United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2008-7095 

MARVIN ROBINSON, 

Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

Respondent-Appellee. 

Kenneth M. Carpenter, Carpenter, Chartered, of Topeka, Kansas, argued for 

claimant-appellant. On the brief was Mark R. Lippman, The Veterans Law Group, of La 

Jolla, California. 

Martin F. Hockey, Jr., Assistant Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil 

Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for 

respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were Michael F. Hertz, Acting Assistant 

Attorney General, and Jeanne E. Davidson, Director. 

Richard R. James, of Glen Allen, Virginia, for amicus curiae National 

Organization of Veterans Advocates, Inc. 

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims 

Judge Lawrence B. Hagel 
 

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 

2008-7095 

MARVIN ROBINSON, 

 Claimant-Appellant, 

v. 

ERIC K. SHINSEKI, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in 04-1690, Judge 

Lawrence B. Hagel. 

 ___________________________ 

 DECIDED: February 25, 2009 

 ___________________________ 

Before NEWMAN, PLAGER, and DYK, Circuit Judges. 

DYK, Circuit Judge. 

 Marvin Robinson (“Robinson”) appeals a decision of the Court of Appeals for 

Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) affirming a decision by the Board of Veterans’ 

Appeals (“Board”). The Board denied service connection on a claim for heart disease 

and a thyroid disability. We affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

Robinson served on active duty in the United States Navy from October 16, 

1986, to April 14, 1988. On May 27, 1987, Robinson was diagnosed with a peptic ulcer 

and treated at the Naval Hospital in San Diego, California. In November 1988, 
Robinson was awarded service connection for the ulcer by the Department of Veterans 

Affairs (“VA”) effective from the day following the date of his discharge from service. 

Ten years later, in December 1998, Robinson submitted a claim to the VA for 

heart and thyroid conditions which allegedly began in February 1996. The VA Regional 

Office (“RO”) in Montgomery, Alabama, denied Robinson’s claim for the heart and 

thyroid conditions on September 14, 1999. 

Robinson’s newly retained attorney filed a notice of disagreement in November 

1999, in which Robinson stated that he “disagree[s] with your office’s decision . . . 

[denying Robinson’s] claims for entitlement to service connection for heart disease and 

hyperthyroid condition as secondary to [Robinson’s] service connected peptic ulcer 

disease.” R. at 138-39. 

The VA then sent Robinson a statement of the case and accompanying notice 

letter. The notice letter stated as follows: 

This summary will help you make the best argument to the 

[Board] . . . . To complete your appeal, you must file a 

formal appeal. We have enclosed VA Form 9 . . . . Your 

appeal should address . . . the errors that you believe we 

made in applying the law.” 

R. at 146. In one place, the statement of the case characterized the relevant 

issues as “[s]ervice connection for heart disease as secondary to the serviceconnected disability of peptic ulcer disease” and “[s]ervice connection for 

hyperthyroid condition as secondary to the service-connected disability of peptic 

ulcer disease. R. at 148. However, in the decision section, the statement of the 

case is broader: “[s]ervice connection for heart disease is denied” and “[s]ervice 

connection for hyperthyroid condition is denied.” R. at 149. 

2008-7095 2 
Robinson perfected his appeal by filing a substantive appeal, VA Form 9, in 

January 2000. Robinson checked the box indicating that he “want[ed] to appeal all of 

the issues listed on the statement of the case and any supplemental statements of the 

case.” R. at 152. Prompt 10 on the form, stating “Here is why I think the VA decided 

my case incorrectly,” was left blank. 

The VA filed a supplemental statement of the case in April 2001, including a 

discussion of additional evidence but stating the issues and decision in substantially the 

same manner. Robinson responded with a second substantive appeal, VA Form 9, in 

May 2001. On this appeal form, Robinson again checked that he wanted to appeal all 

of the issues, and wrote in response to prompt 10 that “I disagree with all of the 

conclusions in your office’s Statement of the Case, dated April 18, 2001. The Regional 

Office failed to consider all the evidence and failed to follow the correct legal standards 

in reaching its conclusions.” R. at 174. 

In October 2001, the Board remanded to the RO for additional development of 

the record, including obtaining all treatment records and “arrang[ing] for a VA 

examination by an appropriate specialist in order to determine the nature, severity, and 

etiology of any thyroid disorder [and any cardiovascular disorder].” Appeal of Robinson, 

No. 00-02 500, slip. op. at 4-5, (Bd. Vet. App. Oct. 18, 2001). A VA examination 

occurred in late 2002, and the report of the examination stated that Robinson was first 

diagnosed with his thyroid disorder in 1998; that the thyroid disorder was not secondary 

to the ulcer; and that Robinson’s chest pain was “noncardiac.” R. at 697. 

In May 2004, the Board denied Robinson’s claim for service connection for the 

heart condition and the thyroid condition. The Board reviewed all the evidence and 

2008-7095 3 
concluded that “none of the records submitted tends to attribute cardiovascular disease 

to active service or to service-connected peptic ulcer disease.” Appeal of Robinson, No. 

00-02 500, slip. op. at 4-5, (Bd. Vet. App. May 17, 2004). After discussing the relevant 

legal standards for direct service connection, the Board characterized the veteran’s 

arguments: 

In this case, however, the veteran contends that 

cardiovascular disease and/or a thyroid disorder were 

caused or aggravated by service-connected peptic ulcer 

disease, rather than due directly to any incident of active 

service. Therefore, the remainder of the analysis will focus 

solely on secondary service connection for those disorders. 

Id. The Board then addressed the issue of secondary service connection and ultimately 

concluded that, “[a]fter consideration of all the evidence, the Board finds that the 

preponderance of it is against the claim.” Id. at 9. 

Robinson appealed to the Veterans Court. In his briefs before the Veterans 

Court, Robinson raised, inter alia, the contention that “[t]he record . . . before the Board 

revealed that the Appellant may be entitled to service connection on a direct basis. . . . 

[T]he Board’s failure to address th[is] issue[] was in error.” Appellant’s Court. App. Vet. 

Cl. Reply Br. 2-3 (emphasis omitted).1 In its decision of January 29, 2008, a divided 

panel of the Veterans Court affirmed. Robinson v. Mansfield, 21 Vet. App. 545 (2008). 

The Veterans Court first considered whether it had jurisdiction over Robinson’s 

claim for direct service connection when Robinson did not argue direct service 

connection before the Board. Id. at 550-51. The court held that it had jurisdiction 

 1

 The only other issues raised by Robinson before the Veterans Court were 

the alleged inadequacy of the medical examination and the alleged failure of the 

medical examination to comply with the prior remand order. The court affirmed the 

Board on these issues, and neither issue is contested by Robinson on appeal. 

2008-7095 4 
because direct service connection was not a different claim from secondary service 

connection; it was instead another argument under the same claim. Id. 

The court then considered whether the Board erred in failing to adjudicate the 

issue of direct service connection. The court characterized the question as one of 

“issue exhaustion,” and concluded that “[i]n this case, neither the appellant nor the 

record raised the theory of entitlement to service connection on a direct basis and, thus, 

the Board did not err in failing to discuss that theory.” Id. at 553-54. In discussing 

whether the issue was raised by the claimant, the court relied in part on the participation 

of counsel in proceedings before the Board. The majority went on to hold that the issue 

of direct service connection was not raised by the record before the Board. Id. at 555-

56. 

The dissent disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of the correct test to apply 

to determine whether the Board needs to address a theory of service connection, and 

urged that the Board is required to consider “all possible” theories under which the 

veteran could recover, even if there was nothing either stated by the claimant or in the 

record to raise the theory. Id. at 558-60 (Schoelen, J., dissenting). However, the 

dissent recognized that this duty “is not absolutely limitless—it is an inquiry into what is 

possible.” Id. at 559. The dissent stated that this duty would not apply “for example, 

where the claimant is ineligible for the benefit . . . ; if the claim is inherently incredible or 

clearly lacks merit; or if the application requests a benefit to which the claimant is not 

entitled as a matter of law.” Id. at 559 (citation omitted). 

 

2008-7095 5 
The dissent urged that it was irrelevant whether the veteran had raised the issue, 

reasoning that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103 (2000), 

prohibited the application of issue exhaustion to the nonadversarial Board process 

(except in the clear and unmistakable error context as in Andrews v. Nicholson, 421 

F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). Robinson, 21 Vet. App. at 561-62. The dissent also urged 

that it was wrong to impose additional requirements on represented appellants to raise 

issues in the nonadversarial Board process because it would create perverse incentives 

not to obtain representation. Id. at 564. The dissent would have remanded to require 

the Board to address the issue of direct service connection. 

The Veterans Court denied en banc review on February 25, 2008, over a dissent 

by Judge Kasold. Robinson timely appealed to this court. We have jurisdiction over 

this appeal under 38 U.S.C. § 7292. 

DISCUSSION 

I 

In various decisions we have made clear that the Board has a special obligation 

to read pro se filings liberally. See, e.g., Comer v. Peake, 552 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. 

Cir. 2009); Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1282-84; Roberson v. Principi, 251 F.3d 1378, 1380-

84 (Fed. Cir. 2001). This obligation applies both to proceedings appealing a decision of 

the RO to the Board (“direct appeals”) and to proceedings alleging a clear and 

unmistakable error (“CUE”) in a final decision of the Board. See Comer, 552 F.3d at 

1367-68; Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1282-84. In Andrews, however, we held that this 

obligation does not extend to filings by counsel in CUE proceedings. 421 F.3d at 1283-

84. This case presents the question whether the obligation to liberally read filings 

2008-7095 6 
applies to filings by counsel in the direct appeal phase of proceedings before the Board. 

We hold that the Board must read such filings liberally because this obligation is 

expressly imposed by the VA’s own regulations. 

A 

In order to appeal a decision of the RO on a new or original claim to the Board, 

the claimant must follow the Board’s Rules of Practice as delineated by regulation at 38 

C.F.R. part 20. As the regulations state, there are two filings that must be made to 

perfect an appeal of a decision of the RO: a notice of disagreement, and a substantive 

appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.200. “While special wording is not required,” the notice of 

disagreement must be a written communication that “can be reasonably construed as 

disagreement with [the RO’s decision] and a desire for appellate review.” 38 C.F.R. 

§ 20.201. The regulations require that the claimant identify issues appealed in the 

notice of disagreement only if the RO “gave notice that adjudicative determinations were 

made on several issues at the same time.” Id. As an example of what might constitute 

“several issues” in this context, the regulations identify the situation where “service 

connection was denied for two disabilities and the claimant wishes to appeal the denial 

of service connection with respect to only one of the disabilities.” Id.

After the VA responds to the notice of disagreement with a statement of the case, 

the claimant is then required to file a substantive appeal. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202. The 

substantive appeal can be completed by filling out a simple one-page form, VA Form 9. 

Id. The regulations describe in detail how the Board will read the substantive appeal: 

If the Statement of the Case . . . addressed several issues, 

the Substantive Appeal must either indicate that the appeal 

is being perfected as to all of those issues or must 

specifically identify the issues appealed. The Substantive 

2008-7095 7 
Appeal should set out specific arguments relating to errors of 

fact or law made by the [RO] in reaching the determination, 

or determinations, being appealed. To the extent feasible, 

the argument should be related to specific items in the 

Statement of the Case . . . . The Board will construe such 

arguments in a liberal manner for purposes of determining 

whether they raise issues on appeal, but the Board may 

dismiss any appeal which fails to allege specific error of fact 

or law in the determination, or determinations, being 

appealed. The Board will not presume that the appellant 

agrees with any statement of fact contained in a Statement 

of the Case . . . which is not specifically contested. 

Id. (emphases added). 

B 

As we recently held in Comer, these regulations impose an obligation on the 

Board to read the appeal filings “in a liberal manner.” 552 F.3d at 1368. While Comer

was a pro se case, on its face the direct appeal regulations impose an obligation on the 

Board to read such filings by claimants “in a liberal manner,” regardless of whether the 

claimant is represented by an attorney. 

This interpretation is further supported by Congress’s recent decision to expand 

the availability of paid representation in Board proceedings in direct appeals. See

Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 

109-461, § 101(c)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 3403, 3407 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 5904(c)(1)). 

Indeed, it would defeat the congressional purpose of increasing the availability of much 

needed attorney assistance if direct appeal attorney filings were read in a less 

sympathetic light than pro se filings. As we stated in the context of veterans’ service 

organizations in Comer, “[t]o hold that a veteran forfeits his right to have his claims read 

sympathetically if he seeks assistance . . . would be to discourage veterans from 

2008-7095 8 
seeking th[is] much-needed assistance” at this early stage of the proceedings. 552 F.3d 

at1370. 

Our holding in this respect is not inconsistent with Andrews, 421 F.3d 1278. In 

Andrews, this court held that the rule that the Board was required to read pro se filings 

liberally did not extend to filings by counsel in the CUE context. Id. at 1283-84. There 

are three critical features of CUE claims that justify the different treatment of CUE 

filings. 

First, CUE proceedings are fundamentally different from direct appeals. See 38 

C.F.R. § 20.1402 (“Motions filed under this subpart [CUE claims] are not appeals and, 

except as otherwise provided, are not subject to the provisions . . . which relate to the 

processing and disposition of appeals.”); Disabled Am. Veterans v. Gober, 234 F.3d 

682, 694-95 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (upholding the validity of § 20.1402 and discussing the 

purpose of the provision). CUE proceedings are a limited exception to the rule of finality 

that permits collateral attack on a Board decision only where “a very specific and rare 

kind of error [is made] that when called to the attention of later reviewers compels the 

conclusion, to which reasonable minds could not differ, that the result would have been 

manifestly different but for the error.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.1403; see Cook v. Principi, 318 

F.3d 1334, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that a breach of the duty to assist 

cannot constitute CUE). 

Second, unlike direct appeals, regulations governing CUE claims make no 

mention of any obligation to construe the filings liberally, and instead place the onus of 

specifically raising each issue on the claimant: 

The motion must set forth clearly and specifically the alleged 

clear and unmistakable error, or errors, of fact or law in the 

2008-7095 9 
Board decision, the legal or factual basis for such 

allegations, and why the result would have been manifestly 

different but for the alleged error. Non-specific allegations of 

failure to follow regulations or failure to give due process, or 

any other general, non-specific allegations of error, are 

insufficient to satisfy the requirement of the previous 

sentence. Motions which fail to comply with the 

requirements set forth in this paragraph shall be dismissed 

without prejudice to refiling under this subpart. 

38 CFR § 20.1404(b) (emphases added); see Disabled Am. Veterans, 234 F.3d at 698-

99 (finding the specificity requirement reasonable, though invalidating a prior version of 

the regulation for other reasons). As the emphasized language demonstrates, the 

regulations limit the proceedings to the very specific issues raised by the filings. 

Third, as discussed in Andrews, each new CUE theory is independent for res 

judicata purposes, so a narrow reading of what CUE theories were raised would work 

no disadvantage to the claimant, as any unraised theories could be raised in a new 

CUE action. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1409(c) (“Once there is a final decision on a motion 

under this subpart relating to a prior Board decision on an issue, that prior Board 

decision on that issue is no longer subject to revision on the grounds of clear and 

unmistakable error.” (emphasis added)); Andrews, 421 F.3d at 1284; Andre v. Principi, 

301 F.3d 1354, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Because a CUE claim involves an allegation of 

an error with some degree of specificity, a veteran’s assertion of a particular clear and 

unmistakable error by the RO constitutes a distinct claim.” (quotation marks omitted)). 

On appeals to the Board, by contrast, theories of substantive entitlement to benefits 

such as direct and secondary service connection are not independent for res judicata 

purposes, and can be lost forever if not addressed. See Bingham v. Nicholson, 421 

F.3d 1346, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 

2008-7095 10 
For these reasons, it is appropriate to differentiate between CUE proceedings 

and direct appeals. In direct appeals, all filings must be read “in a liberal manner” 

whether or not the veteran is represented. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202. 

An allegation that the Board failed to comply with its obligation to read filings 

liberally may, of course, be raised for the first time on appeal to the Veterans Court. 

II 

We turn finally to the scope of the Board’s obligation to read the filings of the 

claimant “in a liberal manner.” 

We recently addressed this question in Comer. In Comer, the claimant did not 

specifically raise retroactive entitlement to total disability based on individual 

unemployability (“TDIU”) benefits. However, the court held that the Board was obligated 

to consider retroactive TDIU benefits because the claimant filed an appeal raising 

related issues and the record before the Board included “persuasive evidence of his 

unemployability; he has not been employed on a full-time basis since 1975 and the 

Veterans Court did not dispute that there was extensive record evidence of Comer’s 

employment difficulties.” 552 F.3d at 1367 (quotation marks omitted). 

The government in Comer argued that the claimant “does not seek a sympathetic 

reading of a claim or pleading but, instead, seeks the board’s review of an issue that 

was not raised on appeal.” Id. We rejected that argument and clarified that the 

obligation to read filings in a liberal manner included the question of what issues were 

raised. Id. at 1367-68. 

Thus, where the claimant has raised an issue of service connection, the evidence 

in the record must be reviewed to determine the scope of that claim. As we stated in 

2008-7095 11 
Comer, “the VA is obligated to determine all potential claims raised by the evidence.” 

Id. at 1367 (quoting Roberson, 251 F.3d at 1384). However, claims which have no 

support in the record need not be considered by the Board. Contrary to the dissenting 

opinion in the Veterans Court, the Board is not obligated to consider “all possible” 

substantive theories of recovery. Robinson, 21 Vet. App. at 559. Where a fully 

developed record is presented to the Board with no evidentiary support for a particular 

theory of recovery, there is no reason for the Board to address or consider such a 

theory. 

We also do not suggest that under the regulations the veteran is entirely relieved 

of his or her obligation to raise issues in the first instance before the VA where the 

record is being made. The regulations quite clearly impose such an obligation even in 

direct appeals, stating that “the Substantive Appeal must either indicate that the appeal 

is being perfected as to all . . . issues or must specifically identify the issues appealed. 

. . . [T]he Board may dismiss any appeal which fails to allege specific error of fact or law 

in the determination, or determinations, being appealed.” 38 C.F.R. § 20.202. We hold 

only that the veteran’s efforts to raise issues on direct appeal should be liberally 

construed whether or not the veteran is represented by counsel. In this context, having 

raised the basic issue of service connection—here that the veteran suffered thyroid and 

heart conditions that were somehow related to service—the Board was obligated to 

consider direct as well as secondary service connection if raised by the record.2

 2

 Indeed, as the government contends, it may well be that the Veterans 

Court was incorrect in suggesting that the Board did not address the direct service 

connection issue; it appears from the Board opinion that it in fact did so. The Board 

reviewed Robinson’s service medical records and found that “[t]he veteran’s service 

medical records . . . do not reflect any complaint or finding of a thyroid disorder or heart 

2008-7095 12 
2008-7095 13 

III 

In this case, the court found as a factual matter that the record did not raise any 

issue of direct service connection. Robinson, 21 Vet. App. at 555-56. Although the 

dissenting opinion in the Veterans Court points to facts that the dissent urges require a 

different result, the factual determinations of the court are beyond our jurisdiction to 

review. Szemraj v. Principi, 357 F.3d 1370, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004). As a result, we 

must affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. 

AFFIRMED 

COSTS 

No costs. 

 

disease [during service]. . . . The first evidence of a thyroid disorder or heart disease is 

many years after service.” Appeal of Robinson, No. 00-02500, slip. op. at 5, (Bd. Vet. 

App. May 17, 2004). In reviewing records from the Social Security Administration 

(“SSA”), the Board found that “[n]one of the SSA records tend to link any thyroid or 

cardiovascular disorder to active service or to service-connected disability nor does any 

SSA record tend to show any cardiovascular renal disease within a year of separation 

from active service.” Id. at 6.