UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-1867

TONY EDWARD SAVAGE,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

LARRY WAYNE STURDIVANT, JR., Deputy Sheriff, County of 

Stafford Sheriff’s Office, sued in his official and 

individual capacity,

Defendant – Appellee,

and

COUNTY OF STAFFORD, VIRGINIA, sued in its official 

capacity, A Municipal Corporation; COUNTY OF STAFFORD 

SHERIFF’S OFFICE, sued in its official capacity; CHARLES E. 

JETT, County of Stafford Sheriff, sued in his official and 

individual capacity; C.P. CAMERON, Detective, County of 

Stafford Sheriff’s Office, sued in his official and 

individual capacity; RAY HUSTON DAVIS, II, Supervisory 

Deputy Sheriff, County of Stafford Sheriff’s Office, sued 

in his official and individual capacity; MICHAEL JENKINS, 

Supervisory Deputy Sheriff, in his official and individual 

capacity; DANIEL M. CHICHESTER, Office of the 

Commonwealth’s Attorney, in their official capacity; E. 

OLSEN, Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney, in his official 

and individual capacity,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:09-cv-01328-LO-JFA)
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Submitted: May 17, 2012 Decided: July 17, 2012

Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Carl L. Crews, C. LOWELL CREWS, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC, 

Arlington, Virginia, for Appellant. Jeff W. Rosen, Lisa Ehrich,

PENDER & COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Tony Edward Savage filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) 

suit against Larry Wayne Sturdivant, Jr., and other defendants, 

alleging, among other claims, violations of his Fourth Amendment 

rights in connection with a warrantless arrest in his home. 

Savage’s suit was tried before a jury, and the jury rendered a 

verdict in favor of Sturdivant. We affirm.

On appeal, Savage first argues that the district court 

erred in denying his Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 motion for judgment as a 

matter of law on his claim that Sturdivant’s warrantless arrest 

violated his Fourth Amendment rights. We review de novo a 

district court’s denial of a Rule 50 motion for judgment as a 

matter of law. Sloas v. CSX Transp. Inc., 616 F.3d 380, 392 

(4th Cir. 2010). We must “view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party” and are obliged to affirm 

unless “the jury lacked a legally sufficient evidentiary basis 

to find in that party’s favor.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

The Fourth Amendment generally prohibits a warrantless 

arrest within a suspect’s home absent valid consent to entry or 

exigent circumstances. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 

181 (1990); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980). The 

voluntariness of consent is measured under the totality of the 

circumstances, considering the accused’s characteristics and the 
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conditions of the encounter, including the officer’s conduct. 

See United States v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647, 650 (4th Cir. 

1996). “A voluntary response to an officer’s knock at the front 

door of a dwelling does not generally implicate the Fourth 

Amendment . . . .” United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 493 

(4th Cir. 2001). However, the Fourth Amendment is implicated 

“when officers gain visual or physical access to a room after an 

occupant opens the door not voluntarily, but in response to a 

demand under color of authority.” United States v. Mowatt, 513 

F.3d 395, 400 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and 

alteration omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Kentucky v. 

King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011); see Johnson v. United States, 333 

U.S. 10, 12-13 (1948).

As the district court noted, this case is readily 

distinguishable from Mowatt. Viewing the totality of the 

circumstances in the light most favorable to Sturdivant, we 

conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 

finding that Savage voluntarily consented to Sturdivant’s entry 

into his bedroom. See Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650. Thus, we 

conclude that the district court did not err in denying Savage’s 

Rule 50 motion on this ground.

Savage next argues that the district court improperly 

instructed the jury by denying his proposed instructions and in 

providing misleading instructions on the issue of warrantless 
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arrest. We review a district court’s decision to give or not to 

give a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. A Helping 

Hand, LLC v. Baltimore County, Md., 515 F.3d 356, 370 (4th Cir. 

2006). “The test of the adequacy of jury instructions is 

whether the jury charge, construed as a whole, adequately states 

the controlling principle without misleading or confusing the 

jury.” Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 408 (4th Cir. 

1999).

We conclude that Savage’s proposed instructions would 

tend to confuse or mislead the jury and that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give these proposed 

instructions. Further, we conclude that the court’s 

instructions adequately described the law of consent and, 

because it properly informed the jury that the officer’s conduct 

was a relevant consideration in assessing consent, no further 

instruction under Mowatt was needed. Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 650. 

We also conclude that the jury instructions given on the issue 

of warrantless arrest would not tend to confuse or mislead the 

jury. The jury was permitted to find that Sturdivant could 

lawfully arrest Savage in his bedroom following Savage’s 

voluntary consent to entry if Sturdivant had probable cause to 

believe Savage had recently committed a felony. See Rodriguez, 

497 U.S. at 181 (noting that consent is valid exception to 

general rule that warrantless entry into home for arrest or 
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search is unreasonable); United States v. Stokes, 631 F.3d 802, 

807 (6th Cir.) (noting consent is valid exception to general 

prohibition against warrantless in-home arrest), cert. denied, 

131 S. Ct. 2946 (2011). We conclude that the jury instructions 

adequately conveyed this controlling principle and that the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the 

jury accordingly. See Chaudhry, 174 F.3d at 409.

Finally, Savage argues that the district court issued 

contradictory rulings by denying his motion for partial summary 

judgment as to the warrantless arrest claim because the parties 

had not addressed exigent circumstances, while later concluding 

that the parties failed to provide testimony regarding this 

issue at trial. We conclude Savage’s claim lacks merit. Thus, 

we need not resolve Savage’s contention that no exigent 

circumstances existed to justify the entry.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED