UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. KEVAS L. BALLANCE, Defendant - Appellant. No. 20-3141 (D.C. No. 6:19-CR -10023-JWB-2) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , MORITZ , and EID , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Kevas Ballance appeals an order denying his motion to suppress counterfeit bills that law enforcement discovered duri ng an investigative stop. Ballance argues that the officer who initiate d the stop lacked reasonable suspicion and did not obtain voluntary consent to search Ballance’s pockets. Neither ar gument merits reversal, so we affirm for the reasons explained below. Background The events leading to Ballance’s arre st began with a 911 call from an unnamed employee at Hibbett Sports in Newton, Kans as. The government did not produce the

* This order and judgment is not bi nding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judi cata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1( a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### January 12, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 12 audio or a transcript of the 911 call at th e suppression hearing, but two Newton police officers described a dispatch transm ission relaying the call’s contents. 1 According to Officer Char les Shell, dispatch said that the employee had reported a person leaving the store about five minutes earlier who “matched the description of somebody [who] had previously passed some counterfeit money” at a Hibbett Sports. R. vol. 3, 12. At the tim e, Shell did not know when the prior counterfeiting incident had occurred. But O fficer Luke Winslow, who also heard the dispatch transmission, beli eved the incident had occu rred “recently” at a Hibbett Sports in a neighboring city. Id. at 44. Dispatch also to ld Shell that the caller identified the customer as “a black male wearing [a] wh ite shirt and blue jeans,” adding that he drove off heading north on Ma in Street in a black Nissan Armada with a particular license-plate number. Id. at 13. Responding to the dispatch report, Shel l headed south on Main Street toward Hibbett Sports. On the way, he spotted a car matching the caller’s description at a gas station two blocks north of the store. Sh ell pulled in behind the car at a gas pump, confirmed that the car had the same lic ense-plate number as the one the caller provided, and radioed for b ackup. Two black men wearing white T-shirts exited the vehicle; the driver wore either “jeans or black pants,” and the passenger wore blue jeans. Id. at 30. The passenger, later identified as Ballance, walked past Shell’s patrol

1 Ballance disputes certain aspects of the officers’ testim ony about what the call said, and our brief account of their tes timony here is not meant to resolve that dispute, which we address later. Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 23 car and into the gas station. Shell then approached th e black Nissan on foot to speak with the driver, Joseph Richard, Jr., who stood next to the vehicle’s driver’s si de. During the ensuing conversation, Richard confirme d that he and Ballance had ju st been to Hibbett Sports but denied buying anything. When asked about two shoeboxes in a Hibbett Sports sack behind the driver’s seat, which She ll had observed as Richard opened the rear driver-side door to retrieve his ID, Richard clarified that the items had been bought the day before. At some point, the conversation migrated to the other side of the car, where Richard stood within the open passe nger door frame—and later sat in the passenger’s seat with the door open—answering several identification questions about himself and Ballance. 2 Richard wanted to know why Shell was asking him these questions, so Shell explained that “they believe that you guys may be passing some fraudulent bills over at Hibbett Sports.” Supp. R. vol. 1, 4. As Shell supplied this explanation, Wi nslow arrived at th e scene and came to stand near Shell on the passenger side of Ri chard’s vehicle. At that time, Winslow’s understanding was in part that the customer reported by the caller had “attempt[ed] to return some athletic shoes that had been purchased at a different Hibbett Sports in a different city.” R. vol. 3, 44. Winslow had al so heard dispatch say that the caller “felt [the customer] had been involved in sim ilar fraudulent activity at a Hibbetts in a

2 It is unclear how Shell and Richard e nded up on the other side of the car or how much time passed between the drive r- and passenger-side c onversations; Shell’s bodycam footage simply cuts from one side of the car to the other. Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 34 neighboring city.” Id. at 41. Shell said something al ong those lines to Richard just after Winslow arrived, explaining that so meone at the store thought Richard or Ballance “match[ed] the desc ription” of someone who “p assed bills at other local stores.” Supp. R. vol. 1, 4. Sometime later, Winslow took a turn asking Richard ques tions. As before, Richard said that he and Ballance had ju st been to Hibbett Sports. This time, however, Richard added that onl y Ballance went inside the store and that he did so “to return some stuff but they sa id he couldn’t return the stuff.” Id. at 5. About thirty seconds later, Shell interrupted the ques tioning to note that Ballance was walking away from the gas station and was “ gonna leave [Richard] out to hang.” Id. Just before Winslow left in his patrol car to stop Ballance, Richard suggested that the officers “call [Ballance] down here to see if someone passed a fake bill.” 3 Id. Winslow drove around the parking lot to where Ballance was walking on a sidewalk and asked him to “[c] ome here and talk to me.” Id. at 7. Ballance complied. After patting Ballance down for weapons a nd requesting an ID, Winslow questioned Ballance about why he was “trying to get away from that scene.” Id. In the exchange

