Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

P. Jeffrey Schlesinger

Office of the Public Defender

Appellate Division

Crown Point, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Tina L. Mann

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cynequia Latria Glover,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

April 20, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-CR-2572

Appeal from the 

Lake Superior Court

The Honorable 

Clarence D. Murray, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

45G02-1610-MR-3

Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 2 of 8

[1] Following her guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter,1 Cynequia Latria Glover 

(“Glover”) was sentenced to twenty years in the Indiana Department of 

Correction with two years suspended to probation. Contending that the trial 

court abused its discretion by failing to recognize mitigating circumstances and 

that her sentence is inappropriate, she now appeals.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In the early morning hours of October 8, 2016, Glover and Dan Hardy 

(“Hardy”) returned to the residence they shared in Gary, Indiana. They began 

to argue, and the altercation became physical. During the argument, Glover 

stabbed Hardy in the abdomen with a knife. Hardy died shortly thereafter. 

[4] On October 9, 2016, the State charged Glover with murder. On June 3, 2019, 

the State amended the charging information to add one count of voluntary 

manslaughter, a Level 2 felony. Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 119. At that 

time, the State and Glover entered into a “stipulated plea and agreement.” Id. 

at 120-22. Pursuant to that plea agreement, Glover pleaded guilty to Level 2 

felony voluntary manslaughter, and the State dismissed the murder charge. Id. 

at 120-22, 139-40. On October 2, 2019, the trial court, finding that the 

aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, sentenced 

1

See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a).
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Glover to twenty years in the Indiana Department of Correction with two years 

suspended to probation. Id. at 164-65. Glover now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision

[5] Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Bethea v. State, 

983 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (Ind. 2013) (citing Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 

490 (Ind. 2007), reh’g granted on other grounds, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007)). An 

abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of 

the facts and circumstances before the court. Id. A court will abuse its 

discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement, relying on aggravating or 

mitigating factors that are not supported by the record, failing to find factors 

advanced by the parties and clearly supported by the record, or relying on 

factors that are invalid as a matter of law. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490-91. 

The trial court has no obligation to “properly weigh” these factors, and the 

weight given to such factors is no longer subject to appellate review Id. at 491.

[6] Glover argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced her 

because it ignored several significant mitigating circumstances. Here, the trial 

court found that the nature and circumstances of the crime was a significant 

aggravating factor and noted that: (1) the crime was committed in the parties’ 

residence with Glover’s children and Hardy’s seventeen-year-old brother 

present; (2) the incident was fueled by drugs and alcohol; and (3) Glover is 

“volatile” and has “destructive anger management” issues. Appellant’s Conf. 

App. Vol. II at 164. The trial court found the following mitigating 
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circumstances: (1) Glover had no history of criminal activity and had led a lawabiding life for a substantial period before commission of the crime; (2) 

imprisonment of Glover will result in undue hardship to her dependents; (3) 

Glover pleaded guilty, thus saving the court and the taxpayers the time and 

expense of a trial; and (4) completed a number of self-betterment courses while

incarcerated. Id. The trial court found that the aggravating circumstances 

outweighed the mitigating circumstances and sentenced Glover. 

[7] The trial court did not fail to take into consideration evidence that Glover was 

not likely to reoffend because, although she had no criminal history, this 

mitigating circumstance was not supported by the record. The trial court 

reviewed the presentence report that placed Glover in the moderate risk 

category to re-offend. Id. at 152. However, evidence was presented at the 

sentencing hearing that Glover had been violent in the past when she was 

involved in an incident with the father of her three children, where she allegedly 

stabbed him, but he refused treatment because he did not want the mother of 

his children to go to jail. Tr. Vol. 3 at 9, 12-13, 14, 15. The police had been 

called to their house before when they had “gotten into situations” “probably a 

little bit more” than two times. Id. at 15. The trial court did not abuse its 

discretion because there was no evidence that clearly supported that Glover 

would not continue with this pattern of violent behavior. 

[8] The trial court did not fail to recognize grounds tending to excuse or justify the 

crime as a mitigating factor. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court stated 

“under any reasonable evaluation of this case, there is no justifiable reason for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2572 | April 20, 2020 Page 5 of 8

what you did. None that I can see.” Id. at 31. The trial court further stated, “I 

have no reason to believe that your life or your physical safety was in issue at 

the time you committed this act.” Id. Therefore, the trial court looked at the 

facts presented and came to the conclusion that this mitigating factor was not 

significant. Further, Glover pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter. By 

doing so, she admitted that (1) she had not acted in self-defense and (2) had 

knowingly or intentionally killed Hardy while acting under sudden heat. See

Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a). 

[9] There is also no evidence that the trial court failed to recognize that Glover

would respond positively to short term incarceration. The presentence 

investigation indicated that a letter was sent to Lake County Community 

Corrections requesting the defendant be evaluated, but there was no response. 

Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 153. No evidence was presented to support this 

challenged mitigator other than Glover’s counsel’s statement, “She will respond 

positively to shorter term incarceration” and a letter defense counsel sent to 

community corrections confirming a conversation she had regarding Glover’s 

potential acceptance into community corrections. Tr. Vol. 3 at 26-27; Appellant’s 

Conf. App. Vol. II at 126. Although Glover had no criminal history, there was 

evidence presented that this was not the first time that she had been involved in 

violent domestic disputes, and her volatile behavior had occurred in the past. 

The trial court did not have substantial evidence that Glover would respond to 

short term incarceration. 
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[10] Glover also contends that the trial court did not consider her remorse as a 

mitigating factor. The trial court heard Glover’s statement at the sentencing 

hearing, in which she expressed her remorse. Tr. Vol. 3 at 29-30. We give 

substantial deference to the trial court’s evaluation for remorse because the trial 

court may observe the defendant and is therefore in the best position to 

determine whether the remorse is genuine. Webb v. State, 941 N.E.2d 1082, 

1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Corralez v. State, 815 N.E.2d 1023, 1025 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2004)), trans. denied. The court is neither obligated to accept the 

defendant’s arguments as to what constitutes a mitigating factor nor required to 

give the same weight to a proposed mitigating factor as does the defendant. 

Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Here, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Glover’s remorse to 

be a significant mitigating circumstance. We, therefore, conclude that the trial 

court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Glover.

[11] Glover also argues that her sentence is inappropriate. Pursuant to Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B), this court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, 

after due consideration of the trial court’s decision, the [c]ourt finds that the 

sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character 

of the offender.” Our Supreme Court has explained that the principal role of 

appellate review should be to attempt to leaven the outliers, “not to achieve a 

perceived ‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 

(Ind. 2008). We independently examine the nature of Glover’s offense and his 

character under Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference to the trial 
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court’s sentence. Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In 

conducting our review, we do not look to see whether the defendant’s sentence 

is appropriate or if another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test 

is whether the sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Whether a sentence is inappropriate 

ultimately depends upon “the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the 

crime, the damage done to others, and a myriad of other factors that come to 

light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Glover bears the burden 

of persuading us that her sentence is inappropriate. Id. 

[12] Glover’s sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and 

her character. As to the nature of the offense, Glover admitted that she and 

Hardy had a volatile relationship, particularly when they used drugs and 

alcohol, and that, on the night in question, she had grabbed a knife and stabbed 

Hardy in the abdomen during an argument. Glover committed this crime when 

three of her children and Hardy’s brother, who was also under the age of 

eighteen, were present in the residence. 

[13] As to Glover’s character, the trial court described her as volatile due to 

destructive anger management issues. This crime happened when children 

were in the home, which shows that Glover had complete disregard for what 

the children could possibly observe and the long-lasting effects on them if they 

witnessed this violence. There is evidence that Glover had been involved in an 

altercation in the past that caused injury but was never arrested, and police had 

been called to the residence on previous occasions to deal with domestic 
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disturbances. Glover also admitted to a police officer the night of the incident 

that she “needs counseling for her anger issues but has never sought 

counseling.” Appellant’s Conf. App. Vol. II at 76. Glover was aware of her 

propensity to become violent and angry, but she only sought out help and 

treatment after she was incarcerated. Ex. Vol. 4 at 7. We conclude that 

Glover’s twenty-year-sentence with two years suspended to probation is not 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and her character. 

[14] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., and Mathias, J., concur.