UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

THOMAS ANTHONY PEARCE, II, 

a/k/a Thomas Anthony Pearce. 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 23-5007 

(D.C. No. 4:21-CR-00237-GKF-1) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

_________________________________ 

Before MCHUGH, EID, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Thomas Anthony Pearce, II, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence obtained from a traffic stop that he claims violated the Fourth 

Amendment. Mr. Pearce argues the stop was not justified at its inception 

because there was no objectively reasonable basis to suspect he was engaged 

in criminal activity. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we discern 

no error in the district court’s suppression ruling and affirm. 

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the 

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be 

cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 

32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 11, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I1

In the early morning hours of February 8, 2021, Corporal Robert 

Golliday of the Jenks Police Department was working the night shift, 

patrolling the city of Jenks, Oklahoma in his marked police cruiser. At 

around 2:00 a.m., he drove through one of Jenks’s “distance neighborhoods,” 

a residential area somewhat isolated from the rest of the city. R.II.14:18–

15:7; SR.I.58–59. Corporal Golliday spotted a white Dodge Ram—which 

turned out to be Mr. Pearce’s truck—parked in the driveway of a 

construction site on 131st Street, a main thoroughfare. There were no 

streetlights nearby, and the truck’s headlights were off. 

Corporal Golliday regularly patrolled the area, which was a recent 

target for burglaries, but he had never seen a car parked in that spot before. 

As he passed, Corporal Golliday shined an alley light, a bright light on the 

side of his patrol car, to see if anyone was inside the truck. He saw someone 

moving in the driver’s seat. Corporal Golliday drove on for a few seconds to 

turn his cruiser around at a nearby T-intersection and investigate further. 

By the time Corporal Golliday turned around, the truck was already driving 

1 We derive these facts from the district court’s recitation in its 

memorandum and order on the motion to suppress. Because, as we will 

explain, we consider testimony presented to the district court during its 

evidentiary hearing, United States v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 

2014), we rely on the transcript from that hearing as well. 

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away, “accelerating down the road at high speed.” SR.I.59. Corporal 

Golliday activated his overhead lights and signaled for the truck to stop. 

The truck eventually pulled over, after bypassing several places to safely 

stop. Corporal Golliday approached the truck and encountered Mr. Pearce 

in the driver’s seat. B.P., later identified as a minor, was seated in the front 

passenger seat. 

Because of information obtained during the stop, Mr. Pearce was 

arrested and then indicted in the Northern District of Oklahoma on various 

child pornography related offenses.2 Before trial, Mr. Pearce moved to 

suppress under the Fourth Amendment “all evidence and material obtained 

directly and indirectly” from the traffic stop. SR.I.20. He argued, as relevant 

here, Officer Golliday lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the stop.3 

2 The government charged Mr. Pearce with Coercion or Enticement of 

a Minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); Production of Child Pornography 

in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a) and 2251(e); Possession of Child 

Pornography in Indian Country in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(A) 

and 2252(b)(2); and Distribution of Marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(D). SR.III.5–8. 

3 In the district court, Mr. Pearce also urged suppression because the 

detention exceeded its permissible scope. He abandons that argument on 

appeal. Reply Br. at 3 (“[T]he only issue is whether there was reasonable 

suspicion to initiate the stop.”). 

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The district court held an evidentiary hearing. Corporal Golliday 

testified about the circumstances of the traffic stop.4 Mr. Pearce called no 

witnesses. The district court denied Mr. Pearce’s suppression motion in a 

written order. The challenged evidence was admitted at Mr. Pearce’s jury 

trial, where he was convicted on all charges. 

This timely appeal followed. 

II 

Mr. Pearce contends the district court erroneously denied his motion 

to suppress because Corporal Golliday lacked reasonable suspicion to 

initiate an investigatory stop. The district court rejected this argument and, 

on this record, so do we. 

A 

We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress by 

“view[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the determination of 

the district court.” United States v. Johnson, 43 F.4th 1100, 1107 (10th Cir. 

2022) (quoting United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 

2005)). We accept the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous. See United States v. Hammond, 890 F.3d 901, 905 (10th Cir. 

2018). “While the existence of reasonable suspicion is a factual 

4 Corporal Golliday also testified about the stop at Mr. Pearce’s trial. 

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determination, the ultimate determination of the reasonableness of a search 

or seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de 

novo.” United States v. Fonseca, 744 F.3d 674, 680 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting 

United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 944 (10th Cir. 2009)). 

B 

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Interactions between police 

and citizens generally fall into one of several categories: “consensual 

encounters, investigative stops, and arrests.” Oliver v. Woods, 209 F.3d 

1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2000). The stop at issue here was an investigative 

detention. “An investigative detention, which is also referred to as a Terry 

stop, is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but unlike 

an arrest, it need not be supported by probable cause.” Id. To satisfy the 

Fourth Amendment, an investigative detention must be “justified at its 

inception,” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993) 

(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)), and “reasonably related in 

scope to the circumstances” prompting the stop, Terry, 392 U.S. at 20. This 

appeal concerns only the first requirement. 

To be “justified at its inception,” an investigative detention must be 

supported by reasonable suspicion—“‘a particularized and objective basis’ 

for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 

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(2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). We 

apply this objective standard from “the perspective of [a] 

reasonable officer.” United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 

2007) (emphasis omitted) (quoting United States v. Quintana-Garcia, 343 

F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2003)). While not an onerous standard, United 

States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1153 (10th Cir. 2010), reasonable 

suspicion demands “something more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or hunch,” United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 

2005) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Instead, the 

“officer must point to specific, articulable facts.” Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147. 

Our reasonable suspicion analysis “requires a court to assess the totality of 

the circumstances, not to consider facts in isolation.” United States v.

Young, --- F.4th --- No. 21-2066, 2023 WL 3608101, at *5 (10th Cir. May 24, 

2023) (citing United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir. 1993) 

(“Whether . . . an investigative detention is supported by an objectively 

reasonable suspicion of illegal activity does not depend upon any one factor, 

but on the totality of the circumstances.”)). And “reasonable suspicion may 

exist even if it is more likely than not that the individual is not involved in 

any illegality.” United States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 

2011) (quoting United States v. Albert, 579 F.3d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 

2009)). 

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C 

The district court concluded Corporal Golliday reasonably suspected 

Mr. Pearce was involved in criminal activity “based on the time of day, the 

unusual location of the vehicle, reports of crime in the area, and the 

obviously suspicious behavior of driving away from Golliday at a high rate 

of speed.” SR.I.64. The district court made these factual findings: 

 Mr. Pearce’s truck was parked “near a construction site in an unlit 

area” at 2:00 a.m. SR.I.58–59. 

 Corporal Golliday passed the truck in his marked police car. 

 Corporal Golliday had never “seen a vehicle parked in that location 

on his regular patrols through the area.” SR.I.59. 

 The truck’s lights were off, but when Corporal Golliday “turned on 

his side alley light” as he drove by, he “observed a person in the 

vehicle.” SR.I.59, 64. 

 There was a history of vehicle break ins and construction-site theft 

in the neighborhood. 

 After Corporal Golliday passed the truck, Mr. Pearce “fled the area 

at a high rate of speed.” SR.I.64. Based on Corporal Golliday’s 

“training and experience,” he believed Mr. Pearce “was driving 

faster than the posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour.” SR.I.59. 

“Considering the totality of the circumstances,” the district court 

determined Corporal Golliday “had reasonable suspicion to initiate an 

investigative detention.” SR.I.64. 

Mr. Pearce makes three main arguments on appeal. First, he contends 

the district court clearly erred in finding he was speeding. This appears to 

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be Mr. Pearce’s only attack on the district court’s factual findings. Second, 

Mr. Pearce challenges the district court’s ultimate conclusion that, under 

the totality of the circumstances, reasonable suspicion supported the stop. 

Third, Mr. Pearce urges reversal under United States v. Hernandez, 847 

F.3d 1257, 1268 (10th Cir. 2017). As we explain, these arguments are 

unavailing. 

1 

Mr. Pearce claims the district court’s finding that he fled from 

Corporal Golliday “at a high rate of speed” is clearly erroneous. We disagree. 

We will reverse a district court’s factual findings on clear-error review only 

if they are “without factual support in the record or if, after reviewing all 

the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.” Johnson, 43 F.4th at 1107 (quoting United States v. 

Morales, 961 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir. 2020)). This standard is not 

satisfied here. 

Corporal Golliday’s testimony at the suppression hearing supports the 

district court’s finding. Corporal Golliday testified he spotted Mr. Pearce’s 

truck, turned his police cruiser around to investigate, and then “observed 

[the truck] leaving the area at a high rate of speed.” R.II.21:20–24. Corporal 

Golliday thought the truck was exceeding the posted speed limit of 45 miles 

per hour. SR.I.59; R.II.22:20–24, 43:2–8. He admitted he did not use a radar 

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gun but testified about using his “training and experience” to estimate Mr. 

Pearce’s speed. R.II.43:7–8. The district court credited Corporal Golliday’s 

testimony that Mr. Pearce was speeding, and we see no reason to disturb 

that conclusion. 

Mr. Pearce says we uphold stops based on speeding only when there 

is “more information in addition to the [officer’s] estimate.” Opening Br. at 

14 (citing United States v. King, 209 F. App’x 760, 762 (10th Cir. 2006) 

(noting officer’s use of a radar gun to measure a suspect’s speed)). As an 

initial matter, the district court found Corporal Golliday “did not stop [Mr. 

