[Cite as State v. Woolf, 2016-Ohio-3251.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

STARK COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Plaintiff-Appellee 

-vsWILLIAM LEE WOOLF 

 Defendant-Appellant 

JUDGES: 

: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

: Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

: Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

: 

: 

: Case No. 2015CA00195 

: 

: 

: OPINION 

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal appeal from the Stark County 

Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2015-

CR-0618 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: May 31, 2016 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

JOHN D. FERRERO AARON KOVALCHIK 

STARK COUNTY PROSECUTOR 116 Cleveland Avenue N.W. 

BY: RONALD MARK CALDWELL 808 Courtyard Centre 

110 Central Plaza South, Ste. 510 Canton, OH 44702 

Canton, OH 44702 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 2 

Gwin, P.J. 

{¶1} Appellant, William Woolf [“Woolf”] appeals the September 10, 2015 

judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas, Stark County, Ohio overruling his 

motion to suppress. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶2} In 2015, Woolf, was charged by indictment with one count each of failure to 

comply [R.C. 2921.331(B) and (C)(5)(a)(ii)] and operating a vehicle while under the 

influence ("OVI") [R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(a), (d), or (e)]. During the pretrial stage of this 

prosecution, Woolf filed a suppression motion, making two main arguments. First, he 

could not be convicted of the failure to comply since the pursuing officer did not have a 

valid operator's license at the time of the pursuit. And second, that the seizure was illegal 

because the officer used excessive force and inappropriate language while effecting the 

stop of Woolf. 

{¶3} The trial court requested a stipulated statement of facts, which was provided 

by the parties. [“Court’s Exhibit 1”]. After considering this stipulation of facts, the trial 

court overruled the motion. The court concluded that these facts did not establish a 

violation of Woolf s rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Specifically, 

 The defendant asserts that because the Officer making the arrest 

was in violation of the Rules and Regulations of the Alliance Police 

Department by not having a valid driver's license, and further because the 

Officer used abusive language and unnecessary and excessive force during 

the course of the arrest, that said failures and actions on the part of the 

police Officer invalidated the arrest and should result in a suppression of 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 3 

any and all evidence seized, collected, observed, photographed or recorded 

as a result of the search, seizure and interrogation conducted on or about 

April 12, 2015. 

 While the conduct of the police Officer in failing to have a driver's 

license and the allegation of excessive force are matters to be considered 

by the Alliance Police Department and if true, the subject of possible 

disciplinary action or a civil action by the defendant, the same do not render 

invalid the actions of the Officer who was under the color of authority. 

Transcript of Proceedings, Pretrial Hearing Sept. 9, 2015 at 4-5. 

{¶4} After this suppression ruling, Woolf opted to plead no contest and to appeal 

the ruling instead of standing trial. At this hearing, the trial court had the prosecution read 

into the record the bill of particulars, without objection, upon which the court made its 

factual basis for its finding of guilt. With regard to the willfully fleeing charge, this recitation 

provided the following: 

[Woolf] was operating a motorcycle in the area of West Ely Street 

and Buckeye Avenue in Alliance, Stark County, Ohio, when Alliance Police 

Department attempted to stop him for driving under suspension and/or 

fictitious plates. 

 The officer activated lights and/or sirens. 

 Defendant refused to stop and accelerated [,] reaching 

speeds of over 100 miles per hour. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 4 

 Defendant eventually drove through a yard and was thrown 

from the motorcycle due to hitting a mud puddle hole. There were several 

people in the yard when this occurred. 

 This also occurred in a residential area with a posted 25 mile 

per hour speed limit. 

Transcript of Plea & Sentence, Sept. 23, 2015 at 9-10. Regarding the OVI charge, the 

recited bill of particulars provided, 

 Defendant had a strong odor of alcohol coming from his person and 

red glassy eyes. He urinated on himself in the police cruiser. 

 He provided a breath sample of .084 percent and a urine sample of 

.12 percent. 

Transcript of Plea & Sentence, Sept. 23, 2015 at 10. 

{¶5} After accepting Woolf s plea and convicting him, the trial court sentenced 

him to an aggregate prison term of nine months on the failure to comply charge and a 

concurrent 180-day jail sentence for the OVI conviction. 

Assignments of Error 

{¶6} Woolf raises two assignments of error, 

{¶7} “I. APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS GUARANTEED BY 

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 

ARTICLE 1 SECTION 14 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WERE VIOLATED WHEN 

THE TRIAL COURT OVERRULED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 5 

{¶8} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CONSIDERING THE USE OF 

EXCESSIVE FORCE BY LAW ENFORCEMENT AS A FACTOR IN APPELLANT'S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS.” 

I. 

{¶9} Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law 

and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 154-155, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 

71, ¶ 8. When ruling on a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of 

fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and to evaluate witness 

credibility. See State v. Dunlap, 73 Ohio St.3d 308,314, 1995-Ohio-243, 652 N.E.2d 988; 

State v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19, 20, 437 N.E.2d 583 (1982). Accordingly, a reviewing 

court must defer to the trial court's factual findings if competent, credible evidence exists 

to support those findings. See Burnside, supra; Dunlap, supra; State v. Long, 127 Ohio 

App.3d 328, 332, 713 N.E.2d 1(4th Dist. 1998); State v. Medcalf, 111 Ohio App.3d 142, 

675 N.E.2d 1268 (4th Dist. 1996). However, once this Court has accepted those facts as 

true, it must independently determine as a matter of law whether the trial court met the 

applicable legal standard. See Burnside, supra, citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio 

App.3d 706, 707 N.E.2d 539(4th Dist. 1997); See, generally, United States v. Arvizu, 534 

U.S. 266, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740(2002); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 

116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911(1996). That is, the application of the law to the trial 

court's findings of fact is subject to a de novo standard of review Ornelas, supra. 

Moreover, due weight should be given “to inferences drawn from those facts by resident 

judges and local law enforcement officers.” Ornelas, supra at 698, 116 S.Ct. at 1663. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 6 

{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Woolf challenges the trial court's suppression 

ruling, arguing that the court erred in finding that Officer McCord's lack of a valid driver's 

license did not vitiate the legality of his traffic stop of Woolf. According to Woolf, McCord 

could not make a legal stop since was not permitted to drive. 

{¶11} In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 

89(1996) the United States Supreme Court held: 

 The temporary detention of a motorist upon probable cause to 

believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not violate the Fourth 

Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures, even if a 

reasonable officer would not have stopped the motorist absent some 

additional law enforcement objective. 

Whren at 1771. Less than one month later, the Ohio Supreme Court reached a similar 

decision in City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 665 N.E.2d 1091(1996). In 

Erickson, the Court stated: 

 Where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable cause that a 

traffic violation has occurred or was occurring, the stop is not unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the 

officer had some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion 

that the violator was engaging in more nefarious criminal activity. 

Id. at syllabus. 

{¶12} In State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, the 

defendant argued that his actions in the case – twice driving across the white edge line – 

were not enough to constitute a violation of the driving within marked lanes statute, R.C. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 7 

4511.33. Id. at ¶ 15. The appellant further argued that the stop was unjustified because 

there was no reason to suspect that he had failed to first ascertain that leaving the lane 

could be done safely or that he had not stayed within his lane “as nearly as [was] 

practicable,” within the meaning of R.C. 4511.33(A)(1). In rejecting these arguments, the 

Supreme Court noted, “the question of whether appellant might have a possible defense 

to a charge of violating R.C. 4511.33 is irrelevant in our analysis of whether an officer has 

a reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. An officer is not required 

to determine whether someone who has been observed committing a crime might have 

a legal defense to the charge.” Id. at ¶ 17. 

{¶13} In the case at bar, there is no evidence that Woolf knew that Officer McCord 

did not have a valid driver license when he signaled Woolf to pull over. Woolf has not 

challenged the officer’s reasons for attempting the traffic stop. Accordingly, the fact that 

Officer McCord had probable cause to stop Woolf is unchallenged. 

{¶14} We note that Officer McCord was in uniform in a marker police vehicle. 

Officer McCord did not cease to be a police officer simply because he was without a driver 

license. No official action, nor any type of disciplinary action of any kind had been 

commenced against the officer before the traffic stop. 

{¶15} “The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification 

for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.” Brigham 

City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. at 403, 405-406, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006), quoting 

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). Accord, 

State v. Dunn, 131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012–Ohio–1008, 964 N.E.2d 1037, syllabus. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 8 

{¶16} In the case at bar, Officer McCord was duly hired and serving as a police 

officer for the City of Alliance. The fact that he subsequently lost his driver license may 

or may not affect his employment. However, on the date in question, Officer McCord was 

acting under color of law of a known and valid appointment. He simply failed to comply 

with a precedent or requirement that he have or maintain a valid driver license. He would 

be considered, therefore, a de facto officer who had the authority to make traffic stops. 

Cf. State ex rel. Witten v. Ferguson, 148 Ohio St. 702, 76 N.E.2d 886. As this Court has 

noted, 

 “[W]here an officer holds the office and performs the duties thereof 

with the acquiescence of the public authorities and the public and has the 

reputation of being the officer he assumes to be and is dealt with as such, 

he is, in the eyes of the law, a de facto officer.” State ex rel. Witten v. 

Ferguson, 148 Ohio St. 702, 710, 76 N.E.2d 886 (1947). “The law validates 

the acts of de facto officers as to the public and third persons on the ground 

that, although not officers de jure, they are, in virtue of the particular 

circumstances, officers in fact whose acts public policy requires should be 

considered valid.” State, ex rel. Paul, v. Russell, 162 Ohio St. 254, 257, 

122 N.E.2d 780 (1954). 

Swanson v. Maier, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2014CA00208, 2015-Ohio-2141, ¶27. 

{¶17} Accordingly, the fact that Officer McCord did not have a valid driver license 

did not convert and otherwise valid traffic stop into an illegal stop and detention. 

{¶18} Woolf’s first assignment of error is overruled. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 9 

II. 

{¶19} Woolf s second assignment of error challenges the trial court's suppression 

ruling for not considering the excessive force and language used after the traffic stop. 

{¶20} Contrary to Woolf s representation, the trial court did consider the alleged 

excessive force and inappropriate language that was proffered by the defense. The court 

specifically noted in its judgment entry ruling on the suppression motion, 

THE COURT: All right. That proffer is made for purposes of the 

record. 

Obviously denied by the state. 

But it is proffered to be considered relative to the motion to dismiss 

along with the stipulated statement of facts. 

Transcript of Proceedings, Pretrial Hearing Sept. 9, 2015 at 7. 

{¶21} And the trial court's specific suppression ruling considered the allegations 

of excessive force, 

 Additionally, the defendant proffered an allegation that the Officer in 

question used excessive force and inappropriate language in violation of 

the Alliance Police Department Rules and Regulations at the time of arrest 

of the defendant. The Court, for purposes of this motion only, takes said 

allegations into consideration. 

Judgement Entry, filed Sept. 10, 2015 at 1. 

{¶22} Accordingly, the record does not support that the trial court committed the 

error as alleged in Wolfe’s second assignment of error. 

{¶23} Woolf’s second assignment of error is overruled. 
Stark County, Case No. 2015CA00195 10 

{¶24} The judgment of the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

By Gwin, P.J., 

Hoffman, J., and 

Wise, J., concur