### IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matterofthe Disciplinary Proceeding ) 

### ) Against KATHRYN B. ABELE, ) ) 

### ) Attorney at Law. ) ) ) 

### ) No. 201,352-0 En Bane

Filed 

### AUG 27

## 2015

WIGGINS, J.-Followingafour-daydisciplinary hearing, hearing officerWilliam S. Bailey found that attorney Kathryn B. Abele committed two counts of misconduct. He recommended that Abele be suspended for one year, that she complete an evaluation to determine herfitnessto practice law, and thatshe pay all litigation costs. The Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) Disciplinary Board (Board) unanimously adopted the recommendations. Abele appealed, arguing that 11 ofthe 48 findings offact were not supported by substantial evidence and thatsuspension is notthe appropriate sanction. We hold that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings of fact and that his conclusions of law are correct. The record supports the finding**ofJhr~e** aggravating factors and only one mitigating factor. We therefore accept the Board's recommendation and suspendAbele from the practice of lawforone year.In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 FACTS Abelewas admitted to the practice of law in Washington in November2002. At all times relevantto this case she practiced family law as a solo practitioner. This proceeding arises out of two separate matters charged in two separate counts of misconduct. The first count charged Abele with violating several rules of professional conduct for behavior for which she was found in contempt of court in September 2011. The second count charged Abele with knowingly making afalse or misleading report to the Seattle Police Department (SPD) in May 2011. Following a four-day hearing that included testimony from 15 witnesses-9 witnesses for the WSBA, Abele's videotaped deposition, and 5witnesses onAbele's behalf-aswell as audio and video recordings of the incidents giving rise to each count, the hearing officer made 48 detailed findings offact. Abele assigns errorto 11 ofthese facts; the remaining findings are treated as verities on appeal. In re Disciplinary Proceeding AgainstMarshall, 160Wn.2d 317, 330, 157 P.3d 859 (2007). 

### I. Factual History This factual summary is based entirely on unchallenged findings-Abele has not assigned errorto anythe findings used forthis factual history. A. Count 1: Contemptin Judge Farris's Courl In 2011, Abele represented the father in a three-way child custody battle in Snohomish County Superior Court. Ms. Janal Rich and Mr. Richard Jones represented the other parties, and JudgeAnita Farris presided over the matter. The trial lasted 13 days; the attorneys testified that it was unusual, complex, and contentious.



### 2In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Throughout the trial, Abele was repeatedly admonished for interrupting the court and othercounsel. She slammed objects on thetable and made loud comments when Judge Farris ruled against her. Though Abele's comments and actions were distracting to opposing counsel, she did not stop when the court instructed herto do
so. Instead, Abele would falsely respond, "I did not say anything" and continue to engage in disruptive behavior. 1 The court held a posttrial hearing inAugust 2011 to finalize the parenting plan. Abele made it clearthat shewantedthe case resolved thatday because she intended to immediately appeal the court's decision. The court told Abele that it would not be possible to conclude that day and that she would not signAbele's proposed findings. Abele became angry and said to Judge Farris, "You've gotto leave now. We have to take a break now." Judge Farris, inferring from the statementthatAbele was going to "blow up," called for a recess. After Judge Farris left the bench, Abele made a loud screaming noise that could be heard in other rooms in the courthouse. Security was called, butAbelewas not held in contemptforthis outburst,2 On September28, 2011, the court held anotherhearingtofinalizethe parenting plan. Abele and opposing attorney Rich were present in the courtroom, with Jones present bytelephone. Abele and Rich loudly discussed adiscrepancy in the parenting plan while Judge Farris was speaking. Frustrated with Abele's interruption, Judge

1 Abele's disruptive behavior was not limited to the courtroom. Abele's calls to Ms. Rich's staffwere abusive, requiring Ms. Rich to implementan office-wide policy ofscreeningAbele's telephone calls. Abele also referred to the court's decisions as "wrong" or stupid" in front of opposing counsel and the court staffwhile the courtwas in recess. 2Though Judge Farris was not present and did not knowthe cause ofthe scream, testimony from attorney Jones and the court reporter supported Abele's assertion thatthe scream was a cry ofpain ratherthan a cry offrustration or anger. 

### 3In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Farris attempted to make a record of her concerns, hoping to prevent further interruptions. ButAbele repeatedly interrupted Judge Farris, even yelling to express her disagreement. When Judge Farris directed staff to summon security, Abele announced, "I'm going to jail. I'm going to jail," placing her hands over her head, crossed at the wrists as if being handcuffed.Abele walked out ofthe courtroom while court was still in session, causing the proceedings to come to a halt. Abele reentered the courtroom and announced, "I'm leaving. I'm out of here

.... I'm abstaining completely

.... Good-bye." The court ordered security personnel to locate Abele and return her to the courtroom. When Marshal Patrick Miles located Abele, she informed Miles that she would not return. Miles and Sergeant David Hayes again informed Abele that Judge Farrisordered herbacktothe courtroom.Abele refused initially but ultimately returned to the courtroom. OnAbele's return, Judge Farris continuedto makea record ofAbele's behavior. Judge Farris stated that in the previous hearingAbele had made "loud noises thatto
me sounded like an animal being killed" and that "I have been in these courts for 30 years, 18 as ajudge. I have never heard anything-! have never heard any lawyer make any kind of noise or do anything like that before." Abele again yelled at the judge, attributing her previous scream to a hip injury and claiming that heryelling was the result ofa hearing disability. Judge Farris heldAbele in contempt "based on your screaming, yelling, jumping up and down in my courtroom, stomping and thenstomping out and refusing to represent your client

...." Abele responded, "Your

4In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Honor, I appreciate your lecture. Could you just tell me how much I have to pay in a fine so Ican get rid of it and take care ofit and resolve this issue with you?" To purge her contempt, Judge Farris ordered Abele to make contact within 30 days with the Lawyer'sAssistance Program (LAP) provided by theWashington State BarAssociation. Abele refused repeatedly to contact LAP. Abele's behavior continued to have a disruptive effect on the courthouse after the hearing concluded. Immediately after leaving the courtroom, Abele yelled, "[T]hat bitch!" Opposing counsel Ms. Rich was so shaken byAbele's behaviorthat she asked to be accompanied by security personnel while leaving the courthouse. Despite herearlier refusals,Abelecontacted LAP laterin theday, timely purging her contempt. B. CountII: KnowinglyFiling

### a False Police Report Count II was based on Abele's conduct following her appearance before Commissioner James Kahan at the King County Courthouse in Seattle. Abele repeatedly left and reentered the courtroom. Commissioner Kahan requested additional security personnel because he believedthatAbelewas causing adisruption outside of his courtroom. Marshal Samuel Copeland was dispatched and served as standby backup, observing the proceedingsfrom the back ofthe courtroom. While Abele was outside the courtroom, Copeland heard a loud, agitated female voice in the hallway. He investigated, sawAbele in the hallway, and asked her to quiet down. This angered Abele: she extended her palm to Copeland, indicating that she didn'twant to listen to him, told him that she was an attorney and she could talk however she wanted, and indicated that she didn't respect him. She also


### 5In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0 suggested to her client that Copeland was harassing her. Copeland returned to the courtroom in an attemptto de-escalatethe situation. Laterthat day, Abele again encountered Copeland and yelled at him that she didn't respect him and that "someone should tartin [his]face." Copeland again walked away from Abele and toward Marshal Webb at the court's Fourth Avenue security checkpoint. Abele followed Copeland to the checkpoint. Assuming that Webb was Copeland's supervisor, Abele complained to Webb about Copeland's behavior, waving her arms and speaking loudly and aggressively. Webb listened toAbele for a short time and asked her to go about her business, stating that he did not need to speak with her. Abele, angry at this dismissal, attempted to force her way between Copeland and Webb, yelling to the marshals, "[A]re you going to get out of my way?" Webb was seated on a stool, and Copeland was standing approximately one foot away from Webb. Instead ofwalking around the marshals in the six to eight feet of open hallway available to her, Abele pushed herway between them, contacting both police officers: her leg brushed against Webb's knee and she pushed against Copeland's body, causing him to move. Abele immediately spun around, pointed, and yelled atWebb, accusing him of tripping her. She called 911, and SPD Officer James Ritter responded. Abele told RitterthatWebb had intentionallytripped her. She assertedthatshe had politelyasked to go between the marshals because there was no room to go around them, that the marshals were rude to her, and thatWebb laughed at her after his assault.

6In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Officer Ritter interviewed Abele, Copeland, and Webb, and reviewed the security video. Ritter did not interview any other witnesses who were in the hallway during the incident. In reviewing the video, Ritter noted that Abele appeared to intentionally force herself into the 12 inch space between the two marshals, even though the remaining 8feet ofhallwaywas largely clearofvisitors. He also noted that Abele had to turn sideways to pass between the marshals and that while "virtually every portion of her body appeared to make contact with the marshals, she did not appearto stumble orfall." Ritter observed, however, that the video camera angle did not show Webb's seat position or his legs. Ritter concluded that the video did not supportAbele's version ofevents because the hallway was not congested, as Abele alleged; the video did not show hertripping, stumbling, or reacting to the marshals as she passed between them; and none ofthe potential witnesses orother individuals in the hallwayapproached him orsuggestedthattherewas a problemwith the marshals' behavior. The internal investigation was ultimately dismissed, and Marshal Webb received a letterstating thatAbele's charge was not substantiated.

II. Procedural History The WSBA filed an amended formal complaint against Abele on March 21, 2013. Count IchargedthatAbeleviolated Rules ofProfessional Conduct(RPC)3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(d), and/or 8.4U) on September 28, 2011 by engaging in the conduct that resulted in the court's finding her in contempt. Count II charged thatAbele knowingly made afalse and/or misleading statementto an officer ofthe SPD in violation of RPC 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and/or 8.4(d). The hearing took place November 12 to15, 2013. At the hearing, the WSBApresented testimonyfrom ninewitnesses, including Judge Farris,

7In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 her court reporter, opposing counsel present during the September2011 conference, and the marshals and officer involved in the incident that gave rise toAbele's report to law enforcement. The hearing officer also considered portions of Abele's videotaped five-hour pretrial deposition, the audio recording of the September 28, 2011 hearing, and the security video showing the alleged tripping incidenton May 16, 2011. Hearing officerWilliamS. Bailey issued his findings offact (FF), conclusions of law, and hearing officer's recommendation on December 18, 2013. He found that Abele violated RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4(j). Hearing officer Bailey recommended aone-yearsuspensionwith reinstatement conditioned on the successful completion of afitness to practice evaluation. He also required Abele to pay all litigation costs and the costs of her fitness to practice evaluation. The Board unanimously affirmed after considering Abele's briefing and oral argument. ANALYSIS I. Standard of Review This court"bearsthe ultimate responsibilityfor lawyerdiscipline in Washington." Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 329. Nevertheless, "we give considerable weight to the hearing officer's findings of fact." 

### /d. at 329-30. "We also give great weight to the hearing officer's evaluation ofthe credibility and veracity ofwitnesses." 

### /d. at 330. We treat unchallenged findings as verities on appeal. 

### /d. We accept challenged findings of fact as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 

### /d. "Substantial evidence" is "evidence sufficient 'to persuade a

8In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 fair-minded, rational person ofthe truth ofadeclared premise."'

### /d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstPoole, 156Wn.2d 196, 209 n.2, 125 P.3d 954 (2006)). Substantial evidence can be direct evidence as well
as circumstantial evidence. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Guarnera, 152 Wn.2d 51, 61, 93 P.3d 166 (2004) (circumstantial evidence alone can constitute substantial evidence). The hearing officer is allowed to evaluate direct and circumstantial evidence, including evaluations about the credibility ofthe witnesses, and draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Simmerly, 174 Wn.2d 963, 988, 285 P.3d 838 (2012) (evaluations about witness credibility); In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstCohen, 149Wn.2d 323, 332- 33, 67 P.3d 1086 (2003) (reasonable inferences). An attorney challenging findings of fact must present argument as to why the specific findings are unsupported and cite to the record to support that argument. Marshall, 160Wn.2d at 331 (citing In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstKronenberg, 155 Wn.2d 184, 191, 117 P.3d 1134 (2005)). The attorney must do more than argue his or herversion ofthe facts while ignoring the testimony of otherwitnesses. 

### /d. We will not overturn findings based simply on an alternative explanation orversionsofthe facts previously rejected by the hearing officer and Board. 

### /d. We reviewchallenged conclusionsoflawde novo. In re DisciplinaryProceeding AgainstJackson, 180 Wn.2d 201, 220, 322 P.3d 795 (2014). The WSBA must prove misconduct by a clear preponderance of the evidence. 

### /d.; ELC 10.14(b). This standard requires more proof than a simple preponderance but less than beyond a reasonable doubt. 

### /d.

9In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 II. Substantial Evidence Review Abele's opening briefdoes notassign errorto specificfindings offact by number
as required by RAP 1 0.3(g) (appellate court only reviews "a claimed error which is included in an assignment of error or clearly disclosed in the associated issue pertaining thereto"). 3 We are not required to address findings not argued by Abele, and we can reject challenges thatAbele fails to support with citations to the record. See Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 331 (providing that a challenge is sufficient only if the attorney cites to the record or legal authority). Rather than making a true sufficiency argument, the majority ofAbele's briefing merely reiterates the arguments that were considered and rejected by the hearing officer and the Board. Despite these critical deficiencies, we consider and ultimately rejectAbele's appeal from the 11 challenged findings offact listed in the appellant's reply brief. Abele asks this court to reject the hearing officer's and unanimous Board's conclusion thatAbeleviolated RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), 8.4(d), and 8.4U). She generally argues that substantial evidence does not support the conclusion that she acted knowingly or intentionallyasto eithercount. Though she acknowledgesthatshe engaged in the conduct alleged in count I, she arguesthatshewas provoked and that herconductwas negligent.Asto count II,Abelearguesthatwhile substantial evidence may supportthe conclusion thatshewas nottripped, there is not substantial evidence that she subjectively knewthatshe was filing afalse police report.

3When this was pointed out in the bar counsel's answering brief, Abele included in her reply brief a list ofthe findings offact she challenges. But she fails to argue orto cite to the record to demonstratethat specificfindings are unsupported. 10In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Abele's mental state is an essential element in finding aviolation of RPC 3.4(c) (knowingly), 3.5(d) (intentional), and 8.4U) (willful). It is also an element of RCW 9A.76.175 (knowledge), the statute that gives rise to Abele's violation of RPC 8.4(b) and 8.4(c). A lawyer's state of mind is afactual issue, and we give greatweightto the hearing officer's determination because the hearing officer is in the best position to make this determination. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstLongacre, 155Wn.2d 723, 744, 122 P.3d 710 (2005) (citing In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAnsche/1 149Wn.2d 484, 501, 69 P.3d 844 (2003)). We hold that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's factual determinations and that both counts are proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence. 

### A. CountI We hold that count I was proved by a clear preponderance ofthe evidence. Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings thatAbele violated RPC 3.4(c),4 3.5(d),5 8.4(d),6 and 8.4Uf by engaging in conduct that resulted in a finding that she was in contempt of court. The undisputed findings of fact support the challenged findings. Abele's violations require an attorney's conduct to be either

4 RPC 3.4(c), "Fairnessto Opposing Partyand Counsel," providesthat "[a] lawyershall not

... knowinglydisobeyan obligation underthe rules ofatribunal exceptforan open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists." (Formatting omitted.) 5 RPC 3.5(d), "Impartialityand Decorum oftheTribunal," providesthat "[a] lawyershall not

... engage in conduct intended to disrupt atribunal." (Formatting omitted.) 6 RPC 8.4(d), "Misconduct," provides that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to

... engage in conductthat is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice." (Formatting omitted.) 7 RPC 8.4U) provides that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyerto

...willfully disobey orviolate acourt order directing him or herto do orcease doing an actwhich he orshe ought in good faith to do orforbear." (Formatting omitted.) 11In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 knowing, intentional, or willful; the hearing officer specifically found that Abele's conductwas intentional, unprovoked, and unjustified. Abele concedes that herconduct disrupted Judge Farris's court on September 28, 2011 but argues that she did not act knowingly or intentionally. Purportedly recognizing that her behavior was "wrong," her argument instead is that she did not intendtoviolatethe RPCs. In herreply brief, Abele specificallychallengesthe portions of FF**~~** 6, 11, 28, and 29 stating that her conduct was intentional, unprovoked, and unjustified; she does not challenge that the conduct discussed in those findings occurred. She also does not make a true sufficiency argument: she argues that her outburstwarrants admonition or reprimand rather than suspension and does not cite to the record to support her argument that specific findings are unsupported. 8 This mitigation argument reasserts many of the same arguments presented below and implores us to reach a different conclusion. We reject these arguments and hold that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings. Hearing officer Bailey heard testimony from five witnesses, including Judge Farris, on count 

### I. He also reviewed numerous exhibits, including Judge Farris's written order finding Abele in contempt on September 30, 2011. "Contempt of court" requires intentional conduct. RCW 7.21.010. The orderstates: The Court further finds that this contempt was deliberate, willful, and in bad faith and that it was within [Abele's] control to cease her contemptuous behavior.

8 It is not clearwhyAbele argues that admonition ora reprimand would be appropriate, aside from the fact that they are the lowest levels of discipline imposed. Contempt itself requires intentional conduct, and three ofthe rules thatAbele has been charged with violating require knowing, intentional, orwillful conduct. We hold thatAbeleviolated these rules; in finding that she violated these RPCs we necessarily also hold that she did not do so negligently. 12In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Abele did not appeal the finding of contempt or take exception to these findings. Rather, she complied with the court's orderand her contemptwas purged on October 

### 6,2011. Substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's finding that Abele was deliberately disruptive during court proceedings, making it difficult for the other attorneys to examine witnesses. In addition to reviewing Judge Farris's unchallenged findings thatAbele's behavior was "deliberate, willful, and in bad faith," the hearing officer considered Judge Farris's testimony thatAbele behaved badly throughout the entire trial and that Abele was warned about this bad behavior. The hearing officer also heard evidence from opposing counsel thatAbele frequently put them "off their game" by engaging in loud, disruptive conversations with her clients during witness examinations. The unchallenged findings offact lend further support to the hearing officer's challenged finding, FF**~**28, thatAbele's actionswere intentional.Abele's misbehavior began during the pretrial phase, occasioning Judge Farris'sfrequentadmonitions and warnings.Abele consistentlyclaimed thatshe had done nothing and referred to Judge Farris's rulings as "wrong" or "stupid" in front ofopposing counsel and the court staff. Importantly, the hearing officer specifically rejected Abele's alternative explanations forthis disruptive conduct, finding that "[Abele] was able to exercise complete control
overthe volume of her speech, getting loud or soft at will.

... [She] got loud because she was angry, not because she did not know that she was being loud."Abele does not challenge this finding.

13In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0 The hearing officer also considered and explicitly rejected Abele's arguments that Judge Farris allowed her courtroom to get out of control or otherwise provoked the interruption on September28. He noted thatAbele continued to interruptthe court and that Abele continued to yell-she even deliberately screamed in order to demonstrate what a real yell sounded like-"Ifyou want me to tell you the difference between 'I'm going tojail', and (Yelling) I'm screaming, there'sthe difference. Now I'm screaming"-and stormed out of the courtroom while court was in session. Accordingly, the hearing officer rejected Abele's argument that her interruptions and behavior on September28 were the result of"a rare emotional outburst." Rather than present specific facts or argument as to why the hearing officer's findings are unsupported, many ofAbele's challenges merely rehash the arguments already considered and rejected by the hearing officer and by the Board. We hold that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings that Abele's behavior was intentional. We adopt the hearing officer's conclusion that Abele's behaviorviolated RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(d), and 8.4U) and holdthat count I is proved by a clear preponderance ofthe evidence. B. CountII We also uphold the hearing officer's conclusion that count II was proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence. The hearing officer found that Abele violated RPC 8.4(b)9 (by violating RCW 9A.76.175), RPC 8.4(c), 10 and RPC 8.4(d) by

9 RPC 8.4(b) providesthat "[i]t is professional misconductfora lawyerto

...commitacriminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." 10 RPC 8.4(c) provides that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to

... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 14In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 knowingly making a false and misleading statement to an officer of the SPD. RCW 9A.76.175 reads in part, "A person who knowingly makes a false or misleading material statementto a public servant is guilty ofagross misdemeanor." Abele argues thatthe WSBAcannot establish by a clear preponderance ofthe evidencethatAbele had the subjective knowledge that Marshal Webb did not attempt to trip her. Therefore, she concludes that the WSBA cannot establish count II by a clear preponderance of the evidence because it cannot show thatAbele knew that she was making a false statement to the SPD. In making these arguments, Abele challenges FF

# ,m 37-39, 

### ,-r 41, 

### ,-r,-r 43-44, and 

### ,-r 48. However, she does not point to specific facts in the record that counterthese findings; she simply takes exception to factual findings that herversion ofevents was not credible and that she intentionally
or knowingly filed the false report. 11 Abele does not challenge the findings that she continued to loudly engage Marshal Copeland after he made attempts to disengage from the situation, that she was the aggressor, that there was ample room for her to go around the marshals, or that she deliberately forced her way between the marshals. She also concedes that her statement was material and made to a public servant, satisfying elements of RCW 9A.76.175. The Rules ofProfessional Conductprovidethe standardfor"knowing" behavior. RPC 1.0Aprovides in relevant part:

11 Because Abele generally challenges these factual findings and does not make specific exceptions to specific factual findings, this opinion consolidates her challenges to the more general question ofwhethersubstantial evidence supportsthe hearing officer'sdetermination thatAbele "knowingly" filed a false police report. 15In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0 

### (a) "Belief" or "believes" denotesthatthe person involved actually supposed the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferred from circumstances. (f) 

### "Knowingly," "known," or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances. 

### (i) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable. The hearing officer properly resolved this issue by making a permissible credibility determination. Abele argues that she did not knowingly file a false report because she believed that she was tripped. The WSBAargues thatAbele knew that she wasn't tripped and that she invented the complaint because she wanted to get the marshals in trouble. It was up to the hearing officer to determine which version
was more credible, and after considering all the evidence, he found that Abele's version of events was not credible and that the WSBA explanation was the only reasonable explanation. We agree with the hearing officer. The hearing officer is allowed to evaluate direct and circumstantial evidence, including evaluations about the credibility of the witnesses, and draw reasonable inferencesfrom thatevidence. Simmerly, 

### 174Wn.2d at 988 (evaluations about witness credibility); Cohen, 

### 149 Wn.2d at 332-33 (reasonable inferences). The hearing officer heard testimony from five witnesses on count II. Three witnesses, Marshal Webb, Marshal Copeland, and Officer Ritter, testified that Webb did not trip Abele. Anotherwitness, Mr. Rakesh Pai, testified that

16In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 he was in the hallway during the incident and that he sawWebb tripAbele. However, his testimony also asserted that the tripping happened in a different area and that Abele grabbed a metal detector and security barfor support; neither ofthese objects
was nearthe location where the incident occurred. The hearing officerfound that his testimonywas not credible. 12 The hearing officer also watched the surveillance videos, which did not show Abelefallingforward or lurchingas she had described in hercomplaintto Officer Ritter. He considered Officer Ritter's report and Abele's testimony that she wanted one or both ofthe marshals to get in trouble and that "[w]hat I say to a cop has no meaning to me." He further considered and made uncontested findings offact thatAbele twice tried to confront Marshal Copeland, that she forced herway between the marshals, and thatAbele was the aggressor.

12 The hearing officer also heard testimony from Julie Herber. Abele argues that the hearing officer erred in excluding as hearsay Herber's testimony regarding a conversation that she had with Ms. Abele on May 16, 2011. Any error in this ruling was harmless: Abele's attorney laid additional foundation, and the hearing officer overruled a subsequent hearsay objection. The statements at issue were ultimately admitted and considered by the hearing officer. Abele also asserts that the hearing officer's initial ruling that the statement was hearsay demonstrates that "he did not appreciate the relevance of the evidence to Abele's state of mind." She then combines this argument with an objection to FF 1J40, which states that the King County security video "does not support Respondent's claim she was tripped," to suggestthat the hearing officer impermissibly shifted the burden ofpersuasion to Abele to prove that she had been tripped. However, this theory ignores the fact that Abele did not advance the argument below that this was a nonhearsay statement. Instead, counsel below asserted that he didn'tthink itwas hearsayandthat it "goesto excited utterance in anyevent." Given latitude bythe hearing officer,Abelethen proceeded to laythefoundation foran excited utterance objection to the hearsay rule. Ultimately, the hearing officer overruled the WSBA's hearsayobjection and admittedthe statements, noting that he wished to give counsel latitude. Abele does not provide citation or demonstrate how this impermissibly shifted the burden, and we do not address the argumentfurther. 17In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0 Abele attempts to demonstrate that the hearing officer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence by characterizing the findings as both "negative evidence" and "speculation." Shefurtherassertsthatthevideo "is entirely inconclusive
as to [her] beliefthat she was tripped." Both the hearing officer and the investigating police officer used the video in conjunction with witness testimony to evaluate the credibility of the parties. The hearing officer must consider all of the evidence presented and make a credibility determination as to the alternate explanation. See Simmerly, 174Wn.2d at 982-83. He is also permitted to make reasonable inferences. Cohen, 149Wn.2d at 332-33. Here, the hearing officer could use the video to assess the witness' credibility. He could compareAbele's statement that she passed through the marshals because there was no room to go around with the video that clearly showed adequate space in the hallway. This credibility determination is contained at unchallenged FF 

## 1l 35 (despite ample room, Abele deliberately pushed betweenthe marshals). He could use the video to watchAbele deliberately reengage with Copeland in the hallway after he had disengaged from her twice in an attempt to de-escalate the conflict; this information was also captured in an unchallenged finding of fact. He could also considerAbele's general hostility toward police officers, as evidenced by statements such as "I believe every cop lies in every report they ever write" and her answer of "what difference does it make what I say to a cop?" when asked, "[D]o you feel its ok to say things that aren't true to cops?" See a/so unchallenged FF 

## 1l 32 (Abele stating that "someone should tart in your face" to Copeland). The hearing officer was



### 18In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 permitted to consider all of this (unchallenged) evidence and draw reasonable inferencesfromAbele's behavior based on the totality ofthe circumstances. The evidence presented during thefour-day hearing allowedthe hearing officer to make reasonable credibility determinations and inferthatAbele knewthat Marshal Webb did nottrip herand that she knowingly madeafalse police reportto gethim into trouble. A lawyer's state of mind is afactual determination, and we give greatweight to the hearing officer's determination becausethe hearing officer is in the best position to make these determinations. Longacre, 155 Wn.2d at 744. Here, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings offact and that these findings offact support the conclusion that count II was proved by a clear preponderance of the evidence.

Ill. Suspension Is theAppropriate Sanction We also affirm the hearing officer's and unanimous Board's sanctions against Abele. The American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 ed. 

### & Supp. 1992) "govern lawyer sanctions in Washington." Marshall, 160 Wn.2d at 342. Based on these standards, we apply athree-step process to analyze a recommended sanction. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstPreszler, 169Wn.2d 1, 18, 232 P.3d 1118 (2010). First, we determine the presumptive sanction by analyzing '"the ethical duties violated,

... the lawyer's mental state, and

... the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's conduct."' /d. (quoting Marshall, 160Wn.2d at 342). Second, "we determine whether any aggravating or mitigating circumstances call for adeparturefrom the presumptive sanction." 

### /d. Third, if raised by the attorney being disciplined, "we evaluatethe Board's recommended sanction based on '(1) [the]

19In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 proportionality of the sanction to the misconduct and (2) the extent of agreement among the members of the Disciplinary Board."' /d. (quoting In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainstSchwimmer, 153Wn.2d 752, 764, 108 P.3d 761 (2005)). We afford great deferenceto the Board's recommended sanction but retain the ultimate authority for determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney's misconduct. In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainst Wickersham, 178Wn.2d 653, 664, 310 P.3d 1237 (2013). We generally adopt the sanction recommended by a unanimous Board unless there is a clear reason for departure. 

### /d. Abele argues (1) that substantial evidence does not supportthe hearing officer's finding that she acted intentionally or knowingly, (2) that the WSBA failed to prove two of the three aggravating factors found by the hearing officer, (3) that the hearing officer did not apply all applicable mitigating factors, and (4) thatAbele's sanction is disproportionate given the circumstances of her case. 

### A. Mental State forCountI Abele argues that substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding that she acted intentionally or with knowledge as required to impose a suspension under Standards6.22. She assertsthat herconductwas negligent rather than knowing. This argument mirrors her argument that she didn't violate the applicable RPCs, as they require more than negligent conduct. As we noted in Part II.A of this opinion, Judge Farris found thatAbele's behavior was "deliberate, willful, and in bad faith" in her unchallenged order of contempt. Additionally, our sufficiency analysis of count I upholds the hearing officer's finding that Abele's conduct was intentional.

20In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 Standard6.22 reads: Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows[13l that he or she is violating a court orderor rule, and causes injury or potential injury to a client or party, or causes interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. Standards 6.22 applies to Abele's intentional conduct. We therefore adopt the recommendation and hold that suspension is the presumptive sanction forAbele's conduct under count 

### I. B. MentalState forCountII Abele argues that substantial evidence does not support the hearing officer's finding that she knowingly made afalse or misleading report to the SPD in May2011; she does not argue that suspension is not the appropriate standard for an attorney knowingly making a false or misleading police report, pursuant to Standards 5.12. 14 Because we hold that substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's finding that Abele knowingly made a false or misleading report to the SPD in May 2011, we also hold that suspension is the presumptive sanction forAbele's conduct undercount II. 

### C. AggravatingandMitigating Factors Aggravating or mitigating factors can alterthe presumptive sanction but only if they are sufficientlycompelling tojustifyadeviation. Cohen, 149Wn.2d 323, 339. The

13 The ABA Standards articulate a slightly different definition of "knowledge" than the RPCs. Compare STANDARDS at 17 ('"Knowledge' is the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result."), with RPC 1.0A(f) ("'Knowingly,' 'known,' or 'knows' denotes actual knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances."). Abele's intentional conduct satisfies the requirements ofboth definitions. 14 Standards 5.12 reads, "Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in criminal conductwhich does not contain the elements listed in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice." 21In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 hearing officer determined that three aggravating factors applied under Standards 9.22: (1) dishonest or selfish motive, (2) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of conduct, and (3) substantial experience in the practice of law. The hearing officer found one mitigating factor under Standards 9.32: the absence of a prior disciplinary record. Though potentially applicable, the hearing officerdid not apply an aggravating factor for multiple offenses. Abele does not challenge the applicability of the aggravating factor "substantial experience in the practice of law"; Abele was admitted to the bar and has been practicing since 2002. Abele challenges the first two aggravating factors and argues that the hearing officer erred by failing to recognize the stress of litigation as an additional mitigating factor. Each of her challenges is specific to the presence of aggravating factors for count I, even though the hearing officerdid not distinguish aggravating and mitigating factors between count I and count II. We hold thatAbele acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and that she refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her conduct. We decline to add the mitigator of "personal or emotional problems-stress of litigation," requested byAbele, to her sanction analysis. 1 . Dishonest or Selfish Motive As to count I, Abele challenges the application of the aggravating factor "dishonest or selfish motive" by incorporating her earlier argument that her mental state was merely negligent. The WSBA counters with citations to testimony from Judge Farris that Abele's repeated interruptions throughout the proceedings manifested numerous advantages for hercase:

22In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 And by doing it, she does gain advantages. It's a form of belligerent bullying by which she does get extra argument. She gets facts in the record that are not subject to cross-examination. She throws her opponents off because they are disrupted. These assertions are supported by testimony from opposing counsel. The hearing officer is permitted to make reasonable inferences of motive. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Dornay, 160 Wn.2d 671, 684, 161 P.3d 333 (2007). We have already held that substantial evidence supports the finding thatAbele's actions were intentional; substantial evidence also supports the aggravating factor ofdishonest or selfish motive. As to count II, the hearing officerfound thatAbele knowinglygave afalse report to lawenforcement personnel, motivated by herdesireto geteitherMarshal Copeland
or Marshal Webb in trouble by filing a complaint against one or both marshals. Because we hold that this finding is supported by substantial evidence and because Abele does not challenge the presence of any aggravating factor as to count II, we also find thatthe "dishonest or selfish motive" aggravating factor applies to count II. 2. Refusal To AcknowledgeWrongful Nature ofConduct Abele also challenges the second aggravating factor, "refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct." STANDARDS 9.22(g). This aggravating factor is appropriatewhere a lawyeradmitsthatshe engaged in the alleged conduct butdenies that it was wrongful or where she rationalizes the improper conduct as error. In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainst Ferguson, 170 Wn.2d 916, 943-44, 246 P.3d 1236 (2011) (citing In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstHolcomb, 162Wn.2d 563, 588-89, 173 P.3d 898 (2007)). We have also held that Standards 9.22(g) applies when the

23In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 attorney '"did not accept responsibility but sought to justify his conduct with explanationsthatwere insufficient."' In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstLopez, 153 Wn.2d 570, 580, 106 P.3d 221 (2005). The hearing officer reasonably concluded that Standards 9.22(g) applies here. Though Abele presented some evidence that she has acknowledged the wrongful nature of her conduct, her careful selection of statements and assertions ignores substantial evidence that she has not accepted responsibility for her conduct. Abele testified in her deposition, taken only four months before the hearing, that she didn't understand why the WSBAfiled a complaint against her, that she didn't understand what she did wrong in front of Judge Farris, and that "there was nothing [she] could do to please [Judge Farris]." Her stated belief is that "Judge Farris found [her] in contempt because she didn't like [her]

.... [T]hat [is the only reason]." Abele's briefing also shifted blame for her misconduct to Judge Farris. The hearing officerspecificallyfound thatAbele's assertionthat heroutburstswere caused by a hearing disability was not credible, and he explicitly rejected her assertions that Judge Farris's behavior provoked her outburst. These factual findings are unchallenged. The hearing officer also found, and Abele does not challenge, that Abele's remaining excuses and explanations were not credible. We therefore reject Abele's contention thatthe aggravatingfactor "refusalto acknowledgewrongful nature of conduct" does not apply.

24In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0 3. Stress of Litigation Abele urgesthis courtto applythe stressoflitigation as amitigatingfactor, citing Dornay, 160Wn.2d at 687. In Dornay, the attorney lied underoath in orderto protect
an extramarital affair. 

### /d. at 684. We acknowledged that "[t]heWashington Legislature and the courts ofthis state have recognized the profound impact of intimate partner violence" and held thatthe emotional problems associated with Dornay's relationship constituted a mitigating factorthat merits substantial weight. 

### /d. at 687. We rejectAbele'sargumenttoapplythe stressoflitigation as amitigatingfactor. Even acknowledging that Abele's misconduct under count I occurred during a contentious, 13-day trial that Judge Farris agreed "was stressful,"Abele presents no argument that the stress associated with litigation is comparable to the stress of intimate partner violence that was a mitigator in Dornay. Applicable mitigators concerning issues ofmental disabilityand personal oremotional problems (Standards 9.32(c)) are given varying degrees of weight depending on how greatly the factors contributed to the conduct. Wickersham, 178 Wn.2d at 673. However, Abele makes
no attempt to show that the stress of trial caused her to misbehave throughout the proceedings, including during pretrial, or that these factors contributed to her misconduct alleged under count II. We decline to add the mitigator of "personal/emotional problems-stress oflitigation" toAbele's sanction analysis. D. Proportionality Finally, Abele argues that suspension for 12 months is not proportionate to her misconduct. "A six-month suspension is the accepted minimum term ofsuspension." In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Cohen, 150 Wn.2d 774, 762, 82 P.3d 224

25In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201,352-0 (2004). This minimum term suspension is warranted when "there are either no aggravating factors and at least some mitigating factors, or where the mitigating factors clearly outweigh any aggravating factors." In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Halverson, 140 Wn.2d 475, 497, 998 P.2d 833 (2000). In considering a proportionality argument, we generally do not depart from the Board's recommendation. However, we will do so "if we are persuaded that the sanction is inappropriate in light ofthe (1) disproportionality ofthe sanction to the misconduct or (2) the extent of disagreement among the members of the Board."15 Jackson, 180 Wn.2d at 238 (citing In re Disciplinary ProceedingAgainst Kuvara, 149 Wn.2d 237, 259, 66 P.3d 1057 (2003)). Here, there is no disagreement among the members ofthe Board: the Board
was unanimousthatAbele should be suspendedforoneyear. Wegivethis unanimous recommendation great deference. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Day, 162 Wn.2d 527, 538, 542, 173 P.3d 915 (2007). Abele's count I contempt violation is clear and egregious. Judges have a responsibility to maintain order in their courtroom; when the judge has to resort to issuing an order of contempt in order to secure compliance with a court order, the attorney's behavioris clearlyoverthe line.Abeledoes notprovide uswith acompelling
reason to reject the recommended suspension. We therefore adopt the Board's recommendation and hold that aone-yearsuspension is warranted underthesefacts.

15 We may also depart from the Board's recommendation if we find that our weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors differsfrom the Board's. See In re DisciplinaryProceeding AgainstPerez-Pena, 161 Wn.2d 820, 837, 168 P.3d 408 (2007). Becausethat is notthe case here, we do not departfrom the Board's recommendation. 26In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0 CONCLUSION Abele knowingly committed the acts of misconduct alleged in counts Iand II in violation of RPC 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4U). The hearing officer found these violations, andAbele's violation of RPC 8.4(d), by a clear preponderance ofthe evidence. The presumptive sanction for a knowing violation of these rules is suspension. We therefore adopt the Board's recommendation in full and order that Abele be suspended from the practice of law for one year, that she complete an evaluation to determine herfitness to practice priorto being reinstated to the practice of law, and that she pay all costs and expenses, including attorney fees awardable underthe ELC 13.9.

27In re DisciplinaryProceedingAgainstAbele, No. 201 ,352-0

WE CONCUR.

28