*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5 the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 18, 2007

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-60008

Summary Calendar

FEROZ ALI BUDHWANI, also 

known as Rusesh Joshi,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY,

Respondent.

Petition for Review of an Order

of the Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A79 002 879

Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Feroz Ali Budhwani, a native and citizen of India, petitions

this court for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA)

order affirming the denial of his request for a waiver of

inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i), the denial of his request

for adjustment of status, and final order of removal. The
2

immigration judge (IJ) ruled that Budhwani was ineligible for a

section 1182(i) waiver on the ground that Budhwani did not have a

qualifying relative because his parental rights to his child had

been terminated. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s ruling on the ground

that Budhwani had not shown the extreme hardship required to obtain

a waiver under section 1182(i), without resolving whether

Budhwani’s child was a qualifying relative. 

Budhwani argues that the BIA abused its discretion by

determining that he had not shown the extreme hardship required for

a section 1182(i) waiver. The BIA denied Budhwani’s request for a

waiver under section 1182(i) based upon its factual finding that he

had not shown the required extreme hardship. Budhwani’s petition

for review does not raise a challenge to this ruling based upon a

question of law or a constitutional challenge to the BIA’s

decision. Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to consider

Budhwani’s challenge to the BIA’s determination that extreme

hardship had not been shown. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i),

(a)(2)(D). See also, e.g., Kalalib v. Gonzales, 193 F. App. 306,

2006 WL 224288 (5th Cir. 2006); Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F. 3d 590

(5th Cir. 2003); Rueda v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 2004);

Delgado-Reyuna v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 596, 599-600 (5th Cir. 2006);

Marquez-Marquez v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 548, 560-61 (5th Cir. 2006).

To the extent that Budhwani is seeking to raise a legal or

constitutional argument that the BIA should not have ruled on the
3

extreme hardship issue because he was prevented from presenting

evidence to the IJ on that issue, the argument lacks any arguable

merit. The record (e.g., AR 204-05, 217, 225-227) shows that

Budhwani through counsel conceded before the IJ that his child was

not a qualifying relative and that he was not entitled to a section

1182(i) waiver, and he did not seek to present evidence of extreme

hardship. In these circumstances the BIA did not err (or abuse its

discretion) in failing to grant relief on such a basis or in

failing to expressly address the matter. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. §

1003.1(d)(2)(i) (2005) (“. . . panel may summarily dismiss any . .

. portion of any appeal . . . in which . . . (B) The only reason

for the appeal specified by the party . . . involves a finding of

fact or a conclusion of law that was conceded by that party at a

prior proceeding . . . [or] (D) . . . the appeal lacks an arguable

basis in fact or in law . . . .”); Matter of Jimenez-Santillano, I.

& N. Dec. 567, 570 n.2, 1996 WL 426890 (BIA) (“. . . this issue was

neither raised before nor ruled upon by the Immigration Judge.

Therefore, we will not decide the issue, for it is not properly

before us”). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part and otherwise DENIED.