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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

Docket No. 44207

THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

GARY SPACKMAN, in his capacity as 

Director of the Idaho Department of Water 

Resources, and THE IDAHO 

DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES,

 Respondent-Respondent on Appeal,

and

A&B IRRIGATION DISTRICT, BURLEY 

IRRIGATION DISTRICT, MILNER 

IRRIGATION DISTRICT, AMERICAN 

FALLS IRRIGATION DISTRICT #2, 

MINIDOKA IRRIGATION DISTRICT, 

NORTH SIDE CANAL COMPANY, 

TWIN FALLS CANAL COMPANY,

 Intervenors-Respondents.

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IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR 

PERMIT NO. 27-12261, 

In the name of the City of Blackfoot.

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Twin Falls, May 2017 Term

2017 Opinion No. 67

Filed: June 20, 2017

Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk 

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Snake River Basin Adjudication. Hon. Eric J. Wildman, District Judge. 

District court decision on water right, affirmed..

Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, PLLC, Blackfoot, for appellants. Robert L. 

Harris argued. 

Garrick L. Baxter, Idaho Department of Water Resources, Boise, argued for 

respondent Spackman.
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Barker, Rosholt & Simpson, LLP, Twin Falls, for respondents A & B Irrigation 

District, Burley Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal 

Company and Twin Falls Canal Company. Travis L. Thompson argued.

Fletcher Law Office, Burley, for respondents American Falls Irrigation District #2 

and Minidoka Irrigation District. 

_________________________________

BURDICK, Chief Justice.

The Bingham County District Court affirmed a ruling by the Idaho Department of Water 

Resources (IDWR or Department) denying the City of Blackfoot’s (City) application for a water 

right, Application for Permit No. 27-12261 (12261), to be offset by mitigation through another 

water right, Water Right No. 01-181C (181C). The district court ruled that the Department was 

correct in ruling that 181C could not be used for groundwater recharge without an approved 

transfer application and could not be used as mitigation for 12261 until such transfer was 

approved. The City appeals and we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The City currently pumps water from the Blackfoot River and delivers it to irrigators east 

of I-15. Due to the cost of operating and maintaining the pump, the City filed 12261 to appropriate 

9.71 cfs of groundwater. This groundwater, in place of the surface water from the Blackfoot River, 

would then be delivered to the irrigators east of I-15. To offset the injury resulting from the 

appropriation, the City wishes to use 1,066 afa of mitigation credit resulting from seepage that 

occurs under 181C. 

Under its purpose of use element, 181C allows for five different uses: Irrigation Storage, 

Irrigation from Storage, Diversion to Storage, Recreation Storage, and Irrigation. This allows the 

City, during the irrigation season, to divert 2,466.80 afa from the Snake River to fill a recreation 

reservoir in Jensen’s Grove. Of that diversion, 1,100 acre feet are allocated to remain in the 

reservoir for recreation storage, 980.9 acre feet seep into the aquifer, and 186 acre feet are lost to 

evaporation. At the end of the season, the remaining 1,100 acre feet are left to seep into the 

aquifer. The other provisions element of 181C states that the use and diversion of water is 

subject to “additional conditions and limitations contained in a settlement agreement – IDWR 

transfer of water right, Transfer no. 72385, date June 2006 . . . .” (Settlement Agreement). The 

Settlement Agreement, among others things, states the City “must file the appropriate application 

for permit and/or transfer” if it wishes to use 181C for groundwater recharge or mitigation 
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purposes. In its application for 12261, the City proposed using part of the seepage described in 

181C as mitigation for 12261.1

The City’s application for 12261 was protested by the Coalition.2 In its protest, the 

Coalition asserted that the City failed to establish that 12261 would not reduce the quantity of 

water under existing rights. After holding an administrative hearing, the hearing officer 

determined that that the proposed appropriation in 12261 was a consumptive use of water and,

without mitigation, would reduce the quantity of water under existing rights. The hearing officer 

also concluded that 181C does not authorize the City to use the seepage described in 181C for 

recharge and therefore the City could not use 181C as mitigation for 12261. However, the 

hearing officer approved 12261 on the condition that the City successfully apply for a transfer to 

add recharge as an authorized purpose of use for 181C.

