NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

File Name: 24a0135n.06

No. 23-1268

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ALLEN KING,

Defendant-Appellants.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 

MICHIGAN

OPINION

Before: SILER, COLE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.

SILER, Circuit Judge. Defendant Michael King argues that his seventy-eight month 

sentence for possessing methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it is both procedurally and 

substantively unreasonable. He alleges that the district court plainly erred when it failed to explain 

its reasoning for imposing the sentence. But the record tells a different story: the district court 

provided King a thorough analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors as applied to his conduct. 

We therefore affirm King’s sentence.1

I.

A federal grand jury in Michigan indicted King for possessing methamphetamine with the 

intent to distribute it. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). The district court allowed King to return 

to his home state of Arizona while on bond. There, he punched his girlfriend in the face and 

tackled her to the ground. Upon finding King’s girlfriend bloodied and upset, authorities arrested 

King and charged him with assault. King neglected to tell his federal pretrial services officer of 

1 We have determined that oral argument is unnecessary. See I.O.P. 34(a)(4). 
No. 23-1268, United States v. King

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the arrest. He later pled guilty to the federal methamphetamine charge, and then pled guilty to the 

Arizona assault charge. While preparing King’s presentence investigation report, his probation 

officer learned of the Arizona assault conviction. She told the district court about King’s 

conviction and included it in her calculation of King’s criminal history category. This added one 

point to his criminal history score and bumped his criminal history category from II to III. 

At sentencing, the district court accepted the criminal history category over King’s 

objection and calculated King’s guidelines range as seventy to eighty-seven months. The district 

court reviewed the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the seriousness of King’s 

methamphetamine conviction, the potential harm to the public, and his extensive criminal history. 

It concluded that King’s criminal history of “violation upon violation” demonstrated that he was 

undeterred by his previous sentences. 

The district court sentenced King to seventy-eight months imprisonment, just shy of the 

midpoint of his guidelines range. King’s sole objection was to the inclusion of the Arizona assault 

conviction in his criminal history calculation. 

II.

King’s procedural unreasonableness argument is perplexing. The one issue he objected to 

during sentencing—the inclusion of his Arizona assault conviction in his criminal history 

calculation—begets only a passing reference in his brief. He complains that his behavior during 

his three months on bond was “totally compliant with his bond conditions”—absent, of course, 

what he deems the “minor” infraction of punching his girlfriend in the face, tackling her to the 

ground, and then failing to inform his probation officer of his arrest or conviction. Yet despite 

King’s complaint, he does not suggest that it was improper for the district court to include his 

conviction in its calculation. Similarly, King refutes the government’s suggestion at sentencing 

that he dealt drugs, but does not allege that this suggestion was improper. King’s complaints, 
No. 23-1268, United States v. King

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ungrounded in law, do not constitute arguments. His claims are forfeited for want of argument. 

See United States v. Clark, 469 F.3d 568, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n issue is deemed forfeited 

on appeal if it is merely mentioned and not developed.”).

King next alleges that the district court failed to explain his sentence, and instead “simply 

list[ed] the [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] factors and [his] characteristics,” or alternatively, “simply 

selected a sentence without any explanation.” He claims that this error was both procedural and 

substantive. Yet his sentencing transcript shows the district court thoroughly discussed the 

sentencing factors and applied them to the seriousness of his offense as indicated by the quantity 

of drugs, the growing seriousness of his criminal record as indicated by his progression from drug 

possession to distribution, his potential to harm the public in dealing methamphetamine, his 

undeterred history of flouting the law, and the potential benefits King could glean from 

educational, vocational, and anger management classes. The district court’s discussion was 

sufficiently detailed to tell us which factors it considered at sentencing. It was therefore adequate. 

United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 361 (6th Cir. 2009). 

Even had the district court’s explanation been brief, it still would not have erred. WithinGuidelines sentences, like King’s, do not require lengthy discussions. United States v. HajHamed, 549 F.3d 1020, 1024 (6th Cir. 2008). And although King takes issue with the district 

court’s failure to explain why it selected seventy-eight months “as opposed to some other 

sentence,” the district court need not explain why it did not select alternative sentences. United 

States v. Gale, 468 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir. 2006).

AFFIRMED.