Vacated and Dismissed and Opinion filed December 17, 2015.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-15-00144-CV

RHONDA PATRICE GOODMAN-DELANEY, Appellant

V.

MARILYNN GRANTHAM, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 4

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1047984

O P I N I O N

In this forcible detainer case, appellant Rhonda Patrice Goodman-Delaney 

challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence in support of the county court at 

law’s judgment against her for rent and attorney’s fees on the basis that she did not 

have a landlord-tenant relationship with appellee, Marilynn Grantham. We 

conclude that the justice court and county court at law did not have jurisdiction 

over the cause due to the parties’ lack of a landlord-tenant relationship, vacate the 
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judgment as void, and dismiss Grantham’s forcible detainer action for want of 

jurisdiction.

Background

The facts are undisputed. Mary Delaney owned a home in Houston, Texas 

when she married James Delaney. Mary died intestate. In addition to James, she 

had five living children as heirs, including Grantham. James continued to live on

the property following Mary’s death and later married Goodman-Delaney. James 

died in 2014. Grantham served a notice to vacate on Goodman-Delaney and 

subsequently filed a petition for eviction (forcible detainer) in justice court.1The 

justice court rendered judgment in favor of Goodman-Delaney.

Grantham appealed to the county court at law. Grantham admitted at trial in 

county court that she and Goodman-Delaney did not have a landlord-tenant 

relationship, and Goodman-Delaney did not pay rent.2The county court at law 

rendered judgment in favor of Grantham and awarded her $7,700 in rent and 

$2,318.75 in attorney’s fees. The court also made findings of fact, among other 

things, that any possessory rights of Goodman-Delaney “were extinguished at the 

time of James[’s] death” and Goodman-Delaney “wrongfully possessed the 

property from March to October of 2014.”

Discussion

In two issues, Goodman-Delaney challenges the legal sufficiency of the 

evidence to support the county court’s award of rent and attorney’s fees due to the 

undisputed lack of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties. Concluding 

that the justice court and county court at law did not have jurisdiction over this 

 

1

The notice was sent on behalf of “the heirs of Mary Brown Delaney.” 

2 Grantham testified that her siblings “turned their rights over to [her]” under a purported 

warranty deed admitted into evidence.
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case, we do not reach Goodman-Delaney’s legal sufficiency challenges.

A justice court has subject matter jurisdiction over forcible detainers, but the 

justice court and the county court at law on appeal lack jurisdiction to resolve title 

issues.

3 Maxwell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-12-00209-CV, 2013 WL 

3580621, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 11, 2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.)

(mem. op.). The forcible detainer process is supposed to be a summary, speedy, 

and inexpensive proceeding to determine who has the right to immediate 

possession of property. Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2007, no pet.). Thus, a forcible detainer only addresses who has the 

right to possess the property, not who has title to it. Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, 

at *2; see Tex. R. Civ. P. 510.3(e). Neither the justice court nor the county court at 

law have subject matter jurisdiction to determine who has title to property. 

Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2. We may address this issue of subject matter 

jurisdiction sua sponte. Geldard, 214 S.W.3d at 206.

A forcible detainer action is dependent on proof of a landlord-tenant 

relationship. Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 280 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.); Dent v. Pines, 394 S.W.2d 266, 268 

(Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1965, no writ). The sole issue in a forcible detainer suit 

is who has the right to immediate possession of the premises. Aguilar v. Weber, 72 

S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). Without a landlord-tenant 

 

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Jurisdiction to hear a forcible detainer action is expressly given to the justice court of 

the precinct where the property is located and, on appeal, to the county court at law for trial de 

novo. Maxwell v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-12-00209-CV, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 11, 2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.); Rice v. Pinney, 51 

S.W.3d 705, 708 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); see Tex. Prop. Code § 24.004; Tex. R. Civ. 

P. 510.3, 510.10(c). A county court at law exercising appellate jurisdiction over a justice court 

judgment is limited to the original jurisdiction of the justice court. Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, 

at *2; Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). 

Moreover, a county court does not have jurisdiction to try questions of title to land. Doggett v. 

Nitschke, 498 S.W.2d 339, 339 (Tex. 1973).
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relationship, a justice court cannot determine the issue of immediate possession 

without first determining who has title to the property. See, e.g., id. at 733-35 

(noting when there is no evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship, justice court 

and county court at law “would be required to determine the issue of title to resolve 

the right to immediate possession” and thus “lacked jurisdiction”). 

