[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-13796

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

HENRI N. BEAULIEU, JR., 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SAMUEL POWELL,

individually, and in his official capacity as a 

State Trooper for the State of Alabama, 

CALERA, CITY OF,

a municipality located in and a political 

subdivision of Shelby County, Alabama, 

CALERA POLICE DEPARTMENT, CITY OF,

a department of the City of Calera in Shelby 

County, Alabama, 

ANDREW BELL,

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individually and in his official as a law 

enforcement officer/former law enforcement 

officer for the City of Calera, Alabama, 

JORDAN MATTHEW LAWLEY,

an individual, et al., 

Defendants-Appellees,

JESSICA SELF, et al.,

Defendants.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-00878-ACA

____________________

Before ROSENBAUM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Henri Beaulieu appeals the district court’s order dismissing 

his amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights complaint on “shotgun 

pleading” grounds and denying further amendment. After careful 

review, we affirm.

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I.

According to the amended complaint, Beaulieu and his family live on property adjacent to a public swimming pool in a nearby 

subdivision. They have repeatedly complained to the Calera Police 

Department about excessive noise at the pool during the summer 

months, but officers have done little and the noise continues unabated. Beaulieu’s wife—an attorney who represents Beaulieu in 

this case—and parents also filed a nuisance lawsuit in Alabama state 

court relating to the pool noise, for which Beaulieu has attempted 

to conduct surveillance and gather evidence. 

Beaulieu asserts constitutional claims under § 1983 stemming from this noise dispute. His claims largely relate to an encounter on July 16, 2020, when he drove to the subdivision to try 

to confirm the identities of pool users for the lawsuit, as he had 

done several times before. While Beaulieu was stopped in his vehicle on a public street in the subdivision, Officer Andrew Bell approached and said he had received a couple of calls about Beaulieu. 

Bell was aware of Beaulieu and the nuisance lawsuit, and he said 

that the surveillance conduct was legal but that Beaulieu “had to 

keep moving,” despite the presence of other parked vehicles on the 

street. 

Beaulieu kept moving through the subdivision and then “circled back around” to the same area, where Bell was speaking with 

Samuel Powell, a state trooper and former Calera police officer 

who lived in the subdivision, as well as a “Third Responding Officer” and Jordan Lawley, a subdivision resident. While working as 

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a Calera officer, Powell had responded to a noise complaint at 

Beaulieu’s residence and had become confrontational with Beaulieu and his wife, whom Powell had accused in Facebook posts of 

lying about the pool noise. Powell was also named as a defendant 

in the nuisance lawsuit. 

When Beaulieu stopped to check with the officers, Powell 

said he had received a call about a suspicious vehicle outside his 

house, and he accused Beaulieu of “disorderly conduct.” He took 

no further action, though, and Beaulieu left the subdivision. Before 

Beaulieu left, Bell told Beaulieu he was free to be in the area so long 

as he complied with the traffic code. The Third Responding Officer, for his part, “pace[d] nervously.” As this happened, Rachel 

Lawley, who was married to Jordan Lawley, made disparaging 

comments about Beaulieu on Facebook. 

The next day, July 17, 2018, Beaulieu observed Powell and 

Jordan Lawley speaking together at the pool and pointing out 

Beaulieu’s surveillance cameras. Beaulieu called out “smile” so 

they would look towards the camera and he could identify them. 

Not long after that, an attorney for the subdivision’s homeowners’ 

association called Beaulieu’s wife based on a complaint that Beaulieu had been taking pictures of children at the pool. 

After these events, Powell and Jordan Lawley filed harassment complaints with the police department, and Powell obtained 

a no-contact order against Beaulieu. This “quasi-civil matter” was 

dismissed when Beaulieu agreed to stay out of the subdivision for 

nine months. 

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Neither Beaulieu nor his family has returned to the subdivision, making it “virtually impossible” to identify pool users for the 

lawsuit. Nor has Beaulieu been able to obtain body-camera footage from the City related to the July 16 encounter or other incidents.

II.

Beaulieu filed his initial complaint in July 2022 against eight 

named defendants, two described-but-unnamed defendants, and 

other John Doe defendants. The complaint was thirty-one pages 

and eighty-four numbered paragraphs long, with various lettered 

subparagraphs. It included causes of action under both federal and 

state law, organized into two sectionstitled simply, “Constitutional 

Claims” and “State Law Claim(s).” Under Constitutional Claims, 

Beaulieu alleged not only myriad due-process violations, but also 

an unlawful seizure, First Amendment retaliation, defamation, 

false light, and conspiracy.

The district court sua sponte reviewed and struck the complaint as an improper “shotgun pleading.” In the court’s view, the 

complaint was deficient under Rules 8 and 10, Fed. R. Civ. P., because the causes of action were not separated into counts or claims

but were instead grouped together into two broad sections. Plus, 

those sections both “incorporate[d] by reference every preceding 

paragraph,” further muddying the claims and their supporting factual allegations. 

