UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-2416

FAYE D. LARRABEE, 

 Plaintiff – Appellant, 

v. 

BANK OF AMERICA, NA; FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE 

CORPORATION, 

 Defendants - Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District 

Judge. (3:09-cv-00712-HEH) 

Submitted: February 10, 2012 Decided: April 2, 2012

Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

Henry W. McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE OF HENRY MCLAUGHLIN, P.C., 

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Bryan A. Fratkin, Seth A. 

Schaeffer, MCGUIRE WOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 
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PER CURIAM: 

Faye D. Larrabee appeals the district court’s orders 

granting in part Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to 

dismiss and granting Defendants’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 motion for 

summary judgment in her civil action seeking rescission of two 

secured consumer credit transactions (one in 2006 and the other

in 2007) under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 1601-1667f (West 2009 & Supp. 2011). Larrabee argues on 

appeal that the district court erred in granting Defendants’ 

motion to dismiss because she adequately pled TILA violations 

with respect to the 2006 credit transaction and based on the use 

by a lender in connection with the 2007 credit transaction of a 

form notice to disclose her right to cancel that transaction. 

Larrabee also argues that the court erred in granting summary 

judgment to Defendants because an application fee disclosure 

made in connection with the 2007 credit transaction rendered 

unclear the notice disclosing her right to cancel. We affirm. 

We review de novo the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) 

dismissal for failure to state a claim. Giarratano v. Johnson, 

521 F.3d 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2008). In this regard, we accept as 

true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. 

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). While a plaintiff’s 

statement of her claim “need only give the defendant fair notice 

of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” id.
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at 93 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted), a 

complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if it “states a 

plausible claim for relief” that “permit[s] the court to infer 

more than the mere possibility of misconduct” based on “its 

judicial experience and common sense.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 

After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we 

conclude that the district court properly dismissed Larrabee’s 

claim challenging the 2006 credit transaction. Larrabee failed 

to state a plausible claim for relief under the TILA because her 

proposed reading of the notice disclosing the number and due 

dates of payments due under that transaction is not objectively 

reasonable. Further, because the disclosure to Larrabee of her 

right to cancel the 2007 credit transaction contained all of the 

information required by the TILA, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1635(a)-(b), and 

Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.23(a)-(b), (d), the disclosure

complied with the TILA. Watkins v. SunTrust Mortg., Inc., 

663 F.3d 232, 238-40 (4th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Larrabee did 

not state a plausible claim for TILA relief based on the 

lender’s use of the form notice. 

Turning to Larrabee’s remaining claim, we review de 

novo the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment and 

construe the facts in the light most favorable to Larrabee, the 

non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead Johnson & Co., 
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639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary judgment may be 

granted only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine 

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To 

withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party 

must produce competent evidence to reveal the existence of a 

genuine issue of material fact for trial. See Thompson v. 

Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) 

(“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does 

a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-moving 

party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 

After review of the record, we conclude that the 

district court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants 

on Larrabee’s remaining claim. Larrabee did not suggest that 

she was confused as to whether she could cancel the 2007 credit 

transaction without cost, and she did not put forth any evidence 

explaining how or suggesting that an average borrower faced with 

both the notice of right to cancel and the fee notice would be 

confused as to whether she could cancel the 2007 credit 

transaction without cost. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED