Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1411-CR-391 | July 27, 2015 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Mark A. Bates

Office of the Lake County Public 

Defender, Appellate Division

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Cynthia L. Ploughe

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ahkeem Shakur Scott-Manna,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

July 27, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A03-1411-CR-391

Appeal from the 

Lake Superior Court 

The Honorable Diane Ross Boswell, 

Judge

Cause No. 45G03-1212-MR-8

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A03-1411-CR-391 | July 27, 2015 Page 2 of 12

[1] Ahkeem Shakur Scott-Manna was convicted after a jury trial of murder,

1 a 

felony, and was sentenced to sixty years executed. Scott-Manna appeals, 

raising the following restated issues:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted into 

evidence the victim’s statement identifying Scott-Manna as her 

assailant;

II. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to prove the mens rea 

element and to support his conviction for murder; and

III. Whether Scott-Manna’s sixty-year sentence is inappropriate in 

light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At approximately 10:00 a.m. on December 7, 2012, Gary police officers were 

dispatched to an apartment regarding a report that a man was hitting a woman. 

Officer LaRia Crews arrived at the apartment and knocked on the door. A 

young woman answered, who appeared to have been woken up by the 

knocking on the door. The woman told Officer Crews she had not called 

police, but that there was another woman in the apartment. She took Officer 

Crews to a bedroom door, and Dorothy Griffin exited the room. Griffin was 

“disheveled,” “frazzled,” “excited,” “battered,” and “crying.” Tr. at 77-78. 

Griffin was hurt, and her left eye was swollen. Griffin stated that “Twin” had 

battered her. She said he had held her down in her bedroom and had beaten 

 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. 
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her, yelling that “he was not going to allow her to turn him in because they 

were trying to kill him.” Id. at 83. When the police looked inside Griffin’s 

bedroom, they found no one there. Griffin told them that the man who had 

beaten her had jumped out the window when the police knocked on the door. 

The officers noticed that the screen had been pushed out of the bedroom 

window and was lying on the ground. Officer Crews called an ambulance for 

Griffin at that time.

[4] Around the same time, other officers heard another dispatch concerning a man

“running and screaming that someone’s trying to kill him.” Id. at 123. The 

man, later identified as Scott-Manna, entered a nearby McDonald’s restaurant, 

jumped over the counter, and acted paranoid and frantic. The officers located 

him about eight blocks from Griffin’s apartment. When they approached him, 

Scott-Manna repeated that someone was trying to kill him. He then stated, “I 

beat the old woman” and “Are you going to kill me?” Id. at 124. The officers 

told him they were not going to kill him and took him into custody.

[5] The officers then drove Scott-Manna to the apartment complex where the crime 

occurred. Griffin was being placed in an ambulance, and Officer Crews asked 

Griffin, “Is that the man that beat you,” to which Griffin responded, “Yes, 

that’s ‘Twin.’” Id. at 127. Scott-Manna apologized and then stated, “Yeah, I 

beat that . . . bitch, bitch’s ass.” Id. He also said, “Yeah, I hit that old bitch. I 

busted her in the face.” Id. at 144. Both Griffin and Scott-Manna were taken to 

the hospital. While in the emergency room, Scott-Manna had an outburst and 

again yelled, “Yeah, I hit that bitch.” Id. at 87. 
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[6] Griffin died from her injuries a few days later on December 10, 2012. An 

autopsy was performed, which revealed that Griffin had internal hemorrhaging 

within her skull around the brain, between the layers covering the brain, and 

within the spaces of the brain. There was also evidence of severe swelling of the 

brain with parts of the brain beginning to be pushed outside of the skull 

“following the spinal cord and other openings.” Id. at 109. The pathologist 

determined that Griffin died as a result of the intracranial hemorrhages due to 

blunt force injuries to her head, consistent with multiple blows to the head from 

a fist. Id. at 114, 116-17. The manner of death was determined to be homicide. 

[7] On December 13, 2012, the State charged Scott-Manna with murder. A jury 

trial was held on March 3, 2014, which ended in a mistrial because of a hung 

jury. Prior to his retrial, Scott-Manna filed a motion to exclude the statement 

by Griffin, identifying Scott-Manna as her attacker, and the trial court denied 

the motion. A second trial was held on September 2, 2014, at the conclusion of 

which Scott-Manna was found guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced him 

to sixty-years executed. Scott-Manna now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Admission of Evidence

[8] Generally, we review the trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence for an 

abuse of discretion. Jones v. State, 982 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)

(citing Noojin v. State, 730 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ind. 2000)), trans. denied. We 

reverse only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 
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and circumstances. Id. Even if the trial court’s decision was an abuse of 

discretion, we will not reverse if the admission constituted harmless error. Id.

[9] Scott-Manna argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the 

victim’s statement identifying him as her attacker to be admitted during the 

trial. He asserts that the admission of this statement was a violation of the 

Confrontation Clause because Griffin was unavailable to testify, he had no 

opportunity to cross-examine her and her statement constituted a testimonial 

statement. Scott-Manna contends that the statement by Griffin was testimonial 

because she was describing a past event, and the statement was not necessary to 

resolve an ongoing emergency. 

[10] The Confrontation Clause is embodied in the Sixth Amendment to the United 

States Constitution and prohibits the admission of an out-of-court statement if it 

is testimonial, the declarant is unavailable, and the defendant had no prior

opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Lane v. State, 997 N.E.2d 83, 92 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2013), trans. denied), trans. denied. 

Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 

interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the 

primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 

meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 

circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing 

emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 

establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 

prosecution.
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[11] McQuay v. State, 10 N.E.3d 593, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Davis v. 

Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)). In determining whether the primary 

purpose of an interrogation is to address an ongoing emergency, we must 

objectively evaluate the circumstances in which the encounter occurs and the 

statements and actions of the parties. Id. 

[12] In the present case, when the police knocked on Griffin’s apartment door in 

response to a dispatch of a man hitting a woman, they interrupted ScottManna’s attack on Griffin, and Scott-Manna jumped out of the apartment 

window and fled the scene. The police found Griffin battered, hysterical, and 

crying. As they were responding to the initial dispatch, the police received 

reports of a man in the area who was running and screaming that someone was 

trying to kill him. As Griffin had told the police that Scott-Manna had also 

stated that someone was trying to kill him, this second report indicated that 

Griffin’s attacker was running around the neighborhood and was a present 

danger. The police were, therefore, handling an ongoing emergency that they 

needed to resolve to assure community safety. Griffin’s statement identifying 

Scott-Manna verified that the police had arrested her attacker and was in 

furtherance of assisting the police in their ongoing emergency. Therefore, the 

statement was not testimonial in nature and did not violate the Confrontation

Clause.

[13] However, even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Griffin’s 

statement, such error was merely harmless. If a trial court abused its discretion 

by admitting the challenged evidence, we will only reverse for that error if the 
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error is inconsistent with substantial justice or if a substantial right of the party 

is affected. Lehman v. State, 926 N.E.2d 35, 37 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. 

denied. Any error caused by the admission of evidence is harmless error for 

which we will not reverse a conviction if the erroneously admitted evidence was 

cumulative of other evidence appropriately admitted. Id.

[14] Scott-Manna challenges the admission of Griffin’s statement identifying him as 

her attacker, which was made as Griffin was being taken to the ambulance 

shortly after the battery occurred. However, Scott-Manna’s identity as the man 

who attacked Griffin was proven by other evidence. From his first interaction 

with the police, Scott-Manna admitted multiple times that he had battered 

Griffin. When the police initially approached him, he stated, “I beat the old 

woman.” Id. at 124. He later repeated this admission when taken back to the 

scene of the crime when he said, ““Yeah, I beat that . . . bitch, bitch’s ass.” Id.

at 127. He reiterated this admission at the scene and then again when taken to 

the emergency room. We conclude that these repeated admissions by ScottManna overshadow any prejudice that may have existed by the admission of 

Griffin’s statement. The statement by Griffin was merely cumulative of the 

admissions made by Scott-Manna that he battered Griffin, and any error in the 

admission of the statement was harmless.

II. Sufficient Evidence

[15] The deferential standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. This 

court will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses.
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Tooley v. State, 911 N.E.2d 721, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied; Elisea v. 

State, 777 N.E.2d 46, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Rather, we will consider only 

the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. 

Elisea, 777 N.E.2d at 48. We will affirm unless no reasonable fact-finder could 

find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Tooley, 911 

N.E.2d at 724-25. Thus, if there is sufficient evidence of probative value to 

support the conclusion of the trier of fact, then the verdict will not be disturbed. 

Trimble v. State, 848 N.E.2d 278, 279 (Ind. 2006).

[16] Scott-Manna argues that insufficient evidence was presented to support his 

conviction for murder. He specifically contends that the evidence presented

was not sufficient to prove that he knowingly or intentionally killed Griffin. 

Scott-Manna asserts that there was no evidence presented to show that he had 

problems with Griffin in the past, had threatened her previously, or used a 

deadly weapon when he attacked her. He, therefore, claims the evidence was 

only sufficient for the jury to determine that he knowingly and intentionally hit 

Griffin, which only constituted a battery. 

[17] In order to convict Scott-Manna of murder, the State was required to prove that 

he knowingly or intentionally killed another human being. Ind. Code § 35-42-

1-1(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the 

conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A 

person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is 

aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). 

“Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the 
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defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both 

the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has 

the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.” Stokes v. 

State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. The intent to 

commit murder may be inferred from the nature of the attack and the 

circumstances surrounding the crime, and it is within the province of the jury to 

draw an inference of knowledge or intent from the facts presented. Whatley v. 

State, 908 N.E.2d 276, 284 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. 

[18] The evidence presented at trial showed that Scott-Manna attacked Griffin in her 

apartment and hit her several times on the left side of her head. Griffin told the 

police that, as he battered her, Scott-Manna yelled that “he was not going to 

allow her to turn him in because they were trying to kill him.” Id. at 83. A jury 

could infer from such a statement that Scott-Manna intended to kill Griffin in 

order to keep her from turning him in. In fact, Scott-Manna was interrupted in 

his attack of Griffin by the police knocking on the door of the apartment; he, 

therefore, only fled because the police arrived and not because he had 

concluded his attack. Additionally, the evidence showed that Scott-Manna was 

a young man, who was agile enough to jump out an apartment window to 

escape the police. Griffin was a sixty-year-old woman, who was in “frail” 

health and suffered from several health conditions. Therefore, the relative sizes 

and strengths of Scott-Manna and Griffin suggest that Scott-Manna either 

knowingly or intentionally killed Griffin. Further, Scott-Manna repeatedly 

battered Griffin in the head and face area with sufficient force to cause 
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substantial injuries. The multiple blows caused bruising to her left eye area and 

actual eyeball as well as the intracranial hemorrhaging that was found within 

her skull around the brain, between the layers covering the brain, and within the 

spaces of the brain. The attack also resulted in severe brain swelling that had 

begun to cause the brain to be pushed outside of the skull. Looking at the 

evidence most favorable to the jury’s verdict, as we are required to do, we 

conclude that the jury could reasonably infer that, at the least, Scott-Manna 

knowingly killed Griffin. The evidence was sufficient to support Scott-Manna’s 

conviction for murder. 

III. Inappropriate Sentence

[19] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), “we may revise any sentence authorized by 

statute if we deem it to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

the character of the offender.” Corbally v. State, 5 N.E.3d 463, 471 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2014). The question under Appellate Rule 7(B) is not whether another 

sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence 

imposed is inappropriate. King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008). It is the defendant’s burden on appeal to persuade the reviewing court 

that the sentence imposed by the trial court is inappropriate. Chappell v. State,

966 N.E.2d 124, 133 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[20] Scott-Manna argues that his sixty-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the 

nature of the offense and the character of the offender. He claims that, as to the 

nature of the offense, he did not intend to kill Griffin and her cirrhosis 
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contributed to her death, and therefore, his sentence was not appropriate. 

Scott-Manna further asserts that, as to his character, his mental illness, remorse 

for his actions, and minimal criminal history show that his sentence was 

inappropriate.

[21] As to the nature of the case, the evidence shows that Scott-Manna attacked 

Griffin in her apartment, hitting her multiple times in the head and face area, 

and stopped when he was interrupted by the police knocking on the apartment 

door. Griffin eventually died from her injuries, which include severe 

hemorrhaging in her brain and swelling of the brain. Nothing in the record 

shows that Griffin provoked Scott-Manna in any way; in fact, Scott-Manna

stated in a letter he wrote to Griffin before her death that he knew she was 

trying to help him when he attacked her. State’s Ex. 28 D. Further, this was a 

crime committed by a young man against an older woman who was in frail 

health and not his physical equal.

[22] As to Scott-Manna’s character, although this is his first adult conviction, he was 

only eighteen when he committed the instant crime and had juvenile 

adjudications for auto theft and resisting law enforcement. He had been placed 

on probation for one of his adjudications, which he did not successfully 

complete, and had been made a ward of the State and ran away from 

placement, eventually being placed in the Indiana Boys School. Scott-Manna 

failed to utilize the repeated efforts of the juvenile justice system to steer him 

away from a criminal path. Additionally, during his incarceration for this case, 

Scott-Manna displayed repeated misconduct by allegedly battering a 
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correctional officer and damaging jail property. Based on these allegations, 

new criminal charges of battery and criminal mischief were filed against ScottManna. Although the trial court acknowledged that Scott-Manna has some 

mental health issues, that acknowledgement does not necessarily make his 

sentence inappropriate. Based on the nature of the offense and the character of 

the offender, we conclude that Scott-Manna’s sentence was not inappropriate.

[23] Affirmed.

Vaidik, C.J., and Bradford, J., concur.