Pearce] solely to investigate a speeding violation.” SR.I.64. Instead, 

Corporal Golliday relied “on a range of factors,” including the late hour, the 

truck’s proximity to a construction site, and the truck’s speed as it left the 

area to support the stop. SR.I.63–64. But even still, we have never 

suggested an officer’s visual estimation of speed categorically cannot 

support a traffic stop at its inception. Rather, “[i]t’s long been the case that 

an officer’s visual estimation can supply probable cause to support a traffic 

stop for speeding in appropriate circumstances.” United States v. Ludwig, 

641 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir. 2011).5 

5 We note the government does not argue Corporal Golliday’s visual 

estimation of Mr. Pearce’s speed established probable cause for the stop. 

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Perhaps recognizing this principle, Mr. Pearce argues it was not 

appropriate in this case to rely on Corporal Golliday’s visual estimation. Mr. 

Pearce explains Corporal Golliday assessed his speed at night, in an area 

without streetlights, and when Corporal Golliday was himself “accelerating 

to catch up to Mr. Pearce.” Reply Br. at 8–9. These facts do not render the 

district court’s finding clearly erroneous. Even if we could say “there are 

two permissible views of the evidence” presented to the district court, “the 

factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” United 

States v. Pikyavit, 527 F.3d 1126, 1130 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson 

v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). And in any event, Mr. Pearce 

fled from law enforcement.6 Defense counsel conceded at oral argument he 

did “not specifically challenge[]” the district court’s finding of flight as 

The government simply contends Mr. Pearce’s speed was part of the totality 

of the circumstances supporting reasonable suspicion. 

6 Mr. Pearce seems to contend it is significant he did not engage in 

“headlong” flight, meaning he did not “flee an approaching officer.” Reply 

Br. at 9. Mr. Pearce cites no authority defining flight so narrowly, and we 

are aware of none. The Supreme Court has recognized “unprovoked flight 

upon noticing the police” is “evasive behavior” relevant to the reasonable 

suspicion analysis. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (emphasis 

added); see also District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 59 (2018) 

(explaining suspects’ “scattering and hiding” after noticing police could be 

factored into the totality of the circumstances).

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clearly erroneous.7 Oral Arg. 11:37–12:04. 

2 

Mr. Pearce next argues the totality of the circumstances does not 

support the district court’s reasonable suspicion determination. We are not 

persuaded. 

At the outset, we observe Mr. Pearce seems to proceed from an 

incorrect point of departure for the Fourth Amendment analysis. 

Reasonable suspicion “is based on the totality of the circumstances” and not 

on “each of an officer’s observations in isolation.” United States v. Garcia, 

751 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Rice, 483 

F.3d 1079, 1083 (10th Cir. 2007)); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 9 (“Any one of these 

factors is not by itself proof of any illegal conduct and is quite consistent 

with innocent travel. But we think taken together they amount to 

reasonable suspicion.”). Mr. Pearce contests the significance of several facts 

7 Even if preserved, a clear-error challenge to the district court’s 

finding of flight would fail. When Corporal Golliday first saw Mr. Pearce’s 

truck, it was parked with its lights off. As the government highlighted at 

oral argument, Corporal Golliday wanted to investigate further but it took 

him “four to six seconds” to turn around. Oral Arg. 20:20–20:46. In that 

time, Mr. Pearce started to drive away “at a high rate of speed.” R.II.21:20–

24. No other cars were on the road, and Corporal Golliday was aware of 

nothing else that could have provoked Mr. Pearce’s departure. R.II.23:8–16. 

From that, Corporal Golliday testified he believed Mr. Pearce “was trying 

to get away from the police.” R.II.22:25–23:7. Under the circumstances, we 

cannot say the finding Mr. Pearce fled from law enforcement lacks factual 

support in the record. 

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found by the district court, contending these should not factor into the 

Fourth Amendment analysis because an innocent explanation attends to 

each. 

For example, Mr. Pearce posits, even at 2:00 a.m., a person could “just 

as likely [have been] parked in the [construction site] driveway to protect 

the property” rather than vandalize it. Opening Br. at 16. When it comes to 

the reports of break-ins and theft in the area, Mr. Pearce counters an 

“individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing 

alone, is not enough to support a reasonable particularized suspicion that 

the person is committing a crime.” Opening Br. at 13. Mr. Pearce minimizes 

the significance of his driving away from Corporal Golliday, explaining an 

“individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business” when 

approached by law enforcement without reasonable suspicion or probable 

cause. Reply Br. at 9 (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 

(2000)).8 

8 As a general principle, we do not disagree. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125 

(holding “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal 

level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.” (quoting 

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991))). But the district court found 

Mr. Pearce fled, that factual finding is unchallenged, and “[f]light, by its 

very nature, is not ‘going about one’s business;’ in fact, it is just the 

opposite.” Id.

