1 NOT PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 11

- 1968

___________ ZHAOJIN DAVID KE ,

Appellant

v. ASSOCIATION OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE COLLEGE & UNVERSITY FACULTIES; CELIA ELDER

________________________ ____________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Civil Action No. 1

- 10

- cv - 00448 ) District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III

____________________________________ Submitted Pursuant to Third Circu it LAR 34.1(a)

October 11, 2011 Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR. , and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed : October 12, 2011 )

___________ OPINION

___________
PER CURIAM2

Zhaojin David Ke, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order granting Appel lees’ motion to dismiss his complaint. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
I. Since we write for the parties, who are familiar with the background of this case, we discuss the events leading to this appeal only briefly. From August 2001 through December 2007, Ke served as a professor at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania (“EUP”), and was a member of a labor union known as the Association of Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties (“APSCUF”). In December 2006, EUP denied Ke
tenure , a decision he believed was made in retaliation for his having filed racial discrimination claims against the university with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”)

. In light of EUP’s tenure decision, Ke filed a g rievance against EUP pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement

. In February 2007, Celia Elder, the director of APSCUF’s contract department, informed Ke by letter that APSCUF would not be arbitrating his grievance. In April 2007, after having reconsidered the issue at Ke’s
req uest, Elder sent Ke a letter reiterating that APSCUF would not be arbitrating his grievance

. In September 2007, the EEOC issued its findings with respect to the aforementioned claims against EUP , concluding that the universi ty had discriminated against Ke

. In November 2007, Ke received an email from APSCUF’s EUP Chapter3

P resident, David Obringer; that email stated as follows: “I spoke with our state contract department. As I expected and had told you on the phone, our contract determines what we can do. The EEOC operates under a different set of rules. Their ruling does not affect your denied grievance.” (App. 40.) In May 2008, Ke filed a cla im against APSCUF with the EEOC, claiming that APSCUF had refused to arbitr ate his grievance because he is Chi n ese. The EEOC ultimately dismissed Ke’s claim as untimely. In February 2010, Ke initiated the instant action by filing a complaint in the District Court against APSCUF and Elder (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Defendants”)

. The complaint, whi ch centered around APSCUF’s refusal to arbitrate his grievance against EUP, raised claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, and the P ennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”)

. Defendants ultimately

mov ed to dismiss the complaint, and t he District Court referred that motion to a United States Magistrate Jud ge. On March 1, 2011, the Magistrate Judge issued a report recomm ending that the court grant Defendants’ motion. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge concluded that Ke’s Title VII claim a gains t Elder was non

- cognizable, his PHRA claims were barred because he had failed to timely file an administrative complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Com m ission, and his remaining claims were time

- barred. Ke subsequently filed objections to the report, challenging the analysis of his Title VII and § 1981 claims4

only. On March 15, 2011, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report, granted Defendants’ motion, and dismissed the complaint. This appeal followed.
II. We have jurisdi ction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s ord er granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
See U.S. Dep’t of Transp., ex rel. Arnold v. CMC Eng’g , 564 F.3d 673, 676 (3d Cir. 2009). In conducti ng this review, “we accept as true all well

- pled factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we affirm the order of dismissal only if the pleading does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” See id

. The only aspects of the District Court’s decision that Ke disputes are its dismissal of his § 1981 claims and its dismissal of his Title VII claim against APSCUF. Having considered the parties’ arguments, and for substantially the reasons set f orth in the Magistrate Judge ’s report and the District Court ’s March 15, 2011 memorandum , we agree with the court’s decision to dismiss his Title VII claim against APSCUF as untimely

. As for the § 1981 claims, Ke argues that these claims are timely becaus e they are governed by the four

- year statute of limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (a) , not Pennsylvania’s two

- year limitations period for persona l injury actions (the limitations period applied by the District Court ) . We disagree. Section 1658 (a) ’s four

year limitations period does not apply to claims that could have been raised under the
pre - 1990 version of § 1981. S ee Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. , 541 U.S. 369,5

38 2

- 8 3 (2004). Because we agree with the District Court that Ke’s cla ims could have been raised under that version of § 1981, s ee Patterson v. McLean Credit Union , 491 U.S. 164, 177 (1989); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. , 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987) ; Allensworth v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 945 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991), we conclude that the court appropriately applied Pennsylvania’s two

- year limitations period. See Goodman , 482 U.S. at 660

- 64 (agreeing with this Court that Pennsylvania’s two

- year limitations per iod governed plaintiffs’ § 1981 claims)

. Since we concur wit h the District Court’s conclusion that the challenged claims

are untimely , we need not address Ke’s argument s regarding the underlying merits of these claims. To the extent Ke seeks to amend his complaint to “streamline” his allegations, we note that any such amendment would be futile. See Foman v. Davis , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (indicating that district court may deny leave to amend on the basis of futility). Accordingly, and i n light of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s March 15, 20 11 ord er granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss Ke’s complaint.