2017 UT App 21

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHARLES C. REHN,

Appellant and Cross-appellee,

v.

STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN; STEVE S. CHRISTENSEN PC; HENRIOD,

NIELSEN & CHRISTENSEN; CHRISTENSEN, CORBETT & PANKRATZ 

PLLC; AND HIRSCHI CHRISTENSEN PLLC,

Appellees and Cross-appellants.

Opinion

No. 20150119-CA

Filed February 2, 2017

Third District Court, Silver Summit Department

The Honorable Ryan M. Harris

No. 130500115

Joseph E. Wrona and Jared C. Bowman, Attorneys

for Appellant and Cross-appellee

Clinton R. Brimhall, Jeremy R. Miller, Steve S. 

Christensen, and D. Scott Crook, Attorneys for

Appellees and Cross-appellants

JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which 

JUDGES KATE A. TOOMEY and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

VOROS, Judge:

¶1 Charles C. Rehn sued Steve S. Christensen and related 

parties (collectively, Christensen) for slander of title and to 

remove an attorney’s lien Christensen had filed on Rehn’s 

property. Rehn prevailed on some of his claims by way of 

summary judgment and prevailed on the remainder of his 

claims at trial. The district court denied Rehn’s request for 

attorney fees and also denied Christensen’s motion for a directed 

verdict and various post-trial motions. Both parties appeal. 

We affirm.
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 2 2017 UT App 21

BACKGROUND

¶2 In 1996, Rehn retained Christensen to represent him in a 

divorce. The case went to trial in 1997. Rehn did not own any 

real property during the marriage, and the district court entered 

findings stating that there was “no real property owned by the 

parties and thus no allocation is necessary.” Rehn lived in a 

rented home in Park City, Utah (the Property).

¶3 The Property lies at the heart of this dispute. The parties 

disagree about a number of facts surrounding the Property, 

including when Rehn first consulted Christensen, when Rehn 

first had the option to purchase the Property, and when, if ever, 

Rehn discussed the Property with Christensen during the 

divorce proceedings. Christensen argues that Rehn had a “predivorce goal” to purchase the Property and the two had a “15-

minute conversation” during which Christensen advised Rehn 

to wait until after the divorce to purchase the Property. Rehn 

argues that such a conversation never occurred and notes that 

Christensen could not remember when or where the alleged 

conversation occurred.

¶4 In October 1997, Rehn retained Christensen to appeal 

certain aspects of the divorce decree and signed an engagement 

letter (the Retainer Agreement). The Retainer Agreement

provided that Christensen’s law firm, Henriod, Nielsen 

& Christensen (HNC), was entitled to an attorney’s lien on 

Rehn’s real property for past-due billings:

[HNC] shall be entitled to a lien for services 

rendered including a lien on your residence, other 

real property or any subsequent settlement or 

judgment, as permitted [sic] the laws of the State of 

Utah or any other state where services are 

provided, in the event the bill has not been paid in 

full with [sic] thirty (30) days of billing.
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20150119-CA 3 2017 UT App 21

The Retainer Agreement also included an attorney-fee provision:

In the event legal action is taken to enforce this 

agreement the law of Utah shall apply and the 

prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable 

costs and attorney’s fees.

Around this time, Christensen left HNC to form a solo practice, 

Steve S. Christensen PC (SSC). HNC assigned its right to collect 

Rehn’s outstanding attorney fees to Christensen.

¶5 Rehn purchased the Property in 2000. The following year

Christensen recorded an “Amended Notice of Attorney Lien”

(the Lien) against it. The district court later found that the Lien 

contained a number of false statements. First, the Lien did not 

“amend” any earlier filing, because no earlier lien had been filed. 

Second, the Lien incorrectly described the Property as the 

“subject” of Christensen’s representation of Rehn, whereas it

was at most only “connected to” that representation. Third, the 

Lien incorrectly stated that the Property was awarded to Rehn in 

the original divorce action, although Rehn did not buy the 

Property until 2000, and no real property was at issue in the 

divorce. The Lien also incorrectly cited a superseded section of 

the Utah Code that purportedly authorized the Lien and 

incorrectly stated that 1995 rather than 1996 was the year when 

Rehn first retained Christensen. Finally, the Lien included billing 

inaccuracies.

¶6 Christensen did not notify Rehn of the Lien when 

Christensen recorded it. Approximately two months later, after 

learning that Rehn planned to refinance the Property, 

Christensen sent a letter informing Rehn of the Lien:

I am told by lenders that you are able to withdraw 

a higher percentage of your equity if the money is 

to refinance existing obligations rather than to 

obtain cash for yourself. In the event it would be 
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20150119-CA 4 2017 UT App 21

helpful, I have filed the enclosed attorney’s lien for 

your use in a refinance. If it turns out that this lien 

will not be useful to you, I can release the lien.

The Lien remained on the Property for years as Christensen and 

Rehn negotiated Rehn’s outstanding attorney fees.

¶7 In 2004, Rehn filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. He 

listed Christensen as a creditor in his bankruptcy schedules, 

showing a debt of $43,244 in outstanding attorney fees. Rehn did 

not specifically challenge the validity of the Lien. The 

bankruptcy court discharged the debt, but Christensen did not 

release the Lien. When Rehn attempted to sell the Property in 

2012, he discovered that the Lien still encumbered it. Rehn asked 

Christensen to remove the Lien. Christensen refused; Rehn sued.

¶8 Rehn alleged slander of title, promissory estoppel, and 

wrongful lien; he also sought a declaratory judgment that the 

Lien was void and a permanent injunction against its 

enforcement. Rehn’s core argument asserted that Christensen 

had placed an invalid lien on the Property and had refused to 

release it unless Rehn paid exorbitant attorney fees and interest. 

Rehn also moved for a temporary restraining order and 

preliminary injunction to remove the Lien. After Rehn deposited

$40,000 into an escrow account, the district court released the 

Lien and entered a stipulated preliminary injunction.

¶9 Christensen answered and counterclaimed, alleging that 

the Retainer Agreement entitled him to recover attorney fees:

65. SSC is entitled to receive $26,807.14 plus 

contractual interest at the rate of 18% per 

annum . . . .

66. SSC is entitled to receive attorney fees and 

costs . . . defending itself in this legal action 

pursuant to its contract with Rehn. 
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 5 2017 UT App 21

These allegations were based in part on the attorney-fee 

provision in the Retainer Agreement. Christensen moved for 

summary judgment, arguing that his Lien could not have 

slandered Rehn’s title, because the Lien did not amount to a 

slanderous statement—the first element of a slander of title

action. “If a person has a valid lien on property,” Christensen 

argued, “recording a notice of that lien is not slanderous.” Thus, 

according to Christensen, because the Retainer Agreement gave 

him a contractual right to record the Lien, the Lien could not be 

slanderous.

¶10 Rehn filed a cross-motion for summary judgment on the 

ground that the Lien was wrongful and void. The district court 

granted Rehn summary judgment, quieting title to the Property

in him. The court’s ruling rendered moot Rehn’s claim for a 

permanent injunction. The court dismissed Rehn’s wrongful lien 

claim but concluded on summary judgment that Rehn had 

established the first two elements of his slander of title claim—a

false and slanderous statement.

¶11 The district court held a two-day jury trial on the two 

remaining elements of Rehn’s slander of title claim—malice and 

damages. At trial, Christensen repeatedly argued that the

Retainer Agreement gave him a contractual right to record the 

Lien. Christensen advanced this argument in his opening 

statement, his direct examination, his cross-examination, and his 

re-direct examination, and when discussing jury instructions.

¶12 At the close of evidence, Christensen moved for a directed 

verdict, arguing that no evidence existed that Christensen knew 

the Lien was invalid. Rehn responded that he had produced 

evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that

Christensen included false statements in the Lien. The district 

court denied Christensen’s motion.

¶13 The jury found that both remaining elements for slander 

of title were satisfied and awarded Rehn damages of 
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20150119-CA 6 2017 UT App 21

$77,752.29—largely to compensate him for attorney fees incurred 

in removing the Lien.

¶14 After trial, Christensen moved for judgment 

notwithstanding the verdict, asking the court to reduce the 

damage award to $20,000 or, alternatively, for a new trial. The 

district court denied Christensen’s motion. Rehn, as the 

prevailing party at trial, moved for an award of attorney fees not 

covered by the slander of title damages. Rehn asserted three 

grounds for an award of fees: (1) the attorney-fee provision of 

the Retainer Agreement; (2) the Reciprocal Fee Statute found in 

Utah Code section 78B-5-826; and (3) the court’s “inherent

equitable powers.” The district court denied Rehn’s motion.

¶15 Addressing Rehn’s first and second grounds for an award 

of attorney fees, the court reasoned that “[n]either party had a 

contractual right to recover attorney fees associated with 

prosecuting or defending against the slander of title claim,”

because “[t]he slander of title claim was not brought to enforce 

the terms of the contract and was not otherwise based upon the 

contract.” Addressing Rehn’s third ground for an award of 

attorney fees, the court declined “to exercise its equitable 

powers,” because the court did not find “that the facts of this 

case distinguish it from other slander of title cases such that 

justice requires an award of attorney fees in addition to those 

already awarded by the jury, which the jury determined to be 

reasonably necessary to remove the cloud of title from Mr. 

Rehn’s property.”

¶16 Rehn appeals; Christensen cross-appeals.

ISSUES

¶17 Rehn asserts two claims of error on appeal. He first 

contends that the district court erred by not awarding him 

attorney fees under the Reciprocal Fee Statute. He next contends 
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20150119-CA 7 2017 UT App 21

that the district court erred by not awarding him attorney fees 

pursuant to its inherent equitable powers. Rehn also seeks 

attorney fees incurred on appeal.

¶18 Christensen asserts three claims of error in his crossappeal. He first contends that the district court “erred in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Rehn on the first two 

elements of [Rehn’s] slander of title” claim. He next contends 

that the district court erred in denying his motion for a directed 

verdict. Finally, he contends that the district court erred in 

denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or 

for a new trial.

ANALYSIS

I. Rehn’s Appeal

A. Reciprocal Fee Statute

¶19 Rehn contends that the Reciprocal Fee Statute entitles him 

to an award of attorney fees and costs. Specifically, Rehn argues 

that Christensen’s use of the Retainer Agreement “as a basis to 

recover Christensen’s attorney fees and costs incurred by 

Christensen to defend against Rehn’s slander of title 

claim . . . triggered Rehn’s right to reciprocal attorney fees

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.”

¶20 Christensen responds that the Reciprocal Fee Statute

“does not extend to the slander of title claim because no party 

asserted a contract’s enforceability as a basis for recovery 

thereunder.” In essence, Christensen argues that Rehn cannot 

recover fees for bringing Rehn’s slander of title claim, because 

that claim was not “based upon” contract, i.e., the Retainer 

Agreement.
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 8 2017 UT App 21

¶21 The district court denied Rehn’s motion for attorney fees 

on the ground that Rehn did not bring his slander of title claim 

“to enforce the terms” of the Retainer Agreement:

The language of [the Retainer Agreement] only 

allowed a party to recover attorney fees in a legal 

action brought to enforce the terms of [the Retainer 

Agreement]. The slander of title claim was not 

brought to enforce the terms of [the Retainer 

Agreement] and was not otherwise based upon

[the Retainer Agreement]. Neither party had a 

contractual right to recover attorney fees associated 

with prosecuting or defending against the slander 

of title claim. Therefore, [Rehn] cannot recover any 

fees for [his] prosecution for the slander of title 

cause of action pursuant to [the Retainer 

Agreement] or Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826.

Because our review of the Reciprocal Fee Statute involves 

statutory interpretation, we review an award or denial of 

attorney fees under Utah Code section 78B-5-826 for correctness. 

See Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d 1041.

¶22 The Reciprocal Fee Statute allows the prevailing party in a

contract dispute to recover attorney fees if the contract awards 

fees to at least one of the parties:

A court may award costs and attorney fees to 

either party that prevails in a civil action based 

upon any promissory note, written contract, or 

other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when 

the provisions of the promissory note, written 

contract, or other writing allow at least one party to 

recover attorney fees.

Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (LexisNexis 2012). Thus, the text of 

the Reciprocal Fee Statute “provides that a court may award 
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20150119-CA 9 2017 UT App 21

costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party in a civil action if 

two main conditions are met.” Bilanzich, 2007 UT 26, ¶ 14. “First, 

the civil action must be ‘based upon any promissory note, 

written contract, or other writing.’ And second, ‘the provisions 

of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing’ must 

‘allow at least one party to recover attorney’s fees.’” Id. (quoting 

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (LexisNexis 2002) (renumbered as 

id. § 78B-5-826 (LexisNexis 2012))).

¶23 We must determine whether Rehn’s civil action satisfies 

the first condition—whether it is based on a written contract or 

other writing. We agree with the district court that it is not.

¶24 Rehn identifies the Retainer Agreement as the relevant 

writing. But Rehn’s suit was not based on the Retainer 

Agreement. On the contrary, his Complaint asserts that he “did 

not have any agreement with SSC for legal services.”

¶25 We addressed a similar circumstance in McQueen v. Jordan 

Pines Townhomes Owners Association, 2013 UT App 53, 298 P.3d 

666, overruled in part on other grounds by Bank of America v. 

Adamson, 2017 UT 2, ¶¶ 31–33. There, a condominium 

homeowners’ association, pursuant to the condominium 

declaration, placed a lien on a condominium and completed a 

non-judicial foreclosure. Id. ¶ 3. The condominium owner 

responded with quiet title and slander of title actions. Id. ¶ 4. He 

prevailed on the quiet title action and sought an award of 

attorney fees based on a provision in the condominium 

declaration and the Reciprocal Fee Statute. Id. ¶¶ 4, 6. The 

district court denied the fee award, and this court affirmed. Id.

¶¶ 6, 28. We concluded that the quiet title action was not based 

on a breach of the condominium declaration, “even though the 

two may be related.” Id. ¶ 25. “The principal purpose behind the 

quiet title action,” we noted, “was to establish rightful 

ownership of the condominium unit, not to enforce the 

condominium declaration,” even though “part of the quiet title 
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20150119-CA 10 2017 UT App 21

litigation below involved analysis of the condominium 

declaration . . . .” Id.

¶26 We see the present case in the same light. Rehn’s slander 

of title action did not seek to enforce or invalidate the Retainer 

Agreement. That document supported Christensen’s defense to 

Rehn’s slander of title and quiet title claims, just as the 

condominium declaration supported the homeowners’ defense 

to McQueen’s slander of title and quiet title claims. But neither 

document served as the basis for the slander of title or quiet title 

claims.

¶27 Hooban v. Unicity International Inc., 2012 UT 40, 285 P.3d 

766, upon which Rehn relies, does not require a contrary result. 

In Hooban our supreme court held that a “party is entitled to 

reciprocal fee-shifting by statute ‘when the provisions’ of a 

contract would have entitled at least one party to recover its fees 

had that party prevailed ‘in a civil action based upon’ the 

contract.” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826). But the 

alignment of the parties in Hooban, as well as in the later case 

Insight Assets, Inc. v. Farias, 2013 UT 47, 321 P.3d 1021, upon 

which Rehn also relies, varies from the present case in a way that 

matters under the Reciprocal Fee Statute. In those cases, the 

plaintiff brought an action based on a writing, the defendant 

asserted that the writing was unenforceable, and the defendant 

prevailed. The Reciprocal Fee Statute applied because the

defendants successfully defended against a civil action based on 

a writing containing an attorney-fee provision. But in the present 

case, as in McQueen, the plaintiff prevailed in a civil action that 

was not based on a writing; only Christensen’s defense and 

counterclaim relied on a writing.

¶28 And Rehn did recover the attorney fees he incurred in 

responding to Christensen’s counterclaim. Unlike Rehn’s claims,

Christensen’s counterclaim was based on the Retainer 

Agreement. The Retainer Agreement included an attorney-fee 

provision that allowed the prevailing party to recover attorney 
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20150119-CA 11 2017 UT App 21

fees “[i]n the event legal action is taken to enforce this 

agreement.” Rehn recovered his fees incurred in defeating 

Christensen’s counterclaim because Christensen’s counterclaim, 

though non-meritorious, qualified as a civil action based on a 

writing containing an attorney-fee provision. See Hooban, 2012 

UT 40, ¶ 32.

¶29 In sum, we affirm the district court’s denial of Rehn’s 

request for an award of attorney fees incurred in prosecuting his 

slander of title claim under the Reciprocal Fee Statute.

B. Equitable Award of Attorney Fees

¶30 Rehn also contends that the district court “abused its 

discretion by failing to consider an attorney’s malice towards his 

own client as an aggravating factor in considering an equitable 

award of attorney fees and costs.”1

¶31 “In general, Utah follows the traditional American rule 

that attorney fees cannot be recovered by a prevailing party 

unless a statute or contract authorizes such an award.” Hughes v. 

Cafferty, 2004 UT 22, ¶ 21, 89 P.3d 148, abrogated on other grounds

by Utahns For Better Dental Health-Davis, Inc. v. Davis County 

Clerk, 2007 UT 97, ¶ 6, 175 P.3d 1036. “However, in the absence 

of a statutory or contractual authorization, a court has inherent 

equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it 

deems it appropriate in the interest[s] of justice and equity.” Id.

(alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks 

omitted). “This power is part of the original authority of the 

chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.” Id. (citations 

and internal quotation marks omitted). “Courts have exercised 

that inherent power in several categories of cases.” Stewart v. 

 

1. In asserting this claim, Rehn invokes the court’s equitable 

powers; he does not rely on Utah Code section 78B-5-826

(LexisNexis 2012).
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 12 2017 UT App 21

Utah Public Service Comm’n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). The 

category most relevant here includes situations where “a party 

acts ‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive 

reasons.’” Id. (quoting James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal 

Practice ¶ 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)).

¶32 “[T]he appropriate standard for reviewing equitable 

awards of attorney fees is abuse of discretion. When a court 

awards attorney fees pursuant to statute or contract, it does so in 

recognition of a party’s legal right to an award.” Hughes, 2004 

UT 22, ¶ 20. “In contrast, a court making an equitable award of 

fees is concerned not with a party’s legal entitlement to an 

award, but with the equities. In other words, the court must 

ascertain whether the equities of a given case justify the use of its 

inherent and discretionary power to award fees.” Id.

¶33 Rehn argues that the record here demonstrates extreme 

bad faith and argues that an “attorney who lies to his own client 

and undertakes malicious acts against his own client is guilty of 

a particularly repugnant act.” Specifically, Rehn argues that

Christensen “intentionally falsified a lien against his own client’s 

property,” recorded the lien “without notifying the client,” later 

“lied to his client about the purpose of the lien in order to lull the 

client into complacency,” and finally tried “to exhaust his former 

client in litigation in an effort to extract a pound of flesh.”

¶34 Christensen responds that the district court did not ignore 

any relevant facts or otherwise abuse its discretion. He notes that 

the district court “sat through trial and listened to witness 

testimony, . . . weighed the equities[,] and saw no reason to 

award Rehn his attorney fees.” Christensen further argues that 

“the debt in [Christensen’s] lien notice was not imaginary,” but 

that Rehn owed Christensen “tens of thousands of dollars that 

he never paid.”

¶35 The district court declined to exercise its equitable powers 

in this case on the ground that the jury in the slander of title case 
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20150119-CA 13 2017 UT App 21

had already awarded Rehn his fees for removing the cloud on 

his title in the quiet title action:

Although the jury found that the Defendants acted 

with malice when they recorded the subject lien, 

the Court does not find that the facts of this case 

distinguish it from other slander of title cases such 

that justice requires an award of attorney fees in 

addition to those already awarded by the jury, 

which the jury determined to be reasonably 

necessary to remove the cloud of title from Mr. 

Rehn’s property.

Rehn’s challenge to the district court’s ruling does not refute or 

even acknowledge the court’s stated rationale for that ruling—

that equity did not require the court to augment the jury’s 

damage award in Rehn’s slander of title case, which included 

fees incurred in removing the wrongfully filed lien. This 

omission is fatal to his appellate claim. No appellate argument

that ignores the primary rationale for the lower court’s ruling 

can succeed in demonstrating that the ruling exceeded the limits 

of the law. See Golden Meadows Props., LC v. Strand, 2010 UT App 

257, ¶ 17, 241 P.3d 375 (rejecting an appellate challenge on the 

ground that it failed to address the basis of the district court’s 

ruling).

C. Fees on Appeal

¶36 Rehn requests an award of attorney fees on appeal on the 

ground that the Retainer Agreement awards attorney fees to the 

“prevailing” party. “‘[W]hen a party who received attorney fees 

below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees 

reasonably incurred on appeal.’” Salt Lake County v. Butler, 

Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp., 2013 UT App 30, ¶ 39, 297 P.3d 38 

(alteration in original) (quoting Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 

305, 319 (Utah 1998)). Because Rehn did not receive attorney fees 
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20150119-CA 14 2017 UT App 21

below and because he does not prevail on appeal on that 

question, he is not entitled to fees reasonably incurred on appeal.

II. Christensen’s Cross-Appeal

A. Summary Judgment on Slander of Title

¶37 Christensen contends that the district court “erred in 

granting summary judgment in favor of Rehn on the first two 

elements of [Rehn’s] slander of title” claim. Specifically, 

Christensen argues that this court should reverse the slander of 

title judgment because Christensen held “an attorney’s lien, a 

consensual lien, or both” against the Property. In the alternative,

Christensen argues that summary judgment was inappropriate 

because he “did not actually know [his] claim to a lien was 

false.”

¶38 Rehn responds that “[w]hether Christensen possessed an 

attorney’s lien or a consensual lien is irrelevant because . . . the 

first two elements of a slander of title were established by hard 

evidence . . . that [the Lien] contained numerous false 

statements.” Rehn also argues that “Christensen had no right to 

record [the Lien] against [the Property]” in the first place

because the Property was not “connected with” Christensen’s 

representation of Rehn—a required element for an attorney’s 

lien.

¶39 “To prove slander of title, a claimant must prove that 

(1) there was a publication of a slanderous statement 

disparaging claimant’s title, (2) the statement was false, (3) the 

statement was made with malice, and (4) the statement caused 

actual or special damages.” First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. v. 

Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1256–57 (Utah 1989). Before

trial, the district court granted Rehn partial summary judgment, 

ruling that undisputed facts established the first two elements of 

Rehn’s slander of title claim—that Christensen had published a 
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20150119-CA 15 2017 UT App 21

slanderous statement disparaging Rehn’s title to the Property 

and that the statement was false.

¶40 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment 

for correctness, giving no deference to the lower court’s legal 

conclusions. Dillon v. Southern Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 

UT 14, ¶ 21, 326 P.3d 656. We review “the facts and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 

favorable to the nonmoving party,” Christensen. See Orvis v. 

Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ¶ 6, 177 P.3d 600 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶41 Because we conclude that Christensen did not possess a 

valid lien against the Property, we affirm the district court’s

ruling that Christensen’s lien notice constituted a false statement

that disparaged Rehn’s title.

1. Christensen held no attorney’s lien on the Property.

¶42 Christensen first argues that he “held a valid attorney lien 

against Rehn because there was a connection between [the 

Property] and Christensen’s representation of Rehn in the 

divorce and divorce appeal.” Christensen’s claim of an 

attorney’s lien on the Property rests on that connection.

¶43 In Utah an attorney’s lien arises by operation of law for 

the balance of compensation due from a client on any money or 

property owned by the client that is “the subject of or connected 

with” legal work performed for the client:

(2) An attorney shall have a lien for the balance of 

compensation due from a client on any money or 

property owned by the client that is the subject of 

or connected with work performed for the client, 

including:
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20150119-CA 16 2017 UT App 21

(a) any real, personal, or intangible property 

that is the subject of or connected with the work 

performed for the client; . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 38-2-7(2)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016)

(Attorney’s Lien Statute).

¶44 The district court ruled that the undisputed evidence 

demonstrated the lack of a connection between Christensen’s 

legal work and the Property. The vast majority of the legal work 

Christensen performed related to Rehn’s divorce, and, as the 

divorce court found, no real property was at issue in the divorce.

In fact, Rehn owned no real property at the time of the divorce; 

he began renting the Property six weeks before the divorce trial

and did not purchase it until three years after the divorce.

¶45 Christensen alleges that he advised Rehn to wait until 

after the divorce to purchase the Property. Rehn disputes that 

this conversation took place. But viewing the facts in the light 

most favorable to Christensen, the district court ruled that at 

most Christensen “provided $30.00 of billable time work that 

could arguably be related to a decision by Mr. Rehn to purchase 

[the Property at] some date in the future.”

¶46 We hold that, as a matter of law, the Property was not 

connected with the legal work Christensen performed for 

purposes of the Attorney’s Lien Statute. An attorney’s single 

comment concerning property not at issue in the divorce and not 

owned by the client, made in the course of performing extensive

divorce-related work for the client, is too tenuous to connect the 

legal work to the Property. If this gossamer thread satisfied the 

statutory requirement for a connection, the requirement would 

almost cease to exist. A single word of advice could support a 

lien encompassing a client’s entire estate.

¶47 Christensen relies on Bay Harbor Farm, LC v. Sumsion, 2014 

UT App 133, 329 P.3d 46, another attorney’s lien case. There, a 
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20150119-CA 17 2017 UT App 21

farm worker was injured while driving a tractor on or near his 

employer’s farm and sued the employer. Id. ¶ 2. When the 

employer failed to pay its attorney, the attorney filed a lien on 

the farm. Id. ¶ 3. The employer sued, claiming the lien violated 

the Wrongful Lien Act, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-7 (LexisNexis 

2010) (renumbered as id. § 38-9-205 (LexisNexis 2014)). Id. ¶ 4. 

On appeal, this court held that, although the district court might

ultimately conclude that the worker’s compensation matter was 

not “connected with” the employer’s property and thus that the 

attorney’s lien was unenforceable, the attorney at least had a 

“plausible claim” that his work was connected with the farm, 

and therefore the lien was not wrongful for purposes of the 

Wrongful Lien Act. Bay Harbor Farm, 2014 UT App 133, ¶ 13.

¶48 Bay Harbor Farm does not support Christensen’s 

argument. For one thing, the legal work in Bay Harbor Farm bore 

a closer connection to the farm than Christensen’s legal work 

here does to the Property—at the very least, the employer in Bay 

Harbor Farm owned the subject property at the time of the legal 

work. Furthermore, in that case we drew no conclusion about 

the sufficiency of the actual connection between the attorney’s 

work and the subject of the lien. We merely noted that, even if 

the lien might ultimately prove unenforceable, “an expedited 

hearing under the Wrongful Lien Act is not the right vehicle for 

analyzing the lien’s enforceability under the attorney’s lien 

statute.” Id. ¶ 11.

¶49 Here, because the Property was not “the subject of or 

connected with” Christensen’s representation of Rehn, no 

attorney’s lien arose on the Property by operation of the 

Attorney’s Lien Statute. Therefore, that statute presents no bar to 

the district court’s conclusion that Christensen’s lien constituted 

a false statement disparaging Rehn’s title to the Property.
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 18 2017 UT App 21

2. Christensen held no consensual lien on the Property.

¶50 Christensen next argues that his notice of lien was neither 

false nor disparaging, because he held a consensual lien 

pursuant to the Retainer Agreement. The Retainer Agreement

stated that HNC was entitled to a lien on Rehn’s residence and 

other property, as permitted by Utah law:

[HNC] shall be entitled to a lien for services 

rendered including a lien on your residence, other 

real property or any subsequent settlement or 

judgment, as permitted [sic] the laws of the State of 

Utah or any other state where services are 

provided, in the event the bill has not been paid in 

full with [sic] thirty (30) days of billing.

Christensen argues that by this provision Rehn consented in 

advance to the filing of the Lien.

¶51 Rehn responds that “Christensen judicially admitted there 

was no consensual lien and subsequently confirmed that judicial 

admission,” and in any event “[t]he Lien itself demonstrates that 

Christensen construed [the Retainer Agreement] as only 

referencing the attorney’s statutory lien right.”

¶52 The district court read the Retainer Agreement to refer to 

the law firm’s “right to record a lien pursuant to Utah’s attorney 

lien statute.” Further, the court stated that the fact that 

Christensen had “judicially admitted that there was no 

contractual right to record a lien” reinforced the court’s 

interpretation of the Retainer Agreement as referring to a 

statutory lien, not creating a contractual lien. Without 

determining whether Christensen judicially admitted that no 

consensual lien existed, we hold that the Retainer Agreement did 

not create a consensual lien.
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 19 2017 UT App 21

¶53 Our conclusion that the Retainer Agreement did not 

create a consensual or contractual lien rests first on the Retainer 

Agreement itself. “When interpreting a contract, we first look at 

the plain language to determine the parties’ meaning and 

intent.” Meadow Valley Contractors, Inc. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 

2011 UT 35, ¶ 64, 266 P.3d 671. “If the contract is ambiguous, we

seek to resolve the ambiguity by looking to extrinsic evidence of 

the parties’ intent.” Id. “If extrinsic evidence does not resolve the 

ambiguity and uncertainty remains, only then will we resolve the 

ambiguity against the drafter.” Id. Here, neither party relies on 

extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Accordingly, we will 

construe the Retainer Agreement by looking first at the text of 

the document to determine the parties’ intent, and we will 

resolve any ambiguities against the drafter, Christensen.

¶54 The Retainer Agreement does not contain words of 

consent or agreement such as, “By signing this paragraph, you 

agree to grant immediately a consensual lien against your 

present interest.” See Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 189. Rather, it

states that Christensen’s firm “shall be entitled to a lien for 

services rendered . . . as permitted by the laws of the State of 

Utah.” Christensen does not identify the laws referred to, but 

argues that the phrase allows “any lien that is not illegal.” Rehn 

argues that the phrase “laws of Utah” refers to the Attorney’s

Lien Statute. We read the Retainer Agreement as Rehn does. A 

term in an engagement letter stating that a lawyer is entitled to a 

lien by law is more reasonably read as a disclosure to the client of 

the attorney’s rights under the Attorney’s Lien Statute than as a 

mutual agreement of the parties to a consensual lien. 

Furthermore, to the extent the provision is ambiguous, we 

construe it against Christensen.

¶55 In addition, the text of the notice of lien cited the 

Attorney’s Lien Statute, not the Retainer Agreement, as the basis 

for the Lien:
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 20 2017 UT App 21

[T]he undersigned holds and claims a lien by 

virtue of the provisions of Section 78-51-41, Utah

Code Ann., 1953, which entitles the undersigned to 

the lien described above.

Consistent with the Lien’s language, Christensen admitted in his 

deposition that he drafted the notice of lien based on the 

Attorney’s Lien Statute, not the Retainer Agreement.

¶56 Because the Retainer Agreement, the notice of lien, and 

Christensen himself all indicate that Christensen relied on the 

Attorney’s Lien Statute rather than a contractual basis for the 

Lien, we hold that Christensen did not have a consensual lien 

against the Property.

3. The Lien contained false statements.

¶57 Christensen last argues that “even if there were 

scrivener’s errors in the notice of lien, they were not sufficient to 

support a judgment against Appellees for slander of title because 

the lien, whether an attorney lien or a consensual lien, was still 

enforceable.” According to Christensen, “The misstatements in 

the notice should not give rise to a slander of title claim where a 

lien exists.” “The key,” he maintains, “is that [Christensen] held 

a lien and claimed to hold a lien.”

¶58 Because we have determined that Christensen did not 

hold either an attorney’s lien or a consensual lien on the 

Property, this argument fails. See supra ¶¶ 49, 56.

B. Directed Verdict on Malice

¶59 Christensen also contends that “[t]he district court should 

have granted Appellees’ motion for a directed verdict on the 

issue of malice because Rehn failed to establish that Christensen 

acted with malice.” This is so, Christensen argues, because Rehn 

“must establish that the defendant had actual knowledge that 
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 21 2017 UT App 21

the statements at issue were false. . . . However, Rehn failed to 

present evidence showing that Christensen had actual 

knowledge that he held no right to a lien against Rehn’s 

property.” Christensen admits that the notice of lien contained 

“some scrivener’s errors,” but argues that “Rehn did not 

produce evidence that Christensen knew he had no lien against 

Rehn’s property.”

¶60 Rehn responds by arguing that malice can be implied 

under Utah law, and that “the trial record is chock full of 

evidence that Christensen knew the Lien was unenforceable.”

¶61 “Under Utah law, a party who moves for a directed 

verdict has the very difficult burden of showing that no evidence 

exists that raises a question of material fact.” Smith v. Fairfax 

Realty, Inc., 2003 UT 41, ¶ 12, 82 P.3d 1064 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). And when reviewing a challenge to a 

trial court’s denial of a motion for directed verdict, “we review 

the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be 

drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party moved 

against, and will sustain the denial if reasonable minds could 

disagree with the ground asserted for directing a verdict.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶62 “A claim for slander of title requires proof of four 

elements: (1) publication of a slanderous statement, (2) the 

statement must be false, (3) the statement must be made with 

malice, and (4) the statement must cause special damages to the 

plaintiff.” Neff v. Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶ 79, 247 P.3d 380. “[F]or a 

slanderous statement to be malicious, the defendant must have 

actually known that it was false or misleading.” Dillon v. 

Southern Mgmt. Corp. Retirement Trust, 2014 UT 14, ¶ 36, 236 P.3d 

656. However, “malice may be implied where a party 

knowingly and wrongfully . . . publishes something untrue or 

spurious . . . under circumstances that it should reasonably 

foresee might result in damage to the owner of the property.” Id.

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 22 2017 UT App 21

¶63 Here, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences 

therefrom in the light most favorable to Rehn, we agree with the 

district court that reasonable minds could conclude that

Christensen’s false statements were made with malice. For 

example, the Lien incorrectly stated it was an “amended” lien, 

whereas it was in fact the original notice of lien. Second, the Lien 

incorrectly stated that the Property was the “subject” of 

Christensen’s representation of Rehn, despite the Property not 

being involved in the divorce, see supra ¶ 48. Third, the Lien 

incorrectly stated the Property was awarded to Rehn in the 

original divorce action, when it was not—Rehn did not even 

own the Property until three years after the divorce, and the 

divorce court specifically stated that no real property was at 

issue. Fourth, the Lien incorrectly stated that 1995 rather than 

1996 was the year Rehn retained Christensen. And finally, the 

Lien incorrectly cited a superseded section of the Utah Code 

which purportedly authorized the Lien when, at the time, the 

cited section no longer supported the stated proposition because 

the section number had been changed.

¶64 A jury could reasonably conclude that Christensen made 

these false statements knowingly for the purpose of making an 

invalid lien appear valid. Therefore, the district court properly 

denied Christensen’s motion for a directed verdict.

C. Post-trial Motions on Attorney Fees

¶65 Finally, Christensen contends that the district court erred 

in denying his combined motion for judgment notwithstanding 

the verdict (JNOV), motion to alter or amend judgment, and 

motion for new trial. The motions all asserted that “the attorney 

fees awarded [to Rehn] were not reasonably necessary to remove 

[the Lien].” In support, Christensen argues that “slander of title 

attorney fees are per se not eligible as slander of title damages,”

and that “[m]any portions of Rehn’s attorney fees were per se 

not reasonably necessary to remedy [the Lien] disparaging the 
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 23 2017 UT App 21

title to Rehn’s property.” Christensen asked the district court to 

reduce the jury’s determination of damages from $77,752.29 to 

$20,000. However, on appeal Christensen acknowledges that 

“there was testimony at trial that the amounts were reasonable 

and thus there exists a basis in evidence to support the jury’s 

determination.”

¶66 Rehn responds that “the jury was directed to determine if 

Rehn’s attorney fees were reasonably necessary,” and that 

Christensen “failed to present any other evidence suggesting 

that the fees were unreasonable.” In Rehn’s view, “[b]ecause the 

only evidence provided at trial supported the reasonableness of 

Rehn’s attorney fees, and no evidence supported a contrary 

finding, substantial evidence precluded the trial court from 

granting Christensen’s Motion for a JNOV.”

¶67 In denying Christensen’s motions, the court explained

that the jury was properly instructed on the law and that 

Christensen did not object to those jury instructions. The court 

next explained that Rehn “presented evidence of his claimed 

damages” through billing records and attorney testimony. The 

court noted that Christensen had cross-examined the attorney’s 

testimony but did not call an expert of his own. Lastly, the court 

explained, “Before allowing the damages evidence to go to the 

jury, the Court made sure during pretrial proceedings that the 

damages evidence [Rehn] would present to the jury was not 

simply all attorneys’ fees incurred in the whole case but, rather, 

just those fees that were incurred prior to the Court’s summary

judgment ruling clearing title.” Thus, because “[t]here was 

competent evidence in the record to support the jury’s verdict,”

the court denied Christensen’s motion.

¶68 “[A] district court may grant a JNOV motion only if there 

is no ‘basis in the evidence, including reasonable inferences 

which could be drawn therefrom, to support the jury’s 

determination.’” ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, LC, 

2013 UT 24, ¶ 18, 309 P.3d 201 (quoting Braithwaite v. West Valley 
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 24 2017 UT App 21

City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1996)). We reverse a trial 

court’s denial of a motion for a new trial “only if there is no 

reasonable basis for the decision.” Id. ¶ 21 (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted).

¶69 Attorney fees may be recovered as special damages in 

slander of title cases “if the fees are reasonably necessary to 

remedy the disparagement of the plaintiff’s title.” Neff v. Neff, 

2011 UT 6, ¶ 79, 247 P.3d 380; see also Ortega v. Ridgewood Estates 

LLC, 2016 UT App 131, ¶ 30, 379 P.3d 18. Here, the jury was 

instructed to award only those fees that were “reasonably 

necessary to remove the clouds on title”:

In slander of title cases, attorney fees may 

constitute recoverable damages if the fees incurred 

were reasonably necessary to remove clouds from 

a party’s title to property. For instance, if it is 

reasonably necessary for a property owner to file a 

lawsuit in order to remedy defects in his title 

resulting from a slanderous statement affecting his 

title, any fees and costs incurred in that lawsuit up 

to the point in the lawsuit when title is cleared, that 

were reasonably necessary to remove the clouds on 

title are recoverable as damages in a slander of title 

case.

Christensen did not object to this instruction. Nor did he present 

testimony denying that Rehn’s attorney fees were reasonably 

necessary to remedy Christensen’s disparagement of Rehn’s title.

¶70 Because the district court correctly instructed the jury to 

include only those damages “reasonably necessary” to “remove 

the clouds on [Rehn’s] title,” see Neff, 2011 UT 6, ¶ 80, and Rehn 

presented detailed billing records and attorney testimony as 

evidence to support the reasonableness of his fees, we cannot say 

that there was “no basis in the evidence . . . to support the jury’s

determination,” see ASC Utah, 2013 UT 24, ¶ 18 (citation and 
Rehn v. Christensen

20150119-CA 25 2017 UT App 21

internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we affirm the district 

court’s denial of Christensen’s motion.

CONCLUSION

¶71 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 

court is affirmed.