2013 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

1-11-2013

Aliya Davis v. Davis Auto Inc

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-4283

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"Aliya Davis v. Davis Auto Inc" (2013). 2013 Decisions. Paper 1401.

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1

NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________ 

No. 11-4283 

_____________ 

ALIYA DAVIS, 

 Appellant

v. 

DAVIS AUTO, INC. 

TRI-STATE LENDING, LLC 

 

 

_____________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. No. 2:10-cv-03105) 

District Judge: Hon. J. Curtis Joyner

_____________ 

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 

September 24, 2012 

BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, and JORDAN, VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 

(Opinion Filed: January 11, 2013) 

Ari R. Karpf, Esquire

Adam C. Lease, Esquire 

Karpf, Karpf & Cerrutti, P.C. 

3331 Street Road 

Two Greenwood Square

Suite 128 

Bensalem, PA 19020 

Counsel for Appellant
2

James M. Penny, Jr., Esquire 

Terri Gillespie, Esquire

Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell 

& Hippel LLP

One Penn Center, 19th Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Counsel for Appellee 

_____________ 

OPINION

_____________ 

McKee, Chief Judge. 

 Aliya Davis (“Davis”) appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment in 

the defendants‟ favor in her suit against Davis Auto, Inc. (“Davis Auto”) and Tri-State 

Lending, LLC (“Tri-State”), in which Davis alleged her termination from her job at Davis 

Auto was motivated by unlawful retaliation in violation of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). For the following reasons, we will 

affirm the District Court‟s judgment. 

I.

 Since we write primarily for the parties, it is unnecessary to set forth the factual or 

procedural history of this case except to the extent it is helpful to our discussion.

Davis Auto and Tri-State are family-run businesses located in Pennsylvania. 

During the relevant time period, Davis Auto owned and operated two used automobile 

dealerships in Philadelphia and Levittown. Joseph M. Davis, Jr. (“Davis, Jr.”) and 

Joseph M. Davis, Sr. (“Davis, Sr.”) served as Davis Auto‟s President and Vice-President, 

respectively. Father and son also served as the sole members of Tri-State, a separate 

company that functioned as Davis Auto‟s controller. William Bach (“Bach”), Davis, 
3

Sr.‟s son-in-law and Davis, Jr.‟s brother-in-law, managed Tri-State‟s daily operations. 

J.A. 52-53, 182. 

Davis, who is not related to the defendants, worked at Davis Auto and Tri-State in 

varied clerical capacities from June 2006 through October 2008. During this time, Davis 

suffered from several ailments including anxiety, asthma, and a thyroid disorder. 

J.A. 436-38. In a meeting with her employers on July 7, 2008, Davis informed the 

defendants that she might have cancer and added that she would likely need time off 

work to take care of her medical hardships and treatments. J.A. 380, 476.

Following the July 7, 2008 meeting, Davis worked for the defendants for 

approximately three months. Davis‟s employment came to an end on October 15, 2008, 

when Davis, Jr. notified her that she was being laid off. J.A. 379.

 After exhausting administrative remedies, Davis filed suit alleging unlawful 

discrimination and retaliation in violation of the ADA and the Pennsylvania Human 

Relations Act (“PHRA”). Thereafter, the District Court granted the defendants‟ request 

for summary judgment. See Davis v. Davis Auto, 2011 WL 5902220 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 

2011). The District Court held that Davis could not establish a prima facie claim because 

she could not show that she was “substantially limited” in a major life activity nor 

demonstrate that her employers perceived her as disabled. Id. at *6-9. The District Court 

also concluded that Davis could not make out a prima facie claim of unlawful retaliation 

because she could not establish a causal connection between her alleged protected 
4

activity and the defendants‟ decision to terminate her employment. This appeal 

followed.1

II.

Our review of a district court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary. Turner v. 

Hershey Chocolate USA, 440 F.3d 604, 611 (3d Cir. 2006). “„When reviewing a district 

court‟s summary judgment decision in an ADA case, we . . . apply[] the same standard as 

the district court.‟” Hip Heightened Indep. & Prog., Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 

693 F.3d 345, 351 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 

177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010)). Summary judgment is proper only where no genuine issue as to 

any material fact exists such that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 

In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, Davis must 

show by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) she undertook some protected activity, 

(2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there exists a causal 

connection between the two. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500-01 (3d Cir. 

1997). If Davis establishes a prima facie claim, “„the burden shifts to the employer to 

advance a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its adverse employment action.‟” 

Shellenberger v. Summit Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting 

Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500). If the employer successfully meets this burden of production, 

Davis has to show that the otherwise legitimate reasons advanced by her employer are 

actually a pretext to mask a retaliatory animus. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 501. 

 

1 Davis withdrew her PHRA claim against the defendants before the District Court 
5

The District Court assumed that Davis engaged in protected conduct when she 

informed her employers about the possibility that she had cancer and requested an 

accommodation in the form of an undetermined amount of time off from work in the July 

7, 2008 meeting. Because the parties do not contest this issue, we will afford Davis the 

benefit of the same presumption. It is also clear that Davis was subject to an adverse 

employment action when the defendants terminated her on October 15, 2008. See 

Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288 (3d Cir. 2001) 

(“[T]ermination clearly fulfills the second prong of the prima facie case for a retaliation 

claim.”). 

The parties expend a substantial portion of their briefs discussing whether or not 

the District Court correctly concluded that Davis could not establish a prima facie causal 

connection between her asserted protected activity and the defendants‟ decision to 

terminate her employment. However, we need not address that issue because it is clear 

on this record that Davis cannot meet her ultimate burden of showing that the defendants‟ 

stated legitimate reason for her termination masked retaliatory motives.2

 

2 Davis‟s final argument attacks the defendants‟ proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for her termination. Davis argues that the defendants should be 

estopped from claiming that she was laid off due to economic or performance-related 

issues because in a deposition submitted to Pennsylvania‟s Department of Labor, Bach 

stated that the reason for Davis‟s separation from employment was “lack of work.” 

Inconsistent statements, however, “are not sanctionable unless a litigant has taken one or 

both positions „in bad faith – i.e., with intent to play fast and loose with the court.‟” 

Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Savs. Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 781-82 (3d Cir. 

2001) (quoting Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 361 

(3d Cir. 1996)). We do not find the requisite bad faith element here. 
6

Specifically, the defendants assert that declining business and corresponding 

financial difficulties led them to decide to reduce personnel. Consistent with this 

business decision, the defendants claim that Davis was selected for termination due to a 

documented history of shortcomings in the areas of attendance and performance. J.A. 

900-02. 

Davis underscores alleged inconsistencies in the witnesses‟ testimony, such as 

Bach‟s failure to recall whether it was Davis, Jr. or Davis, Sr. who first proposed her 

termination. However, even reading any such inconsistencies in the light most favorable 

to Davis, other compelling evidence in the record undercuts any charge of pretext.3

 Most 

importantly, Davis discounts the undisputed fact that, once informed of the possibility 

that Davis could have cancer on July 7, 2008, the defendants‟ immediate response was to 

suggest that she join the companies‟ medical insurance plan and to offer her a $3.00 

hourly raise. J.A. 186. Davis then continued to work for the defendants for 

approximately fourteen weeks before being laid off in October 2008 – a period during 

which she concedes the defendants underwent financial difficulties that led them to 

reduce overall costs. J.A. 187. Davis‟s attempt to claim retaliatory motives after the 

defendants tried to support her by offering her a medical insurance plan to cover any 

cancer treatments and an hourly raise is patently frivolous. 

 

3 Defendants argue that Davis‟s claim of pretext was waived because it was not timely 

asserted in the District Court. However, since the record does not raise a genuine issue of 

fact regarding a pretextual motive, we reject that argument on its merits. 
7

Moreover, the defendants‟ cost reduction efforts (and the effect these had on 

personnel) are well-documented in the record.4

 Based on these facts, we do not believe a 

reasonable juror could find that the defendants‟ decision to terminate Davis was 

motivated in whole or in part by her request for time off to tend to her ailments.5

III.

In light of the above, we will affirm the District Court‟s November 22, 2011 order.

COSTS TAXED AGAINST APPELLANT. 

 

4 For example, at least 8 of the 21 employees in the defendants‟ combined 2008 

payroll list were laid off between September and December of that year. J.A. 81-86. In 

December 2008, the defendants also shuttered Davis Auto‟s location in Levittown, 

Pennsylvania. J.A. 52, 182. 

5 Contrary to Davis‟s argument, the fact that the defendants reassigned Davis‟sjob 

functions to an employee upon her departure does not, by itself, suggest pretext, nor does 

it necessarily contradict the defendants‟ claim that her termination was the result of the 

companies‟ financial difficulty. This court has recognized that an employer‟s decision to 

reassign work duties to a higher-paid incumbent employee does not betray a causal link 

between a plaintiff‟s protected activity and her termination unless “other evidence” 

renders the employer‟s asserted legitimate motive “inconsistent or incongruous.” LeBoon 

v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 234 (3d Cir. 2007). Here, we do not 

find other such evidence.