### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-04-00476- CR

Ra ym ond C olu nga , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 30217 87, H ONO RAB LE MICH AEL LYNCH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N A jury convicted a

ppellant Ray

mon d C olunga

of ca pital murder in the c ourse of committing burg lary
. SeeTex. P en. Code Ann. § 19.03(a )(2) (West Supp. 2005). The State did not seek the death pe nalty , and the court imposed the mandator y life sentenc e. In three points of error , appellant challeng es the leg al and fac tual sufficie ncy of the evidenc e and complains of a definitional
err or in the cha

rg e. We will overrule these c ontentions and aff irm the conviction. David He rnande z testi fied that the de cea sed, appe llant’s es t ra n ged wife I rene Colunga , was visiting him in his home on th e n i ght of August 26, 2002. They wer e watching t el evis ion when, at a

bout 1:00 a.m., appellant burst throug h the front door car rying a rifle. Her nandez ra n to a bedr oom and closed the door. He he ard a shot, then another. H erna ndez climbed throug h a wi ndow and r an to a ne ighbor ’s house. The y returne d to Herna

ndez’s house and f

ound2

I rene Colunga

ly ing de ad in the living r oom. Appellant was arr ested in D allas the ne x t day . Police found a loa ded semiautomatic r ifle in his car , and it was identified a s the murder wea pon. The medic al examiner testified that the dece ased was hol ding he r hand in fr ont of her fac e whe n she wa s shot. The bullet entere d the hand, tra veled up the f

orea rm, exit ed and the n
ree ntere d the body , shattering the jaw a nd lary nx and sever ing the car otid a rtery befor e exit ing at the ba c k o f t he ne c k. B a se d o n th e a bs e nc e of the gunp owd e r s tip pli ngc a us e d w he n a

fi re arm is discharg ed at c lose rang e, the medic al examiner wa s of the opinion that the rifle w as at lea st two feet
awa y from the de cea sed’s outstretc hed hand when fire d. Appellant testified that he and the de cea sed we re pla nning to meet at 2:00 a.m., a nd that he ha d s pe nt t

he e arl ie r p art

of the e ve nin g dr ink ing a t bar s. He the n dro ve to a f ri e nd ’s ho us e to repa y a debt a nd to ask if the fr iend knew anyone who wanted to purchase his rifle. L eavingthe friend’s house, appe llant passed He rnande z’s residence and sawI rene ’s ca r. Ang ere d by

her pr e se nc e a t H e rn and e z’s ho us e , a pp e lla nt s top pe d, arm e d h ims e lf wi th hi s ri fl e , a nd kic ke d in Her nandez’s front door. Appe llant testified that when He rnande z ran into the bedroom, he thoug ht that Her nandez was g etting a wea pon. Appellant we nt into another room “to g et out of the line of fi re ” and c hambe re d a

ro un d in the ri fl e . Ire ne fo llo we d a pp e lla nt a nd be g an to str

ug g le wi th h im. Appellant tried to shove he r aw ay with his foot and, as he did so, she g rabbe d the end of the rifle. Appellant said that they

both stumbl ed bac k into th e l i v i n g ro o m, then the rifle hit his hip and discharg ed. B elievingthat Her nandez was c alling the police, appellant fired a second shot into the bedroom door. A

ppellant testified that when he saw that I rene had been s hot, he panicked and fled. Appellant said that he did not intend to kil l the dece ased.3 Appellant conte nds that the evidenc e is le g ally and fac tually insufficient to support the finding that he intentionally killed the dece ased. SeeTex. P en. Code Ann. § 19.03( a)( 2). The qu e stion pres ented

is whe the r a

ra tio na l tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th is e le me nt o f t he of fe ns e beyond a re asonable doubt. Se e J ac k so n v. Vi rg ini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (leg al suffic iency ); Gr iff in v . S tate , 614 S.W. 2d

15 5, 15 8- 59 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ) ( le g a l su ff ic ie nc y ); Zun iga v . S

tate , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (fa ctual suff iciency ). In a le gal suffic iency

revie w, all the evidenc e is revie wed in the lig ht most favorable to the verdict; it is assumed that the t rier of fac t r esolved conflicts in the testimony , weig hed the evidenc e, and dr ew r easona ble infer ence s in a
manner that supports the verdic t. Gr iff in , 6 1 4 S
. W
. 2 d

at 1 5 9 (c i t i n g Jack

son , 443 U.S. at 318-19). I n a fa ctual suff

iciency revie w, all the evide nce is c onsidered e qually , i n cl u d i n g t he testimony of defe nse witnesses and the exis tence of alter native hy potheses. Or on a v . S

tate , 836 S.W .2d 319, 321 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no pet.). Although due de fer ence still must be acc orded the fac t finder’ s deter minations, particularly

those conc erningthe weig ht and cr edibi lity of the e vidence , the revie wing court may

disag ree with the result in order to preve nt a manifes t i n

j u stice. Johnson v. Sta te , 23 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). The evidence will be deemed fa ctually insufficient to s usta in the c on vic tio n if the pr oo f o f guil t is too we ak o r t he c on tr ary

e vid e nc e is t oo str on g to support a finding of g uilt beyond a re asonable doubt. Zuniga , 1 44 S.W. 3d a t 48 4- 85 ; see J

ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 11.

A jury may find the spec ific intent to kill from the c ircumstance s acc ompanying the use of a deadly wea pon. Cor do v a v . S tate , 698 S.W .2d 107, 112 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Appellant
arme d himself with a rifle a nd broke into Hernande z’s house, admit tedly ang ry beca use hi s wife w as there . Acc ording to the expert medical testimony , the dece ased w as shot from over two fee t away4

wh ile in a

de fe ns ive po sit ion . A ft e r s ho oti ng hi s wi fe, a pp e lla nt f le d. Th is e vid e nc e is l e g a lly sufficie nt to support a finding beyond a rea sonable doubt that appellant intended to kill the dec ease d. Point of error one is overrule d.

Appellant ar g ues that t he evidence is factually insufficient be cause his testimony that the shoot i n g wa s an ac cident wa s uncontradic ted. This is not accur ate. The medical testimony ment ioned above contra dicts appellant’s te stimony that the rifle w ent off a s he and the dece ased strug g led. Althoug h we view the evidenc e neutr ally

in a fa ctual sufficiency revie w, we must give due def ere nce to the f

act f inder’s de terminations conce rnin g t h e we ight a nd cre dibilit y

of the evidenc e. Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 9. The State’ s ev i d en ce wa s not too weak, a nd the def

ensive evidenc e wa s not too strong, to support the j ury ’s findi ng beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally

killed the dece ased. See Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484-85. Point of err or two is overrule d. I nh i s t h i rd p o i n t o f erro r, ap p el l an t co n t en d s t h at t h e tr i al co u rt erre d i ni t s j u ry ch ar ge by g iving the f

ull statutory

definitions of “intentionally ” and “ knowing ly .” SeeTex. P en. Code Ann. § 6 .0 3( a ), (b ) ( Wes t 20 03 ). He argue s th a t by fa ili ngto d e fi ne the c ulp a ble me nta l st a te s so le ly

in terms of the result of t he actor’s conduct, the charg e allowe d the jury to convict him without finding beyond a re asonable doubt that he intended to kill the dece ased. Appellant did not object to the jury char g e. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals ha s written that capital murder is “ a result of conduc t offe nse which a lso includes nature of circ umstances a nd/or nature of conduc t e lements depe nding upon the under ly ing c onduct which elevates the intentional murder to capital murder .” Hughes v

. Sta te , 897 S.W .2d 285, 295 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). I n Pa tri c k v . S tate , 9 0 6 S. W. 2 d 4 8 1 , 4 9 2 ( T e x. C ri m . Ap p . 1 9 95), the c ourt held that the off ense of capital murde r in the cour se of bur g lary , the5

offe nse for

which appe llant was on trial, containe d all three conduct e lements. The c ourt said that the trial cour

t did n o t err by

definingthe culpable mental states in terms of the result, nature , and
c ir c ums tanc e s o f co nd

uc t, al tho ug h it sh ou ld have lim ite d the a dd iti on a l cul pa ble me nta l st a te s to the under ly ing bur g lary

offe nse. Id
. I f the trial court err ed by defining the culpable me ntal states as it did, the err or did not
cause appellant e g reg ious harm. Se e Al ma nz a v . State , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). The a

pplication para g raph a

uthorized appellant’s c onviction f or capital murde r only

if the jur y fo un d th a t he “ int e nti on a lly c a us e [d] the de a th” of the de c e a se d “ by sh oo tin g he r w itha

fi re arm ” while in the cour se of c ommitt ing or attempting to c ommit burglar y . Contrary

to app el l an t’s argument, the application parag raph r efe rre d the jury to the appropr iate portion of the def initions and
re qu ir e d th e jur

y to f ind that he inte nd e d to ca

us e the de c e a se d’ s death. I f t he tr ia l c ourt ’s fa ilure to
mo r e n ar r o w ly d e f in e th e c u lp a

b le me n ta l s tate s w a s e r

r o r , n o harm resulted. See Patrick , 906 S.W. 2d a t 49 3; Hughes , 897 S.W .2d at 296. Point of error three is overrule d. The judg ment of convic tion is affirmed.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: Apr il 21, 2006 Do No t Pu

bli sh