Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 1 of 31

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this 

Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Richard Ranucci

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Katherine J. Noel

Noel Law

Kokomo, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Vance Voorhis,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Danielle Voorhis,

Appellee-Petitioner.

October 22, 2019

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-DR-1778

Appeal from the Tipton Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Thomas R. Lett, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No. 

80C01-1508-DR-263

Friedlander, Senior Judge. 

[1] In this dissolution action, the trial court issued its findings of fact, conclusions 

thereon, and decree of dissolution that dissolved the parties’ marriage, valued 

the parties’ assets, and divided the marital estate. To effect an equal 

distribution of the parties’ marital assets, the trial court entered a judgment in 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 2 of 31

the amount of $15,167.50 against Vance Voorhis (“Husband”) and in favor of

Danielle Voorhis (“Wife”). The court also directed Husband to pay $10,000.00 

of Wife’s attorney fees as well as outstanding valuation expenses that Wife 

owed to the company that she hired to perform business valuation services. 

Husband appeals, presenting three issues for our review, which we consolidate 

and restate as follows: 

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when valuing the 

property of the marriage and then distributing it; and

2. Whether the trial court improperly ordered Husband to pay

Wife’s attorney fees and outstanding valuation expenses.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions.

[2] The facts of this case are as follows. Husband and Wife were married on July 

27, 1991. Wife filed a petition for dissolution on July 2, 2015. At the time Wife 

sought dissolution of the marriage, the parties had no children under nineteen 

years old. Wife was employed as an elementary school teacher, and Husband 

was self-employed. 

[3] During the marriage, the parties jointly owned a home, located in Tipton 

County, Indiana (“marital home”), that had an attached lot. The parties owned 

several vehicles, including a 2011 Chevrolet HHR. The parties also owned a 

Kubota mower that was used to mow the grounds at the marital home. 

[4] During the course of the marriage, the parties also owned three businesses: 

D&V Housing, LLC (“D&V”); B.E.S. Enterprises, Inc. (“BES”); and 
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Tomorrow Transport (“TT”). D&V is a real estate holding company, owned by 

both Husband and Wife, that held four different real estate properties. The 

properties were located on College Street in Windfall, Indiana; East Street in 

Tipton, Indiana; Washington Street in Tipton, Indiana; and Dearborn Street in 

Tipton, Indiana. BES, owned solely by Husband, is a company that provides 

concession stand services for sporting events. TT was created as a holding 

company for the vehicles used by BES, which included two Ford Transits, a 

GMC Cargo Van, a fork truck, and two Isuzu vehicles. All the businesses were 

run by Husband, and Wife did not participate in the day-to-day operations of 

the businesses. The marital estate also included insurance proceeds for fire 

damage to the property located on East Street, as well as additional personal 

property, retirement assets, and bank account funds. 

[5] On December 18, 2017, and then continuing on May 22, 2018, the trial court 

conducted a final hearing where the parties presented competing evidence 

regarding the valuation of the marital assets. Wife’s experts were Brian Minor 

from Blue & Co., LLC, and Steven Taylor, a real estate appraiser. Husband’s 

experts were Douglas Speer, an appraiser, and Penny Lutocka, a certified public 

accountant with Houlihan Valuation Advisors. With respect to the values 

assigned to the marital assets, the trial court largely accepted the valuations, 

methodologies, and conclusions of Wife’s experts.

[6] On July 22, 2018, the trial court entered a final dissolution decree, accompanied 

by extensive findings of fact and conclusions thereon, dissolving the parties’ 

marriage, ordering an equal distribution of the parties’ assets, and detailing the 
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distribution of the marital property. To achieve an equal distribution, the trial 

court entered a $15,167.50 judgment against Husband. The trial court also

required him to “be responsible for $10,000.00” of Wife’s attorney fees and the 

outstanding balance that Wife owed to Blue & Co., the company that she hired 

to perform the valuations of Husband’s businesses. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p.

18. The trial court’s findings, conclusions thereon, and decree provide in 

relevant part as follows:

10. Just prior to the filing of the dissolution, the rental home 

located at 116 Dearborn St., Tipton, was destroyed by fire [sic].

[1]

Husband received insurance proceeds in the sum of $29,250.00.

He kept said sum and did not divide it with Wife.

. . .

14. Wife had business valuations performed to appraise the value 

of Husband’s three business entities, BES, Tomorrow Transport, 

and D&V Housing. Mr. Brad Minor of Blue & Company 

presented and testified to his valuations in great detail. Mr. 

Minor concluded the value of BES was $243,000.00, Tomorrow 

Transport was $34,000.00, and D&V Housing was $81,000.00. 

Mr. Minor’s testimony was credible and unbiased. The Blue & 

Co. report was substantially delayed due to [Husband’s] failure to 

cooperate in turning over documentation.

