83956 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Transit Administration 

49 CFR Part 674 

[Docket No. FTA–2023–0008] 

RIN 2132–AB42 

State Safety Oversight 

AGENCY: Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA), Department of Transportation 

(DOT). 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: The Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA) is publishing a 

final rule for State Safety Oversight 

(SSO). This final rule implements new 

requirements of the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law (enacted as the 

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 

(IIJA)), removes outdated references, 

and simplifies notification 

requirements. 

DATES: The effective date of this rule is 

January 1, 2025. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For 

program matters, contact Loretta 

Bomgardner, Office of Transit Safety 

and Oversight, FTA, telephone (202) 

577–5896 or loretta.bomgardner@

dot.gov. For legal matters, contact 

Richard Wong, Office of the Chief 

Counsel, telephone (202) 366–4011 or 

richard.wong@dot.gov. Office hours are 

from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Table of Contents 

I. Executive Summary 

A. Purpose of Regulatory Action 

B. Statutory Authority 

C. Summary of Major Provisions 

D. Benefits and Costs (Table) 

II. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 

Response to Comments 

A. Section 674.5—Policy 

B. Section 674.7—Definitions 

C. Section 674.11—State Safety Oversight 

Program 

D. Section 674.17—Use of Federal 

Financial Assistance 

E. Section 674.19—Certification of a State 

Safety Oversight Program 

F. Section 674.21—Withholding of Federal 

Financial Assistance for Noncompliance 

G. Section 674.23—Confidentiality of 

Information 

H. Section 674.25—Role of the State Safety 

Oversight Agency 

I. Section 674.27—State Safety Oversight 

Program Standards 

J. Section 674.29—Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plans: General 

Requirements 

K. Section 674.31—Triennial Audits: 

General Requirements 

L. Section 674.33—Safety Event 

Notifications 

M. Section 674.35—Investigations 

N. Section 674.37—Corrective Action Plans 

O. Section 674.39—State Safety Oversight 

Agency Annual Reporting to FTA 

P. Section 674.41—Conflicts of Interest 

Q. Regulatory Burden 

R. Other Safety Topics 

III. Section-by-Section Analysis 

IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices 

I. Executive Summary 

A. Purpose of Regulatory Action 

This final rule updates the existing 

regulations for state safety oversight of 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems. In the Moving 

Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century 

Act (MAP–21) (Pub. L. 112–141, July 6, 

2012), Congress directed FTA to 

establish a comprehensive public 

transportation safety program, one 

element of which is the State Safety 

Oversight (SSO) Program. (See 49 U.S.C. 

5329). Section 30012 of the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law (BIL), enacted as the 

Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act 

(IIJA) (Pub. L. 117–58, November 15, 

2021), amended 49 U.S.C. 5329 and 

established new requirements for FTA’s 

Public Transportation Safety Program. 

Consequently, FTA is revising 49 CFR 

part 674 to address requirements related 

to the BIL, remove requirements related 

to the initial establishment of this part, 

and clarify requirements of the existing 

part. 

B. Statutory Authority 

Section 5329 of title 49, United States 

Code, includes several provisions that 

require FTA to establish a 

comprehensive public transportation 

safety program, the elements of which 

include a National Public 

Transportation Safety Plan; a training 

and certification program for Federal, 

state, and local transportation agency 

employees with safety responsibilities; 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans; and a strengthened State Safety 

Oversight Program. 

C. Summary of Major Provisions 

This final rule makes the following 

changes to strengthen the existing SSO 

program: 

• Updates terminology to reflect 

current use across programs. 

• Clarifies existing requirements 

consistent with FTA expectations. 

• Removes language relating to the 

period of transition from 49 CFR part 

659, FTA’s previous SSO regulation, to 

49 CFR part 674, the current SSO 

regulation. 

• Addresses BIL requirements. 

D. Benefits and Costs 

The final rule requires additional 

oversight of safety-related activities of 

rail transit agencies (RTAs) by state 

safety oversight agencies (SSOAs). The 

rule also has additional costs for SSOAs 

and RTAs to comply with the 

requirements. 

Table 1 summarizes the economic 

effects of the rule over the first ten years 

of the rule (2025 to 2034) in 2022 

dollars. The benefits of the increased 

oversight are unknown and 

unquantified. On an annualized basis, 

the rule will have costs of $11.0 million 

at a 7 percent discount rate (discounted 

to 2024), $10.9 million at 3 percent, and 

$10.9 million at 2 percent. 

TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS, 2025–2034 

[$2022, discounted to 2024] 

Item Total 

(undiscounted) 

Annualized 

(7%) 

Annualized 

(3%) 

Annualized 

(2%) 

Benefits .................................................................................... Unquantified .............................. .............................. ..............................

Costs: 

SSOA documentation of enforcement authority ............... $118,140 $16,820 $13,446 $12,894 

SSOA oversight ................................................................ 80,338,058 8,093,373 8,058,697 8,050,279 

SSOA safety event tracking ............................................. 183,879 18,388 18,388 18,388 

SSOA investigations ......................................................... 7,355,168 735,517 735,517 735,517 

SSOA annual reporting to FTA ........................................ 609,755 60,975 60,975 60,975 

RTA investigations and reporting ..................................... 20,456,560 2,045,656 2,045,656 2,045,656 

Total costs ................................................................. 109,061,560 10,970,730 10,932,680 10,923,710 


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TABLE 1—SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS, 2025–2034—Continued 

[$2022, discounted to 2024] 

Item Total 

(undiscounted) 

Annualized 

(7%) 

Annualized 

(3%) 

Annualized 

(2%) 

Net benefits .............................................................................. Unquantified .............................. .............................. ..............................

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. 

II. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and 

Response to Comments 

FTA published the State Safety 

Oversight NPRM on November 15, 2023 

(88 FR 78269), with the public comment 

period closing on February 15, 2024. 

During this time, FTA received 27 

unique and substantive comment 

submissions to the rulemaking docket. 

Commenters included SSOAs, RTAs, 

labor organizations, trade associations, 

and individuals. FTA has considered 

these comments and addresses them in 

the corresponding sections below. Some 

comments expressed support for the 

NPRM without advocating for specific 

changes, and FTA acknowledges those 

comments were received and 

considered. 

FTA reviewed all relevant comments 

and took them into consideration when 

developing the final rule. Below, the 

NPRM comments and responses are 

subdivided by their corresponding 

sections of the proposed rule and 

subject matter. 

A. Section 674.5—Policy 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOA commenters regarding 

§ 674.5. One commenter questioned 

how FTA defines the terms ‘‘resources,’’ 

‘‘qualified personnel,’’ and 

‘‘complexity’’ and asked FTA to clearly 

define its expectations for SSOAs. 

Another commenter asked why FTA 

removed the first sentence in 674.5(b) 

related to funding of SSOAs. 

FTA Response: FTA notes that these 

terms originate in statute and defining 

the terms is not necessary to carry out 

the statute, as evidenced by their use in 

the rule since 2016. As with previous 

regulatory action, FTA declines to 

establish formal definitions for these 

terms to avoid conflicts in instances 

where associated statutes or regulations 

are revised. FTA notes that SSOAs have 

differing levels of State-based authority 

and resources to oversee the safety of 

the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems in their State. 

Further, FTA notes that the number, 

size, and complexity of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that SSOAs oversee vary across States. 

The language in § 674.5(a) ensures the 

SSO program is not a ‘‘one size fits all’’ 

program and instead provides States the 

flexibility to establish an SSOA sized 

and resourced to meet the State’s 

oversight needs. Ultimately, as defined 

at § 674.19, the FTA Administrator may 

issue or deny certification of an SSOA 

based on an assessment of whether the 

SSOA has the authority, resources, and 

expertise to oversee the number, size, 

and complexity of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that operate within the State. 

In response to the comment regarding 

the proposed removal of the first 

sentence in § 674.5(b), FTA removed the 

first sentence in subsection (b) because 

the availability of funding is addressed 

in § 674.17(a) and is not necessary to 

repeat here. 

B. Section 674.7—Definitions 

FTA received submissions from 14 

commenters that included specific 

comments related to § 674.7 and 

proposed definitions. 

1. Accountable Executive 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

suggested FTA revise the definition of 

Accountable Executive to include 

language that specifies a rail transit 

agency’s Agency Safety Plan (ASP) is 

‘‘designed and approved by the transit 

agency’s board [of directors].’’ 

FTA Response: FTA declines to revise 

the definition of ‘‘Accountable 

Executive’’ to describe the role of a 

transit agency’s board of directors or 

equivalent entity. FTA notes that it may 

be inaccurate to state that a transit 

agency’s board of directors designs the 

transit agency’s ASP. 

2. Collision 

Comments: Three SSOA commenters 

and one RTA commenter submitted 

comments related to FTA’s proposed 

definition of ‘‘collision.’’ The RTA 

commenter recommended definitional 

alignment with the NTD program. One 

SSOA suggested that without additional 

clarification regarding the terms 

‘‘impact’’ and ‘‘object’’ used in the 

definition of ‘‘collision,’’ FTA would see 

a significant increase in the number of 

events that would require reporting, 

resulting in an increased burden for 

transit agencies. Both SSOA 

commenters recommended that FTA 

replace the word ‘‘impact’’ with 

‘‘contact,’’ asserting that ‘‘contact’’ 

simply means touching, while ‘‘impact’’ 

implies a certain level of force, which 

could be confusing to SSOAs and RTAs. 

One SSOA commenter requested that 

FTA clarify whether this definition 

means that some collisions do not 

require two-hour notification. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

recommendation that definitions align 

with the NTD and notes that FTA has 

coordinated terminology to ensure 

consistency across programs. As for the 

use of the terms ‘‘impact’’ and ‘‘object,’’ 

FTA notes that for consistency, the 

definition of ‘‘collision’’ in the final rule 

uses the same terms as the NTD, 

including both ‘‘impact’’ and ‘‘object.’’ 

FTA disagrees that the term ‘‘impact’’ is 

confusing to RTAs and SSOAs and 

notes the NTD has used this term in its 

definition of ‘‘collision’’ for many years. 

FTA also disagrees that interpretations 

of the definition will result in an 

increase in collision events that require 

notification. FTA notes that all 

notification criteria are described at 

§ 674.33 and include thresholds for 

collisions, such as injuries, fatalities, 

and disabling damage, that define the 

set of collisions that require two-hour 

notification. Finally, FTA confirms that 

not all collisions require two-hour 

notification. Two-hour notifications are 

required for any safety event meeting 

the notification criteria at § 674.33, 

including any collision between two rail 

transit vehicles and any collision 

resulting in one or more injuries, a 

fatality, or disabling damage to a rail 

transit vehicle. 

3. Corrective Action Plan 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

recommended FTA revise the proposed 

definition of ‘‘corrective action plan’’ 

and add a definition of ‘‘safety risk 

mitigation’’ to help distinguish between 

corrective action plans and safety risk 

mitigations. The commenters pointed 

out the relationship between corrective 

action plans and safety risk mitigations 

and noted that corrective action plans 

address compliance with requirements 

and that safety risk mitigations address 

actual performance to ensure an RTA 

meets the safety intent behind the 

corrective action plan requirements. 


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FTA Response: The proposed rule 

included a definition of ‘‘safety risk 

mitigation’’ and FTA retains that 

definition in the final rule. FTA agrees 

with the suggestion that FTA revise the 

definition of corrective action plan to 

support the distinction between safety 

risk mitigations and corrective action 

plans more clearly. FTA generally 

agrees with the commenter’s description 

that corrective action plans focus more 

on resolving issues related to 

compliance, whereas safety risk 

mitigations result from safety risk 

assessments and focus on addressing 

safety risk by reducing the likelihood 

and/or severity of a hazard’s potential 

consequence. FTA has revised the 

definition of corrective action plan in 

this final rule to reflect this distinction 

by removing the phrase ‘‘minimize, 

control, correct, or eliminate risks and 

hazards’’ and replacing it with ‘‘address 

an identified deficiency or safety 

concern.’’ This change removes 

language more closely related to safety 

risk mitigations from the definition of 

corrective action plan and adds 

language that more appropriately 

describes corrective action plans. 

4. Derailment 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

suggested clarifications to the definition 

of ‘‘derailment’’ and use of the term 

‘‘event’’ within the definition. One of 

the SSOA commenters suggested the 

proposed definition was insufficient 

and there was a risk of events not being 

reported that should be (e.g., split 

switch, run-throughs, etc.). The 

commenter offered an alternative 

definition that explicitly identified and 

included split switches, switch runthroughs, wheel lifts, wheel climbs, 

flange running, and web running. One 

transit agency requested that the 

definition of ‘‘derailment’’ apply the 

NTD exclusion for events that occur 

during the engineering or construction 

phases of a new rail transit system or 

the extension of an existing rail transit 

system unless they involve transitrelated activities such as operations, 

testing, simulated service or pre-revenue 

service, or a transit-related maintenance 

activity. 

FTA Response: On the use of the word 

‘‘event’’ within the definition of 

‘‘derailment,’’ FTA agrees that, given 

removal of the definition of ‘‘event’’ 

from the rule, use of the term ‘‘safety 

event’’ is appropriate, and has made that 

change for the definition of 

‘‘derailment’’ for the purposes of the 

two-hour notification requirements in 

§ 674.33. FTA appreciates the 

commenter’s request for clarification 

regarding the NTD program’s exclusion 

of events that occur during the 

engineering or construction phases of a 

new rail transit system or the extension 

of an existing rail transit system, unless 

they involve transit-related activities 

such as operations, testing, simulated 

service or pre-revenue service, or a 

transit-related maintenance activity. 

FTA confirms that the SSO program 

applies this same exclusion for purposes 

of safety event notification and 

investigation criteria and notes that FTA 

has added language at subsection 

§ 674.25(c) that establishes, for the 

purposes of §§ 674.33 and 674.35, 

notification criteria are limited to safety 

events that involve transit-related 

activities such as operations, testing, 

simulated service or pre-revenue 

service, or a transit-related maintenance 

activity. 

5. Designated Personnel 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

suggested non-substantive edits to the 

definition of ‘‘designated personnel’’ to 

match the definition in the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program (PTSCTP) NPRM. 

FTA Response: FTA has ensured the 

‘‘designated personnel’’ definition at 

§ 674.7 matches the definition from part 

672. 

6. Disabling Damage 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two RTA commenters and two 

SSOA commenters regarding the new 

term ‘‘disabling damaged’’ used to 

support safety event notification 

criteria. One RTA commenter expressed 

support for the new term and the fact 

that it is limited to damage that 

physically prevents a rail transit vehicle 

or train from operating under its own 

power. One RTA commenter suggested 

FTA modify the proposed definition to 

specify the physical prevention of 

movement. Two SSOA commenters 

suggested that the definition include 

additional clarification to exclude 

mechanical failures or other 

malfunctions that may impact 

operations. One SSOA commenter 

suggested that FTA modify the 

definition to replace ‘‘preventing the 

vehicle from operating under its own 

power’’ to ‘‘towed from the scene.’’ 

FTA Response: After consideration of 

the comments, FTA declines to revise 

the definition. FTA notes the term 

‘‘disabling damage’’ is referring to 

physical damage preventing operation. 

For some collision examples like mirror 

strikes, a rail transit vehicle could still 

operate on its own power, and FTA does 

not consider this disabling damage. FTA 

notes that even in such an example, 

local policy may require taking the rail 

transit vehicle out of service, but this 

decision could vary agency to agency. It 

is disabling damage only if the damage 

itself prevents the vehicle from 

operating under its own power. Further, 

modifying the definition to replace 

‘‘preventing the vehicle from operating 

under its own power’’ with ‘‘towed from 

the scene’’ could include certain 

collisions that do not result in damage 

that physically prevents rail transit 

vehicle movement. FTA confirms that 

disabling damage includes damage from 

a collision that requires towing for the 

rail transit vehicle. 

7. Evacuation for Life Safety Reasons 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs and two RTAs about 

the definition of ‘‘evacuation for life 

safety reasons.’’ One SSOA suggested 

the definition should not include all 

evacuations of passengers into the rail 

right of way, including for events such 

as mechanical failures, because this 

would ‘‘skew the data.’’ Another SSOA 

requested clarification regarding selfevacuations when the RTA may not be 

aware of certain self-evacuations and 

the circumstances that prompted them. 

One RTA commenter recommended 

FTA ensure this definition aligns with 

the definition used by the NTD, 

specifically relating to passenger selfevacuations into the right of way. 

Finally, one RTA commenter requested 

FTA state these evacuations are not due 

to preceding events, such as collisions, 

as this could distort data. 

FTA Response: Existing SSO program 

and NTD reporting policy support 

retaining in the definition the concept 

that any evacuation into the rail right of 

way is an evacuation for life safety 

reasons, and thus FTA does not believe 

the definition will skew existing data 

sets or trending. FTA appreciates the 

opportunity to clarify self-evacuations 

and notes that RTAs cannot notify 

SSOAs and FTA of events of which they 

are not aware. The inclusion of selfevacuations ensures that evacuations 

resulting from hazards still trigger 

notification, even if the evacuation was 

not directed by the RTA. FTA agrees 

with the recommendation for alignment 

with the NTD definition of ‘‘evacuation 

for life safety reasons’’ and the treatment 

of self-evacuations and confirms the 

definition aligns with the NTD 

definition and treatment of selfevacuations. FTA disagrees with the 

suggestion that evacuations for life 

safety reasons should exclude those 

evacuations that result from preceding 

events, as evacuations commonly follow 

preceding events. An evacuation for life 

safety reasons is one of the notification 

criteria described in § 674.33. Further, 


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FTA notes that a single safety event may 

meet multiple notification criteria. For 

example, a single event may involve a 

collision, injuries, fatalities, an 

evacuation for life safety reasons, and 

disabling damage. This is still 

considered a single safety event that 

requires notification because it meets at 

least one of the safety event notification 

criteria described in § 674.33. 

8. Fatality 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs and one RTA 

regarding the definition of ‘‘fatality.’’ 

Two SSOAs expressed concern over the 

30-day window for confirmation of 

death, suggesting the word ‘‘confirmed’’ 

should be replaced with the word 

‘‘determined’’ because confirmation 

implies that an answer exists, whereas 

determination implies that follow-up is 

required. The two SSOAs also suggested 

that the 30-day window requires SSOAs 

and RTAs to solicit information 

protected under the Health Insurance 

Portability and Accountability Act of 

1996 (HIPAA). One SSOA commenter 

and one RTA commenter requested 

clarification on the inclusion of 

homicides in the definition of ‘‘fatality,’’ 

noting that homicides are considered 

security events and should be excluded 

from notification and investigation 

requirements. 

FTA Response: FTA declines to revise 

the definition of ‘‘fatality’’ as suggested. 

FTA confirms that the definition of 

fatality used by both the NTD and part 

674 are consistent. Further, FTA notes 

that it has not substantively changed the 

definition of ‘‘fatality’’ that has been 

used by both the SSO and NTD 

programs for many years and is not 

aware of any situation where the current 

definition has prevented an SSOA or 

RTA from complying with SSO program 

notification requirements. Further, FTA 

notes that part 674 does not establish 

any requirement to solicit HIPAAprotected information and reiterates that 

RTAs are not required to notify SSOAs 

and FTA of events of which they are not 

aware. However, if an RTA becomes 

aware that a safety event resulted in a 

fatality as defined at § 674.7, the RTA is 

required to notify the SSOA and FTA 

within two hours of being made aware 

of the fatality. FTA confirms the 

notification requirements of § 674.33 

exclude criminal actions such as 

homicides. These events are excluded 

from the safety events requiring SSOA 

investigation. Accordingly, the final rule 

does not require RTAs to notify SSOAs 

and FTA of homicides. FTA notes that 

the final rule does not preclude an 

SSOA from establishing notification 

requirements in addition to those 

established at § 674.33. Finally, given 

removal of the definition of ‘‘event’’ 

from the rule, FTA has replaced the 

term ‘‘event’’ with ‘‘safety event’’ in the 

definition of ‘‘fatality’’ for purposes of 

the two-hour notification requirements 

in § 674.33. 

9. Hazard 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs and one RTA regarding 

the definition of ‘‘hazard.’’ The RTA 

commenter recommended changing the 

term ‘‘hazard’’ to ‘‘safety hazard’’ to 

parallel the change from ‘‘risk’’ to 

‘‘safety risk.’’ The two SSOA 

commenters recommended adding the 

phrase ‘‘of a public transportation 

system’’ to match the definition 

published in 49 CFR part 673. 

FTA Response: FTA declines to 

change the term ‘‘hazard’’ to ‘‘safety 

hazard’’ and instead chooses to 

maintain definitional consistency with 

49 CFR part 673. FTA agrees with the 

commenters who recommended FTA 

revise the definition of ‘‘hazard’’ 

proposed in the NPRM to match the 

definition of ‘‘hazard’’ published in the 

final 49 CFR part 673. FTA has included 

the phrase ‘‘of a public transportation 

system’’ in the definition of ‘‘hazard’’ at 

§ 674.7 to mirror the definition of 

‘‘hazard’’ published in 49 CFR 673.5. 

10. Injury 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs, two RTAs, and one 

industry association regarding the 

definition of ‘‘injury.’’ One RTA 

expressed support for the definition of 

‘‘injury,’’ noting that it will help 

simplify notifications. One RTA 

commenter requested that FTA clarify 

why the definition uses the words 

‘‘medical attention’’ instead of ‘‘medical 

transport’’ and asked FTA to define the 

timeframe for ‘‘immediate’’ medical 

attention. Two SSOAs and an industry 

association asked if ‘‘event’’ should be 

changed to ‘‘safety event.’’ One SSOA 

requested an explicit definitional 

exclusion of injuries resulting from 

security events. Another SSOA 

suggested that FTA move toward a 

methodology like the one created by the 

Association of Transportation Safety 

Information Professionals and an 

approved American National Standard 

via the Manual on Classification of 

Motor Vehicle Traffic Crashes to help 

promote reporting uniformity. 

Additionally, the commenter suggested 

that FTA replace ‘‘requires’’ with 

‘‘results in’’ to ensure consistent 

reporting. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

support received regarding the 

definition of ‘‘injury’’ and agrees that it 

provides a simpler criterion to support 

safety event notifications. FTA confirms 

that the term ‘‘immediate medical 

attention’’ as used in the definition of 

‘‘injury’’ serves to exclude first aid 

received onsite and to include physical 

harm that results in medical transport 

from the safety event scene. This 

excludes medical attention sought by an 

individual at a later time. The definition 

of ‘‘injury’’ used in this rulemaking is 

consistent with the definition of 

‘‘injury’’ in the NTD. Given that FTA 

removed the definition of ‘‘event’’ and 

instead uses ‘‘safety event,’’ FTA has 

made this edit in the final rule, but 

otherwise retains the definition in the 

NPRM. With respect to the requested 

clarification regarding the definition’s 

application to security events versus 

safety events. FTA declines to revise the 

definition of ‘‘injury’’ to exclude those 

resulting from security events. FTA 

notes, as stated in other comment 

responses, that criminal actions such as 

homicides and assaults are excluded 

from RTA notification requirements and 

SSOA investigation requirements. FTA 

believes it is appropriate to preserve 

definitional alignment with the NTD for 

the term ‘‘injury’’ and to establish 

security event exclusions in the 

requirements for RTA notification and 

SSOA investigation. FTA notes that the 

final rule does not preclude an SSOA 

from establishing notification 

requirements in addition to those 

established at § 674.33. 

FTA appreciates the 

recommendations regarding crash data 

classifications and will consider these 

methodologies when evaluating data 

management changes in the future. 

Finally, FTA appreciates the comments 

suggesting minor changes to the injury 

definition, including replacing 

‘‘requires’’ with ‘‘results in’’ but 

declines to revise the definition, to 

ensure consistency with the other FTA 

programs. 

Finally, given removal of the 

definition of ‘‘event’’ from the rule, FTA 

has replaced the term ‘‘event’’ with 

‘‘safety event’’ in the definition of 

‘‘injury’’ for purposes of the two-hour 

notification requirements in § 674.33. 

11. Inspection 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs and one RTA 

regarding the definition of ‘‘inspection.’’ 

One SSOA expressed concern that the 

definition of ‘‘inspection’’ did not 

include personnel. The RTA and two 

SSOAs requested clarification of what is 

meant by ‘‘physical observation,’’ with 

two commenters noting inspections may 

include non-invasive inspection 

methods (ultrasonic, leak tests, video 


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review, other inspection methods, etc.) 

that may be conducted via other means 

that do not require the physical onsite 

presence of the person conducting the 

inspection. 

FTA Response: The definition of 

‘‘inspection’’ does not include 

personnel in the list of items observed 

during an inspection. FTA agrees with 

this commenter and has added the term 

‘‘personnel’’ within the definition of 

‘‘inspection,’’ which would include the 

inspection of training records and the 

observation of an RTA’s designated 

personnel. FTA appreciates the request 

for clarification on the use of ‘‘physical 

observation’’ in the definition of 

‘‘inspection’’ and notes this term is 

intended to distinguish an inspection, 

which would involve observation of 

physical system elements, from other 

types of activities that do not rely on 

physical observations, such as a 

document review. Physical observation, 

therefore, may include virtual 

observation or other observation of 

system elements. 

12. Investigation 

Comments: An SSOA asserted the 

proposed definition of ‘‘investigation’’ is 

too limited and conflicts with the use of 

the term in § 674.25(e), specifically the 

investigation of allegations of 

noncompliance with an RTA’s ASP. 

FTA Response: FTA first notes the 

definition is the same as the 2016 

definition, except FTA has replaced 

‘‘accident, incident, or hazard’’ with 

‘‘safety event.’’ Further, § 674.25(e) is 

the same as § 674.25(d) in the 2016 rule. 

Thus, FTA disagrees the purpose is too 

narrow or that the definition would not 

encompass investigations of 

noncompliance required by § 674.25(e). 

FTA notes that hazards may include 

procedural noncompliance, which are 

within the purpose of an investigation, 

so FTA declines to amend the 

definition. 

13. Person 

Comments: Two SSOAs requested 

that FTA define the terms ‘‘volunteer,’’ 

‘‘official worker,’’ and ‘‘associated 

infrastructure’’ used in the definition of 

‘‘person.’’ 

FTA Response: FTA does not believe 

it is necessary to define commonly 

understood terms such as ‘‘volunteer,’’ 

‘‘official worker,’’ and ‘‘associated 

infrastructure’’ to ensure understanding 

of the rule. 

14. Potential Consequence 

Comments: Two SSOAs asserted the 

definition of ‘‘potential consequence’’ 

was confusing and recommended that 

FTA restate the definition. 

FTA Response: FTA disagrees that the 

definition requires revision. Further, 

FTA notes that the definition of 

‘‘potential consequence’’ at § 674.7 

mirrors the definition of ‘‘potential 

consequence’’ published in 49 CFR 

673.5. 

15. Rail Fixed Guideway Public 

Transportation System 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from one RTA, one SSOA, and one 

industry association about the definition 

of ‘‘rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system.’’ The RTA 

commented that including the phrase 

‘‘or any such system in engineering or 

construction’’ may cause conflict with 

State occupational safety regulators. The 

industry association and SSOA 

recommended that FTA edit the 

definition to explicitly refer to streetcar 

systems. 

FTA Response: The phrase ‘‘or any 

such system in engineering or 

construction’’ has been a part of the 

definition since the original part 674 

was published in 2016, and FTA is not 

aware of any conflict this definition has 

for the purposes of State safety 

regulators. As for the inclusion of 

streetcar in the definition, the list of 

transit modes in the definition is not 

exhaustive and includes the text, 

‘‘. . . include but are not limited 

to . . .’’ Further, FTA notes this 

definition mirrors FTA’s definition of 

‘‘rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system’’ published in 49 

CFR 673.5. 

16. Safety Committee 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs, one RTA, and one 

industry association related to the 

definition of ‘‘safety committee.’’ The 

RTA commenter suggested that FTA 

provide more clarity in the definition 

because their agency includes different 

safety committees. The two SSOAs and 

industry association suggested that FTA 

use the term ‘‘Joint Labor-Management 

Committee’’ instead of ‘‘Safety 

Committee’’ to provide additional 

specificity. 

FTA Response: FTA understands 

RTAs may have a variety of safetyrelated committees. FTA notes that the 

term ‘‘safety committee’’ is not used in 

this final rule and has been removed 

from § 674.7. 

17. Safety Event 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from four RTAs, four SSOAs, and two 

industry associations related to the 

proposed definition of ‘‘safety event.’’ 

Several commenters, including one RTA 

and the two industry associations, 

commented on FTA’s simplification of 

event categorization and the elimination 

of the terms ‘‘accident,’’ ‘‘incident,’’ and 

‘‘occurrence,’’ which were used by FTA 

in the previous rule to establish criteria 

for event notification and investigation. 

Two SSOAs and one industry 

association expressed support for the 

simplification of existing terminology 

related to safety events. The two 

industry associations and one RTA 

commenter noted that the previous 

event tiers can be useful for analysis and 

trending purposes. Two RTAs and an 

industry association commented that 

FTA should not remove the three event 

subcategories from the rule and asserted 

that agencies are accustomed to using 

these terms to support existing SSOA 

notification activities and that the 

proposed definition of ‘‘safety event’’ is 

insufficient to determine which events 

require notification to FTA and the 

SSOA. One SSOA recommended that 

FTA retain the definition of the word 

‘‘incident’’ because the word is used in 

49 U.S.C. 5329. 

One RTA requested additional clarity 

on whether the definition was intended 

to be limited to events related to or 

affecting transit operations. One SSOA 

commented that the use of the term 

‘‘damage to the environment’’ would 

result in the need for additional SSOA 

personnel with very specific expertise. 

Two RTAs and one industry association 

commented that FTA should ensure the 

definitions in part 674 align with NTD 

definitions to reduce confusion and to 

avoid the underreporting of events. 

One RTA and one SSOA commented 

on the use of the term ‘‘unexpected’’ in 

the ‘‘safety event’’ definition. The RTA 

suggested replacing the term 

‘‘unexpected’’ with ‘‘unintentional.’’ 

The SSOA requested clarification on 

FTA’s use of the phrases ‘‘unexpected 

outcome’’ and ‘‘general criminal action’’ 

and questioned whether it was the 

responsibility of the RTA to determine 

intent when applying this definition. 

One SSOA commented that FTA’s focus 

should be on the reduction of safety 

events that can be realistically 

prevented by an RTA and asserted FTA 

should not use data that includes safety 

events that could not realistically be 

prevented by an RTA as the sole 

determination of the safety of an RTA or 

the effectiveness of an SSOA. 

FTA Response: FTA agrees with the 

commenters that noted safety event 

stratification can be useful to support 

safety performance analysis and 

encourages RTAs and SSOAs to conduct 

data analysis to support safety 

performance monitoring and safety 

oversight activities as necessary but 

notes the final rule does not establish 


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any requirement that necessitates the 

definition of additional safety event 

tiers. As to the sufficiency of the ‘‘safety 

event’’ definition to define events 

requiring notification, FTA notes the 

definition of ‘‘safety event’’ in § 674.7 

does not establish criteria for SSOA and 

FTA two-hour notifications or SSOA 

investigations. Instead, FTA describes 

safety event notification criteria at 

§ 674.33. FTA does not believe the 

statutory usage of the term ‘‘incident’’ 

warrants a severity-based stratification 

of safety events, nor does it require FTA 

to define the term in part 674. 

FTA confirms that safety events 

generally are related to or affect 

operations. Further, FTA notes that 

neither the definition of safety event nor 

the notification criteria at § 674.33 

would necessitate SSOA staff to obtain 

specialized skills related to assessing 

environmental damage. FTA has 

coordinated terminology to ensure 

consistency across programs. 

FTA considered the suggestion to 

replace the word ‘‘unexpected’’ with 

‘‘unintentional,’’ and declines to make 

the suggested revision. The word 

‘‘unexpected’’ is used to distinguish 

planned outcomes from unexpected 

outcomes. FTA notes the definition in 

§ 674.7 mirrors the definition of ‘‘safety 

event’’ published in 49 CFR part 673. 

FTA confirms the exclusion of criminal 

actions such as homicides and assaults 

from the two-hour notification 

requirements in § 674.33 and notes that 

the final rule does not preclude an 

SSOA from establishing notification 

requirements in addition to those 

established at § 674.33. FTA confirms 

the RTA is responsible for making this 

determination as well as determinations 

regarding all notification criteria 

established at § 674.33. FTA agrees the 

determination of the effectiveness of an 

RTA or an SSOA should not be made 

solely on the use of data related to safety 

events that could not ‘‘realistically be 

prevented by an RTA.’’ 

18. Unintended Train Movement 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from six commenters regarding the 

proposed definition of ‘‘unintended 

train movement,’’ including three 

SSOAs, two RTAs, and one industry 

association. One RTA recommended 

that FTA align this definition with the 

NTD definition of ‘‘Runaway Train.’’ 

Two SSOAs, one RTA, and one industry 

association recommended that FTA 

replace the word ‘‘driver’’ in the 

definition with the word ‘‘operator,’’ 

noting that the definition excludes nonrevenue vehicles, so the term ‘‘operator’’ 

would be more appropriate. One SSOA 

recommended that FTA not exclude 

non-revenue vehicles from the 

definition. One RTA asked for 

clarification on whether a runaway train 

would still meet the two-hour 

notification criteria. Two SSOAs 

requested clarification on the 

application of unintended train 

movement to the automated guideway 

mode. 

FTA Response: FTA declines to 

change ‘‘driver’’ to ‘‘operator’’ or to 

broaden the definition to include nonrevenue vehicles as the definition is 

consistent with the 2024 NTD Safety & 

Security Policy Manual definition of 

runaway train. FTA confirms that under 

this final rule, the term ‘‘runaway train’’ 

has effectively been replaced by the 

term ‘‘unintended train movement.’’ 

This means that an event involving a 

runaway train according to past 

terminology would now be said to 

involve an unintended train movement 

and would trigger the two-hour 

notification requirements at § 674.33. 

Further, the definition of ‘‘unintended 

train movement’’ applies to automated 

guideway systems when a revenue 

vehicle of the automated guideway 

system experiences uncontrolled 

movement and is no longer under the 

control of the automated control system. 

19. Additional Comments 

Comments: In addition to comments 

related to specific definitions, described 

above, FTA received general comments 

related to definitions. Several comments 

were related to part 672, including 

requests for additional definitions or 

text in part 672. Other commenters 

asked whether definitions amended by 

this rulemaking would be amended in 

the NTD. Those comments are outside 

the scope of this rulemaking and are not 

addressed. Commenters generally 

recommended that definitions align 

with the NTD and other safety 

rulemakings and FTA has aligned 

definitions where needed. 

Some commenters requested that 

additional terms be defined, including 

‘‘project,’’ ‘‘State Safety Oversight 

Program,’’ and ‘‘audit.’’ FTA declines to 

define ‘‘project’’ as it is a commonly 

understood term. FTA believes it is 

unnecessary to add a definition for 

‘‘State Safety Oversight Program’’ and 

notes the final rule describes the scope 

of and requirements for a State Safety 

Oversight program, including the 

minimum expectations for a State Safety 

Oversight program. Similarly, the term 

‘‘audit’’ does not need to be defined as 

§ 674.31 describes requirements for 

SSOA triennial audits of rail transit 

agencies. 

C. Section 674.11—State Safety 

Oversight Program 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs related to § 674.11. 

One commenter asked FTA to clarify in 

this section that only rail fixed 

guideway public transit systems that 

receive Federal funding must have an 

SSOP. Both commenters asked for 

clarification regarding whether FTA can 

evaluate an SSOA’s staffing level after 

FTA has issued an initial certification. 

The commenters also requested that 

FTA define its process and criteria for 

auditing an SSOA. One SSOA 

commenter requested clarification on 

FTA SSOA audits, including State 

Management Reviews and the FTA SSO 

Audit Program, asking what the 

difference is between these audits/ 

reviews and what the specific 

requirements are that must be met for 

compliance. Further, the SSOA noted 

that State leadership, not the SSOA, 

should be FTA’s point of contact 

because the SSOA does not have the 

authority to change State law. 

FTA Response: Section 674.3 

describes the entities to which this rule 

applies, and FTA declines to restate part 

674 applicability criteria within 

§ 674.11. With respect to SSOA staffing 

levels, FTA certified the compliance of 

every SSOA in 2018. FTA notes that 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e)(9) requires FTA to 

continually evaluate an SSOA’s 

implementation of its State Safety 

Oversight program, which is not limited 

to staffing levels, but how effectively 

those staff resources are used. The 

NTSB, through their investigations, has 

also identified SSOA staffing levels as a 

potential concern. Therefore, FTA will 

continue to conduct audits to confirm 

SSOAs are staffed at appropriate levels. 

If FTA identifies a pattern of SSOA 

noncompliance, it will consider the 

impact of SSOA resourcing on the 

agency’s noncompliant status. 

The rule does not define FTA audit 

procedures for the SSO program or other 

programs identified by the commenter, 

such as State Management Reviews. 

FTA believes it is not practicable to 

publish criteria that would govern the 

audit or evaluation process, given the 

diversity of the 31 SSOAs currently 

under the program, and the number, 

size, and complexity of the fixed 

guideway systems under their oversight. 

FTA notes that FTA SSO program audits 

are performed to confirm compliance 

with 49 CFR part 674, and each SSOA 

is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

Finally, FTA appreciates the comment 

received regarding FTA SSO audit 

points of contact and will consider this 


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recommendation during future SSO 

audit program updates. 

D. Section 674.17—Use of Federal 

Financial Assistance 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs, three individuals, 

and one industry association regarding 

the use of Federal financial assistance. 

Three individuals recommended FTA 

establish additional requirements that 

limit the amount of Federal financial 

assistance SSOAs can use to procure 

contractor support and encouraged 

strengthening SSOA internal 

capabilities. Two of these commenters 

suggested that FTA require that no more 

than 10% of annual SSO grant funding 

should be used for contractor support. 

The third commenter suggested FTA 

require that no more than 15% be used 

for contactor support. Four commenters, 

including two SSOAs, one industry 

association, and one individual 

commented on the revised, broader 

reference to 49 U.S.C. 5329 generally 

instead of the specific reference to 

section 5329(e)(4) and sought 

clarification on whether this change 

means that SSO funds are now eligible 

for States to expend on PTASP-related 

activities that were previously 

prohibited, such as drafting ASPs for 

small public transportation providers. 

One SSOA recommended that FTA 

adjust the Federal share of 80% to 85% 

to help SSOAs implement SSO 

programs at a faster rate. Finally, one 

SSOA recommended that FTA’s 

apportionment for 49 U.S.C. 5329 take 

into consideration the number, size, and 

complexity of the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems in the 

State to ensure adequate funding is 

available to the State to best meet the 

Federal requirements. 

FTA Response: FTA does not have the 

authority to place restrictions on the 

percentage of SSOA grant funds that can 

be used for contractor support and FTA 

encourages the professional 

development of internal SSOA staff. 

FTA confirms the reference to 49 U.S.C. 

5329 is no longer limited to subsection 

(e) as the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law 

amended section 5329 and established 

additional SSOA-related requirements 

at 49 U.S.C. 5329(k). The revised 

reference incorporates the requirements 

at both 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) and (k), and 

ensures the rule remains valid even if 

Congress further amends the law. This 

change does not mean that SSO grant 

funds are now eligible for States to 

expend on PTASP-related activities that 

were previously, and remain, prohibited 

(e.g., drafting ASPs for small public 

transportation agencies). FTA does not 

have the authority to increase the 

Federal share for SSOA grants, as that 

is established by statute (49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(6)(C)). Finally, the 

apportionment formula in 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(6)(B) specifically takes into 

consideration the number, size, and 

complexity of the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems in the 

State to ensure adequate funding is 

available to the State to best meet the 

Federal requirements. FTA published an 

explanation of the formula and basis of 

calculation in a March 10, 2014, Federal 

Register Notice (79 FR 13380). 

E. Section 674.19—Certification of a 

State Safety Oversight Program 

FTA received comments from four 

commenters regarding certification of a 

State Safety Oversight program, 

including three SSOAs and one industry 

association. 

1. Section 674.19(a)—Administrator’s 

Determination 

Comments: One SSOA commenter 

asked for clarification regarding FTA’s 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan (National Safety Plan). Specifically, 

the commenter asked if the National 

Safety Plan established a ceiling for 

requirements that an SSOA can 

establish. The commenter expressed 

concerns over potential situations where 

information in the National Safety Plan 

conflicts with a State’s SSO program. 

The commenter requested clarification 

on what elements within the SSO 

program and an RTA’s ASP require 

consistency with the National Safety 

Plan. Further, the commenter asked if a 

State’s SSO program would require 

recertification in light of the updates to 

the National Safety Plan. Finally, the 

commenter asked about any timelines 

that FTA has defined related to 

updating program documentation to 

address the updated NSP. The SSOA 

also asked for clarification on 

certification in relation to the RTA 

development process and at which 

phase of RTA development a State 

needs to have an approved State Safety 

Oversight program. 

FTA Response: In response to 

comments regarding the National Safety 

Plan, FTA confirms that § 674.19(a) 

states, ‘‘the Administrator must 

determine whether an SSO program is 

adequate to promote the purposes of 49 

U.S.C. 5329, including, but not limited 

to, the National Public Transportation 

Safety Plan, the Public Transportation 

Safety Certification Training Program, 

and the Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plans.’’ The National Safety Plan 

presents (1) safety performance criteria 

for all recipients that must develop 

ASPs under 49 CFR part 673, including 

safety performance measures related to 

the safety risk reduction program, and 

(2) voluntary minimum safety standards 

and recommended practices to support 

mitigation of safety risk and to improve 

safety performance. FTA confirms the 

National Safety Plan does not establish 

a ceiling related to a State’s SSO 

program requirements and reiterates 

that the standards and recommended 

practices presented in Chapter III of the 

National Safety Plan are voluntary in 

nature. In terms of standards with 

which an SSO program must be 

consistent, FTA notes Chapter II of the 

National Safety Plan outlines the safety 

performance measures required of all 

agencies subject to the PTASP 

regulation for which each RTA must set 

safety performance targets and 

document them in their ASP. Finally, if 

any changes are needed to program 

documentation, FTA expects SSOAs 

and RTAs to make any needed changes 

to program documentation through the 

organizations’ next review and update 

cycles based on existing SSO and ASP 

review processes. FTA confirms that the 

publication of a revised National Safety 

Plan does not require a new certification 

for each State. A State must have a 

certified State Safety Oversight Program 

by the time a rail fixed guideway public 

transit system reaches the engineering 

or construction phase. 

2. Section 674.19(c) and (d)—Issuance 

of Denial 

Comments: An industry association 

requested that FTA provide criteria in 

the rule for how FTA or the FTA 

Administrator would make a 

determination regarding certification, 

including a determination of whether an 

SSOA is ‘‘inadequate’’ or ‘‘incapable,’’ 

as described in statute at 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(8)(A). Two SSOAs requested 

clarification on the timeframe for 

certification or denial of certification 

and any related follow-up timeframes. 

One SSOA expressed support for the 

regulatory language that accommodates 

an SSOA developmental plan and 

schedule to support the FTA 

Administrator’s evaluation of the SSOA. 

The commenter recommended that such 

a plan and schedule should be able to 

accommodate related processes such as 

hiring that may involve a different 

group and/or agency. Two SSOAs asked 

for clarification on the term 

‘‘cognizant.’’ 

Two SSOAs expressed concern that 

withholding of funds for SSOAs that are 

unable to meet the requirements for 

certification may be counterproductive. 

One SSOA commenter expressed the 

need for clarification regarding the 

distinction between the terms SSO 


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program, SSOA, and State as they relate 

to the requirements of § 674.19(d) and 

49 U.S.C. 5329. 

FTA Response: FTA first notes 

§ 674.19 of this rule is substantially 

similar to the 2016 rule. With respect to 

the request to define criteria in part 674 

that FTA would use to evaluate SSO 

agency capabilities, FTA declines to 

establish additional criteria beyond the 

requirements established in this final 

rule. In an instance where an SSO 

program does not meet the requirements 

of 49 U.S.C. 5329, the Administrator 

will provide a written explanation and 

allow the State an opportunity to 

modify and resubmit SSO program 

documentation for the Administrator’s 

approval. FTA has not defined a set 

timeframe for issuing a certification or 

denial of certification or deadlines for 

any necessary follow-up activity. FTA 

appreciates the support for the 

regulatory language addressing the 

developmental plan and schedule to 

support the FTA Administrator’s 

evaluation of an SSOA and notes that 

the developmental plan and schedule 

should include and address the issues 

identified by the commenter, including 

hiring and interagency communications. 

The term ‘‘cognizant SSOA’’ is used to 

refer to the relevant or recognized SSOA 

and means the entity is aware of its role 

as an SSOA for the State. Further, FTA 

notes that this language has been used 

in part 674 since its promulgation in 

2016. 

In response to the comments received 

regarding the effectiveness of 

withholding funds, FTA confirms that 

the withholding of funds is an option 

available to the Administrator under 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e)(7)(D)(ii), 5329(e)(8)(C), 

and 5329(g). Further, FTA notes that 

statutory and regulatory language does 

not require the Administrator to 

withhold funds but states that the 

Administrator ‘‘may’’ withhold funds. 

As to the relationship between a State, 

SSOA Program, and SSOA, the SSOA is 

the agency within a State that carries 

out the State’s SSO Program. 

Necessarily, FTA monitors SSOA 

compliance with regulatory 

requirements in addition to other inputs 

to ensure a State is meeting its statutory 

requirements to establish an SSO 

Program that is adequate to promote the 

purposes of 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

F. Section 674.21—Withholding of 

Federal Financial Assistance for 

Noncompliance 

Comments: FTA received comment 

submissions from two SSOAs and one 

industry association regarding the 

withholding of funds for noncompliance and the requirement for an 

SSO program to be approved by the FTA 

Administrator prior to a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

entering the engineering or construction 

phase in a State without any rail fixed 

guideway public transit systems (new 

entrants). All three commenters noted 

that with the previous transition from 

part 659 to part 674, States were 

afforded three years to develop 

compliant programs and achieve 

certification. The commenters asserted 

the proposed change to base the 

timeline on the developmental progress 

of an RTA does not afford a new SSOA 

sufficient time to achieve SSO program 

certification. The commenters 

recommended FTA establish a threeyear timeframe for a new State to 

establish a compliant SSO program. 

FTA Response: The statute at 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e)(2) requires States to 

provide safety oversight for any rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system in the engineering or 

construction phase of development 

within the jurisdiction of the State that 

will not be subject to regulation by the 

Federal Railroad Administration (FRA). 

This is not new. Therefore, a State 

without any rail transit systems is 

obligated to stand up an SSO program 

before a new rail transit system enters 

the engineering or construction phase of 

development. FTA notes the three-year 

timeframe defined in the previous part 

674 was established by statute to 

support the transition of existing SSO 

programs to a new rule (from part 659 

to part 674). To ensure a State meets its 

statutory requirement to provide safety 

oversight for any rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system in the 

engineering or construction phase of 

development, a three-year certification 

process is not feasible. FTA encourages 

States without an SSOA and with a new 

rail transit project in the planning stage 

to coordinate with FTA and the rail 

transit project sponsor early in the 

project development process to support 

the development of compliant SSO 

programs. 

G. Section 674.23—Confidentiality of 

Information 

Comments: One SSOA commenter 

requested clarification on the criteria 

that a State or RTA should use to 

withhold a report from being admitted 

as evidence or used in a civil action for 

damages resulting from a matter 

mentioned in the report. The 

commenter also asked for clarification 

on the use of the term ‘‘security’’ in 

§ 674.23(b). 

