F OR P UBLICATION



### UNIT E D ST AT E S CO URT O F APPE AL S FO R T H E NINT H CIRCUIT

A R I Z O N A D R E A M A C T C O A L I T I O N ; C H R I S T I A N J A C O B O ; A L E J

A N D R A L O P E Z ; A R

I E L M A R

T I N E Z ; N A T A L I A P E R E Z

- G A L L E G O S ; C A R

L A C H A V A R R I A ; J O S E R I C A R

D O H I N O J O S , Plaintiffs-Appellees
,

v

.

J A N I C E K. B R

E W E R , Governor of the State of Ariz ona, in her official capacity ; J O H

N S. H A L I K

O W S K I , Director of the Ariz ona Department of Transportation, in his official capacity ; S T A C E Y K. S T A N T O N , Assistant Director of the Motor Vehicle Division of the Ariz ona Department of Transportation, in her official capacity
,

Defendants-Appellants. No. 15-15307

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02546- DGC

ORDER AND AMENDED OPI NI O N

A ppeal from the United States District Court for the District of Ariz o na David G. Campbell, District J udg e, Presiding

Arg ued and Submitted J uly 16, 2015 Pasadena, CaliforniaA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 2

F iled April 5, 2016

A mended F e b r

uary 2, 2017

B efore: Harry

Preg erson, Marsha S. B erz on, and Morg an Christen, Circuit J udg es.

Order; Dissent to Order by

J udg e Koz inski; Opinion by

J udg e Preg erson; Concurrence by

J udg e B erz on

SUMMARY *

Civil Rights

The pan el amended its prior opinion filed on April 5, 2 0 1 6
, a ppearing at 818 F .3d 9 01 (9th Cir. 2016), deni e d a petition f or rehearing en banc on behalf of the court , a nd ordered that no further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.

Dissenting from the denial o f rehearing e n banc, J udg e Koz inski, joined b y J udg e s O’Scannlain, B y bee, Callahan, B ea and N.R. Smith, disag reed with the conclusion that President Obama’s program, created by an e x ecutive memorandum, preem p t e d state law. J u dg e Koz inski noted that C o n g r ess never approved the deferred-action prog ram, but rather the President adopted it on his own initiative after Cong r ess r epeatedly d ec lined to pass leg islation that would

* T h is su m m ary co n stitu

tes n o part o f th e o p in io n o f th e co u rt. It h as b een p rep ared b y

co u rt staf

f f o r th e co n v en i en ce o f

th e read er.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 3

have a uthoriz ed a si m i l a r prog ram. J udg e Koz inski stated that the panel opinion failed to show that Cong ress evinced a “clear and manifest pu r

p ose” to deleg ate to the e x ecutive branch the authority to preempt state law. J udg e Koz inski

s t a t ed that Ariz ona’s control over its drivers’ licenses w a s well within the mainstream of the state’s police power.

The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judg ment in favor of plaintiffs and af fi rm ed the d istrict court’s order entering a permanent injunction that enjoined A riz o n a ’s policy o f d e ny ing Employ men t A uthoriz ation Documents issued u nder the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
prog r am as satisfactory proof of authoriz ed p r e sence under federal law in the United States.

Plaintiffs are five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action f or Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
prog r am, a

nd the A riz ona DREAM Act Coalition. DACA recipients are noncitiz ens who were broug h t to this country

as children. The D ACA p rog ram, authoriz ed by a federal

ex e c utive order, permits recipients t o r emain in the United States f or some p e r iod of time as long a s they meet c ertain conditions.

The panel found that DACA r ecipients are similarly

s i t u ated in all relevant respects to other noncitiz ens elig i b l e for drivers’ licenses under Ariz ona’s policy

. The panel f ound that A riz ona’s refusal to rely o n Employ ment Authoriz ation Documents from DACA r e c i p ients for purposes o f establishing elig ibility f

or drivers’ licenses may well violate the Equal Protection Clause for lack of a rational
g overnmental interest ju stify ing the d istinction r elied upon. The panel, however, appli e d constitutional avoidance a nd found that it could reach the sa m e result on the g round thatA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 4

the I mmig ration and N a t i onality Act occupies the field o f Ariz ona’s classification o f noncitiz ens with reg ard to whether their presence is authoriz ed b y f e d eral law

. The panel concluded that the I mmig ration and Nationality Act preempts

s t a tes f rom eng a g ing in their very own categ oriz ation o f immig rants for the p urpose o f d eny ing some of them drivers’ licenses. B e cause Ar iz ona created a new immig r ation classification w hen it adopted its p o licy reg arding driver’s license elig ibility
, it impermissibly stray ed into an ex clusive domain that Cong r ess, throug h the I mmig ration and Nationality Act, deleg ated to the ex ecutive branch.

Concu r r i n g, in lig ht of the dissent from the d enial o f rehearing en banc, J udg e B erz on stated that s h e joined the panel opinion in full, but wrote separately to emphasiz e that the law that has preemptive power o ver Ari z o n a ’ s policy is Cong r ess’ conferral of ex clusive a uthority on th e e x ecutive branch to d efer removal o f individuals who lack leg al status and to authoriz e them to w ork w hile temporarily permitted to remain. Additionally
, J udg e B erz o n s t a t e d that the preemption issues ultimately decided i n this c ase could be viewed as embedded in the e qual prot ection analy sis, g iven the historical and conce p t ual overlap between equal protection and preemption c o n c e r n s in cases involving state laws that affect immig rants.

COUNSEL

Dominic Dray e (arg

ued), D e puty Solicitor General; J ohn Robert L opez , I V
, Solicitor General; Office of the Attorney Gene r a l, Phoenix
, Ariz ona; Timothy B erg , Sean H ood, a nd Douglas C. N orthup, F ennemore Craig P.C., Phoenix
, Ariz ona; for Defendants-Appellants.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 5

Karen Tumlin (arg

ued), Shiu-Ming Cheer, Nicholás Espíritu, L inton J o aquin, and N ora A. Preciado, National I mmig r ation L aw Center, L o s Ang e les, California; T any a B r oder, National I mmig r a tion L aw Center, B erkeley
, California; J org e Martin Cas t i llo and Victor V iramontes, Mex ican American L eg al Defense Educational F und, L os Ang eles, California; L ee Gelernt
, A merican Civil L iberties Union F oundation I mmig r a n t s ’ Rig hts Project, New York, New York; J ames L y all and Daniel J

. Pochoda, ACL U of Ariz ona, Phoenix
, Ariz ona; J ennifer C. Newell, Michael K.T. Tan, and Cecillia D. W ang , A merican C i v il L iberties Union F oundation I mmig r a nts’ Rig hts Project, San F rancisco, Cal ifornia; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Dale W ilcox a

nd Michael M. Hethmon, W ashing ton, D.C., a s and for Amicus Curiae I

mmig r ation Reform L aw I nstitute.

L i ndsey Powell, United States D epartment of J ustice, W a shing ton D.C., for A m i c u s Curiae United States o f America.

J ohn S. Miles, J eremiah L

. Morg an, W illiam J

. Olson, Robert J

. Olson, and Herbert W

. Titus, W illiam J

. Olson P.C., Vienna, Virg inia; Mich a e l C o n n e l ly
, U.S. J ustice F oundation, Ramona, California; for Ami c i Curiae E n g lish F irst F oundation, Eng lish F i rs t , U.S. J ustice F oundation, G un Owners F oundation, Gun Ow ners o f America, I nc., a nd Conservative L eg al Defense and Education F und.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 6

ORDER

The court’s opinion filed on April 5, 2016, a pp e aring at 81 8 F. 3 d 901 (9th Cir. 2016), is hereby a mended. An amended opinion, including a c oncurrence by J udg e B e rz on, is filed herewith.

J udg e s B erz on and Christen v oted to deny the petition for rehearing en banc, and J udg e Preg erson so recommended.

The full court was advised o f the petition for rehearing en banc. A judg e req u e s t e d a vote on whether to rehear the
matter en banc. T he matter failed to receive a majority of the
votes of the nonrecused active ju d ge s i n favor of en banc consideration. F ed. R. App. P. 35.

The petition for rehearing en banc is DEN I E D
, and no further petitions for rehearing will be accepted.

Circuit J udg e KOZ I

NSKI
, with whom Circuit J udg e s O’SCANNL AI

N, B YB EE, CAL L A H A N, B EA and N.R. SMI T H join, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:

At the crossroads between t w o presidents, we face a fundamenta l question of presidential power. President Obama created, by ex ecutive memorandum, a sweeping new immig ration prog ram that g ives the benefit of “defer r ed action” t o millions o f illeg al immig rants who came to the United States before the ag e of six teen. Deferred action confers no fo r mal immig ration status; it is simply a commitment not to deport. Ariz o n a, like many states, does
not issue d

rivers’ lic e n ses to unauthoriz ed aliens, a ndA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 7

t h e refore refuses to issue drivers’ licenses to the prog ra m ’s beneficiaries.

Does the Supremacy Clause nevertheless force Ariz ona to issue drivers’ licenses to the recipients of the Presiden t’s larg e sse? There’s no doubt that Cong ress can preempt state law; its p ower to d o s o in the f ield of immig ration is particularly b road. B ut Cong ress never approved the deferred-action p rog r am: Th e P r e s ident adopted it on his own initiative after Cong ress repeatedly declined to pass the DREAM Act—leg isla tion that w ould have a uthoriz ed a similar prog ram. Undeterred, the panel claims that the President acted pursuant to a uthority “deleg ated to the

e x e c u t i v e b r a n c h ” t h r o u g h t h e I m m i g r a t i o n a n d Naturaliz a tion Act ( I

NA). Amended op. at 36. According to th e p a nel, Cong ress g ave the President the g eneral authority
to create a sprawling new prog ram that pr e e m p t s state law, even thoug h Cong ress declined to create the same prog ram.

This puz z ling new preemption theory is at odds with the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence ; i t is, instead, cobbled tog ether out of 35-y ear-o l d E qual Protection d icta. I t is a t h e o ry that was rejected with bemusement by the district court, see A riz. D r e a m A ct Coal. v. Brewer
, 9 45 F

. Supp. 2 d 1049, 1 057 (D. A ri z

. 2013), only to be resurrected by the panel at the eleventh hour and buried behind a 3,000- word Equal Protection d etour. I t’s a theory t h at p u t s us sq u a rely at o dds with the F ifth Circuit, which h eld recently that “the I

NA fla t l y does not p ermit the [ ex e cutive] reclassification of millions of illeg a l aliens as lawfully present and thereby make th e m n e wly e lig ible for a host o f federal and state benefits.” Texas v. United States
, 809 F .3d 134, 184 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an e q u a lly divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (per curiam). And it’s a theoryA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 8

that makes no mention of the fo undational principle o f preemption law: Historic state powers are n o t p r eempted “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Cong ress.” A r i zona v

. U

nited States
, 1 32 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 ( 2 0 1 2 ) (internal quotation omitted).

The opinion also b uckles under the w eig ht of its o wn ambig uities. The panel say s repeatedly that Ariz ona has created “immig ration classifications not found in federal law.” Amended op. at 40 n .8; see also id. at 43
, 4 9

. Bu t Ariz ona f o llows federal law to the letter—that is, all laws passed by Cong ress and sig ned by the President. Thus, when the panel us es t he term “law,” it means something quite different from what that term normally means: The panel in effect h o l d s that the enforcement decisions of the President

are federal law. Yet the lawfulness of the President’s policies is a n issue that the panel bends o ver backward not to reach. See id. at 44–47. I

am at a loss to ex plain how this cake can be eaten and y et remain on the plate: The President’s policies

m a y or may not be “lawful” and may or may not b e “ l a w , ” but are nonetheless part of the body o f “ f ederal law” that imposes b urdens and oblig ations on the sovereig n s t ates. W h ile the panel sug g ests other reasons to d o u bt Ariz ona’s
response, 1 the opini o n’s slippery preemption theory simply

1 I h a v e l i t t l e to say ab ou t t h e p an el’ s len g th y Eq u al P ro tectio n d iscu ssio n

. W h ile th is Eq u al P ro tectio n ex cu rsu s eclip ses th e p an el’ s terse

an d en ig m atic d iscu ssio n o f p reem ptio n , th e pan el is n on eth eless clear th at

“ w e d o n o t u ltim ately d ecid e th e Eq u al P ro tectio n issu e.” A m en d ed o p

. at 2 9

. I n o te, h o w ev er, th at th ere are serio u s d o u b ts ab o u t th e co h eren ce

o f th e Su p r e m e Co u rt’ s Eq u al P ro t ectio n j u risp ru d en ce as ap p lied to alien s. S ee, e.g

. , Ko ra b v

. Fin k
, 7 9 7 F. 3 d 5 72
, 5 8 5 (9 th Cir. 20 1 4) (B y b ee, J., co n cu

rrin g ) (d escrib in g th is j u risp ru d en ce as “ rid d l e d w i th

ex cep tio n s an d ca v e a ts th at m ak e co n sisten t j u dicial rev iew of alien ag e classif icatio n s d if

f icu lt,” an d su g g estin g an ap p ro ach b ased so lely onA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 9

isn’t one of them. See, e .g. , Noah F eldman, Obama’s W obbly Legal Victory on Immigration
, B loomb e r g (Apr. 6, 2 016) (describing the panel’s “precarious,” “tricky ” and “funky ” reasoning that is “vulnerable to reversal by the S u p r eme Court”).

* * *

I n the summer of 2012, the President directed his officers
not to remov e c e r

tain illeg al immig rants who came to the United States b ef

o r e a g e six teen. The prog ram, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), did not clear any o f
t he normal administrative-law hurdles; the memorandum announcing the prog r am states that it “confers no substantive rig ht, immig ration status or pathway to citiz enship” because “[ o] nly the Cong ress, acting throug h its leg islative a uthority
, can confer these rig hts.” DHS Memor a ndum, Ex ercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respec t to I ndividuals Who Came to the United States as Children, J une 15, 2012.

Ariz ona responded w i t h a n ex ecutive order of its own, stating
, in a

pparent ag reement with the DACA memorandum,
t hat the n e w federal prog ram “does not and cannot c o n f e r lawful or a

uthoriz ed status o r presence upon the unlawful alien applicants. ” A r i z

. Ex ec. Order 2012-06. B ecause Ariz ona law requires t h a t a p plicants for a driver’s license submit p roof that their presence is “authoriz ed under federal law,” Ariz

. Rev. Stat. § 28-3153(D)—and DACA “confers no substantive rig ht [ or] immig ration status”—Ariz ona felt justified withholding licens e s f r om illeg al immig rants w ho happen to be DACA b en eficiaries. Several DACA

p reem p tio n ).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 10

beneficiaries then sued A riz o n a , claiming
, a mong other thing s, that the state’s policy was preempted.

The panel ag rees, holding that Ariz ona’s policy “stray ed i n to a n e x clusive domain that Cong ress, through the I N A
, deleg ated t o t h e ex ecutive branch.” Amended o p. at 36 (emphasis added); see also id. at 28. One mig ht think that the panel would present especially strong evidence o f
cong ressional deleg ation, such as an ex press statement to that effect. After all, i t ’ s rare enoug h to find that Cong ress has kept an entire field to itself, much less ceded one to the

ex e c utive. And the bar that p reemption must c l e ar is both well-established and hig h: The h i s toric police powers o f
states are not preempted “unless that was the c lear a nd manifes t p u r

pose of Cong ress.” E.g.
, Arizona
, 132 S. Ct. at 2501; W yeth v. Levine
, 555 U.S. 5 55, 5 65 (2009); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr , 518 U.S. 470, 485 ( 1996); Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.
, 505 U.S. 5 04, 516 (1992); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. , 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).

The panel doesn’t b other showing that Cong ress evinced

a “clear and manifest purpose” be f o re forcing the states to accept immig r ation classificat i o n s invented entirely by the President. I ndeed, the panel’s p reemption analy sis mentions only two small provisions of the I NA, and this thin statutory evid e n c e c annot possibly carry the heavy burden of field preemption. 2 T he panel first n otes that the I N A r efers to an al i e n’s “period of stay authorized by the Attorney General,”

2 T h e p an el’ s o n ly o t h e r an aly sis o f th e INA
, in its n o n

- preced en tial Eq u al P ro t ectio n d iscu ssio n , m ak es th e rath er u n rem ark ab le p o in t th at th e

ex ecu tiv e b ran ch h as resp o n sib ility f or ex ecu tin g th e INA

. S

ee am en ded

o p . at 2 5 –2 8 . T h is d o es n o t in an y w ay h elp estab lish

w h eth er Co n g ress in ten d ed th e INA to let th e ex ecu t iv e b ran ch p reem p t th e states.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 11

b e y o n d which the alien is “deemed to be unlawfully p resen t in the Unite d S t a t es.” Amended o p. at 41–42 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B )(ii)). B ut the panel has now c orrected its opinion to ex plain that this p rovision actually contemplates the ex e cutive’s ability to “authoriz e ” a per i o d

o f stay only for a tiny subset of a liens—those “prev i o u s l y removed”—and not, as its orig inal o pinion sug g ested, every class of immig rant covered by the statute. 3

The panel’s second claim is that the REAL I D A ct identifies deferred-action immig rants “ as being present in the Unit e d S tates during a ‘period of authoriz ed stay , ’ for the
purpose of issuin g state identification cards.” Amended op. at 42 (citation omitted). This narrow p rovision also can’t be authori t y f

o r the proposition that the I NA “deleg ated to the

ex e c utive branch” the wholesale a uthority t o preempt state law b y declaring immig rants leg a l w h e n t h e y are not. Nor does this narrow p rovision conflict with Ariz ona’s policy : The provision actually say s that a stat e “ m a y o nly issue a temporary driver’s license or temporary identification card”
to deferred-action immig rants—a limit, n o t a requirement. REAL I D Act o f 2005, Pub. L

. No. 109-13, § 202(c)(2)(C)(i) (emphasis added).

3 Co m p a r e Ariz. Drea m Act Co al. v

. Brewer
, 8 1 8 F.3 d 9 0 1, 9 1 6 (9 th Cir. 2 0 1 6 ) with am en d ed o p

. at 4 1

– 42 (ad d i n g “ at least f o r p u rp o s e s of § 1 1 8 2 (a)(9 )(B )”). A s th e strin g o f letters an d n u m b ers m ig h t su g g est, § 1 1 8 2 (a)(9 )(B ) is n o t a larg e p o rtio n o f th e INA

. T h is s u b sectio n also

o f f ers n o s u p p o r t f

o r a seco n d reaso n : Ev en if it w ere tru e th at an im m ig ran t w a s “ u n law f

u lly p resen t” if h e stay ed b ey o n d a p erio d
ap p ro v ed b y th e A tto rn ey Gen eral, th is d o e s n ’t m ean h e w o u l d b e

“ l aw f u l l y p resen t” if h e d id n ’ t stay b ey o n d su ch a p erio d

. In f o rm al lo g ic, th e in v erse o f

a co n d itio n al can n o t b e in f erred f ro m th e co n d itio n al.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 12

Nevertheless, the panel insists that this evidence “ directly undermines” Ariz ona’s response to D ACA. Amended o p. at 41. That the pa n e l c an trawl the g reat depths o f the I N A

— o n e of our larg est a n d most complex statutes—and
return with this meag er c a t c h sug g ests ex actly the opposite conclus ion: The I

NA evinces a “clear and manifest” intention not to ce d e this field to the ex ecutive. This is precisely the conclusion that the F ifth Circuit re a c h e d in Texas v. United S

tates

. Our sister circuit held that even if the President’s p o licies were of the ty pe t o which Chevron deference was owed—which the circuit assumed only for the sake of arg u ment—such deference would b e unavailable because “the I

NA ex p ressly and carefully provides leg al desig nations allowing defined classes o f aliens to be lawfully
p r e s e nt.” See Texas
, 809 F .3d at 179. I n other words
, t h e I NA has spoken directly to the issue and “flatly does not permit” ex ecutive supplementation like the DACA prog ram. I d

. a t 184. I f what the p anel relies on evinces a “clear a nd manifest purpose” to cede a field to the ex ecutive, it’s hard to imag ine what statute doesn’t. 4

* * *

P erhaps daunted by the lack of support in the statute i t purports to inter

p r et, the panel turns to Supreme Court precedent, but it doesn’t fare much better here. The primary

case on w h i c h t he panel relies, P lyler v. Doe
, mig ht c ontain

some impressive-sounding d icta—“The St ates enjoy no

4 A n d ev en if it w e r e u nd e n i a b ly t h e case th at Co n g ress d eleg ated th e p o w er o f p reem

p tio n to th e Presid en t, I am s k e p t i c a l th at su ch a statu te

w o u ld be co n stitu

tio n al. T h e n o n d eleg atio n d o ctrin e is s till w aitin g in th e

w in g s. S ee g en era lly W

hitma n v

. Am. T

ru ckin g Asso cs. , 5 3 1 U.S. 4 5 7 (2 0 0 1).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 13

p o w e r with respect to the classification of aliens,” 457 U

. S

. 202, 2 2 5 (1982)—but the reasons to reject this dicta a re more impressive still. As the district court p ut it when it rebuffed the Plyler theory of preemption: “ Plyler is not a preemption case.” 945 F

. Supp. 2d at 1057. J ustice B r ennan’s 1 9 82 majority o pinion—a 5

– 4 opinion that g arnered three i n d i v i d u a l co n c u rr en c e s a n d h a s b e e n q u e s t i o n e d continuously since pub l i cation—never once mentions preemption. See 457 U.S. at 205–30. 5

The panel’s search f

or support in t h e Supreme Court’s actual preemption jurisprudence is equally misg uided. The panel quotes De Canas v. Bica for the proposi t i o n t hat the “[ p] ower to r eg ulate immig ration is unquestionably

ex c lusively a federal power.” Ame n d e d o p. at 34 (quoting 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976)). B ut the panel overlooks the very

nex t sentence o f De Canas
, which n otes th a t “the Court has

never held that every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a reg ulation of immig ration and thus per se pree m p t e d

. ” 424 U .S. at 355. So what’s “a reg ulation of i m m i g ration” that would be preempted? The D e Can a s opinion tells us a couple of sentences later: I t ’ s “essentially

a determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country , and the condit i o n s under which a leg al entrant may remain.” Id. Deny in g a driver’s license is not tantamount to deny ing admission to the country

. 6 L ike the

5 T h e case w as also w

ro n g ab in i tio an d is d u e to b e reco n sid ered

. S ee, e.g

. , Eu g en e Vo lo k h
, Wh y Ju s tices Ma

y Overru le ‘Plyler’ o n Illeg a l Alien s , L .A

. Daily J
., No v

. 2 8
, 1 99 4
, at 6 (d escrib in g o b j ectio n s to Plyler

an d reaso n s w

h y it m ay b e o v erru led ).

6 T h e m ore recen t cases cited b y th e p an el— Lo za n o v

. City o

f H a z leto n , 7 2 4 F.3 d 2 9 7 (3 d Cir. 2 0 13 ), V i l l a s a t Pa r

ksid e Pa rtn ers v

. City o

f F a rm e r s Bra n ch
, 7 2 6 F.3 d 52 4 (5 th Cir. 2 01 3 ), an d Un ited S ta t es v

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 14

state l a w u p held in De Canas —which prevented California businesses from h iring illeg al imm i g r a n t s

— A riz ona’s control

over it s d rivers’ licenses is well “within the mainstream o f [ the state’s] p o lice power.” Id. at 356.

I n d e e d
, it’s difficult to imag ine a preemption case less helpful to the panel than De Canas

. The De Canas majority
states ex plicitly that it w ill “not presume that Cong ress, in enacting the I

NA, intended to oust state authority to reg ulate

. . . in a manner consistent with pertinent federal laws.” Id. at 357. That uncontroversial proposition simply raises once

more the question the p anel works hard to a void: I f A riz o na relies on the categ ories drawn by the I N A, but not those o f the ex ecutive branch, why isn’t it operating consistently with “pertinent federal laws”? The panel never says.

* * *

I nstead, we’re left with the enig matic holding we started with: A riz o na “impermissibly stray ed into an e x clusive d o main that Cong ress, throug h the I NA, deleg ated to t h e

ex e c u t ive branch.” Amended op. at 36. This conclusion finds no support in the actual tex t of the I NA. I t receives no help from the Court’s preemption jurisprudence. And it is a braz en reneg otiat i o n o f o ur federal barg ain. I f states must accept the complete policy classifications of the I NA and also
every immig r ation decision made by the President, then

Ala b a ma , 6 9 1 F.3 d 12 6 9 (1 1th Cir. 2 0 12 )—are easily d istin g u ish ab le f or th is reaso n

. T h ey in v o lv ed w h at th e co u rts h eld t o b e an actu al reg u latio n

o f im m ig ratio n —th at is, “ a d eterm in atio n o f w h o sh o u ld o r sh ou ld n ot b e ad m i tted in to th e co u n try , an d th e co n ditio n s u n d er w h ich a l eg al en tran t

m ay rem ain .” 4 2 4 U.S. at 3 5 5.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 15

we’ve just found our s e l v es in a world where the President really can preempt state laws with the stroke of a pen.

The Constitution g ives us a balance where federal l aws “sh a l l b e t he supreme law of the land,” but powers not d e l e g ated to the federal g o v ernment “are reserved to the states.” U.S. Const., art. VI c l. 2; id. amend. X. The political branches of the federal g overnment must ac t t o g ether to

overcome state laws. Unison g ives us clarity about what federal la w c o n sists of and when state law is subordinated. The vast power to set aside t he laws of the sovereig n states

cann o t b e ex ercised by the President acting alone, with his
power at its “ lowest ebb.” Cf. Y oungstown Sheet & Tube Co.

v. Sawyer
, 343 U. S

. 5 7 9, 637 ( 1952) (J ackson, J
., concurring ). 7

Presidential power can turn on and o f f like a spig ot; what

o u r outg oing President has done may be undone by o ur incoming President acting on his own. T he judiciary mig ht find itself, after y ea rs o f litig ation over a President’s policy
, faced with a chang e in administration and a case o n the v erg e of m o o tness. 8 And o ur precedent may long outlive the D ACA prog ram: W e may soon find ourselves with n e w conflicts between the Presi d e n t and the states. See, e.g. ,

7 W e are n o t in th e “ zo n e o f tw i lig h t,” Y o u n g sto wn , 3 4 3 U.S. at 6 3 7
, w h ere th e d i strib u tio n o f p resid en tial an d co n g ressio n al p o w er is

u n certain

. Co n g ress h as rep eated ly d eclin ed to act—ref u sin g t i m e an d tim e ag ain

to p ass th e DREA M A ct—so th e P resid en t is f ly in g so lo

.

8 Mo o t n ess co n cern s aren ’ t t

h eo retical. In Texa s v

. Un ited Sta tes —th e d irect ch allen g e to th e Ob am a A dm in istratio n ’ s im m ig ratio n po licies ov er

w h ich th e Su

p rem e Co u

rt s p lit 4 –4 —th e p arties f

iled a j o in t m o tio n to stay th e m erits p ro ceed in g s u

n t il o n e m o n t

h af t er th e p resid en tial in au g u ratio n

. S ee J o in t Mo tio n to Stay
, No

. 1 : 1 4

- cv

- 0 02 5 4
, Do c. 4 3 0 (No v

. 1 8
, 2 0 1 6 ).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 16

California and Trump Are on a Collision Cour s e O v e r Immigrants Here Illegally
, L .A. Times, Nov. 11, 2016; Cities Vow to Fight Trump on Immigration, Even if They Lose Millions , N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2016.

These looming conflicts should serve as a stark reminder: Ex ecutive power favors the party , o r perhaps simply the
person, who w ields it. That power is the forbidden fruit o f

our politics, irresistible to those w ho possess it and reviled b y those who don’t. Clear and stable structural rul e s a re the bulwark a g ainst t hat p ower, w hich shifts with the sudden
vag aries of our politics. I n its haste to find a doctrine that can protect the p o l i cies of the p r esent, our circuit should remember the old w arning : May all y o ur dreams come true.

OP INION

PREGERSON, Senior Circuit J udg e:

Plaintiffs are five individual recipients of deferred action under the Deferred Action f or Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)
prog r am, and the Ariz ona DREAM Act Coalition (“ADAC”),

an org a niz ation that a dvances the intere s t s of y oung immig rants. DACA recipien t s ar e noncitiz ens who were broug ht to t h i s c ountry a s children. Under the DACA
prog r am, they are permitted to remain in the United States for some period o f time as long as they meet certain conditions. Authoriz ed by federal ex ecutive order, the DACA prog ram is administered by the Department o f Homeland Security and is consistent with th e Supreme Court’s ruling that the federal
g overnment “has broad, undoubted p ower over the subject o fA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 17

immig ration a

nd the status of a liens” u nder the Constitution. Arizona v. United States , 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498 (2012).

I n response to the creatio n of the DACA prog ram, Defendants—th e G overnor of the State of Ariz ona; the Ariz ona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) Director; and the Assistant Director o f t he Motor Vehicle Division—instituted a polic y t hat rejected the Employ ment Authoriz ation Documents (“EADs”) issued to DACA recipients u n d er t he DACA prog ram as proof of authoriz ed
presence f

or the p urpose o f ob t a i n i ng a driver’s license. Plaintiffs seek permanently to enjoin Defendants from

c a t eg orically deny ing drivers’ licenses to DACA recipients. The district c ourt r

uled that Ariz ona’s policy was not rationally related to a leg itimate g overnment purpose and thus violated the Equal Protect i o n Clause of the F ourteenth Amendment. The d istrict court g ranted Plaintiffs’ motion for

s u mmary judg ment and e ntered a p ermanent injunction. Defendants appealed.

W e ag r ee with the district court that DACA recipients a re similarly situated to o ther g roups of n on c i t i z ens A riz o na deems elig ible for drivers ’ l icenses. As a result, Ariz ona’s disparate treatment of DACA recipients may well violate the Equal Protection Clause, as our p revious opinion indicated is like l y the case. Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer
, 757 F .3 d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014). T he district court relied on this ground w hen it issued the permanent injunction. Apply ing the principle of constitutional avoidance, however,

we need not and should not co m e t o rest on the E q ual Protection issue, even if it “is a plausible, and quite possibly meritorious” claim for Plaintiffs, so long as there is a v iable alternate, noncon s t i t u tional g round to reach the same r esult. O v e rstreet v. U

nited Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am

. ,A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 18

Local Union No. 1506 , 409 F .3d 1199, 1 211 (9th Cir. 2005) ( c i t i n g E dward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bld g

. & Constr. Trades Council , 485 U.S. 568, 576–78 (1988)).

W e c onclude that there is. A r i z o na’s policy classifies

n o n c itiz ens based on Ariz ona’s independent definition of “authoriz e d presence,” classification authority den i e d the
states under the I mmig ratio n a n d Nationality A ct (“I NA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq

. W e therefore affirm the d i s t r i ct court’s order g ranting summary judg men t and entry o f a permane n t injunction, on the basis that Ariz ona’s policy is preempted by the ex clusive authori t y of the federal
g overnment to classify noncitiz e n s

. See W eiser v. United States
, 959 F. 2 d 1 4 6, 147 (9th Cir. 1992) (“[ T his court] can affirm the district court on any gr ounds supported by the record.”).

F ACTUAL BACK G ROUND

I. The DACA P r ogram

On J une 15, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security announced the DACA prog ram p ursuant to the DACA Memorandum. Under the DACA prog ram, t h e Department of Homeland Security ex e rc ises its prosecutorial discretion
not to seek removal of certain y oung immig rants. The DACA
prog r am allows these y oung immig rants, including members of ADAC, to remain in the United States for some period o f time as long as they meet specified conditions.

To qualify for the DACA prog ram, immig rants must have

come to the United States before the a g e of six teen and must have been under the a g e of thirty -one by J une 15, 2012. See Memorandum from Secretary J anet Napolitano, Ex ercisingA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 19

Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to I ndividuals Who Came to the United States a s Children (J u ne 1 5, 2012). They

m u s t have been living in the United States at the time t h e DACA p rog ram was announced and must have continuously resided here for at least t h e p r e v i ous five y ears. Id. Additionally
, DACA-elig ible immig r ants must be enrolled in sch o o l
, have g raduated from hig h school, have obtained a General E ducational D evelopment certification, o r have been honorably d i scharg ed from the U.S. Armed F orces or Coast Guard. Id

. They must not pose a threat to public safety and must underg o ex tensive criminal backg r ound checks. Id.

I f g ranted deferred action under DACA, immig rants may remain in the United States for renewable two-y ear period s. DACA recipients e n

joy no formal immig ration status, but the Department of Homeland Security does not c onsider them to be unlawfully present in the United States and allows them to receive federal EADs.

II. Arizona’s Executive Order

On Aug ust 15, 2012, the Governor o f Ariz ona issued Ariz ona Ex ecutive Order 2 0 1 2-06 (“Ariz ona Ex ecutive Order”). Ex ecutive Order 2012-06, “Re-Affirming I ntent o f A r i z o na L aw I n Response to the F ederal Government’ s Deferred Action Prog ram” (Aug

. 15, 2012). A clear response to DACA, the Ariz ona Ex ecutive Order states that “the Deferred A ction prog ram does not and cannot confer lawful

or authoriz ed s t a tus or presence upon the unlawful alien applicants.” Id. at 1. The A r iz ona Ex ecutive Order announced that “[ t] he issuance o f Deferred A ction o r D e f e r r e d A c t i o n U S C I S e m p l o y m e n t a u t h o r i z a t i o n documents to unlawfully present aliens d oes not confer upon them a ny lawful or authoriz ed status and does not entitle themA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 20

to any a dditional p ublic benefit.” I d

. T h e Order directed Ariz ona state a g encies, includin g A D OT, to “ initiate operati o nal, policy
, rule and statutory chang es n e cessary to prevent Deferred Action r ecipients from obtaining e lig ibility
, bey ond those available to any p erson reg ardless of lawful status, for any tax pay er- fu nded public benefits and state identification, including a driver’s license.” Id.

III. Arizona’s Driver’s License P olicy

To implement the A riz ona Ex e c utive Order, off icials at ADOT and its Motor V e h icle Division initiated chang es to Ariz ona’s policy for issuing drivers’ licenses. Under A riz o na state law, applicants can receive a driver’s license only if they

can “submit proof satisfactory to t h e d e partment that the applicant’s presence in the United States is authoriz ed under federal law.” Ariz

. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-3153(D). Prior to the Ariz ona Ex ecutive Order, ADOT Policy 16.1.2 included all federally issued EADs as “proof sa t i s f a c tory ” that an applicant’s p resence was “authoriz ed under federal law.” The Motor Vehicle Division therefore issued drivers’ licenses to all individuals with such documentation.

After the Ariz o n a Ex ecutive O rder, the Motor Vehicle Division announced that it would not accept EADs issued to DACA recipie n t s —coded by the Department o f Homeland Security as (c)(33)—as proof that their presence in the United States is “authoriz e d under federal law.” The Motor Vehicle Division continued to a ccept federally issued EADs from all other noncitiz ens as p roof o f their lawful presence, including individuals who received deferred action outsid e o f the DACA prog ram a

nd applicants coded (c)(9) (individuals w ho have a pplied f or adjustment o f status), and (c)(10) (individuals who have applied for cancellation of removal).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 21

I n 2013, ADOT revised its policy ag ain. Ex p laining this chang e, ADOT Director J ohn S. Halikowski testified that Ariz ona views an EAD as proof of presence authoriz ed under federal law o nly if the EAD d em o n strates: (1) the applicant has formal immig ration status; ( 2 ) the applicant is on a p ath
to obtaining formal immigr a t i o n status; or (3) the relief
soug h t or obtained is e x pressly provided pursuant to the I NA. Using these crit e r i a, ADOT beg an to refuse driver’s license appli c a t i o n s that relied on EADs, not only from DACA recipients
, but also from beneficiaries of g eneral deferred action and d e ferred enforced departure. I t continued to accept

as proof of authoriz ed presence f o r purposes of obtaining drive r s ’ licenses EADs from applicants with (c)(9) a nd (c)(10) status. W e refer to the policy that refuses EADs from DACA recipients as “Ariz o na’s policy .”

IV. P relim inary Injunction

On November 29, 2012, P l aintiffs sued D efendants in federal district court, a lleg ing that A r iz ona’s policy o f deny ing drivers’ licenses to DACA recipi ents violates the Eq u a l P r otection Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Plainti f fs soug ht declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction p r o h i b i t i n g D e f e n dants from enforcing their policy ag ainst DACA recipients. O n May 16, 2 013, the d i s trict court ruled that Ariz ona’s p o licy likely violated the E qual Protection Clause but it declined to g ran t t h e preliminary injunction because P l ai ntiffs had not shown irreparable harm. ADAC v. Brewer
, 9 45 F

. Supp. 2d 1049 (D. Ariz

. 2013) ( “

A D A C I ”), reversed by ADAC v. Brewer
, 757 F

. 3 d 1053 (9th Cir. 2014) (“ ADAC II ”). I t also g ranted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Supremacy Clause c laim. Id. at 1077–78. Plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 22

V. P erm anent Injunction

W h ile Plaintiffs’ appeal of the preliminary injunction ruling was pending
, Plaintiffs soug ht a permanent injunction in district court on E q

ua l P r o t e ction g rounds and moved for
summary judg ment. Defen d a n t s also moved for summary jud gm e n t , arg uing that DACA recipients are not similarly situated to othe r n oncitiz e ns who are elig ible for drivers’ licenses under Ariz ona’s policy

.

W e r eversed the district court’s decision on the motion for preliminary injunction, ag r eeing w ith the district court that Ariz ona’s policy

likely violated the Equal Protection Clause

a n d holding that Plaintiffs had e stablished that they wou l d suffer i r r eparable harm as a result of its enforcement. See ADAC II
, 757 F .3d at 1064. I n a c oncurring opinion, o ne member of our panel concluded that Plaintiffs also demonstrated a likelihood o f success o n t h e ir claim that Ariz ona’s policy was preempted. I d. at 10 6 9 (Christen, J
., concurring ). On J a

nuary 22, 2015, the district court g ranted Plaintiffs’ motion f

or summary judg ment and entered a permanent injunction. ADAC v. Brewer
, 81 F

. Supp. 3d 795 (D. Ariz

. 2 015) (“

ADAC III ”). W e affirm the district court’s order.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

W e review the district court’s g rant or denial of motions for summary j udg ment de novo

. Besinga v. U nited States
, 14 F .3d 1 356, 1359 ( 9th Cir. 1994). W e determine w h ether there are any g enuine issues of material fact a n d r e v i e w the district court’s application of substantiv e l a w. Gerhart v

. Lake Cty., Mont.
, 637 F .3 d 1 013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011). W e “may affirm a g rant of summary j u d g ment on any g r oundA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 23

s u p p o r t e d by the record.” Curley v

. City of N. Las V e gas , 772 F .3d 629, 631 (9th Cir. 2014).

W e review the district court’s d ecision to g rant a permanent injunction for abuse of discretion. La Quinta W orldwide LLC v. Q.R.T.M., S.A. d e C.V.
, 762 F .3d 8 67, 879 (9th Cir. 2014) ( c iting Interstellar Starship Servs., Ltd. v

. Epix, Inc.
, 3 04 F .3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2002)). W e r eview questions of law underly ing the distr i c t c ourt’s decision de

novo

. See Ting v. AT& T
, 319 F .3d 1126
, 1 1 3 5 ( 9th Cir. 2003). “I f the district court ‘identified and applied the correct leg al rule to the r elief requested,’ we will reverse only if the court’s decision ‘resulted from a f a c tual fin d i ng that was illog ical, implausible, o r w i t h o u t support in inferences that
may be d rawn from the f

ac t s in the record.’” Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t M gmt., Inc.
, 736 F .3d 1 239, 1247 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Hinkso n , 585 F .3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)).

D ISCUSSION

I. Equal P rotection

A. Sim ilarly Situated

“The Equal Protection Clause of the F ourteenth Amendment commands that n o S t a t e shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction t he e q ual protection of the laws,’ which i s essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne

v. Cleburne Living Ctr.
, 47 3 U .S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Ply ler v. Doe
, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982)). To prevail on an Equal Protection claim, plaintiffs must show “that a class that is similarly

situated has been treated disparately

. ” ChristianA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 24

G o s p e l Church, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F.
, 896 F .2d 1221
, 1225 (9th Cir. 1990), superseded o n o ther grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

“The first step in equal p r o t ection analy sis is to identify the state’s c lassification of g roups.” Country Classic Dairies, Inc

. v

. Milk Control Bureau
, 847 F .2d 593, 596 (9th Cir. 1988). “The g roups must be c omprised of similarly situated
persons so that the factor mot i vating the alleg ed discrimina t i o n can be identified.” Thornton v. City o f St. Helens
, 4 25 F .3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). I n this instance, DACA recipients do not need to be similar in all respects to other noncitiz ens who are elig ible fo r d rivers’ licenses, but
t h ey must b e similar in those respects that are relevant t o Ariz ona’s own interests and its policy

. Se e N o rdlinger v

. Hahn
, 505 U.S. 1
, 10 (1992) (“The E q ual Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. I t simply keeps g overnmental decisionmakers from treating differently pers o n s who are in all relevant

respects alike.” (emphasis added)).

W e p reviously held that DACA recipients and other categ ories of noncitiz ens w ho ma y r ely on EADs a re similarly situated with reg ard to their rig ht to obtain drivers’ licenses in Ariz ona. See A DAC I I
, 757 F .3d a t 1 064. The material f acts a nd controlling authority remain the same from the preliminary injunction stag e

. Thus, we ag ain hold that in all rel e v a n t respects DACA recipients a re similarly situated
to noncitiz ens elig ible for d rivers’ licenses under Ariz ona’s policy

. N onetheless, f

or clarity and completeness, we address once more Defendants’ arg uments.

Defendants assert that DACA recipients a re not similarly situated to other noncitiz ens elig ibl e for d rivers’ licenses under Ariz ona’s p olicy because DACA recipien t s n eitherA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 25

received nor applied for relief provi d e d by the I NA, or any other relief authoriz ed by federal statute. Particularly relevant h ere, Defendants note that elig ible noncitiz ens under the categ ories of (c)(9) and (c)(10) are tied to r elief ex pressly found in the I

NA: adjustment o f status (I NA § 245; 8 U .S.C. § 1255; 8 C.F

. R. § 274a.12(c)(9)) and cancellation of removal (I NA § 2 40A; 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; 8 C.F .R. § 274a.12(c)(10)),
respec t i v e ly

. I n contrast, Defendants contend that DACA recipients’ presence in the U n i t e d States does not have a connection to f

ederal law b ut rather reflects the Ex ecut ive’s discretionary

decision not to enforce the I NA.

W e continue to disag r ee. See ADAC II
, 757 F .3d at 1061. As ex plained below, Ariz ona has no cog niz able interest in making the distinctio n i t has for d rivers’ licenses purposes. The federal g overnment, not t h e states, holds ex clusive authority c oncerning direct matt e r s of immig r ation law. DeCanas v

. Bica
, 424 U .S. 351, 354 ( 1 9 76), superseded by
statute on o ther grounds as recognized in Arizona
, 132 S. Ct.
at 2 503–04. T he states therefore may n ot make immig r ation decisions that the federal g overnment , i tself, has not made, Plyler
, 457 U.S. at 225 (citing Mathews v. Diaz
, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)). Ariz ona’s encroachment into immig r ation

a f fairs—making distinctions between g roups of immig r an t s it deems not to be similarly situ a t e d
, despite the federal
g overnment’s decision t o treat them similarly —therefore

seems t o e x c eed its authority to d ecide which aliens a re similarly situated to others for E q ual Protection purposes. I n

o t h er words, the “similarly situated” analy sis must f ocus o n factors of similarity and distinction p ertinent to the state’s policy
, not factors outside t h e realm of its authority a nd

concern.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 26

Putting a side that limitation, the I NA ex p licitly a

uthoriz e s the Secretary o f Homeland Security to administer and e nforce all laws relating to i m m ig ration and n aturaliz ation. I N A § 103(a)(1); 8 U .S.C. § 1103(a)(1). As part of this a uthority
, it is well settled that t h e S e c retary can ex e rcise deferred action, a f

o r m of p rosecutorial discretion whereby the Department of H om e l an d Security declines to pursue the removal of a person unlawfully present in the United States.

The I NA e x pressly provides f

or deferred action as a form of relief that can be g ranted at the Ex e cutive’s d iscretion. F o r

ex a mple, I

NA § 237(d)(2); 8 U .S

. C

. § 1 227(d)(2), allows a noncitiz en who has be e n d e n ied an administrative stay o f removal to apply for deferred action. Certain individuals a re also “elig ible for deferred action ” under the I NA if they qualify u nder a set of factors. S ee I NA § 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(I

I ); 8 U.S.C. § 1 154(a)(1)(D)(i)(I I ). Deferred action is available
to individuals who can make a showing of “ex c e p t i o nal circumstances.” I

NA § 2 4 0(e); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e). B y necessity
, the f

ederal statutory and reg u latory scheme, as w ell

a s f ederal case law, vest the Ex ecutive with very br o a d discretion to determine enforcement priorities. 1

1 Pu rsu an t to th is d iscretio n , th e Dep artm en t o f Ho m elan d Secu rity an d its p red ecesso r, th e Im

m ig ratio n an d Natu ralizatio n S erv ice (“ INS”), estab lish ed a series o f g en eral categ o rical criteria to g u id e en f o rcem en t. Fo r ex am p le, th e 1 9 78 INS O p eratin g In stru ctio n s o u tlin ed f iv e criteria f

or

o f f icers to co n s id er in ex ercisin g p ro secu to rial d i s c r etio n , i n clu d in g “a d v an ced o r ten d er ag e.” O .I. 1 0 3 .1 (a)(1 )(ii); see a lso Pa sq u in i v

. Mo rris
, 7 0 0 F.2 d 6 5 8
, 6 6 1 (1 1 th C ir. 1 9 8 3 ). Discretio n can also cu t th e

o th er w ay

. Fo r ex am

p le, th e 2 0 1 1 Mo rto n Mem o h ig h l i g h ted “ w h eth er th e p erso n p o ses n atio n al secu rity o r p u b lic saf ety co n cern ,” Mem o ran d u m f

ro m J o h n Mo rto n , Directo r, U.S. Im m ig ratio n an d C u s t o m s E n f

o rcem en t, on “ Ex ercisin g P ro s ecu to rial Discretio n Co n s i s t e n t

w ith th e Civ il Im m ig ratio n En f o rcem en t P rio rities o f th e A g en cy f o r th e A p preh en sio n , Deten tio n , an d Rem o v al o f A lien s” (J u n e 1 7
, 20 1 1), an dA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 27

Cong r ess ex pressly charg ed the Department of Homeland Security with the responsibility of “[ e] stablishing n ational immig ration e nforcement policies a nd priorities.” 6 U .S.C. § 202(5). The Department of Homeland Security reg ulations describe deferred action as “an ac t o f administrative convenience to the g overnment which g ives some cases lower priority

. ” 8 C.F .R. § 274a.12(c)(14). Additionally
, the Supreme Court has made it clear that “an ag ency ’s d e c i sion
not to prosecute or enforce, whether throug h civil or criminal
process, is a decision g enera l l y committed to an ag e ncy ’s absolut e discretion.” H

eckler v. Chaney
, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). The Supreme Court has ex plained that the Secretary has discretion to ex ercise deferred action at each stag e of the deportation p rocess, a

n d has acknowledg ed th e l o n g history of the E x ecutive “eng ag ing in a re gu l a r practice

. . . o f

ex e r cising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own conveni ence.” Reno v. Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm.
, 525 U.S. 471, 483–84 (1999); see also id. n.8; Arizona
, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 ( noting that “[ a] principal f

eature of the removal sy stem is the broad discretion

ex e r cised b y ” the E x e c u t ive); Texas v. United States
, 106 F

. 3d 661, 6 67 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting the State of Tex as’s concession that the I

NA “ p laces no substantive limits on the

th e 2 0 1 4 J oh n so n Mem o id en tif ies th e “ h i g h est [en f

o rcem en t] prio rity ” as

n o n citizen s w h o m ig h t rep resen t a th reat to “ n atio n al secu rity
, bo rd er

secu rity
, an d p u

b lic saf ety ,” Mem o ran d u m f

ro m J eh Ch arles J o h n so n , Secretary
, Dep artm en t of Ho m elan d Secu rity
, o n “ P o licies f or th e A p preh en si o n , Deten tio n an d Rem o v al of Un d o cu m en ted Im m ig ran ts” (No v em b er 2 0, 2 0 1 4 ).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 28

Attorney General and commits enforcement of the I NA to her discretion”). 2

Defendants’ a r gu ment fails because they attempt to disting uish categ ories of E A D-holders in a way that does not amount to any relevant difference. L ike adjustment of status, (c)(9), and canc e llation o f removal, (c)(10), deferred action is a form of r elief g rounded in the I N A. M oreover, the

ex e r c ise of p rosecutorial discretion in deferred a ction flows from the authority

conferred on the Secretary by the I NA.

Defendants provide two criteria to ex plain when they deem an EAD satisfactory proof of authoriz ed presence: the applicant has formal immig ration status, or the applicant is on the p ath to formal immig rat i on status. Neither criteria

su ffices to render DACA r ecipients not similarly situated to

2 In th e p ast, th e Dep artm en t o f Ho m elan d Sec u r i t y a n d t h e INS h av e g ran te d d ef

erred actio n to dif

f eren t g ro u

p s o f n o n citizen s p resen t in th e Un i ted S t ates. In 1 9 7 7
, th e A tto rn ey Gen eral g ran ted stay s o f rem o v al to 2 5 0 ,0 00 n atio n als o f certain co u n t ries (k n o w n as “ Silv a L etterh o ld ers”). S ilva v. Levi , No . 7 6

- C4 26 8 (N.D. Ill. 1 9 7 7), mo d ified o n o th er g ro un d s

su b no m. S ilva v. Bell
, 6 05 F.2 d 9 7 8 (7 th C ir.1 9 7 9 ). In 1 99 0
, t h e INS in stitu ted th e “ Fam ily Fairn ess” p ro g ram th at def erred th e d ep o rtatio n of 1 .5 m i llio n f

am ily m em

b ers o f n o n citizen s w

h o w ere leg alized th ro u g h th e I m m i g r atio n Ref

o rm an d Co n tro l A ct. S ee Im m ig ratio n Ref

o rm an d Co n tro l A ct o f

1 9 8 6 , P u b . L . No . 9 9- 6 03 , 1 0 0 Stat. 3 3 5 9 ; Mem oran d u m fo r R eg io n al Co m

m issio n ers, INS, f

ro m Gen e McNary
, Co m m issio n er , INS, “ Fam ily Fairn ess: Gu id elin es f or V o lu n tary Dep artu re u n d er 8 CFR 2 4 2 .5 f o r th e In elig ib le Sp o u ses an d Ch ild ren o f L eg alized A lien s” (Feb

. 2
, 1 9 9 0 ). In 1 9 9 2
, P resid en t B u sh d i rected th e A tto rn ey Gen eral to g ran t d e f erred en f o rced d ep artu re to 1 9 0 ,0 00 Salv ad o ran s. S ee Im m i g ratio n A c t

o f 1 9 9 0 § 3 0 3
, P u b l i c La w 1 0 1 -6 4 9 ( N o v

. 2 9
, 1 9 9 0 ) ; h t t p s ://w w w .g p o .g o v /f

d sy s/p k g /FR- 19 9 4

- 1 2

- 0 6 / h t m l / 9 4

- 3 0 0 8 8

. h

t m

. A n d

n a t i o n als o f L ib eria w ere g ran ted d ef erred en f o rced d ep artu re u n t i l Sep tem b er 3 0
, 2 01 6
, h ttp : //w w w .u scis.g o v /h u m an itarian /tem p o r ary

p r o t e c t e d

- s t a t

u s

- d e f e r r e d

- e n f o r c e d

- d e p a

r t u r e / d e f e r r e d

- e n f o r c e d

- d e p a

r t u r e

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 29

o ther EAD-holders on any b asis pertinent to Ariz ona ’s decision whether to g rant them drivers’ licenses. L ike DACA recipients, many noncitiz ens w ho apply for adju s t ment o f
status a nd cancellation of removal—including indiv i d u a ls with (c)(9) and (c)(10) E ADs—do not, and may n e v er, p ossess formal immig r a tion status. See Guevara v. H o l de r , 649 F .3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir. 2011).

Addit ionally
, “ submission of an application does not connote that the alien’s immi gr ation status has chang ed.” Thus, merely a

pply ing for immig ration r elief d oes not sig nal

a clear path to formal immig ration status. Vasquez de Alcantar v. H

older
, 645 F .3d 1 097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2 011) (quoting United States v

. Elrawy
, 448 F .3d 309, 313 (5th Cir. 2006)). I n deed, g iven h ow frequently these applications a re denied, “the supposed ‘ path’ may lead to a dead end.” A DAC II
, 757 F .3d at 1065. I n this reg ard, no n c i t i z ens holding (c)(9) and (c)(10) EAD s a r e no different from DACA recipients. And as discussed above, DA C A recipients have

a temporary reprieve—deferred action—th a t is provided for by the I NA, pursuant to the p rose c u t orial discretion statutorily deleg ated to the Ex e c utive.

Therefore, in all relevant respects, D ACA recipients a re similarly situated to other categ o r ies of n oncitiz ens who may rely on EADs to obtain drivers’ licenses under Ariz ona’s policy

.

B. State Interest

The nex t step in an Equal P r o tection analy sis is to determine the applicable level of scrutiny

. Country Classic Dairies
, 847 F .2d at 596. A lthoug h we do not ultimately d e c i d e the Equal Protection issue, we remain of the v i e w ,A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 30

articul a t e d in our preliminary injunction opinion, that Ariz ona’s policy may well fail even rational basis review. S o , as before, we need not reach what standard of scrut i n y applies. 3 See A DAC II

, 757 F .3d at 1065.

Ariz ona’s policy must be “ra t i o n a lly related to a leg itimate state interest” to withstand rationa l basis review. City of Cleburne
, 473 U.S. a t 440. On appeal, Defendants advance six rationales for Ariz ona’s policy
, none of which persuade us that Plaintiff s’ arg ument under the E q ual Protection Clause is not at least sufficiently strong to trig g er the constitutional avoidance doctrine we ultimately invoke.

F irst, Defendants arg u e that Ariz ona’s policy is rationally related to the State’s concern that it could f ace liabi l i t y for improperly issuing drivers’ licenses to DACA recipients. B ut

as the district court observed, t h e depositions of ADOT Director J ohn S. Halikowski a n d Assistant Director of the Motor V ehicle Division Stacey K. Stanton did not y ield support for this rationale. Neither w itne s s w a s a ble to identify any instances in which the stat e faced liability for issuing licenses to noncitiz ens not authoriz ed to be present in the country

. ADAC I

II
, 81 F

. Supp. 3 d at 807. So the record probably does not e s t a b lish that there is a rational b asis for this concern.

3 In cases i n v o lv in g a l l eg ed discrim in atio n ag ain st n on citizen s

au th orized to b e p resen t in t h e Un ited States, th e S u p r e m e Co u rt h as

co n sisten tly ap p lied s t r i c t s cru tin y to th e state actio n at issu e. S ee, e.g

. , Nyq u i st v. M au clet
, 4 3 2 U.S. 1
, 7 (1 9 7 7 ); Gra h a m v. Rich a rd so n , 4 0 3 U .S. 3 6 5
, 3 72 (1 9 7 1 ). W h ere th e alleg ed d iscrim in atio n targ ets n on citizen s

w h o are n o t au t h o rized to b e p resen t , th e Su p rem e Co u rt ap p lies ratio n al b asis rev iew

. S

ee Plyler , 4 5 7 U.S. at 2 2 3

– 24

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 31

Second, D efendants contend that Ariz ona’s policy serves the State’s interest in preventing DACA recipients from making f alse claims f

or public assistance. As the district
court n oted, however, Director Halikowski a nd Assistant Director Stanton testified that they had no basis f or believing that drivers’ licenses c o uld be used to access state and federal benefits. I t follows that t h i s c o ncern is probably not a ration a l b a sis justify ing Ariz ona’s p olicy either. Id. (citing ADAC II , 757 F .3d at 1066).

Third, Defendants claim that Ariz ona’s policy is meant to reduce the administrative burden of issuing drivers’ licenses
to DACA recipients, o n l y t o have to revoke them once the DACA prog ram is terminated. The district co u rt found this
arg ument lacked merit, n o ting this court’s observation that it is less likely

that Ariz ona will need to revoke the licenses of DACA r ecipients than o f noncitiz ens holding (c)(9) a nd (c)(10) EADs, because applications for adjust m ent of status

o r c a n cellation of removal are routinely denied. 4 A DAC III
, 81 F

. Supp. 3d at 807 (citing ADAC I I
, 757 F .3d at 1066–67). I ndeed, noncitiz e ns with (c)(10) EADs are already in removal proceeding s, wh i c h means they are further along in the deporta t i on process than a re many DACA recipients. The administrative b urden of iss u i n g and revoking drivers’ licenses for D ACA recipi en t s is not g reater than the burden of issuing and revoking drivers’ licenses for noncitiz ens holding (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs. Certainly
, the likelihood o f having to do so does not disting uish these two c l a s s e s o f

4 Def en d an ts s u g g est “ later- d ev elo p ed f acts” in d icate th at n on citizen s h o ld in g (c)(9 ) an d (c)(1 0 ) EA Ds are o n th e p ath to perm an en t resid en cy

. W e are n o t co n

v in ced th at a ch ievin g certain f o rm s o f relief (ad

j u stm en t of
statu s o r can cellatio n o f rem o v al) alters th e f act th at ap plicatio n s f

o r su ch relief are reg u larly

d en i ed in v ery

g reat n u m

bers.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 32

noncitiz ens, as (c)(9) and (c)(10) appl i c a tions for relief a re frequently denied.

F ourth, Defendants arg ue that Ariz ona has an inter es t i n avoiding financial harm to individuals who may be injured in traffic accidents by DACA r e c i pients. Defendants contend that individuals h a r m ed by D ACA recipients may be left without r ecourse when the DACA p rog ram is terminated a nd DACA recipients are removed from the country

. Bu t this rationale applies equally to individuals with (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs. These no n c i t iz ens may find their applications for immig ration r elief denied and may be quickly removed from the country , leaving those injured in traffic accidents ex p osed
to financial harm. Nevertheless, A riz ona issues drivers’ licenses to noncitiz ens holding (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs.

F ifth, Defendants contend that deny ing licenses to DACA recipients serves the g oal of consis t ently apply ing ADOT policy

. B ut ADOT in consistently applie s i t s o wn policy b y deny ing licenses to DACA recipients w h i l e providing licenses to holders of (c)(9) and (c)(10) E AD s

. A riz o na simply h as no w ay to know what “path” noncitiz e ns in any o f these c a t e g ories will eventually take. DACA recipients
appear similar to individuals w ho are elig ible under Ariz ona’s policy with respect to a ll the c riteria ADOT relies on. ADOT thus a pplies its own i m m i gration classification with an

uneven h a n d by deny ing licenses only to DACA recipients. See, e.g.
, Y

ick W o

. v

. Hopkins
, 118 U .S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“[ I ]f [t he law] is applied and administered by public authority with an evil ey e and an unequal hand, so a s practically to ma

k e u njust and illeg al discriminations b etween persons in similar circumstances, material to their r ig hts, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 33

Six th, Defendants claim that Ariz ona’ s p o l i c y is rationally related to A DOT’s statutory oblig ation to ad m i n i s ter the state’s driver’s license statute. ADOT’s di s p a rate treatment of DACA recipients pursuant t o t h e driver’s license statute relies on the premise th a t f e deral law does not authoriz e DACA recipients’ presence in the United Sta t es. This rationale is essentially an assertion of the state’s authority to decide w hether immig rants’ p resence is aut h o riz ed under federal law. Rather than eva l u a t i ng that assertion as part o f the Equal Protection a

naly sis, we defer doing so u n til our discussion of our ultimate, p reemption g round for decision,

w h i c h we adopt as part of our constitutional avoidan c e approach.

B e fore proceeding to that discussion, it bears noting
, once ag ain, see ADAC I

I
, 757 F .3d at 1067, that t h e record does
sug g est a n a dditional reason for Ariz ona’s p olic y : a dog g ed animus ag a inst DACA recipients. The Sup r em e Court has made very clear that such animus cannot constitute a leg itimate state interest, and has cautioned ag ainst sowing the seeds of prejudice. S

ee Romer v. Eva n s , 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996); see also City of Cleburne
, 4 73 U.S. at 464 (Marshall, J
., concurring in the judg ment in part, and dissenting in part) (“Prejudice, o nce let l o o se, is not easily cabined.”). “The Constitution’s g uarantee of equality must at the very least

mean t h a t a b a r e

. . . d esire to harm a politically unpopular
g roup cannot justify disparate treatment of that g roup.” Un i ted S tates v. W

indsor
, 1 33 S. Ct. 2675, 2681 (2013) (citation omitted).

II. P reem ption

W e do not “decide federal constitutional questions where a dispositive nonconstitutional g round is available.” City ofA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 34

L.A. v. Cty. of Kern
, 581 F .3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 2 009) (quoting Correa v. Clayton
, 5 63 F

. 2d 396, 4 0 0 (9th Cir. 1977)). W hile preemption derives its force from the Supremacy Clause o f th e Constitution, “it is treated a s ‘st at u tory ’ for purposes of our practice of deciding statutory

c l a i m s f

i r s t t o a v o i d u n n e c e s s a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l adjudications.” Douglas v. Seacoast P rods.
, 431 U. S

. 265, 271–72 (1977). 5 Given the formidable Equal Protection

concerns Ariz ona’s policy ra i s es, we turn to a preemption analy sis as an alternative to resting our decision on the E q ual Protect i o n C l ause. 6 Doing so, w e c onclude that Ariz ona’s policy encroaches on the ex clusive f ederal authority to c reate immig ration classifications and so is displaced by the I NA.

The “ [ p] ower to regu l at e immig ration is unquestionably

ex c lusively a federal p ower.” De Canas
, 424 U.S. a t 354.

5 T h o u g h p reem

ptio n p rin cip les are ro o ted in th e Su p rem acy Clau se, th is

co u rt h as p r e v io u sly ap p l ied th e p rin cip l e th at p reem p tio n d oes n o t im p licate a co n stitu

tio n a l q u estio n f

o r p u rp o ses o f co n stitu tio n al

av o id an ce. S

e e H o t e l E mp s. & Rest. Emp s

. In t ’l Un io n v. Nev. Ga min g Co mm’n
, 9 8 4 F.2 d 1 5 07
, 15 1 2 (9 th Cir. 1 99 3 ) (h o ld in g th at Pu llma n ab sten tio n w as n o t w arran ted f o r p reem p tio n claim s b ecau se “ p reem p tio n is n o t a co n stitu

t i o n al i ssu e.”); Kn u dsen Co rp

. v. N ev. S ta te Da iry Co mm’n , 6 7 6 F.2 d 3 7 4 , 3 7 7 (9 th Cir. 1 9 8 2 ) (sam e).

6 In th eir o p en in g b r i ef

, Def en d an t s arg u e p reem

p tio n is n o t p ro p erly b ef o re th is co u rt b ecau se P lain tif f s d i d n o t ap p e a l t h e district co u rt’ s d ism issal o f t

h eir p reem

p t io n c l a i m

. B u t at o ral arg u m en t , d ef en s e

co u n sel o f

f ered t o p ro v id e su

p p lem en tal brief

i n g o n th e issu e. Sep arately
, P lain tif f s n o ted th at Def

en d an ts raised th e T ak e Care arg u m en t f o r t h e f irst tim e o n ap p eal an d arg u ed it o u g h t n o t b e co n sid ered b ecau se it w as n o t p resen t ed to t

h e d istrict co u rt. Fo llo w in g o ral arg u m en t, w e req u ested an d th e p arties s u

b m i tted s u

p p lem en tal b rief

in g o n b o th issu es. Def

en d an ts’

su p p lem en tal b rief co n ced ed th at, i n lig h t o f t h e co n sid eratio n s articu l ated in Olymp i a Pip e L in e Co

. v. City o f S ea t tle
, 4 3 7 F.3 d 8 7 2 (9 th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ),

w e m ay p ro p erly co n sid er p reem

ptio n in th is case.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 35

The Supreme Court’s immig ration jurisprudence recog niz e s that the occupation of a r e g ulatory f ield may be “inferr ed from a f ramework o f r e gu l ation ‘ so pervasive

. . . that Cong r ess left no room for the States to supplement i t

. ’ ” Arizona
, 132 S. Ct. at 2501 ( quoti n g R i c e v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.
, 331 U.S. 218, 23 0 ( 1 9 4 7)). The Supreme Court has also indicated that the I NA p rovides a pe rv as i v e framework with reg ard to the a dmission, remova l
, a n d
presence of aliens. See Chamber o f Commerce of U.S. v

. W hiting
, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1973 (2011) (quoting DeCan a s , 424 U.S. at 353, 359); cf. Arizona
, 132 S. Ct

. a t 2499 (“F ederal g overnance of immig ration and alien status is

ex tensive and complex .”).

Traditionally
, federal law preempts state law when: (1) Cong r ess e x p ressly includes a p re e m ption provision in federal law; (2) states attempt to “reg ulat[ e] conduct in a field that Cong ress, acting within its proper authority
, has determined must be r eg ulated by its ex cl u sive g overnance”;

or (3) state law conflicts with federal l a w , either because “compliance w ith both federal and state reg ul a t i o n s is a phy sical impossibility ” or “state law ‘stands a s an obstacle to the accomplishment and ex ecution of the fu l l p u r poses a nd objectives of Cong ress.” Arizona v

. U nited States
, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2501 (2012) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Grow er s , I nc. v. Paul
, 373 U.S. 132, 142–143 (1963), a nd Hines v. Davidowitz , 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).

“The States e njoy no power with respect to the classification o f aliens.” Plyler v. Doe
, 457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982). The Suprem e Court has also ex pressly recog niz ed tha t t he source of preemption in the immig ration contex t is

u nique. The “[ f] e d eral authority to reg ulate the status of aliens derives” not from one specific federal law or networkA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 36

of laws, b ut “from v arious sources, including the F ederal Government’s power ‘[ t] o establish [ a ] uniform Rule o f Natural i z a tion,’.

. . its power ‘[ t] o reg ulate Commerce with foreig n Nations,’ and its broad authority over foreig

n affairs

. . . .” Toll v. Moreno
, 458 U.S. 1, 1 0 (1982). Supreme Court
p r e cedent ex p lains that “neither a clear encroachment on

ex c lusive federal power to admit aliens nor a c l e a r conflict with a specific cong ressional purpose” is required in order for federal law to preempt state reg u lati o n s of immig r ants. See id. at 11 n.16 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Not surpris i n gl y , . . . [ Supreme Court] cases have also b een at pains to note the substantial limitations upon the authority o f the States in making classifications based upon alienag e .” Id. at 10.

To b e s u re, not all state reg ulations touching on immig ration are preempted. S ee Chamber of Commerce
, 131 S. Ct. at 1974. B ut states may n o t d irectly reg ulate immig ration, Valle del Sol Inc. v. W hit i n g , 7 3 2 F

. 3d 1006, 1023 (9th Cir. 2013), and the power to c l assify a liens for immig ration purposes is “committed to the political branches of the F ederal Government.” Plyler
, 457 U.S. a t 225 (quoting Mathews
, 426 U.S. at 81). Ariz ona prohibits the issuance o f drivers’ licenses to any one w ho does not submit proof that his

or her p resence in the United States is “aut h oriz ed under federal law,” Ariz

. Rev. Stat. § 28-3153(D), and then purports to c r eate its own independent definition of “authoriz ed under fe deral law,” one that ex cludes DACA beneficiaries. B ecause Ariz ona creat e d a new immig ration classification when it adopted its policy r eg arding driver’s license elig ibility
, it impermissibly stray ed into a n ex clusive domain that Cong r ess, th r oug h the I NA, deleg a ted to the e x ecutive branch.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 37

States can reg ulate areas of traditional state concern that mig ht impact noncitiz e ns. See DeCanas
, 424 U

. S

. a t 355. Permissible state reg ulations include those that mirror federal

o b j e c t i v e s a n d i n c o r p o r a t e f e d e r a l i m m i g r a t i o n classifications. Plyler
, 457 U

. S. at 225–26. B ut a law that
reg ulates an area of traditional state concern can still effect an impermissible reg ulation of immig r ation.

F or ex ample, in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission
, the Supreme Court observed t h a t a state reg ulation o f entitlement to commer cial f ishing licenses b ased on i m m i g r a t i o n c l a s s i f

i c a t i o n s c o n f

l i c t e d w i t h t h e

“ c o n s t i t u t ionally derived federal power to reg u l a t e immig ration.” 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948). I n Toll v. Moreno
, the Supreme Court held that preemption p rinciples foreclosed

a state p olicy concerning the imposition of tuition c h a rg e s and fees at a state university o n the bas is of immig r ation
status. 4 5 8 U.S. 1
, 16–17 ( 1 982). S i m ilarly
, the Third C ircuit has held that municipal ordinances preventing unauthoriz ed aliens from renting housing consti t uted an impermissible reg ulation of immig ration and were p reempted by the I N A. Lozano v. City of Hazle t o n , 7 24 F .3d 297, 317 (3d Cir. 2013). Althoug h the housing ordinances di d not directly reg ulate immig ration in the sense o f dictating w ho could or could not be admitted in t o t h e United States, the Third Circuit concluded that they impermissibly “ intrude[ d]

on the r eg ulation o f residency and p resence of aliens in the United States.” Id. (emphasis added).

Similarly
, th e Fifth Circuit held that an ordinance “allow[ ing ] state courts to assess the leg ality of a noncitiz en’s presence” in the Uni t ed States was p reempted because it “open[ ed] the door to conflicting state a nd federal ruling s on the question.” V illas at Parkside Partners v. CityA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 38

of Farmers Branch , 726 F

. 3d 524, 536 (5th Cir. 2013). The Fi f t h Circuit’s decision was based on its recog nition th at “[ t] he federal g overnment alone

. . . has the power to classify non-citiz ens.” Id. I n accord with these decisions, the Eleventh Circuit held that a state law prohibiting courts from
recog niz ing contracts i n v o l v i n g unlawfully present aliens was preempted as “a thinly veiled attempt to reg ulate immig r ation under the g uise o f contract law.” See Uni t e d S tates v

. Alabama , 691 F .3d 1269, 1292–96 (11th Cir. 2012).

Cases involving t h e allocation of state resources on the basis of immig ration classifications frequentl y raise both equal protection and preemption c o n c erns. Some decisions apply ing preemption principles have ultimately rested on equal protection g rounds, see, e.g. , Takahashi
, 334 U.S. 410. I n Toll
, however, the Supreme Court noted commentators’ observations “that many of the Court’s decisions concerning alienag e c lassifications, such a s Tak a hashi
, are better

ex p lained in pre-emption than in equal p rotection terms.” 458 U.S. at 11 n.16.

Here, Ariz ona’s policy ostensibly reg ulates the issuance of drivers’ licenses, admi ttedly an area of traditional state

concern. See Chamber of Commerce
, 131 S. Ct. at 1983. B ut i t s policy n ecessarily “embodies the State’s independent judg ment that recipients of [ DACA] are not ‘authoriz ed’ to be present in the United States ‘ under federal law .’” ADAC II
, 757 F .3d a t 1069 (Christen, J

. , concurring ). I ndeed, the Ariz ona Ex ecutive Order declared that “the Deferred Action
prog r am does not and c annot confer lawful or authoriz ed

. . . presence upon the u n l a w f ul a lien a

p plicants.” Ex ecutive O r d e r 2012-06 at 1. The Order also announced A riz o n a ’s view that “[ t] he issuance o f Deferred Action or Deferred Action

. . . [ EADs] to unlawfully present aliens does notA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 39

confer u pon them any lawful or authoriz ed status.” Id. (emphasis added). To implement the O rder, ADOT initiated

a policy of deny ing licenses to DACA recipients pursuant to Ariz ona’s driver’s lic e n s e statute, which requires that applicants “submit proof satisfactory to the department t h at the applicant’s presen c e i n the United States is authorized under federal law .” Ariz

. Rev. Stat. A n n. § 28-3153(D) (emphasis added).

Ariz ona poin t s to three criteria to justify treating EAD recipients differently than individuals with (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs, 7 even thoug h the federal g overnmen t treats their EADs the same in a l l relevant respects. B ut Ariz ona’s three criteria—that an applicant: has f o rmal status; i s on a path to formal status; o r has applied f or r elief ex pressly provided for in the I NA—cannot be e quate d with “authoriz ed presence” under federal law. DACA recipien t s a n d noncitiz e ns with (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs all lack formal immigr a t i o n status,
y et the federal g overnment permits them to live and work in the country for an undefined period of t i m e, p rovided they comply with certain conditions.

Ariz ona thus disting uishes between noncitiz ens based on its own definition o f “authoriz ed p resence,” one that neither mirrors nor borrows from the federal immi gration classificati o n s c h e m e

. A n d b y a r r a ng ing federal classif i c a t ions in the way it prefers, A riz ona impermissibly

assumes the federal prerog ative of creating immig r ation

7 A s w e h av e n o ted
, recip ien ts o f (c)(9 ) an d (c)(1 0 ) d o cu m e n t s a r e

n o n citizen s w

h o h av e ap p lied f

o r ad j u stm en t o f s tatu s an d can cellatio n of

rem o v al, resp ectiv ely

. S

ee 8 C.F.R. § 2 7 4 a.1 2 (c)(9 )– (1 0 ).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 40

classifications according to its own desig n, 8 thereby eng a g ing in an “ex ercise of r eg ulatory bric o l a g e,” ADAC II
, 757 F .3d
at 1072 (Christen, J
., concurring ), despite the fact that “States enjoy no power w ith respect to the cl a s s i f i c ation of aliens,” Plyler , 457 U.S. at 225.

That this case involves classes of aliens the Ex ecutive h as,

as a matter of discretion, placed in a low priority categ ory for removal is a further consideration weig hing ag a inst the validity of Ariz o n a ’ s policy

. The Supreme Court has emphasiz ed that “[ a] principal feature of the removal sy stem is the broad discretio n e x ercised by immig ration officials.” Arizona
, 132 S. C t. a t 2 499. And the Court has specifically
recog niz ed t h a t federal statutes contemplate and protect the discretion of the E x e cu t i ve B ranch when making determinations concerning deferred action. S ee Reno
, 525 U.S. at 484–86. The discreti o n b u i lt into statutory removal procedures sug g ests that aux iliary state r egu lations
reg arding the presence of a liens in th e U n i ted States a re particularly intrusive on the overall federal s t a tutory immig ration scheme.

8 Def en d an ts’ co n tin

u al i n sisten ce th at A rizo n a’ s p o licy is n o t p reem pted b ecau se th e D AC A p r o g ram lack s “ t h e f o rce o f law ” ref

lects a

m isu n d erstan d i n g o f th e p reem ptio n q u estio n

. Preem

p tio n is n ot a g lad iat o r i al co n test th at p its th e DA CA Mem o ran d u m ag ain st A rizo n a’ s p o licy

. No r d o es th is op in io n r ely o n t h e DA CA Mem o ran d u m f o r its

c o n clu sio n th at A rizo n a’ s p o licy is p reem p ted b y f ed eral law

. Rath e r , A rizo n a’ s po licy is p reem p ted b y th e s u

p rem acy o f f

ed eral au th o rity u n der th e INA to create im

m ig ratio n categ o ries. In d eed
, b e c a u se A rizo n a’ s

n o v el classif

icatio n sch em e in clu d es n o t j u st DA CA recip i en ts b u t also recip ien ts o f reg u lar d ef

erred actio n an d def

erred en f o rced d ep artu re, ou r

co n clu si o n th at A rizo n a’ s sch em e im p erm issib ly creates i m

m ig ratio n classif icatio n s n o t f

o u n d in f

ed eral l a w i s no t d ep en d en t u po n th e

co n tin u ed v itality

o f th e DA CA

p ro g ram

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 41

Unable to point to a n y f

e deral statute or reg ulation that justifies c lassify ing individuals w ith (c)(9) and (c)(10) EADs

as authoriz e d to be pr e s e nt w hile ex cluding recipients o f deferred action or deferred enforced departure, Defend a n t s arg ue that Ariz ona properly relied on statements by the U.S. Citiz enship and I mmig rati o n S e rvice that “make clear that deferred action does not confer a lawful immig ration status.” These statements take the f orm of an email from a local U.S. Citiz enship and I mmig ration Service Community R e l a tions Officer in response to an inquiry from ADOT. I n the e mail, the officer not e s that DACA recipients apply ing for work authoriz ation should fill in categ ory “C33” and not categ ory “C14,” which is the categ ory for reg ular deferred action.

This email does nothing to further D efendants’ arg ument. The officer’s statement in no w ay sug g e sts that f ed e ra l l aw supports Ariz ona’s novel classifications. And even if it did,

an email from a local U .S. Citiz enship and I mmig r ation Services Officer is n ot a source of “ fe d eral law,” n o r an official statement of the g overnment’s position. 9

The I N A, indeed, directly undermines Ariz ona ’ s novel classifications. F or purposes of determining the admissibility of aliens other than those lawfull y a d m i tted f or p ermanent residence, the I

N A s t at e s that if an alien is present in the Unit e d S t a tes bey ond a “period of stay authorized by the Attorney General” or without being admitted or paroled, the

9 In ADAC II

, Def en d an t s al s o arg u ed th at a “ Freq u en t ly A sk ed Qu estio n s” sectio n o f th e U.S. Citizen sh ip an d Im m ig ratio n Serv ices W eb site an d a Co n g ressio n a l Research Serv i ce Mem oran d u m d em on strated t

h at A rizo n a’ s classif

i catio n fo u n d su

p p o rt in f ed eral law

. S ee 7 5 7 F.3 d at 1 0 73

. W e u n d erstan d Def en d an ts to h av e ab an d on ed th ese arg u

m en ts. B u t ev en if t h e y h a d n o t , n eith er so u rce is a d ef in itiv e statem en t o f

f ed eral law

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 42

alien i s “deemed to b e unlawfully present in the United States,” at l e a s t for p urposes of § 1182(a)(9)(B ). I N A § 212(a)(9)(B ) (ii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B )(ii) (empha s e s added). The administrative reg ulations implementing this section of the I

NA, to which we owe deference, e stablish that deferred action recipients do not accrue “unlawful presence” for purposes of calculating when they may seek admission to the United States. 8 C. F.R. § 214.14(d)(3); 28 C.F .R. § 1100.35(b)( 2 )

. B ecause such recipients are provisionally present without being admitted or p aroled, their stay must be considered “authoriz ed by t h e A ttorney G eneral,” for
purp o s e s o f this statute. I NA § 212(a)(9)(B )(ii); 8 U .S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B ).

The REA L I D A ct, which amended the I NA, f urther

u n d e r m i n e s A r i z o n a ’ s i n t e r p r e t at i o n o f “ a u t h o r i z e d presence.” REAL I D Act o f 2005, Pub

. L

. N o

. 109-13, div. B
, 119 Stat. 231. T he Real I D Act amendments provide that
states may issue a driver’s license o r identification c a r d t o persons who can demonstrate they are “ a u t h oriz ed [ to] stay in the United States.” Id. § 202(c)(2)(C)(i)–(ii). Persons with “approved deferred action status” are ex pressly identified as being present in the U n i t e d States d uring a “period o f authoriz ed s t a y ,” for the p urpose of issuing state identificati o n cards. Id. § 2 02(c)(2)(B )(viii), (C)(ii). W e point to the s e s t a tutory definitions not as ex a mples of allencompassing cong r e ssionally authoriz ed decisions about who may remain in the United States, b ut as ex amples of the federal g o ver n m e n t e x ercising its ex clusive authority to classify immig rants.

Despite A riz ona’s c lear departure from feder al im m i g r a tion classifications, Defendants arg ue Ariz ona’s policy is not a “back-door reg ulation o f immig ration.” TheyA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 43

c ompare it to the L ouisiana Supreme Court policy the F ift h Circuit uphe l d i n LeClerc v

. W ebb
, which prohibited any alien lacking p ermanent r esident status f r om joining the state bar. 419 F

. 3d 405, 4 10 (5th C ir. 2005). B ut the L ouisiana S u preme Court did n ot create a novel immig rat i o n classification as Ariz ona d oes here. Rather, it per m i s s i bly borrowed from ex isting federal classifications, disting u ishing “those aliens who have attained permanent r esident status in the United States” f

rom those who have not. Id. (quoting I n re Bourke , 819 So. 2d 1020, 1022 (L a. 2002)).

Defendants also arg ue that sections of the I NA g ranting
states discret i o n to provide public benefits to c ertain aliens, including d eferred action recipients, sug g est that Cong ress “has not intended to occupy a field so vast that it precludes all
state reg ulations that touch upon immig r ation.” See 8 U .S.C. §§ 1621, 1622. B ut we do not con c l u d e that Cong ress has preempted all state reg ulations that touch upon immig ration. Ariz ona’s policy is preempted because, in determining which aliens shall be elig ible to receive a state benefit, A riz o na created new immig ration classific a t ions based on its independent view of who is authoriz e d u n d er federal law to be present in the United States.

Defendants offer no foundation for an interpretation o f federal law that classifies individuals with (c)(9) a nd (c)(10) EADs as having “authoriz ed presence,” but DACA recipients

as having n o authoriz ed presence. Ariz ona’s policy o f deny ing drivers’ licenses to DACA recipients bas e d o n its

own notion of “authoriz ed presence” is pre e m p ted by the

ex c lusive a

uthority of the f

e d eral g overnment under the I N A to classify

noncitiz e ns.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 44

III. Constitutionality of the DACA P rogram

W e decline to rule on the constitutionality of the DACA
pr o gr a m , as the issue is not properly b efore our court; only the lawfulness of Ariz ona’s policy is in question.

W e note, however, that the d iscussion above is quite pertinent to both of D e f e n dants’ primary arg uments underg irding their challeng e to the c o n stitutionality of the DACA prog ram. F irst, Defendants arg u e that the Ex ecutive has no power, independent of Cong ress, to enact the DACA
prog r am. B ut as we have discussed, the I NA is replete with provi s i o n s that confer p rosecutorial discretion o n the E x ecutive to establish its own e n f orcement priorities. S

e e supra , section I I

. Third parties g enerally may not contest the

ex e r cise of this discretion, see Linda R.S

. v

. Richard D.
, 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973), includi ng in the immig r ation
contex t, see Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB
, 467 U

. S

. 8 83, 897 (1984). 1 0

Second, Defen d a n t s contend that the DACA prog ram amounts to a wholesale suspension of the I NA’s provisions, which in turn violates the President’s o b lig ation to “take Care that the L aws be faithfully ex ecuted.” U.S. Const. a rt. I I
, § 3

10 Co n g ress’ s f

ailu re to p ass th e Dev elo p m en t, Relief
, an d Ed u catio n f

or A lien Min o rs (“ DREA M”) A ct d o es n o t sig n al th e illeg itim acy o f th e DA CA p ro g ram . T h e Su

p rem e Co u rt h as ad m o n ish ed th at an u n en acted b ill is n o t a reliab le in d icato r o f C o n g r e s s i o n al in ten t

. S ee Red Lio n Bro a d

. Co

. v. FCC
, 39 5 U .S. 3 67
, 3 8 1 n .1 1 (1 9 6 9 ). Mo reo v er, t h e DREA M A ct an d th e D A CA p ro g ram are n o t i n terch an g eab le p o licies b ecau se th ey p ro v id e d if

f eren t f o rm s of relief ( i.e.
, th e DREA M A ct w ou ld h av e g ra n t e d co n ditio n al resid en cy t h at co u ld lead to p erm an en t resid en cy , w h ereas th e DA CA p ro g ram o f f ers a m o re lim ited
, tem

po rary d ef

erral of

rem o v al).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 45

(“the T ake Care Clause”). B ut, according to an a micus brief filed b y t h e Department of J ustice, the Department o f Homeland Security only has funding annually to remove a few hundred thousand of t h e 11.3 million undocumented aliens living in the Uni t e d S t a tes. Constrained by these limited resources, the D e p a r t ment of Homeland Security must

m ake difficult decisions about whom to prioritiz e fo r removal. Despite Defendants’ p rotestations, they h a v e not shown tha t t h e Department of Homeland Security failed to comply with its responsibilities t o the ex tent its resources permit it to do so. 1 1

Fo r t hat reason, this case is nothing like Train v. City of New Y ork
, a case relied u p o n by Defendants, in which the Supreme Court affirmed an o r d e r directing a presidential administration to spend mon ey allocated by Cong ress for certain p rojects. 4 20 U.S. 35, 40 (1975). Here, by contrast, the Department of J ustice asserts tha t Cong ress has not appropriated sufficient funds to remove a l l 11.3 million undocumented aliens, and several p rior administrations have adopted prog r a ms, like DACA, to prioritiz e which noncitiz ens to remove. See supra n.2. “The power to decide when to investig ate, and when to prosecute, lies at the core o f the Ex ecutive’s duty t o s e e t o the faithful ex ecution of the laws

. . . .” Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v

. Pierce
,

11 In d eed
, t

h e Dep artm en t o f J u s t ice’ s b rief rep o rts th at th e

a d m in istratio n h as rem o v ed ap pro x im ately 2 .4 m illio n n o n citizen s f r o m th e co u n try f

ro m 2 0 0 9 to 2 0 1 4
, a n u m b er th e g o v ern m en t states is

“ u n p reced en ted .” P rio ritizin g th o se rem o v al p ro ceed in g s f o r n on citizen s

w h o rep resen t a th reat to “ n a t i o n a l s ecu rity
, b o rd er s ecu rity
, an d p u b l ic saf ety ,” Mem oran d u m f

ro m J eh Ch arles J o h n so n , Secretary
, Dep artm en t

o f Ho m elan d S ecu rity
, o n “ P o licies f o r th e A p p reh en sio n , Deten tio n an d Rem o v al o f Un do cu m en t ed Im m i g ran ts” (No v em

b er 2 0
, 2 0 1 4 ), can n o t f airly b e d escrib ed as ab dicatin g th e ag en cy ’ s resp o n s ib ilities.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 46

786 F .2d 1199, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see Arpaio v. Obama
, 797 F .3d 11, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2015).

F urther, as we have noted, t h e Supreme Court has acknowledg ed the history of the Ex e cutive e ng ag ing in a reg ular practice of pro secutorial discretion in enforcing the I NA. See R eno , 525 U .S. a t 483–84 & n .8 (“To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the I NS may decline to i n s t i t u t e proceeding s, t e rminate proceeding s, o r decline to ex e cute a final order of deportation. T h is commendable e x ercise in administrat i v e discretion,

. . . is now desig nated as deferred action.” ( quoting 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Y ale-L oehr, I mmigr a t ion L aw and Procedure § 7 2.03 [ 2] [ h] (1998))). This history includes “g eneral policy ” non-enforcement, such

as deferred action g ranted to foreig n stude n t s a ffected b y Hurricane Katrina, U .S. Citiz enship and I mmig r ation Services, Interim Relief for Certain Foreign Academic Students Adversely Affected by Hurri cane Katrina: Frequently Asked Questions ( FAQ) at 1 (Nov. 2 5, 2005), a nd deferred a ction for c ertain w idows and widowers o f U .S. citiz ens, Memorandum for F ield L eade r s h i p , U

. S. Citiz e nship and I mmig ration Services, fr o m Donald Neufeld, A cting Ass o c i ate Director, U.S. Citiz enship and I mmig r ation Services, “ G u idance Reg a rding Surviving Spouses o f Deceased U.S. Citiz ens and Their Children” a t 1 (Sept. 4, 2009). 1 2

12 T h e recen t ru lin g in Texa s v

. U n i t e d S ta t es , 8 0 9 F.3 d 1 3 4 (5 th Cir. 2 0 1 5 ) p etitio n fo r cert. g ra n ted su b n o m. Un ited S ta tes v. Texa s , — S

. Ct.

— , 2 0 1 6 W L 2 0 72 5 7 (U.S. No v

. 20
, 20 1 5 ) (m em .), is also in ap p o site to Def en d an ts’ co n stitu

t i o n a l claim s. T h ere, sev eral states ch allen g ed th e Def erred A ctio n f

o r P aren ts o f A m erica n s an d L aw f u l P erm an en t Resid en ts pro g ram (“ DA P A ”), in clu din g D A PA recip ien t s’ elig ib ility f or certain p u b lic ben ef

its su ch as d riv ers’ licen ses an d w o rk au th o rizatio n

. Id

. at 1 4 9 . T h e co u rt co n clu d ed th at th e states w ere lik ely to su cceed o nA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 47

W e reiterate that
, i n the end, Ariz ona’s policy is preempted not because the DACA prog ram is or is not valid, b u t because the policy usurps the authority of the fede ra l
g overnment to create immigrant classifications.

IV. P erm anent Injunction

B e fore a court may g rant a permanent injunctio n , the plaintiff must satisfy

a four-factor test, demonstrating :

(1) that it has s u f

f e r e d an irreparable injury ; (2) that r emedies available at l a w , such a s

m o n e t a r y d a m a ges, are inade q u a t e t o compensate for t h a t i n jury ; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships b etween the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be d isserved by a per m a n e nt injunction.

Monsant o C o

. v

. G eertson Seed Farms
, 561 U.S. 139, 141 (2010) (quoting eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
, 5 4 7 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).

Plaintiffs h ave proven that they s u f fer irreparable injury

as a r esult o f A riz ona’s policy
, and that r emedies available at law are inadequate to compensat e t h e m for that injury

. I n particular, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that their inability to obtain drivers’ l i c e n s e s l i m i t s t h e i r p rofessional opportunities. I n Ariz ona, it takes an averag e of ove r f our times as long to

th eir p ro ced u ral an d su b s tan tiv e claim s u

n der th e A d m in istrativ e P ro ced u re A ct, an d ex p ressly d eclin ed to reach th e T ak e Care Clau s e issu e. Id

. at 1 4 6 & n .3 , 1 4 9

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 48

c o m m u t e to work by public transit than it d oes by driving, and public transportation is n o t a vailable in most localities. One ADAC member had to miss full day s of work so that she could take h er son to his doctors’ appointments b y bus. Another ADAC member finishes work after midnig ht but the buses by her workplace st op r unning at 9 p.m. And a s the district court n oted, another Plaintiff is a g raphic desig ner whose inability to o b tain a driver’s license cause d h er to decline work from clients, while y et a nother Plaintiff w ants to pursue a career as an E mer gency Medical Technician but is unable to d o so because the local fire departm ent requires

a driver’s license for e mploy ment. ADAC III

, 81 F

. Supp. 3d at 809.

Plaintiffs’ inability to obtain dr ivers’ licenses h inders them in p ursuing new jobs, attending work, a d v a ncing their
careers, and developing business opportun ities. They thus suffer financial harm and sig nificant opportunity c osts. A nd

as we have p reviously found, the irreparable nature of this injury is ex a cerbated by Plaintiffs’ y o ung ag e a nd frag ile socioeconomic status. ADAC II
, 757 F .3d at 1068. Setbacks early in their c areers c a n have sig nificant impacts on Plaintiffs’ future professions. Id. This loss of opportunity to pursue one’s chosen p rofession constitutes irreparable harm. Enyart v

. Nat’l Conference of Bar Exam’rs, I n c

. , 6 3 0 F .3d 1153, 1165 ( 9 t h C ir. 2011); see also Chalk v. U.S. Dist. Ct. Cent. Dist. of Cal.
, 840 F .2d 701, 709–10 (9th C i r. 1 9 88) (holding that p l a i n tiff’s transfer to a less satisfy ing job created emotional injury that c onstituted irreparable har m ). Since irr e p ar a ble harm is traditionally defined as harm for which there is no adequate leg al remedy
, such a s an award o f damag es, see R e nt-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc.
, 9 4 4 F. 2 d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991),A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 49

Plaintiffs have also shown that remedies available at law a re inadequate to compensate them.

Plaintiffs have also demonstrated that, after considering the balance of hardships, a remedy in equity is warranted a nd that the public interest would not be disserved by a p ermanent injunction. W e conclude that Ariz ona’s policy is p reempted by federal law. “ [ I ] t is clear that it would not be equitable o r in the public’s interest to allow the state to vi o l a t e the requirements of federal law, e s p e c i ally when there are no adequate remedies available.” Valle del S ol
, 732 F .3d at 1029 (quoting Arizona
, 641 F .3d at 366) (alterations omitted). The public interest and the b a lance of the equities favor “prevent[ ing ] the violation of a party ’s constitutional rig h ts.” Melendres v. Arpaio
, 6 9 5 F .3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2 012) (citation omitted).

CONCLUSION

I n s u m , we find that DACA recipients are similarly situated in all relevant respects to other noncitiz e n s e l i g ible for drivers’ licenses under Ariz ona’s policy . And Ariz ona’s refusal to rely on EADs from DACA recipients f or purposes of establishing elig ibility for drivers’ licenses may w ell violate the E qual Protection Clau s e f o r lack of a rational
g over nmental interest justify ing the d istinction r elied upon. I nvoking the const i t utional a voidance d o ctrine, we construe the I NA a s occupy

ing the f ield of Ariz ona’s classification o f noncitiz ens w ith r e ga rd to whether their presence is authoriz ed by federal law, a nd as therefore preempting states from eng ag ing in their v ery own categ oriz ation of immig rants for the p urpose o f deny ing s ome of them drivers’ licenses. Plaintiffs have shown that they suffer irreparable harm from A r i z ona’s policy and that remedies at law are inadequate t oA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 50

compensate for th a t harm. Plaintiffs have also shown that a

r emedy in equity is warranted and that the public intere s t would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.

According ly
, we AF F IRM the district court’s g rant o f
summary judg ment in favor of Plaintiffs. W e also A F F IRM the district c ourt’s order e ntering a permanent injunction that enjoins Ariz o n a’s policy of deny ing the EADs issued under the D AC A p rog ram a s satisfactory proof of authoriz ed presence under federal law in the United States.

AF F IRMED.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 51

B ERZ ON, Circuit J udge
, C oncurring in lig ht of the Dissent from the denial of rehearing en B anc:

I join the panel opinion in full. Iwrite in concurrence to further e x plain our holding in lig ht of the dissent from denial of rehearing

en banc.

I write first to empha s i z e t h at the “law” that has preemptive p ower over Ariz o na’s policy is Congr es s ’ conferral o f ex clusive authority on the ex ecutive branch to defer removal of individuals who lack leg al status and to authoriz e them to w ork while temporarily permitted to remain. F urthermore, I write to hig hlig ht that the preemption issues ultimately decided in this c ase can be v iewed a s embedded in the e qu al p r otection analy sis, g iven the historical and conceptual overlap between e qual protection and p reemption concerns in cases involvin g s tate laws that affect immig rants. T he serious e qual protection concerns raised by A riz ona’s p olicy bolster our p r eemption holding
, which was reached in a c a reful ex ercise o f the principle o f constitutional avoidance.

I

.

As t h e panel opinion makes c lear, it is the authority specificall y c o n ferred on the Attorney General by the I mmig r a tion a

nd Nationality Act (“I

NA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. , and the associated reg ulations, that is the body of federal law that p r eempts Ariz ona’s policy
, not a ny particular

ex e r cise o f e x ecutive authority

. The I NA, as implemented b y authoriz ed reg ulations, a ff i r matively p e rmits the Attorney General to decide whether u ndocumented immig rants should be removed from the c ountry and w hen, a n d also whether they should be authoriz ed to stay and to work if they are notA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 52

to be immediately removed. Contrary to the Dissent from the d e n i a l o f rehearing en banc ( “Dissent”), this conferral o f authority is not limited to “only two small p r o v i s ions of the I NA.” D issent at 10. See e.g. , 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(I I ), (I V) (indicating that certain visa applicants are “elig ible for d e f e r r e d a c t i o n a n d w o r k a u t h o r i z a t i o n ” ) ; i d

. § 1182(a)(9)(B )(ii) ( p r o viding that for purposes o f determining inadmissibility
, unlawful presence includes any time an alien “is present in the United States after the

ex p iration o f the period of stay authoriz ed by the Attorney General”); id. § 1227(d)(2) (i n d icating that certain visa applicants who are denied an administrative stay of removal

can a pply fo r “ a s t ay o f removal, deferred action, or a continuan ce or abey ance of removal proceeding s”); id. § 1229b ( g iving the Attorney General the discretion to cancel removal for certain inadmissable or removable aliens, including those who were never la w fu lly admitted); id. § 1324a(h)(3) (defining an “ u nauthoriz ed alien” for purposes of employ

ment as an alien who is neither “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” n or “ authoriz ed to be so employ ed by [ statute] o r by the Attorney General” ); REAL I D Act o f 2005, Pub. L

. No. 109-13, div. B
, § 202(c)(2)(B )(viii), (C)(ii), 119 Stat. 231, 313 (indicating that persons with “approved deferred action status” are p resent in the United States during

a “period of authoriz ed s t a y ” for purposes of issuing state drivers’ li c enses and identification cards); 8 C.F .R. § 274a. 1 2 ( c)(14) (indicating that an “ alien who has been
g ranted deferred action, a

n act of administrative convenience
to the g overn ment which g ives some c ases lower priority ”
may be g ranted w o rk authoriz ation upon application and a showing of economic necessity ).

These various provisions, among o thers, make clear that Cong r ess h as e x p r essly au t horiz ed the A ttorney General, atA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 53

his discretion, officially to defer removal of individuals w ho lack leg al status, thereby tem p o r a rily authoriz ing their stay , and to authoriz e such individua l s to work while temporarily permitted to remain. 1 See Arizona v

. U nited States
, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012) (“[ T] he removal process is entrusted to the discretion of the F ederal Government.”).

The At t o rn ey General g r anted the p laintiffs in this case deferred action and furnished them with federal employ ment authoriz ation documents. 2 A ri z ona’s denial of drivers’ license s to DACA recipients rests on the premise that their
pres e nce is not “authoriz ed under federal law,” even thoug h the federal g overnment has decided otherwise, ex ercising the

1 A u th orizin g so m eo n e to w o rk in th e co u n try is n ecessarily to au th o rize th eir p resen ce. T h e Su

prem e Co u rt, i n Ta ka h a sh i v. Fish & Ga m e Co mmissio n , 3 3 4 U.S. 4 1 0
, 4 1 6 (1 9 4 8 ), s tated th at “ [t]h e assertio n o f an

au th ority to d en y to ali e ns t h e o p po rtu n ity of earn in g a liv elih o od w h en law f u lly ad m itted to th e state w o u ld be tan tam o u n t to th e assertio n o f th e rig h t to d en y

th em en tran ce an d ab o d e, f

o r in o rd in ary

cases th ey can n o t liv e w h ere th ey can n o t w ork .” (q u o t in g T ru a x v. Ra i c h
, 2 3 9 U.S. 3 3
, 4 2 (1 9 1 5)). T h e o b v erse is also tru e: A u t h o rizin g an alien to w ork i n th e

co u n try is n ecessarily

au th o rizin g h im

to rem ain

.

2 I n o t e th at th e Dissen t at 7 p o in ts treats th is case as p arallel to T exa s v. Un ited S t a tes , 8 0 9 F.3 d 1 3 4 (5 th Cir. 2 0 1 5), a ff’d b y a n eq u a lly d ivid

ed

co u rt, 1 3 6 S. Ct. 2 2 7 1 ( 2 0 1 6 ) (p er cu riam ). It decid ed ly is n o t. A rizo n a raised in th e d i strict co u rt n o af f irm ativ e ch allen g e to th e Def erred A ctio n f o r Ch ild h o o d A rriv als (“ DA CA ”) pro g ram , w h e t h er b ased on ad m i n istrativ e law co n cep ts o r th e sco pe o f th e ex ecu tiv e’ s resp on sib ility
to en f o rce f ed eral law s. Co mp a re i d

. at 1 4 9

. (A rizo n a is a p lain tif f in th e Texa s v. Un i ted S ta tes litig atio n , w h ich d o es raise su c h i s s u es an d is

o n g o in g .)

. I n stead
, A rizo n a h as asserted th e au th o rity to treat so m e

u n d o cu m en ted in d i v id u a ls w i th d ef erred s tatu s an d f

ed eral w ork

au th orizatio n d if

f eren tly f ro m o th ers w i th th e sam e f ed eral d isp en satio n s. I t is th e v alid i ty o f th at d ifferen tia l treatm en t th at is at th e h eart of t h i s

case.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 54

powers deleg a ted t o i t by Cong r ess. A riz ona has, therefore, intruded into an a

r ea of decisionmaking entru s ted to the federal g overnment. 3

I I

.

C ritically
, our preemption holding reflects a carefu l

ex e r cise o f constitutional avoidance, based on the s e rious equal protection c o n cerns r aised by Ariz ona’s policy

. Althoug h we r est our d ecision on p reemption g rounds, the preemption and equal protection concerns raised in this case

ar e overlapping rather than distinct. And because that is so, I am c onvinced that althoug h we w i s e l y did not decide the equal protection i s s u e , were it necessary to decide the question I would have held that there was an equal protection violation.

Equal protection and preemption concerns have long been intertwined in cases dealing with state laws that classify immig rants. See Plyler v. Doe
, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Nyquist

v. Mauclet
, 432 U .S. 1 (1977); Gr a h am v

. Richardson
, 403 U.S. 365 ( 1971); Takahashi
, 334 U.S. 4 1 0; Truax
, 239 U.S. 33; see also J enny

- B rooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immi g r a n ts?
, 73 W ash. & L ee L

. Rev. 77 (2016); David F

. L evi, Note, The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal P rotection?
, 31 S t a n

. L

. Rev. 1069 (1979).

3 A rizo n a’ s d riv er’ s licen se statu te tu rn s u p on w h eth e r a n im

m ig ran t’ s p resen ce is “ au th o rized u n der f ed eral law ” n o t w

h eth er t h e presen ce is

“ l aw f u l ” i n th e sen se o f sp ec if

ically co n d o n ed b y statu te. See A riz. Rev

. Stat. A n n

. § 2 8

- 3 15 3 (D). If th e s tatu te tu rn ed o n th e latter, A rizo n a co u ld

n o t, as it d o es, issu e licen ses to m an y u n do cu m en ted in div id u als w h o d o

n o t h av e law f

u l statu s b u t h av e b een g ran t ed w o rk au t h o rizatio n w

h ile in

rem o v al p ro ceed i n g s. S

ee A m en d ed o p. 2 9

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 55

F or ex ample, in Nyquist v

. M auclet
, the state asserted that

one of its go al s i n ex cluding certain classes of aliens from elig ibility for in-st at e tuition w as to provide incentives for aliens to naturaliz e. 4 32 U.S. at 9–1 0

. I n holding the state law violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Court found that
state p urpose “not a perm issible one for a State” because “[ c] ontrol over imm i gration and naturaliz ation is entrusted

ex c lusively to the F e deral G o v er n ment, and a State has no power to interfere.” Id. at 10. Similarly in G r aham v

. Richardson , another decision that rested on e qual protection
g rounds, the Court provided th a t “[ s] tate alien residency requirements that either d eny welfare benefits to noncitiz ens

or condition them on long time residency
, equate with the assertion of a [ state] rig ht, inconsistent with federal p olicy
, to deny entrance and a b o d e

. Since such laws encroach upon

e x c l u s i v e f

e d e r a l p o w e r , t h e y a r e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y impermissible.” 403 U.S. at 380. Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission likewise h eld that “[ s] ta te laws which impose discriminatory burdens upon the e ntranc e or residence o f aliens lawfully within the United States c o n flict with [ the]

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e r i v e d f e d er a l p o w e r t o r e gu l a t e immig ration.” 334 U.S. at 419.

The overlap ev i d ent in these cases between the equal
p rotection and preemption analy ses where state laws that affect immigrants are at issue is n o accident. As the equal protection analy sis in the p anel o pinion illustrates, both the “similarly situated” a

nd “leg itimate state i n t e r est” inquiries required for e qual protection analy sis necessarily incorporate
recog nition o f the preeminent, a lthoug h not ex clusive, federalA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 56

role in i m mig ration matters, the same role distribution emphasiz ed in immig ration preemption cases. 4

A.

The primacy of federal immig ration law first informs the equal p rotection analy sis when we are determining whether the g roup s b e i n g classified a re “similarly situated.” As the panel opinion states, the Equal Protection Clause prevents the
g overnment from “treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (emphasis added). “ Relevant r espects” are o nly those respects that relate to the g oals of the challeng ed state law.

Classifications ado pted by states “must rest u pon some g round of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
t he object of the leg islation, so that all persons simila r l y circumstanced shall b e treated alike.” R e ed v. Reed
, 404 U.S. 71, 7 6 (1971) (quoting F.S. Royster Gua n o Co. v

. V irginia
, 253 U.S. 412, 415 ( 1920)). According ly
, to adopt a federal immig ra t i o n classification “as a criterion for its o wn discriminatory policy
, the State mus t d e monstrate that the classification is reasonably adapted to the purposes for which the state d

esires t o u s e it .” Plyler
, 457 U .S. at 226 (internal quotation marks and c ita t i o ns omitted) (emphasis in orig inal). Those purposes do not properly in c l u d e making

4 B ecau s e p reem

p tio n co n cern s are em

b ed d ed in an d ad d ressed b y eq u al
p ro tectio n d ecisio n s reg ard in g state l a w s th at af f ect im m ig ran ts, eq u al
p ro tectio n d ecisio n s lik e Plyler v. Do e , 4 57 U.S. 2 0 2
, a r e relev an t t o ou r p reem p tio n h o ld i n g

. S

ee Co n d o n , su

p r a p p

. 5
, at 8 3 (“ [T ]h e S u p rem e Co u rt h as rein f

o rced th e p rin cip le th at t h e fe d e r al g o v ern m en t h as

e x c lu s iv e resp o n sib ility f o r th e reg u latio n o f im m ig ratio n , as m

u ch th ro u g h its eq u al p ro tectio n j u risp ru d en ce as it h as th ro u g h p reem p tio n d ecisio n s.”).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 57

decisions about who should remain in this country , w ho should b e removed, or what are the c o nditions of stay for those temporarily

authoriz ed to be here.

F or ex a mple, in G raham v. Richardson
, the Court struck d o w n o n equal protection g rounds a state law that denied welfare benefits to non-citiz ens whom the Court foun d similarly situated in all respects relevant to the state w elfare law: non-citiz ens paid tax es, could b e called into the armed forces, and worked in the state, thereby contributing to the state’s economic welfare. 403 U.S. at 3 76. The g roups o f residents were “in d isting uishable ex cept w ith respect to whether they are or a

re not citiz en s o f t h i s country .” Id. at 371. T he tw o g roups were n ot, of course, similarly situated in the latter respect — tha t i s , as to whether they were citiz ens. And that difference entailed many embedded distinctions between the non-citiz ens and citiz ens, including the rig ht to vote, to serve on juries, a nd to r emain in the country even if eng ag ed in criminal act i v i t i es. B ut the citiz en/non-citiz en distinction was the one that the s t a t e h ad
to justify
, not a b asis for declaring the two groups not similarly situated with reg ard to receiving welfare benefits.

Similarly
, the immig ration-related d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e en the plaintiffs and other undocumented immig rants has no role in this case at the “similarly situated” juncture. 5 Rather, the pertinent comparison s at this stag e concern the other

re q u i rements for o btaining drivers’ licenses — Are the applicants old enoug h? Can th e y p a ss the written test? Can

5 T h e p an el o p in io n m ak es th i s basic p o i n t, b rief ly

. A m en ded op

. at 2 3

. I t t h en g o es o n f

o r co m p leten ess to an sw er th e state’ s sim ilarly situ ated
arg u m en t o n its ow

n term s, w

h ich stressed im

m ig ratio n statu s d if

f eren ces b etw een th e p lain tif

f s an d o th er alien s. A m en d ed o p . at 2 3

– 29

.A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 58

they pass the driving test? H ave they violated driving laws in the past, as b y driving without a license or while drunk? The immig ra t i o n -related classification is the one the state must justify at the n ex t stag e of equal protection anal y s i s , not the

measure of whether the p l a intiffs are otherwise similarly situated with reg ard to obtaining drivers’ licenses.

B

. Preemption themes nex t surface in the equal protection analy sis in the ex amination of legitimate state i n terests. A
state interest is only leg itimate for equal protection purposes when it lies within an area of c o n cern within the state’s authority

. W hen the state law touches on im m i gration, the ambit of leg itimate state concern is constrained by the federal
g overnment’s preeminent p ower directly to r e gulate immig ration — that is, to decide who will be admitted, w ho
may remain, and who will be removed.

As stated in P lyler v. Doe
, “[ a] lthoug h it is a routine and normally leg itimate part of the business of the F ede ral Government to classify on the basis of alien status and to take into a ccount the character of the r e l a t ionship between the alien a nd this c oun t r y , only rarely are such matters relevant
to leg islation by a State.” 457 U.S. at 225 (internal quotation marks and c itations o m i t t ed). Consistently with this v iew, Mathews v. D iaz ex plained that “a division by a State of the categ ory of per s o n s w ho a r e not c itiz ens of that State into subcateg ories of United States citiz ens and alie n s has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classi f ication by the F ederal Government is a routine and normally leg itimate part of its business.” 426 U.S. 67, 85 (1976).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 59

F or this r e ason, the Supreme C o u r t has long recog niz ed that federal power over immig ration constrains a state’s legitimate interests in classify ing g roups of i m m ig rants differently

from one another and then disadvantag ing one of the g roups so classified. I n T r u a x v. Raich
, 239 U.S. at 42, for ex ample, the Court admonished that “re a s o n able classification implies action consistent with t h e leg itimate interests o f the state, a

nd it will no t b e d i sputed that these
cannot be so broadly conceived as to bring them into hostility
to ex clusive F ederal power

. ” Truax involved an equal protection challeng e, by an a l i e n lawfully admitted into the United States, to an Ariz ona law that required certa in employ e rs to h ire a majority of w orkers who w e r e q u alified electors or native-born United States citiz ens. Id. a t 40. Truax rejected the arg ument that the s t a t e ’ s p rioritiz ation o f citiz ens for employ

ment was justified by the state’s power “to make reasonable classifications in leg islating to promote the health, safety
, morals, and welfare o f t h o s e w ithin its j u r isdiction,” because the state lacked “the a uthority to deal with that at which the leg islation is aimed.” Id. at 41, 43; see also Takahashi , 334 U.S. at 420 (noting the “tenuousness o f the state’s c laim that it has pow e r to sing le o u t and b an its lawful alien inhabitants

. . . from following a vocation simply because Cong ress has put some g roups in special

c l assifications in ex ercise of its broad and wholl y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e p o w e r s o v e r i m m i g r a t i o n a n d naturaliz ation.”).

States assuredly d

o h av e authority to reg ulate employ ment, just as they have authority to r e gu l ate the distribution of drivers’ licenses. The state authority lacking in Truax
, an d h ere, is the authority to justify discrimination a s to areas within state power on g r ound s that a re beyond stateA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 60

authority because ex c l u sively w ithin the authority of the federal g overnment.

F or these reasons, equal protection analy sis with r e g ard
to state laws, like Ariz ona’s, that disadvantag e some a liens compared with others n ecessarily incorporates distributionof-authority concerns that directly parallel those encountered in preemption analy ses. I t is in lig ht of this overlap b etween preemption and equal protection analy ses in the immig r ation
contex t that the panel’s equal p r o t e c tion analy sis evaluated the p r o ffered state interests said rationally to justify the denial of drivers’ licenses to the plaintiffs. And it is in this lig h t that

we rejected any state justification f o r the classification in
state law th a t sug g e sted an intent to preclude or discourag e the p laintiffs from remaining and working even thoug h the federal g overnment a llowed t h e m to do so. F or the same reason, we rejected any justification that turned on immig ration status distinctions w ith no connection t o statedrivers’-license-related concerns (such a s the distinction between aliens holding

work authoriz a tion while in removal
p r o c e e ding s and DACA recipients h oldi n g w o r k a u t h o r i za t i o n b ut not in the process of being removed). Amende d o p

. at 28– 29, 33, 36. W e then concluded that the remaining rationales A riz ona provided s i m p ly are not reasonable. Amended op. at 29–33.

I n short, the preeminent federal r ole in immig r a t i o n matters thus not only u nderlies o u r ultimate preemption holding
, but also directly informs th e e q ual protection analy sis. Given the c onstraints on a state’s legitimate interests in c lassify ing g roups of immig rants, we could, in my view, have rested our rejection of the challeng ed A r i z o na statute simply on a rational basis e qual protection analy sis (withou t reaching the question whether a more string entA R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 61

standard o f revie w a p p lies). Were it necessary to reach the question, I w ould have held A riz ona’s applic a t ion of its drivers’ license statute invalid as a denial of equal protection
to DACA r ecipients, a s co m p a r ed to other undocumented individuals to whom Ariz ona does provide drivers’ licenses. See Amended op. at 29–33.

The Dissent brushes p ast these equal protection concerns, reg arding them as a

n “ex c urs us,” and e ven sug g esting that

over a century of equal protection jurisprudence r e g arding
state immig ration r eg ulations, beg inning with Truax in 1915, be overturned. Dissent at 8–9 n.1, 13 n.5.

B u t the panel’s methodolog y — a careful analy sis of the streng t h o f a constitutional c h alleng e , before turning to an alternative that avoids definitely deciding that constitutional question — is one with a long pedig ree, g rounded in judicial restraint. S

ee, e.g. , Zadvydas v. Davis
, 533 U.S. 6 78, 690–96, 699 (2001); Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v

. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council
, 485 U

. S

. 5 68, 575–78 (1988). 6 T o criticiz e the panel’s pre e m p t i o n analy sis in a vacuum, with little recog nit ion of the constitutional avoidance rationale underly ing it, is tantamount to lopping off the first five floors of a ten story building and then d eclaring that the building , thus truncated, is unstable.

Ag ain, I concur fully in the panel opinion. I n addition, in
my view, as we held in the preliminary injuncti o n a p p eal,

6 T h is co u rt h a s o b serv ed th at DeBa rto lo reach ed a statu t o ry h o ld in g

o n ly “ [a ] f

ter co n sid erin g at so m e len g th
, b u t n o t d ecid in g , th e [co n stitu tio n al] arg u m en ts.” Overstreet v. Un ited Bh d

. o f Ca rp en ters & Jo in ers o f Am., Lo ca l U

n io n No

. 1 5 0 6
, 40 9 F.3 d 1 1 9 9
, 1 2 0 9 (9 t h Cir. 2 0 0 5 ).A R I Z

. D R E A M A C T C O A L

. V

. B R E W E R 62

Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer
, 757 F .3d 1053, 1067 (9th Cir. 2 014), and as the district court held as the basis for the final injunction, Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer
, 81 F

. Supp. 3d 795, 808 (D. Ariz

. 2015), the equal protection challeng e is independently valid and, if we needed to reach it, would justify our conclusion that Ariz ona’s denial o f drivers’ licenses to DACA recipients cannot stand.