IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-50376

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

JUAN CARLOS MARTINEZ-HARO,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 3:15-CR-13

Before WIENER, HIGGINSON, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Defendant-Appellant Juan Carlos Martinez-Haro appeals his concurrent 

46-month within-guidelines sentences for illegal reentry into the United States 

and false personation in immigration matters. Martinez-Haro contends that 

his sentences are greater than necessary to meet the sentencing goals of 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a) and thus are substantively unreasonable. Specifically, he 

argues that U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2, the sentencing guideline pertaining to illegal

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 30, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 15-50376

2

reentry offenses, lacks an empirical basis and thus overstates the seriousness 

of his offense. As he concedes, however, this argument is foreclosed. See 

United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009). 

Martinez-Haro additionally asserts that his sentences are greater than 

necessary to provide adequate deterrence or protect the public and that they 

fail to properly reflect his personal history and characteristics.

We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence for abuse of 

discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A “sentence imposed 

within a properly calculated guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.” 

United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). The 

presumption of reasonableness is only rebutted by “a showing that the 

sentence does not account for a factor that should receive significant weight, it 

gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or it represents a 

clear error of judgment in balancing [the § 3553(a)] sentencing factors.” United 

States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009).

The record reflects that the district court listened to and rejected 

Martinez-Haro’s arguments in favor of a downward variance and imposed 

sentences at the bottom of the advisory guidelines range. Therefore, MartinezHaro’s sentences are presumptively reasonable. See Campos-Maldonado, 531 

F.3d at 338. In imposing sentence, the district court adopted the findings of 

the presentence report (PSR), which contained a recitation of Martinez-Haro’s 

criminal history, including his prior felony conviction for indecent liberties 

with a child, as well as a lengthy discussion of his personal history and 

characteristics. Although Martinez-Haro disputed the factual basis of his 

indecent liberties conviction, he offered no evidence that the information 

contained in the PSR lacked an evidentiary basis or was otherwise unreliable. 

See United States v. Cabrera, 288 F.3d 163, 173-74 (5th Cir. 2002).

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Martinez-Haro does not show that the district court abused its discretion 

in either its consideration or balancing of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See 

Cooks, 589 F.3d at 186. Rather, he merely complains that the district court 

should have weighed those factors in his favor. We will not second-guess the 

reasonable determinations of the district court, which “is in a superior position 

to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) with respect to a particular 

defendant.” United States v. Heard, 709 F.3d 413, 435 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. As MartinezHaro fails to rebut the presumption of reasonableness, he cannot demonstrate 

that his sentences are substantively unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; 

Cooks, 589 F.3d at 186. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district 

court.

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