Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-294 | June 28, 2019 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Leanna Weissmann

Lawrenceburg, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Sierra A. Murray

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Matt Hansen,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

June 28, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-294

Appeal from the Ripley Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Ryan J. King,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

69C01-1711-F5-56

May, Judge.

[1] Matt Hansen appeals the trial court’s order revoking the remaining portion of 

his work release sentence, his GPS-home incarceration sentence, and six 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-294 | June 28, 2019 Page 2 of 7

months of his suspended sentence. Instead, Hansen would like to be reinstated 

to work release and in-home incarceration. Hansen argues the order is an abuse 

of discretion because the circumstances of his non-compliance were mostly out 

of his control. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 19, 2018, Hansen pled guilty to Level 5 felony operating a vehicle as 

a habitual traffic violator suspended for life.

1 On April 5, 2018, the trial court 

sentenced Hansen to five years in the Indiana Department of Correction 

(“DOC”) with three years suspended to probation. The court ordered Hansen’s 

two years of executed time to be served as one year on work release followed by 

one year on GPS-home incarceration. 

[3] The work release program allowed Hansen to go to work and to authorized 

doctor’s appointments. Because his driver’s license was suspended, Hansen 

relied on his mother and coworker to drive him to and from work and 

appointments. On September 25, 2018, two reporting officers discovered that 

Hansen visited unauthorized locations nineteen different times. Three of the 

locations were Hansen’s coworker’s house and the children’s babysitters’ 

locations because the coworker was the primary transport for his children. 

Another location was his mother’s house to change his clothes in addition to his 

 

1 Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17 (2015).
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mother needing to use the restroom because of irritable bowel syndrome. 

Another location was the library because he wanted to print some pictures so he 

could draw. Work release removed Hansen from its program for being in 

unauthorized locations and having an arrearage on fees.

[4] The State filed a petition for Hansen to be brought before the trial court for a

hearing on his violation. The trial court held the hearing and then revoked 

Hansen’s remaining work release sentence, his GPS-home incarceration 

sentence, and six months of his suspended sentence. The court ordered Hansen 

to serve two and a half years of probation when he is released from the DOC. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Hansen asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his 

remaining work release sentence, his GPS-home incarceration sentence, and six 

months of his three-year suspended sentence. “We treat a hearing on a petition 

to revoke a placement in a community corrections program the same as we do a 

hearing on a petition to revoke probation.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 

(Ind. 1999). Probation is a favor granted by the State, not a right to which a 

criminal defendant is entitled. Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952, 955 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2005), trans. denied. A court may order execution of all or part of the 

sentence that was suspended at the time of the initial sentencing if the court 

finds the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of that 

probationary period. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). 
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[6] The conditions for probation and whether to revoke probation when those 

conditions are violated are left to the discretion of the trial court. Heaton v. 

State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). We review probation violation 

determinations and sanctions for an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of 

discretion occurs if the decision is “‘clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual 

deductions to be drawn therefrom.’” K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 

2006) (quoting In re L.J.M., 473 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). “We 

will second-guess the fact-finding court only when it responds to that factual 

context in an unreasonable manner.” Tapia v. State, 753 N.E.2d 581, 585 (Ind. 

2001). 

[7] Hansen admits he did not comply with the work release program rules, 

(Appellant’s Br. at 11), but he argues his violations do not warrant revocation 

by the trial court. He relies on two cases in support of his argument: Ripps v. 

State, 968 N.E.2d 323 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), and Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 

1224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). We disagree with Hansen’s assertion that his 

circumstances are similar to those found in either Ripps or Johnson. 

[8] In Ripps, we held the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Ripps’

probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his suspended sentence in 

prison because Ripps took steps to comply with his probation rules. 968 

N.E.2d at 324. Ripps moved into an assisted-living facility that was 980 feet 

from the public library, which violated a condition of his probation. Id. at 325. 

