```

[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 198 (Friday, October 11, 2024)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 82499-82506]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-23430]

[[Page 82499]]

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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

31 CFR Part 1010

Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting the Transmittal of 
Funds Involving PM2BTC

AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.

ACTION: Final order.

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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing notice of an order, pursuant to the 
Combating Russian Money Laundering Act, as amended by the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022, to prohibit certain 
transmittals of funds by any covered financial institution involving 
PM2BTC, a financial institution operating outside of the United States 
determined to be of a primary money laundering concern in connection 
with Russian illicit finance.

DATES: This order is effective October 11, 2024.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Resource Center, 1-800-767-
2825 or electronically at [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Summary of Order

    This order (1) sets forth FinCEN's determination that PM2BTC, an 
unincorporated convertible virtual currency (CVC) exchanger (a type of 
virtual asset service provider or VASP), is a financial institution 
operating outside of the United States that is of primary money 
laundering concern \1\ in connection with Russian illicit finance; and 
(2) prohibits certain transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC by any 
covered financial institution.
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    \1\ The application of FinCEN's authorities in this order is 
specific only to section 9714 of the Combating Russian Money 
Laundering Act, as amended. It is not intended to otherwise reflect 
the applicability of, or obligations under, any provision of the 
Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) or its implementing regulations, and FinCEN 
has not considered the extent to which PM2BTC does business in the 
United States.
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    As set out in this order, PM2BTC, a CVC exchanger offering CVC and 
fiat currency exchange services with significant ties to, and 
connections with, Russia, is of primary money laundering in connection 
with Russian illicit finance through its facilitation of funds 
transfers by illicit actors and association with a wide array of 
illicit activities, including fraud schemes, sanctions evasion, 
ransomware attacks, and child abuse.

II. Background

A. Statutory provisions

    Section 9714(a) of the Combating Russian Money Laundering Act (Pub. 
L. 116-283), as amended by section 6106(b) of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Pub. L. 117-81) (hereafter, 
``section 9714''),\2\ provides, in relevant part, that, if the 
Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) ``determines that reasonable 
grounds exist for concluding that one or more financial institutions 
operating outside of the United States . . . is of primary money 
laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance,'' the 
Secretary may, ``by order, regulation, or otherwise as permitted by 
law'': (1) require domestic financial institutions and domestic 
financial agencies to take 1 or more of the special measures described 
in 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b); \3\ or (2) prohibit, or impose conditions upon, 
certain transmittals of funds (as defined by the Secretary) by any 
domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency, if such 
transmittal of funds involves any such institution. The authority of 
the Secretary to administer both section 9714 and the Bank Secrecy Act 
(BSA) has been delegated to FinCEN.\4\
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    \2\ Section 9714 (as amended) may be found in a note to 31 
U.S.C. 5318A.
    \3\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A grants the Secretary the authority, upon 
finding that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that one or 
more financial institutions operating outside of the United States 
is of primary money laundering concern, to require domestic 
financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take 
certain ``special measures.''
    \4\ Pursuant to Treasury Order 180-01, the authority of the 
Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to administer the BSA, 
including, but not limited to, 31 U.S.C. 5318A, has been delegated 
to the Director of FinCEN. Treasury Order 180-01 (Jan. 14, 2020). On 
August 11, 2022, and in accordance with Treasury Order 101-05 and 31 
U.S.C. 321(b), Treasury's Under Secretary for Terrorism & Financial 
Intelligence re-delegated to the Director of FinCEN the authority of 
the Secretary under section 9714.
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    The six special measures set out in section 9714 are prophylactic 
safeguards that may be employed to defend the United States financial 
system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks with a nexus 
to Russian illicit finance. The Secretary may impose one or more of 
these special measures in order to protect the U.S. financial system 
from such threats. Specifically, the Secretary may impose any of the 
five special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 5318A, commonly known as 
section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Through special measure one, the 
Secretary may require domestic financial institutions and domestic 
financial agencies to maintain records, file reports, or both, 
concerning the aggregate amount of transactions or individual 
transactions.\5\ Through special measures two through four, the 
Secretary may impose additional recordkeeping, information collection, 
and reporting requirements on covered domestic financial institutions 
and domestic financial agencies.\6\ Through special measure five, the 
Secretary may prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or 
maintaining in the United States of correspondent or payable-through 
accounts for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if the 
class of transactions found to be of primary money laundering concern 
may be conducted through such correspondent account or payable-through 
account.\7\ In addition to the special measures set out in 31 U.S.C. 
5318A, section 9714 also provides that the Secretary may impose a 
special measure prohibiting, or imposing conditions upon, certain 
transmittals of funds.\8\
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    \5\ See section 9714(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1).
    \6\ See section 9714(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(2)-(b)(4).
    \7\ See section 9714(a)(1); 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5).
    \8\ See section 9714(a)(2).
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B. PM2BTC

    PM2BTC is a CVC exchanger, a category of VASP, that exists as a 
collection of several exchange services. By its own account, PM2BTC is 
comprised of the following exchange services: PM2BTC.ME, BTC2PM.ME, 
PM2CASHIN.ME, BTC2CASHIN.ME, PM2WM.ME, and BTC2WM.ME.\9\
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    \9\ This statement was made by the BitcoinTalk user, ``pm2btc,'' 
which FinCEN assesses is the official account for PM2BTC, on the CVC 
forum BitcoinTalk. See BitcoinTalk, PM2BTC Post, available at 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=639799.msg7140395#msg7140395 
(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
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    Although PM2BTC--through each of its constituent exchange 
services--is advertised as an automated web product, FinCEN assesses 
that this collective grouping of exchange services should be considered 
a single organization, and for that reason, FinCEN will correspondingly 
refer to this collective, its activities, and its website as 
``PM2BTC''. Indeed, notwithstanding the characterization in its 
advertisements, PM2BTC holds itself out as a legal person insofar as 
PM2BTC states--in its terms of service--that use of its exchange 
services constitutes a contract between parties to an agreement, with 
PM2BTC expressly identified as a party. Consistent with that 
characterization in its terms of service, FinCEN assess that PM2BTC 
also operates as a standard organization, comprised of its founders/
operators and employees, with consistent and

[[Page 82500]]

coordinated internal operations and customer service interfaces. As a 
threshold matter, PM2BTC, including each of its constituent exchange 
services, is operated, with other persons, by Sergey Sergeevich Ivanov 
(Ivanov), a Russian national with an established history of advertising 
the use of U.S.-based money services businesses for cashouts and drops 
services on various Russian-speaking cybercrime forums, ties to top-
tier cyber criminals and cybercrime services, and apparent ties to 
other online CVC exchanges and an associated payment processing service 
associated with ransomware, bank fraud, malware, and other suspected 
illicit activity. In addition, in its daily operations, PM2BTC relies 
on developers and other personnel. As set out in its terms of service, 
for example, PM2BTC's ``administration'' conducts anti-money laundering 
(AML) checks of all the transactions it processes, with corresponding 
authority to verify users and suspend the execution of the 
transactions, as well as to assess a ``commission'' for processing the 
transaction.\10\ Moreover, each of PM2BTC's constituent exchange 
services offers an identical customer service point of contact--
``pm2btc''--on a Russian messaging platform, and the same email 
address--``support@pm2btc[.]me''--with each apparently offering 
customer service support through PM2BTC personnel.\11\ As such, FinCEN 
assesses that, rather than a mere automated web product, PM2BTC is an 
organization that operates as a service provider.\12\
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    \10\ See infra Part III.A.3, for further discussion of PM2BTC's 
anti-money laundering program.
    \11\ PM2BTC's websites, available at https://pm2btc.me, https://pm2btc.me/terms, https://pm2wm.me, https://pm2wm.me/terms, https://pm2cashin.me, https://pm2cashin.me/terms, https://pm2cashin.me/terms, https://pm2cashin.me/terms, https://btc2wm.me, https://btc2wm.me/terms, https://btc2pm.me, https://btc2pm.me/terms, https://btc2cashin.me, https://btc2cashin.me/terms, https://pm2btc.me (last 
accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \12\ All references to PM2BTC's Terms of Service are sourced 
from https://pm2btc.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
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    Further, in light of its activities and the services it provides, 
PM2BTC is a financial institution within the meaning of section 9714. 
According to its official website,\13\ PM2BTC allows customers to 
exchange between Russian Rubles (RUB) and various CVCs, including 
Bitcoin (BTC), Litecoin (LTC), and Dash (DASH), as well as other CVC 
offered by Russian money service businesses--Perfect Money \14\ and 
WebMoney.\15\ As a general matter, the names of PM2BTC's constituent 
exchange services denote the exchangeable direction of the offered CVC 
or fiat currencies. For example, PM2BTC as an exchange service, 
converts the digital currency Perfect Money--or ``PM''--into Bitcoin--
or BTC--and thus, taken together, the name of the exchanger--PM2BTC--
captures the service and direction of exchange. As a general matter, 
transactions through PM2BTC's constituent exchange services follow 
generally similar processes. By way of illustration, PM2BTC's official 
PM2BTC.ME website details a transaction process whereby, for example, 
PM2BTC connects to a customer's Perfect Money (PM) account and 
coordinates the conversion of PM into BTC, subsequently receiving a 
fixed fee. To carry out this type of exchange transaction, a customer 
would enter their PM account information and a corresponding BTC wallet 
address to which PM2BTC would send BTC. Once the order is submitted, 
PM2BTC would effectuate the withdrawal of PM value and send BTC to the 
customer-designated wallet, completing the transaction.\16\ Although 
section 9714 does not expressly define the term ``financial 
institution,'' FinCEN has long defined that term to apply to foreign 
and domestic ``money transmitters,'' including persons that accept and 
transmit value that substitutes for currency, such as CVC.\17\ VASPs, 
such as PM2BTC, are ``money transmitters'' because they are engaged in 
the transfer of funds as defined in 31 CFR 1010.100. PM2BTC is 
therefore a financial institution within the meaning of section 9714.
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    \13\ Unless noted otherwise, all references to PM2BTC's official 
website, web page, or policies are sourced from pages and links 
accessed via https://pm2btc.me, https://pm2btc.me/terms, https://pm2wm.me, https://pm2wm.me/terms, https://pm2cashin.me, https://pm2cashin.me/terms, https://btc2wm.me, https://btc2wm/terms, https://btc2pm.me, https://btc2pm.me/terms, https://btc2cashin.me, https://btc2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \14\ Perfect Money, or PM, is a Russian financial service that 
allows its users to make anonymous instant payments and to make 
money transfers securely throughout the internet. Perfect Money, 
available at https://perfectmoney.com/about.html (last accessed 
Sept. 17, 2024); see also Ben [LNU], The unregulated Russian payment 
and lending platform Perfect Money!, FinTelegram (Feb. 14, 2022), 
available at fintelegram.com/r4i-the-unregulated-russian-payment-and-lending-platform-perfect-money (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \15\ WebMoney, or WM, is a Russia based global online payment 
system that facilitates online business activities. See WebMoney, 
Terms of Use, available at https://debt.wmtransfer.com/Rules.aspx?lang=en (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \16\ PM2BTC, available at https://pm2btc.me (last accessed Sept. 
17, 2024).
    \17\ See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. 5312; 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(3); 
1010.100(ff); 1010.605(f)(iv); see also FinCEN, FIN-2019-G001, 
Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Certain Business Models 
Involving Convertible Virtual Currencies (May 9, 2019); FinCEN, FIN-
2013-G001, Application of FinCEN's Regulations to Persons 
Administering, Exchanging, or Using Virtual Currencies (Mar. 18, 
2013).
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    Additionally, based on public and non-public information available 
to FinCEN, PM2BTC operates outside the United States and, although it 
is not incorporated in any jurisdiction, PM2BTC has significant ties 
to, and connections with, Russia. Indeed, PM2BTC presents substantial 
ties to the Russian financial sector and largely--but not exclusively--
offers exchange services between individual, often Russian users as 
well as Russian financial institutions and financial services 
platforms. As a threshold matter, the ``Exchange Regulations and AML & 
KYC'' policies for certain of PM2BTC's constituent exchange services 
expressly reference, and indicate a need to comply with, Russian law 
under certain circumstances,\18\ as well as require users to 
acknowledge that payments will be processed during the exchange's 
working hours, set on Moscow Standard Time (MSK).\19\ More 
significantly, PM2BTC provides services that, as noted above, permit 
customers to exchange between Russian Rubles (RUB) and various CVCs. In 
fact, each of PM2BTC's constituent exchange services automatically 
converts the value of BTC the customer is preparing to send to the 
service to its equivalent value in Russian Rubles.\20\ Among its 
services, PM2BTC also provides specific services to users in, or 
transacting in, Russia, including, for instance, offering services to 
convert BTC to cash at certain Russian banks, permitting users only to 
identify Russia for ``Receivers [sic] Country'' (meaning the service 
will transmit funds to Russia), providing customers ready access to 
numerous Russian banks and money service businesses, and offering 
Cyrillic script user interfaces.
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    \18\ BTC2CASHIN Terms, available at https://btc2cashin.me/terms 
(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); PM2CASHIN Terms, available at 
https://pm2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \19\ Id. According to the Central Intelligence Agency's World 
Fact Book, UTC +3 is the time zone used in Moscow, Russia. Central 
Intelligence Agency, World Factbook: Russia, available at https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/russia (last accessed Sept. 
17, 2024).
    \20\ BTC2CASHIN, available at https://btc2cashin.me (last 
accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
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    PM2BTC can carry out such transactions quickly, with most 
transactions up to 30,000 RUB completed within 15-60 minutes, although 
PM2BTC's website notes that transactions with Alfa-Bank require up to 
two hours.\21\ In addition, PM2BTC

[[Page 82501]]

has ongoing arrangements with numerous Russian financial institutions 
and financial service providers, including but not limited to JSC Alfa-
Bank (Alfa-Bank),\22\ Perfect Money, WebMoney, and Limited Liability 
Company YooMoney (YooMoney).\23\ For instance, according to PM2BTC's 
official BTC2CASHIN.ME website, PM2BTC's services that offer conversion 
of BTC to cash for customers contain a drop-down menu called ``method 
of obtaining'' for customers to select which of the financial 
institutions they wish to transact with. The dropdown menu lists 
numerous Russian banks and money service businesses, including, but not 
limited to, Alfa-Bank and YooMoney.
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    \21\ PM2CASHIN, available at https://pm2cashin.me (last accessed 
Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2CASHIN, available at https://btc2cashin.me 
(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024), https://pm2cashin.me (last accessed 
Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2CASHIN, available at https://btc2cashin.me 
(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \22\ On April 6, 2022, Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets 
Control (OFAC) sanctioned Alfa-Bank and six of its subsidiaries 
pursuant to E.O. 14024 for having operated in the Russian financial 
services sector. Treasury, Press Release, U.S. Treasury Escalates 
Sanctions on Russia for its Atrocities in Ukraine (Apr. 6, 2022), 
available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0705.
    \23\ On February 24, 2022, OFAC sanctioned YooMoney (also known 
as Yoo Money, Yu Money, and Yandex Money). Treasury, Press Release, 
U.S. Treasury Announces Unprecedented & Expansive Sanctions Against 
Russia, Imposing Swift and Severe Economic Costs (Feb. 24, 2022), 
available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0608; 
see also Treasury, Press Release, U.S. Treasury Escalates Sanctions 
on Russia for Its Atrocities in Ukraine (Apr. 6, 2022), available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0705; Treasury, 
Sanctions List Search, Limited Liability Company YooMoney, available 
at https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/Details.aspx?id=34597. Yoo 
Money is a Moscow, Russia based payment processor that was acquired 
by PJSC Sberbank (Sberbank) on July 2, 2020, available at https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/yandex-money (last accessed on Sept. 
17, 2024). The BTC2CASHIN.ME website uses the spelling ``Yu Money'', 
but FinCEN assesses this is a transliteration variant and will 
subsequently refer to the entity as ``Limited Liability Company 
YooMoney''. See id.
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III. Finding That PM2BTC Is of Primary Money Laundering Concern in 
Connection With Russian Illicit Finance

    Based on public and non-public information available to FinCEN, 
FinCEN finds that reasonable grounds exist for concluding that PM2BTC, 
a CVC exchanger with significant ties to and connections with Russia, 
is a financial institution of primary money laundering concern in 
connection with Russian illicit finance through its facilitation of 
funds transfers by Russian-affiliated illicit actors and associated 
with a wide array of illicit activities, including fraud schemes, 
sanctions evasion, ransomware attacks, and child abuse.

A. The Extent to Which PM2BTC Is of Money Laundering Concern in 
Connection With Russian Illicit Finance

    Based on blockchain analysis, FinCEN identified significant ties 
between PM2BTC and a broad spectrum of illicit actors and illicit 
activities. FinCEN's analysis, using the combined counterparty 
information from two clusters attributed to PM2BTC by commercially 
available blockchain analytic software found that a substantial 
percentage of transactions processed through PM2BTC were associated 
with wallet addresses linked to illicit actors and activity, including 
fraud shops, illicit actors or organizations, sanctioned persons and 
jurisdictions, ransomware attackers, darknet markets (DNMs), scam 
operators, child abuse materials traffickers, and entities that are the 
subject of FinCEN-imposed special measures. In addition to the specific 
categories of illicit activity with which PM2BTC is associated, FinCEN 
determined that PM2BTC facilitates a disproportionally high volume of 
suspected illicit activity compared to peer exchange service providers. 
Moreover, alarmingly, PM2BTC also employs a technique that is used to 
stymie the ability to trace illicit funds to or from PM2BTC, which 
permits illicit actors access to a money laundering platform and also 
decreases the risk of this activity being identified by investigating 
authorities.
1. PM2BTC's Disproportionate Volume of Transactions Involving Illicit 
Activities
    As a threshold matter, FinCEN found that a predominant percentage 
of transactions processed through PM2BTC were linked to suspected 
illicit activity. Based on analysis conducted using commercially 
available blockchain analysis software A, FinCEN has determined that, 
as a percentage of all funds transacted before July 2023, the 
cumulative value of suspected illicit funds accounted for up to 43.1 
percent of all CVC received by PM2BTC. Those funds were associated with 
suspected illicit activities that include, in order of cumulative 
value, fraud schemes, transfers of stolen funds, sanctions evasion, 
terrorist financing, ransomware payments, and child abuse materials 
transactions. Significantly, further analysis comparing transactions 
through PM2BTC against transactions involving 1,244 other VASPs from 
around the world indicated that, after adjusting for the relative size 
of the other VASPs analyzed, PM2BTC is in the top one percent of direct 
receiving exposure and the top two percent of indirect receiving 
exposure to the categories deemed to be associated with suspected 
illicit activity. In short, PM2BTC has exceedingly high exposure to, 
and association with, transactions associated with suspected illicit 
activity compared to peer VASPs throughout the world, presenting a 
significant money laundering risk.
2. PM2BTC's Ties to Illicit Actors
    PM2BTC's exposure to, and facilitation of, transactions associated 
with suspected illicit activity is, importantly, consistent with its 
long-standing associations with a wide range of illicit actors, 
including, in particular, Russian ransomware groups, darknet markets, 
and sanctioned persons.
    For several years, PM2BTC processed, for example, a substantial 
volume of transactions associated with the now-defunct Conti and 
Trickbot ransomware gangs.\24\ According to blockchain analysis using 
commercially available blockchain analytic software, between February 
5, 2018, and February 2, 2021,

[[Page 82502]]

Trickbot, including its affiliates and associates, processed 
approximately $4,299,457 of CVC through PM2BTC.\25\ Those transactions 
constituted, by value, a significant majority of PM2BTC's ransomware-
related financial activity during the period. In addition, although the 
Conti and Trickbot ransomware gangs are now defunct, PM2BTC continues 
to process transactions involving CVC from sources attributed to other 
variants of ransomware.
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    \24\ Based on public and non-public information, FinCEN assesses 
that, on or around 2021, the Conti and Trickbot ransomware gangs had 
effectively merged and were effectively one and the same. For 
further details concerning Trickbot and its relation to Conti or 
their collective Russia connections, see WIRED, Leaked Ransomware 
Doc Show Conti Helping Putin from Shadows (Mar. 18, 2022), available 
at https://www.wired.com/story/conti-ransomware-russia/ (describing 
Conti's pledged allegiance to Russia, its connection to Russian 
cybercrime and Russia's intelligence apparatus); CPO Magazine, After 
Declaring Support for Russian Invasion, Conti Ransomware Gang Hit 
With Data Leak (Mar. 8, 2022), available at https://www.cpomagazine.com/cyber-security/after-declaring-support-for-russian-invasion-conti-ransomware-gang-hit-with-data-leak/ 
(concerning Conti's relationship with Russian law enforcement); 
CyberScoop, Conti Ransomware Group Announces Support of Russia, 
Threatens Retaliatory Attack (Feb. 25, 2022), available at https://cyberscoop.com/conti-ransomware-russia-ukraine-critical-infrastructure/; Reuters, Russia-Based ransomware Group Conti Issues 
Warning to Kremlin Foes (Feb. 26, 2022), available at https://www.reuters.com/technology/russia-based-ransomware-group-conti-issues-warning-kremlin-foes-2022-02-25/ (concerning Trickbot's 
support of the Russian Government); Security Week, Conti Ransomware 
`Acquires' Trickbot as it Thrives Amid Crackdowns (Feb. 21, 2022), 
available at https://www.securityweek.com/conti-ransomware-acquires-trickbot-it-thrives-amid-crackdowns/; WIRED, Inside Trickbot, 
Russia's Notorious Ransomware Gang (Feb. 1, 2022), available at 
https://www.wired.com/story/trickbot-malware-group-internal-messages/ (concerning the connection between Trickbot and Conti); 
Department of Justice, Russian National Sentenced for Involvement in 
Development and Deployment of Trickbot Malware (Jan. 25, 2024), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/russian-national-sentenced-involvement-development-and-deployment-trickbot-malware; 
Treasury, United States and United Kingdom Sanction Additional 
Members of the Russia-Based Trickbot Cybercrime Gang (Sept. 7, 
2023), available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1714 (concerning recent U.S. government actions against Trickbot).
    \25\ This analysis takes into account only direct transfers 
(e.g., where an address attributed to Trickbot transfers directly to 
PM2BTC). It does not include indirect exposure in which Trickbot 
sought to obfuscate the transactional path between their addresses 
and PM2BTC, nor does it include any transfers in which Trickbot 
first sent to another service and subsequently sent from that 
service to PM2BTC. All transaction values throughout this Order 
represent the USD exchange rate of the CVC at the time of the 
transaction.
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    In addition to ties to ransomware-related transactions, PM2BTC has 
a long history of facilitating transactions involving darknet \26\ 
markets, including the now-defunct Russia-linked darknet markets 
Hydra--which was sanctioned by OFAC in April 2022 \27\--and Ferum 
Shop.\28\ Darknet markets are fundamentally illicit in nature and can 
operate largely as a result of the inherent anonymity of the darknet 
infrastructure, facilitating illicit activity because of the difficulty 
involved for law enforcement in identifying users, infrastructure, and 
even domains associated with the sale of illicit goods and 
services.\29\ FinCEN assesses that, between 2016 and 2022, PM2BTC 
regularly processed transactions involving Hydra and Ferum Shop. For 
instance, between June 15, 2016, and January 30, 2021, Hydra sent a 
total of $41,361 worth of CVC to PM2BTC. Similarly, based on analysis 
conducted using commercially available blockchain analytic software, 
Ferum Shop sent a total of $3,453,610 worth of CVC to PM2BTC between 
April 6, 2021, and February 8, 2022. In addition, although Hydra and 
Ferum Shop have now been shut down,\30\ PM2BTC continues to process a 
substantial volume of transactions, by value, associated with darknet 
markets. Indeed, based on analysis conducted using commercially 
available blockchain analytic software, PM2BTC processed transactions 
valued at over $600,000 involving other darknet markets between July 
22, 2023, and January 14, 2024.
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    \26\ ``Darknet'' is a term used to refer to networks that are 
only accessible through the use of specific software or network 
configurations. In particular, darknet content is not indexed by web 
search engines, and is often accessed via anonymized, encrypted 
systems like the software The Onion Router (TOR). Darknet markets 
are online markets only accessible with the use of software like 
TOR, and because such markets are not indexed, they can only be 
found if the domain name and URL are already known to the user. As a 
result of the inherent anonymity of the darknet infrastructure, 
darknets facilitate criminal activity because of the difficulty 
involved for law enforcement in identifying users, infrastructure, 
and even domains associated with the sale of illicit goods and 
services.
    \27\ See Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Russia-
Based Hydra, World's Largest Darknet Market, and Ransomware-Enabling 
Virtual Currency Exchange Garantex (Apr. 5, 2022), available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0701.
    \28\ Elliptic, Elliptic Analysis: Russia Seizes Four Major Dark 
Web Carding Sites with $263 million in crypto sales (Feb. 9, 2022), 
available at https://www.elliptic.co/blog/russia-seizes-four-major-dark-web-carding-sites-with-263-million-in-crypto-sales.
    \29\ FinCEN, Proposal of Special Measure Regarding Convertible 
Virtual Currency Mixing, as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money 
Laundering Concern, 88 FR 72701 (Oct. 23, 2023), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/23/2023-23449/proposal-of-special-measure-regarding-convertible-virtual-currency-mixing-as-a-class-of-transactions.
    \30\ In February 2022, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs 
took down four major illicit dark websites: Sky-Fraud Forum, Trump's 
Dumps, UAS Store, and Ferum Shop. Elliptic, Elliptic Analysis: 
Russia Seizes Four Major Dark Web Carding Sites with $263 million in 
crypto sales (Feb. 9, 2022), available at https://www.elliptic.co/blog/russia-seizes-four-major-dark-web-carding-sites-with-263-million-in-crypto-sales. Because the Russian Ministry of Internal 
Affairs carried out what amounts to a coordinated, simultaneous 
takedown of multiple darknet markets, but indicated no coordination 
with any international partners, FinCEN assesses Ferum Shop was at 
least partially operated in Russia.
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    Finally, PM2BTC has long-standing and close ties to an array of 
Russian or Russian-affiliated financial institutions that are the 
subject of U.S. sanctions or other restrictions. As noted earlier, 
PM2BTC has ongoing arrangements with numerous Russian financial 
institutions and financial service providers, including but not limited 
to YooMoney (an affiliate of Sberbank) and Alfa-Bank, each of which are 
the subject of U.S. sanctions.\31\ In addition, since 2020, PM2BTC has 
conducted an increasing volume of transactional activity with Garantex, 
a Russian-affiliated VASP that was sanctioned by the United States in 
April 2022.\32\ Between November 11, 2020, and September 20, 2023, 
PM2BTC engaged in CVC transactions with a value of nearly $300,000 
involving Garantex, and notably, the bulk of those transactions 
occurred only after sanctions were imposed on Garantex. During largely 
the same period, PM2BTC also engaged in a sizable volume of 
transactions with Bitzlato Limited (Bitzlato), a Russian-affiliated CVC 
exchanger identified by FinCEN in January 2023 as a financial 
institution operating outside of the United States that was of primary 
money laundering concern in connection with Russian illicit finance, 
under section 9714.\33\ According to blockchain analysis conducted by 
FinCEN using commercially available blockchain analytic software, 
between May 10, 2018, and January 17, 2023, Bitzlato sent approximately 
$154,429 worth of CVC to PM2BTC and, in turn, received approximately 
$541,307 worth of CVC from PM2BTC.
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    \31\ See supra notes 22-23.
    \32\ See Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Sanctions Russia-
Based Hydra, World's Largest Darknet Market, and Ransomware-Enabling 
Virtual Currency Exchange Garantex (Apr. 5, 2022), available at 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0701.
    \33\ FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting the 
Transmittal of Funds Involving Bitzlato, 88 FR 3919 (Jan. 23, 2023) 
available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/23/2023-01189/imposition-of-special-measure-prohibiting-the-transmittal-of-funds-involving-bitzlato.
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    Taken as a whole, PM2BTC's historic and ongoing facilitation of 
transactions by, and associations with, illicit actors, including 
ransomware groups, darknet markets, and sanctioned persons connected to 
Russian illicit finance, combined with its access to international 
markets presents substantial money laundering risk.
3. PM2BTC's Lax Anti-Money Launder Policies and Procedures
    The risks presented by PM2BTC associations with illicit actors and 
comparative high volume of transactional activity linked to suspected 
illicit activity are compounded by PM2BTC's lax KYC and AML policies 
and procedures, as well as recent technical changes that have the 
effect of obscuring PM2BTC's involvement in transactions.
    Although PM2BTC purports to maintain KYC and AML policies and 
procedures, those policies and procedures appear inadequate and loosely 
implemented. According to its website, PM2BTC ``adhere[s] to a number 
of rules and implements a number of procedures aimed at preventing the 
use of the service for the purpose of money laundering operations.'' 
\34\ Moreover, as set out in its terms of service, PM2BTC retains the 
ability to, and may, suspend the execution of transactions until 
verification is carried out in accordance

[[Page 82503]]

with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations and 
``request from the User identification data and data confirming the 
source of funds.'' \35\
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    \34\ PM2BTC Terms, available at https://pm2btc.me/terms (last 
accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2CASHIN Terms, available at https://btc2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2WM Terms 
available at https://btc2wm.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 
BTC2PM Terms, available at https://btc2pm.me/terms (last accessed 
Sept. 17, 2024); PM2WM Terms available at https://pm2wm.me/terms 
(last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); PM2CASHIN Terms available at https://pm2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \35\ BTC2WM Terms, available at https://btc2wm.me/terms (last 
accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2PM Terms available at https://btc2pm.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2CASHIN Terms, 
available at https://btc2cashin.me/terms (last accessed Sept. 17, 
2024).
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    However, in practice, PM2BTC appears to only require users to 
provide the following information in order to conduct a transaction: 
(1) the type of CVC involved; (2) the value of the CVC to be sent or 
received; and (3) an email address (required ``in order to communicate 
with the User, if necessary, to notify about Service's profitable 
offers'').\36\ Such limited information is not consistent with FATF 
recommendations. There appears to be no requirement to provide a name, 
date of birth, address, national identification, or any other proof of 
identification--all necessary to meaningfully establish and verify the 
identity of users and core features of the FATF's guidance on necessary 
official identity data points for an effective KYC and AML program.\37\ 
Indeed, in contrast to PM2BTC's claim that it adheres to FATF 
standards, it represents that it offers ``[c]omplete anonymity of 
exchanges'' and that ``[t]here is no need to register or undergo any 
verification to make an exchange.'' \38\
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    \36\ BTC2CASHIN, available at https://btc2cashin.me (last 
accessed Sept. 17, 2024); see also, BTC2PM available at https://btc2pm.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); BTC2WM, available at 
https://www.btc2wm.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); PM2BTC, 
available at https://pm2btc.me (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024); 
PM2CASHIN, available at https://pm2cashin.me (last accessed Sept. 
17, 2024); PM2WM, available at https://pm2wm.me (last accessed Sept. 
17, 2024).
    \37\ FATF, Guidance on Digital Identity (Mar. 2020), at 63, 
available at https://www.fatf-gafi.org/content/dam/fatf-gafi/guidance/Guidance-on-Digital-Identity.pdf.
    \38\ This statement was made by the BitcoinTalk user, 
``pm2btc,'' which FinCEN assesses is the official account for 
PM2BTC, on the CVC forum BitcoinTalk. See BitcoinTalk PM2BTC Post, 
available at https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=639799.msg7140395#msg7140395 (last accessed Sept. 
17, 2024).
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    Notwithstanding its purported policies and procedures, FinCEN 
assesses that PM2BTC has implemented technical changes to its wallet 
arrangement that have the effect of obscuring its involvement when 
transacting with other VASPs. On or around July 2023, FinCEN assesses 
that PM2BTC implemented a cyclical infrastructure setup--a continuous 
creation of new wallets which are rotating and temporary--that avoids 
the reuse of wallets and, contrary to standard practice among VASPs, 
impedes any capacity to capture long-term transactional histories that 
would allow financial institutions to identify PM2BTC as the 
counterparty to a transaction. This typology is not wholly new and, for 
instance, has been employed by several VASPs of concern, some of whom 
are subjected to OFAC sanctions. In FinCEN's assessment, this typology 
can be, and has been, used to facilitate evasion of U.S. sanctions. 
Here, FinCEN assesses that PM2BTC's cyclical infrastructure setup is an 
effort to avoid blockchain forensics-based transaction monitoring--an 
outcome that is already evident in the precipitous decline in 
observable transactions associated with suspected illicit activity 
since July 2023. FinCEN assesses that this decline in such observable 
transactions is a result of PM2BTC's efforts to avoid blockchain 
activity monitoring, and is not a true reflection of PM2BTC's actual 
business activity with illicit actors.
    Taken together, PM2BTC's lax implementation of KYC and AML policies 
and procedures and adoption of a technical arrangement that inhibits 
effective blockchain analysis increases the risk PM2BTC poses to the 
international and U.S. financial systems.

B. Whether the Money Laundering Concern Posed by PM2BTC Outweighs Any 
Legitimate Business Activity It May Conduct

    The record amply demonstrates that PM2BTC's services are used, to 
an unusually large extent by comparison to other CVC exchanges, to 
facilitate illicit activities by illicit actors. Although PM2BTC offers 
services that could potentially be used by licit actors, those services 
may be found at other VASPs, including VASPs located in jurisdictions 
with robust AML/CFT frameworks and regulatory oversight. Legitimate 
actors have access to a broad range of comparable services that provide 
for appropriate transparency and can support international efforts to 
protect the integrity of the international financial system, including 
transactions involving CVC. Accordingly, given the extensive flow of 
illegitimate funds through PM2BTC, FinCEN assesses that the need to 
protect U.S. financial institutions from the money laundering risks 
presented by PM2BTC outweighs any potential legitimate utility its 
services may provide.

IV. Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting Transmittals of Funds 
Involving PM2BTC

    Having found that PM2BTC is a financial institution operating 
outside the United States that is of primary money laundering concern 
in connection with Russian illicit finance, FinCEN has determined that 
the imposition of a special measure prohibiting certain transmittals of 
funds involving PM2BTC is warranted.\39\
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    \39\ In connection with this action, FinCEN consulted with staff 
at the following Departments and agencies with regard to the 
proposed order and prohibition: the Department of Justice; the 
Department of State; the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; the Securities 
and Exchange Commission; the Commodity Futures Trading Commission; 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; and the National 
Credit Union Administration Board. Those consultations involved 
sharing drafts and information for the purpose of obtaining 
interagency views on the imposition of a prohibition on certain 
transmittals of funds by any domestic financial institution from or 
to PM2BTC, or from an account or CVC address administered by or on 
behalf of PM2BTC, and the effect that such a prohibition would have 
on the domestic and international financial system. Each of the 
Departments and agencies concurred in the issuance of this order.
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A. Whether the Prohibition of Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving 
PM2BTC Will Address the Money Laundering Concern in a Manner Consistent 
With U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests

    Given PM2BTC's extensive association with suspected illicit 
activity and illicit actors, FinCEN assesses that imposing a 
prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC is 
necessary to safeguard U.S. national security and the U.S. financial 
system, as well as serve key U.S. national security objectives. In 
light of the predominant percentage of transactions linked to known or 
suspected illicit activity processed through PM2BTC, prohibiting 
certain transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC will insulate the U.S. 
financial system from international money laundering and other 
financial crimes.
    In particular, prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving 
PM2BTC will further ongoing U.S. efforts to curtail suspected Russian-
associated illicit activity and financial transactions. Targeting 
illicit proceeds obtained by ransomware actors, especially those with a 
nexus to Russia, is, for instance, a high priority for the United 
States. Recent actions by FinCEN, OFAC, and intergovernmental task 
forces have also focused on Russia-related illicit finance threats. 
Prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC will serve 
the United States' national security and foreign policy interests by 
protecting U.S. businesses and interests from known ransomware threat 
actors, by publicly countering a financing mechanism used by illicit 
entities, including entities that seek to further the Russian state's 
aims of political and

[[Page 82504]]

economic destabilization. Similarly, such a prohibition would sever a 
pathway that might facilitate circumvention of U.S. economic sanctions, 
supporting the efficacy of U.S. sanctions and complementing previous 
actions taken by the U.S. government.
    Additionally, this action reinforces the expectations of AML/CFT 
compliance in the virtual asset ecosystem in order to improve the 
identification and reporting of suspicious activity by financial 
institutions around the world.

B. Whether the Prohibition of Certain Transmittals of Funds Involving 
PM2BTC Would Impose Burdens on Legitimate Activity of PM2BTC or Third 
Parties

    FinCEN assesses that prohibiting certain transmittal of funds 
involving PM2BTC will impose limited burdens on legitimate activities 
currently transacted through PM2BTC and, indeed, will have a positive 
systemic impact on the international payment, clearance, and settlement 
system.
    By U.S. and international standards, PM2BTC represents a limited 
percentage of total received BTC (directly and indirectly). As of April 
15, 2024, PM2BTC's total received value was between .0002 and 0.0014 
percent (respectively) of the largest U.S.-domiciled CVC VASP 
(hereinafter referred to as ``VASP 1''). PM2BTC's transaction history 
with VASP 1 totals just over $32 million in CVC over nearly 11 years. 
By contrast, a CVC price and volume aggregator estimates that VASP 1 
processed more than $3 billion in transfers daily \40\ as of April 17, 
2024. By comparison, PM2BTC's largest U.S.-based counterparty 
(hereinafter referred to as ``VASP 2'') sent approximately $147 million 
worth of CVC to PM2BTC between 2018 and 2024, which amounted to 
approximately 0.002 percent of VASP 2's overall sending activity. As 
such, there is no evidence that PM2BTC is a major participant in the 
international payment system or relied upon by the international 
banking community. Indeed, given its size and limited international 
presence, the legitimate business services that it offers would be 
readily available through other regulated institutions. Further, as 
noted in the February 16, 2022, Financial Stability Board's Assessment 
of Risks to Financial Stability, direct connections between CVC as a 
whole, and systemically important financial institutions and core 
financial markets, are limited at present. Volatility and disruptions 
in the CVC ecosystem have been contained within the CVC markets and 
have not significantly spilled over to financial markets and 
infrastructures.\41\
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    \40\ CoinGecko, Exchanges, available at https://www.coingecko.com/en/exchanges (last accessed Sept. 17, 2024).
    \41\ Financial Stability Board, Assessment of Risks to Financial 
Stability from Crypto-assets (Feb. 16, 2022), at 5, available at 
https://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P160222.pdf (last accessed 
Sept. 17, 2024).
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    Given widespread availability of other VASP services, as well as 
PM2BTC's predominant use for suspected illicit activity, imposing a 
prohibition on certain transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC will 
merely remove from transaction chains a VASP that facilitates illicit 
or otherwise unduly risky transactions that pose a risk to the 
international financial system. This action will not have an adverse 
impact on the international payment, clearance, and settlement system 
or on legitimate business activities currently involving PM2BTC.
    Moreover, FinCEN assesses that imposing a prohibition on certain 
transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC will not present a significant 
competitive disadvantage for financial institutions organized or 
licensed in the United States given PM2BTC's relatively small size and 
the relatively limited burden that compliance with this order would 
impose. Given the small size of PM2BTC and the comparatively low value 
of activity between U.S. financial institutions and PM2BTC, FinCEN 
assesses that this would impose neither an undue cost nor substantial 
burden these financial institutions. Further, compliance with the 
prohibition on certain transmittals of funds set out in this order 
requires no tools or competencies other than those already employed by 
domestic financial institutions to maintain their current AML/CFT 
compliance programs. In order to ensure that is the case, FinCEN has 
elected to provide within this order for the rejection of certain 
transmittals of CVC that are received from or originate at PM2BTC and 
outline the steps a covered financial institution should take in such 
circumstances.
    In providing for the rejection of CVC under certain limited 
circumstances, FinCEN acknowledges that, at this time, there are 
technological limitations that may limit or preclude covered financial 
institutions from declining CVC transfers originating at addresses 
outside of their control, and compliant institutions may find 
themselves in receipt of CVC from PM2BTC despite a desire and effort to 
limit such exposure.\42\ This order allows covered financial 
institutions the flexibility to act with discretion based on the facts 
and circumstances of a particular transaction and comply with this 
order, even where the originating address is no longer accessible, 
where, for example, (1) CVC transfers originated from PM2BTC but were 
held for an extended period of time in an unhosted wallet, or (2) the 
covered financial institution's risk mitigation procedures would 
preclude returning funds to PM2BTC. Moreover, by providing for the 
rejection of CVC, this order ensures that covered financial 
institutions will not be subject to an undue cost or burden associated 
with compliance.
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    \42\ FinCEN notes that CVC payment systems are often designed to 
limit the control of specific financial institutions over 
transactions and to prevent rejections of funds by persons or 
entities other than the sender of funds. As a result, although 
covered financial institutions may institute an internal prohibition 
on the sending of CVC transactions to another address or entity, 
FinCEN assesses that there are few, if any, readily available ways 
for covered financial institutions to ``reject'' incoming CVC 
transactions (prior to receipt).
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C. Whether Any Other Reasonable Alternatives or Special Measures Would 
Adequately Address the Money Laundering Concern

    FinCEN considered other special measures available pursuant to 
section 9714 prior to selecting the prohibition reflected in this 
order.\43\ However, prohibiting certain transmittals of funds involving 
PM2BTC is the only means of adequately addressing the money laundering 
concern in connection with Russian illicit finance posed by PM2BTC.
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    \43\ Pursuant to section 9714, these measures include: (1) the 
special measures described in 31 U.S.C. 5318A, including the 
imposition of additional recordkeeping, information collection, and 
reporting requirements on covered U.S. financial institutions and/or 
the prohibition or imposition of conditions upon the opening or 
maintaining of correspondent or payable-through accounts for or on 
behalf of a foreign banking institution; and (2) the imposition of 
conditions on the transmittal of funds, as an alternative to a 
prohibition on the transmittal of funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In particular, none of the special measures described in 31 U.S.C. 
5318A would effectively address the illicit finance threat posed by 
PM2BTC.\44\ Any

[[Page 82505]]

additional recordkeeping, information collection, or reporting 
requirements, as described in 31 U.S.C 5318A(b)(1)-(4), would be 
insufficient to guard against the risks posed by covered financial 
institutions processing transmittals of funds involving PM2BTC. Such 
measures may allow such transfers to continue to benefit of illicit 
actors connected to Russian illicit finance. Further, placing 
conditions upon or prohibiting the opening or maintaining in the United 
States of a correspondent account or payable-through account by any 
domestic financial institution or domestic financial agency for or on 
behalf of a foreign banking institution, as described in 31 U.S.C 
5318A(b)(5), is similarly inadequate because the types of CVC 
transactions that PM2BTC facilitates do not rely on correspondent or 
payable-through accounts, and FinCEN is unaware of such relationships 
between PM2BTC and U.S. or foreign financial institutions. In addition, 
PM2BTC's recordkeeping is incomplete, so imposing additional 
recordkeeping requirements is not likely to be successful or sufficient 
to address the risks it poses. For these reasons, FinCEN assesses that 
the prohibition on certain transmittals of funds, including CVC, 
involving PM2BTC is the most appropriate special measure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \44\ Likewise, imposing conditions on transmittals of funds, 
pursuant to section 9714(a)(2), would be insufficient to address the 
threat. While imposing conditions, rather than a full prohibition, 
may be appropriate in circumstances where the institution provides 
services for legitimate business that are not easily replicated or 
where a complete prohibition on transactional activity would 
otherwise unduly harm legitimate economic activity, PM2BTC provides 
a service that is easily obtainable for legitimate customers through 
other providers, and in this case the value of any legitimate 
activity it may conduct is outweighed by the significant proportion 
of illicit financial activity identified and its lack of mandatory 
KYC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Whether the Special Measure Prohibiting Certain Transmittals of 
Funds Should Be Imposed by Order or Regulation

    Pursuant to section 9714, the Secretary may impose specified 
special measures, including a prohibition on certain transmittals of 
funds, ``by order, regulation or otherwise as permitted by law.'' In 
determining the appropriate approach in this instance, FinCEN 
considered imposing special measures by order or regulation. Although 
PM2BTC is not a large participant in the international payment system, 
FinCEN determined that proceeding by an order is the most appropriate 
course of action given the imminent threats posed by the illicit actors 
whose transactions and access to funds PM2BTC facilitates as well as 
the ongoing transactions associated with suspected illicit activity 
that continue to be processed through PM2BTC.
    A copy of this order will be published in the Federal Register. To 
the extent PM2BTC or other parties have information relevant to this 
order, they may submit it to FinCEN at [email protected].

V. Order

A. Definitions

1. PM2BTC
    The order defines PM2BTC, a CVC exchanger comprised of a collection 
of the services PM2BTC.ME, BTC2PM.ME, PM2CASHIN.ME, BTC2CASHIN.ME, 
PM2WM.ME, and BTC2WM.ME, to mean all subsidiaries, branches, and 
offices of PM2BTC operating in any jurisdiction, as well as any 
successor entity.
2. Convertible Virtual Currency (CVC)
    The order defines convertible virtual currency (CVC) as a medium of 
exchange that either has an equivalent value as currency, or acts as a 
substitute for currency, but lacks legal tender status. Despite having 
legal tender status in at least one jurisdiction, for the purpose of 
this order, Bitcoin is included as a type of CVC.
3. Covered Financial Institution
    The order defines a covered financial institution as having the 
same meaning as ``financial institution'' in 31 CFR 1010.100(t).
4. CVC Exchanger
    The order defines a CVC exchanger as any person engaged as a 
business in the exchange of CVC for fiat currency, funds, or other CVC.
5. Recipient
    The order defines recipient as the person to be paid by the 
recipient's covered financial institution.
6. Successor Entity
    The order defines successor entity as any person that replaces 
PM2BTC by acquiring its assets, in whole or in part, and/or carrying 
out the affairs of PM2BTC under a new name.
7. Transmittal of Funds
    The order defines transmittal of funds as the sending and receiving 
of funds, including CVC.
8. Meaning of Other Terms
    All terms used but not otherwise defined herein shall have the 
meaning set forth in 31 CFR Chapter X and 31 U.S.C. 5312.

B. Prohibition of the Transmittal of Funds Involving PM2BTC

1. Prohibition
    A covered financial institution is prohibited from engaging in a 
transmittal of funds from or to PM2BTC, or from or to any account or 
CVC address administered by or on behalf of PM2BTC.
2. Rejection of Funds and Condition on the Transfer of Rejected Funds
    A covered financial institution will be deemed not to have violated 
this Order where, upon determining that it received CVC that originated 
from PM2BTC or from an account or CVC address administered by or on 
behalf of PM2BTC, that covered financial institution rejects the 
transaction, preventing the intended recipient from accessing such CVC 
and returning the CVC to PM2BTC, or to the account or CVC address from 
which the CVC originated.

C. Order Period

    The terms of this order are effective October 11, 2024, with no 
cessation date.

D. Reservation of Authority

    FinCEN reserves its authority pursuant to section 9714 to impose 
conditions on certain transmittals of funds from or to PM2BTC, or from 
or to any account or CVC address administered by or on behalf of 
PM2BTC.

E. Other Obligations

    Nothing in this order shall be construed to modify, impair, or 
otherwise affect any requirements or obligations to which a covered 
financial institution is subject pursuant to the BSA, including, but 
not limited to, the filing of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs), or 
other applicable laws or regulations, such as the sanctions 
administered and enforced by the U.S. Department of the Treasury's 
Office of Foreign Assets Control.

F. Penalties for Noncompliance

    The covered financial institution, and any of its officers, 
directors, employees, and agents, may be liable for civil or criminal 
penalties under 31 U.S.C. 5321 and 5322 for violating any of the terms 
of this order.\45\
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    \45\ Section 6106(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022 (Pub. L. 117-81) amended section 9714 of the 
Combatting Russian Money Laundering Act (Pub. L. 116-283) to, among 
other things, provide that the penalties set forth in 31 U.S.C. 5321 
and 5322 shall apply to violations of any order, regulation, special 
measure, or other requirement imposed under section 9714, in the 
same manner and to the same extent described in sections 5321 and 
5322.
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G. Validity of Order

    Any judicial determination that any provision of this order is 
invalid shall not affect the validity of any other provision of this 
order, and each other

[[Page 82506]]

provision shall thereafter remain in full force and effect.

Jimmy L. Kirby,
Deputy Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2024-23430 Filed 10-10-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P
```