J-S14009-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

STEVEN ERIC SEMPLE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2430 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division 

at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001766-2005

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED APRIL 29, 2020

Steven Eric Semple appeals pro se from the order that dismissed his 

petition for writ of habeas corpus as an untimely petition for relief under the 

Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). We affirm. 

The history of this case is as follows. On March 6, 2006, Appellant 

entered a negotiated guilty plea to attempted murder and received the 

agreed-upon sentence of seventeen to thirty-four years of imprisonment. He 

filed no direct appeal. In September 2006, Appellant filed a pro se motion 

challenging the validity of his guilty plea. The court treated it as a PCRA 

petition and appointed counsel, who was ultimately permitted to withdraw 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). The 

PCRA court dismissed the petition, and Appellant did not appeal. 
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In February 2014, Appellant filed a motion for modification of sentence, 

contending that his sentence was excessive, which the court denied as an 

untimely post-sentence motion. On appeal, this Court ruled that the motion 

should have been treated as Appellant’s second PCRA petition, and affirmed 

its dismissal on the basis of untimeliness. See Commonwealth v. Semple, 

116 A.3d 682 (Pa.Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum at 4-5).

Appellant filed the pro se petition that is the subject of the instant appeal 

on June 28, 2019. Therein, Appellant acknowledged that his sentence is legal, 

but claimed that it is “excessive and unreasonable and not needed[,]” and 

that a miscarriage of justice will occur if his sentence is not vacated. Petition 

for Writ of Habeas Corpus Relief, 6/28/19, at 4, 11. The court treated 

Appellant’s petition as his third, untimely PCRA petition and issued notice of 

its intent to dismiss it without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. After 

receiving Appellant’s response, the PCRA court dismissed the petition by order 

docketed on August 13, 2019. Appellant filed a timely appeal and both

Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellant presents the following questions for this Court’s review: (1) 

“Did the PCRA court incorrectly determined, [sic] that [Appellant’s] habeas 

corpus petition seeks relief cognizable under the [PCRA] . . . ?” and (2) “Did 

the PCRA court incorrectly determine that [Appellant’s] subsequent converted 

PCRA petition is time-barred?” Appellant’s brief at 6-7 (unnecessary 

capitalization omitted). 
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We begin by noting that “the PCRA subsumes all forms of collateral 

relief, including habeas corpus, to the extent a remedy is available under such 

enactment.” Commonwealth v. West, 938 A.2d 1034, 1043 (Pa. 2007). 

“[A] defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his petition or 

motion as a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 

466 (Pa.Super. 2013). “Simply because the merits of the PCRA petition cannot 

be considered due to previous litigation, waiver, or an untimely filing, there is 

no alternative basis for relief outside the framework of the PCRA.” 

Commonwealth v. Kutnyak, 781 A.2d 1259, 1261 (Pa.Super. 2001).

However, “claims that fall outside the eligibility parameters of the PCRA may 

be raised through a writ of habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Masker, 34 

A.3d 841, 850 (Pa.Super. 2011) (en banc). 

The PCRA court and the Commonwealth maintain that Appellant’s 

petition challenges the legality of his sentence. See Trial Court Opinion, 

11/18/19, at 5; Commonwealth’s brief at 8-9. Such claims are cognizable 

under the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 

1031 (Pa.Super. 2019) (noting that the legality of a sentence is always subject 

to review through a timely PCRA petition).

Yet, Appellant expressly acknowledges that his sentence is within the 

lawful maximum. See Appellant’s brief at 16. His claim is that his legal 

sentence is unreasonable and excessive under the circumstances. Id. Hence, 

Appellant’s contentions implicate the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 
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See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006) 

(holding claim that sentence is unreasonable challenges discretionary aspects 

of sentence).

This Court has held that “[c]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of 

sentencing are not cognizable under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Fowler, 

930 A.2d 586, 593 (Pa.Super. 2007). See also Commonwealth v. Wrecks, 

934 A.2d 1287, 1289 (Pa.Super. 2007) (“Requests for relief with respect to 

the discretionary aspects of sentence are not cognizable in PCRA 

proceedings.”). However, we have also acknowledged that “the PCRA statute 

is intended as the sole means of collaterally challenging a sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Concordia, 97 A.3d 366, 372 (Pa.Super. 2014). See 

also Taylor, supra at 467 (questioning in dicta the validity of decisional law 

concerning the cognizability of discretionary aspects claims under the PCRA).

Nonetheless, regardless of which framework applies, it is abundantly 

clear that Appellant is entitled to no relief. If the PCRA applies, the petition 

was properly dismissed as untimely. See, e.g., Taylor, supra at 468 (“A 

petition for relief under the PCRA must be filed within one year of the date the 

PCRA petitioner’s judgment of sentence becomes final unless the petitioner 

alleges and proves that an exception to the one-year time-bar is met.”). The 

claim further fails to qualify for habeas corpus relief, as “[i]t is well settled 

that the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, which can be successfully 

invoked only in exceptional cases, is not a substitute for an appeal or a motion 
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for a new trial, nor is it available for the correction of trial errors.” Com. ex 

rel. Williams v. Myers, 162 A.2d 419, 420 (Pa. Super. 1960). See also 

Com. ex rel. Ashmon v. Banmiller, 137 A.2d 236, 238 (Pa. 1958) (“[A] 

habeas corpus petition is not available for the correction of trial errors which 

could have been reviewed and corrected on appeal; it is not a substitute for 

an appeal or for a writ of error or for a motion for a new trial.”).

Moreover, Appellant was sentenced pursuant to a negotiated plea 

agreement. It is axiomatic that “[o]ne who pleads guilty and receives a 

negotiated sentence may not then seek discretionary review of that sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. O’Malley, 957 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Pa.Super. 2008). See 

also Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 784 (Pa.Super. 2015) (holding 

challenges to discretionary aspects of a negotiated sentence are waived and 

unreviewable). Therefore, Appellant’s discretionary aspects claim would have 

been deemed waived even if he had raised it in a post-sentence motion and 

pursued it on direct appeal. 

As such, it is apparent from the record that there is no viable avenue 

for Appellant to obtain the relief requested in his petition. Therefore, it was 

properly dismissed.

Order affirmed. 
J-S14009-20

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/29/2020