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The Supreme Court has forbidden precisely “this sort of 

divide-and-conquer analysis.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274. Regardless of what 

we might make of any singular fact, the proper focus of the district court’s 

inquiry, and ours, is the totality of the circumstances. Looking to the 

totality we have no trouble concluding, as did the district court based on its 

thorough factual findings, that “specific, articulable facts,” Simpson, 609 

F.3d at 1147, taken together, provided a “particularized and objective basis” 

to suspect Mr. Pearce of criminal activity, Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting 

Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18).9 Mr. Pearce has not meaningfully argued 

otherwise.

3 

Finally, Mr. Pearce urges reversal under United States v. Hernandez, 

where we affirmed the district court’s suppression ruling following an 

investigative stop. 847 F.3d 1257 at 1268. According to Mr. Pearce, the facts 

in Hernandez are analogous to those presented here, and we should find his 

stop, like the one in Hernandez, was based only on “inchoate suspicions and 

9 The district court suggested Corporal Golliday had reasonable 

suspicion to stop Mr. Pearce even without considering his flight. SR.I.64 

(“These facts alone would have merited further investigation and Golliday 

would have been permitted to approach the vehicle to conduct a limited 

investigation even if defendant had not driven away.”). We find Mr. Pearce’s 

flight significant in our de novo reasonable-suspicion analysis and factor it 

into the totality of the circumstances. 

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unparticularized hunches.” Reply Br. at 6 (quoting Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 

1270). We disagree because Hernandez is distinguishable. 

In Hernandez, police stopped the defendant in the early evening as he 

walked outside the fenced perimeter of a construction site near an 

intersection in downtown Denver. Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1260–61. The 

defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during the stop, 

arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion. Id. The government 

responded the officers had reasonable suspicion because: 

(1) Mr. Hernandez was walking next to a construction site which 

had been the previous target of construction material thefts; (2) he 

was walking in a “high crime” area (with regard to theft, gang 

activity, and drug dealing); (3) he was not using the sidewalk 

located on the other side of the street; and (4) he was wearing all 

black clothing and carrying two backpacks. 

Id. at 1268. The district court rejected the government’s arguments and 

granted the defendant’s motion. Id. at 1261. The panel likewise found these 

justifications insufficient and affirmed. Id. at 1270. 

True, Mr. Pearce and Mr. Hernandez were both stopped near 

construction sites that had a recent history of theft known to law 

enforcement. But Mr. Hernandez walked on public property outside a 

construction site fence, id. at 1260, while Mr. Pearce admits he was parked 

on a partially built driveway within a construction site. Opening Br. at 20; 

R.II.16:5–17:8. Mr. Hernandez was walking near an urban intersection before 

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8:00 p.m., Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1261, while Mr. Pearce was sitting in his 

parked truck in a remote neighborhood at 2:00 a.m., SR.I.59, 64; R.II.14:16–

15:2. And unlike Mr. Pearce, Mr. Hernandez did not flee when he saw police. 

Hernandez, 847 F.3d at 1261 (explaining officers drove next to Mr. 

Hernandez as they spoke to him, and when they asked him to stop, he 

complied).10 Thus, on the record before us, we are not persuaded to reverse 

under Hernandez. 

10 Mr. Pearce relies on several other cases, but none advance his cause. 

Reid v. Georgia is factually distinguishable. 448 U.S. 438, 440–41 (1980)

(finding no reasonable suspicion where a suspect arrived on a flight from a 

location known to be a source of cocaine, the flight arrived early in the morning, 

the suspect had limited luggage, and the suspect and his companion appeared 

to “conceal the fact that they were traveling together.”). So is United States v.

Davis. 94 F.3d 1465, 1470 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding no reasonable suspicion 

where government “fail[ed] to show any specific factual basis for suspecting” 

the defendant of a “particular crime” based on the defendant walking in a high 

crime area with his hands in his pockets and defendant’s choice to continue 

“walking in the same direction and same manner” after officers instructed him 

to stop (emphasis omitted)). United States v. Salazar seems to undermine Mr. 

Pearce’s position. 609 F.3d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding potentially 

innocuous conduct, like pulling into a closed business next to an unoccupied 

commercial vehicle, supported reasonable suspicion in the totality of the 

circumstances after the suspect attempted to evade officers). 

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III 

We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Mr. Pearce’s motion to 

suppress. 

ENTERED FOR THE COURT 

Veronica S. Rossman 

Circuit Judge 

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