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The district court ordered Beaulieu to file an amended complaint that “contained a separate count for each claim that contains 

a factual basis for that claim only,” with a heading for each count 

that identified “the specific [d]efendant(s) against whom the claim 

is asserted” and “the statute or law under which the claim is 

brought.” 

In an amended complaint, Beaulieu reduced the length of 

the pleading to twenty-three pages and seventy-two numbered paragraphs, and he dropped two named defendants and a describedbut-unnamed defendant. The causes of action remained split into 

two sections: “Section 1983 Action for Violations of the Fourteenth 

Amendment Due Process Clause Under Color of Law” and “State 

Law Claim(s).” As before, both sections incorporated by reference 

all preceding paragraphs. 

The first section begins by asserting claims based on Beaulieu’s July 16 encounter with Bell and Powell. It alleges, first, that 

Bell, Powell, the Third Responding Officer, and the Lawleys, individually and in conspiracy with each other, denied Beaulieu due 

process of law by preventing him from stopping on a public street 

to gather evidence. The alleged wrongful conduct included the following: (a) Bell told Beaulieu that he could not stop on a public 

street; (b) Powell “threatened and intimidated” him with a show of 

force and a false claim of disorderly conduct; (c) the Third Responding Officer “did nothing to intervene and appeared nervous”; and 

(d) Rachel Lawley made malicious statements about him on Facebook. Second, and relatedly, the amended complaint asserts that 

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Bell, Powell, and the Third Responding Officer conspired with 

each other and the City to destroy or not preserve body-camera 

footage from the July 16 encounter.

The first section also reaches more broadly. One paragraph 

asserts that, after the encounter, Powell and Jordan Lawley filed 

false reports of harassment with the police department, that Beaulieu had to “surrender his liberty without cause” to resolve Powell’s 

false complaint, and that the “Defendants’ actions” were motivated 

by evil intent or reckless indifference to Beaulieu’s “federally protected rights.” Another paragraph charges the City with failing to 

enforce its police-camera policies and failing to properly train and 

instruct its officers in the use and preservation of camera footage, 

not just in relation to the July 16 encounter but to other prior encounters and the civil nuisance lawsuit.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint 

on several grounds, including that the amended complaint remained a shotgun pleading. Beaulieu responded in opposition and 

also filed two additional amended complaints, which prompted additional motions to dismiss.

The district court dismissed the amended complaint as a 

shotgun pleading and rejected Beaulieu’s attempts at further 

amendment. In the court’s view, the amended complaint suffered 

from the “same deficiencies” as the original complaint, which the 

court had instructed Beaulieu to cure when it sua sponte dismissed

that complaint as a shotgun pleading. The court further found that 

Beaulieu’s second and third amended complaints were 

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procedurally improper, and that, in any case, the amendments 

were futile because they failed to remedy the deficiencies of the 

prior complaints. Because Beaulieu “made no meaningful effort to 

correct” those deficiencies despite receiving notice and specific instructions on how to cure them, the court dismissed Beaulieu’s federal claims with prejudice and the supplemental state-law claims

without prejudice. Beaulieu now appeals.

III.

We first consider Beaulieu’s challenge to the dismissal of his 

amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. We review for abuse 

of discretion a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint as an 

impermissible shotgun pleading. Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 

878 F.3d 1291, 1294 (11th Cir. 2018). 

“Shotgun pleadings” are complaints that violate federal 

pleading rules by “fail[ing] to one degree or another, and in one 

way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the 

claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”

Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 

(11th Cir. 2015); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) & 10(b). We have “little 

tolerance for shotgun pleadings” because they “waste judicial resources, inexorably broaden the scope of discovery, wreak havoc 

on appellate court dockets, and undermine the public’s respect for 

the courts.” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295 (cleaned up). 

We have identified four rough types of shotgun pleadings. 

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–24. A complaint may qualify as a 

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shotgun pleading if it (1) “contain[s] multiple counts where each 

count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts”; (2) is “replete 

with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of action”; (3) does not separate 

“each cause of action or claim for relief” into a different count; or 

(4) “assert[s] multiple claims against multiple defendants without 

specifying which of the defendants are responsible for which acts 

or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is brought 

against.” Id. At bottom, though, the issue is not one of form or 

pleading technicalities, but rather substance—that is, whether the 

complaint gives defendants fair “notice of the specific claims 

against them and the factual allegations that support those claims.” 

Id. at 1325. 

“A district court has the inherent authority to control its 

docket and ensure the prompt resolution of lawsuits, which includes the ability to dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading 

grounds.” Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295 (quotation marks omitted). 

Before dismissing a complaint on shotgun-pleading grounds, 

though, the court must “sua sponte allow a litigant one chance to 

remedy such deficiencies.” Id. The court should “explain how the 

offending pleading violates the shotgun pleading rule” and order

the plaintiff to replead the case. Id. at 1295–96. “If that chance is 

afforded and the plaintiff fails to remedy the defects, the district 

court does not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds.” Jackson v. Bank of America, 

N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1358 (11th Cir. 2018). 

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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint as a shotgun pleading. As the 

court observed, the amended complaint falls into the first and third 

rough types of shotgun pleadings. It “contain[s] multiple counts 

where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts.”

Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321. And it does not separate “each cause of 

action or claim for relief” into a different count, which we described more fully above. Id. at 1323. Beaulieu does not dispute 

that the amended complaint bears these characteristics. Because 

Beaulieu received notice of these same deficiencies and instructions 

to cure them when the court struck the original complaint and ordered him to replead, it follows that the court “d[id] not abuse its 

discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds.” Jackson, 898 F.3d at 1358.

Beaulieu responds that, despite these “technical[]” deficiencies, the amended complaint still provided adequate notice of the 

specific claims against the defendants. We disagree. 

To start, while Beaulieu correctly notes that Rule 10(b) does 

not require plaintiffs to state each cause of action in a separate 

count unless “doing so would promote clarity,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

10(b), he ignores the court’s order to comply with that requirement 

after reviewing his initial complaint.1 In other words, the court 

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) states,

A party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of 

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determined that “doing so would promote clarity” for Beaulieu’s 

claims, but Beaulieu offers no justification for his failure to follow 

the court’s instructions and separate his claims into distinct counts. 

Not only that, but Beaulieu’s amended complaint fails “to 

identify his claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to 

frame a [responsive] pleading.” Sledge v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires 

N. Am., Ltd., 275 F.3d 1014, 1018 n.8 (11th Cir.2001). The pleading 

essentially presents a narrative detailing the history of the noise dispute and Beaulieu’s and his family’s grievances with the City, police officers, and subdivision residents arising from that dispute. It 

then broadly asserts that the defendants’ conduct, both public and 

private, amounts to a violation of his due-process rights. 

Yet Beaulieu fails to identify with any clarity how the defendants denied him due process, other than to assert he had a right 

to be on a public street to gather evidence for a lawsuit. And when 

we omit the unsupported assertions of “conspiracy” and “collusion,” the connection between the denial of that purported right 

and much of the alleged wrongful conduct—including malicious 

comments on Facebook, false reports of harassment, or the failure 

to preserve evidence—is difficult to discern. “If [Beaulieu] himself 

cannot offer a coherent explanation for how [or at what point he 

circumstances. A later pleading may refer by number to a paragraph in an earlier pleading. If doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence—and each defense other than a denial—must be stated 

in a separate count or defense.

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was denied due process], we cannot expect the defendants” or the 

court to do it for him by digging through his scattershot allegations. 

Barmapov v. Amuial, 986 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2021). 

Given the vague and expansive nature of the alleged constitutional injury, the amended complaint was likely to generate 

equally unfocused responsive pleadings and to “impose unwarranted expense” on the litigants and the court. See Jackson, 898 

F.3d at 1356–57. Because the district court provided Beaulieu—

who is represented by counsel—notice and an opportunity to cure,

and Beaulieu failed to remedy the deficiencies, our shotgun-pleading caselaw permitted the district court to dismiss with prejudice. 

See id. at 1358; Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1295. 

IV.

Finally, Beaulieu maintains that the district court abused its 

discretion by denying him the right to amend once as a matter of 

course and by concluding that the second and third amended complaints were still subject to dismissal as shotgun pleadings. For the 

reasons explained below, we need not decide whether the second 

amended complaint was filed “as a matter of course.” See Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 15(a)(1).

Rather, we agree with the district court that, even assuming 

without deciding it was procedurally proper, the second amended 

complaint did not fix the shotgun-pleading issues the court identified when it struck the original complaint and ordered repleading. 

Despite some changes in the presentation of the causes of action, 

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the second amended complaint continues to “contain[] multiple 

counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding 

counts” and to not separate “each cause of action or claim for relief” into a different count. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321–23. Nor 

can we say that it provides the defendants with any more clarity 

about the “claims against them and the grounds upon which each 

claim rests” than the amended complaint, since it does little to narrow the vague and expansive nature of the alleged constitutional 

injury. See id. at 1323. As for the third amended complaint, it violated the court’s order not to incorporate other pleadings. And because it purported to incorporate the whole of the second amended 

complaint, it was likewise subject to dismissal on shotgun-pleading 

grounds. The district court acted within its discretion by rejecting

these amendments. 

For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice of 

Beaulieu’s federal claims and the dismissal without prejudice of the 

supplemental state-law claims. See Vibe Micro, 878 F.3d at 1296–

97 (where a complaint has been dismissed with prejudice on shotgun pleading grounds, supplemental state law claims should be dismissed “without prejudice as to refiling in state court”).

 AFFIRMED.

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