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STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

In re C.K., C.H., C.B., G.B., and T.B.

No. 19-1003 (McDowell County 18-JA-100-M, 18-JA-101-M, 18-JA-102-M, 18-JA-103-M, and 

18-JA-104-M)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Petitioner Mother B.A., by counsel Gloria M. Stephens, appeals the Circuit Court of 

McDowell County’s October 4, 2019, order terminating her parental rights to C.K., C.H., C.B., 

G.B., and T.B.1 The West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (“DHHR”), by 

counsel S.L. Evans, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order. The guardian ad litem,

Andrew Waight, filed a response on behalf of the children in support of the circuit court’s order. 

On appeal, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in (1) adjudicating her upon insufficient 

evidence, (2) failing to adhere to the preference for placing siblings together and the best interest 

standard in determining the children’s placement, (3) failing to rule on her motion for a postdispositional improvement period, (4) terminating her parental rights, and (5) denying her posttermination visitation with the children. 

This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal 

arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided 

by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record 

presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons, 

a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure.

On October 10, 2018, the DHHR filed an abuse and neglect petition alleging that petitioner 

improperly supervised the children. The facts giving rise to the petition occurred over a period of 

approximately four months. Specifically, the petition alleged that during an incident in June of 

2018, C.H., then four years old, was found “wandering the streets of Welch” around 4:50 a.m. 

According to the record, law enforcement stated that the child “was a significant distance from 

1

Consistent with our long-standing practice in cases with sensitive facts, we use initials 

where necessary to protect the identities of those involved in this case. See In re K.H., 235 W. Va. 

254, 773 S.E.2d 20 (2015); Melinda H. v. William R. II, 230 W. Va. 731, 742 S.E.2d 419 (2013); 

State v. Brandon B., 218 W. Va. 324, 624 S.E.2d 761 (2005); State v. Edward Charles L., 183 W. 

Va. 641, 398 S.E.2d 123 (1990). 

FILED

June 24, 2020

EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS

OF WEST VIRGINIA
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[petitioner’s] home and . . . was very lucky he was not injured.” Petitioner admitted that C.H. had 

“a history of getting out of the home.” The petition further alleged that child C.B., then three years 

old, was also found “out in the road” during a second incident that occurred several days prior to 

the petition’s filing. According to the petition, petitioner admitted to taking Suboxone, but was 

unable to provide a prescription and admitted to abusing the drug. Additionally, petitioner 

submitted to a drug screen prior to the petition’s filing and tested positive for Suboxone, cocaine, 

and benzodiazepines. The DHHR alleged that it attempted to implement protection and safety 

plans in the home at various times, but that petitioner’s noncompliance ultimately required removal 

of the children. Petitioner thereafter waived her right to a preliminary hearing. 

In November of 2018, the circuit court held an adjudicatory hearing, during which a DHHR 

employee testified that safety services were in place in petitioner’s home from approximately June 

of 2018 until October of 2018. Despite the fact that the DHHR sought to improve petitioner’s 

ability to properly supervise the children following the first instance of a child wandering from the 

home in June of 2018, a second incident occurred in October of 2018. According to this employee, 

the DHHR did not intend to file a petition during this period because petitioner was cooperating 

with services. However, following the children’s emergency removal after the second incident, 

petitioner stopped complying with the DHHR’s services. A DHHR employee further testified to 

the circumstances of the children leaving the home unsupervised. According to the employee, 

petitioner admitted that during one incident in which C.H. wandered from the home, he “would 

have had to pass a very steep inground pool” to have accessed the area where he was found. 

According to the witness, the pool was “the steepest she has ever observed” and was uncovered 

with some water in it. Ultimately, the circuit court adjudicated petitioner as an abusing parent upon 

her failure to properly supervise the children or otherwise protect them from potential injury. The 

circuit court further noted petitioner’s positive drug screen in making its finding regarding her 

status as an abusing parent. 

In January of 2019, petitioner agreed to a case plan that required her to refrain from 

substance abuse, submit to regular drug screens, and undergo substance abuse treatment. Petitioner 

was also required to participate in parenting and adult life skills services and visit the children on 

a regular basis. Further, during a status hearing in March of 2019, it was expressed that the children 

“were removed from their foster home in light of [the parents’] concerns regarding possible abuse 

by the foster parents.” The circuit court found, however, that the claims of abuse were 

unsubstantiated. During this hearing, petitioner also disclosed a history of mental health issues and 

multiple admissions to mental health care facilities, including three admissions during the current 

proceedings, and two mental hygiene proceedings. During this hearing, the circuit court observed 

petitioner’s demeanor to be “combative.” According to the court, petitioner accused a DHHR 

employee of lying and was admonished by her counsel to be silent. Based on this information, the 

circuit court ordered petitioner to undergo a psychological evaluation. The circuit court also noted 

that petitioner refused to comply with drug screening in the absence of an explicit court order, 

despite the fact that she agreed to that condition in executing her case plan. As such, the circuit 

court ordered petitioner to submit to such screening during the March of 2019 hearing. 

Over the course of two status hearings, the circuit court heard evidence that petitioner failed 

to appear for her psychological evaluation on two occasions. Additionally, the circuit court heard 

evidence that indicated that C.B. struggled in his foster placements and was likely autistic. In June 
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of 2019, petitioner submitted to a psychological evaluation, although she was two hours late for 

her appointment and refused to complete paperwork before becoming belligerent and leaving. 

Petitioner then contacted the evaluator and indicated that, “at the advice of her lawyer,” she wished 

to complete the evaluation. Upon returning, petitioner again failed to complete the evaluation, 

failed to return for an additional appointment, but ultimately returned a few days later to complete 

the evaluation. 

In July of 2019, the circuit court held a dispositional hearing, during which the DHHR 

presented evidence from multiple service providers regarding petitioner’s efforts to remedy the 

conditions of abuse and neglect during the proceedings. According to one DHHR employee, 

petitioner’s compliance with services was sporadic. Specifically, the employee testified that, with 

the exception of the two weeks prior to the hearing, petitioner had not participated in services, 

including visitation, since April of 2019. Specifically, petitioner cancelled twenty-five visits with 

the children between December of 2018 and June of 2019, and failed to visit the children at all for 

approximately three months during that period. Further, at least one visit was cancelled because 

petitioner appeared to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. The provider attempted to have 

petitioner submit to a drug screen at that time, but petitioner “became agitated and refused, stating 

that the only person who could make her take a drug screen was the judge.” The employee also 

testified that when petitioner was admitted in February of 2019 for mental health treatment, she 

tested positive for cocaine and methamphetamine. The record also established that petitioner was 

removed from a substance abuse treatment program due to her noncompliance. The circuit court 

also considered petitioner’s psychological evaluation, during which petitioner admitted to 

substance abuse, including her use of Suboxone while “not currently under the supervision of a 

prescribing physician,” and being arrested during the proceedings. 

Thereafter, by order entered on October 4, 2019, the circuit court terminated petitioner’s 

parental rights and denied her post-termination visitation with the children.

2 In the final order, the 

circuit court found that petitioner was provided services for thirteen months, yet her participation 

was “passive, halfhearted and lackluster at best.” Further, the circuit court found that “there 

tragically appears to be a complete absence of desire on the part of [petitioner] to be involved in 

the lives of her children.” According to the circuit court, petitioner failed to meet the requirements 

of her case plan, to which she agreed. Based on this failure, the circuit court found that termination 

of petitioner’s parental rights was necessary for the children’s welfare. The circuit court also noted 

that, although petitioner never moved for a post-adjudicatory improvement period in writing as 

required, she did move for one orally. However, the circuit court found that she failed to 

demonstrate that she would fully comply and denied the motion. The circuit court also denied 

petitioner post-termination visitation with the children, finding that it would not be in the children’s 

best interests. Thereafter, on October 21, 2019, petitioner filed a motion for stay and a motion for 

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The father of C.H. is nonabusing, and the permanency plan for C.H. is to remain in the 

father’s care. The fathers of the remaining children retain their parental rights as the proceedings 

against them are ongoing. Currently, children C.K., G.B., and T.B. are placed together in a foster 

home with a concurrent permanency plan of adoption in that home if the father’s parental rights 

are ultimately terminated. Due to behavioral issues and the need for heightened care, C.B. has been 

placed in a separate foster home with a concurrent permanency plan of adoption therein if the 

father’s parental rights are terminated. 
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a post-dispositional improvement period. The circuit court denied the motion for a stay and did 

not rule on the motion for a post-dispositional improvement period. It is from the October 4, 2019,

dispositional order that petitioner appeals. 

The Court has previously established the following standard of review:

“Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to de 

novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the 

facts without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the 

evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such 

child is abused or neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing 

court unless clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there 

is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 

with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, 

a reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it would have decided 

the case differently, and it must affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the 

evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Syl. Pt. 1, In 

Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011). 

On appeal, petitioner first argues that the circuit court erred in adjudicating her as an 

abusing parent upon insufficient evidence of the conditions existing at the time of the petition’s 

filing. As such, we note the following: 

“[West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i)], requires the [DHHR], in a child abuse 

or neglect case, to prove ‘conditions existing at the time of the filing of the petition 

. . . by clear and convincing [evidence].’ The statute, however, does not specify any 

particular manner or mode of testimony or evidence by which the [DHHR] is 

obligated to meet this burden.” Syllabus Point 1, In Interest of S.C., 168 W.Va. 366, 

284 S.E.2d 867 (1981). 

Syl. Pt. 1, In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997) (citations omitted). This Court 

has explained that “‘clear and convincing’ is the measure or degree of proof that will produce in 

the mind of the factfinder a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be established.” 

In re F.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 546, 759 S.E.2d 769, 777 (2014) (citation omitted). However, “the 

clear and convincing standard is ‘intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but not to 

the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt as in criminal cases.’” Id. at 

546, 759 S.E.2d at 777 (citation omitted). Finally, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 49-1-201, a

neglected child is one

[w]hose physical or mental health is harmed or threatened by a present refusal, 

failure or inability of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child 

with necessary food, clothing, shelter, supervision, medical care, or education, 

when that refusal, failure, or inability is not due primarily to a lack of financial 

means on the part of the parent, guardian, or custodian
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Upon our review of the record, we find that the DHHR satisfied the applicable burden and 

established that the children were neglected children.

In support of this assignment of error, petitioner argues that the petition was filed, in part, 

because of her failed drug screen. According to petitioner, this was erroneous because the circuit 

court found that she tested positive for multiple substances on October 7, 2018, instead of the 

correct date of October 9, 2018. Petitioner argues that there “was no clear and convincing evidence 

. . . that connected . . . petitioner’s October 9, 2018[,] drug tests results to the October 7, 2018, 

incident.” We find, however, that it is of no consequence that the circuit court found that petitioner 

tested positive for substances two days earlier than she actually did, given that the test results 

simply reflect petitioner’s substance abuse and are not tied directly to whether she may have 

actually been under the influence at the time the child wandered from the home on October 7, 

2018. Even more importantly, petitioner did not have to be under the influence at the time her 

children were improperly supervised in order for her to be adjudicated of neglect, given that the 

evidence overwhelmingly established that she could not provide the supervision necessary to 

protect the children.

Petitioner also argues that it was not her conduct that necessitated the petition’s filing. 

Rather, she argues that it was the conduct of C.L., an individual that the DHHR permitted to be in 

the home to provide the children with appropriate supervision pursuant to the protection plan, that 

resulted in the petition’s filing. In support, petitioner cites to a DHHR employee’s testimony that 

the petition was filed “[b]ecause the protection plan didn’t get followed, where [C.L.] had left for 

an hour.” As such, petitioner argues that she could not be adjudicated because no evidence 

connected C.L.’s violation of the protection plan on October 8, 2018, to the October 7, 2018, 

incident involving C.B. We find, however, that petitioner’s argument misstates the record and is 

simply an attempt to deflect blame for her failure to properly supervise the children. The reality is 

that, due to petitioner’s neglect, her young children were twice permitted to wander from her 

residence without supervision, thereby exposing the children to a great risk of harm. While 

petitioner cites the DHHR’s stated intent not to file a petition during the period between the first 

incident and the second as supportive of the notion that a petition was not necessary, she ignores 

the simple fact that after approximately four months of services designed to prevent her neglect, 

another child was allowed to leave the residence unsupervised. Petitioner further ignores the reality 

that her neglect of the children required C.L.’s presence in the first place. While it may be true that 

the DHHR’s decision to finally file a petition was based upon the fact that the protection plan was 

not followed, all of these actions were predicated upon petitioner’s pattern of extreme neglect, 

given that she allowed her young children to wander from the home unsupervised for extended 

periods and expose themselves to grave danger, including the potential for drowning. These 

conditions not only existed at the time of the petition’s filing, but as far back as four months prior 

to the petition. Petitioner’s attempts to blame C.L. for the petition’s filing only underscore her 

continued attempts to deflect blame for the poor supervision she provided that resulted in two 

children leaving the home under dangerous circumstances on multiple occasions. As such, it is 

clear that the DHHR established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the children were 

neglected.
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Next, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in permitting the children to be separated 

and placed in multiple foster homes and failed to consider their best interests in making these 

determinations. We find, however, that petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this regard for 

several reasons, chief among them being the fact that even if petitioner could establish some error 

on the part of the circuit court in this regard, she would not be entitled to the return of the children. 

Put simply, the resolution of this issue has no bearing on the fact that petitioner neglected the 

children, which necessitated their removal, and failed to remedy the conditions of abuse and 

neglect, which precluded their return to her care. It is true that West Virginia Code § 49-4-111(e)

establishes a preference for children removed from their parents’ custody to be adopted in the same 

home. However, petitioner fails to acknowledge that this Court has established that this preference 

is not absolute. Syl. Pt. 4, In re Carol B., 209 W. Va. 658, 550 S.E.2d 636 (2001) (recognizing that 

siblings may be separated when the foster or adoptive parents of a child’s sibling do not seek the 

“care and custody of the child” or when such separation is in the children’s best interests). 

Petitioner further ignores the reality of the situation below, which concerned the removal of five 

children. One child was returned to the custody of his nonabusing father, but the remaining 

children were not that father’s biological children. Additionally, the record shows that petitioner 

actively undermined the children’s placement by raising allegations of abuse by a foster parent 

that were never substantiated. Finally, one child required multiple placements due to his need for 

heightened care and the belief that he may be diagnosed with autism, the manifestations of which 

petitioner was shown to have ignored instead of seeking treatment upon their display. Simply put, 

there are extenuating circumstances that preclude the placement of all five children together in the 

same home, and we decline to find that petitioner would be entitled to any relief regarding her 

adjudication or the termination of her parental rights in relation to the children’s various 

placements. 

Next, petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in failing to rule on her motion for a postdispositional improvement period. We find this argument entirely without merit, however, given 

that the circuit court explicitly denied petitioner’s request for a post-adjudicatory improvement 

period. Indeed, petitioner acknowledges that she filed her written motion for a post-dispositional 

improvement period on October 21, 2019, which was approximately twenty days after the entry of 

the circuit court’s order terminating petitioner’s parental rights. Given that the circuit court had 

already entered its final dispositional order, petitioner’s motion for a post-dispositional 

improvement period could only be viewed as a motion to modify disposition. However, 

petitioner’s parental rights had already been terminated, thus depriving her of standing to file such 

a motion under West Virginia Code § 49-4-606. Syl. Pt. 6, In re Cesar L., 221 W. Va. 249, 654 

S.E.2d 373 (2007) (“A person whose parental rights have been terminated by a final order . . . does 

not have standing as a ‘parent,’ pursuant to [West Virginia Code § 49-4-606] to move for 

modification of disposition of the child with respect to whom his/her parental rights have been 

terminated.”). 

Further, as noted above, the dispositional order on appeal specifically denied petitioner’s 

request for a post-adjudicatory improvement period. Given that the standard for obtaining either 

type of improvement period is identical, petitioner’s motion for a post-dispositional improvement 

period was redundant. While petitioner argues that the guardian suggested at disposition that an 

improvement period might be appropriate, she cites to no evidence that she satisfied the burden 

necessary to obtain one. As this Court has held, a circuit court may grant a parent a post-
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adjudicatory improvement period under West Virginia Code § 49-4-610(2)(B) when the parent 

“demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence, that the [parent] is likely to fully participate in 

the improvement period.” Further, “[t]his Court has explained that ‘an improvement period in the 

context of abuse and neglect proceedings is viewed as an opportunity for the miscreant parent to 

modify his/her behavior so as to correct the conditions of abuse and/or neglect with which he/she 

has been charged.’” In re Kaitlyn P., 225 W. Va. 123, 126, 690 S.E.2d 131, 134 (2010) (citation 

omitted). As set forth above, petitioner received services for thirteen months, yet failed to 

participate in those services or otherwise correct the conditions of abuse and neglect. As such, she 

clearly demonstrated that she was not likely to fully participate in an improvement period. 

Moreover, this Court has held that circuit courts have the discretion to deny an improvement period 

when no improvement is likely. In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002). 

As such, we find no error in the denial of petitioner’s motion for an improvement period. 

Petitioner next argues that it was error to terminate her parental rights without permitting

her the opportunity to participate in an improvement period. Having already addressed the 

propriety of the circuit court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for an improvement period, we find 

no error in this regard, especially considering the ample evidence upon which the circuit court 

found that there was no reasonable likelihood petitioner could substantially correct the conditions 

of abuse and neglect and that termination of her rights was necessary for the children’s welfare. 

According to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6) (2019),3 circuit courts may terminate parental 

rights upon these findings. Further, according to West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(3) (2019), a 

situation in which there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect can be 

substantially corrected in the near future includes when “[t]he abusing parent . . . ha[s] not 

responded to or followed through with a reasonable family case plan or other rehabilitative efforts 

of social, medical, mental health, or other rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce or prevent the 

abuse or neglect of the child.” Here, the evidence overwhelmingly supports this finding. Moreover, 

“[w]e have previously pointed out that the level of interest demonstrated by a parent in visiting his 

or her children while they are out of the parent’s custody is a significant factor in determining the 

parent’s potential to improve sufficiently and achieve minimum standards to parent the child.” In 

re Katie S., 198 W. Va. 79, 90 n.14, 479 S.E.2d 589, 600 n.14 (1996) (citations omitted). Here, the 

record shows that petitioner went as long as three months without visiting the children, prompting 

the circuit court to find that “there tragically appears to be a complete absence of desire on the part 

of [petitioner] to be involved in the lives of her children.” Accordingly, the record supports the 

findings necessary for the termination of petitioner’s parental rights. Additionally, this Court has 

held that 

“[t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the 

statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, [West Virginia 

Code § 49-4-604 (2019)] . . . may be employed without the use of intervening less 

restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under 

[West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c) (2019)] . . . that conditions of neglect or abuse 

can be substantially corrected.” Syllabus point 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W.Va. 496, 266 

S.E.2d 114 (1980).

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Although the Legislature amended West Virginia Code § 49-4-604 effective June 5, 2020, 

including renumbering the provisions, the amendments do not impact this case.
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Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011). As such, we find that the circuit 

court did not err in terminating petitioner’s parental rights. 

In regard to petitioner’s final argument that the circuit court erred in denying her posttermination visitation with the children because she had a strong emotional bond with them, we 

find no error. Importantly, petitioner cites to no evidence to support her assertion of such a bond. 

Further, even assuming such a bond existed, petitioner disregarded this bond by failing to visit 

with the children for extended periods as is evidenced by the record. On appeal, petitioner argues 

that an abrupt cessation of contact between her and the children would be detrimental to their 

wellbeing, but she fails to acknowledge the fact that she willfully caused such an abrupt cessation 

by her conduct during the proceedings. Petitioner further argues that the circuit court’s order is 

devoid of analysis as to whether visitation was warranted, but this argument is not supported by 

the record. Indeed, the circuit court’s final order clearly states that post-termination visitation was 

denied because “such visitation would be inconsistent with the best interests” of the children. This 

finding was based upon ample evidence of petitioner’s detrimental impact upon the children while 

they were in her custody. As this Court has held, 

“[w]hen parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit 

court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation 

or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among 

other things, the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has 

been established between parent and child and the child’s wishes, if he or she is of 

appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate that such 

visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child’s well being 

and would be in the child’s best interest.” Syl. Pt. 5, In re Christina L., 194 W.Va. 

446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995).

Syl. Pt. 11, In re Daniel D., 211 W. Va. 79, 562 S.E.2d 147 (2002). Given the circuit court’s 

detailed order on appeal and its specific findings regarding the denial of post-termination 

visitation, we find that petitioner is entitled to no relief on this issue.

Lastly, because the proceedings in regard to two of the fathers are ongoing, this Court 

reminds the circuit court of its duty to establish permanency for the children. Rule 39(b) of the 

Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings requires that

[a]t least once every three months until permanent placement is achieved as defined 

in Rule 6, the court shall conduct a permanent placement review conference, 

requiring the multidisciplinary treatment team to attend and report as to progress 

and development in the case, for the purpose of reviewing the progress in the 

permanent placement of the child.

Further, this Court reminds the circuit court of its duty pursuant to Rule 43 of the Rules of 

Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings to find permanent placement for the children

within twelve months of the date of the disposition order. As this Court has stated, 
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[t]he [twelve]-month period provided in Rule 43 of the West Virginia Rules 

of Procedure[] for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings for permanent placement 

of an abused and neglected child following the final dispositional order must be 

strictly followed except in the most extraordinary circumstances which are fully 

substantiated in the record.

Cecil T., 228 W. Va. at 91, 717 S.E.2d at 875, syl. pt. 6. Moreover, this Court has stated that 

[i]n determining the appropriate permanent out-of-home placement of a 

child under [West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(b)(6) (2019)], the circuit court shall 

give priority to securing a suitable adoptive home for the child and shall consider 

other placement alternatives, including permanent foster care, only where the court 

finds that adoption would not provide custody, care, commitment, nurturing and 

discipline consistent with the child’s best interests or where a suitable adoptive 

home [cannot] be found.

Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Michael M., 202 W. Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 177 (1998). Finally, “[t]he guardian 

ad litem’s role in abuse and neglect proceedings does not actually cease until such time as the child 

is placed in a permanent home.” Syl. Pt. 5, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 

(1991).

For the foregoing reasons, we find no error in the decision of the circuit court, and its 

October 4, 2019, order is hereby affirmed.

Affirmed.

ISSUED: June 24, 2020

CONCURRED IN BY:

Chief Justice Tim Armstead

Justice Margaret L. Workman 

Justice Elizabeth D. Walker

Justice Evan H. Jenkins

Justice John A. Hutchison