FTA Response: Section 674.23(b) 

provides that part 674 does not require 

security-sensitive information to be 

publicly available. This language is 

unchanged from the previous version of 

part 674 and stems from FTA’s 

relationship with the Transportation 

Security Administration (TSA) and the 

elimination of requirements for System 

Security Plans previously required 

under 49 CFR part 659. As FTA noted 

in the publication of the original part 

674 in 2016, TSA, an agency of the 

United States Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS), has the prerogative and 

responsibility for all rulemakings on 

security in public transportation. 

Specifically, under the Implementing 

the Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110– 

53), the September 2004 Memorandum 

of Agreement between DOT and DHS, 

and the September 2005 modal annex 

between FTA and TSA, DHS is tasked 

with the responsibility for carrying out 

a national strategy for public 

transportation security to minimize 

security threats and to maximize the 

ability of public transportation agencies 

to mitigate damage from terrorist attacks 

and other major incidents. While this 

does not preclude RTAs from 

implementing measures securing their 

assets, it is no longer the responsibility 

of the SSOAs to oversee those measures. 

FTA recognizes, of course, that some of 

the steps an RTA takes to ensure the 

personal safety and security of its riders 

and employees will overlap with steps 

it takes to secure its system from a 

terrorist attack, such as the steps an 

agency takes that are part of a threat and 

vulnerability assessment. 

H. Section 674.25—Role of the State 

Safety Oversight Agency 

FTA received comments from twelve 

commenters regarding § 674.25, 

including seven SSOAs, two RTAs, one 

industry association, one individual, 

and one contractor. 

1. General 

Comments: One RTA commenter 

recommended that FTA consider 

acknowledging the role of the SSOA 

engaging in active assistance of the 

RTA. The commenter noted that FTA’s 

transition away from the ‘‘system 

safety’’ approach codified within the 

former part 659 to the current SMS 

approach of part 674 relies on the 

design of workable and effective 

processes to manage safety risk and 

evaluate the results of those efforts. To 

achieve success, the commenter 

asserted, SSO programs should not only 

entail compliance-based processes but 

should include engagement in 

continuous improvement processes, best 

practices, and other assistance. 


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FTA Response: FTA agrees that 

effective SSO programs will focus on 

more than just compliance. FTA 

encourages SSOAs to develop and 

implement oversight practices that 

support an SMS and that apply 

continuous improvement principles and 

best practices. FTA notes that new 

SSOA requirements related to risk-based 

inspections, oversight of safety risk 

mitigations, and data to support 

oversight of safety risk management 

activity align with this focus. 

2. Section 674.25(a)—Minimum 

Standards 

Comments: Two SSOAs and one 

industry association requested that FTA 

clarify the meaning of the term 

‘‘minimum standards for safety’’ in 

§ 674.25(a), asserting that without a 

clear understanding of this term, SSOAs 

would not know what baseline or 

criteria FTA would use to audit SSOA 

compliance. One SSOA commenter 

requested clarification on whether the 

National Safety Plan reference in 

§ 674.25(a) means that SSO program 

standards cannot go beyond the 

requirements established within FTA’s 

National Safety Plan. Further, the 

commenter expressed concerns over 

potential situations where information 

in the National Safety Plan conflicts 

with a State’s SSO program. The 

commenter requested clarification on 

what elements within the National 

Safety Plan require consistency with the 

SSO program and an RTA’s ASP. 

FTA Response: Subsection 674.25(a) 

remains unchanged from the 2016 rule 

and FTA is not aware of any difficulties 

in SSOAs implementing the rule. FTA 

defines the requirements for SSO 

programs and SSO program standards in 

this final rule, with § 674.27 describing 

the required components of an SSO 

program standard. FTA notes that in 

this way the regulation establishes 

minimum safety requirements and 

confirms that an SSOA may establish 

standards and requirements beyond the 

minimum requirements of part 674 in 

their SSO program standard. FTA will 

audit SSOAs to ensure that the SSO 

program standard meets the 

requirements of part 674 and that the 

SSO program standard is being carried 

out as written. 

FTA confirms that § 674.25(a) requires 

an SSOA to establish minimum 

standards for the safety of all rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within its oversight that are consistent 

with the National Safety Plan. As noted 

in section E.1 of this preamble, the 

National Safety Plan presents (1) safety 

performance criteria for all recipients 

that must develop ASPs under 49 CFR 

part 673, including safety performance 

measures related to the safety risk 

reduction program and (2) voluntary 

minimum safety standards and 

recommended practices to support 

mitigation of safety risk and to improve 

safety performance. The National Safety 

Plan does not establish a limit or ceiling 

related to a State’s SSO program 

requirements and the standards and 

recommended practices presented in 

Chapter III of the National Safety Plan 

are voluntary in nature. FTA notes that 

Chapter II of the National Safety Plan 

outlines the safety performance 

measures required of all agencies 

subject to the PTASP regulation for 

which each RTA must set safety 

performance targets and document them 

in their ASP. 

3. Section 674.25(b)—Agency Safety 

Plan Review and Approval 

Comments: One RTA commenter 

asked if § 674.25(b) establishes a 

requirement for an annual ASP review 

and approval. One SSOA commenter 

recommended that FTA revise 

regulatory text to include a reference to 

a State’s ‘‘SSO program’’ and suggested 

that the use of general terms makes 

compliance difficult if not impossible. 

Further, the commenter recommended 

that FTA revise the existing regulatory 

text in § 674.25(b) from ‘‘enforce the 

execution’’ to ‘‘enforce the compliance,’’ 

asserting that execution is the 

responsibility of the RTA’s Accountable 

Executive and the SSOA is responsible 

for compliance. 

FTA Response: Subsection 674.25(b) 

is substantially unchanged from the 

2016 rule. Subsection 673.25(b) does not 

establish timeframe requirements for an 

RTA’s ASP review process. FTA notes 

that the PTASP regulation at 

§ 673.11(a)(5) requires each transit 

agency to conduct an annual review of 

its ASP. Subsection 673.25(b) requires 

an SSOA to review and approve an 

RTA’s ASP and subsequent updates to 

the ASP that may result from the 

required annual review. FTA disagrees 

with the commenter who suggested the 

language in § 673.25(b) makes 

compliance difficult if not impossible 

and notes the language at § 673.25(b) 

remains unchanged from the original 

publication in 2016 and to date has not 

resulted in compliance issues. Further, 

FTA declines to replace the word 

‘‘execution’’ with ‘‘compliance’’ and 

notes SSOAs are charged with 

overseeing compliance, which means 

ensuring that an RTA executes its ASP. 

Subsection 673.25(b) suggests that 

SSOAs can do this through a CAP or 

other enforcement means based on 

which type of enforcement tool would 

be appropriate or necessary given the 

specifics of the compliance issue. 

4. Section 674.25(c)—Engineering and 

Construction 

Comments: Six SSOAs, one RTA, and 

one contractor submitted comments 

related to § 674.25(c) and the 

requirement for SSOAs to provide 

oversight of an RTA’s project(s) in the 

engineering and construction phase to 

verify compliance with Federal and 

State safety requirements. 

Two SSOA commenters requested 

that FTA develop guidance on the 

SSOA’s role in oversight of major 

capital projects, including instances 

where FTA is utilizing its Project 

Management Oversight (PMO) program. 

One contractor commented that the 

project phase terminology used in the 

rule is not the same as the project 

phases of the PMO program. 

One SSOA commenter requested 

clarification on the SSOA’s 

responsibilities to ensure proper 

compliance during engineering and 

construction and whether the SSOA is 

responsible for overseeing all aspects of 

a capital project. One contractor and one 

SSOA commenter asserted the phrase 

‘‘applicable Federal and State safety 

requirements’’ is very broad. These 

commenters and an additional SSOA 

commenter sought clarification on the 

scope of oversight, including 

clarification that FTA does not intend 

for SSOAs to perform the oversight 

functions of FTA’s PMO contractors for 

certain rail projects, including things 

that are normally outside of the purview 

of the SSOA, such as budgeting, 

financial planning, social and economic 

equity, and environmental protection. 

Three SSOA commenters recommended 

that there be a clear distinction between 

the roles and responsibilities of FTA’s 

PMO contractors and the SSOA and 

clarity regarding SSOA responsibility. 

Two SSOA commenters 

recommended that FTA extend 

oversight responsibility earlier in the 

life of an RTA project, to the planning 

phase. One SSOA commenter and one 

individual objected to the requirements 

for oversight of projects in the 

engineering or construction phase. The 

SSOA commenter asserted the language 

of § 674.25(c) is too vague, impractical, 

and duplicative of existing processes, 

including FTA’s PMO program. The 

SSOA commenter recommended FTA 

convene an industry working group to 

evaluate the provision before 

implementation. The SSOA commenter 

requested FTA provide additional 

clarification regarding applicable 

projects, scope for compliance, and 

relationship with existing oversight 


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programs. Further, the SSOA 

commenter disagreed with FTA’s 

assertion that the language in this 

subsection parallels the statutory 

language in 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(2)(B) and 

clarifies FTA’s intent that SSOAs take 

an active oversight role during a 

project’s pre-revenue phases. Instead, 

the commenter suggested, the 

terminology is used in statute only to 

define ‘‘eligible states’’ and should not 

be interpreted by FTA to define the 

scope of safety oversight. 

One RTA commenter requested 

revising the language of § 674.25(c) to 

add ‘‘on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system’’ to add additional 

qualifying language for the term ‘‘RTA 

project.’’ 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

request for additional guidance related 

to the SSOA’s role in oversight of 

engineering and construction of major 

capital projects, including instances 

where FTA is utilizing its PMO 

program, and will consider this topic for 

future guidance and technical 

assistance. FTA confirms that the 

terminology ‘‘engineering or 

construction phase’’ is not the same as 

the terminology used in FTA’s PMO 

program. The terminology at § 674.25(c) 

comes from 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(2)(B) 

whereas the PMO phases are based on 

project development standards. FTA is 

not establishing a new interpretation but 

is using existing statutory language. 

Under the original 49 CFR part 659, 

FTA established revenue service as the 

start of State safety oversight. Under the 

Intermodal Surface Transportation 

Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA, Pub. L. 

102–240), Congress moved the start of 

State oversight to planning and design 

phases. Under Moving Ahead for 

Progress in the 12st Century Act (MAP– 

21, Pub. L. 112–141), Congress moved 

the start of State oversight to the 

construction or engineering phase 

where it remains today. FTA’s 

understanding of Congressional intent 

establishes the engineering or 

construction phase as the start of 

required safety oversight responsibility 

for States. However, States may choose 

to oversee the safety of rail projects 

earlier in the process at their discretion. 

FTA notes § 674.25(c) provides SSOAs 

flexibility, and SSOAs should address 

the determination of ‘‘engineering or 

construction phase’’ in the SSO program 

standard. Criteria examples may include 

triggering events such as project 

groundbreaking, solicitation of bids for 

construction activity, a finding of no 

significant impact under the National 

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), etc. 

FTA confirms that an SSOA is not 

responsible for overseeing aspects of a 

project that are traditionally addressed 

through FTA’s PMO program, including 

areas such as budgeting, financial 

planning, social and economic equity, 

and environmental protection, and 

notes the SSOAs oversight 

responsibilities are limited to safety. 

FTA agrees with commenters who 

recommended a clear distinction 

between the roles and responsibilities of 

FTA’s PMO contractors and the SSOA 

and notes that SSOAs are not expected 

to conduct PMO reviews of grantees or 

recreate such processes. Instead, FTA 

expects SSOAs to work with RTAs to 

ensure the development of necessary 

program elements, processes, and 

documentation that address the 

requirements of 49 CFR part 673, 49 

CFR part 674, and the State’s SSO 

program standard. 

As for the comments that 

recommended extending a State’s 

oversight responsibility to earlier in the 

life of an RTA project, to the planning 

phase, FTA declines to make this 

change and notes that, as mentioned 

above, ISTEA provided SSOAs with this 

authority, but under MAP–21, Congress 

moved the start of oversight from the 

design phase to the construction or 

engineering phase where it remains 

today. Further, FTA notes that 

mandating an earlier involvement 

would represent a significant change 

from existing requirements and would 

require additional notice and comment. 

FTA declines to remove of the 

requirement for States to ensure the 

safety oversight of projects in the 

engineering or construction phase and 

notes the requirements and language of 

§ 674.25(c) are established in statute and 

are not new. Further, FTA reiterates the 

requirement for a State to oversee safety 

of a rail project during the engineering 

or construction phase is not duplicative 

of the PMO process and is not intended 

to recreate PMO-related processes. FTA 

does not believe it is necessary to 

establish an industry working group to 

evaluate the provision before 

implementation. As mentioned earlier 

in this section, FTA will consider the 

topic of the SSOA’s role in oversight of 

major capital projects and the 

relationship to the PMO program for 

future guidance and technical 

assistance. Further, FTA disagrees with 

the commenter’s assessment that the 

statutory language should not be used to 

establish the scope of safety oversight. 

FTA notes that this interpretation has 

been applied by FTA since the 

publication of the first Section 5329 

apportionment on March 10, 2014 (79 

FR 13380) and this was reiterated in the 

publication of the original 49 CFR part 

674 in 2016 (81 FR 14256). 

Finally, declines to add the phrase 

‘‘on a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system’’ to § 674.25(c) as 

FTA does not believe such a change 

serves to clarify the existing 

requirement. 

5. Section 674.25(d)—Agency Safety 

Plan Requirements 

Comments: One SSOA commenter 

recommended FTA amend § 674.25(d) 

to reflect the requirements in 49 U.S.C. 

5329(k) for SSOAs to conduct risk-based 

inspections, asserting that ASPs should 

address an SSOA’s risk-based 

inspection program. One SSOA 

commenter requested clarification on 

SSOA jurisdiction over transit systems 

and projects that are not related to rail 

transit, noting that currently SSOAs 

have no such jurisdiction unless they 

are granted that authority on a State 

level. 

FTA Response: This provision is in 

§ 675.25(b) of the 2016 rule. The intent 

of § 674.25(d) is to address the SSOA’s 

obligation to assure the RTA is in 

compliance with PTASP provisions at 

49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and the PTASP rule 

at 49 CFR part 673. Part 673, at 

§ 673.11(a)(6) addresses the new 

requirement in 49 U.S.C. 5329(k) so is 

already captured in regulatory text. 

Further, FTA has revised the definition 

of ‘‘State Safety Oversight Agency’’ at 

§ 674.7 to include the reference to 49 

U.S.C. 5329(k) to incorporate the riskbased inspection requirements 

established by the BIL. FTA confirms 

that part 674 does not establish any 

requirement for SSOAs to oversee the 

safety of bus systems, even bus services 

operated by transit agencies that also 

provide rail service applicable under 

part 674. SSOAs are responsible for 

overseeing an RTA and ensuring its ASP 

meets the requirements for part 673. 

FTA notes that some ASPs address both 

rail and bus operations. Part 674 does 

not require SSOAs to evaluate part 673 

compliance for bus services. However, 

this final rule does not prevent SSOAs 

from performing additional oversight 

activities at their discretion pursuant to 

their State laws. 

6. Section 674.25(e)—Allegations of 

Noncompliance 

Comments: One SSOA commenter 

expressed concern at the language 

within § 674.25(e) that assigns the SSOA 

with the primary responsibility for 

investigating ‘‘any allegation of 

noncompliance,’’ asserting this puts 

undue responsibility on an SSOA and 

fails to address the RTA’s responsibility 

to address and respond. The commenter 

also noted there is no SSOA notification 

or reporting requirement in the 


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proposed rule or other FTA regulations 

for allegations of noncompliance. One 

individual requested that FTA add a 

reference to 49 U.S.C. 5330 when 

describing the Administrator’s 

authority. 

FTA Response: This subsection is 

identical to § 675.25(d) of the 2016 rule. 

The final rule continues to require 

SSOAs to investigate allegations of 

noncompliance when those allegations 

are brought to the attention of the 

SSOA. Further, FTA does not believe 

that the requirement for SSOAs to 

investigate allegations of 

noncompliance absolves an RTA for 

carrying out its own processes to 

address such safety concerns according 

to processes defined in the RTA’s ASP. 

FTA declines to add a reference to 49 

U.S.C. 5330, noting the statute was 

repealed in 2019 in accordance with 

section 20030(e) of MAP–21, and 49 

U.S.C. 5329(f) provides the 

Administrator’s authority. 

7. Section 674.25(f)—Investigations 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

suggested that § 674.25(f) include 

additional language explicitly 

authorizing the SSOA to delegate 

investigation authority to the RTA. One 

individual commenter suggested FTA 

include an additional requirement in 

§ 674.25(f) for investigation reports to 

clarify corrective actions to prevent 

recurrence and assign a corrective 

action plan identification number. 

FTA Response: FTA declines to add 

additional language to § 674.25(f) 

regarding the delegation of investigation 

responsibility to the RTA and notes this 

is addressed at § 674.35(b). FTA 

declines to require CAPS to be included 

in investigation reports and notes FTA 

has established requirements for CAPs 

at § 674.35. Further, nothing in the rule 

prevents an SSOA from requiring the 

documentation of CAPs within a final 

investigation report. 

8. Section 674.25(g)—Contractor 

Investigation Support 

Comments: One individual 

commenter suggested FTA add 

additional text to § 674.25(g) to 

reference incidents and occurrences and 

to note that the SSOA is responsible for 

the investigations. 

FTA Response: FTA declines to revise 

§ 674.25(g) and notes that part 674 has 

eliminated references to incidents and 

occurrences with the transition to the 

new definition of ‘‘safety event’’ in parts 

673 and 674. Further, FTA it is not 

necessary to restate the SSOA’s primary 

responsibility for investigation, as that 

is stated in § 674.25(f). 

9. Section 674.25(h)—SSOA 

Compliance With PTSCTP 

Comments: One commenter noted 

that FTA has removed the PTSCTP 

curriculum in the proposed revisions to 

49 CFR part 672 (88 FR 73573). The 

commenter asked where they could find 

guidance on PTSCTP to ensure 

minimum standards are developed 

consistent with PTSCTP. The 

commenter also recommended FTA 

revise the language of § 674.25(h) to 

include the term ‘‘designated 

personnel’’ or simply state, ‘‘SSOAs 

must comply with Part 672.’’ 

FTA Response: FTA notes that 

information on PTSCTP can be found at 

FTA’s safety training website: https://

www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-andguidance/safety/safety-training. FTA 

has revised § 674.25(h) to include the 

term ‘‘designated personnel.’’ 

I. Section 674.27—State Safety 

Oversight Program Standards 

1. Section 674.27(a)(3)—Disposition of 

RTA Comments 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs, two RTAs, and one 

individual related to § 674.27(a)(3). The 

three SSOA commenters generally 

agreed with FTA’s proposal. Two of 

these SSOA commenters requested 

clarification that SSOAs would not be 

required to accept all suggestions made 

by the RTA. The other SSOA 

commenter noted that the process 

described in § 674.27(a)(3) is already 

being implemented and documented in 

SSO program standards. One RTA 

commenter requested FTA define 

additional minimum requirements for 

this process, including specifically how 

comments are submitted, request and 

response timeframes, expectations, and 

approval processes. One RTA 

commenter supported the proposed 

requirement and urged FTA to formalize 

its role in settling jurisdictional 

questions and interpretations of FTA 

regulations by establishing a process for 

SSOAs and RTAs to bring matters of 

disagreement before a hearing with 

FTA. Similarly, one individual 

commenter suggested FTA needs to 

collaborate with SSOAs to develop and 

formalize a conflict resolution and 

escalation process for FTA and SSOAs. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates 

commenters’ support for the provisions 

at § 674.27(a)(3) and thanks those 

SSOAs and RTAs that are already 

implementing this process. FTA 

confirms the requirement at 

§ 674.27(a)(3) does not require the SSOA 

to accept all suggestions made by the 

RTA. FTA declines to establish 

additional minimum requirements 

related to this process and preserves the 

flexibility of SSOAs to define these 

aspects but notes that an SSOA is 

responsible for defining how it will 

address the requirements and 

documenting this in the SSO program 

standard. FTA declines to establish a 

hearing process for conflicts between 

SSOAs and RTAs, noting that is outside 

the scope of this regulation. Further, 

FTA notes that it does not serve in a 

mediator role between RTAs and SSOAs 

and can use existing mechanisms to 

support intervention with RTAs and 

SSOAs if necessary. Similarly, 

developing a conflict resolution process 

is outside the scope of this current 

regulatory effort. However, FTA will 

consider these suggestions for SSOAs 

and RTAs as topics for future 

rulemakings. 

2. Section 674.27(a)(5)—Oversight of 

RTA Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plans and Internal Safety 

Reviews 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs and one contractor 

related to § 674.27(a)(5). One SSOA 

commenter noted that SSOAs are 

already implementing the activities 

required in the proposed rule. Two 

SSOA commenters requested 

clarification on the use of the term 

‘‘internal safety review’’ and noted that 

in the past, FTA had referred to these 

activities as ‘‘internal audits.’’ Further, 

the two commenters noted that State 

Safety Oversight Reporting Tool (SSOR) 

uses the phrase ‘‘internal audit’’ and 

that other programs, such as PTSCTP, 

refer to ‘‘audits and examinations,’’ and 

pointed out that the Transportation 

Safety Institute (TSI) delivers courses 

titled ‘‘Transit Safety and Security 

Audits.’’ The commenters sought 

clarification on whether the terminology 

change in the rule is intended to ‘‘lower 

the bar’’ for internal safety reviews. One 

contractor suggested the phrase ‘‘the 

SSOA will receive and evaluate all 

material submitted under the signature 

of an RTA’s Accountable Executive’’ 

was too broad and, taken literally, could 

mean any document the Accountable 

Executive signs. The contractor also 

commented that 49 CFR part 673 does 

not include the specific internal safety 

review requirements established in 

§ 674.27(a)(5)(i-iv) and that FTA should 

require RTAs to document the 

associated processes in their ASP. 

FTA Response: Paragraph 675.27(a)(5) 

is substantially similar to paragraph 

675.27(a)(4) of the 2016 rule, so FTA is 

encouraged to know SSOAs and RTAs 

are complying with the 2016 rule. FTA 

notes that under part 659, FTA referred 

to this activity as ‘‘internal safety and 


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security audits.’’ With the transition to 

49 CFR part 674 in 2016, FTA used the 

term ‘‘internal safety reviews’’ to 

describe this activity at § 674.27(a)(4). 

With this final rule, FTA continues to 

use the term ‘‘internal safety review,’’ 

and the terminology does not ‘‘lower the 

bar’’ for this RTA function. To the 

contrary, FTA has defined explicit 

requirements for internal safety reviews 

at §§ 674.27(a)(5)(i–iv). FTA confirms 

the SSOR uses the terminology ‘‘internal 

safety review.’’ Finally, FTA confirms 

that § 674.27(a)(5) does not require the 

SSOA to evaluate all material that an 

Accountable Executive may sign. 

Instead, in alignment with the title of 

the paragraph, the requirement at 

§ 674.27(a)(5) applies to the oversight of 

RTA ASPs and internal safety reviews 

and includes documents the RTA 

submits to the SSOA under signature of 

the Accountable Executive to address 

SSO program requirements, such as an 

RTA’s ASP and the RTA’s annual report 

on internal safety reviews. Further, FTA 

confirms that § 673.27(d)(1)(iii) requires 

RTAs to address any specific internal 

safety review requirements established 

by their SSOA in the ASP. 

3. Section 674.27(a)(6)—Oversight of 

Safety Risk Mitigations 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from three SSOAs and one RTA related 

to § 674.27(a)(6) and the requirements 

for the oversight of RTA safety risk 

mitigations. One SSOA commenter 

noted that SSOAs are already 

implementing the activities required in 

the proposed § 674.27(a)(6). Two SSOA 

commenters noted that under the 

requirements of 49 CFR part 673, RTAs 

determine mitigation effectiveness 

through their safety assurance 

processes. Further, the commenters 

noted the SSOA receives and reviews 

information on RTA safety risk 

mitigations for oversight of compliance, 

but the RTA Accountable Executive and 

Chief Safety Officer are empowered to 

dictate the action of the RTA. One RTA 

commenter noted their safety risk 

mitigation processes have been 

documented, approved by the SSOA, 

and implemented since 2020, but if the 

SSOA were to establish new 

requirements related to safety risk 

mitigations, it could be disruptive to the 

maturation of the RTA’s SMS and 

burdensome. The commenter 

recommended FTA encourage SSOAs to 

review existing mitigation processes 

instead of establishing completely new 

requirements. One SSOA commenter 

asked for confirmation that the 

requirements of § 674.27(a)(6) were 

considered in the rule’s cost estimate. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

support for this provision and thanks 

SSOAs that currently oversee the safety 

risk mitigations of an RTA as required 

at § 674.27(a)(6). FTA generally agrees 

with the statement that while an SSOA 

receives information regarding safety 

risk mitigations, it is RTA’s Accountable 

Executive and Chief Safety Officer that 

are empowered to direct the action of 

the RTA, and notes it is not in conflict 

with the requirements at § 674.27(a)(6). 

FTA notes that these requirements do 

not charge SSOAs with monitoring the 

effectiveness of safety risk mitigations 

but instead require SSOAs to define a 

process in the SSO program standard for 

reviewing information and data related 

to safety risk mitigations to ensure that 

the RTA is developing, implementing, 

and monitoring safety risk mitigations 

according to the documented and 

approved processes in their ASP. FTA 

confirms that nothing in this final rule 

establishes new requirements for how 

an RTA identifies, implements, and 

monitors safety risk mitigations, nor 

does the rule require SSOAs to establish 

new requirements for how an RTA 

identifies, implements, and monitors 

safety risk mitigations. Finally, FTA 

confirms that § 674.27(a)(6) was 

considered when developing the rule’s 

cost estimate. FTA notes that 

§ 674.27(a)(6) does not establish a new 

oversight requirement but explicitly 

identifies existing oversight 

responsibility. Safety risk mitigations 

are an existing required element of an 

SMS that must be addressed in an ASP 

and are included in SSOA oversight 

responsibilities. As such, this provision 

does not create additional oversight 

burdens. 

4. Section 674.27(a)(7)—Oversight of 

RTA Compliance With the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from five SSOAs, one RTA, one industry 

association, and one contractor related 

to § 674.27(a)(7) and the requirements 

for the oversight of RTA compliance 

with the PTSCTP. One SSOA 

commenter noted that SSOAs are, for 

the most part, already implementing the 

activities required in § 674.27(a)(7). The 

remaining four SSOAs, one RTA, and 

one industry association expressed 

concern with language that seems to 

require the SSOAs to formally review 

and approve each RTA designation for 

the purposes of PTSCTP designated 

personnel and to formally review and 

approve each refresher training 

administered by the RTA. Three SSOA 

commenters and one industry 

association commenter disagreed that 

SSOAs should be approving these 

PTSCTP designations and trainings, 

noting that this should be the 

responsibility of the RTA. One RTA 

commenter noted that under part 672, 

this responsibility is given to the RTA. 

Several commenters also noted that this 

would place an additional burden on 

SSOAs and would be duplicative of 

existing efforts, and one SSOA asked for 

confirmation that required approvals 

were considered in the estimate of 

burden. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

support for this provision and 

acknowledges those SSOAs that 

currently oversee the RTA compliance 

with the PTSCTP consistent with 

§ 674.27(a)(7). FTA appreciates the 

concerns raised by commenters 

regarding the proposed language that 

seemed to require the SSOAs to 

formally review and approve each RTA 

designation for the purposes of PTSCTP 

designated personnel and to formally 

review and approve each refresher 

training administered by the RTA. FTA 

has revised the language in this final 

rule to address the concerns raised by 

these commenters. FTA clarifies that 

§ 674.27(a)(7) requires SSOAs to oversee 

RTA compliance with PTSCTP 

requirements and that SSOAs may 

define in their SSO program standard 

how they will oversee RTA compliance. 

FTA confirms that the rule’s cost 

estimate does not include costs 

associated with formal SSOA approval 

of designations and refresher training 

development because the final rule does 

not require these approvals. 

5. Section 674.27(a)(8)—Triennial SSOA 

Audits of RTA Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plans 

Comments: One SSOA commenter 

requested clarification on the use of the 

term ‘‘agree’’ and whether that meant if 

an RTA does not agree to an ongoing 

review over the three-year period, 

would the SSOA be forced to perform 

one triennial audit, or could the SSOA 

determine, at its own discretion, to do 

audits on an ongoing basis. 

FTA Response: The language in 

paragraph 674.27(a)(8) is identical to 

§ 674.27(a)(5) of the 2016 rule and FTA 

believes this language is sufficient to 

support SSOA audit scheduling with 

RTAs. The scheduling of the SSOA’s 

triennial audit is expected to be 

cooperative between the SSOA and RTA 

while recognizing the SSOA is 

responsible for conducting triennial 

audits in compliance with part 674 and 

as specified in the SSO program 

standard. If an RTA takes issue with the 

triennial audit schedule as outlined in 

the SSO program standard, the RTA 


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may provide a comment or suggestion to 

the SSOA as permitted under 

§ 674.27(a)(3). 

6. Section 674.27(a)(9)—Safety Event 

Notifications 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

requested clarification on the 

notifications referenced in § 674.27(a)(9) 

and suggested that FTA not require the 

notification of events that do not meet 

the notification criteria in § 674.33. 

FTA Response: Except for changing 

‘‘accident’’ to ‘‘safety event’’ and adding 

FTA as an entity the RTA needs to 

report to, this provision is the same as 

the provision at § 674.27(a)(6) of the 

2016 rule. FTA has designated safety 

events in § 674.33 as minimum 

requirements and does not want to limit 

SSOAs if they wish to have RTAs report 

on safety events that do not appear in 

§ 674.33. 

7. Section 674.27(a)(10)—Investigations 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

requested FTA clarify that an SSOA 

may delegate investigation 

responsibility to the RTA and adopt the 

final report as its own. One of the SSOA 

commenters noted that it may be 

difficult to detail the role of the SSOA 

in supporting any safety event 

investigation conducted by the NTSB or 

FTA as those entities will be leading the 

safety event investigation and utilize the 

resources of the SSOA on a case-by-case 

basis. 

FTA Response: More detail on this 

requirement is in § 674.35(b), ‘‘The 

SSOA is ultimately responsible for the 

sufficiency and thoroughness of all 

investigations, whether conducted by 

the SSOA or RTA. If the SSOA requires 

an RTA to investigate a safety event, the 

SSOA must conduct an independent 

review of the RTA’s findings of 

causation.’’ Further, § 674.35(b) states, 

‘‘The SSOA must formally adopt the 

report of a safety event . . .’’ 

FTA recognizes the involvement of 

the NTSB and FTA in safety event 

investigations processes may vary based 

on the investigating body and defining 

the role of the SSOA may be difficult. 

Given this circumstance, the regulation 

deliberately does not define the SSOA’s 

role and processes in the regulation 

with respect to the NTSB or FTA role 

in leading safety event investigations. 

Safety event investigations are not 

always routine, and agencies, 

particularly the SSOA and RTA, may 

need to be flexible during the 

investigation process when the NTSB 

and FTA are involved. 

8. Section 674.27(a)(11)—Corrective 

Actions 

Comments: One SSOA questioned 

FTA’s use of the word ‘‘order’’ and 

recommended that SSOAs use wording 

within their SSOA’s authority to outline 

how an RTA must develop and carry out 

a CAP. Further, the commenter noted 

the conflict management language 

proposed in § 674.27(a)(11) would also 

be useful for other required SSO 

program activity. 

FTA Response: FTA acknowledges the 

commenter’s concern with the use of the 

phrase ‘‘the SSOA must order the RTA 

to develop and carry out a CAP.’’ In this 

case, the term ‘‘order’’ is a synonym 

used in place of the word ‘‘require.’’ 

Moreover, this language is identical to 

that found in the 2016 rule at 

§ 674.37(b). 

9. Section 674.27(a)(12)—Inspections 

Comments: The NTSB, one SSOA, 

two RTAs, and two individuals 

commented on the proposed 

requirements at § 674.27(a)(12). The 

NTSB commented that effective riskbased inspection programs rely on 

adequate staffing and noted that it is 

reviewing whether staffing shortages at 

an SSOA may have played a role in a 

2023 rail safety event in Chicago. 

Further, the NTSB expressed support for 

the proposal for a risk-based inspections 

program but noted that FTA should 

develop and issue minimum inspection 

requirements for a basic list of safety 

topics that SSOAs should have in their 

risk-based inspection programs, which 

would include required topics such as 

roadway worker protection, hours of 

service, and fatigue risk management. 

One SSOA commenter suggested FTA 

retitle this paragraph from 

‘‘Inspections’’ to ‘‘Risk-Based 

Inspections’’ because the specific 

requirements are associated with riskbased inspections programs. One RTA 

commented that an SSOA’s risk-based 

inspection program should follow the 

principles of SMS in utilizing safety risk 

information to prioritize oversight 

action and stated that an SSOA’s riskbased inspection program procedures 

should include presenting the transit 

agency with the SSOA’s basis for 

conducting any given inspection, and 

this basis should be expressed in safety 

risk terms. The RTA noted that focus on 

areas that are not risk-based or not 

associated with the highest levels of 

safety risk can result in an inappropriate 

allocation of transit agency resources as 

the agency pursues corrective actions or 

other responses that may not effectively 

mitigate safety risk. 

One SSOA commenter asked for FTA 

to define the terms ‘‘resources,’’ 

‘‘qualified personnel,’’ and 

‘‘complexity,’’ asserting FTA will 

evaluate SSOAs based on these criteria 

and SSOAs need to understand these 

terms to ensure compliance. One 

individual commented that SSOAs 

should have the authority to enter rail 

transit facilities without prior notice to 

perform safety inspections to show 

‘‘normal’’ conditions, that inspections 

should be proactive to confirm or 

improve safety, and that there should be 

no punitive consequence for the transit 

agency unless inspections show little or 

no improvement. 

One RTA commenter requested that 

FTA add language in § 674.27(a)(12)(iii) 

requiring SSOAs to design risk-based 

inspections programs in consultation 

with the RTA to parallel language at 49 

U.S.C. 5329(k)(1)(B). One SSOA 

commenter asked FTA to consider 

adding language to § 674.27(a)(12)(iii) 

that addresses announced inspections. 

The SSOA commenter also asked FTA 

to consider additional language 

requiring RTAs to grant SSOA 

personnel access for inspections. One 

individual commented that while the 

proposed rule ensures that SSOAs have 

the authority to enter rail transit 

facilities without prior notice to perform 

safety inspections, FTA should also 

develop consequences for RTAs that 

refuse to allow FTA officials to enter 

their right of way that include fines to 

individuals and the RTA. In addition, 

FTA should require RTAs to share track 

charts to provide FTA with an 

understanding of the right of way they 

are accessing and require FTA officials 

to carry a radio compatible with the 

RTAs they inspect to communicate with 

dispatchers regarding their presence and 

itinerary. 

FTA Response: FTA agrees that 

adequate staffing is critical to ensuring 

the effectiveness of an inspection 

program. Proper staffing for SSOA 

programs, including inspection 

responsibilities, is also covered at 

§ 674.11(d) and is examined during 

initial certification and regular audits of 

the SSOAs. In the instance an SSOA is 

discovered to be short of staffing or in 

need of increased resources, FTA may 

address this through issuing special 

directives. With respect to the comment 

asking for clarity of defining and setting 

expectations on appropriate SSOA 

staffing levels and resources, FTA 

recognizes that all SSOA programs are 

unique and face different challenges. 

Additionally, SSOA oversight 

responsibilities may change over time, 

requiring a modification in staffing 

resources. For instance, the opening of 


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a new rail transit system, major 

extension of a system, or significant 

safety challenges at a system may 

require additional SSOA staffing 

resources to support more oversight. 

Further, the closing of a rail transit 

system may require less SSOA staffing 

resources. FTA declines to amend the 

regulatory text, to ensure the regulation 

can accommodate everchanging 

circumstances at rail transit agencies 

and allow the SSOA programs to adjust 

staffing resources and oversight 

responsibilities as necessary. 

FTA appreciates the request for more 

specific and/or minimum SSOA riskbased inspection requirements, such as 

roadway worker protection, hours of 

service, and fatigue management. FTA 

will maintain the risk-based inspection 

program as practice driven and 

prioritized by SSOA and RTA risk 

management rather than prescribing 

areas for the inspection program to 

regularly examine. However, FTA will 

keep this comment in mind as safety 

programs continue to be developed, 

including current and future 

rulemakings (see, e.g., 88 FR 74107 and 

89 FR 20605). 

FTA declines to change the heading 

from ‘‘Inspections’’ to ‘‘Risk-based 

Inspections’’ in order to recognize other 

types of inspections that may be 

appropriate for oversight, such as CAP 

verification inspections, field 

inspections for audits, and others. FTA 

notes that SSO program standards 

should document or incorporate by 

reference risk-based inspection 

processes. 

FTA agrees with the comment that 

risk-based inspections should follow the 

principles of SMS. FTA expects riskbased inspection activities to 

synchronize and be built into an RTA’s 

existing SMS activities. This 

information will be considered as a 

topic for FTA guidance and workshops. 

FTA has determined it is unnecessary to 

revisit the definition of ‘‘risk-based 

inspections,’’ ‘‘SMS,’’ or ‘‘safety risk 

management’’ in this section of the 

regulation. 

The importance of cooperation 

between the SSOA and RTAs with 

respect to facility and location access 

will be defined in the SSO program 

standard and, as required at 

§ 674.27(a)(3), the RTA is provided the 

opportunity to comment on the SSO 

program standard through the comment 

disposition process. 

FTA appreciates the several 

comments received related to facility 

access and inspection activities and 

agrees that these inspections are 

designed to improve a rail transit 

agency’s safety. Actions taken by the 

SSOA in response to RTA noncompliance are not prescribed by this 

rule and such actions will be 

determined by the SSOA. As a matter of 

defining when or how the RTA will 

grant access to the SSOA for inspection, 

this detail shall be developed by the 

SSOA in concert with what is 

appropriate for each rail transit agency 

and memorialized in the SSO program 

standard or related procedure. In 

response to the commenter that 

suggested FTA add language requiring 

RTAs to grant SSOA personnel access 

for inspections, FTA notes this is 

included in the regulation and 

referenced as ‘‘unannounced’’ 

inspections. 

FTA recognizes that each RTA has 

developed track right-of-way access 

protocols for their systems to ensure the 

safety of personnel and transit 

operations. SSOA and FTA officials 

must adhere to the rail transit agency’s 

access protocols, including radio 

practices and specialized training as 

determined by the rail transit agency. 

FTA will address access restrictions 

faced specifically by FTA officials on a 

case-by-case basis. FTA will not issue 

citations directly to an RTA if violations 

are found while FTA officials are onsite. However, FTA shall enforce 

authority granted in 49 U.S.C. 5329 and 

49 CFR part 670 when appropriate. 

10. Section 674.27(a)(13)—Vehicle 

Maintenance and Testing 

Comments: Four SSOAs, two RTAs, 

one contractor, and the NTSB 

commented on the proposed 

requirements of § 674.27(a)(13) related 

to vehicle maintenance and testing 

requirements. Two SSOA commenters 

and one RTA commenter sought 

clarification on who is being required to 

perform the periodic testing of rail 

transit vehicle braking systems, the RTA 

or the SSOA. Two RTA commenters 

expressed serious concerns if the new 

requirements mean that the SSOA will 

direct the RTA to undertake a new 

vehicle maintenance or brake testing 

regime or change the frequency of its 

testing instead of following 

manufacturer recommendations and 

established RTA procedure (unless or 

until the need for such changes is 

demonstrated through the agency’s own 

testing or the oversight process). One 

commenter requested that FTA consider 

developing additional guidance to 

support SSOA compliance with this 

new requirement, issuing a Safety 

Advisory that addresses the NTSB 

recommendation R–17–04 and 

providing additional detail to support 

RTA and SSOA compliance. Further, 

the contractor suggested the proposed 

requirement appears to go beyond rail 

vehicle braking system testing to 

address the entire RTA vehicle 

maintenance program. Two SSOA 

commenters recommended against FTA 

establishing vehicle maintenance 

inspections as a distinct program area 

for the SSOA’s program standard. Both 

SSOA commenters recommended 

allowing the SSOA the flexibility to 

determine how often and to what depth 

it reviews these aspects of the RTAs it 

oversees. One of these SSOA 

commenters recommended that FTA 

remove this proposed requirement from 

the SSO program standard and instead 

allow SSOAs to address this issue 

through the risk-based inspections 

program because of the burden 

associated with conducting such 

inspections. 

The NTSB urged FTA to develop 

minimum brake system test and 

inspection criteria and require SSOAs to 

perform rail transit vehicle brake system 

tests and inspections. 

FTA Response: To clarify, the rail 

vehicle brake system maintenance and 

testing program is established and 

implemented by the RTA, not the 

SSOA. It is the SSOA’s responsibility to 

oversee that the RTA brake system 

maintenance and testing program is 

effectively established and implemented 

as written. 

FTA appreciates the suggestion to 

develop guidance or issue a Safety 

Advisory to better inform SSOAs and 

RTAs of the scope and expectations for 

this new requirement. FTA will take 

this suggestion under consideration. 

This requirement does not change 

oversight responsibilities but specifies 

that RTAs are required to perform 

periodic brake system testing and 

maintenance activities. It is the SSOA’s 

purview, now as it has been in the past, 

to verify that the RTA is implementing 

these activities. It is not the SSOA’s 

responsibility to perform the brake 

system testing. Further, FTA notes that 

SSOAs may incorporate vehicle brake 

system maintenance into their riskbased inspection program. 

Regarding NTSB’s suggestion that 

FTA provide minimum inspection 

standards for braking system 

maintenance and testing, this is outside 

the scope of this regulation, but FTA 

will consider this suggestion in future 

action. 

11. Section 674.27(a)(14)—Data 

Collection 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs, two RTAs, and one 

individual in response to the proposed 

requirements at § 674.27(a)(14). One 

SSOA commenter recommended against 


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FTA establishing data collection as a 

distinct program area for the SSOA’s 

SSO program standard and asserted the 

SSOA should be allowed the flexibility 

to determine how often and to what 

depth it reviews these aspects of the 

RTAs it oversees. One RTA requested 

that FTA add language to § 674.27(a)(14) 

that specifies that data collection 

policies and procedures will be 

developed in consultation with the 

RTA. One individual commenter 

recommended that SSOAs should be 

allowed to collect data from RTAs with 

safeguards to protect personal 

information and rules similar to FRA’s 

49 CFR part 225. One SSOA commenter 

asked FTA if data access requirements 

should be included in the SSO program 

standard with consideration for cyber 

security precautions. One RTA 

commenter recommended revisions to 

the proposed requirement, suggesting 

the SSO program standard define how 

the SSOA will use RTA data to support 

the SSOA’s oversight of the RTA’s safety 

risk management activities. 

FTA Response: The regulation does 

not require any particular data 

collection. Instead, the regulation 

requires ‘‘policies and procedures for 

collecting and reviewing data that the 

RTA uses when identifying hazards and 

assessing safety risk’’. The regulation 

does not detail ‘‘how’’ (scaling, 

frequency, depth) the SSOA is to 

conduct these activities. This will be left 

to the SSOA to determine and 

memorialize in policies and procedures 

as applicable. 

FTA acknowledges the importance of 

cooperation between the SSOA and 

RTAs with respect to data sharing and 

access. This practice will be defined in 

the SSO program standard and, as 

required in § 674.27(a)(3), the RTA is 

provided the opportunity to comment 

on the SSO program standard through 

the comment disposition process. 

FTA agrees the protection of sensitive 

SSOA and RTA information and 

employee personal information is 

important. Section 674.23(b) provides 

protections for SSOA and RTA securitysensitive information. FTA expects 

SSOAs and RTAs to follow and apply 

existing laws that protect personal 

information for employees and 

contractors. 

FTA agrees with the commenter that 

suggested the SSOA should define how 

the SSOA will use RTA data to support 

the SSOA’s oversight activities. FTA has 

added the following language, shown 

italicized, to the final rule to address 

this comment: ‘‘The program standard 

must include policies and procedures 

for collecting and reviewing data that 

the RTA uses when identifying hazards 

and assessing safety risk and explain 

how the SSOA uses collected data to 

support oversight of the RTA’s safety 

risk management process.’’ 

FTA recognizes data access and cyber 

security practices will be different for 

each SSOA and respective RTAs. The 

regulation purposely does not specify 

nor prescribe methods for data sharing 

and cyber security. Each SSOA and 

respective RTA are to define policies 

and practices that work amongst the 

agencies for ensuring secure data access 

and sharing. 

J. Section 674.29—Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plans: 

General Requirements 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

expressed confusion regarding the 

language at § 674.29 related to the 

National Safety Plan. Both commenters 

requested clarification on what elements 

within the National Safety Plan require 

consistency with the RTA’s ASP. Both 

SSOA commenters also requested 

clarification on the removal of 

subsection (b), which is in the 2016 

rule. 

FTA Response: As clarified in section 

E.1 above, the National Safety Plan 

presents (1) safety performance criteria 

for all recipients that must develop 

ASPs under 49 CFR part 673, including 

safety performance measures related to 

the safety risk reduction program, and 

(2) voluntary minimum safety standards 

and recommended practices to support 

mitigation of safety risk and to improve 

safety performance. The National Safety 

Plan does not establish a ceiling related 

to a State’s SSO program requirements 

and the standards and recommended 

practices presented in Chapter III of the 

National Safety Plan are voluntary in 

nature. In terms of requirements defined 

in the National Safety Plan, FTA notes 

that Chapter II of the National Safety 

Plan outlines the safety performance 

measures required of all agencies 

subject to the PTASP regulation for 

which each RTA must set safety 

performance targets and document them 

in their ASP. With respect to the 

removal of subsection (b), FTA notes 

that because the 2016 version of part 

674 was published prior to part 673, 

FTA provided a list of the expected 

PTASP elements in subsection (b) as an 

interim measure to guide SSOAs. With 

the publication of part 673 in 2018, the 

list is no longer necessary. 

K. Section 674.31—Triennial Audits: 

General Requirements 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs and one RTA related 

to the requirements for triennial audits 

proposed at § 674.31. Two SSOA 

commenters recommended FTA add 

language to this section regarding the 

SSOA and RTA agreeing to schedule 

ongoing audits. One SSOA commenter 

requested guidance to support the 

SSOA’s analysis of the effectiveness of 

an RTA’s ASP. The SSOA commenter 

also asserted that it is the RTA’s job to 

monitor effectiveness and it is the 

SSOAs job to monitor compliance. One 

SSOA commenter also asked if FTA is 

defining requirements for what should 

be included in the annual audit report 

in situations where an SSOA conducts 

triennial audits in an ongoing fashion 

over the three-year period. 

An SSOA commenter and an RTA 

commenter requested clarifications 

related to the requirement for the SSOA 

to allow the RTA to comment on the 

findings and recommendations in the 

report. The RTA recommended that 

FTA require the SSOA to provide 

written response to the RTA’s 

comments. The SSOA commenter 

questioned whether the RTA could 

comment on the audit report or only on 

the findings and recommendations 

within the report. 

FTA Response: This section omits 

language included in § 674.27(a)(8) 

regarding the SSOA and RTA 

‘‘agreeing’’ to conduct an on-going 

rather than an audit once every three 

years as repetitious and notes the 

§ 674.31 language does not conflict with 

§ 674.27(a)(8). Further, FTA expects 

SSOAs and RTAs to cooperate on the 

scheduling of the SSOA’s triennial audit 

while recognizing the SSOA is 

responsible for conducting triennial 

audits in compliance with part 674 and 

as specified in the SSO program 

standard. 

In response to the commenter seeking 

guidance for analysis of the 

effectiveness of an RTA’s ASP, given the 

diversity of SSO programs, SSO 

program standards, and ASPs, this 

language is purposely not prescriptive. 

The SSOA shall design a triennial audit 

program so that it complies with the 

regulation and examines the RTA’s 

implementation of its ASP to identify 

corrections or improvements. 

As detailed in the § 674.31 language, 

the audit report shall include the 

following: (1) analysis of the 

effectiveness of the RTA’s efforts to 

implement the ASP; (2) findings and 

recommendations resulting from this 

analysis; and (3) recommendations for 

improvement and/or a corrective action 

plan(s), if necessary. At a minimum, the 

SSOA shall issue provisional triennial 

audit reports annually if it is auditing 

on an ongoing basis. 

FTA acknowledges the importance of 

outlining and administering a process 


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for RTAs to comment on the SSOA 

triennial audit report, findings, and 

recommendations. RTA comments may 

be made to both the report language and 

the resulting findings and 

recommendations. RTA comments are 

expected to be resolved through formal 

or informal communications between 

the agencies. This regulatory language is 

purposely not prescriptive, allowing the 

SSOA to include in the SSO program 

standard a review and comment process 

for collaborating with each audited 

RTA. An RTA may identify issues with 

the SSO program standard, including 

the comment resolution practice for 

triennial audits, per § 674.27(a)(3). 

L. Section 674.33—Safety Event 

Notifications 

1. General 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from seven commenters regarding FTA’s 

proposed notification criteria at 

§ 674.33, including one SSOA, four 

RTAs, one industry association, and one 

anonymous commenter. One RTA 

commenter recommended that FTA 

eliminate the requirement for RTAs to 

notify FTA directly of safety events, 

asserting that ideally RTAs would only 

have one set of reporting requirements 

and one entity to whom they report. 

One RTA commenter and one 

industry association commenter 

recommended FTA extend the two-hour 

notification requirement to provide 

RTAs with more time to make the 

required notification to the SSOA and 

FTA. The RTA commenter 

recommended extending the timeframe 

to at least four hours to provide the RTA 

with sufficient time for an RTA 

investigator to arrive on the scene and 

assess the situation. The industry 

association commenter recommended 

FTA extend the notification window to 

four or six hours after the event occurs. 

The commenter noted that SSOAs rarely 

dispatch to the scene and that the 

notification timeframe would make 

sense if the SSOAs would commit to 

being on-site within two hours of the 

event’s occurrence. An individual 

commenter suggested that the two-hour 

requirement did not ensure timely 

notifications and recommended that 

FTA require RTAs to notify the FTA and 

the SSOA as soon as possible as 

opposed to two hours so FTA and the 

SSOA can evaluate the response 

needed. 

One RTA commenter and one SSOA 

commenter expressed concern at the 

potential burden associated with 

changes in notification criteria. The 

RTA commented that the number of 

events requiring notification may 

increase to near the levels required 

under part 659 and increase agency 

burden. One SSOA commenter noted 

that by using the same injury definition 

as the NTD, which is based on 

individuals receiving immediate 

medical transport away from the scene, 

the number of events requiring SSOA 

and FTA two-hour notification may 

increase. 

One RTA commenter requested that 

FTA provide a grace period for the 

industry to address the criteria changes 

through the necessary updates to 

policies, procedures (across multiple 

departments), and intergovernmental 

agreements/contracts, and to provide 

time to execute configuration changes to 

internal databases and other tools used 

to track and manage event records, such 

as computer-aided dispatch (CAD) 

systems. The commenter also 

recommended that FTA work to develop 

a single comprehensive safety and 

security glossary. 

FTA Response: FTA is authorized to 

oversee and, when necessary, 

investigate rail transit agency safety 

events. To uphold this authority and 

activate investigations, FTA must be 

informed of events as they occur. 

FTA declines to lengthen the 

minimum notification timeframe as it 

ensures that FTA and SSOAs receive 

timely information upon which they 

may base their decisions regarding 

response. RTAs should be able to easily 

determine if a safety event meets the 

notification criteria defined at § 674.33. 

FTA declines to shorten the notification 

timeframe from two-hours to ‘‘as soon as 

possible,’’ as the change would fail to 

establish a defined expectation for 

notification timelines. 

As to whether the reporting criteria 

may result in an increase in 

notifications and burden to reporting 

agencies, FTA expects the revised 

criteria will simplify and ease the 

burden on reporting agencies in 

comparison to past regulation 

notification requirements. For example, 

the elimination of the ‘‘serious injury’’ 

criteria in the previous regulation will 

eliminate the need to assess the 

condition of injured passengers before 

recognizing when and what meets 

reporting criteria and therefore lessen 

the burden of safety event notifications 

as compared to the previous rule. 

FTA recognizes that notifications will 

likely increase due to the definition of 

‘‘injury’’ to include ‘‘harm to persons as 

a result of an event that requires 

immediate medical attention away from 

the scene.’’ FTA revised this term and 

definition for several reasons, including 

to clarify reporting criteria and lessen 

the burden of reportable event 

notifications as previously mentioned. 

FTA is aware the reportable events may 

increase with this revised definition, 

and this has been factored into 

workload estimates. 

FTA agrees that changes to terms and 

definitions in the regulation language 

have a broad impact and will need a 

grace period for SSOAs and RTAs to 

realign policies and practices. FTA 

designates January 1, 2025, as the 

effective date for the final rule. This 

date allows SSOAs and RTAs time to 

modify processes and inform employees 

and contractors. Further, this date aligns 

with the launch of the 2025 NTD 

reporting year and the associated NTD 

Safety & Security Policy Manual. FTA 

appreciates the comment regarding a 

comprehensive glossary and will take 

this recommendation into consideration 

for future data management efforts. 

2. Notification Criteria 

Two RTA commenters, one SSOA 

commenter, and one industry 

association commenter requested 

confirmation regarding their 

understanding of the proposed 

notification criteria and associated 

requirements or suggested changes to 

the proposed criteria. 

An RTA commenter asked about the 

collision damage threshold and 

requested confirmation that a rail transit 

vehicle collision occurring at a grade 

crossing or intersection would no longer 

be reportable to FTA and SSOA within 

two hours unless the rail transit vehicle 

suffered disabling damage regardless of 

the damage suffered by the privately 

operated vehicle. Similarly, an SSOA 

commenter requested confirmation that 

collisions that result in disabling 

damage to a privately owned vehicle but 

that do not result in a fatality, injury, or 

disabling damage to the rail transit 

vehicle do not require two-hour 

notification under the proposed 

thresholds. 

An SSOA commenter asked for 

confirmation that under the proposed 

criteria, notification is required for two 

or more injuries except for collisions 

which require notification if there is one 

or more injury. An industry association 

commenter recommended changing the 

collision injury criteria from one or 

more to two or more, asserting the 

proposed criteria would cause 

confusion and potentially misreporting. 

An SSOA commenter asked for FTA to 

confirm that ‘‘serious injury’’ is no 

longer relevant for purposes of safety 

event notifications as required by the 

proposed criteria. An RTA commenter 

asked FTA to confirm if the notification 

of safety events includes fatalities and 

injuries resulting from illness and/or 


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other natural causes and whether 

notifications include criminal assaults 

that are not related to a collision with 

a rail transit vehicle. 

An SSOA asked for confirmation from 

FTA regarding the notification 

requirement when a single safety event 

meets more than one of the notification 

criteria defined in § 674.33. 

FTA Response: Under the revised 

regulation, a rail transit vehicle collision 

occurring at a grade crossing or 

intersection with a privately owned 

vehicle requires notification if the rail 

transit vehicle suffers from disabling 

damage, regardless of the damage 

suffered by the privately owned vehicle. 

A collision between a rail transit vehicle 

and a privately owned vehicle which 

results in disabling damage to only the 

privately owned vehicle, yet no 

fatalities or injuries, does not require 

notification. 

There is no longer a distinct 

definition for ‘‘serious injury.’’ Injuries 

and fatalities resulting from illness or 

natural causes do not trigger the twohour notification requirements of 

§ 674.33. Further, injuries or fatalities 

from criminal assaults and homicides 

do not trigger the two-hour notification 

requirements of § 674.33, even if the 

homicide or assault involved a collision 

with a rail transit vehicle. FTA notes the 

final rule does not preclude an SSOA 

from establishing notification 

requirements in addition to those 

established at § 674.33. 

In circumstances where a single safety 

event meets more than one reporting 

criteria, the notification should share all 

the reporting criteria met, given the 

information available at the time of 

notification. For instance, if is the RTA 

knows at the time the notification is 

made that a collision between two rail 

transit vehicles resulted in a derailment 

and three injuries, all this information is 

expected to be shared with the SSOA 

and FTA. All three of these 

consequences meet the two-hour 

notification threshold and must be 

communicated. 

A safety event with two or more 

injuries is reportable and a rail transit 

vehicle collision that results in one or 

more injuries (instead of two or more) 

is also reportable. A commenter 

requested the latter situation match the 

two or more injuries threshold for 

uniformity. However, FTA is interested 

in any rail transit vehicle collisions 

resulting in injuries. With the injuries 

metric alone, setting the threshold to 

two or more will eliminate isolated 

safety events resulting in injuries, like 

slips and falls. 

M. Section 674.35—Investigations 

Comments: One SSOA provided four 

unique comments. The SSOA 

commenter requested that FTA revise 

the language at § 674.35(b) to reiterate 

that SSOAs can give authority to 

perform investigations to an RTA 

because the rule does not explicitly state 

it. Further, the commenter disagreed 

with the word ‘‘coordinate’’ when 

describing situations where the SSOA is 

investigating. The commenter asked 

FTA to clarify if the language at 

§ 674.35(c) requires an SSOA to issue a 

separate investigation report from the 

adopted RTA investigation report and 

asked FTA to clarify how the review 

must be conducted. The commenter also 

asked for clarification on the PTSCTP 

requirements for investigators, 

including SSOA investigators and RTA 

investigators conducting investigations 

on behalf of the SSOA. Finally, the 

commenter asked if the impact of the 

requirements of § 674.35 were included 

in the regulation’s cost estimates. 

FTA Response: FTA first notes that 

FTA proposed no substantive changes to 

the 2016 version of § 674.35. When an 

RTA investigates safety events that meet 

the criteria of § 674.33, the RTA must 

conduct these investigations in 

accordance with the SSO program 

standard and any subsequent procedure 

developed or adopted by the SSOA. Any 

issues or concerns identified with the 

SSOA investigation practices and RTA 

roles and responsibilities may be shared 

during the SSO program standard 

comment disposition process per 

§ 674.27(a)(3). 

FTA expects the SSOA to document 

the adoption of an RTA’s investigation 

report in a manner that works for both 

agencies and satisfies the requirements 

of § 674.35. 

Stakeholders interested in training 

requirements for investigators should 

review part 672 for more information. 

Further, nothing precludes the SSOA 

from establishing unique requirements 

for SSOA and RTA investigators for 

technical experts and subject matter 

experts. 

As to the impact of these 

requirements to cost estimates, FTA 

does include activities associated with 

§ 674.35 in the regulation cost estimate 

and notes again this is not a new 

requirement. 

N. Section 674.37—Corrective Action 

Plans 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from one SSOA and three RTAs 

regarding the requirements in the 

proposed § 674.37. Two RTA 

commenters expressed concern at the 

inclusion of findings of non-compliance 

from internal safety reviews in the list 

of items for which the SSOA must 

require the development of a CAP. One 

RTA commenter asked FTA to clarify if 

it is requiring the SSOA to approve 

CAPs from internal safety reviews and 

conduct spot checks on the 

implementation and effectiveness of the 

internal safety review CAPs. Further, 

the commenter contended that this 

would be inappropriate for RTA internal 

reviews and would slow down the 

process of developing and 

implementing CAPs. The RTA further 

asserted that the SSOA triennial audit 

cycle is the appropriate venue to review 

CAPs related to an RTA’s internal safety 

reviews. Another RTA commenter 

asserted that requiring the development 

of a CAP for findings of non-compliance 

from internal safety reviews is a 

significant expansion to the scope of 

CAPs. The RTA commenter suggested 

that internal safety review CAP 

development and monitoring 

responsibility rests with the RTA and 

these processes are managed 

independently from SSOA oversight 

activities. Further, the RTA commenter 

expressed concern that this requirement 

focuses more on compliance and less on 

a scalable, performance-driven 

methodology, and that it could have a 

negative impact on RTA safety culture. 

The RTA commenter also recommended 

FTA use the term ‘‘non-conformance’’ 

instead of ‘‘non-compliance’’ because 

the latter is potentially misleading. 

One SSOA commenter noted 

§ 674.37(a)(2) requires CAPs to address 

findings of non-compliance from safety 

reviews and inspections performed by 

the SSOA but does not use the word 

‘‘audit.’’ The commenter also 

recommended that CAPs should also 

address longer-term monitoring of the 

corrective actions. Finally, the RTA 

commenter expressed concern about use 

of the word ‘‘order’’ in § 674.37(d) and 

recommended that SSOAs use wording 

within their SSOA’s authority to outline 

how an RTA must develop and carryout 

a CAP. 

An SSOA commenter recommended 

that the rule should clearly outline how 

the Administrator will conduct 

independent investigations of any safety 

events and under what general 

circumstances they would review an 

SSOA’s or RTA’s findings of causations 

of a safety event. An RTA commenter 

noted that § 674.37(d) requires the 

SSOA to evaluate whether FTA 

investigation findings require a CAP by 

the RTA. The commenter suggested that 

if FTA recommendations must be 

considered for determining CAPs, then 

other sources should be as well, such as 


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recommendations from the Safety 

Committee. 

FTA Response: Except for subsection 

(a), which outlines when an SSOA must 

require the RTA to develop a CAP, the 

language in this section is identical to 

the 2016 version of the rule. One of the 

items in subsection (a) is, ‘‘Results from 

investigations, in which the RTA or 

SSOA determined that causal or 

contributing factors require corrective 

action.’’ SSOA oversight does not 

distinguish between CAPs developed to 

address issues identified through RTA 

internal processes as opposed to SSOA 

processes. The SSOA continues, as in 

the past, to have the authority to require 

the development of, review, approve, 

and monitor CAPs to address a 

deficiency identified from activities 

described in the regulation and the SSO 

program standard, regardless of whether 

the source is RTA or SSOA reviews. 

Any conflicts in CAPs should follow the 

documented conflict resolution process. 

Further, the RTA may raise concerns 

with or make suggestions to revise the 

SSOA CAP requirements and process 

upon review of the SSO program 

standard as described in § 674.27(a)(3). 

FTA understands an SSOA will use 

the triennial audit as a forum to verify 

an RTA’s internal audit program is 

being implemented in accordance with 

the ASP. Recommendations for 

improvements and CAPs, if necessary, 

will be issued out of triennial audits per 

§ 674.31. 

FTA recognizes a concern with 

terminology, particularly the use of 

‘‘non-compliance’’ instead of 

‘‘conformance’’ or ‘‘non-conformance’’ 

as related to internal safety reviews. For 

purpose here, ‘‘non-compliance’’ refers 

to instances where the SSOA identifies 

areas of non-conformance with 

processes outlined in the ASP. 

With respect to the assertion that a 

focus on compliance-based activities 

may degrade an RTA’s safety culture, 

the application of the Safety 

Management System for rail transit 

systems is focused on safety 

performance to support agency safety 

improvements and risk reduction. The 

implementation of SMS does not negate 

the usefulness of compliance focused 

activities. An effective SMS will 

incorporate compliance-based programs 

and support overall risk management to 

strengthen the agency’s safety culture. 

CAPs may be generated, as needed, from 

performance-based and compliancebased activities. 

CAPs may be generated from audits, 

safety reviews, and inspections. The list 

in § 674.37(a) represents a minimum 

and is not exhaustive. 

FTA appreciates the comment to 

support the monitoring of longer-term 

CAPs implementation. The regulation 

does not distinguish the length of time 

for monitoring of CAPs but is focused 

on the progress to carry out the CAP to 

completion. As written, the regulation 

includes the monitoring of longer-term 

CAPs. 

As for the concern with the use of the 

phrase ‘‘the SSOA must order the RTA 

to develop and carry out a CAP,’’ the 

term ‘‘order’’ is a synonym used in place 

of the word ‘‘require’’ and is in the 2016 

version of the rule. 

FTA acknowledges the suggestion to 

outline how FTA may conduct an 

investigation and separately the 

circumstances for occasions when FTA 

may conduct an independent review of 

safety event causations and findings 

revealed through SSOA and RTA 

investigations. FTA will consider the 

suggestion on FTA safety event 

investigation practices while developing 

future guidance and workshops for 

training and sharing information with 

SSOAs and RTAs. FTA may review 

safety event investigations and findings 

of causations at any time per § 674.33(e). 

As to whether the regulation should 

include FTA as an entity that may 

conduct investigations which may result 

in CAPs for the SSOA or RTA, FTA has 

the statutory authority under 49 U.S.C. 

5329 to perform independent 

investigations to determine causal and 

contributing factors as stated in 

§ 674.35(e). Out of FTA’s investigations, 

like other investigations, findings may 

necessitate the development of CAPs. 

As for the recommendation to 

incorporate in the regulation, language 

that considers recommendations from 

other sources, such as the Safety 

Committee, to be considered for CAP 

development, FTA again notes the list 

in § 674.37(a) is a minimum and is not 

exhaustive. The SSOA may require the 

development of a CAP from 

investigations conducted by the RTA 

and SSOA, which includes the review 

of hazards for causal and contributing 

factors. Hazards may be identified by 

any number of sources within an SSOA 

and RTA, such as the Safety Committee. 

O. Section 674.39—State Safety 

Oversight Agency Annual Reporting to 

FTA 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from two SSOAs and one industry 

association regarding the annual 

reporting requirements of the proposed 

§ 674.39. Two SSOA commenters 

recommended that FTA redesign SSOR 

so that it is organized according to the 

subsections of § 674.39. One industry 

association commenter recommended 

that FTA remove requirements 

associated with technical training plans 

(TTP) from 49 CFR part 672 and 

incorporate them into this rule. The 

commenter asserted that since TTPs are 

associated with SSOAs, the related 

requirements belong in 49 CFR part 674. 

The industry association commenter 

also requested clarification on the 

‘‘publicly available report’’ required 

under § 674.39(a)(3) and specifically 

requested clarification to differentiate 

between the safety status report that the 

SSOA is required to send to the 

Governor, FTA Administrator, and RTA 

board of directors and the annual 

reporting submission that the SSOA 

makes through the SSOA and clarify the 

expected level of effort for this 

requirement. One SSOA commenter 

asked for clarification from FTA if it 

requires the publicly available report 

required at § 674.39(a)(3) to include 

causal factors of events in totality or if 

trending sufficient. 

One industry association commenter 

recommended against the requirement 

for SSOAs to submit final investigation 

reports to FTA, asserting this 

requirement would be burdensome. The 

commenter also questioned the 

usefulness of such reports in supporting 

FTA analyses. One SSOA commenter 

asked for clarification on the 

certification requirement at 

§ 674.39(a)(8) and confirmation on 

whether the requirement is for 

submission of a self-certification or the 

submission of a certification from FTA 

that the SSOA is compliant with part 

674. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

suggestions for improving the SSOR and 

encourages SSOAs to provide feedback 

to their assigned FTA PM regarding 

suggested enhancements to the SSOR. 

Further, FTA notes that the SSOR data 

collection forms are currently designed 

to meet all the annual reporting 

submission requirements of part 674. 

However, to support the most efficient 

and accurate collection of Annual 

Reporting data, SSOR uses categories 

and collection sequencing that may vary 

from the regulatory text organization 

while ensuring comprehensive 

collection of required data. 

FTA recognizes the comment to 

incorporate training requirements 

currently found in 49 CFR part 672 into 

the revised 49 CFR part 674. However, 

FTA notes that 49 CFR part 672 does 

include SSOA-specific requirements 

and disagrees that removing TTP-related 

requirements from part 672 is 

advantageous for the industry. 

The ‘‘publicly available report’’ 

required under § 674.39(a)(3)—a 

requirement since 2016—refers to the 


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safety status report the SSOA is required 

to send to the Governor, FTA 

Administrator, and RTA board of 

directors. The language at § 674.39(a)(3) 

does not establish any new submission 

requirement that was not already in 

place under existing reporting 

requirements and therefore confirms 

that no additional level of effort is 

required to address the requirements of 

§ 674.39(a)(3) in this final rule. FTA has 

not established specific requirements for 

the details of the report required at 

§ 674.39(a)(3) beyond the elements 

identified in the rule and offers 

flexibility to the SSOA to determine 

how it may best present ‘‘causal factors 

of safety events identified through 

investigation,’’ be it trending or other 

methods. 

SSOAs are already required to submit 

final investigation reports to FTA 

through SSOR and § 674.39(a)(4) does 

not establish any new programmatic 

requirement or new burden. Further, 

final investigation reports submitted by 

SSOAs have been instrumental in FTA 

safety risk assessments and other safety 

analyses routinely performed by FTA. 

FTA confirms that § 674.39(a)(8) 

requires an SSOA to submit a 

certification attesting that the SSOA has 

complied with the requirements of 49 

CFR part 674. This is not a certification 

issued by FTA. 

P. Section 674.41—Conflicts of Interest 

Comments: Two labor union 

commenters, one SSOA commenter, and 

one industry association submitted 

comments related to the conflicts of 

interest provisions proposed at § 674.41. 

Two labor union commenters submitted 

a recommendation that FTA add a 

requirement that explicitly prohibits an 

SSOA from including, as executive or 

governing personnel, any appointees 

from a political office also responsible 

for appointing executive or governing 

personnel to any transit provider 

overseen by the SSOA. 

One industry association commenter 

voiced concern that some former 

employees of RTAs now work for the 

SSOA that oversees their past employer 

and now oversee many of the areas of 

their previous employment. The 

commenter recommended that FTA 

should require a ‘‘cooling-off period’’ of 

at least 12 months between when an 

employee leaves or retires from an RTA 

and then oversees the exact same area 

in which they previously worked in at 

an RTA to preserve integrity and to 

avoid conflicts of interest. 

One SSOA commenter expressed 

concerns about FTA’s conflict of interest 

provisions at § 674.41(c) that preventing 

a contractor from providing services to 

both an RTA and the SSOA that 

oversees the RTA, unless granted an 

exemption by FTA. The SSOA 

commenter noted that their SSOA 

struggles to compete with an overseen 

RTA for contractors because the RTA is 

large and can provide more lucrative 

business opportunities for the 

contractors, limiting the availability of 

contractor expertise for the SSOA. The 

commenter recommended that FTA 

revise the proposed § 674.41(c) to allow 

RTAs and SSOAs to determine 

appropriate mitigations of conflicts of 

interest, such as organizational 

firewalls, so that SSOAs can work with 

the contractors of their choice, rather 

than whatever contractors remain 

following RTA contracting. 

FTA Response: Regarding the 

recommendation to add a provision that 

would prohibit an SSOA from 

including, as executive or governing 

personnel, any appointees from a 

political office also responsible for 

appointing executive or governing 

personnel to any transit provider 

overseen by the SSOA, FTA believes a 

prescriptive ban is not necessary at this 

time, as FTA believes §§ 674.11 and 

674.13 of the regulation provide 

sufficient financial and legal 

independence between an SSOA and 

the RTAs it oversees. 

Regarding the recommendation for 

cooling-off period, although Federal 

post-employment laws establish postemployment restrictions on former 

Federal employees (18 U.S.C. 207), 

these restrictions do not extend to local 

employees of rail transit agencies and 

SSOAs who are more appropriately 

covered under State employment laws. 

Former employees of an RTA 

transferring to work for an SSOA should 

also be aware that employment 

contracts may contain post-employment 

restrictions. 

Regarding the proposal by the SSOA 

who sought the authority to determine 

whether a conflict of interest existed 

between itself and the RTAs it oversees 

in the hiring of support contractors, 

FTA believes that the conflict of interest 

provision at § 674.41(c) that prevents an 

SSOA from hiring a contractor that also 

provides services to an RTA overseen by 

the same SSOA is essential to maintain 

the independence between the entity 

preparing and implementing the PTASP 

and the SSOA overseeing that entity. 

FTA notes that § 674.41(c) includes an 

opportunity for an SSOA to petition 

FTA for a waiver from this prohibition 

if. FTA is persuaded that any potential 

conflict of interest has been adequately 

mitigated. Because the current 

prohibition is an essential safeguard, 

FTA declines to revise the provision. 

FTA believes a sufficient number of 

contractors with qualified personnel 

available exist regardless of 

compensation competition; moreover, 

FTA has not received a request to waive 

this provision during the past eight 

years when the waiver provision has 

been available. 

Q. Regulatory Burden 

Comments: Two SSOA commenters 

submitted comments related to the 

burden estimates published in the 

NPRM. One SSOA commenter noted 

that oversight requirements related to 

engineering and construction phases, 

RTA compliance with the PTSCTP, 

vehicle maintenance and testing, data 

collection, and annual reporting may 

increase the regulatory burden. 

Another SSOA commenter requested 

clarification if FTA had quantified the 

impacts of the proposed rule on RTAs 

and SSOAs. The same SSOA commenter 

asked how FTA calculated the estimated 

number of events used to support 

burden estimates, asking for 

clarification on the occupation groups, 

codes, and titles that were used in 

conducting FTA’s burden analysis. 

FTA Response: Some SSOAs have 

been providing oversight of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

in engineering or construction phases 

when they were directed to do so in 

section 20021 of MAP–21 (Pub. L. 112– 

141) and this final rule does not 

establish an additional responsibility. 

Further, where there are new 

requirements related to RTA compliance 

with the PTSCTP, vehicle maintenance 

and testing, data collection, and annual 

reporting, FTA has analyzed those costs 

to SSOAs and RTAs. 

In the NPRM, FTA estimated the 

economic impacts of the proposed rule 

on the industry as described in 

‘‘Regulatory Analyses and Notices.’’ 

Table 4 and the accompanying 

discussion identify the Bureau of Labor 

Statistics occupational categories and 

codes used. To quantify the impact of 

the notification criteria change on RTAs 

and SSOAs, FTA analyzed safety event 

data reported to the NTD from 2017 to 

2021 and identified events that would 

become reportable under the new 

criteria. 

R. Other Safety Topics 

Comments: FTA received comments 

from the NTSB related to safety 

concerns affecting the transit industry, 

including fatigue, fitness for duty, and 

roadway worker protection. The NTSB 

recommended that FTA establish 

roadway worker protection (RWP) rules 

including requirements for job briefings; 

establish a national inspection program 


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that specifically includes roadway 

worker activities; develop a work 

scheduling program for RTAs that 

incorporates fatigue science, provides 

for the management of personnel fatigue 

risks, and is implemented through the 

state safety oversight program; establish 

hours-of-service regulations that set 

limits on hours of service, provide 

predictable work and rest schedules, 

and consider circadian rhythms and 

human sleep and rest requirements; 

identify the necessary training and 

certification needs for work schedulers 

in the rail transit industry and require 

the transit agencies to provide 

additional training or certification for 

their work schedulers; and require rail 

transit employees who develop work 

schedules to complete initial and 

recurrent training based on current 

fatigue science to identify and mitigate 

work schedule risks that contribute to 

operator fatigue. 

FTA Response: FTA appreciates the 

comments received from the NTSB and 

notes that FTA is currently engaged in 

a rulemaking addressing rail transit 

roadway worker protection (RIN 2132– 

AB41). On March 25, 2024, FTA 

published a notice of proposed 

rulemaking that would establish 

minimum safety standards for rail 

transit RWP to ensure the safe operation 

of public transportation systems and to 

prevent accidents, incidents, fatalities, 

and injuries to transit workers who may 

access the roadway in the performance 

of work (89 FR 20605). FTA is currently 

reviewing public comments received in 

response to the publication of the 

proposed rule. 

On October 30, 2023, FTA published 

an advanced notice of proposed 

rulemaking (ANPRM) addressing transit 

worker hours of service and fatigue 

safety risk management (88 FR 74107). 

FTA is considering proposing minimum 

safety standards to provide protections 

for transit workers to obtain adequate 

rest thereby reducing the risk of fatiguerelated safety incidents and sought 

public input in two areas: hours of 

service; and fatigue risk management 

programs. FTA is reviewing collected 

information to better understand current 

industry practices, priorities, 

requirements, and the costs and benefits 

of Federal requirements to assist FTA as 

it considers potential regulatory 

requirements. 

III. Section-by-Section Analysis 

Subpart A—General Provisions 

674.1—Purpose 

This section explains that the purpose 

of this regulation is to carry out the 

mandate of 49 U.S.C. 5329 for States to 

perform oversight of rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems within 

their jurisdictions. This represents an 

expansion from the purpose stated in 

the previous § 674.1, ‘‘this part carries 

out the mandate of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e).’’ 

The removal of ‘‘(e)’’ acknowledges the 

additional obligations for inspections 

and data collection required by SSO 

Agencies in section 5329(k), as amended 

by the BIL, and better reflects the 

connection among all elements of FTA’s 

public transportation safety program. 

674.3—Applicability 

FTA has not changed this section. 

674.5—Policy 

This section removes the term 

‘‘sufficient’’ in subsection (a) to 

eliminate subjectivity regarding the 

requirements for State Safety Oversight 

Agency (SSOA) authorities. FTA also 

removes the first sentence in subsection 

(b), as the availability of funding is 

addressed in the existing language in 

§ 674.17(a). 

674.7—Definitions 

This section replaces the terms 

‘‘accident,’’ ‘‘incident,’’ ‘‘occurrence,’’ 

and ‘‘event’’ with the inclusive term 

‘‘safety event,’’ which includes events 

such as collisions, derailments, fires, 

and unintended train movements for 

purposes of meeting the two-hour 

notification requirement in § 674.33. 

The ‘‘safety event’’ notification 

requirements of § 674.33 exclude 

criminal actions. 

FTA also removes the definition of 

‘‘serious injury.’’ These revisions are 

consistent with changes that FTA 

published in the Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plans (PTASP) final rule) 

(89 FR 25694) and are intended to 

simplify requirements related to safety 

event notifications and investigations. 

This section establishes new terms 

and definitions for ‘‘collision,’’ 

‘‘derailment,’’ ‘‘evacuation for life safety 

reasons,’’ ‘‘fatality,’’ ‘‘injury,’’ ‘‘public 

transportation,’’ ‘‘rail transit vehicle,’’ 

‘‘revenue vehicle,’’ and ‘‘unintended 

train movement,’’ and removes the 

general term ‘‘vehicle’’ in recognition of 

these new definitions, which will be 

consistent with FTA’s National Transit 

Database (NTD) reporting manuals and 

support the notification and 

investigation thresholds defined in 

§§ 674.33 and 674.35. FTA’s definition 

of ‘‘injury’’ restores the threshold under 

FTA’s previous part 659 regulation and 

is consistent with the NTD reporting 

manuals. The definition of ‘‘injury’’ 

includes damage or harm to persons that 

requires immediate medical attention 

away from the scene. An individual 

who declines transportation away from 

the scene for medical attention should 

not be counted as an ‘‘injury’’ for twohour notification purposes. This 

definition allows for an immediate, on 

scene determination of injuries by the 

RTA without the need to await a formal 

diagnosis or determination from an offsite medical professional. 

FTA also includes a new definition 

for ‘‘disabling damage’’ to support the 

notification and investigation 

thresholds. ‘‘Disabling damage’’ is 

limited to damage resulting from a 

collision that physically prevents a 

vehicle or train from operating under its 

own power. Disabling damage does not 

include mechanical failures or other 

malfunctions that may impact 

operations. 

FTA established new terms and 

definitions for ‘‘potential consequence,’’ 

‘‘safety committee,’’ ‘‘safety risk,’’ and 

‘‘safety risk mitigation’’ as well as 

revised definitions of ‘‘Accountable 

Executive’’ and ‘‘safety risk 

management’’ for consistency with 

definitions 49 CFR part 673. 

This section revises the definition of 

‘‘corrective action plan’’ to help 

distinguish corrective action plans from 

safety risk mitigations. 

This section revises the definition of 

‘‘investigation’’ to reflect the 

replacement of the terms ‘‘accident’’ and 

‘‘incident’’ with ‘‘safety event’’ as 

described above. 

This section includes new terms and 

definitions for ‘‘inspection’’ and ‘‘riskbased inspection program’’ to support 

new SSOA requirements mandated by 

the BIL. 

This section revises the definition of 

‘‘Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan’’ to remove reference to the 

transition from the requirements under 

49 CFR part 659, the previous State 

Safety Oversight regulation, to the 

present requirements under 49 CFR part 

674. This revision is consistent with the 

end of the transition period, which 

occurred in early 2019, and FTA’s 

subsequent rescission of part 659 (87 FR 

6783). 

This section revises the definition of 

‘‘Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program’’ to 

remove reference to the interim 

provisions for this program. This section 

also adds a new term and definition for 

‘‘designated personnel’’ to recognize 

individuals subject to the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program regulation (49 CFR 

part 672). 

This section reorders the clauses in 

the definition of ‘‘rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system’’ for 

clarity. This change aligns with the 


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definition that the PTASP regulation 

and does not reflect a change in FTA’s 

implementation or interpretation. 

FTA also makes a minor revision to 

the definition of ‘‘State Safety Oversight 

Agency’’ to add a citation referencing 

the SSOA inspection requirement in 49 

U.S.C. 5329(k), which was added by the 

BIL. 

674.9—[Reserved] 

FTA removes and reserves this 

section. Previously, this section 

provided requirements for the transition 

from 49 CFR part 659, the previous State 

Safety Oversight regulation, to part 674. 

This removal acknowledges the end of 

the transition period, which occurred in 

early 2019, and FTA’s subsequent 

rescission of part 659. 

Subpart B—Role of the State 

674.11—State Safety Oversight Program 

FTA eliminates the deadlines 

established for States’ initial compliance 

with the requirement, as all States must 

have an FTA-approved SSO program for 

rail transit agencies in their State to be 

eligible for FTA financial assistance. 

This initial compliance date, which was 

three years after April 15, 2016, has 

already passed. FTA also makes a minor 

technical correction to the statutory 

citation regarding FTA triennial audits 

of SSO programs. 

674.13—Designation of Oversight 

Agency 

FTA revises the statutory citation in 

§ 674.13(a) to reflect new statutory 

requirements. In § 674.13(a)(5), FTA 

includes inspection authorities in the 

list of authorities an SSOA must have, 

reflecting the new requirements in 49 

U.S.C. 5329(k) that SSOAs must 

conduct risk-based inspections of the 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems that the SSOA 

oversees. 

In §§ 674.13(a)(4) and (a)(6), FTA 

includes a new reference to 49 CFR part 

673, Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plans, which did not exist when 

FTA published the current part 674 in 

2016. 

674.15—Designation of Oversight 

Agency for Multi-State System 

FTA has not changed this section. 

674.17—Use of Federal Financial 

Assistance 

FTA deletes the term ‘‘parts’’ as 

superfluous. 

674.19—Certification of a State Safety 

Oversight Program 

FTA removes ‘‘(e)’’ from ‘‘5329(e)’’ in 

this section for the reasons mentioned 

above and adds language in § 674.19(d) 

to clarify the Administrator’s 

determination to issue a certification or 

a denial of certification for an SSO 

program. This does not reflect a change 

in FTA’s application of the statutory 

and regulatory criteria. 

674.21—Withholding of Federal 

Financial Assistance for Noncompliance 

When FTA published its final rule in 

2016, States with existing rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

were provided a three-year transition 

period. Now that the transition period 

has expired, FTA updates § 674.21(b) to 

adopt FTA current practice, which is to 

require a State to establish an SSO 

program and have that program 

approved by the FTA Administrator 

prior to a new rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system entering 

the engineering or construction phase of 

development. FTA also replaces the 

word ‘‘apportioned’’ with ‘‘authorized’’ 

for accuracy. 

674.23—Confidentiality of Information 

FTA has not changed this section. 

Subpart C—State Safety Oversight 

Agencies 

674.25—Role of the State Safety 

Oversight Agency 

In § 674.25, FTA adds a new 

subsection (c) to explicitly acknowledge 

an SSOA’s authority to provide safety 

oversight of projects in the engineering 

or construction phase of development. 

This parallels the statutory language in 

49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(2)(B) and clarifies 

FTA’s intent that SSOAs take an active 

oversight role during a project’s prerevenue phases. FTA also moves from 

the current subsection (b) into a new 

subsection (d) the requirement that 

SSOAs ensure that an ASP meets the 

requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and 

part 673, a non-substantive change that 

will provide clarity and improve 

readability. Consequently, FTA 

redesignates existing subsections 

674.24(c) through (f) as subsections (e) 

through (h). 

In addition, FTA makes minor 

conforming edits in these subsections to 

reflect the definitions in § 674.7 as 

discussed above and to remove 

references to 49 U.S.C. 5330, which has 

been repealed. 

674.27—State Safety Oversight Program 

Standards 

In § 674.27, FTA adds a new 

paragraph (a)(3) to require an SSOA to 

develop a process to address comments 

from an RTA regarding an SSO program 

standard. This reflects industry 

concerns that some SSOAs do not 

formally respond to RTA comments. 

This addition requires SSOs to establish 

a process by which SSOAs will address 

RTA comments regarding the SSO 

program standard. Because of the 

addition of paragraph (a)(3), the 

remaining paragraphs are renumbered. 

FTA expands the renumbered 

§ 674.27(a)(5) to include specific 

requirements for SSOA oversight of 

RTA internal safety reviews. Internal 

safety reviews are distinct from the 

existing annual review and update 

requirement in 49 CFR 673.11(a)(5). 

Internal safety reviews monitor the 

actual implementation of the ASP. 

However, the results of the internal 

safety reviews may inform the RTA’s 

annual ASP document review and 

update process. The previous 49 CFR 

659.19 included explicit requirements 

for these internal safety reviews; 

however, part 674 removed the 

prescriptive requirements in § 659.19 

with the expectation that they would be 

addressed in the PTASP final rule. The 

PTASP final rule did not address 

internal safety reviews, prompting some 

RTAs to ask whether they were no 

longer required by FTA, even though 

SSOAs continued to require them under 

their SSO program standards. To 

provide clarity, the language confirms 

the requirement that the SSO program 

standard must define internal safety 

review requirements, which are 

addressed in § 673.27(d)(1)(iii). The 

language establishes minimum 

requirements for internal safety reviews, 

including the requirement that RTAs 

must verify the implementation of all 

elements of the ASP over a three-year 

period, with the expectation that RTAs 

will be conducting internal safety 

reviews on an ongoing basis. Further, 

the RTA must notify the SSOA thirty 

days before it conducts an internal 

safety review of any aspect of the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system and provide any checklists or 

procedures it will use during the 

review. Finally, the RTA must submit a 

report to the SSOA annually 

documenting the internal safety review 

activities and the status of subsequent 

findings and corrective actions. 

A new § 674.27(a)(6) relating to the 

oversight of safety risk mitigations 

establishes requirements for the SSOA 

to define the process it will use to 

oversee an RTA’s development, 

implementation, and monitoring of 

safety risk mitigations. The SSO 

program standard must specify the 

frequency and format for how the SSOA 

will receive and review information 

about an RTA’s safety risk mitigation 

status and effectiveness. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 83977 

Although 49 CFR part 673 established 

specific requirements for safety 

management, including the 

development, implementation and 

monitoring of safety risk mitigations, 

part 674 was published prior to part 673 

and did not include specific oversight 

requirements related to safety risk 

mitigation. Therefore, FTA is including 

these requirements in part 674 to ensure 

that SSOAs have a documented process 

to oversee the safety risk mitigation 

processes required of RTAs. 

A new § 674.27(a)(7) regarding 

oversight of the safety certification 

training program requires an SSOA to 

oversee the RTA’s compliance with the 

Public Safety Certification Training 

Program regulation (49 CFR part 672). 

This role was not made explicit in the 

previous part 674 and this new language 

clarifies FTA’s expectation that SSOAs 

oversee RTA compliance with 49 CFR 

part 672 requirements. 

The renumbered § 674.27(a)(9) is also 

renamed from ‘‘Accident notification’’ 

to ‘‘Safety event notification,’’ 

consistent with the discussion above in 

§ 674.7, where FTA replaces the term 

‘‘accident’’ with the term ‘‘safety event’’ 

and the conforming edits in the 

renumbered § 674.27(a)(10). FTA also 

requires the SSO program standard to 

establish requirements for RTAs to 

notify the SSOA and FTA of safety 

events to ensure that the notification 

requirement in § 674.33 is addressed in 

an RTA’s ASP, as the current paragraph 

omitted any reference to FTA. 

In the renumbered § 674.27(a)(11), 

FTA inserts the term ‘‘SSO’’ before 

‘‘program standard’’ for consistency 

with the rest of this section. 

FTA adds a new § 674.27(a)(12), 

‘‘Inspections,’’ to incorporate the 

requirement that SSOAs conduct riskbased inspections of the RTAs they 

oversee. On October 21, 2022, FTA 

issued Special Directives to each SSOA 

directing them to develop and 

implement a risk-based inspection 

program as required by the BIL. The 

Special Directives require SSOAs to 

include policies and procedures for 

Risk-Based Inspection in their SSO 

program standards and develop and 

begin implementing their Risk-Based 

Inspection program by October 21, 2024. 

FTA adding a new § 674.27(a)(13), 

‘‘Vehicle Maintenance and Testing,’’ 

requiring SSOAs to amend their SSO 

program standard to include a new 

requirement that SSOAs ensure that rail 

transit agencies conduct maintenance 

and testing procedures of braking 

systems, consistent with NTSB 

Recommendation R–17–004 (https://

data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-public/srdetails/R-17-004). 

Finally, a new § 674.27(a)(14), ‘‘Data 

Collection,’’ establishes specific data 

collection requirements for collecting 

data that the RTA uses when identifying 

hazards and assessing safety risk. This 

responds to industry feedback regarding 

the role of the SSOA in overseeing 

safety risk management of the RTAs 

under their jurisdiction. 

674.29—Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plans: General Requirements 

Section 674.29 adds a reference to 49 

U.S.C. 5329(d) and 49 CFR part 673 in 

subsection (a) for clarity and the 

removes subsection (b). Because part 

674 was published prior to part 673, 

FTA provided a list of the expected ASP 

elements in subsection (b) as an interim 

measure to guide SSOAs. With the 

publication of part 673 in 2018, the list 

is no longer necessary. Consistent with 

the removal of the current subsection 

(b), FTA renumbers subsection (c) as 

subsection (b). 

674.31—Triennial Audits: General 

Requirements 

Section 674.31 clarifies that SSOAs 

who elect to audit an RTA’s compliance 

with its ASP on an ongoing basis must 

issue interim audit reports at least 

annually. This clarification does not 

reflect a change in FTA’s current 

implementation of this requirement. 

674.33—Notifications of Safety Events 

This section replaces the term 

‘‘accident’’ with ‘‘safety event.’’ This 

replacement streamlines definitions 

used in requirements related to event 

notification and investigation. 

This section establishes specific 

notification criteria that replace the 

Appendix in the current part 674. This 

replacement text clarifies FTA’s 

minimum requirements for two-hour 

notifications to FTA and SSOAs and 

reflects changes to reporting thresholds 

suggested by SSOAs and RTAs, who 

found it difficult to quickly determine 

the scope of one’s ‘‘serious injuries’’ as 

defined in the Appendix within two 

hours of a safety event, specifically, 

injuries resulting in bone fractures, 

nerve or muscle damage, injuries to 

internal organs, or hospitalizations 

exceeding 48 hours. Additionally, FTA 

removes the requirement in subsection 

(b) that required RTAs to notify FTA 

and SSOAs of safety events triggering 

FRA’s notification requirements under 

49 CFR part 225, as notification on FRAregulated trackage is already reported to 

the USDOT and received by FTA via the 

National Response Center. In subsection 

(b) FTA has added an exclusion to the 

notification requirement for criminal 

actions such as assaults or homicides. 

674.35—Investigations 

Section 674.35 replaces the term 

‘‘accident’’ with ‘‘safety event,’’ and 

clarifies that this includes any safety 

event that meets one or more thresholds 

in § 674.33. FTA also divides the 

requirements in § 674.35(a) into a new 

§ 674.35(a) and § 674.35(b) for clarity. 

These changes do not reflect a change in 

the implementation of the current 

requirements. 

674.37—Corrective Action Plans 

In § 674.37, FTA includes a new 

subsection (a) and redesignates 

subsections (a) through (c) as 

subsections (b) through (d). 

The new subsection (a) clarifies the 

basis for the development of a corrective 

action plan (CAP). The language 

requires the development of a CAP to 

address investigations that determined 

causal or contributing factors require 

corrective actions, findings of noncompliance from safety reviews and 

inspections performed by the SSOA, or 

findings of non-compliance from 

internal safety reviews performed by the 

RTA. This language does not reflect a 

change in current practice. 

In the renumbered § 674.37(c), FTA 

revises language clarifying CAP 

requirements to ensure alignment with 

Safety Management System 

terminology. In the renumbered 

§ 674.37(d), FTA adds ‘‘FTA’’ as an 

agency authorized to conduct 

investigations, reflecting FTA’s 

authority to investigate public 

transportation accidents and incidents 

under 49 U.S.C. 5329(f)(5), with the 

SSOA expected to evaluate whether the 

findings or recommendations by FTA or 

the NTSB require a CAP by the RTA. 


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83978 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

1Office of Management and Budget (2023). 

‘‘Circular No. A–4.’’ https://www.whitehouse.gov/ 

wp-content/uploads/2023/11/CircularA-4.pdf. 

2Federal Transit Administration. August 3, 2022. 

‘‘State Safety Oversight Contacts.’’ https://

www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/ 

safety/state-safety-oversight-contacts.P≤3Average 

events calculated using FTA’s State Safety 

Oversight Reporting system. 

674.39—State Safety Oversight Agency 

Annual Reporting to FTA 

Section 674.39(a)(2) clarifies language 

regarding ‘‘designated personnel’’ for 

consistency with the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program in 49 CFR 672 and 

does not reflect a change in purpose or 

intent. 

Section 674.39(a)(3) replaces the term 

‘‘accident’’ with ‘‘safety event,’’ 

consistent with the explanation 

provided above. Section 674.39(a)(4) 

specifies that SSOAs must submit final 

investigation reports as part of their 

annual reporting to FTA. This reporting 

is already required through the current 

reporting process and this language does 

not reflect a change in FTA’s practice. 

Section 674.39(a)(5) specifies that 

SSOAs must provide a summary of the 

internal safety reviews conducted by 

RTAs during the previous 12 months 

and RTA progress in carrying out CAPs 

arising from the SSOA’s oversight of 

RTA ASPs and any related safety 

reviews. This reporting is already 

required through the current reporting 

process and this language does not 

reflect a change in FTA’s practice. 

674.41—Conflicts of Interest 

FTA has not changed this section. 

Removed—Appendix to Part 674— 

Notification and Reporting of Accidents, 

Incidents, and Occurrences 

FTA removes the table addressing the 

notification and reporting requirements 

for accidents, incidents, and 

occurrences, as FTA addresses this 

requirement in § 674.33, Notifications of 

safety events. 

IV. Regulatory Analyses and Notices 

Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory 

Planning and Review), Executive Order 

13563 (Improving Regulation and 

Regulatory Review) 

Executive Order 12866 (‘‘Regulatory 

Planning and Review’’), as 

supplemented by Executive Order 

13563 (‘‘Improving Regulation and 

Regulatory Review’’), directs Federal 

agencies to assess the benefits and costs 

of regulations, to select regulatory 

approaches that maximize net benefits 

when possible, and to consider 

economic, environmental, and 

distributional effects. It also directs the 

Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) to review significant regulatory 

actions, including regulations with 

annual economic effects of $100 million 

or more. OMB has determined that the 

proposed rule is not significant within 

the meaning of Executive Order 12866 

and has not reviewed it under that 

order. 

Overview 

The final rule, which implements 

amendments made by the Bipartisan 

Infrastructure Law, will add 

requirements for state safety oversight 

agencies (SSOAs) and the rail transit 

agencies (RTAs) they oversee. The rule 

will require SSOAs to conduct riskbased inspections, oversee safety risk 

mitigations, and investigate a larger 

number of safety events. The rule will 

also require RTAs to conduct additional 

accident investigations and prepare 

additional reports. Finally, the rule will 

clarify existing requirements, update 

terminology, and remove interim 

provisions that no longer apply. 

Updates From the NPRM 

The analysis for the final rule adds 

calculations using a discount rate of 2 

percent, following guidance in the 

November 2023 update to OMB Circular 

A–4.1

To give RTAs time to modify safety 

event notification and investigation 

processes and SSOAs time to review 

those changes, FTA is setting an 

effective date of January 1, 2025, for 

RTAs and SSOAs to comply with new 

notification criteria. The analysis uses 

2025 to 2034 as the updated ten-year 

analysis period for the rule. 

Benefits 

The final rule will lead to increased 

oversight of RTA safety-related 

activities, although the benefits of the 

oversight are unknown and 

unquantified in the analysis. The rule 

may also benefit SSOAs and rail transit 

agencies by clarifying requirements and 

reducing costs to ensure compliance. 

Costs 

SSOAs and RTAs will incur economic 

costs to meet the new oversight and 

increased reporting requirements of the 

final rule. The 31 SSOAs in operation as 

of March 1, 2024, will be required to 

document their enforcement authority, 

adjust their SSO program standards, and 

to comply with new oversight and 

reporting requirements beginning on 

January 1, 2025. To estimate the costs of 

meeting the requirements, FTA 

estimated the number of entities 

affected, the number and type of staff 

involved, and the time needed for the 

first year and subsequent years (Table 

2).2

TABLE 2—STAFF AND HOURS NEEDED FOR SSOAS TO MEET OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS

Requirement Staff Annual hours Total hours 

SSOA documentation of enforcement authority (first year only) .............. 31 SSOA staff ................................. 40 1,240 

SSOA oversight (first year) 

Establish disposition process .................................................................... 31 SSOA staff ................................. 80 2,480 

Define requirements for internal safety reviews ........................................ 31 SSOA staff ................................. 80 2,480 

Document oversight of safety risk mitigations ........................................... 31 SSOA staff ................................. 80 2,480 

Document oversight of RTA training compliance ...................................... 31 SSOA staff ................................. 20 620 

Develop risk-based inspection programs .................................................. 62 SSOA staff (2 staff per SSOA) .. 160 9,920 

Establish thresholds for safety event notifications .................................... 31 SSOA staff ................................. 10 310 

Document data collection procedures with RTAs ..................................... 31 SSOA staff ................................. 20 620 

SSOA oversight (later years) 

Oversee safety risk mitigations ................................................................. 31 SSOA staff ................................. 500 15,500 

Oversee RTA training compliance ............................................................. 31 SSOA staff ................................. 20 620 

Source: FTA analysis. 

Under the current thresholds for 

reporting safety events, RTAs had an 

average of 618 reportable events per 

year from 2017 to 2021.3 Under the new 

thresholds, RTAs would have had an 

average of 811 reportable events per 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 83979 

4Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2024. ‘‘May 2022 

National Occupational Employment and Wage 

Estimates: United States.’’ https://www.bls.gov/oes/ 

2022/may/oes_nat.htm. 

5Multiplier derived using Bureau of Labor 

Statistics data on employer costs for employee 

compensation in December 22 (https://www.bls.gov/ 

news.release/ecec.htm). Employer costs for state 

and local government workers averaged $57.60 an 

hour, with $35.69 for wages and $21.95 for benefit 

costs. To estimate full costs from wages, one will 

use a multiplier of $57.60/$21.95, or 1.62. 

year for an increase of 193 reports, resulting in additional reporting costs 

for SSOA and RTA employees (Table 3). 

TABLE 3—ANNUAL STAFF AND HOURS NEEDED FOR SSOAS AND RTAS TO MEET REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Requirement Staff 

Hours for 

single 

activity 

Total hours 

SSOA safety event tracking (annual) ........................... SSOA staff; 193 reports ............................................... 1 193 

SSOA safety event investigations (annual) 

Prepare investigation reports ....................................... SSOA safety event investigators; 193 reports ............. 22 4,246 

Review and approve reports ........................................ SSOA safety event investigators; 193 reports ............. 10 1,930 

SSOA reporting to FTA (annual) 

Submit investigation reports ......................................... SSOA staff; 193 reports ............................................... 5 320 

Submit summary of internal safety reviews ................. SSOA staff; 193 reports ............................................... 5 320 

Investigation and reporting (annual) 

Conduct accident investigations ................................... RTA safety event investigators; 193 reports ................ 47 9,071 

Prepare event investigation reports ............................. RTA safety event investigators; 193 reports ................ 30 5,790 

Make submissions to SSOA ......................................... RTA safety event investigators; 193 reports ................ 12 2,316 

Source: FTA analysis. 

To estimate the value of staff time 

spent on the requirements, FTA used 

occupational wage data from the Bureau 

of Labor Statistics as of May 2021 (Table 

2).4 For general SSOA and trail transit 

agency staff, the closest occupational 

category is ‘‘General and Operations 

Managers’’ (code 11–1021) in the 

‘‘Transit and Ground Passenger 

Transportation’’ industry (North 

American Industry Classification 

System code 485000). FTA used median 

hourly wages as a basis for the 

estimates, multiplied by 1.62 to account 

for employer benefits, for a cost estimate 

of $95.27 per hour.5 For safety event 

investigators, who do not have a close 

analogue in the occupational wage data, 

FTA assumed a 25 percent wage and 

benefit premium for a cost estimate of 

$119.09 per hour. 

TABLE 4—OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AND WAGES USED TO VALUE STAFF TIME

[$2022] 

Staff Occupational category Code Median 

hourly wage 

Wage with 

benefits 

SSOA and RTA general staff ......................... General and Operations Managers ............... 11–1021 $59.07 $95.27 

SSOA and RTA safety event investigators .... N/A ................................................................. ........................ 73.84 119.09 

Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, May 2021 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates. 

The requirements of the final rule 

have estimated costs of $9.8 million (in 

2022 dollars) for the first year and 

annual costs of $10.7 million for later 

years (Table 5). The largest annual costs 

are for SSOA oversight ($7.9 million) 

and RTA activities ($2.0 million). 

TABLE 5—FIRST-YEAR COSTS AND ANNUAL COSTS FOR RULE REQUIREMENTS

[$2022] 

Requirement First-year costs Annual costs 

SSOA documentation of enforcement authority .............................................................................................. $118,140 ............................

SSOA oversight ............................................................................................................................................... 9,655,277 $7,853,642 

SSOA safety event tracking ............................................................................................................................ 18,388 18,388 

SSOA investigations ........................................................................................................................................ 735,517 735,517 

SSOA annual reporting to FTA ....................................................................................................................... 60,975 60,975 

RTA investigations and reporting .................................................................................................................... 2,045,656 2,045,656 

Total .......................................................................................................................................................... 12,633,954 10,714,179 

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. 

Summary 

Table 6 summarizes the economic 

effects of the final rule over the first ten 

years of the rule (2025 to 2034) in 2022 

dollars. On an annualized basis, the rule 

will have net costs of $11.0 million at 

a 7 percent discount rate (discounted to 

2024), $10.9 million at 3 percent, and 

$10.9 million at 2 percent. 


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83980 Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 

TABLE 6—SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS, 2025–2034 

[$2022, discounted to 2024] 

Item Total 

(undiscounted) 

Annualized 

(7%) 

Annualized 

(3%) 

Annualized 

(2%) 

Benefits Costs .......................................................................... Unquantified .............................. .............................. ..............................

SSOA documentation of enforcement authority ...................... $118,140 $16,820 $13,446 $12,894 

SSOA oversight ................................................................ 80,338,058 8,093,373 8,058,697 8,050,279 

SSOA safety event tracking ............................................. 183,879 18,388 18,388 18,388 

SSOA investigations ......................................................... 7,355,168 735,517 735,517 735,517 

SSOA annual reporting to FTA ........................................ 609,755 60,975 60,975 60,975 

RTA investigations and reporting ..................................... 20,456,560 2,045,656 2,045,656 2,045,656 

Total costs ................................................................. 109,061,560 10,970,730 10,932,680 10,923,710 

Net benefits .............................................................................. Unquantified .............................. .............................. ..............................

Note: Totals may not sum due to rounding. 

Regulatory Flexibility Act 

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 

(RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires 

Federal agencies to assess the impact of 

a regulation on small entities unless the 

agency determines that the regulation is 

not expected to have a significant 

economic impact on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

The rule will require SSOAs and rail 

transit agencies to meet additional 

administrative requirements. Under the 

Regulatory Flexibility Act, local 

governments and other public-sector 

organizations qualify as small entities if 

they serve a population of less than 

50,000. State agencies do not qualify, 

and no rail transit agency serves an 

urbanized area with a population of less 

than 50,000. FTA has therefore 

determined that the rule will not have 

a significant effect on a substantial 

number of small entities. 

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 

FTA has determined that this rule 

does not require a written statement 

under the Unfunded Mandates Reform 

Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1532) because it 

does not impose a Federal mandate that 

may result in the expenditure of $100 

million or more in any 1 year (when 

adjusted annually for inflation using the 

base year of 1995) for either State, local, 

and tribal governments in the aggregate, 

or by the private sector. 

Executive Order 13132 (Federalism 

Assessment) 

Executive Order 13132 requires 

agencies to assure meaningful and 

timely input by State and local officials 

in the development of regulatory 

policies that may have a substantial 

direct effect on the States, on the 

relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. This action has 

been analyzed in accordance with the 

principles and criteria contained in 

Executive Order 13132, and FTA 

determined this action will not have a 

substantial direct effect or sufficient 

federalism implications on the States. 

FTA also determined this action will 

not preempt any State law or regulation 

or affect the States’ ability to discharge 

traditional State governmental 

functions. 

Executive Order 12372 

(Intergovernmental Review) 

The regulations implementing 

Executive Order 12372 regarding 

intergovernmental consultation on 

Federal programs and activities apply to 

this program. 

Paperwork Reduction Act 

In compliance with the Paperwork 

Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 

3501 et seq.), and the White House 

Office of Management and Budget’s 

(OMB) implementing regulation at 5 

CFR 1320.8(d), FTA is seeking approval 

from OMB for a currently approved 

information collection (OMB Control 

Number 2132–0558) that is associated 

with this Notice of Proposed 

Rulemaking. The information collection 

(IC) was previously approved on April 

7, 2023. However, this submission 

includes changes in requirements 

applicable to the SSO program affecting 

various respondents. 

National Environmental Policy Act 

Federal agencies are required to adopt 

implementing procedures for the 

National Environmental Policy Act 

(NEPA) that establish specific criteria 

for, and identification of, three classes 

of actions: (1) Those that normally 

require preparation of an Environmental 

Impact Statement, (2) those that 

normally require preparation of an 

Environmental Assessment, and (3) 

those that are categorically excluded 

from further NEPA review (40 CFR 

1507.3(b)). This rule qualifies for 

categorical exclusions under 23 CFR 

771.118(c)(4) (planning and 

administrative activities that do not 

involve or lead directly to construction). 

FTA has evaluated whether the rule will 

involve unusual or extraordinary 

circumstances and has determined that 

it will not. 

Executive Order 12630 (Taking of 

Private Property) 

FTA has analyzed this rule under 

Executive Order 12630, Governmental 

Actions and Interference with 

Constitutionally Protected Property 

Rights. FTA does not believe this rule 

affects a taking of private property or 

otherwise has taking implications under 

Executive Order 12630. 

Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice 

Reform) 

This rule meets applicable standards 

in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of Executive 

Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform, to 

minimize litigation, eliminate 

ambiguity, and reduce burden. 

Executive Order 13045 (Protection of 

Children) 

FTA has analyzed this rule under 

Executive Order 13045, Protection of 

Children from Environmental Health 

Risks and Safety Risks. FTA certifies 

that this action will not cause an 

environmental risk to health or safety 

that might disproportionately affect 

children. 

Executive Order 13175 (Tribal 

Consultation) 

FTA has analyzed this rule under 

Executive Order 13175, and believes 

that it will not have substantial direct 

effects on one or more Indian Tribes; 

will not impose substantial direct 

compliance costs on Indian Tribal 


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Federal Register / Vol. 89, No. 202 / Friday, October 18, 2024 / Rules and Regulations 83981 

governments; and will not preempt 

Tribal laws. Therefore, a Tribal 

summary impact statement is not 

required. 

Executive Order 13211 (Energy Effects) 

FTA has analyzed this action under 

Executive Order 13211, Actions 

Concerning Regulations That 

Significantly Affect Energy Supply, 

Distribution, or Use. FTA has 

determined that this action is not a 

significant energy action under that 

order and is not likely to have a 

significant adverse effect on the supply, 

distribution, or use of energy. Therefore, 

a Statement of Energy Effects is not 

required. 

Executive Order 12898 (Environmental 

Justice) 

Executive Order 12898 (Federal 

Actions to Address Environmental 

Justice in Minority Populations and 

Low-Income Populations) and DOT 

Order 5610.2(a) (https://

www.transportation.gov/transportationpolicy/environmental-justice/ 

department-transportation-order56102a) require DOT agencies to 

achieve Environmental Justice (EJ) as 

part of their mission by identifying and 

addressing, as appropriate, 

disproportionately high and adverse 

human health or environmental effects, 

including interrelated social and 

economic effects, of their programs, 

policies, and activities on minority and 

low-income populations. All DOT 

agencies must address compliance with 

Executive Order 12898 and the DOT 

Order in all rulemaking activities. On 

August 15, 2012, FTA’s Circular 4703.1 

became effective, which contains 

guidance for recipients of FTA financial 

assistance to incorporate EJ principles 

into plans, projects, and activities 

(http://www.fta.dot.gov/documents/ 

FTA_EJ_Circular_7.14-12_FINAL.pdf). 

FTA has evaluated this action under 

Executive Order 12898, the DOT Order, 

and the FTA Circular, and FTA has 

determined that this action will not 

cause disproportionately high and 

adverse human health and 

environmental effects on minority or 

low-income populations. 

Regulation Identifier Number 

A Regulation Identifier Number (RIN) 

is assigned to each regulatory action 

listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal 

Regulations. The Regulatory Information 

Service Center publishes the Unified 

Agenda in April and October of each 

year. The RIN number contained in the 

heading of this document can be used 

to cross-reference this rule with the 

Unified Agenda. 

List of Subjects in 49 CFR Part 674 

Grant program—transportation, Mass 

transportation, Reporting and 

recordkeeping requirements, Safety. 

Veronica Vanterpool, 

Deputy Administrator. 

■ In consideration of the foregoing, and 

under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 5329, 

the Federal Transit Administration 

revises and republishes 49 CFR part 674 

to read as follows: 

PART 674—STATE SAFETY 

OVERSIGHT 

Subpart A—General Provisions 

Sec. 

674.1 Purpose. 

674.3 Applicability. 

674.5 Policy. 

674.7 Definitions. 

674.9 [Reserved]. 

Subpart B—Role of the State 

674.11 State Safety Oversight Program. 

674.13 Designation of oversight agency. 

674.15 Designation of oversight agency for 

multi-state system. 

674.17 Use of Federal financial assistance. 

674.19 Certification of a State Safety 

Oversight Program. 

674.21 Withholding of Federal financial 

assistance for noncompliance. 

674.23 Confidentiality of information. 

Subpart C—State Safety Oversight 

Agencies 

674.25 Role of the State safety oversight 

agency. 

674.27 State safety oversight program 

standards. 

674.29 Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans: general requirements. 

674.31 Triennial audits: general 

requirements. 

674.33 Notifications of safety events. 

674.35 Investigations. 

674.37 Corrective action plans. 

674.39 State Safety Oversight Agency 

annual reporting to FTA. 

674.41 Conflicts of interest. 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 5329; 49 CFR 1.91. 

49 CFR Part 674 

Subpart A—General Provisions 

§ 674.1 Purpose. 

This part carries out the mandate of 

49 U.S.C. 5329 for State safety oversight 

of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems. 

§ 674.3 Applicability. 

This part applies to States with rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems; State safety oversight agencies 

that oversee the safety of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems; 

and entities that own or operate rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems with Federal financial 

assistance authorized under 49 U.S.C. 

Chapter 53. 

§ 674.5 Policy. 

(a) In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329, 

a State that has a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system within the 

State has primary responsibility for 

overseeing the safety of that rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system. 

A State safety oversight agency must 

have the authority, resources, and 

qualified personnel to oversee the 

number, size, and complexity of rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems that operate within a State. 

(b) FTA will certify whether a State 

safety oversight program meets the 

requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329 and is 

adequate to promote the purposes of the 

public transportation safety programs 

codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

§ 674.7 Definitions. 

As used in this part: 

Accountable Executive means a 

single, identifiable person who has 

ultimate responsibility for carrying out 

the Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan of a transit agency; responsibility 

for carrying out the transit agency’s 

Transit Asset Management Plan; and 

control or direction over the human and 

capital resources needed to develop and 

maintain both the transit agency’s 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(d), and the transit agency’s Transit 

Asset Management Plan in accordance 

with 49 U.S.C. 5326. 

Administrator means the Federal 

Transit Administrator or the 

Administrator’s designee. 

Collision means any impact between 

a rail transit vehicle and any other 

vehicle, object, or any person. 

Contractor means an entity that 

performs tasks on behalf of FTA, a State 

Safety Oversight Agency, or a Rail 

Transit Agency, through contract or 

other agreement. 

Corrective action plan means a plan 

developed by a rail transit agency that 

describes the actions the rail transit 

agency will take to address an identified 

deficiency or safety concern, and the 

schedule for taking those actions. Either 

a State Safety Oversight Agency or FTA 

may require a rail transit agency to 

develop and carry out a corrective 

action plan. 

Derailment for the purposes of this 

part means a safety event in which one 

or more wheels of a rail transit vehicle 

unintentionally leaves the rails. 

Designated personnel means: 

(1) Employees and contractors 

identified by a recipient whose job 


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functions are directly responsible for 

safety oversight of the public 

transportation system of the public 

transportation agency; or 

(2) Employees and contractors of a 

State Safety Oversight Agency whose 

job functions require them to conduct 

reviews, inspections, examinations, and 

other safety oversight activities of the 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems subject to the 

jurisdiction of the agency. 

Disabling damage means damage to a 

rail transit vehicle resulting from a 

collision and preventing the vehicle 

from operating under its own power. 

Evacuation for life safety reasons 

means a condition that occurs when 

persons depart from transit vehicles or 

facilities for life safety reasons, 

including self-evacuation. A life safety 

reason may include a situation such as 

a fire, the presence of smoke or noxious 

fumes, a fuel leak from any source, an 

electrical hazard, or other hazard to any 

person. An evacuation of passengers 

into the rail right of way (not at a 

platform or station) for any reason is 

presumed to be an evacuation for life 

safety reasons. 

Fatality means a death confirmed 

within 30 days of a safety event. 

Fatalities include suicides, but do not 

include deaths in or on transit property 

that are a result of drug overdose, 

exposure to the elements, illness, or 

natural causes. 

FRA means the Federal Railroad 

Administration, an operating 

administration within the United States 

Department of Transportation. 

FTA means the Federal Transit 

Administration, an operating 

administration within the United States 

Department of Transportation. 

Hazard means any real or potential 

condition that can cause injury, illness, 

or death; damage to or loss of the 

facilities, equipment, rolling stock, or 

infrastructure of a public transportation 

system; or damage to the environment. 

Injury means any harm to persons as 

a result of a safety event that requires 

immediate medical attention away from 

the scene. Does not include harm 

resulting from a drug overdose, 

exposure to the elements, illness, 

natural causes, or occupational safety 

events occurring in administrative 

buildings. 

Inspection means a physical 

observation of equipment, facilities, 

rolling stock, operations, personnel, or 

records for the purpose of gathering or 

analyzing facts or information. 

Investigation means the process of 

determining the causal and contributing 

factors of a safety event or hazard, for 

the purpose of preventing recurrence 

and mitigating safety risk. 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan means the plan to improve the 

safety of all public transportation 

systems that receive Federal financial 

assistance under 49 U.S.C. Chapter 53. 

NTSB means the National 

Transportation Safety Board, an 

independent Federal agency. 

Person means a passenger, employee, 

contractor, volunteer, official worker, 

pedestrian, trespasser, or any other 

individual on the property of a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

or associated infrastructure. 

Potential consequence means the 

effect of a hazard. 

Public transportation has the meaning 

found in 49 U.S.C. 5302. 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan (PTASP) means the documented 

comprehensive agency safety plan for a 

transit agency that is required by 49 

U.S.C. 5329 and part 673 of this chapter. 

Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program 

(PTSCTP) means the certification 

training program that is required by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(c) and part 672 of this 

chapter. 

Rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system means any fixed 

guideway system, or any such system in 

engineering or construction, that uses 

rail, is operated for public 

transportation, is within the jurisdiction 

of a State, and is not subject to the 

jurisdiction of the Federal Railroad 

Administration. These include but are 

not limited to rapid rail, heavy rail, light 

rail, monorail, trolley, inclined plane, 

funicular, and automated guideway. 

Rail transit agency (RTA) means any 

entity that provides services on a rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system. 

Rail transit vehicle means any rolling 

stock used on a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system, including 

but not limited to passenger and 

maintenance vehicles. 

Revenue vehicle means a rail transit 

vehicle used to provide revenue service 

for passengers. This includes providing 

fare free service. 

Risk-based inspection program means 

an inspection program that uses 

qualitative and quantitative data 

analysis to inform ongoing inspection 

activities. Risk-based inspection 

programs are designed to prioritize 

inspections to address safety concerns 

and hazards associated with the highest 

levels of safety risk. 

Safety event means an unexpected 

outcome resulting in injury or death; 

damage to or loss of the facilities, 

equipment, rolling stock, or 

infrastructure of a public transportation 

system; or damage to the environment. 

Safety risk means the composite of 

predicted severity and likelihood of a 

potential consequence of a hazard. 

Safety risk mitigation means a method 

or methods to eliminate or reduce the 

severity and/or likelihood of a potential 

consequence of a hazard. 

State means a State of the United 

States, the District of Columbia, Puerto 

Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, 

Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin 

Islands. 

State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) 

means an agency established by a State 

that meets the requirements and 

performs the functions specified by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e) and (k) and the 

regulations set forth in this part. 

Unintended train movement means 

any instance where a revenue vehicle is 

moving and is not under the control of 

a driver (whether or not the operator is 

physically on the vehicle at the time). 

This applies regardless of whether the 

event occurred in revenue service. 

§ 674.9 [Reserved] 

Subpart B—Role of the State 

§ 674.11 State Safety Oversight Program. 

Every State that has a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

must have a State Safety Oversight 

(SSO) program that has been approved 

by the Administrator. FTA will audit 

each State’s compliance at least 

triennially, consistent with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(10). At minimum, an SSO 

program must: 

(a) Explicitly acknowledge the State’s 

responsibility for overseeing the safety 

of the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems within the State; 

(b) Demonstrate the State’s ability to 

adopt and enforce Federal and relevant 

State law for safety in rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems; 

(c) Establish a State safety oversight 

agency, by State law, in accordance with 

the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329 and 

this part; 

(d) Demonstrate that the State has 

determined an appropriate staffing level 

for the State safety oversight agency 

commensurate with the number, size, 

and complexity of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

in the State, and that the State has 

consulted with the Administrator for 

that purpose; 

(e) Demonstrate that the employees 

and other personnel of the State safety 

oversight agency who are responsible 

for the oversight of rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems are 

qualified to perform their functions, 


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based on appropriate training, including 

substantial progress toward or 

completion of the Public Transportation 

Safety Certification Training Program; 

and 

(f) Demonstrate that by law, the State 

prohibits any public transportation 

agency in the State from providing 

funds to the SSOA. 

§ 674.13 Designation of oversight agency. 

(a) Every State that must establish a 

State Safety Oversight program in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329 must 

also establish an SSOA for the purpose 

of overseeing the safety of rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within that State. Further, the State 

must ensure that: 

(1) The SSOA is financially and 

legally independent from any public 

transportation agency the SSOA is 

obliged to oversee; 

(2) The SSOA does not directly 

provide public transportation services 

in an area with a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system the SSOA 

is obliged to oversee; 

(3) The SSOA does not employ any 

individual who is also responsible for 

administering a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system the SSOA 

is obliged to oversee; 

(4) The SSOA has authority to review, 

approve, oversee, and enforce the Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan for a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system required by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 673 of this 

chapter; 

(5) The SSOA has investigative, 

inspection, and enforcement authority 

with respect to the safety of all rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within the State; 

(6) At least once every three years, the 

SSOA audits every rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system’s 

compliance with the Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan 

required by 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 

673 of this chapter; and 

(7) At least once a year, the SSOA 

reports the status of the safety of each 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system to the Governor, 

the FTA, and the board of directors, or 

equivalent entity, of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system. 

(b) At the request of the Governor of 

a State, the Administrator may waive 

the requirements for financial and legal 

independence and the prohibitions on 

employee conflicts of interest under 

paragraphs (a)(1) and (3) of this section, 

if the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems in design, 

construction, or revenue operations in 

the State have fewer than one million 

combined actual and projected rail fixed 

guideway revenue miles per year or 

provide fewer than ten million 

combined actual and projected unlinked 

passenger trips per year. However: 

(1) If a State shares jurisdiction over 

one or more rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems with another 

State, and has one or more rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that are not shared with another State, 

the revenue miles and unlinked 

passenger trips of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

under shared jurisdiction will not be 

counted in the Administrator’s decision 

whether to issue a waiver. 

(2) The Administrator will rescind a 

waiver issued under this subsection if 

the number of revenue miles per year or 

unlinked passenger trips per year 

increases beyond the thresholds 

specified in this subsection. 

§ 674.15 Designation of oversight agency 

for multi-state system. 

In an instance of a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system that 

operates in more than one State, all 

States in which that rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system operates 

must either: 

(a) Ensure that uniform safety 

standards and procedures in compliance 

with 49 U.S.C. 5329 are applied to that 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system, through an SSO 

program that has been approved by the 

Administrator; or 

(b) Designate a single entity that meets 

the requirements for an SSOA to serve 

as the SSOA for that rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system, through 

an SSO program that has been approved 

by the Administrator. 

§ 674.17 Use of Federal financial 

assistance. 

(a) In accordance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329(e)(6), FTA will make grants of 

Federal financial assistance to eligible 

States to help the States develop and 

carry out their SSO programs. This 

Federal financial assistance may be used 

for reimbursement of both the 

operational and administrative expenses 

of SSO programs, consistent with the 

uniform administrative requirements for 

grants to States under 2 CFR parts 200 

and 1201. The expenses eligible for 

reimbursement include, specifically, the 

expense of employee training and the 

expense of establishing and maintaining 

an SSOA in compliance with 49 U.S.C. 

5329. 

(b) The apportionments of available 

Federal financial assistance to eligible 

States will be made in accordance with 

a formula, established by the 

Administrator, following opportunity 

for public notice and comment. The 

formula will take into account fixed 

guideway vehicle revenue miles, fixed 

guideway route miles, and fixed 

guideway vehicle passenger miles 

attributable to all rail fixed guideway 

systems within each eligible State not 

subject to the jurisdiction of the FRA. 

(c) The grants of Federal financial 

assistance for State safety oversight shall 

be subject to terms and conditions as the 

Administrator deems appropriate. 

(d) The Federal share of the expenses 

eligible for reimbursement under a grant 

for State safety oversight activities shall 

be eighty percent of the reasonable costs 

incurred under that grant. 

(e) The non-Federal share of the 

expenses eligible for reimbursement 

under a grant for State safety oversight 

activities may not be comprised of 

Federal funds, any funds received from 

a public transportation agency, or any 

revenues earned by a public 

transportation agency. 

§ 674.19 Certification of a State Safety 

Oversight Program. 

(a) The Administrator must determine 

whether a State’s SSO program meets 

the requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

Also, the Administrator must determine 

whether an SSO program is adequate to 

promote the purposes of 49 U.S.C. 5329, 

including, but not limited to, the 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program, and the 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans. 

(b) The Administrator must issue a 

certification to a State whose SSO 

program meets the requirements of 49 

U.S.C. 5329. The Administrator must 

issue a denial of certification to a State 

whose SSO program does not meet the 

requirements of 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

(c) In an instance in which the 

Administrator issues a denial of 

certification to a State whose SSO 

program does not meet the requirements 

of 49 U.S.C. 5329, the Administrator 

must provide a written explanation, and 

allow the State an opportunity to 

modify and resubmit its SSO program 

for the Administrator’s approval. In the 

event the State is unable to modify its 

SSO program to merit the 

Administrator’s issuance of a 

certification, the Administrator must 

notify the Governor of that fact, and 

must ask the Governor to take all 

possible actions to correct the 

deficiencies that are precluding the 

issuance of a certification for the SSO 

program. In his or her discretion, the 

Administrator may also impose 


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financial penalties as authorized by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e), which may include: 

(1) Withholding SSO grant funds from 

the State; 

(2) Withholding up to five percent of 

the 49 U.S.C. 5307 Urbanized Area 

formula funds appropriated for use in 

the State or urbanized area in the State, 

until such time as the SSO program can 

be certified; or 

(3) Requiring all rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems governed 

by the SSO program to spend up to 100 

percent of their Federal funding under 

49 U.S.C. chapter 53 only for safetyrelated improvements on their systems, 

until such time as the SSO program can 

be certified. 

(d) When determining whether to 

issue a certification or a denial of 

certification for an SSO program, the 

Administrator must evaluate whether 

the cognizant SSOA has the authority, 

resources, and expertise to oversee the 

number, size, and complexity of the rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

systems that operate within the State, or 

will attain the necessary authority, 

resources, and expertise in accordance 

with a developmental plan and 

schedule. 

§ 674.21 Withholding of Federal financial 

assistance for noncompliance. 

(a) In making a decision to impose 

financial penalties as authorized by 49 

U.S.C. 5329(e) and determining the 

nature and amount of the financial 

penalties, the Administrator shall 

consider the extent and circumstances 

of the noncompliance; the operating 

budgets of the SSOA and the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that will be affected by the financial 

penalties; and such other matters as 

justice may require. 

(b) If a State fails to establish an SSO 

program that has been approved by the 

Administrator prior to a rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

entering the engineering or construction 

phase of development, FTA will be 

prohibited from obligating Federal 

financial assistance authorized under 49 

U.S.C. 5338 to any entity in the State 

that is otherwise eligible to receive that 

Federal financial assistance, in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(3). 

§ 674.23 Confidentiality of information. 

(a) A State, an SSOA, or an RTA may 

withhold an investigation report 

prepared or adopted in accordance with 

these regulations from being admitted as 

evidence or used in a civil action for 

damages resulting from a matter 

mentioned in the report. 

(b) This part does not require public 

availability of any data, information, or 

procedures pertaining to the security of 

a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system or its passenger 

operations. 

Subpart C—State Safety Oversight 

Agencies 

§ 674.25 Role of the State safety oversight 

agency. 

(a) An SSOA must establish minimum 

standards for the safety of all rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

within its oversight. These minimum 

standards must be consistent with the 

National Public Transportation Safety 

Plan, the Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program, the rules 

for Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans and all applicable Federal and 

State law. 

(b) An SSOA must review and 

approve the Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plan for every rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

within its oversight. An SSOA must 

oversee an RTA’s execution of its Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan. An 

SSOA must enforce the execution of a 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan, through an order of a corrective 

action plan or any other means, as 

necessary or appropriate. 

(c) An SSOA has the responsibility to 

provide safety oversight of an RTA’s 

project(s) in the engineering or 

construction phase to verify compliance 

with all applicable Federal and State 

safety requirements. For purposes of 

§§ 674.33 and 674.35, this is limited to 

safety events that involve transit-related 

activities such as operations, testing, 

simulated service or pre-revenue 

service, or a transit-related maintenance 

activity. 

(d) An SSOA must ensure that a 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan meets the requirements at 49 

U.S.C. 5329(d) and part 673 of this 

chapter. 

(e) An SSOA has primary 

responsibility for the investigation of 

any allegation of noncompliance with a 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan. These responsibilities do not 

preclude the Administrator from 

exercising their authority under 49 

U.S.C. 5329(f). 

(f) An SSOA has primary 

responsibility for the investigation of a 

safety event on a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system. This 

responsibility does not preclude the 

Administrator from exercising his or her 

authority under 49 U.S.C. 5329(f). 

(g) An SSOA may enter into an 

agreement with a contractor for 

assistance in overseeing safety event 

investigations and performing 

independent safety event investigations; 

and for expertise the SSOA does not 

have within its own organization. 

(h) All designated personnel 

employed by an SSOA must comply 

with the requirements of the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program. 

§ 674.27 State safety oversight program 

standards. 

(a) An SSOA must adopt and 

distribute a written SSO program 

standard, consistent with the National 

Public Transportation Safety Plan and 

the rules for Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plans. This SSO program 

standard must identify the processes 

and procedures that govern the 

activities of the SSOA. Also, the SSO 

program standard must identify the 

processes and procedures an RTA must 

have in place to comply with the 

standard. At minimum, the program 

standard must meet the following 

requirements: 

(1) Program management. The SSO 

program standard must explain the 

authority of the SSOA to oversee the 

safety of rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems; the policies that 

govern the activities of the SSOA; the 

reporting requirements that govern both 

the SSOA and the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation systems; and the 

steps the SSOA will take to ensure 

open, on-going communication between 

the SSOA and every rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system within its 

oversight. 

(2) Program standard development. 

The SSO program standard must 

explain the SSOA’s process for 

developing, reviewing, adopting, and 

revising its minimum standards for 

safety, and distributing those standards 

to the rail fixed guideway public 

transportation systems. 

(3) Disposition of RTA comments. The 

SSO program standard must establish a 

disposition process that defines how the 

SSOA will address any comments the 

RTA makes with respect to the SSO 

program standard. 

(4) Program policy and objectives. The 

SSO program standard must set an 

explicit policy and objectives for safety 

in rail fixed guideway public 

transportation throughout the State. 

(5) Oversight of RTA Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plans and 

internal safety reviews. The SSO 

program standard must explain the role 

of the SSOA in overseeing an RTA’s 

execution of its Public Transportation 

Agency Safety Plan and any related 

safety reviews of the RTA’s fixed 

guideway public transportation system. 

The SSO program standard must 


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describe the process whereby the SSOA 

will receive and evaluate all material 

submitted under the signature of an 

RTA’s Accountable Executive. The SSO 

program standard must define baseline 

RTA internal safety review requirements 

including, at a minimum, the following 

requirements: 

(i) The RTA must develop and 

document an ongoing internal safety 

review process to ensure that all 

elements of an RTA’s Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan are 

performing and being implemented as 

intended. 

(ii) The RTA’s internal safety review 

process must ensure that the 

implementation of all elements of its 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan are reviewed within a three-year 

period. 

(iii) The RTA must notify the SSOA 

at least thirty (30) days before the RTA 

conducts an internal safety review of 

any aspect of the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system and 

provide any checklists or procedures it 

will use during the review. 

(iv) The RTA must submit a report to 

the SSOA annually documenting the 

internal safety review activities and the 

status of subsequent findings and 

corrective actions. 

(6) Oversight of safety risk 

mitigations. The SSO program standard 

must explain the role of the SSOA in 

overseeing an RTA’s development, 

implementation, and monitoring of 

safety risk mitigations related to rail 

fixed guideway transportation, 

including how the SSOA will track RTA 

safety risk mitigations. The SSO 

program standard must specify the 

frequency and format whereby the 

SSOA will receive and review 

information on RTA safety risk 

mitigation status and effectiveness. 

(7) Oversight of RTA compliance with 

the Public Transportation Safety 

Certification Training Program. The 

SSO program standard must explain 

how the SSOA will ensure that the RTA 

satisfies the requirements of the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program, including the RTA’s 

designation of personnel and the RTA’s 

identification of refresher training. 

(8) Triennial SSOA audits of RTA 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans. The SSO program standard must 

explain the process the SSOA will 

follow and the criteria the SSOA will 

apply in conducting a complete audit of 

the RTA’s compliance with its Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan at 

least once every three years, in 

accordance with 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

Alternatively, the SSOA and RTA may 

agree that the SSOA will conduct its 

audit on an on-going basis over the 

three-year timeframe. The program 

standard must establish a procedure the 

SSOA and RTA will follow to manage 

findings and recommendations arising 

from the triennial audit. 

(9) Safety event notifications. The 

SSO program standard must establish 

requirements for RTA notifications of 

safety events occurring on the RTA’s rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system, including notifications to the 

SSOA and to FTA. SSOA safety event 

notification requirements must address, 

specifically, the time limits for 

notification, methods of notification, 

and the nature of the information the 

RTA must submit to the SSOA. 

(10) Investigations. The SSO program 

standard must identify safety events that 

require an RTA to conduct an 

investigation. Also, the program 

standard must address how the SSOA 

will oversee an RTA’s own internal 

investigation; the role of the SSOA in 

supporting any investigation conducted 

or findings and recommendations made 

by the NTSB or FTA; and procedures for 

protecting the confidentiality of the 

investigation reports. 

(11) Corrective actions. The program 

standard must explain the process and 

criteria by which the SSOA may order 

an RTA to develop and carry out a 

corrective action plan (CAP), and a 

procedure for the SSOA to review and 

approve a CAP. Also, the program 

standard must explain the SSOA’s 

policy and practice for tracking and 

verifying an RTA’s compliance with the 

CAP and managing any conflicts 

between the SSOA and RTA relating 

either to the development or execution 

of the CAP or the findings of an 

investigation. 

(12) Inspections. The SSO program 

standard must include or incorporate by 

reference a risk-based inspection 

program that: 

(i) Is commensurate with the number, 

size, and complexity of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation systems 

that the State safety oversight agency 

oversees; 

(ii) Provides the SSOA with the 

authority and capability to enter the 

facilities of each rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system that the 

SSOA oversees to inspect infrastructure, 

equipment, records, personnel, and 

data, including the data that the RTA 

collects when identifying and 

evaluating safety risks; and 

(iii) Include policies and procedures 

regarding the access of the SSOA to 

conduct inspections of the rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system, 

including access for inspections that 

occur without advance notice to the 

RTA. 

(13) Vehicle maintenance and testing. 

The SSO program standard must 

include the process by which the SSOA 

will review an RTA’s rail transit vehicle 

maintenance program, including the 

RTA’s periodic testing of rail transit 

vehicle braking systems to ensure 

performance and to detect potential 

latent system failures. 

(14) Data collection. The program 

standard must include policies and 

procedures for collecting and reviewing 

data that the RTA uses when identifying 

hazards and assessing safety risk and 

explain how the SSOA uses collected 

data to support oversight of the RTA’s 

safety risk management process. The 

frequency of collection shall be 

commensurate with the size and 

complexity of the rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system. 

(b) At least once a year an SSOA must 

submit its SSO program standard and 

any referenced program procedures to 

FTA, with an indication of any revisions 

made to the program standard since the 

last annual submittal. FTA will evaluate 

the SSOA’s program standard as part of 

its continuous evaluation of the State 

Safety Oversight Program, and in 

preparing FTA’s report to Congress on 

the certification status of that State 

Safety Oversight Program, in accordance 

with 49 U.S.C. 5329. 

§ 674.29 Public Transportation Agency 

Safety Plans: general requirements. 

(a) In determining whether to approve 

a Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan for a rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system, an SSOA must 

evaluate whether the Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan is 

compliant with 49 U.S.C. 5329(d) and 

part 673 of this chapter; is consistent 

with the National Public Transportation 

Safety Plan; and is in compliance with 

the SSO program standard set by the 

SSOA. 

(b) In an instance in which an SSOA 

does not approve a Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan, the 

SSOA must provide a written 

explanation and allow the RTA an 

opportunity to modify and resubmit its 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan for the SSOA’s approval. 

§ 674.31 Triennial audits: general 

requirements. 

At least once every three years, an 

SSOA must conduct a complete audit of 

an RTA’s compliance with its Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plan. 

Alternatively, an SSOA may conduct 

the audit on an on-going basis over the 

three-year timeframe. If an SSOA audits 


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an RTA’s compliance on an ongoing 

basis, the SSOA shall issue interim 

audit reports at least annually. At the 

conclusion of the three-year audit cycle, 

the SSOA shall issue a report with 

findings and recommendations arising 

from the triennial or ongoing audit, 

which must include, at minimum, an 

analysis of the effectiveness of the 

Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plan, recommendations for 

improvements, and a corrective action 

plan, if necessary or appropriate. The 

RTA must be given an opportunity to 

comment on the findings and 

recommendations. 

§ 674.33 Notifications of safety events. 

(a) An RTA must notify FTA and the 

SSOA within two hours of any safety 

event occurring on a rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system that results 

in one or more of the following: 

(1) Fatality 

(2) Two or more injuries 

(3) Derailment 

(4) Collision resulting in one or more 

injuries 

(5) Collision between two rail transit 

vehicles 

(6) Collision resulting in disabling 

damage to a rail transit vehicle 

(7) Evacuation for life safety reasons 

(8) Unintended train movement. 

(b) The two-hour notification 

requirement excludes criminal actions 

that result in fatalities or injuries, such 

as homicides and assaults. 

§ 674.35 Investigations. 

(a) An SSOA must investigate or 

require an investigation of any safety 

event that requires notification under 

§ 674.33. 

(b) The SSOA is ultimately 

responsible for the sufficiency and 

thoroughness of all investigations, 

whether conducted by the SSOA or 

RTA. If an SSOA requires an RTA to 

investigate a safety event, the SSOA 

must conduct an independent review of 

the RTA’s findings of causation. In any 

instance in which an RTA is conducting 

its own internal investigation of the 

safety event, the SSOA and the RTA 

must coordinate their investigations in 

accordance with the SSO program 

standard and any agreements in effect. 

(c) Within a reasonable time, an SSOA 

must issue a written report on its 

investigation of a safety event or review 

of an RTA’s safety event investigation in 

accordance with the reporting 

requirements established by the SSOA. 

The report must describe the 

investigation activities; identify the 

factors that caused or contributed to the 

safety event; and set forth a corrective 

action plan, as necessary or appropriate. 

The SSOA must formally adopt the 

report of a safety event and transmit that 

report to the RTA for review and 

concurrence. If the RTA does not concur 

with an SSOA’s report, the SSOA may 

allow the RTA to submit a written 

dissent from the report, which may be 

included in the report, at the discretion 

of the SSOA. 

(d) All personnel and contractors that 

conduct investigations on behalf of an 

SSOA must be trained to perform their 

functions in accordance with the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program. 

(e) The Administrator may conduct an 

independent investigation of any safety 

event or an independent review of an 

SSOA’s or an RTA’s findings of 

causation of a safety event. 

§ 674.37 Corrective action plans. 

(a) The SSOA must, at a minimum, 

require the development of a CAP for 

the following: 

(1) Results from investigations, in 

which the RTA or SSOA determined 

that causal or contributing factors 

require corrective action; 

(2) Findings of non-compliance from 

safety reviews and inspections 

performed by the SSOA; or 

(3) Findings of non-compliance from 

internal safety reviews performed by the 

RTA. 

(b) In any instance in which an RTA 

must develop and carry out a CAP, the 

SSOA must review and approve the 

CAP before the RTA carries out the 

plan. However, an exception may be 

made for immediate or emergency 

corrective actions that must be taken to 

ensure immediate safety, provided that 

the SSOA has been given timely 

notification, and the SSOA provides 

subsequent review and approval. 

(c) A CAP must describe, specifically, 

the actions the RTA will take to correct 

the deficiency identified by the CAP, 

the schedule for taking those actions, 

and the individuals responsible for 

taking those actions. The RTA must 

periodically report to the SSOA on its 

progress in carrying out the CAP. The 

SSOA may monitor the RTA’s progress 

in carrying out the CAP through 

unannounced, on-site inspections, or 

any other means the SSOA deems 

necessary or appropriate. 

(d) In any instance in which a safety 

event on the RTA’s rail fixed guideway 

public transportation system is the 

subject of an investigation by the NTSB 

or FTA, the SSOA must evaluate 

whether the findings or 

recommendations by the NTSB or FTA 

require a CAP by the RTA, and if so, the 

SSOA must order the RTA to develop 

and carry out a CAP. 

§ 674.39 State Safety Oversight Agency 

annual reporting to FTA. 

(a) On or before March 15 of each 

year, an SSOA must submit the 

following material to FTA: 

(1) The SSO program standard 

adopted in accordance with § 674.27, 

with an indication of any changes to the 

SSO program standard during the 

preceding twelve months; 

(2) Evidence that its designated 

personnel have completed the 

requirements of the Public 

Transportation Safety Certification 

Training Program, or, if in progress, the 

anticipated completion date of the 

training; 

(3) A publicly available report that 

summarizes its oversight activities for 

the preceding twelve months, describes 

the causal factors of safety events 

identified through investigation, and 

identifies the status of corrective 

actions, changes to Public 

Transportation Agency Safety Plans, 

and the level of effort by the SSOA in 

carrying out its oversight activities; 

(4) Final investigation reports for all 

safety events meeting one or more of the 

criteria specified at § 674.33; 

(5) A summary of the internal safety 

reviews conducted by RTAs during the 

previous twelve months, and the RTA’s 

progress in carrying out CAPs arising 

under § 674.37(a)(3); 

(6) A summary of the triennial audits 

completed during the preceding twelve 

months, and the RTAs’ progress in 

carrying out CAPs arising from triennial 

audits conducted in accordance with 

§ 674.31; 

(7) Evidence that the SSOA has 

reviewed and approved any changes to 

the Public Transportation Agency Safety 

Plans during the preceding twelve 

months; and 

(8) A certification that the SSOA is in 

compliance with the requirements of 

this part. 

(b) These materials must be submitted 

electronically through a reporting 

system specified by FTA. 


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§ 674.41 Conflicts of interest. 

(a) An SSOA must be financially and 

legally independent from any rail fixed 

guideway public transportation system 

under the oversight of the SSOA, unless 

the Administrator has issued a waiver of 

this requirement in accordance with 

§ 674.13(b). 

(b) An SSOA may not employ any 

individual who provides services to a 

rail fixed guideway public 

transportation system under the 

oversight of the SSOA, unless the 

Administrator has issued a waiver of 

this requirement in accordance with 

§ 674.13(b). 

(c) A contractor may not provide 

services to both an SSOA and a rail 

fixed guideway public transportation 

system under the oversight of that 

SSOA, unless the Administrator has 

issued a waiver of this prohibition. 

[FR Doc. 2024–23866 Filed 10–17–24; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–57–P 


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