The City filed exceptions to the hearing officer’s rulings, challenging, among other 

things, the requirement that it needs to apply for a transfer to add recharge as a purpose of use 

before it can use 181C for mitigation. The Director of the Department (Director) reviewed the 

City’s exceptions and agreed with the hearing officer that 181C does not authorize the City to 

use water for recharge and a transfer would be required to authorize such use. However, the 

Director disagreed with the hearing officer’s grant of conditional approval and denied the 

application for 12261 without prejudice, suggesting the City could refile its application for 12261

in conjunction with a transfer application for 181C. 

Following the Director’s order, the City filed a petition with the district court asserting 

that the Director’s ruling was contrary to law. After permitting the Coalition to appear as 

intervenors, a hearing was held on the City’s petition. The district court found the plain 

unambiguous language of 181C’s purpose of use element does not authorize the City to use 

water for recharge and if the City wanted to use 181C as mitigation for 12261 it would have to 

file a transfer. The City appeals the district court’s ruling. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When reviewing the decision of a district court acting in its appellate capacity under the 

Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, “ ‘we review the decision of the district court to determine 

 1 The City also seeks mitigation credit from the non-use of Blackfoot River water rights, which are not subject to 

this action. 

2 “Coalition” refers collectively to the A&B Irrigation District, Burley Irrigation District, American Falls Reservoir 

District #2, Minidoka Irrigation District, Milner Irrigation District, North Side Canal Company, and Twin Falls 

Canal Company. 
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whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it.’ However, we review the agency record 

independently of the district court’s decision.” Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 160 

Idaho 251, 255, 371 P.3d 305, 309 (2016) (quoting Clear Springs Foods v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 

790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011)). Furthermore, “the agency’s factual determinations are binding 

on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the 

determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.” Id. (quoting A & 

B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 505–06, 284 P.3d 225, 230–31 

(2012)). We review questions of law de novo. Vickers v. Lowe, 150 Idaho 439, 442, 247 P.3d 

666, 669 (2011). 

When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 

other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action 

unless the court finds that the agency’s findings, inferences, conclusions, or 

decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(c) made upon unlawful procedure;

(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or

(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and 

remanded for further proceedings as necessary.

I.C. § 67–5279(3). 

Even if one of these conditions is met, this Court will still affirm the 

agency action “unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.” 

I.C. § 67–5279(4)

A & B Irrigation Dist., 153 Idaho at 506, 284 P.3d at 231.

III. ANALYSIS

The City raises multiple issues on appeal. However, the wellspring of the City’s issues is

whether the district court erred in affirming the Director’s ruling that the City may not use 181C 

for mitigation or recharge unless it first files for a transfer. We address this issue first.

A. Whether the City must file for a transfer before it can use 181C for mitigation or 

recharge. 

When interpreting a water decree this Court utilizes the same rules of interpretation 

applicable to contracts. Id., 153 Idaho at 523, 284 P.3d at 248. If a decree’s terms are 

unambiguous, this Court will determine the meaning and legal effect of the decree from the plain 
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and ordinary meaning of its words. Cf. Sky Canyon Props, LLC v. Golf Club at Black Rock, LLC, 

155 Idaho 604, 606, 315 P.3d 792, 794 (2013) (“If a contract’s terms are clear and unambiguous, 

the contract’s meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be determined from the plain 

meaning of its own words.”). A decree is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject to conflicting 

interpretations. Cf. Huber v. Lightforce USA, Inc., 159 Idaho 833, 850, 367 P.3d 228, 245 (2016)

(“Where terms of a contract are ‘reasonably subject to differing interpretations, the language is 

ambiguous . . . .’ ” (quoting Clark v. Prudential Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 138 Idaho 538, 541, 66 

P.3d 242, 245 (2003))). Whether ambiguity exists in a decree “is a question of law, over which 

this Court exercises free review.” Rangen, Inc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 159 Idaho 798, 807,

367 P.3d 193, 202 (2016) (quoting Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 455, 259 P.3d 

595, 601 (2011)).

