COURT OF APPEALS 

DECISION 

DATED AND FILED

August 27, 2019 

Sheila T. Reiff 

Clerk of Court of Appeals 

 

NOTICE 

 This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2018AP615-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2014CF3157

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS 

DISTRICT I 

STATE OF WISCONSIN, 

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 

V. 

JOSE ANTHONY GUZMAN, 

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

 APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: CAROLINA STARK, Judge. Affirmed. 

 Before Brash, P.J., Kessler and Brennan, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jose Anthony Guzman appeals from a judgment, 

entered upon a jury’s verdict, convicting him on one count of first-degree sexual 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

2 

assault of a child less than sixteen years old. Guzman also appeals from an order 

denying his postconviction motion without a hearing. Guzman contends that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to call two witnesses, for failing to elicit 

additional testimony from the crime lab analyst, and for failing to object to a 

portion of the State’s closing argument. We disagree with Guzman’s arguments, 

and we affirm the judgment and order. 

BACKGROUND 

¶2 Around 6:00 p.m. on July 18, 2014, then-thirteen-year-old I.M. was 

on the front stairs of the duplex where she lived with her family in the upper unit. 

She had intended to go to the store with her grandfather, who lived a few houses 

away, but he had already left. I.M.’s mother was upstairs, sleeping after returning 

from work, and I.M. had locked herself out, so she was waiting on the stairs for a 

friend. 

¶3 As I.M. was waiting, she saw a man—later identified as Guzman—

park his car and make a phone call. After he ended the call, he came over to I.M. 

and started to ask her about a “for rent” sign in the yard. She explained that it was 

not for the duplex but for another house on the same lot. Guzman told I.M. that 

she was pretty and asked if she had a boyfriend. Guzman then went to his car to 

grab a piece of cardboard on which he wrote his phone number. He gave the 

number to I.M. so her mother could call him about the rental property. 

¶4 I.M. stated that after Guzman gave her his phone number, he gave 

her two dollars, then grabbed her hand and put it on his penis. She said he pulled 

down his shorts and held both of her hands on his penis, moving her hands up and 

down three or four times while telling her that he loved her. I.M. also said that he 

kissed her and rubbed his penis against her. Guzman then left. 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

3 

¶5 I.M. told her mother and grandfather what happened. They called 

Guzman’s phone number and he returned. As Guzman walked back to the house, 

he was confronted by Israel Nunez-Otero, a neighbor and friend of I.M.’s mother. 

Guzman initially tried to flee but was grabbed by Nunez-Otero, who held Guzman 

down until police arrived. Guzman was arrested and charged with one count of 

first-degree sexual assault of a child less than sixteen years old. 

¶6 I.M.’s grandfather, M.M., testified at trial. M.M. said he returned 

home about 6:00 p.m. the day of the incident, and I.M. ran up to him, crying. She 

told him what had happened. He punched his truck, which caught the attention of 

Nunez-Otero. M.M. testified that he helped hold Guzman down until police 

arrived. M.M. also testified that, as they held Guzman, Guzman kept saying “tell 

her I’m sorry” and that he did not want to go to jail. 

¶7 State Crime Lab Analyst Michelle Burns testified regarding DNA 

evidence. I.M.’s pants had been swabbed in the crotch and fly areas, as well as 

inside and outside the waistband. Only the inside of the waistband yielded enough 

material for testing. The DNA was consistent with having come from two 

individuals, but there was insufficient material to make either inclusionary or 

exclusionary identifications. The analyst testified that there was at least one male 

contributor, but she could not say conclusively whether the entire sample was a 

mix of male and female DNA or a mix of DNA from multiple males. I.M.’s hands 

were also swabbed for DNA. No DNA was recovered from her right hand. There 

was a trace amount of male DNA on her left hand but, like the waistband sample, 

it was too small of a sample to make any comparisons. 

¶8 Burns’s report was also admitted at trial. Among other things, this 

report noted that the DNA mixtures from both I.M.’s waistband and her left hand 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

4 

showed a “partial Y-STR DNA profile that is a mixture of DNA from at least two 

male individuals.” Burns did not testify about the Y-STR results. In its closing 

argument, the State acknowledged that there was “no smoking gun” from the 

DNA evidence, but asked the jury to consider “what other male could she have 

possibly gotten this DNA on her palm from.” The jury convicted Guzman as 

charged, and he was sentenced to fourteen years’ initial confinement and six 

years’ extended supervision. 

¶9 Guzman then filed a postconviction motion, alleging ineffective 

assistance of trial counsel. He claimed trial counsel was deficient for failing to: 

(1) call Nunez-Otero as a witness because Nunez-Otero told police that when he 

approached and confronted Guzman, Guzman responded, “I didn’t touch anyone”; 

(2) call Officer David Waliszewski as a witness because the officer prepared a 

report stating that he and his partner canvassed the neighborhood but none of the 

neighbors who were home during the incident saw or heard anything; (3) elicit 

testimony from Burns that the DNA showed two male sources; and (4) object to 

the State’s mischaracterization of the DNA evidence in its closing argument. 

¶10 The trial court denied the postconviction motion without a hearing, 

concluding that there was no prejudice from any of the alleged errors. The trial 

court noted there was no detail in Waliszewski’s report about where the neighbors 

actually were during the incident, and, in any event, Guzman had admitted talking 

to the victim, so the lack of witnesses was “not particularly relevant as to his 

presence.” The trial court was also unpersuaded that Nunez-Otero’s testimony 

would have changed the verdict, because Guzman had also admitted telling I.M. 

she was pretty, asking whether she had a boyfriend, and giving his phone number 

to her. With respect to the DNA evidence, the trial court noted that DNA had not 

been used to identify the perpetrator; it simply tended to support I.M.’s allegations 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

5 

that some man had sexual contact with her as described. Finally, the trial court 

concluded that the State’s argument about the DNA evidence was fair game. 

Guzman appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

¶11 “A hearing on a postconviction motion is required only when the 

movant states sufficient material facts that, if true, would entitle the defendant to 

relief.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. 

Whether the motion alleges such facts is a question of law. See id., ¶9. If the 

motion raises sufficient material facts, the trial court must hold a hearing. See id. 

If the motion does not raise sufficient material facts, if the motion presents only 

conclusory allegations, or if the record conclusively shows the defendant is not 

entitled to relief, then the decision to grant or deny a hearing is left to the trial 

court’s discretion. See id. 

¶12 The trial court has the discretion to deny “even a properly pled 

motion ... without holding an evidentiary hearing if the record conclusively 

demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief.” See State v. Sulla, 2016 

WI 46, ¶30, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880 N.W.2d 659. A trial court’s discretionary 

decisions are reviewed for an erroneous exercise of that discretion, a deferential 

standard. See id., ¶23. 

¶13 The requirements for showing ineffective assistance of counsel are 

well established. A defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 

deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. See State v. Balliette, 

2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 358, 805 N.W.2d 334. “Whether counsel was 

ineffective is a mixed question of fact and law.” Id., ¶19. The defendant must 

show both elements of the test, and we need not address both prongs if the 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

6 

defendant fails to make a sufficient showing on one of them. See State v. 

Maloney, 2005 WI 74, ¶14, 281 Wis. 2d 595, 698 N.W.2d 583. 

I. The Failure to Call Nunez-Otero as a Witness 

¶14 “Failure to call a potential witness may constitute deficient 

performance.” State v. Jenkins, 2014 WI 59, ¶41, 355 Wis. 2d 180, 848 N.W.2d 

786. Counsel’s performance is deficient if it “fell below the objective standard of 

reasonably effective assistance.” See id., ¶40. If deficient performance is 

established, the defendant must also show prejudice—that is, “the defendant must 

show that, absent defense trial counsel’s errors, there was a reasonable probability 

of a different result.” See id., ¶49. 

¶15 Guzman contends that “Nunez-Otero’s testimony was important 

because it contradicted testimony that Mr. Guzman apologized for hurting I.M.” 

While it is true that Nunez-Otero told police that Guzman said he did not touch 

anyone, we are unpersuaded that the failure to call him was prejudicial. First, 

when Guzman allegedly made his denial, he was attempting to flee the scene. 

Attempted flight demonstrates consciousness of guilt. See State v. Miller, 231 

Wis. 2d 447, 460, 605 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1999). Second, Nunez-Otero 

testifying about Guzman’s attempted flight would have corroborated testimony 

from I.M., M.M., and I.M.’s mother that Guzman tried to flee. Third, both M.M. 

and I.M.’s mother testified that Nunez-Otero was also present during Guzman’s 

apology. Though the police report does not reflect that Nunez-Otero reported 

hearing an apology, it is reasonable to infer that he may have been able to 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

7 

corroborate the others’ testimony about the apology.1 Thus, we are unconvinced 

that calling Nunez-Otero to testify would have resulted in a different verdict, so 

Guzman has not sufficiently demonstrated prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to 

call this witness, even if this failure might be seen as deficient performance. 

II. Failure to Call Officer Waliszewski as a Witness 

¶16 Guzman next complains that trial counsel should have called 

Waliszewski “to attack the credibility of I.M.’s account of her interaction with 

Mr. Guzman.” Guzman says that the officer’s report shows “three neighbors 

reported being home the whole time that this incident occurred, but they did not 

see anything.” Guzman contends this is significant because the event occurred 

while it was still light outside and I.M. had neighbors downstairs. Thus, the jury 

never had “any opportunity to question I.M.’s version of events because it never 

learned that there were people around during the incident that never saw or heard a 

thing.” 

¶17 First, I.M. testified that two people were walking nearby while she 

was talking to Guzman, just before he assaulted her, so the jury did in fact hear 

that there were others nearby. Second, according to Waliszewski’s report, at least 

five neighbors were at home and none saw or heard anything involving Guzman. 

However, though the report provides the neighbors’ addresses, there is no 

indication of their actual proximity to I.M.’s home or porch, and the report does 

 

1

 Guzman additionally suggested that calling Nunez-Otero would have undermined 

M.M.’s testimony because M.M. said he detained Guzman while the police report reflects that 

Nunez-Otero said he forced Guzman to the ground and stayed on top of him until the police 

arrived. However, M.M. clarified on cross-examination that “the other gentleman” had grabbed 

and held Guzman while M.M. assisted. 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

8 

not indicate where most of the neighbors were in their homes, so there is no reason 

to believe that any of them was even in a position to observe something at I.M.’s 

home—indeed, one of the interviewees stated he was watching television. 

Moreover, as the trial court noted, Guzman did not deny being at I.M.’s home, 

speaking with her, or giving her his phone number. Accordingly, the failure to 

call Waliszewski to testify that multiple neighbors saw nothing does not even 

remotely undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial, so trial counsel 

was not ineffective in this regard. 

III. Failure to Elicit Additional Testimony from the Analyst 

¶18 As noted, Burns’s report indicated a “partial Y-STR DNA profile 

that is a mixture of DNA from at least two male individuals” on I.M.’s waistband 

and left hand. Guzman argues that “[e]liciting testimony from the analyst about 

this particular profile showing at least two male individuals was vital to 

illustrating to the jury [that it] should not give the DNA evidence much weight 

because DNA can be transferred in a variety of ways and can remain on objects.” 

¶19 However, trial counsel did elicit testimony from Burns about the 

mechanics of DNA transfer, including how difficult it is to transfer DNA by touch 

and how bodily fluids are a better transfer vehicle than touching. Guzman does 

not explain how having Burns testify about her determination of two male 

contributors is “vital” to diminishing the weight of the DNA evidence in light of 

Burns’s more specific testimony about how DNA transfer works. We are 

therefore unpersuaded that trial counsel’s performance in this regard was deficient 

or prejudicial. 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

9 

IV. Failure to Object to the State’s Closing Argument 

¶20 Related to Burns’s conclusion of two male contributors, Guzman 

also argues that trial counsel: 

failed to object to the [S]tate’s closing argument, which 

was that that Mr. Guzman was the only source of DNA and 

that he is the only place that could have come from. It 

argued that the DNA evidence “corroborate[d]” the 

victim’s statement because “what other men could she have 

gotten this DNA on her palm from.” The [S]tate argued 

that because I.M. lives with just her mom and her sister, 

there is no way other way male DNA could have possibly 

gotten on her palm. It reasoned that the DNA would not 

have come from her grandfather or any officer, so, it must 

have been from Mr. Guzman, which corroborates I.M.’s 

story. 

Guzman complains that the State “mischaracterized the DNA evidence to the 

extent that it was misleading” because the State “was aware that the evidence 

shows that there was at least two males present in the DNA sample ... [but] 

argued that there was only one male and that it could only have come from Mr. 

Guzman.” Guzman contends this was an improper argument. 

¶21 “Generally, counsel is allowed latitude in closing argument and it is 

within the trial court’s discretion to determine the propriety of counsel’s 

statements and arguments to the jury.”2 State v. Cockrell, 2007 WI App 217, ¶41, 

306 Wis. 2d 52, 741 N.W.2d 267. “A prosecutor may comment on evidence and 

argue from it to a conclusion.” Id. “Prosecutors may not ask jurors to draw 

 

2

 A failure to timely object to closing argument waives the right to appellate review of 

the issue. See State v. Guzman, 2001 WI App 54, ¶25, 241 Wis. 2d 310, 624 N.W.2d 717. 

However, the error may still be indirectly reviewable as part of an ineffective assistance claim. 

See, e.g., State v. Duckett, 2010 WI App 44, ¶6, 324 Wis. 2d 244, 781 N.W.2d 522 (unpreserved 

objection to sentencing argument reviewed in context of ineffective assistance claim). 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

10 

inferences that they know or should know are not true.” State v. Weiss, 2008 WI 

App 72, ¶15, 312 Wis. 2d 382, 752 N.W.2d 372. 

¶22 The relevant part of the State’s closing argument was as follows: 

Also ... we heard from the DNA analyst from the 

state crime lab. I will admit this is no smoking gun in the 

case, there is no DNA profile that says Jose Guzman 

touched this girl because his DNA is all over her palms. 

We don’t have a DNA profile, we don’t have a partial DNA 

profile; all the analyst could say is there is male biological 

material on one place on [I.M.], her left palm, that is all 

we’ve got. So it is no smoking gun, but it is also not 

nothing at all, it is significant evidence. Because what 

other men could she have possibly gotten this DNA on her 

palm from? 

¶23 While this may be a hard blow, we are not persuaded it was a foul 

one. See id., ¶10; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Here, there is 

nothing objectively false in the State’s argument. It did not represent that there 

was only a single male contributor to the DNA recovered. Burns testified that 

DNA can be transferred by touch, so male DNA on I.M.’s hand is not inconsistent 

with the allegation that Guzman grabbed her hands and placed them on his penis, 

even though the exact source of the DNA was not identified. There is no

suggestion that any other male had touched I.M. in any fashion, so it is not an 

unfair inference that Guzman was the source of some of the recovered DNA, even 

if there is also a second unknown source. The State does not suggest that the 

DNA conclusively established Guzman as I.M.’s assailant—in fact, it 

acknowledged the limits of the DNA in that regard. Rather, the State simply 

argued that the DNA evidence tended to support I.M.’s version of events because 

there is no alternate version that accounts for the presence of male DNA on her 

palm. We are unpersuaded that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to this 

closing argument. 
No. 2018AP615-CR 

11 

CONCLUSION 

¶24 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Guzman did not plead 

sufficient material facts regarding deficient performance or prejudice to entitle him 

to a hearing and that the record establishes he is not entitled to relief. Thus, 

whether to grant a hearing on the postconviction motion was a discretionary 

decision for the trial court, and we are not persuaded that its discretion was 

erroneously exercised. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed. 

 This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).