REPORTED

IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

No. 2465

September Term, 2015

CASEY O. JOHNSON

v.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Woodward, 

Arthur,

Leahy,

JJ.

Opinion by Leahy, J.

Filed: March 29, 2017
“If you don’t have time to do it right, when will you have time to do it over?”

John Wooden, UCLA Head Coach (1948-1975)

On a snowy evening in January, 2015, a Montgomery County Police Officer 

became suspicious that criminal activity may be afoot after he stopped Casey O. Johnson 

(“Appellant” or “Johnson”) for a broken tail light in Germantown, Maryland. After

more officers and a K-9 unit arrived at the scene, Johnson and her two passengers were 

asked to exit the vehicle. The police searched Johnson’s two jacket pockets and found

nothing, but when they searched Anthony Haqq, the front passenger, they found a baggie 

of 13 grams of marijuana in his waistband and smelled PCP on his breath. As they 

arrested the front passenger, the police proceeded to search Johnson’s entire vehicle,

including the trunk, while the K-9 stood idly by. A digital scale and 104.72 grams of 

marijuana were found inside a paper bag inside a backpack that was inside the trunk. 

Then the officers arrested Johnson, and during the search incident, found $544.00 on her 

person.

A grand jury charged Johnson with possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute and conspiracy possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. Prior to trial

in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Johnson moved to suppress all evidence 

seized by the police, who she claimed, violated the protection afforded her under the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. The circuit court denied Johnson’s motion, and the case proceeded to trial. 

The jury found Johnson guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, and 

the court sentenced Johnson to five years suspended in favor of supervised probation. 

1
On appeal, Johnson presents two issues for our review:

1. “Did the police have reasonable articulable suspicion to continue 

detaining Ms. Johnson after a reasonable amount of time to process a traffic 

stop had passed?”

2. “Did the police have probable cause to search Ms. Johnson’s trunk 

based on drug evidence found on the person of her front-seat passenger?”

Johnson’s questions confine our review to the facts and argument presented before 

the suppression court. See Longshore v. State, 399 Md. 486, 498–99 (2007); Ferris v. 

State 355 Md. 356, 368 (1999). Because the officers lacked probable cause to believe 

that drugs were in the trunk based solely on the drugs found in the waistband and on the

breath of the front passenger, we hold that the suppression court erred by concluding the 

officers were permitted to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk pursuant to the 

Carroll Doctrine. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); see also California 

v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1999); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); Wilson 

v. State, 174 Md. App. 434 (2007). Given our disposition of this issue, we need not 

address Johnson’s first question.

BACKGROUND

Suppression Hearing

The circuit court held a hearing on Johnson’s motion to suppress on April 16, 

2015. Because the State tried Johnson and her front-seat passenger, Haqq, together, the 

suppression court heard arguments from both defendants on their pending motions.

Johnson claimed the officers lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to prolong the stop 

past the purpose of writing a citation for the traffic law violation and that the officers 

2
lacked probable cause to search the trunk of Johnson’s vehicle. Officers Robert Sheehan 

and Michael Mancuso testified for the State, and Haqq testified for the defense. The 

following facts were established at the suppression hearing from these witnesses, and 

from Officer Sheehan’s dashboard camera video of the traffic stop, which was played 

during his testimony. 

The Stop

The defective tail light on Johnson’s car was apparent on the video of the stop that 

occurred at 7:25 p.m. on January 9, 2015 near the intersection of Middlebrook Road and 

Germantown Road in Germantown. Johnson had two passengers with her: Anthony 

Haqq1 in the front seat and Kevin Helms2 in the back seat. 

At the time of the stop, Officer Sheehan was assigned to the Germantown District 

Community Action Team, a unit placed “in areas of high crime for crime suppression.” 

He had served as a police officer for twelve years, including approximately one year on 

the Special Investigations Criminal Street Gang Unit, and approximately one year on the 

Special Investigations Narcotics Enforcement Team. Officer Sheehan also took several 

classes concentrating on drug interdiction, and completed 417 hours of training on drug 

interdiction. He testified that the stop occurred in a high-crime area.

1 Haqq testified that Johnson was his girlfriend. This information was not known 

to the officers at the time of the traffic stop, however. Johnson had identified her 

passengers to Officer Sheehan as “friends” whom she had only known “about a month.” 

2 The record does not contain information on whether Kevin Helms was charged 

in relation to this incident.

3

 
Officer Sheehan explained that he initiated the traffic stop to issue the driver a 

safety equipment repair order. When he activated his emergency equipment, Johnson 

drove “very slowly,” turned into a Safeway parking lot, and stopped in the second 

parking aisle.3

 It had been snowing and was dark out, so Officer Sheehan shined a 

spotlight on the rear window of Johnson’s vehicle. 

Furtive Movements and Nervousness

Officer Sheehan perceived, through the rear window of the vehicle, Johnson and 

the front-seat passenger, Haqq, making “furtive movements.” Specifically, he observed:

It looked like [Johnson] may have been manipulating something in the 

center console area. She was bent over it. I could see her hand, her left 

hand on the steering wheel as she bent over the center console area, 

reaching in that area and reaching over towards Haqq’s seat. . . . I could see 

her, portion from her elbow up moving, and I could see her shoulder. I 

couldn’t see her arm. I’m sorry. Her hand. 

* * *

[Haqq] was moving around in his seat. He appeared to be either reaching 

under his seat on to the floorboard in front of his seat, and occasionally 

would lift his rear end up off the seat and then bring it back down, as if he 

was either trying to reach underneath where he was sitting, or the seat or the 

floorboard.

Haqq contested Officer Sheehan’s observations and testified that neither he nor Johnson 

were moving around in their seats. 

Officer Sheehan related that, after observing the furtive movements, the first 

thought that came to his mind was that the vehicle’s occupants were trying to conceal 

3 After viewing the video of the traffic stop, the suppression court found that 

Johnson pulled over twenty-five seconds after Officer Sheehan initiated the stop, at 

7:25:45. p.m. 

4

 
drugs or weapons. So at 7:25:50 p.m. he “jump[ed] out of [his] car real quick to [go] up 

to the vehicle to see what was going on.” Shining his flashlight into the vehicle as he 

approached, he observed Haqq “leaned over his own legs” and that “his hands were in 

between his legs.” According to Officer Sheehan, when he got to the driver’s window 

and introduced himself, Haqq “immediately jumped back in his seat . . . and pulled his 

shirt down over his crotch area.” Johnson’s “voice was shaking[,]” and Officer Sheehan 

observed “the carotid pulse in her neck [was] beating rapidly[.]”

