Filed 9/30/24 P. v. Blanche CA2/7

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ANTHONY BLANCHE,

Defendant and Appellant.

 B329475

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NA011531)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed.

William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Nima Razfar, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
2

Anthony Blanche appeals from a postjudgment order

denying his motion for a Franklin1 proceeding. The superior 

court found Blanche was ineligible for a youth offender parole 

hearing under Penal Code section 30512 because he was 

sentenced to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP) for his 

convictions of two counts of special circumstance first degree

murder. He was also convicted of attempted murder. Blanche

was 24 years old when he committed the offenses.

On appeal, Blanche contends section 3051 violated his 

federal and state constitutional rights to equal protection because 

under that section young adult offenders serving LWOP

sentences for crimes they committed between the ages of 18 and 

25 are ineligible for youth offender parole hearings but young 

adult offenders serving non-LWOP sentences and juvenile

offenders who committed crimes before the age of 18 serving 

LWOP sentences are eligible. Blanche also argues his LWOP 

sentence constituted cruel or unusual punishment in violation of 

the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) We affirm.

1 In People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, 283-284, the 

Supreme Court held a juvenile offender who is eligible for a youth 

offender parole hearing pursuant to Penal Code section 3051 is

entitled to a hearing to develop and preserve evidence of his or 

her youth-related characteristics and the circumstances at the 

time of the offense. 

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal 

Code.
3

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Evidence at Trial3

1. The November 1991 murder and attempted murder

On the night of November 20, 1991 Blanche went to

Heather Donham’s house to visit her and to retrieve his jacket 

and other belongings. Donham lived with her mother, her 

mother’s boyfriend Omeli Aulai, and her mother’s children with 

Aulai. Aulai and Blanche walked out to the sidewalk, followed by 

Keith Jones and Stephen Jordan, who had been visiting the 

residence. Blanche and Jordan got into an argument over 

Donham, with each man claiming she was his girlfriend. Blanche 

stabbed Jordan in the upper abdomen, and Jordan punched 

Blanche in the chin. Jordan went inside the house to call 911, 

and Aulai followed. Blanche chased Jones and fatally stabbed 

him in the back, shoulder, and mouth before fleeing.

 

2. The May 1992 murder

On May 17, 1992 Blanche was living at an apartment with 

his close friend Michele Cespuglio, her young son, and Brenda 

Zaidi. Brenda’s husband, Safar Zaidi,

4 paid the rent for the 

apartment, but he did not live there. Brenda told Blanche that 

he had to move out. Blanche became enraged, tore a picture off 

3 We grant Blanche’s March 11, 2024 request for judicial

notice of our prior unpublished opinion in People v. Blanche 

(Dec. 2, 1995, B087391) [nonpub. opn.] (Blanche). (Evid. Code, 

§§ 452, subd. (d)(1) & 459.) We summarize the trial evidence 

recounted in our prior opinion. 

4 We refer to Brenda and Safar Zaidi by their first names to 

avoid confusion. 
4

the wall, knocked over an entertainment center, and broke all the 

windows in the living room before leaving. When Safar arrived 

at the apartment, he became furious when he saw the damage. 

Blanche called Cespuglio to apologize, but Safar grabbed the 

phone and cursed and yelled at Blanche. Two minutes later 

Blanche returned to the apartment, and Safar again yelled and 

cursed at him. Banche grabbed a butcher knife from the kitchen, 

chased Safar out of the apartment and down the stairs, and 

stabbed him in the back before fleeing. Safar survived an 

emergency surgery, but he later died due to blood clotting 

complications.

After his arrest, Blanche gave a recorded confession while 

in police custody, which was played for the jury.

3. The defense case

Blanche testified at trial on his own behalf. His testimony 

was substantially similar to what he told police at the time of his 

arrest. Blanche admitted he committed the crimes, but he 

claimed he acted in self-defense.

 

B. The Verdicts, Sentencing, and First Appeal 

On July 7, 1994 the jury found Blanche guilty of the first 

degree murder of Safar (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), the first degree 

murder of Jones (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2), and the attempted 

murder of Jordan (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 3). The jury found 

true the multiple-murder special circumstance allegation. 

(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3).) The jury also found true with respect to 

counts 1 and 2 that Blanche personally used a deadly or 

dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)) and as to count 3 that

Blanche inflicted great bodily injury on Jordan (§ 12022.7). 
5

On August 24, 1994 the trial court sentenced Blanche to 

LWOP on the two murder convictions. On the attempted murder 

conviction the court sentenced Blanche to a consecutive term of 

life with the possibility of parole, plus an additional determinate 

term of four years for the weapon use and great bodily injury 

enhancements. 

Blanche appealed, and we affirmed. (Blanche, supra, 

B087391.) 

C. Blanche’s Motion for a Franklin Proceeding

On February 10, 2023 Blanche moved for a Franklin

proceeding to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to his 

youth. (See In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 451 [“an offender 

entitled to a hearing under sections 3051 and 4801 may seek the 

remedy of a Franklin proceeding even though the offender’s 

sentence is otherwise final”]; People v. Franklin, supra, 

63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) Blanche asserted he was convicted of 

two counts of murder and one count of attempted murder; he was

24 years old at the time of the crimes; and he was sentenced to 

LWOP. Blanche argued the exclusion from eligibility for youth 

offender parole hearings for 18-to-25-year-old young adult

offenders who had been sentenced to LWOP violated his federal 

and state constitutional rights to equal protection (U.S. Const., 

14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) and the state 

Constitution’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment (Cal. Const., 

art. I, § 17).

On February 24, 2023 the superior court denied Blanche’s 

request for a Franklin proceeding. The court explained in a 

written order, “In 1994, Petitioner was found guilty of two counts 

of murder in the first degree and one count of attempted murder. 
6

He was twenty-four years old at the time he committed his crime 

and, consequently, was sentenced to a state prison term of life 

without the possibility of parole. [¶] Under Penal Code 

section 3051, certain juvenile and youthful offenders are entitled 

to a youth offender parole hearing for the purpose of reviewing 

whether an offender is suitable for parole. However, the terms of 

Penal Code section 305l(h) expressly exclude life without the

possibility of parole offenders who were 18 years old or older at 

the time they committed the offenses from having such a hearing. 

Therefore, Petitioner’s request for such a hearing is denied.” 

Blanche timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

A. Section 3051 Does Not Violate Blanche’s Constitutional 

Right to Equal Protection

“Section 3051 provides that, at a time designated in the 

statute, the Board of Parole Hearings must hold a parole hearing 

‘for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner 

who was 25 years of age or younger . . . at the time of the 

controlling offense.’ (§ 3051, subd. (a)(1); id., subd. (d).) How 

much time must pass before an eligible youth offender receives a 

parole hearing depends on the length of the original sentence for 

the ‘“[c]ontrolling offense,”’ a term defined to mean ‘the offense or 

enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest 

term of imprisonment.’ (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).) An offender 

sentenced to a determinate term becomes eligible for parole after 

15 years (id., subd. (b)(1)); an offender sentenced to an 

indeterminate life term of fewer than 25 years to life becomes 

eligible after 20 years (id., subd. (b)(2)); and an offender 

sentenced to an indeterminate life term of 25 years to life, or an 
7

offender sentenced to life without parole for a crime committed 

before the age of 18, becomes eligible after 25 years (id., 

subd. (b)(3), (4)).” (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 842-

843 (Hardin).)

“Certain persons are, however, categorically ineligible for 

youth offender parole hearings, including offenders sentenced for 

multiple violent or serious felonies under the ‘Three Strikes’ law 

(Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12); offenders sentenced 

for sex offenses under the One Strike law (id., § 667.61); and 

offenders who, ‘subsequent to attaining 26 years of age, commit[] 

an additional crime for which malice aforethought is a necessary 

element of the crime or for which the individual is sentenced to 

life in prison.’ (§ 3051, subd. (h).) The statute also excludes those 

who . . . are sentenced to life without parole for a controlling 

offense committed after reaching the age of 18. (Ibid.)” (Hardin,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 843.)

Blanche contends section 3051’s exclusion of young adult 

offenders with LWOP sentences from eligibility for a youth

offender parole hearing violated his federal and state 

constitutional rights to equal protection. The Supreme Court 

recently rejected this argument in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at 

page 864. 

In Hardin, Tony Hardin was sentenced to LWOP following 

his conviction of first degree murder with a special circumstance

finding for an offense he committed when he was 25 years old. 

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 840.) Hardin asserted 

section 3051 violated his right to equal protection because “once 

the Legislature decided to expand [youth offender parole] 

opportunities to young adults, it could not rationally treat those 

sentenced to life without parole differently from those convicted 
8

of other serious crimes and serving lengthy parole-eligible 

sentences.” (Hardin, at p. 846.) The Supreme Court clarified the 

standard for rational basis review of an equal protection claim, 

explaining, “[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing 

distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on 

the basis that the distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal 

protection, courts no longer need to ask at the threshold whether 

the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in 

question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged 

difference in treatment is adequately justified under the 

applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party 

challenging the law to show that it is not.” (Id. at pp. 850-851.) 

Under rational basis review, applicable here, a court 

“presume[s] that a given statutory classification is valid ‘until the 

challenger shows that no rational basis for the unequal treatment 

is reasonably conceivable.’ [Citation.] The underlying rationale 

for a statutory classification need not have been ‘ever actually 

articulated’ by lawmakers, nor ‘be empirically substantiated.’” 

(Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) The court reviewed 

section 3051’s legislative history and observed that “in designing 

section 3051, the Legislature consciously drew lines that altered 

the parole component of offenders’ sentences based not only on 

the age of the offender (and thus the offender’s amenability to 

rehabilitation) but also on the offense and sentence imposed. The 

lines the Legislature drew necessarily reflect a set of legislative 

judgments about the nature of punishment that is appropriate for 

the crime.” (Hardin, at p. 855.) The court acknowledged that it 

“may be true,” as Hardin had argued, that the crime-based 

categories that affect at what age an offender is eligible for relief 

may not be rationally related to the purpose of expanding 
9

opportunities for early release based on the attributes of youth. 

(Ibid.) But, the court continued, the Legislature was aware of 

this point, and “nonetheless crafted a statutory scheme that 

assigns significance to the nature of underlying offenses and 

accompanying sentences.” (Ibid.) Therefore, the court reasoned, 

“[t]he statutory framework indicates that the Legislature aimed 

to increase opportunities for meaningful release for young adult 

offenders, while taking into account the appropriate punishment

for the underlying crimes, depending on their severity.” (Ibid.) 

The Supreme Court held Hardin could not establish that 

“the Legislature’s decision to exclude offenders convicted of 

special circumstance murder from the youth offender parole 

system” is ‘so devoid of even minimal rationality that it is 

unconstitutional as a matter of equal protection.’”

5 (Hardin,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 859.) The court explained that

section 190.2 adequately separates out the most egregious 

murders (special circumstance murders), which are subject to the 

most severe punishment—death or LWOP—from other murders

(id. at p. 859), and therefore, “it is difficult to see how the 

Legislature that enacted section 3051 could have acted 

irrationally in singling out special circumstance murder as a 

particularly culpable offense.” (Id. at p. 860.) Accordingly, 

Hardin failed to show “that the exclusion of offenders who are 

serving sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole 

for a crime committed after the age of 18 from youth offender 

parole eligibility is irrational.” (Id. at p. 864.)

5 In Hardin, the defendant only raised an equal protection 

challenge under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution. (Hardin, supra, 

15 Cal.5th at p. 847, fn. 2.)
10

Similar to the defendant in Hardin, Blanche was sentenced 

to LWOP after he was convicted of special circumstance murder. 

In his reply brief Blanche contends Hardin does not preclude his 

equal protection argument that there is no rational basis to 

distinguish between young adult offenders and juvenile offenders 

sentenced to LWOP. Blanche is correct that the Supreme Court 

in Hardin did not consider this equal protection challenge, but 

the court observed that the Court of Appeal (this court) had held, 

and Hardin did not dispute, that it was unnecessary to address 

this argument because “the Legislature acted reasonably in 

distinguishing between offenses committed before and after the 

age of 18 because the Eighth Amendment (and the law more 

generally) makes the same distinction.” (Hardin, supra, 

15 Cal.5th at p. 846.) 

Blanche fails to show that the Legislature acted 

irrationally in granting youth offender parole hearings to juvenile 

offenders with LWOP sentences but denying such hearings to

young adult offenders with LWOP sentences. As explained by 

the Court of Appeal in People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 

204 in rejecting a similar equal protection challenge to 

section 3051, “The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish 

between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) 

based on their age. For juvenile offenders, such a sentence may 

violate the Eighth Amendment. [Citations.] But the same 

sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment when imposed 

on an adult, even an adult under the age of 26.” The Sands court 

reasoned “the Legislature could rationally decide to remedy 

unconstitutional sentences but go no further.” (Sands, at p. 204; 

accord, In re Murray (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 456, 463-464

[rejecting equal protection challenge to section 3051 based on the
11

different treatment of juvenile and young adult offenders

sentenced to LWOP because “the United States and California 

Supreme Courts have found the line drawn between juveniles 

and nonjuveniles to be a rational one”]; People v. Morales (2021) 

67 Cal.App.5th 326, 347 [“for purposes of LWOP offenders, the 

line drawn at 18 is a rational one”]; People v. Acosta (2021) 

60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779 [“[T]here is a rational basis for 

distinguishing between juvenile LWOP offenders and young 

adult LWOP offenders: their age.”].)

B. Section 3051 Does Not Violate the State Constitutional 

Prohibition Against Cruel or Unusual Punishment

Blanche contends his LWOP sentence constituted cruel or 

unusual punishment under article 1, section 17 of the California 

Constitution.6 He acknowledges that his sentence did not 

constitute cruel or unusual punishment when it was imposed in 

1994. Instead, he argues that sections 3051 and 48017 rendered 

his LWOP sentence constitutionally excessive because the 

Legislature, in enacting the sections, acknowledged that youthful 

6 Blanche does not contend his sentence constitutes cruel and 

unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment of the United 

States Constitution. 

7 Section 4801, subdivision (c), provides that “[w]hen a 

prisoner committed his or her controlling offense . . . when he or 

she was 25 years of age or younger, the board [of parole 

hearings], in reviewing a prisoner's suitability for parole 

pursuant to Section 3041.5, shall give great weight to the 

diminished culpability of youth as compared to adults, the 

hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and 

increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant 

case law.”
12

offenders who commit serious or violent offenses before they turn 

26 years old are less culpable than older offenders, but it denied 

youth offender parole hearings for young adult offenders 

sentenced to LWOP. Blanche has failed to meet his burden to 

show his LWOP sentence constituted constitutionally excessive 

punishment. 

In In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th 959, 971-972, the 

Supreme Court held with respect to excessive punishment claims 

under the California Constitution that “the court’s inquiry 

properly focuses on whether the punishment is ‘grossly 

disproportionate’ to the offense and the offender or, stated 

another way, whether the punishment is so excessive that it 

‘“shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of 

human dignity.”’” (Accord, In re Butler (2018) 4 Cal.5th 728, 746 

[“A sentence violates the prohibition against unconstitutionally 

disproportionate sentences only if it is so disproportionate that it 

‘shocks the conscience.’”].) Palmer articulated “three analytical 

techniques to aid our deferential review of excessiveness claims: 

(1) an examination of the nature of the offense and the offender, 

with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to 

society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment 

California imposes for more serious offenses; and (3) a 

comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in other 

jurisdictions for the same offense.” (Palmer, at p. 973.) The 

Supreme Court added, “A claim of excessive punishment must 

overcome a ‘considerable burden’ [citation], and courts should 

give ‘“the broadest discretion possible”’ [citation] to the legislative 

judgment respecting appropriate punishment.” (Id. at p. 972.) 

With respect to juvenile offenders, in Miller v. Alabama

(2012) 567 U.S. 460, 479, the United States Supreme Court held 
13

that “the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that 

mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile 

offenders” (who committed their crime before they turned 

18 years old). The court’s decision in Miller followed its decision 

in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 (Roper), which held 

the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death 

penalty for juvenile offenders. In People v. Caballero (2012) 

55 Cal.4th 262, 268, the California Supreme Court held, in the 

context of a 110-years-to-life sentence imposed on a juvenile for 

nonhomicide offenses, that parole-eligible sentences for juvenile 

offenders violate the Eighth Amendment if the parole eligibility 

date falls beyond the offender’s natural life expectancy.

The California Supreme Court in People v. Flores (2020) 

9 Cal.5th 371, 429, considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s 

prohibition on the death penalty for juvenile offenders under

Roper should apply to youthful offenders who commit crimes 

between the ages of 18 and 21. The court rejected the defendant’s 

argument that the Legislature’s enactment of section 3051, 

subdivision (a)(1), providing youth offender parole hearings to 

most youthful offenders who were 25 or younger at the time of 

their commitment offense, supported a “categorical bar on the 

death penalty for individuals between the ages of 18 and 21 at 

the time of their offenses.” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Tran (2022) 

13 Cal.5th 1169, 1234-1235 [rejecting argument “that imposing 

the death penalty on persons for crimes committed while they 

were 18 to 20 years old violates the state and federal 

Constitutions because it is cruel and unusual punishment”]; 

People v. Powell (2018) 6 Cal.5th 136, 191 [death penalty did not 

constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 
14

federal and state Constitutions where defendant was 18 years old 

at the time of the killing].) 

The Courts of Appeal have applied a similar analysis to 

Eighth Amendment challenges to young adult LWOP sentences. 

As the court explained in In re Williams, 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 

439, “If the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a sentence of 

death for 21 year olds, then most assuredly, it does not prohibit 

the lesser LWOP sentence.” (Accord, People v. Acosta, supra,

60 Cal.App.5th at pp. 769, 782 [LWOP sentences did not violate 

Eighth Amendment where defendant was 21 years old at the 

time of the murders]; People v. Montelongo (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 

1016, 1020, 1030-1032 [rejecting an 18-year-old defendant’s 

contention his LWOP sentence was cruel and unusual 

punishment under the Eighth Amendment].)

Blanche argues that the cases that found young adult 

LWOP sentences did not constitute cruel and unusual 

punishment relied on the Eighth Amendment, and not article I, 

section 17 of the California Constitution, which prohibits cruel or

unusual punishment. But Blanche does not provide any 

authority or rationale justifying a different result under the 

California Constitution. And, as the California Supreme Court 

observed in Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at page 847, footnote 2, 

with respect to Hardin’s equal protection challenge under the 

California Constitution, there is “‘“no reason to suppose” that 

federal equal protection analysis would yield a result different 

from what would emerge from analysis of the state Constitution.’” 

(See People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 733 [“There is 

considerable overlap in the state and federal approaches. 

‘Although articulated slightly differently, both standards prohibit 

punishment that is “grossly disproportionate” to the crime or the 
15

individual culpability of the defendant.’ [Citation.] ‘The 

touchstone in each is gross disproportionality.’”].) 

Applying the analytical framework established by In re 

Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th at page 973, we conclude Blanche’s 

LWOP sentence does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment

under the California Constitution. Blanche was convicted of two 

special circumstance murders and attempted murder when he 

was 24 years old, and we must defer to the Legislature’s 

determination that his special circumstance murder convictions 

warranted the severe punishment of LWOP. (Id. at p. 972 [the 

Legislature is given “considerable latitude in matching 

punishments to offenses” because “‘[t]he choice of fitting and 

proper penalties is not an exact science, but a legislative skill 

involving an appraisal of the evils to be corrected, the weighing of 

practical alternatives, consideration of relevant policy factors, 

and responsiveness to the public will’”].) Blanche’s LWOP 

sentences for the two special circumstance murders (committed 

just six months apart) is not “‘grossly disproportionate’ to the 

offense and the offender,” nor is it “so excessive that it ‘“shocks 

the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human 

dignity.”’” (Palmer, at p. 972; see In re Butler, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 

p. 746.)
16

DISPOSITION

The order denying the Franklin proceeding is affirmed. 

FEUER, J.

We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.