### OBAYDULLAH,



### v. UNCLASSIFIEDI/FOR PUBLIC RELEASE



### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FORTHEDISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


### Petitioner, ) ) ) ) 

### ) Civil Case No. 08-1173 (RJL) ) 

### BARACK H. OBAMA,I 

### etal., ) ) 

### Respondents. )


### CLASSIFIEDMEMORANDUM OPINION (November.:M..201O) For the reasons setforth on the record at the pub1ic hearingheld on October 19, 2010, and for the following reasons, the Court DENIES Obaydullah's petition for a writ ofhabeas corpus. 

### ANALYSIS Petitioner Obaydullah, an approximately 27-yearold Afghan citizen, grew up in the small village ofMilani in the Khost province near the Pakistan border. On 

### July 21, 2002, U.S. forces, actingon tips from various intelligence sources, conducteda nighttime raid at the petitioner's home. During that raid, U.S. forces secured from his person a notebook containingcertain diagrams that appeared to be wiringdesigns for building

J**Pur.~uant** Lo Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 25(d), ifapublic officernamed as aparty Lo an action in his official capacity ceases tohold office, the court will automatically substitute that officer's successor. Accordingly, the Court substitutes Barack H. Obama for George W. Bush. SECkEl

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lethal improvised explosive devices ("IEDs"). 

### In addition, U.S. forces found a stash of 23 anti-tank mines buried in an outdoorpit close to petitioner'shome. Petitionerwas, of course, taken into custody and transported to Champman Airfield for follow-up questioning. Shortly thereafter, he was transferred to Bagram Airfield where he was imprisoned for approximately three months before being transported to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, CubainOctober

### 2002. 

### ANALYSIS The Government argues that Obaydullah is the type ofindividual who is detainable under the Authorization for Use ofMilitary Force ("AUMF")-or, in other words, is an enemy combatant-becausehe was "part of' an AI Qaeda "bombcell" operating in the Khost region ofAfghanistan at the time he was taken into custody by U.S. forces in 

### 2002. (Return 11 at 1.) In particular, the Government contends that petitioner: (1) was hiding onhis property a cache of23 anti-tank mines and seven plastic mine shells from which explosiveshad been removed; (2) was captured in possession ofa notebookcontaining instructions and wiring diagrams for how to build a remote-control detonating device (i.e
.. lED); (3) was storing an automobile that contained dried blood and Taliban propaganda, and that had been used byhim and another toferry to alocal hospital certain bomb cell members who had been mjured in an accidental explosion; and (4) has repeatedly given false and implausible explanations regarding his knowledge of, and involvement with, these explosives, this notebook, and this automobile. In short, the

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### SECR£'f Government contends that its pre-raid intelligence sources linking Obaydullah to the bomb cell have been more than adequately corroborated and that it is therefore more likely than not that petitioner was indeed amember ofthat a1 Qaedacell. Petitioner, not surprisingly, disagrees. He denies any ownership interest in the mines and automobile recovered from his property. (Classified Opening ]6:12-18:2, 18:4-23.) Moreover, he claims that the notebook contains nothing more thanhis notes from a bomb detection training he had been required to attend by the Taliban some eight months earlier. as well as notes from his business. (Traverse 5-6.) In essence, he claims that eitherthe Government'spre-raid intelligence has not been adequately corroborated,
or that the unidentified sources ofthe Government's pre-raid intelIigence have falsely accused him ofmembership in this supposed al Qaedabomb cell. (Classified Opening 20: 4-18; 21 :4-10.) Upon reviewing the return, the traverse, and oral arguments of counsel during the merits hearing, Idisagree with the petitioner's contention and conclude for the following reasons that the Government has more than adequately established that it is more likely than not that the petitioner was in fact a member ofan al Qaeda bomb cell, and is therefore detainable under the AUMF. 

### 1. The pre-raid intelligence. The Government's case 

### in large part rests onthe pre-raid intelligence reports that 

### link Obaydul1ah to an a1 Qaeda bomb cell. However, the Government has not disclosed the source ofthe pre-raid intelligence. Though, as petitionerpoints out, raw intelligence 

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reports may not be sufficiently reliable, standing alone, tojustify detention (Traverse 17- 18), essentially, the government argues that its intelligence has been sufficiently corroborated to conclude that itis accurate, and thus, that 

### it is more likely chan not that Obaydullah was, in fact, a member ofan al Qaeda bomb cell and is thus detainable under the AUMF. Accordingly, a short description ofthe infonnation contained in that pre-raid intelligence is appropriate.



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### 2. The raid on Obaydullah's compound. U.S. forces, acting on this intelligence, subsequently conducted a night-timeraid
on petitioner's compound onJuly 21, 2002.

forces recovered 23 anti-tank mines ofItalian and Pakistani origin, as well as seven empty mine shells, compound. 

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### Obaydullah's U.S. forces also found a taxi

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cab in the compound that was covered by a tarp and contained inside dried blood and Taliban propaganda. (Gov'tExs. 

### 37,.110.) Indeed, the Special Forces Staff Sergeant who participated in the raid reported that the blood could havebeenconnected to an earlier incident in which petitionerand Karim Bostanwere seen by an intelligence
source taking some individuals to the hospital after an accidental explosion that occurred during the construction ofa mine-based lED. (Gov't Ex. 

### 37.) Finally, U.S. forces recovered a notebook from Obaydullah's pocket. (Return 1jf45 at 18- 19; Gov'tEx. 110;
see also Gov'tEx. 17.) That notebook contained information intended to assist in the construction ofa remote-controlled lED that used a mine as its main charge. (Gov'tEx. 13.) ObayduIlah, who then identifiedhimselfas "Baitullah," was taken into custody along with two ofhis cousins. (Gov'tEx. 110, Return**~43** at 18). 

### 3. Petitioner's explanations for his possession ofthe mines andthe notebook. At the scene, the petitioner, by his own admission, lied whenconfronted with the mines and the notebook. With respect to the mines, Obaydullah claimed that he was holding onto the mines for his business partner and friend, Karim, who he lateridentified to be Karim Bostan. (Gov'tEx. 37; Return**~f46** at 19.) With respect to the notebook, petitioner again lied by telling the soldiers that the notebook contained notes and diagramsregarding, ofall things, apowergenerator. (Gov't Exs. 37. 110.) Petitioner also maintained that the notebookhad been given to himby Karim. (Gov'tEx. 110.)



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### SECRET Obaydullah now puts forth very different accounts ofthe mines as well as the notebook. For the following reasons, however, I find his current explanations for why he
was in possession ofanti-tank mines and a notebook ofinstructions onhow to generate mine-detonated lEDs, not to be credible. With respect to the mines, Obaydullah later changed his story on a numberof occasions regarding his involvement with, and interest in, the mines. (HearingTr., Oct. 1,2010AM, 4:24-9:25,11:10·14:21.) His initial reconfiguration ofthe events was that the mines had been left behind at his home more than ten years earlier by the Soviet commander Ali Jan, who had used Obaydullah's compound as an operations base. 

### (Id. 8:9-15; Gov't Ex. 29.) However, he has also at times claimed that the mines were instead left byjihad fighters.**(Gov~t** Ex. 

### 30). He claimed that his mother and uncle buried the discarded mines some 300 meters from his compound. (Gov'tEx. 47.) However, at other times heclaimed that he buriedthem himself(Gov'eExs. 

### 30,46), thatjusthe and his uncle buried them (Gov'tEx. 107), orthatjust he and his mother buried them (Gov't Ex. 89). Petitionerhas also changed his story as to when the mines were buried, at one time saying that they were buried approximately in 1992, ten years prior to his an'est (Gov'tEx. 47), yet also stating that they were buried approximately in 2001,just after ObayduIJah's supposed conscripted attendance at aTaliban school (Gov'tEx. 107). Petitioner nm\' even questions whetherthe mines uncovered by the U.S. forces are the
same mines he recalls burying, but even ifthey are, continues to contend that he did not

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intend to use the anti-tankmines to build IEDs for use against U.S. and Allied forces. (HearingTr., Sept. 30, 2010PM, 35:9-36:15; 61:5-6.) More specifically with respect to the mines, however, petitionercontends, inter alia, that a number ofinaccuracies in the pre-raid intelligence's description regardingthe mines and their location, are sufficient evidence to undercut the overall credibility ofthe
sources ofthe pre-raid intelligence linking him to a) Qaeda. (Classified Opening 2 I:24- 23:22.) For example, the pre-raid intelligence

mines were Soviet, not Pakistani orItalian (Classified Closing 31:19-20). Petitioneralso points to other statements in the pre-raid intelligence linkinghim to al Qaeda to argue that it has notbeen sufficiently corroborated. I disagree. The details Obaydullah focuses on are-forthe most part-ofinsufficient importance in the grand scheme ofthe events. Forexample, whether the numberof mines was 18 Or 23 and whether the mines were properly characterized as beingof Italian, Soviet, orPakistani origin are oflittle to no moment.

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SEeRfl' What matters is that there were, in fact, 23**anti~tank** mines ofItalian and Pakistani origin that were found in close proximity to the petitioner's compound. And while the parties may quibble over issues relating to how the mines were buried and by whom, the fact is that Obaydullah lied abouthis interest in them when first confronted and then came up with a series ofinconsistent and inherently ridiculous accounts as to their storage. Indeed, if, as he now claims, the mines the U.S. forces found were /lotthe
same ones allegedly discarded by the Soviets (or, in an alternate version ofpetitioner's account, byjihad fighters) that hepurportedlyburied with various family members, why did he not direct the U.S. forces to the supposed location 300meters away? But even
more importantly, ifpetitionerrealIy had no ongoing interest in these mines, what on earth was he doing with a notebook on hisperson that spelled out in detail how to assemble those mines into remote-control detonated IEDs? Petitioner's story as to the notebookhas also, not surprisingly, evolved to his cun-ent account that they were his notes from aTaliban-required class he attended months earlieronbomb detection. This story-yet again-defies both common sense and reality. In fact, the Government's uncontrovertedanalysis ofthe notebook's contents clearly indicates that it contains wiring diagrams and notes that constitute a veritable checkJistin albeit somewhat cryptic form-ofhow to assemble a remote-control detonated IED. Thus, ifthere were any lingeringdoubt aboutpetitioner's interest in the landmines unearthed on his property prior to the notebook's analysis, when viewed in combination 9 SECRt:'F

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with the notebook, there can be little doubt about the accuracy ofthe pre-raid intelligence ofpetitioner's interest in, and intent to use, these explosives against U.S. and Allied forces. 

### 4. Taxi recovered during 

### raid. It is worth commentingbriefly on the automobile found at petitioner's compound. The Special Forces StaffSergeant ("the StaffSergeant") who participated in the raid submitted a declaration indicatingthat the petitionerand Karim Bostan, in the aftennath ofan accidental explosion, were seen driving an automobile taking several wounded bomb cell members to a local hospital for medical attention. (Gov'tExs. 37, 110.) He also stated that the U.S. forces seized a taxi from petitioner's compound, and that that automobile had contained both evidence ofdried blood and certain pro-Taliban propaganda. (ld. Petitioner denies that any such car existed by pointing to the post-raid report that does not mention the contents ofthe automobile seized, the lack ofphysical evidence of the blood in the car, and questions the veracity ofthe StaffSergeant'sdeclaration, which
was submitted four years after the raid. (HearingTr. Sept. 30, 2010 PM, 40:I0- 17; 41:4- 7.) However, other than the arguments ofcounsel, there is nothing to indicate that the StaffSergeant had, or wouldhave, falsified his sworn statements to the Court. Moreover, the StaffSergeant noted in his 2010declaration that this automobile was found underneath a

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Accordingly, I find no reason todistrust the statements made by the StaffSergeant regarding the discovery ofthe taxi and its contents, including the residue ofdried blood. This fact, ofcourse, is consistent with the pre-raid intelligence claim that petitioner was seen using a vehicle to ferry wounded individuals to a local hospital, once again corroboratingthe government's intelligence. 

### 5. Petitioner's relationship with KarimBostan Finally, as for the petitioner's relationship to Karim Bostan, 1would, ofcourse, be remiss to unnecessarily plunge head-first into an analysis ofBostan's alleged ties to al Qaeda as chronicled at length byfonner Guantanamo detainee Adel Al Zame] (ISN 568). Indeed, unraveling the considerable evidence regarding AI Zamel's credibility-atthis point-would be a majorproject that no court would likely undertake unless absolutely necessary. Fortunately, in this case, it is not. Notwithstanding AI Zame\'s accounts, it is well-established that petitioner had a long-standing relationship ofboth a business and personal nature with Karim Bostan. Bostan is also an Afghan citizen from the Khowst region who was ObayduJlah's business partner. (Gov't Exs. 22, 29, 3].) The two were also both members ofareligious organization caJled Jamaat al-Tabligh, which, though officially apolitical, has been used
as a cover by members ofsome terrorist groups, including al Qaeda. (HearingTr., Sept. 30,2010PM, 59:11-12; Gov'tExs. 29, 24,45,64.) Indeed, petitioner and Bostan's relationship was sufficiently close that on the evening ofthe raid by U.S. forces

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### SECREf Obaydullah claimed to be holding the mines found on his property for Bostan. (Gov't

Not surprisingly, perhaps, petitionerbegan backing away from these and other stories involving Bostan when Bostan later showed up as a fellow detainee at the Guantanamo facility. However, the combinationofthe explosives. the notebook instructions and the automobile with dried blood all fit togetherto corroborate the intelligence sources placingboth the petitionerand Bostan at the scene aiding fellow bomb cell members who had been accidentally injured while constructing an lED.

corroborate the credibility ofthe government's intelligence source linking Obaydullah to 

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the 

### a1 Qaeda bomb cell. Thus, combining 

### all ofthis evidence and corroborated intelligence, the mosaic that emerges unmistakably supports the conclusion that it is more likely than not that petitioner Obaydullah was in fact a member ofan a1 Qaeda bomb cell committed to the destruction ofU.S. and Allied forces. As such, he is beinglawfully detained under the AUMF and this Courtmust, and will, therefore DENYhis petition for
a writ ofhabeas corpus. 

### CONCLUSION Thus, for all ofthe foregoing reasons, and those set forth at the hearing on October 19,2010,the Court DENIES Obaydullah's petition for a wnt ofhabeas corpus.

United States District Judge



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