NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIA MAGDALENA VALENZUELA

CAMPOS; ASTRID ANAHY 

VALENZUELA CAMPOS, 

Petitioners, 

 v. 

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, 

Respondent.

No. 18-72555 

Agency Nos. A206-848-630 

A206-848-631 

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted October 16, 2020**

San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW and COLLINS, Circuit Judges, and EATON,***International 

Trade Judge.

Maria Valenzuela Campos (Valenzuela) and her minor daughter, natives and 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Richard K. Eaton, Judge of the United States Court of 

International Trade, sitting by designation.

FILED

NOV 2 2020

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

citizens of Honduras, petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’s

(BIA) (1) denial of their claim that the Immigration Judge (IJ) faulted Valenzuela

for not submitting evidence that corroborated her testimony, without providing her 

notice and opportunity to gather such evidence and (2) affirmance of the IJ’s denial 

of their applications for asylum and withholding of removal. They also now

contend that the Immigration Court lacked jurisdiction over their removal 

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the petition. 

1. The Immigration Court properly exercised jurisdiction over

Valenzuela’s removal proceedings. “A notice to appear need not include time and 

date information” for jurisdiction to vest in the Immigration Court. Karingithi v. 

Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 

2105 (2018), is not controlling because “the Immigration Court’s jurisdiction does 

not hinge on [8 U.S.C.] § 1229(a).” Karingithi, 913 F.3d at 1159.

2. The BIA properly rejected Valenzuela’s corroborative evidence claim. 

As Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2011), and its progeny explain, the Real 

ID Act provides that an “IJ may require corroborative evidence” from a credible

asylum applicant whose testimony does not alone sustain her burden of proof. Id.

at 1093 (emphasis added). If the IJ so requires, he “must give the applicant notice 

of the corroboration that is required and an opportunity either to produce the 

requisite corroborative evidence or to explain why that evidence is not reasonably 
3 

available.” Id. Here, however, the IJ neither requested corroborative evidence nor

faulted Valenzuela for not submitting such evidence. Therefore, Ren’s notice-andopportunity requirement was inapplicable. See Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 

1003, 1009 (9th Cir. 2017). 

3. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Valenzuela’s 

applications for asylum and withholding of removal. Valenzuela bore the burden 

of proving that her status as a single mother was a “central reason” (for asylum 

purposes) or at least “a reason” (for withholding of removal purposes) for her past 

or future persecution by Honduran gangs. Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 

351, 358–59 (9th Cir. 2017). This showing required more than a “desire to be free 

from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang 

members.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).1

Valenzuela testified that gangs would target her upon her return to Honduras

“just for gang recruitment and gang violence.” Meanwhile, she attributed the 

robberies and threats she suffered in the past to her being “a weak woman” and the 

lack of “security” or effective policing in Honduras. Given this record, substantial 

1 Valenzuela’s petition does not challenge the BIA’s conclusions regarding 

her eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal on the basis of her nationality 

or the proposed particular social groups of “Americanized individuals” or 

“individuals who might be subject to gang recruitment.” Meanwhile, the petition’s 

vague references to her eligibility for relief under the Convention Against Torture 

are misplaced, as she abandoned that claim before the IJ. We therefore do not 

consider Petitioners’ eligibility for relief on any of these grounds. 
4 

evidence supports the IJ’s finding that there was “no evidence linking [her] status 

as a single mother to her victimization.” Cf. Regalado-Escobar v. Holder, 717 

F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Regalado presented little evidence that his 

attackers were motivated by anything other than his refusal to join them, increase 

their ranks, and participate in their violent activities. . . . Regalado offered no 

evidence to show that his attackers were even aware of his [protected ground].”).2

PETITION DENIED.

2 The IJ’s decision predated Barajas-Romero, and he thus wrongly applied 

the “central reason” standard to Valenzuela’s withholding of removal claim. But 

because the IJ found “no evidence linking [Valenzuela’s] status as a single mother 

to her victimization,” “neither the result nor the [IJ’s] basic reasoning would 

change” as to Valenzuela’s application for withholding of removal, Singh v. Barr, 

935 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). Thus, remanding this matter is 

unnecessary. See id.