This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A14-1470

S3 Holdings, LLC, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Stephen R. Niosi, et al., 

Appellants, 

John Doe, et al., 

Defendants.

Filed July 6, 2015

Affirmed

Peterson, Judge

Scott County District Court

File No. 70-CV-14-9903

Kelly V. Griffitts, Griffitts Law Office, PLLC, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)

William B. Butler, Butler Liberty Law, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Schellhas, 

Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

PETERSON, Judge

In this appeal from a summary judgment in an eviction action, appellants argue 

that respondent lacked standing to bring the action and that the district court erred by 
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granting summary judgment in favor of respondent and abused its discretion by refusing 

to grant an unconditional stay of the eviction proceedings. We affirm.

FACTS

In 2003, appellants Stephen R. Niosi and Kimberly A. Niosi executed a mortgage 

in favor of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., on a house they owned in Prior Lake. The 

mortgage was assigned to JP Morgan Chase in 2012. Appellants defaulted on the 

mortgage, and JP Morgan Chase began foreclosure proceedings in February 2013. 

In April 2013, appellants filed an affidavit of postponement under Minn. Stat. 

§ 580.07, subd. 2(2) (2014), which postponed the sheriff’s sale for five months, but 

shortened the redemption period from six months to five weeks. After several additional 

postponements, the sheriff’s sale was held in January 2014. JP Morgan Chase purchased 

the property and received the sheriff’s certificate of sale. The redemption period ended in 

February 2014. Appellants did not exercise their redemption right. After the redemption 

period expired, JP Morgan Chase conveyed its interest in the property to respondent S3 

Holdings, LLC by quitclaim deed. 

Appellants continued to occupy the property, and in June 2014, respondent filed 

an eviction complaint. In August 2014, the district court issued its findings, conclusions, 

and order for judgment, granting summary judgment in favor of respondent and an 

immediate writ of recovery. Judgment was entered on the order, and appellants filed a 

notice of appeal to this court and asked that execution of the writ of recovery be stayed 

during the appeal. The district court ordered a stay of the writ of recovery conditioned on
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appellants’ posting a monthly bond of $2,975.67, an amount that would cover monthly 

property taxes and foregone rental value of the property.

D E C I S I O N

We review the district court’s summary-judgment decision de novo to determine 

whether there are genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its 

application of the law. Ruiz v. 1st Fid. Loan Servicing, LLC, 829 N.W.2d 53, 56 (Minn. 

2013). 

I.

Appellants argue that respondent did not have standing to bring this eviction 

action because the assignments of their mortgage to and from the parties to the trust that 

held the mortgage are not recorded and, therefore, the foreclosure was void. 

Alternatively, appellants argue that respondent lacked standing because JP Morgan Chase 

transferred its interest in the sheriff’s certificate of sale to respondent more than ten years 

after the closing date of the trust, which made the transfer void under New York law. 

The district court concluded that it was not appropriate to litigate such issues in an 

eviction action. We agree.

An eviction action is a summary proceeding intended to adjudicate the limited 

question of who has a present possessory right to a property. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust 

Co. v. Hanson, 841 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. App. 2014); see also Minn. Stat. 

§ 504B.001, subd. 4 (2014) (defining “eviction” as “a summary court proceeding to 

remove a tenant or occupant from or otherwise recover possession of real property by the

process of law set out in this chapter”). “Parties generally may not litigate related claims 
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in an eviction proceeding,” but defendants may “raise defenses and counterclaims that fit 

within the limited scope of an eviction proceeding.” Hansen, 841 N.W.2d at 164. 

Challenges to the validity of the mortgage or foreclosure process may be raised in a 

separate proceeding, in which the party raising the challenges may seek a stay of the 

eviction action. AMRESCO Residential Mortg. Corp. v. Stange, 631 N.W.2d 444, 445-46 

(Minn. App. 2001); see also Real Estate Equity Strategies, LLC v. Jones, 720 N.W.2d 

352, 359-60 (Minn. App. 2006) (identifying remedies a tenant may pursue outside of an 

eviction action).

Furthermore, this court recently held that when the former owners of property that 

was sold at a sheriff’s sale remain in possession of the property after the redemption 

period expires, the holder of the sheriff’s certificate of sale suffers an injury in fact and 

has standing to bring an eviction action. See Fed. Home Mortg. Corp. v. Mitchell, 862 

N.W.2d 67, 71 (Minn. App. 2015), pet. for review filed (Minn. Apr. 30, 2015).

Appellants’ challenges to respondent’s standing are meritless.

Appellants argue that Minn. Stat. § 504B.121 (2014) specifically permits them to 

challenge respondent’s title in this eviction action because they obtained their interest in 

the property before respondent obtained its interest. That statute states:

A tenant in possession of real property under a lawful lease 

may not deny the landlord’s title in an action brought by the 

landlord to recover possession of the property. This 

prohibition does not apply to a tenant who, prior to entering 

into the lease, possessed the property under a claim of title 

that was adverse or hostile to that of the landlord.
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Id. Because appellants have not entered into a lease and are not in possession of the 

property under a lease, this statute does not apply to this eviction action. See Mitchell, 

862 N.W.2d at 72-73 (explaining that former owners who remain in possession of 

property following foreclosure and sheriff’s sale are not “tenants” within meaning of 

Minn. Stat. § 504B.121).

II.

Appellants argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in 

favor of respondent. A district court must grant summary judgment if there are no 

genuine issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.03. A party seeking eviction after a foreclosure must demonstrate 

that (1) the other party remains in possession of the property; (2) the mortgage on the 

property has been foreclosed; (3) the time for redemption has expired; and (4) the party 

seeking eviction has a right to possession of the property. Minn. Stat. § 504B.285, subd. 

1(1)(ii) (2014). The record shows that appellants remain in possession of the property, 

the mortgage was foreclosed, the time for redemption has expired, and JP Morgan Chase, 

the holder of the sheriff’s certificate of sale, transferred its interest in the property to 

respondent, which gave respondent a right to possess the property. The district court did 

not err by granting summary judgment to respondent.

III.

Relying on Bjorklund v. Bjorklund Trucking, Inc., 753 N.W.2d 312, 318-19

(Minn. App. 2008), review denied (Minn. Sept. 23, 2008), appellants argue that the 

district court abused its discretion by denying an unconditional stay of the eviction 
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proceeding when there is a pending title action that involves the same defenses and 

counterclaims. The district court’s decision on whether to grant a stay is reviewed under 

an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. at 317. 

Although it appears that appellants brought an action to register title in district 

court after the redemption period ended, appellants have provided no information about 

that proceeding. Another proceeding subsequent, which was brought by JP Morgan 

Chase, was dismissed. Thus, appellants have not demonstrated that the district court 

abused its discretion by refusing to grant a stay under Bjorklund.

Nor have appellants demonstrated that the district court abused its discretion by 

refusing to grant an unconditional stay of the writ of recovery during this appeal. Minn. 

R. Civ. App. P. 108.01, subd. 1, states “Except as otherwise provided by rule or statute, 

an appeal from a judgment or order does not stay enforcement of the judgment or order in 

the [district] court unless that court orders relief in accordance with Rule 108.02.” The 

eviction statute provides that a party who remains in possession of the property while 

appealing “must give a bond that provides that: (1) all costs of the appeal will be paid; (2) 

the party will comply with the court’s order; and (3) all rent and other damages due to the 

party excluded from possession during the pendency of the appeal will be paid.” Minn. 

Stat. § 504B.371, subds. 3 (2014). 

The district court stayed execution of the writ but determined that appellants 

should make monthly payments of $2,975.67, to cover property taxes and the anticipated 

rental value of the property. This was not an abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.