United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued April 17, 2012 Decided June 12, 2012

No. 11-7097

CHEVRON CORPORATION,

APPELLEE

v.

WEINBERG GROUP,

APPELLANT

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(No. 1:11-mc-409)

James E. Tyrrell, Jr. argued the cause for appellant. 

With him on the briefs were Eric S. Westenberger, Jason W. 

Rockwell, Brendan M. Walsh, and Richard D. Carter. Gerald 

F. Ragland, Jr. entered an appearance.

Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. argued the cause for appellee. 

With him on the brief were Peter E. Seley and Thomas H. 

Dupree, Jr.

Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and TATEL and 

KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge

KAVANAUGH.
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KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge: Some Ecuadorian citizens 

sued Chevron in an Ecuador court, alleging that Chevron was 

responsible for environmental damage there. To obtain expert 

reports in support of their case, the plaintiffs enlisted the 

Weinberg Group, a scientific consulting firm in Washington, 

D.C. Chevron was ultimately found liable in the Ecuador 

case.

As the proceedings in Ecuador unfolded, Chevron sued 

the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their attorneys in the U.S. 

District Court for the Southern District of New York. 

Chevron claimed that the Ecuadorian plaintiffs and their 

attorneys had committed fraud in the proceedings in Ecuador.

As part of the New York litigation, Chevron subpoenaed 

documents from the Weinberg Group. Because the Weinberg 

Group is here in Washington, the subpoena was issued from 

the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. See Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 45.

The Weinberg Group asserted the attorney-client and 

work product privileges over some of the documents

responsive to the subpoena. In the D.C. district court, 

Chevron moved to compel production of those documents. 

Chevron contended that the documents fell within the crimefraud exception to the attorney-client and work product 

privileges.

The D.C. district court found that the crime-fraud 

exception applied and granted Chevron’s motion to compel.

In so doing, the D.C. district court relied almost entirely on a 

decision in favor of Chevron by the New York district court 

in the underlying fraud litigation. See Chevron Corp. v. 

Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). While the 

Weinberg Group’s appeal to this court was pending, however, 

the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the New York
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district court. See Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232,

247 (2d Cir. 2012).

Given that the D.C. district court relied on the decision of 

the New York district court and that the New York district 

court’s decision was subsequently reversed by the Second 

Circuit, we must vacate the D.C. district court’s decision and 

remand.

To be sure, the D.C. district court added in the alternative 

that even “if the question were an open one,” it would find 

“the evidence marshaled” by the New York district court to be

“more than sufficient evidence of a prima facie case that the 

Weinberg Group’s work was part of a fraud upon the 

Ecuadorian court.” Chevron Corp. v. Weinberg Group, No. 

11-mc-409, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Sept. 8, 2011). But the D.C. 

district court did not independently explain what facts would 

support that conclusion (no doubt because the D.C. district 

court principally relied on the extant New York district court 

decision). Moreover, it is not clear that the D.C. district court 

applied the crime-fraud tests set forth by this court’s cases. 

We therefore cannot rely on the D.C. district court’s statement 

in the alternative to affirm the order here.

* * *

We vacate the district court’s order and remand for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

So ordered.