1 IN TH E COURT OF APPEALS O F THE ST ATE OF NEW MEXICO

2 O pin ionN um

be r: 3 Fi lin g D at e: JU LY17, 201 8 4 N o. A -1 -C A -3 6153 5 STATE OF NEW MEXI CO, 6 Plaintiff-Appellee, 7 v

. 8 J O S E C H A V E Z, 9 D ef

en dant- Appe llant.

10 AP PE AL FR OM T HE D ISTRICT C OUR T OF LU NACO UN TY 11 Je nn if

er E. D eL an ey , D ist ri ctJu dg e 12 He ctor H . B alderas, Attorney Ge neral 13 San ta Fe, NM 14 Anne K elly , A ssistant Attorney Ge neral 15 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 16 for Appellee 17 Charles E . K

nobl auch 18 Alb uq ue rq ue , NM 19 fo r Appe llant1 OPIN ION

2 Z AM ORA , Jud ge. 3 { 1} D ef

en dant a ppe al s hi s c onvi ct ion s f

or dr ivi ng whi le und er

the inf lue nc e of 4 int oxi catin g li quor

( D W I) , pur suant t o N MS A 197 8, S ect io n 66- 8- 102 (2 016) , a nd 5 for f ol l ow i ng t oo c l os e l y , p ur su a nt t o N M S A 1 97 8, S e c t i on6 6- 7- 31 8 ( 19 78). 6 D ef en da nt rai se s a s in gl e is su e o n app eal —t ha t Se ct io n 6 6- 7- 318 is u nc onst itutio na lly 7 va gue a nd the re fo re vo id. W e iss ue d anot ic e of pr opos ed

sum m ar y dis posi tio n 8 pr opos ing to af

fi rm , in re spon se to w hic h D ef en da nt f ile d am em or an dum

in 9 o p p o s i t i o n . Af

t erdu e co n s i d er at i o n o f D ef en d an t ’s ar g u m en t s we af fi rm Def en d an t ’s 10 co nv ic ti on s fo r th e rea so ns di sc us se d b el ow. 11 BACKGRO UND 12 { 2} Ne w M ex i co St at e P o l i c e Of fi ce r B o b b i e T er ra za s o b s er v ed De fe n d an t ’s 13 vehicle following anoth er vehicle and ini tiated a traf fic stop

. Of

ficer Te rraz as 14 testified that she stop ped the vehicle for following too closely based on a “ high way 15 st an da rd ” th atfor “ ev ery te n[ -]m il es [-p er h ou r] y ou are g oi ng , it ’s a car l en gt h.” 16 Ac cording to Office r T erra zas, she observed no sky betwee n the vehicles, leading her 17 to believe that the dis tance betw ee n De fendant’ s vehicle and the vehicle he wa s 18 following wa s less than a car le ngth . A s a result of the stop Off icer T erra zas obtained 19 ev ide nc e le ad ing to D ef en dant’ s D W I co nvi ct ion

.2

1 { 3} D ef

en dant m ove d to sup pr es s th e ev ide nc e obt ai ne d a ft er the sto p, c la im ing 2 tha t O f f i cer Te rraz as lacked re asonable sus picion to stop hi s vehicle. H e indicates that 3 at the sup pr es sio n he ar ing he a rg ue d th at the f oll ow ing -t oo- cl ose ly

statut e la ck s 4 spe ci fi ci ty , m ak in g it diff ic ult to en fo rc e an d pr ovi din g no obj ec tiv e standard to 5 which the public can conform its behavior. The m otion wa s denied, D efendant w as 6 co nv ic te d o f th e tr affi c o ffen se s, an d h e ap pe al edto th is Co ur t. 7 DISC US SION 8 { 4} D ef

en dant c la im s th at

O ff ic er T er ra za s ha d no re as ona

ble sus pic ion to s top his 9 ve hic le be ca

use the f oll ow ing -t oo- cl ose ly

statut e is unc onst itu tio na lly v a g u e . S e c t i on 10 66-7-318 prohibit s a driver of a m otor vehicle f

rom “ follow[ing] another vehicle m ore 11 closely

than is reasonable and prudent, havi n g d u e re g ard for the speed of such 12 ve hic le s and the tr af fi c upona nd the co nditio n of the hig hw ay . ” A cc or din g to 13 Defen dant the “ re as ona ble a nd p ru de nt” standard is co nst itu tio na lly

une nf or ce ab le 14 for tw o reasons: first, it provides officer s with t oo m uch discretion in deciding when 15 the statut e ha s be en viola te d, a nd s ec ond, it pr ovi de s in suf

fi ci en t gu idanc e to the 16 m oto ri ng p ubl ic in de te rm ini ng how cl ose ly the y m ay fo llo w an oth er ve hic le w ith out 17 violatin g the statute. 18 { 5} Whe n a de fen da nt co nt en ds th a t a st atut e is un co ns ti tu ti on al ly vag ue , we 19 reviewthe claim “ in light of t he fac ts of the case and the cond uct which is prohibit ed3

1 by the statute.” Sta te v . L agun a , 199 9- N MC A -1 52, ¶ 24, 128 N

. M. 345 , 992 P

. 2d 8 96 2 (i nte rn al quo ta tio n m ar ks and c itatio n om itt ed ). T he re is a “ str ong pr es um pti on o f 3 co nst itu tio na lity [, ] ” an d a de fe ndant “ ha s th e bur de n of pr ovi ng [ tha t] astatut e is 4 uncons titutio na l b ey ond all reasonable dou bt.” Id

. A statut e is unc onst itu tio na lly 5 vague if: 6 (1 ) it fa ils to pr ovid e pe rs ons of or din ar y int el lig en ce usi ng 7 or din ar

y c om m on se ns e a fa ir

opp ortun ity

to de te rm ine w he the r the ir 8 co nduc t i s pr ohi bit ed ; or 9 (2 ) it fa ils to cr eate m ini m um gui de lin es f

or the reasonable 1 0 pol i c e o f

f i c e r , p r o s e c u t o r , j u d g e , o r j u ry c h a r g e d w i t h e n f o r c e m en t of 11 the statut e, a nd the re by e nc our ag es sub

j ec tiv e an d a d ho c ap pli catio n. 12 State v. Jacquez , 200 9- N MC A -1 24, ¶ 6, 147 N

. M. 313 , 222 P

. 3d 6 85. 13 { 6} W e ha ve a lr ea dy a ddr es se d th e const itu tio na lity of the “ re as ona

ble a nd 14 prud en t” st an da rdof S ect io n 6 6- 7- 31 8 i n a no n- pr eced en ti al op in io n. State v. 15 Sanchez , N o. A -1-CA -34170 , 2016 W L 1546619 , m em . op. ¶ 8 (N .M. Ct. App. Mar. 16 2, 2016 ) (non-precedential) (internal quot ation m arks and citation om itted ). In 17 Sanchezwe held that the provi si o n ’s “ reasonable and prudent” standard provi des 18 ad eq ua te no ti ce t o d riv ers of wh atdri vi ng be ha vi oris pro sc rib edby the s t a t u t e. Id

. 19 ¶¶ 6- 9. W e al so h el d t ha t the pr ovi sio n do es not inv ite a d ho c ap pli catio n or 20 inc onsi ste nt e nf

or ce m en t, a nd tha t the pos sib ili ty of fl ex ibi lity in a ppl y ing the statut e 21 do es no t o ve rco m e th e p res um pt io n t ha t a gi ve n st atut e is co ns ti tu ti on al

. Id

. ¶ 10. I n4

1 doi ng so w e dis cu sse d United States v. H unter , 663 F. 3d 11 36 (10th Cir. 2011 ), 2 w hic h r ej ec te d a voi d- fo r- va gue ne ss c ha lle nge to a K an sa s st at ute c ont ai nin g 3 language identi cal to that found in Sec tion 6 6-7-318. The H unt er court point s out th at 4 “ im pr ec isi on i n st at

ute s su cha s th e one he re sim ply bui ld in ne ed ed

f le xib ili ty w hil e 5 incorporating a com

prehensi b l e, n o rmat i v e s t an d ar dea s i l y u n d er s toodby the ordinary 6 dr iv er, an d g iv in g fa ir wa rn in g a s to wha t con du cton hi s o r he r pa rt i s p ro hi bi te d.” 7 Id

. at 1142 (footno te om itted). 8 { 7} Ina ddi tio n to Hunter , a n u mb e r o f o p i n i o n s f r o m o t h e r j u r i s d i c t i o n s h a v e c o me 9 to the sa m e co nc lus iona s w e d id in Sanchez , r eg ar din g th e co nst itu tio na lity of the 10 “ reas on ab le an d p ru de nt ” st an da rdin th e co nt ex t o f fo ll owi ng to o c lo se ly. Se e, e . g. , 11 State v. H

arper , 415 P. 3d 948, 952- 53 (I da ho Ct

. App. 2018 ) (s ta tin g tha t a vio la tio n 12 of the statut e “ not ne ed to be re duc ed to an e xa ct m athe m at ic al e qua tio n, ” an d th at the 13 sta tut e tha t instru ct s off ic er s to m ak e j udgm en ts b as ed on a r ea sona ble a nd p ru de nt 14 standard and provi des other factors t o c on sider aff ords drivers noti ce of the prohibited 15 co nduc t an d gu ide s th e dis cr et ionof the of fi ce rs ); No lan v . Sta te , 201 4- KM- 0164 7, 16 182 S o. 3d 48 4, ¶

¶ 33

- 34 , 37 ( M i ss . C t

. App . 20 16 ) ( r e f e rr i ng t o m

ul tiple oth er 17 j ur isd ic tio ns tha t have re vie w ed sta tut es pr ohi bit ing fo llo w ing too c los el y a nd h av e 1 8 de ci de dt h o s e s t a tu t e s a r e c o n s t i tu t i o n a l , a n dh o l d i n g t h a tt h e s t a tu t o ry l a n g ua ge 19 co upl ed

w ithr ule s of the r oa d are suf

fi ci en tly de fi nit e to al low anor din ar y pe rs on t o5

1 understand th e prohibited con du ct an d avoid arbitrary enforce m ent from

officer s); 2 Sta te v . H

art on , 108 S

. W

. 3d 2 53, 259 -6 0 ( T en n. Cr im

. App. 200 2) ( re ferrin g to 3 decisions fro m

other states ref

using to find following-too -closely statutes 4 unc onst itu tio na lly

va gu e, an d c onc lud ing that the T en ne sse e sta tut e giv es “ fa ir 5 warning of prohi bit[ed] conduct and provides suff icient guid ance to prevent ar bitrary 6 an d di sc ri m ina tor

y e nf or ce m en t” ). O ur

r es earc h ha s n ot unc ove re d asin gle c as e 7 inv al ida tin g af

ol lo wing -t oo- cl ose ly

statut e on the ba sis that the “ re as ona ble a nd 8 pr ude nt” standard

is unc onst itu tio na lly

va gue . W e not e al so tha t the U nif orm V eh ic le 9 Co de , w hic h a

ppe ar s to be the sourc e fo r m an y if not al l of the f oll ow ing -t oo- cl ose ly 10 sta tut es in vari ous j ur isd ic tio ns, c ont ai ns ex ac tly the sa m e “ re as ona ble a nd p ru de nt” 11 la ng ua ge as S ect io n 6 6- 7- 31 8. See N at ’ l Comm . on U nif

. T ra ff ic L aw s and 12 Ord in an ces , Uniform V ehicle Code & Model Traffic O rdina nce c h. 11, a rt

. I II , § 11

- 13 310(a) (2000), http:\\iamtraff ic.org/wp-content/u ploads/ 2013 /01/UVC2000.pdf. 14 { 8} W e se e no r ea son to de pa rt f ro m the ove rwhe lm ing w ei ght of pr ec ed en t 15 ad dr es sin g th is i ssu e. W e do n ote that i n our not ic e of pr opos ed sum m ar y dis posi tio n 16 w e ch al le nge d D ef

en dant t o lo cate e ve n on e ca se in w hic h th e “ re as ona ble a nd 17 prudent” standard was held to be constitu tionally vague. In response, D efendant cited 18 tw o c as es inv olv ing spe ed ing sta tut es , one de ci de d in 1963 an d one d ec ide d in191 2, 19 w hic h di d in de ed

inv al ida te the statut es in que sti on b ec au se the y pr ovi de d no6

1 num erica l speed lim it but in stead prohibi ted driving at a speed gre ater than w as 2 reas on ab le an d pru de nt orreas on ab le an d p ro pe r. Sta te v . Ca m pbe ll , 196 A

. 2d 1 31, 3 132 (R

. I. 196 3) ; H

ay es v . Sta te , 75 S

. E

. 523 , 523 ( G a. Ct

. App. 191 2). Th is r es ult 4 m ig h t b e m o r e d e f

e n s i b l e i n t h e s p e e d i n g c o n t e x t ( a l t h o u g h w e e x p r e s s no o pin ion 5 on that su bje ct), wher e it is possi ble to establish firm , en fo rc eabl e num erica l 6 standard s go ve rn ing the spe ed a t w hic h ave hic le m ay be dr ive n unde r nor m al dr ivi ng 7 co ndi tio ns. H ow ever, in the c ont ex t of the vari ous fa ct or s th at

m ust be take n in to 8 accou n t i n deciding whether a driver is following anoth er vehicle too closely , such 9 as the conditio n of the ro ad, the am ount of traf fic in the vicinity , and the speed at 10 w hic h th e ve hic le s ar e tr av el ing , the a na ly se s se t ou t i n Sanchez, Hunter , a nd the 11 m any out-of-state authorities m entioned abo ve are m ore persuasive. 12 { 9} W e not e fi na lly tha t D ef en da nt’ s doc ke tin g sta te m en t ar gue d that we s hould 13 de part f ro m the fe de ra l an d out -o f- sta te autho ri tie s ad dr es sin g th is i ssu e be ca use our 14 state Constitu tion has been construed to provid e grea ter protection than that granted 15 by the Fourth Am endm ent to the United States Const itutio n. In our notice of proposed 16 sum m ar y dis posi tio n w e poi nte d ou t tha t this ar gum en t se em s ir re le va nt t o th e voi d17 fo r- va gue ne ss arg um en t m ad e in thi s cas e. W e al so s ta te d th at w e ar e aw ar e of

no 18 au tho ri ty

ind ic at ing that our ap pli catio n of c onst itu tio na l va gue ne ss p ri nc ipl es is, or 19 shou ld b e, m or e ex ac tin g th anthe f ed er al c ourts’ or

a ny oth er state ’ s appl ic at ionof7

1 tho se pr inc ipl es . In re spon se , D ef en da nt r ef

er s br ie fl y

to a “ ri ght

to loc om oti on” a nd 2 the federa l courts’ willingness to restrict that r ight, as exem plified by the Hunter 3 opin ion. This summ ary statem ent is not sufficient to explain Defendant’ s theory that 4 the sta te Co nst itu tio n pr ovi de s gr eate r pr ote ct ion in the voi d- fo r- va guen es s and 5 tr af fi c- law s c ont ex t than do es the f ed er al Co nst itu tio n, a nd w e the re fo re do n ot 6 ad dr es s t he arg um en t. See State v. G onza les , 201 1- N MC A -0 07, ¶ 19, 149 N

. M. 226 , 7 247 P. 3d 1 111 (s ta tin g th at “ thi s C ourt ha s no duty

to re vie w ana rg um en t tha t i s no t 8 adequately

developed”). 9 CON CLU SION 10 { 10} Ba se d onthe f or eg oin g, w e co nc lud e that the dis tr ic t c ourt di d no t e rr in 11 de ny ing D ef

en dant’ s m oti on t o su

ppr es s, a nd w e af

fi rm D ef en da nt’ s c onvi ct ion s. 12 { 11} IT IS S O ORDERE D.

13 14 M . M ON IC A Z A M OR A , Ju dg e 15 WE CO NCUR:

16 17 J. M IL ES HA N IS EE , Ju dg e

18 19 ST EP HE N G. F R EN C H, Ju dg e