NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 14-3326

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NIHAL MENEKSE,

Appellant

v.

HARRAH’S CHESTER CASINO & RACETRACK

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Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. 2-12-cv-04912)

District Judge: Honorable L. Felipe Restrepo 

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Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) March 21, 2016 

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Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: May 5, 2016)

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OPINION*

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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge:

 

*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 

not constitute binding precedent.
2

Appellant Nihal Menekse appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 

against her on her claims against Harrah’s Chester Casino & Racetrack (“Appellee”) for 

unlawful retaliation related to her Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) leave, and 

for unlawful retaliation for what Menekse alleged was protected activity under Title VII 

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. We agree with the District 

Court’s conclusions that Menekse cannot make out a prima facie case of retaliation under 

Title VII and that Menekse did not put forth sufficient evidence to demonstrate pretext on 

her FMLA retaliation claim. We will affirm. 

I. Background

Menekse, who began working for Harrah’s in 2007 as a beverage server, 

complains of harassment that began in 2008. Menekse claims that upon discovering her 

national origin and religion (Menekse is Turkish and Muslim), her supervisor, John 

Truitt, began making harassing comments to her, imposing unfair discipline, and refusing 

to give her seniority privileges. Menekse also claims that, on several occasions, Truitt 

refused to give her requested leave, as is required under the FMLA. Based on this

treatment, Menekse claims that she complained to management. 

Menekse further claims that she was harassed by two of her co-workers because of 

her national origin and religion. First, in March or April of 2011, a Harrah’s casino 

dealer asked Menekse what her nationality was. Menekse answered the question and 

claims that the dealer replied: “Are you a terrorist? [] Do you have a bomb?” J.A. 402. 

Menekse also complains of an incident around the same time in which another casino
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dealer, upon learning she was from Turkey, said to her: “Are you a Turkey—are you 

gobble, gobble, are you going to be cooked for Thanksgiving?” J.A. 415. 

Menekse claims that she complained to a supervisor about both instances of 

alleged harassment. At her deposition, Menekse stated that she told a Human Resources 

representative about the terrorist comment. Menekse also indicated that a supervisor

initially reported the terrorist comment to management. As for the second incident, 

Menekse stated that she complained to her union representative, but did not complain to

anyone in Harrah’s management. 

From March 2011 onward, Menekse had several disciplinary problems. In March 

2011, she was disciplined for serving a guest more than three alcoholic beverages without 

notifying a supervisor, in violation of Harrah’s policy. In March 2011, Menekse applied 

for additional FMLA time, and believing the request had been approved, took the days 

off in April 2011.

1

 Since Menekse was not actually approved for the leave, she was 

disciplined for missing days of work. In June 2011, Menekse received a negative 

performance evaluation. Finally, in July 2011, she was disciplined for being outside of 

her work area for more than fifteen minutes. 

On July 5, 2011, Menekse was involved in an incident that led to her termination. 

On that day, another server attempted to serve patrons in Menekse’s assigned area. In 

 

1 Appellee asserts that management replied to Menekse’s request and directed her 

to submit additional information. When management received no follow-up from 

Menekse, it denied her request. Menekse claims that she does not recall receiving this 
4

response, Menekse claims that she told the server: “stay the fuck out of my section.”

2

 

J.A. 678. Menekse was suspended soon thereafter, and was terminated on July 6, 2011. 

Harrah’s maintains that it believed the statement was a threat, and terminated Menekse on 

that basis. 

Menekse then filed suit in August 2012, alleging that Harrah’s unlawfully

retaliated against her for complaining about harassment in violation of Title VII, and 

unlawfully retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave. The District Court granted 

summary judgment for Harrah’s on both counts. With regard to Menekse’s Title VII 

claim, the Court concluded that Menekse put forth insufficient evidence to establish a 

prima facie case. The Court also concluded that Menekse’s FMLA claim failed because 

there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate pretext. Menekse now appeals. 

II. Analysis3

We exercise plenary review of the District Court’s order for summary judgment. 

Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 2014). “In conducting 

our review, we view the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing the 

motion and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.” Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 

 

communication and that she was not aware that her application was missing any 

information. 

2 A Harrah’s report completed on the day of the incident states that Menekse said:

“She better stay out of my section or I will fuck her up, I mean it!!!!” J.A. 798. 

Menekse denies using those precise words. 

3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5

F.3d 188, 192 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001).

A. Retaliation for Complaint 

To establish a prima facie case for Title VII retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) 

that she engaged in a protected activity, which can include “informal protests of 

discriminatory employment practices” such as making complaints to management; (2) 

adverse action taken “by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the 

employee’s protected activity;” and (3) a causal connection between the protected 

activity and the adverse action. See Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d 

Cir. 2015).

The District Court correctly concluded that Menekse could not demonstrate a 

causal link between her complaints and termination. The time period between Menekse’s 

most recent complaint (March or April 2011) and her termination (July 2011) does not, 

on its own, raise an inference of causation. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 

F.3d 271, 280 (3d Cir. 2000). Further, Menekse presented little to show that the evidence 

as a whole raises an inference of causation. As the District Court noted, Menekse did not 

“depose any decisionmakers or witnesses or provide documents that adequately support 

her claim.” J.A. 11. 

Menekse argues that the District Court failed to consider evidence showing that 

between 2010 and 2011 she received no disciplinary action, but then after complaining in 

March 2011 she was repeatedly the subject of discipline. Menekse contends that the

uptick in disciplinary action after her complaint, when contrasted with her previous good 
6

conduct is sufficient to raise an inference of causation. However, the record 

demonstrates that Menekse received discipline from 2007 (the year she started at 

Harrah’s) to and throughout 2009. While the record suggests that Menekse was not 

formally disciplined4in 2010 and for some months in 2011, such evidence alone, 

especially in the context of Menekse’s complete disciplinary record, is insufficient to 

establish a causal relationship.5 Thus, the District Court properly found that Menekse

failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. 

B. Retaliation for Taking FMLA Leave 

Menekse also argues that she was retaliated against for attempting to assert her 

FMLA rights and for making a complaint about an FMLA violation. To make a prima 

facie case of FMLA retaliation under 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), the plaintiff must establish 

that: (1) she was protected under the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (3) the adverse action was causally related to the exercise of her FMLA 

rights. See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 508 (3d Cir. 2009). 

If the plaintiff succeeds in her prima facie case, the defendant must articulate a 

 

4 Harrah’s filed a “Slot Incident Report” in September of 2010, describing an 

incident in which Menekse addressed casino patrons in a “poorly matter,” J.A. 717, 

however it is unclear whether formal discipline was taken against Menekse in relation to 

this incident. 

5 Menekse attempts to explain her pre-2010 disciplinary record by pointing to the 

alleged discriminatory animus of supervisor John Truitt. Menekse essentially argues that, 

absent Truitt’s discrimination, she would have a clean record, and therefore the discipline 

she received in 2011 is more suspect. However, Menekse puts forth no competent 

evidence to show or suggest that Truitt had knowledge of her religion or her national 

origin. Thus, these alleged facts do not assist in demonstrating causation. 
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legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Ross v. 

Gilhuly, 755 F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 

F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997). “The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove, by 

a preponderance of the evidence, that the articulated reason was [] pretext for 

discrimination.” Id. 

We agree with the District Court that, even if she can establish a prime facie case,

Menekse failed to demonstrate pretext on her FMLA claim. Menekse was terminated one 

week after her most recent request for FMLA leave on June 30, 2011. The District Court

was correct to conclude that “the one-week gap . . . is sufficiently small that it creates a 

triable issue as to whether her request for FMLA leave was the cause of her termination.” 

J.A. 13. Menekse could not, however, establish pretext as she did not show that 

Harrah’s proffered reasons for her termination were so weak so as to be disbelieved. See 

Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2003). On this point, the District 

Court noted that Menekse presented no evidence. 

On appeal, Menekse argues that the following evidence can establish pretext: 

first, the fact that her statement was not actually a threat; second, the temporal proximity 

between her request and her termination; and third, Harrah’s previous denials of her 

FMLA requests. None of this evidence can establish pretext. The record evidence 

indicates that Harrah’s reasonably believed Menekse’s statement was a threat. While 

Menekse might have a different view as to how her statement was interpreted, this 

disagreement does not establish pretext. Id. (stating that an employee’s “personal view of 
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his employer’s explanation . . . falls far short of establishing pretext”). Menekse fares no 

better on her arguments regarding temporal proximity and Harrah’s denials of her FMLA 

requests. Without more, such evidence cannot raise an inference of pretext, given 

Menekse’s history of disciplinary infractions, which are documented in the record, and 

which began long before the leave requests at issue. 

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.