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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 42415

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

TERMINATION OF THE PARENTAL 

RIGHTS OF JANE DOE (2014-20).

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IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & 

WELFARE,

Petitioner-Respondent,

v.

JANE DOE (2014-20),

Respondent-Appellant.

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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 805

Filed: November 7, 2014

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 

OPINION AND SHALL NOT 

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial 

District, State of Idaho, Bonneville County. Hon. Ralph L. Savage, Magistrate.

Order terminating parental rights, affirmed. 

James H. Barrett, Jr., Bonneville County Public Defender; Scott J. Davis, Deputy 

Public Defender, Idaho Falls, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Mark V. Withers, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

MELANSON, Judge

Jane Doe (2014-20) appeals from the magistrate’s decree terminating her parental rights 

to her child, arguing that the magistrate’s findings that there was clear and convincing evidence 

of neglect and that termination was in the best interest of the child were not supported by 

substantial and competent evidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

The following facts were adduced from testimony and exhibits presented at the 

termination hearing. Jane and John Doe (2014-21) are the biological parents of the son in this 

case, who was born August 30, 2011. However, Jane’s involvement with this case began after 

she started dating and living with John in 2010. In April 2010, a child protection proceeding 
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involving John’s daughter was initiated after the daughter suffered burns to her hands while in 

the custody of her biological mother.1 As a result, the daughter was placed in John’s custody 

under the protective supervision of the Idaho Department of Health & Welfare in May. The 

Does began having difficulty providing a safe and sanitary environment for the daughter early 

on. During surprise visits in June and July, the Does’ home was found to be in an unsanitary 

state, with clothes, garbage, and debris strewn about the residence. 

On July 19, a search warrant was executed at the Does’ residence during which 

methamphetamine, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia were found. On July 26, the Does were 

found passed out and not taking care of John’s daughter. Their residence was filthy, with no 

food in the home. A subsequent visit by a social worker on July 27 found the residence in a 

similar state of disarray with bird droppings on the carpet and pill bottles on the floor accessible 

by the daughter. As a result of these unsanitary and dangerous conditions, the daughter was 

removed from the home and placed in foster care. John tested positive for high levels of 

methamphetamine, marijuana, and amphetamine on July 28. The Does were subsequently 

arrested on August 4, and charged with possession of a controlled substance. They were each 

found guilty of the charge and sentenced to a unified term of four years, with a minimum period 

of confinement of eighteen months. The sentences were suspended and each was placed on 

probation.

Legal custody of the daughter was granted to the Department following a shelter care 

hearing on August 24, based on the Does’ criminal conduct, neglect, and a lack of a stable home 

environment. The Does stipulated to a case plan in regard to the daughter on October 5. As part 

of the case plan, both John and Jane were placed in family drug court. However, as a result of 

repeated violations, including missed court proceedings, missed drug tests and a general failure 

to abide by drug court rules, both Jane and John were suspended from family drug court on 

November 16.

Jane continued to miss drug tests, failed to keep in regular contact with pretrial services, 

and stopped paying the costs of supervision until she was terminated from the drug testing 

program in January 2011. After she was sentenced for the possession charge from July, Jane was 

required to participate in treatment and obtain employment. However, she failed to find 

 

1 The biological mother of the daughter voluntarily terminated her parental rights and is 

not a part of this proceeding.
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employment and her participation in treatment and compliance with the terms of her probation 

deteriorated as the year progressed. Jane failed to drug test regularly, missed several treatment 

classes (nineteen in total), exhibited a progressively worsening attitude when she did attend, and 

tested positive for drugs on several occasions. 

The Does’ son was born August 30, 2011. Jane admitted that she had been using 

prescription narcotics that were not hers during the pregnancy. Nevertheless, her son remained 

in her custody for several months after his birth. During this time, the Does had an extended 

home visit with John’s daughter. At a review hearing held on October 31, a report by the 

Department indicated that there had been no problems during the extended home visit and that 

John had complied with his case plan. No problems regarding the son were indicated. However, 

Jane was terminated from treatment in December for failing to attend classes as required and 

provide regular urinalyses. During this time, Jane had returned to using opiates and admitted 

that she could not provide a clean drug test during a meeting with her probation officer in 

February 2012. Her failure to complete treatment and continued drug use were violations of both 

her probation and child protection case plan.

