### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00620- CV

No lan Byr on W ar r e n, A ppe lla nt

v. Nora Z am arron, Appellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 126TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. GN-3005 31, H ONO RAB LE DARLENE B Y RNE, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
A no-a nswer de fault judg ment wa s entere d ag ainst appellant Nola n By ron Warre n i na s u i tb r o u g h tb y

a p p e l l e e N o r a

Z am ar r o nf o r d a m a g e s ar i s i n g o u to f

ana u t o m o b i l e a c c i d e n t
. In this restricted a

ppeal, Warren complains that service was not effe cted in strict complianc e with the rules and that the t rial court’s awa rd of damag es i s not supported by the evidenc e. We af

firm in part
and re ve rs e and

re ma nd in p art
. Se r vic e of P r oc e ss Warren f irst asserts that service was not eff ecte d in strict compliance with the rules and ther efor e the defa

ult judg ment cannot stand. He asser ts that e rror

is evident on the fa ce of

the
re c or d b e c a

us e the re tur

n r e c e ipt wa s si g ne d by “ B y

ro n War re n, ” wh e re a s th e c ourt

do c ume nts name

“ No lan B y

ro n Warr e n” a s d e fe nd ant.2 A d e fa ult jud g me nt m ay

be a tta c ke d thro ug h a

re str ic te d a

pp e a l br ou g ht ( 1) wi thi n six months of t he date of t he judgment, (2) by a party to the s uit (3) who did not par ticipate in the actua l trial, (4) if the a sserted e rror is appare nt on the fac e of the rec ord. Norman Communications v. Texas Eastman Co. , 9 55 S.W. 2d 26 9, 27 0 ( Te x. 19 97 ); see Tex. R. App. P . 26.1(c) , 30. A plaintiff defe n d in g a

d e f a u lt ju d g me n t m

u s t s h o w s tr ic t c o mp li an c e w it hth e p r o c e d

u r a l r u le s g o v e r

ning citation and return of ser

vice. Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silve r , 8 84 S.W. 2d 15 1, 15 2 ( Te x. 19 94 ); see Tex. R. C iv. P. 99, 103, 105, 106, 107. I n revie wing a def ault judgme nt, we make no presumptions of complianc e with the rule s. Pr im ateCon str
. , 884 S.W .2d at 152.

After an orig inal petition is filed, the c lerk issues a c itation and delivers it “a s directe d by th e reque sting pa

rty ”; the par

ty reque sting c itation is responsible for obtainingservice of the citation and a c opy

of the petiti on. Tex. R. C iv. P. 99(a). The citation provides information about the ca se, such a s the court in which it was filed, t he parties’ name s, the date by which the de fenda

nt must answer, a

nd that failure to answer

may result in d ef

au l t judgment be ing e ntere d ag ainst the defe ndant. Tex. R. C iv. P. 99(b). An authorized per son s er v es t he citation by deliveringit and a copy of the pe tition t o the def endant in per s o n or by

reg istered or

cer tified mail, return r ece ipt reque sted. Tex. R. C iv. P. 103, 10 6 (a). When the servingoffice r re ceive s the citation, he or she must note the time and date of rec eipt
. T ex . R. Civ. P . 105. Once service is made, the ser ving of fi c e r m us t si g n a “ re tur

n of se rv ic e ” and no te wh e n and ho w c itatio n wa s se rv e d. Te x. R. C iv. P. 107. I f se r

v ic e is ma d e b y

r e g is te r e d

o r c e rti f ie d ma il , th e r e tu

r nr e c e ip t s ign e d

b y th e a ddresse e must be attache d to the return of service
. Id
.3 Z amar ron named “Nolan By

ron W arr en” a s defe ndant and pr ovided a post off ice box
as the appropr iate addre ss f or service of proce ss. Citation wa s issued to “Nolan B y ron Warre n” and the re turn of service was filed by an authoriz ed private proce ss serve r and verified by a notar y public. The re turn rec ites that the citation, petition, and sever al discover y documents wer e executed at the g iven addr ess o n Fe b ru ar y 24, 2003 to “Nolan B y

ron Warre n” by

restric ted ce rtified mail, re turn
rec eipt reque sted. The r eturn re ceipt attac hed to the return of service lists “Nola n By ron Warre n” as the a ddresse e, states it is “RESTRI CTED DEL I VERY ONLY!” and that the restric ted fe e wa s paid, and ha s the word “ ONL Y” h andwritten nex t to a chec ked box requiring that the re ceipt be signe d by the addr essee . “Nolan B y ron Warre n ” is hand-pr inted in the “Rec eived by” block, a nd

“ B y r o nWar r e n ” is th e n ame s ig n e d

in th e s ign a tu

r e b lo c k n e xt t o th e “ A d dr e s s e e O N L Y ” b o x. Warren’ s argument is that beca use the re turn rec eipt was not sig ned “ Nolan By ron Warren,” the re ceipt does not show strict compliance with the rules. We disag ree . I t is true that the courts ex amine ser

vice of citation in defa

ult judgment ca ses ver

y strictly
. See, e .g. , Uv ald

e Cou ntr y C l u b v. Ma rtin L inen Supply Co. , 690 S.W .2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985) (holding that citation to and service on “He nry

Bunting ,” not “He nry

Bunting , Jr ., ” we re de fe c tiv e ); TAC Ams., Inc. v. Boothe , 94 S.W .3d 315, 320-21 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2002, no pet.) (holdingthat return of service showing citation obtained afte r it wa s purportedly serve d was de fec tive). Howe ver, the return of service and return r ece ipt broug ht forth in this cause c omply with the rules of pr ocedur e. The re turn rec eipt notes in sever al pl ace s that it was restric ted and c ould only be g iven to and sig ned by the addressee himself. Warren’ s full name, Nolan B y ron Warre n, is handwritten below the sig nature line as the pe rson by whom the citat i o n wa s re ceive d. I t is only Warren’ sWe do not know what name War ren uses i n h i s d ai l y

life, but it is certainly

not 1 inconce ivable that he, like ma ny others, uses his middle name i n s t ead of his first or full name. War re n c ite s Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen Supply Co. for support o f hi s argument. 690 S.W .2d 884 (Tex. 1985) . I n Uvalde Country Club , the petition stated that servic e should be made on Henr y Bunting , J r., but citation was dire cted to He nry Bunting
. Id . at 884. The court he ld that there was no showing that Henr y Bunting was authorized to rec eive service or otherwise c onnecte d to the defe ndant. Id . at 885. Her e, the petition, the citation, and the return rec eipt wer e all addre ssed to Nolan B y

ron Warren. I t w as Warren himself who signe d his na me without “Nolan.” T here was no err or committed by

Z amar ron or the pr ocess se rver

that would rende r this service invalid. 4 handwr itten signature that does not inc lude “Nolan,” and we will not hold Zama rron r esponsible for the manner

in which Warre n chose to sign his name. Process servers cannot be ex pecte d to require
a c itatio n r e c ipi e nt t o s ig n h is o r her nam e in a par tic ula r m ann e r, and

it w ou ld b e vir

tua lly imp os sib le to e ff

e c t pr op e r s e rv ic e if

a re c ipi e nt co uld de fe a t ser vic e by fa ili ngto s ig n h is o r h e r f

ull , fo rm a l na me . T he fa c t th a t Warr e n d id n ot s ig n h is f ir st n a me do e s not re nd e r thi s se rv ic e inv a lid
or de fe c tiv e . We h old

the re is no er

ro r in se rv ic e of c itatio n on the fa c e of thi s re c or d. We o ve rr ule 1 Warren’ s first point of err or.
Evid ence Supporting the Dam ages Award Warren ne x t argues that the e vidence is le g ally and fac tually insufficient to support the trial cour

t’s damag es aw ards, attacking the evidence supportingthe cour t’s finding s of var ious ty pes of da mag es and the authentication of some of Z amar ron’s e vidence
. Standard of Review Review by

restric ted appe al involves a revie w of the entire c ase, a nd leg al and f

actua l sufficie ncy claims may

be ra ised. Norman Communications , 955 S.W .2d at 270. Howeve r, er ror must appear on the face of the record, which consists of all the papers on file, i ncluding the statement5

of fa cts. Id
. When a def

ault judgme nt on an unliquidated claim is enter ed, all fa ctual alleg ations set forth in the petition a

re de emed a dmitted ex cept f or the a mount of damag es. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v . Heine , 8 35 S.W. 2d 80 , 8 3 ( Te x. 19 92 ). B e fo re awa rd ingun liq

uid a te d dama g e s in a

de fa ult jud g me nt, a

trial cou rt

mus t he ar e vid e nc e of

tho se dama g e s. Te x. R. C iv. P. 2 43 ; Heine , 835 S.W .2d at 83. I f no finding s of fa ct or c onclusions of law are filed or re quested in a be nch trial, we will assume that the trial cour t m ad e al l finding s nece ssary to support its j udg ment, but when a repor ter’s r ecor d is made par

t of the re cord, the se implied findings ma y be challeng ed for

fac tual or leg al suffic iency
. Heine , 8 35 S.W. 2d a t 83- 84 . I n r e vie wi ngle g a l su ff ic ie nc y , w e wi ll c on sid e r o nly the evidenc e and infere nces that tend to suppor t the finding , disreg ardingall contra ry evidenc e and i n fe re n ce s an d

wi l l o v erru l e t h e c h al l en ge i f m o re t h an a s ci n t i l l a o f e v i d en ce s u p p o rt s t h e f

i n d i n g. Id . at 84. I n re vie wi ng fa c tua l suf fi c ie nc y , we wi ll not su

bs tit ute ou r j ud g me nt f

or the fa c t- fi nd e r’ s, but will consider all of the e vidence and re verse only if the challeng ed finding is so a g ainst the g reat weig ht and pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e as to be manifestly unjust or shock the consc ience
. Pool v. Ford Motor Co. , 715 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
Evidenc e of Damage

s Be cause Warren a

ttacks the suff

iciency of the e vidence supporting the trial cour t’s d a m a g e s aw ar d s , a

r e c i t a t i o no f t h e e v i d e n c e p r o d u c e d a t t h e d e f

a u l t j u d g m e n t h e ar i n g i s n e c e s s ar y. Z amar ron testified that she w as re ar- ended by Warren in F ebrua

ry 2001 and that the a ccide nt was Warren’ s fault. Z amar

ron testified that a s a re sult of the acc ident she suffe red head, neck, and bac k inj ur ie s, wh ic h c a

us e d he r ph y sic a l and me nta l pa in and su ff e ri ngand re qu ir e d me dic a l tr e a tme nt. Z amar ron re ceive d cortisone injec tions, went to therapy with a chiropr actor , and wa s seeingan6

orthopedic sur g eon. Z amar ron testi fi ed that the surg eon dete rmined Z amar ron had “ a 10 per cent dis a bil ity a s a re su lt o f t his c oll isi on ” and pr e sc ri be d a “T EN S un it” fo r the ra py . Z a marr on

wa s st ill havin g ne c k p ro ble ms a

nd no tic e d th a t th e pa in c ha

ng e d w iththe we a the r. She te sti fi e d th a t he r p a st tr e a tme nts c a

us e d h e r p a in a

nd sh e anti c ipate d s imi lar p a in f or futur e the ra

py and tr e a tme nts
. Z amar ron introduced her medical rec ords and bills i nto evidence . The re cords show that Z amar

ron wa s involved in an earlier automobile acc ident in September 2000, and st ate that her doctors tried to diff

ere ntiate betwe en the two acc idents. One doctor noted that Z amar ron’s injuries
wer e caused by the Februa ry 2001 acc ident with Warren a nd that sever al months later she still had persistent pain in her

neck a nd shoulder. The bulk of Z amar ron’s re cords r efe r to the F ebrua ry 2001
acc ident as the date of injury and foc us on that acc ident as the c ause of her injuries.
Past and Future Medic al Expense s War re n f ir st atta c ks the tr ia l c ourt ’s awa rd s f or pa st a nd futur e me dic a l e xpe ns e s,
arguin g that ( i) Z amarr on’s me dic a l r e c or ds we re no t pr op e rl y a uth e nti c a te d a

nd thu s im pr op e rl y
a dmi tte d, (i i) the re wa s n o p ro of that th e bil ls w e re fo r r e a so na ble and ne c e ssa ry se rv ic e s, and

(i ii) the bil ls s ub mitte d d o n ot t ota l th e amou nt a wa rd e d f or pa st e xpe ns e s. We ag ree with Warren that Z amar ron did not prove the r easona ble nec essity

of her medical ex penses, an essential element to rec overy of medica l expenses. See Jack son v. Gutierrez , 77 S.W. 3d

89 8, 90 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Hous ton [14 th D ist .] 20 02 , n o p e t.) . Pr oo f o f t he amou nts Z amar ron ac tually

paid in medical ex penses, presented throug h the admis sion of her medical r ecor ds and bills, does not establish that the expenses wer e nec essar y . Se e id . I ndeed, e ven if Z amar ron had proved that the expenses wer e reasonable and customary , there is still insufficient e vidence that theyAlthough War ren a rgues that Z amar

ron’s medic al re cords we re imprope rly admitted, even 2 i f w e w e r e t o c o n s i d e r

t h e r e c o r d s , t h e y d o n o ts h o w r e a s o n a b l e n e c e s s i t y. 7 w e r e n e c e s s ar

y. Se e id
. A plaintiff may prove that her medical expenses wer e rea sonably nece ssary 2 throug h expert testimony

or throug h an af

fidavit complying w ith section 18.001 of the civil pra ctice and re medies code
. Id .; see Tex. Ci v. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 18.001 (West 1997). Z amar ron produce d neither e x pert testimony nor an a ffidavit and did no t m ak e the required show ing of
nece ssity . The e vidence is factua lly insufficient to support the trial c ourt’s aw ards of past and futur e medical expenses. We the ref ore reve rse the awa

rds for past and future medical expenses. We need not addre ss whether Z amar ron’s medical rec ords wer e prope rly authenticated or a dmitted or whether any err or in the admission of the re cords wa s waived. Past and Future Pain and Suffering We now turn to Warren’ s complaints related to the trial court’s awa rds for pa st and future pa in and suffe ring . Z amar ron testified that a s a result of t he ac cident she suf fer ed hea d, back, neck, a nd shoulder injuries and suf fer ed pain in those a

rea s. She stated t h at h er past medica l treatments were very

painful; that she under

went tre atment with a chiroprac tor for nine months; that she wa s curr ently

beingtreated b y an orthopedic sur g eon, who be lieved she ha d a ten- perc ent dis a bil ity a s a re su lt o f the a c c ide nt; and that sh e sti ll s uf

fe re d n e c k p a in. Z amarr on be lie ve d th a t, based on he r past and on- g oing pa in, she would continue to suffe r pain in the futur e.

Awar ds for damag es such as pain and suffering should not be disturbed unless they
are excessive. Se e Ro se nb oo m M ac h. & Too l, I

nc . v . M ac ha la , 9 9 5 S. W. 2 d 817, 829 ( T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st

Di st. ] 199 9, pe t. d e nie d) ; W al- Ma rt S tor es, In c . v . S

ho ll , 990 S.W .2d 412, 420Case law tr eats “ mental pain and suf fer ing” intercha

ng eably with “mental anguish.” See 3 Pa rk way Co. v . W oo dr uff , 901 S.W .2d 434, 442 (Tex. 1995) (“mental anguish” damag es per mitted when “ mental suffe ring ” ac companied by phy sical injury

or produc ed by

particula rly disturbing e ve nt) ; Car

re ll v . R ic hie , 697 S.W .2d 43, 44-45 (Te x . App.—Austin 1 9 8 5 , writ ref ’d n.r.e .) (upholding awa

rd for “mental pain and suffe ring ” whe n evidenc e desc ribed ter ror, “ fea r, trepidation, humil iatio n a

nd e mba rr a ssm e nt” ); se e als o Ca rr v . W e iss , 9 8 4 S. W.2d 753, 76 8 , 7 7 0 ( T e x. App.—Amar illo 1999, pet. denied) (usingboth phrases in discussion of mental anguish dama g es). 8 (T e x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 99 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Ow e ns -C or ning F ibe rg las s Co rp . v . M

ar tin , 942 S.W .2d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no wr it). Ba sed on this rec ord, we hold that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

sufficie nt t o s u p p o rt t h e trial court’s awa rds of $9,793 for

past pain and suffe ring and $9,793 for

future pa in and s uffe ring . We overrule Warren’ s complaints relate d to the pa in a nd su ff e ri ngawa rd s. Past and Future Mental Pain and Suffering The trial c ourt’s awa

rds for mental pain and suff ering , howeve r, ca

nnot be sustained. The only evidenc e as to mental anguish came when Z amar ron wa s asked, “ Did y ou experience any mental pain and suf

fer ing,” and re sponded, “Ye s.” Recove ry for menta l ang uish require s evidenc e of the natur e , d

ur a tio n, or

se ve ri ty of me nta l anguis h le a din g to a su bs tanti a l di sr

up tio n in he r d a ily routine or other

evidenc e of a

high de g ree of mental distress amounting to more than mere worry or
an x i e t y. Sa e nz

v . Fi de lit y & Gu ar . I

ns . U nd e rwr ite rs , 925 S.W .2d 607, 614 (Tex. 1996) (quoting 3 Pa rk way Co. v . W oo dr uff , 901 S.W .2d 434, 444 (Tex. 1995)). Z amar ron’s a g ree ment that she had endure d mental pain and suf fer ing doe s not amount to the require d showing
. See Jackson , 77 S.W .3d at 903. The e vidence is factua lly insufficient to support the trial c ourt’s aw ards f or mental pa in a nd su ff e ri ng . We the re fo re re ve rs e tho se awa rd s.I n hi s br ie f, a pp e lla nt s tate s, “ Al tho ugh it

is n ot e nti re ly

c le ar, the c e rt if

ie d b ill of c os ts 4 appea rs to show taxable court costs of $274.” The bill of costs lists the following c harg es: various filing f ees totaling$185, $8 for issuanc e o f ci t at i o n, $73 in service fee s, two $8 fee s titl ed “f ee acc ount pay able other ,” one ma rked w ith a “P” and the other with a “ U.”

9 Cos ts Fi n al l y , we c onsider the tria l court’s $300.84 a war d for litigation costs. Za marron
corr ectly notes that a prevailing party may rec over “all costs incurre d there in.” Tex . R. Civ. P . 131. Z amar ron st ated during the defa ult hear ing that she had inc urre d “$300.84 for the cost of litigation, being post judgme nt at t he lega l rate allowed by law, and all costs of cour t incurre d in the cause of action and in defe nse of this judgme nt.” Howe ver, the cer tified bill of costs included in the re cord is not entirely

clea r as to the c osts incurred by Z amar ron, and on appea l, she st ates that her $300.84 4
re qu e st “ wa s me re ly

a sp e c if ic a tio n o f t

he tot a l c os ts o f c ourt

a s o f th e ti me of de fa

ult , s a id c os ts being for c osts of filing fee , citation fee , and ser vice f ee,” but provides no furthe r explanation that would result in a $300.84 total. Bec au s e we are rema nding por tions of this cause for

further proce eding s, further

costs might be inc urre d. There fore , we ne ed not attempt to interpre t the bill of
c os ts t o d e te rm ine wh e the r the tr ia l court ’s awa rd wa s cor re c t. I ns te a d, we re ve rs e the awa rd of c os ts and re mand it to the trial court f or a ne w ca lculation of costs af ter fur ther proc eeding s have be en conducte d.
Evi de nc e Showing a C aus al N e xus

L ast, Warre n argues that the e vidence is le g ally and fac tually insufficient to show a
causa l nexus betwee n the ac cident and Z amar ron’s damag es. We disag ree .10 A plaintiff in a de fault judg ment must prove a “ causa l nexus ” betwe en t h e event made the basis of the suit and the plaintiff’ s injuries. Morgan v. Compugraphic Corp. , 675 S.W .2d 729, 732 (Tex. 1984). “Proving that the eve nt sued upon ca used the plaintiff’ s alleg ed injuries is part a nd parc el of provingthe amount of damag es to which the pla intiff is entitled.” Id . Z amar ron testified that as a r esult of the ac cident ca used by Warren, her head, neck, bac k, and shoulders w ere injured, causing her pain and suffe ring and requiring medical car e. We hold that Z amar ron’s te s t i m o ny established a ca usal nexus between the a ccide nt and her injuries and dama g es. See J ackson , 77 S.W .3d at 902.
Conclusion

We aff i rm t h e trial court’ s finding that service was prope rly made a nd its entry

of default ju d g me n t a g a in s t W ar

r e n . We h o ld

th a t Z a ma

r r o ns u f f ic ie n tl y e s ta b li s h e d a c a u s a l n e x us betwee n the acc ident cause by Warren and her injuries and damag es and aff irm the trial court’ s
awa rds of pa st and future pain and suff eri n g. Ho we ver, the damag es aw ards f or past and f

uture medical e x penses a

nd mental pain and suf

fe ri ng are not supported by sufficie nt evidence and ar e
re ve rs e d. We r e mand

the c a us e fo r a ne w he ari ng on tho se me a sure s o f d a ma g e s and fo r c ourt c os ts.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med in Part; Reverse d and Remande d in Part Filed: F ebrua

ry 3, 2005