J-A03031-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

MARYBETH R. BLASETTI

v.

RICHARD J. BLASETTI 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1228 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered April 30, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Civil Division at 

No(s): No. CV-2018-000328

BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED MARCH 07, 2022

Richard J. Blasetti (Husband) appeals from the divorce decree entered 

in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas. Husband contends he was 

denied his right to a hearing de novo following the entry of the divorce hearing 

officer’s report and recommendation concerning the equitable distribution of 

the martial estate he shares with Marybeth R. Blasetti (Wife). Husband also 

requests that, in the alternative, the matter be remanded to the trial court to 

establish a complete record on his nunc pro tunc motion. See Appellant’s 

Brief at 10. Based on the following, we affirm.

Husband and Wife were married on November 24, 1989, and have two 

adult children who currently reside with Wife. See Trial Ct. Op., 8/31/21, at 

1-2. Husband is an attorney, employed by Delaware County as a public 

defender, and is engaged in private practice as a solo practitioner. See id. at 
J-A03031-22

- 2 -

1-2. Wife is a dental hygienist and a preschool teacher’s aide. See id. at 1. 

Husband resides at an apartment in Wayne, Pennsylvania, while Wife lives in 

the former marital residence, also located in Wayne. See id. 

Wife filed a complaint in divorce on January 16, 2018, under 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3301(c) (mutual consent) and (d) (irretrievably broken). See Trial Ct. Op.

at 2. Husband responded by a filing a counter-affidavit and asserting that the 

parties were not living separate and apart and the marriage was not 

irretrievably broken. See id. Pursuant to a court order, a special master, 

Robert A. Turco, Esquire, was appointed and a hearing was held. On June 12, 

2019, the special master issued his report and recommendations, in which he 

“concluded that the overwhelming evidence conclusively demonstrated that 

the marriage was irretrievably broken” and that date of separation was 

January 17, 2018. Id. at 2 (record citation omitted). Thereafter, on July 9, 

2019, the court entered an order, stating that the marriage was irretrievably

broken, the date of separation was January 17, 2018, and grounds for divorce 

had been established. See Order, 7/9/19.

On December 10, 2019, an equitable distribution hearing was held 

before Hearing Officer Edward T. Lawlor, Jr., Esquire (Divorce Hearing Officer). 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 2. Husband appeared pro se and Wife was represented 

by counsel. See id. The Divorce Hearing Officer later entered his report and 

recommendation (DHO Report) regarding the division of the parties’ marital 
J-A03031-22

- 3 -

estate, which was dated January 30, 2020, and docketed February 4, 2020.1 

The February 4th DHO Report was accompanied by a “Notice of Filing of 

Divorce Hearing Officer’s Report and Time in Which to File an Appeal to the 

Court.” The notice provided the following, in relevant part:

Please be advised that pursuant to Delaware County Rule 

1920.54, the following apply:

(ii) The parties to a decision of an Equitable Distribution Master 

shall have the right to Appeal from the Decision of the Equitable 

Distribution Master by the filing of a Request For Hearing De Novo 

within twenty (20) days of the date of entry of the Decision.

Notice of Filing of Divorce Hearing Officer’s Report and Time in Which to File 

an Appeal to the Court, 2/4/20, at 1 (unpaginated). 

Subsequently, on February 26, 2020, “with no demand for a hearing de 

novo pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(c)2filed of record, the [c]ourt entered 

the [February 4th DHO Report] as an [o]rder.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2. The order 

was docketed on March 2, 2020 (March 2nd Order).

Four days later, Husband filed a pro se pleading titled, “Defendant’s 

Appeal From Master’s Report,” which concisely stated: “The Master’s Report 

____________________________________________

1

 The marital estate consisted of the marital residence, a county retirement 

fund, and two individual retirement accounts. The Hearing Officer 

recommended “the assets in this case shall be divided on a 55/45 basis in 

favor of Wife.” Divorce Hearing Officer’s Report and Recommendation, 

2/4/20, at 2 (unpaginated).

