### RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0363- 22 IN THE MATTER OF THE EXPUNGEMENT APPLICATION OF K.M.G.

_ _______________________

Argued October 3, 2023

– Decided November 8, 2023 Before Judges Sumners, Rose and Perez Friscia. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. XP

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- 002190. Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant State of New Jersey (Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney; Monica do Outeiro, of counsel and on the brief). Tara K. Walsh argued the cause for respondent K.M.G. (Ansell Grimm & Aaron, PC, attorneys; Robert A. Honecker, Jr., and Tara K. Walsh, of counsel and on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by SUMNERS, JR ., C.J.A.D. In this appeal of first impression, we must determi ne whether the "clean slate" statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3, which permits a n expungement of a New Jersey criminal record if ten years have passed "from the date of the person 's APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION November 8, 202 3 APPELLATE DIVISION2 A- 0363

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most recent conviction," applies to a conviction fr om another state. (Emphasis added). The trial court entered an order expunging petitioner's New Jersey criminal record after determining her 2017 Virginia misdemeanor conviction did

not preclude eligibility for expungement under the "cle an slate" statute because

an out- of -state conviction does not constitute a "most recen t conviction." The State contends the trial court erred in its interpr etation of the "clean slate" statute, contending petitioner's Virginia convictio n must be considered, and because it was entered within ten years of her peti tion for expungement , her petition should have been denied

. We reverse because the text of the "clean slate" st atute and related expungement statutes do not support the trial court 's interpretation to preclude consideration of an out

- of -state conviction from the phrase "most recent conviction." Moreover, such interpretation defies comm on sense given the "clean slate" statute's purpose to expunge a crimin al record of an applicant who has not violated the law within ten years of their last New Jersey conviction

. Consequently, petitioner's Virginia offense present ly disqualifies her from expungement of her New Jersey criminal record under the "clean slate" statute.
I.3 A- 0363

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On June 15, 2021, petitioner, a Virginia resident, filed an application with the Law Division seeking an ordinary expungement und er N.J.S.A. 2C:52-6, for

a 1988 arrest for forgery, 1 and under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 , for a 1991 conviction for third-degree conspiracy to commit burglary and four th-degree theft resulting in

a three-year probation sentence

. The State objected , claiming petitioner failed to include an "out- of -state arrest and/or charge" of unknown disposition

. On July 15, 2022, petitioner filed an am ended petition, explain ing that in
201 6 , she was arrested and charged in Virginia with "Atte mpt to Purchase a Firearm Without a Permit" and "False History on Cri minal History Consent Form." Petitioner eventually pled guilty in 2017 t o a Class 1 misdemeanor "Concealed Weapon" charge, Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-308 (a), resulting in a twelve-month suspended jail sentence. 2 She professed she in nocently affirmed

1 No conviction resulted.

2 In New Jersey, "[a]n offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction" that is punishable by "a sentence of imprisonment o f one year or less, but more than 30 days, . . . shall be considered in this Sta te to be a disorderly persons offense when a reference is made by this code, or b y any other statute of this State, to such offense." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a). Disorderly persons offenses and "crimes" are distinct. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1). An out- of -state offense punishable by more than one year imprisonment "shal l be considered in [New Jersey] to be a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(2).4 A- 0363

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on her handgun purchase application that she had ne ver been convicted of a felony. Petitioner claimed she believed her 199 1 New Jersey conviction had been automatically expunged

. Petitioner argued before the trial court that "her Virginia conviction should not be considered a criminal conviction. " She does not repeat that argument here. Indeed, her Virginia offense does n ot qualify as a "crime," see N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(a)(2), but as a "disorderly persons offense" under New Jersey law, see N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a). 3 There is no basis to read "most recent conviction" to refer only to convictions for "crime s."

If not for her Virginia conviction, it appears peti tioner would have been eligible for ordinary expungement under paragraph t hree of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a), which provid es that a person may present an expungement applicati on if she has been "convicted of multiple crimes . . . all of whi ch are listed in a single judgment of conviction," but not if she has "any su bsequent conviction for another crim e or offense in addition to those convictions include d in the expungement application, whether any such convictio n was within this State or any other jurisdiction." (Emphasis added). Had she been convicted of only one crime in New Jersey, she might have been eligible u nder paragraph one, which requires that the petitioner does not have "any sub sequent conviction for another crime, whether within this State or any other juris diction." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a). Petitioner's Virginia conviction was not for a "cri me," but a "disorderly persons offense." See N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(1).

3 T his offense has no bearing on the timeliness of petiti oner's "clean slate" application. As will be discussed later, the "clean slat e" statute provides for the expungement of disorderly persons offenses, too, no t just crimes. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3.5 A- 0363

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Petitioner requested that the trial court consider the "facts and circumstances surrounding" her Virginia conviction and "grant [her] expungement at the present time, rather than denyin g [her] application only to resubmit" when the 2017 Virginia conviction satisfies the ten-year co nvictionfree waiting period sometime in 2027

. The State objected, arguing petitioner was ineligible for ordinary expungement because the Virginia conviction was not outside the ten-year window to permit a "clean slate" expungement under N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 5. 3(b). On September 7, 2022, the trial court issued an ord er and written opinion granting petitioner's expungement application

. The court determined the Virginia conviction did not make petitioner's expun gement application premature, and that she otherwise satisfied the "cl ean slate" eligibility requirements of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3. The trial court reasoned the Virginia conviction did not constitute a "most recent conviction" under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3 because it was an out- of -state conviction

. The court interpreted the "most recent conviction" language of the "clean slate" statute's ten-year time requirement t o exclude an out- of -state conviction. The court explained the phrase "most r ecent conviction" is used twice in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), and the second usag e necessarily refers to a New6 A- 0363

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Jersey conviction where it states: "The person shall submit the expungement application to the Superior Court in the county in which the most recent conviction for a crime or offense was adjudged . . . . " The court determined that a petitioner could not file for a "clean slate" exp ungement in another jurisdiction, so the phrase "'most recent convictio n' . . . in that sentence must be referring to a New Jersey conviction." Citing De F lesco v. Mercer County Board of Elections, 43 N.J. Super. 492, 499 (App. Div. 19 57) (citation omitted), it relied on "the presumption that a word or phrase is used in the same sense throughout [a] statute," finding that "since the ph rase 'most recent conviction' in the third sentence of subsection (b) is clearly lim ited to a New Jersey conviction, the same phrase in the first sentence regarding the ten-year waiting period must also be limited to a New Jersey conviction." The court held "[t]o conclude otherwise would require [it] to conclude, which it cannot, that the [L]egislature included contradictory language within the subsecti on of a statute." The trial court found further support for disregardi ng petitioner's Virginia conviction by ruling: (1) another "potential start ing point[] of the waiting period," "the date on which the petitioner made pay ment of any 'court-ordered financial assessment,'" is limited to penalties related t o New Jersey convictions, as the statute defines "court-ordered financial ass essment" to mean any7 A- 0363

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"financial assessment imposed by the court as part of the sentence for the conviction or convictions that are the subject of t he application," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b) (emphasis added); (2) "convictions" in the phrase "a duly verified petition as provided in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-7 praying th at all the person's convictions . . . be expunged," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b), "must be limited to New Jersey convictions"; and (3) the Legislature expressly con sidered out- of -state convictions in defining eligibility in the other ex pungement statutes, but failed to include similar language in defining the waiting period in the "clean slate"
statute. II. Before us, the State argu es the trial court misinterpreted the "clean slate" statute. Before addressing the specifics of the Sta te's challenge, we first lay out the principles governing statutory interpretation and the "clean slate" statute 's requirements for expungement.
A. Our review of statutory interpretation is "de novo, unconstrained by deference to the decisions of the trial court." St ate v. Grate, 220 N.J. 317, 329 (2015) (citing State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 209 (2 007)). In doin g so, "[w] e

' mu st follow the well-settled rules of statutory const ruction "to determine and8 A- 0363

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give effect to the Legislature's intent."'" In r e R.K., 475 N.J. Super. 535, 540- 541 (App. Div. 2023 ) (quoting In r e H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020))

. If " a statute's plain language is clear, we apply that pl ain meaning and end our inquiry." Id. at 541 (quoting Garden State Check C ashing Serv., Inc. v. Dep't of Banking & Ins., 237 N.J. 482, 489 (2019)). The Leg islature's words and phrases are to be construed within the context of "related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole" and given their "gen erally accepted meaning . . . unless that meaning is 'inconsistent with the manif est intent of the [L]egislature.' " State v. Courtney, 243 N.J. 77, 85 (2020) (first q uoting Spade v. Select Comfort Corp., 232 N.J. 504, 515 (2018); and then quoting N.J.S.A.
1:1 -1). We recognize that courts must neither "rewrite a pl ainly-written enactment of the Legislature nor presume that the L egislature intended something other than that expressed by way of the p lain language." R.K. , 475 N.J. Super. at 543 (quoting State v. Frye, 217 N.J. 566, 575 (2014)). Nonetheless, e ve n though a statute may be clear and unambiguous , we have the responsibility to avoid "a literal interpretation [ that] would create a manifestly absurd result, contrary to public policy, [such tha t] the spirit of the law should control." Frye, 217 N.J. at 575 (quoting Turner v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 1629 A- 0363

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N.J. 75, 84 (1999)). This court recent ly recognized our "rules of construction are subordinate to [the] . . . proposition " that legislation should not be construed to create an absurd result. State v. W.C., 468 N.J . Super. 324, 331 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting State v. Provenzano, 34 N.J. 318, 32 2 (1961)). Thus "w hen . . . a plain reading of the statute leads to an absurd r esult, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, 'including legislative history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction. '" Courtney, 243 N.J. at 86 (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 238 N.J. 105, 114 (2019)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
B.
E xpunge ment in New Jersey is governed by N.J.S.A. 2C:52-1 to -32.1 , which was "'intended to establish "a comprehensive statutory scheme for the expungement of criminal records"' and to create 'an equitable system of expungement of indictable and nonindictable offense s as well as of arrest records.'" State v. Gomes, 253 N.J. 6, 21 (2023) ( quoting State v. T.P.M., 189 N.J. Super. 360, 364 (App. Div. 1983)). Eligibility for expungement depends on the record to be expunged: indictable offenses, N.J.S .A. 2C:52-2; disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C :52 -3; local ordinances, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-4; and juvenile matters, N.J.S.A. 2C :52-4.1. In 2019, our Legislature reformed the expungement system , in pertinent part, "including10 A- 0363

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'clean slate' expungement for those who had not com mitted an offense in ten years, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3." Gomes, 253 N.J. at 22

. This appeal centers around the interpretation of th e "clean slate" statute, which was enacted to make expungement available to those who are "not otherwise eligible to present an expungement applic ation pursuant to any other section of chapter 52." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a). Pr imary focus is on N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b) , which provides:

The person, if eligible, may present the expungemen t application after the expiration of a period of ten years from the date of the person's most recent convictio n , payment of any court-ordered financial assessment, satisfactory completion of probation or parole, or release from incarceration, whichever is later. Th e term "court-ordered financial assessment" as used herein and throughout this section means and includes any fine , fee, penalty, restitution, and other form of financ ial assessment imposed by the court as part of the sent ence for the conviction or convictions that are the subj ect of the application, for which payment of restitution t akes precedence in accordance with chapter 46 of Title 2 C of the New Jersey Statutes. The person shall submi t the expungement application to the Superior Court in th e county in which the most recent conviction for a cr ime or offense was adjudged, which includes a duly veri fied petition as provided in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-7 praying that all the person’s convictions, and all records and information pertaining thereto, be expunged. Th e petition appended to an application shall comply wi th the requirements set forth in [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-1 et seq. [(Emphasis added).]11 A- 0363

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The "clean slate" statute further provides a person may apply to expunge any number of New Jersey convictions for crimes, di sorderly persons offenses, and/or petty disorderly persons offenses, so long a s the person has never been convicted of a more serious crime listed in N.J.S.A . 2C:52-2(b), which are not subject to expungement, e.g., sexual assault, or of certain drug offenses described in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(c). N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a). Addi tionally, the eligibility bar against those who have previously h ad a conviction expunged does not apply to "clean slate" expungements. N.J. S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a); N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(e). Compared to the ordinary expungement pathway, "clea n slate" expungement has softer eligibility requirements but a harsher waiting period of ten years. See N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 2( a) (imposing a five-year waiting period for ordinary expungement) ; In re LoBasso , 423 N.J. Super. 475, 491 (App. Div. 2012) (holding the waiting period under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2 "was to increase the likelihood that a beneficiary of expungement had pe rmanently turned away from criminal activity and will not re-offend"). "Clean slate" petitions are otherwise subject to much of the same requirements as ordinar y expungement petitions. While the "clean slate" statute makes expungement a vailable to those who are "not otherwise eligible to present an expungement a pplication pursuant to any12 A- 0363

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other section of chapter 52 . . . or other section of law," N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a), it also states that a "clean slate" petition "shall comply with the requirements set forth in" chapter 52, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b). Addit ionally, while N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 14(e) expressly exempts "clean slate" expungement p etitions from the previous expungement bar, the other grounds for denial of ex pungement listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14 do not contain such exemptions. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-14(a) to (d).
III. The State essentially accepts the trial court's rea ding as to the plain meaning of the statute

–– out

- of -state convictions are excluded from the phrase "most recent conviction"

–– but argues that it is not the best indicator of the Legislature's intent in this appeal. In particular, the State argues the trial court's interpretation should be rejected because it contra dicts the purpose of New Jersey's expungement statutes

— to give "relief to the reformed offender." See N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32 (emphasis added). Expungement in view of petitioner's 2017 conviction, according to the State, "lead s to inconsistent and absurd results."
A. Initially, we point out our disagreement with the trial court , and for that matter, the State's concession that based on a plain meaning i nterpretation of the "clean slate" statute, "conviction" in the phrase " most recent conviction" is13 A- 0363

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limited to New Jersey convictions. Because the "cl ean slate" statute allows for the expungement of disorderly and petty disorderly persons offenses, not just crimes, "conviction" in the phrase "most recent con viction" means a conviction of a crime or disorderly persons or petty disorderl y persons offense

. When the words "crime," " dis orderly persons offense," or "petty disorderly pers ons offense" are used in New Jersey statutes, they ordi narily include out- of -state offenses. For example, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-4(b)(2)(a) st ates that "[a]n offense defined by the laws of any other jurisdiction" that is punishable by "a sentence of imprisonment of one year or less, but more than 30 days, . . . shall be considered in this State to be a disorderly persons offense when a reference is made by this code, or by any other statute of this State, to such offense." While we appreciate the trial court 's worthy analysis , we do not interpret "most recent conviction" in the ten-year waiting pe riod provision as creating a contradiction to exclude out

- of -state convictions as the court maintained. At most, the statutory language creates an inconsisten cy

— in one provision, it includes out- of -state convictions, in another, it does not. But a rguably, there is

no inconsistency because "conviction" simply means "c onviction," in New Jersey or elsewhere, and "conviction" in the statut e's venue provision is14 A- 0363

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impliedly qualified to mean "New Jersey conviction, " while it is not so qualified in the waiting period provision. More importantly, while it is the "general rule tha t a word or phrase should have the same meaning throughout the statute in the absence of a clear indication to the contrary," Perez v. Pantasote, Inc., 95 N.J. 1 05, 116 (1984) , courts should not "accord controlling significance to a mechanica l rule of statutory construction when to do so would violate the clear policies that form the foundation of" a statute, State v. O'Connor, 105 N. J. 399, 408 (1987). The trial court's reading of the statute fail ed to consider the Legislature's mandate that chapter 52 "be construed with the primary objective of providing relief to the reformed offender," but not "persistent violators o f the law or those who associate themselves with continuing criminal activ ity." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. To be clear, the trial court's interpretation of the s tatute is not limited to applicants like petitioner, who some might say had only a mino r additional brush with the law. The court's reading would apply equally and g ive relief to a petitioner with a lengthy record of out- of -state convictions in the ten years preceding an expungement petition. Reading N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(b ) to permit the expungement of an unlimited number of convictions o f a person who has continued to violate the law is plainly contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:52-32. Had the15 A- 0363

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Legislature intended to exclude a person's out- of -state offenses in defining their ability to obtain "clean slate" expungement, it wou ld have made that intention more explicit, as it did in making the prior-expung ement bar inapplicable to "clean slate" expungement. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3(a); s ee Perez v. Zagami, LLC , 218 N.J. 202, 216 (2014) (recognizing the Legislatu re does not "hide elephants in mouseholes" (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001))). In her merits brief, petitioner acknowledges "that the legislative intent of the '[c]lean [s]late' statute is to provide rehabilitated individuals the opportunity to succeed by removing barriers" presented by past convictions

. But the question here is not whether petitioner is "a rehab ilitated individual who . . . deserves an expungement," as she argues, but whethe r this court should accept a construction of the "clean slate" statute that wo uld give relief to not only her, but also to individuals who have not reformed and have repeatedly violated the law out- of -state since their last New Jersey conviction. Our answer is unequivocally no.
B. Assuming arguendo the trial court's and petitioner 's interpretations of the "clean slate" statute were a fair reading of its pl ain language, which excludes16 A- 0363

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consideration of her Virginia conviction in expungi ng her New Jersey convictions , we agree with the State that it would "lead [] to inconsistent and absurd results." Applying the trial court's plain-meaning interpretation is cont rary not only to the general purpose of the expungement statutes, but also to the apparent design of the "clean slate" statute as an alternative to ordinary expungement, one that balances comparatively looser eligibility requ irements with a stricter waiting period. As this court has noted with respe ct to an ordinary expungement, the intended "function of the original ten-year waiting period"

— which was later amended down to five years, N.J.S.A . 2C:52- 2( a)

— for ordinary expungement "was to increase the likelihood that a beneficiary of expungement had permanently turned away from criminal activity and will not re-offend."
LoBasso , 423 N.J. Super. at 491. The Legislature's apparent intention in creating th e "clean slate" option was to expand eligibility while ensuring, with a ha rsher waiting period, that only the least likely to re-offend could benefit from it . Allowing a continuous offender to expunge all their New Jersey conviction s simply because their most recent crimes occurred out of state would completely undermine this design. It would also, as the State argues, disadvantage New J ersey residents over non-17 A- 0363

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New Jersey residents for no conceivable reason. As a matter of common sense, petitioner should not be rewarded through an expung ement of her New Jersey criminal record for what amounts to a disorderly pe rsons offense because the offense took place in another state. Had the disor derly persons offense been committed in New Jersey, petitioner could not have had it expung ed under the "clean slate" statute. This belies logic consideri ng the "clean slate" statute's
purpose. Our courts have faced a similar dilemma when interpreting prior iterations of the expungement statutes to avoid an absurd resu lt. In State v. Josselyn, 148 N.J. Super. 538, 539-40 (Law Div. 1977), the trial court interpreted the phrase "no subsequent conviction" in the expungement statu te, N.J.S.A. 2A:164- 28

. 4 At that time, the statute stated:

In all cases wherein a criminal conviction has been entered against any person, and no subsequent conviction has been entered against such person, it shall be lawful after the lapse of 10 years from the date of such conviction or 10 years after the date such per son completed his term of imprisonment or was released from parole, whichever is later, for the person so convicted to present a duly verified petition to th e court wherein such conviction was entered, setting forth all

4 "N.J.S.A. 2A:164-28 . . . was the applicable expung ement statute prior to the enactment of Title 2C of the penal code in 1979." In re Ross, 400 N.J. Super. 117, 122 (App. Div. 2008).18 A- 0363

- 22 the facts in the matter and praying for the relief provided for in this section. [Josselyn, 148 N.J. Super. at 539-40 ( quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:164

- 28 ( 1977 )) .] The court determined that "no subsequent conviction " included out- of

state convictions. Id. at 540. The court reasoned that the alternative "would enable an individual with a single criminal convict ion in this State, but . . . subsequent judgments of conviction rendered against him within the ten-year period in every other jurisdiction of this nation, to petition the New Jersey courts" for expungement, an "absurd" result that ra n counter to the statute's purpose to give relief to the reformed. Id. at 540

- 41. 5 Likewise, we addressed out

- of -state convictions in State v. Ochoa, 314 N.J. Super. 168, 170-73 (App. Div. 1998). We consi dered whether out- of -state disorderly persons offenses impacted expungement el igibility under an earlier version of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3, which then provided:

Any person convicted of a disorderly persons offens e or petty disorderly persons offense under the laws of this State who has not been convicted of any prior or subsequent crime, whether within this State or any

5 The Legislature effectively validated the court's c onclusion in Josselyn two years later when it enacted a new expungement statu te making explicit that a disqualifying "prior or subsequent crime" encompass ed crimes "within this State or any other jurisdiction." N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2(a) (1 979).19 A- 0363

- 22 other jurisdiction, or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses, may, a fter the expiration of a period of 5 years from the date of his conviction, payment of fine, satisfactory completio n of probation or release from incarceration, whichever is later, present a duly verified petition as provided in section [N.J.S.A.] 2C:52-7 hereof to the Superior C ourt in the county in which the conviction was entered praying that such conviction and all records and information pertaining thereto be expunged. [Id. at 170 (emphasis added) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:5 2- 3 (1981)) .] The issue centered on the qualifier phrase, "whethe r within this State or any other jurisdiction," which followed "subsequent cri me" but seemed not to apply to "or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses." Id. at 170- 71 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). We concluded " [i]t would be manifestly inconsistent with this legislative inten t to expunge the New Jersey convictions of a habitual petty offender who has co mmitted numerous petty offenses in other jurisdictions but no more than th ree such offenses in New Jersey." Id. at 172 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (198 1)).
We also rejected the notion that "a literal reading" of N.J.S.A. 2C:52- 3 supported such a result, reasoning that the statute barred "expungement of convictions for disorderly persons and petty disorderly of fenses if the petitioner has 'another three disorderly persons or petty diso rderly persons offenses,'20 A- 0363

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without specifying that such offenses must have been committed within this State." Ibid. (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 (1981)). Notwithstanding that the statute expressly referred to convictions for crime s "'whether within this State or any other jurisdiction,' without repeating this phrase in regard to other convictions for disorderly persons and petty disord erly persons offenses," the court declined "to construe this omission as an aff irmative expression of a legislative intent that convictions of disorderly p ersons and petty disorderly persons in other jurisdictions should be disregarde d." Id. at 172-73. The current version of the statute now makes clear that disorde rly persons convictions "whether within this State or any other jurisdictio n" are counted in determining eligibility. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3. As in Ochoa, the "clean slate" language does not sp ecify that the conviction in question includes out

- of -state convictions, but it also does not specify "that such offenses must have been committe d within this State." 314 N.J. Super. at 172; cf. N.J.S.A. 2C:52-5.3. Like in Ochoa, there also is a strong, if not conclusive, textual argument that the disput ed language nevertheless excludes out- of -state convictions. See Goldhagen v. Pasmowitz, 24 7 N.J. 580, 600 (2021) ("When 'the Legislature has carefully em ployed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implie d where excluded.'" (quoting21 A- 0363

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In re Plan for Abolition of Council on Affordable H ous., 214 N.J. 444, 470 (2013))). Furthermore, similar to Ochoa, that argu ment must fail given the Legislature's clear directive that the expungement statutes be construed to give relief to the reformed "but not to create a system wh ereby persistent violators of the law . . . have a regular means of expunging the ir police and criminal records."
N. J.S.A. 2C:52-32. Our Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]he Legisla ture is presumed to be 'thoroughly conversant with its own legislation and the judicial construction placed thereon.'" Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephso n, 135 N.J. 209, 239- 40 (1994) ( quoting Quaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 14 (1975)). When our Legislature has not specified whether out- of -state convictions are considered regarding the availability of expungement, the courts have constr ued the expungement statutes

to declare that they do. E.g., Ochoa, 314 N.J. Super. at 172-73; Josselyn, 1 48 N.J. Super. at 539-40. We should not assume the Le gislature intended we would rule any differently here. Finally, nothing in the history of the "clean slate " statute's enactment supports the trial court's interpretation. Statements from the Governor's Office and legislators in support of the enactment are con sistent with the purpose of the expungement statutes as expressed in N.J.S.A. 2C:52 -32. The Governor's22 A- 0363

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Office's press release refers to the "clean slate" expungement process as for those "who have not committed an offense in ten yea rs. " Senate President Stephen M. Sweeney, who sponsored the "clean slate" bill, S. 4154 ( 2018 ), said that "clean slate" was for "former offenders." Ass emblywoman Verlina Reynolds-Jackson stated the process would "bring us a step closer to social equity and social justice for offenders who have no t committed a law violation in years." We are thus convinced that, given the clear intent of the "clean sl ate" statute, expunging petitioner's New Jerse y criminal record would result in an absurd result because her Virginia conviction occur red within ten years of her petition for expungement

. Reversed and remanded to the trial court to enter a n order vacating its expungement order.