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******************************************************WE THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT, INC., ET AL. v.

DANNEL P. MALLOY (AC 35143)
Beach, Robinson and Sheldon, Js.* Argued December 9, 2013—officially released May 27, 2014 (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Graham, J.)
Deborah G. Stevenson, for the appellants (plaintiffs).
Jane R. Rosenberg, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, Perry Zinn Rowthorn, deputy attorney general, andRobertDeichert, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).Opinion BEACH, J. The plaintiffs, We the People of Connecticut, Inc., Maria Nelson, Laurie Wojnarowski, Mary D. Mathes, Angela Griffs, Jay Kiley, and Linda GaramelloFusco, appealfromthejudgmentofthetrialcourtgranting the motion to dismiss of the defendant, Governor Dannel P. Malloy. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following relevant facts are undisputed. In March, 2011, Senate Bill No. 1106, providingforacollective bargaining process for family child care providers,

was proposed in the General Assembly. In June, 2011, the legislature adjourned without voting on the bill.
On September 21, 2011, the defendant issued Executive Order No. 9, which prescribed a process by which

a majority representative offamily child care providers whoparticipate inthe childcare subsidyprogramunder General Statutes § 17b-749, was to be selected. It provided that the representative was to meet and confer with representatives of the Department of Social Services and any other executive branch representatives deemed appropriate bythe defendantto discuss certain designated topics; it further provided that a working groupwastobeappointedbythedefendantonorbefore October 1, 2011, for the purpose ofmaking recommendations regarding the structuring of collective bargaining rights for family child care providers. Not later than February 1, 2012, the working group was to report its findings to the defendant. On the same day, the defendant also issued Executive Order No. 10, which

was similar to Executive Order No. 9, but pertained to personalcare attendants. Itprovided (1) forthe election ofamajorityrepresentative ofpersonalcareattendants, (2) for the establishment of a working group on or before October 1, 2011, for the purpose of determining how best to structure collective bargaining rights for personal care attendants, and (3) that the working group report its findings to the defendant no later than February 1, 2012.
Pursuant to the executive orders, the election forthe majority representative of family child care providers concluded in December, 2011, and the election for the majorityrepresentative ofpersonal care assistants concludedinMarch, 2012. Both groups selectedthe Service Employees InternationalUnionto be theirmajorityrepresentative. The final reports ofthe working groups for familychildcareprovidersandpersonalcareattendants

were issued on February 15, 2012.
In March, 2012, the plaintiffs instituted an action in the Superior Court alleging that, by issuing Executive Orders Nos. 9 and 10, the defendant exceeded his authority and violated the principle of separation of powers as provided in articles second, fourth and eleventh of the Connecticut constitution. The plaintiffsclaimed that they were specifically harmed by the issuance ofthe executive orders procedurally and substantively, by not being able to participate in the election procedure, by being represented by an entity that was electedin anillegalprocedure, bynothavingthe legislature make the law establishing the election procedure, and by not having an orderlyform ofgovernmentbased

on the separation ofpowers as established and guaranteed bythe Connecticut constitution. Intheirprayerfor relief, the plaintiffs sought injunctive reliefinvalidating Executive Orders Nos. 9 and 10.
In March, 2012, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint on the ground of mootness.1Inamemorandumoflawinsupportofthemotion, the defendant argued that the complaint was moot because oflegislationthenpending. Thelegislationthen pending was enacted two months later.
In May, 2012, the legislature enacted No. 12-33 ofthe 2012 Public Acts, effective July 1, 2012.2 Public Act 12- 33 provided that ‘‘family child care providers,’’ defined inthe actto be persons who provide child care services pursuant to § 17b-749, were to have the right to bargain collectively. The act prescribed a collective bargaining process. Public Acts 2012, No. 12-33, § 2. It further provided that the Commissioner of Social Services was to compile a list of names of family child care providers who participated in the § 17b-749 subsidy program on
or after July 1, 2012, and the list was to be updated on
a monthly basis. Public Acts 2012, No. 12-33, § 2 (c). PublicAct 12-33, § 2 (g) provided: ‘‘Anyproviderorganization certified as the majority representative offamily child care providers in any election held prior to the effective date of this section pursuant to Executive Order Number 9 of Governor Dannel P. Malloy may provide proofofsuch certificationto the State Board of Labor Relations and the State Board ofLabor Relations shall certify such majority representative as the exclusive bargaining agent for such providers without the requirement of an additional election unless and until such time as a question concerning representation is appropriately raised under this section and section 1 of this act.’’
Public Act 12-33, § 6 provided that personal care attendants also were to have the rightto bargain collectively, and it prescribed a similar collective bargaining process. It established a personal care attendant workforce council to ‘‘ensure the quality of

. . . care.’’ Public Acts 2012, No. 12-33, § 5 (a). It provided that the workforce council was to compile a list of names of personal care attendants no later than October 1, 2012, to be revised monthly thereafter. Public Acts 2012, No. 12-33, § 5 (f) (1). PublicAct 12-33, § 6 (f) provided: ‘‘Any organization certified as the majority representative of personal care attendants in any election held prior to the effective date ofthis section pursuant to ExecutiveOrder Number 10 of Governor Dannel P. Malloy, may provide proofofsuch certificationto the State Board of Labor Relations and the State Board ofLabor Relations shall certify such majority representative as the exclusive bargaining agent for such personal care attendants withouttherequirementofanadditionalelectionunless anduntilsuchtimeasaquestionconcerningrepresentation is appropriately raised under this section and section 2 of this act.’’
The court issued amemorandum ofdecision in October, 2012, granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The court held that the issue was moot because the public act replaced the executive orders and that no practical relief could be given to the plaintiffs with respect to the executive orders. This appeal followed.
‘‘Mootness

. . . implicates subject matter jurisdiction, whichimposes adutyonthe [trial] courtto dismiss

a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief totheparties.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.) Curley v. Kaiser, 112 Conn. App. 213, 229, 962 A.2d 167 (2009). ‘‘Mootnesspresents acircumstance whereinthe issue before the court has been resolved or had lost its significance because of a change in the condition of affairs between the parties.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Begley, 122 Conn. App. 546, 550–51, 2 A.3d 1 (2010). ‘‘A case becomes moot when due to intervening circumstances a controversy between the parties no longer exists.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Waterbury Hospital v. Connecticut Health Care Associates, 186 Conn. 247, 252, 440 A.2d 310 (1982).
The plaintiffs claim that the issues raised in their complaint were not moot, but rather that the executive orders have had a continuing legal effect and exist side by side with Public Act 12-33.3 They contend that the public act itself demonstrates that the procedures for electing majority representatives of family child care providers and personal care attendants, respectively, have an ongoing legal effect because the public act provides that the victors of election procedures conducted pursuant to the executive orders were to continue to act as exclusive bargaining agents for their respective groups until such time as new elections should be held.
There is no practical relief that can be given to the plaintiffs. Executive Orders Nos. 9 and 10 provided, respectively, for elections of majority representatives of family child care providers and personal care attendants. The executive orders also providedforthe establishment ofworking groups thatwere to report findings regarding collective bargaining to the governor no later than February 1, 2012. The legislature passed Public Act 12-33, which, for purposes of the claims raised in the present case, entirely replaced Executive Orders Nos. 9 and 10. The act established collective bargainingfor the two groups at issue and further provided that the majorityrepresentatives offamily child care providers and personal care attendants, as elected in Executive Orders Nos. 9 and 10, respectively, were to act as the exclusive bargaining agents without the need for

new elections. Even if the executive orders were rescinded, Public Act 12-33 would still be in place. Any challenge would now appropriately be addressed, if at all, to the legislation. The requested remedy, in this case, then would have no practical effect.4
Theplaintiffs argue inthe alternativethattheirclaims fallunderthe ‘‘capable ofrepetitionyet evadingreview’’ exception to the mootness doctrine. To qualify under this exception, an otherwise mootquestion must satisfy the following three requirements: ‘‘First, the challenged action, orthe effect ofthe challenged action, by itsvery nature, must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissedasmoot.’’ (Internalquotationmarks omitted.)In

rePriscillaA., 122 Conn. App. 832, 836, 2A.3d24 (2010).
The plaintiffs’ claim is of public importance, but the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the effect of the executive orders, bytheirverynature, is ofsuch limited duration that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about the validityofsimilarorderswillbecomemootbeforelitigation has concluded. We have no information before us to lead us to conclude that most executive orders are ofinherently short duration. The plaintiffs contend that in this case, the defendant, aware of the judicial challenge to the executive orders, hastened the ratifying legislation through the General Assembly, and that any executive order could escapejudicial review by a similarprocess. Both the premise and the conclusion ofthe argumentarepurelyspeculative. Finally, there hasbeen

no demonstration that the question presented in this

case will arise again and will affect the same persons
or any similar group.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

1 The motion to dismiss also alleged lack ofstanding and sovereign immunity. The trial court did not reach these grounds, nor do we.
2 Public Act 12-33 is now codified as General Statutes § 17b-705 et seq.
3 The plaintiffs also argue that the trial court ignored the appropriate standard ofreview for a motion to dismiss when it failed to analyze whether their complaint stated a cause of action and instead determined that theirclaim was moot. The court did not apply an incorrect standard. A motion to dismiss properly attacks thejurisdiction ofthe court; Hayes FamilyLtd. Partnership v. Glastonbury, 132 Conn. App. 218, 221, 31 A.3d 429 (2011); and mootness implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 271 Conn. 193, 201, 856 A.2d 997 (2004).

4 The plaintiffs also argue that Public Act 12-33 is unconstitutional. We cannot review this claim. Our review ofthe complaint reveals that it cannot reasonably be construed to include a challenge to the constitutional validity of Public Act 12-33. See Young v. Vlahos, 103 Conn. App. 470, 476, 929 A.2d 362 (2007) (interpretation of pleadings question of law subject to plenary review), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 913, 943 A.2d 474 (2008). The trial court did not consider or rule on the validity of Public Act 12-33.