Ripps was in the process of moving out of the facility when he was arrested for 
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his violation. Id. at 327. We held that the revocation of Ripps’ probation was 

an abuse of the trial court’s discretion because the circumstances—appellant’s 

medical condition, his attempt to adhere to the terms of his probation, the 

technical nature of the measurement of the distance between the assisted-living 

facility and the library, the fact that he was in the process of moving out when 

he was arrested, his having wrongly served time in prison for an offense that 

violated ex post facto principles, and the sheriff’s department having learned of 

his living arrangement only because appellant reported his location—did not 

warrant revocation. Id. at 328.

[9] In Johnson, where the appellant had a cognitive deficit, we held the trial court 

abused its discretion in revoking Johnson’s placement in community 

corrections. 62 N.E.3d at 1226. Johnson was to remain in the interior living 

area of the apartment in which he resided and keep current with his community 

corrections fees. Id. at 1230. Sometimes, he was near—not inside—his 

apartment, and he was unable to pay his fees. Id. We concluded the trial court

abused its discretion in finding appellant’s violation warranted serving the 

entirety of the remaining portion of his executed sentence in the DOC. Id. at 

1232. We reasoned that the level of appellant’s functioning and resources, his 

previous successful placement on work release, the nature of the violation, and 

the severity of the court’s sentence were enough to justify placing Johnson on 

work release for the remaining portion of his executed sentence. Id.

[10] Here, Hansen continuously violated the work release rules, unlike Ripps, who 

moved out of his living space as soon as he was made aware the location
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violated his probation. Hansen knew that he “should have called each and 

every time for each and every delay,” (Tr. Vol. II at 13-14), but he did not do 

so. We disagree with his assertion that “his violations largely flow from 

circumstances beyond his control.” (Appellant’s Br. at 11.) The case would be 

different if each violation came as a surprise to Hansen, but that is not the 

situation. Hansen knew of his mother’s irritable bowel syndrome and his 

coworker being the primary person to transport the coworker’s children to and 

from their babysitter. Instead of notifying his work release reporting officer of

the routine stops made by his drivers, Hansen violated the rules nineteen 

different times. Hansen knew how to pre-approve his doctor’s appointments, so 

it would have been logical and practical to have the stops pre-approved as 

conditions that might occur during his drive to and from work and 

appointments. Unlike Ripps, Hansen did not take steps to address his on-going 

violations.

[11] Moreover, there is no evidence pointing to Hansen having cognitive deficits, 

which distinguishes him from Johnson, who had problems understanding. 

Johnson, 62 N.E.3d at 1228. Moreover, there were times when Hansen’s drivers 

were not the reason for the unauthorized stops. One was because Hansen 

“didn’t feel comfortable going to the doctor with everything exposed,” (Tr. Vol. 

II at 10), because there was “a rather large hole down the backside of [his] 

pants,” (id.), so he went home to change his pants. A second was because he 

was soaked head to toe with hydraulic fluid, so he went home to change his 

clothes. Just as it was logical to change clothes, it would have been equally 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-294 | June 28, 2019 Page 7 of 7

logical to notify the reporting officer that he was stopping by his house to do 

just that. A third stop was because Hansen wanted to print some pictures,

which he acknowledged was not appropriate. (Id. at 12). 

[12] We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion when Hansen admits 

violating the rules and his only mitigating evidence is his willingness “to do the 

work to get right.” (Id. at 14). Yet, when he was granted the opportunity to be 

on work release after breaking the law, Hansen violated the rules nineteen 

times. We are not convinced Hansen should be reinstated to work release and 

in-home incarceration when he knowingly and repeatedly broke the work 

release rules. See, e.g., Milliner v. State, 890 N.E.2d 789, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (stating the trial court’s decision was not clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances because “[appellant’s] actions showed a 

lack of respect for the law and for the opportunities afforded him”). 

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked the remaining 

portion of Hansen’s work release sentence, his GPS-home incarceration 

sentence, and six months of his suspended sentence. Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.