NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FILIP C. IACOB, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE 

DEPARTMENT, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 17-15433 

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-00923-JAD-GWF 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted November 15, 2017**

Before: CANBY, TROTT, and GRABER, Circuit Judges. 

Filip C. Iacob appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in 

his employment action alleging violations of Title VII and Nevada law. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of 

Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

NOV 20 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 17-15433 

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s racial 

discrimination and retaliation claims because Iacob failed to raise a genuine 

dispute of material fact as to whether his employer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory

and non-retaliatory reasons for its actions were pretextual. See Villiarimo v. Aloha 

Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth prima 

facie elements of discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII and burden 

shifting framework, and noting that circumstantial evidence of pretext must be 

specific and substantial); see also Apeceche v. White Pine County, 615 P.2d 975, 

977-78 (Nev. 1980) (a discrimination claim under Nev. Rev. Stat. § 613.330 is 

analyzed under federal anti-discrimination law).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s hostile 

work environment claim because Iacob failed to raise a genuine dispute of material 

fact as to whether he was subjected to sufficiently severe or pervasive conduct. 

See Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating prima 

facie requirements for hostile work environment claim under Title VII).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s claim of 

negligent hiring, supervision, and retention because appellee was immune from 

liability. See Martinez v. Maruszczak, 168 P.3d 720, 722, 728-29 (Nev. 2007)

(explaining discretionary immunity under Nevada law and adopting federal test for 

determining if immunity applies); see also Vickers v. United States, 228 F.3d 944, 
3 17-15433 

950 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[D]ecisions relating to the hiring, training, and supervision of 

employees usually involve policy judgments of the type Congress intended 

[discretionary immunity] to shield.”).

 The district court properly granted summary judgment on Iacob’s

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim because Iacob failed to raise a 

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether appellee engaged in extreme and 

outrageous conduct or whether Iacob suffered severe or extreme emotional 

distress. See Nelson v. City of Las Vegas, 665 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Nev. 1983)

(setting forth elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under 

Nevada law).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.