COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

May 9, 2023

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP177-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2019CF1630

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

CHRISTOPHER S. BUTLER,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Brown County: 

BEAU LIEGEOIS, Judge. Reversed and cause remanded with directions. 

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.

¶1 GILL, J. Christopher S. Butler appeals an order denying his motion 

to dismiss his criminal charges based on his claim that the circuit court lacked 

personal jurisdiction over Butler because he was held in pretrial custody for 321

days before his initial appearance was completed, and 342 days before his 
No. 2021AP177-CR

2

preliminary hearing was held. Butler also asserts a Riverside1 violation, as well as 

violations of his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial and his 

Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. 

¶2 We agree that the circuit court lost personal jurisdiction over Butler

by not completing Butler’s initial appearance “within a reasonable time.” See 

WIS. STAT. § 970.01 (2021-22).2 We conclude that when determining whether a 

sua sponte adjournment of an incomplete initial appearance—solely to locate 

counsel for a defendant—is “reasonable,” circuit courts and court commissioners 

must make factual findings on the record considering the justification for the 

adjournment, the possible prejudice to the defendant, and, where applicable, public 

interest. See State v. Lee, 2021 WI App 12, ¶¶43, 50, 396 Wis. 2d 136, 955 

N.W.2d 424; State v. Selders, 163 Wis. 2d 607, 614-15, 472 N.W.2d 526

(Ct. App. 1991). The record before us lacks any evidence of such considerations. 

Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Butler’s motion to dismiss and remand 

with directions for the court to grant the motion and dismiss the criminal 

complaint and Information without prejudice. We conclude that the remainder of 

Butler’s claims lack merit. 

BACKGROUND

¶3 On October 9, 2019, a Green Bay police officer was advised of a 

report that Butler had molested two young females. At the time of this report, 

Butler was on probation in a separate case. As a result of the allegations, a 

 

1

 County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise 

noted. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

3

probation hold was issued against Butler, and he was taken into custody on 

October 10. On October 23, 2019, Butler was charged with three felonies, each as 

a repeater: (1) repeated sexual assault of same child (a Class B felony) as a 

“persistent repeater”; (2) repeated sexual assault of same child (a Class C felony) 

as a “persistent repeater”; and (3) exposing genitals to a child (a Class I felony).3 

¶4 Butler’s initial appearance commenced on the day he was charged. 

At that hearing, Butler appeared with an attorney from the Office of the State 

Public Defender (SPD).4 A court commissioner set cash bail at $75,000, and then 

stated that he would “schedule a balance of initial appearance.” At the time, the 

Brown County Circuit Court’s policy was to adjourn a defendant’s initial 

appearance until counsel was appointed to represent the defendant. Based on this 

policy, the court commissioner did not make a probable cause finding at Butler’s 

first hearing. In fact, the court commissioner informed Butler, “Just given the 

nature of this [case], I expect it will take the [SPD] some time to appoint.” 

¶5 From October 23, 2019, to April 22, 2020, Butler was in custody and 

had six “adjourned initial appearances.” At each hearing, an SPD attorney 

appeared with Butler, and he or she informed a court commissioner that the SPD 

was still attempting to find an attorney to represent Butler. At the conclusion of

these appearances, either the SPD attorney asked for another initial appearance 

 

3

 In 2000, Butler was found guilty of a serious child sex offense. See WIS. STAT.

§ 939.62(2m)(a)1m. Therefore, if found guilty of either sexual assault charge in this case, Butler 

faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole or extended 

supervision. See § 939.62(2m)(b)2., (c). 

4

 For purposes of this opinion, whenever Butler appeared with an SPD attorney, the 

attorney’s appearance was a limited appearance for that hearing only. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

4

date or the court commissioner adjourned the initial appearance sua sponte.5 

Although the State appeared at each of Butler’s hearings, the State gave no input 

as to the adjourned initial appearances. At no point during these hearings was a 

probable cause finding made. 

¶6 On February 17, 2020, Butler had his final probation revocation 

hearing in his prior case. An administrative law judge ruled in Butler’s favor, and 

he was not revoked. Sometime thereafter, Butler’s probation hold was lifted, but 

he was unable to pay the bail amount in this case and remained in custody. 

¶7 On March 24, 2020, Butler filed a pro se motion titled “Demand for

Speedy Trial,” in which he cited WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2), and argued that he “has a 

statutory right to be brought to a preliminary examination within 10 days of his 

initial appearance.” Butler also argued that “[p]ersonal jurisdiction has been lost 

due to the preliminary examination not being timely held.” His motion also cited 

his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. The motion was never 

formally heard or ruled on by a court commissioner or the circuit court. 

¶8 On April 17, 2020, the SPD appointed Attorney Aileen Henry to 

represent Butler. At the next adjourned initial appearance on April 22, Henry 

informed a court commissioner “that at the time I accepted the case from the 

[SPD], I did not realize that [Butler] had put in a speedy trial demand.... I’m not 

sure that I will be able to meet [his] speedy trial demand ....” The court 

commissioner warned Butler that if Henry withdrew, “I wouldn’t be shocked if it 

takes that much longer to get you a new lawyer, at which point your speedy trial 

 

5

 Between October 23, 2019, and April 22, 2020, SPD attorneys also made two requests 

for Butler’s bail to be reduced. Both requests were denied. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

5

demand probably doesn’t mean a whole lot.” Butler then inquired with the court 

commissioner why the process of hiring an attorney took so long, and the court 

commissioner responded, “Shortage of attorneys willing to take public defender 

cases. That’s the only explanation I can give you.” The court commissioner set a 

hearing for the following week to allow Butler and Henry to determine if she 

would continue to represent Butler. The court commissioner still did not make a 

finding regarding probable cause. 

¶9 At the next hearing the following week, Henry informed a court 

commissioner that “[w]e’ve agreed that I should withdraw and have the [SPD] try 

to find [Butler] counsel that will be able to get him a trial within the timeframe 

that he wants.” The court commissioner again warned Butler that “it may take the 

[SPD] months to appoint you an attorney again.” Butler insisted that he wanted to 

proceed with a speedy trial, and the court commissioner granted Henry’s motion to 

withdraw as Butler’s attorney. 

¶10 From April 28 to June 22, 2020, nothing in Butler’s case changed 

procedurally. Butler had two more adjourned initial appearances, during which 

SPD attorneys again informed court commissioners that the SPD was still looking 

for an attorney to represent Butler. Butler’s bail was reduced to $50,000 on 

May 5, but he remained in custody.6 On May 27, Butler filed another pro se 

motion, arguing, among other things, that his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth 

Amendments were being violated. 

 

6

 Butler filed several more bond modification motions, all of which were either denied or 

not addressed. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

6

¶11 On June 22, 2020, the State filed a letter with the circuit court stating 

that it “felt compelled to raise” concerns with the court regarding the length of 

time Butler’s case had been pending. Citing “the statutory and constitutional 

rights of the parties and the [alleged] victims,” the State pointed out that “there 

have been twelve court appearances in this case” over the course of eight months. 

¶12 In response to the State’s letter, the circuit court scheduled a hearing 

for July 1, 2020. During that hearing, the court stated that it “should intervene to 

see how I can troubleshoot getting an attorney appointed faster.” The court then 

set another adjourned initial appearance for later that month. 

¶13 At Butler’s next hearing, which was held before a court 

commissioner, Butler appeared with an SPD attorney who informed the court 

commissioner that the office was still looking for an attorney to represent Butler. 

Butler asked the court commissioner, “How long is this going to take? I’ve been 

in here for nine months without an attorney. It’s an ongoing issue. I feel like my 

rights are being violated, all types of things.” The court commissioner responded, 

“[T]he only thing we can do is just see what will happen, if anyone is willing to 

appoint you an attorney.” 

¶14 At a subsequent hearing on July 16, 2020, Butler appeared with an 

SPD attorney. A court commissioner stated that “Judge Liegeois wanted me to 

place on the record today, the status” of the case. Specifically, the court 

commissioner informed the parties that Judge Liegeois “had contacted four 

attorneys to see if they would take the case at the [SPD] rate. Thus far, two had 

refused and two he had not heard back from, at least as of yesterday.... So I will 

put it on, on a weekly basis, going forward.” The court commissioner then set 
No. 2021AP177-CR

7

another adjourned initial appearance for the following week. The court 

commissioner made no probable cause finding. 

¶15 At the next hearing on July 23, 2020, a court commissioner informed 

the parties that Judge Liegeois had located Attorney Christopher Hartley to 

represent Butler, but that the SPD was “contacting the attorney to see if he 

qualifies for the appointment.” Butler stated that he “reject[ed] ... any other court 

hearings. This is getting out of hand. I want that on [the] record also.” The court 

commissioner scheduled an adjourned initial appearance hearing for the following 

week. 

¶16 On July 30, 2020, Butler again appeared with an SPD attorney, who 

informed a court commissioner that the SPD had sent Hartley the paperwork to get 

certified by the SPD to represent Butler. On August 6, 2020, an SPD attorney 

informed the court commissioner that Hartley “does not take cases from the 

[office], regularly.... [T]herefore, he has to call the [office] and basically sign up 

and register with us. We can’t just hand out, especially a case like this, to just 

anybody. That attorney has not done that yet. We just confirmed that today.” 

After going through the SPD’s appointment process, Hartley was appointed as 

Butler’s attorney on August 13, 2020. 

¶17 On September 8, 2020—321 days after Butler was first charged in 

this case—Butler appeared in court with Hartley, and the initial appearance was 

completed. Nevertheless, the court commissioner still did not make a probable 

cause determination. Butler made no objections during the September 8 hearing. 

On September 29—342 days after Butler was first charged in this case—a 

preliminary hearing was held, and the State filed an Information. During the 
No. 2021AP177-CR

8

preliminary hearing, a court commissioner found probable cause to bind Butler 

over for trial. Again, Butler made no objections during the September 29 hearing. 

¶18 Butler was arraigned on November 3, 2020, and pled not guilty to 

the three charges against him. Another hearing was held on November 13, during 

which the parties discussed the pro se speedy trial motion that Butler filed in 

March 2020. The circuit court concluded that “there has not been a valid speedy 

trial demand submitted at this point. The [I]nformation wasn’t filed until 

September 29th[, so] I don’t believe [there was a timely assertion].” On 

November 24, Butler made a formal speedy trial demand, and a jury trial was set 

for February 2021. Butler’s family posted his cash bond in December 2020 and he 

was released from custody. Subsequently, Butler rescinded his speedy trial 

request. 

¶19 Prior to the trial date, Butler filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Citing our recent decision in Lee, Butler argued that the 

circuit court lost personal jurisdiction over him when it failed to hold a 

preliminary hearing within ten days of his initial appearance, as required by WIS.

STAT. § 970.03(2). Following a hearing on Butler’s motion to dismiss, the court 

denied Butler’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that Butler’s case was factually 

distinguishable from Lee. 

¶20 After the circuit court denied his motion to dismiss, Butler filed a 

petition for leave to appeal the court’s decision. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.50. 

We granted Butler’s petition and stayed his trial pending the appeal. We later 

stayed Butler’s appeal pending the outcome of the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 

review of Lee. Ultimately, our supreme court dismissed its review in Lee as
No. 2021AP177-CR

9

improvidently granted, State v. Lee, 2022 WI 32, ¶1, 401 Wis. 2d 593, 973 

N.W.2d 764 (per curiam), and we lifted the stay on Butler’s appeal. 

DISCUSSION

¶21 Butler raises a number of issues on appeal. First, Butler argues that 

no probable cause finding was made until his preliminary hearing, in violation of 

Riverside. Second, Butler argues that the circuit court lost personal jurisdiction 

over him by continuously adjourning his initial appearance under WIS. STAT.

§ 970.01(1) and by violating WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2) as provided under Lee. 

Third, Butler claims that his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment were violated. Lastly, Butler contends that both his statutory and 

constitutional rights to a speedy trial were violated. 

I. Personal jurisdiction

A. Butler did not forfeit his challenges to personal jurisdiction, but he did 

concede a challenge to a purported Riverside violation. 

¶22 The State contends that we should not reach the merits of Butler’s 

personal jurisdiction arguments because he forfeited those claims by not objecting 

to jurisdiction at the time he was arraigned. “We review de novo whether a 

defendant adequately preserved his or her right to appellate review of a particular 

claim.” State v. McReynolds, 2022 WI App 25, ¶46, 402 Wis. 2d 175, 975 

N.W.2d 265. 

¶23 “[F]orfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right.” 

State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (citation 

omitted). “[S]ome rights are forfeited when they are not claimed at trial; a mere 

failure to object constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate review.” Id., ¶30. 

The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to enable the circuit court to avoid or correct 
No. 2021AP177-CR

10

any error as it comes up, with minimal disruption of the judicial process and 

maximum efficiency.” State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶26, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 

938 N.W.2d 530. “An objection based on a defect in the institution of a criminal 

proceeding must be raised before trial by motion or be deemed [forfeited].” See

State v. Evans, 187 Wis. 2d 66, 85, 522 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1994). 

¶24 The State relies heavily on the fact that Butler entered not-guilty 

pleas at the arraignment. According to the State, three cases dictate that Butler’s 

entry of pleas forfeited his right to challenge the circuit court’s personal 

jurisdiction: State v. Asmus, 2010 WI App 48, ¶4, 324 Wis. 2d 427, 782 N.W.2d 

435 (“[A] defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is waived by pleading to the 

[I]nformation.”); Armstrong v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 282, 285-86, 198 N.W.2d 357 

(1972) (same); and Godard v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 189, 190, 197 N.W.2d 811 (1972) 

(same). 

¶25 As Butler correctly argues, the defendants in Asmus, Armstrong, 

and Godard all pled guilty to the charges against them and then attempted to 

reverse their convictions based on purported jurisdictional defects. Butler, 

however, has not pled guilty to any of the charges against him. We addressed this 

distinction in Selders, 163 Wis. 2d at 615 n.2, stating that “[a]lthough a [circuit] 

court’s lack of personal jurisdiction is waived by a guilty plea that does not 

preserve the objection, Godard, 55 Wis. 2d at 190, 197 N.W.2d at 812, Selders 

pled not guilty.”

7

 Like the defendant in Selders, Butler pled not guilty at his 

arraignment and, therefore, did not forfeit a challenge to personal jurisdiction. 

 

7

 “Waiver” in this context is actually a form of forfeiture and

(continued)
No. 2021AP177-CR

11

¶26 The State also argues that Butler forfeited his personal jurisdiction 

challenges by not objecting to jurisdiction after his initial appearance was 

completed, at his preliminary hearing, or when he was arraigned. See Godard, 55 

Wis. 2d at 190 (stating the defendant’s “failure to object” to the circuit court’s lack 

of personal jurisdiction “at the preliminary hearing was a waiver”). We also 

addressed this argument in Selders, where the defendant objected at the time of the 

State’s proposed adjournment of his preliminary hearing. Selders, 163 Wis. 2d at 

613, 615 n.2. We determined that “[a]dditional objections would have been both 

futile and pointless,” and, therefore, the defendant did not waive his objection to 

personal jurisdiction. Id. at 615 n.2 (alteration in original). 

¶27 While prior to the completion of the initial appearance, as Butler 

points out, he did object to there being personal jurisdiction over him. Butler 

objected on the record in his March 24, 2020 pro se motion, stating that he had “a 

statutory right to be brought to a preliminary examination within 10 days of his 

initial appearance” and that the failure to do hold a preliminary hearing within that 

time limit resulted in personal jurisdiction being lost. Similarly, on July 23, 2020, 

Butler announced that he “reject[ed] ... any other court hearings. This is getting 

out of hand. I want that on [the] record also.” Butler’s objections to personal 

jurisdiction, which occurred prior to the initial appearance being completed, were 

 

does not convey the usual meaning of an intentional 

relinquishment of a known right. Instead, the effect of a guilty 

plea is to cause the defendant “to forego the right to appeal a 

particular issue.” If we were writing on a blank slate, a more 

accurate label would be the “guilty-plea-forfeiture” rule, or 

something to that effect. 

State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶18 n.11, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886 (citations omitted). 
No. 2021AP177-CR

12

more than sufficient to give “both parties and the circuit court notice of the issue 

and a fair opportunity to address the objection.” See Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d 653, ¶30. 

¶28 Conversely, we need not address any challenge to a purported 

Riverside violation. On appeal, the State argues that “Butler did not assert an 

alleged Riverside violation at any point prior to his brief before this Court.” 

Butler does not address the State’s argument in his reply brief, and we conclude 

that he conceded any argument to the contrary. See United Coop. v. Frontier FS 

Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d 578 (stating that the 

failure to refute a proposition asserted in a response brief may be taken as a 

concession). Therefore, we decline to address the merits of Butler’s arguments 

based upon any alleged Riverside violation.

B. The circuit court lost personal jurisdiction over Butler by erroneously 

exercising its discretion to continuously adjourn the initial appearance, 

violating WIS. STAT. § 970.01(1). 

¶29 Under WIS. STAT. § 970.01(1), “[a]ny person who is arrested shall 

be taken within a reasonable time before a judge in the county in which the 

offense was alleged to have been committed.” At an initial appearance, the circuit 

court or a court commissioner has a duty to inform the defendant

(a) Of the charge against the defendant and shall furnish the 

defendant with a copy of the complaint which shall contain 

the possible penalties for the offenses set forth therein. In 

the case of a felony, the judge shall also inform the 

defendant of the penalties for the felony with which the 

defendant is charged. 

(b) Of his or her right to counsel and, in any case required 

by the U.S. or Wisconsin constitution, that an attorney will 

be appointed to represent him or her if he or she is 

financially unable to employ counsel. 

(c) That the defendant is entitled to a preliminary 

examination if charged with a felony in any complaint .... 
No. 2021AP177-CR

13

WIS. STAT. § 970.02(1). The court must also “admit the defendant to bail in 

accordance with [WIS. STAT.] ch. 969.” Sec. 970.02(2). In addition, if the 

defendant does not waive his or her preliminary hearing, “the judge shall forthwith 

set the action for a preliminary examination under [WIS. STAT. §] 970.03.” 

Sec. 970.02(5). 

¶30 “The preliminary examination shall be commenced ... within 10 

days [of an initial appearance] if [a] defendant is in custody and bail has been 

fixed in excess of $500. On stipulation of the parties or on motion and for cause, 

the court may extend such time.” WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2). “The primary function 

of the preliminary examination is to ‘protect the accused from hasty, improvident, 

or malicious prosecution and to discover whether there is a substantial basis for 

bringing the prosecution and further denying the accused his [or her] right to 

liberty.’” Lee, 396 Wis. 2d. 136, ¶23 (citation omitted). 

¶31 In Lee, the State charged Lee with three felonies, and he had his 

initial appearance the same day. Id., ¶5. At the initial appearance, the circuit 

court found probable cause and set bail at $25,000. Id. Lee was unable to post 

bail and remained in custody, thus triggering the ten-day statutory time limit to 

hold a preliminary hearing under WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2). See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 

136, ¶6. However, Lee’s preliminary hearing was continuously adjourned well 

beyond the ten-day time limit. Id., ¶¶5-19. In total, Lee was in custody for 113 

days before a preliminary hearing was held. Id., ¶1. 

¶32 During this time, a court commissioner held eight “review hearings,” 

and each time the commissioner summarily found good cause to extend the time 

limit for holding Lee’s preliminary hearing based solely on the SPD’s continued 

search for an attorney to represent Lee. Id., ¶¶44, 46. Roughly two months after 
No. 2021AP177-CR

14

Lee was charged and incarcerated in pretrial detention, the circuit court held a 

hearing “to address the delay” in getting Lee an attorney. Id., ¶47. At that 

hearing, the court asked an SPD attorney to explain the delay, and counsel 

informed the court that at least 100 attorneys had been contacted about Lee’s case. 

Id. The court ultimately relied on the court commissioner’s previous findings of 

good cause to extend the time limit yet again. Id. 

¶33 “Thereafter, four additional review hearings were held over the 

course of more than one month before the SPD obtained counsel for Lee.” Id., 

¶48. We explained that, 

[a]t nearly every hearing, the presiding circuit court judge 

or court commissioner expressed dismay at the amount of 

time Lee had been awaiting the appointment of counsel. 

Yet, none of them made further inquiries of the [SPD]

regarding the reason for the delay or considered the 

possible prejudice Lee suffered by continuing to remain 

incarcerated without having a preliminary hearing. 

Id. Only once was the prospect of hiring Lee an attorney at county expense 

considered, but the court commissioner “elected not to make such an appointment 

solely on the basis that ‘they’re trying not to have to do that’—an apparent 

reference to the costs the county would incur by it appointing counsel.” Id. 

¶34 On appeal, we held that a circuit court’s decision to extend the time 

limit “for cause” under WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2) must be articulated on the record 

and that simply stating that the SPD was attempting to locate counsel for a 

defendant, by itself, was not a proper exercise of discretion. See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 

136, ¶51. In particular, we reasoned:

Certainly, difficulty in locating competent counsel to 

represent an indigent defendant can be a justifiable reason 

for extending the time limit for the preliminary hearing, 

especially early in the proceedings. But simply observing 
No. 2021AP177-CR

15

that the defendant has not yet had counsel appointed by the 

[SPD] is insufficient to demonstrate a “reasonable inquiry 

and examination of the facts.” 

Id. (citation omitted). 

¶35 Instead, “a decision to grant relief from a deadline must be based on 

two major factors: (1) the justification for the relief sought; and (2) the possible 

prejudice to the opposing party. In appropriate cases, the public interest may also 

be considered.” Id., ¶¶43, 50 (citing Selders, 163 Wis. 2d at 614-15). In a case 

where a circuit court extends the preliminary hearing based on a lack of appointed 

counsel, it should consider “the nature of the charges against the defendant, the 

extent of the SPD’s efforts to locate counsel, the reasons for the delay in obtaining 

counsel, ... how long that delay is likely to continue given the other 

circumstances[,]” and “alternate avenues of procuring counsel, like court 

appointment.” Id., ¶¶53-54. Based on the lack of reasoning given by the court 

commissioner and the court, we determined that the adjournment of Lee’s 

preliminary hearing for 113 days because the SPD could not find an attorney for 

Lee was an erroneous exercise of discretion. Id., ¶46. We concluded that the 

remedy for the court erroneously adjourning the preliminary hearing was dismissal 

of the charges against Lee without prejudice. Id., ¶61. 

¶36 Unlike WIS. STAT. § 970.03’s timing requirement for a preliminary 

hearing, WIS. STAT. § 970.01(1) “does not provide for a specific time frame in 

which [an initial] appearance must take place.” See Evans, 187 Wis. 2d at 90. 

Instead, “this court looks at the individual circumstances of the case to determine 
No. 2021AP177-CR

16

whether the initial appearance was held within a ‘reasonable time’ from the 

defendant’s arrest.”

8

 Evans, 187 Wis. 2d at 91 (citation omitted). 

¶37 Despite the lack of a specific time frame in which an initial 

appearance must take place, we conclude that the reasoning from Lee applies to 

WIS. STAT. § 970.01. That is, prior to sua sponte adjourning an initial appearance 

under § 970.01, a circuit court or court commissioner must consider the 

justification for the relief sought, the possible prejudice to the opposing party, and, 

where applicable, public interest. See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶¶43, 50. 

¶38 We conclude Lee is largely applicable in the initial appearance 

context for several reasons. First, circuit courts and court commissioners have 

discretionary authority in adjourning initial appearances, just as they do in 

adjourning preliminary hearings. While WIS. STAT. § 970.01(1) does not 

expressly allow adjournments, “[c]ourts have the inherent authority to ensure that 

‘the court functions efficiently and effectively to provide the fair administration of 

justice.’ A court’s authority to grant or deny continuances and adjournments is 

critical to ensuring that it functions efficiently and fairly.” See State v. Chvala,

2003 WI App 257, ¶19, 268 Wis. 2d 451, 673 N.W.2d 401 (citation omitted). 

“[M]otions for continuance ... are addressed to the sound discretion of the court.” 