Officer Sheehan attested that in his twelve years of experience conducting traffic 

stops, he developed a sense for “traffic stop nervous,” which he described as “a normal 

baseline for a person that I just stopped for a regular violation.” Johnson, however, was 

“extremely nervous” according to Officer Sheehan, who described Johnson’s “trembling” 

hands “fumbl[e] through her wallet for her license . . . .” From these observations, 

Johnson appeared to Officer Sheehan more nervous than “traffic stop nervous.” 

Johnson asked Haqq for help locating the vehicle’s registration in the glove box,

but “he didn’t move” and instead sat “like a statue” staring out the window. Haqq’s brief 

testimony during the hearing that he “just sat in [his] seat and stared out the window” was 

consistent with Officer Sheehan’s version of the events. 

Upon returning to his patrol car at 7:26:27 p.m., Officer Sheehan called in to 

request that his Germantown District Community Action Team members assist him with 

the stop. Immediately thereafter, he began processing the traffic stop on “eTix,” and 

5
conducting the routine license, registration, and warrant checks in four systems.4 While 

conducting these checks he observed Haqq resume making furtive movements. 

Specifically, Officer Sheehan testified that “[a]s I am working on the computer, I can see 

now that Mr. Haqq is no longer statue-esque [sic] and not moving” but rather, “I could 

see . . . the top of [Haqq’s] body moving back and forth . . . lifting up off his seat and 

leaning back a little bit” and “his arms moving in front on him.” At the point on the 

video corresponding to Officer Sheehan’s testimony, a voice is heard on the video 

informing Officer Sheehan that “NICIC clear. 2009 Mitsubishi 4-door. License status, 

valid. Points zero. NCIC person clear.”5

Just after Officer Sheehan received the information on the background checks, 

Officer Dos Santos arrived at the stop at 7:29:30 p.m. Officer Sheehan brought Officer 

Dos Santos up to date, explained that he had already requested a K-9 unit, and 

recommended that they wait for another member of the team to arrive for “officer safety 

reasons” before approaching the vehicle again because there were three occupants in the 

car. At 7:32 p.m. Officer Mancuso arrived, and after Officer Sheehan summarized his 

observations, the three officers approached Johnson’s car. 

4 Officer Sheehan conducted the routine checks through NCIC, E-Justice, 

Maryland Judiciary Case Search, and LInX. 

5 Johnson’s counsel then asked the court to rule on whether the officers had 

developed reasonable articulable suspicion to lawfully continue the traffic stop. The 

suppression court declined to rule at that time. 

6

 
The Frisk and Search Incident

Officer Sheehan asked Johnson to step out of the car so that he could show her the 

broken brake light and ask her a few questions. The video displayed the following 

exchange beginning at 7:32:44 p.m.:

Officer Sheehan: Who are these people in the car with you?

Ms. Johnson: Oh. My friends.

Officer Sheehan: Friends? Where are y’all coming from?

Ms. Johnson: Coming from right over here.

Officer Sheehan: Okay. And then stopping you, I could see a lot 

of movement in the car, all right?

Ms. Johnson: Oh. Okay.

Officer Sheehan: Okay? You were moving around a lot, he was 

moving around an awful lot, front passenger, 

and I couldn’t see him because of the salt on the 

window.

Ms. Johnson: Oh. Okay.

Officer Sheehan: What were you guys doing?

Ms. Johnson: Oh, nothing. I was just, I mean, moving 

around, because I don’t understand. I was just 

(unintelligible), I wasn’t doing anything.

Officer Sheehan: Okay. All right. Is anything illegal in the car 

that I need to know about? No drugs?

Ms. Johnson: No.

Officer Sheehan: No weapons?

Ms. Johnson: No, sir.

Officer Sheehan: Okay. Where do these guys live? Do they live 

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in the area?

Ms. Johnson: Yeah. 

Officer Sheehan: Okay. How long have you known them for?

Ms. Johnson: I don’t know. You know, about a month?

Officer Sheehan: Do you know if they have anything illegal on 

them?

Ms. Johnson: No. No sir.

Officer Sheehan: Okay. Nothing illegal in the car. 

Ms. Johnson: No.

Officer Sheehan: Can I search your vehicle to make sure there’s 

nothing illegal inside there?

Ms. Johnson: I’m not understanding why you need to?

Officer Sheehan: I just explained why. Because after I stopped 

you, you guys were moving around an awful 

lot.

Ms. Johnson: I understand that, I’m just saying that, to me, 

I’m not understanding why you have to search 

the car?

Officer Sheehan: I don’t have to. I’m just asking consent.

Ms. Johnson: Yeah. I just don’t think that that’s appropriate, 

but –

Officer Sheehan: Okay. So, you don’t want me to.

Ms. Johnson: I mean, I mean, I don’t – no. Because I don’t 

understand why you need to.

Officer Sheehan: Okay. That’s fine. I’ve talked to you, I just 

thought that I might (unintelligible) them too.

Ms. Johnson: Yeah, I mean. I mean. No.

8
As the quoted exchange demonstrates, Johnson denied Officer Sheehan consent to 

search her vehicle. But soon after, she did consent to Officer Sheehan’s request to search 

the outer two pockets of her sweatshirt. That search did not reveal any contraband or 

weapons. Officer Sheehan’s exchange with Johnson concluded at 7:35:16 p.m.6

Meanwhile, Officer Mancuso had retrieved Haqq’s information, and Officer Dos 

Santos had retrieved Mr. Helms’ information. Officer Mancuso remained standing next 

to Haqq’s passenger window, while Officer Sheehan ran the passengers’ checks. By 

7:37:07 p.m. there were five officers on the scene—Officers Sheehan, Dos Santos, 

Mancuso, Stone, and Dzenkowski. Officer Sheehan testified that while he ran the 

background checks he also re-opened the e-ticket for the repair order for Johnson’s 

broken brake light at 7:41 p.m.7

 By 7:42:39 p.m. Officer Sheehan completed the 

passengers’ background checks, which revealed both passengers had “PWID [possession 

with intent to distribute] or distribution priors,” and Haqq had “a couple of assault on law 

enforcements.” 

At 7:44:18 p.m. Officer Kelly—the sixth officer—arrived with a K-9. Officer 

Sheehan informed Johnson that a K-9 unit would conduct a scan of her vehicle. Officer 

6 At this point during Officer Sheehan’s testimony, Johnson’s counsel again 

requested the court rule on the motion to suppress, arguing that the officers did not have 

probable cause to believe criminal activity was afoot based on the exchange between 

Officer Sheehan and Johnson, to continue detaining Johnson and her passengers after 

7:35 p.m. The suppression court declined again to rule at that time. 

7 Officer Sheehan’s testimony is not exactly clear as to whether he actually issued 

the repair order at 7:41 p.m. or just opened it back up at that time. He did not give 

Johnson the order/citation until they got to the police station. 

9

 
Mancuso testified that, at this point in the stop, he asked Haqq and Helms to exit the 

vehicle in accordance with the police department’s policy. At 7:46 p.m., before the K-9 

scan of the vehicle, Haqq exited the vehicle and, on his own initiative, turned around,

placing his hands on the roof of the car, and spread his feet. Haqq testified that he did 

that because he was nervous. Officer Mancuso testified that he then asked Haqq whether

he could conduct a search of his person, and that he smelled PCP on Haqq’s breath when 

Haqq responded to his request. Haqq claimed Officer Mancuso did not ask him anything, 

but proceeded to search his pants area and shirt. The search revealed a baggie of 13.14

grams of marijuana in Haqq’s waistband. Officer Mancuso testified that based on his 

training and experience, he knew the baggie contained over 10 grams of marijuana.8

 

Haqq was arrested. The officers then conducted a search of the entire vehicle,

including the trunk. In the trunk they discovered a backpack, according to Officer 

Sheehan, who testified: “I opened up the backpack, and inside was . . . a large black 

shopping bag . . . inside, I could see orange peels, coffee grounds, a digital scale, and a 

large container of 4C Iced Tea Mix. When I opened up the container of 4C Iced Tea 

Mix, there was a gallon sized bag of marijuana inside of it.” He related that the 

marijuana was found to weigh 104.72 grams. When the officers placed Johnson under 

arrest, Officer Dzenkowski searched Johnson and found $544.00 in cash “folded into 

8 In 2014, the Maryland General Assembly decriminalized the use and possession 

of less than 10 grams of marijuana, making it a civil offense subject to a fine. 2014 Md. 

Laws, ch. 158 (S.B. 364). The pertinent provisions are now codified at Maryland Code 

(2002, 2012 Repl. Vol., 2016 Supp.), Criminal Law Article (“CL”), §§ 5-601 and 5-

601.1. 

10

 
different bundles.” 

Closing Arguments

During closing arguments, the State argued that Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 

806, 810 (1996), permits officers to conduct traffic stops with the dual purposes of 

issuing a citation for a traffic law violation and investigating a suspected crime and that 

the traffic stop can transmute into a Terry investigation of a suspected crime. The State 

contended that the officers did not unreasonably detain Johnson and Haqq because the 

traffic stop began at 7:25 p.m. and was ongoing through 7:32 p.m., at which point the 

officers had developed reasonable articulable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop

when they learned that both passengers had “possession with intent to distribute priors.” 

According to the State, by 7:46 p.m., the officers had developed probable cause to 

conduct a warrantless search of the entire vehicle pursuant to the Carroll Doctrine after 

Officer Mancuso smelled PCP on Haqq’s breath and performed a consent search 

revealing a baggie of 13.14 grams of marijuana in Haqq’s waistband. The State 

confirmed that Officer Kelly did not conduct a K-9 scan of the vehicle because the 

marijuana found on Haqq “supplied the probable cause” to search the entire vehicle. 

Johnson countered that the police detained her unlawfully beyond the time it took 

to effectuate the traffic stop—and that the furtive movements and Johnson and Haqq’s 

degree of nervousness were insufficient to form reasonable suspicion for a second stop

because police cannot rely on nervousness to form the requisite probable cause under 

Whitehead v. State, 116 Md. App. 497 (1997). Johnson urged the suppression court (as to 

the second and dispositive issue in this appeal) that there was no nexus between the 

11
marijuana found on Haqq and the marijuana and scale found inside the backpack that was 

in the trunk of the car. Johnson’s counsel adopted the closing argument of Haqq’s 

counsel, who asserted that there was “no independent probable cause for the officers to 

search the inside of the vehicle, let alone the trunk of the vehicle.” “[M]arijuana found 

on a passenger is not enough to search a vehicle that he doesn’t own, that he has not been 

driving.” At best, counsel reasoned, the officers could have performed a Gant search,

9

which would have been limited to the passenger side of the vehicle where Haqq was 

sitting. Counsel maintained that the police could only perform a Carroll search if they 

had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained contraband. 

Suppression Ruling

After considering the parties’ arguments, the suppression court reconvened on 

April 28, 2015 and, in denying Johnson’s motion to suppress, made extensive findings of 

fact. The court began by observing that

[u]pon stopping the vehicle the officer approached and asked for the 

driver’s information. Thereafter the officer followed normal procedures 

associated with the routine stop for a broken taillight. Both before and 

while in the midst of these normal procedures the officer became suspicious 

of additional illegal activity and initiated further measures of investigation.

The stop began at 7:25:45. We had the benefit of a video that, of the 

stop which had a time sequence reported and marijuana was taken from the 

front passenger, Mr. Haqq, at 7:46:45 just short of 21 minutes.

The court acknowledged that the determination of reasonable suspicion must be 

based on “common sense judgments and inference about human behavior,” and credited 

9 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

12

 
the experience and specialized training of the police officers. The court credited the 

other facts relied upon by the State, including that 1) the stop occurred in a high crime 

area, 2) the officer observed Johnson and Haqq’s furtive movements, and 3) Haqq and 

Johnson showed an “unusual degree of nervousness.” 

The court concluded that the repair citation was completed at 7:41 p.m. (even 

though Officer Sheehan did not physically give the citation to Johnson at that time), 

“approximately 16 minutes after the stop[,]” and that during this time there was no 

unlawful detention “with all that was going on with regard to the warrant checks and with 

regard to the observations of the defendants by the police officer.” The court next 

observed that a few minutes later the passengers were asked to exit the vehicle in 

accordance with police department policy for the purpose of conducting a canine search. 

The court found that Haqq consented freely to the search of his person:

[Officer Mancuso] testified that upon defendant Haqq stepping outside the 

vehicle that the defendant immediately faced the car and put his hands up 

onto the vehicle’s roof. 

The defendant admits he did this without officer direction . . . 

because he was nervous . . . . The officer then asked if he could search the 

defendant’s person to which the defendant responded according to Officer 

Mancuso [‘]go ahead.[’]

 

The court also noted that Officer Mancuso smelled PCP on the breath of defendant Haqq 

when he had exited the vehicle.

The court rejected the defendants’ arguments that, even if Haqq gave consent, that 

consent was not voluntary. The court stated its finding on the voluntariness of Haqq’s 

consent:

The Court finds that a reasonable person in this situation would have 

13
felt free to decline the officer’s request. The defendant’s consent, 

defendant Haqq was not coerced or granted only in submission to a claim 

of lawful authority.

Significant to this finding is the fact that just minutes earlier 

defendant Johnson refused to consent to the search of the vehicle which 

lends credence to and support of the finding that the environment of the 

stop was not one in which the defendant’s [sic] will were overborne.

The suppression court then turned to the issue of whether the officers had 

developed probable cause to conduct a search of the entire vehicle pursuant to the Carroll

Doctrine. In denying the motion to suppress, the court announced its finding that the 

officers had probable cause to search the vehicle’s trunk:

Under [the Carroll] doctrine if a car is readily mobile[,] and probable cause 

exists to believe it contains contraband[,] the Fourth Amendment permits 

police to search the vehicle without warrant. . . .

. . . Probable cause is a flexible common sense standard. It exists for 

a warrantless automobile search where facts and circumstances known to 

the police are such that it would warrant a man of reasonable caution to 

believe that the vehicle contained articles lawfully subject to seizure.

A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is 

involved is all that is required. . . .

In this case[,] the police recovered a baggie of marijuana from 

defendant Haqq. The police . . . had testified there was a strong odor of 

PCP on his breath. These facts, in conjunction with the furtive behavior 

previously observed by the officer, the location of the stop, the evasive 

answers provided by the occupants and the extreme nervousness of both the 

front driver and the front passenger occupant were sufficient to establish 

probable cause to search the vehicle.

Jury Trial

Johnson was tried on the charge for possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute.10 After a two-day jury trial, Johnson was found guilty on September 22, 2015. 

10 Johnson and Haqq were originally tried together in a jury trial on May 4-5, 

2015. On May 5, 2015, the jury found Johnson not guilty of conspiracy to possess 

14

 

Continued on next page . . .
As mentioned supra, the trial court sentenced Johnson to five years of imprisonment 

suspended in favor of supervised probation on November 19, 2015. Johnson filed this 

appeal timely on December 17, 2015. 

DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court has made clear that when the police stop a motor vehicle and 

detain the occupant(s), the detention is a seizure that implicates the Fourth Amendment, 

United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 

653 (1979), and is “subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ 

under the circumstances.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). A traffic 

stop “is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation 

has occurred.” Id. (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653; Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 

106, 109 (1977)). 

There is no dispute that the initial traffic stop in this case was valid. Officer 

Sheehan had probable cause to believe that Johnson violated a traffic law by driving with 

a broken tail light. Indeed, Johnson does not challenge the traffic stop itself; instead, in 

her first question on appeal she assails the constitutionality of the traffic stop’s duration, 

and claims Officer Sheehan did not have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 

activity to conduct a Terry investigative stop after the traffic stop concluded. Because we 

marijuana with intent to distribute. On May 6, 2015, Johnson filed a motion for mistrial 

on the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute charge, which the court granted. 

On the same day, May 6, 2015, Haqq was acquitted. After the mistrial, Johnson was tried 

alone and convicted as described above.

15

 
hold that the officers lacked probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk 

of Johnson’s vehicle, the issue of whether Officer Sheehan developed reasonable 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a Terry investigative stop is a 

constitutional question that is not necessary to decide today. Curran v. Price, 334 Md. 

149, 171 (1994) (“We have long adhered to the policy of not deciding constitutional 

issues unnecessarily.”). We therefore turn to the second issue presented by Johnson.

I.

A. Standard of Review 

The issue before us concerns the trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to 

suppress evidence; therefore, we view the facts presented at the suppression hearing in 

the light most favorable to the prevailing party—in this case, the State. Sellman v. State, 

449 Md. 526, 531, 538 (2016); see also Moats v. State, 230 Md. App. 374, 384 (2016)

(citation omitted), cert. granted, ___ Md. ___ (2017). We defer to the suppression 

court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, and review those findings and

determinations for clear error. Williams v. State, 372 Md. 386, 401 (2002). 

Although we “‘do not engage in de novo fact-finding[,]’” Padilla v. State, 180 Md. 

App. 210, 218 (2008) (quoting Haley v. State, 398 Md. 106, 131 (2007)), “[i]n 

determining whether a constitutional right has been violated, we make an independent, de 

novo, constitutional appraisal by applying the law to facts presented in a particular case.” 

Williams, 372 Md. at 401 (citing Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 569; Cartnail v. State, 359 

Md. 272 283–84 (2000)). In so doing, we note that the burden of justifying the search 

before the suppression court in this case was upon the State, for “once it is established . . . 

16
that the search in issue was warrantless, a tectonic shift occurs in the allocation of the 

burdens. The respective roles of the State and of the defense are procedurally and 

dramatically reversed.” Epps v. State, 193 Md. App. 687, 703 (2010). “‘The very 

possibility of such a shift is a direct consequence of the Supreme Court’s strong 

preference for searches and seizures pursuant to judicially approved warrants over 

warrantless searches and seizures.’” Id. at 704 (quoting Herbert v. State, 136 Md. App. 

458, 485 (2001)). 

B. The Search Exceeded the Scope Permitted

Under the Carroll Doctrine 

Before this Court, Johnson argues that the police did not have probable cause to 

search the trunk of her vehicle based on discovering marijuana in Haqq’s waistband and 

smelling PCP on Haqq’s breath.

11 Johnson contends that police were required to have a 

“particularized and objective basis” to believe that Johnson granted Haqq access to her 

trunk before they could search the trunk without a warrant. Furthermore, Johnson argues 

that searches under the Carroll Doctrine do not give police officers carte blanche to 

search the entire vehicle including the trunk. Instead, Johnson contends that the 

11 Johnson does not have standing to challenge the search of Haqq and the seizure 

of the 13.14 gram bag of marijuana. Jones v. State, 407 Md. 33, 49–50 (2008) (other 

citations omitted) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (“Fourth 

Amendment rights are personal in nature and may only be enforced by the person whose 

rights were infringed upon”); see also Fitzgerald v. State, 153 Md. App. 601, 659 (2003) 

(“If the defendant has no Fourth Amendment interest in the thing seized or the place 

searched, the defendant is barred, at the threshold, from raising the issue of the Fourth 

Amendment merits, whatever those merits might have been with respect to someone 

else.” (citations omitted)). 

17

 
“automobile exception” limits the scope of a warrantless search to specific places within 

a vehicle for which police officers have probable cause to search for the object of the 

suspected criminal activity. According to Johnson, Maryland courts have drawn a 

distinction between passengers and the driver: passengers, unless there is something 

indicating otherwise, do not have control over the contents of the vehicle.12 Johnson 

points out that the officers only recovered evidence of drugs on the person of the frontseat passenger, Haqq, prior to their search of the trunk and there was no indication (or 

evidence) that Haqq may have placed drugs in the trunk of Johnson’s vehicle. 

According to Johnson, neither Johnson’s furtive movements reaching toward the center 

console, nor passenger Haqq’s furtive movements pulling his shirt over his knees and 

12 Johnson relies on State v. Wallace, 372 Md. 137, 158–59 (2002) for this 

proposition. In Wallace, during a valid traffic stop, a canine made two positive alerts 

indicating that the vehicle may have contained contraband. Id. at 142. The officers 

proceeded to search each occupant of the vehicle and found cocaine in Wallace’s pants—

Wallace was a passenger. Id. at 143. After searching each occupant, the officers, then, 

conducted a search of the vehicle and found a large quantity of cash. Id. The State 

petitioned the Court of Appeals to determine whether the officers had probable cause to 

search Wallace—a passenger—solely based on the positive canine alert that drugs were 

located within the vehicle. Id. at 147. The Court noted that under Maryland law, there is 

a “distinction between drivers and owners and passengers of vehicles.” Id. at 158-59. The 

Court held that “a positive canine alert to contraband in a vehicle, without more, does not 

establish probable cause to search all of the passengers in the vehicle.” Id. at 141, 159. 

This Court had called Wallace into doubt because of its reliance on Pringle v. State, 370 

Md. 525 (2002), rev’d sub nom. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003). See Stokeling 

v. State, 189 Md. App. 653, 674 n.9 (2009) (“The continued vitality of Wallace is 

questionable given the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in Pringle.”). But in Norman 

v. State, the Court of Appeals dispelled any doubts about Wallace by declaring, “Wallace

remains good law, and has not been vitiated by Pringle[,]” adding that “[w]e disagree 

with the Court of Special Appeals’s remark in Stokeling, that Pringle casts doubt on 

Wallace’s status as good law.” ___ Md. ___, ___, No. 56, September Term 2016, slip op. 

at 41, 43 (filed Mar. 27, 2017) (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted).

18

 
reaching toward the floor, could supply the probable cause required for a lawful search of 

the trunk. Johnson revisits Officer Sheehan’s testimony that Haqq “might have shoved 

something under his seat,” and concedes, at most, the facts available to police at the time 

were that drugs may have been placed by Haqq in the front-passenger side of the car. 

Conversely, the State contends the police are not required to have a “particularized 

basis” to search specific areas of a vehicle where there is probable cause to believe that 

evidence of a crime is within the vehicle. The State relies on Acevedo, Ross, and Wilson,

supra, for the proposition that because the police recovered marijuana from Haqq during 

a consent search and further smelled PCP on his breath, the “probable cause to search 

Johnson’s car for drugs or paraphernalia extended to every part of the car in which such 

items could be concealed[,]” including the trunk. Citing Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 

295 (1999), the State rejects Johnson’s contention that we should differentiate between 

drivers and passengers in determining whether the police developed probable cause, and 

presses that Johnson’s nervousness and furtive movements proved she was aware Haqq 

had contraband in his possession. 

We have not had occasion to examine whether the police may have probable cause 

to search the trunk of a vehicle without a warrant under the Carroll Doctrine based solely 

on finding drugs on the person of a passenger. We begin our analysis with the ascendant 

constitutional framework.

1. The Requirements and Scope of Searches Pursuant to the Carroll

Doctrine.

The Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the 

19
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Surveying 

federal constitutional law, we explained in State v. Andrews, that “[t]he Fourth 

Amendment protects not against all intrusions as such, ‘but against intrusions which are 

not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.’” 227 Md. 

App. 350, 373–74 (2016) (quoting Maryland v. King, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 

1969 (2013)). As such, the Fourth Amendment mandates that searches and seizures be 

reasonable, but “what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes 

place.” Id. (citing State v. Alexander, 124 Md. App. 258, 265 (1998)) (emphasis added in 

Alexander). Reasonableness “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant[,]” 

Riley v. California 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014), for it is an established principle that 

“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or 

magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 

specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 

347, 357 (1967) (footnotes omitted). 

The National Prohibition Act drove the Supreme Court’s first significant 

articulation of the “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement. Carroll, 267 U.S. 

at 136. We quote Chief Justice Taft’s vivid rendition of the facts in Carroll: 

We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, 

and that Detroit and its neighborhood along the Detroit river, which is the 

international boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing 

illegally into this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. 

It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition agents were engaged in 

a regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids 

to stop and seize liquor carried in automobiles. They knew or had 

20
convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll boys, as they 

called them, were so-called ‘bootleggers’ in Grand Rapids; i.e., that they 

were engaged in plying the unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. 

The officers had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapids half way 

to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went, 

but they escaped observation. Two months later these officers suddenly met 

the same men on their way westward presumably from Detroit. The 

partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were 

together in the same automobile they had been in the night when they tried 

to furnish the whisky to the officers, which was thus identified as part of 

the firm equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great 

source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where they plied their 

trade. That the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed that they 

were carrying liquor, we can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear 

that they had reasonable cause for thinking so. 

Id. at 160. The Court held that where “the search and seizure without a warrant are made 

upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances 

known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by 

law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.” Id. at 149. 

The Court underscored the difference between a search for contraband located in a 

premises such as a house, office, or building, versus the search of a movable vessel where 

the contraband “readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant.” Id. at 151. The 

underlying rationale for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, therefore, 

is that vehicles are inherently mobile, and by their very nature, create an exigency. Id. at 

151; see also Berry v. State, 155 Md. App. 144, 178 (2004) (explaining that the 

automobile exception has no separate exigency requirement). 

In Carroll, the Court did not address the scope of the search that is permissible, 

and it took many years before the Supreme Court re-examined the automobile exception 

21
in 1982 in Ross, supra, 456 U.S. 798.

13 The subsequent decisional detours under and 

around the Carroll doctrine are particularly instructive in considering the present case

involving the search and arrest of a passenger, followed by the search of a vehicle. 

Historically, the automobile exception was not so relevant where the occupant of a 

vehicle was arrested, because attendant to that arrest, police were permitted to search the 

entire vehicle. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), overruled in part by

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)). The automobile exception assumed greater 

prominence, however, after Chimel and New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981)—cases 

in which the Supreme Court limited significantly the breadth of a permissible search 

incident to arrest.14 

13 In the intervening years, the Supreme Court had created a container exception,

see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), which was essentially applied as an 

exception within the automobile exception after the Court ruled in Sanders that closed 

containers found in motor vehicles cannot be searched without a warrant. Arkansas v. 

Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 765–766 (1979). The ensuing confusion between the Carroll and 

Chadwick principles provoked the Court, in 1999, to overrule Sanders, reasoning that “it 

is better to adopt one clear-cut rule to govern automobile searches and eliminate the 

warrant requirement for closed containers set forth in Sanders.” Acevedo, supra, 500 U.S. 

at 579.

14 On appeal Johnson does not argue, as before the suppression court, that, at most, 

the officers may have been able to conduct a Gant search limited to the passenger 

compartment. In Gant, the Supreme Court further limited the rule established in New 

York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) allowing police to search the passenger compartment 

of a vehicle after the arrest of a recent occupant of the vehicle. 556 U.S. at 351. The 

Court noted that:

Although it appears that the State's reading of Belton has been widely 

taught in police academies and that law enforcement officers have relied on 

the rule in conducting vehicle searches during the past 28 years,[] many of 

these searches were not justified by the reasons underlying the Chimel 

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Continued on next page . . .
In Ross, the Supreme Court set out to address “the extent to which police 

officers—who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to 

believe that contraband is concealed somewhere within it—may conduct a probing search 

exception. Countless individuals guilty of nothing more serious than a 

traffic violation have had their constitutional right to the security of their 

private effects violated as a result.

Id. at 349. The Gant Court held that “[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent 

occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 

compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains 

evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 351. The Court further explained that when 

these justifications are absent, “a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable 

unless police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement 

applies.” Id. 

We note that Johnson’s case illustrates how the reasonable articulable suspicion 

required as a basis for a Gant search and the probable cause required for a Carroll search 

are qualitatively different, and how the scope of the search permitted under each may 

contrast as well. The doctrines are separate and distinct exceptions to the Fourth 

Amendment warrant requirement. Clearly, given that reasonable articulable suspicion is 

a lesser standard than probable cause, see Sellman, supra, 449 Md. at 543, every 

warrantless search that intrudes into an automobile does not automatically become a 

distended Carroll search. 

Although Gant was intended to clarify the scope of a search incident to arrest in 

the context of a motor vehicle search, as Judge Wilner recently noted in Taylor v. State, 

448 Md. 242, 249 (2016), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (2017), some confusion remains as 

to the precise meaning of the phrase “reasonable to believe” in its holding. Gant, 556 

U.S. at 351. In Taylor, the police conducted a search incident to an arrest after arresting 

the petitioner for driving under the influence. 448 Md. at 245. The search uncovered 

cocaine in the passenger compartment, and the petitioner was convicted of driving under 

the influence and possession with the intent to distribute cocaine. Id. at 244–45. After 

reviewing the different interpretations among other jurisdictions, the Court of Appeals 

determined that “reasonable to believe” is “the equivalent of reasonable articulable 

suspicion.” Id. at 250. And, accordingly, it held that the search of the passenger 

compartment incident to the arrest was permissible under Gant because the officers had 

reasonable articulable suspicion, based on prior experience with similar arrests, that 

evidence related to driving under the influence—open containers—might be found in 

Taylor’s car. Id. at 250–51. Once again, neither Johnson nor the State advance an 

argument based on Gant. 

23

 
of compartments and containers within the vehicle whose contents are not in plain view.” 

456 U.S. at 800. There, detectives had received a tip from a reliable informant that Ross 

was selling narcotics from the trunk of his car parked at a certain address. Id. The 

detectives drove immediately to that address to investigate. Id. After identifying the car, 

the detectives drove around the block to avoid alerting anyone of their presence. Id. 

Upon their return five minutes later, the detectives observed the same car turning on to 

another street. Id. at 801. The detectives confirmed the driver matched the informant’s 

description of Ross, stopped the car, and asked Ross to exit the vehicle. Id. A bullet was 

discovered on the front seat and then a pistol was found in the glove compartment. Id.

Ross was arrested. Then detectives proceeded to search the trunk of the car, finding a 

paper bag containing heroin and a leather pouch with $3,200.00 in cash. Id. After Ross 

was charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute, he moved to suppress the 

heroin and money found in closed containers in the trunk. Id. 

In holding that a warrant was not required to search both closed containers, the 

Supreme Court explained that the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile “is 

defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to 

believe that it may be found.” Id. at 824. The Court reasoned:

Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in

a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable 

cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van 

will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to 

believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains 

contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab. 

Id. (emphasis added).

24
Accordingly, “the scope of the warrantless search authorized by the [automobile] 

exception is no broader and no narrower than a magistrate could authorize legitimately by 

warrant. If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies 

the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the 

search.” Id. at 825. The police were therefore permitted to search the closed 

containers—a paper bag and leather pouch—in the trunk without a search warrant 

because the officers had probable cause that contraband was concealed somewhere in the 

vehicle based on the reliable informant’s tip that he had seen Ross sell narcotics from the 

trunk of his car and “heard [Ross] say he possessed additional narcotics.” Id. at 817 n.22. 

In 1991, the Supreme Court rejected the distinction made in earlier cases between 

an automobile and personal property that may be placed in an automobile and held that 

the reduced expectation of privacy in an automobile now applies to containers placed in 

vehicles. Acevedo, supra, 500 U.S. at 576. In Acevedo, a federal drug enforcement agent 

seized a package of marijuana sent via federal express, and arranged a sting operation 

with a police officer to arrest the individual who arrived to claim the package. Id. at 567. 

