UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CATAWBA INDIAN TRIBE OF SOUTH

CAROLINA, a/k/a Catawba Indian

Nation,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. No. 99-2177

CITY OF NORTH MYRTLE BEACH;

HORRY COUNTY; STATE OF SOUTH

CAROLINA,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Florence.

Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.

(CA-97-3000-4-22)

Argued: May 1, 2000

Decided: June 15, 2000

Before MURNAGHAN, WILKINS, and WILLIAMS,

Circuit Judges.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Henrietta Urbani Golding, BELLAMY, RUTENBERG,

COPELAND, EPPS, GRAVELY & BOWERS, P.A., Myrtle Beach,

South Carolina, for Appellant. Andrew Frederick Lindemann,
DAVIDSON, MORRISON & LINDEMANN, P.A., Columbia, South

Carolina; Michael Warner Battle, Sr., BATTLE & VAUGHT, P.A.,

Conway, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Howell V. Bellamy, Douglas M. Zayicek, Mary Anna Malpass, BELLAMY,

RUTENBERG, COPELAND, EPPS, GRAVELY & BOWERS, P.A.,

Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, for Appellant. Charles M. Condon,

South Carolina Attorney General, Kenneth P. Woodington, Senior

Assistant Attorney General, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee

South Carolina.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

The Catawba Tribe of South Carolina, a/k/a Catawba Indian Nation

(the Catawba Tribe or the Tribe) filed suit in the United States District

Court for the District of South Carolina against the City of North

Myrtle Beach (the City) and Horry County (the County) (collectively,

Defendants). The Catawba Tribe's complaint sought both damages

arising out of Defendants' alleged deprivation of the Tribe's right to

operate a high-stakes bingo facility in their jurisdiction and declaratory relief as to the meaning of the term "approval" in the statute governing the Tribe's location of such a facility in South Carolina. The

district court dismissed the Tribe's claims for monetary relief as

unripe and granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment on

the Tribe's claim for declaratory relief. The Tribe filed a timely notice

of appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.

I.

In August 1992, the State of South Carolina and the Catawba Tribe

entered into an "Agreement in Principle" to settle the Tribe's claims

to 144,000 acres of land in South Carolina (the Claim Area).1 Follow-

_________________________________________________________________

1 For an extended discussion of the historical background of the Agreement in Principle, see district court order of July 30, 1999 at 2-6.

 2
ing additional negotiations to refine the terms of the settlement agreement, the parties entered into a revised Agreement in Principle. The

revised Agreement in Principle was subsequently amended by the

South Carolina General Assembly and enacted as the Catawba Indian

Claims Settlement Act (the Settlement Act), S.C. Code Ann. §§ 27-

16-10 to -140 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). On June 14, 1993, thenSouth Carolina Governor Carroll Campbell signed the Settlement Act

into law. On October 27, 1993, the United States Congress enacted

a federal implementing statute entitled The Catawba Indian Tribe of

South Carolina Land Claims Settlement Act of 1993, which ratified

and adopted the Agreement in Principle and the state implementing

legislation.

Of relevance to this case, the Settlement Act provides that the

Catawba Tribe may apply to the South Carolina Department of Revenue for a special bingo license that would permit the Tribe to conduct

the game of high-stakes bingo up to six days a week and award cash

prizes of up to $100,000 per game. See S.C. Code Ann. § 27-16-

110(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). The statute entitles the Catawba

Tribe to two bingo licenses at two separate locations. See S.C. Code

Ann. § 27-16-110(C)(5). Section 27-16-110(D) provides that if the

Tribe elects to operate one of the high-stakes games off the Tribe's

Reservation and outside the Claim Area, it "first must obtain the

approval of the governing authority of the county and any municipality in which it seeks to locate the facility." S.C. Code Ann. § 27-16-

110(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998). In contrast, if the Tribe decides to

operate one or both of the games off the Reservation but inside the

Claim Area, "it shall do so in an area zoned compatibly for commercial activities after consulting with the municipality or county where

a facility is to be located." Id.

After voting to authorize bingo, the Catawba Tribe preliminarily

decided to locate and operate a bingo facility in North Myrtle Beach,

which is outside of the Claim Area, after confirming that the desired

site was located in a zoning district that already considered regular

bingo a permissible use. After the Horry County Council learned of

the Tribe's intentions, it passed a non-binding resolution stating that

the Council "strongly opposes the location of`mega bingo-parlors' in

Horry County." (J.A. at 1163.) On June 4, 1996, the County Council

rescinded the resolution and expressed "its approval of the project as

 3
outlined by the Catawba Indian Nation at the May 28, 1996, workshop of Horry County Council." (J.A. at 1170.) At approximately the

same time that the Horry County Council expressed its approval of

the Tribe's project, the Tribe outlined its plans for opening a bingo

facility in North Myrtle Beach to the North Myrtle Beach City Council. After holding several hearings and workshops on the issue, the

City Council voted on March 17, 1997 to reject the Tribe's proposal

to locate and operate a high-stakes bingo facility in North Myrtle

Beach. On August 19, 1997, Gregory Hembree, an attorney for the

City of North Myrtle Beach, wrote a letter to John C. Stewart, Jr., an

attorney representing the Catawba Tribe, to inform him that

the City will not issue a business license for the facility to

operate games permitted under the special bingo license

unless and until the Catawba Indian Nation has been granted

a special bingo license by the South Carolina Tax Commission and the North Myrtle Beach City Council has granted

the required approval.

(J.A. at 1249.)

In response to the City's refusal to approve the proposed bingo

facility and issue the requisite business license, the Catawba Tribe

brought the instant suit in October 1997, seeking both money damages arising out of Defendants' alleged deprivation of the Tribe's

right to operate a high-stakes bingo facility in their jurisdiction and

declaratory relief as to the meaning of the term"approval" in § 27-16-

110(D). The County filed a motion for summary judgment and the

City filed a motion to dismiss. After conducting a hearing on these

motions, the district court issued an order on December 30, 1998

holding that the Tribe's claim for declaratory judgment was ripe for

adjudication and dismissing the Tribe's claims for monetary relief as

unripe. The County and the City subsequently filed motions for summary judgment and the Catawba Tribe filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, limited to the issue of the meaning of the term

"approval" in S.C. Code Ann. § 27-16-110(D).2 The Tribe took the

_________________________________________________________________

2 The State of South Carolina (the State) intervened with respect to the

constitutionality of the statute and filed a memorandum in support of

summary judgment in which it adopted the arguments made by the City

on the constitutional issues. The State, therefore, is a party to this appeal.

 4
position that the term "approval" merely requires compliance with

local zoning and business licensing ordinances, while the City argued

that "approval" conveys broad discretionary authority to the local

governing body to allow or disallow a high-stakes bingo facility

within its jurisdiction.3

By order of July 30, 1999, the district court granted Defendants'

motions for summary judgment and denied the Tribe's cross-motion

for summary judgment. First, the district court concluded that based

upon the plain meaning of the words used, the context of the words

in the section, and the overall statutory scheme, the term "approval"

in § 27-16-110(D) granted the City and the County governing bodies

discretionary authority to allow or disallow the Catawba Tribe's

request to locate a high-stakes bingo facility within their jurisdiction.

The district court subsequently rejected the Tribe's contention that

this interpretation would render the statute unconstitutional. The district court reasoned that this interpretation did not violate the Equal

Protection Clause because no other entity in South Carolina besides

the Tribe possessed the authority to operate a high-stakes bingo facility and because granting discretionary authority to the governing

bodies of the City and the County was rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of addressing concerns related to "megabingo." The district court also concluded that this interpretation did

not violate the Indian Commerce Clause because the federal implementing legislation expressly delegated regulatory authority over the

Tribe's gambling operations to the State of South Carolina and its

political subdivisions and because Indians going beyond reservation

boundaries are generally subject to nondiscriminatory state law otherwise applicable to other state citizens. Finally, the district court found

that this interpretation did not violate the Tenth Amendment because

giving local governments discretion to allow or disallow high-stakes

bingo was consistent with state sovereignty.

The Catawba Tribe filed a timely notice of appeal. Before us, the

Tribe sets forth the same arguments it made before the district court.

First, the Tribe asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants because the term "approval" merely

_________________________________________________________________

3 Both the County and the State agreed with the City's interpretation of

the term "approval."

 5
requires compliance with any zoning regulations and other ordinances

regulating bingo establishments enacted by a local county or municipality. Next, the Tribe contends that the definition of the term "approval" in S.C. Code Ann. § 27-16-110(D) adopted by the district

court renders the statute violative of the Equal Protection Clause, the

Indian Commerce Clause, and the Tenth Amendment. Finally, the

Tribe argues that the district court erred in dismissing the Tribe's

claim for money damages as unripe because the Tribe lost substantial

amounts of income as a result of the City's prohibition of the Tribe's

operation of a bingo establishment authorized by the Settlement Act.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate if "`the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter

of law.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Although "[t]he evidence of the non-movant

is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his

favor," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986), in

order to survive summary judgment, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be

insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]," id. at 252. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. See Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &

Co., 863 F.2d 1162, 1167 (4th Cir. 1988). We also exercise de novo

review over a district court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to

meet the constitutional requirement of a "case or controversy," such

as a dismissal for lack of ripeness. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Attorney

Gen. of Virginia, 940 F.2d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1991).

We have reviewed the record, briefs, and pertinent case law on this

matter, and we have had the benefit of oral argument. Our careful de

novo review persuades us that the rulings of the district court were

correct. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the district court.

See Catawba Indian Tribe of South Carolina v. City of North Myrtle

 6
Beach, No. CA-97-3000-4-22 (D.S.C. Dec. 30, 1998 & July 30,

1999).

AFFIRMED

 7