SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2691-19

KENNETH REID,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PLAINFIELD,

ADRIAN MAPP, and

CARL RILEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

__________________________

Submitted March 1, 2021 – Decided 

Before Judges Messano, Hoffman, and Suter.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Union County, Docket No. L-3967-17.

O'Connor, Parsons, Lane & Noble, LLC, attorneys for 

appellant (Gregory B. Noble and Robert A. Ballard, III, 

of counsel; Meredith Mona, on the briefs).

Rainone Coughlin Minchello, LLC, attorneys for 

respondents City of Plainfield and Adrian Mapp (John 

F. Gillick, of counsel and on the brief).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

September 14, 2021
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Antonelli Kantor, PC, attorneys for respondent Carl 

Riley (Jarrid H. Kantor and Yulieika Tamayo, on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Kenneth Reid appeals the January 24, 2020 summary judgment 

orders of the Law Division that dismissed his second amended complaint

(complaint) with prejudice. His complaint alleged violations of the New Jersey 

Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42, against defendants, 

the City of Plainfield (City), Adrian O. Mapp, the Mayor of Plainfield, and Carl 

Riley (Riley), the Police Director of Plainfield. We reverse these orders and 

remand for further proceedings. 

I.

Plaintiff was employed by the City of Plainfield Police Department 

(Department) as a lieutenant. On December 2, 2015, the Department received a 

call about a motor vehicle accident involving an intoxicated driver. The officers 

who responded to the scene noted the driver was not conscious or able to 

communicate. Suspecting the driver was intoxicated, they requested a blood 

draw search warrant, but the Assistant Prosecutor would not approve this

without properly identifying the driver. The officers later misrepresented they 

had obtained the driver's identity, and a search warrant was issued. 
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One of the officers became uncomfortable with what occurred and advised 

plaintiff. Plaintiff never notified the Union County Prosecutor's Office about 

what occurred, although he said he would. The Prosecutor's Office became 

aware of the issue and investigated it. It did not authorize criminal charges, but 

because plaintiff had not notified the Prosecutor's Office, it recommended 

administrative discipline against him for the failure to supervise, and against the

other officers for their involvement.

The Department commenced an internal investigation. Approximately a 

week later, plaintiff was admitted to the hospital having suffered a minor stroke.

While he was hospitalized, Riley and another officer visited. Plaintiff testified 

Riley and the other officer asked him how old he was and when he was 

considering retirement. He testified Riley referenced the potential disciplinary 

charges and told him these charges could "go away" if he retired. Plaintiff 

interpreted these statements as a threat. 

On February 24, 2016, plaintiff received a preliminary notice of 

disciplinary charges pending a final hearing. The charges included negligence 

in his duties as a watch commander, failure to take appropriate action of illegal 

activity, failure to provide proper training, wasting public resources, failure to 

report perjury, failure to report to the Police Director, providing misleading 
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information to the Prosecutor's Office, and failure to notify them of perjury. He 

was charged with conduct unbecoming a public employee, N.J.A.C. 4A:2-

2.3(a)(6), and "other sufficient cause" for failing to properly supervise, N.J.A.C. 

4A:2-2.3(a)(12).

Plaintiff and the City, including the Department, entered into a Stipulation 

of Settlement (Stipulation) on April 29, 2016, that settled the disciplinary 

charges. Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Under the Stipulation, plaintiff 

retired from the Department and agreed to withdraw his request for a hearing of 

the disciplinary charges. He acknowledged he "did not engage in the proper 

supervision of subordinates," and he did not advise the Prosecutor's Office or 

others about the "conduct of subordinate officers under [his] command." He 

acknowledged the "[d]isciplinary [c]harges were not racially motivated." The 

Stipulation provided the Department withdraw all pending disciplinary issues

against plaintiff. He retired in "good standing." 

The Stipulation included "Release" and "Knowing and Voluntary Waiver" 

provisions. Relevant here, paragraph ten provided:

Release. As inducement for the City to enter into this 

Agreement, Employee hereby withdraws his request for 

a hearing on this disciplinary matter waives (sic). 

Further he waives his right to appeal pursuant to 

N.J.S.A. 40A:14-150, and accepts the above-described 

terms of settlement of this matter, and does remise, 
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release and forever discharge the City and its members 

of the governing body, including all of its divisions, 

departments, employees and agents from any and all 

debts, obligations, suits, actions, causes of action, 

claims or demands, in law or in equity, which Employee 

now has, or hereafter can, shall or may have, with 

respect to the subject matter of this disciplinary action.

Paragraph eleven provided:

Knowing and Voluntary Waiver. Employee 

acknowledges that in the execution of this Agreement 

he is effecting a knowing and voluntary waiver of any 

claims, liabilities or causes of action against the City 

and any of its members of the governing body, 

employees, agents, successors and assigns of the 

Township by reason of the subject matter of this 

disciplinary action or issue. Employee further 

acknowledges that he has discussed the terms of this 

Agreement with his attorney, . . . and that [he] has 

answered any questions [plaintiff] may have regarding 

this matter to [plaintiff]'s full satisfaction. [Plaintiff]

also hereby agrees and acknowledges that he has been 

fully, fairly and adequately represented by [his 

attorney] in this matter.

On November 7, 2017, plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint against

defendants. It was amended twice. As amended, Count One alleged age 

discrimination contrary to the LAD "because [plaintiff] was [fifty-eight] at the 

time of his forced retirement." Count Two alleged that plaintiff was the victim 

of "hostile work environment disability and/or perceived disability harassment 

and discrimination" by defendants because they allegedly harassed and 
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intimidated him during his medical leave. Count Three alleged defendants were 

liable for "aiding and abetting" discrimination or harassment of plaintiff. 

Plaintiff sought back pay, front pay, compensatory and punitive damages, 

attorney's fees and costs. 

On December 27, 2019, defendants filed motions for summary judgment 

predicated on the Stipulation. On January 24, 2020, following oral argument, 

the trial court granted defendants' summary judgment motions, dismissing

plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. In its statement of reasons, the trial court 

determined "[p]laintiff entered into a valid waiver and release of all claims 

against [d]efendants, including claims under the LAD." It found plaintiff 

entered into "a 'knowing and voluntary waiver of any claims, liabilities or causes 

or action[.]'" Noting that plaintiff was represented by counsel and was aware of 

pending disciplinary charges, the trial court found plaintiff was allowed to retire 

in good standing, "[i]n exchange for the dismissal of the pending disciplinary 

charges." The trial court found, 

[p]laintiff cannot defeat this summary judgment motion 

by arguing that the language in the Stipulation of 

Settlement is not clear or unambiguous. The Court 

finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact 

regarding the language of the agreement or the intent of 

the parties in entering into the agreement.
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Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred in finding the 

Stipulation was a waiver by plaintiff of all his claims against defendants under 

the LAD. He contends the judge should have found the Stipulation's language 

was "unclear and ambiguous" because it did not mention age or disability 

discrimination. Plaintiff contends the hostile work environment claim is a 

separate and distinct claim that is not encompassed by the Stipulation, and there 

are genuine issues of material fact that should have precluded summary 

judgment. 

II.

We review a court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the 

same standard as the trial court. Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339, 346 (2017). 

Summary judgment must be granted if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that the 

moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." Templo 

Fuente De Vida Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 224 N.J. 189, 

199 (2016) (quoting R. 4:46-2(c)).

The central issue in this case is whether plaintiff released all claims 

against defendants by entering into the Stipulation. "The scope of a release is 
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determined by the intention of the parties as expressed in the terms of the 

particular instrument, considered in the light of all the facts and circumstances."

Bilotto v. Accurate Forming Corp., 39 N.J. 184, 203 (1963). Questions about 

intent "cannot ordinarily be fairly disposed of on affidavits in a summary 

judgment application." Id. at 204 (citation omitted). 

In interpreting the intent of the parties to a contract, the contract "must be 

read as a whole, in 'accord with justice and common sense.'" Cumberland Ctny. 

Improvement Auth. v. GSP Recycling Co., Inc., 358 N.J. Super. 484, 497 (App. 

Div. 2003) (quoting Krosnowski v. Krosnowski & Garford Trucking, Inc., 22 

N.J. 376, 387 (1956)). "A general release, not restricted by its terms to particular 

claims or demands, ordinarily covers all claims and demands due at the time of 

its execution and within the contemplation of the parties." Bilotto, 39 N.J. at

204 (citations omitted).

The trial court relied on Swarts v. Sherwin-Williams, Co., 244 N.J. Super. 

170 (App. Div. 1990), in reaching its conclusion that plaintiff knowingly and 

voluntarily waived his claims against defendants. In Swarts, the plaintiff signed 

a release and covenant not to sue his prior employer to obtain a special severance 

allowance as part of his retirement. 244 N.J. Super. at 172. We affirmed the 
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trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint by adopting a "totality of the 

circumstances approach for determining the validity of such waivers." Ibid.

The waiver the plaintiff signed in Swarts provided it was in "full 

satisfaction of any and all claims or demands" that he had "arising either directly 

or indirectly out of [his] present or past employment relationship." Id. at 175. 

He then sued his former employer alleging age discrimination under the LAD. 

In an affidavit, the plaintiff alleged there was a genuine issue of material fact 

about whether he intended to waive the age discrimination claim even though it 

apparently was not disputed he had "full awareness" of these rights based on a 

letter he sent to the former employer. Id. at 178. We were "satisfied the trial 

judge correctly concluded plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly waived any age 

discrimination claim he had." Ibid.

In the present appeal, the trial court dismissed plaintiff's complaint finding 

the Stipulation was a "valid waiver and release" of all of plaintiff's claims 

including all LAD claims. The court quoted from the Stipulation that it was a 

"voluntary waiver of any claims, liabilities or causes of action[.]" However, the 

actual sentence said that plaintiff released defendants from claims plaintiff

"now has, or hereafter can, shall or may have, with respect to the subject matter 

of this disciplinary action." The waiver paragraph contained the same reference 
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to "disciplinary action." This was a critical omission by the trial court and 

distinct from Swarts where the waiver was of claims arising from the 

"employment relationship." Reference in the Stipulation to the "disciplinary 

action" might have been intended as a limitation.

The trial court also did not consider whether there were genuine issues of 

material fact about plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff contended there was an ongoing

scheme by defendants to pressure and harass him into retiring. He argued the 

evidence showed a prima facie case of age and disability discrimination and 

hostile work environment claim. At the summary judgment stage, the trial court 

is to view the evidence "in a light most favorable to the non-moving party" to 

determine if there are genuine issues of material fact. Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. 

Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). The trial court did not undertake this 

type of analysis. We are constrained to reverse the summary judgment orders 

and remand. The trial court may consider any other arguments defendants raised

when they sought summary judgment which were not addressed.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.