[Cite as State v. Black, 2011-Ohio-3127.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT 

HARDIN COUNTY 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 6-10-15 

 v. 

SHAWN MARK STEVEN BLACK, O P I N I O N 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 

Appeal from Hardin County Common Pleas Court 

Trial Court No. 20052025 CRI 

Judgment Affirmed 

Date of Decision: June 27, 2011 

 

APPEARANCES: 

Nicole M. Winget for Appellant 

Bradford W. Bailey for Appellee 
Case No. 6-10-15 

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WILLAMOWSKI, J. 

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Shawn Mark Steven Black (“Black” or 

“Defendant”), appeals the judgment of the Hardin County Court of Common Pleas 

after he was granted a new sentencing hearing to correct an error in the imposition 

of postrelease control (“PRC”) for his 2006 convictions for rape and gross sexual 

imposition. In this appeal, Black contends that the trial court erred when it failed 

to provide the reasoning behind its decision to impose consecutive sentences. For 

the reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed. 

{¶2} In May of 2006, a jury found Black guilty of one count of rape of a 

child under age 10, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a felony of the first 

degree, and six counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 

2907.05(A)(4), felonies of the third degree. On August 1, 2006, the trial court 

classified Black as a sexual predator and sentenced him to a mandatory life prison 

term for his rape conviction and to a two-year prison term for each of his grosssexual-imposition convictions, all to be served consecutively for a total sentence 

of life plus twelve years. On June 25, 2007, this Court affirmed Black’s 

conviction on appeal. See State v. Black, 172 Ohio App.3d 716, 2007-Ohio-3133, 

876 N.E.2d 1255. 
Case No. 6-10-15 

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{¶3} In August of 2010, the State requested a resentencing hearing “solely 

to impose the five year mandatory postrelease control.”1

 A resentencing hearing 

was held for the “limited purpose” to “re-sentence Mr. Black, to state on the 

record that he basically is going to receive five years of post release control ***.” 

(Oct. 25, 2010 Sentencing Tr., p. 2.) On November 1, 2010, the trial court filed 

the corrected Entry of Sentence, imposing the same sentence as in his original 

sentence for each of the seven counts, but also adding the notification that PRC is 

mandatory for five years. 

{¶4} Black now appeals from this new sentencing entry, raising the 

following assignment of error for our review. 

Assignment of Error 

The trial court erred as a matter of law, and in prejudice of 

[Black], when it failed to give reasons in support of its findings 

when it imposed consecutive sentences. 

{¶5} Black argues that the trial court erred by failing to make findings, 

pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(E)(4), prior to imposing consecutive sentences. We find 

that his argument is without merit for several reasons. 

 

1

 The original August 1, 2006 Entry of Sentencing notified Defendant about his parole eligibility after ten 

years on count one, pursuant to R.C. 2967.13. The judgment then stated that if Defendant was ever paroled 

and then found to have violated any term of his parole, the Adult Parole Authority could impose a more 

restrictive sanction and he could face being returned to prison until his death. The judgment entry further 

stated that, “Defendant is Ordered to serve as part of this sentence any term of post release control imposed 

by the Parole Board, and any prison term for violation of that parole.” However, the trial court did not 

specify a definitive mandatory term of five years of postrelease control. See State ex rel. Carnail v. 

McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 931 N.E.2d 110; R.C. 2967.28(B). 
Case No. 6-10-15 

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{¶6} As a preliminary matter, Black’s resentencing was only for the narrow 

purpose of imposing the correct PRC. Black’s limited sentencing hearing to 

correct the portion of his sentence pertaining to PRC “cannot be used as a vehicle 

to reopen all other aspects of his case.” See State v. Griffin, 3d Dist. No. 1-10-27, 

2011-Ohio-1462, ¶9. 

{¶7} R.C. 2929.191, enacted as part of H.B. 137, establishes a procedure to 

remedy sentences that fail to properly impose a term of PRC for defendants, like 

Black, who were sentenced on or after its July 11, 2006 effective date. See State 

v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958, paragraph 

two of the syllabus. 

The hearing contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(C) and the 

correction contemplated by R.C. 2929.191(A) and (B) pertain 

only to the flawed imposition of postrelease control. R.C. 2929.191 

does not address the remainder of an offender's sentence. Thus, 

the General Assembly appears to have intended to leave 

undisturbed the sanctions imposed upon the offender which are 

unaffected by the court's failure to properly impose postrelease 

control at the original sentencing. 

(Emphasis added.) Singleton at ¶24. 

{¶8} The Ohio Supreme Court recently affirmed that it is only the PRC 

aspect of a sentence that must be rectified, and the remainder of the sentence 

remains valid under the principles of res judicata. State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 

92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶17. Although the issue in Fischer 
Case No. 6-10-15 

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pertained to the imposition of PRC in a case where the defendant was sentenced 

before the effective date of R.C. 2929.191, its reasoning is equally applicable to 

the facts in any case where a court has not properly imposed PRC. See id. at ¶31 

(stating that “[o]ur decision today is limited to a discrete vein of cases; those in 

which a court does not properly impose a statutorily mandated period of 

postrelease control.”) “[R]es judicata still applies to other aspects of the merits of 

a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the 

ensuing sentence.” Id., at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶9} And, even if other portions of Black’s sentence would have been 

subject to review, Black’s argument has no basis in the current law. In State v. 

Foster, the Ohio Supreme Court declared unconstitutional those portions of the 

felony sentencing statutes that required judicial fact-finding before the trial court 

could impose a prison sentence, specifically including R.C. 2929.14(E)(4). 109 

Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶97. The Ohio Supreme Court 

held that, “[t]rial courts have full discretion to impose a prison sentence within the 

statutory range and are no longer required to make findings or give their reasons 

for imposing maximum, consecutive, or more than the minimum sentences.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at paragraph seven of the syllabus. This reasoning was 

recently reaffirmed in State v. Hodge, 128 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-6320, 941 

N.E.2d 768, at paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. 
Case No. 6-10-15 

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{¶10} Based on the above, Black’s assignment of error is overruled. 

Having found no error prejudicial to the Appellant herein in the particulars 

assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Judgment Affirmed 

ROGERS, P.J. and SHAW, J., concur. 

/jlr