J-A17027-20

2020 PA Super 284

JOHANNA L. GOODWIN

v.

SCOTT M. GOODWIN

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2338 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered July 22, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Family Division at

No(s): 2008-63956-DQRY

BEFORE: BOWES, J., McCAFFERY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.

CONCURRING & DISSENTING OPINION BY McCAFFERY, J.:

FILED DECEMBER 14, 2020

Respectfully, I would reverse the trial court’s finding that Son’s life 

insurance proceeds were a “gift,” and thus excluded from the marital estate, 

within the meaning of Section 3501 of the Pennsylvania Divorce Code.1In 

light of this disposition, I would remand for the trial court to reconsider the 

overall distribution scheme. However, I agree with the learned Majority’s 

denial of relief on Husband’s claim that the trial court failed to properly 

consider the Section 3502 factors for dividing marital property. Accordingly, 

I concur and dissent.

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1 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 3101-3904.
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Husband’s first claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in finding 

Son’s life insurance proceeds2 were marital property pursuant to Section 3501. 

For ease of review, I first set forth the Divorce Code’s definition of “marital 

property:”

(a) General rule.—As used in this chapter, “marital 

property” means all property acquired by either party during the 

marriage . . . . However, marital property does not include:

* * *

(3) Property acquired by gift, except between spouses, 

bequest, devise or descent or property acquired in exchange 

for such property.

* * *

(b) Presumption.—All real or personal property acquired by 

either party during the marriage is presumed to be marital 

property regardless of whether title is held individually or by the 

parties in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, 

tenancy in common or tenancy by the entirety. The presumption 

of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property 

was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a).

See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a)(3), (b). 

I also consider the trial court’s discussion:

[T]he life insurance proceeds Wife received following her son’s 

passing are not a bequest, devise, descent or any other form of 

inheritance from [a] decedent. [I]t is well established that the 

assignation of an individual as a life insurance beneficiary is a 

mere expectancy. Knoche v. Mutual Life Inc. Co., [176 A. 230, 

230-31 (Pa. 1934)].

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2

I separately consider Husband’s claim as to Son’s IRA proceeds infra.
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It is clear that the naming of a beneficiary on a life insurance 

policy vests nothing in that person during the lifetime of the 

insured[;] thus the funds were never in the possession of the 

insured, [Son]. As a result, he cannot have given them as a gift 

to his mother. As the funds were never in the possession of 

[Son’s] estate, they cannot have been a testamentary gift either.

Rather, Wife possesses the funds from her son’s life 

insurance polic[ies] because he assigned the expectancy of 

those insurance contracts specifically to her alone. He did this 

as a gift — voluntarily, “without consideration or compensation 

as an incentive or motive for the transaction.” Bundy v. Wetzel, 

184 A.3d 551, 556 (Pa. 2018). During her son’s life, Wife had no 

legally protectable interest against him extinguishing this 

expectancy in favor of another, because an expectancy is the 

chance to obtain property from a living person and not in itself 

property. Braman Estate, [258 A.2d 492, 493 n.3 (Pa. 1969)]. 

. . .

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6 (emphases added).

On appeal, Husband asserts that under Section 6108(a) of the Probate, 

Estates and Fiduciaries Code (PEC Code), the trial court properly found Son’s

life insurance and IRA proceeds were not a “bequest, devise, or descent”

pursuant to Subsection 3501(a)(3). Husband’s Brief at 30, 32, citing 20 

Pa.C.S.A. § 6108(a) (the designation of a life insurance beneficiary is not 

testamentary and shall not be subject to any law governing the transfer of 

property by will); Henderson Estate, 149 A.2d 892, 894-95 (Pa. 1959) (life 

insurance proceeds are not testamentary conveyances). Husband reasons 

that under these same principles, the trial court should have found the life 

insurance and IRA proceeds were likewise not “gifts” under Section 

3501(a)(3), and thus should have excluded them from the marital estate. 