Water rights are defined by elements. See I.C. §§ 42-1411(2); see also City of Pocatello 

v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 839, 275 P.3d 845, 854 (2012) (“The elements listed [in section 42-

1411(2)] describe the basic elements of a water right.”); Olson v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 105 

Idaho 98, 101, 666 P.2d 188, 191 (1983). Idaho Code sections 42-1411(2) and 42-1411(3) 

comprise a list of elements that define a water right.3 Under Idaho Code section 42-1412(6), a 

 3 Idaho Code sections 42-1411(2)–(3) reads: 

(2) The director shall determine the following elements, to the extent the director deems 

appropriate and proper, to define and administer the water rights acquired under state law:

(a) the name and address of the claimant;

(b) the source of water;

(c) the quantity of water used describing the rate of water diversion or, in the case of an instream 

flow right, the rate of water flow in cubic feet per second or annual volume of diversion of water 

for use or storage in acre-feet per year as necessary for the proper administration of the water 

right;

(d) the date of priority;

(e) the legal description of the point(s) of diversion; if the claim is for an instream flow, then a 

legal description of the beginning and ending points of the claimed instream flow;

(f) the purpose of use;

(g) the period of the year when water is used for such purposes;

(h) a legal description of the place of use; if one (1) of the purposes of use is irrigation, then the 

number of irrigated acres within each forty (40) acre subdivision, except that the place of use may 

be described using a general description in the manner provided under section 42-219, Idaho 

Code, which may consist of a digital boundary as defined in section 42-202B, Idaho Code, if the 

irrigation project would qualify to be so described under section 42-219, Idaho Code;

(i) conditions on the exercise of any water right included in any decree, license, or approved 

transfer application; and

(j) such remarks and other matters as are necessary for definition of the right, for clarification of 

any element of a right, or for administration of the right by the director.

(3) The director may include such general provisions in the director’s report, as the 

director deems appropriate and proper, to define and to administer all water rights.
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water decree “shall contain or incorporate a statement of each element of a water right as stated 

in subsections (2) and (3) of section 42-1411, Idaho Code, as applicable.” Purpose of use is one 

of those defining elements. I.C. § 42-1411(2)(f). Thus, a water decree must either contain a 

statement of purpose of use or incorporate one, but not both. Markel Int’l Ins. Co., Ltd. v. 

Erekson, 153 Idaho 107, 110, 279 P.3d 93, 96 (2012) (“The word ‘or’ . . . is [a] disjunctive

particle used to express an alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things.’ ”); 

In re Snook, 94 Idaho 904, 906, 499 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1972) (“The word ‘or’ . . . is given its 

normal disjunctive meaning that marks an alternative generally corresponding to ‘either’ . . . .”). 

Here, there is no reference to an incorporated statement in the purpose of use element; 

rather, the element contains a clear statement that plainly provides water may be used for: (1) 

Irrigation Storage; (2) Irrigation from Storage; (3) Diversion to Storage; (4) Recreation Storage; 

and (5) Irrigation. No ambiguity lurks in this element. It clearly lists five uses and recharge is not 

one of them. 

The City attempts to argue that recharge, although not contained in the purpose of use 

element, is an authorized use of 181C. However, recharge is a statutorily recognized beneficial 

use. I.C. § 42-234(2). As such, it must be included in the purpose of use element before a water 

right may be used for recharge. See I.C. §§ 42-1411(2)(f), -1412(6). And as noted above, 

recharge is simply not included in 181C’s purpose of use element. The City’s attempt to argue 

otherwise is nothing more than an impermissible collateral attack on the partial decree. As the 

district court stated:

If the City believed recharge should be authorized under water right 01-

181C, this proceeding is not the proper time or place to raise that argument. Some 

history is relevant here. Water right 01-181C was acquired by the City in 2005 to 

fill and maintain the reservoir at Jensen Grove. It was purchased from the New 

Sweden Irrigation District, which used the right for irrigation purposes. To change 

the nature of use to accommodate Jensen Grove, the City filed an application for 

transfer with the Department. In addition to irrigation, it sought to add 

“recreation,” “storage” and “recharge” as authorized uses under the right. The 

Coalition initially protested the transfer, but ultimately withdrew that protest 

pursuant to a settlement agreement. On February 14, 2007, the Director approved 

the City’s transfer for the following purposes of use: [(1) Irrigation Storage; (2) 

Irrigation from Storage; (3) Diversion to Storage; (4) Recreation Storage; and (5) 

Irrigation] 

Notably, he did not approve the City’s request to add recharge as an 

authorized purpose of use. In fact, recharge was deliberately withheld from the 

approved transfer. If the City believed the Director erred in this respect, it was 
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required to timely exhaust its administrative remedies and, if necessary, seek 

judicial review. It did neither.

Then, on May 29, 2009, the SRBA District Court entered a Partial Decree 

for the right in the Snake River Basin Adjudication. When the Director issued his 

recommendation for the right, he did not recommend a recharge purpose of use. If 

the City believed it was authorized to divert water for recharge, it had a duty to 

timely object to the Director’s recommendation and present evidence to rebut the 

same in the SRBA. It did not. The SRBA District Court proceeded to enter a 

Partial Decree for the right consistent with the Director’s recommendation. The 

uses of water authorized under the Decree are ascertainable from a simple reading 

of the purpose of use element. They did not include recharge. If the City believed 

the Court erred in failing to identify recharge as an authorized purpose of use, it 

was required to timely appeal. It is inappropriate to now argue, in the context of 

this judicial review proceeding, that the Partial Decree issued for 01-181C

authorizes a use of water not identified in the purpose of use element of that 

Decree.

(citations omitted).

By statute, “decree[s] entered in a general adjudication shall be conclusive as to the 

nature and extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water system.” I.C. § 42-1420(1); see also

State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 12, 16, 951 P.2d 943, 947 (1998) (“Finality in water rights is 

essential.”). Thus, as the district court stated, if the City believed recharge was authorized under 

181C, it should have appealed the Director’s original decision not to include recharge as purpose 

of use and appealed the partial decree when it was first issued by the district court. Rangen, Inc.,

159 Idaho at 806, 367 P.3d at 201.

There is no question that an application for transfer is required to change the purpose or 

nature of use of a water right. I.C. § 42-222(1) (“Any person . . . who shall desire to change 

the . . . nature of use of all or part of the water, under the right shall first make application to the 

department of water resources for approval of such change.”); see also City of Pocatello, 152 

Idaho at 839, 275 P.3d at 854. Furthermore, it is equally clear from the plain language of the 

decree that recharge is not listed as an authorized use under the purpose of use element of 181C. 

Claiming, at this stage, that recharge is an authorized use of 181C, is nothing more than an 

impermissible collateral attack on the partial decree. Allowing the City “to collaterally attack this 

determination would severely undermine the purpose of the SRBA and create uncertainty in 

water rights adjudicated in that process.” Idaho Ground Water Assoc. v. Idaho Dep’t of Water 

Res., 160 Idaho 119, 128, 369 P.3d 897, 906 (2016). As we recently stated in Rangen, Inc., 

“[a]ny interpretation of [the] partial decree [ ] that is inconsistent with the [ ] plain language 
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would necessarily impact the certainty and finality of SRBA judgments and, therefore, requests 

for such interpretations needed to be made in the SRBA itself.” 159 Idaho at 806, 367 P.3d at 

201. Here, no such request was made. 

The City attempts to circumvent this fact by arguing that it is disputing the Director’s and 

district court’s interpretation of the partial decree and not the decree itself. The City argues the 

partial decree itself is sound and clearly authorizes recharge as a purpose of use, but the Director 

and district court erred by not correctly interpreting the decree. Specifically, the City argues: (1) 

the Settlement Agreement contemplates recharge as a use and therefore enlarges the purposes of 

use element to include recharge as a purpose of use; and (2) regardless of the elements of 181C,

the actual circumstances of 181C demonstrate that 181C provides mitigation for 12261. These 

arguments, however, are misplaced.

1. Whether the Settlement Agreement adds recharge as an authorized use of water under 

181C.

The City argues that the plain language of paragraph 1.e of the Settlement Agreement 

permits the City “to use 181C for groundwater recharge or mitigation purposes associated with 

future groundwater rights . . . .” This argument fails. A private settlement agreement cannot 

define, add, or subtract from the elements of a validly adjudicated water right; it can only limit, 

condition, or clarify the administration of the right as between the private parties to the 

agreement. 

One of the purposes of the water right adjudication statutes is “to establish, through an 

adjudication a uniform description for surface water rights, ground water rights and water 

rights.” I.C. § 42–1427(1)(a). “It is important that the elements of a water right be standardized 

to allow for a fair and efficient administration of the limited water supply” Id. To this end, the 

district court adjudicating the water right is required to issue a decree that “shall contain or 

incorporate a statement of each element of a water right as stated in subsections (2) and (3) of 

section 42-1411, Idaho Code, as applicable.” I.C. § 42-1412(6). These elements are separate and 

distinct elements that, when combined, make up the water right. City of Pocatello, 152 Idaho at 

839, 275 P.3d at 854. The adjudication statutes require distinct definition statements for each 

separate element. § 14-1412(6) (“The decree shall contain or incorporate a statement of each 

element of a water right . . . .” (emphasis added)).

The City asserts, however, that the Settlement Agreement, as a document incorporated 

under the other provisions element of 181C, must be “construed along with the rest of 181C” and 
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may affect all the elements of 181C and, specifically, may add recharge to the purpose of use 

element. This argument falls short in two aspects. First, it flies in the face of section 42-1412(6), 

which only allows an element to either contain a statement defining the element or incorporate a 

statement that defines the element. The City’s argument, by allowing a document incorporated 

under the other provisions element to add a use to those already contained in the purpose of use 

element, would allow both. Not only is this prohibited under the language of 42-1412(6), see 

supra (discussing the requirement that a decree either contain or incorporate a statement of each 

element, but not both), it would impermissibly muddy the decree. Rangen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 

808, 367 P.3d at 203 (noting that adopting a perspective that would render a “partial decree less, 

rather than more, clear” is disfavored).

Second, an adjudicated water right is a judicially decreed property right. Clear Springs 

Foods, Inc. v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 797, 252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011) (“When one has legally 

acquired a water right, he has a property right . . . .” (quoting Bennett v. Twin Falls North Side 

Land & Water Co., 27 Idaho 643, 651, 150 P. 336, 339 (1915))). It is binding on the IDWR, 

indeed the Director has a “ ‘clear legal duty’ to distribute water” according to decreed water 

rights. In re SRBA, 157 Idaho 385, 393, 336 P.3d 792, 800 (2014); see also Musser v. Higginson, 

125 Idaho 392, 395–96, 871 P.2d 809, 812–13 (1994) (holding that mandamus was appropriate 

to require the director to deliver the full decreed water rights of a water right holder), abrogated

on other grounds by Rincover v. State, Dep’t of Fin., Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 976 P.2d 473 

(1999). In contrast, the Settlement Agreement is a private agreement between private parties. 

IDWR is not a party to the Settlement Agreement. As such, the Director is not bound by the 

Settlement Agreement and has no duty to enforce the Settlement Agreement. This is made clear 

by the language incorporating the Settlement Agreement into the other provisions element of 

181C: “The diversion and use of water under transfer 72385 is subject to additional conditions 

and limitations contained in a settlement agreement . . . . the settlement agreement is recorded in 

Bingham county [ ] and Bonneville county [ ] and is enforceable by the parties thereto.” 

Consequently, the Settlement Agreement cannot define, add, or subtract from the defining

elements of 181C. It is limited to providing “additional conditions and limitations” on the 

exercise of 181C. To allow the Settlement Agreement to enlarge or otherwise alter the clearly

decreed elements of 181C, would allow private parties to alter a judicial decree. Such a result is 
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simply untenable. Cf. Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 177, 233 P.3d 102, 108 (2010) (“An 

important principle drives this holding—private stipulations cannot circumvent court orders.”).

2. Whether regardless of the elements of 181C, the actual circumstances of 181C 

demonstrate that it provides mitigation for 12261.

The City argues that regardless of the elements of 181C, it may be used as mitigation for 

12261 because “[t]here is no factual dispute that 2,080.8 AF of water seeps from Jensen’s Grove 

into the ESPA each year.” Thus, because it is undisputed that this “seepage” occurs, the City 

argues it can use the seepage as mitigation, even if recharge is not listed as an authorized use of 

181C and without filing a transfer.

Recharge, however, is a statutorily recognized beneficial use. I.C. § 42-234(2). Uses must 

be identified under the purpose of use element of a water right. I.C. §§ 42-1411(2)(f), -1412(6). 