3 Ballance notes that Richar d actually said to “call him down here,” not using Ballance’s name, and that Wi nslow was unsure, in his testimony at the suppression hearing, whether the “him” Richard referr ed to was Ballance or an employee at Hibbett Sports. Supp. R. vol. 1, 5 (emphasis added). But the district court found that Richard was referring to Ballance, and Rich ard’s statement can be read to support that finding. Because we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s decision in an appeal from the de nial of a suppression motion, we presume that Richard was referring to Ballance. See United States v. Juszczyk , 844 F.3d 1213, 1214 (10th Cir. 2017). Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 45 that followed, Winslow peppered Ballance w ith questions about hi s explanation that he was on his way to the liquor store, poin ting out that there was no liquor store in the direction he was headed and that he could have driv en to the liquor store after Richard got gas. When Winslow eventually asked what Ballance and Richard had been doing that day, Ballance said he had tried to retu rn some shoes for his cousin but could not do so because his ID did not have an address on it. Ballance complied with Winslow’s request to see th e bills in Ballance’s wall et, and Winslow found only legitimate bills inside. Wh ile Winslow questioned Ballance about why the store employee would say that he “pass[ed] fake bills,” Ballance reached for his pockets. Id. at 12. After ordering Ballance not to reach for his pockets, Winslow said: “You mind if I look, make sure you got nothing in your pockets?” Id. “Go ahead,” Ballance replied. Id. Winslow found a counterfeit $50 bill in one of Ballan ce’s pockets and then arrested him. During booking at the co unty jail, officers f ound more counterfeit bills in Ballance’s shoes. Based on these events, a federal grand jury charged Ballance with (1) one count of conspiracy to manuf acture, possess, or pass coun terfeit money and (2) eight counts of possessing or passi ng counterfeit money. Balla nce moved to suppress the counterfeit bills found in his pocket and shoes, arguing that they were fruits of an unlawful seizure and search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. At a hearing on the motion, the government presented test imony from Shell and Winslow, bodycam footage from both officers, and transcripts of the bodycam footage. The district court Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 56 later denied Ballance’s motion, determini ng that Winslow had reasonable suspicion to stop Ballance and that Ballance voluntarily consented to a search of his pockets. Ballance ultimately entered a conditional guilty plea to cons piracy to possess or pass counterfeit money, reserving his right to appeal the order denying his suppression motion. This appeal followed. Analysis When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress, we vi ew the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’ s ruling, accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, an d review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. 4 See Juszczyk , 844 F.3d at 1214. A finding is clearly erroneous “if it is without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left w ith the definite and fi rm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Hernandez , 847 F.3d 1257, 1263 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting In re Vaughn , 765 F.3d 1174 , 1180 (10th Cir. 2014)). Ballance offers two reasons the district court should have grante d his suppression motion, which we consider

4 Ballance asks that we “reconsider [ou r] practice” of view ing the evidence in the light most favorable to the governme nt when reviewing an order denying a defendant’s suppression motio n. Aplt. Br. 21. But as Ballance acknowledges, we “recently refused to overrule this line of precedent” because “only the en banc [c]ourt could do so.” Id. at 23; see also United States v. Berg , 956 F.3d 1213, 1216 n.3 (10th Cir.), cert. denied 141 S. Ct. 605 (2020). And even mo re recently, this court again declined to abandon this approach, sp ecifically rejecting the argument Ballance raises: that the Supreme Court’s decision in Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 (1996), forbids appellate courts from viewi ng the evidence in the light most favorable to the government when the dist rict court rules in its favor. See United States v. Torres , 987 F.3d 893, 900–01 (10th Cir. 2021) . We therefore reject Ballance’s argument here, as well. Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 67 in turn: (1) Winslow lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Ballance, and (2) Ballance did not voluntarily consent to a search of his pockets. I. Reasonable Suspicion Ballance first challenges the district c ourt’s determination that Winslow had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investiga tive stop. If an officer lacks such suspicion when a stop begins, the stop is an unreaso nable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Martinez , 910 F.3d 1309, 1313 (10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Whitley , 680 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (10th Cir. 2012). The parties here agree that the stop began when Ballance complied with Winslow’ s command to “[c]ome here and talk to me, bud” and started answering Winslo w’s questions. Supp. R. vol. 1, 7; see also United
States v. Gaines , 918 F.3d 793, 799 (10t h Cir. 2019) (concluding that seizure began when defendant “yielded to [a] show of authority” by “getting out of his car, answering the officer’s questions, and looking for his identification”). So to resolve Ballance’s argument, we must assess whethe r “the facts available to [Winslow] at th[at] time” amounted to reasonable suspicion. 5 Whitley , 680 F.3d at 1234 (quoting United States v. McHugh , 639 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011)). Reasonable suspicion exists if, consideri ng the totality of the circumstances, the detaining officer has “a particularized a nd objective basis” for suspecting a person’s

