[Federal Register Volume 89, Number 196 (Wednesday, October 9, 2024)]
[Notices]
[Pages 81958-81966]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2024-23292]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-101246; File No. SR-OCC-2024-014]


Self-Regulatory Organizations; The Options Clearing Corporation; 
Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by Partial 
Amendment No. 1, by the Options Clearing Corporation Concerning Its 
Process for Adjusting Certain Parameters in Its Proprietary System for 
Calculating Margin Requirements During Periods When the Products It 
Clears and the Markets It Serves Experience High Volatility

October 3, 2024.
    Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(``Exchange Act'' or ``Act''),\1\ and Rule 19b-4 thereunder,\2\ notice 
is hereby given that on September 24, 2024, The Options Clearing 
Corporation (``OCC'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(``SEC'' or ``Commission'') the proposed rule change as described in 
Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared primarily by 
OCC. On October 1, 2024, OCC filed a partial amendment (``Partial 
Amendment No. 1'') to the proposed rule change.\3\ The Commission is 
publishing this notice to solicit comments on the proposed rule change, 
as modified by Partial Amendment No. 1 (hereafter the ``proposed rule 
change'') from interested persons.
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
    \2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \3\ In Partial Amendment No. 1, OCC submitted a revised Exhibit 
3D to SR-OCC-2024-014 without changing the substance of the proposed 
rule change. Partial Amendment No. 1 does not materially alter the 
substance of the proposed rule change or raise any novel regulatory 
issues.
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I. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Terms of Substance of the 
Proposed Rule Change

    This proposed rule change would codify OCC's process for adjusting 
certain parameters in its proprietary system for calculating margin 
requirements during periods when the products OCC clears and the 
markets it serves experience high volatility. Proposed changes to OCC's 
Margin Policy are submitted in Exhibit 5 to File No. SR-OCC-2024-014. 
Material proposed to be added is marked by underlining and material 
proposed to be deleted is marked with strikethrough text. All terms 
with initial capitalization that are not otherwise defined herein have 
the same meaning as set forth in the OCC By-Laws and Rules.\4\
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    \4\ OCC's By-Laws and Rules can be found on OCC's public 
website: https://www.theocc.com/Company-Information/Documents-and-Archives/By-Laws-and-Rules.
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II. Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    In its filing with the Commission, OCC included statements 
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and 
discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule change. The 
text of these statements may be examined at the places specified in 
Item IV below. OCC has prepared summaries, set forth in sections (A), 
(B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of these 
statements.

(A) Clearing Agency's Statement of the Purpose of, and Statutory Basis 
for, the Proposed Rule Change

    OCC is the sole clearing agency for standardized equity options 
listed on national securities exchanges registered with the Commission. 
OCC also clears certain stock loan and futures transactions. In its 
role as a clearing agency, OCC guarantees the performance of its 
Clearing Members for all transactions cleared by OCC by becoming the 
buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer (or the lender to 
every borrower and the borrower to every lender, in the case of stock 
loan transactions). These clearing activities could expose OCC to 
financial risks if a Clearing Member fails to fulfil its obligations to 
OCC. In its role as guarantor for all transactions cleared through OCC, 
one of the more material risks related to a Clearing Member's failure 
to perform is credit risk arising from the activity of the Clearing 
Members whose performance OCC guarantees. OCC manages these financial 
risks through financial safeguards, including the collection of margin 
collateral from Clearing Members designed to, among other things, 
address the market risk associated with a Clearing Member's positions 
during the period of time OCC has determined it would take to liquidate 
those positions.
    OCC has established a proprietary system, the System for 
Theoretical Analysis and Numerical Simulation (``STANS''), that runs 
various models used to calculate each Clearing

[[Page 81959]]

Member's margin requirements. However, OCC maintains broad discretion 
under its rules to set and adjust margin requirements to protect the 
respective interests of Clearing Members, OCC, and the public.\5\ This 
discretion is important because all models are subject to assumptions 
and limitations. For that reason, regulations applicable to OCC require 
it to establish policies and procedures related to the review of OCC's 
model parameters and assumptions during periods of time when the 
products cleared or markets served display high volatility, report the 
results of its analysis to appropriate decisionmakers, and use the 
results to evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its margin methodology, 
model parameters, and other relevant aspects of its credit risk 
management framework.\6\
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    \5\ See, e.g., OCC Rule 601(c) (``Notwithstanding any other 
provisions of this Rule 601, [OCC] may fix the margin requirements 
for any account or any class of cleared contracts at such amount as 
it deems necessary or appropriate under the circumstances to protect 
the respective interests of Clearing Members, [OCC], and the 
public.'').
    \6\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(C), (D).
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    One of OCC's margin models generates variance forecasts for the 
returns on individual equity securities, the result of which OCC then 
includes as one of the inputs to the margin calculation. As discussed 
in more detail below, OCC has observed that this particular model may 
produce results that are ``procyclical,'' which means the tendency of 
margin requirements to increase during periods of market stress and 
decrease during calm periods that, if not appropriately addressed, 
could threaten the stability of its members during periods of 
heightened volatility.\7\ A sudden, extreme increase in margin 
requirements could stress a Clearing Member's ability to obtain 
liquidity to meet its obligations to OCC, particularly in periods of 
high volatility. If that Clearing Member subsequently defaulted, its 
positions, including the positions of its customers, would be subject 
to liquidation as part of OCC's default management processes.\8\ In 
addition, the resulting suspension and liquidation of the defaulting 
Clearing Member's positions could result in losses chargeable to the 
mutualized Clearing Fund.\9\ Charging a loss to the Clearing Fund may 
result in unexpected costs for non-defaulting Clearing Members, 
stressing their ability to obtain liquidity to meet their own financial 
obligations in stressed market conditions.
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    \7\ See Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 78961 (Sept. 28, 2016), 81 FR 70786, 70816 n.318 (S7-03-
14) (``In this context, procyclicality typically refers to changes 
in risk-management practices that are positively correlated with 
market, business, or credit cycle fluctuations that may cause or 
exacerbate financial [in]stability.'').
    \8\ See OCC Rules Ch. XI.
    \9\ A mutualized, pre-funded guaranty fund comprised of deposits 
from each member, such as OCC's Clearing Fund, is another financial 
safeguard commonly employed by central counterparties to address 
credit risk as the guarantor of the products it clears.
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    To mitigate procyclical margin requirements during periods when 
OCC's cleared products or the markets its serves experience high 
volatility, OCC has established regular and high volatility control 
settings. OCC's price return model employs bounds (i.e., the ``control 
sets'' implemented under regular or high volatility settings) for 
certain parameters that are calculated daily based on current market 
data.\10\ OCC applies bounds to these parameters calibrated using 
historical data to mitigate the reactivity of the model volatility 
forecast, which is a primary driver of margin requirements. When OCC 
implements high volatility control settings, those parameters are 
bounded differently than under regular control settings. In general, 
these control settings help to prevent significant overestimation of 
Clearing Member margin requirements.\11\
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    \10\ See infra notes 24-27 (describing the parameters to which 
the bounds are applied).
    \11\ See infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (detailing 
examples in which high volatility control settings were 
implemented).
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    To determine when implementation of high volatility control 
settings may be appropriate, OCC monitors the volatility of the 
products it clears and the markets it serves. Based on the results of 
this monitoring, OCC may determine to implement high volatility control 
settings for those model parameters. Under OCC's margin methodology, 
these high volatility control settings may be applied to individual 
securities, which are among several ``risk factors'' under OCC's margin 
methodology, or globally across all risk factors or a class or sector 
of risk factors (e.g., equities, indexes, volatility-based products, 
etc.).
    To ensure that OCC's rules include a sufficient level of detail 
about material aspects of OCC's margin system,\12\ OCC proposes to 
amend its Margin Policy, which is filed as a rule with the 
Commission,\13\ to define material aspects of OCC's high volatility 
control setting process. This proposed rule change would amend the 
Margin Policy to describe the process, including: (1) how OCC sets and 
reviews the regular and high volatility control sets; (2) how OCC 
monitors for market volatility and idiosyncratic price moves and 
establishes thresholds to escalate the results of such monitoring for 
consideration of whether high volatility control settings are 
warranted; and (3) OCC's internal governance for implementing and 
terminating high volatility control settings. OCC does not believe that 
proposed revisions to its Margin Policy would have any practical effect 
on Clearing Members or other market participants because OCC is not 
proposing significant changes to its current practices for setting 
member margin requirements.
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    \12\ OCC previously described its use of high volatility control 
settings within STANS in its filing to establish its STANS 
Methodology Description. The STANS Methodology Description, however, 
does not provide details concerning the governance and process for 
setting or applying high volatility control settings.
    \13\ See Exchange Act Release Nos. 100998 (Sept. 11, 2024), 89 
FR 76171 (Sept. 17, 2024) (SR-OCC-2024-009); 99169 (Dec. 14, 2023), 
88 FR 88163 (Dec. 20, 2023) (SR-OCC-2023-008); 98101 (Aug. 10, 
2023), 88 FR 55775 (Aug. 16, 2023) (SR-OCC-2022-012); 96566 (Dec. 
22, 2022), 87 FR 80207 (Dec. 29, 2022) (SR-OCC-2022-010); 91079 
(Feb. 8, 2021), 86 FR 9410 (Feb. 12, 2021) (SR-OCC-2020-016); 90797 
(Dec. 23, 2020), 85 FR 86592 (Dec. 30, 2020) (SR-OCC-2020-014); 
87718 (Dec. 11, 2019), 84 FR 68992 (Dec. 17, 2019) (SR-OCC-2019-
010); 86436 (July 23, 2019), 84 FR 36632 (July 29, 2019) (SR-OCC-
2019-006); 86119 (June 17, 2019), 84 FR 29267 (June 21, 2019) (SR-
OCC-2019-004); 83799 (Aug. 8, 2018), 83 FR 40379 (Aug. 14, 2018) 
(SR-OCC-2018-011); 82658 (Feb. 7, 2018), 83 FR 6646 (Feb. 14, 2018) 
(SR-OCC-2017-007).
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(1) Purpose
Background
    STANS is OCC's proprietary risk management system for calculating 
Clearing Member margin requirements.\14\ The STANS methodology utilizes 
large-scale Monte Carlo simulations to forecast price and volatility 
movements in determining a Clearing Member's margin requirement.\15\ 
STANS margin requirements are calculated at the portfolio level of each 
Clearing Member account with positions in marginable securities and are 
comprised of an estimate of a 99% expected shortfall \16\ over a two-
day time horizon, among other components. OCC uses the STANS 
methodology to measure the exposure of portfolios of products cleared 
by OCC and cash instruments in margin collateral.\17\
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    \14\ An overview of the STANS methodology is on OCC's public 
website: https://www.theocc.com/Risk-Management/Margin-Methodology.
    \15\ See OCC Rule 601.
    \16\ The expected shortfall component is established as the 
estimated average of potential losses higher than the 99% value at 
risk threshold. The term ``value at risk'' or ``VaR'' refers to a 
statistical technique that is used in risk management to measure the 
potential risk of loss for a given set of assets over a particular 
time horizon.
    \17\ Pursuant to OCC Rule 601(e)(1), OCC also calculates initial 
margin requirements for segregated futures accounts on a gross basis 
using the Standard Portfolio Analysis of Risk Margin Calculation 
System (``SPAN''). CFTC Regulation 39.13(g)(8), requires, in 
relevant part, that a derivatives clearing organization (``DCO'') 
collect initial margin for customer segregated futures accounts on a 
gross basis. While OCC uses SPAN to calculate initial margin 
requirements for segregated futures accounts on a gross basis, OCC 
believes that margin requirements calculated on a net basis (i.e., 
permitting offsets between different customers' positions held by a 
Clearing Member in a segregated futures account using STANS) affords 
OCC additional protections at the clearinghouse level against risks 
associated with liquidating a Clearing Member's segregated futures 
account. As a result, OCC calculates margin requirements for 
segregated futures accounts using both SPAN on a gross basis and 
STANS on a net basis, and if at any time OCC staff observes a 
segregated futures account where initial margin calculated pursuant 
to STANS on a net basis exceeds the initial margin calculated 
pursuant to SPAN on a gross basis, OCC collateralizes this risk 
exposure by applying an additional margin charge in the amount of 
such difference to the account. See Exchange Act Release No. 72331 
(June 5, 2014), 79 FR 33607 (June 11, 2014) (SR-OCC-2014-13).

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[[Page 81960]]

