IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 21-0927

Filed September 22, 2021

IN THE INTEREST OF J.S.-M. and A.S.-M.,

Minor Children,

J.S.-M., Father,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (North) County, Ty Rogers, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to two children. 

AFFIRMED.

Alan N. Waples, Burlington, for appellant father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Natalie Deerr, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Alicia Stuekerjuergen, West Point, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
2

BADDING, Judge.

A father appeals a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to

seven-year-old J.S.-M. and five-year-old A.S.-M.1 He contends (1) the State failed 

to prove the statutory grounds for termination, (2) termination is not in the children’s 

best interests, and (3) his strong bond with the children should preclude 

termination. 

After conducting a de novo review of the record, we find clear and 

convincing evidence to support termination of parental rights under Iowa Code 

section 232.116(1)(f) (2021). See In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 

2021). We agree with the juvenile court that the children’s best interests are 

served by moving toward permanency with their aunt and uncle, and their need for 

long-term stability and safety overrides the closeness of the parent-child 

relationship. Thus, we affirm the termination order. 

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

The Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) intervened in late August 

2019 after receiving a report that J.S.-M. and A.S.-M., then ages five and three, 

were riding bicycles near a grocery store without supervision. During that

investigation, the mother threatened to kill two DHS workers, and she was arrested 

for harassment. After being released from jail, the mother admitted using illegal 

drugs while the children played outside. Based on that information, the juvenile 

court removed the children from her care in early September. The children have 

lived in foster care since then. 

 

1 The mother’s parental rights were also terminated. She is not a party to this 

appeal. 
3

At the temporary removal hearing, the court learned the father was 

incarcerated and could not be reached by his attorney. Given his unavailability 

and the mother’s mental-health and substance-abuse issues, the court adjudicated 

J.S.-M. and A.S.-M. as children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code 

sections 232.2(6)(c)(2), (n), and (p). Neither parent attended the October CINA 

hearing. 

That same month, the father was released from prison into the Fort Des 

Moines halfway house, where he remained through February 2020. While living 

there, he had regular phone calls and visits with the children. He obtained

employment as part of his probation, but changed jobs twice and struggled to

secure his own housing. By summer, he was no longer working and was living 

with his girlfriend in a small apartment. Despite noting a bond between the father

and children, and observing positive interactions between them, service providers 

worried about his ability to provide the children with a long-term stable home 

environment and financial support. 

After an August 2020 permanency hearing, the court granted a six-month 

extension based on the father’s progress during visits with the children. In the 

meantime, the court directed him to obtain housing and employment, participate in 

services, cooperate with visitation, and comply with random drug testing. But the 

father did the opposite. Over the next several months, he was inconsistent with

visits and grew hostile toward DHS workers and service providers. His interactions 

with the children moved to fully supervised because he refused to submit to drug 

testing. He also did not participate in any recommended mental-health services or

parenting classes. On top of that, the father continued to lack employment and 
4

financial stability. After nineteen months of services, the case manager reflected 

that “[t]he only stability he’s shown is his current home.” 

In February 2021, the State petitioned to terminate the father’s parental 

rights. Both DHS and the guardian ad litem agreed that moving toward 

permanency was the right course. When asked what he believed should be the 

next step, the father responded: “I would like for them to be placed with me and, 

you know, I would like for DHS to stay a part of this, you know, and see how things 

go to where if there is ever—if there’s a concern or danger it could be 

addressed.” Declining to grant another extension, the juvenile court terminated his 

parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f). The father appeals. 

II. Analysis

A. Statutory Grounds

First, the father challenges the statutory grounds for termination. Although 

he addresses both alternatives on appeal, we may affirm on any ground supported 

by the record. W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 313. We choose to focus on section 

232.116(1)(f). As is often the case, the father challenges only the fourth element 

of this ground—whether the children could be returned to his home at the present 

time. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “present 

time” to mean “the time of the termination hearing”). 

The father asserts the State’s evidence did not support the juvenile court’s

finding that “[he] was likely to neglect his children” or that he suffered from

unaddressed mental-health and substance-abuse issues. Put differently, he 

argues the record lacks clear and convincing evidence of an adjudicatory harm
5

within the meaning of section 232.102. See In re M.S., 889 N.W.2d 675, 680 (Iowa 

Ct. App. 2016).

Contrary to the father’s assertion, the juvenile court considered more than

concerns of neglect, mental health, and substance abuse. In addressing this fourth 

factor, the court pointed to his noncompliance and poor participation in services as

root causes for why the children could not be returned to his custody. The court 

found no reason to believe that, after months of refusing services and attending 

only a few in-person visits, the father was ready to be a full-time parent. 

We reach the same conclusion on our de novo review. Despite DHS’s 

repeated efforts, the father did not follow through on services or prioritize his 

interactions with the children. His visits were sporadic and inconsistent throughout 

the CINA case. He failed to appear for drug testing numerous times despite being

told that his interactions with the children would remain supervised until he 

provided a negative drug screen. He then completely disengaged in services 

during the six months that he should have been working toward reunification, going 

from July 2020 until February 2021 without any in-person visits with the children. 

By the time of the termination hearing in April 2021, the father’s progress 

remained “stagnant.” See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (noting 

that “once the limitations period lapses, termination proceedings must be viewed 

with a sense of urgency”). There were ongoing concerns about his housing, 

employment, and parenting skills. He had only recently reengaged in 

visitation. Given his limited interactions with the children, neither the case 

manager nor the service provider could attest to his ability to care for them on a 

day-to-day basis. In fact, they were doubtful that he had developed the necessary
6

skills for effective long-term parenting. Rather than counter that viewpoint, the 

father acknowledged that he had never cared for the children on his own and 

requested continued DHS involvement. By his own reflection, J.S.-M. and A.S.-M.

could not have safely returned to his care at the time of the termination 

hearing. For these reasons, termination was proper under section 232.116(1)(f). 

B. Best Interests

Next, we must decide whether termination is in the children’s best 

interests. In making this determination, we “give primary consideration to the 

child[ren]’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and 

growth of the child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and 

needs of the child[ren].” In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (alteration in 

original) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). Under the governing statute, we may 

also consider whether the children have “become integrated into the foster family 

to the extent that the child[ren]’s familial identity is with the foster family.” Iowa 

Code § 232.116(2)(b). 

The father asserts termination is not in the children’s best interests when 

“[t]here is no need to wait for either parent to become able to parent these 

children.” He emphasizes that “[he] has a home that is suitable for the children” 

and “a significant other who is fully employed,” pointing out that “they both have a 

good relationship with these children.” 

While those are positive attributes that may factor into the best-interests 

determination, the “defining elements” are the children’s safety and their need for 

a permanent home. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 802 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., 

concurring specially). At the time of the termination hearing, the father had been 
7

living with his girlfriend for less than one year. There was no evidence besides the 

father’s own testimony that his living situation was stable and suitable for the 

children in the long-term. Further, most of his interactions with the children were 

supervised and via videoconferencing. So we have no way to confirm the safety 

of his home environment without DHS involvement. 

In that same vein, the father’s disengagement made it difficult for service 

providers to assess his ability to meet the physical, mental, and emotional needs 

of the children. And his testimony reveals that he did not know what their needs 

were. When asked why he relied on service providers to communicate the 

children’s basic needs, the father responded: “When they’re in someone else’s 

custody, . . . I mean they’re not with me on a daily basis. How am I to know what 

they need?” Given these deficiencies, the juvenile court correctly refused to delay 

permanency “on the mere hope” that the father would soon learn to become a selfsufficient parent. 

Since their removal in 2019, both J.S.-M. and A.S.-M. have developed a 

strong attachment to their foster family, as well as their maternal aunt and uncle, 

according to their therapist. The aunt and uncle have expressed a desire to adopt 

the children and can provide them with a safe, stable, and nurturing home. After 

considering the relevant factors, we conclude termination is in the children’s best 

interests. 

C. Exceptions to Termination

As his third and final claim, the father argues the juvenile court should have 

considered his bond with the children as a reason not to terminate his parental 

rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c). This paragraph allows the court to 
8

avoid termination if clear and convincing evidence shows “termination would be 

detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child 

relationship.” 

By all accounts, the father developed a close bond with the children during 

visits. J.S.-M., in particular, grew attached to him. But that attachment has not 

been healthy for J.S.-M. When the father failed to consistently attend or participate 

in visits, J.S.-M. started displaying behavioral issues. His first-grade teachers 

reported that his demeanor changed and he became disrespectful. Similarly, his 

foster parents noticed he would exhibit child-like behavior after visits. Both J.S.-

M. and A.S.-M. have also needed counseling for their anxiety stemming from the 

CINA case. Based on these facts, we agree with the juvenile court’s assessment 

that none of the permissive statutory factors outweigh the children’s need for 

permanency. See W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 315. Thus, we affirm the termination 

order.

AFFIRMED.