United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 13-1055

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Andre Roddy

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

____________

 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

____________

 Submitted: September 23, 2013

Filed: October 1, 2013

[Unpublished]

____________

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BYE, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

____________

PER CURIAM.

Andre Roddy entered a plea of guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess

with intent to distribute cocaine and other controlled substances in violation of 21

U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Roddy was determined to be a career offender pursuant

to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. This designation resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines
range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment. The district court imposed a 224-month 1

term of imprisonment. Roddy appeals this sentence, and we affirm.

Roddy first asserts procedural error, arguing that the district court failed to

depart downward sua sponte under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). Roddy positsthat he was

entitled to this departure because his career offender designation significantly

overstated the seriousness of his criminal history. Roddy, however, never requested

this departure before the district court but rather raises it for the first time on appeal. 

Next, Roddy argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. Specifically, he

contendsthat the district court gave too little weight to his disadvantaged background

and did not reflect the need to provide educational and vocational training as part of

the sentence.

In reviewing Roddy’s challenge to his sentence, we “first ensure that the

district court committed no significant procedural error.” Gall v. United States, 552

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Because Roddy raised no procedural objection in the district

court, we consider his procedural claim under the plain-error standard. United States

v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 2010); see also United States v. McGee, No.

95-1626, 1996 WL 230055, at *1 (8th Cir. May 8, 1996) (holding that where, as here,

the defendant did not seek a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 before the district

court, failure to depart is reviewed for plain error). Under plain-error review, Roddy

must show: (1) an error; (2) that is plain; and (3) that affects substantial rights. 

Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67 (1997) (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)). “A plain error will not be corrected unless [] it

seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 

United States v. Mireles, 617 F.3d 1009, 1013 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States

v. Bain, 586 F.3d 634, 640 (8th Cir. 2009)).

The Honorable James M. Moody, United States District Judge for the Eastern 1

District of Arkansas.

-2-
At the sentencing hearing, the district court commented that it was appalled by

Roddy’s criminal history. Even before the present offense, Roddy was convicted of

seven prior crimes, including robbery, residential burglary and battery, as well as

three instances of possessing a controlled substance. Given that the district court

clearly and carefully considered Roddy’s extensive criminal history, we find no error,

much less plain error, in the district court’s failure to depart downward sua sponte

under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1).

Next, we address Roddy’s substantive reasonableness challenge. We review

the substantive reasonableness ofthe sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion

standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 41. A district court abuses its discretion in sentencing

when it “(1) fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant

weight; (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or (3)

considers only the appropriate factors but in weighing those factors commits a clear

error of judgment.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en

banc) (quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 752 (8th Cir. 2009)). 

First, we note that Roddy’s within-guidelines sentence is presumptively

reasonable. United States v. Woodard, 675 F.3d 1147, 1152 (8th Cir. 2012). Second,

the district court expressly weighed Roddy’s disadvantaged background against his

criminal history in assessing Roddy’s history and characteristics: “[Y]ou’ve had a

hard life and have been denied most of the advantages that other people have, but I

am somewhat appalled by the criminal history that you have, not only the frequency

of the offenses that you’ve committed, but the violent nature of many of these

[offenses].” In addition, despite Roddy’s contrary contention, the district court did

recommend that Roddy “participate in residential substance abuse treatment and

educational and vocational programs during incarceration.” In considering these

relevant factors and imposing a within-guidelinessentence, we discern no clear error

of judgment. Nor do we find that the district court failed to consider a relevant factor

that should have received significant weight. For these reasons, we find no abuse of

-3-
discretion and conclude that Roddy’s sentence is not unreasonable. Therefore, we

affirm.

______________________________

-4-