After Jamie Daza claimed the package, the officers followed him to his apartment. Id. 

The officers later observed Charles Acevedo enter Daza’s apartment and leave with a 

paper bag similar in size to the marijuana package. Id. The officers then observed 

Acevedo put the bag in the trunk of his car and drive off. Id. Concerned that they would 

lose the evidence, the officers stopped Acevedo, opened the trunk, and found the bag of 

marijuana. Id. After Acevedo was charged with possession of marijuana for sale, he 

moved unsuccessfully to suppress the marijuana found in the trunk. Id. at 568. The state 

25
intermediate appellate court reversed, concluding that the motion should have been 

granted. Id. The court reasoned that because “the officers had probable cause to believe 

that the paper bag contained drugs but lacked probable cause to suspect that Acevedo’s 

car, itself, otherwise contained contraband,” the officers needed a search warrant to open 

the paper bag. Id. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the officers required a 

warrant to search a closed container—the bag of marijuana found in the trunk—when the 

officers had probable cause to believe that the bag contained drugs but lacked probable 

cause to search the entire vehicle. Id. at 573. Thus, the distinction between Ross and 

Acevedo was the probable cause; in Ross officers had probable cause to believe that 

contraband was somewhere in the vehicle whereas in Acevedo officers had probable 

cause to believe that contraband was in the container in the trunk. The Court noted that, 

in Ross, the Court had already recognized that “‘prohibiting police from opening 

immediately a container in which the object of the search is most likely to be found and 

instead forcing [the police] first to comb the entire vehicle would actually exacerbate the 

intrusion on privacy interests.’” Id. at 574 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 821). The Court 

affirmed the interpretation of the Carroll doctrine set forth in Ross, and held the same 

principles apply to containers found in an automobile. Id. Justice Blackmun, writing for 

the majority in Acevedo, observed that the Ross Court

went on to note: ‘Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the 

trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of 

the entire cab.’ [Ross, 456 U.S. at 824.] We reaffirm that principle. In the 

case before us, the police had probable cause to believe that the paper bag 

in the automobile’s trunk contained marijuana. That probable cause now 

26
allows a warrantless search of the paper bag. The facts in the record 

reveal that the police did not have probable cause to believe that 

contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a 

search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause 

and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 

Id. at 580 (emphasis added). 

Although, as we have already noted, there is no appellate decision in Maryland 

that has examined the precise question at issue in this appeal, in 2007 Wilson, supra, this 

Court had occasion to apply the Carroll Doctrine as defined by Ross and Acevedo. In 

that case, a police officer initiated a traffic stop upon observing Wilson exceed the posted 

speed limit. Wilson, 174 Md. App. at 438. As the officer asked Wilson for his driver’s 

license and registration, he noticed the smell of burnt marijuana emanating from the 

vehicle. Id. The officer informed Wilson that he detected the odor and asked Wilson and 

his passenger to step out of the vehicle so he could search the vehicle. Id. The officer 

requested a K-9 drug detection unit, which did not arrive until after the officer concluded 

his search. Id. at 438–39. The officer did not find contraband in the passenger 

compartment of the vehicle but he found six and a half pounds of marijuana in the trunk. 

Id. 

After surveying the decisions from numerous other jurisdictions that had 

addressed circumstances similar to those presented in Wilson, this Court concluded the 

warrantless search of the trunk was permissible under the Carroll Doctrine. Id. at 454. 

The Court noted that “the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from a vehicle provides 

probable cause to believe that additional marijuana is present elsewhere in the vehicle.” 

Id. We held that the location-specific principle—that the search is limited to where 

27
officers have probable cause to believe the item is located—“does not apply when 

officers have only probable cause to believe that contraband is located somewhere within 

the vehicle, rather than in a specific compartment or container within the vehicle.” Id. In 

summary, “if officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is in only one part 

of a car, then they are limited to that area. If, on the other hand, officers have probable 

cause to believe that contraband is located somewhere in a car, but they don’t know 

exactly where, then they can search the entire vehicle.” Id. at 444–45 (quoting United 

States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1107 n.8 (5th Cir. 1993)).

Turning to the case on appeal, we first note important factual distinctions from 

Ross, Acevedo, and Wilson. In each of those cases the officers had probable cause to 

suspect that drugs were located in the trunk based on an informant’s tip—as in Ross—or 

by police observation—as in Acevedo—or, based on the odor of marijuana emanating 

from the vehicle, that drugs were “somewhere in the car”—as in Wilson. In this case, the 

police found a baggie of marijuana in a front passenger’s waistline and smelled the odor 

of PCP on his breath after he stepped out of the vehicle. The police had already searched 

Johnson’s pockets—the driver and owner of the vehicle—and found no contraband on 

her person. There was no indication that she had taken any illegal drugs, and certainly 

her nervousness could not, alone, establish reasonable suspicion, let alone probable 

cause, that she was transporting contraband in the trunk of her car. See Ferris, supra, 355 

Md. at 389 (cautioning against placing too much reliance upon nervousness when 

analyzing a determination of reasonable suspicion). The information given to the police 

about the passenger, Haqq, was that he was a friend of Johnson’s, whom she had known

28
only “about a month.” There was no testimony or evidence presented to suggest that 

Haqq had any control over the vehicle, or would have had access to the trunk as say, if he 

was on a long road trip or in a common criminal enterprise with Johnson. Indeed, neither 

Officer Sheehan nor Officer Mancuso testified as to why they had probable cause to 

believe drugs were located in the trunk. Interestingly, this case presents circumstances 

that are exactly inverse to those presented in Acevedo—here the police had probable 

cause to believe that there were drugs in the passenger compartment of the vehicle, but 

not the trunk. 

Applying the principles expressed in Acevedo, Ross, and Wilson, the permissible 

scope of the search in this case was defined by the object of the search: to find 

contraband that Haqq may have left or concealed within the vehicle. The police did not 

articulate a reasonable suspicion to believe that contraband was hidden in the trunk, or 

somewhere generally in the car,

15 or beyond the passenger compartment, and therefore, 

15 Recently, the Court of Appeals held that although the General Assembly had 

decriminalized the possession of less than 10 grams of marijuana, when the police detect 

the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle, they have probable cause to search the 

entire vehicle. See Robinson v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___, Nos. 37, 39 & 46, September 

Term 2016, slip op. at 33, 47 (filed Jan. 20, 2017). In Norman, supra, the Court 

considered a different issue: “whether a law enforcement officer who detects an odor of 

marijuana emanating from a vehicle with multiple occupants has reasonable articulable 

suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are armed and dangerous, and thus may frisk—i.e., 

pat down—the vehicle’s occupants for weapons.” Slip op. at 1. The Court reversed the 

judgment of the circuit court denying Norman’s motion to suppress and this Court’s 

decision affirming, concluding that “there were insufficient circumstances giving rise to 

reasonable articulable suspicion that Norman was armed and dangerous to justify the 

frisk.” Id., slip op. at 57–58. A plurality joined in the precise holding that 

29

 

Continued on next page . . .
the police lacked probable cause to support a warrantless search of Johnson’s trunk.

16 

The State urges that Wyoming v. Houghton, supra, 526 U.S. 295, supports its 

argument that there is no longer a distinction between a driver and a passenger in 

determining the scope of the search of a vehicle under the Carroll doctrine. In 

Houghton, a police officer stopped a vehicle for exceeding the speed limit and driving 

with a broken brake light. 526 U.S. at 297. While questioning the driver, the officer 

where an odor of marijuana emanates from a vehicle with multiple 

occupants, a law enforcement officer may frisk, i.e., pat down, an occupant 

of the vehicle if an additional circumstance or circumstances give rise to 

reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupant is armed and dangerous. 

Stated otherwise, for a law enforcement officer to have reasonable 

articulable suspicion to frisk one of multiple occupants of a vehicle from 

which an odor of marijuana is emanating, the totality of circumstances must 

indicate that the occupant in question is armed and dangerous. An odor of 

marijuana alone emanating from a vehicle with multiple occupants does not 

give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle’s occupants are 

armed and dangerous and subject to frisk.”

Id., slip op. at 2.

16 According to the State’s representation at the hearing, upon finding the 

marijuana in Haqq’s waistband, the officers chose not to conduct a K-9 scan of Johnson’s 

vehicle—even though a K-9 unit was present—believing they had obtained sufficient 

probable cause to search the passenger compartment and the trunk immediately. A 

positive alert from a K-9 scan, however, may have provided the requisite probable cause 

to search the entire vehicle, including the trunk. See Bowling v. State, 227 Md. App. 

460, 469 (2016) (citations omitted) (“With respect to the odor of marijuana, the Maryland 

appellate courts consistently have held that the detection of the odor of marijuana by a 

trained drug dog establishes probable cause to conduct a warrantless Carroll doctrine 

search of a vehicle.”); see also Wallace, supra, 372 Md. at 146 (citing Gadson v. State, 

341 Md. 1, 8 (1995); In re Montrail M., 87 Md. App. 430 (1991) (“[T]he law is settled 

that when a properly trained canine alerts to a vehicle indicating the likelihood of 

contraband, sufficient probable cause exists to conduct a warrantless ‘Carroll’ search of 

the vehicle.”). 

30

 
noticed a hypodermic syringe in the driver’s shirt pocket. Id. at 298. After the driver 

admitted to using the syringe to take drugs, backup officers ordered the two passengers—

one of whom was Sandra Houghton—out of the car so that they could search the 

passenger compartment for contraband. Id. In the backseat of the vehicle, the officer 

found Houghton’s purse, proceeded to search it, and found drug paraphernalia and a 

syringe containing methamphetamine. Id. Houghton was subsequently charged with 

felony possession of methamphetamine and was convicted of that crime after the court 

denied her motion to suppress. Id. 

In Houghton, it was uncontested that the police officers had probable cause to 

believe there were illegal drugs in the car and, therefore, could search the vehicle without 

a warrant pursuant to the Carroll doctrine. Id. at 300. The issue the Court addressed was 

whether a container (Houghton’s purse) belonging to a passenger and left in the 

passenger compartment of a vehicle was lawfully within the scope of a Carroll search. 

Id. at 297. The Court declined to create an exemption to the Carroll Doctrine for a 

passenger’s property, and, instead, held that police officers with probable cause to search 

a vehicle under the Carroll Doctrine may also search a passenger’s purse capable of 

concealing the object of that search found in a vehicle. Id. at 307. “[N]either Ross itself 

nor the historical evidence it relied upon admits of a distinction among packages for 

containers based on ownership.” Id. at 302.

The State reasons that because the Houghton Court refused to create a passengerproperty exemption to the Carroll Doctrine, all passenger-driver distinctions are 

irrelevant under the Carroll Doctrine. Accordingly, the State maintains that the drugs 

31
found in Haqq’s waistband and the PCP odor on his breath were all the police needed to 

form the requisite probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the entire car, 

including the trunk, for drugs and paraphernalia. 

The State’s reading of Houghton is a paralogism, for it ignores the point that once 

the object of the search establishes the proper scope, all areas and property within the 

scope may be searched. ‘“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped 

vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may 

conceal the object of that search.”’ Id. at 301 (quoting Ross, 456 U.S. at 825). The 

Houghton Court reasoned that an exemption for property belonging to a passenger,

“would dramatically reduce the ability to find and seize contraband and evidence of 

crime” because “one would expect passenger-confederates to claim everything as their 

own.” Id. at 305–06. Nothing in Houghton suggests, however, that it is irrelevant 

whether the probable cause to search a vehicle or part of a vehicle is developed through 

interactions with the driver versus a passenger. We do not interpret the holding in 

Houghton as eliminating the distinction between passengers and drivers in Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudence. 

Conclusion

The factual circumstances surrounding the stop of Johnson’s vehicle fell short of 

establishing probable cause that she was transporting contraband in the trunk of her car. 

Because the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile “is defined by the object of 

the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be 

found,” Ross, 456 U.S. at 799, before the police may conduct a warrantless search of the 

32
trunk of a vehicle, the police must either have probable cause to believe drugs are in the 

car generally, or, as in this case, where the police find drugs on a passenger, they must 

articulate a particularized basis to search the trunk, such as the reasons for their belief that 

the passenger had access to the trunk. Here, the officers lacked probable cause to believe 

that drugs were in the trunk based solely on the drugs found on the breath and in the 

waistband of the front-seat passenger. Consequently, the suppression court concluded 

erroneously that the officers were permitted to search the trunk of the car under the 

Carroll Doctrine. 

JUDGMENT REVERSED. 

COSTS TO BE PAID BY 

MONTGOMERY COUNTY.

33