resigned,” is contradicted by the testimony of C olon 12

and others that she resigned from her position during the meeting at issue

. 13
App’x at 693 ; see also App’x at 351, 1065. 14

Later , in its totality analysis, the district court stated that “[i]t also strains 15
credulity that the August 28, 2015 meeting and Clarke’s unsuccessful attempt to 16
have [Williams] transferred from Mill Brook somehow precipitated or had any 17

connection whatsoever w ith [Williams’ s ] retirement almost two years later.” See 1837 Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at *19. Had the court drawn all inferences in 1
Williams’s favor, it would not have dismissed this potential link so readily. For 2
example, though a jury might factor the near ly two

- year gap against Williams, 3
the jury could alternatively consider that the staffing shortages, which 4
precipitated Williams’s retirement, began in October 2015, roughly two months 5
after the initial meeting with Mark

- Viverito and about one month after the later 6
meeting with Clarke. The court thus overlooked disputed material facts, 7
supplanting the function of a jury. 8

i. Totality of the Circumstance s Analysis 9

In Harris v. Forklift Sys tems, Inc. , the Supreme Court established the 10
principle that “whether an environment is ‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be 11
determined only by looking at all the circumstances,” including such factors as, 12
“the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is 13
physically th reatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 14
it unreasonably interfere s with an employee’s work performance.” 510 U.S. at 23

. 15
Courts are thus “cautioned to consider the totality of the circumstances, and to 16
evaluate the ‘quantity, frequency, and severity’ of the incidents,” and must 17

consider th o se factors “ ‘cumulatively,’ so that we may ‘obtain a realistic view of 1838 the work envir onment. ’ ” Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Serv. , 180 F.3d 426, 1
437 (2d Cir. 1999) ( internal citation s omitted), abrogated on other grounds by 2
Burlington N. & Sant a Fe Ry. Co. v. White , 548 U.S. 53 (2006). This Circuit’s case 3

law focuses its analysis on the frequency and severity of the conduct, as the other 4
enumerated factors are “specific considerations within the severity inquiry.” 5

Aulicino v. N.Y.C. Dep ’ t of Homeless Servs. , 580 F .3d 73, 82 (2d Cir. 2009). But as the 6
Supreme Court held in Harris , “no single factor is required.” 510 U.S. at 23. These 7

factors should “ guide the factfinder in making

. . . a factual, not a legal , 8

determination

. ” Schiano , 445 F.3d at 605. 9
Williams argues the district court failed to follow this guidance , 10
impermissibly disaggregat ing the facts

. Appellant’s Br. at 21

– 29. By divorcing the 11

facts from the full context, she argues, the district court , misapplied the Harris 12

standard. Id

. According to Williams, “the proper analysis is not whether each 13

incident of harassment ‘standing alone’ is sufficient to sustain [her] hostile work 14
environment claim, but whether

— taken together

— the reported incidents make 15

out such a case.” Id

. at 23. 16
We disagree that a district court commits err or per se by employing a two

17

pronge d analysis as the lower court did here. The district court properly began 1839 by analyzing each key event in isolation because “even a single episode of 1

harassment can establish a hostile work environment if the incident is 2
sufficiently ‘ severe. ’ ” Redd v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole , 678 F.3d 166, 175

– 76 (2d Cir. 3
2012) ( internal quota tion marks omitted) ; see also Alfano , 294 F.3d at 374 (“[E]ven 4
a single act can meet the threshold if, by itself, it can and does work a 5
transformation of the plaintiff’s workplace.”). Williams herself emphasized the 6

toll that the single meeting with Mark

- Viverito took on her

— she worried that 7
management would try to sabotage her work and set her up to fail to justify her 8

terminati on and replac ement

. 9

The district court did not offend the Harris standard in assessing whether 10

this incident

— and the other incidents, individually

— were “sufficiently severe” 11

to establish a hostile work environment. See Redd , 678 F.3d at 175

– 76. Of course, it 12

would have been error had the court omitted its totality of the circumstan ces 13
analysis

. Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at * 1 8

– 19 . Because the court did not forgo a 14
cumulative totality analysis, we d isagree that mere ly employing a two

- step 15
analysis meant the court was wrong from the start

. 16
We find, however, that t he district court did err in the substance of its 17
analysis. After examining each of the five incidents giving rise to Williams’ s 1840 hostile work environment claims, the court concluded that Williams had 1
proffered no evidence that the fourth and fifth inciden ts

— the alleged failure to 2
replace the HAs between late 2015 and 2016, and the replacement of the Spanish

3
speaking superintendent in 2017, respectively

— were “in any way connected to 4
the other three alleged discriminatory events of 2015 or otherwise motivated by 5
discriminatory intent on the part of the NYCHA Defendants.” Id. at *19

. 6
Accordingly, the court only assessed whether the first three incidents 7

combined were “ inadequate to support [Williams’s] hostile work environment 8

claims.” Id. ; see also id. at *18 (“I will not consider [Williams’s] claim that the 9
NYCHA Defendants failed to timely fill Mill Brook HA vacancies as part of my 10
analysis of whether, under a totality of the circumstances, a claim for a hostile 11
work environment lies.”); id. (“Since [Williams ] failed to identify any evidence of 12
untoward conduct by [ D efendants] with respect to [superintendent] Martinez’s 13
transfer, or a factual basis for any link between the transfer and the alleged 14
discriminatory events , I decline to consider this event as part of [Williams’s] 15

hostile work environment claims

. . . .”). 16

The district court misapplied the Harris test by completely excluding the 17

fourth and fifth inciden ts from its totality analysis. Th is analysis is intende d to 1841 provide courts with “a realistic view of the work environment

. ” Richardson , 180 1
F.3d at 437 ( internal quotation marks omitted)

. S ince Williams ’s evidence 2
reasonably suggests an orchestrated effort to remove her from her position at 3

Mill Brook Houses , these other two events are a substantial part of her story. In 4
Schwapp , this Court held that a lower court erred when it only considered four of 5

twelve incidents of racial discrimination, having reasoned that only the first four 6
events occurred in the plaintiff’s presence and were thus relevant. See 118 F.3d at 7

111. Like the plaintiff in Schwapp , Williams claims that the fourth and fifth events 8
adversely affected her work environment in the period leading up to her 9
resignation. The district court similarly failed to consider the totality of the 10

circumstances in its refusal to factor the other two events in to its analysis. 11
None of this is to say that Williams is entitled to judgment in her favor . A 12
jury could conclude that Mark

- Viverito’s reference to a “Spanish manager,” if 13
indeed she used the term, referred to language abilities, not ethnicity, and thus 14
did not represent a “covert basis for national origin discrimination.” Cf. Pacheco v. 15

N .Y. P resbyterian Hosp. , 593 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Garcia v. 16

Gloor , 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)). So too could a jury find that, even if the 17
phrase was uttered and referred adversely to Williams’ s ethnicity, it was nothing 1842 more than a n “isolated incident[] of racial enmity” that could not “r easonably be 1
perceived

. . . as hostile or abusive ,” Schwapp , 118 F.3d at 110 (internal quotation 2

marks omitted) , borne more out of Mark

- Viverito’s frustration with Williams’ s 3
alleged belittlement of Mill Brook Houses’ Spanish

- speaking residents than from 4
any pervasive discrimination . E ven if a jury concluded the incident s were as 5
demeaning by themselves as Williams suggests, it co uld still find that the 6

incidents did not rise to such a level as to “alter the conditions of [Williams’ s ] 7
employment and create an abusive working environment

. ” Rivera , 743 F.3d at 20 8
( internal quotation marks omitted)

. 9
Alternatively , a jury could plausibly find that Mark

- Viverito and the 10

NYCHA Defendants engaged in a campaign to remove Williams from her 11
position at Mill Brook Houses on account of race

. The evidence would permit a 12
reasonable jury to find , among other things, 1) that Mark

- Viverito demanded 13
that Williams be replaced with a “ Spanish manager; ” 2) that Clarke attempted to 14
carry out Mark

