FILED

December 23, 1997

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

OCTOBER SESSION, 1997

DARRELL DOUGLAS ) C.C.A. NO. 03C01-9701-CR-00031

SHEETS, )

)

Appellee, )

) JOHNSON COUNTY

VS. )

) HON. LYNN BROWN

HOWARD CARLTON, ) JUDGE

WARDEN, and )

STATE OF TENNESSEE )

)

Appellant. ) (Habeas Corpus)

ON APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE

CRIMINAL COURT OF JOHNSON COUNTY

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

DARRELL D. SHEETS JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Pro Se Attorney General and Reporter

P.O. Box 5000

Mountain City, TN 37683 MICHAEL J. FAHEY

Assistant Attorney General

425 5th Avenue North

Nashville, TN 37243

C. BERKELEY BELL

District Attorney General

Route 19, Box 99

Johnson City, TN 37601

OPINION FILED ________________________

AFFIRMED

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE
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OPINION

The Petitioner, Darrell Douglas Sheets, appeals the trial court’s order

denying him habeas corpus relief. He was indicted for and convicted of

aggravated rape. He argues that his conviction is void because the indictment

charging him with the offense of aggravated rape is fatally defective because it

failed to allege the requisite mens rea. We affirm the judgm ent of the trial court

dismissing the petition.

In his habeas corpus petition, the Petitioner alleges that the indictment

failed to specify the mens rea for the offense of aggravated rape and thus, his

conviction was void. The Petitioner was indicted for aggravated rape on May 4,

1992. He pleaded guilty to that offense on September 23, 1992, and was

sentenced to fifteen years incarceration. He filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus on August 19, 1996. The trial court dismissed the petition on September

9, 1996, without a hearing. The Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the order of

dismissal and a motion for entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law on

October 1, 1996. The trial court denied the motion on December 10, 1996. The

Petitioner now appeals.

The Petitioner argues that his conviction for aggravated rape is void

because the indictment did not allege the requisite mens rea for the offense. An

indictment or presentment must provide notice of the offense charged, an

adequate basis for the entry of a proper judgment, and suitable protection against

double jeopardy. State v. Trusty, 919 S.W .2d 305, 310 (Tenn. 1996); State v.
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Byrd, 820 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn. 1991); State v. Lindsay, 637 S.W.2d 886,

890 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982). The indictment “must state the facts in ordinary

and concise language in a manner that would enable a person of common

understanding to know what is intended, and with a degree of certainty which

would enable the court upon conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment.” 

Warden v. State, 381 S.W.2d 244, 245 (Tenn. 1964); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-

202. 

A lawful accusation is an essential jurisdictional element, thus, a

prosecution cannot proceed without an indictment that sufficiently informs the

accused of the essential elements of the offense. State v. Perkinson, 867 S.W.2d

1, 5 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); State v.Morgan, 598 S.W.2d 796, 797 Tenn. Crim.

App. 1979). A judgment based on an indictment that does not allege all the

essential elements of the offense is a nullity. Warden v. State, 381 S.W .2d at

245; McCracken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972).

Furthermore, the Tennessee Code provides that "[i]f the definition of an offense

within this title does not plainly dispense with a mental elem ent, intent,

knowledge, or recklessness suffices to establish the culpable mental state." 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-301(c). 

The Petitioner cites a recent decision of a panel of this Court that held an

indictment invalid which charged the offense of aggravated rape in language

nearly identical to that in the case sub judice. See State v. Roger Dale Hill,

C.C.A. No. 01C01-9508-CC-00267, Wayne County (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville,

June 20, 1996), rev’d, ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1997). He argues that the

indictment fails to assert a reckless, knowing or intentional mental state as
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required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-301(c). The indictment

reads as follows:

The Grand Jurors of the aforesaid State and County duly empaneled and

sworn, upon their oath, present that: Darrell Douglas Sheets between

November 1991 and February, 1992 in the State and County aforesaid,

and before the finding of the indictment, did unlawfully have sexual

penetration of [A.M.L.], a victim less than 13 years of age, contrary to the

statute, and all of which is against the peace and dignity of the State of

Tennessee.

Our supreme court recently provided guidance on this issue in its opinion

reversing Hill:

for offenses which neither expressly require nor plainly dispense with the

requirement for a culpable mental state, an indictment which fails to allege

such mental state will be sufficient to support prosecution and conviction

for that offense so long as

(1) the language of the indictment is sufficient to meet the

constitutional requirements of notice to the accused of the charge

against which the accused must defend, adequate basis for entry of

a proper judgment, and protection from double jeopardy;

(2) the form of the indictment meets the requirements of Tenn. Code

Ann. § 40-13-202; and

(3) the mental state can be logically inferred from the conduct

alleged.

Hill, ___ S.W.2d ___ (Tenn. 1997).

Here, the indictment clearly satisfies the constitutionalnotice requirements.

There was adequate notice that the Defendant was charged with the statutory

offense of aggravated rape as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section

39-13-502(a)(4) (1991), which contained the essential elements of the offense.

Here too, is sufficient information by which the trial judge could pronounce

judgment for the offense of aggravated rape. Finally, the Defendant is

adequately protected against a second prosecution for an offense of aggravated
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rape of the victim occurring during the period of November 1991 to February

1992.

Regarding the second requirement, it is also apparent that the indictment

was drafted such that a person of ordinary intelligence could understand with

what offense he was charged. The language in the indictment clearly tracks the

language of the statute. Likewise, the third requirement, that the mental state

be logically inferred from the indictment, has been satisfied. One can infer from

the charged act that the Petitioner “did unlawfully have sexual penetration”, that

the required mental state of reckless, knowing, or intentional was present in the

nature of the alleged criminal conduct. Hill, ___ S.W.2d at ___. Therefore, we

conclude that the indictment in this case adequately informed the Defendant of

the charges against him and does not provide sufficient grounds for his claim for

habeas corpus relief. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgm ent of the trial court dismissing the

petition.

____________________________________

DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE

CONCUR:

___________________________________

GARY R. WADE, JUDGE

___________________________________

JERRY L. SMITH, JUDGE