Here, 181C’s purpose of use element does not contain recharge as a beneficial use. Thus, the 

undisputed seepage that occurs “from the diversion and use of [181C] for [its] various beneficial 

purposes” is incidental recharge. I.C. § 42-234(5) (“[I]ncidental ground water recharge benefits 

are often obtained from the diversion and use of water for various beneficial purposes.”). Such 

recharge cannot be “used as the basis for claim of a separate or expanded water right.” Id.

Accordingly, without a transfer approving recharge as a beneficial use, any seepage that occurs 

under 181C is incidental recharge and not eligible to be used for mitigation purposes. Id.

In summary, recharge is a beneficial use. I.C. § 42-234(2). As such, it must be identified 

in the purpose of use element. I.C. § 42-1412(6). An element may either contain a statement 

defining the element or incorporate one, but not both. Id. 181C’s purpose of use element clearly 

contains a statement listing five uses and recharge is not one of them. The private Settlement 

Agreement, incorporated in the other provisions element of 181C, cannot alter, add, or subtract 

from the uses clearly contained in the judicially decreed purpose of use element. The sole 

mechanism for altering, adding, or subtracting from a judicially decreed purpose of use element 

is through an application for transfer. I.C. § 42-222(1). Accordingly, if the City wishes to use 

181C for recharge it must file for a transfer.4

 4 The City argues that the appropriate application is one for permit, not transfer. However, to change the nature of use 

of a water right one must file an application for transfer. I.C. § 42-222; City of Pocatello, 152 Idaho at 839, 275 P.3d at 

854. It is true that the non-use of an existing water may provide mitigation for the approval of another right without the 

filing of a transfer. However, as the district court observed, while “[a] transfer is not required under Idaho Code § 42-

222 to effectuate the non-use of an existing right . . . the City does not propose the non-use of water right 01-181C. 

Rather it proposes using the right for the additional purpose of recharge.” Thus, if the City wishes to use 181C for 

mitigation purposes without a transfer it would have to propose the non-use, rather than the continued use, of 181C.
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B. Attorney fees.

The Coalition requests attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code section 12-117(1) and Idaho 

Code section 12-121. Attorney fees are appropriate under section 12-117(1) “in any proceeding 

involving as adverse parties a state agency . . . and a person . . . if [the court] finds that the 

nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.” I.C. § 12-117(1). We have

awarded fees under section 12-117(1) where the nonprevailing party

continued to rely on the same arguments used in front of the district court, without 

providing any additional persuasive law or bringing into doubt the existing law on 

which the district court based its decision. Although the [nonprevailing parties] 

may have had a good faith basis to bring the original suit based on their 

interpretation of Idaho law, [they] were very clearly aware of the statutory 

procedures, failed to appeal separate appraisals when they had a right to appeal, 

and were clearly advised on the applicable law in an articulate and well reasoned 

written decision from the district court. Nevertheless, [they] chose to further 

appeal that decision to this Court, even though they failed to add any new analysis 

or authority to the issues raised below. Accordingly, it was frivolous and 

unreasonable to make a continued argument, and [the prevailing party] is awarded 

its reasonable attorney fees

Rangen, Inc., 159 Idaho at 812, 367 P.3d at 207 (alterations in original) (quoting Castrigno v. 

McQuade, 141 Idaho 93, 98, 106 P.3d 419, 424 (2005)).

Here, the City has asserted the same arguments on appeal as it did before the Director and 

the district court. It has continually asserted that recharge, although clearly not listed as a 

purpose of use, is an authorized use of 181C. However, the City failed to appeal either the 

Director’s decision to leave recharge off the initial transfer or the district court’s partial decree, 

which also did not include recharge as a beneficial use. While the City’s argument that an 

incorporated document under the other provisions element may add a use to the purposes of use 

element is novel, it is not reasonably based in law. The district court clearly articulated this in its 

decision. Thus, because the City failed to add any significant new analysis or authority to its 

arguments, and failed to appeal both the Director’s decision not to include recharge as a 

beneficial use and the partial decree, which also did not include recharge as a beneficial use, we

award the Coalition fees under section 12-117(1). 

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the district court. Attorney fees and costs on appeal to the Coalition. Costs on 

appeal to IDWR. 

Justices EISMANN, JONES, HORTON and KIDWELL, Pro tem, CONCUR.