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Filed 2/4/16 P. v. Lorrain CA3 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

----

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
JAMES T ODD LORRAIN,

Defendant and Appellant. C077758 (Super. Ct. No. CRF13456)

After the trial court denied his motion s to suppress evidence and quash a search

warrant , defendant James Todd Lorrain pled no contest to transportation of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of a false compartment designed for storing controlled substances, and possession of controlled substance paraphernalia. In his plea, defendant admitted , among other enhancements,
one pr ior strike conviction

.2

Prior to sentencing, defendant submitted a Romero 1 motion, asking the court to dismiss his prior strike. The court denied defendant’s Romero motion and sentenced him to 16 years in prison. On appeal, defendant c ontends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress and motion to quash. Defendant additionally argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismis s his prior strike conviction. We disagree and
affirm

. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A few weeks before the date of the offense s at issue here , City of Davis Police Officer Justin Infante responded to a call regarding the burglary of a storage unit in which, among other things, a custom knitted blanket was reported stolen

. O n January 31, 2013, the victim of that burglary was at the stora ge facility when he observed his custom knitted blanket hanging in an open storage unit , later determined to be rented to Amanda
Steele

- Pfleger . The victim saw one female and one male standing near the open unit,
later identified as Steele

- Pfleger and defendant. A vehicle, subsequently determined to be registered to defendant, was parked within five feet of the unit

. The victim contacted the police and Officer Infante and Corporal Jeff Beasley reported to the storage facility

. Upon arriving at the storage facility, the officers saw a custom knitted blanket along with two methamphetamine pipes in Steele

- Pfleger’s unit. The officers detained
defendant in a patrol car for suspected involvement with the stolen property , and they
arrested Steele

- Pfle ger on an outstanding warrant and placed her in a separate patrol car. While waiting in the patrol car, Steele

- Pfleger summoned Officer Infante through the car’s open window , accused defe ndant of being “a big dope dealer , ” and said defendant
had narcotics inside his vehicle “under the power window control panel [on] the driver

1 P eople v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.3

side door.” Officer Infante then inspect ed defendant’s vehicle by “ manipulat [ing] the control panel to see if it was loose or had been tampered with.” The control panel easily popped off and Officer Infante saw a round, black case inside the panel. Officer Infante
retrieved the case , opened the top, and observed what he belie v ed to be methamphetamine. Defendant wa s then placed under arrest f or possession of methamphetamine for sale and possession of methamphetamine pipes

. Officer Infante gave the suspected methamphetamine to Yolo County Narcotics Enforcement Team Agent Ryan Bellamy. Agent Bellamy tested and weighed the suspected narcotics and found the seized baggies weighed 3.3, 2.5, 3.5, 3.5, and 3.5
grams respectively and returned posit ive color reactions for methamp h e t a m in e. Agent Bellamy then obtained a search warrant for defendant’s residence based upo n the above
information

. U pon the warrant’s execution, officers found what they believed to be two pay/ owe sheets, individual bags containing a white powder tha t did not produce a positive
color reaction for methamphetamine or cocaine, a methamphetamine s moking pipe , numerous surveillance cameras, and a handw ritten note of the address of Steele

- Pfleger’s storage unit.
The p rosecution charged defendant with transportation of methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for sale, possession of a false com partment designed for storing controlled substances, and possession of controll ed substance paraphernalia. Defendant moved to suppress all evidence seized from his vehicle and moved to quash the search warrant. At the suppression hear ing, the trial court ruled Officer Infante did not conduct a search when he manipul ated defendant’s vehicle door panel , but upon doing so and seeing the container within, had probable cause to search the container.
Based on the court’s finding that no illegal search occurred , the court denied defendant’s motion to quash. Defendant subsequentl y pled no contest to all charges and admitted having a prior strike within the meaning of the three strikes law

.4

Before sentencing, defendant submitted a Romero motion, requesting the court dismiss his prior 1986 strike conviction for burglary

. The trial court denied defendant’s
motion and sentenced him u nder the three strikes law to 16 years , four months in prison. This timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I
The Motion To Suppress An d The Motion To Quash Were Properly Denied
D efendant first argues the trial court erred when it held Officer Infante did not
conduct a search when he d ismantled defendant’s vehicle door panel. Second ly , he contends the trial court erred in denying his mot ion to suppress because no exception to the warrant requirement would have permitted the warrantless search of his vehicle

. L astly , defendant argues it was error to dismiss his motion to quash the search warrant for
his home because the warrant was tainted by the illegal search of his vehicle . We agree
with defendant ’s first argument , but disagree with his lat t er two

.

“ The standard of ap pellate review of a trial court’ s ruling on a motion to suppress
is well settled. We view the record in the light mo st favorable to the trial court’ s ruling and defer to its findings of historical fact, whether express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. We then decide for ourselves what legal principles are relevant, independently apply them to the historical facts, and determine as a matter of
law whether there has be en an unreasonable search and/or seizure. ” ( People v. Knight (20 04) 121 Cal.App.4th 1568, 1572. )
A

Officer Infante Conducted A Search When He Manipulated Defendant’s Vehi cle Door Panel Defendant argues, and the People properly concede , that Offic er Infante’s manipulation of defendant’s vehicle door panel was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment states, in relevant part, t hat “[t]he right of5

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” (U.S. Const. , 4th Amend.) It is we ll recognized that a person’s vehicle is considered an effect wit hin the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. ( United States v. Jones (2012) 565 U.S. ___ [ 181 L.Ed.2d 911, 917

- 918 ] .) It is likew ise established that a government ’s trespa ssory, physical intrusion of a person’s effect is a sear ch under the Fourth Amendment. ( Id. at pp.

___ -

___ [ 181 L.Ed.2d at p p

. 918

- 922 ] .) Thus, Officer Infante’s entry into defendant’s vehicle and physical dismantling of his door panel was a clear search under the Fourth Amendment

. B
The Search O

f Defendant’s Vehicle Was Reasonable
The People assert the search of defendant’s vehicle was justified under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement

. 2 We agree.
A warrantless search of an automobile is reasonable within the meaning of the
Fou rth Amendment when an officer ha s probable cause t o believe the vehicle contains
contraband. ( United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 79 8, 824 [72 L.Ed.2d 572, 5 93 ].) “If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” ( Id. at p. 825 [ 72 L.Ed.2d at p. 594]. ) Whether there is probable cause to search a car is governed by the same standards as any other probable cause determination: could a neutral and detached magis trate make a decision, considering the totality of the circumstances, “including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, [that] there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a

2 The People also argue the search was justified as a search incident to arrest and an inventory search. Because we conclude the search was lawful under the automobile exception, we do not address the People’s two other justifications for the search.6

crime will be found in a particular place[?]” ( Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 238 [76 L.Ed.2d 52 7 , 548].) Defendant argues probable cause to s earch his vehicle did not exist because the
information concerni ng the locality of the methamphetamine cam e from an unreliable
and untested informant whose statement was not corroborated before the search occurred.
Defendant relies on People v. Lissauer (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 413 to support his
contention

. In Lissauer , a n untested informant provided informati on concerning the defendant’s involvement in drug sales. ( Id. at p. 417

. ) Law enforcement officers set up surveillance on the defendant’s house, followed his car, stopped and sea rched his car , and
found contraband in the backseat. ( Id. at p 418. ) The defendant pled guilty to po ssession of marijuana after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the eviden ce found in his vehicle during the warrantless search. ( Id. at p. 416

. )
The Lissauer court stated that in determining whether “ ‘there is a fa ir probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place [ , ] ’ ” “ the

‘ veracity’ and ‘basis of knowledge ’ of [an] informant must be assessed” alongside any corroboration of an untested informant’s tip

. ( People v. Lissauer , s upra , 169 Cal.App.3d at p. 42 2 , quoting Illinois v. Gates , supra , 462 U.S. at p. 238 [76 L.Ed.2d at p. 548]

. ) The court held probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle did not exist, reasoning the
circumstances known to officers did not establish the reliability of the informant , despite
the information being corroborated

. ( Id

. at p. 423

. ) The court noted the informant’s information was “such as could be acquired by any casual observer ” and the basis of the informant’s knowledg e and the informant’s relationship wit h the defendant was never
determined. ( I

bid

. )
While it is true Officer Infante had no prior interaction with Steele

- Pfl e ger, thereby making her an untested informant, defendant is mistaken in assuming Steele

Pfleger was an unreliable informant whose information could not serve as a basis for probable cause

. In contrast to Lissauer , where the untested informant provided onl y a7

vague statement that the defendant was engaged in selling drugs , Steele

- Pfleger’s statement was very specific and not information that would be known by a casual observer, but someone who was clos e with defendant. Similarly, unlike Lissauer where
offi cers were unaware of the informant’s basis of knowledge, the surrounding circumstances in the present case could have reasonably led Officer Infante to infer that
Steele

- Pfleger knew about the hidden methamphetamine because she was a companion of
defendant

. D efendant and Steele

- Pfleger were reportedly seen at the storage facility together by the victim of the prior burglary and Officer Infante and Corporal Beasley contacted the two together at the unit , thus providing a basis upon which Officer Infante

cou ld reasonably infer the two had some type of relationship

. Secondly, only defendant’s
vehicle was at the facility, creating a n inference that the two arrived at the unit together
and supporting the belief that the two were companions

. Given the specifici ty of Steele

Pfleger’s statement and the fact defendant was with Steel e

- Pfleger at her storage unit , Officer Infante could have reasonably inferred that Steele

- Pfleger knew about the methamphetamine in the vehicle door panel because she was a companion of defendant, and thus provided reliable information.
Because we conclude Officer Infante could have reasonably inferred the basis of
Steele

