[Cite as In re E.J., 2023-Ohio-1376.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE E.J. :

No. 112209

A Minor Child :

[Appeal by M.J., Mother] :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 27, 2023

Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Juvenile Division

Case No. AD21907572

Appearances:

Law Office of Anthony J. Richardson, II, LLC, and 

Anthony J. Richardson, II, for appellant. 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

Appellant, M.J., the mother (“Mother”) of E.J., appeals the judgment 

of the juvenile court denying her request that legal custody of E.J. be awarded to 

maternal grandmother, terminating her parental rights, and granting permanent 

custody of E.J. to appellee the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family 
Services (“CCDCFS” or the “agency”). After a thorough and careful review of the 

facts and pertinent law, we affirm.

Procedural History 

The agency became involved with the family when E.J. was born in 

March 2021.

1

 At that time, Mother claimed the child “was the devil,” thereby raising 

concerns for the child’s safety. The child was removed from Mother’s custody in 

March 2021 and remained in CCDCFS’s custody, with the same foster family, 

throughout the pendency of this case in the juvenile court.

In August 2021, the agency filed a complaint alleging that E.J. was 

dependent and requesting an order of temporary custody. The agency’s request was 

granted, and the child was committed to the temporary custody of CCDCFS. 

Following the child’s removal from Mother, the agency developed a case plan to 

promote the permanency plan of reunification. The case plan included services for 

Mother to address her issues with mental health, parenting, and substance abuse. 

In February 2022, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody

to permanent custody. In June 2022, Mother filed a motion requesting that the 

child be placed with maternal grandmother. CCDCFS opposed the motion, and the 

trial court denied the motion. In July 2022, Mother filed a motion for legal custody 

to herself or to maternal grandmother. In November 2022, maternal grandmother 

filed a motion for allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and/or parenting 

1 E.J.’s alleged father has had no involvement in the child’s life and never 

responded to CCDCFS’s attempts to contact him. The juvenile court found that he 

abandoned the child. We will not discuss him in this appeal.
time. On the morning of the November 2022 trial, maternal grandmother filed a 

motion to intervene, which was denied. On November 22, 2022, the trial court

journalized its entry for the child in which it denied Mother’s motion for legal 

custody to herself or grandmother, terminated all parental rights and ordered the 

child placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.

Trial Testimony

Mental Health and Substance Abuse Issues

Mother’s case plan required her to obtain treatment for mental health 

and substance abuse issues. Mother entered an outpatient program with a provider 

called Exodus to address those issues. According to Mother, she “wasn’t getting the 

help that she needed” from Exodus and she was discharged from the program in 

August 2021, prior to completion of the services, and was referred for “a higher level 

of care” for both her mental health and substance abuse issues. The agency referred 

different services for Mother, but she was not initially willing to return to mental 

health services. Eventually, Mother indicated that she wanted to return to Exodus, 

despite the program not being able to accommodate her with the inpatient services 

it had recommended for her. 

Mother also refused to submit to any — random or requested — drug 

screens mandated by the agency because, according to her, her drug use was helping 

her deal with her mental health issues. Mother rejected the suggestion that legal 

medication could help her manage her mental health issues, stating that she needed 

marijuana and was going to continue using it.
Darlene Palmore, a licensed chemical dependency counselor, was 

assigned to Mother to help her with her substance abuse goals. Palmore testified 

that Mother displayed erratic behavior, that was concerning to CCDCFS. For 

example, Palmore testified about an occasion when Mother was threatening suicide 

and refused help. In another incident that occurred at a July 2022 supervised visit

Mother had with E.J., Mother threatened Palmore and security had to physically 

remove Mother from the building. Mother fought, both verbally and physically, with 

the security guards during the incident. According to Palmore, Mother eventually 

stopped communicating with her. It was Palmore’s belief that Mother was not 

leading a sober life.

CCDCFS caseworker Andrea Flynn also testified about Mother’s mental 

health crises. Flynn testified that, on at least six occasions, she had to call the police 

or mobile crisis unit to Mother’s home because Mother was suicidal. The last time 

it happened was in September 2022, two months before the trial in this matter. 

Flynn testified that, as of the time of trial, Mother’s mental health was not stable 

enough for her to participate in a parenting group. Specifically, Flynn had concerns 

that Mother’s participation could jeopardize the safety of the other participants. 

Flynn continuously advised Mother that she needed to get help with her marijuana 

use in order to be reunited with her child, but Mother told her that she needed 

marijuana and needed it in particular to sleep. Flynn testified that “it became more 

difficult to work with [Mother] because of her mental health” and Mother’s 

unwillingness to engage in mental health services. 
Flynn testified that Mother did engage in services with Ohio 

Guidestone in the summer of 2022, but after approximately one month of doing so,

Mother “fell off.” Mother reengaged in services at Ohio Guidestone approximately 

one month before trial, but Flynn testified that, as of the time of trial, Mother had 

not made any meaningful progress on her case-plan objectives and would not be 

able to provide a safe and appropriate home for E.J. in the foreseeable future. 

The record further demonstrates that over the course of the 

proceedings, Mother threatened CCDCFS and juvenile court staff with physical 

violence. She also had an outstanding arrest warrant from an incident in which she 

assaulted two MetroHealth Hospital police officers. Service providers who 

interacted with Mother had to take safety precautions because of her volatile 

behavior and did not enter her home alone.

Maternal Grandmother

Maternal grandmother, a licensed foster caregiver, testified that she 

began fostering Mother when she was approximately one-month old and adopted

her when she was approximately three-years old. Mother began experiencing 

mental health issues — bipolar disorder, depression, behavioral issues, and 

anxiety — in her adolescence.

Maternal grandmother testified that she made Mother leave her 

home when she was 18 years old because she was not compliant with her medication. 

Grandmother testified that Mother would leave the house with the door open —

thereby leaving the house unsecured — and stay out all night; Mother would not tell 
her when she planned to return. Mother would also get angry at times and knock 

things off the wall. Grandmother explained that “[b]ecause [Mother] couldn’t follow 

the house rules, then she was on her own” when she turned 18. 

Mother’s Visitation With the Child

Mother was scheduled to visit with the child weekly on Fridays, and 

although her attendance at visits was sporadic, according to Palmore, “[w]hen she 

would come[,] she engaged pretty well with the baby.” After the July 2022 incident,

when Mother threatened Palmore, her visits were briefly suspended, and when 

visitation resumed in September 2022, Mother was inconsistent in attending.

Because of Mother’s volatile behavior, the visits were conducted in the 

most restrictive setting at the agency building, and during one visit, Mother 

threatened to abscond with the child. It was discovered that she had a stun gun with 

her.

CCDCFS’s Efforts Regarding Possible Relative Placement 

At the time of E.J.’s removal from Mother’s custody, CCDCFS 

approached maternal grandmother about the possibility of her caring for the child, 

but she stated that “she had other foster children in her home at that time and she 

wasn’t willing for them to move while [E.J.] moved in.” However, in January 2022, 

the maternal grandmother indicated that she had changed her position about caring 

for E.J. Specifically, the grandmother stated that she felt that her getting E.J. would 

help Mother with her mental health issues. The agency was concerned about 
grandmother’s reasoning, which it deemed unrealistic, given Mother’s untreated 

and ongoing mental health issues. 

Mother was initially upset with the idea of maternal grandmother 

taking care of E.J. Mother called grandmother a “murderer” because Mother’s older 

child died of sudden infant death syndrome while in grandmother’s care. 

Throughout the proceedings, Mother wavered about grandmother having custody 

of the child, sometimes requesting that the child be placed with grandmother and,

at other times, pleading that the child not be placed with her, saying that 

grandmother “killed my other son” or that grandmother “didn’t raise me right, 

please don’t place [E.J.] with her.” 

Notwithstanding its concerns about grandmother, the agency offered 

to provide her the opportunity to meet and interact with the child through virtual 

visits at the agency. Initially, grandmother declined because it would have 

interfered with her schedule; however, she did start visiting the child at the agency 

in summer of 2022.

The agency also offered grandmother the opportunity to visit with the 

child in her home, but she was unwilling to transport the child to and from the 

visitations. Eventually, CCDCFS brought the child to grandmother’s home for two 

visits.

CCDCFS met with grandmother in May 2022, with the goal of her 

developing a plan in the event the child was placed with her to keep the child safe if 

Mother ever posed as a threat. Grandmother said if that ever happened, she would 
call 911. According to grandmother, she was “pretty sure” that she could “come up 

with ways” to protect herself and the child if Mother posed as a threat. She suggested 

that she could wear an “alert button,” but she maintained that she did not think it 

was necessary; rather, she testified that “the system [i.e., CCDCFS] thinks it’s 

necessary for me to have.” 

Guardian Ad Litem

E.J.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) submitted a written report in which 

she recommended that permanent custody be granted to CCDCFS. At trial, she 

confirmed that her position remained the same. The GAL explained to the court 

that Mother had not completed her case-plan objectives. According to the GAL, she 

did not believe the child would be safe with Mother. The child, who was a little over 

one and-a-half-years old at the time of trial, was “happy,” “part of the family,” and

“very engaged and very bonded” with the foster family, with whom the child had 

been with since birth. According to the GAL, breaking E.J.’s bonds with the foster 

family would be “catastrophic” for the child. 

The GAL stated that the child could “absolutely not” be placed with 

Mother. In regard to placement with maternal grandmother, the GAL stated that,

at that time, grandmother was not willing to do what she needed to do to form and 

nurture a relationship with her grandchild. She explained that she believed it was 

“too much” for grandmother because “she had other responsibilities.” She was 

concerned that if grandmother’s other responsibilities made it too difficult for her 

to transport the child for visitation, she would not be able to take care of E.J. “24/7.” 
However, the GAL recognized the importance of grandparents in 

children’s lives and believed maternal grandmother should have a role in E.J.’s life 

— but as a grandmother, not a custodian.

Based on this evidence, the juvenile court denied Mother’s motion for 

legal custody to herself or grandmother, terminated Mother’s parental rights, and 

granted the agency’s motion for permanent custody.

Assignments of Error

I. The trial court committed error by terminating appellant and

E.J.’s familial rights, where Ohio statutes would be 

unconstitutional as applied.

II. The trial court committed error by not granting legal custody of 

E.J. to his willing, fit grandmother.

Law and Analysis 

Termination of Parental Rights Supported by Clear and 

Convincing Evidence

In her first assignment of error, Mother contends that “termination 

of her and E.J.’s rights under R.C. Chapter 2151 was unconstitutional as applied, 

where appellant was fit to raise and parent [E.J.] and where E.J.’s grandmother was 

willing to accept legal custody and keep E.J. in the family.” Although couched in 

terms of a constitutional challenge, the substance of Mother’s argument is one of 

weight of the evidence and that is how we will analyze it.

With regard to a challenge based upon manifest weight of the 

evidence, the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:

“Weight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount 

of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue 
rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [factfinder] that the 

party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their [judgment], if, 

on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater 

amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be 

established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but 

depends on its effect in inducing belief.’”

Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517, ¶ 12, 

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997), quoting 

Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).

When conducting a manifest-weight review, this court “weighs the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and 

determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly 

lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] 

must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Eastley at ¶ 20. “In weighing the 

evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful of the presumption in favor 

of the finder of fact.” Id. at ¶ 21, citing Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio 

St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 (1984).

Therefore,

[t]he discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be 

accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the 

impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties 

concerned. In re Satterwhite, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 77071, 2001-

Ohio-4137. The knowledge a trial court gains through observing the 

witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding (i.e., observing their 

demeanor, gestures and voice inflections and using these observations 

in weighing the credibility of the proffered testimony) cannot be 

conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record. Id., citing Trickey 

v. Trickey, 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 106 N.E.2d 772 (1952).

In re C.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 87159, 2006-Ohio-1944, ¶ 15.
We begin our analysis with the recognition that, while a parent’s right 

to raise a child is an essential and basic civil right, In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 

679 N.E.2d 680 (1997), children have the right to “parenting from either [biological] 

or adoptive parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and 

motivation.” In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102, 696 N.E.2d 1090 (8th 

Dist.1996). 

R.C. 2151.414, Ohio’s permanent-custody statute, provides that the 

juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody must be supported by clear 

and convincing evidence. Clear and convincing evidence has been defined as 

“that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere 

‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty 

as is required beyond a ‘reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which 

will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction 

as to the facts sought to be established.” 

In re K.H., 119 Ohio St.3d 538, 2008-Ohio-4825, 895 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 42, quoting 

Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the 

syllabus. We will not reverse a juvenile court’s termination of parental rights and 

award of permanent custody to an agency unless the judgment is not supported by 

clear and convincing evidence. In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-

Ohio-314, ¶ 48; In re M.J., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100071, 2013-Ohio-5440, ¶ 24.

R.C. 2151.414 sets forth a two-prong analysis to be applied by a 

juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. Under the statute, 

the juvenile court is authorized to grant permanent custody of a child to the agency 

if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, that any 
of the five factors under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) to (e) exists and, furthermore, 

permanent custody is in the best interest of the child under the factors enumerated 

in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1).

Under the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the juvenile 

court is to determine if any of the following factors exists: whether the child is 

abandoned (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(b)); whether the child is orphaned and there are no 

relatives of the child who are able to take permanent custody 

(R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(c)); whether the child has been in the temporary custody of 

public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 12 or more 

months of a consecutive 22-month period (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)); whether another 

child of the parent has been adjudicated as abused, neglected, or dependent on three 

separate occasions (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(e)); or, when none of these factors apply, 

whether “the child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a 

reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents” (R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1)(a)).

Here, the trial court found under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that “the 

child cannot be placed with either the Mother or alleged father within a reasonable 

time or should not be placed with Mother or alleged father.” In making this finding, 

the trial court relied on the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E), the finding of any 

one of which requires the “cannot or should not be placed” finding. Specifically, R.C. 

2151.414(E) states, in pertinent part, that “[i]f the court determines, by clear and 

convincing evidence, * * * that one or more of the [enumerated (E) factors] exist as 
to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be 

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with 

either parent[.]”

Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the trial court found that Mother failed to 

remedy the conditions that led to the child’s removal. The record demonstrates that 

a case plan was implemented for Mother at the outset of the child’s removal in March 

2021. The plan required her to address her issues with mental health, parenting, 

and substance abuse. However, Mother was not successful in achieving the goals of 

her case plan. Throughout the proceedings, Mother maintained that she would not 

stop her marijuana use, contending that it helped her sleep and with her mental 

health issues. 

Further, Mother refused to engage in mental health services for 

approximately a year between August 2021 and summer 2022. According to 

caseworker Flynn, Mother’s mental health was not stable enough to allow her to 

participate in a parenting group; the agency feared Mother’s participation would put 

the other participants in an unsafe situation. Indeed, the service providers who 

interacted with Mother took safety precautions and would not enter her home alone 

due to her volatile behavior. Thus, as of the time of trial, Mother had not made any 

meaningful progress on any of her case-plan objectives and was not able to provide

a safe and appropriate home for E.J. in the foreseeable future.
On this record, the trial court’s finding that Mother failed to remedy 

the conditions leading to E.J.’s removal was supported by clear and convincing 

evidence.

The trial court also made a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) that 

Mother had chronic mental illness and chemical dependency that was so severe that

it made her unable to provide an adequate, permanent home for E.J. as of the time 

of trial and, as anticipated, within one year after trial. The record demonstrates that 

Mother rejected the offer to obtain legal medication to help with her issues and, 

instead, insisted on self-medicating with marijuana. She specifically stated that she 

was not going to stop using marijuana. Indeed, Mother acknowledges her “cannabis 

addiction and an attitude which led to incontrollable outbursts.” Appellant’s brief, 

p. 10.

We are not persuaded by Mother’s insinuation that her drug use did 

not interfere with her ability to parent E.J. because she “only” used marijuana and 

it helped with her mental health issues. Nonmedical marijuana use in Ohio is illegal,

and its use impairs judgment. See In re G.H., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-752, 

2016-Ohio-1188, ¶ 34. Mother could have sought medical marijuana, which, if 

prescribed, would have subjected her use to supervision under the care of a medical 

professional. But she rejected the idea of using legal medication to help with her 

issues. Additionally, Mother’s marijuana use was not the agency’s sole concern. 

Further, the record does not bear out Mother’s insinuation that her 

marijuana use helped with her mental health issues — those issues continued 
throughout the proceedings, including at trial where Mother had numerous 

outbursts, that resulted in several admonishments and her removal from the 

courtroom on more than one occasion.

Further, the record shows that Mother has had mental health issues 

dating back to her adolescence, at which time she was not compliant with her 

medications and resulted, in part, with maternal grandmother not allowing her to 

live with her after the age of 18. In these proceedings, Mother failed to consistently 

engage in mental-health services, at one point going approximately one year without 

engagement. Her mental-health issues continued throughout the pendency of this 

matter and included erratic, violent behaviors and repeated threats of suicide. As 

the GAL noted in her written report, “most experiences with [Mother] were erratic, 

threatening, awkward and confusing.” On this record, the trial court’s finding under 

R.C. 2151.414(E)(2) regarding Mother’s chronic mental illness and chemical 

dependency was supported by clear and convincing evidence.

R.C. 2151.414(E)(4) allows a juvenile court to make a finding that a 

parent has demonstrated a lack of commitment toward his or her child by failing to 

regularly support, visit, or communicate with the child when able to do so, or by 

other actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for 

the child. The trial court made a finding under this section in regard to Mother. The 

record shows that Mother was advised that she needed to stop using mind-altering 

substances in order to have a chance at reunification with E.J. Mother told 

caseworker Flynn that she was not going to stop using marijuana because she 
needed it, in particular to sleep. She rejected exploring legal medication to help her 

with her issues. This evidence supports the trial court’s finding of Mother’s lack of 

commitment.

The trial court also made a finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(14) that

Mother was unwilling to provide for E.J. Again, this finding is supported by 

Mother’s unwillingness to consistently engage in mental-health services and her 

statement that she was going to continue her marijuana use, despite being advised 

that her failure to make significant progress in those areas would hamper her ability 

to be reunified with the child.

Thus, the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E) are supported 

by clear and convincing evidence in the record. Because the statute mandates that 

if the trial court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that “one or more of the 

following exist as to each of the child’s parents, the court shall enter a finding that 

the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not 

be placed with either parent,” the trial court properly found that E.J. cannot or 

should not be placed with Mother within a reasonable period of time. See, e.g., In re 

I.R., 2021-Ohio-3103, 179 N.E.3d 138, ¶ 69 (8th Dist.) (based on its findings under 

R.C. 2151.414(E), the juvenile court was required to find that the child could not be 

placed with either of his parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed 

with either parent), citing In re C.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 82258 and 82852, 

2003-Ohio-6854, ¶ 58. 
We now consider the second prong of a motion for permanent

custody, that is, the best interest of the child. In determining the best interest of the 

child, R.C. 2151.414(D) mandates that the juvenile court consider all relevant 

factors, including, but not limited to, the following: 

(a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s 

parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home 

providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the child;

(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or through 

the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of the 

child;

(c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has 

been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services 

agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of 

a consecutive twenty-two-month period * * *;

(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and 

whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of 

permanent custody to the agency; 

(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section 

apply in relation to the parents and child.

This court reviews a trial court’s best-interest determination under 

R.C. 2151.414(D) for an abuse of discretion. In re J.F., 2018-Ohio-96, 102 N.E.3d 

1264, ¶ 55 (8th Dist.), citing In re D.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95188, 2010-Ohio5618, ¶ 47. In this regard, “‘[a] trial court’s failure to base its decision on a 

consideration of the best interests of the child constitutes an abuse of discretion.’”

In re J.F. at id., quoting In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, 

at ¶ 60. Further, although the juvenile court is required to consider each factor listed 

in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1), no one factor is to be given greater weight than the others.
In re T.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100852, 2014-Ohio-2985, ¶ 23, citing In re 

Schaefer, 111 Ohio St.3d 498, 2006-Ohio-5513, 857 N.E.2d 532, ¶ 56.

The trial court here considered the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D) 

and found that “a grant of permanent custody is in the best interests of the child.” 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in making this finding. 

In regard to Mother’s interaction and relationship with E.J., the 

record demonstrates that she was scheduled to visit with the child weekly on 

Fridays. Her attendance at the visits were sporadic, including an approximate twomonth period where she did not visit at all, but when she did visit, she “engaged 

pretty well with the baby.” The child was well-bonded to the foster family with 

whom the child had been placed since birth and, according to the GAL, breaking 

those bonds would be “catastrophic” for E.J. The GAL recommended permanent 

custody to CCDCFS. Although Mother interacted well with E.J. during visits, this 

court has stated that “‘the mere existence of a good relationship is insufficient. 

Overall, we are concerned with the best interest of the child, not the mere existence 

of a relationship.’” In re K.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95374, 2011-Ohio-349, ¶ 23, 

quoting In re R.N., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83121, 2004-Ohio-2560.

In regard to the child’s need for a legally secure permanent 

placement, the trial court found that E.J. cannot or should not be placed with 

Mother. Such a finding precluded the trial court from considering returning the 

child to Mother. See In re Mayle, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 76739 and 77165, 

2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3379, 20-21 (July 27, 2000) (after finding that a child cannot 
or should not be placed with a parent, the trial court is required by statute to place 

the child with someone other than the parent).

In regard to the R.C. 2151.414(E) factors, as discussed, the juvenile 

court found that several applied here, those being that Mother (1) failed to remedy 

the conditions which led to E.J.’s removal; (2) had chronic mental health and 

chemical dependency issues; (3) demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the 

child; and (4) demonstrated an unwillingness to provide for the child.

On this record, the trial court’s finding that granting CCDCFS 

permanent custody of E.J. was in the child’s best interest was not an abuse of 

discretion.

The first assignment of error is overruled.

Denial of Legal Custody to Maternal Grandmother

In her second assignment of error, Mother contends that the juvenile 

court erred by not granting legal custody of E.J. to maternal grandmother. We 

disagree.

The juvenile court may award legal custody of a child who has been 

adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent to any person who filed a motion 

requesting legal custody of the child. R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). 

“Legal custody” [is] a legal status that vests in the custodian the right 

to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where 

and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, 

train, and discipline the child and to provide the child with food, 

shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to any residual parental 

rights, privileges, and responsibilities.

 
R.C. 2151.011(B)(21).

Following an adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency, a juvenile 

court awards legal custody “‘by examining what would be in the best interest of the 

child based on a preponderance of the evidence.’” In re T.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

102071, 2015-Ohio-4177, ¶ 44, quoting In re M.J.M., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94130, 

2010-Ohio-1674, ¶ 11, 14. A “preponderance of the evidence” means evidence that 

is “‘more probable, more persuasive, or of greater probative value.’” In re C.V.M., 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98340, 2012-Ohio-5514, ¶ 7, quoting In re D.P., 10th Dist. 

Franklin Nos. 05AP-117, 05AP-118, 2005-Ohio-5097, ¶ 52.

When considering the best interest of a child in a legal custody matter, 

“there is no ‘specific test or set of criteria’ that must be applied or considered.” In re 

T.R. at ¶ 48. However, this court has found the factors delineated in R.C. 

2151.414(D) to be “instructive.” In re D.T., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 100970 and 

100971, 2014-Ohio-4818, ¶ 20, citing In re E.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99065, 

2013-Ohio-1193, ¶ 13. As discussed, the factors listed in R.C. 2151.414(D) include 

the interaction of the child with the child’s parents, siblings, relatives, and foster 

caregivers; the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has been 

in the temporary custody of a public children services agency and for how long; and 

the child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement.

The decision whether to grant a request for legal custody is within the 

discretion of the juvenile court. In re M.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108567, 2019-

Ohio-5128, ¶ 33. We will not reverse an award of legal custody absent a showing of 
an abuse of discretion. In re B.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95794, 2011-Ohio-1967, 

¶ 10. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in an 

unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has discretionary authority. 

Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427, 2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. 

The record demonstrates that maternal grandmother did not 

demonstrate full commitment to E.J.’s needs. She initially declined to take the child 

because the responsibility would have conflicted with her other obligations. There 

were also significant periods of time where she did not visit with the child because 

she either could not or would not provide transportation for E.J. The record further 

demonstrates that grandmother’s plans to keep E.J. safe were undeveloped or 

unrealistic.

We are not persuaded by Mother’s citation to R.C. 2151.353(A)(3)(c)

in support of her contention that by not granting legal custody to grandmother, the 

juvenile court impermissibly foreclosed her chance of regaining custody of E.J. in 

the event of her rehabilitation. R.C. 2151.42(B) specifically states that an order of 

legal custody is intended to be permanent; it is not intended as a means to afford a 

parent additional time to remedy the issues that led to agency involvement in the 

first place. 

“‘Courts are not required to favor a relative if, after considering all the 

factors, it is in the child’s best interest for the agency to be granted permanent 

custody.’” In re S.F., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28606, 2020-Ohio-693, ¶ 50, 

quoting In re A.A., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2008 CA 53, 2009-Ohio-2172, ¶ 19. Here, in 
consideration of all the best interests factors, along with the GAL’s opinion that 

removing E.J. from the only family the child has known since birth and to whom the 

child is “very bonded,” would be “catastrophic,” we find no abuse of discretion in the 

trial court’s denial of Mother’s request for legal custody to grandmother.

The second assignment of error is overruled.

Finally, we address two general contentions Mother has made in this 

appeal. Specifically, Mother contends that the juvenile court erred in rendering its 

decision without the aid of expert testimony or a specific determination of her 

unsuitability to parent the child. 

In regard to expert testimony, this court has held that where mental 

health is an issue, but not a predominant issue nor the determinative issue, in a 

permanent custody case, due process does not require the court to appoint a 

psychiatric expert to assist in the defense. In re M.W., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 83409, 2005-Ohio-1305, ¶ 5; In re J.D., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82898, 2004-

Ohio-358, ¶ 9; In re B.G., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81982, 2003-Ohio-3256, ¶ 24. 

The juvenile court here did not explicitly nor solely base its decision to terminate 

Mother’s parental rights based on her chronic mental illness. Thus, it cannot be said 

that Mother’s mental health issues were the determinative factor in the court’s 

decision. Following this court’s precedent, we find no merit to Mother’s contention.

In regard to the lack of an unsuitability finding, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio has held that “[a] juvenile court adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency

is a determination about the care and condition of a child and implicitly involves a 
determination of the unsuitability of the child’s custodial and/or noncustodial 

parents.” In re C.R., 108 Ohio St.3d 369, 2006-Ohio-1191, 843 N.E.2d 1188, ¶ 23. 

Here, the juvenile court found E.J. dependent. That adjudication carries with it the 

implicit finding of parental unsuitability. The juvenile court was, therefore, not 

obligated to make a separate finding of unsuitability prior to awarding CCDCFS 

permanent custody. 

Having found no merit to Mother’s assignments of error, the trial 

court’s judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment 

into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, P.J., and

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, J., CONCUR