Filed 5/29/24 Certified for Publication 6/21/24 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

RYAN OWEN FRAYO,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ANDREW D. MARTIN et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

 H050689

 (Santa Cruz County

 Super. Ct. No. 22CV00610)

Appellant Ryan Owen Frayo appeals the judgment entered after the trial court 

sustained a demurrer to his first amended complaint without leave to amend. After being 

terminated for refusing to take a COVID-19 test, Frayo sued his employer, A&A Organic 

Farms Corporation (A&A) and its owners, Andrew D. Martin and Aimee M. 

Raphael-Martin (collectively with A&A, respondents), alleging they violated the 

Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA) (Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.)1. After 

providing Frayo an opportunity to cure the defects in his initial complaint, the trial court 

sustained A&A’s demurrer to Frayo’s first amended complaint, finding Frayo failed to 

state a claim under the CMIA. For the reasons we explain below, we affirm. 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all undesignated statutory references are to the Civil 

Code.
2

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Ryan Owen Frayo was a salesman employed by A&A, owned by husband 

and wife, Andrew D. Martin and Aimee M. Raphael-Martin2. In August 2020, at the 

height of lockdowns and business shutdowns due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Frayo was 

a leading salesman for A&A.

When the pandemic started, A&A implemented COVID-19 guidelines to protect 

A&A’s employees and their families, including a requirement that its employees provide 

a negative COVID-19 test before returning to work if they were exposed to or exhibited 

symptoms consistent with the virus.

On May 17, 2021, Frayo sent text messages to Martin stating he was not feeling 

well, woke up drenched in sweat, and had a pounding headache. Pursuant to A&A’s 

COVID-19 guidelines, Martin requested that Frayo complete a COVID-19 test from a 

CVS pharmacy3 before returning to work. Frayo responded he did not want to get a 

COVID-19 test. Martin told Frayo “[i]f you decide not to take the test tomorrow, we will 

consider this your resignation.” 

The next day, Martin called Frayo to ask if he had taken the COVID-19 test and if 

he could provide Martin with the results. Frayo again declined, stating he was “not going 

to take a test and turn it over to [Martin] because doing so is against the law” and also 

against Frayo’s faith and beliefs. Frayo said he was not resigning but asked if A&A had 

terminated his employment based on his refusal to take the COVID-19 test. 

Ralphael-Martin told Frayo that A&A was consulting with legal counsel on the issue and 

would respond to him accordingly. On May 19, 2021, A&A informed Frayo that his

employment would be terminated “if he did not submit to take a COVID-19 test from 

2 For ease of reference, we refer to Andrew Martin as “Martin,” Aimee 

Raphael- Martin as “Raphael-Martin,” and the two together as “the individual 

defendants.”

3 Based on Frayo’s claims, we understand that a “COVID-19 test” refers to a third

party administered test, not a self-administered test.
3

CVS or other health care service provider and then disclose the information to his 

employer.” Frayo did not comply. The following day, A&A terminated Frayo’s 

employment. 

In March 2022, Frayo sued respondents, alleging two causes of action under 

section 56.20 of the CMIA. First, Frayo alleged respondents violated section 56.20, 

subdivision (b) (hereafter section 56.20(b)), by terminating his employment when he 

refused to provide a COVID-19 test result. Second, Frayo claimed respondents violated 

section 56.20, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 56.20(c)), when A&A used Frayo’s 

description of his symptoms to Martin (i.e., that he was feeling unwell, sweating and had 

a headache) as a basis to terminate his employment.

On May 9, 2022, Frayo voluntarily dismissed Martin and Raphael-Martin from the 

initial complaint without prejudice. A&A then demurred to the complaint, contending 

that Frayo failed to state a claim. A&A argued that Frayo did not and could not plead 

certain necessary elements under the CMIA, specifically that (1) A&A requested that 

Frayo sign an authorization to release his medical information as required by section 

56.20(b), and (2) A&A possessed Frayo’s “medical information” as defined under the 

CMIA as required for a claim under section 56.20(c). 

At the hearing on the demurrer, the trial court agreed with A&A that the elements 

had not been demonstrated and expressed doubt regarding Frayo’s ability to establish 

them. The trial court explained, “[t]he statute and the jury instructions are both very clear 

in what needs to be shown, whether—is there an authorization? Was there evidence of 

the—that the Defendant actually had medical information?”4 Frayo’s counsel 

4 A summary of the essential factual elements for a section 56.20(b) claim

provided in jury instructions CACI No. 3071 is as follows: (1) that defendant asked 

plaintiff to sign an authorization so that defendant can obtain medical information about 

plaintiff from his health care providers; (2) that plaintiff refused to sign the authorization; 

(3) that defendant engaged in retaliatory acts (e.g., termination of the plaintiff’s 

employment); (4) that plaintiff’s refusal to sign the authorization was a substantial 

(continued)
4

represented that the defects could be cured. The trial court sustained the demurrer but 

granted Frayo leave to amend. 

In his first amended complaint, although Frayo added new allegations, the ultimate 

facts alleged remained the same: respondents asked him to take a COVID-19 test before 

returning to work, he refused, and respondents terminated him on that basis. He again 

named Martin and Raphael-Martin as individual defendants. A&A demurred to the first 

amended complaint, again asserting Frayo had not pled the necessary facts to support a 

claim under the CMIA. A&A argued the demurrer should be sustained as to all 

defendants because the amended complaint failed to assert a claim against any defendant 

and because the CMIA applies only to employers, not individuals.

5

The trial court sustained A&A’s demurrer to the first amended complaint without 

leave to amend. As to Frayo’s first cause of action, the trial court concluded that he

failed to state a claim under section 56.20(b) because the statute prohibits employer 

discrimination based on an employee’s refusal to sign an authorization to release his 

medical information. The trial court stated, “Plaintiff alleges that he was asked and 

refused to take a COVID test—not that he refused to ‘sign an authorization.’ ”

Additionally, the trial court noted the exception to liability provided under section 

56.20(b) which states, “nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer from taking 

motivating reason for defendant’s decision; (5) that plaintiff was harmed; (6) that 

defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm; and (7) even if 

plaintiff proves all of the above, the defendant’s conduct was not unlawful if defendant 

provides the lack of medical information made it necessary to take the retaliatory action 

against plaintiff. 

5 The status of the individual defendants in the trial court is not clear on the record 

before us. It appears that Martin and Raphael-Martin did not individually appear or 

respond to the amended complaint in the trial proceedings as the demurrer to Frayo’s 

amended complaint was brought solely by A&A. However, the record is also silent as to 

whether Frayo obtained court approval to reinsert Martin and Raphael-Martin as 

defendants in the amended complaint and whether Frayo had effectuated service of the 

summons and amended complaint on the individual defendants. (Phoenix of Hartford 

Ins. Cos. v. Colony Kitchens (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 140, 147.)
5

such action as is necessary in the absence of medical information due to an employee’s 

refusal to sign an authorization . . . .” (§ 56.20(b).) The trial court reasoned A&A’s 

termination of Frayo’s employment qualified as a necessary action in the absence of 

Frayo’s COVID-19 test result, so long as A&A’s COVID-19 guidelines were otherwise 

lawful. Because Frayo did not allege A&A’s COVID-19 guidelines to be unlawful, the 

trial court concluded he failed to state a claim under section 56.20(b).

The trial court sustained the demurrer to Frayo’s second cause of action under 

section 56.20(c) because Frayo failed to allege A&A had possession of his medical 

information, as defined by the statue. In the first amended complaint, Frayo alleged the

information he provided to Martin about his illness, including his description of

symptoms, constituted medical information under the CMIA, and respondents’ use of that 

information to terminate him was a violation of section 56.20(c). In opposition to A&A’s

demurrer, Frayo conceded the symptom descriptions he relayed to Martin did not fall 

within the CMIA’s definition of medical information. Instead, Frayo argued the COVID19 test result A&A demanded from him constituted medical information under the CMIA

and A&A’s intent to use his test result to determine whether he could return to work 

without his signed authorization was a violation of section 56.20(c). The trial court 

rejected Frayo’s contentions, ruling that since Frayo alleged he never took the COVID-19 

test, A&A was never in possession of Frayo’s medical information as that term is defined 

under the CMIA, and thus could not have violated section 56.20(c). 

Following its orders sustaining A&A’s demurrer as to all claims, the trial court 

entered judgment in favor of respondents. Frayo timely appealed.6

6 On December 23, 2022, Frayo filed a notice of appeal challenging the order 

sustaining A&A’s demurrer. The judgment dismissing the action against all defendants 

being subsequently entered on March 8, 2023, on our own motion, we deemed Frayo’s 

notice of appeal filed as of that date.
6

II. DISCUSSION

Frayo argues the trial court wrongly interpreted and improperly applied sections

56.20(b) and (c) of the CMIA, and additionally erred when it dismissed the individual 

defendants from the complaint without a separate ruling on the issue of their personal

liability. Respondents contend the trial court properly applied the law, and because Frayo

was unable to provide factual allegations to satisfy the elements necessary under the 

CMIA, the dismissal was proper as to all defendants. We have independently reviewed

Frayo’s amended complaint and conclude that Frayo does not state a cognizable CMIA 

claim under either section 56.20(b) or (c). 

A. Standard of Review 

“ ‘The purpose of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of a complaint by raising 

questions of law.’ ” (Candelore v. Tinder, Inc. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1143.) “We 

review an order sustaining a demurrer de novo, exercising our independent judgment as 

to whether a cause of action has been stated as a matter of law.” (Thompson v. Ioane 

(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1190.) In doing so, “ ‘[w]e assume the truth of the properly 

pleaded factual allegations, [and] facts that reasonably can be inferred from those 

expressly pleaded.’ [Citation.] But we do not assume the truth of ‘contentions, 

deductions, or conclusions of law.’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the complaint ‘with 

a view to substantial justice between the parties,’ drawing ‘all reasonable inferences in 

favor of the asserted claims.’ [Citations.]” (Liapes v. Facebook, Inc. (2023) 95 

Cal.App.5th 910, 919.) “[B]ecause we are reviewing the trial court’s ruling and not its 

reasoning, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record regardless of whether 

the trial court relied upon it.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 

247 Cal.App.4th 953, 960.) 

“When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, ‘we decide whether there 

is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the 
7

trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of 

discretion and we affirm.’ [Citation.] Plaintiff has the burden to show a reasonable 

possibility the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action.” (Hamilton v. 

Greenwich Investors XXVI, LLC (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1602, 1609.) “Where, however, 

amendment could not correct a deficiency in the complaint . . . the demurrer is properly 

sustained without leave to amend.” (State of California Automobile Dismantlers Assn. v. 

Interinsurance Exchange (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 735, 742 (Automobile Dismantlers).) 

B. Frayo Failed to State a Cause of Action Under the CMIA

1. The Applicable CMIA Provisions

The Legislature enacted the CMIA “to protect the confidentiality of individually 

identifiable medical information obtained from a patient by a health care provider, while 

at the same time setting forth limited circumstances in which the release of such 

information to specified entities or individuals is permissible.” (Loder v. City of 

Glendale (1997) 14 Cal.4th 846, 859 (Loder).) Although the CMIA principally governs 

disclosures by health care providers, chapter three of the CMIA governs an employer’s

use and disclosure of an employee’s medical information. (§§ 56.20-56.245; Rossi v. 

Sequoia Union Elementary School (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 974, 986 (Rossi).)

Section 56.20 provides that an employer who receives the medical information of 

its employees must ensure its confidentiality. (Id., subd. (a).) Medical information is 

defined as “any individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical form, in 

possession of or derived from a provider of health care, health care service plan, 

pharmaceutical company, or contractor regarding a patient’s medical history, mental or 

physical condition, or treatment.” (§ 56.05, former subd. (i), now subd. (j), added by 

Stats. 2023, ch. 374, § 1.5, p. 92, eff. Jan. 1, 2024.

7

) 

7 The legislature amended portions of the CMIA throughout 2021 to 2024 which 

are not material to our analysis in this case. We cite to the former version of the statute 

effective at the time of the trial court’s ruling on A&A’s demurrer in November 2022.
8

Under section 56.20(c), absent certain exceptions, the employer in possession of 

the employee’s medical information cannot use or disclose such information “which the 

employer possesses pertaining to its employees without the patient having first signed an 

authorization under Section 56.11 [disclosure by health care providers, et al.] or Section 

56.21 [disclosure by employer] permitting such use or disclosure. . . .” (§ 56.20(c).) An 

“authorization” under the CMIA must, among other things, be in writing, signed, and 

dated by the patient or an authorized representative. (§ 56.05, subd. (a), added by Stats. 

2021, ch. 190, § 1; § 56.11, added by Stats. 2009, ch. 493, § 2; § 56.21, added by Stats. 

2006, ch. 538, § 39.) 

If an employee refuses to authorize the use or disclosure of his medical 

information, section 56.20(b) provides that “[n]o employee shall be discriminated against 

in terms or conditions of employment due to that employee’s refusal to sign an 

authorization under this part. However, nothing in this section shall prohibit an employer 

from taking such action as is necessary in the absence of medical information due to an 

employee’s refusal to sign an authorization . . . .” (§ 56.20(b).) 

2. Frayo’s Section 56.20(b) Claim

Frayo claims respondents discriminated against him in violation of 

section 56.20(b) by terminating his employment when he refused to take a third party 

administered COVID-19 test and provide the results to respondents.

Section 56.20(b) prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee 

for refusing to sign an authorization to release his medical information. (§ 56.20(b), 

[“No employee shall be discriminated against in terms or conditions of employment due 

to that employee’s refusal to sign an authorization under this part.”].) “An employer 

‘discriminates’ against an employee in violation of section 56.20, subdivision (b), if it 

improperly retaliates against or penalizes an employee for refusing to authorize the 

employee’s health care provider to disclose confidential medical information to the 

employer or others (see Civ. Code, § 56.11), or for refusing to authorize the employer to 
9

disclose confidential medical information relating to the employee to a third party (see 

Civ. Code, § 56.21).” (Loder, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 861.) 

The first two elements of a prima facie section 56.20(b) claim are “that 

defendants asked [plaintiff] to sign an ‘authorization’ (§§ 56.05, subd. (a), 56.11) and 

[plaintiff] refused to do so. (See CACI No. 3071.)” (Rossi, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at 

p. 989.) An “authorization” is defined in the CMIA as a written document that allows a 

health care provider or employer to disclose an individual’s medical information to 

others. (§ 56.05, subd. (a) [“permission granted in accordance with Section 56.11 or 

56.21 for the disclosure of medical information.”].) Sections 56.11 and 56.21 detail 

what must be included in an “authorization” under the CMIA, including typeface size, 

language clearly separated from any other print on the page, the signature of the patient 

and date of signature, the name of the employer authorized to disclose the medical 

information, limitations on the use of the medical information by the person authorized 

to receive the medical information, the date the document ceases to authorize an 

employer to release information, and the right of the patient to receive a copy of the 

authorization. (§§ 56.11, 56.21.) 

Frayo concedes respondents never requested that he sign a CMIA defined

authorization to release his medical information and he never refused to sign such an 

authorization. He argues instead that his refusal to take a COVID-19 test is equivalent

to a refusal to sign an authorization under the CMIA. Respondents argue that under the 

plain language of section 56.20(b), as the employer did not request Frayo to sign an 

authorization as defined in the CMIA, and he did not refuse to sign such authorization, 

Frayo cannot state a claim under section 56.20(b).

We find Rossi instructive here. Plaintiff, who was a school worker, was 

terminated for refusing to disclose her COVID-19 vaccination status or undergo weekly 

COVID-19 testing. (Rossi, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 979-982.) She sued the school 

district, school, and other individuals under the CMIA, alleging violations of sections
10

56.20 (b) and (c). (Id. at pp. 979, 982.) The trial court sustained defendants’ demurrer 

without leave to amend, and plaintiff appealed. (Id. at p. 984.) While the appellate 

court ultimately affirmed the trial court based on the necessity exception in section 

56.20(b), it expressed “some doubt as to whether plaintiff adequately pleaded the first 

two elements of a prima facie section 56.20(b) claim: that defendants asked her to sign 

an ‘authorization’ [citations] and she refused to do so. ” (Rossi, at p. 989.) Noting that 

the trial court concluded a refusal to take a test or to release medical information are 

“ ‘akin to refusing to sign an authorization,’ ” the Rossi court disagreed. (Id. at pp. 989-

990.) “We do not wish to imply that a literal authorization form is always required to 

state a section 56.20(b) claim; what is important is that there be allegations that the 

employer was actually seeking the plaintiff’s permission to obtain her medical 

information from a healthcare provider.” (Rossi, at p. 990, fn. 11, italics added.) The 

appellate court acknowledged that the plaintiff was required by her employer to submit

confirmation of her vaccination status, which would have qualified as medical 

information under the CMIA. (Ibid.) However, the school asked plaintiff herself to 

provide the confirming medical information, and did not seek permission to obtain the 

information from her healthcare provider. (Ibid.)

Here, as in Rossi, while the results of a COVID-19 test would necessarily include 

medical information derived from a health care provider, the first amended complaint 

contained no allegation that A&A requested Frayo to authorize his health care provider to 

disclose the results of such a test to A&A. Instead, as in Rossi, Frayo alleged A&A asked 

him to personally provide proof of a negative test result from a third party provider 

before returning to work, which Frayo refused to provide. Based on the plain language of 

the statute, these facts do not establish a prima facie section 56.20(b) claim. We decline 

to treat an employee’s refusal to take and provide the results of a COVID-19 test as akin 

to an “employee’s refusal to sign an authorization” under the CMIA.
11

Frayo further claims that the “CMIA was triggered because he was forced to 

provide a COVID-19 test from a third party health care provider and was unable to use an 

at-home test.” Frayo’s interpretation of section 56.20(b) would extend the CMIA to 

regulate employer-mandated COVID-19 testing methods and policies. In Loder, our 

Supreme Court determined that section 56.20(b) of the CMIA “does not prohibit an 

employer from disqualifying an applicant or employee who refuses to authorize 

disclosure to the employer of the ultimate results” of an employee drug testing program,

so long as the program is otherwise lawful. (Loder, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 862.) The 

court noted that the Legislature did not intend that section 56.20(b) regulate the 

circumstances of employer mandated medical examinations or drug tests as other federal 

and state regulations exist to directly address those issues. “[T]here is nothing in the 

language of legislative history of [the CMIA] to suggest that the Legislature, in drafting 

this enactment, ever considered the entirely distinct question of whether, and under what 

circumstances, an employer may require a . . . current employee to submit to an 

employer-administered medical examination or drug test as a condition of employment.” 

(Ibid., italics omitted.) Whether the court’s reasoning in Loder applies equally to an 

employer’s mandated COVID-19 protocol that requires proof of a negative third party 

administered test has not been decided by any court.

As we conclude that Frayo cannot adequately plead the first two elements of a 

prima facie claim under section 56.20(b), we need not resolve this issue. For the same 

reason, we do not determine whether the trial court erred when it determined that the 

“necessary action” exception outlined in section 56.20(b) shields A&A from liability as a 

matter of law. And because we determine that the first amended complaint did not put 

forth a viable cause of action under section 56.20(b), we find that Frayo suffered no 

infringement of his right to due process.

Because Frayo has not argued or shown a reasonable possibility that the defects in 

his section 56.20(b) claim could be cured by amendment, the trial court properly 
12

sustained the demurrer to this cause of action without leave to amend. (Automobile 

Dismantlers, supra,180 Cal.App.3d at p. 742.) 

3. Frayo’s Section 56.20(c) Claim

We also conclude that the first amended complaint fails to adequately plead the 

prima facie elements of a section 56.20(c) claim because Frayo did not allege facts from 

which we can infer that respondents used “medical information which . . . [they] 

possesse[d] pertaining to [him].” (§ 56.20(c).)

In the first amended complaint, Frayo alleged respondents violated section 

56.20(c) by using the “medical information” he provided without his authorization, which 

consisted of his statement that he was ill and a description of his symptoms, as the basis 

to terminate him. Frayo does not argue this theory on appeal, and properly so. Under the 

CMIA, Frayo’s description of his own symptoms does not constitute “medical 

information” which is defined as information provided from “a provider of health care, 

health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor.” (§ 56.05, subd. (j); 

Rossi, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 996-997.)

Instead, Frayo now argues respondents violated section 56.20(c) by failing to

provide him with an authorization form before asking him to take the COVID-19 test and 

by forcing Frayo to provide his COVID-19 test result. Frayo asserts without supporting 

authority that “when an employer seeks medical information from its employee, the 

employer must provide the employee with an authorization. . . .” But the language of 

section 56.20(c) contains no such requirement. The statute simply states, absent certain 

exceptions not relevant here, “[n]o employer shall use, disclose, or knowingly permit its 

employees or agents to use or disclose medical information which the employer possesses 

pertaining to its employees without the patient having first signed an authorization . . . .” 

(§ 56.20(c).) We are without authority to add the requirement that an employer seeking 

an employee’s medical information must provide an authorization to the employee as
13

Frayo desires here. “A court ‘may not rewrite a statute, either by inserting or omitting 

language, to make it conform to a presumed intent that is not expressed.’ ” (Kaanaana v. 

Barrett Business Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 171.)

Further, because section 56.20(c) describes the use of “medical information which 

the employer possesses pertaining to its employees,” the plain language of section 

56.20(c) limits its application to employers who already have possession of the 

employee/patient’s CMIA defined medical information, prohibiting such employers from 

using or disclosing that information without the employee’s authorization. Based on this

statutory language, the court in Rossi, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pages 996-997, concluded 

that to successfully assert liability under section 56.20(c), the plaintiff must allege that

the employer used medical information received from the employee’s health care 

provider. In Rossi, plaintiff alleged defendants violated section 56.20(c) because the 

school’s classification of Rossi as “unvaccinated,” was used without her authorization 

and as a basis for her termination. (Id. at pp. 981-982.) The appellate court concluded 

that the school’s classification of plaintiff as “unvaccinated” was not based on medical 

information received by the school, as plaintiff refused to disclose such information. (Id. 

at pp. 996-997.) “Without any factual allegations that [respondents] received any 

‘medical information,’ such as medical records, a medical certification, or other 

information in ‘electronic or physical form . . . derived from a provider of health care’ 

[citation], the complaint fails to state a cause of action for unauthorized use of such 

information under section 56.20(c).” (Id. at p. 997.) We perceive no sound reason to 

disagree with this interpretation of the statute.

As in Rossi, Frayo has not alleged that respondents received any medical 

information “derived from a provider of health care” under the CMIA. Indeed, Frayo 

conceded he never took the COVID-19 test, and thus it would be impossible for 

respondents to be in possession of medical information related to the test. As in Rossi, 

without factual allegations establishing that respondents actually received or were in 
14

possession of Frayo’s medical information as defined under the CMIA, he fails to state a 

claim that respondents used this information without his authorization under section

56.20(c). Frayo has not argued nor shown a reasonable possibility that he could establish 

this element by amendment. Accordingly, the trial court properly sustained the demurrer

to his second cause of action without leave to amend.

C. No Error in Dismissing the First Amended Complaint as to All Parties

Frayo contends the trial court erred when it dismissed the lawsuit in its entirety

without ruling on the issue of whether Martin and Raphael-Martin could be individually 

liable under CMIA. Frayo requests that we rule on this issue “to streamline subsequent 

litigation.” Respondents argue the CMIA applies only to employers. Additionally, 

respondents argue that if Frayo is unable to state a cause of action against A&A, then 

claims against the owners of A&A individually based on the same allegations cannot be 

sustained. 

We need not decide whether the CMIA applies solely to employers. At oral 

argument, Frayo’s counsel conceded that Frayo’s causes of action against the individual 

defendants are predicated upon the same facts as his claims against A&A. As we have 

concluded that the facts alleged in the first amended complaint failed to establish a viable 

claim under the CMIA as a matter of law, we determine that the trial court did not err in 

dismissing the entire action. (See, e.g., Pierce v. San Mateo County Sheriff’s Dept.

(2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 995, 1020-1021 [“In some cases, it may be appropriate to 

dismiss an action even as to Doe defendants after a successful demurrer by a named 

defendant, for example, where the basis for the successful demurrer applies equally to the 

Doe defendants.”].)

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their costs on 

appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1)(2).)
15

_______________________________

Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________________________________

 Bamattre-Manoukian, J.

______________________________________

 Adams, J.*

H050689 

Frayo v. Martin et al.

_____________

* Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
1

Filed 6/21/24

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

RYAN OWEN FRAYO

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ANDREW D. MARTIN, et al.,

Defendants and Respondents. 

H050689

Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 22CV00610

BY THE COURT:

The order filed on June 18, 2024, granting the request for publication is amended 

as follows.

The written opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on May 29, 2024, was not 

certified for publication in the Official Reports. Upon application of respondents A&A 

Organic Farms Corporation, Andrew D. Martin and Aimee M. Raphael-Martin, and good 

cause appearing, it is ordered that the opinion shall be certified for publication pursuant 

to rule 8.1105(b) of the California Rules of Court. It is therefore ordered that the opinion 

be published in the Official Reports.

(Greenwood, P.J., and Bamattre-Manoukian, J. participated in this decision.)

Date: _______________ ___________________________________ P.J.
2

Trial Court: Santa Cruz County Superior Court

 Superior Court No: 22CV00610

Trial Judge: The Honorable Timothy Volkmann

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant

Ryan Owen Frayo:

Emilio Rene Dorame-Martinez, 

Martinez Law Office

Howard Lawrence Williams

Attorneys for Defendant and Respondents

A&A Organic Farms Corporation, 

Andrew D. Martin, and 

Aimee M. Raphael-Martin:

Mark Patrick Iezza, 

Iezza & Hockel, PC

Thomas Kevin Hockel

Iezza & Hockel, PC.

Eileen Mary Rice

Klein, Hockel, Iezza & Patel, P.C

Frayo v. Martin et al.

H050689