5 For this reason, the district court im properly relied on information Winslow learned after stopping Ballance, such as Ballance’s explanati on “that he had decided to walk to a non[]existent liquor store rather than return to the vehicle.” R. vol. 1, 47. We do not consider any post-s top facts in our reasonable- suspicion analysis, focusing instead on what Winslow kne w at the stop’s inception. See Whitley , 680 F.3d at 1232, 1234. Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 78 involvement in cr iminal activity. Martinez , 910 F.3d at 1313 (quoting United States v.
Pettit , 785 F.3d 1374, 1379–80 (10th Cir. 2015)). Un der this standard, the officer “‘need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct;’ he or sh e simply must possess ‘some minimal level of objective justif ication’ for making the stop.” Id. (quoting United States v. Winder , 557 F.3d 1129, 1134 (10t h Cir. 2009)). That said, th e objective basis for the stop must be “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” Id. (quoting United States v. Moore , 795 F.3d 1224, 1229 (10th Cir. 2015)). The district court determined that Wins low had an objective basis to suspect Ballance’s involvement in counterfeiting activity. It based th is determination on “the 911 call, the corroborated facts by Richard, and [B allance’s] actions in attempting to flee” by walking away from the gas station. R. vol. 1, 46. Ballance attacks those circumstances individually to show that they do not estab lish reasonable suspicion, mostly focusing on the 911 call. Ballance’s primary argument involves the district court’s factual finding about what information the 911 call contained. Ci ting Winslow’s testimony, the district court found that the caller “reported that the suspect was returning athletic shoes that had been purchased with counterfeit cu rrency and that the suspect had been involved in this fraudulent conduct at a Hibbett Sports store in a neighboring city.” R. vol. 1, 40. Ballance contends that this finding is clearly errone ous, mainly because (in his view) Winslow gave conflicting testimony on whether the caller said that “t he person in the store tried to return shoes that had been purchased with counterfeit currency.” Aplt. Br. 28. Without evidence showing that the custom er tried to return such ite ms, Ballance says, the 911 call Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 89 lacks sufficient detail of criminal activ ity to support reasonable suspicion. The alleged conflict in Winslow’s tes timony comes from statem ents he made on direct examination about his memory of th e 911 call, as relayed by the dispatch transmission. In response to a leading ques tion from the government, Winslow answered in the affirmative when asked if he knew, upon arriving at the gas station, “that the suspect was attempting to return some athl etic shoes that had been purchased at a different Hibbett Sports in a different city .” R. vol. 3, 44. According to Ballance, Winslow later contradicted this answer by “testi f[ying] that he did not recall if he got this information from the dispatch report.” Aplt. Br. 30. For support, Ballance cites this exchange from Winslow’s direct examination: [Q.] [W]as it your understanding . . . that the suspect was attempting to return athletic shoes that had been purchased with counterfeit currency? A. That was my understanding at so me point[.] I don’t remember if I got that information directly fro m the dispatched call or not. Q. Pardon? A. I don’t remember . . . if I got that information directly from the dispatch call or not but I know that by the time I went to contact [Ballance] that was part of my understanding. Q. So when you contacted him, . . . you believed and knew . . . that somebody had tried to return shoes at Hibbett Sports that had been purchased with counterfeit currency?
A. Yes. R. vol. 3, 52–53. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s ruling, we see no clear error by the district court. Winslo w did not retract his earlier agreement with Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 910 the statement that dispatch said the suspect had tried to return shoes bought with counterfeit currency, nor did he testify that dispatch did not provide that information. Instead, Winslow simply expressed uncertai nty about the source of his knowledge, suggesting that he could have obtained th e information from either dispatch or his investigation at the scene before stopping Ba llance. Because Winslow did not rule out the possibility that dispatch was the true source of his knowledge, the district court could reasonably accept his initial statement and find th at dispatch relayed the information. That is not to say that the district cour t was required to credit the initial statement. It could have read Winslow’s later statem ent as conflicting with his initial one (as Ballance does), and that may have been a r easonable reading given Winslow’s conduct at the scene. But when “there are two permissi ble views of the evid ence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United States v. De la Cruz-Tapia , 162 F.3d 1275, 1277 ( 10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City , 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). Because there is a plausible way to avoid the conflict Ballance perceives in Winslow’s testimony, that testimony supports th e district court’s finding that the caller reported an attempted return of items purch ased with counterfeit currency. Thus, the district court’s finding on this point was not clearly erroneous. 6 See Hernandez , 847 F.3d

6 Ballance also argues that the district court made “somewhat contradictory findings” by crediting (1) Winslo w’s testimony about an atte mpted return of an item purchased with counterfeit currency, and (2) Winslow’s and Shell’s testimony that the caller said the customer matched the description of so meone who previously used counterfeit bills at another Hibbett Sports . Aplt. Br. 28. We reject this argument because both findings can be true; the calle r may have reported that the customer tried to return an item and that the customer matched th e description of the suspect from the prior incident. Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1011 at 1263. Next, Ballance argues that the 911 call does not establish reasonable suspicion because it provides insufficien t information linking Ballance to criminal activity. This argument involves the factors we apply to determine whether an a nonymous tip supports reasonable suspicion. Those factors include whether the tipster was truly anonymous, “reported contemporaneous, firsthand knowl edge,” and “provided detailed information about the events observ ed,” as well as the tipster’s “s tated motivation for reporting the information” and “whether the police were ab le to corroborate info rmation provided by the informant.” United States v. Chavez , 660 F.3d 1215, 1222 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Navarette v. California , 572 U.S. 393, 399 (2014) (app lying similar factors). Ballance maintains that several of these factors ar e “completely absent” here. Aplt. Br. 32–33. Specifically, he argues that the caller repor ted only a conclusory allegation based on secondhand information that a customer was in volved in a prior coun terfeiting incident at another store, and that the officers corroborate d only innocent details showing that he was the person the caller observed in the Newton store. On the firsthand-knowledge factor, Ball ance presumes that the only relevant criminal activity is the prior counterfeiting incident. Were that the case, we would have no trouble concluding that the ca ller supplied only secondhand knowledge because, as Ballance notes, the caller did not suggest that he or she observed the prior incident at the other stor e and linked Ballance to the incident based solely on a description provided by someone else who did. But the prio r incident is not the only criminal activity the caller reported. As we have e xplained, Winslow’s testimony Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1112 supports the district court’s finding that the caller said someone tried to return property previously purchased with counterfe it bills. This atte mpted fraudulent return at the Newton store is a dis tinct crime apart fro m the purchase at the other store, and the 911 call provided “contemporaneous, firsth and knowledge” of that crime from an employee at the Newton store. 7 Chavez , 660 F.3d at 1222. To be sure, the caller omitted some details about the attempted fraudulent return. The caller did not say, for instance, how he or she knew that the items being returned had been bought with counterfeit bills. But in any event, the caller’s reliability overcomes any deficiency in the dearth of details th e caller supplied. Becau se the caller provided identifiable employment information, Wins low could discover th e caller’s identity and obtain the missing details th rough further investigation. See Chavez , 660 F.3d at 1222 (finding caller not truly anonymous becau se “he told [dispatchers] he was a Wal-Mart employee at a specific Wal-Ma rt store and there by provided the police with information to discover his identity”). This possibility boosts the reliability of the caller’s information because it “provides a disincentive for making false allegations.” United States v. Jenkins , 313 F.3d 549, 554 (10th Cir. 2002). The lack of evidence

7 We recognize that the distri ct court’s analysis on this factor differs somewhat from our own. The district court reasoned that although “the employee was reporting contemporaneous, firsthand knowledge regard ing the suspect’s actions at the Newton store,” the employee was nevert heless “likely not relaying firsthand knowledge of the suspected criminal activity.” R. vol. 1, 43. But because the attempted fraudulent return was itself a crime, we base our analys is of this factor in stead on the alternative ground that the employee reported a firsth and account of crimin al activity in the Newton store. See United States v. Price , 75 F.3d 1440, 1444 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining that we may “up hold the denial of a motion to suppress on any ground supported by the record”). Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1213 suggesting that the caller had an y reason to fabricate the repor t also enhances the caller’s reliability. See United States v. Saulsberry , 878 F.3d 946, 95 0 (10th Cir. 2017) (stating that “caller’s implic it motive was the public interest” because “there [was] no reason to believe otherwise”). In addition, Winslow corroborated so me details from the call during his conversation with Richard at the gas st ation before stoppi ng Ballance. Most importantly, Richard confirmed not only that Ballance had just been to the Newton Hibbett Sports, but also that Ballance went in side alone to “return some stuff but they said he couldn’t return the stuff.” 8 Supp. R. vol. 1, 5. This statement tracked the caller’s statement that a person matching Ba llance’s description ha d tried to return items. That Richard said the store would no t accept the return provided Winslow with even more reason to believe the caller’s report that those items had been bought with counterfeit bills. Altogether, the anonymous-tip factor s discussed above support reasonable suspicion. Based on Winslo w’s testimony, the caller observed someone trying to return merchandise that the store knew ha d been bought recently using counterfeit bills. When questioning Richard, Winslow c onfirmed that Ballance had just been in the store to return some items and that the store would not allow him to do so. And because the caller identified th emselves as an employee at a specific store, Winslow

8 Ballance stresses that this statement show s he “had been in the Newton store” but does not “connect[] [him] to th e previous counterfeiting incident.” Aplt. Br. 35. But again, the attempted return in the Newton store was itself cr iminal activity, and Richard’s statement certainly connected Ballance to that activity. Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1314 could follow up with the caller and confir m details missing from the call, such as how the store knew that the purchaser had used counterfeit bills. For these reasons, the 911 call gave Winslow at least some reason to suspect Ballance’s involvement in criminal activity. And once Winslow arrived at the gas sta tion, he learned two new facts that heightened this suspicion. First, Winslow hear d Richard deflect blame onto Ballance. When Shell noted Ballance walking away from the gas station and Winslow asked which officer should “run [B allance] down,” Richard said the officers should “call [Ballance] down here to see if someone passed a fake bill.” S upp. R. vol. 1, 5. Richard’s statement adds more support for reasonable suspicion because, as the district court found, “rathe r than outright denying any involvement in counterfeit currency,” he “deflected the officer’s inquiry” about counte rfeiting and directed it at Ballance. R. vol. 1, 46. Second, the officers obs erved Ballance walking away from the gas station on foot. The district court determined that this fact supported reasonable suspicion because it constitutes “[u]nprovoked flight upo n noticing the police.” Id. (quoting United States v. Carroll , 491 F. App’x 900, 903 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished)). Ballance questions the district court’s re liance on so-called “flight” cases because here no evidence suggests that his “walki ng away from [the] gas station on foot was ‘headlong’ or ‘unprovoked. ’” Aplt. Br. 38 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow , 528 U.S. 119, 124–25 (2000)). Yet this argum ent fails because even if Ballance’s conduct does not constitute “flight,” it nevertheless constitutes susp icious behavior. We ha ve said that both Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1415 “unprovoked flight and other evasive behavior upon noticing police officers” may be “pertinent factor[s] in determ ining reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Madrid , 713 F.3d 1251, 1257 (10th Cir. 2 013) (emphasis added). And any number of circumstances besides outright flight may “r easonably suggest evasion,” including “[a] sudden change of direction upon seeing law enforcement, in creased speed in an apparent attempt to create distance from the officers, and re peated glances over one’s shoulder.” United States v. Briggs , 720 F.3d 1281, 1287 (10t h Cir. 2013). Here, the district court reasonably found Ballance’s behavior evasive because rath er than return to Richard’s car, Ballance walked away from the gas station on foot. “A lthough not ‘of ironclad significance,’” this evasive behavior was another circumstance supporting reasonable suspicion, and the district court did not err in treating it as such. 9 Id. at 1286 (quoting United States v. Sokolow , 490 U.S. 1, 8 (1989)). Thus, considering all the facts known to Winslow when the stop occurred, he had “a particularized and objective basis” for su specting Ballance’s invo lvement in criminal activity. Martinez , 910 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Pettit , 785 F.3d at 1379–80). The 911 call generated some suspicion that the customer wh o left the store had tried to return goods bought with counterfeit bills. And after arri ving at a nearby gas st ation where another officer had located that customer’s vehicle using a description and license-plate number

9 It did err, however, in noting that Ba llance “avoided eye contact with [Shell]” when walking into the gas station. R. vol. 1, 3, 46. Winslow had not arrived yet when this occurred, and no eviden ce shows that he knew about it before stopping Ballance. Accordingly, we do not consider this fact in our analysis. See Whitley , 680 F.3d at 1234 (assessing reasonable suspicion based on “facts available to the detaining officer” (emphasis added) (quoting McHugh , 639 F.3d at 1256)). Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1516 provided by the caller, Wins low received confirmation fro m Richard that Ballance had just been inside the store and tried to retu rn items. These facts, along with Richard’s deflection and Ballance’s evasive conduct, pr ovided the “minimal level of objective justification” needed to stop Ballance. Martinez , 910 F.3d at 1313 (quoting Winder , 557 F.3d at 1134). In sum, the district cour t did not err in determining that Winslow had reasonable suspicion. II. Voluntary Consent Ballance also challenges the district cour t’s finding that he voluntarily consented to a search of his pockets. Whether consent is voluntary is a fact question reviewed for clear error on appeal. United States v. Latorre , 893 F.3d 744, 756 (10th Cir. 2018). As we have noted, a factual finding is clearly erroneous “if it is w ithout factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all of the eviden ce, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Hernandez , 847 F.3d at 1263 (quoting In re Vaughn , 765 F.3d at 1180). When, as here, an officer conducts a warrantless search, it is “presumptively unreasonable, and evidence obtained from such a search is inadmissible, subject only to a few carefully established exceptions.” Latorre , 893 F.3d at 756 (quoting United States v.
Harrison , 639 F.3d 1273, 1278 (1 0th Cir. 2011)). The government invokes the consent exception, which applies when a person (1) eith er expressly or impliedly consents to a search and (2) does so freely and voluntarily. Id. Ballance challenges the second element, arguing that his consent was involuntary. Whether consent is voluntary, rather than “the product of duress or coercion,” Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1617 depends on the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Jones , 701 F.3d 1300, 1318 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Harrison , 639 F.3d at 1278). Those circumstances include physical mistreatment, use of violen ce, threats, promises, inducements, deception, trickery, or an aggressi ve tone, the physical and mental condition and capacity of the defenda nt, the number of officers on the scene, and the display of police we apons. Whether an officer reads a defendant [the] Miranda rights, obtains consent pursuant to a claim of lawful authority, or informs a defendant of his or her right to refuse consent also are factors to consider. Id. (quoting Harrison , 639 F.3d at 1278). Citing these factors, Ballance argues that his consent was involuntary because (1) Winslow used an aggr essive tone and accusatory approach in questioning Ballance; (2) Wins low was in uniform a nd wearing a utility belt with a firearm; (3) Ballance was detained wh en the search occurred; (4) Winslow patted Ballance down and held onto his identification card; and (5) Winslow did not inform Ballance of his right to refuse consent. Other factors, however, support the dist rict court’s contrary finding. Having “reviewed the video of the interaction betw een [Ballance] and Winslow,” the district court viewed Winslow’s tone as “firm and direct” but “not aggr essive.” R. vol. 1, 48. It also noted that although Wi nslow wore a uniform and carri ed a gun, “the weapon was holstered.” Id. Plus, because Shell remained at th e gas pump with Richard, “only one officer was present during the interaction.” Id. It is true that Balla nce was detained when Winslow requested consent, but detention is only one of several factors in the voluntariness analysis; a person “may voluntarily consent to a search even though he is detained.” Latorre , 893 F.3d at 756 (quoting United States v. Davis , 636 F.3d 1281, 1293 (10th Cir. 2011)). And notably, nothing “indi cat[es] that [Ballance] was coerced, Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 1718 threatened, made promises, or tricked.” R. vol. 1, 48. Ballance emphasizes Winslow’s “persistent accusatory questioning.” Rep. B r. 11. But considering the totality of the circumstances, we can’t say “that a reasona ble person would have been so adversely impacted by” such questioning “that he or she would have involuntarily consented to a search.” Jones , 701 F.3d at 1319. Thus, the district court did not clearly err when it found that Ballance voluntarily consente d to a search of his pockets.
Conclusion The district court properly determin ed both that Winslow had reasonable suspicion to stop Ballance and that Ballance voluntarily consented to a search of his pockets. Accordingly, we affirm the distri ct court’s order denyi ng Ballance’s motion to suppress.

Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz Circuit Judge Appellate Case: 20-3141 Document: 010110630761 Date Filed: 01/12/2022 Page: 18