[Cite as Patterson v. Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc., 2020-Ohio-4803.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

ERIC L. PATTERSON, et al. 

 Appellants 

 v. 

NATIONWIDE TRUCK BROKERS, INC., 

et al. 

 Defendants 

 and 

SWAGELOK COMPANY WELFARE 

BENEFITS PLAN 

 Appellee 

C.A. No. 29715 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CV-2016-11-4897 

 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: October 7, 2020 

 

CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellants, Eric and Laura Patterson (“the Pattersons”) appeal an order of the 

Summit County Court of Common Pleas that determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider 

their motion for sanctions. This Court reverses. 

I. 

{¶2} The Pattersons filed a complaint against an alleged tortfeasor and related parties 

after Mr. Patterson was injured in an automobile accident. The complaint also named the 

Swagelok Company Welfare Benefit Plan (“the Plan”) as a defendant, noting that the Plan may 
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have paid medical bills on Mr. Patterson’s behalf and requiring the Plan to assert its subrogation 

rights, if any. The Plan asserted a right to subrogation and reimbursement with respect to medical 

bills that it paid. During the course of the litigation, the Plan produced a summary plan description, 

but did not produce a plan document. The parties resolved all of the claims at issue and, on July 

19, 2017, all claims were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a joint stipulation of dismissal. 

{¶3} On March 7, 2019, the Pattersons filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that in a 

second, unrelated case, the Plan produced the relevant plan document and that it contradicted the 

summary plan description provided in this case with respect to subrogation rights. The trial court 

concluded that because this case had been dismissed and the trial court neither reserved jurisdiction 

over the settlement nor incorporated the terms of the settlement into the dismissal, it did not have 

jurisdiction to act. The Pattersons filed this appeal. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT DID NOT RETAIN 

JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR 

SANCTIONS FOLLOWING THE VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF ALL 

CLAIMS PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 41(A). 

{¶4} In the Pattersons’ sole assignment of error, they argue that the trial court erred by 

concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider their motion for sanctions. Specifically, they 

maintain that their motion for sanctions raised a collateral issue that could be considered by the 

trial court notwithstanding the stipulated dismissal with prejudice. 

{¶5} As a general rule, a trial court does not have jurisdiction over a case once a final 

judgment has been entered, but may act when specific authority is granted it to do so. Palmer v. 

Bowers, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010836, 2017-Ohio-355, ¶ 10. Similarly, a trial court does not 

have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a dismissal has been entered unless 
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jurisdiction to do so was reserved in the dismissal or the terms of the settlement were incorporated 

therein. Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties II, Ltd., 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-

Ohio-1101, syllabus. In various circumstances, however, courts have also concluded that after a 

dismissal, a trial court may consider a motion for sanctions because such a motion is collateral to 

the proceedings. See, e.g., Sunrise Coop., Inc. v. Joppeck, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010984, 

2017-Ohio-7654, ¶ 21 (concluding that a motion for sanctions can be considered after a dismissal 

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case); Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. GMS Mgt. Co., 

Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 19814, 2000 WL 840495, *2 (June 28, 2000), quoting Baker v. 

USS/Kobe Steel Co., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007151, 2000 WL 14044, *2 (Jan. 5, 2000); (noting 

that courts retain jurisdiction after a voluntary dismissal to consider motions for sanctions under 

R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11); Lewis v. Celina Fin. Corp., 101 Ohio App.3d 464, 470 (3d Dist.1995) 

(recognizing that a motion for sanctions can be considered after a voluntary dismissal because 

“any other result would permit a party to voluntarily dismiss an action to evade an award of 

sanctions[.]”). See generally State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605, 

¶ 23; State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 556 (2001). 

{¶6} The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Pattersons’ 

motion for sanctions without considering whether it was a collateral motion that could be 

considered after the stipulated dismissal. In this respect, this Court agrees that the trial court erred, 

but we decline to consider that question in the first instance. See Allen v. Bennet, 9th Dist. Summit 

Nos. 23570, 23573, 23576, 2007-Ohio-5411, ¶ 21. Likewise, this Court makes no determination 

regarding the merits of the Pattersons’ motion. 

{¶7} The Pattersons’ assignment of error is sustained. 
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III. 

{¶8} The Pattersons’ assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for 

proceedings consistent with this Court’s resolution of the Pattersons’ assignment of error. 

Judgment reversed 

and cause remanded. 

 

 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellee. 

 

 LYNNE S. CALLAHAN 

 FOR THE COURT 

SCHAFER, J. 

TEODOSIO, J. 

CONCUR. 
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APPEARANCES: 

BENJAMIN P. PFOUTS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHAUN D. BYROADS and DARAN KIEFER, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.