Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 82499 

1The application of FinCEN’s authorities in this 

order is specific only to section 9714 of the 

Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, as 

amended. It is not intended to otherwise reflect the 

applicability of, or obligations under, any provision 

of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or its implementing 

regulations, and FinCEN has not considered the 

extent to which PM2BTC does business in the 

United States. 

2Section 9714 (as amended) may be found in a 

note to 31 U.S.C. 5318A. 

3 31 U.S.C. 5318A grants the Secretary the 

authority, upon finding that reasonable grounds 

exist for concluding that one or more financial 

institutions operating outside of the United States 

is of primary money laundering concern, to require 

domestic financial institutions and domestic 

financial agencies to take certain ‘‘special 

measures.’’ 

4Pursuant to Treasury Order 180–01, the 

authority of the Secretary of the Treasury 

(Secretary) to administer the BSA, including, but 

not limited to, 31 U.S.C. 5318A, has been delegated 

to the Director of FinCEN. Treasury Order 180–01 

(Jan. 14, 2020). On August 11, 2022, and in 

accordance with Treasury Order 101–05 and 31 

U.S.C. 321(b), Treasury’s Under Secretary for 

Terrorism & Financial Intelligence re-delegated to 

the Director of FinCEN the authority of the 

Secretary under section 9714. 

5See section 9714(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1). 6See section 9714(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(2)– 

(b)(4). 7See section 9714(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5). 

8See section 9714(a)(2). 

9This statement was made by the BitcoinTalk 

user, ‘‘pm2btc,’’ which FinCEN assesses is the 

official account for PM2BTC, on the CVC forum 

BitcoinTalk. See BitcoinTalk, PM2BTC Post, 

available at https://bitcointalk.org/ 

index.php?topic=639799.msg7140395#msg7140395 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 

31 CFR Part 1010 

Imposition of Special Measure 

Prohibiting the Transmittal of Funds 

Involving PM2BTC 

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement 

Network (FinCEN), Treasury. 

ACTION: Final order. 

SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing notice of an 

order, pursuant to the Combating 

Russian Money Laundering Act, as 

amended by the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, 

to prohibit certain transmittals of funds 

by any covered financial institution 

involving PM2BTC, a financial 

institution operating outside of the 

United States determined to be of a 

primary money laundering concern in 

connection with Russian illicit finance. 

DATES: This order is effective October 

11, 2024. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The 

FinCEN Resource Center, 1–800–767– 

2825 or electronically at frc@fincen.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Summary of Order 

This order (1) sets forth FinCEN’s 

determination that PM2BTC, an 

unincorporated convertible virtual 

currency (CVC) exchanger (a type of 

virtual asset service provider or VASP), 

is a financial institution operating 

outside of the United States that is of 

primary money laundering concern 1 in 

connection with Russian illicit finance; 

and (2) prohibits certain transmittals of 

funds involving PM2BTC by any 

covered financial institution. 

As set out in this order, PM2BTC, a 

CVC exchanger offering CVC and fiat 

currency exchange services with 

significant ties to, and connections with, 

Russia, is of primary money laundering 

in connection with Russian illicit 

finance through its facilitation of funds 

transfers by illicit actors and association 

with a wide array of illicit activities, 

including fraud schemes, sanctions 

evasion, ransomware attacks, and child 

abuse. 

II. Background 

A. Statutory provisions 

Section 9714(a) of the Combating 

Russian Money Laundering Act (Pub. L. 

116–283), as amended by section 

6106(b) of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 

(Pub. L. 117–81) (hereafter, ‘‘section 

9714’’),2 provides, in relevant part, that, 

if the Secretary of the Treasury 

(Secretary) ‘‘determines that reasonable 

grounds exist for concluding that one or 

more financial institutions operating 

outside of the United States . . . is of 

primary money laundering concern in 

connection with Russian illicit finance,’’ 

the Secretary may, ‘‘by order, regulation, 

or otherwise as permitted by law’’: (1) 

require domestic financial institutions 

and domestic financial agencies to take 

1 or more of the special measures 

described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b); 3 or (2) 

prohibit, or impose conditions upon, 

certain transmittals of funds (as defined 

by the Secretary) by any domestic 

financial institution or domestic 

financial agency, if such transmittal of 

funds involves any such institution. The 

authority of the Secretary to administer 

both section 9714 and the Bank Secrecy 

Act (BSA) has been delegated to 

FinCEN.4

The six special measures set out in 

section 9714 are prophylactic safeguards 

that may be employed to defend the 

United States financial system from 

money laundering and terrorist 

financing risks with a nexus to Russian 

illicit finance. The Secretary may 

impose one or more of these special 

measures in order to protect the U.S. 

financial system from such threats. 

Specifically, the Secretary may impose 

any of the five special measures set out 

in 31 U.S.C. 5318A, commonly known 

as section 311 of the USA PATRIOT 

Act. Through special measure one, the 

Secretary may require domestic 

financial institutions and domestic 

financial agencies to maintain records, 

file reports, or both, concerning the 

aggregate amount of transactions or 

individual transactions.5 Through 

special measures two through four, the 

Secretary may impose additional 

recordkeeping, information collection, 

and reporting requirements on covered 

domestic financial institutions and 

domestic financial agencies.6 Through 

special measure five, the Secretary may 

prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the 

opening or maintaining in the United 

States of correspondent or payablethrough accounts for or on behalf of a 

foreign banking institution, if the class 

of transactions found to be of primary 

money laundering concern may be 

conducted through such correspondent 

account or payable-through account.7 In 

addition to the special measures set out 

in 31 U.S.C. 5318A, section 9714 also 

provides that the Secretary may impose 

a special measure prohibiting, or 

imposing conditions upon, certain 

transmittals of funds.8

B. PM2BTC 

PM2BTC is a CVC exchanger, a 

category of VASP, that exists as a 

collection of several exchange services. 

By its own account, PM2BTC is 

comprised of the following exchange 

services: PM2BTC.ME, BTC2PM.ME, 

PM2CASHIN.ME, BTC2CASHIN.ME, 

PM2WM.ME, and BTC2WM.ME.9

Although PM2BTC—through each of 

its constituent exchange services—is 

advertised as an automated web 

product, FinCEN assesses that this 

collective grouping of exchange services 

should be considered a single 

organization, and for that reason, 

FinCEN will correspondingly refer to 

this collective, its activities, and its 

website as ‘‘PM2BTC’’. Indeed, 

notwithstanding the characterization in 

its advertisements, PM2BTC holds itself 

out as a legal person insofar as PM2BTC 

states—in its terms of service—that use 

of its exchange services constitutes a 

contract between parties to an 

agreement, with PM2BTC expressly 

identified as a party. Consistent with 

that characterization in its terms of 

service, FinCEN assess that PM2BTC 

also operates as a standard organization, 

comprised of its founders/operators and 

employees, with consistent and 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
82500 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

10See infra Part III.A.3, for further discussion of 

PM2BTC’s anti-money laundering program. 

11PM2BTC’s websites, available at https://

pm2btc.me, https://pm2btc.me/terms, https://

pm2wm.me, https://pm2wm.me/terms, https://

pm2cashin.me, https://pm2cashin.me/terms, 

https://pm2cashin.me/terms, https://

pm2cashin.me/terms, https://btc2wm.me, https://

btc2wm.me/terms, https://btc2pm.me, https://

btc2pm.me/terms, https://btc2cashin.me, https://

btc2cashin.me/terms, https://pm2btc.me (last 

accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

12All references to PM2BTC’s Terms of Service 

are sourced from https://pm2btc.me/terms (last 

accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

13Unless noted otherwise, all references to 

PM2BTC’s official website, web page, or policies are 

sourced from pages and links accessed via https:// 

pm2btc.me, https://pm2btc.me/terms, https://

pm2wm.me, https://pm2wm.me/terms, https://

pm2cashin.me, https://pm2cashin.me/terms, 

https://btc2wm.me, https://btc2wm/terms, https://

btc2pm.me, https://btc2pm.me/terms, https://

btc2cashin.me, https://btc2cashin.me/terms (last 

accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

14Perfect Money, or PM, is a Russian financial 

service that allows its users to make anonymous 

instant payments and to make money transfers 

securely throughout the internet. Perfect Money, 

available at https://perfectmoney.com/about.html 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); see also Ben [LNU], 

The unregulated Russian payment and lending 

platform Perfect Money!, FinTelegram (Feb. 14, 

2022), available at fintelegram.com/r4i-theunregulated-russian-payment-and-lendingplatform-perfect-money (last accessed Sept. 17, 

2024). 

15WebMoney, or WM, is a Russia based global 

online payment system that facilitates online 

business activities. See WebMoney, Terms of Use, 

available at https://debt.wmtransfer.com/ 

Rules.aspx?lang=en (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

16PM2BTC, available at https://pm2btc.me (last 

accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

17See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5312; 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(3); 

1010.100(ff); 1010.605(f)(iv); see also FinCEN, FIN– 

2019–G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to 

Certain Business Models Involving Convertible 

Virtual Currencies (May 9, 2019); FinCEN, FIN– 

2013–G001, Application of FinCEN’s Regulations to 

Persons Administering, Exchanging, or Using 

Virtual Currencies (Mar. 18, 2013). 

18BTC2CASHIN Terms, available at https://

btc2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 

PM2CASHIN Terms, available at https://

pm2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

19 Id. According to the Central Intelligence 

Agency’s World Fact Book, UTC +3 is the time zone 

used in Moscow, Russia. Central Intelligence 

Agency, World Factbook: Russia, available at 

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/ 

russia (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

20BTC2CASHIN, available at https://

btc2cashin.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

21PM2CASHIN, available at https://

pm2cashin.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 

coordinated internal operations and 

customer service interfaces. As a 

threshold matter, PM2BTC, including 

each of its constituent exchange 

services, is operated, with other 

persons, by Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov 

(Ivanov), a Russian national with an 

established history of advertising the 

use of U.S.-based money services 

businesses for cashouts and drops 

services on various Russian-speaking 

cybercrime forums, ties to top-tier cyber 

criminals and cybercrime services, and 

apparent ties to other online CVC 

exchanges and an associated payment 

processing service associated with 

ransomware, bank fraud, malware, and 

other suspected illicit activity. In 

addition, in its daily operations, 

PM2BTC relies on developers and other 

personnel. As set out in its terms of 

service, for example, PM2BTC’s 

‘‘administration’’ conducts anti-money 

laundering (AML) checks of all the 

transactions it processes, with 

corresponding authority to verify users 

and suspend the execution of the 

transactions, as well as to assess a 

‘‘commission’’ for processing the 

transaction.10 Moreover, each of 

PM2BTC’s constituent exchange 

services offers an identical customer 

service point of contact—‘‘pm2btc’’—on 

a Russian messaging platform, and the 

same email address—‘‘support@

pm2btc[.]me’’—with each apparently 

offering customer service support 

through PM2BTC personnel.11 As such, 

FinCEN assesses that, rather than a mere 

automated web product, PM2BTC is an 

organization that operates as a service 

provider.12

Further, in light of its activities and 

the services it provides, PM2BTC is a 

financial institution within the meaning 

of section 9714. According to its official 

website,13 PM2BTC allows customers to 

exchange between Russian Rubles 

(RUB) and various CVCs, including 

Bitcoin (BTC), Litecoin (LTC), and Dash 

(DASH), as well as other CVC offered by 

Russian money service businesses— 

Perfect Money 14 and WebMoney.15 As a 

general matter, the names of PM2BTC’s 

constituent exchange services denote 

the exchangeable direction of the 

offered CVC or fiat currencies. For 

example, PM2BTC as an exchange 

service, converts the digital currency 

Perfect Money—or ‘‘PM’’—into 

Bitcoin—or BTC—and thus, taken 

together, the name of the exchanger— 

PM2BTC—captures the service and 

direction of exchange. As a general 

matter, transactions through PM2BTC’s 

constituent exchange services follow 

generally similar processes. By way of 

illustration, PM2BTC’s official 

PM2BTC.ME website details a 

transaction process whereby, for 

example, PM2BTC connects to a 

customer’s Perfect Money (PM) account 

and coordinates the conversion of PM 

into BTC, subsequently receiving a fixed 

fee. To carry out this type of exchange 

transaction, a customer would enter 

their PM account information and a 

corresponding BTC wallet address to 

which PM2BTC would send BTC. Once 

the order is submitted, PM2BTC would 

effectuate the withdrawal of PM value 

and send BTC to the customerdesignated wallet, completing the 

transaction.16 Although section 9714 

does not expressly define the term 

‘‘financial institution,’’ FinCEN has long 

defined that term to apply to foreign and 

domestic ‘‘money transmitters,’’ 

including persons that accept and 

transmit value that substitutes for 

currency, such as CVC.17 VASPs, such 

as PM2BTC, are ‘‘money transmitters’’ 

because they are engaged in the transfer 

of funds as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100. 

PM2BTC is therefore a financial 

institution within the meaning of 

section 9714. 

Additionally, based on public and 

non-public information available to 

FinCEN, PM2BTC operates outside the 

United States and, although it is not 

incorporated in any jurisdiction, 

PM2BTC has significant ties to, and 

connections with, Russia. Indeed, 

PM2BTC presents substantial ties to the 

Russian financial sector and largely— 

but not exclusively—offers exchange 

services between individual, often 

Russian users as well as Russian 

financial institutions and financial 

services platforms. As a threshold 

matter, the ‘‘Exchange Regulations and 

AML & KYC’’ policies for certain of 

PM2BTC’s constituent exchange 

services expressly reference, and 

indicate a need to comply with, Russian 

law under certain circumstances,18 as 

well as require users to acknowledge 

that payments will be processed during 

the exchange’s working hours, set on 

Moscow Standard Time (MSK).19 More 

significantly, PM2BTC provides services 

that, as noted above, permit customers 

to exchange between Russian Rubles 

(RUB) and various CVCs. In fact, each of 

PM2BTC’s constituent exchange 

services automatically converts the 

value of BTC the customer is preparing 

to send to the service to its equivalent 

value in Russian Rubles.20 Among its 

services, PM2BTC also provides specific 

services to users in, or transacting in, 

Russia, including, for instance, offering 

services to convert BTC to cash at 

certain Russian banks, permitting users 

only to identify Russia for ‘‘Receivers 

[sic] Country’’ (meaning the service will 

transmit funds to Russia), providing 

customers ready access to numerous 

Russian banks and money service 

businesses, and offering Cyrillic script 

user interfaces. 

PM2BTC can carry out such 

transactions quickly, with most 

transactions up to 30,000 RUB 

completed within 15–60 minutes, 

although PM2BTC’s website notes that 

transactions with Alfa-Bank require up 

to two hours.21 In addition, PM2BTC 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 82501 

BTC2CASHIN, available at https://btc2cashin.me 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024), https://

pm2cashin.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 

BTC2CASHIN, available at https://btc2cashin.me 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

22On April 6, 2022, Treasury’s Office of Foreign 

Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Alfa-Bank and 

six of its subsidiaries pursuant to E.O. 14024 for 

having operated in the Russian financial services 

sector. Treasury, Press Release, U.S. Treasury 

Escalates Sanctions on Russia for its Atrocities in 

Ukraine (Apr. 6, 2022), available at https://

home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0705. 

23On February 24, 2022, OFAC sanctioned 

YooMoney (also known as Yoo Money, Yu Money, 

and Yandex Money). Treasury, Press Release, U.S. 

Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive 

Sanctions Against Russia, Imposing Swift and 

Severe Economic Costs (Feb. 24, 2022), available at 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ 

jy0608; see also Treasury, Press Release, U.S. 

Treasury Escalates Sanctions on Russia for Its 

Atrocities in Ukraine (Apr. 6, 2022), available at 

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ 

jy0705; Treasury, Sanctions List Search, Limited 

Liability Company YooMoney, available at https:// 

sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ 

Details.aspx?id=34597. Yoo Money is a Moscow, 

Russia based payment processor that was acquired 

by PJSC Sberbank (Sberbank) on July 2, 2020, 

available at https://www.crunchbase.com/ 

organization/yandex-money (last accessed on Sept. 

17, 2024). The BTC2CASHIN.ME website uses the 

spelling ‘‘Yu Money’’, but FinCEN assesses this is 

a transliteration variant and will subsequently refer 

to the entity as ‘‘Limited Liability Company 

YooMoney’’. See id. 

24Based on public and non-public information, 

FinCEN assesses that, on or around 2021, the Conti 

and Trickbot ransomware gangs had effectively 

merged and were effectively one and the same. For 

further details concerning Trickbot and its relation 

to Conti or their collective Russia connections, see 

WIRED, Leaked Ransomware Doc Show Conti 

Helping Putin from Shadows (Mar. 18, 2022), 

available at https://www.wired.com/story/contiransomware-russia/ (describing Conti’s pledged 

allegiance to Russia, its connection to Russian 

cybercrime and Russia’s intelligence apparatus); 

CPO Magazine, After Declaring Support for Russian 

Invasion, Conti Ransomware Gang Hit With Data 

Leak (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://

www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/afterdeclaring-support-for-russian-invasion-contiransomware-gang-hit-with-data-leak/ (concerning 

Conti’s relationship with Russian law enforcement); 

CyberScoop, Conti Ransomware Group Announces 

Support of Russia, Threatens Retaliatory Attack 

(Feb. 25, 2022), available at https://

cyberscoop.com/conti-ransomware-russia-ukrainecritical-infrastructure/; Reuters, Russia-Based 

ransomware Group Conti Issues Warning to Kremlin 

Foes (Feb. 26, 2022), available at https://

www.reuters.com/technology/russia-basedransomware-group-conti-issues-warning-kremlinfoes-2022-02-25/ (concerning Trickbot’s support of 

the Russian Government); Security Week, Conti 

Ransomware ‘Acquires’ Trickbot as it Thrives Amid 

Crackdowns (Feb. 21, 2022), available at https://

www.securityweek.com/conti-ransomware-acquirestrickbot-it-thrives-amid-crackdowns/; WIRED, 

Inside Trickbot, Russia’s Notorious Ransomware 

Gang (Feb. 1, 2022), available at https://

www.wired.com/story/trickbot-malware-groupinternal-messages/ (concerning the connection 

between Trickbot and Conti); Department of Justice, 

Russian National Sentenced for Involvement in 

Development and Deployment of Trickbot Malware 

(Jan. 25, 2024), available at https://www.justice.gov/ 

opa/pr/russian-national-sentenced-involvementdevelopment-and-deployment-trickbot-malware; 

Treasury, United States and United Kingdom 

Sanction Additional Members of the Russia-Based 

Trickbot Cybercrime Gang (Sept. 7, 2023), available 

at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/ 

jy1714 (concerning recent U.S. government actions 

against Trickbot). 

has ongoing arrangements with 

numerous Russian financial institutions 

and financial service providers, 

including but not limited to JSC AlfaBank (Alfa-Bank),22 Perfect Money, 

WebMoney, and Limited Liability 

Company YooMoney (YooMoney).23 For 

instance, according to PM2BTC’s official 

BTC2CASHIN.ME website, PM2BTC’s 

services that offer conversion of BTC to 

cash for customers contain a drop-down 

menu called ‘‘method of obtaining’’ for 

customers to select which of the 

financial institutions they wish to 

transact with. The dropdown menu lists 

numerous Russian banks and money 

service businesses, including, but not 

limited to, Alfa-Bank and YooMoney. 

III. Finding That PM2BTC Is of Primary 

Money Laundering Concern in 

Connection With Russian Illicit Finance 

Based on public and non-public 

information available to FinCEN, 

FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds 

exist for concluding that PM2BTC, a 

CVC exchanger with significant ties to 

and connections with Russia, is a 

financial institution of primary money 

laundering concern in connection with 

Russian illicit finance through its 

facilitation of funds transfers by 

Russian-affiliated illicit actors and 

associated with a wide array of illicit 

activities, including fraud schemes, 

sanctions evasion, ransomware attacks, 

and child abuse. 

A. The Extent to Which PM2BTC Is of 

Money Laundering Concern in 

Connection With Russian Illicit Finance 

Based on blockchain analysis, FinCEN 

identified significant ties between 

PM2BTC and a broad spectrum of illicit 

actors and illicit activities. FinCEN’s 

analysis, using the combined 

counterparty information from two 

clusters attributed to PM2BTC by 

commercially available blockchain 

analytic software found that a 

substantial percentage of transactions 

processed through PM2BTC were 

associated with wallet addresses linked 

to illicit actors and activity, including 

fraud shops, illicit actors or 

organizations, sanctioned persons and 

jurisdictions, ransomware attackers, 

darknet markets (DNMs), scam 

operators, child abuse materials 

traffickers, and entities that are the 

subject of FinCEN-imposed special 

measures. In addition to the specific 

categories of illicit activity with which 

PM2BTC is associated, FinCEN 

determined that PM2BTC facilitates a 

disproportionally high volume of 

suspected illicit activity compared to 

peer exchange service providers. 

Moreover, alarmingly, PM2BTC also 

employs a technique that is used to 

stymie the ability to trace illicit funds to 

or from PM2BTC, which permits illicit 

actors access to a money laundering 

platform and also decreases the risk of 

this activity being identified by 

investigating authorities. 

1. PM2BTC’s Disproportionate Volume 

of Transactions Involving Illicit 

Activities 

As a threshold matter, FinCEN found 

that a predominant percentage of 

transactions processed through PM2BTC 

were linked to suspected illicit activity. 

Based on analysis conducted using 

commercially available blockchain 

analysis software A, FinCEN has 

determined that, as a percentage of all 

funds transacted before July 2023, the 

cumulative value of suspected illicit 

funds accounted for up to 43.1 percent 

of all CVC received by PM2BTC. Those 

funds were associated with suspected 

illicit activities that include, in order of 

cumulative value, fraud schemes, 

transfers of stolen funds, sanctions 

evasion, terrorist financing, ransomware 

payments, and child abuse materials 

transactions. Significantly, further 

analysis comparing transactions through 

PM2BTC against transactions involving 

1,244 other VASPs from around the 

world indicated that, after adjusting for 

the relative size of the other VASPs 

analyzed, PM2BTC is in the top one 

percent of direct receiving exposure and 

the top two percent of indirect receiving 

exposure to the categories deemed to be 

associated with suspected illicit 

activity. In short, PM2BTC has 

exceedingly high exposure to, and 

association with, transactions associated 

with suspected illicit activity compared 

to peer VASPs throughout the world, 

presenting a significant money 

laundering risk. 

2. PM2BTC’s Ties to Illicit Actors 

PM2BTC’s exposure to, and 

facilitation of, transactions associated 

with suspected illicit activity is, 

importantly, consistent with its longstanding associations with a wide range 

of illicit actors, including, in particular, 

Russian ransomware groups, darknet 

markets, and sanctioned persons. 

For several years, PM2BTC processed, 

for example, a substantial volume of 

transactions associated with the nowdefunct Conti and Trickbot ransomware 

gangs.24 According to blockchain 

analysis using commercially available 

blockchain analytic software, between 

February 5, 2018, and February 2, 2021, 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
82502 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

25This analysis takes into account only direct 

transfers (e.g., where an address attributed to 

Trickbot transfers directly to PM2BTC). It does not 

include indirect exposure in which Trickbot sought 

to obfuscate the transactional path between their 

addresses and PM2BTC, nor does it include any 

transfers in which Trickbot first sent to another 

service and subsequently sent from that service to 

PM2BTC. All transaction values throughout this 

Order represent the USD exchange rate of the CVC 

at the time of the transaction. 

26 ‘‘Darknet’’ is a term used to refer to networks 

that are only accessible through the use of specific 

software or network configurations. In particular, 

darknet content is not indexed by web search 

engines, and is often accessed via anonymized, 

encrypted systems like the software The Onion 

Router (TOR). Darknet markets are online markets 

only accessible with the use of software like TOR, 

and because such markets are not indexed, they can 

only be found if the domain name and URL are 

already known to the user. As a result of the 

inherent anonymity of the darknet infrastructure, 

darknets facilitate criminal activity because of the 

difficulty involved for law enforcement in 

identifying users, infrastructure, and even domains 

associated with the sale of illicit goods and services. 

27See Treasury, Press Release, Treasury 

Sanctions Russia-Based Hydra, World’s Largest 

Darknet Market, and Ransomware-Enabling Virtual 

Currency Exchange Garantex (Apr. 5, 2022), 

available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/jy0701. 

28Elliptic, Elliptic Analysis: Russia Seizes Four 

Major Dark Web Carding Sites with $263 million in 

crypto sales (Feb. 9, 2022), available at https://

www.elliptic.co/blog/russia-seizes-four-major-darkweb-carding-sites-with-263-million-in-crypto-sales. 

29FinCEN, Proposal of Special Measure 

Regarding Convertible Virtual Currency Mixing, as 

a Class of Transactions of Primary Money 

Laundering Concern, 88 FR 72701 (Oct. 23, 2023), 

available at https://www.federalregister.gov/ 

documents/2023/10/23/2023-23449/proposal-ofspecial-measure-regarding-convertible-virtualcurrency-mixing-as-a-class-of-transactions. 

30 In February 2022, the Russian Ministry of 

Internal Affairs took down four major illicit dark 

websites: Sky-Fraud Forum, Trump’s Dumps, UAS 

Store, and Ferum Shop. Elliptic, Elliptic Analysis: 

Russia Seizes Four Major Dark Web Carding Sites 

with $263 million in crypto sales (Feb. 9, 2022), 

available at https://www.elliptic.co/blog/russiaseizes-four-major-dark-web-carding-sites-with-263- 

million-in-crypto-sales. Because the Russian 

Ministry of Internal Affairs carried out what 

amounts to a coordinated, simultaneous takedown 

of multiple darknet markets, but indicated no 

coordination with any international partners, 

FinCEN assesses Ferum Shop was at least partially 

operated in Russia. 

31See supra notes 22–23. 

32See Treasury, Press Release, Treasury 

Sanctions Russia-Based Hydra, World’s Largest 

Darknet Market, and Ransomware-Enabling Virtual 

Currency Exchange Garantex (Apr. 5, 2022), 

available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/jy0701. 

33FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure 

Prohibiting the Transmittal of Funds Involving 

Bitzlato, 88 FR 3919 (Jan. 23, 2023) available at 

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/ 

01/23/2023-01189/imposition-of-special-measureprohibiting-the-transmittal-of-funds-involvingbitzlato. 

34PM2BTC Terms, available at https://

pm2btc.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 

BTC2CASHIN Terms, available at https://

btc2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 

BTC2WM Terms available at https://btc2wm.me/ 

terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2PM 

Terms, available at https://btc2pm.me/terms (last 

accessed Sept. 17, 2024); PM2WM Terms available 

at https://pm2wm.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 

2024); PM2CASHIN Terms available at https://

pm2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

Trickbot, including its affiliates and 

associates, processed approximately 

$4,299,457 of CVC through PM2BTC.25

Those transactions constituted, by 

value, a significant majority of 

PM2BTC’s ransomware-related financial 

activity during the period. In addition, 

although the Conti and Trickbot 

ransomware gangs are now defunct, 

PM2BTC continues to process 

transactions involving CVC from 

sources attributed to other variants of 

ransomware. 

In addition to ties to ransomwarerelated transactions, PM2BTC has a long 

history of facilitating transactions 

involving darknet 26 markets, including 

the now-defunct Russia-linked darknet 

markets Hydra—which was sanctioned 

by OFAC in April 2022 27—and Ferum 

Shop.28 Darknet markets are 

fundamentally illicit in nature and can 

operate largely as a result of the 

inherent anonymity of the darknet 

infrastructure, facilitating illicit activity 

because of the difficulty involved for 

law enforcement in identifying users, 

infrastructure, and even domains 

associated with the sale of illicit goods 

and services.29 FinCEN assesses that, 

between 2016 and 2022, PM2BTC 

regularly processed transactions 

involving Hydra and Ferum Shop. For 

instance, between June 15, 2016, and 

January 30, 2021, Hydra sent a total of 

$41,361 worth of CVC to PM2BTC. 

Similarly, based on analysis conducted 

using commercially available 

blockchain analytic software, Ferum 

Shop sent a total of $3,453,610 worth of 

CVC to PM2BTC between April 6, 2021, 

and February 8, 2022. In addition, 

although Hydra and Ferum Shop have 

now been shut down,30 PM2BTC 

continues to process a substantial 

volume of transactions, by value, 

associated with darknet markets. 

Indeed, based on analysis conducted 

using commercially available 

blockchain analytic software, PM2BTC 

processed transactions valued at over 

$600,000 involving other darknet 

markets between July 22, 2023, and 

January 14, 2024. 

Finally, PM2BTC has long-standing 

and close ties to an array of Russian or 

Russian-affiliated financial institutions 

that are the subject of U.S. sanctions or 

other restrictions. As noted earlier, 

PM2BTC has ongoing arrangements 

with numerous Russian financial 

institutions and financial service 

providers, including but not limited to 

YooMoney (an affiliate of Sberbank) and 

Alfa-Bank, each of which are the subject 

of U.S. sanctions.31 In addition, since 

2020, PM2BTC has conducted an 

increasing volume of transactional 

activity with Garantex, a Russianaffiliated VASP that was sanctioned by 

the United States in April 2022.32

Between November 11, 2020, and 

September 20, 2023, PM2BTC engaged 

in CVC transactions with a value of 

nearly $300,000 involving Garantex, and 

notably, the bulk of those transactions 

occurred only after sanctions were 

imposed on Garantex. During largely the 

same period, PM2BTC also engaged in 

a sizable volume of transactions with 

Bitzlato Limited (Bitzlato), a Russianaffiliated CVC exchanger identified by 

FinCEN in January 2023 as a financial 

institution operating outside of the 

United States that was of primary 

money laundering concern in 

connection with Russian illicit finance, 

under section 9714.33 According to 

blockchain analysis conducted by 

FinCEN using commercially available 

blockchain analytic software, between 

May 10, 2018, and January 17, 2023, 

Bitzlato sent approximately $154,429 

worth of CVC to PM2BTC and, in turn, 

received approximately $541,307 worth 

of CVC from PM2BTC. 

Taken as a whole, PM2BTC’s historic 

and ongoing facilitation of transactions 

by, and associations with, illicit actors, 

including ransomware groups, darknet 

markets, and sanctioned persons 

connected to Russian illicit finance, 

combined with its access to 

international markets presents 

substantial money laundering risk. 

3. PM2BTC’s Lax Anti-Money Launder 

Policies and Procedures 

The risks presented by PM2BTC 

associations with illicit actors and 

comparative high volume of 

transactional activity linked to 

suspected illicit activity are 

compounded by PM2BTC’s lax KYC and 

AML policies and procedures, as well as 

recent technical changes that have the 

effect of obscuring PM2BTC’s 

involvement in transactions. 

Although PM2BTC purports to 

maintain KYC and AML policies and 

procedures, those policies and 

procedures appear inadequate and 

loosely implemented. According to its 

website, PM2BTC ‘‘adhere[s] to a 

number of rules and implements a 

number of procedures aimed at 

preventing the use of the service for the 

purpose of money laundering 

operations.’’ 34 Moreover, as set out in 

its terms of service, PM2BTC retains the 

ability to, and may, suspend the 

execution of transactions until 

verification is carried out in accordance 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 82503 

35BTC2WM Terms, available at https://

btc2wm.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 

BTC2PM Terms available at https://btc2pm.me/ 

terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2CASHIN 

Terms, available at https://btc2cashin.me/terms 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

36BTC2CASHIN, available at https://

btc2cashin.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); see 

also, BTC2PM available at https://btc2pm.me (last 

accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2WM, available at 

https://www.btc2wm.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 

2024); PM2BTC, available at https://pm2btc.me 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); PM2CASHIN, 

available at https://pm2cashin.me (last accessed 

Sept. 17, 2024); PM2WM, available at https://

pm2wm.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

37FATF, Guidance on Digital Identity (Mar. 

2020), at 63, available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/ 

content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Guidance-onDigital-Identity.pdf. 

38This statement was made by the BitcoinTalk 

user, ‘‘pm2btc,’’ which FinCEN assesses is the 

official account for PM2BTC, on the CVC forum 

BitcoinTalk. See BitcoinTalk PM2BTC Post, 

available at https://bitcointalk.org/ 

index.php?topic=639799.msg7140395#msg7140395 

(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024). 

39 In connection with this action, FinCEN 

consulted with staff at the following Departments 

and agencies with regard to the proposed order and 

prohibition: the Department of Justice; the 

Department of State; the Board of Governors of the 

Federal Reserve System; the Federal Deposit 

Insurance Corporation; the Securities and Exchange 

Commission; the Commodity Futures Trading 

Commission; the Office of the Comptroller of the 

Currency; and the National Credit Union 

Administration Board. Those consultations 

involved sharing drafts and information for the 

purpose of obtaining interagency views on the 

imposition of a prohibition on certain transmittals 

of funds by any domestic financial institution from 

or to PM2BTC, or from an account or CVC address 

administered by or on behalf of PM2BTC, and the 

effect that such a prohibition would have on the 

domestic and international financial system. Each 

of the Departments and agencies concurred in the 

issuance of this order. 

with the Financial Action Task Force 

(FATF) recommendations and ‘‘request 

from the User identification data and 

data confirming the source of funds.’’ 35

However, in practice, PM2BTC 

appears to only require users to provide 

the following information in order to 

conduct a transaction: (1) the type of 

CVC involved; (2) the value of the CVC 

to be sent or received; and (3) an email 

address (required ‘‘in order to 

communicate with the User, if 

necessary, to notify about Service’s 

profitable offers’’).36 Such limited 

information is not consistent with FATF 

recommendations. There appears to be 

no requirement to provide a name, date 

of birth, address, national identification, 

or any other proof of identification—all 

necessary to meaningfully establish and 

verify the identity of users and core 

features of the FATF’s guidance on 

necessary official identity data points 

for an effective KYC and AML 

program.37 Indeed, in contrast to 

PM2BTC’s claim that it adheres to FATF 

standards, it represents that it offers 

‘‘[c]omplete anonymity of exchanges’’ 

and that ‘‘[t]here is no need to register 

or undergo any verification to make an 

exchange.’’ 38

Notwithstanding its purported 

policies and procedures, FinCEN 

assesses that PM2BTC has implemented 

technical changes to its wallet 

arrangement that have the effect of 

obscuring its involvement when 

transacting with other VASPs. On or 

around July 2023, FinCEN assesses that 

PM2BTC implemented a cyclical 

infrastructure setup—a continuous 

creation of new wallets which are 

rotating and temporary—that avoids the 

reuse of wallets and, contrary to 

standard practice among VASPs, 

impedes any capacity to capture longterm transactional histories that would 

allow financial institutions to identify 

PM2BTC as the counterparty to a 

transaction. This typology is not wholly 

new and, for instance, has been 

employed by several VASPs of concern, 

some of whom are subjected to OFAC 

sanctions. In FinCEN’s assessment, this 

typology can be, and has been, used to 

facilitate evasion of U.S. sanctions. 

Here, FinCEN assesses that PM2BTC’s 

cyclical infrastructure setup is an effort 

to avoid blockchain forensics-based 

transaction monitoring—an outcome 

that is already evident in the precipitous 

decline in observable transactions 

associated with suspected illicit activity 

since July 2023. FinCEN assesses that 

this decline in such observable 

transactions is a result of PM2BTC’s 

efforts to avoid blockchain activity 

monitoring, and is not a true reflection 

of PM2BTC’s actual business activity 

with illicit actors. 

Taken together, PM2BTC’s lax 

implementation of KYC and AML 

policies and procedures and adoption of 

a technical arrangement that inhibits 

effective blockchain analysis increases 

the risk PM2BTC poses to the 

international and U.S. financial systems. 

B. Whether the Money Laundering 

Concern Posed by PM2BTC Outweighs 

Any Legitimate Business Activity It May 

Conduct 

The record amply demonstrates that 

PM2BTC’s services are used, to an 

unusually large extent by comparison to 

other CVC exchanges, to facilitate illicit 

activities by illicit actors. Although 

PM2BTC offers services that could 

potentially be used by licit actors, those 

services may be found at other VASPs, 

including VASPs located in 

jurisdictions with robust AML/CFT 

frameworks and regulatory oversight. 

Legitimate actors have access to a broad 

range of comparable services that 

provide for appropriate transparency 

and can support international efforts to 

protect the integrity of the international 

financial system, including transactions 

involving CVC. Accordingly, given the 

extensive flow of illegitimate funds 

through PM2BTC, FinCEN assesses that 

the need to protect U.S. financial 

institutions from the money laundering 

risks presented by PM2BTC outweighs 

any potential legitimate utility its 

services may provide. 

IV. Imposition of Special Measure 

Prohibiting Transmittals of Funds 

Involving PM2BTC 

Having found that PM2BTC is a 

financial institution operating outside 

the United States that is of primary 

money laundering concern in 

connection with Russian illicit finance, 

FinCEN has determined that the 

imposition of a special measure 

prohibiting certain transmittals of funds 

involving PM2BTC is warranted.39

A. Whether the Prohibition of Certain 

Transmittals of Funds Involving 

PM2BTC Will Address the Money 

Laundering Concern in a Manner 

Consistent With U.S. National Security 

and Foreign Policy Interests 

Given PM2BTC’s extensive 

association with suspected illicit 

activity and illicit actors, FinCEN 

assesses that imposing a prohibition on 

certain transmittals of funds involving 

PM2BTC is necessary to safeguard U.S. 

national security and the U.S. financial 

system, as well as serve key U.S. 

national security objectives. In light of 

the predominant percentage of 

transactions linked to known or 

suspected illicit activity processed 

through PM2BTC, prohibiting certain 

transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC 

will insulate the U.S. financial system 

from international money laundering 

and other financial crimes. 

In particular, prohibiting certain 

transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC 

will further ongoing U.S. efforts to 

curtail suspected Russian-associated 

illicit activity and financial transactions. 

Targeting illicit proceeds obtained by 

ransomware actors, especially those 

with a nexus to Russia, is, for instance, 

a high priority for the United States. 

Recent actions by FinCEN, OFAC, and 

intergovernmental task forces have also 

focused on Russia-related illicit finance 

threats. Prohibiting certain transmittals 

of funds involving PM2BTC will serve 

the United States’ national security and 

foreign policy interests by protecting 

U.S. businesses and interests from 

known ransomware threat actors, by 

publicly countering a financing 

mechanism used by illicit entities, 

including entities that seek to further 

the Russian state’s aims of political and 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
82504 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

40CoinGecko, Exchanges, available at https://

www.coingecko.com/en/exchanges (last accessed 

Sept. 17, 2024). 

41Financial Stability Board, Assessment of Risks 

to Financial Stability from Crypto-assets (Feb. 16, 

2022), at 5, available at https://www.fsb.org/wpcontent/uploads/P160222.pdf (last accessed Sept. 

17, 2024). 

42FinCEN notes that CVC payment systems are 

often designed to limit the control of specific 

financial institutions over transactions and to 

prevent rejections of funds by persons or entities 

other than the sender of funds. As a result, although 

covered financial institutions may institute an 

internal prohibition on the sending of CVC 

transactions to another address or entity, FinCEN 

assesses that there are few, if any, readily available 

ways for covered financial institutions to ‘‘reject’’ 

incoming CVC transactions (prior to receipt). 

43Pursuant to section 9714, these measures 

include: (1) the special measures described in 31 

U.S.C. 5318A, including the imposition of 

additional recordkeeping, information collection, 

and reporting requirements on covered U.S. 

financial institutions and/or the prohibition or 

imposition of conditions upon the opening or 

maintaining of correspondent or payable-through 

accounts for or on behalf of a foreign banking 

institution; and (2) the imposition of conditions on 

the transmittal of funds, as an alternative to a 

prohibition on the transmittal of funds. 

44Likewise, imposing conditions on transmittals 

of funds, pursuant to section 9714(a)(2), would be 

insufficient to address the threat. While imposing 

conditions, rather than a full prohibition, may be 

appropriate in circumstances where the institution 

provides services for legitimate business that are 

not easily replicated or where a complete 

prohibition on transactional activity would 

otherwise unduly harm legitimate economic 

activity, PM2BTC provides a service that is easily 

obtainable for legitimate customers through other 

providers, and in this case the value of any 

legitimate activity it may conduct is outweighed by 

the significant proportion of illicit financial activity 

identified and its lack of mandatory KYC. 

economic destabilization. Similarly, 

such a prohibition would sever a 

pathway that might facilitate 

circumvention of U.S. economic 

sanctions, supporting the efficacy of 

U.S. sanctions and complementing 

previous actions taken by the U.S. 

government. 

Additionally, this action reinforces 

the expectations of AML/CFT 

compliance in the virtual asset 

ecosystem in order to improve the 

identification and reporting of 

suspicious activity by financial 

institutions around the world. 

B. Whether the Prohibition of Certain 

Transmittals of Funds Involving 

PM2BTC Would Impose Burdens on 

Legitimate Activity of PM2BTC or Third 

Parties 

FinCEN assesses that prohibiting 

certain transmittal of funds involving 

PM2BTC will impose limited burdens 

on legitimate activities currently 

transacted through PM2BTC and, 

indeed, will have a positive systemic 

impact on the international payment, 

clearance, and settlement system. 

By U.S. and international standards, 

PM2BTC represents a limited 

percentage of total received BTC 

(directly and indirectly). As of April 15, 

2024, PM2BTC’s total received value 

was between .0002 and 0.0014 percent 

(respectively) of the largest U.S.- 

domiciled CVC VASP (hereinafter 

referred to as ‘‘VASP 1’’). PM2BTC’s 

transaction history with VASP 1 totals 

just over $32 million in CVC over nearly 

11 years. By contrast, a CVC price and 

volume aggregator estimates that VASP 

1 processed more than $3 billion in 

transfers daily 40 as of April 17, 2024. By 

comparison, PM2BTC’s largest U.S.- 

based counterparty (hereinafter referred 

to as ‘‘VASP 2’’) sent approximately 

$147 million worth of CVC to PM2BTC 

between 2018 and 2024, which 

amounted to approximately 0.002 

percent of VASP 2’s overall sending 

activity. As such, there is no evidence 

that PM2BTC is a major participant in 

the international payment system or 

relied upon by the international banking 

community. Indeed, given its size and 

limited international presence, the 

legitimate business services that it offers 

would be readily available through 

other regulated institutions. Further, as 

noted in the February 16, 2022, 

Financial Stability Board’s Assessment 

of Risks to Financial Stability, direct 

connections between CVC as a whole, 

and systemically important financial 

institutions and core financial markets, 

are limited at present. Volatility and 

disruptions in the CVC ecosystem have 

been contained within the CVC markets 

and have not significantly spilled over 

to financial markets and 

infrastructures.41

Given widespread availability of other 

VASP services, as well as PM2BTC’s 

predominant use for suspected illicit 

activity, imposing a prohibition on 

certain transmittals of funds involving 

PM2BTC will merely remove from 

transaction chains a VASP that 

facilitates illicit or otherwise unduly 

risky transactions that pose a risk to the 

international financial system. This 

action will not have an adverse impact 

on the international payment, clearance, 

and settlement system or on legitimate 

business activities currently involving 

PM2BTC. 

Moreover, FinCEN assesses that 

imposing a prohibition on certain 

transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC 

will not present a significant 

competitive disadvantage for financial 

institutions organized or licensed in the 

United States given PM2BTC’s relatively 

small size and the relatively limited 

burden that compliance with this order 

would impose. Given the small size of 

PM2BTC and the comparatively low 

value of activity between U.S. financial 

institutions and PM2BTC, FinCEN 

assesses that this would impose neither 

an undue cost nor substantial burden 

these financial institutions. Further, 

compliance with the prohibition on 

certain transmittals of funds set out in 

this order requires no tools or 

competencies other than those already 

employed by domestic financial 

institutions to maintain their current 

AML/CFT compliance programs. In 

order to ensure that is the case, FinCEN 

has elected to provide within this order 

for the rejection of certain transmittals 

of CVC that are received from or 

originate at PM2BTC and outline the 

steps a covered financial institution 

should take in such circumstances. 

In providing for the rejection of CVC 

under certain limited circumstances, 

FinCEN acknowledges that, at this time, 

there are technological limitations that 

may limit or preclude covered financial 

institutions from declining CVC 

transfers originating at addresses 

outside of their control, and compliant 

institutions may find themselves in 

receipt of CVC from PM2BTC despite a 

desire and effort to limit such 

exposure.42 This order allows covered 

financial institutions the flexibility to 

act with discretion based on the facts 

and circumstances of a particular 

transaction and comply with this order, 

even where the originating address is no 

longer accessible, where, for example, 

(1) CVC transfers originated from 

PM2BTC but were held for an extended 

period of time in an unhosted wallet, or 

(2) the covered financial institution’s 

risk mitigation procedures would 

preclude returning funds to PM2BTC. 

Moreover, by providing for the rejection 

of CVC, this order ensures that covered 

financial institutions will not be subject 

to an undue cost or burden associated 

with compliance. 

C. Whether Any Other Reasonable 

Alternatives or Special Measures Would 

Adequately Address the Money 

Laundering Concern 

FinCEN considered other special 

measures available pursuant to section 

9714 prior to selecting the prohibition 

reflected in this order.43 However, 

prohibiting certain transmittals of funds 

involving PM2BTC is the only means of 

adequately addressing the money 

laundering concern in connection with 

Russian illicit finance posed by 

PM2BTC. 

In particular, none of the special 

measures described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A 

would effectively address the illicit 

finance threat posed by PM2BTC.44 Any 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 82505 

45Section 6106(b) of the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Pub. L. 

117–81) amended section 9714 of the Combatting 

Russian Money Laundering Act (Pub. L. 116–283) 

to, among other things, provide that the penalties 

set forth in 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 shall apply to 

violations of any order, regulation, special measure, 

or other requirement imposed under section 9714, 

in the same manner and to the same extent 

described in sections 5321 and 5322. 

additional recordkeeping, information 

collection, or reporting requirements, as 

described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(1)–(4), 

would be insufficient to guard against 

the risks posed by covered financial 

institutions processing transmittals of 

funds involving PM2BTC. Such 

measures may allow such transfers to 

continue to benefit of illicit actors 

connected to Russian illicit finance. 

Further, placing conditions upon or 

prohibiting the opening or maintaining 

in the United States of a correspondent 

account or payable-through account by 

any domestic financial institution or 

domestic financial agency for or on 

behalf of a foreign banking institution, 

as described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(5), is 

similarly inadequate because the types 

of CVC transactions that PM2BTC 

facilitates do not rely on correspondent 

or payable-through accounts, and 

FinCEN is unaware of such 

relationships between PM2BTC and 

U.S. or foreign financial institutions. In 

addition, PM2BTC’s recordkeeping is 

incomplete, so imposing additional 

recordkeeping requirements is not likely 

to be successful or sufficient to address 

the risks it poses. For these reasons, 

FinCEN assesses that the prohibition on 

certain transmittals of funds, including 

CVC, involving PM2BTC is the most 

appropriate special measure. 

D. Whether the Special Measure 

Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of 

Funds Should Be Imposed by Order or 

Regulation 

Pursuant to section 9714, the 

Secretary may impose specified special 

measures, including a prohibition on 

certain transmittals of funds, ‘‘by order, 

regulation or otherwise as permitted by 

law.’’ In determining the appropriate 

approach in this instance, FinCEN 

considered imposing special measures 

by order or regulation. Although 

PM2BTC is not a large participant in the 

international payment system, FinCEN 

determined that proceeding by an order 

is the most appropriate course of action 

given the imminent threats posed by the 

illicit actors whose transactions and 

access to funds PM2BTC facilitates as 

well as the ongoing transactions 

associated with suspected illicit activity 

that continue to be processed through 

PM2BTC. 

A copy of this order will be published 

in the Federal Register. To the extent 

PM2BTC or other parties have 

information relevant to this order, they 

may submit it to FinCEN at frc@

fincen.gov. 

V. Order 

A. Definitions 

1. PM2BTC 

The order defines PM2BTC, a CVC 

exchanger comprised of a collection of 

the services PM2BTC.ME, BTC2PM.ME, 

PM2CASHIN.ME, BTC2CASHIN.ME, 

PM2WM.ME, and BTC2WM.ME, to 

mean all subsidiaries, branches, and 

offices of PM2BTC operating in any 

jurisdiction, as well as any successor 

entity. 

2. Convertible Virtual Currency (CVC) 

The order defines convertible virtual 

currency (CVC) as a medium of 

exchange that either has an equivalent 

value as currency, or acts as a substitute 

for currency, but lacks legal tender 

status. Despite having legal tender status 

in at least one jurisdiction, for the 

purpose of this order, Bitcoin is 

included as a type of CVC. 

3. Covered Financial Institution 

The order defines a covered financial 

institution as having the same meaning 

as ‘‘financial institution’’ in 31 CFR 

1010.100(t). 

4. CVC Exchanger 

The order defines a CVC exchanger as 

any person engaged as a business in the 

exchange of CVC for fiat currency, 

funds, or other CVC. 

5. Recipient 

The order defines recipient as the 

person to be paid by the recipient’s 

covered financial institution. 

6. Successor Entity 

The order defines successor entity as 

any person that replaces PM2BTC by 

acquiring its assets, in whole or in part, 

and/or carrying out the affairs of 

PM2BTC under a new name. 

7. Transmittal of Funds 

The order defines transmittal of funds 

as the sending and receiving of funds, 

including CVC. 

8. Meaning of Other Terms 

All terms used but not otherwise 

defined herein shall have the meaning 

set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X and 31 

U.S.C. 5312. 

B. Prohibition of the Transmittal of 

Funds Involving PM2BTC 

1. Prohibition 

A covered financial institution is 

prohibited from engaging in a 

transmittal of funds from or to PM2BTC, 

or from or to any account or CVC 

address administered by or on behalf of 

PM2BTC. 

2. Rejection of Funds and Condition on 

the Transfer of Rejected Funds 

A covered financial institution will be 

deemed not to have violated this Order 

where, upon determining that it 

received CVC that originated from 

PM2BTC or from an account or CVC 

address administered by or on behalf of 

PM2BTC, that covered financial 

institution rejects the transaction, 

preventing the intended recipient from 

accessing such CVC and returning the 

CVC to PM2BTC, or to the account or 

CVC address from which the CVC 

originated. 

C. Order Period 

The terms of this order are effective 

October 11, 2024, with no cessation 

date. 

D. Reservation of Authority 

FinCEN reserves its authority 

pursuant to section 9714 to impose 

conditions on certain transmittals of 

funds from or to PM2BTC, or from or to 

any account or CVC address 

administered by or on behalf of 

PM2BTC. 

E. Other Obligations 

Nothing in this order shall be 

construed to modify, impair, or 

otherwise affect any requirements or 

obligations to which a covered financial 

institution is subject pursuant to the 

BSA, including, but not limited to, the 

filing of Suspicious Activity Reports 

(SARs), or other applicable laws or 

regulations, such as the sanctions 

administered and enforced by the U.S. 

Department of the Treasury’s Office of 

Foreign Assets Control. 

F. Penalties for Noncompliance 

The covered financial institution, and 

any of its officers, directors, employees, 

and agents, may be liable for civil or 

criminal penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 

and 5322 for violating any of the terms 

of this order.45

G. Validity of Order 

Any judicial determination that any 

provision of this order is invalid shall 

not affect the validity of any other 

provision of this order, and each other 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1
82506 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 198 / Friday, October 11, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

provision shall thereafter remain in full 

force and effect. 

Jimmy L. Kirby, 

Deputy Director, Financial Crimes 

Enforcement Network. 

[FR Doc. 2024–23430 Filed 10–10–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4810–02–P 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND 

SECURITY 

Coast Guard 

33 CFR Part 100 

[Docket Number USCG–2024–0919] 

RIN 1625–AA08 

Special Local Regulation; Elizabeth 

River, Norfolk Harbor, Norfolk, VA 

AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. 

ACTION: Temporary final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is 

establishing a temporary regulation for 

waters of the Elizabeth River, in 

Norfolk, Virginia to protect personnel, 

vessels, and the marine environment 

from potential hazards created by a boat 

parade that is scheduled for the 

afternoon of October 20, 2024. Parade 

participants operating within the 

regulated area must comply with all 

instructions given by the on-scene 

Patrol Commander (PATCOM). Vessels 

or persons entering the regulated area 

during the enforcement period are 

subject to the direction and control of 

the on-scene PATCOM as designated 

and specifically authorized by the 

Captain of the Port, Sector Virginia. 

DATES: This rule is effective on October 

20, 2024, from noon to 4 p.m. 

ADDRESSES: To view documents 

mentioned in this preamble as being 

available in the docket, go to https://

www.regulations.gov, type USCG–2024– 

0919 in the search box and click 

‘‘Search.’’ Next, in the Document Type 

column, select ‘‘Supporting & Related 

Material.’’ 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If 

you have questions about this rule, call 

or email LCDR Justin Strassfield, Sector 

Virginia Waterways Management 

Division, U.S. Coast Guard; telephone 

757–668–5581, email 

Justin.Z.Strassfield@uscg.mil. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Table of Abbreviations 

CFR Code of Federal Regulations 

COTP Captain of the Port 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FR Federal Register 

NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking 

PATCOM Patrol Commander 

§ Section 

SLR Special Local Regulation 

U.S.C. United States Code 

II. Background Information and 

Regulatory History 

The marine event sponsor of a boat 

parade is expecting to draw a high 

concentration of vessels to the Norfolk 

Harbor area along the proposed parade 

route. Traditionally, the Norfolk Harbor 

area serves as a major thoroughfare for 

commercial traffic, naval operations, 

ferry routes, and several other 

recreational uses through the connecting 

waters of the James River, Elizabeth 

River, and Lower Chesapeake Bay. The 

Coast Guard is establishing a Special 

Local Regulation (SLR) to monitor the 

parade before, during, and after the 

event to minimize impacts on this 

congested waterway. We must 

promulgate this rule by October 20, 

2024, to ensure the safety of individuals, 

property, and the marine environment. 

The Coast Guard is issuing this 

temporary rule under authority in 5 

U.S.C. 553(b)(B). This statutory 

provision authorizes an agency to issue 

a rule without prior notice and 

opportunity to comment when the 

agency for good cause finds that those 

procedures are ‘‘impracticable, 

unnecessary, or contrary to the public 

interest.’’ The Coast Guard finds that 

good cause exists for not publishing a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

because it would be impracticable to 

publish an NPRM, consider comments, 

and publish a final rule before this rule 

needs to be in place to serve its purpose. 

This rule is necessary to accommodate 

the number of vessels expected to 

participate in the boat parade. 

Also, under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), the 

Coast Guard finds that good cause exists 

for making this rule effective less than 

30 days after publication in the Federal 

Register. Delaying the effective date of 

this rule would be impracticable 

because prompt action is needed to 

respond to the potentially significant 

increase in vessel traffic not local to the 

area and to the risks associated with 

large congregations of vessels navigating 

unfamiliar waters. 

III. Legal Authority and Need for Rule 

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule 

under authority in 46 U.S.C. 70041. 

Captains of the Port are authorized by 

33 CFR 100.35 to issue SLRs. The 

Captain of the Port (COTP), Sector 

Virginia has determined that potential 

hazards associated with the proposed 

parade starting October 20, 2024, will be 

a safety concern for anyone within the 

vicinity of the parade route. This rule is 

needed to protect personnel, vessels, 

and the marine environment in the 

navigable waters within the SLR during 

the enforcement period of this rule. 

IV. Discussion of the Rule 

This rule establishes an SLR from 

noon until 4 p.m. on October 20, 2024. 

The SLR will cover all navigable waters 

within the Elizabeth River from 

shoreline to shoreline beginning in the 

vicinity of the Craney Island Flats, 

proceeding south through the Norfolk 

Harbor Reaches, and ending at the 

Waterside District in Norfolk, Virginia, 

to promote safety along the ‘‘MidAtlantic Trump Boat Parade’’ route. The 

southern boundaries of the SLR are 

bound by the following fixed structures: 

all waters north of the I–264 Norfolk/ 

Portsmouth (Downtown Tunnel), east of 

the West Norfolk Bridge and west of the 

Berkley Bridge. This SLR will also 

temporarily establish the southern area 

of Anchorage N (Hospital Point) as a 

First Amendment area(where people 

may lawfully assemble and convey their 

message in a safe manner to their 

intended audience), to be used at the 

discretion of the Coast Guard Patrol 

Commander (PATCOM) as a spectator 

area. 

The duration of the SLR has been 

tailored to protect personnel, vessels, 

and the marine environment in these 

navigable waters when the parade is 

scheduled to occur, while minimizing 

the burden on routine vessel traffic. 

Vessels or persons entering the SLR 

during the enforcement period are 

subject to the direction and control of 

the on-scene PATCOM, as designated 

and specifically authorized by the 

Captain of the Port, Virginia. 

V. Regulatory Analyses 

We developed this rule after 

considering numerous statutes and 

Executive orders related to rulemaking. 

Below we summarize our analyses 

based on a number of these statutes and 

Executive orders, and we discuss First 

Amendment rights of protestors. 

A. Regulatory Planning and Review 

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 

direct agencies to assess the costs and 

benefits of available regulatory 

alternatives and, if regulation is 

necessary, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits. 

This rule has not been designated a 

‘‘significant regulatory action,’’ under 

section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, as 

amended by Executive Order 14094 

(Modernizing Regulatory Review). 

Accordingly, this rule has not been 

reviewed by the Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB). 


ddrumheller on DSK120RN23PROD with RULES1