SUMMARY 

March 22, 2018 

2018COA45

No. 17CA0652, People in Interest of B.C. — Juvenile Court — 

Dependency and Neglect — Criteria for Termination 

A division of the court of appeals considers whether the 

district court erred by terminating parental rights without 

conducting a dispositional hearing or adopting a formal treatment 

plan that it found to be appropriate. The division concludes that, 

pursuant to section 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2017, the district court 

must find that “an appropriate treatment plan approved by the 

court has not been reasonably complied with” before deciding to 

terminate parental rights. Because the district court omitted the 

important step of finding a treatment plan to be appropriate, it 

could not terminate parental rights. Accordingly, the division 

reverses the termination order and remands the case for further 

proceedings. 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion. 
The special concurrence further explains how the supreme 

court’s decision in People in Interest of J.W., 2017 CO 105, does not 

impact the division’s opinion. 
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2018COA45 

Court of Appeals No. 17CA0652 

Pueblo County District Court No. 16JV42 

Honorable Deborah R. Eyler, Judge 

The People of the State of Colorado, 

Petitioner-Appellee, 

In the Interest of B.C., a Child, 

and Concerning L.T., 

Respondent-Appellant. 

JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE 

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS 

Division I 

Opinion by JUDGE RICHMAN 

Taubman, J., concurs 

Furman, J., specially concurs 

Opinion Modified and 

Petition for Rehearing DENIED 

OPINION PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED AS “NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO 

C.A.R. 35(e)” ON December 21, 2017, IS NOW MODIFIED AND DESIGNATED 

FOR PUBLICATION 

Cynthia Mitchell, County Attorney, David A. Roth, Special Assistant County 

Attorney, Pueblo, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee 

Anna N. H. Ulrich, Guardian Ad Litem 

Law Office of Roy Wallis, Roy Wallis, Mesa, Arizona, for Respondent-Appellant 
1 

¶ 1 L.T. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating the 

parent-child legal relationship with her child, B.C. 

¶ 2 Mother contends that the trial court erred by not conducting a 

dispositional hearing or adopting a formal treatment plan that was 

found to be appropriate. The Pueblo County Department of Social 

Services (the Department) responds that the court substantially 

complied with the procedural requirements of sections 19-3-507 

and -508(1)(d)(II), C.R.S. 2017. The Department also argues that 

mother waived her objections by not raising them in the trial court, 

and that she was not prejudiced by any failure to hold a 

dispositional hearing. Because we agree with mother, we reverse 

the judgment and remand for further proceedings. 

I. Background 

¶ 3 The proceedings in this case began when the child and mother 

tested positive for methamphetamine after the child was born. 

¶ 4 The Department filed a petition in dependency and neglect, 

alleging that there were concerns that mother had continued to use 

methamphetamine and was not bonding with the child. 

¶ 5 After a Family Voice Conference, mother stipulated to an 

adjudication, admitting that the child’s environment was injurious 
2 

to his welfare. She also stipulated to a preliminary treatment plan 

that required her to (1) sign releases of information; (2) participate 

in sobriety monitoring; (3) complete substance abuse and mental 

health evaluations and follow recommended treatment; (4) attend 

parenting classes and the child’s doctor appointments; and (5) 

attend visitation. 

¶ 6 Although no dispositional hearing was held, on February 23, 

2016, the Department filed a special report with the trial court 

containing an attached treatment plan that had the same 

requirements. The cover page indicates that the Department sent 

mother’s counsel a copy of the formal treatment plan. 

¶ 7 By order dated February 29, 2016, based on mother’s 

stipulation, the trial court adjudicated the child dependent and 

neglected. The court also ordered the Department to “submit a 

formal treatment plan to the Court within twenty (20) days from the 

date of the family voice conference.” The order specified that “if no 

objections are made to said formal treatment plan, the formal 

treatment plan shall be adopted and made an order of the Court.” 

The order did not include a finding that the treatment plan was 

“appropriate.” 
3 

¶ 8 Mother did not object to the preliminary treatment plan from 

the Family Voice Conference or the formal treatment plan. 

¶ 9 At two subsequent hearings, the trial court entered orders that 

stated that, as relevant here, the “Treatment Plan previously 

approved by the Court shall remain in full force and effect.” 

¶ 10 The Department later moved to terminate mother’s parental 

rights. Mother objected to the termination of her parental rights 

and asserted that she was in compliance with “the treatment plan.” 

She did not specify which treatment plan. 

¶ 11 Approximately one year after the petition was filed, following a 

contested hearing, the trial court entered judgment terminating 

mother’s parental rights.

¶ 12 As pertinent here, the court stated that by its order of 

February 29, 2016, it had found the treatment plan dated February 

23, 2016, “to be appropriate and in the best interests of the child.” 

The court found that mother had not complied with the treatment 

plan, and the plan had not been successful. The court then entered 

judgment terminating mother’s parental rights. 
4 

II. Analysis 

¶ 13 Section 19-3-508(1) requires the court to “approve an 

appropriate treatment plan.” Section 19-3-604(1)(c)(I), C.R.S. 2017, 

requires a finding that “an appropriate treatment plan approved by 

the court has not been reasonably complied with” before deciding to 

terminate parental rights. 

¶ 14 In this case, not only was there no dispositional hearing, but 

the trial court did not approve an “appropriate treatment plan.” In 

its termination judgment, the court stated that by orders of 

February 29, 2016, and March 30, 2016, it “found the treatment 

plans . . . to be appropriate.” However, these orders do not contain 

findings of “appropriateness.” Rather, they say the Department 

must submit a formal treatment plan, and if no objections are 

made, the plan would be adopted. These orders did not conclude 

that the plans were appropriate, nor did they set forth the criteria 

by which plans are deemed to be appropriate. 

¶ 15 Two divisions of the court have held that a parent’s right to 

object to the elements of a treatment plan is waived if not raised 

before the termination hearing. See People in Interest of D.P., 160 

P.3d 351, 354 (Colo. App. 2007); People in Interest of M.S., 129 P.3d 
5 

1086, 1087 (Colo. App. 2005). Another division has held that 

objections to a treatment plan may be raised on appeal even if not 

objected to at the termination hearing. See People in Interest of 

S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 914-18 (Colo. App. 2011). 

¶ 16 This difference need not be resolved here. It is correct that 

mother did not specify objections to components of the treatment 

plan. But the issues raised on appeal are that the plan was 

adopted without a dispositional hearing, and that the trial court did 

not make a finding that the plan was appropriate. Although we 

recognize that the court here may have been attempting to expedite 

this proceeding, these formal steps may not be ignored. 

¶ 17 Section 19-3-507(1)(a) specifies that at a dispositional hearing 

the court shall hear evidence on “the question of the proper 

disposition best serving the interests of the child and the public.” 

Subsection (1)(b) requires a caseworker to submit details of services 

offered or provided to the family to facilitate reunification of the 

child and family. These steps are important in their own right, and 

subsection (2) adds that if based on this evidence the court has 

reason to believe a child may have an intellectual or developmental 

disability, specific referrals are required. 
6 

¶ 18 Section 19-3-508 provides for the different dispositions that 

the court may reach, timing guidelines for the termination hearing 

depending on the disposition, and provisions for placement of the 

child. 

¶ 19 An appropriate treatment plan has been defined as one that is 

“reasonably calculated to render the particular [parent] fit to 

provide adequate parenting to the child within a reasonable time 

and that relates to the child’s needs.” § 19-1-103(10), C.R.S. 

2017. 

¶ 20 Finally, section 19-3-604(1)(c) permits the court to terminate 

the parent-child relationship only if “an appropriate treatment plan 

approved by the court has not been reasonably complied with by 

the parent.” The court cannot make such a finding if it has not first 

found the treatment plan to be appropriate. 

¶ 21 Because of the omission of these important steps in the 

proceedings of this case, we reverse the termination order and 

remand the case for further proceedings. 

¶ 22 The week before we issued our opinion in this case, the 

supreme court issued its opinion in People in Interest of J.W., 2017 

CO 105, ¶ 32 (holding that the juvenile court’s failure to enter a 
7 

written adjudication order confirming the children’s status before 

terminating the parent-child legal relationship did not divest the 

court of jurisdiction to terminate). In a petition for rehearing, the 

Pueblo County Department of Social Services (Department) 

contends that we should reconsider our opinion in light of the 

supreme court’s J.W. decision. The Department reasons that not 

holding a dispositional hearing before termination is the equivalent 

of not entering a written dependency and neglect adjudication. We 

requested simultaneous briefing from the parties on the 

Department’s petition. Having considered the briefs, we now deny 

the petition for rehearing. We conclude that the opinion in People 

in Interest of J.W. does not suggest a different result in this case 

because J.W. analyzed whether the court had jurisdiction to 

terminate parental rights, which was not at issue in this case. 

JUDGE TAUBMAN concurs. 

JUDGE FURMAN specially concurs. 
8 

JUDGE FURMAN, specially concurring. 

¶ 23 I write separately to address why I would not grant the 

Department’s petition for rehearing. 

¶ 24 Because a termination of parental rights case involves 

constitutional and statutory requirements, I address two 

fundamental questions: (1) What is the constitutional standard of 

proof in proceedings involving termination of a parent-child 

relationship? (2) Does People in Interest of J.W., 2017 CO 105 apply 

to our opinion? I answer the first question by discussing our 

supreme court’s opinion in People in Interest of A.M.D., 648 P.2d 

625 (Colo. 1982). I then answer the second question by discussing 

the supreme court’s opinion in J.W.

I. Constitutional Standard of Proof 

¶ 25 In A.M.D., our supreme court explained constitutional due 

process requirements for a juvenile court to terminate parental 

rights. First, the court recognized the following: 

The fundamental liberty interest of natural 

parents in the care, custody, and management 

of their child does not evaporate simply 

because they have not been model parents or 

have lost temporary custody of their child to 

the State. Even when blood relationships are 

strained, parents retain a vital interest in 
9 

preventing the irretrievable destruction of their 

family life. If anything, persons faced with 

forced dissolution of their parental rights have 

a more critical need for procedural protections 

than do those resisting state intervention into 

ongoing family affairs. When the State moves 

to destroy weakened familial bonds, it must 

provide the parents with fundamentally fair 

procedures. 

A.M.D., 648 P.2d at 632 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 

753-54 (1982)). 

¶ 26 Second, the court determined that, “in Colorado, a dependency 

or neglect proceeding and the resulting adjudication provide the 

jurisdictional bases for State intervention to assist the parents and 

child in establishing a relationship and home environment that will 

preserve the family unit.” A.M.D., 648 P.2d at 640. 

¶ 27 Third, the court determined that “clear and convincing 

evidence is the appropriate constitutional standard of proof in 

proceedings involving termination of a parent-child relationship.” 

Id. at 631. But, the court explained that only 

when conditions have so deteriorated that a 

child is abandoned . . . or a parent is deemed 

unfit when tested by demanding standards . . . 

is a parent-child relationship to be terminated. 

Termination is an unfortunate but necessary 

remedy when all reasonable means of 

establishing a satisfactory parent-child 
10 

relationship have been tried and found 

wanting. 

Id. at 640 (citations omitted). 

¶ 28 Thus, here, before seeking to terminate parental rights, the 

Department must have intervened into the lives of mother and her 

child and used all reasonable means of establishing a satisfactory 

parent-child relationship. Using all reasonable means of 

establishing a satisfactory relationship could only have been 

accomplished by developing an appropriate treatment plan 

approved by the court at a dispositional hearing. See

§ 19-3-507(1)(a), C.R.S. 2017; see also § 19-1-103(10), C.R.S. 2017 

(defining an appropriate treatment plan as one that is “reasonably 

calculated to render the particular [parent] fit to provide adequate 

parenting to the child within a reasonable time and that relates to 

the child’s needs”). Because the court did not approve an 

appropriate treatment plan at a dispositional hearing, the 

Department did not use all reasonable means of establishing a 

satisfactory parent-child relationship. We, therefore, reversed the 

judgment terminating parental rights and remanded the case with 
11 

directions for the court to hold a dispositional hearing because the 

constitutional and statutory standards of proof had not been met. 

II. Application of J.W.

¶ 29 In my opinion, J.W. does not apply to the present case because 

J.W. analyzed whether the court had jurisdiction to terminate 

parental rights, which was not at issue in this case. 

¶ 30 J.W. first held that the failure of the juvenile court to reduce a 

dependency and neglect adjudication to writing did not divest the 

juvenile court of subject matter jurisdiction to later terminate 

mother’s parental rights. Id. at ¶ 4. But, no one here disputed the 

subject matter jurisdiction of the juvenile court to hold a 

termination of parental rights hearing. 

¶ 31 J.W. also held that respondents in dependency and neglect 

cases may consent by their words and conduct to the personal 

jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Id. at ¶ 25. But, no one here 

disputed the personal jurisdiction of the juvenile court to supervise 

the Department’s intervention into the lives of mother and her 

children to establish a satisfactory parent-child relationship. 

¶ 32 The question in this case is not whether mother consented to 

the personal jurisdiction of the juvenile court, or whether the 
12 

juvenile court had jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. 

Rather, the question is whether the constitutional and statutory 

standards of proof were satisfied. J.W. does not help us answer 

that question. 

¶ 33 Because the juvenile court did not approve an “appropriate 

treatment plan” at a dispositional hearing, the court lacked the 

prerequisites to find that mother was unfit. See People in Interest of 

S.N-V., 300 P.3d 911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011) (“For a parent’s 

‘treatment plan’ to be ‘appropriate,’ it must be ‘approved by the 

court’ and be ‘reasonably calculated to render the particular 

respondent fit to provide adequate parenting to the child within a 

reasonable time and . . . relate[ ] to the child’s needs.’” (quoting 

§ 19-1-103(10), C.R.S. 2011)). I, therefore, concur with the majority 

and vote to deny the petition for rehearing.