[Cite as White Stag Aircraft Leasing U.S. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2021-Ohio-1245.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

MAHONING COUNTY

WHITE STAG AIRCRAFT LEASING 

U.S. LLC, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 

Defendant-Appellee.

 

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY 

Case No. 20 MA 0018 

 

Civil Appeal from the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio 

Case No. 2016 CV 319 

BEFORE: 

Carol Ann Robb, Cheryl L.Waite, Judges and Thomas R. Wright, 

Judge of the Eleventh District Court of Appeals, Sitting by Assignment. 

JUDGMENT: 

Affirmed. 

Atty. Brian Kopp, Atty. Justin Markota, Betras Kopp & Harshman, LLC, 6630 Seville Drive,

Canfield, Ohio 44406 for Plaintiff-Appellant and 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

Atty. William Falin, The Hanna Building, 1422 Euclid Avenue, Suite 630, Cleveland, Ohio

44115 for Defendant-Appellee. 

 

Dated: March 31, 2021 

 

Robb, J. 

{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant White Stag Aircraft Leasing U.S. LLC appeals the 

decision of the Mahoning County Common Pleas Court granting the Civ.R. 60(B) motion 

for relief from default judgment filed by Defendant-Appellee JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. 

Appellant alleges the trial court arbitrarily granted the bank’s motion where a prior judge 

denied the same motion. This court dismissed the appeal from the prior judge’s denial 

order as it was not final since damages were pending; we noted the bank’s motion seeking 

relief from judgment was actually a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. 

After the decision on damages was issued, the bank refiled its motion for relief from 

judgment, which the new trial judge granted. 

{¶2} Appellant initially argues the grant of relief from default judgment violated 

the law of the case doctrine. Alternatively, Appellant contends the bank’s failure to answer 

the complaint was not excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). For the following 

reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 

{¶3} In 2014, Appellant leased a plane to Zagrosjet Company Ltd. The bank 

provided a letter of credit to Appellant for $150,000 to secure the lease in case the lessee 

defaulted. Appellant claims the bank was notified of the lessee’s default prior to the 

August 29, 2014 expiration of the letter of credit. 

{¶4} On January 29, 2016, Appellant filed a complaint against the bank due to 

its failure to pay the amount secured by the letter of credit. The summons on the 

complaint was sent to the bank on February 9, 2016 via certified mail with successful 

service returned a week later. 

{¶5} On April 26, 2016, Appellant filed a motion for default judgment against the 

bank as no answer had been filed. On June 6, 2016, the court granted default judgment 

against the bank and set the case for a damages hearing. The clerk sent notice of default 

judgment to the bank by ordinary mail on June 9, 2016. 
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{¶6} On June 28, 2016, the bank filed a motion for relief from judgment under 

Civ.R. 60(B)(1) and sought leave to file an answer instanter. The bank noted the 

timeliness of the motion and alleged it had several meritorious defenses. The bank 

pointed to the one-year statute of limitations for a letter of credit in R.C. 1305.14 and the 

requirement in R.C. 1305.07(A) that an issuer shall dishonor the presentation of a letter 

of credit which does not appear on its face to strictly comply with the terms and conditions 

of the letter of credit. The bank compared the terms of the letter of credit to the demand 

letter attached to the complaint and concluded the demand letter did not strictly comply 

with the terms of the letter of credit. There was also an allegation the demand letter was 

not received or it was not received before the deadline and was not accompanied by the 

original letter of credit. 

{¶7} On the topic of excusable neglect, the bank presented the affidavit of a 

document review specialist from the bank’s Legal Papers Served Department. He 

reviewed the corporate procedure for ensuring a complaint would be answered after 

service on the bank’s statutory agent. He then provided the following explanation as to 

how the procedure failed as a result of his mistake. 

{¶8} The document reviewer received the complaint from the statutory agent and 

read it to determine which section of the bank’s Office of General Counsel would be 

responsible for assigning outside counsel to file an answer. On February 22, 2016, the 

document reviewer sent the complaint to an attorney with the Business Banking section, 

where it would be reviewed to ensure the appropriateness of the assigned section. The 

next day, that attorney followed established procedure to reject the assignment with 

instructions for the document reviewer to redirect the case to an attorney in the Corporate 

and Investment Banking section of the Office of General Counsel. 

{¶9} On March 7, 2016, an employee in the Litigation Business Management 

Department (which monitors the assignment system to ensure successful assignment by 

the Legal Papers Served Department) noticed the case was still reported as “open” in the 

system and called the attorney originally assigned. The originally assigned attorney 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

reported the case was being sent to the Corporate and Investment Banking section by 

the document reviewer.1 

{¶10} The document reviewer made an entry in the system marking the 

assignment status of the case as “closed” in the case assignment system (rather than 

forwarding it to the other section of the Office of General Counsel). He attested that he 

mistakenly thought the original attorney accepted the case. The affiant said that upon the 

subsequent receipt of the default judgment, the case was immediately assigned to the 

outside attorney, who filed the motion for leave to file an answer instanter and for relief 

from judgment. 

{¶11} The bank’s motion to vacate the default judgment concluded that the 

affidavit of its document reviewer demonstrated a mistake in the execution of the 

corporate assignment of legal papers that constituted excusable neglect. Appellant 

obtained an extension of time to respond to the bank’s motion for relief from judgment. 

As a result, the damages hearing set for August 2, 2016 was continued. 

{¶12} Appellant’s response did not contest the timeliness of the bank’s motion or 

the bank’s presentation of operative facts indicating a meritorious defense if relief was 

granted; instead, Appellant argued the bank’s neglect was not excusable. Appellant said 

the employee who noticed the case was still reported to be open in the assignment system 

on March 7, 2016 should have remedied the lack of assignment instead of sending the 

matter back to the document reviewer. The bank filed a reply on September 8, 2016 

(requesting leave to file instanter because the court canceled the oral argument 

scheduled on the bank’s motion). 

{¶13} On September 9, 2016, the trial court overruled the bank’s motion and 

denied relief from judgment, finding the bank failed to show excusable neglect. The bank 

appealed. 

{¶14} However, this court granted a motion to dismiss the bank’s appeal for lack 

of a final appealable order. White Stag Aircraft Leasing U.S. LLC v. JP Morgan Chase 

 

1 A footnote in Appellant’s brief on appeal says the attorney’s statement to the Litigation Business 

Management employee (that the case was being reassigned) should not be considered because he did not 

submit his own affidavit. Appellant did not argue this to the trial court. And, there is no argument that would 

affect the portion the document reviewer’s affidavit explaining the corporate procedure, his own actions, the 

instructions he received, or his mistakes. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

Bank, N.A, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 16 MA 0154 (1/25/17 J.E.). We concluded: the case 

remained in an interlocutory stage with damages still to be determined; the entry of default 

judgment with a damages hearing pending was not a final judgment; a Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion may only be directed to final judgments; and the motion was actually a motion to 

reconsider an interlocutory order which is not appealable. Id. 

{¶15} After the appeal was dismissed, the case was set for hearing by a 

magistrate but was continued multiple times. In the meantime, a new trial judge took the 

bench in that courtroom. 

{¶16} On December 17, 2019, the trial court held the damages hearing and issued 

judgment on damages in the amount of $150,000. 

{¶17} On December 30, 2019, the bank filed a motion for relief from judgment 

(and requested leave to file an answer instanter). The motion contained a joint notice 

signed by counsel for both parties which stated the parties were re-submitting and 

attaching their memoranda previously filed on the bank’s June 28, 2016 motion. 

{¶18} On January 9, 2020, the trial court granted the bank’s motion for relief from 

judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), thereby vacating the default judgment. The court also 

granted leave to file the answer instanter. 

{¶19} In granting relief from judgment, the court first indicated the motion was 

timely filed within a reasonable time and not more than one year from the final judgment 

as required by the rule. Next, the court said the bank set forth a potential meritorious 

defense as the bank claimed the presentation of the letter of credit for payment before its 

expiration did not strictly comply with the terms on the face of the letter of credit. The 

court also said the bank wished to prove it did not receive the demand letter at all or by 

the deadline and the original letter of credit was not attached to the demand. 

{¶20} Lastly, the trial court found excusable neglect under Civ.R. 60(B)(1). The 

court pointed to the affidavit detailing the corporate procedure and the affiant’s statement 

that the procedure was initially followed until he inadvertently closed the assignment file. 

