United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

No. 19-60294

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Pavel Isaac Burgos-Coronado, also known as Pavel Isaac 

Burgos Coronado, 

Defendant—Appellant,

consolidated with

No. 19-60295

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Javier Alejandro Moline-Borroto, also known as Javier 

Alejandro Moline Borroto,

Defendant—Appellant,

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 18, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
2

consolidated with

No. 19-60380

United States of America,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

Valentina Sybreg Castro-Balza, also known as Valentina 

Sybreg Castro Balza,

Defendant—Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:18-CR-70-3

USDC No. 1:18-CR-70-4

USDC No. 1:18-CR-70-7

Before Clement, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.

Leslie H. Southwick, Circuit Judge:

Defendants challenge the denial of their motion to suppress evidence, 

arguing police officers did not have reasonable suspicion that would allow 

prolonging their stop at a highway safety checkpoint. We AFFIRM.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Around midnight on May 18, 2018, State Troopers Gregory Bell, 

Matthew Minga, Andrew Beaver, and Steven Jones set up a “driver’s safety 

checkpoint” on a highway approximately eight miles east of Starkville, 

Mississippi. The checkpoint was intended for the troopers to check for 

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

3

driver’s licenses, insurance, seat belt usage, and other safety matters. After 

approximately 15 to 20 minutes of light traffic, the troopers stopped a Toyota 

with a Florida license plate traveling north, occupied by the three defendants 

— Pavel Isaac Burgos-Coronado, Javier Alejandro Moline-Borroto, and 

Valentina Sybreg Castro-Balza. Trooper Minga approached the Toyota and 

made contact with the occupants. Trooper Bell, who was observing and 

overheard Trooper Minga’s exchange with the Toyota occupants, identified 

Moline-Borroto as the driver, Burgos-Coronado in the rear driver-side seat, 

and Castro-Balza in the rear passenger-side seat. At a September 7, 2018

hearing on the defendants’ motion to suppress, Trooper Bell described the 

exchange with the Toyota occupants:

Trooper Minga asked the driver for his driver’s license 

and proof of insurance. Mr. Borroto provided him a Florida 

temporary issue driver’s license. And, at that time, I believe he 

said it was a rental vehicle. Trooper Minga asked him, then, 

who he had in the rear seat and who his passengers were. 

Mr. Borroto said something in Spanish to them, rolled 

down the back window; and Mr. Pavel [Burgos-Coronado] 

provided another temporary Florida driver’s license; and 

Ms. Balza provided a Venezuela passport.

Bell subsequently answered some questions:

Q. . . . [W]hen Trooper Minga asked about the other persons 

in the car, were you able to hear that? 

A. Yes, sir. 

Q. And what happened? How was the conversation between 

the passengers in the backseat? 

A. It was in Spanish between them. 

. . .

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 3 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

4

Q. Okay. And there was a conversation, then, between the 

people in the car or Trooper Minga with the persons in the 

backseat? 

A. No. The driver of the vehicle with the persons in the 

backseat. 

Q. And were you able to listen and determine whether it was in 

English or Spanish? 

A. It was Spanish. 

Q. Did you ever attempt to speak to the persons in the backseat 

of the Toyota? 

A. I tried to, but we didn’t — outside of basic conversation, 

Mr. [Moline-]Borroto pretty much translated anything we 

asked. 

At the same hearing, Bell also testified that he started questioning MolineBorroto only after the passengers gave Trooper Minga their identifications. 

Upon inspecting the Toyota occupants’ identifications, Trooper Bell noticed 

that Castro-Balza’s Venezuelan passport did not have a stamp indicating her 

entry into the United States.

Trooper Bell also testified that because of the seating arrangement 

within the Toyota — male driver, empty passenger seat, male occupant in 

rear driver-side seat, and female occupant in rear passenger-side seat — he 

had a concern about the trip being abnormal “[f]rom a human trafficking 

aspect.”

About 25 to 30 seconds after the Toyota was stopped, a Volkswagen 

arrived at the checkpoint. Trooper Jones, who had been near Troopers 

Minga and Bell when the stop of the Toyota took place and had overheard 

discussion of a Venezuelan passport, talked to the occupants of the 

Volkswagen and noticed that it too had a Florida license plate, and he noted 

that the driver of the Volkswagen, Daniel Pena-Morales, also had a 

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 4 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

5

Venezuelan passport. When Trooper Jones informed Trooper Bell of the 

apparent connections between the two vehicles, Trooper Bell asked the 

driver of the Toyota, Moline-Borroto, if he was traveling with anyone. After 

hesitation, Moline-Borroto responded that he was traveling with the 

individuals in the Volkswagen. Trooper Jones asked the driver of the 

Volkswagen, Pena-Morales, the same question, to which Pena-Morales 

responded that he was not traveling with anyone. According to Trooper 

Bell’s testimony at the suppression hearing, these conflicting accounts put 

him on “high alert.” Ultimately, the troopers searched the Toyota and the 

Volkswagen and found evidence of credit card skimming in both.

A grand jury charged Burgos-Coronado, Moline-Borroto, and CastroBalza — the Toyota occupants — as well as the Volkswagen occupants, with

(1) conspiracy to commit offenses against the United States which affected 

interstate commerce; (2) possession with intent to defraud of an access 

device card encoder, software, and computer; (3) possession with intent to 

defraud of credit card skimming equipment; (4) possession with intent to 

defraud of 15 or more unauthorized access devices; and (5) using or 

attempting to use with intent to defraud more than one unauthorized access 

device to obtain goods, services, and money aggregating in excess of $1,000.

The defendants from both vehicles moved to suppress the evidence 

based on an unconstitutional search and seizure. The district court denied 

the motions. Pursuant to plea agreements, Burgos-Coronado, MolineBorroto, and Castro-Balza entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the 

right to appeal the denial of their motions to suppress. They were sentenced 

and entered separate notices of appeal. We granted an unopposed motion to 

consolidate these three defendants’ appeals for briefing and oral argument 

purposes. We denied the Government’s opposed motion to consolidate the 

Toyota occupants’ appeals with similar appeals filed by the Volkswagen 

occupants. On January 29, 2020, we affirmed the district court’s denial of 

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 5 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

6

the motions to suppress with respect to the Volkswagen occupants. See 

United States v. Pena-Morales, 791 F. App’x 499 (5th Cir. 2020). We now 

AFFIRM in the companion cases. 

DISCUSSION

Our review of a denial of a motion to suppress evidence requires us to 

examine factual findings for clear error but to consider conclusions of law de 

novo; a determination about the existence of reasonable suspicion is a legal 

conclusion. United States v. Freeman, 914 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2019). “We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below.” 

Id. We will uphold the district court’s ruling if there is any reasonable view 

of the evidence to support it. See id. at 342.

“A checkpoint-type stop of an automobile is a seizure constrained by 

the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855, 857–58 (5th 

Cir. 2002). While suspicionless seizures are ordinarily unreasonable, and 

thus Fourth Amendment violations, certain types of automobile checkpoint 

stops have been excepted from this general rule. Id. at 858. The Supreme 

Court has suggested that such checkpoints designed to check a driver’s 

license and registration are permissible. See id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 

440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). We have explained that “it is a legitimate, 

programmatic purpose that justifies a checkpoint stop made without any 

suspicion.” United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 433 (5th Cir. 

2001). We examine the available evidence to determine the “primary 

purpose” of a checkpoint; “a program driven by an impermissible purpose 

may be proscribed while a program impelled by licit purposes is permitted.” 

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000). “[T]he primary 

purpose of a checkpoint is a finding of fact reviewed for clear error.” Green, 

293 F.3d at 859.

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 6 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

7

Though the evidence of the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint 

here was scant, Trooper Bell testified that the troopers were stopping every 

car that passed to check for driver’s licenses, insurance, seat belt usage, and 

other “safety aspects.” The district court’s finding “that the purpose of the 

checkpoint” was to “check[] licenses, insurance, and seatbelts” was not 

clearly erroneous. Seizures carried out at “general crime control” 

checkpoints are justified only if accompanied by “some quantum of 

individualized suspicion.” Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47. In contrast, the 

“suspicionless” checkpoint here was permissible because it served a 

legitimate programmatic purpose closely related to the necessity of ensuring 

roadway safety and “problem[s] peculiar to the dangers presented by 

vehicles.” Green, 293 F.3d at 858.

Inquiries relating to safety, much like those at a regular noncheckpoint traffic stop, might include checking the driver’s license of the 

driver, determining whether there are outstanding traffic-related warrants 

against the driver, and inspecting an automobile’s registration and proof of 

insurance, i.e., inquiries “ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated 

safely and responsibly.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355 (2015). 

Seizures carried out pursuant to that purpose are permissible, at least at their 

inception, under the Fourth Amendment. See Green, 293 F.3d at 858.

In the context of immigration checkpoints, we have held that “the 

permissible duration of the stop is limited to the time reasonably necessary to 

complete a brief investigation of the matter within the scope of the stop.”

Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d at 433. The primary purpose of the checkpoint 

stop here was not related to immigration, but the inquiry remains the same. 

