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In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-13-00470-CV

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IN THE ESTATE OF CHAD ERIC MCDONALD

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On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 1

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Cause No. 108647 

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MEMORANDUM OPINION 

After receiving a notice of appeal in this probate proceeding, we stayed 

further proceedings in the trial court while the parties briefed whether we had 

jurisdiction to consider Johnsye McDonald’s appeal from an order allowing

Johnsye to participate in the case as a creditor of the estate, but not as a person 

interested in the welfare of Chad Eric McDonald’s child. We conclude the order

does not deny that the appellant, Johnsye McDonald, has standing to participate in 

the trial court as a person interested in Chad’s estate, as the order expressly allows 

Johnsye the right to participate as a creditor in the proceedings before the court. 
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Thus, the orders at issue do not conclude a discrete phase of litigation regarding the 

estate and are not subject to interlocutory review on appeal. We dismiss the appeal 

for lack of jurisdiction.

Chad Eric McDonald died from injuries received in an industrial accident. In 

applications for letters of administration and to determine heirship, Kaylen Brooke 

Rankin alleged that she is Chad’s wife and the mother of his child. Kaylen

subsequently gave birth to another child, who may also be shown in further 

proceedings to be a beneficiary of Chad’s estate. Kaylen also filed an application 

for a determination that she and Chad had an informal marriage. 

In a competing application for independent administration and an application 

to determine heirship, Johnsye alleged that Chad was never married. Johnsye also 

alleged that he is interested in the estate because he was given possession of 

Chad’s minor child by court order and because he paid Chad’s funeral bills. Over 

Kaylen’s objection, Johnsye applied to be the temporary administrator of Chad’s 

estate. Johnsye demanded a jury trial. The County Judge transferred the case to the 

County Court at Law, and Kaylen filed a motion challenging Johnsye’s standing to 

participate in the probate court proceedings. Kaylen also filed a motion to deposit 

funds into the registry of the court, in which the trial court was asked to use funds 
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Kaylen deposited into the court’s registry to reimburse Johnsye for the expenses he 

advanced for Chad’s funeral. 

After finding that Johnsye had standing as a creditor of the estate to 

participate in the probate proceedings, the trial court signed an order denying 

Kaylen’s motion to dismiss; but, in the same order, the trial court granted Kaylen’s 

claim that Johnsye lacked standing to proceed as a person interested in the welfare 

of Chad’s minor child. Subsequently, the trial court stayed all further discovery 

and ordered the county clerk to deposit the funds tendered by Kaylen into an 

account for Johnsye’s use and benefit. In an order signed on October 9, 2013, the 

trial court struck Johnsye’s jury demand. Johnsye filed a notice of appeal. 

The general test for appealing probate orders states that if an express statute 

declares the phase of the probate proceedings at issue to be final and appealable, 

the statute controls. Crowson v. Wakeham, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995). 

“Otherwise, if there is a proceeding of which the order in question may logically be 

considered a part, but one or more pleadings also part of that proceeding raise 

issues or parties not disposed of, then the probate order is interlocutory.” Id. We 

are to avoid constructions that defeat bona fide attempts to appeal. See id. 

Kaylen contends that Johnsye’s appeal is premature because the trial court 

has not yet entered a judgment declaring heirship. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 
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55(a) (West 2003). Johnsye argues that the trial court’s various orders finally 

disposed of his claimed interest in Chad’s estate. See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 3(r) 

(West Supp. 2013). 

An order sustaining a challenge to an applicant’s interest in an estate may be 

appealed because it disposes of the merits of the issue of interest. Womble v. 

Atkins, 331 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. 1960) (“A judgment of no interest . . . is in no 

sense interlocutory.”). “To avoid ambiguity, if the motion to dismiss is granted, the 

order should reflect that the claim is dismissed.” In the Estate of Chapman, 315 

S.W.3d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.). 

In this case, the trial court’s order does not dismiss Johnsye’s claim; rather, 

it allows him to participate as a creditor in the probate proceedings involving 

Chad’s estate. The trial court’s orders with respect to whether Johnsye has a right 

to participate as a party interested in the estate of Chad’s child are not final, as the 

trial court could change its mind regarding its ruling on that matter prior to the 

trial. For instance, the trial court neither struck McDonald’s pleadings nor 

dismissed his application to determine heirship or his application to administer

Chad’s estate. Because those claims are still before the trial court, the orders

disposing of Johnsye’s claims remain interlocutory. See Crowson, 897 S.W.2d at 

783; Chapman, 315 S.W.3d at 165. 
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Because the trial court’s orders have not disposed of all issues, and no 

statute declares the phase of the probate proceedings at issue to be final and 

appealable, we conclude that the orders Johnsye seeks to appeal are interlocutory. 

We hold that we do not have jurisdiction of Johnsye’s appeal. We withdraw our 

order of October 23, 2013, and we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 

APPEAL DISMISSED.

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 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

Opinion Delivered November 27, 2013

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.