Pursuant to Feder al Rule of Appellate Pr ocedure 43(c) (2), Attorne y General Mic hael B. * Muka sey is a uto m ati cal ly s ub sti tut ed

fo r f orm er A tto rne y G en era l A lbe rto R. Go nz ale s as res po nd en t in

thi s ca se. 1 06- 023 8- ag W a l a v . Muka s ey
UNITED STA TES COU RT OF AP PEALS FOR THE SECOND CI RC UI T August Term, 2006 (Argued: May 4, 2007 Deci ded: December 12, 2007 Am ended: January 30, 2008) Do ck et N o. 06 -02 38 -ag

_____________________________________________

MARCIN WALA, Pe tit ion er , – v. – MICHAEL B. MUK

ASEY, ATTORN EY GENE RAL,

* Respondent
.

____________________________________________ Before: CALABRESI, POOLER and SOTOMAYO R, Ci rcu it J ud ges .

____________________________________________ Marcin Wala (“Wala”) petit ions for review of an orderof the Board of Imm igrati on Ap pe als (“B IA ”) a ff

irm ing the de cis ion

of the Imm igr ati on

Ju dg e (“ IJ” ) or de rin g h im rem ov ed on the gro un ds that hi s co nv ict ion fo r th ird -de gre e b urg lar

y, in v iol ati on

of Co nn . G en . S tat
. section 53a- 103, was a crime involving moral turpit ude (“CIMT”) wit hin the meaning of 8 U. S. C. § 1 18 2(a )(2 )(A )(i )(I ). W e h old that al tho ug h th e IJan d B IApro pe rlyco nc lud ed that W ala pled t o a burglary wit h the intent to comm it lar ceny, it was improper for the BIA to have inf err ed fr om the ple a co llo quy th at W ala int en de d a

lar ceny o ff

en se i nv olv ing a p erm an en t, rathe r th ana te m

po rar y, tak ing of

pro pe rtyfo r th e p urp os e o f d ete rm ini ng wh eth er W ala co mm itt ed

a C IMT . W e V AC AT E the BI A’ s re m ov al o rde r an d REM AN D f or f urt he r proceedings c onsistentwith this opi nion.2

Judge CALABRESI concurs in a s eparate opi nion.

____________________________________________

JUSTIN CON LON (Michael Boyle, on thebr ief ), North Haven, Connecticut , for pe tit ion er . SA ND RAS. GL OV ER , A ssi stant Unit ed St ate s Attorney, (William J. Nardini, on thebr ief ), for Kevin J. O’Connor, United Stat es Attorney for the Di str ict of Co nn ect icut, N ewHave n, Co nn ect icut, for respondent
. SOTOMAY OR, Circuit Judge : Marcin Wala (“Wala”) petit ions for review of an orderof the Board of Imm igrati on Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the decisi on of Immigration Judge (“IJ ”) Michae l Straus or dering him rem oved on the grounds t hat his convi ction for thir d-degree bur glary, in vi olation of Connecticut Gener al Statut es secti on 53a-103 (the “ burglary st atute”) , was a crime involving moral turpitude (“ CIMT”) within t he meaning of 8 U.S .C. § 1182(a)(2)( A)(i)(I ). In re Ma rci n Wal a , No. A44 514 700 (B.I.A. Dec. 27, 2005), aff ’g No. A44 514 700 (Imm ig. Ct. Hartford, Co nn . Aug . 4 , 2 00 4). W e h old that al tho ug h th e IJan d B IApro pe rlyco nc lud ed that W ala

ple d to a burgl ary wi th t he int en t to co mm it l arc eny, it w as i m pro pe r f or t he BI A t o h av e in fe rre d from the plea col loquy that Wala intended a larceny offense involvi ng a permanent, rather t han a temporary, taking of propert y for the purpose of deter mining whether W ala comm itted a CIM T. W e V AC AT E the BI A’ s re m ov al o rde r an d REM AN D f or f urt he r pr oc eed ing s co ns ist en t w ith this opini on. BACKGROUND I. The Criminal Convicti on W ala, a cit izen of Poland, was admitted to the Unit ed States i n 1994 as a lawfulW ala was charge d with violat ing ConnecticutGeneral Stat utes sect ion 53a-172, 1 “Failure t o appear in t he first degre e,” as a res ult of his failure to appear i n court on July 20, 20 02 , whil e o n b ail , to an sw er the cri m ina l cha rge s ar isi ng fr om

the burgl ary

inc ide nt. 3 permanent resident. On August 7, 2002, W ala pled gui lty in the Superior Court of Fair field, Connecticut t o two counts of burglary i n the thir d degree, in vi olation of Conn. Gen. Stat. sect ion 53a-103, and one count of failur e to appear i n the first degr ee, in viola tion of section 53a -172. 1 W ala was also c harged with two count s of larceny and one count of credit car d theft arisi ng from the sam e in cid en t, b ut t

he pro sec uto r enter ed

a no lle pros eq ui fo r th os e ch arg es. Durin g W ala ’s ple a co llo quy, the pro sec uto r re cit ed the fo llo wi ng fa ctu al b asi s f or t he ple a: On Ju ly 8 , 2 00 1 s om eo ne rep ort ed to t he Gr eenwi chPo lic e D ep artm ent th at whil e th at pe rso n w as away o n v acatio n f rom June 30 , 2 00 1 to Ju ly 7 , 2 00 1 p eo ple en ter ed he r home and stole cash and jewelr y, as well as a c redit ca rd. Police i nvestigat ed and the owne r ha d w ork ers at h er h ou se. Th is d ef en dant w as o ne of

the tw o w ork ers . T he Po lic e spoke to the defendant ’s co-workerand the defendant admitted that on t wo occasions th ey we ntin to th e v ic ti m’s ho us e a ndto ok it ems fr om t he vi ct im’ s h ou se . T he fi rs t t ime the y to ok tw o ri ng s. Th e se co nd

tim e th eytoo k o ff

ici al j ew elr

y and the ne xt t im e a f

irs t union credit card and two watches . The co-defendant sai d that thi s defendant, the code fe nd an t, and

a th ird pe rso n c om

m itt ed tho se c rim es. Th e st ate jud ge the n q

ue sti on ed W ala ab out th e v olu

ntarin ess of

his ple a an d h is sat isf act ion wi th h is l aw ye r’s advic e. Th e ju dg e al so inf orm ed W ala of the rig hts he wo uld fo rf eit as a res ult of his adm iss ion

of gu ilt
. Th e f

oll ow ing ex ch an ge oc curre d: THE COU RT: . . . The State’s Att orney rela ted cert ain facts, which he al leged occurr ed. Is that whatyou did? I s that what you ar e guilty of? MR . WAL A: Ye s si r. THE COU RT: Pleading guilt y because you are guilty? MR . WAL A: Ye s si r. The judge further advi sed Wala of the possible imm igrati on consequences of his pl ea and, pursuant to t he terms of the plea agreement, imposed concurrent s uspended sentenc es of five years of imprisonment and three years of probat ion for all count s of the convicti on.4 II. Immi gration Proceedings W ala was serve d with a Notice t o Appear (“NTA”) on July 7, 2003. The NTA alleged, inter a lia , th at W ala

ap pli ed fo r ad m iss ion as a ret urn ing law fu l pe rm an en t re sid en t at Ne wark Airport on June 13, 2003, a nd that he had pr eviously been c onvicted of two counts of thir dde gre e b urg lar

y und er C onne cti cut law. Th e N TAch arg ed W ala wi th r em ov ab ili ty u

nd er 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i )(I), whic h authorize s the removal of “any alien convi cted of, or who adm its havin g c om

m itt ed , o r w ho adm its co mm itt ing act s w hic h c on sti tut e th e es sentia l el em en ts of . . . a crime involving moral turpitude.” In January 2004, Wala submitted a writt en motion to terminate his removal proceedi ngs on the ground that his convict ions did not qual ify as CIMTs. In a decisi on dated August 4, 2004, the IJ deni ed Wala’s m otion and order ed him rem oved on the basis of his burglary convi ctions. Th e IJhe ld t

hat th e b urg lar

y s tat ute is d ivi sib le b eca

us e it cri m ina liz es o ff

en ses that m ayor m ay not be consider ed CIMTs. On the ba sis of

thi s d ivi sib ili ty f

ind ing , th e IJco ns ult ed

W ala ’s record of convict ion to deter mine the underlying cri me W ala inte nded to comm it when he
en ter ed the vic tim ’s h ou se, an d c on clu de d th at W ala int en de d to co mm it l arc eny, wh ich the IJ found to be a CIMT. Having found W ala removable on this ba sis, the I J declined t o reach the qu est ion of wh eth er W ala ’s c onvic tio n f or f ail ure to a pp ear in s tat e co urt

ind ep en de ntl y q

ua lif ied
as a rem ov ab le o ff

en se. W ala timely appeale d the IJ’s decision t o the BIA, which affirmed the IJ’s decisi on, stating: Based upon our revie w of the record, we find that t he factual findings of the Imm igrati on Judge are not c learly e rroneous and we adoptand affirm the thorough and well- reasoned deci sion of the Imm igrati on Judge. Matter of Burbano , 2 0 I& N D ec. 87 2, 87 4 (B IA19 94 ) (n oti ng that ad op tio n o r af fi rm an ce5

of a decision of an Imm igrati on Judge, in whole or i n part, is “ simply a statement that th e B oa

rd’ s co nc lus ion s u

po n re vie w o f t

he rec ord co inc ide wi th t

ho se whic h the Imm igr ati on

Ju dg e ar tic ulated in h is o r he r de cis ion ”); seege ne ra lly 8 C.F.R. § 1 00 3. 1(d )(3 )(i ) (s tat ing that th e B oard s ha ll r ev iewfa ctu al d ete rm inatio ns , including cr edibili ty findings, “only t o determine whether the findi ngs of the Imm igrati on Judge are cl early erroneous”). I n particul ar, we concur in t he Imm igrati on Judge’s finding [that] the unde rlying cr ime of larceny involved in the burgl ary co nv ict ion

is a cri m e invo lvi ng m ora l turpi tud e. Th e p lea trans cri pt i s adequate to s how that such offense involved a pe rmanent taking of property. W ala timely petit ioned this Court for review of the BIA’s decis ion. DI SC US SI ON W ala wa s d eem ed

rem ov ab le f

or h av ing be enco nv ict ed of a C IMT ba sed

on his gu ilty ple a to tw o c ounts of

burgl ary in t he thi rd d eg ree , in

vio lat ion of Co nn . G en . S tat . s ect ion

53 a103, which provides i n pertinent part: “A per son is guilt y of burglary in the third degr ee when he
en ter s o r re m ain s unlawf

ull y in a b uil din g w ithint en t to co mm it a cri m e th ere in. ” W ala contends that he was not convict ed of a CIMT because he was not cha rged with, and he di d not oth erw ise adm it t o, anint en t pe rm an en tlyto d ep riv e th e v ict im of he r pr op erty. He fu

rth er arg ue s th at the BI A e rre d in so far as it i nf err ed fr om his ple a co llo quy tr an scr ipt that he int en de d a permanent taking. We agree and hold thatthe crime Wala pled to does not const itute a CIM T. I. Ju ris di cti on an d S tan da rd of R ev iew Or din ari ly, thi s C ourt l ack s juris dic tio n to rev ieword ers of rem ov al b ase d o n an a lie n’s conviction for ce rtain offenses, incl uding CIMTs. Se e 8 U .S .C . § 12 52 (a) (2) (C ). W e re tai n jurisdi ction, however, t o consider “que stions of law,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (D), includi ng whether an ali en’s convict ion qualifies a s a removable offense under the imm igrati on laws. Se e Miz ra hi v . G onza les , 4 92 F. 3d 15 6, 15 7-5 8 (2 d C ir. 20 07 ); Blak e v. Go nz ale

s , 481 F.3d 152, 15 5-5 6 (2 d C ir. 20 07 ).6

Where, as her e, the BIA adopts the IJ’s re asoning and offers additi onal comm entary, we review the dec ision of the IJ a s supplemented by the BIA. Se e Y an Ch en v. Go nz ale

s , 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s construct ion of ambiguous statut ory ter m s in imm igr ati on

law , s uc h a s “m ora l turpi tud e. ” Se e C he vro n U .S .A ., Inc . v . Na tural R es. De

f. C ou nc il, Inc

. , 4 67 U. S. 83 7, 84 3-4 4 (1 98 4); see also Mi chel v. INS , 206 F.3d 25 3, 26 2-6 5 (2 d C ir. 20 00 ) (d ef err ing to t he BI A’ s ru le that cr im es f or whic h k

no wl ed ge is an element are general ly CIMTs). “However, as we r ecognized in Mic he l , 2 06 F. 3d at 2 62 , th e B IA ha s n o e xp ert ise in c on str uin g . . . state criminal

statute s, and so we review de novo the BI A’ s finding that a pet itioner ’s crime of conviction contains tho se e lem en ts whic h h av e b een pro pe rly fo un d to co ns tit

ute a C IMT .” Gill v. INS , 420 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2005). Thus, in t his case, we defer to the BIA’s vi ew that lar ceny involving a permanent taking amounts to a CIMT, but we review de no vo wh eth er W ala ’s c onvic tio n f or t hir d-d eg ree burgl ary

un de r C onne cti cut law f

all s within this category. II. Wa la’ s A lle ge d C IMT W ith these principl es in mind, we turn to whether Wala’s convic tion for burglar y in the thi rd d eg ree wa s a C IMT su chthat he wa s re m ov ab le und er 8 U. S. C. § 1 18 2(a )(2 )(A )(i )(I ). A. De fin iti on of a CI MT An alien is r emovable under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i )(I) i f he has been “convict ed of,
or . . . adm its havin g c om m itt ed , o r . . . a dm its co mm itt ing act s w hic h c on sti tut e th e es sentia l ele m en ts o f .
. . a cr im e invo lvi ng m ora l turpi tud e. ” T rad iti on all y, the BI A h as d ef ine d a CI MT as “conduct t hat shocks the public consci ence as being i nherently ba se, vile, ordepraved, and
co ntr ary to t he acc ep ted

rul es o f m ora lity and

the dutie s o we d b etw een pe rso ns or t o s oc iety inW ala arg ue s th at a lth ou ghhe too k it em s f rom the vic tim ’s h ou se, thi s d oe s n ot m ean 2 that he ent ered with the intent t o comm it a lar ceny. Under Connecticut law, however, the government need not prove Wala’s intent when he entered t he building i f it can establ ish the intent formed when he remained. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-103. 7 ge ne ral .” Ro dr igu ez v . G onza les , 451 F.3d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 2006) (i nternal quot ation marks
om itt ed ); seeals o In re M

– , 2 I. & N. De c. 72 1, 72 3 (B .I. A. 19 46 ). T he BI A h as h eld that burglary offenses “may or may not involve moral turpitude, t he determinative factorbeing whether the cr ime intended to be comm itted at the time of entry or priorto the brea king out inv olv es m ora l turpi tud e. ” In re M– , 2 I. & N. Dec. at 723. Thus, Wala’s convict ion under the burglary st atute const itutes a CIMT only if the cri me he intended to comm it upon entr y into the vic tim ’s h ou se i s it sel f a

CI MT . T he re i s n o s eri ou s d isp ute he re that th e und erl yin g c rim e W ala intended to c omm it was lar ceny. Under BIA precedent, however , not all l arcenies are CIMTs. 2 Th e B IAha s h eld

that “[ o] rdi naril y, a co nv ict ion fo r th ef t is co ns ide red

to i nv olv e m ora l tur pit ud e o nly wh ena p erm an en t takin g is int en de d. ” Mat ter of Grazle y , 14 I. & N. Dec. 330, 33 3 (B .I. A. 19 73 ); see also In r e R– , 2 I. & N. De c. 81 9, 82 8 (B .I. A. 19 47 ) (“ It i s se ttl ed lawthat the of fe ns e o f t ak ing pro pe rtytem po rar ilydo es n ot i nv olv e m ora l turpi tud e. ”). W e recognize that in some cases the BIA has stated t hat larc eny is a CIMT without distingui shing between a per manent and a temporary taking. See, e.g. , In re Westman , 17 I. & N. De c. 50 , 5 1 (B IA19 79 ) (c iti ng cas es s up po rtin g th is p rop os iti on ). W e al so no te that th e B IAha s recentl y suggested tha t whether thi s distinc tion actua lly exist s is an open quest ion. Se e In re Jurado-Delgado , 2 4 I. & N . D ec. 29 , 3 3 (B IA20 06 ). I n th is c ase , h ow ev er, the BI A’ s o rde r, insofar as itdeparted from the IJ’s hol ding, expressl y referenced Wala’s all eged permanent tak ing , m ak ing it c lear th at the BI A treated the inq uir y a s d ete rm inativ e o f whe the r W ala8

co mm itt ed

a re m ov ab le o ff

en se. Un de r th e Ch en ery doctrine, ourreview is l imited to “[t]he gro un ds up on

wh ich
. . . th e re co rd d isc los es t hat [ the ag en cy ’s] act ion

wa s b ase d. ” SEC v. Chenery Corp. , 3 18 U. S. 80 , 8 7 (1 94 3). Thus , w e n eed no t co ns ide r th e g ov ernm en t’s contention t hat burglar ies involvi ng any kind of larceny ar e CIMTs for purposes of removal. Nevertheles s, we acknowledge thatthe BIA is free to reconsi der its vi ew of what types of lar cen ies am ount t o C IMT s, an d w e expre ss n o p os iti on he re o n whe the r any s uc h c hang e in position would be e ntitle d to or rece ive deference. When deciding whethe r a larc eny is comm itted wit h the intent ion of a permanent taking, the BIA has looked to t he nature of the st atute, see, e.g. , In re M– , 2 I. & N. Dec. at 723 (analyzi ng third-de gree burgla ry statut e in New York), and in some cases “look[ed] beyond the statute to considersuch facts as may appear from the record of convicti on or admissions of the alien to r each an independe nt conclusi on as to whether t he offense is one which, under [the BI A’ s] law , invo lve s m ora l turpi tud e, ” In re F– , 2 I. & N. De c. 51 7, 51 9-2 0 (B .I. A. 19 46 ). I n the latter ins tan ce, wh enit i s cl ear fr om the rec ord

of co nv ict ion

that ce rta in t

yp es o f t ak ing s ar e involved, the BIA has a ssumed or presumed that the taking was i ntended to be per manent for purposes of determining removability. See, e.g. , Mat ter of Grazle y , 14 I. & N. Dec. at 333 (takin g o f c ash ); In re G– , 2 I. & N. De c. 23 5, 23 7-3 8 (B .I. A. 19 45 ) (t ak ing of go od s f or r esa le) ; In re Jurado-Del

gado , 24 I. & N. Dec. at 29, 33 (r etail t heft).

B. Re lev an t C on ne cti cu t S tat ut es W ala arg ue s th at h is c onvic tio n d oe s n ot c on sti tut e a C IMT be cau se t he cri m e to wh ich he pled guilt y does not necess arily i nvolve the int ent to take permanently the vict im’s property, and he did not admit any such int ent in his pl ea colloquy. Before re aching the ques tion of9

whether Wala necessari ly pled guil ty to an offense constit uting a CIMT, we brie fly review the statute under which Wala was convicted. Th e b urg lar

y s tat ute to whic h W ala

ple d g uil ty m ak es i t a c rim e to en ter or r em ain
un law fu llyin a

bu ild ing wi th t

he int en t to co mm it anytyp e o f c rim e th ere in. Co nn . G en . S tat
. § 5 3a -10 3; seeals o S

tate v. Li ttle , 485 A.2d 913, 918 (Conn. 1984). As noted above, ther e is no dispute tha t the objec t crime to which Wala pled guilty was l arceny. In Connect icut, “[a] person
co mm its lar ceny whe n, wi th i nte nt t o d ep riv e an oth er o f p rop erty o r to ap pro pri ate the sam e to him sel f o r a thir d p ers on , h e w ron gf ull y take s, ob tai ns or w ithho lds su chpro pe rtyfr om an
owne r.” Co nn . G en . S tat . § 53 a-1 19 . T his lar ceny s tat ute , h ow ev er, do es n ot d ist ing uis h between permanent or temporary taki ngs; both are culpable ac ts. Se e S tate v. Wie ler , 660 A.2d 740, 741-42 (Conn. 1995) (holdi ng that taki ng property wit hout the int ent to depri ve permanently its owner t hereof can sustai n a convicti on under the la rceny stat ute). Thus, we ad dre ss whe the r, b y a dm itt ing to t hir d-d eg ree burgl ary

wi th t he int en t to co mm it l arc eny, W ala is removable for having comm itted a CIM T.

C. Ca teg or ica l an d M od ifi ed Ca teg or ica l A pp ro ac he s In g en era l, t

he BI A and

thi s C ourt h av e ap pli ed

eithe r a “ cat eg ori cal ” o r a “ m od if ied categori cal” approa ch to deter mine whether a specific cri me f alls withi n a grounds for removability. See, e.g. , Gi ll , 4 20 F. 3d at 8 9-9 1 (a

pp lyi ng the cat eg ori cal ap pro ach ); Di cks on v. As hc ro ft , 346 F.3d 44, 48-49 (2d Cir. 2003) ( applying the modified categor ical appr oach). Under the cate gorical approach, a revi ewing court “l ook[s] to the elements and the natur e of the of fe ns e o f c onvic tio n, rathe r th anto t he parti cu lar

fa cts rel ati ng to p eti tio ne r’s cri m e. ” Canada
v. Go nz ale

s , 4 48 F. 3d

56 0, 56 5 (2 d C ir. 20 06 ) (i nte rna l qu otatio n m ark s o m itt ed ); seeals o10

Dalton v. As hc ro

ft , 257 F.3d 200, 204 (2d Cir. 2001). This appr oach requir es a court t o “focus
on the int rin sic natur e o f t

he of fe ns e, rathe r th anon

the sin gu lar

cir cum stanc es o f an in div idu al petiti oner’s cr imes, and only the minim um crim inal conductnecessary t o sustain a c onviction
un de r a g ive n s tat

ute is r ele vant. ” Va rg

as -Sa rm ien to v . U

.S . D ep ’t o f Ju sti ce , 448 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Ci r. 2 00 6) ( int ern al q

uo tat ion m ark s an d a lte rat ion s o m itt ed ). I n d esc rib ing the cat eg ori cal approach, we have hel d that “ever y set of facts vi olating a s tatute must sati sfy the crite ria for removability in orde r for a crime to amount to a removable offense; the BIA m ay not justi fy
rem ov al b ase d o n th e p art icu lar set of fa cts un de rly ing an

ali en ’s c rim ina l co nv ict ion .” Dickson , 346 F.3d at 48. Un de r th e m od if

ied cat eg ori cal ap pro ach , h ow ev er, a li m ite d re vie w o f a pe tit ion er’ s cir cum stanc es m aybe warrante d whe re a statut e o f c onvic tio n is “d ivi sib le. ” Se e V ar ga sSa rm ien to , 448 F.3d at 167. A statute is divisi ble if it “enc ompasses m ultiple categori es of offense conduct, some, but not all, of which would categor ically c onstitut e” a removable offense. Id. ; see also Dicks on , 3 46 F. 3d at 4 8 (“ Whe re . . . a cr im ina l st atute e nc om pa sse s d ive rse cla sse s of criminal acts—some of which would categorical ly be grounds for removal and other s of wh ich wo uld no t—w e h av e h eld

that su chstatut es c anbe co ns ide red ‘di vis ibl e’ s tat

ute s. ”). In
rev iew ing a co nv ict ion

un de r a d ivi sib le s tat

ute , w e m ayref

er t o th e “r eco rd o f c onvic tio n” to
asc ert ain wh eth er a

pe tit ion er’ s co nv ict ion

wa s und er the branc h o f t he statut e th at p ros cri be s removable offenses. Id. at 4 8-4 9; seeals o C hr za no ski v. As hc ro ft , 3 27 F. 3d

18 8, 19 3 n .8 (2d

Ci r. 2003). The record of convic tion incl udes, inter a lia , “ the ch arg ing do cum en t, a ple a ag ree m en t,
a v erd ict or j ud gm en t of

co nv ict ion , a

rec ord of the senten ce, or a

ple a co llo quy tr an scr ipt .” Dickson , 346 F.3d at 53.Although the Supreme Court in Sh ep ar d wa s al so ad dre ssi ng a q

ue sti on lef t op enbyits 3 previous deci sion in Ta

ylo r v. Un ite d S

tates , 4 95 U. S. 57 5 (1 99 0)— that is , what m ate ria ls a distri ct court may consider when det ermining whether a defendant’s offense of conviction fo llo wi ng a g uil ty p lea

qu ali fi es a s a “ vio lent f

elo ny ” f or p urp os es o f t

he Ar m ed Caree r C rim ina l Act—we focus here only on the Court ’s analysi s concerning a sentencing c ourt’s abi lity to make inferences from the record of convict ion. 11 In Dulal-Whit eway v. U. S. De p’t of H om ela nd Se c. , 501 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2007), we recentl y discussed t he parameters of the modified categorica l approach as applied to gui lty pleas
. W e relie d in part on t he Supreme Court’s decision i n Sh ep ar d v . U nited Sta tes , 544 U.S. 13, 16 (20 05 ), i n whic h th e C ourt a dd res sed wh eth er a

burgl ary co nv ict ion

in a state who se l awde fi ne d “b urg lar y” m ore bro ad ly t

han th e “g en eri c” d ef

ini tio n o f b urg lar

y w as b ase d o n f

act s th at c ou ld support a convi ction for “gener ic” burgla ry. The state bur glary sta tute at i ssue in Sh ep ar d 3
expand ed the ge ne ric burgl ary

of fe ns e o f b reakin g and

en ter ing int o a

bu ild ing or an e nc los ed space by incl uding the brea king and enter ing into a ca r or a boat. Id. at 1 7. Th e C ourt e xp lai ne d that w ith“a t

ran scr ipt of ple a co llo quy o r by

wr itt enple a ag ree m en t pr ese nte d to the co urt [entering the j udgment of conviction], or by a record of comparable findings of fact adopted by the de fe nd an t up on

en ter ing the ple a[ ,]
. . . a lat er c ourt [ de ter

m ini ng the senten ce] co uld ge ne ral ly t ell wh eth er the ple a h ad ‘ne ces sar ily ’ re ste d o n th e f act ide nti fy ing the burgl ary

as generic,” i .e., the breaki ng into a buil ding. Id. at 20-21 (quot ing Taylor , 4 95 U. S. at 6 02 ). In Dulal-Whit eway , we applied the Court ’s reasoni ng in Sh ep ar d to t he rem ov al c on tex t, explaining t hat, for convicti ons following a plea, t he BIA m ay rely only upon fact s to which a defendant “necessa rily ple aded” in orderto determine the type of conduct that re presented t he basis of an alie n’s convict ion. 501 F.3d at 131. To the ext ent our deci sion in Dulal-Whit eway relies on Sh ep ar

d , th e “n ece ssaril y p lea de d” lan gu ag e re fe rs n ot j us t to wh eth er a pe tit ion er p led12