Id., ¶21 (citation omitted). As such, we review a court’s decision to adjourn a 

hearing for an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶51. 

 

8

 This situation applies “[i]n cases where a defendant’s Riverside determination was 

properly made in a proceeding prior to the initial appearance.” State v. Evans, 187 Wis. 2d 66, 

91, 522 N.W.2d 554 (Ct. App. 1994). “If, however, the initial appearance is to also serve as the 

Riverside probable-cause hearing it must be held within 48 hours barring extraordinary 

circumstances.” Evans, 187 Wis. 2d at 91. Because Butler conceded that he forfeited a Riverside

challenge, we address this former scenario in this case. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

17

¶39 As we said in Selders, 

[a] decision whether to grant authorized relief from a 

deadline must be based on an analysis of two major 

factors: (1) the justification for the relief sought; and 

(2) the possible prejudice to the opposing party. Where 

appropriate, such as in criminal cases, the public interest 

should also be considered. 

Selders, 163 Wis. 2d at 614-15 (emphasis added; citations omitted). Selders

stated these three factors with reference to cases that did not involve statutorily 

required “good cause” to adjourn. See id. (e.g., citing Hamiel v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 

656, 674, 285 N.W.2d 639 (1979) (defense requested adjournment to seek counsel 

or proceed pro se)). In other words, the Selders factors are not applicable only to 

preliminary hearings. In WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2), the “deadline” is ten or twenty 

days after the initial appearance. See generally Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136. In WIS.

STAT. § 970.01(1), the “deadline” is “within a reasonable time.”9 

¶40 Second, aside from the Riverside probable cause protections, “[t]he 

statutory right of an initial appearance ‘within a reasonable time’ is a codification 

of the due process rights guaranteed by the United States and Wisconsin 

Constitutions.” Evans, 187 Wis. 2d at 90. Furthermore, compliance with WIS.

STAT. § 970.02 ensures a defendant understands his or her rights and the charges 

against him or her. As such, the circuit court or court commissioner is required to 

inform a defendant at an initial appearance of all matters listed under § 970.02, 

where applicable. See State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶66, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 818 

 

9

 For purposes of this analysis, we do not find it relevant that WIS. STAT. § 970.01(1)

lacks the “for cause” requirement that exists in WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2). For reasons we need not 

discern, the legislature decided to proscribe a more specific time restraint in § 970.03(2) than in 

§ 970.01(1). What is important for this analysis is that circuit courts and court commissioners 

have inherent power to adjourn both initial appearances and preliminary hearings. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

18

N.W.2d 904. Importantly, when a defendant is charged only with a misdemeanor 

or misdemeanors, he or she will not be entitled to a preliminary hearing. 

Sec. 970.02(1)(c). In this sense, an initial appearance is even more important 

given that the charges can immediately be set for trial. See § 970.02(3) (at an 

initial appearance and “[u]pon the request of a defendant charged with a 

misdemeanor, the judge shall immediately set a date for the trial”). 

¶41 Lastly, given the jurisdictional timing requirement in WIS. STAT.

§ 970.03, see Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶61, not extending the analysis in Lee to 

adjourned initial appearances would allow repeated adjournments of initial 

appearances to defeat the primary function behind a preliminary hearing and the 

timing requirement in § 970.03(2). As outlined above, § 970.03(2) requires a 

preliminary hearing be commenced within ten days if a defendant is in custody 

and bail has been fixed in excess of $500—or twenty days if out of custody. A 

circuit court may extend the time for holding a preliminary hearing “[o]n 

stipulation of the parties or on motion and for cause.” Id. It follows, then, that a 

repeated adjournment of an initial appearance, without proper consideration, could 

effectively eliminate the timing requirement under § 970.03(2). In fact, the State 

concedes as much, stating “that repeated adjournments [of an initial appearance] 

could, in some cases, defeat the purpose of [§] 970.03(2), as set forth in [Lee].” 

¶42 We emphasize that we do not hold that a circuit court or court 

commissioner “must conduct a relatively thorough inquiry that ensures there is

good cause for” an adjournment of an initial appearance. See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 

136, ¶59 (emphasis added). We are cognizant of the fact that WIS. STAT.

§ 970.01(1) confers a different, and less specific, timing standard than WIS. STAT.

§ 970.03(2). As such, our holding is that a circuit court or court commissioner 

“must conduct a relatively thorough inquiry that ensures” an initial appearance is 
No. 2021AP177-CR

19

held “within a reasonable time” after an arrest.10 See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶59. 

We therefore hold that Lee’s reasoning applies to repeatedly adjourned initial 

appearances, and that, based on the record before us, an erroneous exercise of 

discretion occurred when Butler’s initial appearance was adjourned for 321 days 

without proper consideration of the Selders factors.11 

¶43 Proper considerations in determining the justification for adjourning 

an initial appearance based on a lack of appointed counsel for the defendant, and 

whether each adjournment will comply with the “reasonable time” requirement, 

include the following: the extent of the SPD’s efforts to locate counsel, the 

reasons for the delay in obtaining counsel, and how long that delay is likely to 

continue given the other circumstances. Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶53. “The circuit 

court should also consider alternate avenues of procuring counsel, like court 

appointment.” Id., ¶54. “The overall length of the delay is also a factor that must 

have significance to the determination.” Id., ¶57. 

¶44 The reasonableness analysis should also take into account whether 

the defendant is already lawfully in custody for other reasons. “We have stated 

that ‘absent either prejudice or other unforeseen circumstances ... the interval 

 

10

 We also emphasize, again, that the analysis we outline, and extend from State v. Lee, 

2021 WI App 12, 396 Wis. 2d 136, 955 N.W.2d 424, is relevant only when a defendant’s 

Riverside determination was properly made in a proceeding prior to the initial appearance (or, as 

in this case, a Riverside challenge is not properly before the appellate court). Otherwise, if the 

initial appearance is to also serve as the Riverside probable-cause hearing, it must be held within 

forty-eight hours, barring extraordinary circumstances. Evans, 187 Wis. 2d at 91. 

11

 Upon granting Butler’s petition for leave to appeal, we asked the parties to consider 

whether the ten-day deadline under WIS. STAT. § 970.03(2) for holding a preliminary hearing 

begins to run when a defendant first appears in court or when the initial appearance has 

concluded. We need not answer this question because we conclude that, under either 

interpretation, circuit courts cannot adjourn an initial appearance without properly considering the 

factors articulated in State v. Selders, 163 Wis. 2d 607, 614-15, 472 N.W.2d 526 (Ct. App. 1991). 
No. 2021AP177-CR

20

between an arrest and an initial appearance is never unreasonable where the 

arrested suspect is already in the lawful physical custody of the State.’” Evans, 

187 Wis. 2d at 91 (citation omitted). Furthermore, a post-arrest detention without 

an initial appearance is permitted to a certain extent for “proper purpose[s]” such 

as “determining whether to release or to charge the suspect, checking out a story 

told by the witness or the suspect, and gathering evidence.” Id. (citation omitted). 

Additionally, where an initial appearance is started but not completed, as in 

Butler’s case, courts should consider to what extent there has been compliance 

with WIS. STAT. § 970.02. See Thompson, 342 Wis. 2d 674, ¶85 (remanding to 

circuit court to determine if court’s failure to inform defendant of § 970.02(1)(a) 

prejudiced the defendant). 

¶45 As in Lee, the level of thoroughness in determining whether to 

adjourn an initial appearance should “be reflective of overall length of the delay in 

each case.” Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶59. A circuit court or court commissioner 

must “recite on the record the factors that lead it to find” adjourning the initial 

appearance will not violate the “reasonable time” requirement. See id. 

¶46 In all, “an appellate court should be able to determine from the 

record whether discretion was in fact exercised and whether a reasonable judicial 

mind could have reached the conclusion it did.” Id. (quoting State ex rel. 

La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court for La Crosse Cnty., 115 Wis. 2d 220, 

236-37, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983)). We will uphold a circuit court’s exercise of 

discretion if it

applied the proper legal standard to the facts before it and, 

through a reasoned process, arrived at a reasonable 

conclusion. “[T]o determine whether the [circuit] court 

properly exercised its discretion in a particular matter, we 

look first to the court’s on-the-record explanation of the 

reasons underlying its decision.” While this explanation 
No. 2021AP177-CR

21

need not be a lengthy process, the court’s statements must 

“indicate to the reviewing court that the trial court 

‘undert[ook] a reasonable inquiry and examination of the 

facts’ and ‘the record shows that there is a reasonable basis 

for the ... court’s determination.’”

Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶45 (alterations in original; citations omitted). 

¶47 Turning to the facts in Butler’s case, it is clear that the circuit court 

and the court commissioners continuously adjourned Butler’s initial appearance 

solely based on locating representation for him.

12

 At Butler’s first hearing, the 

court commissioner stated that “given the nature of this [case], I expect it will take 

the [SPD] some time to appoint.” While the court commissioner set Butler’s cash 

bail, it did not conduct any of the other requirements under WIS. STAT. § 970.02,

such as informing Butler of the charges against him, the maximum penalties, or 

his right to a preliminary examination.13 

¶48 Thereafter, from October 23, 2019, to April 22, 2020, Butler had six 

adjourned initial appearances. Each of these hearings was adjourned because the 

SPD was still looking for an attorney for Butler. Particularly troubling is that, at 

the time of Butler’s pretrial detention, the blanket policy of the Brown County 

 

12

 We note that the approaches taken by both the circuit court and the court 

commissioners in this case preceded our decision in Lee. 

13

 The SPD attorney who appeared with Butler at his first hearing “waive[d]” the reading 

of the criminal complaint. Still, WIS. STAT. § 970.02(1)(a) states that “[i]n the case of a felony, 

the judge shall also inform the defendant of the penalties for the felony with which the defendant 

is charged.” (Emphasis added.) See State v. Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶¶62-63, 70, 342 Wis. 2d 

674, 818 N.W.2d 904 (judge’s duty at initial appearance to personally inform the defendant of 

penalties—including mandatory minimum penalties—for felonies is mandatory). Especially in a 

case like Butler’s, where he faces a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the 

possibility of parole or extended supervision if convicted of either of the two sexual assault 

charges against him, the failure to comply with § 970.02(1)(a) is extremely concerning. See 

supra n.3. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

22

Circuit Court was to continuously adjourn initial appearances until counsel was 

located. As we held in Lee, “simply observing that the defendant has not yet had 

counsel appointed by the SPD is insufficient to demonstrate a ‘reasonable inquiry 

and examination of the facts.’” Id., ¶51 (citation omitted). Thus, on the record 

before us, the reasoning behind Butler’s adjourned initial appearances appears to 

be tied to this blanket policy as opposed to the specific circumstances of Butler’s 

case. 

¶49 Further, the record lacks any indication that the circuit court or any 

court commissioner considered appointing an attorney at county expense when it 

became clear that the SPD’s process may not have a successful outcome. In Lee, 

we observed that after the court became aware of the fact that roughly 100 

attorneys had refused to represent Lee, “the need for additional inquiries into the 

necessity of the delay, as well as consideration of the alternative mechanism for 

appointing counsel, should have been obvious.” Id., ¶52. At the July 1, 2020 

hearing in this case, an SPD attorney informed the court that the SPD was having 

difficulty appointing an attorney for Butler because of his speedy trial demand, 

lack of experience in the office to accept charges as serious as those against 

Butler, general attorney case load, and the fact that many private bar attorneys did 

not qualify to take Butler’s case due to the severity of the charges. In response, 

the court insisted that “we’re at the point where the [c]ourt, myself, is going to 

start calling defense attorneys that are qualified to take this case and see if they 

will accept the” SPD’s appointment. Importantly, the court did not consider 

appointing an attorney at county expense, which “might prove more compelling to 
No. 2021AP177-CR

23

private attorneys,” as they would not have to go through the SPD’s qualification 

process and would receive greater compensation.14 See id., ¶54. 

¶50 Crucially, the circuit court and court commissioners did not consider 

the overall delay Butler faced each time his initial appearance was adjourned. As 

we stated in Lee, “If there has been a speedy trial demand, the length of the delay 

is an even more significant consideration.” Id., ¶57. We reasoned that “the length 

of the delay ... might inform a circuit court’s good cause determination to the 

extent it impacts the weighing of the various interests, including a defendant’s 

eventual invocation of his or her speedy trial right.” Id., ¶57 n.21. Here, Butler 

filed a motion on March 24, 2020, titled “Demand for Speedy Trial,” which cited 

WIS. STAT. § 971.10—Wisconsin’s speedy trial statute. The court neither 

responded to Butler’s motion nor considered his demand when it continuously 

adjourned his initial appearance. 

¶51 Additionally, it is clear from the record that the circuit court or court 

commissioners failed to consider “the possible prejudice” to Butler when deciding 

to continuously adjourn his initial appearance. See Selders, 163 Wis. 2d at 

614-15; see also Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶43. For example, the court did not 

consider the potential prejudice to Butler from “further evidence gathering by 

police while incarcerated and the possibility that the delay could compromise the 

 

14

 For services performed after January 1, 2020, court-appointed attorneys are generally 

compensated at a rate of at least $100 per hour, SCR 81.02, while private-bar, SPD-appointed 

attorneys are compensated at a rate of $70 per hour, WIS. STAT. § 977.08(4m)(d). For services 

performed prior to January 1, 2020—during part of Butler’s pretrial detention—court-appointed 

attorneys were generally compensated at a rate of $70 per hour, SCR 81.02 (1993), while 

private-bar, SPD-appointed attorneys were compensated at a rate of $40 per hour, WIS. STAT.

§ 977.08(4m)(c) (2017-18). 
No. 2021AP177-CR

24

defense or result in lost evidence, to [Butler’s] detriment.” See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 

136, ¶58. 

¶52 The time period during which Butler was on a probation hold, 

however, does not weigh against the State in determining the reasonableness of the 

timing of the initial appearance. Butler was taken into custody on a probation hold 

on October 10, 2019, and released from that hold sometime after February 17, 

2020. Butler’s initial appearance was not completed until September 8, 2020, and 

his preliminary hearing was not completed until September 29. At the very 

minimum, the circuit court or court commissioners should have considered the 

negative prejudice toward Butler from the date he was released from his probation 

hold until September 8. See Evans, 187 Wis. 2d at 90; see also Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 

136, ¶23. 

¶53 The State contends that because Butler “terminated his first 

attorney,” he therefore invited any error under Lee. See State v. Gary M.B., 2004 

WI 33, ¶11, 270 Wis. 2d 62, 676 N.W.2d 475 (A “defendant cannot create his [or 

her] own error by deliberate choice of strategy and then ask to receive benefit from 

that error on appeal” (citation omitted)). As an initial matter, there is no evidence 

in the record that Butler intentionally manipulated the system to create 

jurisdictional issues. Moreover, we disagree that Butler “terminated” Henry. 

Instead, Henry withdrew because she could not meet both Butler’s speedy trial 

demand and provide competent representation. We also disagree that the invited 

error doctrine has any bearing on this case. To hold otherwise would require 

Butler to choose between two constitutional rights: the right to a speedy trial and 

the right to representation by counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WIS. CONST.

art. I, § 7; WIS. STAT. § 971.10(2). 
No. 2021AP177-CR

25

¶54 The State also contends that any violation of rights resulting from

continuously adjourning Butler’s initial appearance was harmless error because 

Butler was on a probation hold and because the circuit court eventually found 

probable cause at the preliminary hearing for all three felonies. See State v. 

Nelson, 2014 WI 70, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317 (holding that 

harmless error “prohibits reversal ... for errors that do not affect the substantial 

rights of a defendant”). We disagree that the violations in this case did not affect 

Butler’s substantial rights. The purpose behind conducting a timely initial 

appearance and a timely preliminary hearing would be frustrated if the State was 

allowed to simply argue that probable cause existed based upon a finding made 

months or years later—in this case, 342 days—without any protection to the 

accused beforehand.15 See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶23. 

¶55 Under the circumstances of this case, the proper remedy for a 

violation of WIS. STAT. §§ 970.01(1) or 970.03(2) is dismissal of the charges 

without prejudice. See Lee, 396 Wis. 2d 136, ¶61. Therefore, we reverse the 

circuit court’s order denying Butler’s motion to dismiss, and we remand with 

directions for the court to grant the motion and dismiss the criminal complaint and 

the Information without prejudice. 

 

15

 At Butler’s final initial appearance hearing on September 8, 2020, a court 

commissioner inquired with Hartley on when a preliminary hearing date would work for him. In 

response, Hartley stated that he would “clear a couple of other things off [his] calendar” and 

requested a date for late September. Because that date did not work with the court 

commissioner’s calendar, the parties considered September 15 and 22, before settling on 

September 29. Although Hartley appeared to agree to extending the ten-day deadline under WIS.

STAT. § 970.03(2), we note that the court did not find “good cause” to extend the timing 

requirement. Assuming § 970.03(2) does not attach until after the completion of an initial 

appearance, see supra n.11, Butler’s preliminary hearing did not occur until September 29, 2020, 

more than ten days after the completion of his initial appearance. Our conclusion in this regard 

could also be grounds for dismissal of the charges against Butler without prejudice. See Lee, 396 

Wis. 2d 136, ¶61. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

26

II. Procedural due process

¶56 Butler also contends that his procedural due process rights under the 

Fourteenth Amendment were violated. In support, Butler cites his “lengthy [and] 

arbitrary incarceration,” which “deprived him of his constitutional right to a 

prompt judicial determination as to probable cause, his statutory right to a timely 

preliminary hearing, and his constitutional and statutory rights to a speedy trial.” 

According to Butler, “[t]he combined deprivation [of] those rights constitutes a 

flagrant violation of his constitutional rights to procedural due process, which 

entitles him to dismissal of the charges with prejudice.” 

