alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### DALLAS COUNTY BOIS d’ ARC LEVEE DIST. v. GLENN.

(No. 10198.)

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Dallas.

April 27, 1929.

For former opinion, see 8 S.W.(2d) 1101.

Claude D. Bell, of Dallas, and Goree, Odell & Allen, of Port Worth, for appellant.

Lee R. Stroud, McCormick Bromberg, Left-wich & Carrington and G. W. Schmucker, all of Dallas, for appellee.

JONES, O. J.

In the original opinion in this ease, reported in (Tex. Civ. App.) 8 S.W. (2d) 1101, judgment was entered reversing and rendering this case in favor of appellant. •On motion for rehearing, the single question involved was certified to the Supreme Court. This question was as to whether taxes duly levied by a levee district, created under what is known as the “Laney Act,” and which taxes had become delinquent for more than two years previous to the filing of the suit to enforce collection, are exempt from the operation of the two-year limitation statute. The only law applicable to the collection of such delinquent taxes by such a levee district is contained in article 8016, R. S. 1925, which article is a part of the ‘.Laney Act.” This article, after adopting by reference the statutory procedure for the collection of delinquent state and county taxes, then declares that “ * * * the collection of such delinquent levee improvement district taxes and sales of property therefor shall be governed by the laws applying to the collection of delinquent State and county taxes. * * * ” •

In its opinion, this court held that articles 7298 and 7329, R. O. S. 1925, both of which deny the right of delinquent taxpayers to plead limitation as a defense against the payment of state, county, and municipal taxes, thus became a part of the “laws applying to the collection of delinquent State and county taxes,” and therefore the right to plead limitation as a defense in such suit is denied. Judgment was entered by this court in accordance *66with such holding. The question, however, was certified to the Supreme Court before passing on appellee’s motion for rehearing. The Supreme Court, through the Commission of Appeals, answered the certified question to the effect that neither of such statutes was adopted by reference, and that the defense of limitation can be successfully pleaded in a suit by a levee district, created under the “Raney Act,” (Acts 35th Leg., 4th Called Sess., c. 44) to enforce collection of delinquent taxes. State v. Glenn, 13 S.W.(2d) 337 [rehearing denied 15 S.W.(2d) 1028].

This holding becomes the law of this case, and is binding on this court, for which reason the motion of appellee for rehearing must be granted, the judgment heretofore entered set aside, and judgment entered affirming the judgment of the lower court, and it is so ordered.
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th
 PZENA INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INC.By:
Name:
    
    /s/ Richard S. Pzena

Richard S. PzenaTitle:
    
    Chief Executive Officer
 21
Robert Teresa /s

Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

December 17, 2015

No. 04-15-00436-CV

Bryan SMITH d/b/a Vision Design and Build,

Appellant

v.

Robert OVERBY and Teresa Overby,

Appellees

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2008-CI-02799

Honorable Gloria Saldana, Judge Presiding

O R D E R

The Appellant’s second motion for extension of time to file brief is hereby GRANTED. 

Time is extended to January 13, 2016. NO MORE EXTENSIONS OF TIME WILL BE 

ALLOWED.

_________________________________

Jason Pulliam, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 17th day of December, 2015.

___________________________________

Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
##### 



Exhibit 32.1
 APACHE OFFSHORE INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP
by Apache Corporation, General Partner
 Certification of Chief Executive Officer
and Chief Financial Officer
  /s/ G. Steven FarrisBy:
    
    G. Steven FarrisTitle:
    
    President, Chief Executive Officerand Chief Operating Officer
   /s/ Roger B. PlankBy:
    
    Roger B. PlankTitle:
    
    Executive Vice Presidentand Chief Financial Officer
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FOURTH DISTRICT

CARLOS E. ROBINSON,

Appellant,

v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

Appellee.

No. 4D17-0911

[July 19, 2018]

Appeal of order denying 3.850 motion from the Circuit Court for the 

Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County; John S. Kastrenakes, 

Judge; L.T. Case No. 502008CF011591AXXXMB.

Michael Hursey of Michael Hursey, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

No appearance required for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### SAVAGE et al. v. DE LEON.

No. 9920.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Jan. 20, 1937.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 17, 1937.

J. B. Lewright, of San Antonio, for appellants.

John C. Wall, of San Antonio, and Bog-gess, LaCrosse & Lowrey, of Del Rio, for appellee.

SMITH, Chief Justice.

We adopt the statement- of the case made in appellants’ brief, approved by ap-pellee, as follows:

Appellants, J. H. Savage, Guy S. McFarland, and Chauncey H. Dunn, Jr., were and are the independent executors *598of the last will and testament of Mrs. Elizabeth Moore, who died on November 23, 1925, and whose will was soon thereafter duly probated in county court of Bexar county, Tex. Appellee sued appellants as such executors of will, alleging that under said will he was entitled to a legacy of $1,000, payment of which was , refused by the executors. The case was tried below without a jury. The trial judge rendered judgment for appellee in the sum of $1,000 with interest, etc. The executors have appealed.

Except as to the names of appellees this cause is identical, in law and fact, with the case of J. H. Savage et al. v. Guzman, 91 S.W.(2d) 1178, decided by this court on January 12, 1936. We deem it sufficient to refer to that case for a full statement of the nature and result of this case, and for the reasons given in the opinion therein, the judgment here appealed from will be reversed, and judgment here rendered that appellee take nothing by reason of his suit, and pay all costs.

Reversed and rendered.
Exhibit 31.2


CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER


PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 OF


THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


I, Thomas G. McGonagle, certify that:


|   |                                                                                                                
|-- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|1. | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to the Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Industrial Property Trust Inc.; and

|   |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.




April 10, 2019/s/ THOMAS G. MCGONAGLEThomas G. McGonagleManaging Director, Chief Financial Officer(Principal Financial Officer andPrincipal Accounting Officer)
EX-35.2


(logo) TORCHLIGHT
INVESTORS
TORCHLIGHT LOAN SERVICES

OFFICER'S CERTIFICATE

March 13, 2014

U.S. Bank National Association
Attention: Global Corporate Trust Services
COMM 2012-CCRE4
Cmbs.transactions@usbank.com

Wells Fargo Bank, National Association
Attention: Corporate Trust Services-COMM
2012-CCRE4
trustcompliance@wellsfargo.com
ctsservicercomplianceteam@wellsfargo.com

Fitch, Inc.
Attention: Commercial Mortgage Surveillance
Info.cmbs@fitchratings.com

Moody's Investors Services, Inc.
Attention: CMBS Surveillance Group
cmbssurveillance@moodys.com

Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
Attention: CMBS Surveillance Group
Servicers_CSEAM@standardandpoors.com

Deutsche Mortgage & Asset Receiving
Corporation
60 Wall Street
New York, NY 10005
Attention: Lainie Kaye

Third Point, LLC
Attn: Operations
operations@thirdpoint.com

Park Bridge Lender Services LLC
Attention: David Rodgers
David.rodgers@parkbridgefinancial.com

Wells Fargo Bank Commercial Mortgage
Servicing
Attn: Compliance Department
Nesha.harrell@wellsfargo.com
Lyn.smith@wellsfargo.com


Re: COMM 2012-CCRE4, Commercial Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates

Dear Sir or Madam:

This Officer's Certificate is provided to you by Torchlight Loan Services, LLC
("Torchlight"), pursuant to Sections 10.11, 10.12 and 10.13 of that certain
Pooling and Servicing Agreement ("PSA") dated as of November 1, 2012 relative to
the above referenced securitization for which Torchlight acts as Special
Servicer. Capitalized terms used herein shall bear the meaning ascribed to them
in the PSA unless otherwise defined in this letter.

The undersigned officer, on behalf of Torchlight, hereby informs you that (i) a
review of the activities of the Special Servicer during the preceding calendar
year (the "Reporting Period") and of its performance under this Agreement, has
been made under such officer's supervision, (ii) to the best of such officer's
knowledge, based on such review, the Special Servicer has fulfilled all of its
material obligations under this Agreement in all material respects throughout
such Reporting Period, and (iii) the Special Servicer has received no notice
regarding the qualification, or challenging the status, of any Trust REMIC as a
REMIC from the IRS or any other governmental agency or body.


230 Park Avenue New York, New York 10169
T 212.488.3653 F 646.253.9753
E jbaron@torchlightinvestors.com
  www.torchlightinvestors.com


(page)


Sincerely,

Torchlight Loan Services, LLC
A Delaware Limited Liability Company,

By:/s/ Jacob Baron
   Jacob Baron
   Authorized Signatory

230 Park Avenue New York, New York 10169
T 212.488.3653 F 646.253.9753
E jbaron@torchlightinvestors.com
  www.torchlightinvestors.com
**Exhibit** **32.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,**

**AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

 

In connection with the annual report of Petrogress, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2021 (the “Report”), I, Evangelos Makris, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 

| (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

 

/s/ Evangelos Makris        

Evangelos Makris

Chief Financial Officer

March 30, 2022

 

This certification accompanies the Report pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and shall not, except to the extent required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, be deemed filed by the Company or purposes of §18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.

 

A signed original of this certification has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Order entered March 26, 2020

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00330-CV

EDGAR TUNCHEZ, Appellant

V.

BRADLY HOUK, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. CC-19-02501-A

ORDER

Before this Court is the March 25, 2020 letter from counsel for appellant that 

we construe as a motion for extension of time to file the clerk’s record. We 

GRANT the motion. The clerk’s record shall be filed by April 8, 2020.

We DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to send a copy of this order to Dallas 

County Clerk John Warren and all parties.

/s/ ERIN A. NOWELL 

JUSTICE
### NUMBER 13

- 1 5

- 00 0 1 9

- CV



## COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

____________________________________________________________

SKY VIEW AT LAS PALMAS, LLC

AND ILAN ISRAELY, Appellants,

v.

ROMAN GERONIMO MARTINEZ MENDEZ

& SAN JACINTO TITLE SERVICES

OF RIO GRANDE VALLEY, LLC, Appellees.

On appeal from the 370th District Court

of Hidalgo County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________



## MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Benavides

, Longoria, and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Benavides

Appellant s

, Sky View a t Las Palmas, LLC a nd Ilan Israely

, perfected an appeal

from a judgment entered by the 370 th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, in cause

number C

- 1401

- 10

- G(4) . The parties have filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal on2

grounds that all matters in controversy between them in this cause have been settled.

The parties request that this Court dismiss the appeal.

The Court, having considered the documents on file and the joint motion to

dismiss, is of the opinion that the mo tion should be granted. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1(a).

The joint motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. In

accordance with the agreement of the parties, costs are taxed against the party incurring

same. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 42.1( d) ("Absent agreement of the parties, the court will tax

costs against the appellant."). Having dismissed the appeal at the parties’ request, no

motion for rehearing will be entertained, and our mandate will issue forthwith.

GINA M. BENAVIDES,

Justice

Delivered and filed t he

7th day of March , 201 9

.
#### Prosser and others, Appellants, vs. Nickolay, Respondent.

*May 22*

June *22, 1946.*

*76For the appellants there was a brief by *Benton, Bosser, Becker &*Parnell, attorneys, and *David L. Fulton*of counsel, all of Appleton, and oral argument by *Mr. Fulton*and *Mr. Homer H. Benton.*

For the respondent there was a brief by *Bradford & Derber*of Appleton, and oral argument by *Allen S. Bradford.*

Rector, J.

The appellants submit two contentions against the validity of the conveyance: (1) The execution of *77the instrument was a nullity in that no description was contained therein at the time and could not thereafter be inserted pursuant to parol authority; (2) there was no valid delivery prior to the grantor’s death.

In support of their first contention the appellants cite an imposing array of authorities. They are from other jurisdictions, however, and are not in accord with the rule in this state. Our cases hold that parol authority may be given to complete a> conveyance by later inserting a material portion omitted at the time of execution and acknowledgment, and that when it is inserted no further execution is required. *Friend v. Yahr*(1905), 126 Wis. 291, 104 N. W. 997; *Van Etta v. Evenson*(1871), 28 Wis. 33.

Our decisions likewise dispose of the second contention. It is clearly established that a deed delivered to a third person with instructions to record it and deliver it to the grantee after the grantor’s death becomes effective upon delivery to the third person who thereafter holds as trustee for the grantee. *Lawrence v. Children's Home & Aid Society*(1939), 231 Wis. 44, 285 N. W. 415; *Hamblyn v. Crase*(1928), 194 Wis. 628, 217 N. W. 311; *Kolber v. Steinhafel*(1926), 190 Wis. 468, 209 N. W. 595; *Albright v. Albright*(1888), 70 Wis. 528, 36 N. W. 254. We may concede that had the grantor, Jacob Nickolay, died before completion of the conveyance by his attorney, Michael Burns, a question might have arisen as to whether Burns’ authority to complete the conveyance extended beyond Jacob Nickolay’s death. The conveyance was completed prior to his .death, however, and no such question is presented. After the deed had been properly completed by Mr. Burns the transfer of title was just as effectual as it would have been had he been delivered a fully completed instrument in the first instance.

The appellants argue that the parol authority given to Mr. Burns could have been revoked by the grantor and that consequently the grantor had not absolutely parted with control of the deed. They reason from this premise that there was no *78complete delivery prior to the grantor’s death. Compare *Ward v. Russell*(1904), 121 Wis. 77, 98 N. W. 939; *Zimmerman v. Zimmerman*(1917), 165 Wis. 146, 161 N. W. 369; *Williams v. Daubner*(1899), 103 Wis. 521, 79 N. W. 748; *Prutsman v. Baker*(1872), 30 Wis. 644. This argument overlooks the important fact that the deed was completed by Mr. Burns prior to the grantor’s death. After the completion any revocation of his authority to act in that behalf was out of the question.

*By the Court.*— Judgment affirmed.
#### In the Matter of the Probate of the Will of Tillie Beck, Deceased.

Surrogate’s Court, Nassau County,

January 17, 1958.

*Cahn & MacTcston*for petitioner.

*Harry A. Kornfeld,*as executor, in person.

*32John D. Bennett, S.

In this probate proceeding one'of the executors objects to the jurisdiction of the court, claiming that at the time of the decedent’s death, she was domiciled in and a resident of the County of Kings.

He presently seeks by motion an examination before trial as to all the facts and circumstances relating to the residence of the of the decedent during the year prior to the date of her death.

The proponent and coexecutrix, in opposition to the motion for an examination, contends that the examination before trial should not be allowed prior to joinder of issue by service of an answer or objections to probate. The opposition to this motion is well taken. The present objection to this probate proceeding is merely a preliminary issue. It is the practice of this court to dispose of these preliminary issues prior to the actual contest, if any, and as expeditiously as possible.

It is the well-established rule that applications for examinations before trial are premature if made before the action is at issue *(Punia*v. *Dry Dock Sav. Bank,*280 App. Div. 431 and cases cited therein).

In *Matter of Carll*(201 Misc. 829) the court stated, at page 835: ‘ *‘*The examination sought by the widow under section 288 of the Civil Practice Act, in advance of the service of her answer is premature, and is not necessary to enable her to file objections. Until service of such answer and objections, and issue joined, the widow cannot be said to be a contestant (cf. *Union Trust Co. of Rochester*v. *Conway,*238 App. Div. 764; *Mackay, Lovell & Co.,*v. *Dillon,*215 App. Div. 842, and *Kardonsky*v. *Tozzi,*217 App. Div. 753).”

Section 288 of the Civil Practice Act makes the taking of an examination before trial subject to such examination being material and necessary in the prosecution or the defense of the “ action ”. However, there is no *“*action ” pending unless and until either an answer or objections are interposed to the probate proceeding *(Matter of Alderdice,*198 Misc. 5). The only matter before the court is merely a preliminary question as to residence. This in no way is a joinder of issue on the matter of the probate proceeding itself. Accordingly the motion for an examination before trial is hereby denied.

The question of the residence of the decedent as a preliminary issue will be set down for trial on the 29th day of January, 1958 at 11:00 a.m.

Settle order on five days’ notice.
Exhibit 32.1








CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350 (AS ADOPTED


PURSUANT
TO SECTION 906 OF THE


SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002)





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Winwheel Bullion, Inc. on Form 10-Q
for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Sungjin Kim, Principal
Executive Officer, certify to my knowledge and in my capacity as an officer of
the Company, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





1.


The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and,





2.


The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company as of the dates
and for the periods expressed in the Report.







Date:
February 12, 2009


/s/ Sungjin KimSungjin
      KimChief
      Executive Officer





The
foregoing certification is provided solely for purposes of complying with the
provisions of Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002.
**Exhibit** **31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO**

**SECTION 302 OF**

**THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

 

I, Evangelos Makris, certify that:

 

| (1) | I have reviewed this Amendment No. 1 to annual report on Form 10-K/A of Petrogress, Inc.; |
|-----|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

 

| (2) | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; |
|-----|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

  

 

| May 18, 2020 | **Petrogress, Inc.**    |
|--------------|-------------------------|
|         |                    |   |
|         | By:                     | /s/ Evangelos Makris |
|         | Evangelos Makris        |
|         | Chief Financial Officer |