gu ilty to ele m en ts o f t

he un de rly ing state o ff

en se, but al so to whe the r by ple ad ing gu ilty, he ple d those facts nece ssary to es tablish t hat he viola ted a divis ible sta tute in a manner thatsatisfies t he gro un ds fo r th e re m ov ab ili ty p rov isi on at i ssu e—

the eq uiv ale nt o f t

he “g en eri c” b urg lar

y o ff en se in Sh ep ar d . T hu s, a p eti tio ne r ne ces sar ilyple ad s to fa cts wh en , f or e xam ple , h e ac tua llyadm its specific facts i n his plea col loquy or comparable judic ial rec ord that es tablish he violated a div isi ble statut e in

m anne r th at s ati sf

ies the cri ter ia o f t

he pe rti ne nt r em ov ab ili ty s tat ute . F urt he r, if the petit ioner is c harged with viol ating a divi sible st ate stat ute in manner that sat isfies the elements of the pertinent removability stat ute and he plea ds guilty, he ha s “necessar ily pleade d” to an offense for which he is removable. In Dulal-Whit eway , we assumed—based on the pe tit ion er’ s f

ail ure to c ha lle ng e th e d ivi sib ili ty o f t he statut e o f c onvic tio n— that th e st atute w as divisibl e. Id. at 128. However, we held thata resti tution orde r did not est ablish tha t the petiti oner “necess arily pl eaded” to an offense thatwould justify appli cation of the per tinent removal statute bec ause, inter a lia , th e p eti tio ne r di d n ot a dm it the se f act s an d w as n ot c onvic ted of them. Id. at 129-34. D. The BIA’s Error Although we have not yet ha d occasion to de termine whether Conn. Gen. Stat. sect ion 53a-103 is divi sible, both pa rties, a s well as the IJ and BIA, have adopted t he position t hat the statute is divisi ble on the grounds that itencompasses offenses that “may or m ay not involve
m ora l turpi tud e, ” In re M– , 2 I. & N. De c. at 7 23 . W e thus ass um e f or p urp os es o f t

his cas e th at the statut e is div isi ble an d p roc eed un de r th e m od if

ied cat eg ori cal ap pro ach

to e xam ine wh eth er W ala ’s r eco rd o f c onvic tio n n ece ssaril y a dm its fa cts est ab lis hin g th e el em en ts o f a CI MT . M ore sp eci fi cal ly, be cau se t

he BI A h eld

in t his cas e th at the int en t of

a p erm an en t takin g w asAl tho ug h th e g ov ernm en t su gg est s th at W ala adm itt ed to t ak ing cas h am on g th e st ole n 4 ite m s, the po rti on

of the ple a co llo quy th at s up po rts thi s p rop os iti on is b ase d u

po n th e v ict im ’s po lic e re po rt r ath er than W ala ’s o wn adm iss ion s. W ala

adm itt ed on ly t o th e takin g o f r ing s, of fi cia l je we lry , a

fi rst un ion cre dit car d, an d tw o w atc he s. W e th ere fo re d o n ot c on sid er i n th is opinion whether t he taking of cash would yie ld the same result he re. Cf . Ma tte r o f G razle y , 1 4 I. & N . D ec. at 3 33 (ho ldi ng that th e takin g o f c ash is a ssum ed

to b e p erm an en t). 13 necessary t o sustain t he removability char ge, the issue is whether Wala’s rec ord of conviction necessari ly supports t his resul t. We hold that it does not , and that the BIA erred in deeming W ala rem ov ab le. In h is p lea

co llo quy, W ala

adm itt ed to t ak ing“tw o ri ng s, ” “o ff ici al j ew elr

y, ” “a fi rst
un ion cre dit car d, ” an d “ tw o w atc he s” f rom the vic tim ’s h om e. In s o d oin g, W ala “ac tua lly 4 adm itt ed ,” Dulal-Whit eway , 501 F.3d at 125, to facts est ablishing t hat he was convict ed of a bu rg la ry wi th th e i nt en t t o c ommita l ar ce ny . Wal a d idno t a dmi t, ho we ve r, to ta ki ng th es e i te ms wi th t he int en t to ap pro pri ate the m pe rm an en tly . W ala , m ore ov er, wa s n ot c harge d w ith
co mm itt ing a p erm an en t takin g; t he ch arg ing do cum en t do es n ot s pe cif ica llynam e th e inten de d cri m e as so ciated

wi th h is b urg lar

y c onvic tio n and

the pro sec uto r enter ed

a no lle pros eq ui for two charges of larc eny and one charge of cre dit card t heft. Finally, as de scribed su pra , to be convicted of lar ceny in Connectic ut, the sta tute requi res only an “i ntent to depr ive anotherof property orto appropri ate the sa me to him self or a thir d person,” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a- 119, wi tho ut r eg ard

to whe the r th e takin g w as p erm an en t or tem po rar y. Ho we ve r im

pro ba ble , W ala could have been t aking the je welry with the i ntent to l oan it to hi s girlfrie nd for one “night on the town” an d th enret

urn it. Or , h e co uld

have be entak ingthe cre dit car ds wi th t

he int en t to us e the m fo r a o ne -ti m e id en tif

icatio n p urp os e. Th e p oint is that ei the r w ou ld h av e b een su ff ici en t to sustain Wala’s guil ty plea and convi ction under Connect icut penal law.14

Thus , a lth ou ghit m ayhave be enrea so na ble fo r th e B IAto i nf

er that W ala

int en de d permanently to keep the i tems he adm itted t aking, the modified categori cal approac h does not permit the BIA to draw inferences of this kind. We have held that the BIA cannot adjudica te the fa cts in a cri m ina l ca se t o d ete rm ine wh eth er, stand ing alo ne , th eysu gg est that th e p eti tio ne r
comm itted a r emovable off ense. See Sui v. IN

S , 250 F.3d 105, 119 (2d Cir. 2001) (emphasizing that the BIA cannot assume the position of factfinder). Beca use Wala did not admit to, was not ch arg ed wi th, an d w as n ot r eq

uir ed to p lea d to a p erm an en t takin g in ord er t o b e co nv ict ed

in Co nn ect icut of

burgl ary in t he thi rd d eg ree , W ala ’s g uil ty p lea do es n ot n ece ssaril y re st o n f act s identifying the burglary as a CIMT. See Dulal-Whi teway , 5 01 F. 3dat12 9- 31 . As th e S up re me Court explaine d in Sh ep ar d , if the state s tat

ute req uir es n o f ind ingof the parti cu lar

ele m en t at iss ue an d th ere is n o c hargi ng do cum en t th at n arr ow s th e ch arg e to tho se l im its , th e “o nly certai nty [in a pleaded ca se] of [that] finding lies in . . . the defendant ’s own admissions or
acc ep ted fi nd ing s o f f

act co nf irm ing the fa ctu al b asi s f

or a va lid ple a. ” Sh ep ar

d , 544 U.S. at 25. In W ala ’s c ase , th e re co rd i s si lent on the rem ov ab ili ty e lem ent, t hat is , whe the r he int en de d to
co mm it a pe rm an en t takin g. Th e B IA , b y lo ok ing to t he fa cts of

W ala ’s c onvic tio n to inf

er s uc h an intent, t herefore tra nsgressed t he permitted scope of the modified categori cal approac h. Ac co rdi ng ly, the BI A e rre d in fi nd ing W ala

rem ov ab le und er 8 U. S. C. § 1 18 2(a )(2 )(A )(i )(I ). CO NC LU SI ON For the foregoing re asons, we hold that(1) it was pr oper for the IJ a nd BIA to conclude that W ala ple d g uil ty t o a

bu rgl ary wi th t he int en t to co mm it l arc eny, but (2 ) th e B IAerr ed in fi nd ing W ala

rem ov ab le und er 8 U. S. C. § 1 18 2(a )(2 )(A )(i )(I ) be cau se i t im pro pe rlyinf

err ed fr om W ala ’s r eco rd o f c onvic tio n th at h e inten de d to tak e p rop erty p erm an en tly , rathe r th an15

tem po rar ily . W ala

wa s n ot r eq

uir ed to p lea d f

act s es tab lis hin g th at h e inten de d to co mm it a pe rm an en t takin g, an d th ere is n o s tat em en t in W ala ’s p lea

co llo quy a dm itt ing anint en t to
co mm it a pe rm an en t takin g. W ala ’s g uil ty p lea , th ere fo re, did no t ne ces sar ilyadm it the ele m en ts of a CIMT. W e VACATE the BIA’s removal order and REMAND for further proceedi ngs consistent with this opi nion.16

GUIDO CA LABRES I, Circuit Judge , concurring. I concur completely wit h the reasoni ng of the Court and with it s applicat ion to this case. I w ri te se pa ra te ly si mpl y t o s ay th atth is ca se se ems to me t o d emon st ra te th e s ev er e p ro bl ems that adher e to the cat egorical approach and to t he modified categorical approach. The law of the Circuit i s clear, however , and we are bound to the se approaches
. Se e V elt ri v . B ldg. S

erv . 3 2B -J Pension Fund , 3 93 F. 3d

31 8, 32 7 (2 d C ir. 20 04 ). T hat be ing so , I j oin the op ini on

of the Co urt in toto .