“The key is the rule that a stop may not exceed its permissible duration 

unless the officer has reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 434. This means that if 

the initial inquiries generate reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity, 

even if not related to the primary purpose of the checkpoint, the stop may be 

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 7 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

8

lengthened to accommodate the new justification. Id. It is thus permissible 

for an officer to prolong a detention until the officer has dispelled the newlyformed suspicion. United States v. Glenn, 931 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 140 S. Ct. 563 (2019).

A reasonable suspicion consists of “specific and articulable facts . . . 

taken together with rational inferences from those facts” that reasonably 

suggest “criminal activity [is] afoot.” United States v. Escamilla, 852 F.3d 

474, 480–81 (5th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1, 21, 30 (1968)). Although reasonable suspicion cannot consist simply 

of an officer’s hunch that an individual is engaged in illegal activity, only 

“some minimal level of objective justification” is required. United States v. 

Broca-Martinez, 855 F.3d 675, 678 (5th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). 

In our review, we must consider the “totality of the circumstances” that 

confronted the law enforcement officer. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 

266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). 

Observations that by themselves are susceptible to innocent explanations, 

when taken together, can still amount to reasonable suspicion. Id. at 274–75. 

“In considering whether officers reasonably suspect someone of criminal 

activity, we defer to their law enforcement experience, recognizing that 

trained officers may draw inferences from certain facts ‘that might well elude 

an untrained person.’” Escamilla, 852 F.3d at 481 (quoting United States v. 

Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 

Our inquiry is thus whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 

arose before the time reasonably necessary to satisfy the purpose of this stop 

had expired. In our inquiry, we do not expand on the arguments made by the 

defendants in the district court. The motion to suppress jointly filed by these 

defendants contains the following assertions about the events after MolineBorroto stopped the Toyota at the checkpoint. “The officer then asked for 

his identification and registration of the vehicle. Mr. Moline-Borroto handed 

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 8 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

9

a valid Florida’s driver license to the officer and the rental agreement for the 

car. The passengers in the vehicle also produced valid identification. At this 

point, the vehicle should have been waved through the stop and allowed to 

proceed.”

Making the temporal point even clearer, at the suppression hearing, 

the district court judge asked counsel for each of the Toyota occupants to 

state exactly when the seizure became illegal. Counsel for Moline-Borroto 

responded that the seizure became illegal “[t]he moment that the officer sees 

the passengers with seat belts on, and that the driver has given him a license 

that seems to be valid and has said I’m going to Memphis to see my uncle, at 

that point, continued questioning I do not think was justified under the law.” 

The statement about a trip to Memphis was in response to Trooper Bell’s 

initial questioning. Counsel for Burgos-Coronado said she would “echo 

everything” in that answer, and counsel for Castro-Balza said he “would 

simply adopt the remarks” already made.

The relevant point identified by counsel was after those in the 

backseat of the Toyota gave their identifications to Trooper Minga. Thus, 

defendants did not contest the validity of any of Trooper Minga’s earlier 

actions. At the time Trooper Bell began questioning Moline-Borroto, the 

record shows that the following facts were known to the troopers: (1) the 

time was soon after midnight, (2) the Toyota had an out-of-state license 

plate, (3) the driver of the Toyota had a temporary driver’s license, (4) that 

temporary driver’s license was also out-of-state, (5) the driver had not yet

provided registration or proof of insurance but claimed the vehicle was a 

rental, (6) the driver was a man, the passenger seat was unoccupied, and 

there was man and woman occupying the rear seats, (7) the driver began 

translating to the passengers in Spanish, (8) the male passenger produced 

another out-of-state temporary driver’s license, and (9) the woman 

passenger produced a Venezuelan passport with no entry stamp.

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/18/2020
No. 19-60294

consolidated with 19-60295, 19-60380

10

We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party that 

prevailed below, i.e., the prosecution. United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 347

(5th Cir. 2017). In doing so, we recognize that each of the articulated facts is 

consistent with an innocent explanation. That, though, is not enough to rule 

out reasonable suspicion. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274–75. The collection of 

information was that a female passenger’s passport lacked an entry stamp, 

which might reasonably suggest that she was in the country illegally. Further, 

the abnormal seating arrangement — abnormal because the officer believed 

multiple adults do not usually choose to sit in the back when the passenger 

seat is empty — when combined with the unstamped passport and the late 

hour, might suggest that the woman was being held against her will. 

Based on these facts, the troopers had the “minimum level of 

objective justification” to support reasonable suspicion of criminal activity

— namely, human trafficking— sufficient to justify prolonging the stop by 

inquiring further about where the Toyota occupants were going. During that 

justified extension, more facts were discovered supporting reasonable 

suspicion and, eventually, supporting a search.

AFFIRMED.

 Case: 19-60294 Document: 00515531838 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/18/2020