### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT KNOXVI LLE Ma y 3, 200 5 S es sio n FREEMAN INDUSTRI ES, LL C v. EAST MAN CHEMI CAL COMPANY, ET AL 

### . App e al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als Circuit Court

for Su llivan County No. C34355-L Richard E. Ladd , Chancellor

No. E2003-00527-SC-S09-CV - F iled Augu st 25, 2005

We gr anted pe rmission to appe al to de termine: 1) whether an indirect purcha ser may bring an ac tion under the Tenne ssee Tr ade Pra ctices A ct ag ainst defe ndants involved in an price -fixing sche me; 2) whether the conduc t complained of falls within the scope of the act; and 3) whether the trial court e rr e d inde c lin ing to g rant s umm ary jud g me nt t o t he defe nd a nts a s to theplaint if f’ s u nju st enric hment claim. We conclude that althoug h an indi rec t purcha ser may bring an ac tion under the Tenne ssee Tr ade Pra ctices A ct, t he conduct complained of in this case did not substantiallyaff ect Te nn e sse e c omm e rc e a ndthu s f a lls ou tsi de thesc op e of the a c t. We f urthe r c on c lud e that to su stain an unjust enrichme nt claim, the plaintiff is not require d to: 1) establish that the defe ndants rec eived a dir e c t be ne fi t or

2) e xhaus t a ll r e me die s a g a ins t th e pa rty wi th w ho m th e plaint if

f i s inprivi ty if thepu rs uit

of the re me die s w ou ld b e fu til e . B e c aus e theplaint if f f a ile d to pr ov idea

fa c tua l ba sis to support its ba

re alleg ation that any

attempt to exhaust i ts remedies w ould have be en futile, the tria l c ou rt erred in fai lin g to g rant the de fe nd a nts ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary jud g me nt o n th e un

jus t enric hment claim. Acc ording ly , the judg ment of the Court of Appe als is affirmed in part a nd reve rsed in part, and the c ase is re manded to the tria l court for further proce eding s in acc ordanc e with this opi nion.
Te nn. R . A pp. P . 1 1 A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion ; J udgm e nt of t he Co ur t o f Appe als Affir m e d in P art; Reve rsed in Par t; Re m anded to the Trial Court
J ANI CE M. H OL DER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R ., and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.
Ba rry C. Barnett, Dallas, Tex as; Daniel R. Kar on, Cleveland, Ohio; I saac L . Diel and Rex A. Sharp, Prairie Villag e, Kansas; J ohn S. Bing ham, King sport, Tenne ssee; and T odd R. Seelman, Denve r, Col or a do , f

or theapp e llant, F re e ma n Ind us trie s, LL C.
Her bert S. Washer, Ne w York, N ew Yor k, and Morris H adden, Kingsport, Tennesse e, for the appellee , Daice l Chemical I ndustries, Ltd.-2-

Mic he lle K. F ish e r andTh oma s D e mit ra c k, Cle ve la nd , Oh io, a nd Willi a m T. Gambl e , King sp ort, T e n n e s s e e , f

o r t h e ap p e l l e e , E a s t m a n C h e m i c a l C o m p a n y.
J ennife r B . Patterson and Micha el D

. Bl ec h m an, New York, N ew Yor k, and Morris Hadden, King sport, Tenne ssee, f

or the a ppellees , Hoec hst Aktieng esellscha ft and Nutrinova Nutrition Specialities & Food Ing redie nts, GmbH. Eug ene G . I llovsky , Walnut C ree k, California, a nd Morr i s Hadde n, King sport, Tenne ssee, f or the appellee , Nippon Gohsei Industries, Ltd.
OP IN ION
Def endant Ea stman Chemical Co. (“Ea stman”) is a Delaw are corpor ation with its principal place of business in Kingsport, T ennesse e. Def endants Hoec hst A ktieng esellscha ft (“H oechst” ) and Nu tr in o v a Nutrition Specialities & F ood I ng redie nts, GmbH (“Nutrinova”) are German cor porations wi th p ri nc ipa l pl a c e s of bu sin e ss i n Frank fu rt , G e rm a ny . D e fe nd a nts Da c ie l Ch e mic a l Ind us trie s, Ltd. (“ Da c ie l” ) andNi pp on Go hs e i Ind us trie s, Ltd. (“ Nipp on” ) a reJapane se c or

po ratio ns wi th principal plac es of business in Toky o and Osaka, J apan, respec tively

. Eastman, Hoe chst, Nutrinova, Dac iel, and Nipp o n (c o l lectively “def endants” ) ar e produc ers of sorbates. Sorbates arefood pr e se rv a tiv e s us e d insma ll q ua nti tie s inhig h- moi stu rea ndhig h- su g ar p ro du c ts t o s low theg ro wth of mold.
B e tw e e n 1 99 8 a nd2001 , each def e nd a nt p le a de d g uil ty

to f ixing thepric e s o f s or

bate s in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997). The defe ndants also have settled fe de ra l la ws uit s b ro ug ht b y a natio nw idec la ss o f d ir e c t pu rc ha se rs of sorb a te s a s w e ll a s la ws uit s broug ht by

indirect purc haser s in fourtee n states, including Tenne ssee, and the District of Columbia.
Plaintiff Fre eman Industries, LL C (“Free man”) is a New York c orporation with it s principal place o f b u s in e s s inT u c k ah o e , N e w Y o rk

. F r e e man is a n e n d

- u s e r o f f o o d p r o d u c ts c o n tain ing sorbates and purcha ses these pr oducts at supermarke ts in New York. Free man, as a n indirect purcha ser of

sorbates, f

iled a lawsuit ag ainst the defendants claiming a violation of the Tenne ssee Trade Practice s Act (“ TTPA”), Te nn. Code Ann. § 47-25- 101 et seq. (2 00 1) , a ndun jus t e nric hme nt.
The trial c ourt g rante d the defendants’ moti on to dismiss Fr eeman’s TTPA claim. The trial court c oncluded that the T T P A d o es n o t apply to indirect purc haser s or to transac tions occurring ou tsi de of Ten ne sse e . T he tria l c ou rt de nie d th e de fe nd a nts ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary jud g me nt a s to F re e ma n’ s u nju st e nric hme nt c la im. On interlocutory

revie w, the Court of Appea ls c oncluded that althoug h indirect purc haser s may rec over unde r the TTPA, the a ct does not apply to indirect purc haser s who arenot “Tenne ssee consumers.” The Court of Appe als further conc luded that Fr eeman could not rec over unde r the TTPA beca

use it failed to esta

blish that it“had a

transact ion in Tennessee that w a s su bs ta nti a lly a ff e c te d b y thede fe nd a nts ’ i lle g a l c on du c t. ” Withre sp e c t to F re e ma n’ s u nju st e nric hme nt c la im,T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 47- 25

- 10 1 (2001 ) provi des t hat 1

A l l arr angem ent s, c o n tra c ts, agreem ent s, t rus t s, or co m b i nat i o ns b et ween p ers o ns o r corp o rat i o ns m a d e w ith a vie w to le sse n , o r wh ic h ten d to les se n , f u ll a n d fre e c o m p e tit io n in the im p o rta tio n o r sa le of a r t i cl es i mpor t ed i n t o t h i s s t at e, or i n t h e man u f ac t u r e or s al e of a r t i cl es of

dome s t i c g r owt h or of do mest i c r aw mat er i al , an d al l ar r ang ement s , cont r act s , ag r eement s , t r us t s , or c om bi nat i ons bet ween (c o n tinu e d ...) -3- the Court of Appe als held t hat a plaintiff i s not require d to confe r a direc t benef it upon a def

endant to proce ed with a c laim for unjust enrichme nt. The Court of Appe als there fore modified the portion of the trial c ourt’s judg ment that held that the TTPA is not ap p l i ca b l e t o indirect purc haser s and aff irmed the trial c ourt’s judg ment in all other re spects. We g rante d revie w. AN AL YSI S
A. Tennessee Trade P ractices Ac t
We mus t f

ir st d e c idewh e the r the tria l c ou rt e rr e d ing ranti ng thedefend ant s’ motio n to dismiss Fr eeman’s TTPA claims pursuant to Tenne ssee Rul e of Civil Procedur e 12.02(6) . A motion to dis mis s a c omp la int fo r failu re to state a c la im pu rs ua nt to Rul e 12 .0 2( 6) “ a dmi ts thetruthof a ll of the re levant and material a lleg ations contained in the complaint, but it asserts that the alleg ations fail to establish a c ause of action.” L ea ch v . Tay lor, 124 S.W .3d 87, 90 (Tenn. 2004) . When revie wing a dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12.02(6), wemust take the fa ctual alleg ations of the complaint as true and revie w the trial court' s leg al conclusions de novo without any presumption of cor rec tness. I d.
1. Ind irec t P urchasers
Tenne sse e Cod e An no tate d s e c tio n 4 7- 25 -1 06 (2 00 1) pr ov ide s f or a c ivi l r e me dy

a g a ins t tho se wh o v iol a te theTT PA. Se c tio n 4 7- 25 -1 06 state s th a t: [a]n y pe rs onwh o is inj ur e d o r d a ma g e d b y a ny su c h a rr a ng e me nt, c on tr a c t, a g re e me nt, trus t, o r c omb inat ionde sc ri be d inthi s p art ma y su e fo r andre c ov e r, in any court of c ompetent jurisdiction, from any person ope rating such trust or c omb inatio n, thefu ll co ns ide ratio n or sum pa id by thepe rs on fo r any g oo ds , w are s, me rc ha nd ise , o r a

rt ic le s, thesa le of

wh ic h is c on tr oll e d b y su c h c omb inatio n o r t ru st. By providing a civil re medy to “[a]nyperson who is in jured or damag ed” a s the result of vio la tio n s o f

t h e T T P A , t h e p l a i n l a n g u a g e o f s e c t i o n 4 7

- 2 5

- 1 0 6 p r o v i d e s a c au s e o f a c t i o n to indirect purc haser s. See City of Cookeville ex rel. Reg ’l Med. Ctr. v. Humphre y , 126 S.W .3d 897, 90 2 ( Te nn . 2 00 4) (p ro vid ing that w he rethela ng ua g e of a statut e is cl e ar an d una mbi g uo us , w e mus t ap p l y t h e s t at u t e i n ac co rd an ce wi t h i t s p l ai n l an gu age ). C o n tra ryt o t h e C o u rto f A p p ea l s ’ h o l d i n g, the pl ain l ang uag e of section 47-25-106 does not prohibit rec overy to indirect purchase rs who are non-re sidents of Tennessee. Moreove r, sections 47-25-101 and -102 (2001) pr ohibit price fixing 1(

. . . con t i n u ed) 1 p erso ns o r co rp o rati o ns d esigne d , o r wh i ch t en d , t o ad va nc e, red uc e, o r co ntro l t he p rice or t he co st to the p ro d u c e r o r the c o n su m e r o f an y su c h p ro d u c t o r a rtic le , ar e d e c la re d to b e a g a ins t p u b lic p o licy,
u n l aw f u l , a n d v oi d.

T en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated 4 7

- 2 5

- 1 0 2 p ro hib i t s agre em en t s “t o sell an d m ark et . .

. p r o d u c t s and arti cles,
man u f ac t u r ed i n t h i s s t at e, or i mpor t ed i n t o t h i s s t at e, t o a n y pr odu ce r or c on s u mer a t pr i ce s r edu ce d be l ow t h e cos t of pr odu ct i on or i mpor t at i on i n t o t h i s s t at e. ” T h e s t at u t e f u r t h er pr oh i bi t s “ an y ot h er a r r an g eme n t s , c on t r ac t s , or agr eement s , by an d bet ween i t s age nt s and s ubage nt s , whi ch t end t o l es s en f ul l and f r ee com pet i t i on i n t he s al e of al l s uch
a r t i c l e s ma n u f a c t u r e d a n d i mp or t e d i n t o t h e s t a t e , a n d w h i c h a mo u n t t o a s u bt e r f u g e f or t h e pu r po s e of

ob t a i n i n g t h e s a me a d v a n ta g e a n d p u rp o se s.”

T he defendan t s cont end t hat per mi t t i ng Fr eeman t o re cover t he f ul l cons i dera t i on t hat i t pai d t o t he di r ect 2 pur cha s er for t he foo d product s vi ol at es t he cons t i t ut i onal pri nci pl es o f f ai r nes s and due pr oces s
. B eca us e we i nt er pret T enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 47- 25

- 10 6 as p er mi t t i ng F r eeman t o re cover onl y t he amo un t of t he over cha r ge t hat t he di r ect pur cha s er pas s ed on t o Free man, we nee d not r eac h t hi s i s s ue. -4- a g re e me nts that te ndto a ff e c t th e pric e to the “ pr od uc e r o r c on su me r” of su c h p ro du c ts. Th e se statut e s r e fl e c t a

c le ar i nte nt t o p ro te c t a nda ff or d a re me dy to u lti mate c on su me rs
. This Court has identified two purposes of the TTPA. See Baird v. Smit h, 161 S.W

. 492, 493 (T e nn . 1 91 3) . T he fi rs t pu rp os e is t o p re se rv e fu ll andfr e e c omp e tit ionin the sa le of me rc ha nd ise that “had be come a

part of the mass of prope rty in the S tate.” I d. The sec ond purpose is to prese rve fu ll andfr e e c omp e tit ionin the ma nu fa c tur e a nd sa le of “ art ic le s o f d ome sti c g ro wth a nddo me sti c raw materia l” and to pre vent combinations tending to affe ct the pric e or cost of these article s to the produce r or c onsumer. I d. We believe that pe rmitting indirec t purcha sers to re cover under the TT PA p ro mot e s th e se pu rp os e s. The de fendants contend that the lang uag e of TennesseeCode Annotated se ction 47-25-106 pe rm itt ing re c ov e ry

of “ thefu ll c on sid e ratio n o r su m pa id b y thepe rs on ” fo r the pr od uc ts, “ thesa le of which is contr olled by

such combination or trust,” limi ts recove ry to direct purc haser s. Acc ording to the defe ndants, the only sale “contr olled by ” an antitrust viol ator is the tra nsaction betwe en the violator and the dire ct purc haser . We believe that their ar g ument is flawed. F irst, “control” means “[p] ower or auth o rity

to manag e, dire ct, superintend, r estrict, re g ulate, g overn, a dminist er, or o v er see” as we ll as “[t] he ability to exercise a r estraining or direc ting influe nce ove r something .” Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary

329 (6 ed. 1990). Asale “ controlled by ” an antitrust violation includes not

th only a sal e made by

the violator to the direc t purcha ser but also a transac tion between the direc t pu rc haser and th e c on su me r i n w hic h th e pric e of thepr od uc t pu rc ha se d b y thec on su me r i s inf lue nc e d b y

thea nti tr us t vi olator ’s c on du c t. Second, we believe that this l ang uag e pertains no t t o p er s ons who may rec over but to the rec overy itself. A plain rea ding of section 47-25-106 permits a person to r ecover the consider ation or sum that was “ controlled by ” or influence d by the antit rust violator. I n other wor ds, an indirec t purcha ser may

rec over f

rom the antitrust v i o lator the a mount of the overc harg e that the dire ct purcha ser pa ssed on to the indirec t purcha ser. 2S ec t i o n 4 o f t he C l ayto n A ct, 1 5 U .S.C

. § 1 5 , p ro vid es: 3

[A ]ny pe rs o n who s hal l be i njured i n his b usi ness o r p rop ert y b y reaso n o f a ny t hi ng forbidd en i n t he ant i t rus t l aws ma y s u e th e re fo r in any dis t ri ct co urt of t he U ni t ed Stat es i n t he d i st ri ct i n whi ch t he d e fen d a n t re sid e s o r i s fo u n d o r ha s a n a g e n t, w itho u t re sp e c t to the a m o u n t i n c o n tro v e rs y, an d sh a ll
re c o v e r th re e fo ld the d a m a g e s b y h im su sta ine d , an d the c o st o f suit, i n c lud ing a re a so n a b le a tto rn e y’s fee.
S ee, e
. g. , Al a. Code § 6- 5- 60 ( 2004) ; Cal

. B u s
. & Pr of

. Code § 16750 ( 1987) ; Col o. Rev

. St at

. § 6- 4- 111 4 (1 9 9 2 ); D .C

. C o d e A n n
. § 2 8 -4 5 0 9 (1 9 8 1 ); H a w
. R e v
. S ta t. § § 4 8 0 -3 (1 9 8 7 ),4 8 0 -1 3 (2 0 0 2 ), 4 8 0 -1 4 (2 0 0 3 ) ; 7 4 0 I ll. Comp. St at

. 10/ 7 ( 2003) ; K an
. St at

. An n
. § 50- 161 ( 2000) ; M e. Rev

. St at

. An n
. t i t

. 10, § 1104 ( 2 0 0 4 ) ; M i ch

. Comp. La ws § 445. 778 ( 1985) ; M i n n
. St at

. § 325D

. 57 ( 1984) ; M i s s
. Code An n
. § 75- 21- 9 ( 2005) ; N eb. Rev

. St at

. § 59- 821 ( 2 0 0 2 ) ; Ne v
. R e v
. S t a t

. § 5 9 8 A

. 2 1 0 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; N. M

. S t a t

. A n n
. § 5 7

- 1

- 3 ( 1 9 7 9 ) ; N. Y. Ge n
. Bu s
. L a w § 3 4 0 ( 1 9 9 9 ) ; N. D. C ent

. Co de § 51

- 08

. 1- 08 ( 19 91 ) ; O r
. Rev. St at

. § 64 6. 77 5 (2001 ) ; R. I

. G en. Laws § 6- 36

- 12 ( 19 79 ) ; S. D

. Co di f i ed Laws § 37

- 1

- 3 3 (19 9 1 ); V t

. Stat

. A nn. t i t

. 9, § 2 4 6 5 (19 9 9 ); W i s. Stat

. § 1 3 3

. 1 8 (19 8 7 ). -5- Third, we c onclude that the U nited States Supreme Court’s holding in I llinois Brick Co. v. I llinois , 431 U. S

. 720 (1977), doe s not require a diffe rent re sult. I n that case , the Supreme Court held that “the ove rcha

rg ed dire ct purc haser , and not others in the c hain of manuf actur e or distribution, i s the party

‘injured in his business or prope rty ’ within the meaning of [ section 4 of the ClaytonAc t].” I lli no is B ri c k Co. , 43 1 U. S. at 72 9. Th us , in dir e c t pu rc ha se rs do no t ha ve a c aus e 3 of ac tion under fe dera l antitrust law because they do not suffe r a leg ally cog nizable injury . See id. The Court in I llinois Brick Co. was conc erne d that permitting offe nsive use of the “ pass-on” theory by indirect purc haser s would cre ate: 1) a risk of re covery

of the e ntire overc harg e by both the direc t and indirec t purcha sers, resulting in multiple liabilityfor the de fendant; 2) difficulty in apportioning the re s p o n s i b i l i ty

for the ove rcha

rg e among those in the cha in of distribution; and 3) la ck of incent i v e for direct purc haser s to bring suit. I d. at 737-38. The Court further rea soned that permitting indire ct purc haser s to bring suit would re sult in hi g hly comp l ex litigation due to the nece ssityof dete rmining the amount of the overcha rg e passed on to the indirect purc haser s. I d. at 732.
Th e Sup re me Cou rt ’s ho ldi ng in I lli no is B ri c k Co., ho we ve r, app lie s o nly to f e de ra l a nti trus t la w. Cle arl y , s tate s may

pr ov idea

re me dy to i nd ir e c t pu rc ha se rs un de r the ir own an tit

ru st l a ws
. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989).
I n response to I llinois Brick Co., many state s ame n d e d

the ir antitrust statutes to either provide indirect purc haser s wi th a private rig ht of ac tion or permit the state’s attorney g ener al to bring an a c tio n a s parens patriae on behalf of indirec t purcha sers. The de fendants identify various failed 4 attempts by

the Tenne ssee leg islature to amend the TTPA to expresslypermit indirect pur chase r c la ims in s up po rt

of its c on te nti on that th e TT PA doe s not cu rr e ntl y pr ov ide fo r s uc h s uit s. Whil e leg islative inaction is ge nera lly irrele vant to the i nterpre tation of ex isting st atutes, the leg islature’s failure to “express disapprova l of a judicial c onstruction of a statute is pe rsuasive e vidence of leg islative adoption of the judi cial construction.” Hamby v. McDa niel, 559 S.W .2d 774, 776 (Tenn. 1977); see F orman, Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Com p. I ns., I nc., 13 S.W.3d 365, 373 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).-6-

Th e pr e se nt c a se , h ow e ve r, inv olv e s th e Te nn e sse e le g isl atur e ’s fa ilu reto ame nda state statute in response to a

fede ral c ourt’s interpr etation of a fede ral statute. Furthermo re, the United States Supreme Court has emphasiz ed that its holding in I llinois Brick C o. applies onl y to fede ral a nti trus t la w. AR C Am. Cor p. , 490 U. S. at 103

. Th is ca se is this Cou rt ’s fi rs t op po rtun ity to a dd re ss theiss ue of

wh e ther i nd ir ect

pu rc ha se rs ha ve a

c aus e of a c tio n u nd e r the TT PA. Un de r the se c ir c ums ta nc e s, it i s impossibl e to assert with any deg ree of assuranc e t hat [legislative] failure to act repr esents (1) appro v al o f t h e st atus quo, as opposed to (2) inabilityto ag ree upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawa rene ss of the status quo, (4) indiffer enceto the status quo, or eve n (5) political cow ardic e.
J ohnson v. Transp. Ag ency Santa Clara Coun t y , Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Sca lia, J ., dissenting) . There fore , we, l i ke other jurisdictions, decline to presume that our state leg islature considere d I llinois Brick Co. as af fec ting the TTPA and thus requiring an ame ndment to the curr ent statute.
Furthermore , unlike many states that have a pplied I llinois Brick Co. in disallowing indirec t p u rc h as er s from bring ing a private action under their antitrust la ws, Tenne ssee does not ha ve a statutory “harmony

clause ” mandating c ourts to interpret the T TPA consistently wi th fede ral law

. Cf. Stifflear v. B ristol-My ers Squibb Co., 931 P.2d 471, 476 (Col o. C t

. Ap p . 1996); Vac co v. Microsoft Corp., 793 A.2d 1048, 1056 (Conn. 2002); Davidson v. Microsof t Corp., 792 A.2d 336, 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Major v. Mic rosoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 513 (Okla. Ct. App. 2002); Siena v. Microsoft Corp., 796 A.2d 461, 464 ( R.I

. 2002); Abbott L abs., I nc. v. Seg ura, 907 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1995). Thus, we join other jurisdi ctions in declining to interpre t I llinois Brick Co. as pre cluding indirect purc haser s from bring ing suit under the TTP A. S ee B unker’ s Glass Co. v. Pilki ng ton PL C, 7 5 P. 3 d 9 9 , 1 0 7 ( A r iz

. 2 0 0 3 ) ; Co me s v
. M ic r o s o f t Co rp
. , 6 4 6 N

. W. 2 d 4 4 0, 445 (I owa 2002) ; Hy de v. Abbott L abs., Inc., 473 S .E. 2d 680, 686-87 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 676 N.W.2d 29, 38 (Ne b. 2004).
I n addition, the conce rns identified by the United States Supreme Court in I llinois Brick Co. do not justi fy

prohibiting indi rec t purcha ser suit s under the TTPA. The Supreme Court expressed c on c e rn s r e g ard ing thepo ssi bil ity of mul tip le lia

bil ity

. I lli no is B ri c k Co. , 43 1 U. S. a t 73 0. Th e ri sk that a n a nti trus t vi olator ma y be su bje c t to bo th a dir e c t pu rc ha se r s uit

a nda n in dir e c t pu rc ha se r s uit under the TTPA does exist. Our trial courts, howeve r, ar e compe tent to handle such a problem. See Bunke r’s Gla ss Co., 75 P.3d at 108; Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 449-50. I n fac t, many I llinois Brick Co. re pe a le r statut e s le a ve the so lut ion of the ri sk of mul tip le lia bil ity to the tria l c ou rt s. B un ke r’ s G la ss Co., 75 P.3d at 108 (citing statutes f rom I llinois , New Me x ico, and South Dakota)

. The Supreme Court also expressed co ncern reg arding the dec rea sed ince ntive for dire ct purcha sers to bring suit. I llinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 745. The Court, howeve r, re cog nized that direc t purch a s e r s li k e ly

w il l n o t b r in g s u it

d u e to f e ar o f r e ta li a ti o n b y

th e ir s u p p li e r s
. I d

. a t 746. Rather, the dir ect pur chase rs fre quently pas s on the over char g e to the indirec t consumers who a re-7-

theinj ur e d p art ie s. I d. a t 76 4 ( B re nn a n, J. dis se nti ng ); Com e s, 64 6 N .W. 2da t 45 0. Th e Sup re me Court conce ded that by

allowing only

direc t purcha ser act i o n s , the per son “ac tually injured,” the indirect purc haser

who ultimately

paid the over char g e, is not aff orded r edre ss. I llinois Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 746. Thus, the indirec t purcha sers, the r eal victims of the antitrust violations, have the true ince ntive to bring suit. By construing Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 47-25-106 (2001) a s pe rm itt ing ind ir e c t pu rc ha se r s uit s, we area ff or din g a re me dy to the ult imate vic tim s of thea nti trus t conduct. Ac cepting the def endants’ position would leave such vi cti ms of illega l activity with no r e d r e s s , a r e s u l tt h a th ar d l y c o m p o rt s w i t h n o t i o n s o f f a i r p l a y. Finally , the Supreme Court e x presse d conce rn reg arding the risk of hig hly complex li tigation due to the diffic ulty

in apportioning damag es. I d. at 745-47. Antitrust, howe ver, is a c omplex are a of law and g ener ally

involves highly

complex litigation. See Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 451. W e do not believe that the e nds of justice should be def eate d simplybeca

