IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2019-CP-01317-SCT
ATIBA PARKER

v. JERWORSKI MALLETT AND KAREN ROBINSON

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/29/2019 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN HUEY EMFINGER TRIAL COURT ATTORNEY: DARRELL CLAYTON BAUGHN COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATIBA PARKER (PRO SE) ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: DARRELL CLAYTON BAUGHN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 07/23/2020 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE KING, P.J., MAX WELL AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
MAX WELL, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Af ter two f elony convictions and consecutive sentences f o r s e l l i n g c o c aine, Atiba Parker later pled guilty to a third f elony —this tim e cocaine possession. The judge sentenced Parker as a subsequent o f

f ender to eight y ears on the possession charge. 1 And he ordered the

sentence be served c onsecutive to Parker’s two cocaine sale convictions. Based on the two

1 M iss. C o d e A n n . § 4 1 -2 9 -1 4 7 (R ev
. 2 0 0 5 ).drug dealing convictions, the judge also sentenced Parker as a habitual of f ender. 2 ¶2. A f ter serving a quarter of each of his f i rst two f elony sentences , P a r k e r a s k e d t h e Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections f or a parole date on his cocaine possession sentence. MDOC d e term ined Parke r w as parole eligible on the two cocaine sale sentences. But because Parker had been s entenc e d a s a h abitual of f ender on his cocaine p ossession charge—and h ad n ot y et com pleted his m andatory eight y e ar possession sentence—he was ineligible f

or parole. So no p arole date was s et on his cocaine possession c onviction. Af ter exhausting MDOC’s Adm inistrative Rem edy P rogram (ARP), Parker f iled a com

plaint in circuit court seeking judicial review. The c ircuit c o urt agreed with MDOC and af f irm ed its parole decision. Parker has now appeale d to this Court. Because tim e s t ill rem ains on Parker’s h abitual of

f ender sentence, he is s tatutorily prohibited f rom r eceiving p arole f

or his cocaine possession conviction. W e thus af f irm MDOC’s parole denial.
B ackground Facts and Procedural History ¶3. In Novem

b e r 2 0 0 6 , a j u r y f

o u n d P a r k e r guilty of two separate J uly 2005 f elony cocaine sales. 3 O n Novem ber 17, 2006, the t rial court s entenced Parker t o twenty y ears on one of the drug deals and a consecutive f ourteen y ear term

on the other. ¶4. In Septem

ber 2005—af

ter P a r ker com m itted his July 2005 cocaine sales but bef ore his Novem

ber 2 0 06 trial—Parker got caught again with c ocaine. This arrest, w hich occurred

on Septem

ber 24, 2005, w as f

o r possession of less t han 0.1 gram s of cocaine. A grand jury

2 M iss. C o d e A n n . § 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 (R ev . 2 0 0 0 ).

3 S ee P a rk er v. S ta te , 5 S o . 3 d 4 5 8 (M iss. C t. A p p . 2 0 0 8 ). 2indicted Parker f or f elony c ocaine possession. 4 Based o n Parker’s earlier 2006 cocaine sale convictions, the State am ended Parker’s cocaine p ossession indictm ent to charge subsequent drug of f ender and habitual of

f ender enhancem ents under Mississippi Code Sections 41-29-
147 and 99-19-81. T he trial j udge f ound Parker q u a l i f

i e d as a subsequent drug of f ender.
Thi s g a v e t h e judge discretion to double the ordinary m axim um sentence. 5 The judge exercised this discretion a nd sen t e n c e d P a rker to eight y e a rs—two tim es the f our y ear statutory m axim

um
. See Miss. C ode A nn. § 41-29-139(c)(1)(A) (Rev. 2005). Because the
trial judge als o f

ound Parker qualif

ied as a habitual of

f ender, t he m andatory eight y ear

4 A t th e tim e o f h is ch arg ed crim e, M i ssissip p i C o d e S e ctio n 4 1 -2 9

- 1 3 9 ( c)(1 )(A ) (R ev . 2 0 0 5 ) p ro v id ed :

L ess t h an o n e-ten th (0 .1 ) g r a m o r o n e (1 ) d o sag e u n it o r less m ay b e ch arg ed a s a m isd e m e an o r o r f elo n y . If ch arg ed b y in d ictm en t as a f elo n y : b y im p riso n m en t n o t less th an o n e (1 ) y e ar n o r m o r e th an f o u r (4 ) y e a r s a n d a f in e n o t m o re th an T en T h o u san d D o llars ($ 1 0 , 0 0 0 )

. If ch a r g ed a s a m isd em ean o r: b y im

p riso n m en t f

o r u p to o n e (1 ) y ear a n d a f in e n o t m o re th an O n e T h o u san d D o l lars ($ 1 ,0 0 0 ).

