alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
October 16 , 2012



### JUDGMENT


## The Fourteenth Court of Appeals

BYER CUSTOM BUILDERS , Appellant

NO. 14

- 11

- 00906

- CV V.

STEVEN AND ROBIN FRA NKS , Appellee s

________________________________ This cause, an appeal from the judgmen t in favor of appellee, Steven and Robin Franks, signed, September 13 , 201 1 , was heard on the transcript of the record. We have inspected the record and find no error in the judgment. We order the judgment of the
court below AFFIRMED

. We order appellant, Byer Cu stom Builders, to pay all costs incurred in this appeal.

We further order this decision certified below for observance.
## NO. 12

- 24

- 00227

- CV
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS

IN THE INTEREST OF L. M. C., R. C. & R. W. C., JR., CHILDREN § § § APPEAL FROM THE 420TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
NACOGDOCHES COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION PER CURIAM This appeal is being dismissed for failure to comply with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3. Pursuant to Rule 32.1, Appellant D.S. ’s docketing statement was due to have been filed at the time the appeal was perfected, i.e., July 18, 2024 . On July 18 , this Court requested that Appellant file a docketing statement within ten days if s he had not already done so. Appellant did not file the docketing statement as requested. On July 31 , this Court issued a second notice advising Appellant that the docketing statement was past due. The notice further provided that unless the docketing statement was filed on or before August 8 , the appeal would be presented for dismissal in accordance with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3. The date for filing the docketing statement passed, and Appellant has not complied with the Court’s request. Because Appellant failed, after notice, to comply with Rule 32.1, the appeal is dismissed

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3(c) (after giving ten days’ notice, appellate court may dismiss appeal because appellant failed to comply with a requirement of the appellate rules, a court order, or a notice from the clerk requiring a response or other action within a specified time)

.
Opinion delivered August 1 5 , 202 4

. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

## COURT OF APPEALS
TW ELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
J UDGMENT

AUG UST 1 5, 2024

NO
. 12-24-00227- CV

I N THE INTEREST OF L. M. C., R. C. & R. W. C., JR., CHILDREN

A ppeal from the 420th District Court of Nacogdoches County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. C2338248)
THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the appellate record; and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this Court that this appeal should be dismissed. It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED by this Court that this appeal be, and the same is hereby dismissed ; and that the decision be certified to the court below for observance.

B y per curiam opinion. Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J
#### JACOBSON v. JACOBSON.

No. 2837.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Beaumont.

Dec. 6, 1935.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 11, 1935.

D. E. O’Fiel, of Beaumont, for appellant.

A. L. Shaw, of Beaumont, for appellee.

WALKER, Chief Justice.

This was an action for divorce by appellant, Ethel Jacobson, against appellee, F. M. Jacobson, with prayer for adjustment of property rights. In her petition appellant listed a large amount of personal property which she claimed to own as her separate estate. Appellee'answered, praying for divorce, and claiming part of the property as his separate estate, and the principal part of the balance as community property. Two creditors intervened; one pleading an unsecured debt, and the other a debt secured by mortgage against certain 'of the property brought into the case by the pleadings of appellant and appellee, with prayer for foreclosure of lien. Pending the litigation, a receiver was appointed to hold and manage the property. 'The judgment recited that all parties appeared and announced ready for trial, -that a jury was waived, and that the evidence and argument of counsel were heard by the trial court, whereupon judgment was entered granting appellant a •divorce against appellee, fixing the rights of the parties in the property, granting the interveners judgment for the amounts of their respective claims, with foreclosure of lien, as prayed for. There is no statement of facts in the record.

Appellant’s propositions are: (a) The court entered judgment without hearing testimony; (b) it conclusively appears that the property described in the pleadings was her separate property; (c) she was deprived of the privilege of securing counsel to represent her; (d) the court erred in awarding appellee judgment for a community interest in the property.

The record contains two bills of exception. One of these bills was prepared by the court, and recites as facts' the very things that appellant assigns error against. Appellant made a notation on this bill that she refused to accept it, and presented to the court a second bill, which was a mere copy of her motion for new trial. *516In this motion for new trial she recited as facts the conclusions upon which her propositions are based. The court refused to approve that bill of exception and made thereon this notation: “This bill is allowed subject to the bill heretofore made and filed herein on February 28th by me which I ask to be taken as a substitute and qualification of this bill tendered on this 1st day of March, A. D. 1935 and made a part of the record on appeal herein, witness this March 1st, A. D. 1935. Geo. C. O’Brien, Judge 58th District Court”.

Appellant accepted this bill with the qualification, and filed it. She is therefore, bound by the fact recitations of the bill prepared and filed by the trial judge. There being no statement of facts, this court is bound by the recitations of the judgment, and by the facts recited in the trial court’s bill ,of exception.

The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
EXHIBIT
32.2




WRITTEN
STATEMENT


PURSUANT
TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350




In
connection with Quarterly Report of Lihua International, Inc. and its
subsidiaries (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30,
2010 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the “Report”), the undersigned, Yang “Roy” Yu, Chief Financial Officer of
the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:




(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13a-14(b) or
15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and




(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Dated:
      November 15, 2010
                        By:
                        /s/
      Yang “Roy” YuName:
                        Yang
      “Roy” YuTitle:
                        Chief
      Financial
Officer
1 John T. Boyd, Chi ef Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Ap peals, sitting by

assignment . Tex. Gov ’t Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2002). NO. 07-02-0267 -CR IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L E JANUA RY 8, 2003

______________________________ JOSE DEME TRO ARAUSA JR., AP PELLANT

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________ FROM THE64 TH DISTRICT COURT OF HALE COUNTY; NO. A14185-0109; H ONORAB LE JACK R. MILLE R, JUDGE

_______________________________ Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, SJ. 1 Upon his plea of guilty, appellant Jose Demetro Arausa Jr. was c onvicted of the offense of aggravated r obbery and assessed a seven-ye ar probated p enal senten ce and2

a fine of $1,000, w ith 180 d ays of the sente nceto b e se rve d in t he H ale C oun ty J ail. Appellant gave timely notice of ap peal from the conviction. However, other than the preparation and filing of a clerk’s and reporter’s record, no further action was taken towards pursuing the appeal. That state of affa irs led us to abate and rem and the case to the tr ial court for the purpose of

determ ining why the appeal had not been properly pursued and if appellant still desired to appeal his conviction. In compliance with this cou rt’s dire ctio n, o n De cem ber 19, 200 2, t he t rial cour t he ld a hearing todeterm ine thosem atters. Appellant was pre sent a t the hearing. At the com pletion of the heari ng, the tria l court made findi ngs of fact and con clus ionsof l aw in which it found that although appellant was indigent, hedid not desire the appointment of an attorney or to pr osecute an appeal in this case and he wish ed the appeal to be dismissed. The trial court also found that it had notgranted appellant permission to appeal his conviction after his guilty plea. Accordingl y, this

app eal is

hereby dismissed. Because the appeal is dismissed as a result of app ella nt’s request, no m otion for rehearing will be entertained and our mand ate will issue forthwith. John T. Boyd Senior Justi ce Do not publish.
| (1)   | the                quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB of Sunberta Resources Inc. for the                quarter                ended September 30, 2007 fully complies with the requirements of                Section                13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | the                information contained in the quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for                the                quarter ended September 30, 2007, fairly presents in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of Sunberta                Resources Inc. |
|-----------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   By: |   /s/                Kelly Sundberg                                                            |
|-----------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|  Name:     |  Kelly                Sundberg                                                                      |
|  Title:    |  Principal                Executive Officer,Principal                Financial Officer and Director |
|  Date:     |  November                13, 2007                                                                   |
Exhibit 35.1



AMERICAN HONDA FINANCE CORPORATION

ANNUAL COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE

PURSUANT TO SECTION 3.11(a) OF THE

SALE AND SERVICING AGREEMENT AND

ITEM 1123 OF REGULATION AB



I, Paul C. Honda, do hereby
certify that I am the Vice President and Assistant Secretary of American Honda Finance Corporation, a California corporation (the
"Company"), and further certify on behalf of the Company in its capacity as servicer (the "Servicer" and "Sponsor")
under the Sale and Servicing Agreement (the "Agreement") dated as of October 18, 2012 among the Servicer and Sponsor,
American Honda Receivables LLC, as Seller, and Honda Auto Receivables 2012-4 Owner Trust, as follows:



| | (i) | A review of the activities of the Servicer during the reporting period ended March 31, 2014, and of its performance under the
Agreement has been made under my supervision.
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) | To the best of my knowledge and information, based upon such review, the Servicer has fulfilled
all its obligations under the Agreement throughout such period in all material respects.
| | ---- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 23rdday
of May, 2014.



| | /s/ Paul C. Honda                                   
| | ----------------------------------------------------
| | Paul C. Honda                                       
| | Vice President and Assistant Secretary              
| | (senior officer in charge of the servicing function)
#### BILBY v. STATE.

No. 13727.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Jan. 7, 1931.

Appeal from District Court, Young County; Allan D. Montgomery, Judge.

A. M. Bilby was convicted of manufacturing intoxicating liquor, and he appeals. Affirmed.

V. D. Shurtleff, of Breckenridge, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, J.

Conviction is for manufacturing intoxicating liquor; punishment being two years in the penitentiary.

Conviction was under the second count in the indictment which alleged that appellant manufactured “whisky.” The point is made that under the statute (Rev. St. 1925, art. 5075) it was necessary to allege that appellant manufactured “intoxicating liquor,” which it is claimed was not met by averring the manufacture of whisky. . The holding of this court has been against appellant’s contention. Brown v. State, 101 Tex. Cr. R. 495, 276 S. W. 438. It is not necessary to cite the numerous cases in which it has been held that this court will take judicial knowledge that whisky is an intoxicating liquor. In view of such settled holding, it would be illogical to say that an averment describing the liquor as whisky did not describe it also as intoxicating liquor.

 .The question presented by bill of exception No. 1 is not briefed by counsel for appellant, and the point is probably waived, but, there being no direct waiver thereof, we consider it. The bill reflects that, after the impanelment of the jury, the presentment of the indictment and appellant’s plea, and during the testimony of the first witness for the state, one of the jurors disclosed that he had been upon the grand jury which had returned the 'bill of indictment against appellant, which fact seems not to have been theretofore known. We find this recital in the bill:

“* * * The court 3⁄8 * * asked counsel for the defendant if he requested the court to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury, to which counsel for the defendant stated that is correct; the court then asked the defendant ‘You through your counsel are making that request and agree to it?’ to which the defendant assented and stated, ‘Yes, sir, that is correct.’ 3⁄8 * *”

After appellant personally confirmed such request, the court discharged .the first jury and directed the selection of another. The plea of former jeopardy was interposed, based upon the transaction heretofore recited. It has been too many times held that appellant cannot interpose a plea of former jeopardy by reason of a condition brought about by himself, such as the discharge of a former jury, to justify a discussion of the question; reference to the authorities upon the point is deemed sufficient. Arcia v. State, 28 Tex. App. 198, 12 S.W. 599; Carroll v. State, 50 Tex. Cr. R. 485, 98 S. W. 859, 123 Am. St. Rep. 851, 14 Ann. Cas. 426; McCoy v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. R. 593, 294 S. W. 573; Abbott v. State, 94 Tex. Cr. R. 31, 250 S. W. 188.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment is affirmed.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr., Chief Justice

Stephen J. Markman

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano 

Richard H. Bernstein, Justices

I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

 July 28, 2015

d0720

Order 

Clerk

July 28, 2015

149728(25)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v SC: 149728

COA: 320350

Wayne CC: 84-473556-FC

KIM MOSS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/

On order of the Court, the motion for reconsideration of this Court’s April 1, 2015 

order is considered, and it is DENIED, because it does not appear that the order was 

entered erroneously.
## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________
No. 1D 16

- 1922

_____________________________
M ARK B EECHAM , Appellant,

v.

S TATE OF F LORIDA , Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. Angela C. Dempsey , Judge

. April 19, 2018

P ER C URIAM

.
A FFIRMED

.
R OBERTS , R OWE , and W INOKUR , JJ., concur

.

_____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________2 Edward Iturralde of Law Office of Edward Iturralde, P.A., Tallahassee
, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General; Holly N. Simcox and Sharon S. Traxler, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee
, for Appellee.
Exhibit 10.1


 





SEVENTH
AMENDMENT TO


CONSULTING
AGREEMENT


DATED
AS OF JULY 2, 2012 BETWEEN


NTN
BUZZTIME, INC. AND JABAM, INC.


 


 


The
following amendment to the above-referenced Agreement between NTN BUZZTIME, INC. and JABAM INC. are made and effective as of July
1, 2014.


 


		A.	Section
                                         2.1 is amended to read, in its entirety, as follows:



 


The
term of this Agreement shall commence on July 1, 2014 (the "Effective Date") and, unless earlier terminated in accordance
with Section ‎7 shall expire on September 30, 2014.







 


 


 





	NTN
    BUZZTIME, INC.	 	 	JABAM,
    INC.
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	By:
    	/s/
    Jenna Lynch		 	By:
    	/s/
    Jeffrey A. Berg
	 	Authorized
    Signature	 	 	 	Authorized
    Signature
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	Jenna
    Lynch	 	 	 	Jeffrey
    A. Berg
	 	Print
    Name	 	 	 	Print
    Name
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	VP
    Human Resources	 	 	 	Chairman
	 	Title	 	 	 	Title
	 	 	 	 	 	 
	 	July
    1, 2014	 	 	 	July
    1, 2014
	 	Date	 	 	 	Date
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-40658

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

GREGORIO LOPEZ-GAMEZ,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:12-CR-1163-1

Before PRADO, ELROD, and HAYNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The Federal Public Defender appointed to represent Gregorio LopezGamez has moved for leave to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance 

with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 

F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). Lopez-Gamez has not filed a response. 

Because Lopez-Gamez has completed the confinement portion of his 

sentence, has evinced a desire to appeal only his sentence, and has been 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 16, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-40658 Document: 00512598511 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
No. 13-40658

removed from the United States, his appeal is now moot. See United States v. 

Rosenbaum-Alanis, 483 F.3d 381, 382-83 (5th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, the 

appeal is DISMISSED as moot, and counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is 

DENIED as unnecessary.

2

 Case: 13-40658 Document: 00512598511 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
## Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Quan M. Lacy , Appellant

No. 06

- 21

- 00045

- CV v.

William Hull, Jr. , Appellee Appeal from the 89th District Court of Wichita County, Texas (Tr. Ct

. No. DC89

- CV2021

- 0605 ). Memorandum Opinion delivered by Chief Justice Morriss

, Justice Burgess and Justice Stevens participating

.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appeal should be dismissed

for want of prosecu tion . Therefore, we dismiss the appeal.

We note that the appellant, Quan M . Lacy , has adequately indicated his inability to pay
costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED OCTOBER 13 , 2021 BY ORDER OF THE COURT JOSH R. MORRISS, III CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST: Debra K. Autrey , Clerk
EX-10.4(c)



 EXHIBIT 10.4(c) 
 August 8, 2014 
 Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC 

522 Fifth Avenue, 13th Floor 
 New York, New York
10036 
  

			
	Re:	  	 Ceres Managed Futures LLC: Amended Schedules 1 and 2 to the Alternative

Investment Selling Agent Agreement


 Ladies and Gentlemen: 
 Pursuant to paragraph 13(c) of the Alternative Investment Selling Agent Agreement dated November 12, 2013, as amended on March 1, 2014; April 7, 2014 and as further amended from time
to time (the “Agreement”), between, among others, Ceres Managed Futures LLC (“CMF”), the general partner of each of the limited partnerships listed on Schedule 1 thereto (each, a “Partnership,” and together,
the “Partnerships”), and Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC (“MSSB”), CMF is hereby confirming that Schedules 1 and 2 to the Agreement are hereby deleted in their entirety and replaced with Schedules 1 and 2
attached hereto effective as of October 1, 2014. 
 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Agreement, by signing
below MSSB hereby agrees to, acknowledges and accepts the amendment of the Agreement, effective as of October 1, 2014. 







 Page 2 
 If the foregoing is in accordance with your understanding of our discussions, kindly sign and return to us a counterpart hereof (by mail, facsimile or email) as soon as possible. 

Sincerely, 
  

			
	CERES MANAGED FUTURES LLC
		
	By:	 	/s/    Alper Daglioglu
		 	 Alper Daglioglu
 President
and Director



  

			
	 EACH PARTNERSHIP LISTED ON
 SCHEDULE 1 HERETO
  
 By: Ceres
Managed Futures LLC, the
 general partner of each Partnership

		
	By:	 	/s/    Alper Daglioglu
		 	 Alper Daglioglu
 President
and Director



 Confirmed, accepted and agreed to: 

 

			
	MORGAN STANLEY SMITH BARNEY LLC
		
	By:	 	/s/    Jeremy Beal
	Name:	 	Jeremy Beal
	 Title:
	 	Executive Director








 Page 3 
 SCHEDULE 1 
  

					
	 PARTNERSHIP
	  	
STATE AND DATE OF
 ORGANIZATION
	  	EFFECTIVE DATE
	 Emerging CTA Portfolio L.P.
	  	New York; July 7, 2003	  	October 1, 2013








 Page 4 
 SCHEDULE 2 
  

			
	PARTNERSHIP	  	ONGOING SELLING AGENT
FEE
	         
                       Emerging CTA Portfolio L.P.	  	2.00% per year of the adjusted net assets of Class A Units and 0.75% per year of
the adjusted net assets of Class D Units (computed monthly by multiplying the adjusted net assets of the Class A Units by 2.00% and the adjusted net assets of the Class D Units by 0.75% and dividing the result thereof by 12).1 Class Z units will not be subject to an ongoing selling agent
fee.

  

	1 	Adjusted net assets are month-end Net Assets increased by that current month’s ongoing selling agent fee, management fee, the general partner’s administrative
fee, the incentive fee accrued, other expenses and any redemptions or distributions as of the end of such month.