alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
| Name                                                                                                                 |   | Place ofIncorporation |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|-----------------------|
| Banco Santander (México), S.A., Institución de Banca Múltiple, Grupo Financiero Santander México |   | Mexico                |
| Casa de Bolsa Santander, S.A. de C.V. Grupo Financiero Santander México                                         |   | Mexico                |
| Santander Consumo, S.A. de C.V. SOFOMER. E.R.                                                                        |   | Mexico                |
| Instituto Santander Serfin, A.C.                                                                                     |   | Mexico                |
| Santander Servicios Corporativos, S.A. de C.V.                                                                       |   | Mexico                |
| Santander Servicios Especializados, S.A. de C.V.                                                                     |   | Mexico                |
| Santander Holding Vivienda, S.A. de C.V.                                                                             |   | Mexico                |
| Santander Hipotecario, S.A. de C.V. SOFOM. E.R.                                                                      |   | Mexico                |
| Santander Vivienda, S.A. de C.V. SOFOM. E.R.                                                                         |   | Mexico                |
| Fideicomiso GFSSLPT, Banco Santander, S.A.                                                                           |   | Mexico                |
| Banco Santander, S.A., Fideicomiso 100740                                                                            |   | Mexico                |
| Fideicomiso 361 (HICOACB06U and HICOACB06-2U)                                                                        |   | Mexico                |

----
Exhibit 31.1

CERTIFICATION

I, Jason
Kulas, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-K and all reports on Form 10-D required to be filed in respect of the
period covered by this report on Form 10-K of Santander Drive Auto Receivables Trust 2012-4 (the Exchange Act periodic reports);

2. Based on my knowledge, the Exchange Act periodic reports, taken as a whole, do not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit
to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my knowledge, all of the distribution, servicing and other information required to be provided under Form 10-D for the period
covered by this report is included in the Exchange Act periodic reports;

4. I am responsible for reviewing the activities performed
by the servicer and based on my knowledge and the compliance review conducted in preparing the servicer compliance statement required in this report under Item 1123 of Regulation AB, and except as disclosed in the Exchange Act periodic reports,
the servicer has fulfilled its obligations under the servicing agreement in all material respects; and

5. All of the reports on
assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities and their related attestation reports on assessment of compliance with servicing criteria for asset-backed securities required to be included in this report in accordance
with Item 1122 of Regulation AB and Exchange Act Rules 13a-18 and 15d-18 have been included as an exhibit to this report, except as otherwise disclosed in this report. Any material instances of noncompliance described in such reports have been
disclosed in this report on Form 10-K.

In giving the certifications above, I have reasonably relied on information provided to me by the
following unaffiliated parties: Wells Fargo Bank, National Association.



/s/ Jason KulasName:

Jason KulasTitle:

President and Chief Financial OfficerDate:

March 28, 2014
**Exhibit 10.4****LEASE**     **LEASE AGREEMENT**effective as of the 13th day of September, 2006, between **F. MillerConstruction, L.L.C.**(I. D. No.                                        ) as lessee (“Lessee”) and **Joe T. Miller, Sr.,** referred to as lessor (“Lessor”).**WITNESSETH****:****ARTICLE I****LEASED PREMISES**     Lessor does hereby demise and lease unto Lessee, and Lessee does hereby hire and take fromLessor those certain premises (the “Leased Premises”) described as follows:Commencing on the North right-of-way line of U. S. Highway No. 90 adistance of 461.4 feet Southeasterly from intersection of North lineof U. S. Highway No. 90 and West line of Section Thirty-six (36),Township Nine (9) South, Range Eight (8) West, La. Mer., thenceNorth 0° 44’ West along the East line of property allotted to Mrs.May Thelma Lamb 1400 feet, more or less, to South right-of-way lineof Southern Pacific Railroad, thence East along South right-of-wayline of Southern Pacific Railroad 453.45 feet to Northwest corner ofproperty allotted to Herman Collins House, thence South 0° 44’ Eastalong West line of property allotted to Herman Collins House 800feet, thence North 80° 56’ West 361.4 feet parallel to U. S. HighwayNo. 90, thence South 0° 44’ East 670 feet to North right-of-way lineof U. S. Highway No. 90, thence North 80° 56’ West along the Northside of U. S. Highway No. 90 a distance of 100 feet to the point ofcommencement.     Lessor has full right and authority to enter into this Lease and to grant to Lessee the estateand all rights purported to be herein granted without the prior consent or approval of any thirdparty.
 

 
**ARTICLE II****TERM**     The primary term of this Lease shall commence the 15th day of September, 2006 and shallcontinue until the 31st day of August, 2007, subject to all other provisions of this Lease. Lesseeshall have the option to renew this Lease for five (5) additional successive renewal terms of one(1) year each, if Lessee gives Lessor written notice by certified or registered mail of itsintention to renew at least ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the primary term, orrenewal term, as applicable, of this Lease. If Lessee timely exercises the options to renew grantedin this Lease, then this Lease shall continue upon the same terms and provisions contained in thisLease (including rental).**ARTICLE III****RENT**     (a) Amount. Lessee shall pay to the Lessor a monthly rental of $3,500.00, in advance,on September 15, 2006 and then on the first day of each month thereafter through August 31, 2007.Rent for any period of early occupancy or for any partial calendar month during the term shall beprorated.     (b) Address for Payment:     Each rental payment shall be made payable to the following person and delivered to it at the following address:Joe T. Miller, Sr.
#### Frank GRIFFITH, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 20476.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 11, 1939.

Kahn & Branch, of Houston, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

KRUEGER, Judge.

The conviction is for an assault. The punishment assessed is a fine of $10.

The appellant has filed an affidavit to dismiss this appeal, duly verified as required by law. The motion is granted as prayed for and the appeal is dismissed.

PER CURIAM.

The foregoing opinion of the Commission of Appeals has been examined by the judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals and approved by the court.
ex_100629.htm


Exhibit 10.3


 











	 



November 8, 2017


 


Re: Letter Agreement


 


Dear Samuel R. Rubio, 


 


Reference is made to that certain Severance Protection Agreement, between you and GulfMark Offshore, Inc. (the “Company”), dated April 6, 2016 (the “Existing Agreement”). 


 


As you may be aware, the Company entered into a Restructuring Support Agreement on May 15, 2017 (the “RSA”) and filed a petition for relief under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code to implement a restructuring of its balance sheet (the “Reorganization”) on May 17, 2017.


 


In consideration of the benefits contemplated by the RSA, you and the Company hereby agree that, as set forth in the RSA and the Amended Chapter 11 Plan of Reorganization of GulfMark Offshore, Inc., as modified on October 2, 2017 (Docket No. 309), as may be amended from time to time in accordance with the terms of the Restructuring Support Agreement (the “Plan of Reorganization”):


 


(i) prior to the assumption or rejection of the Existing Agreement, you and the board of directors of the reorganized Company (the “New Board”) will engage in good faith negotiations regarding changes to the Existing Agreement within the thirty (30) day period following the effective date of the Plan of Reorganization (the “Negotiation Period”); and 


 


(ii) notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Existing Agreement or any other agreement between you and the Company, neither the Reorganization nor the transactions contemplated by the Plan of Reorganization will constitute a ‘Change of Control’ for purposes of the Existing Agreement or any other employment, severance, change of control or similar type of agreement or arrangement covering you. 


 


The Negotiation Period may be extended by a mutual agreement of you and the New Board. For the avoidance of doubt, the reorganized Company will have the right to reject the Existing Agreement if you and the New Board do not come to a mutually acceptable agreement during the Negotiation Period, as it may be extended by mutual agreement from time to time.


 


Sincerely,


 


GULFMARK OFFSHORE, INC.           


              


	
			 


			
			/s/ Quintin V. Kneen      

			


			
			By: Quintin V. Keen               


			Title: President & CEO   

			

				Accepted and Agreed:  /s/ Samuel R. Rubio             
	 	Samuel R. Rubio



            


 


GulfMark Offshore, Inc. | 842 W Sam Houston Parkway N| Suite 400 | Houston, Texas 77024


Phone 713 963-9522 | Fax 713 963-9796
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 13

- 00786

- CV

IN RE Andrea Hall DOOLITTLE

Original Mandamus Proceeding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Catherine Stone, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Delivered and Filed: November 20, 2013

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On November 4, 2013

, relator Andrea Hall Doolittle filed a petition for writ of mandamus

.

On November 5, 2013, relator filed an emergency motion to stay a hearing scheduled on motions

to modify temporary orders in the underlying child custody proceeding

. The court has considered

relator’s petition for writ of mandamus , the response f iled on behalf of the r eal party in interest

and relator’s reply and is of the opinion that relator is not entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly,

the petition for writ of mandamus is denied

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(a).

PER CURIAM

1 This proc eeding arises out of Cause No. 2010CI19384, styled In the Interest of C.P.D. and A.P.D., Minor Children

, pending in the 224th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Larry Noll presiding.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3443 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3443

 To prohibit the provision of funds under title X of the Public Health 
 Service Act to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., or its 
  affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, or clinics during a period of 
    review by the Government Accountability Office and the Congress.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 8, 2015

Mrs. Ellmers of North Carolina introduced the following bill; which was 
            referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To prohibit the provision of funds under title X of the Public Health 
 Service Act to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., or its 
  affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, or clinics during a period of 
    review by the Government Accountability Office and the Congress.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Women's Health Accountability Act''.

SEC. 2. PROHIBITION OF PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE ACT TITLE X FUNDING TO 
              PLANNED PARENTHOOD UNTIL CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF GAO 
              EVALUATION.

    (a) In General.--No Federal funds may be made available pursuant to 
a grant or contract under title X of the Public Health Service Act (42 
U.S.C. 300 et seq.) to Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., 
or any of its affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, or clinics until 
the date on which Congress completes a review of the report under 
subsection (b).
    (b) Congressional Review of GAO Evaluation on Planned Parenthood 
Activities.--
            (1) GAO report.--Not later than 2 years after the date of 
        enactment of this Act, the Comptroller General of the United 
        States shall submit to Congress a report containing an 
        evaluation of all medical items and services being offered in 
        the facilities of Planned Parenthood Federation of America, 
        Inc., and of its affiliates, subsidiaries, successors, or 
        clinics.
            (2) Congressional review.--Not later than the date that is 
        three months after the date of receipt of the report under 
        paragraph (1), Congress shall complete a review of such report.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit 31.2

Certification of Chief Financial Officer

I, Kevin Samuelson, certify that:



|1. | I have reviewed this amended Annual Report on Form 10-K/A of Infor, Inc.; and
|-- | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------



|2. | Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such
statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.
|-- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  |  |  |  |                        
|------------------- |  |  |  |  |  | -----------------------
|Date: July 22, 2016 |  |  |  |  |  | /s/ KEVIN SAMUELSON    
|                    |  |  |  |  |  | Kevin Samuelson        
|                    |  |  |  |  |  | Chief Financial Officer
#### JORDAN v. STATE.

No. 18207.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 15, 1936.

Rehearing Denied May 27, 1936.

A. L. Lowery, of Nacogdoches, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

LATTIMORE', Judge.

Conviction for robbery; punishment, twenty years in the penitentiary. ■

The record is here'without bills of exception. We find no brief on file for the accused. Curtis Butler, the party alleged to have been robbed, testified that on the night in question appellant came to his room, drew a pistol upon him, and demanded and took from him $65, without his consent and because he was put in fear. Appellant denied the assault and robbery, and introduced some witnesses whose testimony seemed to indicate another party as guilty. Conflicts in testimony are for settlement by the jury. They seem to have accepted the state’s testimony and theory of the case. There being testimony in the record to support their finding, we are without power to disturb the judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

On Motion for Rehearing.

MORROW, Presiding Judge.

In a motion for rehearing appellant calls in question the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction. The evidence is direct and definite to the effect that Curtis Butler, some time after he had retired for the night, was called upon by the appellant and at the point of a pistol was commanded by the appellant to surrender to him $65 in money. Jim Burleson, an alleged confederate of the appellant, was nearby at the time the money was delivered. According to the testimony, after the robbery the appellant and Burleson left in an automobile, which was parked nearby at the time of the commission of the offense. The alleged injured party promptly reported the* robbery to an officer. Butler testified that he had come to San Augustine in company with others for the purpose of getting some counterfeit money. Upon his arrival he was introduced to Burleson, who said that the money could not be delivered until nighttime. The officers at San' Augustine declined to act upon the report of Butler that he had been robbed, but upon his report of it to the officers at Nacog-doches the matter was taken up by them. Appellant was definitely identified by Butler as the man who had robbed him.

Appellant testified to an alibi and introduced his wife to corroborate him upon that point.

No legal questions are presented. The truth of the conflicting statements of fact is a question purely for the solution of the jury. Their verdict, upon a proper charge, was approved by the trial judge. We find nothing in the record upon which this court would be justified in disturbing the verdict.

The motion is overruled.
##### 



EXHIBIT 32.B
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  /s/ JOHN R. SULTJohn R. SultSenior Vice President, Chief Financial Officer
and Controller(Principal Accounting and Financial Officer)November 5, 2007
#### Alton COVILL, Appellant, v. STATE, Appellee.

No. 20013.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. 12, 1938.

Roy A. Downey, of Royalty, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State’s Atty., of Austin, for the State.

GRAVES, Judge.

The offense is passing a forged instruí ment; punishment, three years confinement in the penitentiary.

Since his appeal was perfected, the appellant has filed a written request, verified by his affidavit, asking for the privilege of withdrawing his appeal. The request is granted, and the appeal ordered dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 114th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3423 Introduced in House (IH)]

114th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3423

To amend title 38, United States Code, and the Agent Orange Act of 1991 
to extend the certain authorities of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
  regarding associations between diseases and exposure to dioxin and 
                other chemical compounds in herbicides.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             July 29, 2015

 Mr. Walz (for himself, Mr. Jones, Mr. Gibson, Miss Rice of New York, 
  Mr. Nolan, and Mr. Takano) introduced the following bill; which was 
             referred to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To amend title 38, United States Code, and the Agent Orange Act of 1991 
to extend the certain authorities of the Secretary of Veterans Affairs 
  regarding associations between diseases and exposure to dioxin and 
                other chemical compounds in herbicides.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Agent Orange Extension Act of 
2015''.

SEC. 2. EXTENSION OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES OF SECRETARY OF VETERANS 
              AFFAIRS REGARDING ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN DISEASES AND 
              EXPOSURE TO DIOXIN AND OTHER CHEMICAL COMPOUNDS IN 
              HERBICIDES.

    (a) Use of Information To Provide for Presumption of Service 
Connection.--Section 1116(e) of title 38, United States Code, is 
amended by striking ``September 30, 2015'' and inserting ``September 
30, 2017''.
    (b) Agreement With National Academy of Sciences.--Section 3(i) of 
the Agent Orange Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-4; 38 U.S.C. 1116 note) is 
amended by striking ``December 31, 2015'' and inserting ``December 31, 
2017''.
                                 <all>
```
##### 



Exhibit 32.2
 Certification Pursuant To
18 U.S.C. Section 1350
As Adopted Pursuant To
Section 906 Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act Of 2002
     /s/ Ronald D. MogelRonald D. MogelVice President and
Chief Financial Officer
Horizon Offshore, Inc.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 03-7181
WILLIE ANDRE BROWN, Petitioner - Appellant, versus EDDIE LEE PEARSON, Warden, Sussex II State Prison, Respondent - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Chief District Judge. (CA-03-606) Submitted: December 10, 2003 Decided: December 29, 2003 Before WIDENER, WILKINSON, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Willie Andre Brown, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Willie Andre Brown seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying relief on his petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000). The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that his constitutional claims are debatable and that any dispositive procedural rulings by the district court are also debatable or wrong. See Miller-El v. Cockrell , 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee , 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Brown has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED