NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NELLI TAMAZYAN, 

Petitioner, 

 v. 

JEFF B. SESSIONS, Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

No. 13-74290 

Agency No. A099-968-426 

MEMORANDUM *

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 8, 2017**

Pasadena, California

Before: SCHROEDER, DAVIS,*** and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

Nelli Tamazyan petitions for review of a decision from the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA), denying her applications for asylum, withholding of 

removal, and relief under the Convention against Torture (CAT).

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Andre M. Davis, United States Circuit Judge for the 

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting by designation.

FILED

FEB 10 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Tamazyan’s appeal is governed by the standards of the REAL ID Act. 

When, as here, “the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ, we review the IJ’s decision 

as if it were that of the BIA.” Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 

2005) (quoting Hoque v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004)). “We 

review the BIA’s denials of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief for 

substantial evidence and will uphold a denial supported by reasonable, substantial, 

and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Garcia-Milian v. 

Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

We will not reverse a finding “with respect to the availability of corroborating 

evidence” unless we are “compelled to conclude that such corroborating evidence 

is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); see Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 

1047–48 (9th Cir. 2010). Under these standards, we affirm the BIA’s decision and 

deny Tamazyan’s petition for review.

1. The asylum-seeker bears the burden of proof to show that they are a refugee 

eligible for asylum. See Singh v. Holder, 649 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th Cir. 2011) (en

banc). An IJ may require that an applicant provide corroborating evidence to meet 

their burden of proof. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). An application for asylum may 

be denied on the ground that the applicant “failed to provide sufficient 

corroborating evidence when requested to do so, and therefore failed to meet 

[their] burden of proof.” Ren v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1079, 1089 (9th Cir. 2011);
3 

accord Aden v. Holder, 589 F.3d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that an 

asylum application “can be turned down for failing to provide corroboration where 

[s]he does have it or could reasonably obtain it.”). Tamazyan testified to a history 

of persecution in Armenia. The immigration judge directed Tamazyan to provide 

documents to corroborate her testimony, including courts records Tamazyan 

specifically referenced and evidence to show her employment at a university. The 

immigration judge repeatedly notified Tamazyan of the importance of this 

evidence and gave her adequate opportunity to provide it. Tamazyan, for the most 

part, did not provide this corroborating evidence. Further, Tamazyan did not 

appear to make diligent efforts to obtain corroborating evidence or test the limits of 

her capacity to obtain corroborating evidence. Tamazyan failed to explain 

adequately her failure to produce evidence, see Ren, 648 F.3d at 1081, 1094, and 

substantial evidence supports that corroborating evidence was reasonably 

obtainable. Because the IJ had substantial evidence to find the evidence reasonably 

obtainable, and Tamazyan failed to provide the evidence, there was legal authority 

to dismiss Tamazyan’s petition for asylum. Aden, 589 F.3d at 1045.

2. A petitioner seeking withholding of removal “must show a ‘clear 

probability’ of the threat to life or freedom if deported to his or her country of 

nationality”—a standard “more stringent than the . . . standard for asylum.” 

Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Tamazyan 
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“failed to meet h[er] burden of proof for asylum, [s]he necessarily failed to meet 

the higher burden of proof for withholding of removal.” Ren, 648 F.3d at 1094 

n.17.

3. To be eligible for relief under the CAT, Tamazyan must prove “it is more

likely than not that . . . she would be tortured if removed” to Armenia. 8 C.F.R. § 

1208.16(c)(2); see Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2014).

Tamazyan’s testimony is taken as true in the absence of an adverse credibility 

finding. See Konou, 750 F.3d at 1124. Tamazyan cannot show that evidence in the 

record compels a conclusion that she will more likely than not be tortured. For the 

violence she experienced personally, Tamazyan appears not to be able to show 

“repeated, lengthy and severe harassment,” see Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 

1020 (9th Cir. 2006), or violence inflicting “severe pain and suffering” within the 

CAT’s definition of torture. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1)–(2). Though her testimony 

regarding her uncle’s killing showed past torture, see Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543 

F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008), Tamazyan did not argue to the BIA that the 

killing of her uncle entitled her to relief under the CAT. Tamazyan’s failure to 

raise the argument about her uncle before the BIA deprives the panel of 

jurisdiction to review her argument on appeal. See Ramos v. I.N.S., 246 F.3d 1264, 

1267 (9th Cir. 2001).

PETITION DENIED.