use the risk o f compli cate d litigation exist s. See id.
Acc ording ly , we conclude that an indirec t purcha ser may bring an ac tion under Tenne ssee Code Annotated section 47-25-106 for c onduct in violation of the TTPA eve n though the indirect purcha ser is a non- resident of this state.
2
. S co p e o f

th e T T PA
We mu s t n e xt d e te r mi n e w h e th e r th e c o n d u c t c o mp lain e d o f f a ll s w ith in th e scope of

the TTPA. Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 47-25-101 (2001) pr ovides that [a] ll arrang ements, contra cts, ag ree ments, trusts, or combinations betwee n persons or cor porations made w ith a view to l es s en, or w hich tend to lessen, f ull and fre e competition in the importation or sale of a rticles imported into this state, or in the manufa cture or sale of articles of dom estic growth or of domestic ra w material, and all arr ang ements, contra cts, ag ree ments, trusts, or combinations betwee n persons or corpor ations desig ned, or w hich tend, to advance, r educe , or control the price or the c os t to the pr od uc e r or

thec on su me r o f any

su c h p ro du c t or

art ic le , a rede c lare d to be ag ainst public policy , unlawful, a nd void.
This Court last addre ssed the re ach of the TTPA in Standard Oil Co. v. State, 100 S.W . 705, 709 (1907), in which w e held that this state’s antitrust statutes did not apply to interstate commer ce “whe n properly

construed” and that the s tatute’s purpose was to “corre ct and pr ohibit abuses of trade wi thi n th e state .” At

thetim e of

thi s h old ing , a

the ory of du a l so ve rei gnty pres uming mutua lly exclusive jurisdiction for state and f eder al re g ulation prevai l ed

. See Abbott L abs. v. Durr ett, 746 So. 2d 316, 330-34 (Ala. 1999) (discussing the theory of dual sover eig nty ).
I n Standard Oil Co., this Court reas oned that the state leg islature knew it did not have the power to enac t laws that reg ulated interstat e commerc e and thus did not intend to enac t un c on sti tut ion a l la w. 10 0 S. W. at 71 0. We f urthe r r e a so ne d th a t th e state le g isl a tur e int e nd e d to-8-

corr ect and punish the wrong s to trade that we re be ing pe rpetrated ag ainst commerc e within the state, which the Sherman Antitrust Ac t c ould not reac h and for which no ef

ficient re medy

was a vailable. I d. Thus, we concluded that “ [t ]he L eg islature cle arly intended to prohibit trusts, combinations, and ag ree ments aff

ecting all commerc e not cove red by the fe dera l statute, and upon which it had a rig ht to leg islate. It did not int end to stop short of its power or to exceed it.” I d. at 711.
The lang uag e of Te nnessee ’s antitrust statutes have not c hang ed sig nificantly since Standar d Oil C o. Compare Standar d Oil Co., 100 S .W. at 707, with Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-101 ( 2001). I n St a nd ardOi l Co ., ho we ve r, thi s Court did not re ly up on theplain l a ng ua g e of thi s st a te ’s a nti trus t statu t es i n determining its scope. Rathe r, our holding was ba sed upon two principles of statutory c on str uc tio n. F ir st, c ou rt s h a ve a du ty to c on str ue statut e s in su c h a ma nn e r a s to a vo id c on fl ic t w ith the United States Constitut i o n if the construc tion can be a ccomplished without disreg arding the le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt. Sta nd ardOi l Co ., 10 0 S. W. at 71 0. Se c on d, a lth ou g h a statut e inc lud e s te rm s that are overly broad, courts have a dut y to limit a st atute’s application to circumstanc es within the le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt. I d. a t 71 1. We b a se d o ur ho ldi ng up on thestate le g isl a tur e ’s c on stitut ion a lly permitted scope of authority in the are as of antitrust law a nd interstate c ommerce that prevailed at t h a tt i m e a s w e l l a s u p o n o u r d u t y t o c o n s tru e a

s t a t u t e s o a s t o a v o i d a n y u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y. The dua l sovereig nty

theory presumi n g mu tu all y

e xc lu s iv ejurisdic tion for state a ntitrust laws and fe dera l antitrust laws has since be en rejecte d. The United States Supreme Court now conside rs state antitrust re gu lations to supplement and complement the f eder al antitrust laws and the enfor ceme nt of these state laws to be c onsistent with the feder al antitrust laws. See A RC Am. C orp., 49 0 U .S. a t 10 1- 02 . Furthe rm or e , a state g e ne ra lly

is not pr oh ibi te d fr om g ivi ng e ff e c t to its a nti trus t laws mere ly

beca use the reg ulation a ffe cts interstate c ommerce . See Standar d Oil Co. v. Tenn., 217 U. S. 4 13 (1 91 0) . Sp e c if

ic a lly , a state a nti trus t r e g ulatio n th a t ha s o nly inc ide nta l e ff

e c ts o n in te rs tate commerc e and is reg ulated evenhandedly to e ffe ctuate a leg itimate local intere st does not run afoul of the Commerc e Clause unless the bur den i m p o s ed on interstate commerc e is clea rly excessive when c ompare d to the punitive local bene fits. See Pike v. Br uce C h u rch, I nc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
I n construing statutes, we mustasce rtain and g ive ef fec t to the leg islature’s intent and purpose. See Lipscomb v. Doe, 32 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Tenn. 2000). Furthermore , we must construe a statute so as to avoid a constitutional conflict if any rea sonable construction exis ts that satisfies the Constit ution’s require ments. Davis-Ki d d Bo o ksellers, Inc. v. McWherte r, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (T e nn . 1 99 3) . T hu s, in c on str uin g there a c h o f the TT PA, we mus t de ve lop a stand ardthat is c on sis te nt w iththele g isl a tur e ’s int e nt andpu rp os e wi tho ut o ff e nd ing c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s. The TTPA prohibits a g ree ments adver sely aff ecting competition in the “sa l e o f a rt icles imported into this state” or influencing the “price or the cost to the produc er or the consumer

of any such produc t or article .” Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-25-101 (2001). Acc ording to its plain langua g e, the TT PA p ro hib its arr a ng e me nts that de c re a se c omp e tit ionor a ff e c t the pric e s o f g oo ds e ve n if tho se go o d s arri v ed i n T en n es s e e t h ro u gh i n t er s t at e c o m m er ce
. T h e a ctd o es n o tco n t ai n an y l an gu age indicating that the leg islature intended that the scope of the act be limit ed to intrastate c ommerce
.-9-

Had the le g islature intended suc h a limitation, the legislaturesimplycou l d h av e included the lim itatio n inthea c t.
I n developing a standard for determining the application of the TTPA to a particula r set of ci rc u m s tance s, we must determine whether the foc us should be upon the anticompetitive conduc t of the de fendant o r t he ef fec ts of the anticompetitive conduc t. I n examining whethe r the circ umstances of

a particular c ase f

all within the TTPA, the Court of Appeals has employ ed a conduct- b as ed t estfocusing upon the cha rac ter of the defe ndant’s anticompe titive conduct g iving rise to the dispute. See L y nch Display

Corp. v. Nat’l S ouvenir Ctr., Inc., 640 S.W.2d 837, 840 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) ( holding that a lease betwee n a Te nnesseecorpor ation and a Ma ry land corpor ation and an associate d franchise a g ree ment betwee n a Te nnessee corpor ation and a D istrict of Col umb ia

c or po ratio n w e re“ pr e do min a ntl y inte rs tate in c ha

ra c te r” a nd“ on ly

inc ide nta lly a ff e c t [e d ] i n tr a s t a t e c o m m e r c e ” )

. A n y t e s t f o c u s i n g u p o n t h e a n t i c o m p e t i t i v e c o n d u c t g i v i n g ri se to the dispute, howeve r, would be diff icult to apply

when the plaintiff is an indirect pur chase r who didno t tr a ns a c t di re c tly

wi th the de fe nd a nt.
Furthermore , the purpose of the TTPA is to protect the state ’s trade o r commerce a ffe cted by the anticompetitive conduct. See State ex rel. Astor v. Schlitz Brew ing Co., 59 S.W. 1033, 1039 (Tenn. 1900) (“The thing condemne d and punished by the Act is injury to trade. Thething intende d to be protec ted is trade. . . .” ). Thus, we re j ec t an ystandard that require s examination of the anticompetitive conduct in de termining whether a particula r case falls within the scope of the TTPA. Rather, the effect

of the a nticompetitive conduct on Te nnessee trade or commer ce is de terminative of wh e the r the TT PA i s a

pp lic ableun de r the c ir c ums ta nc e s.
We must now d et er m i n e t he standa rd to employ

in examini ng whether

the ef fec ts of the anticompetitive conduc t on Tennesse e tra de or c ommerce fall within the s cope of the TTP A. One possible standard is a “ predominant e ffe cts” standa rd. The te rm “pre dominant” is defined a s “[s] omething g rea t er o r s u perior in powe r and influe nce to other s with which it is connected or compar ed.” B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 1177 (6 ed

. 1 990). Thus, anticompe titive conduct ca nnot

th predominantly

aff ect both intrastate c ommerce and interstate commerc e. Unde r a “ predominant eff ects” standard, c ourts would be re quired to we igh the eff ects of anticompetitve conduct on Tenne ssee c ommerce ag ains t its effec ts on interstate commer ce and determine which ef fec ts are g reater. I f the e ffe cts on interstate c ommerce are g reater than the eff ects on Te nnessee commerc e, t h e T T P A w o u l d n o tap p l y.
I n c on str uin g theTT PA, oth e r j urisd ic tio ns ha ve uti lize d a “ pr e do min ant ” st and ardin apply ing a

conduct- based te st. See e.g ., I n re Tera zosi n Hy drochloride Antitrust L itig., 160 F . Supp. 2 d 1 3 6 5 , 1 3 7 8 ( S

. D

. F l a
. 2 0 0 1 ) ; F T C v
. M y l a n Lab s
. , In c
. , 9 9 F

. S u p p
. 2 d 1 , 4 ( D

. C

. C i r
. 1 9 9 9 )

. In our modern soc iety , howeve r, interstate and international transactions have become more c ommon. Numerous tec hnologic al advances, inc lu ding the internet, e nable c onsumers and businesse s from opposite are as of the c ountry to eng age i n t ra n s actions with ea se. See g ener ally , J ohn Rothchild, Protecting the Dig ital Consumer: The Limits of Cy berspa ce U topianism, 74 I nd. L .J . 893 (1 999) (discussing the incre ase in business-to-c onsumer online commer ce) . Adoption of a pre dominant-10-

eff ects standa

rd would re nder the TTPA obsolete except in th o s e ra re circumstances in which the effects on intrastate commer ce a re g reater than the eff

ects on interstate commer ce. We do not believe that this standard is sufficient to advanc e the TTPA’ s purpose of pr otecting Tenne ssee tra de and commer ce. We conclude that the proper standard f

or dete rmining w hether a case falls within the scope of the TTPA is a “ substantial effe cts” standa rd. Pursuant to this standard, courts must decide whether the alleg ed anticompetitive conduct aff ects Tenne ssee trade or commer ce to a substantial de g re e . F e de ra l c ou rt s ha ve app lie d the su bs ta nti a l e ff e c ts stand ard to the She rm a n A nti trus t A c t. See Ha rtford F ire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 76 4 , 7 96 (1993) ( concluding that “the Sherman Act applies to for eig n conduct that wa s meant to produce and did in fac t produce some substantial ef fe ct i n the United States”) ; McL ain v. Real Estate Bd. of New O rlea ns, I nc., 444 U.S. 232, 242 (1 98 0) (h old ing that “ [t]o e sta bli sh thejurisd ic tio na l e le me nt o f a She rm a n A c t vi olatio n it wo uld be suff icient for pe titioners to demonstrate a substantial effect on inter state commer ce” g ener ated by a c tiv ity that is prima

ri ly loc a l in natur e ). Othe r state s a lso app ly a fo rm of su bs ta nti al ef fe c ts standard in de termining whether an ac tion falls within their anti t ru s t s t at u te. See e .g ., Amare l v. Conne ll , 2 4 8 Ca l. Rp tr

. 2 7 6 , 2 8 4 ( Ca l. Ct

. A p p
. 1 9 8 8 ) ( h o ld in g th a t a c au s e o f a c ti o n u n der Ca li for ni a’s a nti trus t la w i s n ot p re c lud e d s o lo ng a s th e a nti c omp e tit ivec on du c t ha d a “ dir e c t, substantial and re asonably fore seea ble ef fec t within the st at e”); Olstad v. Microsoft Corp., 700 N. W.2 d 1 39 (Wi s. 20 05 ) (con clu ding that Wis c on sin ’s a nti trus t st a tut e app lie s if thea c tio na

ble conduct “ ‘substantially

aff ects’ the people of

Wis consin and ha s impacts in [t he] state, even if the illega l activity

resulting in t

h ose impacts occ urre d predominantly or exclusively

outside [t he] state”). We believe that a “substantial effec ts” standard further s the TTP A’s goal of protecting Tenne ssee c omm e rc e wi tho ut o ff

e nd ing c on sti tut ion a l pr ov isi on s. The de termination of whe ther a n eff ect is substantial does n o t i n v o lv e“ mathematical nice ty .” An e sth e sia

Ad va nta g e , Inc . v . M e tz G ro up , 9 12 F .2 d 3 97 , 4 01 (1 0 Cir . 199 0)

. Ra the r, thete st i s th prag matic, turning upon the par ticular fa cts of t he case. See id. at 402; Huelsman v. Civic Ctr. Corp., 873 F.2d 1171, 1175 ( 8 Cir. 1989). The anticompetitive conduc t, however , need not thre aten the th demise of Tenne ssee businesses or af fec t market pric es to substantially aff ect intra state commer ce. See Hosp. B ldg. Co. v. Tr s. of R ex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 745-47 (1976) (re fer ring to the Sherman Antitrust Act).
I n the present case , Fr eeman alleg es t hat Eastman eng ag ed in conduc t from its principal place o f b u s i n es s i n Ki n gs p o rt , T en n es s ee , i n cl u d i n g: 1 ) c o m m u n i ca t i n g wi t h i t s co -d ef en d an t s t h ro u gh in-person meeting s, telephone calls, letters, and email resulting i n an ag ree ment to fix the price s of so rb a te s; 2 ) imp lem ent ing thea g re e me nt b y dr a fting pric e sc he du le s a ndle tte rs to thir d p art ie s, a dju sti ng pric e s a ndpr od uc tio n v olu me s o f sor bate s, a nd takin g or de rs a nd imp le me nti ng sa le s to c us tom e rs a t th e ne w pr ic e s; an d 3) atte mpt ing to co nc e a l its con du c t by lim iti ng the nu mbe r o f i ts e mpl oy e e s h a vin g kn ow le dg e of the a g re e me nt. Th e se a lle g a tio ns prima ri ly re late to the de fe nd a nts ’ a c tio ns in c on sp iring a ndimp le me nti ng thec on sp ir a c y to f ix the pric e s o f s or

bate s.-11-

The foc us under the substantial e ffe cts standar d, howeve r, is n o t o n t h e anticompe titive conduct itself but on the e

ffe c ts of the c onduct on Tenne ssee c ommerce . Whil e Free man alleg ed that Eastman took or ders and implemented sales to c ustomers at the ne w price s from Tenne ssee, wedo not believe that this bare alleg ation without more is sufficie nt to establish that Tennesse e commer ce wa s su bs tan ti a lly

a ff e c te d. F urthe rm or e , Fre e ma n f a ils to e sta

bli sh ho w the de fe nd a nts ’ anticompetitive conduc t affe cted Te nnessee commerc e to a substanti al deg ree even thoug h the conduct r esulted in Fr eeman paying hig her prices to reta ilers for items c ontaining sor bates. To the contra ry , there is no indication that the items that Fre eman pur chase d cont ained sorbates manufa cture d by

Eastman, the lone de fendant with ties to Tennessee. T here fore , we conclude that Fr eeman’s claim does not fa ll within t he scope of the TTPA and that the tria l court prope rly g rante d thede fe nd a nts ’ m oti on to d ism iss F re e ma n’ s c la im.
B. U nj ust

Enr ic hm e nt
We must nex t determine whether the t rial court erre d in deny ing the defe ndants’ motion for su mmary judg me nt r e g ard ing F re e ma n’ s c la im o f u nju st e nric hme nt. Sum mary jud g me nt i s app ro priate on ly

wh e n th e mov ing pa

rty de mon str a te s that no g e nu ineiss ue s o f m a te ri a l f a c t e xist and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. S ee T enn. R . Civ. P . 56.04; Penley v. Honda Motor Co., 31 S.W .3d 181, 183 (Tenn. 2000). Its purpose “is to re solve controlling issues of law r ather

than to find fac ts or resolve disputed f actua l issues.” XI

Props., I nc. v. Rac etra c Petroleum, I nc., 151 S .W.3d 443, 446 (Tenn. 2004) (citation omitted). Thus, we must re view a trial c ou rt ’s de c isi on to g rant o r d e ny su mma ry jud g me nt d e no vo wi th n o p re su mpt ionof c or re c tne ss attache d to the trial court’ s conclusions. See Mooney v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000). We mus t a lso vie w the evi den c e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra bleto the no n- mov ing pa rty , d ra wi ng a ll rea sonable infe renc es in the non-moving party ’s fa vor. Staples v. CBL & A ssocs., I nc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)

. We have pr eviously

rec og nized two types of implied contra cts: contra cts implied in fact and contra cts implied in law. See Pascha ll ’s , I n c. v . Dozier, 407 S.W .2d 150, 153-54 (Te nn. 1966). Con tr a c ts i mpl ie d infa c t ari se un de r c ir c ums ta nc e s e sta bli shin g t he partie s’ mutua l in te nti on to contra ct. I d. at 154 (citation om itted). Contracts i mplied in law or qua si contrac ts are c reated by law without the parties’ a ssent and ar e base d upon rea son and jus tice. I d. (citation om itted); Ang us v. Cityof Jackson, 968 S.W .2d 804, 808 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Courts may impose a contr act implied in l a w w here

no con tr actex is ts un der v ari ou s q uas i co nt ract ual th eori es, in clu di ng un ju st e nr ic hme nt. Whit ehave n Cmty . Ba

ptist C hurch v. H olloway , 973 S.W .2d 592, 596 (Tenn. 1998)

. The e lements of an unjust enrichment claim ar e: 1) “[a] bene fit confe rre d upon the def endant by the plaintiff”; 2) “appr eciation by the def endant of such bene fit”; and 3) “ acc eptanc e of suc h benef it under such c ircumstance s that it would be inequitable for him to retain the bene fit without payment of the va lue there of.” Pasc hall’s, I nc. , 4 0 7 S.W .2d at 155. The most sig nificant require ment of an unjust enrich m en t cl aim is that the benef it to the defendant be unjust. I d.; Whit ehave n Cmty

. Ba

ptist Church, 973 S.W.2d at 596. The plaintiff must furthe r demonstrate that he or she has exhausted all re medies ag ainst the person w ith whom the plaintiff enjoy ed privity of-12-

contra ct. Pascha ll’s, I nc., 407 S.W.2d at 155; W hitehaven Cmty . Ba ptist C h urch, 973 S.W.2d at 596. A p la int if

f n e ed not b e in p ri vity

wi th a de fe nd a nt t o r e c ov e r u nd e r a c la im o f u nju st enric hment. See Pascha ll’s, I nc., 407 S.W.2d at 154. Thus, Fr eeman may bring a cause of ac tion fo r u nju st e nric hme nt a g a ins t th e de fe nd a nts e ve n th ou g h Fre e ma n d id no t pu rc ha se theite ms containing sorbates dire ctly from the defe ndants. The defendants, howeve r, contend that Fre eman must establish that itconfe rre d a direct benef it, rathe r than a n indirect or inc idental bene fit, upon the d ef en d an t s
. A b en ef

i ti s an y fo rm o f a d v an t age t h ath as a m ea s u rab l e v al u e i n cl u d i n g t h e a d v an t age of being saved f

rom an e x pense or

loss. L awr enceWarehous e C o
. v. Twohig , 224 F.2d 493, 498 (8 Cir. 1955). The unde rly ing principle of the doc trine of unjust enric hment is that a party who th
re c e ive s a

be ne fi t th a t heor

sh e de sir e s, un de r c ir c ums ta nc e s r e nd e ri ng rete nti on of thebe ne fi t wi tho ut p ro vid ing c omp e ns a tio n in e qu ita ble , mu st c omp e ns a te thepr ov ider o f th e be ne fi t. Paschall’s, Inc., 407 S.W.2d at 154. I n acc ordanc e with this underlying principle, we conclude that to r ecove r for unjust e nrichment, a plaintiff nee d not establish that the defe ndant re ceive d a dire ct benef it from the plaintiff. Rather, a plaintiff may rec over for unjust e nrichment a g ainst a def endant wh o r e c e ive s a ny b enef

it from the plaintiff if the de fendant’s rete ntion of the bene fit would be un jus t. Ou r c on c lus ionis c on sis te nt w ithoth e r j urisd ic tio ns tha t ha ve a lso c on c lud e d th a t th e be ne fi t rec eived by a defe ndant need not be direc t to establish an unjust e nrichment claim. See, e.g ., Hirsch v. Bank of Am., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 229 (Cal. App. 2003) ( holding that to conf er a benef it, the plaint if f need not pay

themon e y

dir e c tly to the de fe nd a nt) ; H PI

He a lthCareSe rv s. , Inc . v . M t. Ve rn on Ho sp ., I nc ., 54 5 N.E .2 d 672 , 679 (Ill. 19 89 ) ( pe rm itt ing re c ov e ry of a be ne fi t tr a ns fe rr e d to the def endan t by a third party

wher e the third pa

rty mistakenly

g ave the benef

it to the defendant i n s t ea d o f t h e p l ai n t i f

f, wh er e t h e d ef

en d an tp ro cu re d t h e b en ef i tfr o mt h e t h i rd p ar t y

t h ro u gh wrong ful conduc t, or wher e the plaintiff’s claim to the benefit is superior to the de fendant’s claim); State v. e x re l. Pal me r v . U nis y s Co rp ., 63 7 N .W. 2d14 2, 15 5 ( I ow a 20 01 ) ( c on c lud ing that “ be ne fi ts can bedirec t or indirect, and can involve be nefits conf err ed by third parties” ).
The de fendants further c ontend that Fr eeman failed to establish that it ex hausted its reme dies ag ainst the superma

rket fr om which it purcha sed the food pr odu ct s that contained sor bates. The defe ndants submitted various aff idavits to demonstrate that Fr eeman had not soug ht to rec over f rom the superma

rket. We conc lude that throug h these a ffidavits, the de fendants h ave ne g ated the e xhaus tio n o f r e me die s e le me nt of F re e ma n’ s un jus t e nric hme nt c la im. Th us , th e bu rd e n s hif ts t o Fr eeman to provide specific facts establishi ng the ex istence of disputed issues of materia l fac t that must be resolved by the trier of fac t. See Bla ir v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W .3d 76 1 , 7 6 7 (Tenn. 2004).
I n response , Fr eeman submitt ed an af fi d avit from its counsel maintaining that he wa s unawa re of any viable claims ag ainst the superma rket. Free man essentially contends that pursuit of any cause s of action ag ainst the s uperma rket would have be en futile. Althoug h our courts have not a d d r e s s e d t h e i s s u e o f

f u t i l i t y w i t h r e g ar d t o t h e e xh au s t i o n o f r e m e d i e s e l e m e n to f

a n u n j u st enri c h me n t c laim , o u r c o u rts h a v e r e c o g n iz e d th is e xc e p ti o n in o th e r c au s e s o f a c ti o n w ith an exhaustion of remedies r equire ment. See e.g., Wi lson v. Miller, 250 S.W .2d 575, 578 (Tenn. 1952)-13-

(ac tion b y a u n i on member to re cover union funds pursuant to a union ag ree ment); Cantrell v. Walker Die Casting , I n c. , 121 S.W .3d 391, 396 n.3 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ( ERI SA action). Likewise, we conclude that to maintain an ac ti on for unjust enric hment, a plaintiff is not requir ed to exhaust all remedies ag ainst t h e p ar t y wi t h wh om the plaintiff is in privityif the pursuit of the re me die s w ou ld b e fu ti le. W e do no t be lie ve , h ow e ve r, that a ba rea lle g a tio n th a t a ny

a tte mpt to e xhaus t it s r e me die s a g a ins t th e su pe rm arket wou ld be fu til e wi tho ut p ro vid ing a fa c tua l ba sis to support the allegation is sufficient to establish a disputed issue of material fac t as to the exhaustionof-r emedies e lement of Fr eeman’s unjust e nrichment claim ag ainst the defe ndants. Thus, the trial c ou rt e rr e d inde nying thede fe nd a nts ’ m oti on fo r s umm ary jud g me nt.
CO NC LU SION
We conclude that althou gh Fr ee man may bring a claim ag ainst the defe ndants under the TTPA as an i n direc t purcha ser, the c onduct of whic h Fr eeman complains does not fa ll within t he sc op e of thea c t be c aus e Te nn e sse e c omm e rc e wa s n ot s ub stanti a lly a ff e c te d b y thec on du c t. A s to theun jus t e nric hme nt c la im, we ho ld that Fre e ma n w a s n ot r e qu ir e d to e sta bli sh that th e de fe nd a nts direc tly benef itted from the tra nsaction betwe en Fr eeman and the supe rmarke t. We further hold, howeve r, that the trial court err ed in de clining to g rant the defe ndants’ motion for summary judgme nt a s to the un

jus t enric hme nt c la im d ue to Fre e ma n’ s f a ilu reto p ro vid e a

fa c tua l ba sis to s up po rt

its alleg ation that any

attempt to exhaust i ts remedies a g ainst the supermar ket would have be en futile. Acc ording ly , we a ffirm the judg ment of the Cou rt o f Ap p ea l s in part and r ever se in part, and we rema nd the ca se to the trial court for further proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion.
The c osts of appea l a

re taxed to the appellant, Fr eeman I ndustries, and its sureties, for which e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f

n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ JANI CE M . H OLDE R, JUS TI CE