- Pfleger’s information was reliable , we conclude her statement regarding the presence of methamphetamine in defendant’s vehicle coupled with Officer Infante seeing two methamphetamine pipes in the storage unit where defendant was standing indicates a “fair probability that contra band or evidence of a crime w [ ould] be found in” defendant’s
vehicle

. ( Illinois v. Gates , supr a , 462 U.S. at p. 238 [76 L.Ed.2d at p. 548] .) As such,
Office r Infante could legally search the vehicle’s control panel and the contents within the panel that could conceal the object of the search. T hus, defendant’s motion to
suppress was properly deni ed. Furthermore, s ince we conclude the search of defendant’s vehicle was lawful, the search warrant for defendant’s residence was not tainted by any
ill egality, so the motion to quash the search warrant was also properly denied.8 II
The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
When It Denied Defendant’s Romero Motion Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to dismiss his prior
strike convi ction. We disagree. Trial courts have discretion under Penal Code
section 1385 to dismiss a prior strike when a court finds a defendant f alls outside the spirit of the three s trikes law. (Pen. Code, § 1385; P eople v. Superior Court ( Romero ),

supra , 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529

- 530.) In deciding whether to exercise this discretion, th e court “must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the s cheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” ( People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) Appellate courts review a trial court’s “ fa ilure to dismiss or strike a prior [felony] conviction allegation .

. . under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. ” ( People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) A trial court will not abuse its discretion “unless
its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” ( Id. at p. 377.) As such, “a trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction alle gation in limited circumstances.” ( Id

. at p. 378.)
Defendant has the following criminal record: a 1986 conviction for burglary , resulting in a strike; a 1987 misdemeanor conviction for possession of a controlled substance; a 1988 misdemeanor conviction for trespassing; a 1990 misdemeanor conviction for being under the influence of a controlled substance; three 1991 convictions for selling or distributing hypodermic needles without a license, possession of a controlled substance, and transporting a controlled substance for sale ; a 1992 felony conviction for possessi on of a controlled substance; a 1994 felony conviction for9

possession of a controlled substance for sale; a 1996 trespassing conviction; a 1997 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance; and three 2003 convictions for possession of a contr olled substance, possession of a device used to inject or smoke a controlled substance, and transporting a controlled substance, for which he was sentenced to six years in prison. Defendant was not convicted of another offense until the present

case

. Whi le released on bail in this case though , defendant was arrested on two separate occasions

. As a result of these arrests, defendant has been charged with possession of a controlled substance, possession of marijuana for sale, and possess ion of methamphetam ine for sale in one case; and , in a separate case, he has been charged with possessi on of metha mphetamine for sale. Defendant argues the remoteness of his prior strike and the nonviolent nature of
his prior offenses take him outside the spirit of the thr ee strikes law

. De fendant emphasizes that his one strike occurred whe n he was 18 years old and stole a VCR from his parents ’ home , and he asserts his criminal history is a result of a lifelong struggle with drug addiction

. However, t hese contentions amount to a simple disagreement as to the
conclusion the trial court drew from the facts , as t he record reflects the trial court considered both the remoteness of defendant’s strike along with the nonviolent nature of his prior convictions when analyzing h is Romero motion. The trial court noted his

“ original conviction .

. . is somewhat mitigating from the standpoint that he was young, that he was apparently using drugs, and he just stole a VCR

. [¶]

. . . [¶] [And, the] incident happened 28 years ago.” Additionally, the trial court acknowledged that his numerous convictions were “pretty much all drug related, some personal use, [and] some sales related.” Despite these acknowledgments, the trial court ultimat ely concluded these factors did not outweigh defendant’s inability to live a “legally blameless life up to [the current] offense or since [the current] offense” and thus, denied defendant’s Romero
motion.10

The standard for abuse of discretion is not reaso nable disagreement, but manifest irrationality or arbitrariness. ( People v. Carmony , supra , 33 Cal.4th a t p. 377

. ) Because, as we explain, the trial cou rt’s conclusion not to grant defendant’s Romero motion was
not irrational or arbitrary, we are not aut horized to substitute our judgment for the judgment of the trial judge. ( Ibid. )
Defendant has demonstrated a continuous inability to reform his behavior to that
of a law

- abiding citizen . Although he exhibited a period of lawfulness between his
release from prison in 2008 and his arrest for the current offense in 2013 , it is clear from his criminal history that, as the trial court noted, he has not lived a “legally blameless life up to [the current] offense or since [the current] offense.” Only under ex traordinary circumstances may “a career criminal .

. . be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls.” ( People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328,
338

. ) As such, we cannot con clude the trial court’s judgment that defendant’s proclivity
for crime outweighed other mitigating factors was so irrational or arbitrary as to amount to an abuse of discretion

. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

/s/ Robie, J.

We concur:

/s/ Nicholson, Acting P. J.

/s/ Butz, J.