F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

FEB 10 2000

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

FREDERICK A. JONES,

KATHERINE PRESTON, AND

LILLIAN B. TURNER,

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

DENVER POST CORPORATION, a

Colorado corporation,

Defendant - Appellee.

No. 98-1458

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

(D. Ct. No. 96-S-2359)

Scot Melvin Peterson (Michael H. Berger with him on the briefs), Waldbaum,

Corn, Koff, Berger & Cohen, P.C., Denver, Colorado, appearing for PlaintiffsAppellants.

Mary H. Stuart, Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP, Denver, Colorado, appearing for

Defendants-Appellees.

Before TACHA , McKAY , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.

TACHA , Circuit Judge.
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The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs’

claims of racial discrimination in employment. Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal

and we exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part and

reverse in part.

I.

 “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

applying the same legal standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Oklahoma

ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326

(10th Cir.), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 53 (1999). Summary judgment is appropriate

“if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “‘We view the evidence and draw any inferences in

a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, but that party

must identify sufficient evidence which would require submission of the case to a

jury.’” Aramburu v. Boeing Co. , 112 F.3d 1398, 1402 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting

Williams v. Rice , 983 F.2d 177, 179 (10th Cir. 1993)). In an employment

discrimination case, the trial court finding of intentional discrimination against a

protected class is a finding of fact. EEOC v. Flasher Co. , 986 F.2d 1312, 1317

(10th Cir. 1992). We review this finding for clear error. Id. 
1

 Denesia Bey was also a plaintiff in the district court. Ms. Bey did not

appeal from the final judgment of that court and therefore is not a party to this

appeal.

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 II.

The three plaintiffs allege that defendants’ employment practices violated

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (“Title VII”). 1 We review each plaintiff’s claims

individually.

A. Frederick Jones

1. Background

Frederick Jones, an African-American, began working at the Denver Post

(“Post”) in 1989. Between 1989 and 1996, Jones worked primarily as a voluntary

sales representative, processing phone requests for classified advertisements. 

Beginning in 1992, Jones received letters from Post management regarding

his absenteeism. On August 11, 1992, Rhonda Canino, one of Jones’s

supervisors, issued him a written reprimand for insubordination concerning an

extended lunch hour. On August 27, Canino advised Jones in writing that he had

abused the company’s sick leave policy by taking an unauthorized medical

absence. 

 On January 3, 1995, Rosemary Reitz, another of Jones’s supervisors,

issued him a written warning for long-distance telephone calls made on company

time and at company expense. On September 20, 1995, Jones received an
2

 In his First Amended Complaint, Jones raised additional claims that the

district court found unrelated to his discrimination charge. The court dismissed

these claims for failure to exhaust, and Jones does not appeal the dismissal of

these additional claims. 

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additional written warning from Nancy Allen, another Post supervisor. Allen

reprimanded Jones for using Post phones to conduct outside business. Allen

cautioned Jones that future violations would result in his immediate termination. 

From late 1995 to early 1996, Jones worked at the Post’s fax desk, taking

fax orders from advertisers. During this period, Reitz approached Jones about

complaints regarding his work. Reitz advised Jones that if the situation at the

desk did not improve, changes would be made. After a few months at the fax

desk, Jones was sent back to the voluntary classified sales department. 

On April 22, 1996, Jones filed a discrimination charge with the Colorado

Civil Rights Division (CCRD) and the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC). On August 1, 1996, the EEOC issued Jones a Notice of

Right to Sue. Jones’s discrimination charge alleged that the Post disciplined him

differently than other employees and that the Post demoted him from the fax desk

without warning. Based on the scope of the charge, the district court limited its

jurisdiction to Jones’s claims of disparate treatment and discriminatory demotion

based on race. 2

2. Analysis
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In Title VII cases, the inquiry is whether defendant intentionally

discriminated against plaintiff based on protected class characteristics. Flasher ,

986 F.2d at 1317. A plaintiff may prove intentional discrimination “‘either

directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely

motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered

explanation is unworthy of credence.’” EEOC v. Wiltel, Inc. , 81 F.3d 1508, 1513

(10th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States Postal Service v. Aikens , 460 U.S. 711,

716 (1983)) (second citation omitted). A personnel policy which is

discriminatory on its face provides direct evidence of intentional discrimination. 

See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston , 469 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1985). Since

Jones offers no evidence of “an existing policy which itself constitutes

discrimination,” Ramsey v. City & County of Denver , 907 F.2d 1004, 1008 (10th

Cir. 1990), his claim rests on indirect evidence of discrimination.

In Title VII cases based on indirect evidence, plaintiff has the initial burden

of establishing a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S.

792, 802 (1973). If plaintiff does so, then defendant must “articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged personnel action. Id. 

Plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that defendant’s stated

reason is in fact a pretext for unlawful discrimination. Id. at 804.

The district court found that Jones failed to establish a prima facie case of
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disparate treatment regarding his discipline by the Post. We agree. A prima

facie case of disparate discipline may be established if the plaintiff proves by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) the plaintiff is a racial minority, (2) the

plaintiff was disciplined by the employer, and (3) the employer imposed the

discipline under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination. 

Cf. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine , 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)

(articulating prima facie case for discriminatory treatment in context of failure to

promote claim); id., at 254 n.6 (The prima facie “standard is not inflexible, as

‘[t]he facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above of

the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in

every respect in differing factual situations.”) (quoting McDonnell Douglas , 411

U.S. at 802 n.13). One of the ways this third prong may be met, and the method

chosen by Jones here, is by attempting to show that the employer treated similarly

situated employees differently.

In the instant case, Jones contends that Rhonda Canino took orders for

pastries from her husband’s business during business hours, but the Post did not

discipline her for this alleged conduct. Since the Post reprimanded Jones for

using Post phones to conduct his outside business, Jones claims disparate

treatment. However, the comparison Jones makes between himself and Canino is

not legally relevant. Canino was one of Jones’s supervisors and therefore cannot
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be deemed similarly situated in a disciplinary matter such as this one. Jones

points to no other individual who was disciplined differently. Thus, the district

court correctly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this count. 

Jones also contends that his transfer from the fax desk back to voluntary

sales constituted a discriminatory demotion. To establish a prima facie case of

discriminatory demotion, plaintiff must show (1) that he was within a protected

group, (2) adversely affected by defendant’s employment decision, (3) qualified

for the position at issue, Hooks v. Diamond Crystal Specialty Foods, Inc. , 997

F.2d 793, 799 (10th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Buchanan v.

Sherrill , 51 F.3d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1995), and (4) that the job from which he

was demoted was not eliminated, Perry v. Woodward , Nos. 97-2343, 98-2003,

1999 WL 1256340, at *13 (10th Cir. Dec. 20, 1999).

The district court did not evaluate Jones’s prima facie case under the

standard outlined above. Instead, the judge focused on Jones’s lack of evidence

concerning similarly situated non-African-American employees. We therefore

assume without deciding that Jones established a prima facie case, and the burden

shifted to the Post to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

returning him to voluntary sales. At this stage , defendant need only “explain its

actions against the plaintiff in terms that are not facially prohibited by Title VII.” 

Flasher , 986 F.2d at 1317. Jones had a long history of problems at the Post: he
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received both verbal and written warnings and was disciplined for various

workplace violations. In addition, there were specific complaints about his

performance at the fax desk. Thus, on this record, the Post has met its burden.

Jones bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that defendant’s proffered

reasons for his demotion were pretextual. The district court concluded that the

evidence as a whole was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact

regarding pretext. We agree. Jones’s replacement at the fax desk apparently was

passed over for another position at the Post. Based on this singular objective fact, 

Jones offers his personal belief that the replacement was less qualified than he

was for the fax position. “It is the manager’s perception of the employee’s

performance that is relevant, not plaintiff’s subjective evaluation of his own

relative performance.” Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc. , 82 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir.

1996). Based on documented workplace violations and specific complaints, a

Post manager returned Jones to voluntary sales. We find no evidence of

pretextual behavior and thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment on Jones’s discriminatory demotion claim.

B. Katherine Preston

1. Background

Katherine Preston, an African-American, began working full-time at the

Post in December 1995 as a voluntary sales representative. In February and May
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of 1996, Preston applied for a promotion to the real estate contract desk. On both

occasions, the Post selected another employee for the position. On May 29, 1996,

Preston filed a discrimination charge with the CCRD and the EEOC. On August

1, 1996, the EEOC issued Preston a Notice of Right to Sue. In the discrimination

charge, she alleged that she was denied a promotion based on her race. The

charge specifically limited the date of discrimination to May 22, 1996. 

2. Analysis

In dismissing Preston’s single claim for failure to promote, the district

court assumed she had established her prima facie case. The court then found that

defendant set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its personnel

decision, and Preston could not make a sufficient showing of pretext. We affirm

the district court’s dismissal of Preston’s claim.

The Post hired Tara Wagner, a white female, to the position Preston sought

in May 1996. Nolan Epple, a Post manager, cited the following factors in support

of his decision to hire Wagner: (1) Wagner’s experience for one year within the

department, (2) recommendations from both her supervisors, (3) her rapport with

clients, and (4) her ability to work in the team environment at the Post. We agree

with the district court that Epple’s testimony concerning Wagner’s superior

qualifications constitutes a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the Post’s

decision not to promote Preston.
3

 In her brief, Preston also relies on affidavit testimony from two coworkers. However, this testimony only relates to a claim Preston failed to exhaust

below. 

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We also agree that Preston has not carried her ultimate burden in

demonstrating genuine issues of material fact concerning pretext. Preston

counters Epple’s objective criteria with her subjective belief that Wagner

contributed to the demotion of a fellow employee, thereby casting doubt on her

abilities as a team player. 3 “[P]laintiff’s ‘mere conjecture that [her] employer’s

explanation is a pretext for intentional discrimination is an insufficient basis for

denial of summary judgment.’” Panis v. Mission Hills Bank, N.A. , 60 F.3d 1486,

1491 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Branson v. Price River Coal Co. , 853 F.2d 768,

772 (10th Cir. 1988)). We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of

Preston’s May 1996 failure to promote claim. 

In the First Amended Complaint, Preston alleged numerous additional

discriminatory practices at the Post. Based on the scope of the discrimination

charge, the district court limited its jurisdiction to the single claim of failure to

promote in May 1996 and dismissed Preston’s other claims for failure to exhaust. 

On appeal, Preston contends that the district court erred in dismissing two of

these claims.

First, Preston claims that the district court should have considered her

claim of failure to promote in February 1996. We disagree. A plaintiff must
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exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit under Title VII. 

Aramburu , 112 F.3d at 1409. “The suit may include allegations of discrimination

reasonably related to the allegations listed in the administrative charge, including

new acts occurring during the pendency of the administrative charge.” Id. 

Preston expressly limited the allegation in the charge to May 22, 1996. She now 

attempts to plead past acts not documented in that charge. Exhaustion gives the

charged party notice of the alleged violation. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp. , 42 F.3d

616, 625 (10th Cir. 1994). Here, Preston gave notice of a singular failure to

promote and apparently declined to allege a pattern of discrimination. The

district court therefore properly dismissed this claim for failure to exhaust.

Second, Preston argues that the district court should have considered her

claim that the Post retaliated against her for filing an administrative charge. 

Preston contends that, after the charge was filed, the Post limited her

opportunities to substitute on other desks for extra pay. It is true that “‘an act

committed by an employer in retaliation for the filing of an EEOC complaint is

reasonably related to that complaint, obviating the need for a second EEOC

complaint.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Hartshorne Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 , 864 F.2d

680, 682 (10th Cir. 1988)). Thus, the district court should have considered the

retaliation claim on the merits. 

The Post asserts that Preston did not raise her retaliation claim before the
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district court and therefore cannot maintain it on appeal. We disagree. Both the

First Amended Complaint and Preston’s brief opposing summary judgment raised

this claim, and the district court ruled on it. We therefore hold that Preston’s

retaliation claim is not barred for failure to exhaust, and that Preston adequately

raised it below. We thus remand the claim for consideration by the district court

on the merits. 

C. Lillian Turner

1. Background

Lillian Turner, an African-American, joined the Post in 1984 as a contract

sales representative in the automotive department. During the course of her

employment with the Post, Turner has received numerous verbal and written

warnings concerning absenteeism and performance problems. On February 29,

1988, M. Jean O’Toole, a manager in the classified department, expressed

concern in writing about Turner’s attendance record. In the spring of 1995,

Rhonda Canino counseled Turner about an error in a particular advertisement. On

June 9, 1995, Canino issued Turner a written warning based on additional errors

in published advertisements. On June 20, 1995, Bob Haddad, another Post

supervisor, suspended Turner for one day without pay as a result of continued

customer complaints. 

Finally, on August 16, 1995, after another customer complaint, the Post
4

In her First Amended Complaint, Turner raised additional claims that the

district court found unrelated to the administrative charge. The court dismissed

these claims for failure to exhaust, and Turner does not appeal the dismissal of

these additional claims.

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moved Turner from contract to voluntary sales. Her base salary remained the

same but was frozen for a period of time. According to plaintiff, she was

eventually promoted back to contract sales. Defendant neither admits nor denies

this fact. 

On April 17, 1996, Turner filed a discrimination charge with the CCRD and

the EEOC. On August 1, 1996, the EEOC issued Turner a Notice of Right to Sue. 

Given Turner’s allegations in the charge, the district court limited its jurisdiction

to Turner’s claims of disparate treatment and discriminatory demotion in violation

of Title VII. 4

2. Analysis

The district court did not expressly evaluate Turner’s prima facie case for

discriminatory demotion under the controlling criteria set forth in Hooks and

Perry . We therefore assume without deciding that Turner established a prima

facie case and the burden shifted to the Post to articulate a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for returning Turner to voluntary sales. As set forth

above, Turner had a history of discipline problems at the Post. The company

imposed progressive discipline for continued violations, which culminated in the
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demotion at issue. By documenting a pattern of performance problems, the Post

has met its burden at this stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

To survive summary judgment, Turner must demonstrate that “there is a

genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for

the challenged action is pretextual – i.e. unworthy of belief.” Randle v. City of

Aurora , 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995). Turner has not done so on the record

before us. Turner concedes that she was the lowest producer on the automotive

desk and admits to making numerous errors with her advertisements. The

gravamen of her allegation is that other employees on the contract desk made

similar errors and were not disciplined accordingly. However, Turner has

produced only generic and conclusory testimony to support this allegation. When

opposing a motion for summary judgment, the non-movant may not rest upon

“mere allegations” but must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The affidavits Turner produced

are wholly devoid of any specific instances of disparate treatment. 

Beyond that, there is no evidence in the record that any supervisor was

aware of the alleged mistakes committed by fellow employees. In fact, one

supervisor, in his written reprimand, expressly informed Turner that other sales

representatives with comparable responsibilities were not having the same

problems. Turner even acknowledged that she does not know if advertisers were
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making similar complaints about other employees. Thus, Turner has not

demonstrated that there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning pretext, and

we therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of this count.

Turner’s claim of disparate treatment fails for the same reasons. One

method plaintiff may employ to give rise to an inference of racial discrimination

is to show that she was treated differently than other similarly situated employees. 

The record contains the affidavits of similarly situated employees who state that,

in their opinion, the Post subjected Turner to disparate treatment. However, these

employees reference no particular incidents to support the charge. Without

specific examples of unlawful discrimination, Turner cannot withstand a motion

for summary judgment. See id. at 1408 n.7 (stating that fellow employees’

subjective belief that employer discriminated against plaintiff is not sufficient to

preclude summary judgment). In addition, we have found no objective evidence

of disparate treatment in the record. For example, there is no independent

evidence that a white employee made the same mistakes as Turner and that this

white employee’s supervisor knew about the mistakes but did not discipline the

employee. Thus, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Turner’s

disparate treatment claim.
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D. Attorney Fees to Canino

Finally, plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in awarding attorney

fees to defendant Canino. We review the factual findings underlying an attorney

fee award for abuse of discretion. Mann v. Reynolds , 46 F.3d 1055, 1062 (10th

Cir. 1995). However, we review de novo the legal conclusions supporting the

award. Bryan v. Office of Personnel Mgmt. , 165 F.3d 1315, 1320 (10th Cir.

1999).

In the First Amended Complaint, Turner asserted a single claim against

Canino for “Aggravation of Preexisting Medical Conditions.” The district court

found that this self-styled allegation did not state a claim for relief under

Colorado law. The court thus dismissed the claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). 

“When exercising jurisdiction over pendent state claims, we must apply the

substantive law of the forum state . . . just as we would if our jurisdiction rested

on diversity of citizenship.” Lytle v. City of Haysville , 138 F.3d 857, 868 (10th

Cir. 1998). In the Tenth Circuit, attorney fee statutes are considered substantive. 

See Boyd Rosene & Assocs. v. Kansas Mun. Gas Agency , 174 F.3d 1115, 1118

(10th Cir. 1999) (finding that attorney fees are substantive for diversity purposes). 

 Therefore, the district court properly consulted Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-17-
5

 At one point in its order, the district court cites both state and federal law

concerning fee recovery. However, the court clearly relied upon Colorado law in

its final order awarding fees to Canino. We therefore review the district court’s

application of Colorado law and do not address the court’s reference to federal

law. 

6

 Section 13-17-201 expressly applies only to actions dismissed under Rule

12(b) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. However, we find the statute

applies with equal force when a federal court dismisses a pendent state tort

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 

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201 (West 1999), the applicable Colorado fee recovery statute. 5 

Section 13-17-201 provides that if a court dismisses a personal injury

action pursuant to a 12(b) motion, then “defendant shall have judgment for his

reasonable attorney fees.” 6 Because the district court dismissed Turner’s

“personal injury” action on a Rule 12(b) motion, the court properly awarded her

fees. See Smith v. Town of Snowmass Village , 919 P.2d 868, 873 (Colo. Ct.

App. 1996) (finding that where entire action against one defendant was dismissed

but claims remained against another defendant, § 13-17-201 entitles prevailing

defendant to attorney fees). 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART , and REMANDED for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No. 98-1458, JONES et al. v. DENVER POST CORPORATION

McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I join in the court’s opinion except as to Appellant Turner. I am persuaded

that the trial court erred in treating the affidavit testimony of fellow employees

Jeffry J. Mangin and Gloria K. Smith as conclusory and nonprobative. This

testimony, viewed in a light most favorable to Ms. Turner, is sufficient to

establish a prima facie claim for disparate treatment. Based on this evidence, a

trier of fact could find that “the employer imposed the discipline [on Ms. Turner]

under circumstances giving rise to an inference of racial discrimination.” Maj.

Op. at 6. As noted by the majority, a showing that she was treated differently

than similarly situated employees is sufficient to demonstrate such circumstances. 

See id. The testimony is also sufficient to create a substantial fact issue

concerning pretext in connection with the discriminatory demotion claim.

Far from being merely conclusory as the majority determines, the testimony

of these fellow employees in the classified advertising department represents both

specific facts and specific observations which are both relevant and persuasive.

Mr. Mangin’s affidavit stated:

All of us made mistakes and Lillian made no more mistakes

than the rest of us. . . . 

. . . When I made errors I was not written up[;] however when

Lillian made errors she was written up by Rhonda Canino. The

volume was enormous, as I stated above, and everyone made
1Ms. Smith’s affidavit indicates that the two employees who worked at the

automotive contract desk in the same position as Ms. Turner, Mr. Mangin and Ms.

Passwalt (or Patzwaldt), were not of minority descent. See Appellant’s App.,

Vol. 2 at 426.

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mistakes so why did they single out Lillian. Susan Passwalt and I

even had discussions regarding the fact that Lillian was being singled

out.

Appellants App., Vol. 2 at 404-05.1 This is not mere conclusion and allegation. 

It is statement of fact by one who knows whether his mistakes were known to

their joint supervisor and who was in a clear position to observe the difference in

consequences. Who better to know the facts than the one receiving preferential

treatment. At the summary judgment stage it is not necessary for a witness who is

integral to the environment at issue to submit a comparative table of errors or

even to cite specific cases. When he says he was “not written up,” that

adequately implies that his errors were known.

Ms. Smith’s testimony included the fact that “Rhonda was out to get Lillian

and some of the charges were minor and common for the people working in that

department. It was clear to me and many others in classified that Lillian was

being badgered.” Id. at 426. This is not the “vague and conclusory” stuff the

trial court held it to be. First of all, “badgering” does not lend itself to tables and

charts. It is uniquely one of those things any person can recognize. This is a

fellow employee, intimately and uniquely in a position both to observe and
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compare. Moreover, the affidavits reveal that the badgering was so open and

notorious as to be a matter of common discussion within the office. The detailed

differences in the frequency of errors is a matter for cross-examination at

trial–not for dismissal at summary judgment.

Because Ms. Turner has presented evidence demonstrating genuine issues

of material fact, I would reverse and remand for trial in her case.