5 T h is d iscretio n w as f

o u n d in M ississip p i C o d e S ectio n 4 1 -2 9

- 1 4 7 (R ev
. 2 0 0 5 ), w h ich stated : E x cep t a s o th erw i se p ro v id ed in S ectio n 4 1 -2 9 -1 4 2 , an y p erso n co n v icted o f a seco n d o r su b seq u en t o f f en se u n d er t h is art i cle m ay b e im p riso n ed f

o r a term u p to tw ice th e t erm o th erw ise a u th o rized , f

i n e d a n am o u n t u p to tw ice th at o t h erw ise au th o rized , o r b o th

. F o r p u rp o ses o f t h is sectio n , an o f f en se i s co n sid e red a seco n d o r su b seq u e n t o f

f en s e, if , p rio r to h is co n v ictio n o f th e o f f en se, th e o f

f en d er h as at an y tim e b een co n v icted u n d er th is article o r u n d er an y statu te o f th e U n ited S tates o r o f a n y state r elatin g t o n a rco tic d ru g s, m arih u an a, d ep ressan t, stim u lan t, o r h allu cin o g en ic d ru g s. 3sentence coul d n o t b e r e d uced or suspended. 6 Nor c ould Parker receive parole f or that sentence, which was to run “consecutive to any other sentence” he was serving. ¶5. On October 31, 2017, the parole board notif ied Parker he was eligible f or parole on his t wo 2006 cocaine sale c harges. This led Parker to s eek a parole date. But Parker had not
y et served his rem aining eight y ear, m andatory habitual of f ender drug possession sentence. MDOC of

f icial Jerworski Mallett’s f irst step response to Parker explained t hat because this eight y ear s entence rem ained, h e was not parole e li g i b l e on t he c ocaine p ossession conviction. 7 Parker wanted MDOC to take another look. So he requested a s u p e r v i s o r review his f

i le and tim e s heets. Supervisor K aren R obinson carried out that r eview. And in her second step response, she too f ound Parker still m

ust serve his habitual of

f ender based

m andatory eight y e ar sentence. P arker, pro s e and i n f o rm a pauperis (IFP), f

iled a com plaint on January

17, 2019, in the Rankin County Circuit Court, suing Mallett and Robinson. ¶6. In his com

plaint, Parker argued MDOC wrongly denied him a parole date f or his eight
y ear sentence. He asserted h e is n ot a subsequent drug of f ender under Section 41-29-147.

6 T h e ap p l icab le h ab itu al o f f en d er statu te t o P ark e r , M i s s
. C o d e A n n
. § 9 9 -1 9 -8 1 (R ev . 2 0 0 0 ), stated : E v ery p erso n c o n v icted in th is state o f a f elo n y w h o sh all h av e b een co n v icted tw ice p rev io u s l y o f an y f elo n y o r f

e d eral crim e u p o n ch a rg es sep arately b ro u g h t an d arisin g o u t o f sep a rate in cid en ts at d if f e r en t tim es a n d w h o sh all h av e b een s e n t e n c e d to sep arate t erm s o f o n e (1 ) y ear o r m o re in an y state an d /o r f ed eral p en al in stitu tio n , w h eth er i n th is state o r elsew h e re, sh all b e sen ten c ed t o th e m a x im

u m term o f im

p riso n m en t p rescrib ed f

o r su ch f elo n y , an d su c h sen ten ce sh all n o t b e red u ced o r su sp en d ed n o r sh all su ch p erso n b e elig ib le f o r p aro le o r p ro b a tio n
.
7 In its b rief

, M D O C in sists th at M allett m erely d eliv ered th e f irst step resp o n se, b u t an o th er M D O C o f

f icial rev iew ed P ark er’s f

ile an d tim e sh e ets. 4And he claim ed he was not properly charged as a Section 99-19-81 habitual of f ender. The
trial court disagreed. The judge f ound MDOC’s decision w as within MDOC’s a uthority and supported by substantial evidence. It was neither arbitrary nor c apricious, and did not violate Parker’s statutory or constitutional rights. T h e j u d g e af f irm ed MDOC’s decision to deny Parker a parole date. Parker now appeals to this Court.
Discussion ¶7. Th i s Court “reviews the decision of an adm i nistrative agency to determ ine whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary or capricious, was bey ond the agency ’s power to adopt, or was violative of a constitutional or statutory provision.” King v. Miss. M

ilitary Dep’t , 245 So. 3d 404, 407 (Miss. 2018) (citing Watkins Dev., LLC

v. Hosem ann , 214 So. 3d 1050, 1053 ( Miss. 2017)). W e review t he record a nd the agency ’s
f indings, but do not reweigh evidence or s ubstitute our judgm ent. Miss. C om m ’n on Envtl. Quality v. Chickasaw C

ty. Bd. of Supervisors , 6 21 So. 2d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 1993) (citing
Miss. Pub. S

erv. Com m ’n v. Merchs. Truck Line, Inc. , 598 So. 2d 778, 7 82 (Miss. 1992)). This Court no longer g rants def e rence to an agency ’s statutory interpretations. King , 245 So. 3d at 407-08. Instead, we review these interpretations de novo

. Id.
I. Merits of MDOC’s Decision ¶8. Parker’s two 2006 cocaine sale sentences a r e n o t t h e i m pedim ent here—nor is his subsequent o f

f ender designation. I n d e e d , M D O C o ffi c i a ls explained during the ARP process that P arker is p a role e l i g i b l e f or both of his 2006 sentences. W hat prevents Parker f rom receiving parole is his habitual of f ender status, which requires h e serve his 2 009 m andatory

5eight y ear sentence—a sentence he has not y et com pleted. ¶9. Parker received three consecu t i v e s e n t e n c e s for f elony drug convictions under Section
41-29-139. H is 2006 cocaine sale sentences a re straightf orward—twenty and f

ourteen y ears. See Parker v. State , 5 So. 3 d 458 (Miss. Ct. A p p
. 2008). W h en convicted in 2006, Mississippi Code Section 4 7-7-3 required Parker to s erve one q uarter of each 2006 sentence and observe the penitentiary ’s rules to b e parole eligible. Miss. Code Ann. § 4 7-7-3 (Supp. 2005). And he did that. Still, in y ears past, even though P arker had served a quarter of each sentence, his subsequent o f f ender s t a t u s u nder S ection 4 1-29-147 f or the 2009 cocaine possession would have precluded his p arole. But r ecently , House Bill 387 rem oved this bar. ¶10. On July 1 , 2 0 1 8 , H o u s e Bill 387 (the A ct) becam e law. See H.B. 387, Reg. Sess.,
2018 Miss. Laws ch. 4 16, § 5. Am ong i ts other provisions, the Act am ended Miss i ssippi Code Section 47-7-3(1)(f ). Bef ore the Act, the Section s tated that def endants c onvicted of
“f elonies w ith e n h a n c e d penalties” were not eligible f or p arole. M iss. Code Ann. § 47-7- 3(1)(f ) (Rev. 2015). But the revised statute n ow has an exception f or penalty enhancem ents under Section 41-29-147. See Miss. Code A nn. § 4 7-7-3(1)(f ) ( Supp. 2019). The Act specif ically provides t hat “an of f ender who r eceives an e n h a n c ed penalty under the provisions of

Section 41-29-147 f

or such possession, shall be eligible f or parole.” Id. ¶11. Passage o f the Act—and i ts ef f ect on subsequent of

f enders—prom

p ted Parker to seek

a parole date through the ARP process. Parker is correct that his subsequent of f e nder status

no longer precludes MDOC f rom setti n g a p a r o l e d a t e. But what the Act did not do is

rem ove the parole prohibition f or habitual of

f e n ders. Indeed, at the ve r y b e g inning of

6Section 4 7-7-3, it states “[ n]o prisoner convicted as a conf irm ed and habitual crim inal under

t h e provisions of Section[ ] 9 9-19-81

. . . shall be eligible f or p arole.” Miss. Code A n n
. § 47-7-3(1)(a) (Supp. 2019). T he Act d id not change this. And Section 99-19-81 still m akes

c l e a r t h a t habitual of

f enders m ust serve their sentence without p ossibility of suspension, reduction, parole, or p r obation. See Miss. C ode Ann. § 99-19-81 (Supp. 2019). Because Parker was sentenced a s a habitual of f ender and has not y et com pleted his 2009 m andatory eight y ear cocaine possession sentence, MDOC properly denied him a parole date.
II. Other Claim s ¶12. Parker also t hrows in severa l p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i ef ty pe attacks. He aim s at his indictm ent, the enhancem e nts, a nd the legalit y o f his m a ndatory eight y ear sentence. But Parker has previously raised sim ilar claim s in a postconviction relief petition, which the
Court of Appeals f

ound tim e barred and without m e rit. 8 See Parker v. State , 208 So. 3d 19,
23-24 (Miss. C t. App. 2017). Parker did not petition the Court of Appeals f or rehearing or seek certiorari r e view in this Court. Nor has he s ought perm i ssion f rom this Court to f

ile a subsequent postconviction relief petition in t h e t r i al court—som ething he m ust do bef

ore raising new PCR claim s. C onclusion ¶13. Substantial e vidence supported MDOC ’ s d e c i s i o n t h a t Parker had t o com plete his

8 O n th e m erits, th e C o u r t o f A p p eals h eld : ( 1 ) P ark er’s g u ilty p lea w as k n o w in g ly an d v o lu n tarily m a d e; (2 ) th e am en d ed in d ictm en t’s en h an cem en t s d i d n o t u n f airly su rp rise th e d ef e n d an t n o r p reclu d e an y d ef en se; (3 ) h is c o u n sel w as n o t in ef f ectiv e ; an d (4 ) P ark er’s e i g h t y ear m an d ato ry sen ten c e w as p erm issib l e b ecau se h e w as b o th a su b seq u en t d ru g o f f en d e r a n d a h ab i tu al o f

f en d e r. P a rk er v. S

t a t e , 2 0 8 S o
. 3 d 1 9 , 2 3 -2 4 (M iss. C t. A p p
. 2 0 1 7 ). 7e i g h t y e ar m andatory sentence bef ore b ecom ing parole eligible on his cocaine possessi o n conviction. The decision w as not arbitrary or capricious, nor vio l a t i v e o f Parker’s constitutional or statutory rights. W e af f irm

. ¶14. AFFIRMED. RANDOLPH, C.J., K ITCHENS AND K I N G , P.JJ., COLEMAN, BEAM, CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.

8