¶57 “To prove a procedural due process violation, a party must show ‘a 

deprivation by state action of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty or 

property without due process of law.’” State v. Keister, 2019 WI 26, ¶10, 385 

Wis. 2d 739, 924 N.W.2d 203 (citation omitted). Butler cites no relevant authority 

in support of his reasoning that his pretrial detention was “arbitrary” or that it 

otherwise amounted to a procedural due process violation under the Fourteenth 

Amendment. While initial appearances have underpinnings of due process 

protection, we will not develop an argument for a party. As such, we need not 

reach the merits of this claim. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). 

III. Speedy trial

¶58 Lastly, Butler argues that his statutory and constitutional rights to a 

speedy trial were violated. A statutory right to a speedy trial under WIS. STAT.

§ 971.10(2)(a) guarantees a defendant the right to a trial within ninety days of 

demand. The constitutional speedy trial right attaches when a defendant “is 

indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused.” State v. Borhegyi, 222 
No. 2021AP177-CR

27

Wis. 2d 506, 510, 588 N.W.2d 89 (Ct. App. 1998) (formatting altered; citation 

omitted). The remedy for a statutory speedy trial violation is to release the 

defendant from custody, see WIS. STAT. § 971.10(4), but the remedy for a 

constitutional speedy trial violation is dismissal of the charges, see State v. 

Urdahl, 2005 WI App 191, ¶11, 286 Wis. 2d 476, 704 N.W.2d 324. 

¶59 We need not address Butler’s statutory speedy trial demand. Butler 

withdrew his statutory speedy trial demand on January 15, 2021, and he posted 

bond in this case. Therefore, assuming his statutory speedy trial right was 

violated, there is no remedy under WIS. STAT. § 971.10(4) available in this case. 

¶60 Second, we conclude that Butler’s constitutional right to a speedy 

trial was not violated.16 “‘Whether a defendant has been denied the right to a 

speedy trial is a constitutional question that this court reviews de novo.’ However, 

we accept any factual findings made by the circuit court unless they are clearly 

erroneous.” State v. Lock, 2013 WI App 80, ¶20, 348 Wis. 2d 334, 833 N.W.2d 

189 (citation omitted). To determine whether a defendant’s constitutional speedy 

trial right was violated, we conduct a balancing test, considering, under the totality 

of the circumstances, “(1) the length of delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the 

defendant’s assertion of his [or her] right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.” 

Urdahl, 286 Wis. 2d 476, ¶11 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)). 

 

16

 The State contends that Butler “forfeited” his constitutional right to a speedy trial. 

But, a defendant cannot “waive” his or her constitutional right to a speedy trial; hence, we 

consider whether the defendant asserted his or her constitutional speedy trial right under the third 

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), factor. See Hatcher v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 559, 568, 

266 N.W.2d 320 (1978) (“Though a defendant’s failure to demand a speedy trial will not 

constitute a waiver of the right, ... the defendant’s complete failure or delay in demanding a 

speedy trial will be weighed against him [or her].” (citation omitted)); see also State v. Provost, 

2020 WI App 21, ¶45, 392 Wis. 2d 262, 944 N.W.2d 23. 
No. 2021AP177-CR

28

¶61 The State concedes that the first Barker factor weighs in Butler’s 

favor. Butler was arrested on October 10, 2019, and his trial was not scheduled to 

occur until February 2021. See Urdahl, 286 Wis. 2d 476, ¶25 (calculating delay to 

the scheduled trial date although no trial actually occurred). As such, the 

fourteen-month delay is presumptively prejudicial and weighs in favor of Butler’s 

constitutional speedy trial violation claim. See id., ¶12. 

¶62 That said, the remaining three factors do not weigh in favor of 

Butler. First, we conclude that the third factor—whether Butler asserted his right 

to a speedy trial—does not weigh in favor of either party. As outlined previously, 

Butler made a number of speedy trial demands, most notably on March 24, 2020, 

in which he cited both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution. However, as also discussed previously, Butler later withdrew his 

speedy trial demand, and we therefore do not see the third factor favoring either 

party. 

¶63 Second, the reason for the delay was to obtain counsel for Butler. 

Therefore, this analysis weighs in favor of the State. See Urdahl, 286 Wis. 2d 

476, ¶26 (“[I]f the delay is caused by something intrinsic to the case, such as 

witness unavailability, that time period is not counted.”). While Butler is correct 

that the State is responsible for appointing counsel for indigent criminal 

defendants, he does not point to any authority to support his assertion that this fact 

weighs against the State. Nor is this court aware of any such authority. 

¶64 Given this lack of authority and the fact that the search for counsel 

was intrinsic to the case and to provide Butler a constitutional right, we conclude 

the second Barker factor weighs in favor of the State. See United States v. Varca, 

896 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation resulting 
No. 2021AP177-CR

29

from eleven-month delay occasioned by defendant’s need to obtain counsel); but 

see Hadley v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 350, 362-63, 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (illness of 

judge not intrinsic to case); Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 636-37, 250 N.W.2d 

305 (1977) (overburdened court system weighs against the state, but not 

“heavily”). Notably lacking from this case is evidence in the record to suggest 

that the State deliberately delayed the trial in order to hamper Butler’s defense. 

See Urdahl, 286 Wis. 2d 476, ¶26. In fact, the State was concerned about the 

delay and raised the issue via letter to the circuit court in June 2020, citing the 

“statutory and constitutional rights of the parties and the crime victims.” 

¶65 Finally, we cannot adequately conduct a prejudice analysis in this 

case. Our supreme court has explained that “[i]n the absence of a showing of 

extraordinary circumstances, an outright dismissal of the [I]nformation with 

prejudice on speedy trial grounds is not warranted because the evidence of 

prejudice is speculative until after trial.” State v. Lemay, 155 Wis. 2d 202, 214, 

455 N.W.2d 233 (1990). Butler does not respond to the State’s reliance on 

Lemay. Nor do we conclude that extraordinary circumstances exist here. While 

Butler’s trial was delayed by fourteen months, he ultimately withdrew his speedy 

trial demand. Given that the delay occurred solely for the purpose of obtaining 

counsel for Butler, we conclude that the State has overcome the presumption of 

prejudice to Butler resulting from the fourteen-month delay and that Butler’s 

constitutional right to a speedy trial was not violated. 

By the Court.—Order reversed and cause remanded with directions. 

Not recommended for publication in the official reports.