J-S10031-18

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.W.C., 

A/K/A/ Z.T.W.-C., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: B.W., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 3295 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Order Entered September 7, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Family Court at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000845-2017, 

CP-51-DP-0002202-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED APRIL 06, 2018

Appellant B.W. (Mother) appeals from the order involuntarily 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter Z.W.C., who was born in 

August 2010 (Child).

1

 Mother claims that the Department of Human Services 

(DHS) failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that termination was 

warranted under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We affirm.

We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the trial court. 

See Trial Ct. Op., 11/21/17, 1-21. For purposes of a brief background, we 

reiterate that Child was placed in the care of DHS on September 17, 2014, 

found dependent on September 26, 2014, and briefly reunited with Mother 

____________________________________________

1 DHS also petitioned to terminate the parental rights of R.B.C. (Father), which 

the trial court granted. Father did not appeal from the termination of his 

parental rights.
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from March 15 to March 24, 2016. However, Child was returned to DHS’s 

custody on March 24, 2016, after Mother missed medical appointments for 

Child, a mouse and roach infestation was discovered at her home, and Mother 

failed to use medical equipment provided for Child. Child has significant 

medical needs due to cerebral palsy and a history of meningitis. Child is 

dependent on a gastrostomy tube for feeding and has a ventriculoperitoneal 

shunt. 

DHS filed its petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on August 

23, 2017. The trial court appointed legal counsel for Child. On September 7, 

2017, the trial court granted the petition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), 

(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). On October 5, 2017, Mother contemporaneously 

file a timely notice of appeal and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.

Mother raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec.2511(a)(1) without 

clear and convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent to relinquish 

her parental claim or refusal to perform her parental duties.

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec.2511(a)(2) without 

clear and convincing evidence of [M]other’s incapacity to 

perform parental duties.

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec.2511(a)(5) without 

clear and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts 

were made by Department of Human Services to provide 

[M]other with additional services and that the conditions that 

led to placement of the [C]hild continue to exist.

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec.2511(a)(8) without 
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clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to 

placement of the [C]hild continue to exist when mother 

presented evidence of compliance with the goals and objectives 

of her family service plan.

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. sec.2511(b) without clear 

and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond 

between [M]other and [C]hild and that termination would serve 

the best interest of the [C]hild.

Mother’s Brief at 7.

Mother first argues that DHS failed to present clear and convincing 

evidence to support the trial court’s termination of her parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(1). Mother’s Brief at 11. She claims that she completely 

satisfied the goals and objectives of the single case plan (SCP), which led to 

reunification in March of 2016. Id. She further claims that “[a]fter [Child] 

was recommitted to DHS and returned to Pedia Specialty Care based on the 

roach infestation in the family home, [M]other exterminated the property 

completely.” Id.

Additionally, Mother argues that after Child was returned to DHS 

custody, her ability to visit “was compromised by [the Community Umbrella 

Agency’s (CUA)] choice of placement at the Pedia Specialty Care location in 

Doylestown, Bucks County instead of the Philadelphia location.” Id. 

Therefore, she concludes that her “inability to completely satisfy the goals and 

objectives of her family service plan was caused by a lack of reasonable efforts 

by [DHS] to reunify [C]hild with [M]other.” Id.

Our standard of review is well-settled:
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate 

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations, brackets, and quotation 

marks omitted).

The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental 

rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

Additionally, this Court has explained that “[t]he standard of clear and 

convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty 

and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation and 

quotation marks omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 
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needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

Section 2511(a)(1) provides as follows:

(a) General rule. The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least 

six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition 

either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months 

prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008). Once this has 

been established, “the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the 

parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact 

between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination 

of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).” Id.

Additionally,

[t]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must 

be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the 

psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a serious 

intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-child 

relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and capacity 

to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to reestablish 
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his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof on this 

question.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2010) (alteration in original) 

(citation omitted).

While the six months preceding the petition are the focus of this inquiry,

the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and 

not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. The 

court must examine the individual circumstances of each case and 

consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination 

of [the parent’s] parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in 

light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly warrants the 

involuntary termination.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

With respect to “parental duties,” this Court has explained:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental 

duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A child 

needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance.

* * *

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty 

requires that a parent “exert himself to take and maintain a place 

of importance in the child's life.”

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good 

faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order 

to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her 

ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and 

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental 

rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or 

convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while 
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others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional 

needs.

Id.

Lastly, our Supreme Court has held that Section 2511 does not require

an agency to make reasonable efforts to reunite parents and children prior to 

termination. In the Interest of D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 671 (Pa. 2014). 

Nevertheless, “the provision or absence of reasonable efforts may be relevant 

to a court’s consideration of both the grounds for termination and the best 

interests of the child.” Id. at 672.

Here, the trial court concluded that DHS established the requirements 

of Section 2511(a)(1). The court “found clear and convincing evidence that 

Mother failed and refused to perform parental duties, failed to address the 

conditions which brought the Child into placement, and lacks the capacity to 

adequately provide care and control and a stable environment necessary for 

this special needs Child.” Trial Ct. Op., 11/21/17, at 22. The court based its 

conclusion on testimony from several witnesses, which established that 

Mother failed to meet her SCP objectives, as she did not consistently attend 

mental health therapy, did not secure housing, did not consistently attend 

Child’s medical appointments, and did not maintain consistent visitation with 

Child. Id. at 22-29; N.T., 9/7/17, at 50.

The trial court further addressed Mother’s claims of error in its opinion 

as follows:

Mother alleges DHS did not meet its burden by clear and 

convincing evidence, and that the evidence presented was 
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insufficient to terminate her parental rights. She claims to have 

achieved some of her objectives and can be a Caregiver to her 

Child. The Court disagrees, and found clear and convincing 

evidence that Mother failed and refused to perform parental 

duties, failed to address the conditions which brought the Child 

into placement, and lacks the capacity to adequately provide care 

and control and a stable environment necessary for this special 

needs Child.

This [c]ourt relied on the credible testimony of two CUA Workers, 

Case Supervisor, Ms. Rashida Smith and Case Manager, Keisa 

Walden. Both testified that the SCP objectives for Mother were to 

maintain visitation, to attend the medical appointments, obtain 

mental health therapy for herself, and obtain housing.

Ms. Walden noted that Mother did attend Community Counsel for 

mental health therapy and was consistent at times, however, 

since April of 2017, Mother has not provided any documentation 

that she has been attending any type of therapeutic services. 

Regarding Mother's attendance at medical appointments, she 

testified Mother has not been consistent. Some appointments 

occur at CHOP in Philadelphia and others occur in Chalfont in 

Bucks County. Mother is offered transportation by [Child’s]

facility, if she is on time at the facility, however, Mother has not 

offered any reasons as to why she cannot attend the medical 

appointments consistently. Further, she noted that Mother has 

remained unemployed and is not attending any type of 

educational program. Mother lives with Maternal Grandmother. 

Regarding visitation, Mother has liberal supervised visits at 

Pediatric Specialty Care, where [Child] has been since May of 

2016. Mother has attended 10 visits with [Child] in 2016, and 3 

visits thus far in 2017. Mother was also offered telephone and 

video chat as a means of contact with her Child, however, she has 

not been consistent with that either.

The [c]ourt also heard pertinent and credible testimony from 

Stacey Wilson, Social Worker at Pediatric Specialty Care. She 

stated that parents can visit their children at the facility seven 

days a week. [Mother] has attended 13 times, 10 were in 2016 

and 3 were on 2/18/2017, 4/29/2017 and 7/29/2017. Mother has 

not visited with [Child] since 7/29/2017. She noted that [Child]

had 5 medical appointments in Philadelphia in 2016 and that 

Mother attended 2. In 2017, [Child] has had 15 appointments thus 

far and Mother has attended 3 and on the 4th appointment, 

Mother had to be called and asked to attend. The last time Mother 
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attended an appointment at CHOP was 6/9/2017, and since that 

time, [Child] has had 6 appointments. Mother is called by the 

Social Work Team or the Administration to notify her of the dates 

and times of appointments.

Finally, the [c]ourt also relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Erica 

Williams. She testified she conducted the Parent Capacity 

Evaluations on Mother on May 15, 2017, and noted that [Child]

came into care due to Mother's unstable housing and not meeting 

[Child]'s medical needs. Mother did complete what was asked of 

her and was reunified with her daughter. However, within one 

week the concerns were raised again because of Mother not 

having appropriate medical equipment, not having medications 

filled and not meeting the needs of [Child]. The deplorable 

conditions of Mother’s home put [Child] at risk and prevented the 

medical staff from attending to [Child].

Dr. Williams noted [Child] is not able to care for herself in any 

capacity and also needs medical equipment to sustain her life. She 

requires medical nursing support as well as constant care by a 

Caregiver. The Caregiver must be able to respond to any 

immediate emergency of Trach blockage, flushing it out; feeding 

her through her feeding tube and meeting all her needs at any 

given moment. Mother was aware that there were issues meeting 

[Child]’s medical needs, however she was only able to identify 

concerns with housing. She did not focus on the concerns that 

CUA raised which were more serious, the medical needs of [Child]

not being met.

Dr. Williams also observed various child-like behaviors by Mother. 

At one point, Mother closed the sweatshirt she was wearing and 

spoke through the clothing. Further, she was observed by workers 

sucking on her toes for comfort. Mother’s coping skills are childlike and undeveloped, and she therefore withdraws, or exhibits 

child-like behaviors. She opined Mother requires individual 

therapy directly targeting coping skills and how to manage 

stressors.

Regarding visitation, Dr. Williams noted that Mother was allowed 

liberal visitation, meaning she could visit [Child] whenever she 

liked. Mother reported going regularly, however, in speaking with 

CUA, the fact was that Mother was not visiting [Child] regularly, 

despite being provided tokens for transportation. She further 

testified, the issue of visitation is vital in terms of building a 

relationship, creating a bond in which [Child] can depend on her 
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Mother to meet her needs. Dr. Williams found it relevant that 

Mother was choosing not to follow through on even this part-time 

role. Mother was not present, not practicing the medical skills 

required, not building the relationship, and not meeting [Child]’s 

needs. Dr. Williams testified that if Mother was not up-to-date on 

[Child]’s medical needs and has not demonstrated the skills to 

deliver the medical care required by a Caregiver, it would be a life 

or death situation, according to the records that she reviewed. 

Ultimately, Dr. Williams opined that although Mother presented 

with various strengths that she could build on, she did not at the 

time of the PCE have the capacity to provide safety or permanency 

for [Child].

Trial Ct. Op., 11/21/17, at 22-25 (footnote omitted).

The trial court’s conclusion regarding Mother’s failure to perform 

parental duties are supported by the record. See N.T., 9/7/17, at 21-26, 44-

47, and 60-63. Mother failed to maintain visitation with Child, attend Child’s 

medical appointments, obtain housing, or consistently attend individual 

mental health therapy. Id. Given Child’s complex medical needs, it is clear 

that these failures demonstrate that Mother did not perform her parental 

duties with respect to Child. 

Additionally, the trial court considered the actions of DHS during the life 

of the case and concluded that it made reasonable efforts to facilitate 

reunification. See N.T., 9/7/17, at 93-96; see also D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 672. 

This conclusion is supported by the record, which provides ample evidence to 

support the trial court’s determination that DHS made reasonable efforts and, 

despite being offered those resources, Mother failed to satisfy her SCP goals. 

Id. at 93-94.
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Therefore, we find the trial court’s determinations under Section 

2511(a)(1) are supported by competent evidence, and we discern no basis to 

disturb the trial court’s conclusion that termination was warranted. 

Accordingly, Mother’s first issue warrants no relief.2

Mother, in her final issue, contends that there was insufficient evidence 

to prove that termination was in Child’s best interest under Section 2511(b). 

She further asserts that she “has a strong emotional bond with Child.” 

Mother’s Brief at 14. Finally, she concludes that DHS “severely compromised” 

her ability to visit and bond with Child, and that the agency’s failure to make 

reasonable efforts toward reunification ultimately had a negative impact on 

Child’s well-being. Id.

Section 2511(b) states: 

(b) Other considerations. The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. . . . 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). 

____________________________________________

2

In order to affirm a trial court’s determination with respect to section 

2511(a), we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection. In 

re B.L.W. 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004). Because we affirm the trial 

court’s consideration of Section 2511(a)(1), we need not consider Mother’s 

arguments with respect to the sufficiency of evidence for subsections 

2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). See id. 
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Section 2511(b) focuses on “whether termination of parental rights 

would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2005). 

This inquiry involves “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability” and requires the court to “discern the nature and status of the 

parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of 

permanently severing that bond.” Id. at 1287.

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (citations omitted). In addition, “Section 

2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” Id. Although it is 

often wise to have a bonding evaluation and make it part of the certified 

record, “[t]here are some instances . . . where direct observation of the 

interaction between the parent and the child is not necessary and may even 

be detrimental to the child.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 

2008). The parent-child bond is “only one of many factors to be considered 

by the court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In 

re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). “Above all else . . . adequate consideration must 

be given to the needs and welfare of the child. A parent’s own feelings of love 

and affection for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights.” 

In re Z.M., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).
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The trial court here found that DHS demonstrated, through clear and 

convincing evidence, that termination would best serve the needs of the child. 

The trial court explained:

This [c]ourt heard credible evidence presented by CUA Case 

Manager, Ms. Keisa Walden, who opined that [Child] would not 

suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were terminated 

because [Child] does not know or recognize Mother as her parent. 

She has only seen [Child] [three] times in 2017. A pre-adoptive

home is being explored for [Child] that would meet all of her 

medical needs. The medical pre-adoptive foster parent, a nurse, 

has visited with [Child] and has received medical training. The 

Court found credible the evidence that [Child] was not bonded to 

Mother. Therefore, this Court reasoned that [Child] would not 

suffer irreparable harm if Mother’s parental rights were 

terminated, and that termination meets the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of [Child].

Trial Ct. Op., 11/21/17, 26-27; see also N.T, 9/7/17, at 50-51.

Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that 

termination meets the developmental, physical, and emotional needs and 

welfare of Child. Further, the trial court heard credible evidence that, despite 

Mother’s assertion to the contrary, Child did not recognize Mother and would 

suffer no irreparable harm from termination. N.T., 9/7/17, at 50. Our 

standard of review requires us to accept the trial court’s findings of fact and 

credibility determinations where, as here, they are supported by the record. 
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See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Accordingly, we decline to reweigh the 

evidence and reassess witness credibility.3

In sum, our review of the record supports the trial court’s conclusion 

that DHS met its statutory burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence 

that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

2511(a)(1) and 2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/6/18

____________________________________________

3 To the extent Mother asserts DHS interfered with her ability to visit and bond 

with Child, we have indicated previously that there is no requirement for the 

court to consider “reasonable efforts” by the agency. See In the Interest 

of D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 672. In any event, we discern no support for 

Appellant’s contention that DHS severely compromised her ability to visit with 

Child when Child was in Bucks County receiving medical care. Mother testified 

that although she was provided with bus tokens, she never tried to use the 

bus to visit her daughter. N.T., 9/7/17, at 83.