The court concluded the internal corporate error was excusable neglect as there was a 

set procedure within the corporate structure for dealing with legal process and the 

procedure was inadvertently not followed until default judgment was entered against the 

corporation at which point the bank immediately retained outside counsel. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

{¶21} Appellant filed the within timely appeal. Appellant presents two issues 

under a sole assignment of error. 

ISSUE 1: LAW OF THE CASE 

{¶22} Appellant’s assignment of error and the first issue presented for review state 

as follows: 

 “The Trial Court Erred in Granting JP Morgan’s Civ.R. 60(B) Motion For Relief from 

Judgment After the Matter was Remanded as a Result of JP Morgan’s Premature 

Appeal.” 

“The Trial Court Acted Arbitrarily When It Reversed its Previous Ruling Which 

Denied JP Morgan's Civ.R. 60(B) Motion for Relief from Default Judgment As It Failed to 

Adhere to the Clearly Established Law of the Case.” 

{¶23} Appellant relies on the original trial judge’s September 9, 2016 judgment 

denying the bank’s first motion where the bank sought relief from judgment. This judge 

purported to deny Civ.R. 60(B)(1) relief by finding the bank failed to show excusable 

neglect and was not “unavoidably delayed or hindered in some way from responding as 

required by the civil rules. Rather, it appears that this is a matter of simple neglect on 

Defendant’s part, without excuse.” (9/9/16 J.E.) Appellant argues this ruling is the law of 

the case and the new trial judge was therefore prohibited from altering this decision after 

the premature appeal was dismissed. 

{¶24} Under the law of the case doctrine, a trial court is without authority to extend 

or vary the mandate issued by a reviewing court, and if a trial court at a rehearing after 

remand is faced with substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior 

appeal, then the court is bound to adhere to the reviewing court's determination of the 

applicable law. Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 N.E.3d 

1194, ¶ 14, 16. The doctrine ensures consistency of results in a case, avoids endless 

litigation by settling the issues, and preserves the constitutional hierarchy of courts. Id.

at ¶ 14. 

{¶25} Here, the bank filed a motion seeking to vacate a default judgment, which 

was denied by the trial court. However, when the bank attempted to appeal, this court 

ruled the default judgment was not final because the damages hearing was still pending. 

White Stag Aircraft Leasing, 7th Dist. No. 2016 MA 0154. “As a general rule, even where 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

the issue of liability has been determined, but a factual adjudication of relief is unresolved, 

the finding of liability is not a final appealable order even if Rule 54(B) language was 

employed.” Noble v. Colwell, 44 Ohio St.3d 92, 96, 540 N.E.2d 1381 (1989). 

Consequently, this court said the bank’s motion was actually a motion for reconsideration 

of an interlocutory order because a Civ.R. 60(B) motion may only be directed to final 

judgments. White Stag Aircraft Leasing, 7th Dist. No. 2016 MA 0154. 

{¶26} “[A] motion for reconsideration would be the proper procedural vehicle for 

obtaining relief after interlocutory orders.” Pitts v. Ohio Dept. of Transp., 67 Ohio St.2d 

378, 423 N.E.2d 1105 (1981), fn. 1. “Civ.R. 54(B) allows for a reconsideration or 

rehearing of interlocutory orders” that are not yet subject to appeal as it states that such 

orders are “subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 

the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.” Id., quoting Civ.R. 54(B). The 

denial of a motion to reconsider an interlocutory order is not appealable as it is 

interlocutory as well. See State ex rel. Boddie v. Franklin Cty. 911 Admr., 135 Ohio St.3d 

248, 2013-Ohio-401, 985 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 2, citing Brewer v. Hope Timber Pallet & 

Recycling, 5th Dist. Licking No. 10-CA-76, 2011-Ohio-533, (order denying motion to 

reconsider interlocutory order denying summary judgment is not final and appealable). 

{¶27} Although an interlocutory order is subject to a motion for reconsideration, a 

final order is not. Pitts, 67 Ohio St.2d 378 at fn. 1. To obtain relief from a final order, the 

rules provide a motion to vacate a judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Id. at 380 (and a motion 

for new trial or JNOV where applicable). Civ.R. 60(B) specifically refers to the trial court’s 

ability to grant relief “from a final judgment.” 

