alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Stone, Respondent, v. Harris and others (Wisconsin Board of Examiners in Optometry), Appellants.

*March 2*

April 7, *1959.*

*636For the appellants there was a brief by the *Attorney General*and *Warren H.*Resh, assistant attorney general, and oral argument by *Mr. Resh.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *Wiernick & Zurlo*of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Dominick D. Zurlo.*

A brief was filed by *Hoffman, Cannon, McLaughlin & Herb on,*attorneys, and *Ellis R. Herbon*and *Gordon P. Ralph*of counsel, all of Milwaukee, as *amici curiae.*

Broadfoot, J.

The petitioner does not challenge the provisions of ch. 153, Stats., providing for the appointment of the Board of Examiners and the regulation of the practice of optometry in Wisconsin. Nor does the petitioner dispute the fact that he violated the above subsections of sec. Opt 9.08, 4 Wis. Adm. Code. The sole issue to be determined is whether or not the board had authority by law to promulgate said rules.

The board points to the following sections of the Wisconsin statutes as its authority for promulgating the rules which are here challenged: Secs. 153.03 (4), 153.07 (f), 153.08, 153.11, and 227.014 (2) (a). It is unnecessary to review the specific provisions of these statutes. The rules under consideration all deal with advertising. The question at issue is to be determined, not from the statutory provisions referred to above, but by the provisions of sec. 153.10, relating to prohibited advertising.

The inference is clear that if the legislature had intended to prohibit the type of advertising covered by the rules of the board it would have so stated in sec. 153.10, Stats., as it has done in sec. 152.06 with respect to unprofessional ad*637vertising by dentists. Rules of the state board of dental examiners with respect to unprofessional advertising were challenged in *Modern System Dentists v. State Board of Dental Examiners,*216 Wis. 190, 256 N. W. 922. In that case certain rules promulgated by the board were held to be beyond its powers. Thereafter the statute was amended to include the subject matter attempted to be regulated by board order. It was held in that case that it was not within the province of the board to add to the restrictions imposed by the legislature.

The same rule is applicable here. Therefore the determination of the trial court is correct and the board’s order of suspension based on said rules is of no effect.

*By the Court,*— Judgment affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-4737

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus CHARLES ALEXANDER PINEIRO, Defendant - Appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District ofMaryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge. (CR04-449) Submitted: March 30, 2006 Decided: April 5, 2006 Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Peter D. Ward, LAW OFFICE OF PETER D. WARD, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Michael Joseph Leotta, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).- 2 - PER CURIAM: Charles Alexander Pineiro appeals the district court's judgment sentencing him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea to two counts of fraud in connection with access devices, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (2000). His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising one issue but stating that, in his view, there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Pineiro has been informed of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but has not done so. The United States argues that this court must enforce the waiver of appellate rights provision in Pineiro’s plea agreement. We agree. This Court reviews de novo the validity of a waiver of the right to appeal. United States v. Marin , 961 F.2d 493, 496 (4th Cir. 1992). Whether such a waiver is knowing and intelligent depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding its making, including the defendant's background, experience, and conduct. United States v. Davis , 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992). A waiver is ineffective if the district court fails to question the defendant about it, United States v. Wessells , 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991), unless other evidence in the record shows that the waiver was informed and voluntary. Davis , 954 F.2d at 186. Here, Pineiro’s waiver was clearly knowing and voluntary. The details of the waiver were clearly set forth in the written- 3 - plea agreement, which Pineiro had read, discussed with his attorney, and understood. He was twenty-five, a high school graduate, and not under the influence of drugs or alcohol when he entered his guilty plea. The district judge questioned him about the waiver of his appellate rights, and Pineiro stated that he understood the waiver. In his plea agreement, Pineiro reserved the right to appeal a departure from his guideline range. His sentence was within the guidelines range. On appeal, Pineiro’s counsel raises the issue of whether Pineiro is entitled credit for time spent in state custody , an issue within the scope of the appellate waiver. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal based on the waiver provision in the plea agreement. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decision process.

DISMISSED
#### Katherine Lane *vs.*David D. Sullivan.

Middlesex.

October 4, 1938.

January 31, 1939.

Present: Field, C.J., Donahue, Lummus, Qua, & Dolan, JJ.

*Pleading, Civil,*Declaration. *Contract,*Consideration.

A demurrer properly was sustained to a declaration based upon a promise in writing that the defendant would make payments to the plaintiff upon certain stated contingencies where, although there was an allegation that the plaintiff had “performed all of the obligations imposed upon” him “by the terms of said contract,” there was no allegation of any act or promise by the plaintiff as a consideration for the defendant's promise.

Contract. Writ in the Superior Court dated December 6, 1937.

A demurrer to the declaration was sustained by *M. Morton,*J. The plaintiff appealed.

*R. B. Heavens,*for the plaintiff, submitted a brief.

*F. J. Kelley,*for the defendant.

*214Qua, J.

The defendant’s demurrer was rightly sustained on the ground that the declaration fails to state any consideration for the defendant’s promise.

The declaration sets forth a promise in writing by the defendant to pay the plaintiff, upon certain contingencies, the sum of $4,000, “plus her share of the estate of Elizabeth Christmas.” No act is alleged to have been performed and no promise is alleged to have been given on the part of the plaintiff in exchange for the promise of the defendant. The statement that the plaintiff “has performed all of the obligations imposed upon her by the terms of said contract” is not an allegation of the consideration agreed upon. *Newton Rubber Works*v. *Graham,*171 Mass. 352. *Wesalo*v. *Commissioner of Insurance,*299 Mass. 495, 498.

If, as the plaintiff suggests, an oral promise by her not to contest an account “in the estate of Elizabeth Christmas” was the consideration, she should have alleged that fact in order that her declaration might show a valid contract. *Stone*v. *White,*8 Gray, 589, 593. *Davis*v. *H. S. & M. W. Snyder, Inc. 252*Mass. 29, 36. *Gloucester Mutual Fishing Ins. Co.*v. *Boyer,*294 Mass. 35, 40.

The rule that the consideration for a written promise may be shown at the trial by parol evidence does not do away with the necessity of a sufficient declaration.

G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 19, whatever may be its true construction, has no bearing upon the correctness of the order sustaining the demurrer.

*Order sustaining demurrer affirmed.*
United States Office of Personnel Management 

The Federal Government’s Human Resources Agency 

Benefits Administration Letter 

Number: 23-308 Date: September 2023 

Subject: September 2023 Headcount 

This is a reminder for all payroll providers, including cross-service providers (e.g., National 

Finance Center (NFC), Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), etc.), to submit the 

semiannual Headcount for the September 2023 reporting period no later than September 30, 

2023. 

The semiannual Headcount reporting (March and September) provides the Office of Personnel 

Management (OPM) with a snapshot of agency-wide enrollment for participants in the Civil 

Service Retirement System (CSRS), Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS), Federal 

Employees Retirement System – Revised Annuity Employees (FERS-RAE), Federal Employees 

Retirement System – Further Revised Annuity Employees (FERS-FRAE), Federal Employees 

Health Benefits (FEHB) Program, and/or the Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) 

Program. 

The September 2023 Headcount reporting period is for payroll paid date during the first 15 days 

of September for bi-weekly pay cycles. For monthly pay cycles, the reporting period is August 1 

through August 31, 2023. 

Note: All Payroll providers are required to use OPM’s Headcount Collection System (HCS) to 

input data and submit OPM Forms 1523 and 2812A electronically. HCS also provides an 

electronic upload feature using a standardized template. 

For questions about the new electronic collection process, please contact the Headcount 

Support Team at HeadcountSupport@opm.gov.

Headcount reports must be submitted no later than September 30, 2023. If report submission 

delays or difficulties are anticipated, please call Ms. Yadira Vega at 202-606-4842, Olayla Ruffin at 

202-606-1498, Eirk Brown 202-606-1418 or email Fundsmanagement@opm.gov.

Note: Standard Retirement and Insurance Transfer System (RITS) reports should not be delayed 

because Headcount submissions are not ready/complete. 

If you have questions about this letter, please send an email to FinancialBALs@opm.gov. We 

look forward to assisting you.
<PAGE>

                                   EXHIBIT 32

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of International Uranium Corporation
(the "Company") on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2004, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Form
20-F"), I Ron F. Hochstein, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Form 20-F fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

      (2) The information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: February 14, 2005

International Uranium Corporation

/s/ Ron F. Hochstein
--------------------
Ron F. Hochstein
President and Chief Executive Officer

                                      F-31

<PAGE>

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                        OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Annual Report of International Uranium Corporation
(the "Company") on Form 20-F for the fiscal year ended September 30, 2004, as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Form
20-F"), I David C. Frydenlund, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Form 20-F fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)); and

      (2) The information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated: February 14, 2005

International Uranium Corporation

/s/ David C. Frydenlund
-----------------------
David C. Frydenlund
Vice President and Chief Financial Officer

                                      F-32
#### MARTIN v. TURNBOW.

No. 3411.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. El Paso.

Sept. 10, 1936.

Truett, Abernathy & Wolford, of McKinney, for appellee.

PELPHREY, Chief Justice.

On or about the 14th day of June, 1935, a collision occurred at the west end of a bridge on highway No. 24, between a Dodge pick-up truck owned by appellee and a truck owned by appellant. Suits were filed in the district court of Collin county by appellee and his son, F. E. Turnbow, to recover damages resulting from this collision.

Appellant filed his plea of privilege in both suits to be sued in Wood county, the county of his residence. These pleas were controverted on the ground that appellant’s agents were guilty of active negligence which constituted a, trespass upon appellee and that the driver of the truck discovered the perilous position of F. E. Turnbow in time to have prevented the collision by the use of the means at hand.

Upon a hearing the pleas of privilege were overruled, and this appeal followed.

Opinion.

Appellant contends that his plea was improperly overruled because there was no proof introduced that the collision occurred in Collin county and that there was no prima facie showing of a cause of action in favor of appellee.

With the first contention we must disagree. J. T. Turnbow testified that the accident happened about 6 miles from McKinney, the county seat of Collin county. This court will take judicial knowledge of the fact that such point is in Collin county. There is testimony in the record showing that appellant’s truck with a trailer loaded with lumber attached to it was being driven on a wet highway at a speed of 55 or 60 miles per hour. Such driving is a positive act of negligence and brings an injury resulting therefrom within the meaning of “trespass,” as that word is used in the venue statute (Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St. art, 1995, subd.. 9). Murray v. Oliver et al. (Tex. Civ.App.) 61 S.W.(2d) 534; Scott v. Carlos (Tex.Civ.App.) 13 S.W.(2d) 957; Rogers v. Alexander (Tex. Civ.App.) 289 S.W. 1070.

The judgment is affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3065 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3065

     To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the Hope 
Scholarship Credit for expenses of individuals receiving certain State 
                             scholarships.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 19, 2000

   Mr. Miller introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
                  referred to the Committee on Finance

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
     To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to expand the Hope 
Scholarship Credit for expenses of individuals receiving certain State 
                             scholarships.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXPANSION OF HOPE SCHOLARSHIP CREDIT.

    (a) Definition of Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses.--Section 
25A(f)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to qualified 
tuition and related expenses) is amended by adding at the end the 
following:
                    ``(D) Exception for certain state scholarship 
                recipients.--
                            ``(i) In general.--In the case of an 
                        eligible student receiving a State lottery 
                        funded merit or academic-based scholarship for 
                        any academic period, such term shall include 
                        reasonable costs for books, supplies, and 
                        equipment related to the student's academic 
                        course of instruction and room and board while 
                        attending an eligible educational institution.
                            ``(ii) Special rules for room and board.--
                        The rules of section 529(e)(3)(B)(ii) shall 
                        apply to costs for room and board under clause 
                        (i).''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section shall apply 
to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2000.
                                 <all>
```
SHARE

# Armor for steel

## New method could enable advances in energy, electronics and aerospace

January 12, 2024

Scientists applied a simple approach for growing hBN films on the surface of ubiquitous steels and other metal alloys to “armor” them and thus increase their capabilities. Credit: Adam Malin/ORNL, U.S. Dept. of Energy

Researchers demonstrated that stainless steel and other metal alloys coated with hexagonal boron nitride, or hBN, exhibit non-stick or low-friction qualities along with improved long-term protection against harsh corrosion and high-temperature oxidation in air.

Metal alloys — mixtures of two or more metals — are created to be strong, durable and resistant to corrosion or oxidation. By adding coatings, or “armor,” to make those materials even tougher, scientists could enhance existing products and enable the creation of new, innovative ones.

For example, armoring may boost the ability of solar panels to conduct heat and resist environmental factors. Additionally, it allows semiconductors to maintain proper operating temperature, and aerospace turbine blades to guard against wear, reduce friction and withstand hot conditions. 

The hBN coatings are produced from a combination of solid boron sources and molecular nitrogen by using a process called atmospheric pressure chemical vapor deposition.

“This synthesis technique addresses scalability issues such as cost and process safety in applications where those aspects have been problematic,” said ORNL’s Ivan Vlassiouk, who led the study. “Besides providing a versatile protective layer for steels and metals, using this process to synthesize single- and few-layer hBN for emerging two-dimensional electronic and photonic devices could improve their performance.”  

Click here to learn about licensing this technology.

### Media Contact

### Contact

gibsonws@ornl.gov

865.576.6885

## Researchers

Ivan V  Vlassiouk

Alexander A  Puretzky

Olugbenga A  Olunloyo

David B  Geohegan

Ondrej E  Dyck

Andrew R  Lupini

### Pagination

-                Current page            1 
- ...
-  Next pageNext › 
-  Last pageLast » 

## Organizations

User Facilities

Center for Nanophase Materials Sciences

Nanomaterials Synthesis Section

Functional Hybrid Nanomaterials Group

Physical Sciences Directorate
#### SHEFFIELD, Tax Collector (STATE, Intervener) v. HOGG et al. FEDERAL ROYALTY CO. v. STATE.

Motion Nos. 11692, 11693; Nos. 6001, 6130.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Feb. 27, 1935.

For former opinion, see 77 S.W.(2d) 1021.

Rucks & Enlow and Carlos B. Masterson, all of Angleton, G. P. Dougherty and F. T. Baldwin, both of Houston, and James V. All-red, formerly Atty. Gen., for plaintiffs in error.

Stephen L. Pinckney and David M. Picton, Jr., both of Houston, for defendants in error. No. 6130:

Ike S. Handy, of Houston, for plaintiff in error.

Hart Johnson, of Fort Stockton, Brian Montague, of Del Rio, and James Y. Allred, formerly Atty. Gen., and F. O. McKinsey, formerly Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM.

The motions for rehearing and the several arguments filed in connection therewith have been carefully examined and considered and are overruled.

It has been suggested in a motion filed in connection with the motions for rehearing that the opinion be clarified by pointing out more particularly the nature of the royalty interest in section 32 involved in the “Federal Royalty Company Case,” and which section is, for convenience, referred to in the opinion as an unpatented school land survey.

That section, after being classified as mineral, was sold by the state with reservation to the state of all of the minerals. It remained unpatented. The owner of the land under such sale leased the land for oil and gas, acting as agent of the state by the authority conferred in section 2 of chapter 81, Acts 2d Called Session of 36th Legislature, 1919, commonly known as the Relinquishment Act. Under the terms of that act, one-' half of the royalty reserved in the lease 'belonged to the state and one-half to the owner of the soil, the agent-lessor. A part of the agent-lessor’s royalty reserved in such lease of section 32 was conveyed to Federal Royalty Company, and that royalty so acquired and owned by said company is held by the opinion to be taxable like all the other royalties in both cases as an interest in land. -The opinion does not undertake and was not intended to draw a distinction in connection with the taxation of royalties between patented and unpatented sold school land. The state’s ownership of the minerals in public school land sold with reservation of the minerals, the landowner’s right to lease such land for oil and gas under the Relinquishment Act, and the nature of the royalties reserved in such leases are the same whether the land is patented or unpatented.
```

[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 3023 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 3023

 To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect breastfeeding by new 
                                mothers.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           September 11, 2000

   Ms. Snowe introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
  referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to protect breastfeeding by new 
                                mothers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Amendments of 2000''.

SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964.

    Section 701(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(k)) 
is amended--
            (1) by inserting ``breastfeeding,'' after ``childbirth,'' 
        each place it appears; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following: ``In this 
        subsection, the term `breastfeeding' means the feeding of a 
        child directly from the breast or the expression of milk from 
        the breast by a lactating woman.''.
                                 <all>
```