Husband’s Brief at 39, citing Trial Ct. Op. at 5. Husband contends the court 
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instead improperly “created a new exception” and “a legal fiction,” as “there 

is no such thing as [an] insured making an ‘assignment of an expectancy as 

a gift.’” Husband’s Brief at 23-24. “A mere expectancy is not an asset” that 

can be delivered as a gift. Id. at 40-41. The court’s attempt to label the 

naming of a beneficiary as “an assignment of an expectancy” and a “gift” do 

“not change the nature of the transaction.” Id. at 45, 51. For the following 

reasons, I conclude relief is due.

First, I agree with the Majority there is scant Pennsylvania law 

addressing the situation at bar. See Majority Op. at 9-10. I would begin 

review by examining the statutory language of Section 3501, as well as 

Section 6108(a) of the PEC Code. This Court has stated:

In interpreting a statute, this Court must “ascertain and effectuate 

the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall be 

construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa.C.S. 

§ 1921(a). To do so, we begin by considering the plain meaning 

of the statute’s language. If the statute’s plain language is 

unambiguous, we must apply it without employing familiar canons 

of construction and without considering legislative intent.

Dubose v. Quinlan, 173 A.3d 634, 643 (Pa. 2017) (some citations and 

footnote omitted).

As Son died while the parties were married, his life insurance and IRA 

proceeds were presumed to be “marital property” pursuant to Section 

3501(b), and to establish otherwise, Wife bore the burden of showing the 

proceeds were acquired by a method set forth in Subsection (a). See 23 

Pa.C.S. § 3501(a), (b). As stated above, Section 3501(a) excludes the 
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following from marital property: “[p]roperty acquired by gift, . . . bequest, 

devise or descent or property acquired in exchange for such property.” 23 

Pa.C.S. § 3501(a)(3). However, as Husband points out, the Divorce Code 

does not define the terms “bequest,” “devise,” or “descent.” See Husband’s

Brief at 29-30. The Statutory Construction Act of 1972 provides these 

definitions:3

“Bequest.” — Includes devise and legacy.

* * *

“Devise.” —Includes . . . bequest and legacy when used as a noun.

* * *

“Legacy.” —Includes devise and bequest.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1991 (definitions); see Husband’s Brief at 29-30. The MerriamWebster dictionary defines “descent,” in part, as “transmission or devolution 

of an estate by inheritance usually in the descending line.” 

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/descent.

Section 6108(a) of the PEC provides: “The designation of beneficiaries 

of life insurance . . . shall not be considered testamentary and shall not be 

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3 Section 1991 prefaces the definitions with the provision: “The following 

words and phrases, when used in any statute finally enacted on or after 

September 1, 1937, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, shall have 

the meanings given to them in this section[.]” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1991.
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subject to any law governing the transfer of property by will.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 

6108(a). This Court has stated:

It is clear that the naming of a beneficiary on a life insurance policy 

vests nothing in that person during the lifetime of the insured; the 

beneficiary has but a mere expectancy. Furthermore, the naming 

of a beneficiary on a life insurance policy is sui generis; it is not a 

conveyance of the insured’s assets. 

Lindsey v. Lindsey, 492 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. 1985) (citations omitted). 

See also Trial Ct. Op. at 5, citing Knoche, 176 A. at 230-31 (“Where the right 

to change the beneficiary has been reserved in a life insurance policy, the 

beneficiary named has but a mere expectancy with no vested right or interest 

during the lifetime of the insured.”).

First, I agree with the trial court that Son’s life insurance proceeds were 

not testamentary bequests, devises, or descents. See 20 Pa.C.S. § 6108(a). 

I further agree that the life insurance proceeds themselves were not a “gift,”

for the reasons cited by the trial court: Son could not have gifted the proceeds 

to anyone because “the funds were never in [his] possession.” See Trial Ct. 

Op. at 5.

Pursuant to the same legal authority, however, I disagree with the trial 

court’s conclusion that Son’s naming his mother as the beneficiary was a 

“gift” pursuant to Subsection 3501(a)(3). See Knoche, 176 A. at 230-31; 

Lindsey, 492 A.2d at 398. I would conclude that where “the naming of a 

beneficiary on a life insurance policy . . . is not a conveyance of the insured’s 

assets,” the naming of a beneficiary similarly cannot be a “gift” given by the 
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insured to the beneficiary. See Lindsey, 492 A.2d at 398. Likewise, where 

the beneficiary “has but a mere expectancy,” she cannot have received a 

“gift.” See Knoche, 176 A. at 230-31.

I would thus conclude Husband’s first claim may be resolved by applying 

the plain meaning of Section 3501 of the Divorce Code and Section 6108(a) 

of the PEC. The plain language of Section 3501 and Section 6108(a) is clear. 

As our statutes resolve this issue, I would not, as the Majority does, consider 

how our sister states have resolved similar claims. Any exception or 

accommodation in the statute must come from our legislature, and not by this 

Court’s selective modification of how the statute should apply in certain 

circumstances. 

While I appreciate the trial court’s proper consideration of the particular 

circumstances presented in this matter, as well as its endeavor to fashion an 

overall equitable distribution scheme, for the foregoing reasons I would 

reverse the trial court’s finding that, under Section 3501, Son’s life insurance 

proceeds were a “gift” to Wife and thus excludable from the marital estate. 

See Hess v. Hess, 212 A.3d 520, 523 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted); 

Lindsey, 492 A.2d at 398. I would remand for the trial court to enter an 

amended equitable distribution order.

Having addressed Husband’s claims as to Son’s life insurance

proceeds, I briefly address his arguments concerning Son’s IRA proceeds. 

The Majority addresses these proceeds together with the life insurance 
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proceeds, and similarly concludes they were a “gift,” excludable from the 

marital estate, under Section 3501(a)(3). See Majority Op. at 8, 14. I note, 

however, that while Husband avers Wife was the named beneficiary on this 

IRA account, the trial court articulated no such finding. See Husband’s Brief 

at 13-14, 16. Instead, the court simply stated that Wife “received [these] 

funds from [Son’s] estate.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2; Order, 7/22/19, at 4. I would 

thus direct the trial court to also determine whether Son’s IRA proceeds, “or 

property acquired in exchange for” these proceeds, were marital property 

pursuant to Section 3501.

4

 See 23 Pa.C.S. § 3501(a).

In his second issue, Husband avers the trial court erred in failing to 

designate “a percentage to the equitable distribution scheme in its [July 22, 

2019,] order,” as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 3506. Husband’s Brief at 55. The 

Majority denies relief on this claim, pointing out the trial court specified the 

equitable distribution scheme in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. Maj. Op. at 

14. The Majority further construes Husband’s issue as “less a claim the 

distribution scheme was unclear and more a claim Husband disagrees with the 

treatment of the marital debt.” Id. at 15. I agree with the Majority’s 

discussion that “[t]he trial court clearly concluded the debts were marital in

nature, notwithstanding Wife’s decision to pay them ‘with her separate 

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4

I note Husband presents no challenge to the trial court’s disposition of Son’s

four Bank of America accounts.
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money.’” Id. at 16. Nevertheless, I would grant relief on different grounds: 

because Son’s life insurance proceeds comprise a significant marital asset, I 

would remand for the trial court to reconsider the overall distribution scheme.

Lastly, I agree with the Majority’s denial of relief on Husband’s final issue 

— that the trial court abused its discretion and erred in failing to consider 

some factors, and changing the meaning of other factors, under 23 Pa.C.S. § 

3502(a). See Husband’s Brief at 61. I join that part of the Majority’s opinion. 

See Majority Op. at 17-23. 

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur and dissent with the 

Majority’s opinion.