[J-25-2014][M.O. – Stevens, J.] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

EASTERN DISTRICT 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, 

Appellee 

v. 

RICHARD ANDREW POPLAWSKI, 

Appellant 

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No. 654 CAP 

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence 

entered on 9/6/11 in the Court of 

Common Pleas, Criminal Division of 

Allegheny County at No. CP-02-CR0005652-2009 

ARGUED: April 9, 2014 

CONCURRING OPINION 

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR DECIDED: December 29, 2015 

I join Parts I and II of the majority opinion and concur in the result relative to the 

balance. 

 With regard to the treatment in Part III of Appellant’s claim of trial court error 

related to the admission of his statements containing racial epithets, I have difficulty with 

the majority’s abbreviated disposition of the claim based on harmlessness, particularly 

as it relates to the penalty phase of trial. See Majority Opinion, slip op. at 27-28. In this 

regard, the epithets certainly bolstered the prosecutor’s inciting remarks during the 

penalty phase denominating Appellant as within a class of “haters and bigots and 

racists[.]” Id. at 48 (quoting N.T., June 28, 2011, at 328). Since a broader assessment 

of the impact of the overall evidence along these lines will likely be required on postconviction review, I would refrain at this juncture from wider pronouncements, pertaining 

to the penalty phase, as to harmlessness. 
[J-25-2014][M.O. – Stevens, J.] - 2 

 Concerning Part V’s treatment of the admission of evidence that Appellant visited 

a controversial website, I would not deem Appellant’s challenge to have been waived as 

does the majority. See id. at 48. The material aspect of the salient objection, it would 

seem to me, is invocation of the requirement of Rule of Evidence 403 that evidence 

should be excluded where its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 

prejudice. See Pa.R.E. 403. While certainly inartful, Appellant’s trial counsel appears 

to have been attempting to advance just such an argument, when she was interrupted 

by the trial judge’s ruling. See N.T., June 23, 2011, at 871-72 (“[B]ecause he’s on the

Penguin website, that doesn’t make him a hockey player. Because he was on 

StormFront –“). As I would treat this claim as preserved, at least as pertaining to the 

guilt phase of trial, I would simply deem the evidence harmless in such regard. 

 As to the potential spillover effect into the penalty phase, however, I believe that 

this matter is best left for post-conviction review. In this regard, I note that penalty 

counsel did not object when the Commonwealth moved for incorporation of the guiltphase evidence into the penalty phase, although the very limited purpose for which 

some of that evidence had been admitted was unrelated to penalty. Moreover, penalty 

counsel also failed to object to the prosecutor’s specific allusions to the evidence, which 

clearly transcended the basis for its admission at the guilt phase. See N.T., June 28, 

2011, at 328 (“Nazism, StormFront, haters, ladies and gentlemen . . .[;] what he learned 

on those websites, chatting with those people, those like-minded haters and bigots and 

racists, we’ll never know.”). From my point of view, in the absence of critical objections 

to a pattern of conduct on the part of the prosecutor – encompassing statements 

deemed by the majority to be “highly irregular and improper,” Majority Opinion, slip op.

at 53 n.17, and by the trial judge to be “way over the line” and “just pandering to the 
[J-25-2014][M.O. – Stevens, J.] - 3 

emotions of the jury,” N.T., June 27, 2011, at 95-96 – I believe that a probing judicial 

assessment is properly reserved to post-conviction. 

 Regarding the issue of future dangerousness (Part VI), the Court recently related 

that “a prosecutor is permitted to discuss a defendant’s future dangerousness during 

rebuttal, after a defendant places his future conduct at issue.” Commonwealth v. 

Eichinger, ___ Pa. ___, ___, 108 A.3d 821, 835 (2014) (emphasis added). The majority 

appears to appropriately determine that mitigation evidence centered on a defendant’s 

positive influence on peers as recently as high school, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 

60-61), is not of a type placing future conduct in issue, but it proceeds nevertheless to 

deny relief based on harmless error. See id. at 58-59. Again, viewing this claim in 

isolation, I do not regard the difficulty with the prosecutor’s remarks implicating future 

dangerousness as sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant a new penalty hearing, but I 

would reserve an assessment of the aggregation of the prosecutorial overreaching for 

the post-conviction stage, where the broader range of it may be appropriately 

considered. 

 Finally, I am concerned with the apparent abuse of the latitude afforded to the 

prosecution to introduce victim-impact evidence, see Majority Opinion, slip op. at 59-60, 

and I would suggest that this case may present an apt vehicle, on post-conviction 

review, for imposing some rational limits as a supervisory matter.