    Forecasted returns on individual risk factors are an input to OCC's 
calculation of margin requirements. A ``risk factor'' within STANS is a 
product or attribute for which historical data is used to estimate and 
simulate the risk for an associated product. Risk factors include the 
returns on individual equity securities, returns on equity indexes, and 
returns on implied volatility risk factors, among others.
    OCC uses a GARCH \18\ model to generate variance forecasts for 
price risk factors for all products and implied volatility with respect 
to certain products. Following February 5, 2018, when the market 
experienced extreme levels of volatility that caused a significant 
spike in margin requirements, OCC's analysis demonstrated that GARCH is 
extremely sensitive to sudden spikes in volatility, which can result in 
margin requirements that OCC believes are unreasonable and 
procyclical.\19\ For example, OCC observed that its GARCH model for 
forecasting implied volatility \20\ produced forecasts for particular 
S&P 500 Index (``SPX'') options that were four-fold larger than the 
comparable market index. This led to margin requirements increasing by 
80% overnight, with some margin requirements increasing ten-fold. In 
reviewing OCC's analysis, the Commission acknowledged that the size of 
such margin requirement increases was not necessarily commensurate with 
the risk of those Clearing Member's portfolios, and that imposing such 
a large, unexpected increase could impose a large, unexpected stress on 
a Clearing Member during a period of high volatility.\21\ Since then, 
OCC has taken several measures to mitigate such procyclicality, 
including changes to its GARCH-based implied volatility model,\22\ and 
a new model to replace GARCH for simulating implied volatility for SPX-
based options and volatility index futures.\23\ Even with such 
revisions, however, the GARCH model may produce procyclical margin 
results that are not commensurate with the risk of the products, 
portfolios, or markets that OCC seeks to manage.\24\
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    \18\ The acronym ``GARCH'' refers to an econometric model that 
can be used to estimate volatility based on historical data.
    \19\ See Exchange Act Release No. 84879 (Dec. 20, 2018), 83 FR 
67392, 67393 (Dec. 29, 2018) (SR-OCC-2018-014).
    \20\ In general, the implied volatility of an option is a 
measure of the expected future volatility of the option's underlying 
security at expiration, which is reflected in the current option 
premium in the market.
    \21\ See Exchange Act Release No. 84879, 83 FR at 67394.
    \22\ See id. at 67393.
    \23\ See Exchange Act Release No. 95319 (July 19, 2022), 87 FR 
44167 (July 25, 2022) (SR-OCC-2022-001).
    \24\ See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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    To mitigate such procyclicality, OCC also applies numerical bounds 
to certain statistical parameters that inform the model's reaction to 
market volatility. Specifically, the GARCH model uses statistical alpha 
([alpha]),\25\ beta ([beta]),\26\ and gamma ([gamma]) \27\ parameters 
as part of its econometric model for updating risk factors to reflect 
the most recent market data. Those statistical parameters are 
calculated daily based on updated price data.\28\ As described in OCC's 
STANS Methodology Description,\29\ OCC applies numerical bounds (i.e., 
``control settings'') to these GARCH parameters after their initial 
calibration to mitigate the reactivity of the model volatility 
forecast, which is a primary driver of margin requirements for any 
equity or index.\30\ These bounds apply to the GARCH parameters that 
are used to calculate margin for each Clearing Member.
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    \25\ Alpha is the weight attached to the contribution to the 
forecast variance from the price risk factor. Together with gamma, 
it controls the model's reaction to recent market moves.
    \26\ Beta is the weight attached to the contribution to the 
forecast variance from the previous day's forecast. As such, it 
concerns the persistence of volatility.
    \27\ Gamma is the additional weight attached to the contribution 
to the forecast variance from a negative return in the price risk 
factor. Together with alpha, it controls the model's reaction to 
recent market moves.
    \28\ See Exchange Act Release No. 83326 (May 18, 2018), 83 FR 
25081 (May 31, 2018) (SR-OCC-2017-022); Exchange Act Release No. 
83305 (May 23, 2018), 83 FR 24536 (May 29, 2018) (SR-OCC-2017-811).
    \29\ The STANS Methodology Description is intended to provide a 
comprehensive description of the material aspects of OCC's risk-
based margin system. See Exchange Act Release No. 91079, 86 FR at 
9410 (SR-OCC-2020-016).
    \30\ See Exchange Act Release No. 85788 (Dec. 21, 2020), 85 FR 
85788, 85793 (Dec. 29, 2020) (SR-OCC-2020-016) (``The STANS 
Methodology Description would also describe the controls that may be 
placed on the GJR-GARCH parameters after their initial calibration. 
GARCH volatility forecasting models can be very reactive in certain 
market environments. As a result, OCC may implement parameter 
controls for risk factors and classes of risk factors, which are 
subject to periodic review and approval by the MRWG.'').
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    OCC refers to the bounds for the parameters applicable under normal 
market conditions as ``regular'' control settings. Because the regular 
control settings are designed for daily application, the bounds cover 
large ranges or parameter values obtained from the 95th percentile of 
historical parameter calibrations for representative risk factors. 
However, the large values of the parameter's upper bounds under the 
regular control settings make the GARCH-based model susceptible to 
procyclicality. For instance, the largest day-to-day margin coverage 
\31\ changes tend to happen at the onset of a high volatility period, 
when the existing volatility is close to the long-run floor level and a 
large return shock causes significant volatility increase. To address 
this phenomenon, the STANS Methodology Description provides that OCC 
maintains projections of various market conditions in which pre-
determined bounds (i.e., a control set) are appropriate and that 
specification of those conditions and the control sets are based on 
continual quantitative research and may be specific to risk factor 
types (e.g., equities or volatility indexes). The STANS Methodology 
Description further provides that the assumptions and individual 
application of the parameter controls for risk factors and classes of 
risk factors are subject to periodic review and approval by OCC's Model 
Risk Working Group (``MRWG''), a cross-functional group responsible for 
assisting OCC's management in overseeing OCC's model-related risk 
comprised of representatives from relevant OCC business units, 
including Quantitative Risk Management, Model Risk Management, and 
Corporate Risk Management. OCC refers to implementation of high 
volatility control settings to an individual risk factor as 
``idiosyncratic'' control settings and implementation across all or a 
class or sector of risk factors as ``global'' control settings.
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    \31\ In this context, the coverage rate for a security is the 
change in risk of the security expressed as a percentage of the 
price of the security when the market closes.
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    The high volatility control settings are determined by simulating 
two-day coverage changes by product type (e.g., index, equities or 
volatility products) based on price shocks. The current price

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shocks for index and volatility products are based on the largest 
observed downward and upward price moves, respectively. The current 
return shocks for equities is a negative 15% return, which represents 
large price shocks for risk-factors in corresponding categories. 
Assuming different parameter values, OCC calculates corresponding 
values of two-day coverages and selects the bounds that keep the day-
over-day change in 2-day expected shortfall coverage within a factor of 
approximately 1.5.
    When OCC implements idiosyncratic control settings for a single 
risk factor, it uses the high volatility control settings that 
correspond to that risk factor's product type rather than the regular 
control settings. However, when OCC implements global control settings 
for a class or sector of risk factors, it is OCC's practice to blend 
the high volatility and regular control settings based on a weighted 
percentage between them. Such a ``blended'' or ``weighted'' approach 
allows OCC's risk managers, when appropriate, to select bounds that 
provide more conservative margin coverage when applying high volatility 
control settings globally across multiple risk factors. The blended 
approach also allows the OCC risk managers to decrease the weight 
attached to the high volatility parameter control settings (and 
correspondingly increase the weight attached to the regular control 
settings) as they evaluate the appropriateness of the application of 
the global control settings in the days following their initial 
application.
    In practice, OCC determines whether to implement idiosyncratic 
control settings to a single risk factor based on daily automated 
reports that project margin coverage for risk factors that have 
experienced significant day-over-day price movements, or for which 
idiosyncratic control settings are already in effect, under both 
regular and high volatility control settings, along with the actual 
margin coverage for that risk factor from the previous day's margin 
calculations. Individual risk factors are flagged for potential 
idiosyncratic control settings based on certain thresholds (as defined 
and discussed below, the ``Idiosyncratic Thresholds'') \32\ based on, 
among other things, the returns for that risk factor and the day-to-day 
change in margin coverage rates. If those thresholds are met, then OCC 
generally applies the high volatility control settings. In general, the 
high volatility control settings remain in place for that risk factor 
until the coverage rate under the regular control set converges with 
the initial coverage rate when idiosyncratic control settings were 
first implemented or when the coverage rates decline to or below the 
coverage rate under the Idiosyncratic Thresholds that triggered the 
idiosyncratic control settings.
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    \32\ See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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    The practice of retaining idiosyncratic parameters until the 
coverage rates for regular and idiosyncratic control settings converge 
is supported by OCC's empirical observations with respect to margin 
coverage.\33\ However, with respect to low-priced securities (i.e., 
less than $1), which tend to have high coverage rates and relatively 
low risk exposure for OCC, OCC has observed that the coverage rates may 
not converge.\34\ As a result, the risk factor for such securities may 
stay on idiosyncratic volatility control settings for an extended or 
indefinite period of time, which could result in additional backtesting 
exceedances for the low-priced security when the idiosyncratic control 
setting remains on.\35\ Consistent with the governance surrounding 
turning off the idiosyncratic control settings proposed below,\36\ the 
MRWG has approved conditions for reverting back to regular control 
settings or for maintaining regular control settings when the current 
price of the underlying is below a threshold specified by procedure, 
which would initially be set at 10 cents.
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    \33\ OCC has included the periodic reviews presented to MRWG 
since 2020 in confidential Exhibit 3E to File No. SR-OCC-2024-014, 
including a 2024 review of the conditions for turning off 
idiosyncratic control settings in which FRM concluded that the 
convergence of the regular and high volatility control settings 
works for most risk factors for which idiosyncratic control settings 
were implemented during the review period.
    \34\ Id.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
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    Consistent with regulations applicable to OCC,\37\ OCC has also 
established thresholds related to high market volatility, among other 
factors (as defined and discussed below, the ``CCA Monitoring 
Thresholds''),\38\ which, if breached, require OCC's MRWG, comprised of 
risk managers across OCC's first- and second-line business units, to 
meet and consider the adequacy of its model parameters. When the CCA 
Monitoring Thresholds related to high volatility are met, the MRWG 
meets to consider whether global control settings would be appropriate 
for all risk factors or a class or sector of risk factors.\39\ When 
evaluating whether global control settings would be appropriate, the 
MRWG considers reports that show the previous day's actual margin 
coverage for top risk factors with their projected margin coverage for 
that day under different blends or weights between regular control 
settings and high volatility control settings (e.g., 100% high 
volatility control settings; 75% high volatility/25% regular control 
settings; 50% high volatility/50% regular control settings, etc.). In 
practice, when the MRWG determines in its judgment and discretion that 
application of global control settings is appropriate, the MRWG selects 
the blended control value set that generates coverage levels that 
converge with the implied volatility of the SPX. When global control 
settings are implemented, MRWG meets each day thereafter to consider 
whether they remain appropriate. As with the idiosyncratic control 
settings, global control settings generally remain in place until the 
coverage rates under the regular control set converges with the initial 
coverage rate when global control settings were first implemented. 
However, with respect to the global control settings, MRWG maintains 
discretion to change the weights under the blended approach as 
appropriate based on developing market conditions.
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    \37\ See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
    \38\ See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
    \39\ The CCA Monitoring Thresholds establish when MRWG must 
meet. However, the CCA Monitoring Thresholds should not be read to 
limit the MRWG from meeting on a more frequent basis than monthly 
during times periods when the markets OCC serves or the products OCC 
clears experience high volatility, including to consider application 
of high volatility parameters, based on the judgement and experience 
of the MRWG, even if the CCA Monitoring Thresholds then in effect 
are not met.
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    Implementation of global settings is infrequent. For example, OCC 
implemented global control settings from March 9, 2020 until April 9, 
2020 in connection with the market volatility associated with the onset 
of the COVID-19 pandemic and on January 27, 2021 for volatility-based 
products in connection with market volatility caused by the so-called 
``meme stock'' episode. On March 9, 2020, for example, when the SPX 
experienced a return of approximately -7.5%, coverage for SPX under 
regular control settings would have increased from long coverage of -
11.77% and short coverage of 11.69% to -18.54% and 19.44%, 
respectively.\40\ MRWG approved implementing global control settings 
based on a 50% weighting between regular and high volatility control 
settings, resulting in long and short coverage of -13.60% and

[[Page 81962]]

14.42%.\41\ These coverages were selected based on their alignment with 
the two-day short and long coverage determined from SPX implied 
volatility; -13% and 14%, respectively.\42\ Aggregate margin 
requirements calculated using the global control settings were $84.2 
billion, compared to $103.2 billion had OCC used regular control 
settings.\43\
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    \40\ OCC has included as confidential Exhibit 3A to File No. SR-
OCC-2024-014 responses to questions from OSC concerning drafts of 
this proposed rule change, including data concerning the coverage 
rates under control sets reviewed by the MRWG on March 9, 2020.
    \41\ Following implementation of the global control settings on 
March 9, 2020, MRWG met daily from March 9 through April 9, 2020 to 
review daily reports providing historical and forecasted margin 
coverage rates for selected risk factors with alternative control 
settings. Based on its review of daily reports providing historical 
and forecasted margin coverage rates for selected risk factors with 
alternative control settings, MRWG approved modifications to the 
weights attached to the regular and HVP control settings. For 
example, MRWG increased the weighting for the HVP control setting, 
which was initially 50%, to 75% following March 16, 2024, when VIX 
spiked 43% to 86.69 and SPX fell 12%. In the days that followed, 
MRWG approved increasing the weight attached to the regular control 
settings until reverting to regular control settings for VIX-based 
products on March 27, 2020 and Equity risk factors on April 9, 2024.
    \42\ OCC has also included as confidential Exhibit 3B to SR-OCC-
2024-014 an internal OCC memorandum concerning high volatility 
control settings describing, among other things, how when 
implementing global control settings on March 9, 2020, the MRWG 
compared resulting coverages from different weightings against the 
coverage rates that could be derived through implied option 
volatility to evaluate of coverage rates under alternative 
parameters sets.
    \43\ OCC has included as confidential Exhibit 3C to SR-OCC-2024-
014 responses to questions from Staff of the Commission's Office of 
Clearance and Settlement (``Staff'') dated November 20, 2020 
concerning OCC's March 9, 2020 implementation of global control 
settings, including, among other things, as assessment of the impact 
on margin.
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    OCC has implemented idiosyncratic control settings for individual 
risk factors more frequently.\44\ For example, on April 28, 2023, FRM 
applied idiosyncratic control settings to a risk factor for a security 
that experienced multi-day jumps in stock price,\45\ including from 
$6.72 to $20 on April 27, 2023 and from $20 to $108.20 on April 28, 
2023, which resulted in corresponding short coverage levels under 
regular control settings increasing from 98% to 5695%.\46\ After 
implementing idiosyncratic control settings for that risk factor, 
aggregate margin requirements decreased $2.6 billion. FRM turned off 
the idiosyncratic control settings on May 30, 2023 when it observed the 
coverage rate for regular and idiosyncratic control settings 
converge.\47\ OCC did not observe any daily backtesting exceedances 
associated with the idiosyncratic control settings for this risk 
factor.
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    \44\ From December 2019 to August 2023, for example, OCC 
implemented high volatility control settings lasting various 
durations (ranging from a single day to 190 days, with a median 
period of 10 days) for more than 200 individual risk factors. See 
Exhibit 3A, supra note 39 (providing a list of instances in which 
OCC implemented global and idiosyncratic control settings).
    \45\ While no options were listed on the security, certain 
Clearing Members maintained cleared stock loan positions and 
collateral deposits in that security.
    \46\ See Exhibit 3A, supra note 39 (providing responses 
concerning an April 28, 2023 implementation of idiosyncratic control 
settings).
    \47\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As another example, from January 27, 2021 to March 16, 2021, FRM 
applied idiosyncratic control settings to a risk factor for a security 
that experienced an initial large market move corresponding to a 138.9% 
one-day return, which caused the two-day short coverage using regular 
control settings to increase to 300%, compared to the previous business 
day's two-day short coverage of 54%. Over the following business days, 
through February 9, 2021, the security went through a volatile period 
with additional large one-day price moves.\48\ Once this volatility 
period passed, the coverages based on regular and high volatility 
control settings gradually converged around the same level on March 16, 
2021, when the MRWG approved reverting back to regular control 
settings.\49\ OCC did not observe any additional daily backtesting 
exceedances associated with the idiosyncratic control settings for this 
risk factor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ Id.
    \49\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In general, OCC has not observed backtesting exceedances 
attributable to the implementation of global or idiosyncratic 
volatility control settings. Currently, OCC monitors margin sufficiency 
at the Clearing Member account level to identify backtesting 
exceedances. Account exceedances are investigated to determine the 
cause of the exceedance, including whether the exceedance can be 
attributed to the implementation of high volatility control settings. 
No account level exceedance has been attributed to the implementation 
of high volatility control settings. OCC also performs model 
backtesting on all risk factors with listed derivatives or stock loan 
positions, or securities pledged as collateral within Clearing Member 
accounts, including for risk factors subject to high volatility control 
settings. Model backtesting has not identified an issue with the 
adequacy of margin coverage associated with the implementation of 
idiosyncratic control settings. OCC also conducted instrument-level 
backtesting over a two-year time horizon on securities for which 
idiosyncratic control settings were implemented. Of the 14 out of 244 
securities for which 2-day expected shortfall coverages was less than 
99%, OCC found that the coverages with regular control settings would 
not have been significantly different.\50\ Only one risk factor had 2-
day expected shortfall short coverage under 99% while on idiosyncratic 
control settings that would have been above 99% on regular control 
settings, driven by one additional 2-day expected shortfall short 
exceedance.\51\ However, this single occurrence did not contribute to 
any Clearing Member account-level exceedance. Based on this study, OCC 
believes that application of high volatility control settings does not 
have a significant negative effect on the sufficiency of OCC's margin 
coverage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \50\ See Exhibit 3A, supra note 39 (providing responses to 
requests for backtesting data and analysis).
    \51\ Id.
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Proposed Changes
    OCC proposes to amend its Margin Policy to add a new section \52\ 
addressing control settings so that OCC's rules would include a 
sufficient level of detail about the high volatility control setting 
process currently maintained in other internal OCC procedures, 
including (a) how OCC sets and reviews the regular and high volatility 
control sets; (b) how OCC monitors for market volatility and 
idiosyncratic price moves and establishes thresholds to escalate the 
results of such monitoring for consideration of whether high volatility 
control settings are warranted; and (c) OCC's internal governance for 
implementing and terminating high volatility control settings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \52\ This new section would be added to the ``Margin Calls and 
Adjustments'' section of the Margin Policy, before a section on 
``Additional Margin Adjustments,'' which would be renumbered to 
reflect the addition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(a) How OCC Sets and Reviews Regular and High Volatility Control Sets
    First, OCC proposes to amend the Margin Policy to add a subsection 
under the new control settings section that would address how OCC 
reviews and sets the regular and high volatility control sets (i.e., 
the bounds applied to the GARCH parameters under regular and 
idiosyncratic control settings).\53\ The Margin Policy would require 
that FRM conduct a review of the control

[[Page 81963]]

sets on an at-least annual basis, and any recommended changes would 
require MRWG approval. With respect to the regular control set, the 
Margin Policy would further provide that such review would assess 
whether the GARCH parameter bounds are appropriately risk-based, 
including, but not limited to, assessing whether they align with the 
95th percentile of the parameter calibrations over the prior review 
period. The Margin Policy would further provide that the review of the 
high volatility control set would assess whether the control settings 
effectively mitigate procyclicality while remaining appropriately risk-
based, including, but not limited to, whether the bounds keep the day-
over-day change in 2-day expected shortfall coverage within a factor of 
approximately 1.5 assuming price shocks based on observed returns for 
top risk factors.\54\ These additions to the Margin Policy are intended 
to describe OCC's current process and internal procedures for setting 
the regular and idiosyncratic control sets.\55\
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    \53\ The high volatility control value sets are sometimes 
referend to as idiosyncratic control settings because, in practice, 
the high volatility control set is what OCC applies when 
implementing idiosyncratic control settings. As discussed above, 
when implementing global control settings, MRWG evaluates and 
selects a control setting with different weightings between the 
regular control set and high volatility control set based on an 
assessment of which blended approach generates a coverage level that 
converges with the implied volatility of the SPX. See supra note 41 
and accompanying text.
    \54\ The return shocks are maintained in and updated in 
accordance with model whitepapers that support the STANS Methodology 
Description. OCC has included the model whitepaper as confidential 
Exhibit 3D to File No. SR-OCC-2024-014. The whitepaper is redlined 
with anticipated updates based on the most recent annual review of 
the high volatility control setting process and edits intended to 
capture feedback from Staff in connection with its review of a draft 
of this proposal.
    \55\ OCC has included the periodic reviews presented to MRWG 
since 2020 in confidential Exhibit 3E to File No. SR-OCC-2024-014. 
OCC believes that such changes to the control sets would be 
reasonably and fairly implied by the Margin Policy, as proposed to 
be amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(b) How OCC Monitors for and Escalates High Volatility to Appropriate 
Decisionmakers
    OCC currently conducts daily monitoring for high market volatility 
and idiosyncratic price moves for individual securities against 
thresholds that, if breached, would require escalation to appropriate 
decisionmakers to evaluate the adequacy of and make adjustments to 
OCC's model parameters. Specifically, Pursuant to the Clearing Fund 
Methodology Policy and the procedures thereunder, OCC has established 
thresholds related to high market volatility, low market liquidity, and 
significant increases in position size or concentration that would 
trigger an intra-month meeting of the MRWG to review stress test 
results.\56\ The underlying procedure refers to such thresholds as 
``CCA Monitoring Thresholds'' because they are associated with SEC 
requirements for when a covered clearing agency must perform certain 
required monthly reviews on a more frequent basis.\57\
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    \56\ See Exchange Act Release No. 83406 (June 11, 2018), 83 FR 
83406 (June 15, 2018) (SR-OCC-2018-008) (describing how the Clearing 
Fund Methodology Policy ``would require that OCC maintain procedures 
for determining whether, and in which circumstances'' stress testing 
review must be completed more frequently than monthly ``when the 
products cleared or markets served display high volatility,'' among 
other possible triggers).
    \57\ See 17 CFR 17Ad-22(e)(4)(iv)(C) (with respect to stress 
testing); 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(C) (with respect the risk-based margin 
system); 17Ad-22(e)(7)(vi)(C) (with respect to liquidity resource 
sufficiency).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While these thresholds are set in accordance with the Clearing Fund 
Methodology Policy with respect to its stress testing procedures, OCC 
uses the same thresholds as triggers for review of its risk-based 
margin system, including (1) more frequent sensitivity analysis of its 
margin model and a review of OCC's parameters and assumptions for 
backtesting, and (2) with respect to the high volatility threshold, 
escalation to the MRWG for consideration of whether to implement global 
control settings. However, unlike the Clearing Fund Methodology Policy, 
the Margin Policy does not currently reference how the thresholds are 
set. As proposed to be amended, the ``Margin Monitoring'' section of 
the Margin Policy would be amended to add a discussion of the CCA 
Monitoring Thresholds.\58\ That section would refer to the CCA 
Monitoring Thresholds established under the Clearing Fund Methodology 
Policy and its underlying procedure. The Margin Policy would further 
provide that the CCA Monitoring Thresholds are reviewed annually by the 
MRWG and the Stress Testing Working Group (``STWG'') to ensure they 
remain adequate to identify periods of high market volatility,\59\ low 
market liquidity, and significant increases in position size/
concentration. The MRWG and STWG would be required to approve any 
changes to the thresholds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ The subsections in the ``Margin Monitoring'' section would 
be renumbered accordingly to reflect this addition.
    \59\ With respect to the high market volatility thresholds 
relevant to this filing, OCC's current thresholds are based on a 
statistical 1-in-18 month return calculated daily from the previous 
10 years of market data for the S&P 500 and VIX indexes. As of 
August 3, 2023, the thresholds translated to a 38.12% return for VIX 
and a -4.52% return for the SPX. Developmental evidence supporting 
the CCA Monitoring Threshold for high volatility has been provided 
in the model whitepaper. See Exhibit 3D, supra note 53. However, as 
discussed above, the CCA Monitoring Thresholds and the method for 
reviewing and updating them would be maintained in the procedures 
supporting the Clearing Fund Methodology Policy. As such, OCC 
believes the CCA Monitoring Thresholds for high volatility and 
updates thereto consistent with the Margin Policy would be 
reasonably and fairly implied by the Margin Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To monitor for volatility experienced by individual risk factors 
that may merit implementing idiosyncratic control settings, the Margin 
Policy would require FRM to monitor securities against thresholds for 
idiosyncratic price moves that would be established in its procedures 
(``Idiosyncratic Thresholds'').\60\ The Idiosyncratic Thresholds may 
employ a tiered structure that takes into account the type and 
magnitude of OCC's risk exposure to the security (e.g., whether it is 
an optionable security with open interest, accepted as collateral, and/
or an Eligible Security under OCC's Stock Loan Programs), the value of 
the security, the magnitude of the price move, and the coverage 
rates.\61\ The Margin Policy would further reflect that on an at-least 
annual basis, FRM reviews whether the Idiosyncratic Thresholds, and the 
related instances when idiosyncratic control settings were applied 
during the review period, appropriately capture products experiencing 
high volatility. Any change to the Idiosyncratic Thresholds would 
require MRWG review and approval.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \60\ OCC has included a copy of these procedures as confidential 
Exhibit 3F to File No. SR-OCC-2024-014, which are redlined with 
anticipated changes arising from feedback received from Staff in 
connection with a review of a draft of this proposed rule change.
    \61\ See id. Currently, FRM staff reviews a daily report of 
projected coverages for selected risk factors (excluding securities 
that do not have listed options and are not eligible as either 
collateral or as part of OCC's Stock Loan Programs) with an absolute 
value of simple return greater than 20% or, for securities under $1 
or are missing a current or prior days' closing price, with an 
absolute value of log return greater than 100%. Securities meeting 
these thresholds are then filtered to identify those with more than 
$100 million in prior day risk exposure and a greater-than 3 times 
day-over-day increase in coverage. In addition, the thresholds 
filter for those securities for which regular parameter short 
coverages is greater than 350%. With respect to securities without 
listed options, the short coverage threshold also requires that the 
prior day risk exposure be greater than $10 million. As discussed 
below, the Idiosyncratic Thresholds would be maintained in 
procedures supporting the Margin Policy, reviewed at-least annually, 
and updated with MRWG approval. As such, OCC believes the 
Idiosyncratic Thresholds and updates thereto consistent with the 
Margin Policy would be reasonably and fairly implied by the Margin 
Policy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(c) How OCC Implements and Terminates High Volatility Control Settings
    When the monitoring thresholds discussed above are breached, 
appropriate decisionmakers at OCC determine whether to implement 
idiosyncratic or global control settings. Specifically, for breaches of 
the CCA Monitoring Threshold for high volatility, the Margin Policy 
would require that FRM escalate the matter to the MRWG and make a 
recommendation as to whether global control settings

[[Page 81964]]

should be applied to all risk factors or a class or sector of risk 
factors. The Margin Policy would require MRWG approval to implement 
global control settings. In making that determination, the Margin 
Policy would describe how MRWG would review coverage rates under 
potential control settings generated by taking a weighting of the 
bounds for regular and high volatility control sets. The Margin Policy 
would further require that MRWG make this determination considering 
factors including, but not limited to, which blended control value sets 
generate coverage levels that converge with the implied volatility of 
the SPX.
    The Margin Policy would also provide for how OCC would revert back 
to regular control settings after having implemented global control 
settings. Such reversion would also require MRWG approval. The Margin 
Policy would further provide that when making a determination that 
market volatility has decreased to a level where global control 
settings are no longer required, the MRWG would consider factors 
including, but not limited to, whether SPX coverage rates produced 
under regular control settings have converged with the initial coverage 
rates when global control settings were first implemented.
    With respect to breaches of the Idiosyncratic Thresholds, the 
Margin Policy would provide that OCC generally would apply 
idiosyncratic control settings if the Idiosyncratic Thresholds are 
breached. Implementation of such idiosyncratic high volatility control 
settings would require approval of an FRM Officer.\62\ In practice, FRM 
almost always applies the high volatility control set to a risk factor 
when the Idiosyncratic Thresholds are breached. However, the FRM 
Officer would retain authority under the Margin Policy to maintain 
regular control settings in the case of exceptional circumstances, 
including, for example, due to implementation of global control 
settings, operational issues such as production processing problems, or 
edge cases for which the FRM Officer determines that further refinement 
of the Idiosyncratic Thresholds is warranted. If the FRM Officer 
determines not to implement idiosyncratic control settings in edge 
cases, the Margin Policy would require that the FRM Officer present 
proposed changes to the Idiosyncratic Thresholds that reflect the 
exception within 30 days to the MRWG for review and, subject to MRWG 
discretion, approval. The Margin Policy would also provide for an FRM 
Officer's authority to approve idiosyncratic control settings or revert 
from idiosyncratic control settings to regular control settings based 
on additional considerations such as market moves, expected shortfall 
risk contribution, and changes in Clearing Member positions.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \62\ Officers are identified in OCC's By-Laws. See OCC By-Law 
Art IV. In this context, an FRM officer would include any member of 
FRM appointed by the Chief Executive Officer or Chief Operating 
Officer, including a Managing Director, Executive Director or 
Executive Principal. See id. Sec.  9.
    \63\ For example, an FRM Officer may use this authority to 
implement hypothetical scenarios for securities in cases where the 
securities fell just short of one element in the Idiosyncratic 
Thresholds' tiered structure, but where breaches of other elements 
weighed in favor of applying idiosyncratic control settings in the 
FRM Officer's judgment. See Exhibit 3A, supra note 39 (detailing an 
example in which an FRM Officer used this authority when a security 
was just below the $100 million threshold for prior day risk 
exposure, but an FRM Officer approved implementing idiosyncratic 
control settings based on the significant day-over-day increase to 
short coverage combined with the size of the exposure).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Margin Policy would provide for reversion from 
idiosyncratic control settings to regular control settings. 
Specifically, the Margin Policy would provide that generally, OCC will 
revert to regular control settings when the coverage rates under the 
regular control set converges with the initial coverage rate when 
idiosyncratic control settings were first implemented or when the 
coverage rates decline to or below the coverage rate under the 
Idiosyncratic Thresholds that triggered the idiosyncratic control 
settings.\64\ Reverting to regular control settings would require FRM 
Officer approval. However, to account for possible unforeseen and 
unanticipated situations, the Margin Policy would provide that 
idiosyncratic control settings may be applied for a longer or shorter 
period at the discretion of the FRM Officer. The Margin Policy would 
further provide that the MRWG may establish other thresholds for 
reverting back to regular control settings, including, but not limited 
to, when a low-priced security falls below certain thresholds, as 
discussed above.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ For example, under the current Idiosyncratic Control 
Settings, discussed above in note 60, an FRM Officer would approve 
reverting to regular control settings when the short coverage 
declines to 350% or below.
    \65\ See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Statutory Basis
    OCC believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with 
Section 17A of the Exchange Act \66\ and the rules and regulations 
thereunder applicable to OCC. Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act \67\ 
requires, in part, that the rules of a clearing agency be designed to 
promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions, and in general, to protect investors and the public 
interest. The proposed changes are intended to codify OCC's process for 
adjusting parameters in STANS in response to broad market volatility or 
idiosyncratic price moves for individual securities. As discussed 
above, the GARCH model has been observed to overreact to changes in 
volatility.\68\ Such sudden increases in margin requirements may stress 
certain Clearing Members' ability to obtain liquidity to meet those 
requirements, particularly in periods of high volatility, and could 
result in a Clearing Member being delayed in meeting, or ultimately 
failing to meet, its daily settlement obligations to OCC. A resulting 
suspension of a defaulting Clearing Member may result in losses 
chargeable to the mutualized Clearing Fund deposits of non-defaulting 
Clearing Members, which could result in unexpected costs for those 
Clearing Members. The proposed changes are intended to support the high 
volatility control settings process designed to mitigate the 
procyclicality of its GARCH model that may cause or exacerbate such 
financial instability. For these reasons, OCC believes the proposed 
changes to OCC's rules would support processes reasonably designed to 
promote the prompt and accurate clearance and settlement of securities 
transactions, and in general, to protect investors and the public 
interest, in accordance with Section 17A(b)(3)(F) of the Act.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \66\ See 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
    \67\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(F).
    \68\ See supra notes 18-22, 42-43, and accompanying text.
    \69\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC believes that the proposed changes are also consistent with SEC 
Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6), which requires, in part, that a covered clearing 
agency establish, implement, maintain and enforce written policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to cover its credit exposures to its 
participants by establishing a risk-based margin system that, at a 
minimum, considers, and produces margin levels commensurate with, the 
risks and particular attributes of each relevant product, portfolio, 
and market.\70\ Commission guidance with respect to SEC Rule 17Ad-
22(e)(6) further provides that a covered clearing agency should 
consider whether its margin model, ``to the extent practicable and 
prudent, limits the need for destabilizing, procyclical changes.'' \71\

[[Page 81965]]

As noted above, OCC's GARCH model demonstrates sensitivity to sudden 
spikes in volatility, which can at times result in overreactive margin 
requirements that OCC believes are unreasonable and procyclical.\72\ 
Based on its analysis,\73\ OCC believes that the high volatility 
control settings reduce the oversensitivity of the variance forecasts 
for price risk factors while continuing to produce margin levels 
commensurate with the risks presented during periods of sudden, extreme 
volatility, consistent with Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \70\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).
    \71\ Standards for Covered Clearing Agencies, Exchange Act 
Release No. 78961, 81 FR at 70819.
    \72\ See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
    \73\ See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
    \74\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6) further requires that a covered clearing 
agency's policies and procedures be reasonably designed to monitor its 
risk-based margin system on an ongoing basis, including by conducting a 
review of its parameters during periods of time when the products 
cleared or markets served display high volatility, reporting the 
results to appropriate decisionmakers, and using the results to 
evaluate the adequacy of and adjust its model parameters.\75\ The 
proposed changes to the Margin Policy would require that (i) FRM 
monitor for periods when the products cleared or markets served display 
high volatility; (ii) FRM escalate the results of its monitoring to 
appropriate decisionmakers; and (iii) FRM or MRWG may implement high 
volatility control settings to adjust the GARCH model parameters based 
on specified criteria. OCC believes that FRM and MRWG are the 
appropriate decisionmakers for making determinations about these margin 
parameter adjustments because they are the subject matter experts most 
familiar with the performance of and risks associated with OCC's margin 
models. In addition, OCC believes it appropriate that implementation of 
global control settings require MRWG approval. MRWG is comprised of 
both first- and second-line personnel, including personnel in OCC's 
Model Risk Management business unit, who, under OCC's Risk Management 
Framework, are responsible for evaluating model parameters and 
assumptions and providing effective and independent challenge through 
OCC's model lifecycle.\76\ Accordingly, OCC believes that this cross-
departmental group is the appropriate governing body for reviewing and 
approving such adjustments to OCC's model parameters during periods of 
high market volatility, consistent with Rules 17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).
    \76\ See Exchange Act Release No. 95842, 87 FR at 58413 (File 
No. SR-OCC-2022-010) (filing to establish OCC's Risk Management 
Framework). OCC Risk Management Framework is available on OCC's 
public website: https://www.theocc.com/risk-management/risk-management-framework.
    \77\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, OCC believes that proposed changes to promote aspects 
of the high volatility control setting process to OCC's rule-filed 
Margin Policy are consistent with Section 19(b) of the Exchange Act 
\78\ and SEC Rule 19b-4 \79\ thereunder, which require a self-
regulatory organization to file proposed rule changes with the 
Commission. In particular, SEC Rule 19b-4 provides that proposed rule 
changes subject to this filing requirement include stated policies, 
practices and interpretations of the self-regulatory organization, 
which the Commission defines to include, among other things, ``any 
material aspect of the operation of the facilities of the self-
regulatory organization,'' \80\ regardless of whether the stated 
policy, practice or interpretation is made generally available. SEC 
Rule 19b-4 provides certain exceptions to the filing requirement, 
including if the stated policy, practice or interpretation is 
``reasonably and fairly implied by an existing rule of the self-
regulatory organization.'' \81\ OCC's use of high volatility control 
settings is currently addressed in OCC's STANS Methodology Description, 
a rule of OCC.\82\ This proposed rule change would describe other 
aspects of the high volatility control setting process, including (1) 
how OCC establishes and maintains regular and high volatility control 
sets; (2) how OCC monitors for and escalates high market volatility and 
idiosyncratic price moves to appropriate decisionmakers for 
consideration of whether high volatility control settings are 
warranted; and (3) OCC's internal governance for implementing and 
terminating high volatility control settings. OCC believes that 
promoting these aspects of the high volatility control setting process 
to the Margin Policy would ensure that its rules contain sufficient 
detail about material aspects of its margin system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b).
    \79\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
    \80\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(a)(6)(i).
    \81\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(c)(1).
    \82\ See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    OCC further believes that other internal procedures and technical 
documents concerning the execution of the high volatility control 
settings would be reasonably and fairly implied by its rules, as 
amended--including the regular and high volatility control sets, the 
thresholds used to escalate price movements and market volatility to 
appropriate decisionmakers to consider implementing high volatility 
control settings, and the method for reviewing and updating those 
control sets and thresholds based on the latest market data.\83\ 
Continuing to maintain these details in OCC internal procedures that 
are reasonably and fairly implied by OCC's rules would allow OCC to 
adjust the high volatility control settings process in response to 
novel situations, changing market conditions and additional 
quantitative research as OCC's processes mature. Accordingly, OCC 
believes that the proposed rule change is consistent with Section 19(b) 
of the Exchange Act \84\ and the regulations thereunder.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \83\ See supra notes 54, 58, and 60.
    \84\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For the above reasons, OCC believes that the proposed rule change 
is consistent with Section 17A of the Exchange Act \85\ and the rules 
and regulations thereunder applicable to OCC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(B) Clearing Agency's Statement on Burden on Competition

    Section 17A(b)(3)(I) of the Exchange Act \86\ requires that the 
rules of a clearing agency not impose any burden on competition not 
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. The 
proposed changes merely codify requirements related to the 
administration of OCC's high volatility control settings, which, when 
implemented, apply to all Clearing Members that hold cleared positions 
within the scope of the high volatility control settings. Accordingly, 
OCC does not believe that the proposed rule change would unfairly 
inhibit access to OCC's services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ 15 U.S.C. 78q-1(b)(3)(I).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While high volatility control settings implemented under the 
proposed changes may impact different accounts to a greater or lesser 
degree depending on the composition of positions in each account, OCC 
does not believe that such impact would impose any burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes 
of the Exchange Act. As discussed above, OCC is obligated under the 
Exchange Act and the regulations thereunder to review its model 
parameters during periods of time when the products cleared or markets 
served display high volatility, report the results to appropriate 
decisionmakers, and use the results to evaluate the adequacy of

[[Page 81966]]

and adjust its model parameters.\87\ As discussed above, OCC believes 
the proposed changes to its rules support a high volatility control 
setting process that is reasonably designed to monitor volatility in 
the products and markets served by OCC and escalate the results of that 
monitoring to appropriate OCC decisionmakers, who would evaluate 
whether adjustments to OCC's model parameters through use of control 
settings is warranted. In addition, the changes would support a process 
designed to mitigate procyclicality observed with the GARCH model, 
which OCC believes would help ensure that its margin requirements 
remain commensurate with the risks presented by its Clearing Members' 
activity, consistent with SEC Rule 17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).\88\ Accordingly, 
OCC believes that the proposed rule change would not impose any burden 
or impact on competition not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of 
the purposes of the Exchange Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \87\ See 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(vi)(C)-(D).
    \88\ 17 CFR 240.17Ad-22(e)(6)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

(C) Clearing Agency's Statement on Comments on the Proposed Rule Change 
Received From Members, Participants or Others

    Written comments were not and are not intended to be solicited with 
respect to the proposed change and none have been received by OCC.

III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for 
Commission Action

    Within 45 days of the date of publication of this notice in the 
Federal Register or within such longer period up to 90 days (i) as the 
Commission may designate if it finds such longer period to be 
appropriate and publishes its reasons for so finding or (ii) as to 
which the self-regulatory organization consents, the Commission will:
    (A) by order approve or disapprove such proposed rule change, or
    (B) institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule 
change should be disapproved.
    The proposal shall not take effect until all regulatory actions 
required with respect to the proposal are completed.

IV. Solicitation of Comments

    Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and 
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule 
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of 
the following methods:

Electronic Comments

    <bullet> Use the Commission's internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
    <bullet> Send an email to <a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#592b2c353c743a3634343c372d2a192a3c3a773e362f"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="d1a3a4bdb4fcb2bebcbcb4bfa5a291a2b4b2ffb6bea7">[email protected]</span></a>. Please include 
file number SR-OCC-2024-014 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

    <bullet> Send paper comments in triplicate to Vanessa Countryman, 
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, 
Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to file number SR-OCC-2024-014. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on 
the Commission's internet website (http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). 
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written 
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with 
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed 
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those 
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions 
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for website viewing and printing in 
the Commission's Public Reference Room, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549, on official business days between the hours of 10 a.m. and 3 
p.m. Copies of such filing also will be available for inspection and 
copying at the principal office of OCC and on OCC's website at https://www.theocc.com/Company-Information/Documents-and-Archives/By-Laws-and-Rules.
    Do not include personal identifiable information in submissions; 
you should submit only information that you wish to make available 
publicly. We may redact in part or withhold entirely from publication 
submitted material that is obscene or subject to copyright protection.
    All submissions should refer to SR-OCC-2024-014 and should be 
submitted on or before October 30, 2024.

    For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets, 
pursuant to delegated authority.\89\
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    \89\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
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Vanessa Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2024-23292 Filed 10-8-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P


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