Dismissed and Majority and Dissenting Opinions filed April 3, 2012.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

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NO. 14-11-00618-CR

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EX PARTE DAVID LORENZA JOYNER, Appellant

On Appeal from the 174th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1310608

MAJORITY OPINION

David Lorenza Joyner, pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of 

his application for writ of habeas corpus. In his application, Joyner claimed he was being 

illegally restrained on charges of failure to comply with sex offender registration 

requirements.

After the filing of the notice of appeal in this case, Joyner was tried and convicted of 

theft in trial court cause number 1278852, which is appeal number 14-11-00807-CR in our 

court. An appellate court may take judicial notice of its own records in a related 

proceeding involving the same or nearly the same parties. See Turner v. State, 733 

S.W.2d 218, 221-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), and Goodson v. State, 221 S.W.3d 303, 304, 

n. 2 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth 2007, no pet.). In both this appeal and 14-11-00807-CR, the 

appellant is named David Lorenza Joyner, was born on the same date, and has the same 

SPN number. The appellant in both cases was convicted of the same four prior offenses. 
2

Also, the appellant has filed pro se motions that have both appellate numbers on the 

motion. We therefore conclude David Lorenza Joyner is the appellant in appeal number 

14-11-00807-CR and take judicial notice of our record in that appeal.1

Joyner is currently incarcerated pursuant to a judgment for theft as shown by the 

record in appeal number 14-11-00807-CR. His restraint of liberty is therefore unrelated to 

the charges made the subject of his application for writ of habeas corpus. Even if there 

were merit in his habeas corpus argument, it would provide no basis for the lifting of any 

restraint on his liberty. With the exception of double-jeopardy issues,2none of which 

were raised by Joyner, "pretrial habeas is not appropriate when the question presented, 

even if resolved in the defendant’s favor, would not result in immediate release." Ex parte 

Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Therefore, Joyner's contentions 

pertaining to pre-trial confinement are moot. See Martinez v. State, 826 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1992); and Danziger v. State, 786 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). See 

also Bennet v. State, 818 S.W.2d 199, 200 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no 

writ) ("[w]here the premise of a habeas corpus application is destroyed by subsequent 

developments, the legal issues raised thereunder are rendered moot" quoting Saucedo v. 

State, 795 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ)). 

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as moot. 

/s/ Jeffrey V. Brown

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Christopher. (Christopher, J., dissenting).

Publish -- TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

 

1 We respectfully disagree with the dissent that this is improper. In Smith v. State, 540 S.W.2d 693, 697 n. 4 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1976) (op. on reh'g), the court did not consider testimony from a later trial that was attached to the 

appellant's brief. In Pittman v. State, 321 S.W.3d 565, 571 (Tex. App. -- Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.), this 

court declined to consider sworn grand jury testimony attached to an amicus curiae brief. Neither of these cases cited 

by the dissent are similar facts to the case at bar.

2 Ex parte Preston, 833 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), relied upon by the dissent, is one such case that falls 

within this exception.