### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 16 , 200 4

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JULIU S E. SM ITH
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty Nos. 239667, 239832 Rebec ca Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2003-01059-CC A-R3- CD - F iled Jul y 19, 2004

The de fenda nt, J ulius E. Smit h, enter ed pleas of g uilty to two counts of driving under the influence , third offe nse, and f

our counts of ve hicular a ssault. As to the first driving under the influence offe nse, the tr ia l c ou rt

imp os e d a

se nte nc e of

e le ve n mo nth s a ndtw e nty -n ine da y s, to be su sp e nd e d to probation af

ter the se rvice of 120 day s of conf inement. The se cond wa s merg ed into the convictions for vehicular assault. The trial court imposed consec utive sentenc es of thre e y ear s for e ach ve hicular assault conviction. The sentenc es we re or dere d to be serve d consec utively to the sentenc e for driving

un de r the inf

lue nc e , thi rd of

fe ns e . T he e ff

e c tiv e se nte nc e is, the re fo re , tw e lve y e ars , e le ve n mo nth s, and twenty -nine da y s. I n this appeal, the defe n d an t as s er ts that the eff ective se ntence for the vehic u lar a ssault convictions is ex cessive. It is our judgment that the misapplication of an enhanc ement fa ctor to three of the four vehicula r as sault convictions war rants a r eduction to two y ear s for e ach of

those crimes. Otherw ise, the j udg ments of t he trial court, including the imposition of conse cutive terms, are a ffirme d.

Tenn. R. App . P . 3; Judgme nts of the Trial Court Affi rm ed as Modif ied

G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J OS EP H M. T I PTON and J AM ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J J ., joined.

Ar de na J. Ga rth, Di stric t Pu bli c De fe nd e r, a ndDo nn a Ro bi ns on Mille r, As sis ta nt D ist ri c t Pu bli c Def ender , for the a

ppellant, J ulius E. Sm ith.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral & Reporter ; J . Ross Dy er, A ssistant Attorne y Ge n er al ; and Parke Ma sterson, Assistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
OP IN ION

On Fe bruary

12, 2003, the defendant entered a g uiltyplea in ca se number 239832 to driving under t he influenc e, third off ense. SeeTenn. Code Ann. §§ 55- 10-401, -403. Pursuant to a ple a ag ree ment, the def

endant r ece ived an a g ree d sentenc e of eleve n months a nd twenty -nine da y s, to be-2-

suspende d to probation afte r ser vice of one hundre d twenty

day s of conf

inement in jail. The sti pu la te d f

a c ts, a s st a te d a t th e su bmi ssi on of the g uil ty

ple a , a re a s f oll ow s:
[O] n the 28th of F ebrua

ry , 20 0 1 , the def

endant wa s operating a

motor vehicle tha t
re ar- e nd e d a

c ar tha t w a s st op pe d a t a

lig ht. Th a t car in tur n als o r a n in to the c ar i n fr on t of it. Th e re wa s d a ma g e to b oth of tho se c ars bu t the re we re no t se ri ou s b od ily injuries in that case . The de fenda nt was found under the influence of alcohol by the police off icer , Offic er Watkins, and did re fuse to takea test in that ca se.

As to the oth e r c ha

rg e s, the de fe nd a nt e nte re d p le a s o f g ui lt y to o ne c ou nt o f thir d o ff

e ns e driving under the influence and four counts of vehicular assault. See Te nn. Code Ann. § 39-13- 106. The sente nce w as left to the discretion of the trial c ourt. The stipulated fa cts of that ca se we re d es cr i b ed b y

t h e s t at e a tt h e s u b m i s s i o n h ea ri n g:
[T] hat ca se

. . . occur

red on the 19th of September of 2001. The defe ndant

. . . was operating a

vehicle on that day

. He was tra veling down the 300 block of Bonny Oaks Drive, driving in and out of traff ic. The de fenda nt was very intox icated at this t ime. [Th e de fe nd a nt] h a d a n a c c ide nt wh e n he e nte re d int o the path of a no the r v e hic le in that li ne of tr a ff

ic a t tha t time

. As a re su lt the re we re se ri ou s b od ily inj urie s to Ni c ole Ba x ter, Rac hel B axter, Hea ther White, and Rebec ca White.

I n that case he wa s tested by a blood test and ha d a B AC of .23.

As a pa rt of the ple a a g re e me nt, the se nte nc e fo r dri vin g un de r the inf lue nc e , thir d o ff

e ns e , w a s to be ser ved conse cutively

to the sentenc e imposed for t he vehic ular a ssault convictions because the defe ndant was on ba il for the first c harg es whe n the sec ond acc ident occur red.

At the sentenc ing he aring , Rache l Ba x ter, one of the victims of ve h i cu lar a ssault, testified that her car , which was valued at $2500, was a total loss. Mark Kimsey , a traff ic investigator for the Hamilton County Sheriff' s Depa rtment, testified that the rate of a lcohol-re lated tra ffic f atalities was on the rise in Hamilton Count y and that in 2001, thirty -nine pe rce nt of traf fic fatalities in Hamilton Countywer e alc ohol r elated. Acc ording to Kimsey , that rate was hig her tha n the national ave rag e, which had de cre ased.

The forty -one- y ear -old defe ndant, testify ing on his own be half , ad m i t t ed that he ha d a drinking problem and pr oposed to seek rehabilitation and make restitution if gr anted pr obation. He

a lso c la ime d th a t de pr e ssi on oc c a sio ne d b y de a ths wi thi n h is f

a mil y ha d co ntribu te d to hi s p ro ble ms with alcohol and a sserted that, before being arr ested, he had owne d a succ essful conc rete finishing company . The de fenda nt e x presse d conce rn for the vic tims of his second acc ident and testified that he used his ce ll phone to call an a mbulance. H e ac knowledg ed, howe ver , that he had not soug ht reha bilitation for his alcohol depende ncy afte r either

of the a ccide nts and conc eded that he continued to use alcohol until he wa s incarc erated in September of 2002.-3-

Br uce Smith, the defe ndant' s brother, te stified that the def endant ha d been de eply

aff ecte d by the de a th o f h is m oth e r anda no the r b ro the r, wh ic h h a d o c c ur re d w it hi n a sh ort per iodof tim e be fo re the a c c ide nt. Whil e a c kn ow le dg ing th at the d e fe nd a nt h a d e xpe ri e nc e d a de c lin e in h is business, it was Smit h' s opinion that the defendant, if g rante d probation, could e asily ree stablish a

succe ssful enterprise. Smit h conce ded that the defe ndant had made no eff ort at re habilitation since the a c c ide nt.

I n addition to the eleve n-month-twenty -nine-day sentenc e, the trial court imposed sentence s of three y ea rs on each of the four c ounts of vehicular assault and or dere d consec utive service on
eac h. The trial court also denied alternative sentenc ing, concluding that confine ment was " nece ssary to avoid depre ciating the seriou s n es s of the off ense" and that " measure s less restrictive tha n confine ment have f

reque ntly or re cently

been applied unsucce ssfully to the defe ndant." See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(1)( B) , (C). It also determined that the defe ndant' s behavior indicated " a lac k of potential for

reha bilitation and treatment." See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 103(5).

I I n this a ppeal, the defe ndant asserts that the trial court misapplied one enha nceme nt fac tor and that it err ed by

ordering c onsecutive se ntencing . When there is a c halleng e to the leng th, rang e,
or manne r of se rvice of a se ntence , it is t he duty of t h i s co u rt to conduct a de novo revie w with a presumption that the determinations made by the trial court are corr ect. Te nn. C o d e Ann. § 40-35-401( d). This pr esumption is "c onditioned upon the aff irmative showing in the rec ord that the trial court considere d the sentenc ing principles and all re levant fa cts and c ircumstance s." State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 169 (Tenn. 1991) ; see State v. Jones, 883 S.W .2d 597, 600 (Tenn. 1994)

.
" I f the tr ia l c ou rt app lie s ina pp ro pr ia te fa c tor s or oth e rw ise fails to fo llo w the 19 89 Se nte nc ing Ac t, the pre sumption of corre ctness fa lls." St ate v. Shelton, 854 S .W.2d 116, 123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments provide that the burden is on the defendant to show the imp ro pr ie ty

of the se nte nc e

. Te nn . Code An n. § 4 0- 35 -4 01 , Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts

.
Our re view re quires an a naly sis of (1) the evidenc e, if any , rec eived at the trial and sente ncing hearing; ( 2) t h e p re s en t ence report; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing and the ar g uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the offe nse; (5) any mitigating or enha ncing fac tors; (6) any statements made by

the def endant in his own beha lf; and (7) the defe ndant' s potential for reh ab ilitation or treatment. Tenn. Code A nn. §§ 40-35-102, - 103, -210; State v. Smit h, 735 S.W .2d 859, 863 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987)

.
Vehicula r assault, a Class D felony , car ries a r ang e of punishment of betwee n two and four y ear s for a Rang e I

offe nder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(4) . I n calc ulating the sentenc e for a Class D felony

conviction, the pre sumptive sentence is the minim um in the rang e if there are no enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210( c). I f there are enhanc ement bu t no mit ig a tin g fa c tor s, the tr ia l c ou rt ma y se t th e sen ten ce a

bo ve the min imu m, b ut s til l w ith in the ra ng e. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 210(d). A s entenc e invol ving both enhanc ement and miti g ating fac tors require s an assig nment of rel at i v e we ight f or the e nhance ment fac tors as a me ans of-4-

inc r e a s in g th e s e n te n c e

. T e n n

. Co d e A n n

. § 4 0

- 3 5

- 2 1 0 ( e )

. T h e s e n te n c e mu s t th e n b e reduc ed within the rang e by

any weig ht assigne d to the mitigating fac tors prese nt. I d.

I n arriving at a mid-rang e sente nce of three y ea rs o n ea ch count, the trial court applied enhanc ement fa ctors (2 ), t h e def endant ha s a pre vious historyof criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to t h o s e n ec es sary to establish the appropriate ra ng e, and ( 7), the a mount of damag e to prope rty sustained by the victim was particularly g reat. See Tenn. Code A nn. § 40-35- 114(2), ( 7) (2003) . I n mitigation, the trial c ourt conc luded that the def endant ha d a g ood employ ment history

and g ood family support but de termined that those f actor s were not sufficient to l e sse n th e thr e e -y e ar s e nte nc e s.

The de fenda nt asserts that the trial court err ed by apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (7), that the amount of dama g e to property sustained bythe victim was particularly g reat. The state c oncede s that the tr ia l c ou rt

sh ou ld n ot h a ve app lie d th is f a c tor to the c on vic tio ns pe rt a ini ng to the pa sse ng e rs in the ca r but asserts that it was applicable to the c onviction relating to the driver, w ho owned the c ar. This court has pr eviously held that enha nceme nt fac tor (7) i s ap p l icable w hen, as in this case , a vehicular assault victim's c ar w as tot al ed

. S ee , e.g ., State v. J ohn D. Neble tt, No. 01C01-9805-CC-00231 (Tenn. C ri m. App., at Nashville, Sept. 24, 1999); State v. Ge org e B lake Kelly , No. 01C01-9610-CC-0048 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Oct.13, 1998). I n conseque nce, fac tor (7) w ould be applica ble to the conviction for

vehicular assault of Rac hel B axter, whose ca r
wa s d e str oy e d in the a c c ide nt. No ne of the pa sse ng e rs , h ow e ve r, su ff e re d " pa rt ic ularly g re a t" property damage

. I n fac t, the only property damag e listed by

any of the re maining vic tims was approximated at $100 in clothing a nd jewelry

. Thus, the trial court err ed by apply ing e nhance ment fac tor (7) to the r emaining convictions. I n our view, a modification of the three-y ear sentenc e imposed for the ve hicular a ssault upon Rachel B axter is not war rante d under our sentenc ing act. The

na tur e a ndc ir c ums ta nc e s o f tha t of fe ns e c ou ple d wi th the de fe nd a nt' s p re vio us his tory of a lc oh olre la te d o ff

e ns e s w arr a nt the mid -r a ng e se nte nc e

. As to the re ma ini ng ve hic ula r a ssa ult c on vic tio ns , the m isapplication of an enhanc ement factor, particularly in light of the mitigating fac tors identified by the trial court as having minimal wei gh t , wo u l d require a modification of the sentenc es to two y e ars on e a c h c ou nt.
The United States Supre me Court' s rec ent opinion in Blake ly v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 2004 U.S. L EXI S 4573 (2004), calls into que stion the continuing validity of our cur rent sente ncing scheme

. I n that case , the Court, apply ing the rule in Appre ndi v. New Jersey , 566 U.S. 466, 490 (2 0 0 0 ), s t ru ckd o wn a p ro v i s i o n o f t h e W as h i n gt o n s en t en ci n g gu i d el i n es t h at p er m i t t ed a t ri al j u d ge to impose an "e x ceptional sentenc e" upon the finding of ce rtain statutorily enumer ated e nhance ment fac tors. I d. The Court obser ved that " the ' statutory maxi mum' f

or Appre ndi purposes is the maxi mum sentence a judg e may impose solely on the bas is of the f acts reflecte d in the j ury ve rdict

or admitted by the de

fendant ." I d., at **13-14 (e mphasis in origina l). Fina lly , the Court conclude d that "e very

defe ndant has a right

to i ns ist that th e pr os e c uto r p ro ve to a jury [be y on d a

re a so na ble doubt] all fac ts leg ally

essential to the punishment." I d., at *31 (e mphasis in origina l).T he f i rs t fo ur cr i t eri a are fo und in G ray

. A fi f t h c at ego ry in G ray , ba sed o n a s p eci f i c num b er of

pri o r f el o ny 1

con v i ct i on s , ma y e n h an ce t h e s en t en ce r an g e bu t i s n o l on g er a l i s t ed cr i t er i on

. Se e T en n

. Code An n

. § 40- 35

- 1 1 5, S en t en cing C o m m i ssi o n C o m m en t s.
-5- I n any event, the a

pplication of Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-114( 2) would not violate the rule established in Appre ndi because it is based, in this case, upon prior criminal convictions. See Appr endi, 566 U.S. at 490. The de fenda nt h as s ev en p rior convic tions, the applicability

of which w as not at issue. That f actor would apply

to all four convic tions. During the submissi on hearing, the defe ndant conc eded that he caused the da mag e to Rache l Ba x ter' s vehicle. Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 40 -3 5- 11 4( 7) (2 00 3)

. B e c a us e that fa c t wa s a pa rt of the g uil ty

ple a , it wo uld apply to the vehicular assault of Rache l B axter. By use of the ruling in Blake ly , it is our view that

a m o d i f i c a t i o n t o t w o y e ar s o n t h r e e o f t h e v e h i c u l ar a s s a u l tc o n v i c t i o n s w o u l d b e ap p r o p r i a t e

. In our view, the three -y ear sentenc e as to the vehicular assault of Rache l Ba x ter wa s proper ly imposed.

II The de fenda nt next asserts tha t the trial court err ed by ordering consec utive sentenc ing. Prior to the enac tment of the Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989, t he limited classifications for the imposit ion of consec utive sentenc es we re s et o u t in Gray v. State, 538 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tenn. 1976). I n that case , our supreme court r uled that ag g ravating c ircumstance s must be present be fore place ment in any

one of the classifications. L ater , in State v. Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d 227 (Tenn. 1987) , our hig h court e stablished an additional ca teg ory fo r t hose def

endants c onvicted of two or more statutory o ff en s es involving sexual abuse of minors. There wer e, howe ver, a dditional words of caution:
[C]ons e c uti ve se nte nc e s sh ou ld n ot r ou tin e ly be imp os e d .

. . a nd

. . . the a g g re g a te maxi mum of consecu tive terms must be rea sonably related to the seve rity

of the offe nses involved.
Tay lor, 739 S.W .2d at 230. The Sente ncing Comm i s sion Comm ents adopted the cautionary la ng ua g e . T e nn . Co de An n. § 40- 35 -1 15 , Sen te nc ing Com mis sio n Comme nts

. Th e 19 89 Ac t is, in

essenc e, the codification of the hol dings in Gra y and Ta y lor; consec utive sentenc es may be imposed in the discretion of the trial court only upon a dete rmination th at o n e or more of the following

c ri te ri a e xist:

1
(1 ) T he de fe nd a nt is a pro fe ssi on a l cr imi na l who ha s kno wi ng ly de vo te d h ims e lf to criminal ac ts as a major sour ce of livelihood; (2) The defe ndant is an off ender whose re cord of

criminal ac tivityis ex tensive; ( 3 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n ti s a

d a n g e r o u s m e n t a l l y ab n o r m a l p e r s o n s o d e c l ar e d b y a
c omp e te nt p sy c hiatr ist

wh o c on c lud e s a s a

re su lt o f an in ve sti gati on prior to sentenc ing that the defendant' s criminal conduc t has bee n char acte rized by a pattern of re pe tit ive or

c omp uls ive be ha vio r w ith he e dle ss i nd if fe re nc e to c on se qu e nc e s;-6-

(4) The defe nd an t i s a d ang erous of fende r whose be havior indicates littl e or no
re g ardfo r h uma n li fe , a nd no he sit a tio n a bo ut c omm itt ing a

c ri me in w hic h th e ri sk to human life is high; (5) The defe ndant is convicted of two (2) or more statutory

offe nses involving se x ual abuse of a minor with consider ation of the ag g ravating c ircumstance s arising from t h e re l at i onship betwee n the def endant a nd victim or victims, the tim e span of defe ndant' s undetec ted sexual a ctivity , the nature and scope of the sexual acts a nd the

e xten t of the re sid ua l, p hy sic a l a ndme nta l dama g e to the vic tim or vic tim s; (6) The defe ndant is sentence d for a n offe nse committed while on probation; or (7 ) T he de fe nd a nt i s se nte nc e d f or c ri min a l c on te mpt

. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-115(b)

. The leng th of the sentenc e, whe n consec utive in nature, must be “ justlydeser ved in re lation to the seriousness of the offe nse,” Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 102(1 ), an d “no g reater than tha t deser ved” unde r the c ircumstance s, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103( 2); State v. L ane, 3 S.W .3d 456 (Tenn. 1999)

.
Th e tr ia l c ou rt

or de re d c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s o n th e fo llo wi ng g ro un ds :

I do fi nd by a pr e po nd e ra nc e of the e vid e nc e

. . . "the de fe nd a nt is an of fe nd e r w ho se
rec ord of c riminal activity is ex tensive." I do fi ndby

a pr e po nd e ranc e of

the e vid ence th at

. . . "[t ]he de fe nd a nt i s a dang erous offende r whose behavior indicates li ttle or no reg ard for hum an life a nd no hesitation about committing a c rime in which the risk of life is high."

I n Gra y , our supre me court ruled that before c onsecutive se ntencing could be imposed upon the da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r, c on sid e re d th e mos t su bje c tiv e of the c la ssi fi c a tio ns a ndthe mos t di ff ic ult to a pp ly , o the r c on dit ion s must be pr e se nt: (a ) that the c ri me s in vo lve d a g g ra vatin g c ir c ums ta nc e s; (b) that c onsecutive se ntence s are a nec essary means to pr otect the public from the de fenda nt; and (c) that the term re asonably relates to the severity

of the offe nses. I n State v. Wil kerson, 905 S.W.2d 933, 9 3 8 ( T e n n

. 1 9 9 5 ), our hig h court re aff irmed those princ iples, holding that c onsecutive se ntence s cannot be require d of the dang erous offe nder " unless the terms re asonably relate[] to the severity

of the offe nses commit t ed an d ar e nec essary in order to pr otect the public ( society ) fr om further criminal acts by those persons who resort to ag g ravated criminal conduc t." The Wil kerson de cision, wh ic h mod if

ie d so me wh a t the stric t fa c tua l g uid e lin e s fo r c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing a do pte d in Sta te
v. Woo ds , 8 14 S.W. 2d 37 8, 38 0 (T e nn . Crim . A pp . 1 99 1) , d e sc ri be d s e nte nc ing a s a " hu ma n p ro c e ss that neither c an nor should be reduc ed to a set of fix ed and mecha nical rules." 905 S.W .2d at 938.
Although the trial court determined that the def endant' s ext ensive c riminal history war rante d

consec utive sentenc ing, the rec ord does not support this findin g. W h ile the def endant ha s seven pr ior c on vic tio ns ov e r a

pe ri od of y e ars , a ll are mis de me a no rs a nd no ne inv olv e vio le nc e . Se e Sta te v. Travis Parson, N o. W2002-02743-CCA-R3- C D (T en n . Crim. App., at J ackson, Sept. 9, 2003).-7-

Moreove r, there was no proof of any criminal activity other than the misdemeanor convictions. See Sta te v. Jame s F . M a s s e n g a l e , N o. E2 00 0- 00 77 4- CCA -R 3- CD (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. , at K no xvill e , O c t. 21, 2002) (r ecor d supported finding of ex tensive criminal activity wher e def endant a dmitted that he had stolen as many as o n e h u n d red f ifty car s per y ear ). Other

case s where consec utive sentenc es
we re pr op e rl y

ba se d u po n a n e xten siv e c ri min a l r e c or d h a ve re qu ir e d s ub sta nti allymor e in comparison to thi s case

. See, e.g., State v. Spike Hedg ecoth, No. E2002-01869-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, Nov. 12, 2003); State v. All en P re n tice B ly e, No. E2001-01375-CCA-R3-CD (T enn. Crim. App., at Knoxvill e, Nov. 1, 2002). I t is our view that the defe ndant' s rec ord of c riminal activity is insufficient t o s u p port consec utive sentenc ing unde r Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-115(b)( 2).

I n d e te rm ini ng that the de fe nd a nt qu a lif ie d a s a da ng e ro us of

fe nd e r, the tr ia l c ou rt

faile d to specific ally

find that an e x tended se ntence rea sonably rela ted to the seve rity

of the off enses a nd was

nece ssary to pro t ec t the public ag ainst further criminal conduc t by

the def endant. Or dinarily , a
re ma nd to the tr ia l c ou rt

fo r f urthe r f ind ing s o r a

mod if ic a tio n o f the se nte nc e s to c on c ur re nt t e rm s
wo uldbe in o rd e r. I n th is c a se , h ow e ve r, the re c or d e sta bli sh e s th a t c on se c uti ve se nte nci ng is ap p r o p r iate

. T h e d e f

e n d a n t, w h o w a s o n b a il o n a c h ar g e o f d r iv in g u n d e r th e in fluenc e, third offe nse, rela ted to a car

acc ident that had ca

used sig nificant prope rty

damag e to two vehicle s, was
s u b s eq u en t l y

i n v o l v ed i n a s ec o n d ac ci d en twi t h a s i n gl e ca r th at s er i o u s l y i n j u re d t h e f

o u r t ee n age occupa nts. The def

endant' s blood alcohol at the time of the se cond ac cident wa s more than twice the leg al limit. S ee T enn. Code Ann. § 455- 10-401(a )(2) (1997 & Su p p

. 2001). De spite prior convictions for driving unde r the influenc e, other alcohol-r elated of

fense s, and three alc ohol-related

car acc idents, the defe ndant continued to drink a nd d ri ve. F urther, he admitted that he had not soug ht help for his alc ohol addi ct i on and had, in f act, c ontinued to consume alc ohol on a re g ular ba sis a ft e r the a c c ide nts re su lti ng in the se c on vic tio ns

. The pre sentenc e re port established that the injuries to the victims wer e quit e severe. O ne of the victims, fifteen- y ear -old Heather White, was partially ejec ted from t h e ca r. Her left arm was tr app e d in the c ar d oo r a ndsh e re c e ive d a se ri ou s la c e ratio n to the le ft sid e of he r fa c e

. As a

re su lt, ey elashe s will no longer

g row on he r left ey elid. After three surg erie s, she has pe rmane nt scars on her le ft arm a nd left leg

. The driver of the car , sevente en-y ear -old Rache l B axter, suffe red a broken nose, two broke n ribs, a bruised sple en, and internal blee d i n g. He r l eft a nkle and kne eca p wer e shattere d. Her

fac e re quires re constructive sur g ery . Fifte en-y ear -old Nicole Ba x t er suf fer ed a bro k e n ja w , f

r a c tu r e d s ku ll , a n d to r n e ar c ar ti la g e

. T h e f

o u r thv ic ti m, f

o u r te e n

- y e ar

- o ldRe becc a Whit e, suff

ere d cuts and bruise s. Statements from the mothers of the victims indi cate that three of the victims continue to experien ce m ed i ca l problems. Eac h of the four has suffe red e motional tr a u ma

. U n d e r

th e s e c ir c u ms ta n c e s , it

is o u r v ie w th a t th e d e f

e n d a n t q u a li f

ie s a s a d a n g e rous offe nder, that an extended sentenc e is rea sonably rela ted to the seriousness of the offe nse, and that

c on se c uti ve se nte nc ing is n e c e ssa ry to p ro te c t th e pu bli c fr om this de fe nd a nt.

Acc ording ly , the sentenc es for three of t he four vehicular assault convictions ar e modified to two y ear s. The ef

fe ct i v e sente nce is, ther efor e, ele ven months and twenty -nine da y s plus nine y ear s. Otherwise , the judg ments of the trial c ourt are aff irmed.-8- ___________________________________ GARY R. WADE, PRES I DING JUDGE