(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2018 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is 

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. 

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been 

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 17–1094. Argued November 27, 2018—Decided February 26, 2019 

Respondent Troy Lambert filed a class action in federal court alleging 

that petitioner Nutraceutical Corporation’s marketing of a dietary

supplement ran afoul of California consumer-protection law. On 

February 20, 2015, the District Court ordered the class decertified. 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), Lambert had 14 

days from that point to ask the Court of Appeals for permission to

appeal the order. Instead, he filed a motion for reconsideration on 

March 12, which the District Court denied on June 24. Fourteen 

days later, Lambert petitioned the Court of Appeals for permission to

appeal the decertification order. Nutraceutical objected that Lambert’s petition was untimely because it was filed far more than 14 

days from the February 20 decertification order. The Ninth Circuit 

held, however, that Rule 23(f)’s deadline should be tolled under the 

circumstances because Lambert had “acted diligently.” On the merits, the court reversed the decertification order. 

Held: Rule 23(f) is not subject to equitable tolling. Pp. 3–10.

(a) Rule 23(f) is properly classified as a nonjurisdictional claimprocessing rule, but that does not render it malleable in every respect. Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on its jurisdictional character but rather on whether its text leaves room for 

such flexibility. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 421. 

Here, the governing rules speak directly to the issue of Rule 23(f)’s 

flexibility and make clear that its deadline is not subject to equitable

tolling. While Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 authorizes a 

court of appeals for good cause to “suspend any provision . . . in a particular case,” it does so with a caveat: “except as otherwise provided 

in Rule 26(b).” Rule 26(b), which generally authorizes extensions of 

time, in turn includes the carveout that a court of appeals “may not 
 

2 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

Syllabus 

extend the time to file . . . a petition for permission to appeal”—the

precise type of filing at issue here. The Rules thus express a clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule 23(f)’s deadline, even 

where good cause for equitable tolling might otherwise exist. Precedent confirms this understanding. See Carlisle, 517 U. S. 416, and 

United States v. Robinson, 361 U. S. 220. Pp. 3–6.

(b) Lambert’s counterarguments do not withstand scrutiny. Lambert argues that Rule 26(b)’s prohibition on extending the time to file 

a petition for permission to appeal should be understood to foreclose

only formal extensions granted ex ante and to leave courts free to excuse late filings on equitable grounds after the fact. But this Court 

has already rejected an indistinguishable argument concerning Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b) in Robinson, and Lambert offers no sound basis for reading Rule 26(b) differently. Further, the 

1998 Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(f) speak to a court of appeals’ discretion to decide whether a particular certification decision 

warrants review in an interlocutory posture, not to its determination

whether a petition is timely. Finally, Lambert notes that every Court 

of Appeals to have considered the question would accept a Rule 23(f) 

petition filed within 14 days of the resolution of a motion for reconsideration that was itself filed within 14 days of the original order. 

Although his own reconsideration motion was not filed until after the 

initial 14 days had run, he cites the lower courts’ handling of such

cases as evidence that Rule 23(f) is amenable to tolling. However, a 

timely motion for reconsideration affects the antecedent issue of 

when the 14-day limit begins to run, not the availability of tolling. 

See United States v. Ibarra, 502 U. S. 1, 4, n. 2. Pp. 6–9.

(c) On remand, the Court of Appeals can address other preserved

arguments about whether Lambert’s Rule 23(f) petition was timely

even without resort to tolling. Pp. 9–10. 

870 F. 3d 1170, reversed and remanded. 

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 17–1094 

NUTRACEUTICAL CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. 

TROY LAMBERT 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

[February 26, 2019]

 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 

To take an immediate appeal from a federal district 

court’s order granting or denying class certification, a 

party must first seek permission from the relevant court of

appeals “within 14 days after the order is entered.” Fed. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 23(f ). This case poses the question whether

a court of appeals may forgive on equitable tolling grounds

a failure to adhere to that deadline when the opposing

party objects that the appeal was untimely. The applicable rules of procedure make clear that the answer is no. 

I 

In March 2013, respondent Troy Lambert sued petitioner

Nutraceutical Corporation in federal court, alleging that

its marketing of a dietary supplement ran afoul of California consumer-protection law. The District Court for the 

Central District of California initially permitted Lambert

to litigate on behalf of a class of similarly situated consumers. On February 20, 2015, however, the District 

Court revisited that decision and ordered the class decertified. From that point, Lambert had 14 days to ask the 

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for permission to

appeal the order. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(f ). 

Instead of filing a petition for permission to appeal,

Lambert informed the District Court at a status confer-
 

 

 

2 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

Opinion of the Court 

ence on March 2 (10 days after the decertification order)

that he would “want to file a motion for reconsideration” in 

the near future. App. to Pet. for Cert. 74. The court told 

Lambert to file any such motion “no later than” March 12. 

Id., at 76. Neither Lambert nor the District Court mentioned the possibility of an appeal. 

Lambert filed his motion for reconsideration, in compliance with the District Court’s schedule, on March 12 (20 

days after the decertification order). The District Court 

denied the motion on June 24, 2015. Fourteen days later, 

on July 8, Lambert petitioned the Court of Appeals for 

permission to appeal the decertification order. Nutraceutical’s response argued that Lambert’s petition was untimely because more than four months had elapsed since 

the District Court’s February 20 order decertifying the 

class, far more than the 14 days that Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(f ) allows. App. 41. 

 Notwithstanding the petition’s apparent untimeliness, 

the Court of Appeals “deem[ed] Lambert’s petition timely” 

because, in its view, the Rule 23(f ) deadline should be 

“tolled” under the circumstances. 870 F. 3d 1170, 1176 

(CA9 2017). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Rule 

23(f)’s time limit is “non-jurisdictional, and that equitable 

remedies softening the deadline are therefore generally 

available.” Ibid. Tolling was warranted, the court concluded, because Lambert “informed the [District Court] 

orally of his intention to seek reconsideration” within Rule 

23(f )’s 14-day window, complied with the District Court’s 

March 12 deadline, and “otherwise acted diligently.” Id., 

at 1179. On the merits, the Court of Appeals held that the 

District Court abused its discretion in decertifying the 

class. Id., at 1182–1184. It reversed the decertification 

order. Id., at 1184. 

In accepting Lambert’s petition, the Court of Appeals 
 

 

 

 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

“recognize[d] that other circuits would likely not toll the

Rule 23(f ) deadline in Lambert’s case.”1 Id., at 1179. We 

granted certiorari. 585 U. S. ___ (2018). 

II 

When Lambert filed his petition, Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(f ) authorized courts of appeals to “permit an 

appeal from an order granting or denying class-action 

certification . . . if a petition for permission to appeal is 

filed . . . within 14 days after the order is entered.”2 The 

Court of Appeals held that Rule 23(f )’s time limitation is 

nonjurisdictional and thus, necessarily, subject to equitable tolling. While we agree that Rule 23(f ) is nonjurisdictional, we conclude that it is not subject to equitable 

tolling. 

Because Rule 23(f )’s time limitation is found in a procedural rule, not a statute, it is properly classified as a 

nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule. See Hamer v. 

Neighborhood Housing Servs. of Chicago, 583 U. S. ___, 

___ (2017) (slip op., at 8).3 It therefore can be waived or 

—————— 

1See Nucor Corp. v. Brown, 760 F. 3d 341, 343 (CA4 2014); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 639 F. 3d 28, 31 (CA2 2011); Gutierrez v. 

Johnson & Johnson, 523 F. 3d 187, 193, and n. 5 (CA3 2008); McNamara 

v. Felderhof, 410 F. 3d 277, 281 (CA5 2005); Gary v. Sheahan, 188 F. 3d 

891, 892 (CA7 1999). 

2Rule 23(f) has since been amended and now reads, in relevant part: 

“A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 

denying class-action certification . . . . A party must file a petition for 

permission to appeal . . . within 14 days after the order is entered . . . .” 

The difference is immaterial for purposes of this case. 3To be sure, this Court has previously suggested that time limits for 

taking an appeal are “mandatory and jurisdictional.” Budinich v. 

Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U. S. 196, 203 (1988). As our more recent 

precedents have made clear, however, this Court once used that phrase 

in a “ ‘less than meticulous’ ” manner. Hamer, 583 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 9); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U. S. 443, 454 (2004). Those earlier statements did not necessarily signify that the rules at issue were formally 
 

4 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

Opinion of the Court 

forfeited by an opposing party. See Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 

U. S. 443, 456 (2004). The mere fact that a time limit 

lacks jurisdictional force, however, does not render it 

malleable in every respect. Though subject to waiver and 

forfeiture, some claim-processing rules are “mandatory”— 

that is, they are “‘unalterable’” if properly raised by an 

opposing party. Manrique v. United States, 581 U. S. ___, 

___ (2017) (slip op., at 4) (quoting Eberhart v. United 

States, 546 U. S. 12, 15 (2005) (per curiam)); see also 

Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 456. Rules in this mandatory camp 

are not susceptible of the equitable approach that the 

Court of Appeals applied here. Cf. Manrique, 581 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 8) (“By definition, mandatory claimprocessing rules . . . are not subject to harmless-error 

analysis”). 

Whether a rule precludes equitable tolling turns not on 

its jurisdictional character but rather on whether the text 

of the rule leaves room for such flexibility. See Carlisle v. 

United States, 517 U. S. 416, 421 (1996). Where the pertinent rule or rules invoked show a clear intent to preclude 

tolling, courts are without authority to make exceptions 

merely because a litigant appears to have been diligent, 

reasonably mistaken, or otherwise deserving. Ibid.; see 

Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 458; United States v. Robinson, 361 

U. S. 220, 229 (1960). Courts may not disregard a properly 

raised procedural rule’s plain import any more than they 

may a statute’s. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 

487 U. S. 250, 255 (1988). 

Here, the governing rules speak directly to the issue of

Rule 23(f)’s flexibility and make clear that its deadline is

not subject to equitable tolling. To begin with, Rule 23(f )

itself conditions the possibility of an appeal on the filing of 

a petition “within 14 days” of “an order granting or deny-

—————— 

“jurisdictional” as we use that term today. 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

ing class-action certification.” Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 5(a)(2) likewise says that a petition for permission to appeal “must be filed within the time specified.” To 

be sure, the simple fact that a deadline is phrased in an 

unqualified manner does not necessarily establish that 

tolling is unavailable. See Fed. Rule App. Proc. 2 (allowing suspension of other Rules for “good cause”); Fed. Rule

App. Proc. 26(b) (similar); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45(b)

(similar); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 6(b) (similar). Here, however, 

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure single out Civil

Rule 23(f ) for inflexible treatment. While Appellate Rule

2 authorizes a court of appeals for good cause to “suspend

any provision of these rules in a particular case,” it does so

with a conspicuous caveat: “except as otherwise provided

in Rule 26(b).” Appellate Rule 26(b), which generally 

authorizes extensions of time, in turn includes this express carveout: A court of appeals “may not extend the

time to file . . . a petition for permission to appeal.” Fed. 

Rule App. Proc. 26(b)(1). In other words, Appellate Rule 

26(b) says that the deadline for the precise type of filing at

issue here may not be extended. The Rules thus express a

clear intent to compel rigorous enforcement of Rule 23(f)’s

deadline, even where good cause for equitable tolling 

might otherwise exist.

Precedent confirms this understanding. Carlisle, 517 

U. S. 416, and Robinson, 361 U. S. 220, both centered on 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 45(b), an extension-oftime provision that parallels Appellate Rule 26(b). Carlisle addressed Rule 45(b)’s interaction with the time limit 

in Criminal Rule 29 for filing a postverdict motion for 

judgment of acquittal. See 517 U. S., at 419–423. Rule 

45(b), as it was then written, made clear that “‘the court 

may not extend the time for taking any action’” under 

Rule 29, “‘except to the extent and under the conditions’” 

stated therein. Id., at 421. Because the Court found the 

text’s purpose to foreclose acceptance of untimely motions 
 

 

 

6 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

Opinion of the Court 

“plain and unambiguous,” the Court held that the District

Court lacked that authority. Ibid. Likewise, in Robinson, 

the Court held that an earlier iteration of Rule 45(b) that 

said “‘the court may not enlarge . . . the period for taking

an appeal’” prohibited a court from accepting a notice of 

appeal that was untimely filed. 361 U. S., at 224 (quoting 

Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 45(b)).

Because Rule 23(f ) is not amenable to equitable tolling,

the Court of Appeals erred in accepting Lambert’s petition

on those grounds. 

III 

Lambert resists the foregoing conclusion on a variety of

grounds. None withstands scrutiny. 

Most pertinently, Lambert argues that the abovementioned Rules are less emphatic than they first appear.

Rule 26(b)’s general grant of authority to relax time limits,

he notes, refers both to “extend[ing]” the time to file a 

petition for permission to appeal and “permit[ting]” a 

petition to be filed after the deadline. See Fed. Rule App.

Proc. 26(b) (“For good cause, the court may extend the 

time prescribed by these rules . . . to perform any act, or 

may permit an act to be done after that time expires”

(emphasis added)). Rule 26(b)(1) then prohibits courts

only from “extend[ing] the time to file,” while making no 

further mention of “permit[ting] an act to be done after 

that time expires.” In Lambert’s view, Rule 26(b)(1)’s 

prohibition on “extend[ing] the time to file” a petition for 

permission to appeal therefore should be understood to 

foreclose only formal extensions granted ex ante, and to 

leave courts free to excuse late filings on equitable 

grounds after the fact.

Whatever we would make of this contention were we 

writing on a blank slate, this Court has already rejected 

an indistinguishable argument in Robinson. There, Rule 

45(b) generally authorized both “‘enlarg[ing]’” a filing 
Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

period and “‘permit[ting] the act to be done after [its] 

expiration,’” then specifically forbade “‘enlarg[ing] . . . the 

period for taking an appeal.’” 361 U. S., at 223. The lower 

court had accepted a late filing on the ground that to do so 

“would not be to ‘enlarge’ the period for taking an appeal, 

but rather would be only to ‘permit the act to be done’ 

after the expiration of the specified period.” Ibid.; see also 

id., at 230 (Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). This 

Court reversed, explaining that acceptance of the late 

filing did, in fact, “enlarge” the relevant filing period. Id., 

at 224. Lambert offers no sound basis for reading Rule 

26(b) differently, and none is apparent. Cf. Torres v. 

Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U. S. 312, 315 (1988) (“Permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time for filing a notice of appeal has passed 

is equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for 

filing a notice of appeal”).4 

Likewise unavailing is Lambert’s reliance on the 1998 

Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 23(f ), which say that a 

petition “may be granted or denied on the basis of any 

consideration that the court of appeals finds persuasive.” 

Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1998 Amendments to Fed. 

Rule Civ. Proc. 23, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 815; see also Microsoft Corp. v. Baker, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip 

op., at 6–8). That comment, however, speaks to a court of 

appeals’ discretion to decide whether a particular certification decision warrants review in an interlocutory posture, 

—————— 

4Lambert’s other textual arguments center on rules addressed to 

appeals as of right. See Brief for Respondent 9–12, 17–18, 36–38 

(discussing, e.g., Fed. Rules App. Proc. 3 and 4). As noted above, Rules 

5 and 26 specifically address petitions for permission to appeal from 

nonfinal orders such as the one at issue here. Lambert’s attempts to 

reason by implication from other, inapposite Rules therefore bear little 

weight. See Manrique v. United States, 581 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) 

(slip op., at 6–7). 
 

8 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

Opinion of the Court 

not its determination whether a petition is timely. If 

anything, the comment serves as a reminder that interlocutory appeal is an exception to the general rule that appellate review must await final judgment—which is fully 

consistent with a conclusion that Rule 23(f )’s time limit is 

purposefully unforgiving. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. 

Carpenter, 558 U. S. 100, 106 (2009) (“The justification for 

immediate appeal must . . . be sufficiently strong to overcome the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes”); cf. Baker, 582 U. S., at ___ (slip op., 

at 6) (describing Rule 23(f ) as “the product of careful 

calibration”).5 

Finally, Lambert notes that every Court of Appeals to 

have considered the question would accept a Rule 23(f ) 

petition filed within 14 days of the resolution of a motion 

for reconsideration that was itself filed within 14 days of 

the original order. See 870 F. 3d, at 1177–1178, n. 3 (collecting cases). Although Lambert’s own reconsideration 

motion was not filed until after the initial 14 days had 

run,6 he cites the lower courts’ handling of such cases as 

evidence that Rule 23(f ) is indeed amenable to tolling. He 

further suggests that there is no basis for relaxing the 14-

day limit in one situation but not the other. 

Lambert’s argument relies on a mistaken premise. A 

—————— 

5Lambert also argues that interpreting Rule 23(f) flexibly would be 

consistent with the Rules’ generally equitable approach. Brief for 

Respondent 21—27. But that simply fails to engage with the dispositive point here: Any such background preference for flexibility has been 

overcome by the clear text of the relevant rules. See, e.g., Young v. 

United States, 535 U. S. 43, 49 (2002). 6Lambert argues that his counsel’s statements 10 days after the District Court’s decertification order constituted an oral motion for reconsideration, but the transcript belies any such claim. See App. to 

Pet. for Cert. 71 (requesting only “leave to file”); id., at 74 (informing 

the District Court that Lambert “will want to file” a reconsideration 

motion). 
 

 

Cite as: 586 U. S. ____ (2019) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

timely motion for reconsideration filed within a window to 

appeal does not toll anything; it “renders an otherwise 

final decision of a district court not final” for purposes of 

appeal. United States v. Ibarra, 502 U. S. 1, 6 (1991) (per 

curiam). In other words, it affects the antecedent issue of 

when the 14-day limit begins to run, not the availability of 

tolling. See id., at 4, n. 2 (noting that this practice is not 

“a matter of tolling”).7 

IV 

Lambert devotes much of his merits brief to arguing the 

distinct question whether his Rule 23(f ) petition was 

timely even without resort to tolling. First, he argues 

that, even if his motion for reconsideration was not filed 

within 14 days of the decertification order, it was filed 

within the time allowed (either by the Federal Rules or by 

the District Court at the March 2 hearing). The timeliness 

of that motion, Lambert contends, “cause[d] the time to 

appeal to run from the disposition of the reconsideration 

motion, not from the original order.” Brief for Respondent 

8; see id., at 9–18. Alternatively, he argues that the District Court’s order denying reconsideration was itself “an 

order granting or denying class-action certification” under 

—————— 

7We therefore have no occasion to address the effect of a motion for 

reconsideration filed within the 14-day window. Moreover, because 

nothing the District Court did misled Lambert about the appeal filing 

deadline, see supra, at 1–2, we similarly have no occasion to address 

the question whether his motion would be timely if that had occurred. 

See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U. S. 416, 428 (1996); id., at 435–436 

(GINSBURG, J., concurring) (discussing Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384, 

386–387 (1964) (per curiam), and Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry 

Meat Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215, 216–217 (1962) (per curiam)). We 

also have no occasion to address whether an insurmountable impediment to filing timely might compel a different result. Cf. Fed. Rule 

App. Proc. 26(a)(3) (addressing computation of time when “the clerk’s 

office is inaccessible”). 
 

 

10 NUTRACEUTICAL CORP. v. LAMBERT 

Opinion of the Court 

Rule 23(f). Id., at 8–9, 19–20. The Court of Appeals did 

not rule on these alternative grounds, which are beyond 

the scope of the question presented. Mindful of our role, 

we will not offer the first word. See United States v. Stitt, 

586 U. S. ___, ___ (2018) (slip op., at 9); Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 555 U. S. 438, 

457 (2009). If the Court of Appeals concludes that these 

arguments have been preserved, it can address them in 

the first instance on remand. 

* * * 

The relevant Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure

clearly foreclose the flexible tolling approach on which the

Court of Appeals relied to deem Lambert’s petition timely.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered.