DEBORAH WISHON, HUSBAND AND 

WIFE; LAWRENCE L. LEACH AND 

DRISTA EL. LEACH, HUSBAND AND 

WIFE; JUSTO JAIMERENA AND 

MARIA JAIMERENA, HUSBAND AND 

WIFE; MICHAEL HAYES AND 

GERTRUDE HAYES, TRUSTEES OF 

THE HAYES FAMILY TRUST; ELMER 

A. HANSEN, TRUSTEE OF THE 

ELMER A. HANSEN REVOCABLE 

TRUST; DONALD MCMURTREY; PAUL 

THOMAS BRUNELLE AND SUSAN 

GAYLENE BRUNELLE, TRUSTEES OF 

THE BRUNELLE FAMILY TRUST; 

JOHN FISHER AND JOCELYN 

FISHER, HUSBAND AND WIFE; 

CONRAD CHARLES MARCIONE, JR., 

AND SUZANNE LYNNE MARCIONE, 

TRUSTEES OF THE RESTATEMENT 

AND AMENDMENT OF 

DECLARATION OF MARCIONE 

FAMILY REVOCABLE TRUST; TROY 

D. GRIGGS AND MARTHA A. GRIGGS, 

HUSBAND AND WIFE; KERMIT M. 

KROYER, TRUSTEE OF THE KM 

KROYER TRUST; MARIA E. BOONE, 

TRUSTEE OF THE 2003 BOONE 

FAMILY TRUST; PEGGY PARKER; 

GEORGE B. SCHENCK; LAURIE 

HENNESSEY; LAUREN HAYES; 

ROBERT BETTENCOURT AND 

PAMELA BETTENCOURT, HUSBAND 

AND WIFE; SYDNEY QUINN; AND 

DEBORAH L. AMES AND ANTHONY 

HAYES AND CONSTANCE HAYES 

TRUSTEES OF THE HAYES FAMILY 

TRUST, 

Real Parties in Interest. 

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ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 

This is an original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging 

a district court order denying a motion to dismiss a complaint. 

Real parties in interest (collectively, Porter) filed a complaint 

seeking a deficiency judgment against petitioners Charles Dornbach and 

Jake Huber (collectively, Dornbach). Dornbach appeared by filing a 

motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to NRCP 12(b)(5). Due to the 

passing of Churchill County's only sitting district court judge and related 

delays in the district court, this motion was not addressed for 

approximately eleven months. While this motion was pending, Dornbach 

did not file an answer to the complaint. Dornbach eventually filed a 

separate motion to dismiss the complaint due to Porter's failure to comply 

with NRCP 16.1(e), which requires a plaintiff to hold a case conference 

and file a case conference report within specific deadlines. The district 

court denied the motion, explaining that the death of the judge and the 

resulting delays constituted extraordinary circumstances excusing Porter's 

delay and justifying extending the time to comply with NRCP 16.1(e). 

Dornbach then petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus to compel the 

district court to dismiss the complaint. 

"A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of 

an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or 

station[,] or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion." 

Int? Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 124 Nev. 193, 197, 

179 P.3d 556, 558 (2008); NRS 34.160. It is within this court's discretion 

to determine if a writ petition will be considered. Smith v. Eighth Judicial 

Dist. Court, 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851 (1991). Petitioners bear 

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the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted. Pan 

v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). 

NRCP 16.1(e) provides that a district court may dismiss a case 

without prejudice if a plaintiff fails to hold an early case conference within 

180 days of a defendant's appearance or file a case conference report 

within 240 days of a defendant's appearance.' NRCP 16.1(e)(1)-(2). We 

review a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss due to failure to 

comply with NRCP 16.1(e) deadlines for an abuse of discretion. Arnold v. 

Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 415, 168 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2007). When deciding such 

motions, district courts should consider factors such as "the length of the 

delay, . . . whether the delay has otherwise impeded the timely prosecution 

of the case, [and] general considerations of case management." Id. at 415- 

16, 168 P.3d at 1053. 

Here, the district court explicitly found that the substantial 

delays resulting from the judge's death constituted extraordinary 

circumstances justifying extending the NRCP 16.1(e) deadlines. The 

record does not refute this finding, and we conclude that the district court 

did not abuse its discretion by considering the court's internal delays when 

denying Dornbach's motion to dismiss and extending the NRCP 16.1(e) 

deadlines. See id. Having considered the petition, answer, reply, and 

an alternative basis on which to deny the petition,. Porter argues 

that the deadlines set forth in NRCP 16.1(e) do not begin to run until a 

defendant files an answer, and therefore they had not expired when 

Dornbach moved to dismiss the complaint. Because the deadlines set 

forth in NRCP 16.1(e)(1) and (2) clearly begin to run upon "an appearance 

by a defendant," we reject this argument. 

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C.J. 

, 

usiesty 

—11,•% 

Parraguirre 

Douglas 

appendix filed in this matter, we conclude that Dornbach has not 

demonstrated that our intervention by way of extraordinary relief is 

warranted. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the petition DENIED. 

Gibbons 

J. 

Pickert.y. 

J. 

J. 

cc: Hon. Thomas L. Stockard, District Judge 

Robison Belaustegui Sharp & Low 

Jeffrey K. Rahbeck 

Churchill County Clerk 

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