Filed 12/4/20 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VON HILDEBRANDT
,
Plaintiff and Appellant
,

v

.
STAPLES THE OFFICE SUPERSTORE, LLC
,
Defendant and Respondent

. B2 94 642

Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC 666236

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Yvette M. Palazuelos , Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part

. Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky & Wotkyns, Todd M. Schneider, Car olyn H. Cottrell and David C. Leimbach; Boucher, Raymond P. Boucher, Maria L. Weitz
, Neil M. Larsen and Alexander Gamez for Plaintiff and Appellant

. Morrison & Foerster, Miriam A. Vogel, Tritia M. Murata, David P. Zins and Karen J. Kubin for Defendant and Respondent

.

_________________________2 Plaintiff Von Hildebrandt appeals a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant Staples the Office Superstore, LLC (Staples)

. The trial court determined all of Hildebrandt’s claims were barred by the applicable st atutes of limitations and the pendency of related class action s did not toll the limitations periods. We conclude the trial court erred in applying the class action tolling rules articulated in Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103 ( Jolly )

. Bec ause Hildebrandt concedes his claim for failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements (see Lab. Code, § 226) is time barred, even if tolling applies
, we will affirm the summary adjudication of that claim

. 1 In all other respects the summary judgment is reversed. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND “Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for summary judgment , we take the facts from the record that was before the trial court when it ruled

on that motion. [Citation.] ‘ “ W e review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained. ” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party oppos ing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ( Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc . (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)

1 Staples separately moved for summary adjudicati on of each claim.3

1. The Parties Staples is a global provider of office products and services. Its Superstores are big

- box retail stores catering to individual customers and business clients. By mid

- 2018, Staples operated more than 160 Superstores across California. The g eneral

m anager is the highest

- level manager in a Superstore and the only manager that Staples classif ies as exempt from overtime

pay and meal and rest break requirements. General m anagers are responsible for managing every aspect of a store’s operation. Hildebrandt worked as a salaried g eneral m anager for Staples from April 24, 2000 to June 20, 2013. Du ring his employment, Hildebrandt worked at several Staples locations in California.
2. The Hatgis and Wesson Putative Class Actions On March 11, 2014, Dian n e Hatgis, a former Staples Copy and Print Shop general manger, filed a putative class action

on beha lf of all people employed as general managers at Staples “retail locations” in California. Hatgis asserted claims on behalf of herself and the putative class members for (1) failure to pay overtime compensation (Lab. Code, § 510); (2) failure to authorize and permit rest periods ( id

. , § 226.7); (3) failure to provide meal periods ( id

. , §§ 226.7 & 512); (4) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements ( id

. , § 226); (5) failure to timely pay wages upon termination or resignation ( id

. , § § 201

– 203); an d (6) violation of the unfair competition law (UCL) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200)

. Hatgis premised her claims on the allegation that Staples misclassified its general managers as exempt employees. On July 6 , 2015, the trial court in the Hatgis action grant ed Staples’s motion to limit the putative class to Staples Copy and4

Print Shop general managers only. On October 23, 2015, Hatgis voluntarily dismissed her class claims without prejudice. On September 4, 2015, Fred Wesson, a Staples g eneral

m anager, filed a putative class action against Staples on behalf of all current and former general managers at Staples Superstore retail locations in California who were employed on or after May 10, 2010. Like Hatgis, Wesson assert ed causes of action for (1) failure to pay overtime compensation; (2) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (3) failure to provide meal periods; (4) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements; and (5) violation of the UCL

. He alleged Staples misclassified its Superstore gene ral managers as exempt employees to avoid paying overtime compensation and to avoid providing meal and rest breaks

. On April 17, 2017, the trial court denied Wesson’s motion for class certification, concluding Wesson failed to show that the class claims we re susceptible to common proof and that proceeding as a class action would be superior to other methods of adjudication. 2 The court determined the “great variation in how Staples store general managers perform their jobs and the extent to which they perfo rm nonexempt tasks” would require “highly individualized determinations” regarding each g eneral

m anager’s exempt status.

2 Hildebrandt was one of several general managers who submitted declarations in support of Wesson’s class certification motion . In his declaration, Hildebrandt detailed his job duties and asserted he spent more than 70 percent of his wo rkday performing “the same tasks as hourly employees.”5

3. Hildebrandt’s Lawsuit On June 22, 2017, Hildebrandt filed this action against Staples, asserting the same causes of action that Hatg is and Wesson had pled on behalf of the ir respective putative class es

. Specifically, Hildebrandt’s complaint asserts claims for (1) failure to pay overtime compensation; (2) failure to authorize and permit rest periods; (3) failure to provide meal periods ; (4) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements; (5) failure to pay all wages upon termination; and (6) violation of the UCL

. Like the Hatgis and Wesson complaint s , Hildebrandt allege s Staples misclassified him and other general managers as exe mpt employee s to avoid paying overtime compensation and providing meal and rest breaks. The complaint assert s the applicable statutes of limitations were tolled during the pendency of the Hatgis and Wesson class certification proceeding s

. 4. Staples’s Mot ion for Summary Judgment Staples moved for summary judgment , arguing Hildebrandt’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. Staples’s supporting evidence established that Hildebrandt’s employment ended on June 20, 2013 and that he did not file his lawsuit until June 22, 2017

— outside the longest limitations period of four years. Regarding tolling, Staples argued the Hatgis action could not have tolled the statutes of limitations on Hildebrandt’s claims because Hatgis was a Staples Copy and Print Shop general

manger

— not a Superstore general manager like Hildebrandt. As for the Wesson action, Staples argued the denial of class certification for lack of commonality in Wesson raised a “presumption” against tolling. Staples maintained Hilde brandt could not overcome the presumption because , when the Wesson6

action was filed, Staples had “no way of predicting” which Superstore general managers “would believe themselves to have been deprived of overtime pay and decide to sue.” Staples also

argu ed the denial of class certification in Wesson could not have been “ ‘unforeseeable’ ” to Hildebrandt, since misclassification claims frequently depend on how individual employees perform their jobs. In his opposition , Hildebrandt acknowledged his claims

w ould be time barred without tolling . However, he argued application of the class action tolling doctrine was necessary
to protect the efficiency and economy of the class action device ; otherwise putative class members would be induced to file individual a ctions to avoid the statute of limitations bar, even while class certification proceedings were still pending

. And, because his claims were “nearly identical” to those asserted

on behalf of the class es in Hatgis and Wesson , Hildebrandt argued those putati ve class action s put Staples on notice of the substantive claims and generic identities of potential plaintiffs like him during the applicable limitations periods

. 5. The Order Granting Summary Judgment T he trial court granted Staples’s motion for summary judgment , concluding Hildebrandt’s claims were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and class action tolling did not apply. Relying on Batze v. Safeway, Inc. (20 1 7) 10 Cal.App.5th 440 ( Batze ), the court determined the denial of class certifica tion in Wesson due to lack of commonality gave rise to a “presumption” against tolling. And the court concluded Hildebrandt could not overcome that presumption, as a matter of law, because the evidence showed tolling would be “prejudicial”7

to Staples and the denial of class certification was not “unforeseeable.” Regarding prejudice to Staples, the trial court reasoned the “ discrepancies between the claims of the members of the putative class were ‘ too great for the [ Wesson or Hatgis ] action
to have put [ St aples] on notice that it needed to preserve evidence with respect to every one of its [ Superstore general managers]

. ’ ” Staples, the court determined
, had “no way of predicting which of its Superstore [general managers], including potentially Hildebrandt, managing dissimilar stores at over hundreds of locations statewide[,] would believe they too were misclassified

. ” A nd the court found it would have been “ ‘unrealistic to expect that the filing of the [ Wesson or Hatgis ] action [ ] would have prompted [Sta ples] to maintain all employment records relating to every [Superstore general manager] or to gather evidence and witness statements pertaining to every [Superstore general manager] .’ ” The trial court also found “Hildebrandt fail[ed] to show denial of cla ss certification was unforeseeable.” In support of the finding, the court noted “Hildebrandt was in communication with counsel in Wesson , who is now Hildebrandt’s counsel, and in Wesson class certification was vigorously contested which reflects denial of class certification was not unforeseeable.” The trial court entered judgment for Staples. Hildebrandt filed a timely notice of appeal. DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review On appeal from a summary adjudication, “we review the record de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections8

have been made and sustained.” ( Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) We make “an independent assessment of the correctness of the trial court ’s ruling, applying the same legal standard as the trial court in determining whether there are any genuine issues of material fact or whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ( Iverson v. Muroc Unified School Dist. (1995) 32 C al.App.4th 218, 222.) A defendant is entitled to summary adjudication upon

a showing that a plaintiff’s cause of action has no merit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a) & (f)(1).) The defendant meets this burden with respect to each cause of action by establishing undisputed facts that negate one or more elements of the claim or state a complete defense to the cause of action. ( Id ., subd. (p)(2); Romano v. Rockwell Internat., Inc . (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 487.) Once the defendant has made such a showing , the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or defense. ( Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co . (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853.)
2. The American Pipe Tolling Rule as Adopted in Jolly This appe al presents one issue: Was Hildebrandt entitled, due to the pendency of the Wesson and Hatgis class certification proceedings, to claim the benefit of the class action tolling rule established by the United States Supreme Court in American Pipe & Construc tion Co. v. Utah (1974) 414 U.S. 538 ( American Pipe ), as adopted by our Supreme Court in Jolly , supra, 44 Cal.3d
1103 ? We conclude he was. In Jolly , our Supreme Court summarized the holding of American Pipe as follows : “[U]nder limited circumstances, if class certification is denied, the statute of limitations is tolled9

from the time of commencement of the suit to the time of denial of certification for all purported members of the class who either make timely motions to intervene in the surviving individ ual action [citation], or who timely file their individual actions.” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1119.) The Jolly court identified “ two major policy considerations ” underlying the American Pipe tolling rule: (1) protection of the class action device; and (2) effectuation of the purpose of the statute of limitations. ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1121 .) According to our high court, “ [t] he question to be asked” in determining whether tolling should apply to a n absent class member’s individual claims “ is whether [the former] class action fits the rationale of American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. 538.” ( Ibid .) Regarding the first consideration, the Jolly court explained:

“ In cases where class certification is denied for what the [ American Pipe court ] charact erized as ‘ subtle factors, ’ unforeseeable by class members, a rule that failed to protect putative class members from the statute of limitations after denial of certification would induce potential class members
to ‘ file protective motions to intervene or to join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable, ’ depriving class actions ‘ of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure

. ’ ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1121, quoting American Pipe, supra, 414 U. S. at p. 553 ; see also Crown, Cork & Seal Co. , Inc. v. Parker (1983) 462 U.S. 345, 350

– 351.) Thus,

c ourt s must determine whether tolling will “ serve [ ] to further economy and efficiency of litigation, so as to justify affording plaintiff shelter under the protective umbrella of American Pipe

. ” ( Jolly, at p. 1122.) That determination will often depend on whether the claims asserted on behalf of the putative class were10

sufficiently similar to the absent class members’ individual claims
, so that the absent class members can be found

“ reasonably [to] have relied on the [class action] complaint

as a basis for postponing their own ” actions. ( Id. at p. 1125.) As for the second consideration
, the Jolly court reaffirmed that statutes of limitations promote the “ ‘policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and of barring a plaintiff who has

“ slept on his rights ” ’ ” from bringing a stale claim. ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1121, quoting American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at

p. 554.) Our high court explai ned these policies “ ‘ are satisfied when

. . . a named plaintiff who is found to be representative of a class commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants
not only of the substantive claims being brought against them, but also of the number and gen eric identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment. ’ ” ( Jolly, at

p. 1121, quoting American Pipe, at pp. 554

– 555.) Adequate notice to the defendant is key to ensuring fair application of the tolling rule

. In that regard, the Jolly court emphasized the importance of avoiding a particular abuse that would arise if plaintiffs were

“ ‘ free to raise different or peripheral claims following denial of class status ,’ ” and admonished trial courts to “ ‘ take care to ensure that the [s ubsequent] suit raises claims that “ concern the same evidence, memories, and witnesses as the subject matter of the original class suit, ” so that “ the defendant will
not be prejudiced.” ’ ” ( Jolly, at p. 1124 ; see also id. at p. 1125 [instructing lower co urts to “ exercise discretion in applying the American Pipe rule in order to ‘ prevent the type of abuse mentioned above and [to] preserve a defendant whole against prejudice arising from claims for which he has received no prior notice. ’ ”] .)11 In Jolly , a p plication of the tolling rule satisfied neither underlying policy consideration of American Pipe . ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1122.) The original class action had been filed by Judith Sindell, who sued “on her own behalf and, ‘ with respect to certain relief, ’ on behalf of a class of women allegedly similarly situated. ” ( Id. at p. 1120 ; see Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories (1980) 26 Cal.3d 588 ( Sindell ) .) For herself, individually, Sindell claimed damages for personal injur ies suffered due to her mother ’ s ingestion of DES during pregnancy. 3 ( Jolly, at p. 112 0

. ) For the class, Sindell sought “ only declaratory relief and an order directing defendants to publicize the dangers of DES. ” ( Ibid. ) T he trial court denied certification , citing “l ack of commona lity among class members on issues of proximate cause, extent of injury, and appropriate medical examination or treatment

. ” ( Ibid .) While the certification proceedings were pending, Christine Jolly filed her individual lawsuit for personal injuries

cause d by her mother’s prenatal ingestion of DES. ( Id. at

pp. 1107

– 1108.) Relying on American Pipe , Jolly argued the filing of the class action in Sindell tolled the statute of limitations for individual putative class members until certification was denied. ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1118.) Our Supreme Court rejected the argument, concluding “ the Sindell class action complaint neither sufficiently put defendants on notice of the substance and nature of plaintiff ’ s claims, nor served to further economy

3 DES is the synthetic drug estrogen diethylstilbestrol . It had been prescribed for the prevention of miscarriage s before its association with certain congenital diseases was discovered. (See Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1107.)12

an d efficiency of litigation, so as to justify affording plaintiff shelter under the protective umbrella of American Pipe

. ” ( Id.

, at p. 1122.) Specifically, our high court held the “ same

reasons that render certification of mass

- tort claims generally inapp ropriate render inappropriate the application and extension of American Pipe

. . . to the present case. ” ( Id.

, at p. 1123.) B ecause Sindell had asserted different claims on behalf of the class and because the determination of whether someone suffered inju ry from prenatal exposure to DES implicated myriad factual issues, the Jolly court reasoned Sindell’s class complaint did not put the defendants on notice of Jolly’s substantive claims

or of the generic identities of potential individual plaintiffs like Jo lly . The court explained : “ Because of the nature of the Sindell complaint

— as indicated, Judith Sindell did not seek to certify the class as to personal injury claims, the gravamen of plaintiff ’ s complaint

— and the differences in issues of fact and law

— pla intiff ’ s action for damages puts into issue the prenatal treatment of her mother, the specific form of DES prescribed (e.g., tablet, capsule), the dosage taken, her mother ’ s obstetrical history and many other issues necessarily involved in proving causatio n, damages and defenses

— the Sindell class suit [citation] could not have apprised defendants of plaintiff ’ s substantive claims. Therefore, plaintiff cannot now claim that Sindell ’ s complaint put defendants on notice of allegations related to personal inju ry within the statutory period of limitation so that they might prepare their defense. ” ( Jolly,

supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1123

– 1124.) Likewise, “ because the Sindell complaint did not seek personal injury damages on behalf of the class, ” the Jolly court

reas oned “ even those absent class members who were aware13

of that action could not reasonably have relied on the complaint as a basis for postponing their own personal injury actions. ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1125.) Thus, refusing to extend the tolling rule to Jolly’s personal injury claim would “ not result in duplicative litigation of the sort feared by the court in American Pipe , nor [would] it deprive [the class action device] of its purpose to further the efficiency and economy of litigation .” ( Ibi d .) Having determined the discrepancy in the claims asserted on behalf of the Sindell putative class and in Jolly’s individual complaint precluded application of the American Pipe tolling rule
, the Jolly court remarked that it “ need not address the broader question whether in any personal injury mass

- tort case the filing of a class action complaint can serve to toll the statute of limitations for putative class members when the class ultimately is denied certification for lack of commonality .” ( Jolly, supr a, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1125.) Nevertheless, our Supreme Court offered an admonition for putative class members in such cases: “We observe, however, that because personal

- injury mass

- tort class

- action claims can rarely meet the community of interest requireme nt in that each member’s right to recover depends

on facts peculiar to each particular case, such claims may be presumptively incapable of apprising defendants of ‘ the substantive claims being brought against them ’ [citation],

a prerequisite, in our view, to the application of American Pipe [citation s ]

. This being so, putative class members would be ill advised to rely on the mere filing of a class action complaint
to toll their individual statute of limitations. The presumption, rather, should be to the contrary

— i.e., that lack of commonality will defeat certification and preclude application of the American Pipe tolling doctrine. ” ( Ibid

. )14

3. The Limitations Periods Were Tolled During the Wesson and Hatgis Class Certification Proceedings In declining to apply the tolling rule to Hildebrandt’s claims
, our trial court relied upon Batze , supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
440

. Like our case, Batze considered whether the statute of limitations should have been tolled on claims for unpaid overtime

wages brought by three a ssistant managers of the defendant supermarket after certification of the same unpaid wage claim

on behalf of a putative class of assistant managers was denied for lack of commonality. ( Id. at pp. 445

– 446, 482

– 484.) Ou r colleagues in Division Four “disce rn[ed] no error in the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitations was
not tolled ,” reasoning the denial of certification for lack of commonality gave rise to a presumption against tolling, and the trial court had correctly found applicatio n of the tolling rule would not satisfy the “ ‘two major policy considerations’ ” underlying American Pipe

. 4 ( Batze, at pp. 482

– 484.) As we will discuss , there are inconsistencies between the Batze court’s reasoning and our Supreme Court’s articulation o f these underlying policy considerations in Jolly . Due to those inconsistencies, we cannot follow Batze in this case.

4 The parties commit considerable portions of their briefing to discussing this supposed “presumption” from Jolly. The issue is irrelevant to our disposition of this appeal. The pertinent
passage

— one paragraph appearing at the end of the Jolly opinion

— is dicta. (See Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1125 [observing,

“ In light of our disposition, we need not address the broader question whether in any personal injury mass

- tort case the filing of a class action complaint can se rve to toll the statute of limitations for putative class members when the class ultimately15 The trial court in Batze “ found the discrepancies between the claims of the members of the putative class were ‘ too great for the [former class] action to have put [ the defendant ] on notice that it needed to preserve evidence with respect to every one of its managers and assistant managers, ’ that [the defendant] had no way of predicting which of the thousands of managerial employees holding multiple positions in hundreds of locations would believe themselves to have been deprived of overtime and decide to bring a suit, and that it would have been unrealistic
to expect that the filing of the [former class] action would have prompted [the defe ndant] to maintain all employment records relating to every managerial employee or to gather evidence and witness statements pertaining to every managerial employee

. ”

is denied certification for lack of commonality ” ( italics added ) ].) The passage is a warning to putative class members in “personal injury mass

- tort case[s]” about what their “presumption” should be when considering whether to “rely” on a class action “to toll their individual statute of limitations,” given that “ personal

injury mass

- tort class

- action claims can rarely meet the community of interest requirement .” ( Id. at p. 1125 & fn. 19 [expressing view that “ class actions can rarely be appropriate for resolution of mass tort claims ”]; see also Becker v. McMillin Construction Co . (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1493, 1500 ( Becker ) [recognizing the “presumption” applies only to “ personal injury mass tort cases ”]; Perkin v. San Diego Gas & Elec tric Co

. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 492, 504 ( Perkin ) [same]; cf. Batze, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 482 [ eliding Jolly court’s reference to mass tort claims].) We do not read this passage a s a categorical directive about what a court must presume in assessing the major policy considerations underlying American Pipe in every case in which certification is denied for lack of commonality

.16

( Batze , supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 483.) The Batze court concluded these were appropri ate reasons to refuse tolling, noting the “ evidence presented bore out the [trial] court’s conclusions

. ” ( Id. at p. 484.) Additionally, the court found the “ fact that nearly 200 plaintiffs had already brought individual claims before the class certificat ion was denied [gave] further support to the trial court’s ruling, as it demonstrate [d] that denial of class certification was not unforeseen .” ( Ibid .) We agree with Hildebrandt that the reasons the Batze
court gave for its decision

— reasons adopted by our trial court in refusing to toll the limitations periods on Hildebrandt’s claims

— have no substantive foundation in Jolly or American Pipe. To begin , a s Hildebrandt points out, nothing in Jolly

or American Pipe makes tolling dependent upon whether the defe ndant had “a way of predicting” which absent class member

“ would believe themselves ” injured and “ decide to bring a suit .” ( Batze , supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p p . 483

– 484 .) Indeed, that sort of factual inquiry into what the defendant could have predicted ab out what an absent class member might have believed is plainly improper under Jolly and American Pipe , which require the trial court to focus on the class action pleading to determine whether the defendant had adequate notice sufficient to effectuate the p urpose of the statute of limitations. ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1121; American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at pp. 554

– 555 ; see also Perkin
, supra , 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 498

– 500 [trial court made improper “finding of fact” regarding defendant’s “knowledge of the boundaries” of a fire perimeter in determining if tolling applied ] .) In contrast to the factual inquiry embraced in Batze
, Jolly and American Pipe require only that the original class action17

complaint “ ‘ notifies the defendants

. . . of the substant ive claims being brought against them, [and] of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment. ’ ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1121, quoting American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at pp. 554

– 555 , italics added .) As long as the pleading provides this notice
, there is no further requirement that the defendant also be able to predict which of the potential plaintiffs will decide to bring suit

. (See Becker

, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1501 [where “identity and nu mber of potential claimants [was] ascertainable to a significant degree” from original class action complaint
, this “was adequate to give the required notice
, ” even though some claimants inevitably would not bring suit ] ; cf. Perkin, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 507 [where “potential plaintiffs were not limited to a set number from a specific, clearly defined area,” and could have included anyone

“ in California claiming that their properties were damaged in some way ” by fire, class action complaint did not p rovide adequate notice].) Jolly provides an instructive contrast to our case and to Batze

. In Jolly , the defendant could not possibly have discern ed from the Sindell complaint the number and generic identities of potential plaintiffs who might participate in the class action judgment. The complaint defined the putative class as female residents of California “ ‘who ha ve been exposed to DES before birth and who

. . . have or may have contracted or in the future may contract adenocarcinoma or vaginal or cer vical adenosis

or precancerous tumors of the breast or cancer of the bladder. ’ ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1120.) As Jolly recognizes , e ven if the defendant could identify all pregnant women who were administered DES in California during the relevan t period
,18

an individualized assessment of “ the specific form of DES prescribed (e.g., tablet, capsule), the dosage taken, [each] mother ’ s obstetrical history and many other issues necessarily involved in proving causation , damages and defenses ” would be re quired to ascertain which of their daughters actually had

a significant exposure to DES before birth and which of those

women had contracted or might contract the ailments listed in Sindell ’s class definition. ( Jolly
, at p. 1123.) No such inquiry is requ ired here. Unlike in Jolly
, there is no reasonable dispute that Staples

was readily able to determine the number and generic identity of all potential plaintiffs who might have participated in the Wesson or Hatgis class action judgment , and Staples could do this without a n individualized assessment of intervening factors related to causation, damages, or even its affirmative defense. The Wesson class was defined as “[a]ll current and former employees of [Staples] employed as General Managers at Staples S uperstore retail locations in California [on or after] May 10,
2010

. ” 5 Although the trial court in Wesson found Staples’s

5 The Hatgis class was defined as “All persons employ ed by Defendants as General Managers at Staples retail locations in the State of California between March 11, 2014 and the date class certification is granted.” (Italics added.) Staples argues Hatgis could not have given it notice because “ Hatgis did not

even involve Superstore [general managers], the position [Hildebrandt] held.” The record is to the contrary. Although the trial court in Hatgis limited the class to only Staples Copy and Print Shop general managers more than a year after Hatgis filed he r complaint, during the relevant tolling period, the class19

exemption defense required individualized inquiries that precluded class certification, Staples nevertheless admits it could identify each and every member of the proposed class. Under American Pipe and Jolly , nothing more was required. (See Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1121; American Pipe, supra,
414 U.S. at pp. 554

– 555.) Notwithstanding its admission , Staples argues it “cannot be t he law” that it was required to preserve evidence relevant
to the claims of every Superstore general manager in California “simply because a class action was filed.” The Batze court and our trial court likewise concluded “ it would have been unrealistic
to expect that the filing of the [former class] action would have prompted [the defendant] to maintain all employment records relating to every managerial employee or to gather evidence and witness statements pertaining to every managerial employee

. ” ( Batze , supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p p . 483

– 484 .) But neither American Pipe nor Jolly identified the burden of preserving evidence as a basis to refuse tolling. On the contrary, these controlling authorities were concerned with only the prejudice that would arise if defendants did not receive adequate notice of

definition did include Superstore general managers like Hildebrandt. Staples also argues tolling premised on Hatgis is barred under Fierro v. Landry’s Restaurant Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 276

. But Fierro only held that “ American Pipe tolling does not apply to any later class claims .” ( Fierro, at p. 291.) Hildebrandt argues his individual claims

— specifically, his individual claim for failure to pay wages upon termination

— were tolled during the pendency of the Hatgis class certification proceedings. Fierro is inapposite.20

the substantive claims and generic identity of potential plaintiffs

“ within the statutory period of limitation so that they might prepare their defense. ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1123

– 1124 ; American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 562 .) Part of preparing a defense is preserving and gathering evidence relevant to a claim. As discussed, the Wesson and Hatgis complaint s put Staples on notice that it faced Labor Code and UCL violation claims stemming from its blanket classification of all general managers as exempt employees and alleged failure to pay required wages . And Staples admits the class definition s allowed it to identify all the potential plaintiffs who might assert those claims within the statut ory period of limitations

. Staples therefore had sufficient notice to allow it to gather and preserve evidence in preparing its defense. (See Becker, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p p . 1501

– 1502 [where former class action made the defendant “ ‘aware of the nee d to preserve evidence and witnesses respecting the claims of all the members of the class ,’ ” lack of commonality was “ not fatal
to the existence of an adequate degree of notice to the defendant for purposes of applying the tolling rule ” ( italics added ) ]. ) While the burden placed on a defendant to preserve evidence is not a relevant consideration, the burden placed on the courts is

. The relevant policy consideration is “protection of the class action device ”

— specifically, “ ‘the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure .’ ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1121, 1125, italics added .) When the trial court addressed this policy consideration, it concluded Hildebrandt could not have reasonably relied upon certification of the Wesson class because Hildebrandt was “in communication with counsel in Wesson ” and class certification21

was “vigorously contested

. ” These facts, the trial court reasoned, “reflect[ed] denial of class certification was not unforeseeable.” The Batze court similarly found the plaintiffs could not have reasonably relied on the former class action in waiting to file their claims because “ nearly 200 plaintiffs had already brought individual claims before the class certification was denied .” ( Batze, supr a, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 484.) Neither of these

reasons is consistent with the relevant policy consideration. As Hildebrandt points out, nothing in American Pipe or Jolly suggests we should consider whether class certification

was “vigorously contested” or whether absent class members

“ had already brought ” protective individual actions in assessing whether tolling is necessary to protect the class action device

. Instead, American Pipe and Jolly hold that tolling during class proceedings is necessary becaus e , without a tolling rule , class members would be “ induce [ d ] ” to “ ‘ file protective motions to intervene ’ ” thereby “ depriving class actions ‘of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure. ’ ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 C al.3d at pp. 1121, 1125, italics added.) Again, Jolly provide s an instructive contrast. In evaluating whether application of the tolling rule was necessary to protect the class action device, our Supreme Court did not focus on the individualized evidence that would be necessary to prove Jolly’s claims . Nor did our high court consider whether Jolly should have known certification of the Sindell class would be denied for lack of commonality. Rather, the court’s analysis turned on the difference between the claims asserted in the class action and in Jolly’s individual action, and whether it was reasonable for Jolly to postpone bringing her action in light of that difference. The22

Jolly court explained: “[B]ecause the Sindell complaint did not seek personal injury damages on behalf of the class , even those absent class members who were aware of that action could not reasonably have relied on the complaint as a basis for postponing their own personal injury actions

. ” ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at

p. 1125 , itali cs added .) And, because the claims were different
, the Jolly court held declining to apply the class action tolling rule would “ not result in duplicative litigation of the sort feared by the court in American Pipe , nor [would] it deprive [the class action device] of its purpose to further the efficiency and economy of litigation.” ( Ibid. , citing American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at

p. 553

. ) Staples does not dispute that Hildebrandt asserted the same Labor Code and UCL violations that the Wesson and Hatgis complaints asserted on behalf of the ir respective putative class es

. A comparison of the complaints also confirms Hildebrandt and Wesson based their claims on the same underlying allegation that Staples misclassified its general managers as exempt employee s despite requiring them to spend over 50 percent of their working hours performing duties delegated to non

- exempt employees. Likewise, Hildebrandt asserted the same claim for failure to pay wages upon termination that Hatgis asserted on behalf of the put ative class in her case

. And, unlike mass tort personal injury claims, these misclassification and unpaid wage claims are not presumptively unsuitable for class treatment. (Cf. Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1126, fn. 19 [“class actions can rarely be appr opriate for resolution of mass tort claims ”]; Duran v. U.S. Bank National Assn. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1, 37

– 38 [“A class action trial may determine that an employer is liable to an entire class for misclassification if it is shown that the employer had a23

consi stently applied policy or uniform job requirements

. ” ]; Martinez v. Joe’s Crab Shack Holdings (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 362, 380 [misclassification claim seeking unpaid overtime wages on behalf of managerial employees of rest aura nt chain was amenable to common proof where “parties ha[d] identified a finite task list, suggesting that jobs

. . . were ‘highly standardized’ ”]; Jaimez v. Daiohs USA, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1286, 1301 [common legal and factual issues predominated misclassification claims for unp aid overtime, meal and rest break violations, and wage statement violations] .) Thus, under Jolly , Hildebrandt could “reasonably have relied on the [ Wesson and Hatgis ] complaint [ s ] as a basis for postponing ” the filing of his own claims

. ( Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1125.) Were we to hold the limitations periods on these claims were not tolled during a class certification proceeding in which the same claims were asserted on behalf of Hildebrandt as a member of the putative class, there is little doubt ou r holding would induce absent class members in future misclassification

case s to file protective individual actions for fear their claims might be time barred , thus depriving the class action of the efficiency and economy of litigation that is its principa l purpose. ( Jolly, at p. 1121; American Pipe, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 553.) The Wesson and Hatgis complaints gave Staples adequate notice of Hildebrandt’s potential claims. There is no prejudice
to Staples. Tolling is therefore appropriate, and the stat ute of limitations must give way to the stronger consideration: protection of the class action device. (Cf. Jolly, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 1123

– 1124 [prejudice to defendant is “alone sufficient” to deny tolling relief]; see Becker, supra, 226 Cal.App.3d at p. 1502 [application of tolling rule was “fair” where the defendant ha d24

adequate notice of claims and generic identity of claimants, thus “equitable principles” underlying tolling rule prevailed

over statute of limitations] .) With the exception of the claim for failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements , the trial court erred in ruling Hildebrandt’s claims were time barred. DISPOSITION The summary adjudication of Hildebrandt’s claim for failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements is affirmed

. In all other respects the summary judgment is reversed. Hildebrandt is awarded costs

.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN
, Acting P. J.

DHANIDINA , J.