### *The HONORABLE BRUCE M. VAN SICKLE, Senior District

Judge for the District of North Dakota, sitting by designation. The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States 1 

### District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. ___________ No. 95-3281

___________ Barbara Jean Robinson, * * Appellant, * * v. * Appeal from the United States * District Court for the Southern Neodata Services, Inc., * District of Iowa. * Appellee, * * Susan M. Kipp; Al Winston, * * Defendants. *

___________ Submitted: May 16, 1996 Filed: August 30, 1996

___________ Before MURPHY and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and VAN SICKLE, District Judge. *
ROSS, Circuit Judge.

Appel lant Barbara Jean Robinson appeals from the district court's 1 determ ination following a bench trial that Robinson failed to prov e appellee Neodata Services, Inc. (Neodata) had di scriminated against her on the basis of her disa bility under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq . (ADA).

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We affirm.
Robinson, born June 11, 1934, worked as a clerk in Neodata's ma gazine
ma il processing department, operating an automatic OPEX mail-openin g machine which required repetitive gripping and grasping, opening mail by hand, and countersorting. In February 1991, Robinson fell at work an d suffered an injury that eventually required her to reduce her work load to part-time. Robinson received workers' compensation benefits related t o this injury.

In Novemb er 1991, Dr. Kevin Smith placed Robinson on some permanent work restrictions tha t prevented her from operating the OPEX machine. On Nove mber 21, 1991, Robinson was placed on medical leave without pay
. Neodata encouraged her to apply for future open positions. In early 1992, Dr. Michael Makowsky gave Robinson a 6% disability rating on her right arm , and continued the permanent work restrictions wi th a small increase in the amount of weight Robinson could lift. Dr. Makowsky indicated that Robinso n had a minor impairment that would have little, if any, affect on Robinson' s ability to perform major life activities, including working.
Robinson states that from November 1991 to April or May 1992, sh e regula rlycontacted Neodata about returning to her old position o r obtaining a new position. Robinson applied for four different positions at Neodata, some of which were a grade level higher than her previou s positi on, but was rejected each time. On June 22, 1992, Susan Kipp , manager of personnel, sent Robinson a letter stating that Robinson ha d exceeded Neodata's six-month maximum medical lea ve and therefore she would be terminated in thirty days if not approved to return to work. Robinson, however, was not terminated on the specified date and the medical leave wa s extended. Kipp subsequently arranged for the company nurse to tak e Robinson on a tour of the Neodata facilities to show and explain available jobs to her. Robinson was scheduled to start in-house

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training during the summer of 1992, but she did not participate in th e training.
In April of 1993, Neodata offered Ro binson a position as a mail desk cle rk. Neodata wrote to Robinson advising her of the position in th e special se rvices department by a letter dated April 20 and by anothe r letter dated April 27. The April 20 letter gave Robinson until April 26 to return to work, and the April 27 letter advised Robinson that she was expected to return to work by May 3, 1993. Each letter indicated that her fai lure to return to work on the date specified would lead to he r termination. Robinson informed Neodata that she was in California an d could not return by that date. Neodata then extended her return-to-work date until May 10. When Robinson did not return to work on that date , Neodata terminated her employment.

Th e ADA prohibits employment discrimination "against a qualifie d individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual. " 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A plaintiff seeking relief under the ADA must show (1) that she is a dis abled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that she is able to perform the essential functions o f the job, with or without reasonable accommodat ion; and (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action "because of" her disability. Price v. S- B Power Tool , 75 F.3d 362, 365 (8th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. , 62 F.3d 1108, 111 2 (8th Cir. 1995). "Disability" is defined under the ADA to include:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.

42 U.S. C. § 12102(2). Under the regulations, "major life activities " include "functions such as caring for oneself,

### Robinson argues that the Social Security Administration's 2 

### determination that she was totally disabled, and thus entitled to benefits, had a preclusive effect on the issue of whether she was disabled under the ADA. Social Security determinations, however, are not synonymous with a determination of whether a plaintiff is a "qualified person" for purposes of the ADA. See Smith v. Dovenmuehle Mtg., Inc. , 859 F. Supp. 1138, 1141-42 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (citing Overton v. Reilly , 977 F.2d 1190, 1196 (7th Cir. 1992)). At best, the Social Security determination was evidence for the trial court to consider in making its own independent determination.

-4- perfor ming manual tasks, . . . and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)
. "Substantiallylimits" means "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes
as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphas is added). "The inability to perf orm a single, particular job does not constitute a substantia l limitation in the major life activity of working." Id .; see also Wooten v. Farmland Foods , 58 F.3d 382, 386 (8th Cir. 1995).
Robinson argued at trial that her physical disability substantially aff ects the major life activity of working. While Robinson has a n impairment, the evidence in the record shows tha t she is not significantly restricted in her ability to work, but merely is unable to perform th e primary function of her previous position as a mail processing clerk
. Robinson's own medical expert, Dr. Makowsky, opi ned that Robinson had only
a 6% impa irment rating of the right upper extremity and that this mino r impai rment would have little, if any, affect on her ability to perfor m major life activities, including working. Because Robinson failed t o establish that her physical impairment substanti ally limits one or more of her major life activities, or that she otherwise fits within the definitio n of disab ility, we conclude that the district court did not err i n determining that Robinson is not disabled under the ADA. 2

### -5- Even if Robinson had successfully established that she is a "disabled" person under the ADA, we would nevert heless affirm the district
cou rt's decision in favor of Neodata, because we conclude that Robinso n failed to establish that she was discharged because of her disability
. Eviden ce in the record shows that Neodata attempted to reasonabl y accommodate Robinson's work restrictions by, amo ng other things, providing Robinson with a reduc ed-hour shift, allowing a medical leave in excess of the company's standar d six-month leave, offering Robinson skills training and car eer counseling, and ultimately offering Robinson a job she wa s qualified for and cou ld perform within her restrictions without requiring her to interview for the position. Robinson was ultimately terminated onl y when she failed to report to work by the May 10, 1993 deadline.

Bas ed on the foregoing, the judgment of the district court i s affirmed.
A true copy.

Attest:
CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.