UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-4178

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ISMIL RASHEED JEFFERS, a/k/a Ismil Gray,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Raleigh. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (5:16-cr-00079-FL-1)

Submitted: December 29, 2017 Decided: February 13, 2018

Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Scott L. Wilkinson, SCOTT L. WILKINSON & ASSOCIATES, P.C., Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, 

OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Ismil Rasheed Jeffers pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to two counts of 

being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) 

(2012). On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 

738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning 

whether (1) the district court erred in applying U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2K2.1(a)(2) (2016) because Jeffers did not have two prior convictions for crimes of 

violence or controlled substance offenses; and (2) the district court erred in enhancing 

Jeffers’ sentence based on the possession of three to seven firearms under USSG 

§ 2K2.1(b)(1)(A). Jeffers has filed a pro se brief alleging that the district court erred by: 

(1) failing to group the offenses for sentencing purposes; (2) assigning three criminal 

history points for a previous conviction; and (3) applying a sentencing enhancement for 

obstruction of justice. He also reiterates counsel’s arguments regarding the firearm 

enhancement and the § 2K2.1(a)(2) enhancement. We affirm.

With regard to Jeffers’ first argument, we conclude that the district court did not 

err in applying USSG § 2K2.1(a)(2). Under either the 2015 or 2016 version of the 

Sentencing Guidelines, Jeffers’ prior North Carolina conviction for common law robbery 

qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Gattis, 877 F.3d 150, 158 (4th Cir. 

2017) (holding that North Carolina common law robbery matches generic contemporary 

meaning of robbery); United States v. Williams, 697 Fed. App’x 209, 210–11 (concluding 

that North Carolina common law robbery is a crime of violence under the 2015 

Sentencing Guidelines). As to Jeffers’ North Carolina conviction for possession with 
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intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver heroin, the Guidelines define a controlled substance 

offense as any “offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term 

exceeding one year, that prohibits . . . the possession of a controlled substance . . . with 

intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” USSG § 4B1.2(b). North 

Carolina law provides that it is unlawful for any person to “possess with intent to 

manufacture, sell or deliver, a controlled substance.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) 

(2015). Heroin, the drug involved in the predicate offense at issue, is classified as a 

Schedule I narcotic. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-89(2)(j) (2015). Possession with intent to 

distribute a Schedule I narcotic constitutes a Class H felony, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a), 

(b)(1) (2015), which is punishable by up to 14 months’ imprisonment. N.C. Gen. Stat. 

§ 15A-1340.17(c), (d) (2015). Thus, Jeffers’ conviction fits comfortably within the 

definition of a controlled substance offense.

We also conclude that sufficient evidence supported the district court’s factual 

conclusion that Jeffers possessed a firearm in September 2015. See United States v. 

Thompson, 874 F.3d 412, 414 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding factual Guidelines errors are 

reviewed for clear error). Notably, Jeffers was driving and was in control of the vehicle 

in which the firearm was discovered beneath Jeffers’ seat and within his reach, and a

statement given by a passenger supported the conclusion that the firearm belonged to 

Jeffers. The sum of the evidence indicates that Jeffers at least constructively possessed 

the firearm. See United States v. Al Sabahi, 719 F.3d 305, 311 (4th Cir. 2013) (setting 

forth standard for constructive possession). Therefore, the district court’s conclusion is 

not clearly erroneous.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case 

including the issues raised in Jeffers’ pro se brief, and have found no meritorious grounds

for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that 

counsel inform Jeffers, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United 

States for further review. If Jeffers requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes 

that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to 

withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was 

served on Jeffers.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process.

AFFIRMED