{¶28} As this court declared the trial court’s September 9, 2016 order was not 

final, we said the bank’s pre-damages motion for relief from judgment was not actually a 

Civ.R. 60(B) motion. White Stag Aircraft Leasing, 7th Dist. No. 2016 MA 0154. 

{¶29} In citing the law of the case doctrine, Appellant emphasizes the fact that the 

bank appealed a decision of the trial court, and the case then proceeded in the trial court 

after our judgment on appeal. Nevertheless, the law of the case set forth by this court in 

the bank’s appeal essentially labeled the bank’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion premature. The 

denial of the bank’s first motion could not be appealed as it was actually the denial of a 

motion to reconsider an interlocutory order. 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

{¶30} Our holding did not prohibit the bank from filing a Civ.R. 60(B) motion after 

the trial court rendered a final order on the default judgment. And, we did not issue a 

ruling on the propriety of the trial court’s refusal to vacate the default judgment. In 

accordance, the trial court’s January 9, 2020 decision granting the bank’s Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion filed after the final judgment in the case was not restricted by our judgment 

dismissing the prior appeal, and the decision did not deviate from our judgment. (As the 

September 9, 2016 order was an interlocutory decision denying reconsideration of a 

default judgment, the trial court could have reconsidered it prior to entering final judgment 

on damages.) 

{¶31} Appellant suggests that once the final judgment was rendered by entering 

a damage award, the trial court was prohibited from ruling on the same motion. Appellant 

claims a trial court must adhere to its own rulings in the case and acts arbitrarily by 

changing a ruling where there was no error (but merely a change of mind or a difference 

of opinion in two different judges acting on the same case). Appellant emphasizes the 

bank’s reliance on the same evidence and allegations as the parties merely resubmitted 

the prior motion, affidavit, response, and reply. 

{¶32} Appellant relies heavily on the statement: “The [law of the case] doctrine 

has been extended to encompass a lower court's adherence to its own prior rulings or to 

the rulings of another judge or court in the same case.” Poluse v. Youngstown, 135 Ohio 

App.3d 720, 725, 735 N.E.2d 505 (7th Dist.1999) (but finding no issue with the trial court’s 

reconsideration and stating there are circumstances allowing a trial court to reconsider a 

prior ruling), citing Clymer v. Clymer, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 95APF02–239 (Sept. 26, 

1995). The Poluse case also involved one judge’s reconsideration of a prior judge’s 

interlocutory order; however, the case dealt with the denial and then the grant of summary 

judgment. 

{¶33} The Poluse court: “Regarding a summary judgment motion, an order 

overruling such a motion is subject to revision by the trial court at any time prior to entry 

of final judgment, and the court may correct an error upon a motion for reconsideration 

predicated upon the same law and facts.” (Emphasis added.) Poluse, 135 Ohio App.3d 

at 725. Appellant disregards the initial emphasized qualifier and believes this quote 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

means the trial court could not change the September 9, 2016 judgment unless the bank 

pointed to an error by the trial court (as the bank did not cite new facts or law). 

{¶34} Poluse is distinguishable from the case at hand because it specifically dealt 

with a summary judgment motion, which can only be granted as a matter of law (as there 

is only one correct ruling). In such a case, the legal issue is reviewed de novo on appeal, 

regardless of whether the trial court’s final order was the court’s first ruling on a motion or 

the court’s reconsideration of a prior interlocutory order denying summary judgment. 

Distinguishably, the bank’s motions here involved the trial court’s exercise of discretion. 

{¶35} It has been observed that even if a trial court should employ the law of the 

case doctrine and follow its own prior decisions, the doctrine and the trial court’s decision 

would not bind the reviewing court. See Lehrner v. Safeco Ins. Am. States Ins. Co., 171 

Ohio App.3d 570, 2007-Ohio-795, 872 N.E.2d 295, ¶ 109 (2d Dist.), citing Enterprises 

Inc. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 47 Ohio St.2d 154, 162, 351 N.E.2d 121 (1976). 

{¶36} In addressing the Clymer holding (cited in Poluse), the Ohio Supreme Court 

said the principle would not preclude a common pleas court from reconsidering an 

interlocutory order entered in the same case by a different common pleas court judge. 

State ex rel. Dannaher v. Crawford, 78 Ohio St.3d 391, 678 N.E.2d 549 (1997), quoting 

18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure, Section 4478, 794 (1981) (“A 

wide degree of freedom is often appropriate when the same question is presented to 

different judges of a single district court. * * * Substantial freedom is desirable * * *, 

particularly since continued proceedings may often provide a much improved foundation 

for deciding the same issue.”). 

{¶37} As this court later observed: “one can seek reconsideration of an 

interlocutory order. However, the denial of reconsideration need not be addressed on 

appeal as we are only concerned with reviewing the propriety of final judgments.” 

(Citations omitted.) Jefferson Cty. CSEA v. Pickett, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 99 JE 5 (Sep. 

21, 2000). Moreover: “trial courts normally only give preclusive effect to their prior rulings 

if those rulings could have been appealed and were not.” Creaturo v. Duko, 7th Dist. 

Columbiana No. 04 CO 1, 2005-Ohio-1342, ¶ 25. 

{¶38} Here, the bank attempted to appeal the prior ruling on the first motion, but 

the appeal was dismissed by this court in an entry suggesting the Civ.R. 60(B) motion 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

should be filed from the future final judgment. A Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from 

judgment specifically anticipates a court changing a final judgment if the movant satisfies 

elements for granting relief (discussed in the next issue). 

{¶39} We also note the law of the case doctrine is a rule of practice rather than a 

binding rule of substantive law and will not be applied in a manner that produces unjust 

results. Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 160, 519 N.E.2d 390 (1988). See also

Giancola, 153 Ohio St.3d 594 at ¶ 15 (but the appellate mandate part of the doctrine 

cannot be violated). When dismissing the bank’s prior appeal, this court’s January 25, 

2017 judgment effectively encouraged the bank to file a Civ.R. 60(B) motion after final 

judgment in the case. See White Stag Aircraft Leasing, 7th Dist. No. 2016 MA 0154. 

{¶40} In any event, a Civ.R. 60(B) motion cannot be filed from an interlocutory 

order, and the default judgment was ruled by this court to be an interlocutory order at the 

time of the bank’s first motion. The trial court’s September 9, 2016 ruling on the bank’s 

first motion was not truly a ruling on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, even though the trial court 

purported to rule on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion in its September 9, 2016 order. See, e.g., 

Genhart v. David, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 144, 2011-Ohio-6732, ¶ 12 (“Nor can a 

trial court consider a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment unless the party is 

seeking relief from a final appealable order”), citing Pickett, 7th Dist. No. 99 JE 5. In these 

circumstances, a ruling on a premature Civ.R. 60(B) motion is actually a ruling on a motion 

for reconsideration. See White Stag Aircraft Leasing, 7th Dist. No. 2016 MA 0154 

(construing the bank’s first motion as a motion to reconsider the interlocutory default 

judgment). 

{¶41} Accordingly, the September 9, 2016 trial court order (refusing to reconsider 

an interlocutory default judgment) was not the law of the case on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion 

filed after final judgment. New or additional evidence or even a showing of error was not 

required in order for the bank to re-file the same motion which this court previously ruled 

was premature. The bank’s December 30, 2019 motion for relief from judgment, which 

is the only motion filed after final judgment, is considered the bank’s first Civ.R. 60(B) 

motion. Accordingly, Appellant’s law of the case argument lacks merit. 

ISSUE 2: EXCUSABLE NEGLECT 

{¶42} The second issue presented for review contends: 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

 “The Trial Court Arbitrarily Determined That JP Morgan Demonstrated Excusable 

Neglect as Required by Civ.R. 60(B)(1) When it Reversed its Previous Ruling Without 

New or Additional Evidence.” 

{¶43} Pursuant to Civ.R. 55(B), “If a judgment by default has been entered, the 

court may set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(B).” To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion, 

the movant must demonstrate each of the following three elements: (1) the party has a 

meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief 

under one of the grounds listed in the five subdivisions of the rule; and (3) the motion is 

made within a reasonable time (which is not more than one year after the judgment if the 

motion is based on one of the first three subdivisions). GTE Automatic Elec. Inc. v. ARC 

Industries Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 150-151, 351 N.E.2d 113 (1976). See also Rose 

Chevrolet Inc. v. Adams, 36 Ohio St.3d 17, 20, 520 N.E.2d 564 (1988) (but need not 

prove the meritorious defense will prevail). 

{¶44} The bank’s motion was timely filed less than two weeks after the final 

judgment was entered. The bank alleged various meritorious defenses (as set forth in 

our Statement of the Case above). Among other items, the bank pointed to the one-year 

statute of limitations for a letter of credit in R.C. 1305.14 and the provision in R.C. 

1305.07(A) requiring the issuer to dishonor the presentation of a letter of credit that does 

not appear on its face to strictly comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of credit. 

Appellant did not contest the timeliness or meritorious defense elements below and does 

not contest the trial court’s finding of these elements to this court on appeal. 

{¶45} The only dispute is whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion 

in finding the bank was entitled to relief from judgment under a ground listed in the rule. 

The bank’s motion was filed under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), which provides: “On motion and upon 

such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a 

final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 

surprise or excusable neglect * * *.” 

{¶46} Excusable neglect has been defined in the negative: excusable neglect 

does not exist if the defendant’s inaction indicates a complete disregard for the judicial 

system. Kay v. Marc Glassman Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 20, 665 N.E.2d 1102 (1996). The 

determination of whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable must take into consideration 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

all surrounding facts and circumstances. Id. “Where timely relief is sought from a default 

judgment and the movant has a meritorious defense, doubt, if any, should be resolved in 

favor of the motion to set aside the judgment so that cases may be decided on their 

merits.” GTE, 47 Ohio St.2d 146 at paragraph three of the syllabus. 

{¶47} We review the denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion under an abuse of discretion 

standard of review. State ex rel. Russo v. Deters, 80 Ohio St.3d 152, 1997-Ohio-351, 

684 N.E.2d 1237 (1997). An abuse of discretion exists where the trial court's attitude was 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id., citing Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio 

St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). 

{¶48} In Kay, the defendant submitted affidavits demonstrating counsel prepared 

an answer but the attorney’s secretary inadvertently put it in a file drawer rather than in 

the mail for filing. It was explained that this mistake was prompted by the reorganization 

of the attorney’s system and was an isolated incident. The Supreme Court reversed the 

denial of the defendant’s Civ.R. 60(B)(1) motion upon concluding the trial court abused 

its discretion in failing to find the inadvertence of the attorney’s secretary was excusable 

neglect. Kay, 76 Ohio St.3d at 20-21. 

{¶49} Here, the trial court pointed to the affidavit of a corporate employee attesting 

to the corporate procedure for ensuring the successful assignment of complaints. He 

said this procedure was initially followed until he inadvertently closed his file on the matter 

instead of forwarding the case. The trial court concluded the internal corporate error was 

excusable neglect as there was a set procedure within the corporate structure for dealing 

with legal process and the procedure was inadvertently not followed until default judgment 

was entered against the corporation, at which point the bank received notice of default 

and immediately retained outside counsel who filed for relief from judgment. 

{¶50} Appellant argues the bank’s failure to answer was a complete disregard for 

the judicial system. Appellant states the corporate protocol was not followed when the 

document reviewer failure to follow the attorney’s instructions to forward the complaint to 

a different section and the employee at the reviewing department should have taken over 

after she discovered the case was still open (instead of letting the document reviewer 

continue to handle the matter). Appellant says this was simple neglect (as the first trial 

judge opined when addressing the bank’s motion to reconsider an interlocutory order). 
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{¶51} In granting relief from the final default judgment, the trial court applied a 

Tenth District case setting forth a two-part test for evaluating whether an internal 

corporate error should be excused: “To meet the test, a party must present circumstances 

sufficient to show the following: (1) there is a set procedure, within the corporate 

structure, for dealing with legal process, and (2) the procedure was, inadvertently, not 

followed until a default judgment had been entered against the corporate defendant.” See 

Ohio FAIR Plan Underwriting Assn. v. Hitchman Ins. Agency Inc., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 

12AP-642, 2012-Ohio-6170, ¶ 9, citing Perry v. General Motors Corp., 113 Ohio App.3d 

318, 324, 680 N.E.2d 1069 (10th Dist.1996) (affirming the vacation of default judgment 

on the basis of excusable neglect where a corporate employee failed to properly forward 

the complaint) and Hopkins v. Quality Chevrolet Inc., 79 Ohio App.3d 578, 583, 607 

N.E.2d 914 (4th Dist.1992) (setting forth this two-part test and upholding the trial court's 

finding of excusable neglect where a corporate employee failed to forward the complaint 

to the appropriate person). 

{¶52} We have followed this line of reasoning. WFMJ Television Inc. v. AT&T 

Fed. Systems CSC, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 01 CA 69, 2002-Ohio-3013, ¶ 19-20 (“This 

court prefers to follow the majority opinions of the above-cited districts” on this topic), 

citing Perry, 113 Ohio App.3d 318, Hopkins, 79 Ohio App.3d 578, and Sycamore 

Messenger Inc. v. Cattle Barons Inc., 31 Ohio App.3d 196, 509 N.E.2d 977 (1st Dist.1986) 

(upholding the finding of excusable neglect where a corporate officer's affidavit said a 

bookkeeper failed to forward the complaint to the appropriate person). Even where a 

case “teeters on the verge of inexcusable neglect unreasonably accepted by the trial court 

due to what appears to be cumulative neglect,” this court defers to the trial court as the 

test is not whether this court would have ruled in the opposite manner. See WFMJ, 7th 

Dist. No. 01 CA 69 at ¶ 22. 

{¶53} To review, the bank submitted the affidavit of its document reviewer who 

worked in a department specifically set up to ensure newly-served complaints reached 

an attorney in time to file a timely answer. The affiant explained the existence of the set 

procedure in the corporate structure and the way the procedure was implemented in this 

case. Following corporate procedure, this employee received the complaint from the 

statutory agent, reviewed its contents, and assigned it to an attorney in a certain section 
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of the office of general counsel at the bank (who would review the case and obtain outside 

counsel or direct reassignment). This attorney, also following corporate procedure, 

returned the case to the document reviewer with instructions to assign it to an attorney in 

a different, more appropriate section of the office of general counsel at the bank. 

{¶54} Before the answer date passed, an employee in a separate line of defense 

against untimely answers noticed the case was still open on the assignment system, 

spoke to the attorney, learned of the reassignment instructions, and left the matter to the 

document reviewer. However, the document reviewer mistakenly thought the attorney 

accepted the case, and he therefore marked the case as closed in the assignment 

system, instead of following the attorney’s instructions on reassignment. After the bank 

received notice of default judgment, the bank took immediate action to assign the case 

and obtain outside counsel. 

{¶55} The trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in 

finding the bank had a set procedure within the corporate structure for dealing with legal 

process and the procedure was inadvertently not followed through the date the default 

judgment was entered against the corporate defendant. As the motion was timely and 

the bank presented a meritorious defense, the trial court could resolve any doubts in favor 

of the bank and find the case should be decided on the merits. We should not substitute 

our judgment for that of the trial court as the bank’s inaction did not indicate a complete 

disregard for the judicial system under the totality of the facts and circumstances of this 

case. 

{¶56} Contrary to Appellant’s suggestion, the fact that a different judge (in an 

interlocutory ruling on a premature motion) believed the mistake was inexcusable neglect 

does not indicate the second trial judge acted “arbitrarily” in granting the same motion 

when it was subsequently filed at the appropriate time. Arbitrary is defined as “without 

adequate determining principle; * * * not governed by any fixed rules or standard.” Cedar 

Bay Constr. Inc. v. City of Fremont, 50 Ohio St.3d 19, 22, 552 N.E.2d 202 (1990) (defining 

the parts of the abuse of discretion standard of review). As can be seen by the entry 

granting Civ.R. 60(B) relief, the trial court employed the appropriate principles in 

determining the motion, and as set forth in the prior section, the prior judge’s denial of a 
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Case No. 20 MA 0018

motion to reconsider an interlocutory was not a governing fixed standard or the law of the 

case. Appellant’s arguments are without merit. 

{¶57} For the foregoing reasons, Appellant’s assignment of error is overruled, and 

the trial court’s judgment is affirmed. 

Waite, J., concurs. 

Wright, J., concurs. 
[Cite as White Stag Aircraft Leasing U.S. v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2021-Ohio-1245.]

 

 

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is 

overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court

of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the

Appellant. 

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in 

this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a 

certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution. 

 

NOTICE TO COUNSEL 

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.