In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1122

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL J. MORRISON,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 00-CR-30047--Jeanne E. Scott, Judge.

Argued May 11, 2001--Decided June 20, 2001

 Before BAUER, ROVNER, and EVANS, Circuit

Judges.

 EVANS, Circuit Judge. Michael Morrison

contends that his Fourth Amendment rights

were violated by a "Terry" stop which led

to his conviction for bank robbery.

 At about 9:30 a.m. on June 22, 2000, a

young man robbed the Union Planters Bank

at 111 South Durkin Drive in Springfield,

Illinois, by standing on a teller counter

and jumping into the teller area. The

robber was described as a black male, in

his twenties, about 5 feet 10 inches to 6

feet tall, with short hair; he was

wearing a white shirt and a red cap.

 After the robbery he ran out the front

door, where a bank customer, William

Withers, saw a young black man run south

and jump over a wooden privacy fence

surrounding a parking lot of a

neighboring apartment building. The man

continued to run south and jumped another

fence into a second parking lot serving a

second apartment building. At that point,

Withers saw the man crouch down as if he

were getting into a car. Withers could

not see the car because of the fences.

However, he saw a white-over-red Monte

Carlo leaving the scene and noted the

license plate number.

 Police immediately began an intense
investigation. Officers found and spoke

to the driver of the Monte Carlo but

ruled him out as a suspect because he was

significantly older than the robber was

described to be. Another dead end

included the videotape from security

cameras at a nearby gas station, which

showed nothing extraordinary.

 The officers also retraced the route

Withers said the man took and found a

$100 and several $10 bills in the first

parking lot. They spoke to residents of

the first apartment building. A Ms. Carey

told them that the previous day at about

9:30 she saw two black men sitting in a

black Honda. Because she was the only

African-American living in the apartment

building, she said she found the presence

of the men suspicious and wrote down

their license number, which she said was

CTONEY1. The officers observed that the

location of the car, as Ms. Carey

described it, would give the occupants a

view of the bank if casing it was what

they were up to. Also, the car was

observed on the route the robber

apparently took to escape from the bank

after the robbery. In addition, another

resident of the apartment complex, a Mr.

Poe, reported that his roommate told him

that he was suspicious about a black or

blue Honda he had seen parked in the lot

at 9:15 the day before the robbery.

 Officers also questioned residents of

the second apartment building. Two of the

residents reported seeing a large brown

or reddish car in their parking lot at

about 9:30 the day of the robbery.

 The information about the cars indicated

to the officers that the persons in the

cars might have something to do with the

robbery. In the words of Sergeant Jeffery

Bivens of the Springfield police

department,

It indicated to me that chances were it

was almost exactly 24 hours prior. It

indicated to me that those two people in

the vehicle might very well be involved

or were involved because of the exact

time frame. They were there at the same

time in the morning before, they were in

the escape route, they had a view of the

bank, they could see how it worked; more

or less what we call casing a place.

A search was begun for the suspicious
cars. Sgt. Bivens decided that the

officers should search the apartment com

plexes and streets in the surrounding

area. As a result of the search, at about

11:20, an unoccupied black Honda with

license place CTONEY (close to the

witness’ statement that it was CTONEY1)

was spotted in the parking lot of an

apartment building at 304 Dickenson

Drive, which is approximately 10 blocks

from the Union Planters Bank. Next to the

Honda was a 20-year-old, goldish brown

Buick, at which point one can only guess

that the officers thought things were

coming together nicely.

 The officers discussed what to do. While

this was going on, two black males got

into the Honda and drove off. After

letting it travel a few blocks, the

officers pulled the Honda over. Mr.

Toney, the driver, and his passenger, who

was Michael Morrison--the defendant in

the present case--were informed that the

police were investigating a theft and

that their car had been spotted in the

area of the crime the day before. The men

denied that the car had been in the area.

The officers then spoke to the men

separately outside the vehicle. Toney

said the two had just left Morrison’s

girlfriend’s apartment, which was number

8 in the Dickenson Drive apartment

building. Morrison, on the other hand,

said he had just left his friend Hugh’s

apartment--number 7. He also said he did

not know Hugh’s last name. Morrison also

said he had lived in apartment 10 in the

past.

 A few minutes later, a shoe print lifted

from the teller counter at the Union

Planters Bank was brought to the stop. It

appeared to match the shoes worn by

Toney, although later it was determined

that it was not a match, for good reason

as it was Morrison who robbed the bank.

The men were asked to accompany the

officers to the FBI office to answer

questions; they agreed.

 Meanwhile, officers secured apartments

7, 8, and 10. They spoke to Ms. Williams,

Morrison’s girlfriend and the leaseholder

of apartment 10. She said the goldish

brown Buick in the parking lot belonged

to Morrison. When the officers took a

close look at the Buick, they saw the

remnants of the bank’s dye pack in the

front seat. Williams also gave the
officers permission to search the

apartment in which she lived with

Morrison. More evidence of the robbery

was found in the closet.

 Ultimately, Morrison confessed to the

robbery and was charged with bank

robbery. He moved to suppress evidence

and statement obtained as a result of the

investigatory stop of the black Honda,

contending that the police lacked a

reasonable articulable suspicion to make

the stop. The motion was denied. The

judge said that the stop was reasonable

and that, even if it weren’t, the

evidence obtained by searching the

apartment was not tainted. Williams’

consent to search was an intervening act

dissipating any possible taint. Following

a conditional guilty plea to a charge of

robbing the bank, Morrison appeals both

bases for the district court decision.

 Morrison argues that the police lacked

reasonable suspicion to stop the Honda

because no one had seen it in the

vicinity of the bank on the day of the

robbery, and he contends that the only

basis for the stop was the race of

theoccupants. Our review of the issue is

de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 517

U.S. 690, 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996). We find

Morrison’s argument unconvincing.

 The Fourth Amendment, which protects

"against unreasonable searches and

seizures," does not shield citizens from

heads-up police work. If an officer has

probable cause to believe that a person

committed a crime, he can arrest that

person. See, e.g., United States v.

Johnson, 910 F.2d 1506 (7th Cir. 1990).

But even without probable cause, police

officers can make "Terry stops,"

investigatory stops limited in scope and

executed through the least restrictive

means reasonable. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.

1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968). An

investigatory stop requires that the

officer have a reasonable suspicion

supported by articulable facts. A

reasonable suspicion is "some objective

manifestation that the person stopped is,

or is about to be, engaged in criminal

activity." United States v. Cortez, 449

U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690 (1981). It

must be more than a hunch. United States

v. Tipton, 3 F.3d 1119 (7th Cir. 1993).

Analysis of whether a stop was reasonable

requires consideration of the totality of
the circumstances known to the officers

at the time. United States v. Swift, 220

F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2000).

 What we have here is the police

following a trail which led, very

quickly, to Morrison. The police knew

there was a robbery, so this is not a

case where police are surmising that a

crime may be occurring. Here, also, a

witness saw a black man running from the

bank heading toward a parking lot for a

neighboring apartment building. They had

a general description of the robber. They

traced the route and found currency,

lending credence to the witness’ account.

They then interviewed persons in the

apartment buildings and were given two

descriptions of a dark-colored Honda in

the lot of one of the buildings and two

descriptions of a large, old, reddish

brown car in the other. Both cars stood

out to the residents as not belonging

where they were parked. Furthermore, a

woman in the first building noted that

there were two black men in the Honda

almost exactly 24 hours before the

robbery (the timing is significant

ifcasing the bank was what the men were

up to); she was a black woman who found

the presence of the men suspicious

because she knew she was the only black

person living in the building. She wrote

down the number on the license plate,

further proof that she certainly

suspected that something nefarious was a

possibility. When the police conducted a

search in a fairly large area surrounding

the bank, in what surely had to seem like

more than a mere coincidence, they found

the two suspicious cars parked side by

side. As an aside, we note that this is

not the first getaway car to lead police

to the culprits. See, e.g., Swift; United

States v. Arrington, 159 F.3d 1069 (7th

Cir. 1998). While the police were

contemplating what to do, two black men

got into the Honda and drove off.

 We have no trouble concluding that the

officers’ suspicions were reasonable and

supported a Terry stop of the Honda. Once

the men denied that the Honda had been in

the apartment building parking lot the

day before and then told different

stories regarding where they were coming

from, the officers’ suspicions were

increased and the investigation

intensified.
 Morrison’s argument that the only reason

for the stop was that he and Toney were

black is not convincing. The robber, and

the two men in the Honda the day before

the robbery, were described as black men.

As we have said, the Honda itself bore

essentially the license plate number that

Ms. Carey had noted. When the police saw

two black men drive off in the very Honda

that had been identified the day before,

they had a reasonable suspicion upon

which they could act. When police are

searching for a bank robber described as

a black male, it is reasonable for them

to be looking for a black man. If there

had been no description from any witness

about the race of the people observed and

the police had gone about willy-nilly

stopping black men and, in a stroke of

dumb luck, stumbled upon Morrison, the

argument would have more force. But that

is not what happened here. Morrison and

his companion had the bad luck in casing

the bank to choose to park in apartment

parking lots where the residents were

apparently believers in Neighborhood

Watch. The residents recognized alien

cars as well as people who seemed to not

live in the complex. When their

suspicions were aroused, they noted their

suspicions and, when questioned, passed

them along to the police.

 Morrison’s motion to suppress was

properly denied and the judgment of the

district court is AFFIRMED.