alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# L_2011132DE.01001901.xml

| 19.5.2011 | DE | Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union | L 132/19 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

19.5.2011

DE

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union

L 132/19

---

Berichtigung der Verordnung (EU) Nr. 187/2011 der Kommission vom 25. Februar 2011 zur Änderung des Anhangs I der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 669/2009 zur Durchführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 882/2004 des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates im Hinblick auf verstärkte amtliche Kontrollen bei der Einfuhr bestimmter Futtermittel und Lebensmittel nicht tierischen Ursprungs

(
  Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 53 vom 26. Februar 2011
  )

Amtsblatt der Europäischen Union L 53 vom 26. Februar 2011

Seite 47, Anhang, im Kopf der Tabelle, 3. Spalte:

anstatt:

„Herkunftsland“

muss es heißen:

„Ursprungsland“.

---
Exhibit 32.1
 
 Certification of the Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
 
 The undersigned, the Chief Executive Officer of Front Yard Residential Corporation (the “Company”), hereby certifies on the date hereof, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1350(a), as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Amendment No. 1 on Form 10-K/A for the year ended December 31, 2019 (“Form 10-K/A”), filed concurrently herewith by the Company, fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained in the Form 10-K/A fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 
 A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
 
 
 Date:April 29, 2020By:/s/George G. EllisonGeorge G. EllisonChief Executive Officer
January 22, 2016 

Dear Mr. von Tschamer: 

This letter is to inform you that the following information is missing from your petition (Docket 

No. FAA−2015−5388). This information is necessary for the Federal Aviation Administration 

(FAA) to process your petition. 

 Provide a copy of the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) 

which is required by Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. If you wish for us to 

proceed without this manual and remove closed-set filming from your proposed operation 

please inform of us of your intention by the requested response date listed below. 

Please submit the additional information (non-proprietary) to your docket at 

www.regulations.gov. Once your information has been submitted, please also send a copy of the 

requested information (and any proprietary information), as well as your comment tracking 

number from regulations.gov via e-mail to 333exemptions@faa.gov. If you want us to process 

your request any further, we must receive the information described above by 2/5/16. If we do 

not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further. 

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at (202) 267–2999. 

Sincerely, 

/S/ 

Program Analyst
#### CHANEY v. STATE.

No. 16810.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

May 23, 1934.

Lewis O. Orsbom, of Wills Point, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

*877KRUEGER, Judge.

The appellant was tried and convicted of the offense of transporting intoxicating liquor, and his punishment assessed at confinement in the state penitentiary for a term of one year.

The record is before us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. No defect either in the indictment or procedure has been pointed out or has been perceived. No question is presented for review.

The judgment is affirmed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

EASTERN DISTRICT

STEVEN FRIEDMAN, MD, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE 

OF GAIL FRIEDMAN, DECEASED,

Petitioner

v.

DEVON MANOR AND HEARTLAND 

PHARMACY OF PA LLC, AND HCR 

MANOR CARE, INC.,

Respondents

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 494 EAL 2016

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 18th day of April, 2017, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
#### ARMSTRONG v. GADDIS, County Treasurer.

No. 10350.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. San Antonio.

Nov. 30, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 4, 1939.

*1116O. R. Armstrong, of El Paso, for appellant.

L. B. Cooper, of Cotulla, for appellee.

MURRAY, Justice.

Mrs. A. Y. Armstrong instituted this suit against H. P. Gaddis, County Treasurer of La Salle County and Ex-Officio Trustee of the La Salle County Water Improvement District No. 1. Dissolved, seeking to recover the value of the full performance of a certain contract‘entered into by and between Mrs. Armstrong, on the one hand, and the Water District, on the other. The contract, for a specified “price or damages” authorized the Water Improvement District to go upon Mrs. Armstrong’s land and construct a dam and other irrigation works. The construction of the dam was begun and continued for some nine months, and then abandoned, after doing considerable damage to the land by the digging of ditches, holes, etc. Mrs. Armstrong in the alternative asked for damages to her land.

The .trial court denied recovery under the contract, on the theory that it was to be effective only in the event the dam was completed, but allowed a recovery on the alternative plea for damages in the sum of $2,098.00. Mrs. Armstrong has appealed.

Appellant in the opening paragraph of her argument states she has limited her appeal to assignments of error dealing only with the refusal of the trial court to award her the “price or damages” stipulated in the written contract. There is nothing in the appeal bond to indicate that this is a limited appeal, but, on the other hand, the appeal as determined by the appeal bond is from the judgment in toto. Appellant again in the final prayer of her brief makes it clear that she does not wish to disturb the judgment for damages in her favor.

It, therefore, becomes apparent that appellant is electing to retain all benefits under the judgment as rendered and is asking this Court to grant her further relief only in the event it can do so without disturbing the judgment for damages in her favor.

We have examined the contentions made by appellant and have determined that both recoveries sought by appellant cannot stand. If appellant should recover the “price or damages” stipulated in the contract, she would not be entitled to any further damages to her land, and, on the other hand, if she recovers for the actual damages done, to her land she could not also recover the “price or damages” stipulated in the contract. The two remedies are inconsistent.

Inasmuch as appellant has elected to retain all benefits derived ffom the judgment as rendered in the trial court, we will not further consider her propositions submitted upon the condition that we do not reverse the judgment awarding her actual damages.

The judgment below is affirmed.
FILED

September 29, 1998

Cecil W. Crowson

Appellate Court Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

JUNE, 1998 SESSION

JUAN PEREZ WALKER ) No. 01C01-9708-CR-00371

)

Appellee, )

) Davidson County

vs. )

) Honorable Thomas H. Shriver, Judge

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) (Post-Conviction)

Appellant. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

THOMAS H. MILLER JOHN KNOX WALKUP

(On Appeal) Attorney General & Reporter

Post Office Box 681662

Franklin, TN 37064 CLINTON J. MORGAN

Counsel for the State

MARTIN A. KOOPERMAN Criminal Justice Division

(At the Post-Conviction Hearing) 425 Fifth Ave. North

603 W oodland St. Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Nashville, TN 37206

VICTOR S. JOHNSON, III

District Attorney General

PAM ANDERSON

Assistant District Attorney General

Washington Square, Suite 500

222 2nd Ave. N.

Nashville, TN 37201-1649

OPINION FILED: ____________________

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

CURWOOD W ITT 

JUDGE
2

OPINION

Juan Perez W alker, the petitioner, appeals pursuant to Rule 3 of the

Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure from the trial court's dismis sal of his petition

for post-conviction relief. He contends that the trial court erred in finding that his

attorney had provided effective assistance of counsel and that he knowingly and

voluntarily entered his guilty plea.

In post-conviction proceedings,the petitioner has the burden of proving

the grounds raised in the petition by a clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-30-210(f) (1997). After a hearing, the trial court found that petitioner’s

counsel did “an exceptionally good job” in handling the plea and that his

representation was well within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in

criminal cases under Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 1975). The trial court

also found that the petitioner entered his guilty pleas with a clear understanding of

his constitutional rights and of the consequences of pleading guilty and that the pleas

were entered voluntarily. We have reviewed the record on appeal and the

applicable law. In this instance, the petitioner has not carried his burden. The

evidence in the record is more than sufficient to support the conclusions of the trial

court.

A more lengthy opinion in this matter would be of no precedential

value, and no error of law which requires reversal is apparent on the record.

Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the petitioner’s request for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal

Appeals. 

__________________________

CURWOOD W ITT, Judge

CONCUR:

______________________________

JOE G. RILEY, JR., Judge

______________________________

R. LEE MOORE, JR., Special Judge
II

106TH CONGRESS

2D SESSION S. 2768

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to improve the medicaredependent, small rural hospital program.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 22, 2000

Ms. COLLINS introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred

to the Committee on Finance

A BILL

To amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to improve

the medicare-dependent, small rural hospital program.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Small Rural Hospital

5 Program Improvement Act of 2000’’.

6 SEC. 2. MAKING THE MEDICARE-DEPENDENT, SMALL

7 RURAL HOSPITAL PROGRAM PERMANENT.

8 (a) PAYMENT METHODOLOGY.—Section

9 1886(d)(5)(G) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.

10 1395ww(d)(5)(G)) (as amended by section 404(a) of the
2

•S 2768 IS

1 Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refine2 ment Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 1501A–372), as enacted into

3 law by section 1000(a)(6) of Public Law 106–113) is

4 amended—

5 (1) in clause (i), by striking ‘‘and before Octo6 ber 1, 2006,’’; and

7 (2) in clause (ii)(II), by striking ‘‘and before

8 October 1, 2006,’’.

9 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.—

10 (1) TARGET AMOUNT.—Section 1886(b)(3)(D)

11 of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.

12 1395ww(b)(3)(D)) (as amended by section 404(b)(1)

13 of the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced

14 Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 1501A–

15 372), as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(6) of

16 Public Law 106–113) is amended—

17 (A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by

18 striking ‘‘and before October 1, 2006,’’; and

19 (B) in clause (iv), by striking ‘‘through fis20 cal year 2005,’’ and inserting ‘‘or any subse21 quent fiscal year,’’.

22 (2) PERMITTING HOSPITALS TO DECLINE RE23 CLASSIFICATION.—Section 13501(e)(2) of the Omni24 bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (42 U.S.C.

25 1395ww note) (as amended by section 404(b)(2) of
3

•S 2768 IS

1 the Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced

2 Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (113 Stat. 1501A–

3 372), as enacted into law by section 1000(a)(6) of

4 Public Law 106–113) is amended by striking ‘‘or

5 fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2005’’ and in6 serting ‘‘fiscal year 2000, or any subsequent fiscal

7 year,’’.

8 SEC. 3. OPTION TO BASE ELIGIBILITY ON DISCHARGES

9 DURING ANY OF THE 3 MOST RECENT AU10 DITED COST REPORTING PERIODS.

11 (a) OPTION TO BASE ELIGIBILITY ON DISCHARGES

12 DURING ANY OF THE 3 MOST RECENT AUDITED COST

13 REPORTING PERIODS.—Section 1886(d)(5)(G)(iv)(IV) of

14 the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.

15 1395ww(d)(5)(G)(iv)(IV)) is amended by inserting ‘‘, or

16 any of the 3 most recent audited cost reporting periods,’’

17 after ‘‘1987’’.

18 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE.—The amendments made by

19 this section shall apply with respect to cost reporting peri20 ods beginning on or after the date of enactment of this

21 Act.

Æ
#### Jack PARKINSON, Appellant, v. STATE, Appellee.

No. 20343.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Feb. 1, 1939.

No attorney for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for swindling in securing property .over the value of fifty dollars, *1119punishment assessed at five years in the penitentiary.

Appellant has filed his affidavit advising the court that he does not further desire to prosecute his appeal, and at his request the same is dismissed.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 276

AN ACT

For the relief of Sergio Lozano.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
2

S 276 ES

1 SECTION 1. PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS FOR SERGIO

2 LOZANO.

3 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding subsections (a)

4 and (b) of section 201 of the Immigration and Nationality

5 Act, Sergio Lozano shall be eligible for issuance of an im6 migrant visa or for adjustment of status to that of an alien

7 lawfully admitted for permanent residence upon filing an

8 application for issuance of an immigrant visa under sec9 tion 204 of such Act or for adjustment of status to lawful

10 permanent resident.

11 (b) ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.—If Sergio Lozano en12 ters the United States before the filing deadline specified

13 in subsection (c), he shall be considered to have entered

14 and remained lawfully and shall, if otherwise eligible, be

15 eligible for adjustment of status under section 245 of the

16 Immigration and Nationality Act as of the date of the en17 actment of this Act.

18 (c) DEADLINE FOR APPLICATION AND PAYMENT OF

19 FEES.—Subsections (a) and (b) shall apply only if the ap20 plication for issuance of an immigrant visa or the applica21 tion for adjustment of status are filed with appropriate

22 fees within 2 years after the date of the enactment of this

23 Act.

24 (d) REDUCTION OF IMMIGRANT VISA NUMBER.—

25 Upon the granting of an immigrant visa or permanent res26 idence to Sergio Lozano, the Secretary of State shall in-
3

S 276 ES

1 struct the proper officer to reduce by one, during the cur2 rent or next following fiscal year, the total number of im3 migrant visas that are made available to natives of the

4 country of the alien’s birth under section 203(a) of the

5 Immigration and Nationality Act or, if applicable, the

6 total number of immigrant visas that are made available

7 to natives of the country of the alien’s birth under section

8 202(e) of such Act.

Passed the Senate November 19, 1999.

Attest:

Secretary.
106TH CONGRESS

1ST SESSION S. 276

AN ACT

For the relief of Sergio Lozano.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1532

ANTOINE LETOOMBANTA NONON SAA, Petitioner,
versus PETER D. KEISLER, Acting Attorney General, Respondent. On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals. (A97-624-172) Submitted: November 6, 2007 Decided: November 20, 2007 Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges. Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion. Oti W. Nwosu, THE LAW OFFICE OF OTI W. NWOSU, Arlington, Virginia, for Petitioner. Linda S. Wernery, Assistant Director, Leslie McKay, Senior Litigation Counsel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.- 2 - PER CURIAM: Antoine Letoombanta Nonon Saa, a native and citizen of Togo, petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to reopen. We deny the petition for review. We review the Board’s decision to deny a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. INS v. Doherty , 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (2007). A motion for reconsideration asserts that the Board made an error in its earlier decision, Turri v. INS , 997 F.2d 1306, 1311 n.4 (10th Cir. 1993), and requires the movant to specify the error of fact or law in the prior Board decision. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1) (2007); Matter of Cerna , 20 I. & N. Dec. 399, 402 (BIA 1991) (noting that a motion to reconsider questions a decision for alleged errors in appraising the facts and the law). The burden is on the movant to establish that reconsideration is warranted. INS v. Abudu , 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). “To be within a mile of being granted, a motion for reconsideration has to give the tribunal to which it is addressed a reason for changing its mind.” Ahmed v. Ashcroft , 388 F.3d 247, 249 (7th Cir. 2004). Motions that simply repeat contentions that have already been rejected are insufficient to convince the Board to reconsider a previous decision. Id. We find the Board did not abuse its discretion. Saa merely repeated in his motion to reconsider contentions raised in- 3 - his motion to reopen. He failed to address the adverse credibility finding and did not establish prima facie eligibility for the relief sought. Saa also fa iled to establish the Board erred by finding some of the newly discovered evidence could have been presented to the immigration judge at the merits hearing. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

PETITION DENIED
##### 



UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
 Washington, D.C. 20549
 FORM 8-K
 CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): February 6, 2008
 Grant Prideco, Inc.
  Delaware
    
    001-15423
    
    76-0312499(State of Incorporation)
    
    (Commission File No.)
    
    (I.R.S. Employer Identification No.)400 N. Sam Houston Pkwy. East, Suite 900, Texas
    
    77060(Address of Principal Executive Offices)
    
    (Zip Code)
 Registrants telephone number, including area code: (281) 878-8000
 see
 o
    
    Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR
230.425)o
    
    Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR
240.14a-12)o
    
    Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act
(17 CFR 240.14d-2(b))o
    
    Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act
(17 CFR 240.13e-4(c))




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##### 



Item 7.01 Regulation FD Disclosure




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##### 



SIGNATURES
  Grant Prideco, Inc.Date: February 7, 2008
    By:
    /s/ Philip A. ChoycePhilip A. ChoyceVice President and General Counsel
[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 201 (Thursday, October 17, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Page 83752]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-23886]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

[Disaster Declaration #20533 and #20534; FLORIDA Disaster Number FL-
20009]


Presidential Declaration Amendment of a Major Disaster for the 
State of Florida

AGENCY: U.S. Small Business Administration.

ACTION: Amendment 5.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This is an amendment of the Presidential declaration of a 
major disaster for the State of Florida (FEMA-4806-DR), dated August 
10, 2024.

DATES: Issued on October 9, 2024.
    Physical Loan Application Deadline Date: November 12, 2024.
    Economic Injury (EIDL) Loan Application Deadline Date: May 12, 
2025.

ADDRESSES: Visit the MySBA Loan Portal at https://lending.sba.gov to 
apply for a disaster assistance loan.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan Escobar, Office of Disaster 
Recovery & Resilience, U.S. Small Business Administration, 409 3rd 
Street SW, Suite 6050, Washington, DC 20416, (202) 205-6734.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of the President's major disaster 
declaration for the State of Florida, dated August 10, 2024, is hereby 
amended to extend the deadline for filing applications for physical 
damages as a result of this disaster to November 12, 2024.
    Incident: Hurricane Debby.
    Incident Period: August 1, 2024 through August 27, 2024.
    All other information in the original declaration remains 
unchanged.

(Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Number 59008)

Rafaela Monchek,
Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Disaster Recovery & 
Resilience.
[FR Doc. 2024-23886 Filed 10-16-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8026-09-P
#### Kinzfogl, Respondent, vs. Greiner and others, Appellants.

*October 6*

November *3, 1953.*

*107For the appellants there were briefs by *Michael, Spohn} Best &*Friedrich, attorneys, and *George A. Schutt*and *Roy C. La Budde*of counsel, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by *Mr. La Budde.*

For the respondent .there was a brief and oral argument by *Ben L. Chernov*of Milwaukee.

Broadfoot, J.

The defendants contend that the first cause of action should be dismissed for the reason that the oral contract contained a provision for increasing commissions after five years, and it is therefore void under the provisions of the statute of frauds, sec. 241.02 (1). There are allegations in the record that the only time the term of employment was discussed was at the time of the original hiring, and that plaintiff’s employment was for an indefinite period. Such a contract, because terminable at will, is a valid contract even though it is not in writing. *Kirkpatrick v. Jackson,*256 Wis. 208, 40 N. W. (2d) 372.

The defendants next contend that the second cause of action should be dismissed because plaintiff suffered no damage by being induced to modify a void contract, and if the original contract is valid, he has suffered no damage since the modification was by its terms conditional on plaintiff’s receiving as much or more pay under it.

They also contend that the plaintiff’s third cause of action should be dismissed because plaintiff has elected to affirm the modification which renders his employment contract a valid express agreement, precluding recovery on *quantum meruit.*

The trial court determined that there were issues of fact to be tried, and it is apparent that his determination is correct. The parties are in dispute as to the terms of the original agreement and as to whether or not the subsequent modifications thereof were conditioned upon the yield to the plaintiff being equal to or in excess of the amount to be due him under the net-profits method of computation. It is a fundamental *108rule that summary: judgment will not be granted where an examination of the proper documents in connection with the motion shows that any issue of fact remains to be tried.

As previously mentioned, the separate causes of action set out in the complaint are in the alternative. Whether the agreements are valid or invalid will depend upon the testimony offered upon the trial. It is impossible to tell from the pleadings upon which cause of action the plaintiff will eventually rely.

*By the Court.*— Order affirmed.