UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-1463

LINDA LIEVING,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

PLEASANT VALLEY HOSPITAL, INC.; THOMAS SCHAUER,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of West Virginia, at Huntington. Robert C. Chambers, 

Chief District Judge. (3:13-cv-27455)

Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: January 6, 2016

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Walt Auvil, RUSEN & AUVIL, Parkersburg, West Virginia, for 

Appellant. Arie M. Spitz, Brian J. Moore, DINSMORE & SHOHL, LLP, 

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Linda Lieving appeals the grant of summary judgment in 

favor of Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc. (“PVH”) and Thomas 

Schauer, PVH’s Chief Executive Officer (collectively, 

“Defendants”), in her employment discrimination action. Lieving 

alleged that Defendants fostered a hostile work environment in 

which she was discriminated against on the basis of her sex, in 

violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 

U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012), and the West Virginia Human 

Rights Act, W. Va. Code Ann. § 5-11-1 (2014). On appeal, 

Lieving argues that she suffered unwelcome conduct based on her 

sex and that such conduct was sufficiently severe and pervasive 

to constitute a hostile work environment.

We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, 

“drawing reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 

the non-moving party.” Butler v. Drive Auto. Indus. of Am., 

Inc., 793 F.3d 404, 407 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). Summary judgment is only appropriate when 

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a). “[T]he nonmoving party must rely on more than 

conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one 

inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of 
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evidence.” Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 311 (4th Cir. 

2013).

Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] 

against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s . . . sex.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 

Because “an employee’s work environment is a term or condition 

of employment, Title VII creates a hostile working environment 

cause of action.” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, 775 F.3d 202, 207 

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). To 

establish a claim for a hostile work environment, an employee 

must show that she suffered “unwelcome” harassment that was 

based on her sex, was “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 

the conditions of her employment and create an abusive 

atmosphere,” and was imputable to her employer. Freeman v. 

Dal-Tile Corp., 750 F.3d 413, 420 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal 

quotation marks omitted).

Harassment is based on an employee’s sex where, “‘but for’ 

the employee’s sex, he or she would not have been the victim of 

the discrimination.” Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 

F.3d 138, 142 (4th Cir. 1996). In making this determination, 

“[t]he critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates, is whether 

members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or 

conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are 
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not exposed.” Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 

U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).

After reviewing the record, we find no evidence that 

Lieving suffered harassment based on her sex. There is no 

reason to believe that were she not female, the alleged events 

at PVH would have transpired differently. Lieving primarily 

complains of one incident with another employee and the 

aftermath of that incident. But the incident, combined with a 

few sexually suggestive offhand comments by male executives 

during unrelated board meetings, is not sufficient to show that 

Lieving suffered discrimination based on her sex.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment to Defendants. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented 

in the materials before this court and argument would not aid 

the decisional process.

AFFIRMED