Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-22-00328-CR

Alexander Scott HALEY,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 216th Judicial District Court, Kerr County, Texas

Trial Court No. A20161

Honorable Albert D. Pattillo, III, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting: Irene Rios, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: July 19, 2023

JUDGMENT MODIFIED; AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

A jury convicted appellant, Alexander Scott Haley (“Haley”), of murder and assessed 

punishment at life in prison. On appeal, Haley challenges the denial of his motions to suppress. 

We modify the judgment to delete the assessment of attorney’s fees and affirm as modified.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

Before trial, Haley’s counsel filed motions to suppress his written and/or oral statements 

and illegally seized evidence. Following a hearing on the motions, at which several witnesses 

testified, the trial court denied the motions and issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. 

After a jury trial, the jury found Haley guilty of murder and assessed punishment at life in prison. 

The trial court signed a judgment that included requiring Haley to pay $15,000 in attorney’s fees. 

On appeal, Haley asserts the trial court erred by (1) denying his motions to suppress, (2) denying 

him the opportunity to present evidence on his mental illness and the voluntariness of his 

statements, and (3) assessing attorney’s fees because he is indigent.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Haley asserts the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress because (1) the 

officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and approach him; (2) even if the initial 

encounter was consensual, it became a detention when his freedom to leave and end the interaction 

was restricted; and (3) he invoked his right to counsel; therefore, his statements are inadmissible.

A. Standard of Review

We “review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion under 

a bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023).

“We give almost total deference to the trial court’s findings of fact and review de novo the 

application of the law to the facts.” State v. Ruiz, 577 S.W.3d 543, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019);

Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 877 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (holding we afford “almost complete 

deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts, especially when those determinations 

are based on assessments of credibility and demeanor”). “When a trial judge makes express 

1 Haley does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction. Therefore, we recount any 

relevant factual background in the sections discussing his issues on appeal.
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findings of fact, an appellate court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the ruling 

and uphold those fact findings so long as they are supported by the record.” State v. Rodriguez, 

521 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 274 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2013) (“When, as here, the trial court rules on a motion to suppress and makes explicit factual 

findings, an appellate court must determine whether the findings are supported by the record.”). 

We “then proceed[] to a de novo determination of the legal significance of the facts as found by 

the trial court . . . .” Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d at 8.

B. Factual Background 

At about 7:00 a.m. on July 10, 2019, Louis Vaughan was assaulted and Kerrville Police 

Department officers were advised there was a possible suspect, described as a male with a black 

rolling bag, who might be in a park. Multiple officers began a canvass for someone who might 

have information about the assault. Kerrville Police Officer Juan Diaz testified he was on traffic 

duty when he was notified of a suspicious person under a bridge who had a rolling suitcase. He 

did not know any other details about the assault, but he was looking for a male with a rolling 

suitcase and wearing a bandana. Diaz was the first officer to contact Haley at about 12:25 p.m. 

When he first saw Haley in the park under a bridge, Haley was not wearing a bandana or 

in possession of a black suitcase. However, a suitcase of a “dark color,” which he thought was 

blue, was next to Haley. Diaz agreed neither wearing a bandana in the hot summer months nor 

having a suitcase indicated criminal activity, although having a suitcase might indicate someone 

was homeless. Diaz did not know when other officers were dispatched to the area, but he admitted 

that shortly after he exited his patrol car to approach Haley, Haley was surrounded by three 

officers. Diaz agreed that about one minute after approaching Haley, who was sitting on a low 

wall, there was one officer standing to Haley’s left, an officer standing in front of him, and an 

officer standing to his right. Diaz said he never told Haley he could or could not leave.
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He said Haley was “pretty relaxed, friendly,” and cooperative. Diaz asked for and received 

Haley’s identification card and he began to question him. Diaz did not Mirandize Haley or have 

a search warrant, but he asked Haley if he could look inside the suitcase. He said he did not tell 

Haley that he could refuse the request because Haley immediately agreed to the search. Diaz said

Haley gave no indication he wanted to leave or not talk to anyone and he gave his consent 

willingly. After Haley gave his consent, another officer (Officer Jacob Trevino) began to search 

the bag. Diaz said he did not accuse Haley of anything or threaten to arrest him or take him to jail. 

Eventually investigators arrived on the scene and Diaz stepped away.

Kerrville Police Officer Jacob Trevino began his testimony with the scene of the assault. 

He testified he was on patrol on July 10, 2019 when he was dispatched for a welfare check on 

someone who was sleeping in the park and had a head wound. He said he was the first on the 

scene at about 8:12 a.m. and, when he found the man later identified as Vaughan, there was a 

significant amount of blood and the man was nonresponsive. Emergency personnel, who were 

already on the scene, said it appeared the man had been beaten. At the scene, Trevino observed 

shoe prints near the body, which were not left by emergency personnel or the police, and clothing

and other belongings strewn about. The tread pattern of the shoe prints was identified as belonging 

to a Nike Monarch tennis shoe.

Trevino said the police were familiar with Vaughan because he was an alcoholic and 

homeless. Therefore, they believed Vaughan might have been with another homeless person and 

they wanted to locate and speak with this person to obtain information about the assault. At this 

point, patrol officers began the canvassto locate anyone with information. Trevino said they “were 

looking for this particular individual that could have had the shoe”; and they were told “someone 

that matched the information might have been down there, so we all kind of converged down there 

to make sure we could find this person, which turned out to be Mr. Haley.”
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Trevino said he arrived under the bridge at around 12:30 p.m., shortly after Haley was first 

contacted by Diaz. He described Haley as “really chill”; he “was just hanging out on the . . . rocks 

there and was talking to us”; “he was not uncooperative, loud, or disrespectful”; and “he was just 

holding a conversation when we were sitting there with him.” Trevino agreed they searched 

Haley’s suitcase after Haley said, “be my guest,” and Haley never withdrew his consent. Trevino 

said he saw “a pretty decent amount of blood” on the outside of the suitcase and, upon further 

search, a pair of tennis shoes that had what appeared to be specks of blood on them. Inside the 

suitcase, Trevino found a smaller bag that he identified as belonging to Vaughan. Trevino 

described Haley’s knuckles on his left hand as swollen with “little scrapes,” which he said was 

consistent with hitting or punching something. He said the tread pattern on the shoes in the suitcase

appeared consistent with the tread pattern found at the scene of the assault. At no point did he tell 

Haley he was under arrest, going to jail, or in trouble. Haley did not ask to leave or to stop the 

search of the suitcase.

On cross-examination, Trevino agreed that prior to the search, Haley was not Mirandized, 

not told he had the right to refuse the search or limit the search, and no written consent was 

obtained. Trevino said Haley was free to leave, but Haley was not told he could leave at any time. 

After searching the suitcase, finding blood on the bag and shoes, and finding Vaughan’s smaller 

bag, Haley was detained in handcuffs.

Detective Ben Ledesma testified the initial call came from a park employee who said there 

was a person in the park carrying a rolling suitcase that matched the description originally given 

to the police. Ledesma said he was present when the suitcase was searched and Haley was very 

cordial, cooperative, and polite. Haley did not ask if he could leave and he was not told he could 

not leave or that he was a suspect. Ledesma remembered that Haley did not waver when he gave 

his consent and it was as if he was “just trying to help.”
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Ledesma testified that when Diaz asked Haley if an officer could search his suitcase, he 

was standing directly in front of Haley, Diaz was to his right, and Trevino was to his left. Ledesma 

confirmed Haley was not Mirandized or informed of his right to deny or limit the search. 

Furthermore, Haley was not Mirandized after he was handcuffed and placed in the back of 

Ledesma’s patrol car. Before being placed in the patrol car, Haley, who was shirtless, asked “a 

couple of times” if he could put on a shirt. Ledesma did not have an extra shirt and did not take 

one from Haley’s bag because it was, by now, possible evidence.

Ledesma testified he had several contacts with Vaughan, including arresting him. He stated

that, during the search of the suitcase, he saw things he believed were relevant to the assault. 

Ledesma recognized the smaller bag inside Haley’s suitcase as belonging to Vaughan because he

had seen Vaughan with the smaller bag a few days earlier and because he had searched the bag 

several times when he arrested Vaughan.

Ledesma said Haley was detained in handcuffs because Ledesma saw the blood on the 

shoes and he believed Haley was not only a suspect, but possibly the person who assaulted 

Vaughan.2

 Haley was taken in Ledesma’s patrol car to the Kerrville Police Department. Ledesma

said Haley agreed to go. Once at the station, Haley was taken to an interrogation room. Ledesma

said that when Haley asked to go to the restroom, he was taken to the same room where officers 

keep their personal belongings and he was not handcuffed. The door to the interview room was 

not locked.

Ledesma testified that when Haley was first brought into the interview room, while still 

handcuffed, he asked “where’s my lawyer.” When Ledesma was asked if he understood that to 

mean Haley wanted a lawyer, Ledesma replied he did not know what Haley expected. Ledesma 

2 Ledesma said he handcuffed Haley when another investigator said, in a voice loud enough for Haley to hear, “hook 

him up.”
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stated that if Haley had tried to walk out of the interview room, he would have told Haley he 

needed to be escorted out because he could not “just walk around aimlessly in the building.”

Sargent James Machetta, with the Kerrville Police Department Criminal Investigation Unit

(“CIU”), was the last witness called by the State. On July 10, 2019, he was an investigator with 

the CIU and he was called out to the scene of the assault at around 8:00 a.m. He also saw the shoe 

prints and, along with other officers, determined the prints were present before law enforcement 

and first responders arrived. He said patrol officers were looking for a homeless person in the 

area. Machetta characterized Vaughan’s injuries as consistent with him having been hit multiple 

times with something.

When Machetta arrived at the location where Haley was found under the bridge, Haley was 

sitting on a rock embankment talking to other officers, he was cooperative, and he did not appear 

agitated. Machetta walked up to Haley and shook his hand. After watching the portion of a video 

showing Haley being asked if he was willing to go to the police station, Machetta was asked about

Haley’s response:

Q. What did he say there as you were getting up and walking out?

A. It sounded like he said he’d be willing to go with us, or roll with us or something.

Q. Okay. During this interaction, did he – I know at first he said, I’d rather not. 

And you had mentioned, you know, I’ve got some stuff to hash out with you, come 

with me. And he said, I’m willing to go with y’all. Did he give you any indication 

that he changed his mind or he didn’t want to talk to you?

A. No, sir.

. . .

Q. Okay. And there’s a reference to a lawyer on scene, you know, there. Did you 

take that to mean he didn’t want to talk to you?

A. No, sir. He just asked.

Q. Okay.

A. Just that he’d asked if there was a lawyer.

Machetta decided to handcuff Haley when the officer searching the bag found a bloody 

shirt. Machetta did not tell Haley he was a suspect or under arrest. Machetta said Haley was 

detained in handcuffs for the purpose of transporting him to the police station. When Machetta 
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arrived in the interview room at the police station, he uncuffed Haley, told him he was not free to 

leave, and read Haley his Miranda rights. Machetta testified he asked Haley about his earlier 

reference to a lawyer because he wanted to clarify that once Haley was Mirandized he would be 

willing to talk to him. Machetta said Haley agreed to talk to him. After some questioning, Haley 

finally said “I want a lawyer.” Machetta then left the interview room and Haley was not questioned 

further. 

On cross-examination, Machetta was questioned about whether Haley was free to leave 

while everyone was still at the location under the bridge:

Q. And so at that point Mr. Haley wasn’t free to leave, correct?

A. He was – that was a time – it was kind of a – things were coming as I – so 

initially when I got there, he was – he wasn’t in custody or detained, per se. But as 

things progressed then, yeah, his – his detention occurred.

Q. So when you got there, you found out that there’s bloody evidence, shoes that 

connect him to the scene, but – so at that point, when you know that, he’s not free 

to get up and just walk away with those items belonging to him, correct?

A. Not at that time, no. Once I learned that evidence, no.

Machetta was then questioned about Haley’s mention of a lawyer while under the bridge:

Q. . . . Mr. Haley asked, do I get a lawyer, correct?

A. Something to that effect, yes.

Q. Specifically he said, “Do I get a lawyer or anything,” correct?

A. I guess, yes.

. . .

Q. Okay. So then you tell Mr. Haley, if you want a lawyer, you can have a lawyer. 

If you think you need a lawyer, that’s up to you, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So at that point you’re acknowledging Mr. Haley’s asking, do I get a lawyer, 

can he have a lawyer, he’s requesting one?

A. I didn’t feel that that was an unequivocal request for counsel at that point. He 

was asking me a question, just whether a lawyer was there or where his lawyer was 

at.

Q. Well, you go on and he says – Mr. Haley states that, any time you talk to the 

police you need one, correct?

A. Yes, he does state that.

Q. So he’s making his belief that if you talk to the police you need a lawyer present, 

he’s making that belief apparent to you, correct?

A. Yes.

. . . 
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Q. Officer Holloway asked . . . how are you going to handle that, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And he asks, does he get a lawyer, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So Mr. Holloway is acknowledging Mr. Haley’s request, correct?

A. He’s asking for guidance and how this should be handled.

Q. So he’s acknowledging it?

A. That’s fair, yes.

. . .

Q. . . . Specifically you tell Officer Holloway, I say we take him up there and talk 

to him. If he wants a lawyer, I’ll read him his rights.

A. Yes.

In addition to the testimony at the hearing, the trial court also viewed the footage from the 

officers’ body cameras and car cameras. The first video is from a patrol car camera and shows 

Diaz driving up to where Haley was sitting on a low rock wall. Haley was shirtless and barefoot, 

a large-sized soda cup sat on the wall next to him, and his suitcase was on the ground next to him. 

Diaz exited his patrol car and approached Haley alone. A few minutes later, three other officers 

are shown walking up to Haley. The officers are all in uniform and they do not draw their weapons. 

Diaz at some point steps away, one officer remains standing next to Haley, who sips on his drink, 

while another officer is shown kneeling on the ground next to Haley’s suitcase (it appears he was 

searching the suitcase). Haley appears calm and undisturbed by the encounter. A few minutes 

later, Machetta and Trevino arrive, both in plain clothes.

The next video of the initial encounter contains sound from the conversations with Haley. 

Diaz asked Haley if he had “anything weird” in the suitcase and asked if he could search it. Haley 

responded, “be my guest.” When asked his name, he responded freely. While one of the officers 

searched the suitcase, Haley and two other officers engaged in what appears to be casual 

conversation. When Haley was asked how he got all the blood on the side of the suitcase, he 

gestured to the suitcase and said, “I found that on the side of the road.” He said he had the suitcase 
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for “a couple of days.” At some point, an officer asked Haley what happened to his hand and 

Haley responded that he did push-ups. 

When Holloway and Machetta arrived, they were told about the blood and Haley’s swollen 

hand. Machetta approached Haley and shook his hand. Machetta sat on the wall next to Haley 

while Holloway stood next to them. During the search, Haley asked the officers to retrieve his 

lighter from the suitcase and he lit up a cigarette. Haley continued to sip on his drink and smoke 

a cigarette. He appeared relaxed, calm, and undisturbed by the interaction with the officers or the 

search of the suitcase. Also during the entire encounter, anywhere from one to five officers milled 

about near Haley. With the exception of one car a few feet from Haley and the officers, all other 

cars were parked a distance away. At no time did Haley ask that the search stop or be limited. In 

fact, much of the time he was not watching the search. The video shows the entire search of the 

suitcase and Haley is shown being placed in handcuffs, at which time he asks only if he can put 

on his shirt (he is told “no”). The next video is from the inside of the patrol car transporting Haley 

to the police station. He and the officer do not speak to one another.

The next video shows the conversation between Machetta and Haley while still under the 

bridge. The video shows Machetta approaching Haley, saying “how ya doing brother,” and asking 

Haley for his name and if he was from Kerrville. Haley responded with his name (“Alexander”) 

and said he was from Bandera. When Machetta asked Haley if he knew why they were talking, 

Haley responded, “the golf cart guy” who was watching him and was paranoid about the homeless. 

Haley told Machetta he was “on this side of the river” the night before. When Machetta asked

Haley if he would be willing to come down to the police department to talk, Haley said he would 

“rather not.” Machetta then said, “we need to hash out some things,” so we can “all be on the same 

page,” and be honest with one another. 
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After showing more of the search of the suitcase, Machetta can be heard saying “hook him 

up” at which point Haley was handcuffed. The remainder of the video shows the search of the 

suitcase and the officers photographing its contents. Someone can be heard saying Haley was 

shaking the entire time and “he knows why we’re here.” Machetta told an officer to pack up the 

suitcase and take it back to the police department where it would be checked into evidence. 

Machetta said he would get a search warrant.

The next video begins in the interview room. The video shows Haley brought into the 

room in handcuffs and asked if he has anything harmful on him. Almost immediately, Haley 

asked, “where’s my lawyer” and Machetta replied, “we’ll get there,” “we’re just making sure you 

don’t have anything on you.” Machetta exited the room briefly and when he returned, he removed 

Haley’s handcuffs and sat at the table across from Haley. Machetta told Haley he was not free to 

leave and that he was going to read Haley his Miranda rights. After each right, Machetta asked if 

Haley understood and Haley appeared to nod yes. When Machetta finished reading the rights, he 

asked, “with that being said, do you want to tell me why we’re here talking today?” Haley 

responded, “the golf cart guy.” Haley asked for his prescription glasses “to help defuse the 

situation.” When his glasses were given to him, he laid them on the table.

Machetta then told Haley it was “up to” him if he wanted to talk, and Haley responded, 

“we can talk.” Machetta then stated, “you mentioned a lawyer . . . earlier, if you want to talk 

without your lawyer and we can resolve this issue . . . .” Haley interrupted and stated, “you’re 

asking me why I’m here, I don’t know why I’m here.” Machetta told him there was an incident 

earlier where a man was assaulted and he asked Haley if he knew anything about that. Haley 

responded, “no, I do not.” Machetta asked why there was blood all over the rolling suitcase, and 

Haley said he did not know. Machetta asked if he wanted to explain and Haley said he did not 

remember, maybe his “body did something while he was blacked out.” Machetta continued to 
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question Haley, who answered each question without hesitation. After several minutes, Haley 

said, “I want a lawyer,” and Machetta said “you want a lawyer? Ok, you want a lawyer.” Haley

responded, “you’re pushing for answers, I don’t have any answers,” “get me a lawyer.” Machetta 

agreed to get him a lawyer but then asked, “is your lawyer going to help you remember these 

things?” Haley replied, “no, my lawyer is going to help me walk away from this.” Machetta asked 

Haley if he had a lawyer, Haley said he did not and he reminded Machetta that he was entitled to 

a court-appointed lawyer. Machetta said “ok,” and left the room. The next video shows an officer 

handcuffing Haley, who by this time is relaxing on the floor under the table, and telling Haley he 

was under arrest. 

The State rested after Machetta testified, and the defense called six witnesses, all of whom 

were employed by the Kerrville Parks Department on July 10, 2019 and none of whom 

remembered calling the police on that date. Both sides then closed. Following the hearing, the 

trial court made a number of findings, including the following: 

18. Officer Diaz made consensual contact with the Defendant and asked him for 

his identification. Officer Diaz found the Defendant to be friendly, relaxed, and 

cooperative.

. . .

20. The Defendant voluntarily gave Officer Diaz his identification.

. . .

22. Officer Diaz asked the Defendant if they could search his suitcase. The 

Defendant willingly consented and said “be my guest.”

. . .

28. During this time, the Defendant was polite, cooperative, made small talk with 

the officers; did not ask to leave, or give any indication he did not want to interact 

with law enforcement. Officers did not place him in handcuffs, did not tell him he 

couldn’t leave, or restrict his movements in any way.

. . .

30. Inv. Machetta introduced himself to the Defendant and asked him if he would 

be willing to accompany him to the police department so they could sit down and 

talk.

31. The Defendant asked Inv. Machetta if he was going to “have a lawyer ready 

for me when I get there?” Inv. Machetta responded that if the Defendant wanted a 

lawyer he could have one and that if the Defendant thought he needed a lawyer that 

was up to him.
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32. The Defendant told Inv. Machetta that he would “rather not” go to the police 

station but then later told Inv. Machetta that he “was willing to go with y’all.”

33. During this conversation with Inv. Machetta, the Defendant was not handcuffed, 

was not told he wasn’t free leave, was not told that he was under arrest or would be 

arrested, and did not have his freedom of movement restricted in any way.

. . .

37. Inv. Machetta re-approached the Defendant and asked him again if he “was 

good with coming back to the police department and talking” with him after he 

finished smoking his cigarette. The Defendant shook his head yes.

38. The Defendant voluntarily agreed to accompany Inv. Machetta to the police 

station so Inv. Machetta could talk with him.

. . .

45. At no point before the Defendant was placed in handcuffs was he told he was 

under arrest, that he was going to jail, or that he could not leave, or have his freedom 

of movement restricted by any of the officers who were at the scene under the 

bridge at the park.

46. At no point before the Defendant was placed in handcuffs did he ask to leave 

or give any indication that he wanted to terminate his encounter with the police.

47. At no point after he was detained in handcuffs at the park was the Defendant 

told he was under arrest.

48. At no point while officers were searching his suitcase did the Defendant 

withdraw consent or limit the scope of his consent to search his suitcase.

49. Inv. Machetta made the decision to detain the Defendant in handcuffs after 

officers had observed blood on the side of the Defendant’s suitcase, discovered the 

Nike Monarch shoes with blood on them, Vaughan’s black bag, and the t-shirt with 

blood stains inside of his suitcase, and after noticing that the Defendant’s left hand 

was swollen.

50. Inv. Machetta made the decision to detain the Defendant in handcuffs for 

officer safety purposes and so the Defendant could be safely transported to the 

police station for an interview.

. . .

54. Shortly after the Defendant was seated in the interview room the Defendant 

asked Inv. Machetta “where’s my lawyer?” Inv. Machetta responded “we’ll get 

there.”

. . .

57. Inv. Machetta told the Defendant that because he was not free to leave, he 

needed to read the Defendant the statutory warnings set out in article 38.22 of the 

Code of Criminal Procedure before the interview began.

58. The Defendant understood the article 38.22 warnings and each of his rights set 

out in those warnings.

59. Inv. Machetta asked the Defendant if he wanted to talk to him since he 

“mentioned the lawyer issue earlier.” The Defendant responded “we can talk.”

60. The Defendant voluntarily made the decision to talk to Inv. Machetta after 

being advised of, and understanding, the statutory warnings set out in article 38.22 

of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

61. At one point during the interview the Defendant told Inv. Machetta that he 

wanted a lawyer. Inv. Machetta ended the interview.
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. . .

63. Inv. Machetta left the interview room to draft an arrest warrant for the 

Defendant for assaulting Vaughan.

64. At no point before or during the interview was the Defendant told that he was 

under arrest or that the Defendant was going to be arrested or charged with any 

crime.

. . .

68. The Defendant was arrested after Inv. Machetta obtained an arrest warrant for 

the Defendant’s arrest for aggravated assault. While officers were arresting the 

Defendant for the warrant the Defendant asked why he was being arrested.

69. Officers Diaz, Trevino, and Ledesma and Inv. Machetta were credible 

witnesses based on the court’s observation of them while testifying at the hearing 

on the Motions coupled with their years of experience in law enforcement.

C. The Initial Encounter with Haley Under the Bridge

Haley asserts the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and approach him

because the description of a “suspicious person” was that of a male wearing a black bandana and 

carrying a black suitcase. Haley contends that because this description included no indicia of 

criminal activity and Diaz conceded having a suitcase and wearing a bandana does not indicate 

criminal activity, Diaz could not reasonably rely on this information to gain reasonable suspicion

to stop him. The State asserts the officers’ interaction with Haley before he was handcuffed was 

a consensual encounter that did not require reasonable suspicion.

Alternatively, Haley argues that if the initial encounter was consensual then the encounter 

escalated into a detention when his freedom to leave and end the interaction was restricted. Haley 

contends that because Diaz held his identification while he was surrounded by three officers he 

did not feel free to deny the request to search his suitcase or to leave due to the officers’ “show of 

authority.”

1. Applicable Law

“There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (1) consensual encounters that 

do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment 

seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
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activity; and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, that are reasonable only 

if supported by probable cause.” Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 

“Police officers are as free as any other citizen to approach citizens to ask for information or 

cooperation.” Id. “Such consensual encounters may be uncomfortable for a citizen, but they are 

not Fourth Amendment seizures.” Id. “And a citizen is free to terminate a consensual encounter 

at will.” State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “An officer may, 

without reasonable suspicion, request identification and information from a citizen.” Id. “Even if 

the officer did not tell the citizen that the request for identification or information may be ignored, 

the fact that the citizen complied with the request does not negate the consensual nature of the 

encounter.” Id.; see also Monjaras v. State, 664 S.W.3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022) (“A 

consensual encounter will not escalate into an investigative detention solely because an officer 

asks a citizen for identification and permission to search” or “because an officer fails to inform the 

citizen that he does not have to comply with the requests”). “However, an investigative detention 

does occur if the officer conveys to the citizen that compliance with the requests is required.” 

Monjaras, 664 S.W.3d at 927.

“No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter becomes a detention.” Wade, 

422 S.W.2d at 667. “Courts must take into account the totality of the circumstances of the 

interaction to decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the police officer’s 

request or terminate the consensual encounter.” Id. “If ignoring the request or terminating the 

encounter is an option, then no Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred.” Id. at 668. But “if an 

officer through force or a show of authority succeeds in restraining a citizen in his liberty, the 

encounter is no longer consensual; it is a Fourth Amendment detention or arrest, subject to Fourth 

Amendment scrutiny.” Id. “The question of whether the particular facts show that a consensual 

encounter has evolved into a detention is a legal issue that is reviewed de novo.” Id.
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“In determining whether an interaction is a consensual encounter or an investigative 

detention, the ‘time, place, and surrounding circumstances must be taken into account, but the 

officer’s conduct is the most important factor[.]’” Monjaras, 664 S.W.3d at 927 (quoting 

Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d at 467). The Court has also used the factors in United States v. 

Mendenhall when assessing “what a reasonable person might have perceived during a given 

interaction with an officer[.]” Id. (citation omitted). “Examples of circumstances that might 

indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening 

presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the 

person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 

officer’s request might be compelled.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).

2. Analysis

Based on its findings of fact, the trial court made the following relevant conclusions of 

law:

1. Officer Diaz’s initial encounter with the Defendant under the bridge was 

consensual.

2. The officers’ encounter with the Defendant remained consensual until he was 

detained in handcuffs after they noticed the Defendant’s swollen left hand, found 

what appeared to be blood on the side of his suitcase and the Nike Monarch shoes, 

Vaughan’s bag, and the bloody t-shirt inside of the suitcase.

. . .

5. The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Defendant freely and 

voluntarily consented to the search of his suitcase. The Defendant did not limit the 

scope of his consent to search his suitcase or ever withdraw his consent.

6. Evidence was not illegally seized from the Defendant or his suitcase.

Consistent with the applicable standards of review, we have reviewed the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Because we will not substitute our judgment for 

that of the trial court, we defer to its findings and conclude the officer’s testimony and the videos

admitted at the hearing support the trial court’s findings of fact. After a de novo review of the trial 

court’s conclusions of law, we agree the officers’ encounter with Haley remained consensual until 
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he was detained in handcuffs after they noticed his swollen left hand, found what appeared to be

blood on the side of his suitcase and the Nike Monarch shoes, and found Vaughan’s bag and the 

bloody t-shirt inside of the suitcase. Accordingly, because the consensual encounter did not 

implicate the Fourth Amendment we need not consider whether the stop was supported by a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

D. Did Haley Invoke His Right to Counsel Before He Gave His Statements?

Haley asserts any statements he made are inadmissible and should have been 

suppressed because he had invoked his right to counsel. On appeal, Haley contends he requested 

an attorney while still under the bridge when he asked if he “need[ed] a lawyer or anything” and 

again while in the interview room when he asked, “where’s my lawyer.” The State counters that 

Haley was not in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements while everyone was 

under the bridge or shortly after he arrived at the police station. For the reasons explained below, 

we conclude Haley did not unequivocally invoke his right to counsel until he said, “I want a 

lawyer” while in the interview room.

3

1. Applicable Law

“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming 

from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 

safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 

U.S. 436, 444 (1966); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.22 (when statements of an accused may 

be used). “By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers 

after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 

significant way.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. “As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, 

3 Therefore, we need not determine whether Haley was in custody for Miranda purposes when he made the statements 

while everyone was under the bridge or shortly after he arrived at the police station
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unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence 

and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.” Id. 

“Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any 

statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence 

of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Id. “The defendant may waive effectuation of these 

rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” Id. “If, however, 

he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney 

before speaking there can be no questioning.” Id. at 444-45. “The mere fact that he may have 

answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the 

right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and 

thereafter consents to be questioned.” Id. at 445. 

“Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel ‘requires, at a minimum, some statement that 

can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney.’” 

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). “But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney 

that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 

understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not 

require the cessation of questioning.” Id. “Rather, the suspect must unambiguously request 

counsel.” Id. Thus, the accused’s mere mention of the word “attorney” or “lawyer” does not 

automatically invoke the right to have counsel present during questioning; rather, an accused’s 

request for counsel must be unequivocal and unambiguous. Id. at 459, 462 (holding suspect’s 

statement “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” during the interrogation was too equivocal to express 

a clear desire for the assistance of counsel at that time); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 351, 

352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (holding “Maybe I should talk to someone” failed to specify that the 

suspect wished to speak with a lawyer and the statement was therefore too ambiguous to constitute 
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an invocation of counsel); State v. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d 888, 892 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“An 

ambiguous or equivocal statement with respect to counsel does not even require officers to seek 

clarification, much less halt their interrogation.”). 

Courts determine whether a suspect’s statement referring to a lawyer constitutes an actual 

invocation of the right to counsel by considering the statement itself and the totality of the 

circumstances surrounding the statement. Gobert, 275 S.W.3d at 892; Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 

351. The inquiry is an objective one: whether the accused articulated his desire for the assistance 

of counsel sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would 

understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 458-59; Gobert, 275 

S.W.3d at 892-93; Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 351.

2. Analysis

Based on its findings recited above, the trial court made the following relevant conclusions 

of law:

7. The Defendant was not in custody for purposes of Miranda or article 38.22 of 

the Code of Criminal Procedure during the time he interacted with officers or when 

he made the comments to Inv. Machetta about an attorney under the bridge at the 

park.

8. The Defendant was detained and not in custody for purposes of Miranda or 

article 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure during the interview with Inv. 

Machetta at the police station.

9. Assuming the defendant was in custody after he was transported to the police 

station, the Defendant’s question “where’s my lawyer?” to Inv. Machetta before the 

interview began was not a clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal invocation of his 

right to an attorney.

10. Assuming the [D]efendant was in custody after he was transported to the police 

station, the Defendant’s question “where’s my lawyer?” to Inv. Machetta before the 

interview began was not in response to, or a product of, an interrogation.

. . .

12. Assuming the Defendant was in custody at the time of the interview at the 

police station, the Defendant freely and voluntarily waived his statutory and 

constitutional rights and agreed to speak with Inv. Machetta.

13. All of the Defendant’s statements to the officers who interacted with him at the 

park and to Inv. Machetta were freely and voluntarily made in accordance with 

article 38.21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
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Consistent with the applicable standards of review, we have reviewed the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Because we will not substitute our judgment for 

that of the trial court, we defer to its findings and conclude the officer’s testimony and the videos

admitted at the hearing support the trial court’s findings of fact. After a de novo review of the trial 

court’s conclusions of law, we agree Haley did not unequivocally and unambiguously request a 

lawyer until he stated, “I want a lawyer” while in the interview room. 

E. Conclusion

Having concluded the record supports the trial court’s findings and conclusions, we hold 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Haley’s motion to suppress.

EVIDENCE OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENTS

Haley asserts his mental illness prevented his statements to the police from being voluntary. 

On appeal, he asserts the trial court denied him a Jackson v. Denno hearing4 on the admissibility 

of his statements. The State asserts Haley failed to preserve error on this issue.

In his motions to suppress, Haley did not assert his statements were involuntary due to his 

mental illness. At the suppression hearing, mental illness was mentioned only once during crossexamination of Officer Trevino:

5

 

Q. Mr. Haley obviously appeared homeless, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. You stated that you were looking for a homeless person possibly, right?

A. Yes, sir.

4 In a Jackson v. Denno hearing, the trial court determines the admissibility of a confession based on whether the 

confession was voluntarily given, but does not consider whether the statement given by appellant was truthful or 

untruthful. Martinez v. State, 127 S.W.3d 792, 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 380 

(1964) (“A defendant objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the 

underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.”).

5 The trial court also paused the hearing on a housekeeping matter related to a motion to evaluate Haley’s competency 

to stand trial. The court noted the motion had been granted and, following an evaluation, a doctor found Haley 

competent to stand trial; however, an order was never entered. After some discussion with counsel, the trial court 

accepted the finding. At no point during this discussion did Haley raise the issue of whether his mental illness, if any, 

prevented his statements from being voluntarily made. 
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Q. Surely you’ve encountered homeless people in your line of work before, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And would you agree with me that homeless individuals tend to struggle with 

mental illness more so than the average person?

Prosecutor: Judge, I would object as to relevance. This –

Court: Let’s keep going.

Defense counsel: May I respond, Your Honor?

Court: Let’s just keep going.

A motion to suppress is a specialized objection to the admissibility of evidence and must 

be timely and sufficiently specific to inform the trial court of the complaint. Johnson v. State, 171 

S.W.3d 643, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d). A party who (1) files a 

pretrial motion to suppress evidence that presents arguments global in nature and contains little 

more than citations to constitutional and statutory provisions, and (2) fails to argue specific 

grounds for suppressing evidence at the suppression hearing, waives error. See Swain v. State, 181 

S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Appellant’s global statements in his pretrial motion to 

suppress were not sufficiently specific to preserve the arguments he now makes on appeal.”);

Mbugua v. State, 312 S.W.3d 657, 666-67 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) 

(general statements in a suppression motion did not alert the trial court that the defendant wished 

a specific complaint to be decided); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.

Haley’s pretrial motions to suppress presented arguments that were global in nature and 

contained nothing more than citations to constitutional and statutory authority. During the 

suppression hearing, Haley did not contend his mental health affected the voluntariness of his 

statements, nor was the issue raised during closing arguments. Because Haley’s complaint on

appeal does not comport with the grounds for suppression raised in the trial court, he has failed to 

preserve any error. See Swain, 181 S.W.3d at 367; Saunders v. State, No. 04-17-00385-CR, 2018 

WL 3039924, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated 

for publication) (concluding Saunders waived issue on appeal because the record did not show he
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raised the issue that Texas Transportation Code section 547.606(a) did not apply to his truck with 

sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the basis of his complaint).

ASSESSMENT OF ATTORNEY’S FEES IN THE JUDGMENT

In its judgment, the trial court assessed $15,000 in attorney’s fees against Haley. On 

appeal, both Haley and the State contend this was in error because Haley is indigent. We agree.

“A defendant who is determined by the court to be indigent is presumed to remain indigent 

for the remainder of the proceedings in the case unless a material change in the defendant’s 

financial circumstances occurs.” TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.04(p). Haley was appointed legal 

counsel by the trial court; at trial, he was represented by the Hill Country Regional Public Defender 

Office; this representation has continued through his appeal; and his financial status did not

change. Therefore, the trial court erred by requiring Haley to pay attorney’s fees. Accordingly, 

we modify the portion of the trial court’s judgment by deleting the attorney’s fees in the amount 

of $15,000. See Fulmer v. State, 401 S.W.3d 305, 319 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, pet. ref’d)

(“Because we must presume Fulmer remained indigent and the State produced no evidence or 

argument indicating that the trial court determined Fulmer had the financial resources to enable 

him to pay attorney’s fees, the trial court’s judgment requiring him to do so was erroneous.”).

CONCLUSION

We modify the judgment to delete the requirement that Haley pay $15,000 in attorney’s 

fees and affirm the judgment as modified. 

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Do not publish