1 United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit.

No. 93-1390.

Leroy GRIFFIN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF DALLAS, Defendant-Appellee.

July 26, 1994.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern

District of Texas.

Before JOHNSON, GARWOOD, and JOLLY, Circuit Judges.

SAM D. JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant Leroy Griffin, a Dallas, Texas, police officer filed

a Title VII charge against the City of Dallas o n May 14, 1990,

cl aiming that the Dallas Police Department had wrongfully

discharged him. Mr. Griffin, an African American, filed this

discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") 275 days after his discharge.

The EEOC later issued Mr. Griffin a right-to-sue letter. Mr.

Griffin thereafter brought this cause of action against the city in

the federal district court for the Northern District of Texas. The

City of Dallas moved for summary judgment . It argued that Mr.

Griffin's claim was untimely, having been filed outside the 180-day

time frame outlined in section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. The

dis trict court agreed and granted summary judgment in the city's

favor. Mr. Griffin appeals. We now reverse and remand for trial

on the merits.

I. Background2

The Dallas Police Department hired Leroy Griffin as a police

officer on August 31, 1973. Almost sixteen years later, on July

28, 1989, the city terminated Mr. Griffin's employmen t. Mr.

Griffin attributed his dismissal to his race, as opposed to any

misconduct. He therefore filed a charge of race discrimination

with the EEOC on May 14, 1990—275 days after his discharge.

Although Mr. Griffin did not physically file a charge with the

Texas Commission on Human Rights ("TCHR"), he addressed his charge

to both the EEOC and the TCHR and marked a box which stated, "I

also want this charge filed with the EEOC." The EEOC notified Mr.

Griffin of his right to sue the city on February 11, 1992. On May

6, 1992, Mr. Griffin commenced this race discrimination action in

federal district court.

The City of Dallas filed a motion for summary judgment,

contending that section 706(e) of Title VII required Mr. Griffin to

file his claim with the EEOC no later than 180 days after the

alleged unlawful dismissal. Because Mr. Griffin filed his claim

with the EEOC 275 days after his dismissal—ninety-five days beyond

that 180-day limitations period—the city argued that Mr. Griffin's

claim was time-barred.

Counsel for Mr. Griffin directed the district court to that

part of section 706(e) which extends the limitations period to 300

days if a claim is also filed with a state or local fair employment

practice ["FEP"] agency. Mr. Griffin's counsel proffered a

Worksharing Agreement in which the TCHR had designated the EEOC as

its agent for receiving Title VII claims. In that same agreement,3

the TCHR waived jurisdiction over any Title VII charges filed with

the EEOC after 180 days but before 300 days after the date of the

alleged Title VII violation. Mr. Griffin contended that under the

Worksharing Agreement, the filing of his claim with the EEOC

constituted a filing of the claim with the TCHR and triggered the

section 706(e), 300-day limitations period. The district court

disagreed. It therefore granted the city's motion for summary

judgment. Mr. Griffin appeals.

II. Discussion

A. Compliance with Section 706(e)—Institution of State Proceedings

This is the fourth in a series of cases in which this Court

has been called upon to delineate the relationship between the TCHR

and the EEOC and, in light thereof, to define the limitations

requirements of section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. Section

706(e) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

A charge under this section shall be filed [with the EEOC]

within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred

..., except that in a case of an

unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or

local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such

practice or to institute crimin al proceedings with respect

thereto upon receiving notice thereof , such charge shall be

filed [with the EEOC] by or on behalf of the person aggrieved

within three hundred days aft er the alleged unlawful

employment practice occurred.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Under the clear terms of this statute,

a charge of discrimination must be filed with the EEOC within 180

days after the occurrence of the alleged discriminato ry practice

unless the complainant has instituted proceedings with a state or

local FEP agency. If the complainant has instituted state or local4

proceedings, the limitations period for filing such a charge with

the EEOC extends to 300 days.

In Mennor v. Fort Hood National Bank, this Court ruled that

the 300-day filing period set forth in section 706(e) applies

regardless whether state proceedings are timely filed under state

or local law. 829 F.2d 553, 554 (5th Cir.1987). In our second

section 706(e) case, Urrutia v. Valero Energy Corp., we held that

a nominal filing with the proper state or local agency is all that

is required to institute proceedings under the terms of section

706(e). 841 F.2d 123, 125 (5th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

829, 109 S.Ct. 82, 102 L.Ed.2d 59. We decided in U rrutia that this

nominal-filing requirement was satisfied when the EEOC transmitted

a copy of the charge to the TCHR. We concluded that the complaint

there, filed with the EEOC within the 300-day period set forth in

section 706(e), was timely. I d. We reaffirmed our U rrutia holding

one year later in Washington v. Patlis, 868 F.2d 172 (5th

Cir.1989).

In this, the fourth section 706(e) case, we must determine

whether the EEOC's acceptance of Mr. Griffin's discrim i nation

charge satisfied Urrutia 's nominal-filing requirement and

institute d proceedings with the TCHR. Because the EEOC received

Mr. Griffin's charge as TCHR's agent, we hold that the EEOC's

acceptance of that charge satisfied both requirements.

In August 1989, the TCHR and the EEOC entered a Worksharing

Agreement which was designed "to minimize duplication of effort in

the processing of charges and to achieve maxim um consistency of1 Congress empowered the EEOC to enter into such agreements

in the Civil Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(1) states that

the EEOC "shall have power to cooperate with and, with their

consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies, both

public and private, and individuals." Section 2000e-8(b) expands

upon the authority granted in § 2000e-4(g)(1). That section

provides that the EEOC "may enter into written agreements with

such State or local agencies and such agreements may include

provisions under which the Commission shall refrain from

processing a charge in any cases or class of cases specified in

such agreements or under which the Commission shall relieve any

person or class of persons in such State or locality from

requirements imposed under this section." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e8(b).

5 pur pose and results." 1 Worksharing Agreement § 1(a). The TCHR

designated the EEOC as its limited agent for receiving charges in

section 2(a) of the Worksharing Agreement: "The [TCHR] by this

agreement designates and establishes the EEOC as a limited agent of

the [TCHR ] for the purpose of receiving charges on behalf of the

[TCHR] and EEOC agrees to receive s uch charges." Worksharing

Agreement § 2(a).

Under the plain terms of this agreement, when Mr. Griffin

filed his discrimination complaint with the EEOC—a complaint which

w as also addressed to the TCHR—the EEOC accepted that complai nt,

not only for its own purposes, but also for the purposes of the

TCHR. Hence, upon the EEOC's receipt of the complaint, the TCHR,

for all legal and practical purposes, received the complaint. As

in Urrutia, we hold here that once the TCHR received Mr. Griffin's

complaint, even if only nominally, proceedings we re instituted

within the meaning of section 706(e). The institution of state

proceedings extended the statute of limitations to 300 days.

B. Compliance with Section 706(c)—Termination of State Proceedings6

Although we hold that proceedings were, in fact, instituted

by the TCHR pursuant to section 706(e), that finding does not end

our inquiry. We must next determine whether Mr. Griffin instituted

proceedings with the EEOC pursuant to section 706(c). While it is

true that Mr. Griffin physically presented a written clai m of

discrimination to the EEOC in its Dallas, Tex as, office, section

706(c) provides t hat no charge may be filed with the EEOC unless

one of two events occurs: 1) the expiration of sixty days after

state or local proceedings were instituted or 2) the termination of

those state or local proceedings. When the EEOC receives a charge

prior to the expiration of the sixty days and prior to the

termination of the state or local proceedings, the EEOC merely

holds that charge in " "suspended animation' " until one of the two

triggering events transforms the receipt of the charge into the

filing of the charge. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v.

Commercial Office Products Co., 486 U.S. 107, 111, 108 S.Ct. 1666,

1669, 100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988) (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S.

522, 525-26, 92 S.Ct. 616, 618-19, 30 L.Ed.2d 679 (1972)).

In this case, as in Washington v. Patlis, sixty days beyond

the initiation of the state proceedin gs extends past the 300-day

limitations period. Mr. Griffin's complaint, therefore, if at all

timely, can so be only if the state proceedings were terminated

before the 300-day limitations period expired. Upon review of the

TCHR-EEOC Worksharing Agreement and applicable case l aw, we find

that the state proceedings were instantaneously terminated upon Mr.

Griffin's filing of his charge with the EEOC.7

The TCHR waived its exclusive jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin's

charge, indeed over "[a]ll ch arges covered under Title VII which

[were] received by EEOC beyond 180 days but before 300 days after

the date of the al leged violation." Worksharing Agreement §§

4(c)(7), 4(d). The TCHR additionally conferred upon the EEOC

exclusive responsibility for such charges. Id. at § 4(c)(7). In

Urrutia, this Court recognized that the waiver provisio n there

became effective when the parties entered the Worksharing

Agreement. S ee Urrutia, 841 F .2d at 125 ("Under terms of the

W orksharing Agreement, the TCHR had already agreed that the E EOC

was to have exclusive responsibility for processing all claims

filed between 180 days and 300 days after alleged violations of

Title VII." (emphasis added)). The State therefore needed to do

nothing more to execute its waiver.

Determining the effect of such waiver provisions, the Supreme

Court, in Commercial Office Produ cts, ruled that a state FEP

agency's waiver of its exclusive jurisdiction over discrimination

charges accomplishes three things: A waiver effectively terminates

state proceedings within the meaning of section 706(c). It allows

the EEOC to deem the charge filed, and it permits the EEOC to

process the charge immediatel y. 486 U.S. at 112, 108 S.Ct. at

1669-70. In light of our ruling in U rrutia and the Supreme Court's

decision in Commercial Office Products, we now hold that the TCHR's

waiver of jurisdiction over Mr. Griffin's charge, and indeed over

all charges filed after 180 days but before 300 days following the

alleged discriminatory event, was self-executing. The waiver8

ins tantaneously transformed the EEOC's r eceipt of Mr. Griffin's

charge into a filing of that charge and authorized the EEOC to

initiate proceedings on that charge immediately.

Our holding is consis tent with the EEOC's construction of

waiver provisions in such Worksharing Agreements. In the

regulations which interpret its Title VII authority, the Commission

has determine d that when a discrimination charge "on its face

constitutes a charge within a category of charges over which the

FEP agency has waived its rights to the period of exclusive

processing

..., the charge is deemed to be filed with the

Commission up on receipt of the document." 29 C.F.R. §

1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A). According to the EEOC, "[s]uch filing is

timely if the charge is received within 300 days from the date of

the alleged violation." Id.

This construction is in consonance with the purposes of Title

VII. As the C ommercial Office Products Court recognized, Congress

created the sixty-day, exclusive-jurisdiction period to afford

states the first opportunity to handle discrimination complaints

which arise within their provinces. 486 U.S. at 118, 108 S.Ct. at

1672-73. States' jurisdiction, though exclusive, is entirely

voluntary . If states do not want exclusive—or any—jurisdiction,

they are free to relinquish it. The only consequence is that the

EEOC may then intervene sans delay. Id.

Today's holding brings this Circuit in line with the Fourth,

Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, a nd Eleventh Circuits, each of which has

ruled that such waivers are self-executing, permitting the EEOC to9

commence proceedings when the charge is filed. S ee Worthington v.

Union Pacific Railroad, 948 F.2d 477 (8th Cir.1991); Sofferin v.

American Airlines, Inc., D.J., 923 F.2d 552 (7th Cir.1991); E qual

Employment Opportunity Commission v. Techalloy Maryland, Inc., 894

F.2d 676 (4th Cir.1990); G riffin v. Air Products and Chemicals,

Inc., 883 F.2d 940 (11th Cir.1989); G reen v. Los Angeles County

Superintendent of Schools, 883 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir.1989).

III. Conclusion

Because the EEOC accepted Mr. Griffin's complaint as TCHR's

agent, Mr. Griffin instituted state proceedings within the meaning

of section 706(e) of the Civil Rights Act. The institution of

those proceedings extended the limitations period to 300 days. The

TCHR's waiver of its exclusive juri sdiction over Mr. Griffin's

claim terminated the state proceedings when Mr. Griffin filed his

claim with the EEOC. Because Mr. Griffin filed his claim within

the 300-day period, the State's waiver conferred upon the EEOC the

authority to process the cla im immediately. The district court

erred in holding otherwise.

We REVERSE and REMAND for trial on the merits.