- Viverito’s demand but failed after human resources and the Law 15
Department stymied his efforts; and 3) that s taffing issues at Mill Brook House s 16
began shortly after Clarke’s failed attempts at transferring Williams , continu ing 17
up until her resignation. 1843 The district court held that Williams did not demonstrate the effort to 1
replace her tangibly impacted her work environment , bearing in mind that all a 2
plaintiff must show is that the harassment “altered working conditions as to 3
make it more difficult to do the job.” See Schiano , 445 F.3d at 607 ( internal 4
quotation marks omitted). But a jury could find that the dela y in filling the HA 5

vacancies and the transfer of Mill Brook Houses’ Spanish

- speaking 6
superintendent, along with the behind

- the

- scenes effort to transfer Williams , 7

made it more challenging for Williams to carry ou t her job. 8
Regardless, these are determinations for the jury, not the judge, to make. 9
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility 10
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate 11
inferences from the facts are jury functi ons, not those of a judge, whether [the 12
judge] is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict.”). 13
“An Article III judge is not a hierophant of social graces” and is no better suited 14
than a jury to decide if conduct rises to the level of a hostile work environment. 15

See Schiano , 445 F.3d at 605 (citation and internal quotations omitted)

. 16
Resolving all ambiguities and drawing all inferences in Williams’ s favor, 17
we cannot say as a matter of law that these incidents could not amount to a claim 1844 of a hostile work environment under federal and state law

. Williams raised 1

several triable issues of material fact and as such , summary judgment was 2
inappropriate. 3

B. Th e City Law Hostile Work Environment Claims 4
Once a federal court exercises pendent jurisdiction over claims under the 5

NYCHR L , as the district court did here, the court must “undertak[e] [an] 6
independent analysis required by” city law. Velazco v. Columbus Citizens Found. , 7
778 F.3d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Mihalik , 715 F.3d at 109 (explaining that a 8
district court must “separately and independently” analyze claims under the 9
NYCHRL). Though the district court acknowledged that requirement, see 10

Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at *12, it arguably did not address the separa te force 11

of the NYCHRL. 12
We need not resolve that question, however. In light of our holding that 13

Williams raised triable issues of material fact regarding her hostile work 14

environment claim s under federal and state law , it follows that she has done the 15

sa me under the NYCHRL’s more lenient standard. See Mihalik , 715 F.3d at 109 16
(explaining that federal and state law operate “as a floor below which the City ’ s 17
Human Rights law cannot fall” (quoting Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp. , 582 1845 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 2009) )). We therefore vacate the district court’s grant of 1
summary judgment on the NYCHRL claim. 2

C. The State

- Law Aiding and Abetting Claims Against Mark

- Viverito 3 and Clarke 4
Williams argues that each d efendant aided and abetted the creation of a 5
hostile work environment, in violation of state and city law. See N.Y. Exec. 6

L. § 296(6) (making it “an un lawful discriminatory practice [under state law] for 7
any person to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts 8

forbidden under this article , or to attempt to do so”); N.Y.C

. Admin. Code § 8

- 9
107(6) (prohibiting the same conduct under city law). When evaluating aiding 10
and abetting claims under the NYSHRL, the same standards apply to claims 11

un der the NYCHRL because “the language of the two laws is virtually identical.” 12
Feingold v. New York , 366 F.3d 138, 15 8 (2d Cir. 2004) ( internal quotation marks 13
omitted). 14
The district court concluded that because there was no underlying 15
NYSHRL or NYCHRL violation, D efendants could not aid or abet any acts 16
prohibited by these two statutes

. See Williams , 2021 WL 2077817, at *20. On 17
appeal, Williams objects only to the court’s dismissal of her state

- law aiding and 1846 abetting claims against Mark

- Viverito and Clarke. Because the court did not 1
analyze whether, had the underlying NYSHRL claims survived, the aiding and 2
abetting claims could as well, we vacat e the lower court’s dismissal of the 3

NY SHRL aiding and abetting claim and remand for the district court ’s 4

reassessment. 5

CONCLUSION 6

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the district court’s judgment and 7
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 8