The Does were then caught shoplifting in March. Both were convicted and sentenced to 

two years of probation. As a result of this offense, John spent sixty days in jail and Jane spent

thirty-seven days in jail. 

A probation violation was filed against both John and Jane, and they were arrested on 

April 11 for use of methamphetamine and, in John’s case, other drugs. The Does’ son and 

John’s daughter were both removed from the home. A shelter care hearing was held two days 

later, during which the Does stipulated to the Department having temporary legal custody of both 

children. The Does agreed to a revised case plan that involved both children in June.

During visits with her son and John’s daughter in June, Jane demonstrated a lack of 

bonding with the children and basic parenting skills. She also missed visitations and, on at least 

one occasion, attended a visitation appearing to be under the influence. In addition, she missed 

drug tests, probation appointments and drug court sessions, eventually leading to Jane’s 

incarceration for thirty days for violating the terms of her probation.

The Does were again accepted into family drug court in July 2012. Although both John 

and Jane struggled to fully comply with the drug court and probation requirements, they showed 

progress with their new case plan. Both were employed and had moved into a new apartment 
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that was being maintained in a safe and sanitary manner. The children were also responding well 

to visitation with the Does. At the recommendation of the Department, another extended home 

visit was attempted starting on October 1. However, both were sent to jail for three days for 

missing probation appointments. The extended home visit ended on October 25, just twenty-four 

days after it began, due to the Does’ continued noncompliance with their case plan and their 

incarceration for failing to abide by family drug court rules. Both the Does were terminated 

from family drug court for their noncompliance shortly thereafter in November 2012. 

The petition to terminate the Does’ parental rights was filed January 8, 2013. On 

February 12, the district court issued an order authorizing the suspension of reasonable efforts by 

the Department, but not suspending visitations. The Does signed individual consents in 

abeyance on March 18. Pursuant to the consents in abeyance, the Does agreed to have their 

parental rights terminated if they failed to comply with the requirements of their case plan. In 

return, the Does were to have the children returned to their care for a third and final extended 

home visit. This home visit lasted just twenty-two days before it was terminated due to the Does 

again being arrested on April 10, for probation violations (John’s fourth violation and Jane’s fifth 

violation) stemming from the alleged use and sale of prescription narcotics. John and Jane both 

admitted to associating with unapproved individuals. Additionally, John admitted to 

involvement in selling and abusing his prescription narcotics and renewed use of 

methamphetamine. Jane also admitted to knowledge of and involvement in the scheme by 

contributing her prescription narcotics for sale on at least one occasion. As a result, the 

magistrate ordered visitations suspended on April 15. The Does did not subsequently request 

any visitations or modifications in the order of suspension.

Jane missed an evidentiary hearing for her fifth probation violation on June 3, resulting in 

a bench warrant being issued. Her probation was revoked at a subsequent evidentiary hearing 

held one month later, her underlying sentence was imposed, and the court retained jurisdiction. 

However, Jane was found to be using narcotics and giving them to other inmates while on work 

release. She was subsequently found to have violated probation a sixth time and was sent on 

another rider.

John’s parental rights were terminated on July 3, 2013, and Jane’s parental rights were 

terminated in October 2013, both pursuant to imposition of their respective consents in abeyance 

signed in March 2013. John appealed the judgment, which was reversed and the matter was 
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remanded for further proceedings. See In re Doe, 155 Idaho 896, 318 P.3d 886 (2014). The 

Idaho Supreme Court held that Idaho law does not allow for conditional consents to termination 

of parental rights and that I.C. § 16-2005 requires that termination of parental rights be based on 

one or more statutory grounds established by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 899, 318 P.3d 

at 889.

After remand, a permanency hearing occurred on April 7, 2014. A trial on the petition to 

terminate occurred April 14. Both John and Jane remained incarcerated as of the date of trial, 

and Jane had not yet begun her second rider. At the trial, the Department presented testimony 

and exhibits recounting the Does’ failure to comply with the terms of their case plan, probation, 

and treatment. The testimony indicated that the Does had made no improvements since their 

incarceration in April 2013. Thereafter, the magistrate issued a decision on July 10, 2014, 

terminating Jane’s parental rights as to her son after finding clear and convincing evidence that 

she had neglected her son and that termination was in best interest of the child. Jane appeals.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her 

child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 

341, 343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the 

Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible,

family life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of 

due process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 

383, 386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a 

parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a 

fundamental liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a 

court may terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and 

convincing evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982). See also I.C. § 16-2009; 

In re Doe, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386, 146 P.3d 

at 652.

On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the 

decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a 
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reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,

245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). We indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the 

trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated. Id. The

substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s 

finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere 

preponderance is required. Doe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear 

and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be 

proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. In re Doe, 143 Idaho at 191, 141 P.3d at 1060. 

Further, the magistrate’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 

143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.

Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the 

parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interest and any one of the following five 

factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between 

the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities 

for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or 

(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each 

statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 

1117.

III.

ANALYSIS

Jane asserts that the magistrate abused its discretion in finding that termination was 

warranted under I.C. § 16-2005 and was in the best interest of the child. The Department 

responds that the record contains substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate’s 

decision on both points.

A. Neglect

Jane contends that the magistrate’s finding that the Department had shown by clear and 

convincing evidence that she had neglected her child was not supported by substantial and 

competent evidence. Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in 

I.C. § 16-1602(28),2 as well as situations where the parent has failed to comply with the court’s 

 

2 Idaho Code Section 16-1602(28) further defines “neglected” as a child:
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orders or the case plan in a child protective act case and the Department has had temporary or legal 

custody of the child for fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and reunification has not been 

accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month in which the child has been in the temporary or 

legal custody of the Department. Thus, failure to comply with a case plan is grounds for 

termination of parental rights. I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b); see also In re Doe, 151 Idaho 356, 364, 256 

P.3d 764, 772 (2011). 

The magistrate found, and the record supports, that Jane failed to comply with her case 

plan, Jane’s child was in the temporary or legal custody of the Department for at least fifteen of 

the twenty-two months preceding the termination hearing, and reunification was not 

accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth month.3 See I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b). Indeed, Jane 

acknowledged at the termination hearing that she had failed to comply with her case plan. Thus, 

the magistrate’s decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence of Jane’s neglect on 

this basis.

B. Best Interest

Jane also argues that the magistrate erred in concluding that termination was in the best 

interest of the child. Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court 

must next determine whether it is in the best interest of the child to terminate the parent-child 

relationship. In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When determining 

whether termination is in the child’s best interest, the trial court may consider the stability and 

permanency of the home, the unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the 

parent to the child’s care after the child is out of the parent’s custody, the improvement of the 

child while out of the parent’s custody, the parent’s efforts to improve his or her situation, and 

 

(a) Who is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, 

medical or other care or control necessary for his well-being because of the 

conduct or omission of his parents, guardian or other custodian or their neglect or 

refusal to provide them; . . . or

(b) Whose parents, guardian or other custodian are unable to discharge 

their responsibilities to and for the child and, as a result of such inability, the child 

lacks the parental care necessary for his health, safety or well-being . . . .

3 Specifically, Jane’s son was in the Department’s custody from April 2012 until the 

termination hearing in April 2014, a total of approximately twenty-four months.
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the parent’s continuing problems with the law. In re Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 

1270 (2014); see also Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho at 809-10, 992 P.2d at 1209-10; Doe v. State, Dep’t 

of Health & Welfare, 122 Idaho 644, 648, 837 P.2d 319, 323 (Ct. App. 1992). A finding that it is 

in the best interest of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective 

grounds, supported by substantial and competent evidence. In re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 957, 277 

P.3d 400, 404 (Ct. App. 2012).

The record supports the magistrate’s finding that termination was in the best interest of 

the child. Jane has been unable to provide a safe, stable, healthy environment for the child as a 

result of her substance abuse and other criminal conduct. The child protection case regarding her 

son was open for approximately two years and, during that time, Jane made minimal progress on 

her case plan and failed to act in a manner that would move her toward reunification with her 

child, despite reasonable efforts by the Department.4 The record shows that Jane was given 

numerous opportunities and provided with abundant assistance to address her addiction issues, 

including intensive treatment, probation services, problem solving courts, and counseling, most 

of which was provided at little or no cost. However, Jane repeatedly and consistently failed to 

take advantage of these opportunities and aid, instead taking a lackadaisical approach and 

squandering her chances at change. Indeed, Jane habitually violated the terms of her probation, 

case plan, and treatment; provided little financial support for her child due to her chronic 

unemployment; and repeatedly put him in situations that risked his health and wellbeing, both 

through her own conduct and acquiescence to John’s conduct. For example, while in Jane’s care, 

the son had difficulty breathing as a result of being allergic to cigarette smoke, which required 

the use of a nebulizer to counteract, yet both the Does continued smoking in the home. 

Conversely, the son flourished in foster care and bonded with his foster parents, who 

provided for all of his needs. The son’s breathing improved in the smoke-free environment of 

 

4 A court is not required to make a finding of reasonable efforts toward reunification by the 

Department in a termination case. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 150 Idaho 88, 91, 

244 P.3d 232, 235 (2010); In re Doe, 150 Idaho 201, 207, 245 P.3d 953, 959 (2010). 

Nevertheless, the record indicates that the magistrate found, at all relevant stages of the child 

protection case, that the Department was making reasonable efforts towards reunification. This 

finding was supported by the documented efforts of the Department to facilitate reunification by 

providing several extended home visits and visitation opportunities, financial aid, treatment 

funding and opportunities, and parenting education. Jane did not object to these findings and 

presented no evidence to the contrary during any proceeding.
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the foster home to the point that he no longer needed a nebulizer. Moreover, Jane failed to 

establish a normal, meaningful relationship with her child. The son was in Jane’s custody for 

just over seven months following his birth and was removed from her custody in April 2012 

following the Does’ arrest for using methamphetamine in violation of the terms of their 

probation. While her son was in the custody of Department, Jane frequently missed scheduled 

visitations without excuse. When she did participate in the supervised visits, she failed to exhibit 

basic parenting skills, such as checking the son’s diaper, and showed little interest in interacting 

with her child. She was also fidgety and appeared to be under the influence on at least one 

occasion. Indeed, Jane admitted to regularly being under the influence of drugs at court 

appearances. 

Thus, there is substantial evidence in the record showing that the son regressed during the 

brief periods that he was with Jane and then improved upon being returned to foster care. Jane 

failed to provide a stable and safe home for her son for any appreciable period of time during the 

child protection case as a result of her drug addiction and inability or unwillingness to change her 

conduct. In addition, Jane apparently lacks the capacity to change her behavior. She repeatedly 

failed to complete--or even participate in--drug treatment, violated her probation six times, and 

failed to complete her case plan. As noted by the magistrate, Jane’s “behavior is escalating, not 

improving,” despite four years of chances and assistance. The termination statutes of this state 

exist not merely to alleviate harm but to prevent it. In re Cheatwood, 108 Idaho 218, 220, 697 

P.2d 1232, 1234 (Ct. App. 1985). Termination of Jane’s parental rights will allow her child to 

live in a home in which all of his needs are provided for, give him the stability he deserves, and 

prevent the future harm that will occur from continued custody instability. Accordingly, the 

magistrate did not err in determining that termination was in the best interest of the child.

IV.

CONCLUSION

There is substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s finding that the 

Department presented clear and convincing evidence of neglect and that termination was in the best 

interest of the child. Accordingly, the magistrate’s decree terminating Jane’s parental rights to her 

child is affirmed. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.

Judge LANSING and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR.