UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4192

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

YASTRZEMSKI LIPSCOMBE, a/k/a O,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (8:12-cr-00024-HMH-5)

Submitted: April 29, 2014 Decided: May 12, 2014

Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

T. Micah Leddy, THE LEDDY LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South 

Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States 

Attorney, Andrew B. Moorman, Sr., Assistant United States 

Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Yastrzemski Lipscombe was convicted of conspiracy to 

possess with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of 

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2012). 

He was sentenced to 151 months in prison. Lipscombe appeals, 

alleging that the district court’s restriction on the scope of 

cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause. We affirm.

Prior to trial, the district court ruled that 

Lipscombe could not inquire of cooperating witnesses about the 

specific sentences they faced. At trial, coconspirators Larry 

Gory, Anthony Yanez, and Demeika Martin testified for the United 

States. All had previously pled guilty. Gory testified on 

direct that, although the United States did not promise in his

plea agreement that he would receive a sentence reduction in 

return for his testimony, he was hoping for such a reduction. 

Yanez testified that his plea agreement, which required him to 

tell the truth, did not contain a promise from the United States 

to move for a sentence reduction. However, Yanez stated that he 

hoped for a lenient sentence as a result of his testimony 

against Lipscombe. On cross-examination, Yanez reiterated that 

he wanted his sentence “to be more lenient.” He added that he 

was “facing . . . a severe mandatory minimum sentence” and that, 

in addition to telling the truth, he had to provide “substantial 

assistance” in order to receive leniency. Finally, Martin 
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testified on direct that, while the United States had not 

promised a reduction in his sentence, he was hoping for such a 

reduction.

District “judges possess wide latitude to impose 

reasonable limits on cross-examination, based on concerns 

including harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, 

repetition, or marginal relevance.” United States v. Turner, 

198 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 1999). With respect to limitations 

on cross-examination of cooperating witnesses, the relevant 

issue is “whether the jury possesse[d] sufficient evidence to 

enable it to make a discriminating appraisal of bias and 

incentives to lie on the part of the witnesses.” United 

States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 1997). A district 

court’s limitation on a defendant’s cross-examination of a 

prosecution witness is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United 

States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 500 (4th Cir. 2012). 

We are convinced that the jury had before it 

sufficient evidence upon which to assess witness bias and 

incentive to lie. Through questioning of Gory, Yanez and 

Martin, the jury learned that they had entered into plea 

agreements with the United States and that they hoped to receive 

more lenient sentences in return for testifying at Lipscombe’s 

trial. Precluding Lipscombe from eliciting testimony concerning 
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the specific sentences the witnesses faced was not an abuse of 

discretion. 

Accordingly, we affirm Lipscombe's conviction. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED