Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A01-1406-CR-269 | February 13, 2015 Page 1 of 9

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as 

precedent or cited before any court except for the 

purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Kimberly A. Jackson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

J.T. Whitehead

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

William L. Holt,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

February 13, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

11A01-1406-CR-269

Appeal from the Clay Superior 

Court

The Honorable J. Blaine Akers, 

Judge

Case No. 11D01-1312-FC-912

Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] William L. Holt appeals his convictions for class C felony battery resulting in 

serious bodily injury and class A misdemeanor domestic battery resulting in 

bodily injury. Holt argues that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing 
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the jury, that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, and that his 

convictions violate double jeopardy principles. We conclude that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and that the evidence is 

sufficient to support his convictions. However, we agree with Holt that his 

convictions violate double jeopardy principles. Therefore, we affirm his class C 

felony battery conviction and vacate his class A misdemeanor domestic battery 

conviction.

Facts and Procedural History1

[2] The facts most favorable to the verdicts show that Holt and V.H. had a 

romantic relationship and lived together from July through December 2013. In 

December 2013, they lived with Robert Grant, Jr., Brandy Thompson, and 

Patricia Linville. Grant and Thompson were engaged and slept in their own 

bedroom. Linville also had her own bedroom. Holt and V.H. slept on couches 

in the living room. Late one December evening, Thompson returned home 

from work. Linville was already in bed in her room. Thompson went to her 

bedroom and watched television with Grant. V.H. came into their bedroom to 

talk to them, while Holt remained in the living room. 

[3] Holt came to the bedroom door and threatened V.H. He was angry and said 

that he “was gonna punch her face in.” Tr. at 91. Grant told Holt that there 

 

1

 We remind Holt’s counsel that the statement of facts in an appellate brief should be stated in accordance 

with the appropriate standard of review as required by Indiana Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(6)(b).
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would be no fighting, and Holt returned to the living room. About fifteen 

minutes later, V.H. also returned to the living room. Holt started to argue with 

her, but she told him that she did not want to argue and lay down on a couch to 

go to sleep.

[4] Shortly after V.H. left their bedroom, Thompson heard her screaming and 

crying. Grant and Thompson jumped up and went into the living room. Grant 

saw Holt on top of V.H. with his knee in her chest. Then he saw Holt hit her 

twice in the face. Grant told Holt, “[H]ey, that ain’t right. Get up out of my 

house. You know, you gonna go to jail.” Id. at 108.

[5] Linville also came into the living room. She saw V.H. screaming and covered 

in blood. V.H. told Linville that Holt hit her. Thompson and Linville took 

V.H. to St. Vincent’s Hospital in Clay County. Holt also left. Grant stayed 

behind to clean up the blood.

[6] Nurse Jennifer Reckerd treated V.H. at the hospital. Reckerd observed that 

V.H. was crying and moaning, her face was swollen and bruised, and there was 

blood in and around her mouth. Id. at 173. V.H. told Reckerd that she had 

been beat up by her “boyfriend.” Id. at 190. V.H. was in severe pain, which 

she described as ten on a scale of one to ten. Her appearance was consistent 

with her description of the pain. Hospital examination of V.H. revealed 

multiple fractures to her face. Hospital staff called the police and transferred

V.H. to St. Vincent’s Hospital in Indianapolis for “a higher level of care.” Id. at 

194. 
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[7] Before V.H. was transferred, the police arrived at the hospital. They were 

unable to interview V.H., but they photographed her injuries. They also took a 

statement from Thompson, and she gave them Grant’s address. The police 

went to Grant’s house. Grant showed them the scene of the battery, which they 

photographed. There was blood on the couch and walls. Grant also provided a 

statement and told them that Holt was probably at his ex-girlfriend Lynn 

Godsey’s house. The police then went to her house. She told them that she 

knew why they were there, allowed them in, and took them to Holt. Holt had 

told Godsey that he beat V.H. The police saw blood on Holt’s clothes, hand, 

and fingernails, and they arrested him.

[8] The State charged Holt with class C felony battery resulting in serious bodily 

injury and class A misdemeanor domestic battery resulting in bodily injury. 

Following a two-day trial, the jury found Holt guilty as charged. The trial court 

entered judgment of conviction on both verdicts. Holt appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

instructing the jury.

[9] The trial court gave the following jury instruction over Holt’s objection:

A person who has specialized education, knowledge, or experience is 

permitted to express an opinion in those areas. You should evaluate 

this testimony as you would other evidence in this case. You should 

also consider the witness’ skill, experience, knowledge and familiarity 

with the facts in the case.
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Id. at 297.

[10] “Instructing a jury is a matter assigned to trial court discretion, and an abuse of 

that discretion occurs when ‘the instructions as a whole, mislead the jury as to 

the law in the case.’” Hamm v. State, 826 N.E.2d 640, 641 (Ind. 2005) (quoting 

Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002)). “In reviewing a trial court’s 

decision to give a tendered jury instruction, we consider (1) whether the 

instruction correctly states the law, (2) is supported by the evidence in the 

record, and (3) is not covered in substance by other instructions.” Munford v. 

State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Murray v. State, 798 

N.E.2d 895, 899-900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)). 

[11] Holt argues that the instruction informed the jury regarding expert testimony 

and is unsupported by the evidence because no expert witness testified.2 The 

instruction refers to a person “who has specialized education, knowledge, or 

experience.” Tr. at 297. Reckerd, the nurse who treated V.H. for her injuries at 

the hospital, testified at Holt’s trial regarding her observation and opinion of 

V.H.’s injuries and pain. Nurse Reckerd had specialized education, knowledge, 

and experience in treating trauma patients. Accordingly, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in giving the jury instruction. 

 

2 Holt concedes on appeal that the instruction correctly states the law and is not covered elsewhere. 

Appellant’s Br. at 11. 
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Section 2 – The evidence is sufficient to establish that Holt 

was the person who battered V.H.

[12] Holt asserts that there was insufficient evidence to establish that it was he who 

battered V.H.

3

 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only 

the evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom supporting the 

conviction without reweighing the evidence or judging witness credibility. 

Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008). “We will affirm a conviction if 

there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a reasonable trier of 

fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Id.

[13] Here, Grant testified that he saw Holt hit V.H. in the face two times. Linville 

testified that V.H. told her that Holt hit her. Nurse Reckerd testified that V.H. 

told her that her boyfriend beat her. Godsey testified that Holt came to her 

home late that night and told her that he beat V.H. Police saw blood at the 

scene of the battery and blood on Holt’s clothes, hand, and fingernails. This is 

more than sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could 

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Holt was the batterer. Holt’s 

 

3

 To convict Holt of class C felony battery, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 

he knowingly touched V.H. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner resulting in serious bodily injury. 

Appellant’s App. at 20; Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1. To convict Holt of class A misdemeanor domestic battery, the 

State was required to prove that Holt touched V.H. in a rude, insolent, or angry manner resulting in bodily 

injury and that V.H. was living with Holt as if she were his spouse. Id.; Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3. Holt does 

not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to any of the elements of these offenses other than the identity 

of the perpetrator.
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argument is merely an invitation to reweigh the evidence and judge witness 

credibility, which we must decline.

Section 3 – Holt’s battery and domestic battery convictions 

violate double jeopardy principles.

[14] Holt contends that his convictions for class C felony battery resulting in serious 

bodily injury and class A misdemeanor domestic battery resulting in bodily 

injury violate the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy and 

requests that we vacate his domestic battery conviction. The Indiana 

Constitution provides, “No person shall be put in jeopardy twice for the same 

offense.” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 14. “Indiana’s Double Jeopardy Clause ... 

prevent[s] the State from being able to proceed against a person twice for the 

same criminal transgression.” Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind.

1999). “[T]wo or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in violation of Article I, 

Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, if, with respect to either the statutory 

elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the 

essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements 

of another challenged offense.” Id.

[15] “In addition to the instances covered by Richardson, ‘we have long adhered to a 

series of rules of statutory construction and common law that are often 

described as double jeopardy, but are not governed by the constitutional test set 

forth in Richardson.’” Guyton v. State, 771 N.E.2d 1141, 1143 (Ind. 2002)

(quoting Pierce v. State, 761 N.E.2d 826, 830 (Ind. 2002)). One of these 

categories prohibits “conviction and punishment for a crime which consists of 
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the very same act as another crime for which the defendant has been convicted 

and punished.” Id.; see also Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., 

concurring).

[16] To determine whether both of Holt’s convictions were based on the very same 

act, we consider the evidence, charging information, final jury instructions (if 

there was a jury), and arguments of counsel. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 

867, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Here, the charging information alleged that Holt 

“knowingly touch[ed] [V.H.] in a rude, insolent, or angry manner” to support 

both the class C felony battery and the class A misdemeanor domestic battery

charges. The evidence at trial showed that Holt hit V.H. in the face and caused 

her injuries. The prosecutor argued that Holt’s act of hitting V.H. in the face 

constituted the “touching” for both charges. Tr. at 279, 281. Thus, the very 

same act formed the basis of both convictions. Furthermore, the fact that the 

battery conviction includes serious bodily injury and the domestic battery 

conviction includes bodily injury does not avoid the double jeopardy violation

because V.H.’s bodily injury is encompassed within her serious bodily injury. 

The prosecutor told the jury as much at trial. Id. at 281. Therefore, we 

conclude that Holt’s class C felony battery and class A misdemeanor domestic 

battery convictions violate double jeopardy principles. See Vaughn v. State, 782 

N.E.2d 417, 422 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (concluding that convictions for 

battery and domestic battery arising out of same incident create double jeopardy 

violation), trans. denied, superseded by statute on other grounds; Adams v. State, 754 

N.E.2d 1033, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (concluding that Adams’s act of 
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striking victim on head with ashtray was used to establish both the touching for 

two battery counts and the act causing substantial risk of bodily injury for 

criminal recklessness, thus creating double jeopardy violation).

[17] “When two convictions are found to contravene double jeopardy principles, a 

reviewing court may remedy the violation by reducing either conviction to a 

less serious form of the same offense if doing so will eliminate the violation. If 

it will not, one of the convictions must be vacated.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 

54 (citation omitted). Because we cannot eliminate the violation by reducing 

either conviction to a less serious form of the same offense, we order that Holt’s 

conviction for class A misdemeanor domestic battery be vacated. See Jones v. 

State, 523 N.E.2d 750, 754 (Ind. 1998) (vacating battery conviction because 

information showed that identical touching was basis of second battery 

conviction), abrogated on other grounds by Richardson.

[18] Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

Friedlander, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.