15. Husband had a valuation of BES and Tomorrow Transport

conducted by Houlihan Valuation Advisors. The valuation 

presented by Husband concluded the value of both entities to be 

$209,207.00. This value is perplexing in that Tomorrow 

 

1 The trial court’s findings, conclusions thereon, and dissolution decree mistakenly found that the Dearborn 

Street property was destroyed by fire prior to Wife filing the dissolution petition. It was, however, the East 

Street property that was damaged by a fire that occurred after Wife filed her petition for dissolution. We have 

determined that these errors are immaterial.
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Transport alone owns six commercial vehicles, commercial real 

estate, and has provided a significant source of income to the 

marriage. The Court also believes this valuation was based on 

inaccurate property values for the [College Street] building, as 

[Husband’s] appraisal was almost 1⁄2 that of the assessed value of 

the property and prior appraisals.

. . .

18. The Court finds there is a disparity in income between Wife 

and Husband. While Husband testified he believes he makes less 

than Wife, the Court finds this suspicious. Husband is in 

controls [sic] of what salary, expenses, costs, and income the 

business provides. The parties have acquired substantial assets 

and little debt during the marriage. This was clearly not 

accomplished on a teacher’s salary alone.

19. The Court finds the parties [sic] assets and liabilities shall be 

divided pursuant to Exhibit [1].

[2]

Further, [W]ife shall receive a 

judgment against [H]usband in the sum of $$15,167.50 [sic] to 

effectuate an equal distribution of the martial [sic] estate. The 

Court declines to deviate from an equal distribution.

. . .

21. Due to the disparity in income, [Husband] shall be 

responsible for $10,000.00 of [Wife’s] attorney fees. [Husband]

shall also be responsible for [Wife’s] outstanding balance to Blue 

& Co.

*****

DECREE OF DISSOLUTION

. . .

1. The marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved.

 

2 Exhibit 1 contains a table illustrating the distribution of the parties’ marital assets (hereinafter, “marital 

balance sheet”). While information from the marital balance sheet has been included in this opinion, the 

sheet itself has not been reproduced and included herein.
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2. Wife is awarded as her sole and separate property the 

following: all property (and its value therein) listed in the “Wife”

Column in Exhibit 1, and the [marital home and the attached] 

real estate . . . , and her personal property now in her possession.

. . .

4. Husband is awarded as his sole and separate property the

following: all property (and its value therein) listed in the 

“Husband” Column in Exhibit 1, and the real estate located at . . 

. College [St.], . . . East St., . . . Washington St., . . . and . . .

Dearborn St. . . . , and his personal property now in his 

possession. 

5. Husband is awarded BES, Tomorrow Transport, and D&V 

Housing and all the assets and liabilities associated therewith, . . . 

. Husband is awarded the [fire] insurance proceeds [for the 

damage to the East Street property] in the sum of $29,250.00. He 

is further awarded [the] . . . 2011 Chevy HHR, . . . [the] 1995 

Kubota [mower] and attachments, . . . household goods and 

furnishings in his possession, and the guns and ammunition.

Id. at 16-21.

[7] This appeal followed. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

[8] Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it valued the 

property of the marriage, distributed it, and ordered him to pay Wife’s attorney 

fees and outstanding valuation expenses. The division of marital assets is 

within the trial court’s discretion, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that 

discretion. DeSalle v. Gentry, 818 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). The parties 

must overcome the presumption that the trial court considered and complied 

with the applicable law, and that presumption is one of the strongest 

presumptions pertinent to our consideration on appeal. Id. We may not 
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reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and we consider 

only the evidence most favorable to the trial court’s disposition of the marital 

property. Id.

[9] According to the record before us, neither party filed a Trial Rule 52(A) written 

request with the trial court for special findings and conclusions thereon. 

Instead, at some point during the final hearing, the parties asked to submit to 

the court proposed findings and conclusions, and at the close of the final 

hearing, the trial court directed the parties to do so. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 227. We 

therefore treat the trial court’s findings as sua sponte findings of fact. See Piles v. 

Gosman, 851 N.E.2d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); see also Estudillo v. 

Estudillo, 956 N.E.2d 1084, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). 

[10] Sua sponte findings control only as to the issues they cover, and a general 

judgment standard will control as to the issues upon which there are no 

findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259 (Ind. 1997). We will affirm a 

general judgment entered with findings if it can be sustained on any legal theory 

supported by the evidence. Id. When a court has made special findings of fact, 

we review sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step process. Id. First, we 

must determine whether the evidence supports the trial court’s findings of 

fact. Id. Second, we must determine whether those findings of fact support the 

trial court's conclusions of law. Id.
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[11] We “shall not set aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and 

due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A).

A decision is clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and 

effect of the facts and circumstances before the dissolution court, 

or if a review of the record leaves this court with a firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made. In making this 

determination, we will not weigh the evidence or make 

credibility determinations, and we will only consider the 

evidence favorable to the judgment and reasonable inferences 

drawn therefrom.

R.R.F. v. L.L.F., 956 N.E.2d 1135, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (internal citation 

omitted). “Findings are clearly erroneous if there are no facts in the record to 

support them either directly or by inference, and a judgment is clearly erroneous 

if the wrong legal standard is applied to properly found facts.” Crider v. 

Crider, 26 N.E.3d 1045, 1047 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “[W]e may look both to 

other findings and beyond the findings to the evidence of record to determine if 

the result is against the facts and circumstances before the court.” Stone v. 

Stone, 991 N.E.2d 992, 998 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), aff’d on reh’g, 4 N.E.3d 666. 

[12] On appeal, Husband specifically contends that the trial court abused its 

discretion by: including certain assets and debts in the marital pot and 

excluding others, improperly valuing certain marital property, and awarding 

Wife attorney fees and outstanding valuation expenses. Husband’s first two 

arguments are, essentially, a challenge to the trial court’s valuation and 

distribution of certain marital assets, and we will consolidate and address those
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arguments as such. Thereafter, we will address Husband’s argument regarding 

the award to Wife of fees and expenses.

Husband’s Challenge to Trial Court’s Valuation and 

Distribution of Certain Marital Assets

[13] Husband takes issue with the trial court’s valuation and distribution of the 

following marital assets: (1) D&V, specifically the East Street property held by 

the business and the fire insurance proceeds for the property; (2) BES and TT;

(3) the lot adjoining the marital residence; (4) the Chevrolet HHR; (5) the 

Kubota mower; (6) Husband’s household items; and (7) the parties’ jewelry. 

“We review a trial court’s decision in ascertaining the value of property in a 

dissolution action for an abuse of discretion.” Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 

536 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. Generally, there is no abuse of 

discretion if a trial court’s chosen valuation is within the range of values 

supported by the evidence. Id. “A valuation submitted by one of the parties is 

competent evidence of the value of property in a dissolution action and may 

alone support the trial court’s determination in that regard.” Alexander v. 

Alexander, 927 N.E.2d 926, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quotation and citation 

omitted), trans. denied. In reviewing a trial court’s valuation of property in a 

dissolution, we will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of 

witnesses. Bass v. Bass, 779 N.E.2d 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 10 of 31

1. D&V – East Street Property and Fire Insurance Proceeds

[14] D&V, which held four properties, was valued at $81,000.00.3 One of the 

properties held by D&V was the East Street property. The East Street property

was a double that contained two residential rental units. On April 16, 2016, a 

fire damaged the property. On June 2, 2016, Husband received from the 

insurance company two checks, both in the amount of $14,625—for a total 

payment of $29,250.00. Husband, however, refused to disclose the amount of 

the insurance proceeds to Wife’s expert at Blue & Co., as Husband determined 

that the expert did not need to know the amount of the insurance proceeds to 

calculate the value of the property.

[15] Blue & Co. valued the East Street property at $60,000.00. To arrive at this

value, Blue & Co. listed a net book value for the property of $26,457.00 and 

added a $33,543.00 adjustment “based on [the] Douglas Speer report plus 

estimated insurance proceeds based on prior rent amounts.” Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 2, p. 60. Thus, Blue & Co. utilized the income approach to value when it 

based the $60,000.00 value in part on the amount of rental income the property 

had produced in the past. Husband’s expert, Douglas Speer, assessed a value of 

 

3 The $81,000.00 valuation for D&V was based on the trial court’s acceptance of the following values for the 

four properties held by the business: East Street at $60,000.00; Washington Street at $38,000.00; Dearborn 

Street at $2,500.00; and College Street at $158,000.00. The marital balance sheet lists the four properties but 

does not assign individual values to the properties. Instead, the sheet lists the value assigned to D&V

($81,000.00) and shows that D&V was awarded to Husband. 
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$8,000.00 for the property, pre-fire, based upon the condition in which previous 

tenants had left the property. 

[16] Husband contends that the trial court erred by accepting Blue & Co.’s valuation 

of the East Street property because, according to Husband, the valuation failed 

to account for the fact that “renters had about destroyed the inside [of the 

property,] and [the property] needed everything to be repaired”; and the 

valuation “rested on the mistaken assumption that the East Street fire occurred 

before Speer’s appraisal of East Street for $8,000.00.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 19, 29

(emphasis added). He argues that the trial court should have accepted the

$8,000.00 value that Speer placed on the property because that value was 

assessed pre-fire. Husband also argues that by overvaluing the East Street 

property, the trial court overvalued D&V. We disagree. 

[17] The trial court heard testimony regarding both valuations for the property, 

including the impact of the fire and the tenants’ vandalism on the value of the 

property. For example, Wife’s expert from Blue & Co., Brian Minor, testified

during cross-examination as follows regarding how he arrived at the $60,000.00 

valuation and his opinion of Speer’s $8,000.00 valuation for the property:

A . . . [W]e utilized the appraisal but then we had to estimate 

the value of the real estate based on some prior rents. So, that 

property was receiving rents of about [$]9500 a year. [Speer’s]

appraisal valued the property at [$]8,000, but the appraisal valued 

it after the property was destroyed by fire. . . .

Q Now, are you sure that the appraisal was done after the fire? 

A Yes. 
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Q But if it’s not then that number’s incorrect? 

A Then the 8,000 would be accurate. Well, it wouldn’t make sense. 

I mean obviously a property that’s receiving rents of 9500 a year 

wouldn’t be worth $8,000. It would pay for itself in less than a year. 

That wouldn’t make any sense. . . . So, just common sense says that no, 

that appraisal would not be accurate. Common sense tells me that it 

was after the fire. 

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 22-23 (emphasis added). Speer testified that the reason he valued 

the property at $8,000.00, pre-fire, was because the property had been

“destroyed inside” by the previous tenants, and the property needed extensive 

repair work. Id. at 92. He also testified, however, that if an individual “put 

about 50,000 [dollars] in [the property],” it might be worth between $70,000.00 

and $75,000.00. Id. 

[18] The trial court heard the testimony of both experts, including Minor’s mistaken 

belief that Speer’s appraisal was performed post-fire, and determined that the 

East Street property was worth $60,000.00 and that D&V was worth 

$81,000.00. The trial court’s determination is within the scope of the evidence 

and therefore not an abuse of discretion.

[19] Husband further argues that the trial court “improperly double counted 

insurance proceeds for the fire [that occurred] at [the] East Street [property].” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 9. According to Husband, the $60,000.00 valuation that the 

court accepted for the property accounted for the $29,250.00 in insurance 

proceeds. Thus, Husband claims that the trial court erred in “includ[ing] the 

fire insurance payments in the marital estate a second time, by counting them as 
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a separate asset” attributable to Husband. Id. We agree and, therefore, must 

remand for the trial court to remove the $29,250.00 as an asset attributable to 

Husband as that amount was included in arriving at the value placed on the 

East Street property.

2. BES and TT

[20] Husband next challenges the valuations of BES and TT. His argument is twofold. First, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

include in the marital estate, as a debt of the marriage, a $23,293.26 debt owed 

to BES. He also argues that the trial court erred by assigning a value of 

$243,000.00 to BES and a separate value of $34,000.00 to TT.

A. Debt Owed to BES

[21] In 2010, Husband and Wife refinanced their home to obtain a lower interest 

rate on funds they borrowed to finance BES. As part of the refinance, they 

were required to pay off the existing home mortgage in the amount of

$52,000.00. Husband and Wife borrowed the $52,000.00 from BES and paid 

off the mortgage. As a result, Husband and Wife owed BES $52,000.00. Blue 

& Co. listed this $52,000.00 debt on the BES balance sheet as an asset and 

labeled it “Loans to shareholders[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 43. When 

Blue & Co. determined the valuation of BES, it counted the loan as an asset to

BES.

[22] Between 2010, and the date of the dissolution filing, Husband withheld money 

from his paychecks to pay down this debt owed to BES. As of the date of the 
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dissolution filing, the BES balance sheet showed a remaining debt of 

$23,293.26. 

[23] Husband asserts that the trial court erred by not including the $23,293.00

(amount rounded to nearest whole number) as a debt on the marital balance 

sheet. According to Husband, since this debt was counted as an asset of BES,

the debt increased the value of BES by $23,293.00. Husband argues that

because the amount was not included as a marital debt, Husband received no 

credit for the debt, and the debt on BES’s books is, essentially, dissolved.

Husband claims that “[t]he net effect is for Wife to take a residence without 

mortgage, and Husband owes the equivalent to BES, but gets no credit for the 

debt, even though he was assigned the corresponding asset within BES.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 25. Husband contends that this was an abuse of discretion

that requires remand so that the trial court can add the debt to the marital pot 

and divide the debt equally between the parties. We disagree.

[24] Blue & Co. valued BES at $243,000.00, taking into account the $23,293.00 

owed to BES and an additional $156,353.00 that Blue & Co. listed on BES’s 

balance sheet as “Loans from shareholders”—an amount BES owes to the 

parties. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 43 (emphasis added). Regarding the 

$156,353.00, Minor, with Blue & Co., testified that the amount was a 

“shareholder note[,] which is monies that were owed to [Husband.]” Tr. Vol. 

2, p. 14. He further testified that the amount was an account receivable owed

to Husband from BES. On direct examination, Minor was asked, “If 

[Husband] were to waive that claim or request that he not have those monies 
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returned to him, would that number then need to be added into [BES’s 

valuation]?” Id. at 19. Minor answered, “Correct.” Id. When asked, “[a]nd in 

fact, just to clarify, you’ve discounted the value of the business due to that 

account receivable[,]” Minor replied, “I lowered the value by that . . . exact 

number.” Id. 

[25] Returning to the $23,293.00 at issue, and applying Husband’s argument

regarding the debt, if the trial court erred by failing to include the $23,293.00 

owed to BES in the marital pot as a debt of the parties, then the trial court also 

erred in failing to include in the marital pot as an asset the $156,353.00 that BES 

owes the parties. Husband has not carried his argument thus far. 

[26] Both the debt and the asset values were taken into account in Blue & Co.’s 

determination of the value of BES. The trial court accepted the valuation, 

included the valuation amount in the marital pot, and awarded BES to 

Husband. As the $23,293.00 debt was already accounted for in the valuation of 

BES, the trial court did not need to list the amount as a separate, line-item-debt 

on the marital balance sheet. No abuse of discretion occurred here. 

B. Valuation of BES and TT

[27] Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by adopting Blue & 

Co.’s valuations for BES at $243,000.00 and TT at $34,000.00. Blue & Co. 

used an income approach in reaching the valuations—evaluating income 

stream, capitalization rate, value of operations, excess working capital, and 

structured debt for both companies, and making adjustments for lack of 
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marketability as well as for personal goodwill (the personal relationships that 

Husband has developed with his customers). Husband takes particular issue 

with the addition of excess working capital in the values of the two businesses. 

According to Husband:

If Blue [& Co.] had not added excess working capital to the 

values of BES and TT, the . . . values of these businesses would 

have been $71,888 less ($67,604 for BES plus $4,284 for TT). 

[Thus,] Blue’s . . . valuations of BES and TT, together $277,000 

($243,000 + $34,000), without excess working capital increases 

for both ($277,000 - $71,888), would have been $205,112. 

Appellant’s Br. p. 33. Husband also notes that his expert with Houlihan 

Valuation Advisors, Penny Lutocka, did not include excess working capital in 

her determination of the value of the businesses and calculated a combined 

indicated value for BES and TT, together, at $206,300.00.4

[28] Husband attempts to support his arguments by asserting that Blue & Co. used 

incorrect accounting ratio methodologies to calculate the excess working capital 

values and that this error led to an overvaluation of the businesses. Husband 

maintains that there is no evidence in the record to support the use of the 

particular ratios Blue & Co. used to calculate excess working capital in its final 

determination of the valuations for the businesses. We disagree.

 

4 We note that the trial court found Lutocka’s valuation “perplexing in that Tomorrow Transport alone owns 

six commercial vehicles, commercial real estate, and has provided a significant source of income to the 

marriage.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 17. 
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[29] The trial court heard extensive testimony from both parties’ experts regarding 

the valuations for BES and TT, which included testimony regarding excess 

working capital and ratios. The trial court ultimately adopted Wife’s valuations 

that were provided by Blue & Co. The court was well within its discretion to 

do so. See Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 536 (generally, there is no abuse of discretion 

if a trial court’s chosen valuation is within the range of values supported by the 

evidence).

3. Lot Adjoining Marital Residence

[30] Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

include in the marital pot the value of the lot that adjoins the marital residence. 

Wife’s expert, Steven Taylor, appraised the marital residence and the adjacent 

lot as having a combined value of $300,000.00. The trial court adopted the 

appraised amount and awarded the marital residence and the lot to Wife. 

Husband maintains that Taylor’s appraisal included the lot upon which the 

marital residence sat but did not include the value of the separate lot that was 

located adjacent to that of the marital residence. According to Husband, “[t]his 

mistake in turn resulted in incorrect valuation of the entire marital estate and 

corrupted the intended equal division of the whole pot.” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. 

We find that the evidence of record does not support Husband’s argument and 

that Husband’s argument is an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we 

cannot do. See DeSalle, 818 N.E.2d 40.
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[31] Taylor testified on direct examination as follows regarding his appraisal of the 

marital residence and the adjacent lot:

Q And in fact did you go to the home site and inspect the home? 

A Yes, uh-huh. 

Q And the land around the area? 

A Yes. 

*****

Q Okay. And the property you appraised had some acreage 

with it as well; is that correct? 

A Correct. 

Q And what is, I’m sorry, your appraisal actually includes that 

acreage; is that accurate? 

A Yes, it’s -- yeah. 

Q And what value did you determine that the property located 

[in Tipton] was as of the day of your valuation? 

A It was 300,000. 

Q And that was for the house and the property attached thereto?

A Yes, the land and the outbuilding and everything, yes.

Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 6-7 (emphasis added). Wife testified that she recalled that 

Taylor’s appraisal included the marital residence and the adjacent lot. 

Husband, on the other hand, testified that Taylor’s appraisal did not include the

value of the lot in question, and Husband offered the testimony of his expert, 

Douglas Speer, who testified that the lot had a separate value of $20,000.00. 

[32] Husband’s argument, essentially, is that the trial court should have believed his 

testimony, and that of his expert, over the testimony of Wife’s expert. The trial 
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court, however, was not required to believe Husband’s testimony. “[I]t is the 

province of the trial court to determine which witnesses to believe when it hears 

the evidence.” In re Marriage of Julien, 397 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1979). The trial court determined that Taylor’s appraisal included the marital 

residence and the adjacent lot and that the appraised value of the two properties 

totaled $300,000.00. We will not second-guess the trial court and assume the 

role of factfinder. No error occurred here.

4. Chevrolet HHR

[33] Husband next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by assigning a 

value to the parties’ 2011 Chevrolet HHR vehicle that, according to Husband, 

was not supported by the evidence. The trial court has broad discretion in 

ascertaining the value of property in a dissolution action, and its valuation will 

only be disturbed where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the trial court. Trabucco v. Trabucco, 944 N.E.2d 

544 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). If the trial court’s chosen valuation is within the 

range of values supported by the evidence, we will affirm. Goossens v. 

Goossens, 829 N.E.2d 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

[34] Wife originally placed zero dollars on the value of the HHR on her proposed 

assets and liabilities sheet, as the vehicle was driven exclusively by the parties’

daughter. Wife wanted the vehicle to be given to their daughter and any value

associated with the vehicle to be excluded from the divorce proceedings. At the 

final hearing, however, Husband testified that he was not “comfortable” giving 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 20 of 31

the vehicle to his daughter and excluding the vehicle’s value from the marital 

pot. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 126. 

[35] Husband also testified that the HHR was worth $4,237.00, based upon the 

Kelley Blue Book value of the vehicle.

5

 He admitted into evidence a copy of the 

valuation from Kelley Blue Book, listing the vehicle’s condition as “Good 

Condition” and a value of $4,237.00. Respondent’s Ex. Q, Ex. Vol. 4, p. 15. 

Wife then testified that she had placed a value of $4,700.00 on the vehicle, and 

that this was reflected on her revised assets and liabilities spreadsheet that was 

admitted into evidence. Wife did not submit any documentation supporting her 

valuation of the vehicle. The trial court ultimately found the HHR to be an 

asset of the marriage, assigned a value of $4,700.00, and awarded the vehicle to 

Husband. 

[36] Husband maintains that the trial court erred by adopting Wife’s valuation for 

the HHR, claiming that “Wife offered no basis for her valuation[,]” whereas his 

valuation was based upon the value listed in the Kelley Blue Book pricing 

report. Appellant’s Br. p. 41. Husband’s argument, however, is a request for us 

to reweigh the evidence and judge witness credibility, which we cannot do. 

Crider, 15 N.E.3d 1042. It is well-settled that a valuation submitted by one of 

the parties is competent evidence of the value of property in a dissolution 

 

5 The Kelley Blue Book has been used since 1926 as a resource used to find the value of a vehicle. See

KELLEY BLUE BOOK®, https://www.kbb.com (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 21 of 31

proceeding and may alone support the trial court’s determinations in that 

regard. See, Alexander, 927 N.E.2d at 935. Additionally, we “will not reverse a 

judgment on the basis of conflicting evidence[.]” Ernst v. Ernst, 503 N.E.2d 619, 

621 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted). The trial court’s determination that 

the HHR was worth $4,700.00 was not clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts and circumstances before the court. We therefore find that the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion by adopting the value.

[37] Husband also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to 

include on the marital balance sheet the $4,463.53 debt (remaining loan) 

associated with the HHR. We agree.

[38] It is well established that all marital property goes into the marital pot for 

division, including both the assets and the liabilities of the parties, whether it

was owned by either spouse before the marriage, acquired by either spouse after 

the marriage and before final separation of the parties, or acquired by their joint 

efforts. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4(a); Webb v. Schleutker, 891 N.E.2d 1144 (Ind. Ct.

App. 2008); Capehart v. Capehart, 705 N.E.2d 533 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. 

denied. This “one-pot” theory ensures that all assets are subject to the trial 

court’s power to divide and award. Thompson v. Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 

914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. While the trial court may ultimately 

determine that a particular asset should be awarded solely to one spouse, it 

must first include the asset in its consideration of the marital estate to be 

divided. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 22 of 31

[39] Here, the evidence establishes that as of June 30, 2015, two days prior to the 

filing of the dissolution petition, the HHR carried a loan balance of $4,463.53. 

No evidence was presented that the debt was retired during the dissolution 

proceedings. Thus, the loan debt is a marital liability and it should have been 

considered by the trial court in fashioning an equitable division of the marital 

property. Therefore, we remand with instructions to the trial court to include 

the debt associated with the HHR in the marital pot and determine how the 

debt should be allocated. 

5. Kubota Mower

[40] Husband next contends that the trial court abused its discretion by valuing the 

parties’ Kubota mower at $4,000.00 and assigning the mower to Husband. 

According to Husband, “[t]his was error because the parties, by their respective 

attorneys, made a verbal, on-the-record stipulation that the Kubota would be 

assigned to Wife at a value of $3,500.” Appellant’s Br. p. 40. 

[41] On the first day of the final hearing, Wife testified on direct examination as 

follows regarding her desire to keep the Kubota mower and how much she 

thought the mower was worth:

Q You want to keep that vehicle [sic]?

A Yes. That mower, yes.

Q That mower. And you’ve valued that at $3500?

A Correct.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 23 of 31

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 34. Husband’s attorney then stipulated to the assignment of the 

mower to Wife, and Wife’s attorney agreed. 

[42] Approximately five months later, however, at the continuation of the final

hearing, Wife presented testimony on direct examination indicating that she 

wanted the mower assigned to Husband and that the mower should be valued 

at $4,000.00 because it had a snowblower attachment. The testimony was as 

follows:

Q Okay. And then we have also moved the Kubota tractor and 

attachments over to Husband’s column; is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Now, that Kubota mower is $3500 I believe a stipulated value, 

but it also has an attachment that wasn’t included at the last 

hearing; is that correct?

A Correct. He also took the snowblower that went with it.

Q And that has a value of $500 so you’ve totaled it to 4,000?

A Correct.

Id. at 154. Husband did not object to Wife’s desire to have the mower assigned

to him. Later, however, on cross-examination, he testified that he believed the 

value of the mower, including the attachment, was $3,500.00. 

[43] The parties originally agreed that the mower would be assigned to Wife; 

however, Wife later indicated that she wanted the mower assigned to Husband, 

and Husband did not object. The trial court heard the testimony of the parties 

and ultimately determined that the mower and its attachment were valued at 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 24 of 31

$4,000.00 and that the mower should be assigned to Husband. The court was 

within its discretion to do so. 

6. Husband’s Household Items

[44] Husband argues that the trial court abused its discretion by assigning to 

Husband’s household items a value that, according to Husband, was not 

supported by the evidence. Husband “[took] a garage sale approach” in 

estimating the value of his household items and introduced into evidence a 

detailed item-by-item inventory that indicated his household items were worth 

$4,100.00. Appellant’s Br. p. 38. Wife testified on direct examination as 

follows regarding her belief that Husband’s items were worth $7,685.00:

Q Okay. Now, you have various household items; is that 

accurate?

A Correct.

Q And pursuant to your husband’s estimate, he has $7,685 of 

household goods and furnishings?

A Yes.

. . .

Q And this is going through, your husband has lots of tools and 

equipment and things like that; is that accurate?

A That is accurate.

Tr. Vol. 2, p. 36. The trial court adopted Wife’s valuation for Husband’s 

household items. 

[45] Husband’s argument, essentially, is that because Wife offered only her 

testimony as to what value she believed should be placed on Husband’s items
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 25 of 31

and did not provide her own detailed valuation for the items, Wife’s evidence 

was not sufficient to support the trial court’s adoption of her valuation. 

Husband further argues that the manner in which Wife’s attorney examined 

Wife at the hearing, and the answers that Wife provided, failed to provide 

context for Wife’s answers or clarify whether the $7,685.00 valuation was an 

estimate that was “a holdover from confidential negotiations or mediation.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 39. 

[46] A valuation “submitted by one of the parties is competent evidence of the value 

of property in a dissolution action and may alone support the trial court’s 

determination in that regard.” Skinner v. Skinner, 644 N.E.2d 141, 144 (Ind. Ct.

App. 1994) (citations omitted). Additionally, we “will not reverse a judgment 

on the basis of conflicting evidence[.]” Ernst, 503 N.E.2d at 621 (citation 

omitted).

[47] Here, Husband provided the trial court with an item-by-item list of his 

household items—items that included numerous tools and equipment—and the 

estimated values that Husband believes should be placed on each item, using a 

“garage sale approach,” for a total value of $4,100.00 Appellant’s Br. p. 38. 

Wife testified that Husband’s items were valued at $7,685.00. The trial court 

was not obliged to accept Husband’s assertion of the value of individual 

household items, even if Wife did not expressly refute Husband’s evidence. To 

the contrary, it is well established that “[a] trial court, like a jury, is entitled to 

take into consideration in weighing the evidence its own experience and the 

ordinary experiences in the lives of men and women.” Clark v. Hunter, 861 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 26 of 31

N.E.2d 1202, 1207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (alteration original; quotation and 

citation omitted). Here, because Husband’s valuations were estimations based 

upon a garage sale approach, and in light of our standard of review, we decline

to question the trial court’s determination of the valuation evidence for 

Husband’s household items. We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in adopting Wife’s valuation for Husband’s household items.

7. Parties’ Jewelry

[48] Next, Husband argues that the trial court erred in not including in the marital 

pot an engagement ring that Husband purchased for Wife sometime in 2013,

that Husband valued at $2,300.00, and a pair of diamond earrings that Husband 

purchased during the marriage for $1,500.00. Evidence was presented at the 

final hearing that the earrings were a wedding gift to the parties’ daughter. 

While Husband disputes this, he presented testimony at the final hearing that he 

does not know “what happened to those earrings[,]” and has no “idea whose 

possession those earrings are in[.]” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 207.

[49] The evidence presented at trial indicates that neither party is in possession of 

the earrings. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding 

them from the marital pot. However, regarding the engagement ring, the 

evidence indicates that the ring was purchased during the marriage and that 

Wife is in possession of the ring. Although the trial court may have wished to 

allow Wife to keep the ring, the value of the ring should have been included in 

the marital estate and considered by the trial court in fashioning the equitable 

division of the property. See Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 912 (trial court may 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 27 of 31

ultimately determine that a particular asset should be awarded solely to one 

spouse, but must first include asset in its consideration of the marital estate to 

be divided). Thus, we remand for inclusion of the value of the engagement ring 

in the marital estate and recalculation, if necessary, of the distribution of the 

marital property.

Attorney Fees and Valuation Expenses

[50] Finally, Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion by requiring 

him to “be responsible for $10,000.00” of Wife’s attorney fees and the 

outstanding balance that Wife owed to Blue & Co. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p.

18. Husband argues that Wife should not be awarded attorney fees and 

valuation expenses for a number of reasons. According to Husband, “[t]he trial 

court’s finding of income disparity to justify fee awards was unreasonable and 

contrary to the evidence that neither party enjoyed a superior position from 

which to afford fees.” Appellant’s Br. p. 46. Husband also argues that none of 

his conduct during the dissolution proceedings amounted to a level of 

misconduct sufficient “to justify the fee awards and did not cause Wife to incur

additional attorney or valuator fees.” Id. at 47. Husband maintains that 

between 2012 and 2015, his businesses, in total, averaged $12,010.00 of annual 

income before taxes. According to Husband, “[e]ven adding these 

undistributed, pre-tax profits to [his $45,000.00] salary, he still earned less than 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 28 of 31

Wife’s salary [($45,000 + $12,010) = $57,010; $57,010 < $60,000].”

6

 Id. at 44. 

Husband notes that Wife’s salary is earned for thirty-nine weeks of work per 

year, and his salary is earned for fifty-two weeks of work per year. He argues 

that, contrary to Wife’s testimony, the income from the businesses was not used 

to purchase the parties’ personal vehicles; and that, while business income was 

used for personal expenses related to cell phones, vehicles, gas, food, and 

earned rewards points, the amount of money that was put toward these things 

was so insignificant that it cannot be used to justify a finding that Husband’s 

salary exceeded Wife’s. He further argues that the attorney fees award is not 

properly reflected on the marital balance sheet and that the trial court’s award 

of the valuation expenses is ambiguous, and thus improper, because it fails to 

state the amount that Husband owes to Blue & Co. 

[51] Indiana statutory law pertaining to dissolution proceedings authorizes a court 

to order a party to pay the attorney fees of the other party:

The court periodically may order a party to pay a reasonable 

amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or 

defending any proceeding under this article and for attorney’s 

fees and mediation services, including amounts for legal services 

provided and costs incurred before the commencement of the 

proceedings or after entry of judgment.

 

6 Husband argued at the final hearing that Wife earned a salary of between $58,000.00 and $60,000.00 per 

year.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 29 of 31

Ind. Code § 31-15-10-1(a) (1997). The legislative purpose of this statute is to 

provide access to an attorney to a party in a dissolution proceeding who would 

not otherwise be able to afford one. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d at 543. We review a 

trial court’s award of attorney fees in connection with a dissolution decree for 

an abuse of discretion. Hartley v. Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). 

Reversal is proper only where the trial court’s award is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Bessolo v. Rosario, 966 

N.E.2d 725, 733 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. In assessing attorney’s fees, 

the trial court may consider such factors as the resources of the parties, the 

relative earning ability of the parties, and other factors bearing on the 

reasonableness of the award. Id. In addition, any misconduct on the part of a 

party that directly results in the other party incurring additional fees may be 

taken into consideration. Id. “Further, the trial court need not give its reasons 

for its decision to award attorney’s fees.” Id. (quoting Thompson, 811 N.E.2d at

928). 

[52] Here, we find that the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Wife is supported 

by the record. At the final hearing, Wife testified that her salary from her

elementary school teaching position was $58,000.00 a year. Husband testified 

that he is self-employed; his “paycheck comes from [BES]”; and he earns a 

salary of $45,000.00 a year. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 108. Although the trial court was not 

required to give reasons for its decision to award attorney’s fees, it noted in its 

findings its skepticism regarding Husband’s stated salary and ultimately 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 30 of 31

determined that there was a disparity in income between the parties and that 

Husband earned more than Wife. Specifically, the court found as follows: 

While Husband testified he believes he makes less than Wife, the 

Court finds this suspicious. Husband is in controls [sic] of what 

salary, expenses, costs, and income the business provides. The 

parties have acquired substantial assets and little debt during the 

marriage. This was clearly not accomplished on a teacher’s 

salary alone.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 17. This evidence alone supports the trial court’s 

award of attorney fees to Wife and there was no abuse of discretion. Likewise, 

the trial court was within its discretion to require Husband to pay the 

outstanding valuation expenses that Wife owed to Blue & Co. See I.C. § 31-15-

10-1(a) (“court periodically may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for 

the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under 

this article”). Furthermore, the trial court’s award of attorney fees and 

valuation expenses was not improperly reflected on the marital balance sheet, 

as the award does not constitute marital property and is not eligible for 

inclusion in the marital estate. 

[53] Finally, we disagree with Husband’s assertion that the trial court’s requirement 

that he pay the outstanding valuation expenses amounts to an order to “write a 

blank check to Blue [& Co.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 48. To the contrary, when 

Wife testified that she had an outstanding balance with Blue & Co. for business 

valuation services and requested that the trial court require Husband to pay the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-1778 | October 22, 2019 Page 31 of 31

balance, she introduced into evidence an invoice that listed the amount due as 

$9,244.37. 

[54] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion or commit clear error when valuing and distributing the marital 

property of the parties and awarding Wife attorney fees and valuation expenses, 

except that the trial court erred when it (1) counted the $29,250.00 in fire 

insurance proceeds as an asset attributable to Husband, (2) failed to include in 

the marital pot the debt associated with the HHR vehicle, and (3) failed to 

include in the marital pot the value of the engagement ring that Husband 

purchased for Wife. Thus, we reverse the dissolution decree to that extent and

remand for the trial court to correct these errors and adjust its split of the 

marital property accordingly. 

[55] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and we 

remand for further proceedings with instructions. 

Najam, J., and Bradford, J., concur.