IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

TAMMY R. WILLIAMS, :

: C.A. No. K15A-08-002 WLW

Appellant, : Kent County

v. :

:

BRANDYWINE COUNSELING and :

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE :

APPEALS BOARD, :

:

Appellee. :

Submitted: January 11, 2016

Decided: March 29, 2016

ORDER

Upon an Appeal from the Decision of

the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.

Reversed.

Tammy R. Williams, pro se

Paige J. Schmittinger, Esquire of the Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware;

attorney for the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board.

WITHAM, R.J.
Tammy R. Williams v. UIAB

C.A. No. K15A-08-002 WLW

March 29, 2016

2

Before the Court is Appellant/Claimant Tammy Williams’ (“Williams”) 

appeal from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“UIAB” or 

“Board”) which denied Williams’ appeal of a Referee’s decision as untimely. 

Upon consideration of the pleadings before this Court and the record below, the 

UIAB ruling is REVERSED. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Williams was employed by Brandywine Counseling (“Brandywine”) as a 

counselor from May 13, 2013 through April 27, 2015.1 Her last day of work was 

December 22, 2014. On that date, Williams informed Brandywine that she 

required leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to care for her 

seventy-nine-year-old mother. Her mother lived alone in New York and had 

experienced a health crisis which required hospitalization. Williams contacted 

Brandywine every three weeks to update her status during her absence. In April, 

Brandywine contacted Williams to inquire into her availability to return to work 

because her leave under the FMLA had expired. Williams advised Brandywine 

that her mother was still ill and that she would not be able to return to work at that 

time. Brandywine determined that it was necessary to fill the position and 

terminated Williams’ employment.

 

1 R-38.
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In April 2015, Williams filed a claim for unemployment insurance benefits.2 

The Claims Deputy found that the employer had not shown willful or wonton 

misconduct by Williams and determined that Williams was not disqualified from 

receiving unemployment insurance benefits pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).3,4 

Brandywine timely appealed the decision of the Claims Deputy. After a hearing on 

the appeal, a Referee determined that this was a voluntary quit case and should thus 

be determined under 19 Del. C. § 3314(1).5 The Referee reasoned that Williams 

was offered the opportunity to return to work after her FMLA leave had expired, 

and that her decision not to return to work amounted to a voluntary relinquishment 

of her position.6 Because Williams had left her position for reasons not connected 

with her employment, and had not exhausted all reasonable alternatives prior to 

 

2 R-2.

3 R-19. 

4

19 Del. C. § 3314(2) applies when an employee has been discharged and states in 

pertinent part:

For the week in which the individual was discharged from the individual’s work 

for just cause in connection with the individual’s work and for each week 

thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks 

(whether or not consecutive) and has earned wages in covered employment equal 

to not less than 4 times the weekly benefit amount.

5

19 Del. C. § 3314(1) applies when an employee has left work voluntarily and states in 

pertinent part:

For the week in which the individual left work voluntarily without good cause 

attributable to such work and for each week thereafter until the individual has 

been employed in each of 4 subsequent weeks (whether or not consecutive) and 

has earned wages in covered employment equal to not less than 4 times the 

weekly benefit amount. 

6 R-38-39.
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resigning her position, the Referee determined that Williams was disqualified from 

receiving unemployment insurance benefits. Based on this determination, the 

Referee reversed the decision of the Claims Deputy. The Referee’s decision was 

mailed to Williams on June 17, 2015.

On July 2, 2015, Williams filed an appeal of the Referee’s decision with the 

Board.7 The Board determined that the last day to appeal the Referee’s decision 

was July 27, 2015, and the appeal was therefore not timely.8 The Board noted that 

“this time limit is jurisdictional, although the Board may, in cases of severe 

circumstances, exercise its discretion under § 3320 to accept the appeal sua 

sponte.”9 The Board found no evidence of Department error that would have 

prevented Williams from filing a timely appeal. Based on this finding, the Board 

denied Williams’ application for further review. The Board’s decision was mailed 

to Williams on August 13, 2015.

