UNITED STATES NAVY–MARINE CORPS

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

_________________________

No. 201700214

_________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Appellee

v.

KANIEL L. MACDONALD

Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps

Appellant

_________________________

Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary

Military Judge: Lieutenant Colonel Keith A. Parrella, USMC.

Convening Authority: Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Installations East – Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune, North 

Carolina.

Staff Judge Advocate’s Recommendation: Captain Jenna E. Reed, 

USMC. 

For Appellant: Commander R.D. Evans, Jr., JAGC, USN. 

For Appellee: Captain Luke Huisenga, USMC; Lieutenant Megan P. 

Marinos, JAGC, USN.

_________________________

Decided 19 July 2018

_________________________

Before WOODARD, MARKS, and JONES, Appellate Military Judges

_________________________

This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but may be cited as 

persuasive authority under NMCCA Rule of Practice and Procedure 

18.2.

_________________________

JONES, Senior Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial convicted the 

appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of willful disobedience of a superior 

commissioned officer, eight specifications of assault consummated by a 

battery, one specification of adultery, one specification of communicating a 
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

2

threat, and one specification of negligent endangerment of a child, in 

violation of Articles 90, 128, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 890, 928, and 934. The military judge sentenced the 

appellant to 30 months’ confinement, reduction to pay grade E-1, forfeiture of 

all pay and allowances, and a dishonorable discharge. The convening 

authority (CA) approved the sentence as adjudged but, pursuant to a pretrial 

agreement, suspended all confinement in excess of 24 months. Except for the 

dishonorable discharge, the CA ordered the sentence executed. 

The appellant asserts two assignments of error (AOEs): (1) he suffered 

pretrial punishment in violation of Article 13, UCMJ, entitling him to 

additional day-for-day credit; and (2) he was denied a fair sentencing hearing 

by the trial counsel’s inflammatory sentencing argument. We disagree and, 

finding no error materially prejudicial to the substantial rights of the 

appellant, affirm the findings and sentence. Arts. 59(a) and 66(c), UCMJ.

I. BACKGROUND

In March 2013, the appellant began working as a correctional specialist at 

the Marine Corps Installation East Regional Brig (the Brig)1 at Camp 

Lejeune, North Carolina. Three and one-half years later he became a pretrial 

detainee there. Beginning in September 2016, he spent 226 days of pretrial 

confinement housed in administrative segregation, also known as special 

quarters. Upon arriving at the Brig, the appellant was first placed in special 

quarters because his charges included rape, sexual assault, aggravated 

assault, and the attempted killing of an unborn child. According to the Naval 

Corrections Manual, Bureau of Naval Personnel Instruction 1640.22 (29 Mar 

2011), these charges qualified him as potentially violent and dangerous. But 

even after the appellant was no longer deemed potentially violent and 

dangerous, he remained in special quarters because of his former position as 

a correctional specialist at the Brig. The Brig Officer testified that former 

staff members of Navy-Marine Corps brigs are always placed in 

administrative segregation to prevent them from being harassed or harmed 

by other prisoners, and because their knowledge of brig procedures may pose 

a threat to the security of the facility, the guards, or other inmates.

With regard to the second AOE, during the government’s sentencing 

argument, the trial counsel argued that: (1) the appellant “preyed on a 

child;”2(2) the appellant “turned his back” on the “honorable traditions of the 

United States Marine Corps” and had “disgraced the uniform that we 

 

1 This particular facility where the appellant was a detainee is referred to as the 

“Brig,” while military confinement facilities generally are referred to as “brigs.”

2 Record at 80.
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

3

[wear;]”

3 and (3) “the Marine Corps does not and will not tolerate within its 

ranks”4 servicemembers like the appellant. The defense counsel did not object 

to any of the statements. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Article 13, UCMJ, unlawful pretrial punishment

The appellant renews on appeal his trial motion for relief for illegal 

pretrial punishment. Specifically, he contends that the 226 days of pretrial 

confinement he spent in administrative segregation from the general 

population constituted pretrial punishment in violation of Article 13, UCMJ. 

Accordingly, he requests that we grant him an additional 226 days of credit 

beyond the day-for-day credit he received pursuant to United States v. Allen, 

17 M.J. 126 (C.M.A. 1984). We decline to grant such relief.

“The burden is on [the] appellant to establish entitlement to additional 

sentence credit because of a violation of Article 13[, UCMJ].” United States v. 

Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing R.C.M. 905(c)(2)). Whether an 

appellant is entitled to relief for a violation of Article 13, UCMJ, is a mixed 

question of law and fact. Id. (citing United States v. Smith, 53 M.J. 168, 170 

(2000); United States v. McCarthy, 47 M.J. 162, 165 (C.A.A.F. 1997)) 

(additional citation omitted). “We will not overturn a military judge's findings 

of fact, including a finding of no intent to punish, unless they are clearly 

erroneous. . . . We will review de novo the ultimate question whether [this] 

appellant is entitled to credit for a violation of Article 13[, UCMJ].” Id. (citing 

Smith, 53 M.J. at 170).

Article 13, UCMJ, states that “[n]o person, while being held for trial, may 

be subjected to punishment or penalty other than arrest or confinement upon 

the charges pending against him, nor shall the arrest or confinement imposed 

upon him be any more rigorous than the circumstances required to insure his 

presence[.]” In other words, Article 13, UCMJ, prohibits two things: (1) 

pretrial punishment; and (2) conditions of pretrial confinement that are more 

rigorous than necessary. “The burden is on [the] appellant to establish 

entitlement to additional sentence credit because of a violation of Article 13[, 

UCMJ].” United States v. Mosby, 56 M.J. 309, 310 (C.A.A.F. 2002) (citing 

RULE FOR COURTS-MARTIAL 905(c)(2), MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,

UNITED STATES (2000 ed.)).

 

3 Id. at 78.

4 Id.
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

4

1. No pretrial punishment

When assessing whether the appellant was punished in pretrial

confinement, we initially look to whether the government intended to punish 

him, ‘“which is determined by examining the purposes served by the 

restriction or condition, and whether such purposes are reasonably related to 

a legitimate governmental objective.”’ Howell v. United States, 75 M.J. 386, 

393 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (quoting United States v. Palmiter, 20 M.J. 90, 95 

(C.M.A. 1985)). If we find no intent to punish, we then examine whether the 

particular conditions of the pretrial confinement, which may appear on their 

face to be punishment, are tied to legitimate nonpunitive governmental 

objectives. Id.

At trial, the appellant argued that his administrative segregation 

stemmed from “the [B]rig personnel’s frustration with [him] from when he 

was a Correctional Specialist.” During his tour there, he was “nonrecommended for promotion seven times and received three official 

counselings[.]”5 Unconvinced, the military judge concluded that the appellant 

“ha[d] not presented any evidence demonstrating intent by [B]rig officials to 

punish [him].”6

Finding no intent to punish, the military judge considered whether the 

appellant’s conditions of confinement were an incident of a legitimate 

nonpunitive governmental objective. Id. Where “a particular condition or 

restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate 

governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’” 

Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). Legitimate governmental objectives 

include protection of the welfare and safety of the confinement facility and 

the appellant. See United States v. Mack, 65 M.J. 108, 109 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

While assessing whether a brig policy or decision is in furtherance of a 

legitimate governmental objective, courts must remain “reluctant to secondguess the security determinations of confinement officials.” United States v. 

King, 61 M.J. 225, 228 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (citing McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 167-68). 

To this end, the Supreme Court has cautioned that courts should accord brig 

officials “wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and 

practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and 

discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547

(citations omitted); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) (“Such 

considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise 

of correction officials, and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the 

 

5 Appellate Exhibit (AE) V at 3. 

6 AE XII at 4. 
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

5

record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these 

considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in 

such matters.”). We, too, have “recognize[d] that such personnel are generally 

much better equipped than are we to make such tough calls.” United States v. 

Anderson, 49 M.J. 575, 577 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). 

Here, the military judge’s specific finding that the appellant’s 

administrative segregation “was not intended as punishment”7is amply 

supported by the record.8 The appellant was placed in special quarters based 

on an unwritten Brig policy requiring that all former Brig corrections 

personnel in pretrial confinement be housed in special quarters. The Brig 

Officer testified that this has been the policy of all Navy-Marine Corps brigs 

at which he has served over his 20-year career.9 Still, the appellant contends 

this policy is arbitrary and capricious, therefore constituting illegal 

punishment both in general10 and as applied to his case. We, like the military 

judge, disagree. 

The appellant was confined at the very brig he had worked in for more 

than three years prior to his pretrial confinement. He was under the watch of 

security personnel who had recently considered him a colleague and vice 

versa. Unsurprisingly, the military judge found that as “a former guard, the 

[appellant] had knowledge of brig procedures, security protocol, and staff 

members.”11 The military judge concluded that: “the Brig had a legitimate 

governmental interest in ensuring that the [appellant] did not share this 

insider information with his fellow detainees lest it pose a threat to the 

security of the facility, the guards, or his fellow inmates.”12 These findings are 

not clearly erroneous and are fully supported by the record. The deference 

accorded brig officials in deciding the classification of detainees applies to 

“prophylactic or preventative measures intended to reduce the incidence of 

. . . breaches of prison discipline.” United States v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 

(1986). The Brig policy of segregating the appellant as a former staff member

is an appropriate prophylactic measure to “ensure the safety of inmates and 

 

7 Id. at 2. 

8 During sentencing, the military judge questioned the Brig Officer whether 

“there was . . . any intent to place [the appellant] in segregation as a form of 

punishment[,]” to which the witness responded, “No, sir.” Record at 100. 

9 AE XII at 2.

10 “Any detainee could end up in special quarters for the ostensible ‘purposes of 

control and preserving order.”’ Appellant’s Brief of 22 Sep 2017 at 8. 

11 AE XII at 4. 

12 Id.
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

6

corrections personnel and to prevent escape or unauthorized entry.” Bell, 441 

U.S. at 547 (1979).

Moreover, within eight days of switching from watchful guard to patrolled 

detainee, the appellant “was overheard talking to a fellow detainee about a 

brig staff member—one of the very concerns underlying the brig policy in 

question.”13 At his initial 30-day status review, Brig officials decided to 

continue his administrative segregation “due to his status as a former brig 

guard” and “based, in part, on his conduct while in confinement.”

14

Isolating correctional specialists from other detainees while in pretrial

confinement is not novel to the military. As the military judge noted in his 

ruling, such a policy is “similar to the isolation often accorded civilian police 

officers who are placed in jails or prisons.”15 This longstanding practice in 

civilian correctional facilities has withstood legal scrutiny. See, e.g., Anderson 

v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting county jail’s 

policy of placing former police and correctional officers into administrative 

segregation); United States v. Zuni, 506 F.Supp.2d 663, 685 (D.N.M. 2007) 

(finding it “very likely” that defendant would have to serve his sentence in 

solitary confinement because of his background as former law enforcement 

officer), aff’d, 273 Fed. Appx. 733 (10th Cir. 2008); Valentin v. Murphy, 95 

F.Supp.2d 99, 102 (D. Conn. 2000) (“[h]aving determined initially that [a 

detainee] would be at risk in the general state prison population, based on his 

status as an ex-law enforcement officer, the defendants were not obliged to 

revisit that decision in the absence of information that the risk had 

dissipated”).

In sum, segregating the appellant in special quarters served three 

preeminent safety concerns, any one of which would justify the policy: 

upholding security within the facility, protecting the guards from the dangers 

of leaked insider knowledge, and shielding the appellant from potential 

maltreatment by fellow detainees. Thus, the unwritten policy of placing 

former correctional specialists in special quarters supported legitimate 

governmental objectives and did not inflict unlawful pretrial punishment. 

The military judge’s findings of fact are supported by the record and are 

not clearly erroneous. Nor are his conclusions of law incorrect. Therefore, 

 

13 AE XII at 4.

14 Id. Such a review process was maintained throughout the appellant’s pretrial

confinement. The intention was to eventually transfer him from the facility to 

another brig so that guards and fellow detainees would not recognize the appellant as 

a correctional specialist. Record at 94.

15 AE XII at 4. 
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

7

“we, like the judge, decline to engage in second-guessing the decision of the 

brig authorities.” McCarthy, 47 M.J. at 167. We turn next to focus with more

particularity on the circumstances of the appellant’s pretrial confinement. 

2. No unduly rigorous circumstances of pretrial confinement

Article 13, UCMJ, also prohibits the imposition of unduly rigorous 

circumstances during pretrial confinement. “Conditions that are sufficiently 

egregious may give rise to a permissive inference that an accused is being 

punished, or the conditions may be so excessive as to constitute punishment.” 

United States v. Harris, 66 M.J. 166, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2008) (citations omitted).

Here, the military judge found that the appellant failed to show any 

unduly rigorous circumstances that would constitute punishment.

The conditions of the accused’s pretrial confinement were 

identical in almost every respect to his fellow pretrial 

detainees, except for the obvious segregation. He was housed in 

an identical cell, ate the same food, and had access to the same 

visitation and recreation. The accused also received periodic 

mental health evaluations to ensure he remained mentally fit 

for assignment to special quarters.16 

We agree with the military judge. The appellant did not endure any 

unduly rigorous circumstances; he merely experienced life as a detainee in 

special quarters. The appellant offers no authority that an accused 

legitimately placed in special quarters automatically suffers from unduly 

rigorous circumstances. In fact, this is not the law. The Court of Appeals for 

the Armed Forces has denied Article 13, UCMJ, relief for conditions worse 

than those experienced by the appellant.

17 Indeed, the appellant suffered 

nothing more than the inherent conditions of his legitimate detention—albeit 

in solitary confinement. The Supreme Court has stated that this

inconvenience of being detained is not tantamount to punishment.

Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial center, 

the purpose of the facility is to detain. . . . And the fact that 

 

16 Id. (footnote omitted). The military judge did note that the appellant received 

less recreation and exercise time during the weekends than those who were not in 

special quarters. However, he did “not find that distinction excessive or overly 

burdensome to the accused.” Id. at n.7.

17 See Harris, 66 M.J. 168-69 (rejecting the appellant’s claim that “the conditions 

of his pretrial confinement in maximum custody were unduly rigorous in that he was 

forced to remain in his cell twenty-one hours each day, wear shackles during his twohour television break, eat his meals in his cell, endure roaches and mice in his cell, 

and endure dire heat due to a lack of air conditioning”).
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

8

such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable 

desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little 

restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the 

conditions or restrictions of detention into “punishment.”

Bell, 441 U.S. at 537.

Additionally, as the military judge noted, the appellant did not raise 

pretrial punishment as an issue at arraignment18 nor at any other time prior 

to the week of his scheduled providence inquiry.

19 The appellant first 

complained of the conditions of his pretrial confinement in a motion filed “10 

days after the judicially ordered deadline for the filing of pretrial motions.”

20

 

Strikingly, this juncture marked 224 days spent by the appellant in pretrial

confinement without “seek[ing] redress from his commanding officer, the 

military magistrate, the convening authority, or [the trial] Court.”21 This was 

not for lack of knowledge—to the contrary, the appellant “had a right to 

appear before the Board in order to dispute his assignment” of administrative 

segregation, yet declined each time, totaling 10 forgone opportunities.22

Although he did preserve this issue for appeal, the appellant’s failure to raise 

a claim of pretrial punishment earlier is some evidence that he was not 

suffering unduly rigorous circumstances. See King, 61 M.J. at 228.

The military judge’s findings of fact are supported by the record and are 

not clearly erroneous. Nor are his conclusions of law incorrect. We conclude 

that the appellant’s placement in special quarters was not punishment, and 

he did not suffer unduly rigorous conditions while in pretrial confinement.

B. Improper sentencing argument

The appellant alleges that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing 

because the government made improper argument. The appellant raises this 

issue for the first time on appeal, having not objected at trial to any portion of 

the government’s sentencing argument.

We review allegations of improper argument de novo. United States v. 

Sewell, 76 M.J. 14, 18 (C.A.A.F. 2017). “If proper objection is made, we review 

for prejudicial error. If no objection is made, we hold the appellant has 

forfeited his right to appeal and review for plain error. The burden of proof

 

18 The appellant was arraigned on 15 March 2017. AE XII at 3. 

19 The military judge accepted the appellant’s guilty pleas and convicted him of 

his offenses on 28 April 2017. Id.

20 Id. (footnote omitted).

21 Id. at 5. 

22 Id. at 3. 
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

9

under plain error review is on the appellant.” United States v. Andrews, 77

M.J. 393, 2018 CAAF LEXIS 294, at *6 (C.A.A.F. May 22, 2018) (internal 

citations omitted). “Plain error occurs when (1) there is error, (2) the error is 

plain or obvious, and (3) the error results in material prejudice to a 

substantial right of the accused.” United States v. Fletcher, 62 M.J. 175, 179 

(C.A.A.F. 2005) (citation omitted). We do not find any of the trial counsel’s 

statements to be plain error. 

First, the trial counsel’s use of the word “prey” encompassed the 

appellant’s violence and neglect to a number of people close to him. The trial 

counsel argued that the appellant “preyed on a child, preyed on two women, 

and these were people who should have been able to rely on him more than 

anyone else for care and protection.”23 He further argued, “[f]ar from 

protecting them, the accused preyed repeatedly on all of these intimate 

partners and close immediate family members, by either beating them or 

neglecting them according to his own selfish whims.”24 Considering the 

appellant’s wide swath of criminal activity, which included violence against 

two women, his threat to kill his unborn child, and his culpably negligent 

failure to feed an infant in his care, the trial counsel’s characterization—

while not ideal—was not beyond the pale.

Second, the trial counsel’s argument that the appellant had “turned his 

back” on the “honorable traditions of the United States Marine Corps” and 

“disgraced the uniform that we wear” was not error.25 Contrary to the 

appellant’s argument, the trial counsel’s statements did not impermissibly 

personalize the sentencing argument by asking the military judge to put 

himself in the place of a victim or a relative. See United States v. Marsh, 70 

M.J. 101, 106 (C.A.A.F. 2011). The trial counsel’s statements had a direct 

nexus to two of his offenses under Article 134, UCMJ—wrongfully 

communicating a threat to kill an unborn child26 and child endangerment—

which require proof of detriment to good order and discipline or service 

discrediting conduct.

27 During the providence inquiry, the appellant admitted 

that his conduct was service discrediting because “[i]f the public were to find 

out that a Marine was threatening a pregnant woman[]”28 and “[i]f the public 

 

23 Record at 80.

24 Id. at 78.

25 Id.

26 Charge Sheet preferred on 23 Nov 2016.

27 Charge Sheet preferred on 27 Jan 2017.

28 Record at 34.
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

10

knew that a Marine wasn’t taking care of [his] child,”29 both “would look 

badly [sic] on the Marine Corps.”30 Moreover, the trial counsel’s comments 

also have a connection to the appellant’s guilty plea to disobeying the lawful 

command of his superior commissioned officer.31

Third, we find no error in the trial counsel’s remark that “the Marine 

Corps does not and will not tolerate within its ranks, men who prey on 

innocent members of the community, of their family, in this way.”

32 We find 

this comment within the permissible limits of arguing general deterrence for 

the appellant’s egregious criminal conduct. “During sentencing argument, the 

trial counsel is at liberty to strike hard, but not foul, blows. As a zealous 

advocate for the government, trial counsel may argue the evidence of record, 

as well as all reasonable inferences fairly derived from such evidence.” United 

States v. Halpin, 71 M.J. 477, 479 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (citations and internal 

quotation marks omitted). We are cognizant that “the argument by a trial 

counsel must be viewed within the context of the entire court-martial,” and as 

a result, “our inquiry should not be on words in isolation, but on the 

argument as ‘viewed in context.’” United States v. Baer, 53 M.J. 235, 238 

(C.A.A.F. 2000) (quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 16 (1985)); see 

also Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897) (“If every remark 

made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, 

comparatively few verdicts would stand, since in the ardor of advocacy, and 

in the excitement of trial, even the most experienced counsel are occasionally 

carried away by this temptation.”)).

Assuming the trial counsel’s statements were plain and obvious error, we 

would still decline relief because we see no evidence that the statements 

resulted in material prejudice to any of the appellant’s substantial rights. 

United States v. Pabelona, 76 M.J. 9, 12 (C.A.A.F. 2017). Military judges are 

presumed to know the law and to follow it absent clear evidence to the 

contrary. United States v. Mason, 45 M.J. 483, 484 (C.A.A.F. 1997). We 

“presume that the military judge is able to distinguish between proper and 

improper sentencing arguments[]” whether or not he noted any improprieties 

on the record. United States v. Erickson, 65 M.J. 221, 225 (C.A.A.F. 2007).

The appellant’s repeated failure to object at trial also indicates “that either 

no error was perceived or any error committed was inconsequential.” United 

States v. Sittingbear, 54 M.J. 737, 740 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2001) (citation 

 

29 Id. at 46.

30 Id. at 34, 46.

31 Charge Sheet preferred on 13 Jan 2017.

32 Record at 78.
United States v. MacDonald, No. 201700214

11

omitted). Lastly, the appellant faced 15 years of confinement, the trial 

counsel argued for 60 months, and the military judge awarded only 30 

months of confinement. We have no doubt that the sentence awarded was 

supported by the weight of the evidence and was not influenced by any 

allegedly improper arguments. See United States v. Frey, 73 M.J. 245, 251 

(C.A.A.F. 2014); Halpin, 71 M.J. at 480.

III. CONCLUSION

The findings and sentence as approved by the CA are affirmed.

Chief Judge WOODARD and Senior Judge MARKS concur. 

For the Court

R.H. TROIDL

Clerk of Court