## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## R E P O R T S Appellate Court

Harrison v. Addington , 2011 IL App (3d) 100810

Appellate Court Caption A N D RE H A RR I SO N
, Pl ain ti f f

- A p pellant, v. MI CHAEL ADDING T O N
, J AM ES OL SON, ROY DeVA UL T, SHERRI MARTI N, J EFF CHI SHOLM, STEVE BROCKWAY, MAR K DI GNEY a nd METROE HORNB UCKLE, Def

endants-A ppellees, (Shawn Maddox, De fenda nt).

District & N o. Third District Docke t No. 3-10-0810

Filed September 6, 2011

Held ( Note : Thi s syl lab us

con st it ute s no par t o

f the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo rt er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) I n an action ag ainst sever al of plaintiff’s supervisors and fellow employ ees alleg ing defamation and intentional interfe renc e with plaintiff’s employ ment based on statem ents that plaintiff sexually assaulted a s u b ordinate and that there was a war rant for his arr est, the entry of summary judgme nt for defe ndants was aff irmed wher e the rec ord established that plaintiff did have relationships with subordinates and others, and those relationships cre ated a risk for workplac e violence and a risk of f inancial liability

for the e mploy er.

Dec ision Under Review Appea l from the Circuit Court of Rock I sland County
, No. 09-L -136; the Hon. J ames J. Mesich, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affirmed.Counsel on

Appea l Stephen T. Fiew eg er (ar g ued), of Katz, Huntoon & Fi eweg er, P.C., of Molin e, and Cameron Davidson, of L ane & Waterman, LL C, of Dave nport, I owa, f

or appe llant.

Nina G. Stil lman (ar

ug ed), and Christopher J

. Bor an, both o f M o rgan, L ewis, & Boc kius, LLP, of Chicag o, for a ppellees.

Panel J USTI CE SCHMI DT delivere d the judgme nt of the court, with opinion. Presiding J ustice C arte r and J ustice O’B rien concurr ed in the j udg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 Appellant-pla intiff, Andre Har rison, appea ls the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt on behalf of appe llees-de fenda nts, Michael Adding ton, James Olson, Roy DeVa ult, Sherri Martin, J eff

Chisholm , Steven B rockw ay , Mark Dig ney and Metroe Hornbuc kle. ¶ 2 Counts I I and I V of the third amende d complaint alleg e that Olson and DeVa ult defame d appellant by repe ating the false statements that appellant committed a sexual assault and that there was a

war rant for Har rison’s ar rest. ¶ 3 Counts VI throug h XI I I o f t h e t h i rd am ended complaint alleg e that Addison, Olson, DeVa ult, Martin, Chisholm
, Br ockway , Dig ney an d H o rn b u c kle e a c h inte ntionally interfe red with appellant’ s employ ment by improperly using a company investigation as an opportunity to terminate a

ppellant’s employ ment with Deer e & Co. ¶ 4 Counts I
, I I I
, and V are not at issue in this appe al

. C o u n t s I an d V ar e cl ai ms of defa mation and intentional interfe renc e ag ainst Shawn Maddox and are not involved in this
appea l. Count I I I is a claim of defamation ag ainst Michael Adding ton; appellant conc eded the motion for summary

judgme nt. ¶ 5 Fo r t h e reasons that follow, we hold that the trial court corr ectly gra n t ed s u m m ar y judgme nt in favor of

eac h defe ndant, and we aff irm the judg ment.

¶ 6 FACTS ¶ 7 I . The Parties on A ppeal ¶ 8 Appellant beg an working for Dee re in 1999 as an indust ria l relations repr esentative. Prior
to his termination in 2009, Dee re promoted him five times and incre ased his salary on more than 10 occ asions. ¶ 9 When terminated, appellant was the opera tions manag er at J ohn Dee re Seeding Group

-2-(Seeding ). At that time, eac h of the defe ndants was employ ed by Dee re. Their respe ctive

titles, and work re lationship to appellant, if any , wer e: - Roy DeVa ult, global dire ctor, See ding ( appellant’ s second- level super visor); - James Olson, factory

manag er, See ding ( appellant’ s immediate supervisor) ; - Jeff Chisholm, global direc tor, Dee re w orldwide sec urity ; - Steven B rockw ay , reg ional direc tor, Dee re w orldwide sec urity ; - Mar k Dig ney , investiga

tor, Dee re w orldwide sec urity ; - Metroe Hornbuc kle, vice pr esident, De ere human re source s; - Michae l Addington, dire ctor, De ere human re source s; and - Sherri Martin, direc tor, Dee re huma n resour ces.

¶ 10 Other Rele vant I ndividuals

- Shawn Maddox, Seeding employ ee, only remaining defe ndant aft er t he trial court g rante d summary

judgme nt to appellees, f

ather of Alissa Maddox; - Alissa Maddox, Seeding ma il room employ ee, da ug hter of Shaw n Maddox;
- De nny Bla ck, De ereindustrial relations administrator;

- Heather Thielbert, Seeding conting ent employ ee, appellant’ s subordinat e (employ ed by Volt); and

- Ang ie Soliz
, Dee re employ ee, ne it h e r a s upervisor nor subordinate of appellant; marrie d to an employ ee a

ppellant manag ed.

¶ 11 I I . Alleg ations ¶ 12 On Sunday
, Aug ust 30, 2009, Shawn Maddox ca lled Denny Bla ck and asked him what would happen if he assaulted someone at work. Bla ck informed him of the conseque nces. Recog nizi ng an underly ing issue, Black as k ed Shawn why he had asked. Shawn informed Bla ck that his daug hter, Alissa Maddox, told him that appellant rape d her the previous night. Shawn said that Alissa obtained medical help, filed a repor t with law enfor ceme nt, and either that there was or might be a war rant for appellant’ s arr est. Shawn also told Bla ck that Alissa claimed appellant was forc ing Heather Thielbert to continue a sexual relatio n s h i p with appellant by threatening her position at Seedin g. S h aw n explained that Thielbert was at appellant’ s home at the time of the attack. Bla ck rec ommended that Shawn contac t Seeding
g lobal direc tor, DeV ault. ¶ 13 L ater that day , Shawn Maddox spoke with DeVault, who wa s out of the country . After speaking with Shawn, DeVa ult called Seeding fac tory mana ger J ames Olson, appellant’ s d irec t supervisor. DeVa

ult told Olson about his conver sation with Shawn Maddox, including the alleg ations made ag ainst appellant. Since DeVa ult was schedule d to be out of the country for the wee k, Olson ag ree d to contac t Bla ck for more information so that he could formulate

a re commendation on how to proc eed. ¶ 14 Olson and De Va u l t agr ee d t h at appellant should work from home pending further

-3-investigation. They felt that as a manag ement employ ee, appellant could easily work offsite.

They also determined that Dee re worldwide security should be notified, in acc ordanc e with
company policies that require d the reporting of potential incidents of workplac e hara ssment or violence

. ¶ 15 On Monday morning
, Olson met with appellant at Seedi n g. He t o l d him that Shawn Maddox had reported to the company that appellant sexually assaulted his daug hter and that there was, or might be, an arr est war rant for appellant. Olson told appellant to work from home and that he should take ca re of any supposed war

rant that mig ht exi st. ¶ 16 After meeting with appellant, Olson contac ted De er e wo rl d wi d e re gi o n al s ecurity
manag er Stephen Br ockway ; he informed Br ockway of th e alleg ations made ag ainst appellant. Br ockway then assig ned worldwide security investigator Mark Dig ney to conduct an investig ation at Seeding

. ¶ 17 L ater in the morning
, Br ockway and Dig ney met with J eff Chisholm
, the g lobal direc tor of worldwide security

. Chisholm instructed Dig ney to focus the investigation on the Seeding work environment due to the conce rn for p o t en t i al workplac e hara ssment and violence. Chisholm told Digne y

to avoid the s pecif

ic facts of t he allege d assault t o avoid i nterfe ring with any criminal investig ation conducte d by law enf orce ment. ¶ 18 Stil l on Monday
, sometime afte r me e ti n g with Br ockway and Dig ney , Chisholm met with Sherri Martin and Michae l Addington, both human resourc es di rec tors. He informed them of the a lleg ations made a g ainst appellant and that Dig ney was lea ding the investiga tion. ¶ 19 At some point on Monday
, appellant’ s secur ity b ad ge wa s d ea ct ivated, deny ing him

acc ess to company

fac iliti es. ¶ 20 On Monday
, appellant sent Olson an e-ma il that stated neither the Moline nor Da venport police department ha d any rec ord of a complaint ag ainst appellant, nor was there a war rant for his arr est. Olson passed this information to Dig ney

. I t was later learned that this statement

was on l y half true. Alissa had filed a sexual assault complaint ag ainst appellant with the Dave nport police.

¶ 21 I I I . Dig ney ’s I nvestig ation ¶ 22 Dig ney investigated the alleg ations from Monday
, Aug ust 31, to Wednesday , September 2. On Monday
, he first met with Olson and Bla ck to learn about the alleg ations made ag ainst the appellant. L ater on M o n d ay , afte r obtaining approva l, Dig ney beg an revie wing appellant’ s wor k e-ma il acc ount. He found two sexually expli cit text messag es appellant

rec eived on his company -issued Bla ckber ry , which he forwa

rded using his work e-ma il

acc ount. I n i t i al l y , he did not know who sent the text messag es beca use the messag es only included a phone number. ¶ 23 Dig ney

conducte d the following rele vant interview s: - Shawn Maddox, approxim ately 11 a.m. on September

1; - Alissa Maddox, approxi mately 1:30 p.m. on September 1;
- He ather Thielbert, a

pproxi mately

3:15 p.m. on September 1; - Ang ie Soliz , approximately 9:15 a.m. on September 2;

-4-- Appe llant, approxim ately 11:30 a.m. on September 2. ¶ 24 Thielbert admitted that she and appellant wer e involved in a s ex u al relationship t hat beg an sever al months earlier. She denied that appellant threatened her position with Dee re. She re cognized the phone number of the sexually expli cit text messag es rec eived by appellant a s that of Ang ie Soliz

. ¶ 25 Soliz admitted that s h e h a d been involved in a “per sonal” relationship with appellant. She told Dig ney that she sent the two inappropriate text messag es to appellant. The text messag es described a sex act she would perf orm on him. She said that s h e d i d not know the phone number she sent the messag es to was reg istered to a Dee re phone. These text messag es from Soliz wer e those that Dig ney found from appellant’ s Bla ckber ry

. Appellant admitted that he was in a r elationship with Thielbert. He explained that he forwar ded the text messag es “to
reta in[ ] evidenc e of a consensua l relationship.” At that time, appellant knew that Soliz was marrie d to a fa ctory

worke r whom he ma nag ed at See ding. ¶ 26 Appellant also admitted that he had been involved in a sexual relationship with the wife of another Seeding employ ee. He define d the relationship as “spora dic.” Dig ney understood this to m ean the relationship wa s ong oing, but a ppellant has sinceclaimed the r elationship ended y ear s ag o, prior to the woman’ s marria g e to a De ereemploy ee. ¶ 27 Fo l l o wi n g h i s i n t er v iew, appellant sent an e-ma il to Adding ton, who attend ed t h e interview. I t stated, “I understand the seriousness o f the s ituation. I wanted to assure y ou I have taken all the steps to end those relationships to better ensure that no future issues arise. *** I t was fa

r below the profe ssional standard I expect for my self.”

¶ 28 I V. Dig ney Reports ¶ 29 On September 2, Dig ney summarized his finding s to Chisholm
, Martin, and Adding ton. He later completed a 21-page formal report. Dig ney did not make any rec ommendations
reg arding disciplinary

action; his sole responsibilitywas to investig ate a nd report.

¶ 30 V. Dec ision to Terminate Appe llant ¶ 31 On September 2, a c o n f e r e n c e call occur

red among human resour ces direc tors Martin and Adding ton; human resour ces vice president Hornbuc kle; vice president of Dee re ag riculture and turf E ric Ha nsotia; and preside nt of Dee re a g riculture and turf Da vid Everitt. ¶ 32 During the confe renc e call, Adding ton summarized the results of Dig ney ’s investig ation. Martin explained that Dee re rec ently terminated manag ers who had eng ag ed in inappropriate relationships w it

h s u b o r d in ate s

. Sh e r e c o mm e n d e d termi n ati n g a p p e ll an t to rema in consistent with the curr ent pra ctice. ¶ 33 Everitt asked Martin to g ive details of manag ers who we re fired for actions simil ar to those of appellant. Martin then exp l ai n ed how a manag er was rec ently terminated afte r a single consens u al, s exual encounte r wit h a Deere administrative assis tant. Martin went on to explain that during the past sever al y ea rs , De ere started terminating manag ers who had
eng ag ed in such conduct beca use of the risk of sexual hara ssment or discrimination claims. ¶ 34 Everitt m ade the final decision to terminate appellant’s employ ment. On S eptember 3,

-5-Ad d ington and Olson met with appellant and informed him he was terminated due to th e

information discover ed in the investig ation. ¶ 35 Any additional fac ts nece ssary in the analy sis of appellant’ s arg uments will be included below.

¶ 36 ANAL YSI S ¶ 37 Appellant ar g ues that the trial c ourt improperly g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of the appellee s. The court g rante d summary judgme nt on claims of defa mation and intentional interfe renc e with continued employ ment. We revie w a g rant of summary judgme nt de novo

. Forsythe v. Clark USA, In c. , 2 2 4 I ll. 2d 274, 280 (2007). “Section 2-1005 of the Code of C i v i l P rocedure provides for summary judgme nt when the pleading s, depositions, and admissions on file, toge ther with any aff idavits, show that there is no g enuine issue as to any materia l fac t ***.” Id. ; 735 I L CS 5/ 2-1005 (West 2008). We re view the r ecor d in the light
most favor able to the nonmoving party

. Forsythe
, 224 I ll. 2d at 280. “We may aff irm on any basis appea

ring in the rec ord, whether or not th e t ri al co u rt relied on that basis or its

rea soning was corr ect.” Atanus v. American Airlines, Inc.
, 403 I ll. App. 3d 549, 554 (2010).

¶ 38 I . Def amation ¶ 39 Appellant arg ues that the trial court improperly g rante d summary judgme nt to D eVault and Olson with respe ct to his claims of defa mation per se

. “To prove defa mation, a plaintiff
must show that the defe ndant made a fals e s t at em ent about him, that there was an unprivileg ed publication to a third party with fault by the defe ndant, and that the publication damag ed plaintiff.” Vicke rs v. Abbott Laboratori es , 308 I ll. App. 3d 393, 400 (1999). “Truth is an absolute defe nse to defa mation; true statements cannot support a claim of defa mation.” Hnilica v. Rizz a Chevrolet, Inc.
, 384 I ll. App. 3d 94, 97 (2008). Damag es ar e pre sumed in

a claim of per se defa mation. Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc.
, 174 I ll. 2d 77, 87 (1996). “I n I llinois
, there are five cate g ories of statements that are considere d defa matory per

se : (1) words that impute a person has committed a crime; (2) words that impute a person is infec ted with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute a person is una ble
to perf orm or lacks integ rity in perf orming her or his employ ment duties; (4) words that impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudice s that person in her or his profe ssion; and (5) words that impute a person has eng ag ed in adultery or fornication.” Solaia Technology, LLC v. Specialty Publishing Co.
, 221 I ll. 2d 558, 579-80 (2006). “It is well settled that, even if an a lleg ed stateme nt falls into one of the categ ories of w ords that ar e def amatory per se , it will not be actionable per se if it is rea sonably capa ble of an innocent construction.” Gree n

v. Rogers
, 234 I ll. 2d 478, 499 (2009). Ap p el l an t attempts to establish DeVa ult made a defa matory

statement with the following from De Vault’s deposition: “Q. What did y ou say

to J im Olson?
A. Essentially
, convey ed the messag e that what Shawn had told me, that we had–the alleg ations that Andre had assaulted his daug hter and that he thought there was a war rant out for Andre’s arre st, and that we woul d n eed to contac t Andre and work throug h the issue, and that’s para

phrasing
, for sure, beca

use I don’t reme mber the exact conver sation.

-6-* * * Q. Did y ou tel l J i m Olson that Mr. Maddox had said that the alleg ed assault was reported to local law e nforc ement and that Harrison had a wa rrant for his arr est?
* * * A. Yes, I did.”
He a lso points t o this testim ony from the de position of Olson: “Q. What did Mr. DeV ault tell y ou?
A. He said that Shawn told him that there was some incident, assault, of his daug hter on Friday night or Saturday morning befor e. Q. What else did he say ? A. That it had be en re ported to the police

. Q. Did DeVa

ult say that he reported it to the police, or did DeVa ult say that Maddox had re ported it, said it was re ported to the police ? A. That Maddox said that it was reported to the police. Q. Did he sa y

that there was a n arr est war rant out for

Andre ?
A. That came up. I don’t know if he said there is a war rant or there may be a war rant. I don’t know. This is what Shawn Maddox said. Q. So Maddox said either the re ma y be a w arr ant or ther e wa s a wa rra nt?
A. He sa id one of those.” ¶ 40 Olson and DeVa ult arg ue t h at t h es e s tatements cannot support a claim for de famation beca use they are true. Appellant has never claimed that S h aw n M ad dox did not make the allegat i o n s co ncerning appellant. The evidenc e does not establish that DeVa ult made a defa matory statement. DeVault mere ly m ade the t ruthful s tatement reg arding what S hawn Maddox had alleg ed. Appe llant failed to establish De Vault made a defa matory

statement. ¶ 41 The evidenc e prese nted with reg ard to the alleg ed defa matory statements made by Olson include the de position of Martin. Counsel questioned her conce rning a note she wrote that said, “He turned himself in? ”: “Q. What’s it mean, ‘ He turne d himself in.’? A. Well, there is a que stion mark there

. Q. I know, but who told y ou that he turne d himself in?
A. I don’t rec all for sure , but I believe it wa s– * * * Q. With whom were y ou communicating to ge t this i nformation?
A. I talked to a number of people that day

. This particula r one, I believe that perha

ps J im Olson may

have sa id something like that. Q. Said that Andre turned himself into the police? A. Something like that. Q. Okay . That wa s perha

ps mere pa

raphr asing ?

-7-A. Yes.”

Olson’s deposition testimony indicates that he informed Br ock wa y “that an employ ee had made this ac cusation.” ¶ 42 I n Dig ney ’s deposition, he was asked about various statements in his report. Spec ifically
, ref erring to the r eport: “Q. L ook at pag e 4 and the top of pag e five. It say s, ‘It should be noted that Maddox informed DeVa

ult that the alleg ed assault was reported to local law enfor ceme nt and that Har rison had a w arr ant for his a rre st.’ A. Mr. Olson must have told me that, then.” ¶ 43 Appellant seems to arg ue that the phrase “and that Har rison had a war

rant for his a

rre st” is somehow not related t o the rest of t he sentence, which makes clear t h at t hese are things that Maddox told DeVa ult. This evidenc e mere ly sho ws that Olson passed along the alleg ations that Maddox made. Appellant has failed to establish that Olson made a defa matory statement. The trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt on behalf of Olson and DeVa ult is affirmed.

¶ 44 I I . I ntentional I nterfe renc e ¶ 45 I n separ ate counts, appellant alleg es that eac h of the appellee s interfe red with his ong oing employ ment at Seeding

. The appellee s raise two arg uments supporting the trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt on the intentional interfe renc e claims. First, they arg ue th a t appellant’ s intentional interfe renc e claims are pree mpted by the I llinois Human Rights Act (the Human Rights Act) (775 I L CS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2008)). Second, they arg ue that even if t he action is not pree mpted by the Human Rig hts Act, their ac tions were privilege d.

¶ 46 A. The H uman Rights Ac t Preemption ¶ 47 Def

endants rely on Geise v. Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc.
, 159 I ll. 2d 507 (1994), for the proposition that appellant’ s intentional interfe re n ce claims are pree mpted by the Human Rights Act. They

arg ue that appe llant asserts that all of the defe ndants dec ided t o interfe re with his continued employment in reta liatio n f o r h is p r e v io u s claims of discrimination, which is covere d by

the Human Rig hts Act. ¶ 48 The I llinois Supreme Court r ece ntly clarified Geise in Blount v

. Stroud
, 232 I ll. 2d 302 (2009). The Human Rights Act pree mpts tort claims only when they are “inextricably linked”
to a civil rig hts violation. Blount
, 232 I l l. 2d at 313. No pree mption exis ts if there is an independe nt basis for the a ction apart from the Human Rig hts Act. Id. ¶ 49 Since appellant’ s alleg ations of intentional interfe renc e are cog nizable without refe renc e to the leg al duties cre ated by the Human Rights Act, they are not pree mpted by the Human Rights Act.

¶ 50 B. Intentional I nterfe renc e ¶ 51 We note that appellant appea rs to be arg uing that all of the defe nd an t s co n s p ired to

-8-interfe re with his employ ment; he claims that the actions of all the defe ndants sh ould be

looked at toge ther to determine whether they tortiously interfe red with his continued employ ment. Yet, he did not alleg e a conspirac y in his complaint. He also did not name Dee re as a defe ndant, which would have been liable for all o f the actions taken by its employ ees. Our function is to ensure that the trial court corr ectly determined that no issues of materia l fac t rema in. Forsythe
, 224 I ll. 2d at 280. We will addre ss eac h count individually to determine w hether

questions of fac t remain with re g ard to that c ount. ¶ 52 I n order to preva i l o n a cl ai m o f intentional interfe renc e with prospec tive economic advanta g e, ap p ell ant must show: (1) that he had a rea sonable expectation of continued employ ment; (2) that the defendants knew of t he ex pecta ncy ; (3) that t heir int entional and unjustified interfe renc e cause d the termination of the employ ment; and (4) damag es. Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel
, 172 I ll. 2d 399, 4 0 6 -0 7 (1996); Fellhauer v. City of Gene va , 142 I ll. 2 d 4 9 5
, 5 1 1 (1991); Vicke rs v. Abbott Laboratori es , 308 I ll. App. 3d 393, 411-12 (1999). Gene rally
, a corpor ate office r cannot interfe re with the continued employ ment of an employ ee of the corpor ation beca use the office r acts on behalf of the corpor ation. Vicke rs v. Abbott L a boratories
, 308 I ll. App. 3d 393, 411 (1999). “This qualified privileg e does not apply wher e office rs act s o l el y fo r t heir own g ain or solely for the purpose of harming plaintiff since such conduct is not underta ken to further the corpor ation’s interest. [C itation.] To be tortious, a corpor ate office r’s action must be d o n e without justification or maliciously .” (Emphasis omitted.) Mittelma n v. W itous
, 135 I ll. 2d 220, 249 (1989), abrogated by Kuwik v. Starmark S t a r Marketing & Administrati on, Inc.
, 156 I ll. 2d 16 (1993).

¶ 53 Counts VI I and VI I I –I nterfe renc e by

Olson and De Vault ¶ 54 Appellant made ident i ca l cl ai m s ag ainst Olson and DeVa ult. He claims they

illega lly scrutinized his e-ma il and text messag es, banne d appellant from work, and falsely claimed that he cr eate d a fina ncial risk as w ell as a risk of workplac e violence

. ¶ 55 No n e o f t h i s i s s u p p o rt ed by the rec ord. Shawn Maddox informed DeVa ult of t h e

acc usations conce rning Alissa Maddox and Thielbert. DeVa ult, who was out of the country , cont a c te d O ls o n

. A f

ter talking to Bla ck, Olson rec ommended that the employ ees be separ ated until an investigation could be completed. Olson and DeVa ult ag ree d that as a manag ement employ ee appellant would be able to work from home. They ag ree d to have appellant work from home and to inform security
, so that they could conduct an investigation. DeVa ult and Olson had nothing further to do with the investigation or termination of appe llant. ¶ 56 Appellant arg ues that Olson had a duty to investigate on his own, befor e informing Dee re worldwide securi t y o f the alleg ations. Appellant prese nts no case law requiring that every person who learns of p o tential problems in the workplac e must conduct his or her own investigation befor e i n forming those desig nated by the company to deal with such alleg ations. Olson and DeVa ult learned about the alleg atio n s o f mi s c onduct by appellant over the wee kend. After taking initial steps to separ ate the employ ees involved in the acc usation, they informed the pe ople in the company responsible for

investigating the a lleg ations. ¶ 57 The arg ument that Olson and DeVa ult falsely claimed that appellant cre ated a fina ncial

-9-risk as well as a risk of violence is basele ss. Shawn Maddox had alre ady threatened to attack

appellant based on appellant’ s alleg ed conduct with Maddox’s daug hter, all of wh i ch i s undisputed. Appellant also admitted to sleeping with a subordinate and h av i ng , at least, inappropriate relationships with other subordinates’ wives. And, g iven the content of the text messag es and appellants admissions, DeVa ult and Ols o n co u ld rea sonably have believed those relationships t o be sexual. Certainly , this creates a financial risk to Dee re. ¶ 58 There is no evidenc e that Olson and DeVa ult a cted solely for their own g ain or to ha rm appellant. Their prompt response to the alleg ations is exactly the ty pe of response war

rante d by such alleg ations. The trial court’s decision to g rant summary judgme n t wi th respe ct to counts VI I

and VI I I is affirme d.

¶ 59 Count VI –Adding ton ¶ 60 Appellant alleg ed in his complain t t hat Adding ton was biased ag ainst him based on a char g e of rac e discrimination appellant made in 2003, which Adding ton wa s u n ab l e to resolve. Appellant further alleg ed that Adding ton illega lly scruti n i z ed h is e-mail and text messag es, falsely

claimed that a

ppellant violated De ere ’s elec tronic equipment use policy
, cre ated a financ ial risk for the c ompany , and cr eate d a risk of w orkplac e violence

. ¶ 61 Appellant offers n o ev i d en ce , o t h er t han his own speculation, to substantiate that Adding ton soug ht retribution. “Howe ver, ‘[m] ere speculat i o n, conjec ture, or g uess is insufficient to withstand summary judgme nt.’ [C itation.] ” Atanus
, 403 I ll. App. 3d at 553. The mere fac t that a

ppellant made a claim of discrimination six y ear s earlier does not r aise

a question of fac t conce rning Adding ton’s actions. See Clark C o u n t y S chool District v. Breede n , 532 U.S. 268, 273-74 (2001) ( per curiam ) (holding that adver se ac tion oc curring

nearly two y ear s afte r dis crimination complaint showed “no causa lity at all”); Hughes v. Derwinski
, 967 F.2d 1168, 1174-75 (7th Cir. 1992) (four -month g ap betwee n complaint and adver se ac tion could not support a rea sonable infe renc e of r etaliation). ¶ 62 I n appellant’ s deposition, he s t at ed t h at h e wa s n ot awa re of anything that indicated Addi ng ton had direc ted Dig ney to perf orm an improper investigation. I n fac t, there i s n o

ev i dence that Adding ton had any control over how Dig ney perf ormed his investigation. Ultimately
, Adding ton made an or al re port of Dig ney ’s investig ation to E veritt, who made the dec ision to t erminate appellant. ¶ 63 Adding ton inf o rm ed E v er i t t o f t h e re s ults of Dig ney ’s investigation. Addington’s deposition testimony is, “I told him that we substantiated an inappropriate rela t i o n s h ip betwee n Andre and a Volt employ ee; that in the course of that we identified two other–I used the words i n ap p ro p riate relationships with Dee re or Dee re- related i ndividuals, and that he had–that he had utiliz ed company assets to cre ate, nurture and continue those relationships.” Appellant asserts that Adding ton was out to g et hi m beca use he told E v er i t t that appellant violated the elec tronic usag e policy

. Yet, when asked in his deposition if he was awa re of any violation of the elec tronic usag e policy with respe ct to Ba ld, Adding ton replied, “No.” This testimony does not prec lude the fac t that he felt the elec tronic usag e policy had been violated by appellant with re spect to Thielbert or Soliz

. ¶ 64 Addingt o n s u m m ar i z ed t h e re s u lts of Dig ney ’s investigation to Everitt, who, af ter

-10-rec eiving additional information from Martin, decide d to terminate appellant. There i s no

evidenc e that Adding ton a cted other than in the best interest of Dee re. Appellant has failed
to establish that Adding ton acte d solely to harm appellant or for his own benefit. T h e trial court’s g rant of summary judge ment with respec t to count VI is affirme d.

¶ 65 Count IX–I nterfe renc e by Martin ¶ 66 I n count IX, appellant alleg ed Martin illega lly participa t ed i n an i n v es t i gat i on of appellant’ s persona l life, permitted acc ess to appellant’ s persona l e-ma il, and permitted the

use of e-mails that did not occur during working hours and did not af fe ct h i s work perf ormanc e as the basis of appellant’ s termination. He further alleg es that Martin disabled appellant’ s security badg e and told security personne l not to allow him on the premises. His final alleg ation in this count is that Martin rec ommended appellant be fired even though she knew that other

simil arly situated employ ees ha d not been disciplined or te rminated. ¶ 67 Appellant has prese nted no case law and made no arg ument supporting his claim that the decision t o preve nt him from returning to work until the investigation had been concluded

was improper in any way

. The rec ord indicates that the decision was made that he could work
at home while the investiga tion wa s ong oing. We believe the decision to e nsure the people i n v o lved in this situation wer e kept separ ate during the course of the investigation was prudent a nd in no way

supports a cla im of intentional interfer ence by Martin. ¶ 68 Ap p el l an t ’s al l ega t ion that Martin authorized a revie w of his “per sonal” e-ma il is disinge nuous. The rec ord indicates only that Martin authorized Dig ney to revie w appellant’ s work e-ma il, not a persona l e-mail acc ount. Appellant prese nted no arg ument in his opening brief conce rning the illegality of Dee re employ ees revie wing his work e-mail. The issue was raised for the first time in his reply brief when he cited to section 9 of the I llinois Personnel Record Review Act. 820 I L CS 40/9 (West 2010). Supreme Court Rule 341(h)( 7) (ef f. J uly 1, 2008) states that “[p] oints not arg ued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief.” “This rule has been enfor ced by the reviewing courts of our State.” In re Estate of Jacobs
, 189 I ll. App. 3d 625, 628 (1989). This issue is not pr operly befor e the court, and we do not revie w it. ¶ 69 Martin informed Everitt that other Dee re manag ers had been fired for conduct simil ar to that of appellant. She provided a specific example of a manag er who had been fired in 2008 afte r eng ag ing in a single
, consensua l sexual encounte r with a Dee re administrative assistant. She then rec ommended that appellant be terminated to remain consistent with rec ent Dee re decisions conce rning other manag ers. Appellant makes no arg ument or fa ct u al showing indicating these statements by Martin wer e not truthful. Nor does appellant provide evidenc e that establishes Martin was awa re of simil arly situated employ ees who wer e not terminated for simil ar activity since the company ’s prac tice evolved to one of zero toleranc e. The trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt with reg ard to c ount I X is aff irmed.

¶ 70 Counts X, XI and XI I –Chisholm , Br ockway

and Dig ney ¶ 71 Appellant alleg es in counts X, XI and XI I that Chisholm
, Br ockway and Dig ney , afte r learning that the alleg ations that appellant assaulted Alissa Maddox wer e not true, illega lly

-11-direc ted that the investigation shift to appellant’ s persona l life, and then, based on that illega l

investigation rec ommended appellant be terminated. The rec ord does not support any of these alleg ations. First, the investigation never delved into the potential criminal acc usations made by Alissa Maddox. The rec ord indicat es t h at Chisholm
, Br ockway and Dig ney took

car e not to interfe re w ith a potential criminal investig ation. ¶ 72 Appellant ar g ues that this must not be true due to the fa ct the alleg ations of assault ar e found in the investigative report. The repor t does contain ref

ere nces to the complaint that instigate d the investigation; howeve r, it does not include any investigation o f t h e all eg ed assault. I n fac t , t h e report shows that as some witnesses started to talk about that issue, Dig ney steere d the conve rsation away from the topic of

the assault. ¶ 73 The initial alleg ations made by Alissa Maddox wer e twofold: first, she said that she had been assaulted by appellant; second, she claimed that Thielbert was being coer ced into a sexual relationship with appellant due to his position of authority at Dee re. The focus of the investigation was alway s on determining if any improper relationships exis ted at Dee re and the potential for workplace violence and hara ssment claims. To the extent appellant is claiming this investigation violates section 9 of the I llinois Personnel Rec ord Review A ct, h e wa i v ed this arg ument by failing to arg ue it in his opening brief. I ll. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (7 ) (ef f. Jul y 1, 2008); In re Estate of Jac obs , 189 I ll. App. 3d 625, 628 (1989). ¶ 74 Appellant ar gu es t hat t he investi g ation should have ended once Thielbert said that she

was not being coer ced into a sexual relationship. He cites no authority for the propos i t i on that a company ’s i nvestig ation of an employ ee cannot go bey ond th e i n itial alleg ations. I n this c ase, Dig ney ’s revie w of the messag es appellant rec eived on his w ork phone indicated that he had rec eived inappropriate messag es from an unknown number and had then forward ed t h em to his personal acc ount. Once the company was awa re of appellant’ s involvement in this other potentially inappropriate employ ee- related relationship, additional investigation was appropriate. ¶ 75 Neither Ch i s h o l m , Br ockway nor Dig ney made any rec ommendations reg arding what should be done with respe ct to appellant. They mere ly investigated alleg ations made ag ainst appellant. That t h e investigation ultimately conclude d that appellant had acte d inappropriately
, albeit not in the way initially alleg ed, does not indicate in any way that they

we re n o t ac ting on behalf of the company

. Chisholm
, Br ockway and Dig ney wer e simply doing w hat they

wer e hire d to do. ¶ 76 There are no fac ts that indicate Chisholm, Brockway or Dig ney

failed to a ct in the best interest of the company

. The trial court’s g rant of summary judgme nt with reg ard to counts X, XI and XI I is affirme d.

¶ 77 Count XI I I –Hornbuc kle ¶ 78 I n count XI I I
, appellant alleg es that Hornbuc kle intentionally interfe red with a ppellant’s employ ment by deciding to f ire him f or cre ating risks of work place violence and financ ial liability for Dee re, as well as for violating the elec tronic equipment policy
, even t houg h Hornbuc kle had rea son to know that simil arly situated employ ees had eng ag ed in simil ar acts and not bee n terminated or disciplined.

-12-¶ 79 Appellant arg ues that Hornbuc kle acte d out of a desire for retribution ag ainst him f or a claim of ra cial discrimination made in 2003. Ag ain, he of fer s no fac ts other than his belief that Ho rn b u ck le acte d out of a desire for reve ng e. He has failed to prese nt an issue of materia l fac t conce rning his claim of re taliation. See supra ¶ 65-69. ¶ 80 The evidenc e of Hornbuc kle’s involvement is exceptionally minimal. He was part of the confe renc e call in which Everitt decide d to terminate appellant. Howeve r, there is no rec ord that he made any rec ommendation s re g arding termination or that he had any part in the investigation. Appellant makes much of the fac t that Hornbuc kle later admitted that he had had an improper relationship with a subordinate. His arg ument is that since Hornbuc kle was not terminated, obviously
, terminating ap p ell ant for an inappropriate relationship was a sham. The problem with this theory is that there is no evidenc e that Hornbuc kle terminated appellant. I f Hornbuc kle did something wrong and was not terminated, this hardly g ives rise
to a cause of action ag ainst Hornbuc kle. What would the tort be called, “F ailure to g et fired” ? Also, ap p el l an t d oes not deny that he has had not just one, but sever al inappropriate relationships with employ ees and wives of employ ees. I t was not unrea sonable for Dee re to conclude that such conduc t was unac cepta ble. ¶ 81 Ap p el l an t h as failed to come forth with any evidenc e that Hornbuc kle did anything to aff ect appellant’ s employ ment status, let alone evidenc e that he did something for an improper reason. The trial court’s gr ant of summary judgme nt with reg ard to c ount XI I I is aff irmed.

¶ 82 CONCL USI ON ¶ 83 The re cord c lear ly establishes that appellant’ s conduct in having relationships not only with subordinates, but also with wives and a daug hter of em p l o y ee s created a risk of workplac e viol ence as well as a risk of financial l iability for Deer e. W e find this appea l to be totally devoid of merit. ¶ 84 For the fore g oing rea sons, the j u d gm ent of the circ uit court of Rock I sland Countyis aff irmed.

¶ 85 Affirmed.

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