This version includes the e rrata dated 7Jul03-e
UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR VE TER AN S CL AI M S

N O . 98-354
R I C HAR D D. S I MMONS , A PP EL L ANT ,

V
. ANTHONY J. P RI NCI PI , S EC RE T A RY O F V ET ER A N S A FF A I RS , A PPEL L EE
.

On Ap pe a l f ro m th e B oa

rd of Ve te ra ns ' Ap pe a ls
(De cided June 4, 2003 )

Kenneth M. Carpenter , o f T op e ka , K ans a s, wa s o n th e ple a din g s f or the a pp e lla nt.
Tim S. Mc Cla in , G e ne ra l Co un se l; R. Rand all Cam pb e ll , A ssi sta

nt G e ne ra l Co un se l; Thomas A. Mc Lau gh lin , Special Assistant to the Assistant Gener al Counsel; and Crist ine D. Sense man , a ll of Washington, D.C., we re on the pleading s for the a ppellee.
Be fore FARL EY, STEI

NB ERG, and GREENE, Judges

. STEI NB ERG, Judge : The appe llant, vetera n Richard D. Simm ons, throug h counsel, see ks revie w o f a J anuar

y 1998 Boa

rd of Ve tera

ns' Appea ls (Boa

rd or B VA) de cision that denied a s l e g a l l y i n s u f

f i c i e n ta c l a i m o f c l e ar an d u n m i s t a k a b l e e r r o r

( C U E ) i nanA p r i l 1 9 7 7 d e c i s i o nb y a Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Affa irs (VA) reg ional office (RO) that had denied VAservice connec tion fo r a rt hr iti s and a ne rv ou s d iso rd e r. Re c or d ( R.) a t 3. Th e re le va nt fi lin g s o f t

he pa rt ie s, a lon g wi th the protra cted pr ocedur al history of this case , will be detailed b elow. F or the re asons that follow, the Court will vacate the B oard de cision and re mand the matter

.

I. Re le va nt Bac kgr ound2

Th e ve te ra

n ser ve d in the U. S. Navy fr om No ve mbe r 196 8 to J anu ary 19 70

. R. at 14 . H is service medical r ecor ds (SMRs) reported that he h ad s uffe red f rom depre ssion (R. at 23, 27) but

c on ta ine d no ind ic a tio n of his ha vin g in- se rv ic e art

hr iti s ( see R. at 17 -3 2) . AF e br ua ry 19 72 pr ivate ho sp ita lizatio n d isc ha

rg e repo rt no te d th a t th e ve te ra

n h a d c omp la ine d o f " art

hr iti s o f l arg e joi nts si nce 1 2/ 20 /7 1"; he was dia gnos ed as havi ng "[ p] ol y art hri ti s, pro bab ly rheu mat oi d, ser on egati ve". R. at 34. I n September 1972, the veter an filed with the VARO an application for VAcompensation

or pension based on arthritis. R. at 38-42. He submitted a pr ivate medica l rec ord, date d September 1972, that descr ibed t reatment on "D ece mber 20, 1971, [for] painful swelling . . . nea r the rig ht sacro iliac [sic] joint." R. at 45. I n November 1972, a VA e x amining phy sician diag nosed the ve tera n as having " [p ]o lyarthr it is , c a u s e u n d e te r

mi n e d "

. R. a t 6 2

. T h e RO in D e c e mb e r 1 9 7 2 aw ar d e d the vet er an non-service -conne cted pe nsion benefits for his arthritis, effe ctive De cembe r 1971. R. at 67-68. I n Jun e 19 74 , th e ve te ra

n fi le d a c la im fo r VA se rv ic e c on ne c tio n f or rh e umatoi d a

rt hr iti s; h e a s s e rt e d

t h a th i s art h r i t i s w a s a

" d i r e c tr e s u l to f

h i s m e n t a l d e p r e s s i o ni ns e r v i c e
. " R

. a t8 0

. In J uly 1974, he subm itted, inter alia, an April 1974 private hospitaliz ation summary , which diag nosed "[r]heumatoid arthritis, serone g ative" . R. at 86. An Aug ust 1974 V A psy chiatric examination report noted the vete ran' s acc oun t t h at he had "de veloped r heumatoid ar

thritis in December

1971" a nd dia g no se d " [a]n xi ety re a c tio n w ithde pr e ssi ve fe a tur e s, mod e rate on ly , s e c on da ry to a rt hr iti s
c on dit ion ." R. at 12 3. Th e RO in S e pte mbe r 1 97 4 d e nie d th e ve te ra n' s " re op e ne d c la im" be c a us e his arthritis and anxiety

rea ction "w er e not incurr ed in or a g g ravated by his period of military [service;] nor [was] it shown that he had a rthritis manifested within the first y ear following service ." R. at 128-29. I n November

1974, the veter an subm i t t ed a letter from Dr . Her ion, a private phy sician,

s t at i n g: On the basis of information contained in [m] edica l [ r]ecords

cover ing [ the veteran' s] illness while i n the Unit ed States Navy from Au g us t 19 68 to Janu ary

19 70 , it is r e a so na

ble to p re su me t hat his illness t hen, which a

ppear ed as me ntal depre ssion, was the same a s that prese nting a s poly arthritis when I saw him in Fe bruar y 1972. . . . The brie f interva l betwee n his discharg e fr om t h e m ilitary and the3 onset of his poly arthritis would, Ibelieve, make it likely t h at M r. Simm o n s [' ] c h r o n ic d is e a s e w a s p r e s e n t e v e n w h il e h e w a s in the U n i t e d S t a t e s N a v y. R. at 14 9. I n D e c e mbe r 1 97 4, the RO c on fi rm e d it s e arl ie r d e nia l of se rv ic e c on ne c tio n f

or art hr iti s; the RO c on c lud e d: " Dr . H e ri on ' s st a te me nt pr ov ide s no bas is to est a bli shthat r

he umatoi d a

rt hr iti s dev el o p edd

u ri n g [ t h e v et er an 's ] ac t i v e m i l i t ary s er v i ce o r w i t h i nt h e [ o n e- ] y ea r pre sumpti[ on] period following separ ation from ser vice." R. at 156. I n April 1977, the vete ran submitted to the RO a private medical rec ord from Dr . For d that

con tai neda May

19 70 di agnos is of "[ a] rt hri ti s (t y pe u nd ete r m i ned ) . . . [ andn] ervo us anx iet y ". R. at 182. L ater

that month, the RO confirmed its prior denial of both c laims. R. at 184. I n May 1977, the RO notified the veteran of its decision i n a letter that stated: " Dr. F ord' s statement provides

no bas is to est abl is h serv ice con nect io n for art hri ti s an d n ervo us con di ti on ." Ibid. Th e ve te ra n d id not appea l to the Boa

rd any of the a bove RO dec isions. I n Se pte mbe r 1 99 4, the ve te ra n f ile d a c la im a sse rtin g CU E a s to that Apr il 1 97 7 RO decision

. R. a t 3 1 6

. I t is u n c le ar w h e th e r th e RO in 1 9 7 7 r e o p e n e d th e v e te r an ' s c la ims a nd then denied them on the me rits o r wh et h er t h e R O denied the veter an' s attempt to reopen a s to the previously

disallowed cla ims. For th e p urposes of this dec ision, the Court need not dec ide that question, beca u s e, pursuant to Cri pp e n v . B ro wn , " it d oe s n ot m a tte r w he the r a pa rt ic ula r R O de c isi on wa s o r w a s n ot a

me ri ts a dju dic a tio n, be c aus e th e di sp ositio n o f t he CU E c la im w ou ld ul ti mat ely

tu rn o n t he s ame qu est io n. " Crippen , 9 Vet.App. 412, 421 (1996) (stating that in either

sc e na ri o th e c la ima

nt mus t e sta

bli sh that the me ri ts " wo uld have ' manif e stl y ' be e n c ha

ng e d" and a lso qu o t i n g Ma so n (

Sa ng e rn e tta

) v . B ro wn , 8 Ve t

. Ap p . 44, 52 (1995)) . I n J uly 1995, the veter an submitt ed a statement in which he a sserted that in April 1977 he had been entitled to a pre sumption of ser vice c onnection under

38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a) (3). R. at 339. In Fe bruar y 1995, the RO denied h i s C U E c h a l l e n g e
. R

. a t 3 4 6

- 4 8

. T h e v e t e r an t i m e l y a p p e a l e d t o t h e B o ar d

. R

. a t3 5 1 , 3 5 9

- 6 0

. In the J anuar

y 1998 BV A decision here on appea l, the B oard de nied the vete ran' s CUE claim. R. at 3. The a ppellant filed his brief in this case in January 1999, and in April 1999 the Sec reta ry filed

a mot ion fo r s ing le -j ud g e a ff

ir manc e . In O c tob e r 1 99 9, the Court ord ered the p art ie s to fi le

su pp le me nta l me mor and a

a s to the op ini on

of the U. S. Cou rt of App e a ls f or the F e de ra l Cir c uit4

(F eder al C ircuit) in Ha

y re v . W est , 1 88 F .3 d 1 32 7 ( F e d. Cir . 1 99 9) . T he a pp e lla nt f ile d h is

s u p p l em en t al m em orandum in Nove mber 19 9 9 , an d t h e S ec re t ary

fi l edh i s re s p o n s e t o t h e ap p el l an t 's supplemental memorandum in F ebrua ry 2000. On Aug ust 30, 2000, a panel of the Court issued an opinion in this case af

firming the J anuar

y 1998 Boa

rd dec ision. Sim mo ns v . W est , 14 Vet.App. 84, 91-92 (2000). The Court enter ed it s judgme nt on September 21, 2000. On Novembe r 13, 2000, the Court r e c a ll e d it s ju d g me n t, n o ti n g th a t th e e n a c tm e n t o f th e V e te r an s Cl a im s A s s is ta n c e Act of 2000, P u b

. L . No. 106-475, 114 Stat. 2096 (Nov. 9, 2000) (VCAA) , may aff ect the disposition of many appea ls under its jurisdiction. On De ce m

b er 5 , 2 0 0 0 , t h e ap p el l an t , t h ro u g h co u n s el , fi l eda m o t i o nt o v ac at e t h e C o u rt 's Aug ust 30, 2000, opinion. On Dece mber 21, 2000, the Court or dere d the parties to f ile supplemental b ri ef s ad dressing the ef

fec t of the cha

ng es in law e nacte d in the VCAA. Sim m o n s v
. P r in cipi , 14 Vet.App. 226 ( 2000) (p er c uriam orde r). In J anuar y 2001, the Court also order ed that the appellant' s motion t o vacate the August 30, 2000, opinion be held in abey ance pending rec eipt of the supplemental brief

s. Simmons v. Principi , No. 98-354, 2001 WL122226 (Ve t. App. J an. 31, 2001) (p e r c ur iam or de r) . O n Apr il 5 , 2 00 1, the Se c re tary fi le d a re sp on se in w hic h h e a sse rt e d th a t a

rem an d o f t he matter s on appea l was re quired pursua nt to Holliday v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 280 (2001), in orde r for

the ca se to be rea djudicated in lig ht of the enac tment of the VCAA. The Court construed the Secre tary ' s response a s a m otion for remand. On August 31, 2001, the C ourt revoke d a Jul y 13, 2000, order that had subm itted this appea l to a panel for a decision and r eturne d the matter to the single judge for disposition. On September

10, 2001, in a si ng le-judg e order, the Court vacated the B oard de cision and

rema nded the matter s for re adjudication in ac corda nce w ith the Secre tary 's u n o pposed, construe d motion. Simmons v. Principi , No. 98-354, 2001 WL1167536, at *2 (Ve t. App. Sept. 10, 2001). On that same date, howeve r, the Sec reta ry (1) f iled an opposed motio n to withdraw his April 2001 response and the c onstrued motion for re mand, (2) move d t o fi l e a s u bstitut e re sponse that he appende d to his mot ion, and (3) f urther move d fo r re i nstatement of the Court' s September 2000 judgme n t , based on the Court's opinion in Livesay v . Principi , 15 Vet.App. 165 ( 2001) (e n banc) (ho lding that VCAAdoes not apply to CUE claim as to prior B VA dec ision), of the judg ment of aff irmance

.5

On September

17, 2001, the appe llant filed, throug h counsel, a motion for clar ification of the Court ' s Augus t 31 , 2 00 1, or de r. He no te d, a mon g oth e r thi ng s, that the Court ha d n ot r ule d o n h is motion to vacate the pa

nel opinion o f Au gu s t 3 0 , 2 000. Motion at 2. He also inquired w hether , g iven the sig nificant c hang es in the law r epre sented by this Court's opi nion in Livesay, supra, and opinions of t he F eder al Circuit in Roberson v. Princ ipi , 251 F.3d 1378 (F ed. Cir. 2001) , and Cook v. Principi , 258 F.3d 1311 (F ed. Cir. 2001) [hereinaf ter Cook I ], op ini on with drawn , 275 F.3d 1365 (F ed. Cir. 2002) [hereinaf

ter Cook II

], t he par ties would be provided a

n opportunity

for suppleme ntal briefing

. Ib id

. On September

19, 2001, the appe llant filed a re sponse in oppositi on to the Secre tary ' s motion to file a substitut ed response. He asserted that the holding in Livesay is not dispositi ve of the CUE claim in this case be cause Livesayinvolved the asser tion of CUE as to a B oard de cision u n der 38 U.S.C. § 7111, wherea s this case involves CUE as to a n RO decision, which is g overne d by 38 U.S.C. § 5109A and 38 C.F.R. § 3.105 (2002). Response (Resp.) at 1-2. Additionally , he noted that the Court' s opinion in Livesaysupports a re mand in this case of the issue of the nonf

inality of the 1977 RO dec ision based on g rave proce dural e rror . Resp. at 2. See Hay re v . W est , 188 F.3d 13 27 , 1 33 3 ( F e d. Cir . 1 99 9) ; see also Cook I , su pra . On Oc t o b er 1 , 2 001, the Secr etar y filed a motion for rec onsideration o f, o r, in the alter native, for

a pane l decision repla cing , the September 10, 2001, single -judg e orde r. I n a Ju n e 7 , 2 0 0 2 , p e r c u r ia m o r d e r , th e Co u rt ( 1 ) s u a s p o n te w it h dr e w th e Se p te mber 10, 2 0 0 1 , o rd er ; (2 ) s u

b m i t t edt h e m at t er

t o t h e i n s t an tp an el ; (3 ) s u a s p o n t e w i t h dre w t h e C o u rt 's Aug ust 30, 2000, panel opinion; (4) d en i ed the Secreta ry ' s motion t o withdraw his Apr il 5, 2001, response and to substitut e his September 30, 2001, response , but acc epted the September 2001 filing as a suppleme ntal response ; and (5) or dere d the appe llant to file a supplemental memor andum addre ssing the Sec reta

ry ' s September 2001 suppleme ntal response , as we ll a s t he ef fec t, if any , of t h e o p i n i ons in Roberson , Ha y re , and Livesay , a ll su

pra , a s w e ll a s D is a b le d

A m e r ic a n V

e te rans v. Gobe r , 234 F.3d 682, 704 (F ed.Cir. 2001) [ here inafter DAV v. G ober ], cert. de nied , 532 U.S. 973 (2001), on this matter. Simmons v. Principi , 16 Vet.App. 153, 155 ( 2002) (pe r cur iam order ). The a ppellant filed a

supplemental memora

ndum on J une 24, 2002. The rein, he argues (1) that unde r Livesay , the VCAA wa s inapplicable to his cas e (S u p p l emental Me morandum6

(M e m.) a t 2) bu t th a t " Livesayis appl ic abl e reg ardingthe question of dea l i n g with the ' g rave proce dural e rror ' alleg ation made by the [a] ppellant in this matter" (Mem. at 10) ; (2) that the F eder al Circuit's holding in DAV v. G ober that a c a se a sse rt ingCU E a s to a pr ior fi na l B oa rd de c isi on sh ou ld be dismissed rather

than denied w here the appe llant's a rg ument s fail to comply

with specificpleadingrequire ments for CUE c laims, DAV v. G ober , 234 F.3d at 699, should be expanded to ca ses
a lle g ingCU E a s to a pri or fi nal RO de c isi on (M e m. a t 2) ; ( 3) tha

t Roberson , 251 F.3d at 1384, require s the Court to rema nd his c ase to the Boa

rd with instructions to remand the c ase to the RO, in order to a ddress whether the A pril 1977 RO decision complied with the duty to assist (Mem. at 5- 6) ; and (4 ) t hat Ha y re should require a re mand in this case, but that "the parties and this Court may be well serve d if the proce eding s in this matter we re stay ed pendingthe en ba nc dec ision in Cook " (Mem. at 10)

. The Sec reta

ry responde d to the appellant' s supplemental memora ndum on September 23, 2002. There in, the Secre tary reque sts a stay

of proc eeding s pending the outcome of Cook II , su pr a (R e sp on se (R e sp .) a t 1) , a nd argue s ( 1) that Livesay , 1 5 Ve t

. Ap p
. at 1 7 6 , s u p p o rt s t h e S ec re t ary 's position i n this case a

nd does not requir e a r emand f or consideration of an asser ted "g rievous [sic] pr oc e dura l e rr or " (R e sp . at 4) ; ( 2) that Roberson , su pr a , should be narr owly

construed a

nd does not dictate a rema nd in this case (Resp. at 5-7); and (3) that the Court should aff irm the instant Boa

rd d e c i s i o n , b e c a

u s e " [a ] d e n i a l o r

t e r m i n a t i o nu n d e r

s u c h c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d n o tb e a

me ri ts deter mination, and wo uld not preclude a later CUE attack on the same RO dec ision" (Resp. at 8). The ap p el l ant filed on Oc tober 3, 2002, his re ply to the Secre tary ' s response. H e re iterate s the arguments from his supplemental m em o ra n d u m , and notes that he did not object to a stay of p ro ce ed ings pe nding the outcome of Cook II , su pra . R e p l y a t 1

- 7

. O n N o v e mb e r 1 3 , 2 0 02 , th is matter wa s stay ed pendingthe outcome of Cook II , su pra . On Dec ember

20, 2002, t h e Fe d er al Circuit issued its opini on in Cook v. Principi , 318 F.3d 1334 ( Fe d. Cir. 2002) [hereinaf ter Cook III

]. On J an u ary

10, 2003, the appe llant filed a motion to s tay

proce eding s pending a dec ision by the U.S. Supreme Court on a petiti on for a writ of

cer tiorari, which his counsel, who was also counse l in Cook , contemplated f iling in Cook III

, su pr a . On Fe bruar

y 11, 2003, the Court dissolved the November 13, 2002, stay of proc eeding s and denie d the appe llant's D ece mber 20, 2002, motion to stay proce eding s any

further

.7 II. Ana lys is A. V CAA I n Livesay , this Court held t hat t he VCAA was inapplicable t o a C UE claim as t o a prior f inal B o a rd decision. L i vesay , 15 Vet.App. at 178. Also, in Parker v . Principi , w e he ld, in a c a se inv olv inga

CU E cla im as to a pr ior

fi na l ROdecision, that the Sec reta ry ' s VCAA re mand motion "ha s no merit following this Court's dec ision in Livesay ." Parker , 1 5 V e t.A pp . 4 07 , 4 12 (2 00 2) ; see also Juarez v. Princ ipi , 1 6 Ve t

. Ap p
. 5 1 8 , 5 2 1 (2 0 0 2 ) ( p er cu ri am o rd er ) ( ci t i n g Parker as " holding VCAA inapplica

ble to c laim that RO decision contained CUE")

. Henc e, the Court will not further discuss this is sue. B. G ra v e -P ro c e dural-

Err or Cla im The a ppellant, in his supplemental memorandum, re lies on Ha y re and Livesay , both su

pr a , to support his contention that this m atter should be rema nded on the basis that a " g rave proce dural

e rr or " wa s c omm itt e d d

ur ingthe a dju dic a tio n o f h is c la im. Me m. at 10

. Th e F e de ra l Circ uit re c e ntl y held in Cook III that the finalit y of a VA decision could not be vit iated by a " g rave proce dural e rror " on the par t of VA. Cook 318 F.3d at 1341 (overr uling holding of Hayre

, supra, that f

ina lity of RO decision was v i t i at ed whe n VA committed " g rave proce dural e rror " by failing to obtain service medical recor ds reque sted sever al times by appellant) . I n Cook III

, the asser ted " g rave proce dural

err or" was a

n RO' s failure to provide the ve tera n with a prope r medica l examination. Ib id

. Simi larly , in the i nstant case , the appellant has arg ued that "V A' s failure to obtain a compre hensive medical e valuation to deter mine whether

the 10% threshold under 38 C.F.R. § 3.30[7] (a) [(1976)] had b ee n m et constituted a bre ach of its duty to assist" and that "[u]nder Ha y re [, su pra ], t he appellant' s 1977 claim to e ntitlement to service [-] connec ted arthritis should b e c o n s idere d unadjudicate d or nonfinal." Nov. 1999 Mem. at 2. B eca use a ne arly

identical ar g ument was re jected by the Fe dera l Circuit in Cook III , the Court holds in this case that the appellant' s asser tion that he

wa s n ot p ro vid e d a

" c omp re he ns ive me dic a l e va lua tio n" c ann ot, a s a ma tte r of law, se rv e to v iti a te the finality

of the Apr il 1977 BVA de cision. Cook III , supra.8 C. Roberson De v e lop ment The a ppellant ar g ues the followingas to Roberson , su pra : The [a]ppellan two u l d

as s er tt h at t h e F ed er al C i rc u it's de cision in Roberson requires that this ma tte r be re mand e d to the B oa rd wi th instructions to rema

nd to the [R O] for readjudication of the [ a] p p el l an t ' s cl ai m o f V AR O C UE i nl i gh to f t h e F ed er al C i rc u i t 's de c isi on re g ard ingthe sta

nd ard to be uti lize d in the re vie w of c la ims of CUE. . . .
I n the instant matter, the Boar d should be instructed by the Court to ins tr uc t the [RO] to det e rm ine wh e the r the Ap ri l 19 77 [RO d]ecision fu lly developed the [a]p p el lant' s claims for se rvice connec tion for ar

thritis and a ner

vous condition before deciding it on the merits. Specific ally , whethe r t h e [R O] had fu lly developed wh e the r t

he re we re sy

mptom s or ma

nif e statio ns of

a c hr on ic condition of rheumatoid art hritis during the presumpti[on] period provided in 38 C.F.R. § 3.307(a )(3)

. Mem. at 5-6 ( emphasis in orig inal). I n Roberson , the Fe dera l Circ uit he ld that if a veter an submits evidenc e o f a m ed ical disability for whic h he is then aw arde d service connec tion, makes a cl ai m for the hig hest rating po ssi ble , a

nd su bmi ts e vid e nc e of

un e mpl oy a

bil ity , as had th e ve te ra

n in that c a se , th e n V A mus t consider a

rating of total disability based upon individual unemploy ability (TDIU), e ven if not specific ally

reque sted by

the veter an. Roberson , 251 F.3d at 1382-85. The F eder al Circuit stated: I n Ho dg e v . W

est , 155 F.3d 1356 (F ed. Cir. 1998), we . . . deter mined that Congr ess has mandated th at

. . . VA is " to fully and sy mpathetically

develop the ve tera

n' s claim to its op t i mum before decidingit on the merits." We see no basis fo r ap p l y i n g a diffe rent standard to a

CUE claim, and we hold that

. . . [] VA is thus require d to consider a

CUE claim using the standar d of Hodge

. Roberson , 251 F.3d at 1384. Th e a pp e lla nt' s Roberson arguments appea r to rely on the Fe dera l Circuit's stateme nt that the "sta ndar d o f Hodge " should a pply to CUE claims. Howeve r, in Lane v. Principi , this Court explained the limit ed application of Roberson , w hic h " inv olv e d a sit uatio n w he re the F e de ra l Cir c uit applied the Hodge standard in a ddressing the CUE deter mination that was befor e it in order to find

a n d r e qu ir e dev elo pm ent of a n on -C UE cl aim th at w as s ti ll op en an d p end in g befor e VA. " Lane ,9

16 Vet.App. 78, 86- 87 (2002). The Court went on to hold that "be cause . . . the appe llant has not

r a i s e d an y ar g u m e n ta s t o a

p e n d i n g n o n - C U E c l a i m , an y Hodge sta nd ard of de ve lop me nt i s in app li cabl e." Id

. at 87. Fur thermore , the Fe dera l Circuit, in Cook III , stated that " [i ]n Roberson , a cr itical issue was whether, in addre ssing Rober son' s claim that there was CUE a s to the 1984 rating d e c is io n , . . . V A an d th e [C o u rt o f A p p e a ls f o r V e te r an s Cl a im s ] h a d

e r r e d b y f a il in g to r e c o g n iz e th at i n h is ori ginal cla im , R ob ers on has so ught [ TDI U] ." Cook III , 318 F.3d at 1347. I n the instant case , the appellant has neither raised nor

asser ted that he ha d soug ht TDI U at the tim e of his or ig ina l Ap ri l 19 77 RO de c isi on
. F ur the rm or e , the re are no pe nd ingno n- CU E c la ims related to that RO decision; the onl y arguments raised by

the appe llant in that respec t, i.e., asser tions that his claim is nonfinal due to a " g rave proce dural e rror ", w ere reje cted in part I I .B., a bove. There fore , as we held in Lane , " an y Hodge standard of development" and Roberson are ina pp lic a ble to this case. Lan e, s up ra . D. CU E Cla im 1. Relevant Law An RO dec ision that has become f inal, as had the April 1977 RO decision, g ener ally may not b e r e v e r s e d o r a me n d e d in th e a b s ence of CUE. See 38 U.S.C. § 5109A (codify ing into law V A

re g ulatio n 3 8 C. F .R. § 3 .1 05 (a )) ; 38 C.F .R. § 3 .1 05 (a ) ( 19 97 ); se e als o 38 U.S.C. §§ 5108, 7105(c) ;
c f. 38 U.S.C. § 5110(i) (20 0 2 ) (p roviding that when pr eviously disallowed cla im is reopened a nd

a llo we d on ba sis of ne w an d mat e ri a l evi de nc e in f or m of se rv ic e de pa

rtme nt r e c or ds , e ff

e c tiv e date is date such disallowe d claim was f iled). VAre g ulator

y § 3 .1 05 (a ) p ro vid e s: Where e vidence establishes [C UE ] , t he prior de cision will be reve rsed or

amende d. For

the purpose of

authorizin g b en ef

its, the rating or other a djudicative dec ision which const i tutes a re versa l of a prior de cision on the g rounds of [CUE] has the same eff ect as if the corr ecte d decision had b ee n m ade on the date of the re verse d decision.
38 C.F .R. § 3 .1 05 (a ) ( 20 02 ). Th e CU E c lai m pre se nte d h e re is a c oll a te ra l a tta c k o n a

fi na l RO decision. See Crippen , 9 Ve t.A pp . at 41 8; se e als o F

ugo v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 40, 44 ( 1993).10

I n Russell v. Principi , th e Court de fi ne d CU E a s f

oll ow s: Either the c orre ct fa cts, as they wer e known at the time, were not befor e the adjudicator or the statutory or re g ulatory

provisions ex tant at the time wer e incor

rec tly applied.

. . . [C UE is] t he sort of e rror which, ha d it not been made, w ould have manif estly chang ed the outcome . . . [, an err or that is] undebatable, so that it can be s aid that rea sonable minds could onl y conclude that the orig inal decision wa s fata lly flawe d at the time it was made

. Ru sse ll , 3 Ve t.A

pp . 3 10 , 3 13 -1 4 ( 19 92 ) ( e n b anc ); se e als o Bu sto s v. W est , 179 F.3d 1378, 1380 (F ed. Cir. 1999) (e x pressly adopting the " manifestly cha n ged t h e outcome" languag e in Ru sse ll , su pra ), cert. de nied , 528 U.S. 967 (1999). " A deter mination that there wa s a ' [C UE]' must be base d

on th e reco rd and th e law th at ex is ted at th e ti me of the p ri or .
. . deci si on ." Id. at 314. "I n order for there to be a valid claim of [C UE], . . . [ t] he cla imant, in short, must asser t more than a

disag ree ment as to ho w the facts were weighe d o r eva lu ate d. " Id . at 313; se e als o Da mr e l v . B ro wn , 6 Vet.App. 242 (1994). More over , a CUE motion must i dentify the alleg ed er

ror( s) with "some deg ree of sp eci fi cit y ." Crippen , 9 Ve t.A pp . at 42 0; Fugo , 6 Ve t.A

pp . at 44 (" to r a ise CU E the re mus t be so me de g re e of sp e c if ic ity a s to wh a t th e a lle g e d e rr or is a nd

. . . pe rs ua siv e re a so ns mus t be g ive n a s to why the re sult would have bee n ma nif estl ydiffer ent" ). On appea l of a B VA dete rmination that there was no CUE a s to a prior fina l RO decision, the Court's revie w is limited to de termining whether the Boa rd' s conclusion is "a

rbitrar y , capr icious, an abuse of discre tion, or otherwise not in ac corda nce with law" , 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(3) (A), a nd whether

it is supported by

an ade q uate state ment of "r easons or

b as es ", 3 8 U. S

. C. § 7104(d)(1)

. See Be y rlev . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A

pp . 2 4 ( 19 96 ); se e als o Dobbin v. Principi , 15 Vet.App. 323, 326 ( 2001); Ed dy v . B ro wn , 9 Ve t.A

pp . 52, 57 (1 99 6) ; Damrel , 6 V e t.A pp . at 24 6; Ru sse ll , 3 Vet.App. at 315.

2. Preclusive Eff

ect of Board Denial I n DAV v. G ober , su

pra , th e F e de ra l Cir c uit a dd re sse d a VAre g ulat ion , 3 8 C. F .R. § 20.1404(b) (2000), that pr ovided as follows re g ardinga CUE cla im collatera lly attackinga prior final dec ision of the Boa

rd: (b) Specific allegations required . T he mot ion mus t se t f or th clea rly and spec ifically

the alleg ed cle ar a

nd unm i s t ak ab le er

ror, or e rr or s, of fa c t or law in th e B oa

rd de c isi on , th e le g a l or

fa c tua l ba sis fo r s uc h a lle g a tio ns , a

nd wh y the re su lt w ou ld have be e n ma nif e stl y11 differ ent but for the a lleg ed err or. Non-spec ific alleg ations of fa ilure to follow regulations or failure to give due proc ess, or a ny other g ener al, non-spec ific alleg atio n s o f e r r o r , a re insuff icient to satisfy

the re qu ir e me nt o f t

he pr e vio us se nte nc e
. Mo tio ns wh ic h fa il t o c omp ly with the require ments set forth in this parag raph shall be denied. 38 C.F.R. § 20.1404(b) (2000) (emphasis added)

. The Fede ral Ci rcuit not ed that the denial of a CUE claim under

§ 20.1404(b) ( 2000) would be a "f inal decision" under this Court' s opinion in Ru sse ll , 3 Vet.App. at 315. DAV v. Gobe r , 234 F.3d at 698. The F eder al Circuit further noted that, pursuant to 38 C.F.R. § 20.1409(c) ( 2000), once there is a final decision on a CUE claim on a par ticular issue, the prior B oard de cision being collater ally attacke d "' on that issue is no longe r subj ec t t o revision on the grounds of [C UE]'" , and "' [s] ubsequent mot ions relating to that prior B oard de cision on that is su e sh all be d is mi ss ed w it h prej ud ice .'" DAV v. G ober , 2 34 F .3 d at 69 8 ( qu oti ng38 C.F .R. § 20.1409(c) (2 0 0 0 )). The Fe dera l Circuit then rea d § 20.1404(b) a nd § 20.1404(c) toge ther a nd

c on c lud e d: [These para g raphs] operate tog ether to insulate from CUE re view any issue in a prior B oard de cision that was the subjec t of a CUE motion th a t w a s f o u n d to be d e f e c ti v e f o r an y o f th e r e a s o n s s e t f

o rth in [§ 20.]1404(b). C o n s eq u ently , the B oard de cision on the issue the claimant attempted to c halleng e in the def ective CUE motion is not subject to revision due to CUE. See 3 8 C. F

. R. § 2 0

. 1 4 0 9 ( c ) [( 2 0 0 0 ) ].

DAV v. G ober , 2 34 F .3 d a t 69 8. Af te r no tin g the 38 U. S.C. § 7 11 1( e ) r e qu ir e me nt t hat CU E c la ims be adjudicated " on the merits" , the Fe dera l Circuit concluded:

[R e g u lato r

y § 2 0

. ]1 4 0 4 ( b ) ' s r e qu ir e me n t t h a t a c la im ant specify the basis for his CUE claim is r easona ble.

. . . VA is corr ect that Congr ess direc ted t he Board to promulg ate rules to require CUE claims to be plea d with specificity in or der to " make c onsideration of a p p e a ls r a is in g [C U E ] l e s s b u r d e n s o me
. " H

. R. [R EP .] No. 105-52, at 3. At the same time, how ever , as just expl ained, the e ffe ct of the last sentence o f [§ 20.] 1404(b), in conjunc tion with [ § 20.]1409(c), is to shield fr om CUE revie w any issue that is the subject of a CUE motion that is "de nied" beca use the motion does not c omply with the pleadingrequire ments of [§ 20.] 1404(b). As a result, t he Board ma

y never decide a par

ticular CUE claim "on the merits," as re quired by 3 8 U

. S. C. § 7 1 1 1 ( e ) , n o t b e c a u s e th e c la im an t f

a il e d to e s ta blish, su bs tanti ve ly , h is C UE c la im, bu t, r a the r, be c a us e of ple a din g de fe c ts12 in the motion in which the claim is first advanc ed. F or this rea son, we b el i eve that [ § 20.]1404(b), in the manner it oper ates in tande m wi th [§ 20 .]14 09 (c ), is c on tr ary to t he re qu ir e me nt o f 3 8 U .S. C. § 7 1 1 1 ( e ) th a t t

he Board d e c id e a

CU E c la im

o nth e me r it s
. We the re fo re ho ld, a s it op erate s w ith[§ 20 .]14 09 (c ), [§ 20 .]14 04 (b ) i s invalid.
DAV v. G ober , 234 F.3d at 699. Subsequent to the Fe dera l Circuit's opinion in DAV v. G ober , the Se c r e ta r y a me n d e d § 2 0

. 1 4 0 4 ( b ) in 6 6 F e d

. Re g
. 3 5 , 9 0 3 ( Ju ly 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 )

. T h e la s t s e n te n c e of § 2 0. 14 04 (b ) n owre a ds : " Mo tions whi ch fail to c omp ly wi th t he re qu ir e me nts se t f

or th i n th is pa ra g ra phsh a ll b e dis mis se d w ith ou t pr e judi ce to r e fi lin g un de r t his su bp art ." 38 C.F .R. § 20.1404(b) ( 2002). I n the instant case , the appe llant broug ht a claim of CUE as t o the April 1977 RO dec ision. R. at 9. The B oard, in its J anuar y 1998 decision under

revie w, discussed the Fugo specific -plea ding require ments for CUE c laims and conc luded t hat "the appellant's claim of CUE . . . must be denied as leg ally insufficient." R. at 10. I n Fugo , this Court determined that the appel l ant had "not

re a so na bly ra ise d .

. . CU E" be c a

us e he ha d " fa ll[e n] f

ar s ho rt of a lle g ingthe kin d o f e rr or

that c ou ld be conside red CUE" by failing to g ive "some deg ree of specific ity as to w hat the alleg ed er ror is and . . . persua sive rea sons . . . as to why the re sult would have bee n ma nif e stl ydiffer ent but for the all eged erro r." Fugo , 6 Vet.App. at 43-44. He re , th e a

pp e lla nt' s c la im of CU E a s to a pr ior fi na l RO de c isi on wa s denied

by the B oard, rathe r than simply

not adjudicated, a s in Fugo

. R. at 12. Fur thermore , this denial appea rs to have be e n b a se d o n th e " le g a l in su ff ic ie n[c y ]" of the a

pp e lla nt' s c la im. R. a t 10 . Purs ua nt t o 3 8 U .S. C. § 5109A(e ), a r equest for

revision of a

n RO decision on t he basis of CUE "shall be submitted to the Secre tary and sh al l be dec ide d in the

sa me manne r a s a ny

oth e r c lai

m ." 38 U .S.C. § 5109A(e) (e mph a sis a dd e d) . A lth ou g h s e c tio n 5 10 9Ado es no t con ta in a statut or y pr ov isi on

pe rt a ini ngto

re vie w o f C UE c la ims a s to a pr ior fi na l RO decision that is di re c tly ana log ou s to 38 U. S.C. § 7111(e) ' s require ment that the B oard de cide a CUE claim "on the m erits" , it would be incong ruous to conclude that Congre ss intended to require one class of CUE claims to r ece ive scrutiny "on the merits", but wa s content to allow anothe r cla ss of CUE claims, s u ch as t h e ap pellant' s, to be prec lusively

denied mer ely beca

use it failed to mee t pleading specific ations. Cf. Juarez , 16 Vet.App.13

at 5 2 0 -2 1 (c h ar ac t er i z i n g Parker , su pra , as holding "V CAA inapplicable to c laim that RO decision contained CUE" ). Moreove r, the Court notes that claims for be nefits ar e not subject to pre clusive denial by the B oard f

or plea ding insuff

iciencie s. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 5102(b) (providing that, in event of inc omp le te a

pp lic a tio n, VA sh a ll " no tif y the c la ima

nt

. . . o f t he inf or ma tio n n e c e ssa

ry to c omp le te t h e a p p l i c a t i o n " ) , 7 1 0 5 ( d ) ( 5 ) ( " [ t ] h e B o ar d

. . . m ay dis miss any a

pp e a l wh ic h f

a ils to a lle g e sp e c if

ic

erro r of f a c t or law i n th e de te rm inatio n b e inga pp e a le d" (e mph a sis a dd e d) ); see also 3 8 U. S.C. §§ 5108 (providing that previously and fina lly

disallowed cla ims may

be re opened upon pr esentation of newand mater ial evidenc e), 7266( a) ( providing for f iling Notice of Appeal (NOA ) t o this Court to appea l "f

inal" B oard de cisions). Additionally , we note that, in the VCAA, Cong ress e liminated the we l l -gr o u nded-c laim provision from section 5107(a ). See H olliday , 14 Vet.App. at 284-85. Although this provision wa s t ec h n ically a substantive, rather than a pleading , require ment, see Cal uz a v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A pp . 4 98 , 5 06 (1 99 5) , d e nia l f or fa ilure to s ub mit

a we ll- g ro un de d c la im

co u l d be viewe d as beingakin to denial for a plea ding insuff

iciency

. See Nolen v . Gober , 22 2 F .3 d 1 35 6, 13 60 (F e d. Cir . 2 00 0) (n oti ngthat " the we ll[- ]g ro un de d c la im re qu ir e me nt se rv e s a

' g ateke eping ' function in the cla ims process – if the veter an prese nts a well[-] g rounded c laim to the RO , th a t tr ig g e rs the DV A' s st a tut or y du ty to a ssi st the ve te ra

n in pe rf e c tin g the c la im" ). He nc e , it is releva nt for our pur

poses her e to note that to t he ex tent that this requireme nt could be construe d

a s a ple a din g re qu ir e me nt, no t on ly did Con g re ss i n th e VC AAre pe a l th e we ll- g ro un de d- c la im provision, but it also st atutorily vitiated for a

set period of time be fore the ena ctment of the V CAA the re s judicata e ffe ct of fina l denials for la ck of w ell g roundedne ss under pre -VCAA se ction 51 07 (a ). VC AA§ 7 (b )( 1) , ( 2) ; see H olliday , 14 Vet.App. at 285. I n revie wing BV A decisions on CUE claims, under 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) this Court has " the power to affir m, modify , or reverse a decision of t he Board, or to rema nd the matter." This Court does not, howeve r, af

fi rm the denial of a claim wher e the appe llant has failed to c omply with the p le a d in g r e qu ir e me n ts o f th e Co u rt; th e r e me dy in s u c h c a s e s is a d is missal. See U. S. V ET
. A PP
. R. 31(b) (" I f an a

ppellant fa ils to file a brief within the t ime provided by this rule, .

. . the C ourt, on its own initiative or on motion by the S ecr etar y , may take a ppropriate action, to include dism issal of the a ppeal." ). (Such dismiss als are without prejudice , but the prac tical ef fec t of such a dismissal may prec lude t he refiling of an a ppeal. See 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a) (providing that NOA must be filed14

within 120 day s after

the date on w hich notice of the appe aled B oard de cision is mailed).) The ref ore,
we c onclude that section 5109A(e )' s statement that such case s "sha ll be decide d in the same manne r
a s any oth e r c la im" is the fu

nc tio na l e qu iva le nt o f se c tio n 711 1( e )' s re qu ir e me nt that the B oa rd mus t deci de C UE cl aim s "on th e me ri ts ". As s t at ed ab o v e, the F eder al Circuit, in DAV v. G ober , 234 F.3d at 699, held that a CUE

c la im a s to a p r io r f

in a l B o ar d d e c is io n c o uld not be d en ied for f ailure to mee t pleading require ments, and, indee d, the Secre tary in curre nt § 20.1404(b) has a ddresse d this concer n in the

c on te xt of

CU E c la ims a s to a

pr ior fi na l Boa rd

decision. In the instant case, howe ver, it appe ars that the a pp e lla nt' s CU E c la ims a s to a

pr ior fi na l ROdecision may

have be en denied

for its failure to meet t h e plea ding r equire ments as set out in Fugo , su pra . See p ar tI I

. D. 3

. , b el o w. Al t h o u gh nothing in DAV v. G ober

calls into question Fugo ' s sp e c if ic -p le a din g re qu ir e me nts fo r C UE c la ims , the Fe dera l C i rc u i t 's opinion does make c lear that CUE asser

tions that fail to satisfy

pleading require ments must be dism issed with out preju dice to refiling, an d may

not be denied. DAV v. G ober , su

pra . G ive n th e fu

nc tio na l e qu iva le nc e of

se c tio n 5 10 9A (e ) t o s e c tio n 7 11 1( e ) i n terms of mandating a

decision on the mer its of a CUE claim, whether asser ted as to RO decisions or B oard de cisions, allowing a CUE claim as to a prior

final RO dec ision to be denied rather than dismiss ed without prejudice w ould run counter to the holding of DAV v. G ober , su pra . I ndeed, suc h

a re su lt w ou ld p ro du c e the " abs urd re su lt" of tr e a tin g dis pa

ra te ly tho se c la ima

nts c oll a te ra lly attacking RO decisions and those claimants collaterally attacking BV A dec isions. See U nited States v. X-Citeme nt Video, Inc. , 5 13 U. S. 6 4, 68 -6 9 ( 19 94 ); Gree n v. Boc k Laundry Mac h. Co. , 49 0 U .S. 50 4, 50 9 ( 19 89 ); United States v. Am. Truck ing Ass' ns, Inc ., 310 U.S. 534, 5 4 3 (1 9 40); A ll e n ( W il li a m ) v
. Principi , 2 37 F .3 d 1 36 8, 13 75 -7 6 ( F e d. Cir . 2 00 1) ; Timex V.I., I nc. v. U nited States , 157 F.3d 879, 886 ( Fe d. Cir. 1998); Thayer v. Princ ipi , 15 Vet.App. 204, 210 ( 2001); Holliday v. Principi , 14 Vet.App. 280, 285 (2001) ( citing pr ece dent re g ardingneed to avoid absurd

re su lt w he n in te rp re tin g statut e ); Cottl e v. Principi , 1 4 Ve t.A pp . 3 29 , 3 34 (2 00 1) ; Fa us t v . W est , 13 Ve t.A pp . 3 42 , 3 50 (2 00 0) ; Tril le s v . W est , 1 3 V e t.A

pp . 3 14 , 3 24 (2 00 0) (e n b anc) ; Da v e np or t

v . B ro wn , 7 Ve t.A

pp . 4 76 , 4 83 -8 4 ( 19 95 ); Gardner v. De rwinski , 1 V e t

. A p p
. 5 8 4 , 5 8 7 ( 1 9 9 1 )

. In

or de r to a vo id su c h a

bs ur d re su lts , we thu s ho ld t hat, t o th e e xten t th a t Fugo or any oth e r c a se of

thi s Court can be rea d to hold that it is permissible to de ny , rathe r than dismiss without prejudice, a CUE15

claim as to a pr ior final R O decision beca use an appellant failed t o meet pleading spe cifications, such

o p i n i o n s h a v e b e e no v e r

r u l e d b y DAV v. G ober , su

pra . Fo l l o wi n g DAV v. G ober , the proper re medy fo r t he B oa rd , w he n c on fr on te d w ithan in a de qu a te ly ple a d CU E c la im, wh e the r t hat c la im collater ally

attacks a Boa rd dec ision, see 38 C.F.R. 20.1404(b) ( 2002), or a n RO decision, see 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) , is to dism iss that challeng e without prejudice

. Ac c or din g ly , to the e xten t that the B oa rd de c isi on on

a pp e a l de nie d th e c la im p re c lus ive ly basedon ple ading insufficienc ies, that denial must be set aside as contra ry to section 5109A(e ) and DAV v. G ober , su

pra . Th is br ing s us to the langua g e of the Janu ary 19 98 B VAde c isi on

on a pp e a l. 3. Reasons or B ases I t is a we ll- e sta bli sh e d p ri nc ipl e that a Board de c isi on mus t be wr itt e n w ith" re a so na ble clar ity ". G ilb e r t v

. D erwinski , 1 Vet .App . 4 9, 57 (1 99 0) . A s n ote d a bo ve , th e B oa

rd in t his c a se denied the ap p el l ant' s CUE motion on t he g rounds that it was " leg ally insufficient" . R. at 10. Howeve r, it is not clear w hether the B oard' s denial wa s based on a pleadinginsufficienc y

u nder Fugo , su pra , o r w h et h er

t h e B o ar d at t em p t ed , ra t h er

i n ex ac t l y , t o ad dre s s t h e m er i t s o f t h e ap p el l an t 's CU E m oti on. I nd eed, the B oa rd de c isi on in t his c a se is, a s w e de sc ri be d th e B oa rd de c isi on in L ua llen v . B ro wn , w hic h a lso a dd re sse d a n a lle g a tio n o f C UE fr om a pr ior fi na l RO de c isi on , "a

mo del of i mp reci si on ." Luallen , 8 Vet.App. 92, 95 ( 1995). In Luallen , the Court deter mined that the " imprecision" of the Boa rd decision was "of littl e signific ance ", beca use the Court there aff

irmed the B oard de ci s i o n
. Ibid. I n li g ht o f t he a bo ve dis c us sio n, ho we ve r, we c ann ot r e a c h th e same conclu s i o n here . I ndeed, the "impre cision" of the B oard de cision on appea l could lead to two diverg ent results, i.e., dismiss al without pr ejudice (if the basis of the decisi o n wa s a p l eading insufficienc y

) or denial (if the basis of the de cision was the mer its of the CUE alleg ation), depe nding upon the interpre tation give n to that "impre cision". I two u l d b e p u re s p ec u l at i o nfo r u s t o co n cl u d e t h at t h e B o ar d d i d n o td en y t h e ap p el l an t 's

c la im o n the ba sis of

a ple a din g ins uf

fi c ie nc y . Rathe r, be c a

us e the B oa

rd may we ll h a ve pr e c lus ive ly denied the c laim on the basis of a ple ading insufficienc y , we must vac ate the B oard de cision and

rema nd the m atter for compli ance with section 5109A(e ) and DAV v. G ober , su pra . T o d o o the rw ise would be unjust to the appellant be cause it would place him in what mig ht be construe d as a res judicata position beca

use of a n ambig uity

in the Boa

rd' s decision. As we ex plained in Gi lbe rt :16

" Th e se [B oa

rd ] de c isi on s must c ont

ain c le ar ana ly

sis and suc c inc t bu t c omple te

e xp lan ations . A bare c on c lus or

y state me nt, wi tho ut b oth

su pp or tin g ana ly sis and

e xplanatio n, is n e ith e r h e lpf ul t o the veter an, nor ' clea

r enoug h to permit eff

ective judicial revie w' , nor in compliance with statutory requ ir eme nt s. " Gi lbe rt , su pra (e mp h as i s ad d ed ) ( qu o t i n g I nt'l Lo n g s h o r e m e n 's A s s o c
. v
. Na t' l Medic ation Bd. , 8 70 F .2 d 7 33 , 7 35 (D .C. Cir . 1 98 9) ); see also 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)( 1). On re mand, the B oa rd wi ll b e min df

ul t hat if the ba sis fo r t

he B oa rd ' s deci si on is a

fa ilure of the a pp e lla nt t o p l e a d C U E w i t h t h e s p e c i f

i c i t y r e qu i r e d

b y Fugo , su

pra , the re medy

is dismi ssal without prejudice, not denial. Fur

thermore , if the Boa

rd adjudicate s the appellant' s CUE claims on the meri ts , it mus t provide a statement of the r easons or bases for that decision that is adequate to enable the appe llant to understand the pr ecise basis for that de cision and to fac ilitate reviewin this C ourt s h o u l d that claim be de nied. See 38 U. S.C. § 7 10 4( d) (1 ); Gi lbe rt , su pra .

III. Conclusi on On the basis of the above a naly sis, the Court vacate s the J anuar y 1998 Boa

rd dec ision and

rema nds the matter f

or issuance of a rea djudicated decision supported by an adequate statement of

rea sons or bases, see 38 U. S.C. §§ 11 10 , 7 10 4( a ), (d )( 1) ; 38 U. S.C. § 5 10 9A (e ); D A V v. Gobe r , su pra ; Fletche r v. De rwinski , 1 Ve t.A pp . 3 94 , 3 97 (1991), a ll c on sis te nt w iththi s o pin ion , a nd in

a c c o r d an c e w i t h s e c t i o n3 0 2 o f t h e V e t e r an s ' B e n e f i t s Im p r o v e m e n t s A c to f

1 9 9 4 ( V B IA ) , P u

b

. L. No . 1 03 -4 46 , § 30 2, 10 8 St a t. 464 5, 46 58 (f ound a t 38 U.S. C. § 5101 no te ) (r e qu ir ing Se c re tary to p r o v id e f o r " e xp e d it io u s tr e a tm e n t" f o r c la im s r e ma

n d e d b y B V A o r th e Court); se e Va rg

as Gonzalez v. Principi , 1 5 V e t.A pp . 2 22 , 2 25 -3 0 ( 20 01 ) ( ho ldi ngthat V B I A § 30 2 a pp lie s to a ll elements of a

claim rema

nded by Court or Boa

rd), a nd with all applicable la

w and r eg ulation. See Allday , 7 Vet.App. at 533-34. On remand, t he appellant will be free to submi t additional evidence and arg ument on the re manded c laim in accor dance with Kut sc he ro us k yv . W est , 12 Vet.App. 369, 372-7 3 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ( p e r

c u r ia m o r d e r ) ( c o n c lu d in g th at a p p e ll an t i s e n ti tl e d , u n ti l 9 0 d ay s a f te r B o ard

ma ils po str e mand

no tic e to a

pp e lla nt, to s ub mit

a dd iti on a l e vi dence , a s a pp ro pr ia te to c la im i n question, and ar g ument or to reque st hearingon appea l, at which appe llant may submit new evidenc e and ar g ument), and the Boa rd is require d to consider a ny such evide nce an d ar gu m ent. See Kay v. Principi , 16 Vet.App

. 5 2 9 , 5 34 (2002). A r emand by this Court or by

the B oard c onfer s on an17

appellant the r ight to VA c ompliance wi th the terms of the r emand or der a nd imposes on the Secre tary a conc omitant duty

to ensure c ompliance wi t h those terms. Se e Ste ga ll v . W

est , 11 Vet.App. 268, 271 (1998). A final de cision by the B oard f

ollowing the r emand he rein orde red will constitut e a new decision that, if adver se, may be appe aled to this Court only upon the filing of

a new NOA with the Court not later than 120 day s afte r the date on which notice of the B oard' s new final dec ision is m ailed to the appe llant. Se e Ma rsh v . W est , 11 Vet.App. 468, 472 ( 1998). VACATED A

ND REMANDED

.