2 As will be discussed in more detail infra, Delaware County Rule 1920.54 and 

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(c) are substantially similar in language, i.e., that the 

parties have 20 days to request a hearing de novo.
J-A03031-22

- 4 -

signed by The Honorable Stephanie H. Klein as motion judge on February 26, 

2020 and filed on March 2, 2020 is hereby appealed on March 6, 2020.” 

Defendant’s Appeal From Master’s Report, 3/6/20, at 1 (unpaginated).

3

On April 30, 2020, the court entered a divorce decree, ordering that 

Husband and Wife were divorced from the bonds of marriage. 

On May 21, 2020, Husband filed another pro se document titled “Motion 

to Set Aside Divorce Decree/For Reconsideration of Divorce Decree/For Appeal 

of Equitable Distribution Master’s Recommendations Nunc Pro Tunc.”4 Before 

the court could dispose of the motion, Husband filed a counseled notice of 

appeal from the divorce decree.5

In a per curiam order, this Court quashed the appeal as untimely.6 See

Order, 7/24/20. Husband then filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the 

____________________________________________

3

 In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the court notes the “docket entry is 

mislabeled and does not indicate any type of appeal. For 03-06-2020 the 

docket entry reads: ‘Motion – Motion for Appointment of Special Master.’” Trial 

Ct. Op. at 3 n.1.

4

 On June 16, 2020, Wife filed a motion to quash in response to Husband’s 

motion. 

5

 Husband complied with the trial court’s directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

6

 A Rule to Show Cause was originally issued in this matter as to whether the 

appeal was untimely because instead of filing an appeal, Husband filed the 

motion for reconsideration. Husband responded that the judicial emergency 

orders of the Supreme, Superior, and Delaware County Courts suspended time 

calculations such that his appeal should be considered timely. In the per 

curiam order, this Court indicated the appeal was required to be filed within 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A03031-22

- 5 -

Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In April 2021, the Supreme Court granted 

Husband’s petition and summarily vacated this Court’s order, determining that 

the Delaware County court’s judicial emergency order was ambiguous. See 

Blasetti v. Blasetti, 252 A.3d 594 (Pa. 2021). The matter was remanded to 

this Court and is now pending before us.

Husband identifies the following “issues” in his “Statement of Questions 

Involved:”

1. The entry of the final Decree in Divorce in this matter was done 

so in error and was a nullity in that: 

a. An Equitable Distribution Master’s Report dated February 

4, 2020, was never forwarded to [Husband] nor did he ever 

see a copy of same;

b. On or about February 26, 2020, an Order was entered by 

the [court] adopting the [Divorce Hearing Officer]’s 

recommendations in equitable distribution as the final 

Equitable Distribution Order in this matter;

c. Almost immediately thereafter, [Husband] filed an Appeal 

from the [February 4th DHO Report] wherein he sought to 

appeal the . . . report and the Order of the [trial court] dated 

February 26, 202[0] but docketed March 2, 2020;

____________________________________________

30 days of May 1, 2020, but since the 30th day fell on a Sunday, the appeal 

was required to be filed no later than June 1st. Additionally, the Court stated 

that “review of the Second Order Extending The Thirty-Second (32nd) Judicial 

District’s Past Declared Emergency order of April 28, 2020 extended the 

Judicial Emergency in Delaware County until June 1, 2020. Thus, the appeal 

period was not affected by the Judicial Emergency order of April 28, 2020.” 

Order, 7/24/20. As a result, this Court indicated that since the appeal was 

not filed until June 4th, three days late, it did not have jurisdiction over the 

April 30th divorce decree, entered on May 1st. See id.
J-A03031-22

- 6 -

d. On March 9, 2020, despite the pending Appeal from the 

[February 4th DHO Report], a Praecipe to Transmit Record 

was filed by [Wife]’s attorney indicating no related claims 

pending based upon [the court]’s [March 2nd] Order;

e. The Praecipe to Transmit did not reflect the pending 

Appeal of the Hearing Officer’s recommendations and, as 

such, entry of the final Decree based upon an erroneous 

Praecipe to Transmit Record renders that Decree a nullity;

f. Subsequently, a final Decree in Divorce was entered by 

the [court] on April 30, 2020, and received in the afternoon 

mail by Husband on May 5, 2020;

g. Immediately after securing counsel, Appellant filed a 

Petition on May 21, 2020, to set aside the Divorce 

Decree/For Reconsideration of the Divorce Decree/For 

Appeal of Equitable Distribution Hearing Officer’s 

Recommendations Nunc Pro Tunc;

h. Presumably based upon the current pandemic and limited 

work staff, the Motion to Set Aside still has not been 

processed and assigned to a Judge for hearing as of the date 

of the dictation of this 1925(b) statement; 

2. Appellant has been deprived of his substantive and procedural 

due process rights as alleged in the Petition to Set Aside and for 

Leave to Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc in that Appellant did not receive 

notice of the [Divorce Hearing Officer]’s hearing and, as such was 

unable to address issues that were not adequately addressed by 

the Hearing Officer in the Hearing Officer’s Report;

3. Based upon the pandemic, Appellant’s ability to appeal the 

[Divorce Hearing Officer]’s Report, the final Order from [the 

court], and the final Decree in Divorce, have all been substantially 

and significantly hampered due to the pandemic and the resultant 

work stoppages and/or slowdowns in the judicial system;

4. Appellant is entitled to a hearing de novo on his Equitable 

Distribution Appeal for the reasons recited hereinabove in full at 

length;

5. Entry of the final Decree based upon the pendency of a request 

for Appeal de novo from the Hearing Officer’s Recommendations, 
J-A03031-22

- 7 -

which had not been resolved of record prior to entry of the final 

Decree, renders that final Decree a nullity.

Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (footnote omitted). 

However, in the argument section of his brief, Husband focuses on two 

issues – his right to a hearing de novo and in the alternative, his request that 

the matter be remanded to the trial court to establish a complete record. See

Appellant’s Brief at 10. We will confine our analysis to those two claims.

We note that Husband’s first argument is contingent on the question of 

whether he has properly preserved the claim. Husband asserts that he is 

“entitled to a hearing de novo on his equitable distribution appeal based on 

the procedural machinations which [led] to the inappropriate entry of the final 

Decree in Divorce.” Id. at 11. He notes that nunc pro tunc relief may be 

granted where there is a breakdown in the court’s operations through a default 

of its officers. See id. at 12. Moreover, he states “it is understood that 

procedural rules are not ends in themselves, and that the rigid application of 

those rules does not always serve the interests of fairness and justice[,]” 

which is why Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 126 was adopted – to give 

courts the latitude to overlook any procedural defect that does not prejudice 

a party’s rights. Id. at 13. 

Turning to his case, Husband alleges that he never received a copy of 

the February 4th DHO Report. See id. at 14. He states that after he received 

the court’s March 2nd Order, which entered the report and recommendation 

as a court order, he immediately filed a pro se appeal of the DHO Report. See 
J-A03031-22

- 8 -

id. Moreover, he asserts that this pleading “was incorrectly listed on the 

docket as [a] Motion for Appointment of Special Master rather than a Demand 

for Hearing De Novo.” Id. Husband states “any casual observer of the docket 

would not have identified Husband’s appeal; however, this pleading effectively 

placed all parties on notice that the February 4, 2020[,] report [and 

recommendation] was being appealed. This clerical error mislabeling the 

appeal as a Motion for Special Master enabled the Delaware County Divorce 

Administrator to process the defective Praecipe to Transmit.” Id. at 14-15. 

Husband maintains that the “systemic failure surrounding the lack of notice of 

the Divorce Hearing Officer’s Report and the error in correctly labeling [his] 

appeal effectively deprived [him] of his substantive and procedural due 

process rights.” Id. at 15. Additionally, he states that because he did not 

receive notice of the report and recommendation, he “was unable to address 

issues that were not adequately addressed” in the report, “including, but not 

limited to, the appropriate valuation of the marital residence.” Id. Husband 

concludes that “[t]hese breakdowns in the court’s operations are precisely the 

type of situations meant to be remedies by nunc pro tunc filings and the liberal 

application of the civil rules as provided by” Rule 126. Id. at 16.

We begin with the procedural rules governing hearing officer procedures 

in divorce proceedings. As the trial court mentions, “It is well established law 

that to preserve issues for appeal related to a Master’s Report[,] a party must 

file exceptions or file a written demand for a hearing de novo.” Trial Ct. Op. 
J-A03031-22

- 9 -

at 5 (citations omitted). See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-2(b) (“Within 20 days of the 

date of receipt or the date of mailing of the hearing officers report and 

recommendation, whichever occurs first, any party may file exceptions to the 

report . . . .”) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 3321 (“The court may appoint a master to 

hear testimony on all or some issues . . . and to make recommendations and 

return the same to the court, in which case either party may demand a hearing 

de novo before the court.”). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.55-1 states:

(a) Matters referred to a hearing officer for hearing shall proceed

as prescribed by Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-2 unless the court by local

rule adopts the alternative procedure of Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-3.

(b) The president judge or the administrative judge of Family

Division of each county shall certify that all divorce proceedings

which are referred to a hearing officer in that county are

conducted in accordance with either Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-2 or

Pa.R.C.P. No. 1920.55-3. . . .

Pa. R.C.P. 1920.55-1.

The trial court indicates Delaware County has adopted Rule 1920.55-3. 

See Trial Ct. Op. at 8. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1920.55-3

provides, in relevant part: 

(c) Within 20 days of the date the hearing officer’s report is mailed 

or received, whichever occurs first, any party may file a written 

demand for a hearing de novo. If a demand is filed, the court 

shall hold a hearing de novo and enter a final decree.

(d) If no demand for de novo hearing is filed within the 20-day

period, the court shall review the report and recommendation and,

if approved, shall enter a final decree.
J-A03031-22

- 10 -

Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3.

7

As the trial court points out, this case is similar to Sebastianelli v.

Sebastianelli, 876 A.2d 431 (Pa. Super. 2005). There, the appellee-wife 

filed a complaint in divorce seeking, inter alia, equitable distribution. See id.

at 432. Following an equitable distribution hearing, the appointed master filed 

a report and recommendation. See id. Neither party filed exceptions. See 

id. Rather, the appellant-husband filed a petition for special relief, wherein 

he alleged that appellee-wife improperly removed funds from the custodial 

account for her own personal use. See id. The court entered a divorce 

decree, and specifically incorporated the master’s report and 

recommendation. See id. The court thereafter dismissed appellanthusband’s petition for special relief. See id. The appellant-husband then filed 

a notice of appeal. See id. A panel of this Court affirmed, concluding 

appellant-husband “should have raised his issue in a timely exception to the 

master’s report and that Husband’s failure to do so results in waiver of his 

claim.” Id. 

____________________________________________

7 Likewise, as mentioned by the trial court, Delaware County Local Rule 

1920.54(k)(ii) provides similar language. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6 (“The parties 

to a decision of an Equitable Distribution Master shall have the right of appeal 

from the decision of the Equitable Distribution Master by the filing of a request 

for Hearing de novo within twenty (20) days of the date of entry of the 

Decision.”).
J-A03031-22

- 11 -

Turning to the present matter, the DHO Report was docketed on 

February 4, 2020. The notice attached to the DHO Report informed the parties 

that they had the right to appeal the decision by filing a request for a hearing 

de novo within 20 days of the date of the decision. See Notice of Filing of 

Divorce Hearing Officer’s Report and Time in Which to File an Appeal to the 

Court at 1. Therefore, the parties had until February 24th to file a request for 

a hearing de novo. Husband did not file a request for a hearing de novo within 

that time period.

Rather, on March 6, 2020, he filed a pro se pleading, titled “Defendant’s 

Appeal From Master’s Report.” A review of the document reveals that 

Husband did not set forth any explicit language requesting a hearing de novo, 

but merely stated he wanted to appeal the March 2nd order that confirmed 

the DHO Report. See Defendant’s Appeal From Master’s Report at 1. 

Furthermore, as the trial court properly notes, even if Husband’s March 6th 

pleading could be construed as a demand for a hearing de novo, it was not

filed until 11 days after the deadline had run pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-

3, thereby still making it untimely. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6.8

____________________________________________

8

 Additionally, Husband’s subsequent May 21, 2020, filing titled “Motion to 

Set Aside Divorce Decree/For Reconsideration of Divorce Decree/For Appeal 

of Equitable Distribution Master’s Recommendations Nunc Pro Tunc,” which is 

substantively closer in form to a demand for a hearing de novo, also faces the 

same fate as it is facially untimely. See Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3(d). 
J-A03031-22

- 12 -

As indicated above, Husband alleges that he never received a copy of 

the DHO Report. However, a review of the record reveals that the Divorce 

Hearing Officer mailed the DHO Report to the same address that is listed on 

the March 2nd order for Husband. Additionally, there was no indication on the 

docket that any mailings were returned. See Docket, 2/4/20 and 3/2/20; see 

also Trial Ct. Op. at 11. As such, the record does not support Husband’s 

contention that there was a breakdown in the court’s operations through a 

default of its officers, and that he should be afforded the remedy of a liberal 

application of the procedural rules.

We recognize Husband was acting pro se at the time the DHO Report 

was filed and the March 2nd Order was entered. It is well-settled that “[a]ny

layperson choosing to represent himself [or herself] in a legal proceeding

must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his [or her] lack of

expertise and legal training will prove his [or her] undoing.” Smithson v.

Columbia Gas of PA/ NiSource, __ A.3d __, __, 2021 WL 3483301 at *4

(Pa. Super. Aug. 9, 2021). Nevertheless, it merits mention that Husband is a 

practicing attorney and therefore, should be familiar with legal nuances, such 

as the procedural rules and the civil docket.

Accordingly, Husband’s failure to file a timely written demand for a 

hearing de novo from the DHO Report results in a waiver of his first claim. 

See Sebastianelli, 876 A.2d at 432; see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not 
J-A03031-22

- 13 -

raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on 

appeal.”).

As for Husband’s second claim, Husband requests this Court remand the 

matter for trial court to make a complete record. See Appellant’s Brief at 17. 

By way of background, Husband filed his “Motion to Set Aside Divorce 

Decree/For Reconsideration of Divorce Decree/For Appeal of Equitable 

Distribution Master’s Recommendations Nunc Pro Tunc” on May 21, 2020, 

which the trial court treated as a motion for reconsideration. Before the trial 

court could dispose of that motion, Husband filed his notice of appeal to this 

Court on June 4th. While the appeal was pending, the trial court sent a letter 

to this Court, stating:

The Trial Court scheduled a hearing on the Motions for July 14, 

2020. The Notice of Appeal was perfected in the Superior Court 

and another Common Pleas Judge entered a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (b) 

request to [Husband]. However, this matter merits a Hearing in 

the Trial Court on [Husband]’s nunc pro tunc Motion in order to 

make a trial record as to [Husband]’s notice of the Equitable 

Distribution Master’s Recommendation. Therefore, the 

undersigned is requesting this matter be remanded in order to 

establish a more complete trial record.

Letter from the Honorable Linda A. Cartisano to Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq., 

7/9/2020, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the court9 correctly noted that “[e]xcept as 

otherwise provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties 

____________________________________________

9

It merits mention that the trial judge who issued the Rule 1925(a) opinion 

is the same judge who penned the July 9th letter.
J-A03031-22

- 14 -

may modify or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, 

notwithstanding the prior termination of any term of court, if no appeal from 

such order has been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. See Trial Ct. Op. 

at 3 n.2. “The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration, however, is 

insufficient to toll the appeal period.” Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs. v. RibIt/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242, 245 (Pa. Super. 1997) (citation omitted). 

Furthermore, “[i]f a trial court fails to grant reconsideration expressly within 

the prescribed 30 days, it loses the power to act upon both the petition and 

the original order.” Id. (citations omitted). Since the trial court did not 

expressly grant Husband’s motion within the prescribed time, it was 

precluded from considering the motion and requesting this Court remand the 

matter. Accordingly, we find this argument unavailing and need not address 

it further.

Decree affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/7/2022