On August 20, 2015, Williams filed a timely appeal of the Board’s decision 

with the Superior Court. Her opening brief reiterated her argument relating to her 

entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits, but failed to address the issue of 

timeliness. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

7 R-43.

8

19 Del. C. § 3318(c) requires that an appeal to the Board be filed within ten days.

9 R-44.
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This Court reviews decisions by the Board to determine whether they are 

supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error. 10 “Substantial 

evidence is ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 

to support a conclusion.’”11 The Court possesses limited review power of the 

factual findings of an administrative agency. Specifically, “the findings of the 

Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board as to facts, if supported by the evidence 

and in absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the Court shall 

be confined to the questions of law.12 The Court does not weigh the evidence, 

determine questions of credibility, or make its own factual findings.13 Rather, the 

Court is restricted to a consideration of the record.14 It merely determines if the 

evidence is legally adequate to support the agency’s factual findings. 15 In 

considering an action of the Board, this Court’s scope of review is limited to 

 

10 Mathis v. Del. River and Bay Auth., 2012 WL 5288757, at *2 (Del. Super. Aug. 22, 

2012).

11 Bradfield v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2012 WL 5462844, at *1 (Del. Super. 

Mar. 13, 2012) (quoting Gorrell v. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 1996 WL 453356, at *2 (Del. 

Super. July 31, 1996)).

12 19 Del. C. § 3323(a).

13 Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 213 A.2d 64, 66 (Del. 1965).

14 Hubbard v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 352 A.2d 761 (Del. Super. 1976).

15 29 Del. C. § 10142(d) states: 

The Court, when factual determinations are at issue, shall take due account of 

the experience and specialized competence of the agency and of the purposes 

of the basic law under which the agency has acted. The Court’s review, in the 

absence of actual fraud, shall be limited to a determination of whether the 

agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence on the record before 

the agency.”
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whether the board abused its discretion.16 If the record below contains substantial 

evidence in support of the Board’s findings, then that decision will not be disturbed.

DISCUSSION

 

16 Funk v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Board, 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991). 
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The General Assembly has determined that the public good requires “the 

compulsory setting aside of an unemployment reserve to be used for the benefit of 

persons unemployed through no fault of their own.” 17 “[T]he Unemployment 

Compensation Act is usually given a liberal construction favoring a claimant, at 

least when its basic policy is in issue.” 18 Thus, the Court employs a liberal 

construction in favor of the claimant when determining the meaning of a statute. 

In the case sub judice, there are three issues. The first issue concerns the merits of 

the underlying case. The second issue concerns time computation when 

determining the date by which a claimant must file an appeal from a Referee’s 

decision with the Board. The third issue concerns the discretion given the Board to 

hear a case on the merits under 19 Del. C. § 3320. 

 

17 19 Del. C. § 3301.

18 Delaware Auth. For Reg’l Transit (Dart) v. Buehlman, 409 A.2d 1045, 1046 (Del. 

1979).
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Turning to the merits of the underlying case, the Referee’s decision 

disqualifying Williams from the receipt of unemployment insurance benefits was in 

error. The Referee determined that this was not a discharge case under section 

3314(2), but rather a voluntary quit case under 3314(1). However, whether 

Williams voluntarily left her employment or was discharged is of no moment. 

Sections 3314(1) and 3314(2) contain similar language allowing for the receipt of 

unemployment insurance benefits when the claimant has left employment, whether 

voluntarily or by discharge, to care for a spouse, child under the age of 18, or parent 

with a verified illness or disability. 19 Section 3314(1), which pertains to an 

individual who has voluntarily left employment, states in pertinent part that “[a]n 

individual, who quits work to care for that individual’s spouse, child under the age 

of 18, or parent with a verified illness or disability, will not be considered to have 

left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work.”20 Section 

3314(2) states in pertinent part that “[a]n individual, who is discharged from work 

because the individual is providing care for that individual’s spouse, child under the 

age of 18, or parent with a verified illness or disability, will not be considered to 

have been discharged from work for good cause attributable to such work.” 21 

Thus, as long as Williams is caring for her mother, and her mother has a verified 

illness or disability, she is entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. 

 

20 19 Del. C. § 3314(1).

21 19 Del. C. § 3314(2).
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Regarding the second issue of time computation, the Board has interpreted 

the ten day time limit in which a claimant must file an appeal with the Board to be 

ten calendar days. Although not a matter of first impression, the ten-day time limit 

has not been subjected to a statutory interpretation process. With no need to 

indulge in an in-depth analysis, most courts have accepted the Board’s 

interpretation. However, in Martin v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, the 

court determined it would be logical to presume the time limit in 3318(c) was ten 

calendar days because the term “calendar days” was used in the preceding section.22

I respectfully disagree. As Justice Antonin Scalia said in Finley v. United States, 

“[w]hat is of paramount importance is that Congress be able to legislate against a 

background of clear interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of the 

language it adopts.”23 This statement is equally relevant at the state level. 

 

22 Martin v. Unemployment Ins. Appeal Bd., 2004 WL 772073, at *3 (Del. Super. Feb. 

25, 2004). 

23 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
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As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that this is not an attempt to 

substitute Superior Court Civil Rule 6(a) in place of the statutory time limit.24 This 

is strictly a matter of statutory construction. A close reading of 19 Del. C. § 3318 

reveals that the time limits within which appeals must be filed are phrased 

differently in subsections (b) and (c). When a party wishes to appeal the 

determination of a Claims Deputy, section 3318(b) states that the appeal must be 

filed within ten calendar days after the Claims Deputy has mailed the 

determination.25 When a party pursues further appeals, section 3318(c) states that 

the appeal must be initiated pursuant to section 3320 within ten days of notification 

or of the mailing of the tribunal’s decision. 26 The word “calendar” is 

conspicuously absent from the time limitation in 3318(c). Because the term 

“calendar” was used in the previous subsection, it must be assumed that excepting 

the word “calendar” in this subsection was intentional. If the legislature had 

 

24 Super. Ct. Civ. R. 6(a) states in pertinent part “[w]hen the period of time prescribed or 

allowed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and other legal holidays shall be 

excluded in the computation.”

25 19 Del. C. § 3318(b) states in pertinent part (emphasis added):

Unless a claimant or a last employer who has submitted a timely and 

completed separation notice in accordance with § 3317 of this title files an 

appeal within 10 calendar days after such Claims Deputy’s determination was 

mailed to the last known addresses of the claimant and the last employer, the 

Claims Deputy’s determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or 

denied in accordance therewith. 

26 19 Del. C. § 3318(c) states in pertinent part (emphasis added):

The parties shall be duly notified of the tribunal's decision, together with its 

reason therefor [sic], which shall be deemed to be final unless within 10 days 

after the date of notification or mailing of such decision further appeal is 
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intended the limitation to be ten calendar days, the language used in section 3318(b) 

would have been duplicated in section 3318(c). To interpret “10 days” in section 

3318(c) to mean ten calendar days would render the term “calendar” in section 

3318(b) mere surplusage.27 A liberal interpretation of the ten day time limit would 

exclude weekends and holidays. Thus, the ten day time limitation contained in 

section 3318(c) must be read to exclude weekends and holidays. Under this 

interpretation, Williams was required to file her appeal with the Board by July 1, 

2015. Unfortunately, Williams did not file her appeal until July 2, 2015. 

However, this defect does not prevent the Board from exercising the discretion 

granted them in section 3320. 

Section 3320 grants the Board wide discretion over the appeals process.28 

However, the Board uses this power judiciously. In an opinion letter issued on 

June 27, 1989, the Board stated:

 

initiated pursuant to § 3320 of this title.

27

 “[W]ords in a statute should not be construed as surplusage if there is a reasonable 

construction which will give them meaning, and courts must ascribe a purpose to the use of 

statutory language, if reasonably possible.” Chase Alexa, LLC v. Kent Cnty. Levy Ct., 991 A.2d 

1148, 1152 (Del. 2010) (quoting Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., 636 A.2d 

892, 900 (Del. 1994)).

28 Funk, 591 A.2d at 225. 
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[I]n a situation where a party has filed a late appeal from an 

administrative decision, the Board is extremely cautious in assuming 

jurisdiction over the matter. It does so only in those cases where there 

has been some administrative error on the part of the Department of 

Labor which deprived the claimant of the opportunity to file a timely 

appeal, or in those cases where the interests of justice would not be 

served by inaction.29

Although there was no administrative error on the part of the Department of Labor, 

the interests of justice compel the Board to exercise its discretion in this case. The 

Claims Deputy reached the right conclusion but failed to state the correct reasoning 

for the decision. The Referee’s decision was contrary to law and would have been 

overturned if the Board had exercised its discretion to hear the untimely appeal. 

Based on the facts of this case, the Board’s failure to accept the appeal was an abuse 

of discretion. This would be the case whether the appeal was one day late or five 

days late. 

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Unemployment Insurance 

Appeal Board is REVERSED and the case is remanded to the Board for further 

proceedings on William’s claim for unemployment benefits consistent with this 

decision. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

29 Id.
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/s/ William L. Witham, Jr.

Resident Judge

WLW/dmh