1 

:1 . THEA~TORNEYGENERAI. 

OF TEXAS 

The Honorable .Ted Butler 

Criminal Dietrict Attorney 

Bexar County Courthouse 

San Antonio. Texas 78204 

Dear Mr. Butler: 

August 13, 1974 

Opinion No. H- 369 

Re: Prcmsnt status of 

Texas lawe concerning 

abortion. 

We have had numerous requests, both written and oral, for information 

concerning the p,resent ~tatua of the Texas lawr concerntng abortion following 

the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 

113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 

35 L. Ed. 2d 201, 93 5. Ct, 739 (1973). Specifically you have asked us what 

Articles of the present Penal Code, relating to abortion, are now valid 

and enforceable. Further, since Roe v. Wade declared tha Texas rtatutee 

unconstitutional, you ask: “[W]hat guidelines and standards should now be 

used in reference to ‘abortions’ in this State? ” 

STATUS OF TEXAS LAW 

The Texas laws against abortion were f-d in Chapter 9 of the Penal 

Code, Articles 1191 to 1196. which were: 

Article 1191. ‘Et any person shall designedly 

administer to a pregnant woman or knowingly 

procure to be adminirtered with her consent any 

drug or medicine, or shall uee towardr her any 

violence or means whatever externally or internally 

applied, and thereby procure an abortion, he shall 

be confined in the penitentiary not lerr than two 

p. 1723 
. . 

Page 2 (H-369) 

nor more than five yearrr; if it be done without her 

consent, the punishment ahall be doubled. By 

‘abortion’ icl meant that the life of the fetus or 

embryo shall be destroyed in the woman’e womb 

or that a premature birth thereof be caured. 

Article 1192. Whoever furnirhed the mean, for 

procuring an abortion knowing the purpore intended 

i6 guilty as an accomplice. 

Article 1193. If the meane used shall fail to 

produce an abortion. the offendar ir neverthelerr 

guilty of an attempt to procure abortion, provided 

it be rhown that each means were calculated to 

produce that result, and rhall be fined not leer 

t&an one hundred nor more than one thourand 

dollars. 

Article 1194. If the death of the mother is occarioned 

by an abortion ko produced or by an attempt to effect 

the eame it ia murder. 

Article 1195. Whoever shall during parturition of 

the mother destroy the vitality or life in a child 

in a state of being born and before actual birth, 

which child would otherwise have been born alive, 

rhall be confined in the penitentiary for life or 

for not leas thz+n five yearr. 

p. 1724 
Page 3 W-369) 

Article 1196. Nothing in this chapter applien to 

an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice 

for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. 

All of these, with the exception of Article 1195, were under attack in 

Roe v. Wade (410 U.S. at 117). 

The holding in Roe v. Wade was that Article 1196, excepting from 

criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother without 

regard to then state of pregnancy and without recognition of other involved 

interests, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

The Court further condlrrded that, because Article 1196 was unconstitntional, 

the other abortion otatutes of Texas also fell. “The exception of Art. 1196 

~cannot be stricken separately, for then the State is left with a statute proscribing all abortion, procedures no matter how medically urgent the’case. ” 

(410 U.S. at 166) 

Article ll95, prerantly.Art. 4512. 5, V. T. C.S., is laft unaffected. 

However,.:Art. 4512.5 is not, in truth, an abortion statute. The elements 

of the offense there described require that the child, ,“be in a state’.‘, 

of being born I’;” !‘that the ‘hidher was in..&6 ..atit .of :givi@:birth :&a 

live child”, Hardin 106 S. W. 352 (Tex.Crim., 1907) holding that 

the ingredients of the statute were somewhat different from those of the 

abortion statute. 

Article 4512. 5 is not,repealed by the 1973 Penal Code (Acts 1973, 63rd 

Leg., ch. 399, p. 996e, Section 3). Therefore, it continues as a prohibition 

of a crime of ita very precise definition. 

The 1973 Penal Code (Acts 1973, 634 Leg., ch. 399, p. 883, Ssdtion 1) 

contains no specific prohibition of abortion. It does, in Chapter 19, define 

various types of criminal homicide, but each of them in made to involve the 

death of an “individual” defined in Section 1.07(a)(n) to be a “human being 

who has been born and is alive”. This statute has not yet been construed 

but we doubt that the .courtr will conetrue its provisions to appIy to an unborn 

fetus. Doe v. Israel, 482 F. 2d 156 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S. L. W. 

3627 (U.S. May 14, 1974); Doe v. Israel, 358 F.Supp. 1193 (D.R. I. 1973); 

Rogers v. Danforth, Civil Action No. 18360-2 (W.D. MO. May 18, 1973) (3 

judge ct. ) aff?d. mom., 414 U.S. 1035, 42 U.S. L. W. 3305 (Nov. 20, ‘19731. 

Therefore, there presently are no effective statutes of the State of 

Texas against abortion, per se. 

p. 1725 
Page 4 (H-369) 

TYPES OF REGULATIONS PERMITTED UNDER SUPREME COURT, 

OPINION 

In Roe v. Wade, supra, the majority opinion concluded with this 

eummary: 

1. A state criminal abortion statute of the current 

Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a 

life saving procedure on behalf of the mother, with- - 

out regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative 

of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end 

of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its 

effectuation must be left to the medical judgment 

of the pregnant woman’s attending physician. 

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the 

end of the first trimeater, the State, in promoting 

its interest in the health of the mother, may, if 

it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways 

that are reasonably related to maternal health. 

(c) For the &age subsequent to viability the State, 

in promoting its interest,in the potentiality of 

human life, may, if it chooser, regulate, and even 

proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary 

in appropriate medical judgment, for the preoervation of the life or health of the mother. 

2. The ntate may define the term ‘physician’, ar 

it has been employed in the preceding numbered paragraphs of this Part XI of this opinion, to mean only 

a physician currently licensed by the State, ad may 

proscribe any abortion by a person who is not a 

physician as so defined. (410 U.S. at 164, 165) 

p. 1726 
Page 5 (H-369) 

On the same day that Roe v. Wade was decided, the Supreme Court of 

the United States also decided Doe v. Bolton, supra, involving Georgia’s 

statute regulating the performance of abortions. The Gain thrust of the 

opinion in Doe v. Bolton is that a state may not impose upon abortion 

burdensome regulations bearing little relationship to the purposes of the act. 

Thus, in holding unconstitutional a requirement that abortions be performed 

only in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of, 

Hospitals, the.Court said: “It is a requirement that simply is not baaed on 

differences that.are reanonably related to the purposes of the Act in which 

it is found . . . . ” (410 U.S. at 194) 

The following discussion indicates what ,we believe to be some of the 

restrictions which presently exist upon the performance of abortion or 

which may be imposed by proper statutory enactment. 

I. Requirement that AbortionBe Performed by a Licensed Physician 

Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Roe v. Wade, said: 

There is no doubt that the State may require 

abortions to be performed by qualified medical 

personnel. The legitimate.objective of preoervlng 

the mother’s health clearly supports such laws, 

Their impact upon the woman’s privacy i8 minimal.. 

(410 U.S. at 216) 

Since Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, convictions have been upheld for 

the performance of abortions by persons not licensed to practice medicine. 

Mav v. State of Arkansas, 492 S. W. 2d 888 (Ark. 1973) ceit. denied, 414 U.S. 

1024 (1973); Suears v. State of Mississi~~i, 278 So.2d 443 (Mins. 1973); 

People v. Bricker, 208 N. W. 2d 172 (Mich. 1973); State v. Ingel, 308 A. 2d 

223 (My.Spec.App. 1973); State v. Haren, 307 A. 2d 644 (N. J. Super. Ct., 

L. Div. 1973). See Justice Douglas’.comments on the denial of certiorari in 

Cheanev v. Indiana,410 U.S. 911 (1973). Compare, State of New Mexico v. 

Strance, 506 P. 2d 1217 (N. M. 1973); People v. Frey, 294 N. E. 2d 257 (Ill. 

1973); State v. Hultgren, 204 N. W. 2d 197 (Minn. 1973). 

p. 1727 
Page 6 (H-369) 

Article 4510, Vernon’s Texas Civil Statutes, defines ‘those who are ,, 

regarded as practicing medicine within this state. Art. 4501a, V. T. C. S. 

defines ‘practicing medicine” in a similar manner as follows: 

Any person shall be regarded as practicing 

medicine within the meaning of this Chapter: 

1. Who shall publicly profess to be a physician 

or sur,geon and shall diagnose, treat or offer to 

treat any disease or disorder, mental or physical, 

or any physical deformity 0) injury, by any system 

or method, or to effect cures thereof. 

2. Who shall diagnose, treat or offer to treat 

any disekse or disorder, mental or physical, or 

any physical deformity or injury, by any system or 

’ m&hod, oi to effect cures thereof and charge therefor. 

directly or indirectly, money or other compensation; 

. . . 

Practicing medicine without a license is made a misdemeanor punishable 

by fine or imprisonment for not more than thirty days. Articles 4498.1 and’ 

4510b. V. T. C.S. 

Although it has been held t,hat in the delivery of a child a.midwife i,s net,, 

engaged i,n the illegal practice of medicine as defined by Art. 4510a, formerly 

Art. 714, V. T.P.C.[ Banti v. State, 289 S. W. 2d 244 (Tex. Cr. 1956). Attorney 

General Opinion WW-1278 (1962); compare Vlassis V. State, 286 S. W. 2d 93? 

(Tex. Cr., 1956); De Hay v. State, 254 S. W. 2d 513 (Tax. Cr. 1952)],we believe 

that the performance of an abortion presents a significantly different factual 

situation and would constitute a basis for prosecution under Articles 4498.1 

and 4510b. 

It is our opinion, therefore, that despite the rulihgs in Roe v, Wade and 

Doe v. Bolton and the absence of any newly enacted statute to replace those 

declared unconstitutional, the lawful performance of an abortion,~ oth’er * 

than one that is self-induced, presently is limited in Texas to those performed 

by persons properly licensed to practice medicine. 

p. 1728 
Page 7 (H-369) 

II. Requirement that Abortion Be Performed in a 

Licensed Hospital 

The Georgia statute under consideration in Doe v. Bolton, supra, 

:equired that abortions be performed in hospitals accredited by the Joint 

Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. 

: 

The Court held the requirement unconstitutional because there was no 

showing that only such a hospital might meet the legitimate interest0 of 

the State in asouring the quality of an abortion during the full term of. 

pregnancy. It said: 

This is not to may that Georgia may not or 

should not, from and after the end of the first 

trimester, adopt rtandards for licensing all 

facilities where abortion0 may be performed uo 

long as those l tandards are legitimately related 

to the objective the State seeks to accomplirh. 

. . . We feel compelled to agree with appellants 

that the State must show more than it harr in order 

to prove that only the full resources of a licensed 

hospital, rather than those of some other appropriately licensed institution, satisfy these health 

interests. . . . In so holding we naturally express 

no.opinion on the medical judgment involved in any 

particular case, that is, whether the patient’s 

situation is such that an abortion should be performed in a hospital rather than in oome other 

facility. (410 U.S. at 194, 195) 

We interpret this language to mean that. to the extent it to shown that 

other no less dangerous procedures may be performed in other appropriate 

facilities not ltcensed as hospitals, so, too, during the firat trimertei, an 

abortion may be performed in such appropriate facilities. Hardy v. Vuitch, 

473 F. 2d 1370 (4th Cit. 1973). art. den., 414 U.S. 824 (1973). We further 

interpret the current case law to hold that the State may require all ouch 

facilities to meet certain reasonable standards and even be licenredso long 

aa those requirements are not made aonlicable solely to those facilities 

in which abortions are performed. Se; Word v. Poelker, 42 U.S. L. W. 

2448,(8th Cir. Feb. 20, 1974). 

p. 1729 
Page 8 (H-369) 

Texas does have a Texas Hospital Licensing Law (Article 4437f, 

V. T. C. S. ) which makes it a misdemeanor punishable by fine to 

establish or operate a hospital without a license, defining “hospital” 

in rather broad terms. We are of the opinion, therefore. that, while 

the State may not require an abortion to be performed solely in a 

licensed hospital during the first trimester, nevertheless, if it is 

performed in a facility which comes within the definition of “hospital” 

as contained in the Texas Hospital Licens,ing Law, the facility will be 

subject to the same regulation to which other hospital6 are subjected. 

It would appear then that further regulation in this area, insofar as 

the first trimester is concerned, will have to be by statute applicable 

to facilities generally and not just those performing abortions. Word 

v. Poelker, supra. But see Friendship Medidal Center v. ChicaT 

Board of Health, 367 F. Supp, 594 (N. D. Ill. 1973). 

After the first trimester? the State may adopt regulation8 aimed 

specifically at facilities in which abortion6 may be performed. The 

Court, in Doe v. Bolton, said: 

This is not to say that Georgia may not or 

rhould not, from and after the end of the first 

trimester, adopt standards for licensing all 

facilities where abortion6 may be performed so 

long as those standards are legitimately related to the objective the State seeks to accomplish. 

. . . (410 U.S. at 194, 195) 

Also see Word v. Poelker, supra. 

In Roe v. Wade, referring to permissible state action after the 

first trimester, the Court listed as areas of permissible regulation 

the facility in which an abortion was to be performed, “that is, 

whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic or some other place 

of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the 

like. ” (410 U.S. at 163). 

p. 1730 
Page 9 (H-369) 

III. May Committee Approval Be Reauired 

The Georgia statute construed in Bolton required approval of the 

abortion in advance by a committee of the medical l taff of the hospital 

in which it wae to be performed. The Court’ha);d that a woman has a 

right to receive medical care in accordance with the judgmat of a 

lickneed phyeician and the phyeician hae a right to adminirter ruch 

care unobetnxted by the imposition of euch overview. 

IV. Whether Concurrence of Other Physician8 May 

Be Required 

The Georgia statute construed in BB required that the judgment of 

the patient’s physician be “reduced to writing and concurred in by at leaat 

two other physician8 duly licensed to practice medicine and surgery . . . ” 

(410 U.S. at 203). This too, was held unconlrtitutional by the Chart on the 

groundi that the judgment of the attending phyeician that abortion wan 

necessary was rufficient. A similar rcc@irement has been held unconstitutional a? discriminating against the poor. Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 

189 (D. Utah, 1973). 

V. May a Hospital Refuse To Permit the Performance of an Abortion 

In Doe v. Bolton, the rtatute rpecifically provided that nothi~ng in it should 

require a hospital to admit a patient for the purpoeee of an abortion. Without 

dircuesing the constitutionality of that. etatute, the Supreme Court cited it as 

protection to the hoepital rendering apprqval by a hospital committee unneceesary. 

The right of a horpital to deny uee of itr facilities for an abortion was 

directly preeented in Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hoepital, 479 F. 2d 756 (7th 

Cir. 1973). The plaintiff“ attending phyrician, who had determined that, in 

hie medical judgment, the .abortion wa8 proper, wae a member of the staff 

of tbe horpital. However, the hoepital had rulea strictly limiting the circumstancer under which an abortion might be performed, not including the 

circumetancee of this cane. 

p. 1731 
Page 10 (H-369) 

The hospital was regulated by the state and had received Federal funde. 

Citing Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, the court. said: 

The rationale of those cases is, however, 

inapplicable to private institutions. There is no 

constitutional objection to the deciclion by a purely 

private hospital that it will not permit its facilitier 

to be used for the performance of abortions. We 

think it is also clear that if a state ir completely 

neutral on the question whether private hospitals 

ahall perform abortions. the rtate may expressly 

authorize such hoapitale to anewer that question 

for’ themselves. (479 F. 2d at 759-760). 

The court found nothing in the receipt by the horpital of Federal funds 

to require any different conclusion. The Congrerr of the United States in 

June of 1973 adopted an amendment to the Developmentrl~.Suivicer ~a’&3 

Ekcilitierr Conrrtruction Act (42 U.S. C., Sec. 3008-7) to provide that 

receipt of federal funde doea not authoriae a court or other peraoti to reb 

quire individuals or hospitals to perform abortiona. 

In Allen v. Sisters of St. Josephs, 361 F.Supp. 1212 (N.D. Tex., 1973), 

the court held that a pri+ate hoepita receiving Hill-Burton and welfare 

funds W(LB not acting under color of law and waB not required to perform 

sterilizatione or abortions by 42 U.S. C., Sec. 1983. Since this case was 

subsequent to Rod v. Wade, it impliedly indicates that there was no state 

action involved; therefore the hospital wae under no conrtitutional compulsion to provide the requested services, 

Hathaway v. Worchester Citv Horrnital, 475 F. 2d 701 (lat Cir., 1973) 

involved a decision an to whether or not the hospital could be compelled to 

allow ita ,facilitiee,to be uned for the performance of a sterilization. However, we believe ita rationale and rearoning io equally applicable to the 

performance of an abortion. The honpital war a municipal horpital establirhed under state law for the purporre of short term’ hoopitaliaation. . 

p. 1732 
. . 

Page 11 (H-369) 

The court there stated: 

. . . [I]t seems clear, after Roe and% that - 

a fundamental intereet ie involved, requiring a 

compelling rationale to justify permitting eome 

hospital surgical procedures and banning another 

involving no greater risk or demand on staff and 

facilities. While Roe and Doe dealt with a woman’8 

decision whether or not to terminate a particular 

pregnancy, a decision to terminate the possibility 

of any future pregnancy would seem to embrace 

all of the factors deemed important by ~the Court 

in Roe in finding a fundamental interest, 410 U.S. 

- 

at 155, 93 S. Ct. 705, but in magnified form, particularly so in thie caee given the demonstrated 

danger to appellant’s life and the eight existing 

children. (475 F. 2d at 705) 

The Court heId that in the abeence of ,outright prohiBition of other 

surgical procedures of equal risk the hoepltal’s unique ban on sterilization 

violated the Equal Protection Clauee of the Fourteenth Amendment, 

The Court was careful to say that it wae not requiring maintenance of 

the hospital or retention of it8 present eiae, staff, ‘or facilities’. IThe 

hospital was not required to perform all kinds of surgical procedures. 

It however was constitutionally required to afford the same treatment 

and medical care to pereons undergoing medically indistinguishable 

surgical procedures. The epecific question of abortions in public hos- ’ 

pitals was considered in Nyber g v. Ci ty of Virginia, 361.F.Suppr 932 

(D. Minn. 1973). wherein the court, following ay, supra, held 

that the hospital could not prohihit a phyeician on ite rtaff from using the 

hoepital’e focilitiee for the performance of abortiona. In addition, a 

statute giving all hoepitale permission’to refuee. to perform abortions 

has been held unconetitutional by a three judge court. Doe v. Rampton, 

eupra. 

The available authoritiee then hold that private hoepitale’ may decline 

to permit the performance of abortions within their facilities, but that 

public horpitale may only prohibit performsnce of abortions if other 

similar procedures are likewiee prohibited, that is to say abortions may 

not be singled out. On the other hand, if the hospital specializes in one 

type of treatment only then it may refuse to perform abortion*. 

p. 1733 
. 

Page 12 (H-369) 

VI. May a Physician Refuse ToPerform 

an Abortion 

In Doe v. Bolton, the Court said: 

. . . [A] physician or any other employee has 

the right to refrain, for moral or religious 

reasons from participating in the abortion procedure . . . (410 U.S. at 197, 198) 

In Texas the relationship of a physician and his patient is contractual 

and wholly voluntary. A physician is under no legal obligation to practice 

his profession or to render services to any particular perron. Childs v. 

Weie. 440 S. W. 2d 104 (Tex. Civ.App., Dallas, 1969, no writ). 

It has been held further that a physician practicing in a public hospital 

nevertheless retains his identity and cannot permit the institution free use 

of his services as if he were an employee. Attorney General Opinion 

M-912 (1971); Attorney General Opinion WW-278 (1957). 

VII. Rights, if any. of Father of the Child and Parents of a 

Pregnant Minor 

In a footnote to its principle opinion in koe v. Wade (410 I?;$, at ‘16.5) 

the Supreme Court states: 

Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton . . . 

do~we discuss the father’s rights, if any exist in the 

conetitutimal context, in the abortion decision. No 

paternal right has been asserted in either of the cases, 

and the Texas and the Georgia statutes on their face ’ 

take no cogniaance of the father. We are aware that 

some statutes recogniee the father under certain circumstances . . . We need not now decide whether 

provisions of this hind are constitutional. 

In at l&ant four poet Roe decisions the question has been considered. 

Doe v. Bellin Memorial Gnital, supra, 

1.n 

it was urged that the care should 

not be decided because of the failure of the plaintiffs to join the putative 

father as a party. The court held he was not a necessary party stating that. 

p. 1734 
. . 

Page 13 (H-369) 

it could find nothing in prior decisions of the Supreme Court to suggest 

that the right of the woman to make the abortion decision was conditioned 

on the consent of the putative father. 

Similarly, in Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App., 1973). cert. 

denied, 94 S. Ct. 1486 (1974),: it was the putative father who brought the 

action to restrain the mother of his unborn child from obtaining Bn 

abortion. The court held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy 

was a personal decision to be made by the mother and her attending 

physician and that the putative father had no part in it. 

Statutes which required permission of the father and of the parents of 

a pregnant minor have been held unconstitutional by two three judge courts, 

in Doe v. Ramoton, supra. and Coe v. Gerstein, 42 U.S. L. W. 3662 (S.D. 

Fla. August 14, 1973), as impermissible restrictions upon the mother’s 

right of privacy as exercised in her decision concerning an abortion. 

In the absence of further Supreme Court pronouncement it is impossible 

to state categorically that legislation giving the putative father a guaranteed 

voice in the abortion decision would be unconstitutional but it is clear from 

the available authorities that such legislation would be subject to severe 

constitutional question. 

PROPOSED LEGISLATION * 

Sponsors of pr,oposed legislation in the next regular session of the 

Legislature should be guided by the priizi#& discussed herein, together 

wttb such additional case authority as becomes available hereafter. We 

recogniae that the United States Supreme Court has not dealt with all of 

the possible legal questions which can arise from specific legislative 

proposale. Further, we know that in all probability, in the not t-distant 

future, there will be additional legal guidance available to us dealing with 

some of the areas in which legislative interest has been expressed. 

p. 1735 
: 

‘Page 14 (H-369) 

Therefore, we have considered it to be the better course of action 

for this office to issue letters advisory dealing with ‘specific legislative 

proposals in the abortion areas at a time following the convening of the 

64th Legislature. Meanwhile, copies of this opinion are being forwarded to Honorable 0. H. “Ike” Harris and Honorable Bob Hendricks, 

Chairman, respectively, of the Senate Committee on Jurirprudence 

and the House Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence. for their general 

guidance in connection with the drafting of any proposed legislation by 

their respective committees or their members. 

SUMMARY 

1. Articles 1191, 1192, ll93, 1194 and 1196, Texas ’ 

Penal Code, have been held unconstitutional and are 

no longer of any effect. Article 1195 is still a valid 

statute but applies only to those eituatione in which 

the victim is in the process of being born. Therefore, there are now no laws in this State regulating 

abortion, per se. 

2. During the first trimester of a woman’s 

pregnancy the decision of whether or not an abortion. 

is to be performed is a decision to be made by the 

pregnant woman and her physician. Existing statutes 

concerning the practice of medicine limit to liceared 

physicians those who may perform an abortion. To 

the extent that, even during the first trimester, an 

abortion is performed in an institution qualifying as 

a hospital under the Texas Hospital Licensing Act, 

.the state may regulate its facilities and eervicee. The 

state may require any facilities ured during such 

period to meet reasonable standards and be licensed 

so long as such requirements are not made applicable 

solely to those facilities where abortions are performed. 

p, 1736 
Page 15 (H-369) 

3. During the e’ecdnd and third trimester of the 

woman’s pregnancy the State may regulate the abortion 

procedure and, during the third trimester, proscribe 

abortion except. where it ir oeceerary for the prerervation of the life or the heqlth of the mother. The State 

may adopt laws regulating those who may perform 

abortions and the places where they may be performed 

during the eecond land third trlrneetere. 

4. Private physicians may refuse to perform 

abortion. Private hospitals may refuse to make their 

facilitier available for the performrace of abortions, 

but the state may not restrict abortlone by makipg 

public hoepita facilities unavailable. 

5. Proposed legislation must conform to the guidelines pronounced by the United Stater Supreme Court 

ia Roe v. Wade and related cares. 

Very truly your&, , 

APPJtQVED: 

OHN L. HILL 

General of Texas 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

p. 1737 
APPROVED: 

Page 15 (H-369) 

3. During the second and third trimester of the 

woman’s pregnancy the State may regulate the abortion 

procedure and, during the third trimester, proscribe 

abortion excepts where it ir neceerary for the preservation of the life or the health of the mother. The State 

may adopt laws regulating those who may perform 

abortions and the places where they may be performed 

during the second and third trimesters. 

4. Private physicians may refuse to perform 

abortion. Private hospitals may refuse to make their 

facilities available for the performance of abortions, 

but the state may not rertrict abortions by making 

public hospital facilities unavailable. 

.5. Proposed legislation must conform to the guidelines pronounced by the United States Supreme Court 

in Roe v. Wade and related cases. 

Very truly yours, 

OHN L. HILL 

(4Attorney General of Texas 

~f~rf!~ 

DAVID M. KENDALL, Chairman 

Opinion Committee 

- 

p. 1737