[Cite as State v. Dodson, 2021-Ohio-2415.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 No. 20AP-297 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : (C.P.C. No. 19CR-5480)

 & 

v. : No. 20AP-298 

 (C.P.C. No. 19CR-2331)

Richard L. Dodson, : 

 (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on July 15, 2021 

 

On brief: [G. Gary Tyack], Prosecuting Attorney, and 

Sheryl L. Prichard, for appellee. 

On brief: Rhys B. Cartwright-Jones, for appellant.

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

LUPER SCHUSTER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Richard L. Dodson, appeals from judgments of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas sentencing him for possession of heroin and 

failure to appear as required by recognizance. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 2} This is an appeal from two trial court judgments. In Franklin County Court 

of Common Pleas case No. 19CR-2331, Dodson was indicted on one count of possession of 

heroin, a violation of R.C. 2925.11 and a third-degree felony; one count of possession of 

cocaine, a violation of R.C. 2925.11 and a fifth-degree felony; and one count of aggravated 

possession of drugs, a violation of R.C. 2925.11 and a fifth-degree felony. On January 30, 

2020, Dodson pleaded guilty to the heroin possession count. A nolle prosequi was entered 

as to the other two counts. For the heroin possession conviction, the trial court found 
Nos. 20AP-297 and 20AP-298 2 

Dodson not amenable to community control and sentenced him to three years in prison, to 

be served concurrently with the sentence imposed in Franklin C.P. No. 19CR-5480. 

{¶ 3} In Franklin County Court of Common Pleas case No. 19CR-5480, Dodson was 

indicted on one count of failure to appear as required by recognizance, a violation of R.C. 

2937.99 and a fourth-degree felony. On January 30, 2020, Dodson entered a guilty plea as 

to this single count. For this offense, the trial court again found that Dodson was not 

amenable to community control, and it sentenced him to 18 months in prison, to be served 

concurrently with the sentence imposed in case No. 19CR-2331. 

{¶ 4} Dodson timely appeals from these judgments, and this court consolidated the 

appeals for the purposes of review and disposition. 

II. Assignment of Error 

{¶ 5} Dodson assigns the following error for our review: 

The Appellant's prison sentence[s] on a felony of the third 

degree and a felony of the fourth degree were not supported by 

the record and were contrary to law where the court found that 

appellant should serve prison time instead of a sentence of 

community control. 

III. Discussion 

{¶ 6} In his sole assignment of error, Dodson asserts his sentences were not 

supported by the record and were contrary to law. Dodson argues the trial court did not 

conduct a sufficient analysis of the facts and circumstances of this matter to justify 

imposing prison sentences and not community control sanctions. He also argues the record 

does not support the prison sentences. This assignment of error is not well-taken.

{¶ 7} In sentencing a felony offender, the trial court must consider the overriding 

purposes of sentencing, which are "to protect the public from future crime by the offender 

and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the 

offender using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those 

purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government 

resources." R.C. 2929.11(A). This requires consideration of "the need for incapacitating 

the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the 

offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both." State v. 

Wilburn, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-602, 2018-Ohio-1917, ¶ 7. "Further, pursuant to R.C. 
Nos. 20AP-297 and 20AP-298 3 

2929.12(A), the court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) relating 

to the seriousness of the offender's conduct, as well as the factors set forth in R.C. 

2929.12(D) and (E) relating to the likelihood of recidivism, along with any other relevant 

factors." Id.

{¶ 8} The trial court has the discretion to determine, upon considering and 

weighing all relevant factors, what sentence would best serve the purposes and principles 

of sentencing. State v. Anderson, 10th Dist. No. 16AP-810, 2017-Ohio-7375, ¶ 14 (trial 

court, in exercising sentencing discretion, determines weight afforded to any particular 

statutory factors, mitigating grounds, or other relevant circumstances). Consequently, an 

appellate court will not reverse a trial court's sentencing decision unless the evidence is 

clear and convincing that either the record does not support the sentence or the sentence is 

"otherwise contrary to law." R.C. 2953.08(G)(2); State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. No. 04AP895, 2005-Ohio-1961, ¶ 10, citing State v. Maxwell, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-1271, 2004-Ohio5660, ¶ 27, citing State v. Comer, 99 Ohio St.3d 463, 2003-Ohio-4165, ¶ 10. See also State 

v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, ¶ 1 ("an appellate court may vacate or 

modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence 

that the record does not support the trial court's findings under relevant statutes or that the 

sentence is otherwise contrary to law"). Clear and convincing evidence is that "which will 

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to 

be established." Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 9} As to whether Dodson's sentences were clearly and convincingly unsupported 

by the record, Dodson asserts the heroin possession and failure to appear offenses are 

nonviolent offenses, he was accepted into treatment programs to address his drug problem, 

and he expressed remorse and regret for his criminal actions. He argues community 

control sanctions would have been more appropriate than the imposed prison sentences, 

as they would best serve the purposes of protecting the public, punishing him, and 

rehabilitating him. We are unpersuaded, however, that clear and convincing evidence 

demonstrates the prison sentences were not supported by the record.

{¶ 10} At the sentencing hearing, Dodson expressed remorse, acknowledged his 

drug problem, and indicated interest in treatment for this problem at a community-based 

correctional facility. But the record also demonstrated that he previously walked away 
Nos. 20AP-297 and 20AP-298 4 

unsuccessfully from drug treatment, that he continued to use drugs until his arrest in this 

matter, and that he has outstanding warrants in other counties that likely would delay any 

admission into a drug treatment program. Dodson's likelihood of recidivism also 

reasonably weighed in favor of the trial court imposing prison sentences instead of 

community control sanctions. At the time of Dodson's sentencing, he had an extensive 

criminal history, including having been sent to prison four times. Further, as to Dodson's 

remorse, the trial court was best positioned to evaluate its genuineness. See, e.g., State v. 

Dudley, 11th Dist. No. 2009-L-019, 2009-Ohio-5064, ¶ 22 ("a reviewing court must defer 

to the trial court as to whether a defendant's remarks are indicative of genuine remorse 

because it is in the best position to make that determination"). Therefore, Dodson fails to 

demonstrate that his prison sentences, in lieu of community control sanctions, were clearly 

and convincingly not supported by the record.

{¶ 11} Nor are we persuaded that Dodson's sentences were "otherwise contrary to 

law." A "sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law when a trial court 

considers the principles and purposes of sentencing contained in R.C. 2929.11 and the 

factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes postrelease control, and sentences the 

defendant within the permissible statutory range." State v. Haddad, 10th Dist. No. 16AP459, 2017-Ohio-1290, ¶ 19. In arguing that his sentences were "otherwise contrary to law," 

Dodson does not allege that his sentences were not within the applicable permissible 

statutory ranges, or that the trial court improperly imposed post-release control. He 

contends the trial court's analysis regarding the purposes and principles of sentencing was 

deficient. But the trial court's judgment entries imposing his sentences expressly state that 

it "considered the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the 

fact[or]s set forth in R.C. 2929.12." (Mar. 3, 2020 Jgmt. Entries at 1.) The inclusion of such 

language in a judgment entry belies a defendant's claim that the trial court failed to properly 

consider the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Reeves, 10th Dist. No. 14AP856, 2015-Ohio-3251, ¶ 7. Thus, we reject Dodson's contention that his sentences were 

otherwise contrary to law.

{¶ 12} For these reasons, we overrule Dodson's sole assignment of error. 
Nos. 20AP-297 and 20AP-298 5 

IV. Disposition 

{¶ 13} Having overruled Dodson's sole assignment of error, we affirm the judgments 

of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.

Judgments affirmed. 

BEATTY BLUNT and MENTEL, JJ., concur.