Cite as 2017 Ark. App. 537

ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION IV 

No. CV-17-475

JAMES KRECKER

APPELLANT

V.

ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF 

HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR 

CHILD

APPELLEES

Opinion Delivered: October 18, 2017

APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD 

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 17JV-15-33] 

HONORABLE MICHAEL MEDLOCK, 

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge

James Krecker appeals after the Crawford County Circuit Court filed an order 

terminating his parental rights to S.K. (DOB 7-24-2004), N.K. (DOB 5-25-2006), and J.K. 

(DOB 6-20-2007) on March 13, 2017.1

 On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court 

erred in terminating his parental rights as to S.K. only; he does not argue that the trial court 

erred in terminating his parental rights to J.K. or N.K. Appellant more specifically argues 

that it was not in S.K.’s best interest to terminate his parental rights because there was 

evidence from her therapists that S.K. needed to continue working on reunification with 

him and that it would be very hard to find her an adoptive home. We affirm. 

 1

The trial court additionally terminated the parental rights of Crystal Krecker, the 

children’s mother. However, Crystal did not appeal the termination and therefore is not a 

party to this appeal. 
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I. Facts

Appellant and Crystal Krecker have three children, S.K., N.K., and J.K., whose ages 

now range between ten and thirteen years old. The Arkansas Department of Human 

Services (DHS) has had a long history of involvement with these children. Crystal originally 

had custody of the three children. While the children were in Crystal’s custody, DHS 

opened a case in 2011. In 2013, the children were removed from Crystal and their 

stepfather, David Todd, for sexual abuse, inadequate housing, and incarceration of the 

parents. The three children were placed with their father, James. At the time of this 

placement, James was married to Corina Krecker. Corina has four minor children of her 

own.2

 When James’s three children were placed with him, that resulted in seven children 

living in the home.

Two years later, the instant proceedings commenced. It was discovered that S.K., 

N.K., and J.K. had bruises on their upper thighs. DHS was contacted and determined that 

the bruising was consistent “with being struck with a belt in an out of control or violent 

manner that indicates their caretaker is behaving towards the children in a manner that is 

violent or out of control.” On January 21, 2015, DHS placed a seventy-two-hour hold on 

S.K., N.K., and J.K. Further investigation revealed that the bruising was caused by the 

stepmother, Corina. DHS removed appellant’s three children from the home but allowed 

Corina’s four children to remain in the home because there were no signs of physical abuse 

to them. Accordingly, on January 26, 2015, DHS filed a petition for ex parte emergency 

 2

The record is unclear whether appellant is the father of some, or all, of these four 

children.
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custody and dependency-neglect of S.K., N.K., and J.K. The trial court granted the 

petition, finding that probable cause existed for the removal. Subsequently, the trial court 

filed a probable-cause order. 

An adjudication hearing was held on April 30, 2015. The record indicates that 

appellant attended the hearing. The trial court found that the three children were 

dependent-neglected as defined in the Arkansas Juvenile Code and that the allegations in 

the petition were true and correct. Specifically, the trial court found that the children were 

dependent-neglected due to the physical abuse perpetrated by the stepmother, Corina, and 

due to the failure to protect perpetrated by appellant.

Several review hearings were held throughout this case. A permanency-planning 

hearing was held on February 18, 2016, and a permanency-planning order was filed on May 

12, 2016. In that order, the trial court noted that the goal of the case was to authorize a 

plan to place custody of the children with their father. Appellant had been partially 

complying with the case plan. The trial court ordered that placement of the children occur 

within a time frame that was consistent with their developmental needs but no later than 

three months after the permanency-planning hearing. Additionally, the trial court made the 

following additional findings: 

9. The father and step-mother have partially complied with the case plan in 

that they have completed regular parenting classes, have completed a psychological 

evaluation, have begun family therapy, they have appropriate beds for the children 

and a separate room for [S.K.], they have visited consistently and have maintained 

employment. They have not finished Parenting Without Violence classes, have not 

attended individual counseling as recommended and continue to have some 

environmental issues in the home. They need to make arrangements for the children 

to be supervised while the parents work or sleep. They also need to address 

environmental concerns with the home including the roach and mice infestation, and 
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4 

they need to obtain an alarm to put on [S.K.’s] bedroom.

3

 They have missed some 

parenting classes during this review period. 

10. The father and step-mother are ordered to follow the recommendations 

in their psychological evaluation for individual and family therapy; participate in 

family therapy as recommended by the juveniles’ therapist; make arrangements for 

the children to be supervised while the parents work or sleep; address the roach and 

mice infestation and obtain an alarm to put on [S.K.’s] bedroom; finish Parenting 

Without Violence classes, visit regularly and actively participate in the visitation; and 

otherwise comply with the case plan.

(Emphasis added.) 

During a weekend visit in which the three children were allowed to stay at appellant 

and Corina’s home, an incident occurred. J.K. disclosed that S.K. and E.W., one of the 

four children who had remained in the home, had touched her in a sexual manner one night 

during visitation. One of the requirements for the weekend visitation was that an alarm was 

to be placed on S.K.’s bedroom. While an alarm was obtained and verified as working 

before the visitation began, it was alleged that appellant and Corina did not turn the alarm 

on for S.K.’s bedroom. Thus, the trial court suspended all weekend visitation and ordered 

supervised visitation as recommended by the children’s treatment professionals. 

Furthermore, E.W. was removed from the home. 

After the September 22, 2016 review hearing, the trial court changed the goal of the 

case from reunification with appellant to adoption. The trial court noted that the father and 

stepmother had not complied with the case plan and that they had participated in only one 

family-therapy appointment and refused to attend any other scheduled appointments. 

Furthermore, the trial court found that they had not complied with the safety plan during a 

 3

The record does not detail the ongoing conduct of S.K. that necessitated that her 

bedroom door be equipped with an alarm. 
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weekend visit by ensuring that the alarm was working on S.K.’s bedroom. Finally, the trial 

court found that they had not attended individual or marital counseling as recommended. 

DHS filed a petition for termination of parental rights on December 8, 2016. As to 

appellant, DHS alleged several grounds for termination under Arkansas Code Annotated 

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) (Repl. 2015), including the failure-to-remedy, other-subsequentfactors, and aggravated-circumstances grounds.

At the termination hearing, appellant testified that he did not want his parental rights 

terminated. At the time of the hearing, appellant testified that Corina and his remaining 

three younger children (S.W., J.K.J., and Z.K.) were living in the home with him.4

 

Appellant acknowledged that Corina had spanked S.K excessively. However, appellant 

testified that he had been complying with the case plan and that he still had to complete 

marriage counseling. He testified that he had completed parenting classes, maintained 

employment, kept stable housing, visited the children regularly, and completed a 

psychological evaluation. Appellant testified that he had been diagnosed with a personality 

disorder. 

Erica Enecks testified that she had been involved in this case when she was a familyservice worker and later as a family-service-worker supervisor. Her involvement with the 

children started in 2013 after the three children had been removed from their biological 

mother’s care because they were being sexually abused by their stepfather and stepgrandfather. After the children were placed in appellant’s custody, the children were 

 4

S.K., N.K., and J.K. had been removed from the home in the original order, and 

E.W. had been removed from the home after the inappropriate sexual-touching incident 

involving S.K.
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removed after Corina had left significant bruising on S.K., J.K., and N.K. from spanking 

them with a belt. Enecks testified that appellant had not continued with consistent

counseling since the children had been removed. Multiple referrals were made throughout 

the pendency of the case. Enecks further testified that appellant had willfully failed to follow 

the safety plan during an overnight visit, resulting in an additional sexual-abuse allegation 

and the suspension of overnight visitation. Regarding whether S.K. was adoptable, Enecks 

opined that S.K. would be adoptable with the right family even though she had considerable 

issues in her life. She acknowledged that S.K. required a special sort of foster home. 

However, Enecks testified that S.K. had maintained stability in her current foster home for 

quite some time.

Van Hall, the assistant clinical director for Southwest Arkansas Counseling and 

Mental Health Center in Texarkana, Arkansas, testified that she had previously been S.K.’s 

therapist. Hall was now in a different supervisory position. Hall testified that there had not 

been any progress made during family-therapy sessions with S.K. and appellant. Appellant 

failed to attend regular appointments when Hall was S.K.’s primary therapist. Additionally, 

Hall expressed concerns over appellant’s failing to follow the safety plan that was drafted for 

overnight visitation. Despite Hall’s discussion of the plan with appellant, the first overnight 

visit resulted in inappropriate interactions between S.K. and other siblings due to the lack 

of supervision. Hall testified that she was not comfortable making a recommendation that 

S.K. be returned to appellant’s care based on appellant’s lack of involvement while she was 

S.K.’s primary therapist. Hall did note, however, that since the last court hearing, appellant’s 

participation had increased with S.K.’s new therapist after Hall had transitioned into her 
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supervisory role. On cross-examination, Hall admitted that S.K. would be unable to form 

an attachment with appellant if appellant’s rights were terminated. She further admitted that 

S.K.’s loss of attachment with appellant would be detrimental to S.K. However, Hall opined 

that S.K. could process through some of the loss with the proper therapy or treatment and 

that S.K. could form a more healthful attachment with another male or father figure in the 

future.

Toni Hagans, S.K.’s therapist at the time of the hearing, testified that appellant had 

been attending family-therapy appointments every other week since September 2016. 

However, Hagans testified that appellant had difficulty noticing S.K.’s anxiety. In fact, 

Hagans testified that appellant would ignore S.K. when she would attempt to get his 

attention. Therefore, Hagans testified that “we’re not where we need to be at this point[.]” 

That said, Hagans opined that it was not in S.K.’s best interest to have appellant’s parental 

rights terminated because S.K. wanted to be with her father. Furthermore, Hagans testified 

that she had only just started working with appellant and did not feel that she had enough 

time to make a recommendation. Additionally, although Hagans recognized that adoption 

was not part of her job description, Hagans opined that she thought S.K. may have difficulty 

being adopted and that, if she was never adopted, it could be even more traumatic.

After the hearing and oral arguments, the trial court terminated appellant’s parental 

rights to each child. In the termination order, the trial court made the following pertinent 

findings:

u. The preceding paragraphs demonstrate that James and Corina Krecker are not 

capable of implementing strategies in their home that would protect the 

juveniles from further sexual acting out in the home. The Court notes that 
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8 

the sexual abuse among siblings going on in the home led to physical abuse 

of the juveniles, the reason they were found dependent-neglected.

v. Van Hall also testified that James Krecker was very withdrawn in his 

interactions with [S.K.]. She believed this was due to his anti-social 

personality disorder diagnosis. Van Hall testified that this was something that 

James Krecker could address and improve through his participation in 

individual counseling. Van Hall offered that based on her interactions while 

she was [S.K.’s] therapist, she did not believe [S.K.] was ready for reunification 

with her father at the time she transferred the case. Further, Ms. Hall testified 

that the father participated in very few sessions of family therapy. She stated 

that Mr. Krecker refused to participate further unless services could be offered 

on a Saturday.

w. [S.K.’s] current therapist Toni Hagans testified that James Krecker’s 

participation has been consistent since September of 2016. The Court notes 

that this is the same time that the Court changed the goal of the case to 

termination of parental rights and adoption. This demonstrates that Mr. 

Krecker has been capable of participating in services throughout this case, but 

was not so motivated until the goal of this case changed.

x. The Court notes that Toni Hagans was not in a position to recommend 

reunification of [S.K.] with her father at this time.

y. James and Corina Krecker were also to participate in individual counseling. 

The father’s own testimony demonstrated that he had not regularly 

participated in this service and had not addressed his anti-social personality 

disorder in order to improve his parenting skills. The Court notes that 

multiple referrals were made by the Department for this service. 

z. Erica Enecks testified that James Krecker has not been able to demonstrate the 

skills required for reunification that should have been developed through 

meaningful participation in the services herein. This coupled with the facts 

articulated above demonstrate why the juveniles would be subject or risk of 

harm if returned to the custody of either parent.

aa. Erica Enecks further testified that all of the juveniles were adoptable. [J.K.] and 

[N.K.] have maintained in the same foster home through much of this case. Also, 

despite [S.K.’s] behaviors, the Department believes that it can achieve the goal of 

adoption for [S.K.] as well, as she has maintained long term stability in her foster 

home. Testimony demonstrated that there are no barriers to adoption.

bb. The Court finds on the facts stated above that the Department has proved by 

clear and convincing evidence that:
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i. The juveniles have been adjudicated by the Court to be dependentneglected and have continued out of the custody of the father for a 

period in excess of twelve (12) months and despite a meaningful effort 

by the Department to rehabilitate the father and correct the conditions 

which caused removal, those conditions have not been remedied by 

the father.

ii. Specifically, the father’s lack of participation in and completion of 

services have not put the family in the position to be reunified.

iii. The juveniles have lived out of the home of the mother for a period 

in excess of twelve (12) months and the mother has willfully failed to 

provide significant material support in accordance with her means or 

to maintain meaningful contact with the juveniles. The mother has 

also subjected the juveniles to the aggravated circumstance stated 

above.

iv. That other factors arose subsequent to the filing of the original petition 

for dependency-neglect that demonstrate that placement of the 

juveniles in the custody of the father is contrary to the juvenile’s health, 

safety, or welfare and that despite the offer of appropriate family 

services, the father has manifested the incapacity or indifference to 

remedy the subsequent issues or factors or rehabilitate the 

circumstances which prevent the placement of the juvenile in the 

custody of the father. The father’s failure to appropriately implement 

plans to deal with sexually aggressive behaviors in his home is a 

subsequent factor that the father has failed to remedy.

v. The father has subjected the juveniles to aggravated circumstances in 

that there is little likelihood that services to the parents will result in 

successful reunification. The father has had almost two years to 

accomplish the goals of this case and has failed to do so. There is little 

likelihood that additional services would remedy the father’s failure to 

implement significant change in his life. Additional time to the father 

would be detrimental to the juveniles’ permanency interests and have 

little likelihood of success.

 

It is therefore, Considered, Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that the parental 

rights of the Parents, James Krecker and Crystal Krecker are hereby terminated[.] 

 

(Emphasis added.) This appeal followed.
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II. Best-Interest Analysis

A trial court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on findings proved by 

clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3) (Repl. 2015). Clear and 

convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-finder a 

firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & 

Human Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007). On appeal, the appellate court reviews 

termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo but will not reverse the trial court’s ruling 

unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although 

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a 

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a 

finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the 

trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses. Id.

In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find by clear and convincing 

evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration 

(1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; 

and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the 

child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-

341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based on a showing 

of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in 

section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B). However, only one ground must be proved to support 

termination. Reid v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. 187, 380 S.W.3d 918.
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Appellant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in terminating his parental rights 

as to S.K. only. However, appellant does not contest that statutory grounds existed; instead, 

he argues that it was not in S.K.’s best interest to terminate his parental rights because there 

was evidence from her therapists that she needed to continue working on reunification with 

him and that it would be very hard to find her an adoptive home. Although appellant 

acknowledges Enecks’s testimony that S.K. would be adoptable, he states that the testimony 

from S.K.’s therapists should have been accepted as more objective evidence. He claims 

that Hall and Hagans testified that it would be detrimental to S.K. if she did not continue 

to work on attachment issues with appellant and that S.K. would be very hard to adopt, 

which would lead to greater trauma than the termination itself. Therefore, appellant 

contends that the evidence demonstrated that the termination would harm S.K. and that 

her likely inability to achieve adoption would compound that harm. Thus, he requests this 

court to reverse the trial court’s termination. We disagree. 

A caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an 

adoptability finding. Caldwell v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 144, 484 

S.W.3d 719. However, adoptability is not an essential element of proof and need not be 

established by clear and convincing evidence, but it is merely a factor that must be 

considered by the trial court in determining the best interest of the child. Id.; McDaniel v. 

Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 263. The statute does not require any “magic 

words” or a specific quantum of evidence regarding a child’s adoptability but simply 

provides that the trial court consider the likelihood that the child will be adopted in making 

its best-interest determination. See Smith v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2013 Ark. App. 
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753, 431 S.W.3d 364; see also Renfro v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 419, 385 

S.W.3d 285. But see Grant v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 636, at 13, 378 

S.W.3d 227, 233 (reversing a court’s best-interest finding because a caseworker testified that 

“all children are adoptable,” the child’s autistic condition was not considered in determining 

whether that child was adoptable, and the child was “attached to a loving mother who has 

never volitionally subjected him to harm”). 

Here, the trial court specifically noted in its opinion that it considered Enecks’s 

testimony in determining S.K.’s best interest. Enecks testified that S.K. would be adoptable. 

In giving her opinion, Enecks noted that S.K. had maintained stability in her foster home 

and that with the right family she could achieve a successful adoption. Although appellant 

highlights selected excerpts from the testimony of S.K.’s therapists to bolster his position, 

neither therapist recommended that S.K. be returned to appellant’s custody. In fact, Hall 

even opined that with the proper therapy or treatment, S.K. could form a more healthful 

attachment with another male or father figure in the future. Furthermore, while Hagans 

testified that she thought S.K. would be difficult to adopt, Hagans acknowledged that DHS, 

not she, was tasked with finding an adoptive family. 

Finally, in assessing the potential-harm factor, the court is not required to find that 

actual harm would ensue if the child were returned to the parent or to affirmatively identify 

a potential harm. Sharks v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 435, 502 S.W.3d 

569. The potential-harm analysis is to be conducted in broad terms. Id. Past actions of a 

parent over a meaningful period of time are good indicators of what the future may hold. 

Id. Here, appellant’s behaviors over the course of the entire case as outlined above do not 
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show enough stability to render the trial court’s finding that appellant posed a risk of 

potential harm to the children clearly erroneous. In fact, appellant failed to follow the safety 

plan during the last overnight visitation. Therefore, based on this record, we cannot say 

that the trial court’s finding that termination was in S.K.’s best interest was clearly erroneous. 

As such, we must affirm the termination.

Affirmed. 

 ABRAMSON and VAUGHT, JJ., agree.

Leah Lanford, Arkansas Public Defender Commission, for appellant. 

Andrew Firth, Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.

Chrestman Group, PLLC, by: Keith L. Chrestman, attorney ad litem for minor child.