In Dent, cited by Goodman-Delaney, Milton Pines moved into an apartment 

building owned by Julia Radford. 394 S.W.2d at 268. Radford was married to 

Pines’s uncle when Pines moved onto the property. Id. After Radford and the uncle

died, Pines remained on the property. Id. Dent obtained a judgment against Pines 

in a forcible entry and detainer suit in a county court at law.4Id. at 267. Pines filed 

a separate lawsuit and obtained a permanent injunction in district court preventing 

Dent from evicting him. Id. Dent appealed the permanent injunction judgment to 

this court. Id.

Acknowledging that Pines had moved onto the property lawfully and not by 

force, we noted that there was “no basis for an action of forcible entry and 

detainer.” Id. at 268. We further held that an action for forcible detainer requires 

evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship because the lack of such evidence would 

necessarily require a determination of who has title to the property.5Id. We 

 

4

The property had been devised to Radford by her prior husband. Dent, 394 S.W.2d at 

268. Radford died intestate while her then current husband, Pines’s uncle, resided on the 

property. Id. Radford’s daughter, Jennette, inherited the property, presumably subject to a life 

estate held by the uncle. Id. Jennette died one month after the uncle, and Dent brought the 

eviction lawsuit as the independent executor of Jennette’s estate. Id.

5

In discussing the two causes of action—forcible entry and detainer and forcible 

detainer—separately, we implicitly acknowledged that they are distinct causes of action, even 

though they are often used interchangeably. Johnson v. Mohammed, No. 03-10-00763-CV, 2013 

WL 1955862, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin May 10, 2013, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (mem. op.) (citing 

Tex. Prop. Code § 24.001 (forcible entry and detainer occurs if person enters real property 

without legal authority and refuses to leave upon owner’s demand) and § 24.002 (forcible 

detainer occurs when tenant by right or by sufferance holds over after lease term and refuses to 

leave upon owner’s demand)).
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concluded that the county court did not have jurisdiction over the title dispute and 

affirmed the district court’s finding that the judgment in the eviction suit was void. 

Id. at 269. 

Our sister court reached a similar conclusion in Aguilar, 72 S.W.3d at 

733-35. In that case, the Webers and the Aguilars entered into a contract for deed 

and promissory note for the Aguilars to purchase real property. Id. at 732. The 

contract did not specify that a default on the note would create a landlord-tenant 

relationship or tenancy at sufferance or that in the event of default the Webers 

could institute a forcible detainer suit to establish possession. Id. at 733. Alleging

that the Aguilars defaulted on the note, the Webers initiated a forcible detainer suit 

and obtained a judgment from the justice court in their favor that was affirmed by 

the county court. Id. Because there was no evidence of a landlord-tenant 

relationship, the court of appeals held that the dispute necessarily involved a 

dispute over title, which would require a court to determine the owner of the real 

estate by analyzing the contract for deed. Id. at 733-35. Consequently, the justice 

court and county court at law lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. Id. at 734-35. 

The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and dissolved the 

writ of possession. Id. at 735.

Here, Grantham conceded that she did not have a landlord-tenant 

relationship with Goodman-Delaney. Goodman-Delaney entered the property 

legally when she moved in with her husband who undisputedly had legal 

possession of the property. Grantham alleges she obtained title to the property in 

part through inheritance and in part by deed from her siblings. Accordingly, the 

justice court had to determine whether Grantham had title to the property before it 

could determine whether Grantham had a superior right to possess the property 

over Goodman-Delaney. See Geldard, 214 S.W.3d at 209 (holding justice court did 
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not have jurisdiction to adjudicate merits of title because it was required to analyze 

conveyance of property against claim of homestead right). The justice court, and 

the county court at law on appeal, did not have jurisdiction to make such a 

determination.6See Maxwell, 2013 WL 3580621, at *2; Geldard, 214 S.W.3d at 

209. 

When a court’s void judgment is appealed, we have jurisdiction to declare 

the judgment void and render judgment dismissing the case. Kilpatrick v. 

Potoczniak, No. 14-13-00707-CV, 2014 WL 3778837, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] July 31, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam). We vacate the county 

court’s judgment as void and dismiss the forcible detainer action for want of 

jurisdiction. See id. (holding county court’s judgment of possession was void 

because it was rendered during pendency of bankruptcy stay and dismissing 

forcible detainer action for want of jurisdiction).

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Jamison, Donovan, and Brown.

 

6 Goodman-Delaney concedes that Grantham has title to the property. However, the 

parties may not agree to waive the justice court’s and county court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 

Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 103 (Tex. 2012) (“Subject matter jurisdiction cannot

be waived or conferred by agreement, can be raised at any time, and must be considered by a 

court sua sponte.”).