NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-471

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

GERARDO J. GOMEZ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a bench trial in the Roxbury Division of the 

Boston Municipal Court, the defendant was found guilty of 

unlawfully carrying a firearm.1 On appeal, the defendant 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the 

judge erred in requiring him to produce evidence of licensure as 

an affirmative defense. We affirm. 

Background. We set forth the facts in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth v. Colas, 486 

Mass. 831, 833 (2021), citing Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 

1 The defendant was found not guilty of carrying a loaded 

firearm, possession of ammunition without a firearm 

identification, assault by means of a dangerous weapon, assault 

and battery on a family or household member, and strangulation 

or suffocation. Prior to trial, the Commonwealth dismissed 

charges of possession with intent to distribute a class B 

substance and possession of a firearm while committing a felony.
2

Mass. 671, 677 (1979). On October 9, 2021, the defendant and 

his girlfriend, Liza Tyler, had an altercation in the street 

outside of the defendant's grandmother's house. Sherry Brooks, 

the girlfriend of the defendant's grandmother, witnessed the 

altercation and heard Tyler yell in a nervous and scared voice,

"gun, gun," while the defendant held a black object in his hand.

At trial, she demonstrated the shape of the black object by 

holding her hand with her finger pointed out and her thumb 

pointed up. While observing the altercation, Brooks called the 

police. Brooks saw most of the altercation from fifty to sixty

feet away and moved closer (thirty feet away) when the police 

asked for the license plate number of the car. Brooks saw the 

defendant take the gun out of the trunk of the car but did not 

know where he put it after she saw him swing it at Tyler.

Brooks acknowledged that she was not wearing her glasses at that 

time, and that she needs them to read and see clearly. 

After Brooks called the police, Boston police officers

Raymond Soto and Jasmany Beato responded to 45 Keegan Street and 

found the defendant and Tyler fighting behind a car in the 

middle of the street. When the officers approached the car, 

Tyler got in the driver's seat, and the defendant got in the 

passenger seat. Tyler attempted to turn on the car, and the 

officers ordered both individuals out of the car. The defendant 

began to walk away and was detained. The officers conducted an 
3

inventory search of the car, and Officer Soto found a firearm in 

the glove compartment on the passenger side of the car. 

Discussion. 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. "In 

determining whether the Commonwealth met its burden to establish 

each element of the offense charged, we apply the familiar 

Latimore standard. . . . '[The] question is whether, after 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

[Commonwealth], any rational trier of fact could have found the 

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" 

Colas, 486 Mass. at 836, quoting Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. 

"The inferences that support a conviction 'need only be 

reasonable and possible; [they] need not be necessary or 

inescapable.'" Commonwealth v. Waller, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 295, 

303 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 707, 713 

(2014). 

"[T]o convict the defendant of unlicensed carrying of a 

firearm outside his residence or place of business, the 

Commonwealth was required to prove that he 'knowingly ha[d] in 

his possession; or knowingly ha[d] under his control in a 

vehicle; a firearm, loaded or unloaded, as defined in section 

one hundred and twenty-one of chapter one hundred and forty.'" 

Commonwealth v. Watkins, 98 Mass. App. Ct. 419, 421 (2020), 

quoting G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a). The Commonwealth may proceed 

on a theory of constructive possession if it proves that the 
4

defendant had "knowledge coupled with the ability and intention 

to exercise dominion and control." Commonwealth v. Woods, 94 

Mass. App. Ct. 761, 765 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Than, 

442 Mass. 748, 751 (2004). 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, see 

Latimore, 378 Mass. at 676-677, the testimony from Brooks and 

Officer Soto, taken together, was sufficient to prove that the 

defendant knowingly possessed a gun. Brooks testified that she 

saw the defendant take a gun from the trunk of the car and swing 

it at Tyler who was on the ground. She also testified that she 

heard Tyler excitedly yelling, "gun, gun." To the extent that 

the defendant argues that Brooks' testimony was unreliable 

because she was not wearing her glasses, "questions of 

credibility belong properly to the trier of fact." See

Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 315 (2014); see also 

Commonwealth v. Semedo, 456 Mass. 1, 8 (2010) (reviewing court 

does not consider credibility of witnesses in Latimore

analysis). 

Additionally, Officer Soto's testimony, in conjunction with 

where the gun was found, was sufficient to establish that the 

defendant constructively possessed the gun. Although a 

defendant's presence in an area where contraband is found, 

alone, is insufficient to show constructive possession, it may 

be sufficient when supplemented by additional incriminating 
5

evidence as was the case here. See Woods, 94 Mass. App. Ct. at 

765-766. Officer Soto saw the defendant enter the passenger 

side of the car, and the gun was found in the glove compartment

in front of where he was seated. See Commonwealth v. Blevins, 

56 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 211-212 (2002) (location of gun on floor

of car behind defendant gave defendant ability to exercise 

control over it). Additionally, the defendant attempted to walk 

away after Officer Soto gave the exit order. See Commonwealth

v. Summers, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 260, 264 (2018) ("Flight is often 

considered a 'plus' factor supporting an inference that the 

occupant intended to exercise dominion and control over the 

illegal contraband.") Moreover, the defendant's actions were

also evidence of his consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth

v. Watterson, 99 Mass. App. Ct. 746, 755 (2021), citing

Commonwealth v. Carrion, 407 Mass. 263, 277 (1990). 

Accordingly, the evidence sufficed.

2. Licensure as an affirmative defense. The defendant 

next claims that the judge violated his due process rights by 

requiring him to prove that he had a license to possess a 

firearm. The parties disagree as to the proper standard of 

review. The defendant argues the question is whether the error, 

if any, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The 

2 The defendant contends that an objection would have been futile 

because at the time of his trial New York State Rifle & Pistol 
6

Commonwealth contends that we review to determine whether any 

error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. 

We need not resolve this issue because under either standard, we 

conclude that there was no error.

Since at least 1844, Massachusetts has recognized that a 

license to carry is an affirmative defense to the crime of 

illegal possession of a firearm. See St. 1844, c. 102;

Commonwealth v. Belou, 115 Mass. 139, 140 (1874). The Supreme 

Judicial Court has long held this practice (which places the 

burden of production of a license upon the defendant, and the 

ultimate burden of proof of absence of a license beyond a 

reasonable doubt on the Commonwealth) to be consistent with the 

Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. See 

Commonwealth v. Harris, 481 Mass. 767, 772 (2019); Commonwealth

v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 801-802 (2012). 

The defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed 

because Massachusetts law that criminalizes possession of a 

firearm without a proper license is unconstitutional. The 

Ass'n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022), had not been decided. 

We also note that here, as in Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 

787 (2012), the defendant did not challenge the 

constitutionality of the State firearm licensing scheme. In 

fact, he could not do so because the defendant never applied for 

a license. See Commonwealth v. Powell, 459 Mass. 572, 589-590 

(2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1262 (2012) (defendant could not 

challenge application for license where he did not apply for 

one). 
7

defendant argues that the recent Supreme Court of the United 

States opinion in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 

142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) (Bruen), now requires the Commonwealth to 

prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of a firearm license 

as an element of firearms prosecutions, here G. L. c. 269, § 10

(a). Bruen held that the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to 

the Constitution protect an individual's right to bear arms 

outside of the home, see Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 2135, and that the 

New York firearm licensing statute was unconstitutional because 

it vested discretion in licensing authorities to deny 

applications that satisfy statutory requirements but lack a 

perceived "need or suitability." Id. at 2123. From this, the 

defendant claims that the burden shifting procedure approved in 

Gouse, supra, can no longer be applied; he posits that Gouse has 

been abrogated by Bruen. We are not persuaded.3 Nothing in 

Bruen suggests that the Second Amendment poses any challenges 

for State assignment of the burdens of production. See id. at 

2123. Citing McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), the 

3 So far as we are aware, only a single court, the District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals, has held that proof of something that 

could otherwise be an affirmative defense must be made an 

element of the offense where a presumption is created that 

constitutionally protected conduct is unlawful. See Herrington

v. United States, 6 A.3d 1237, 1243-1244 (D.C. 2010) (concluding 

that possessing "handgun ammunition" in home was

constitutionally protected conduct, such that government must 

prove lack of registration as element of crime charged). And 

Gouse, supra at 801-802, did not so hold.
8

concurring opinion in Bruen confirmed that the Second Amendment 

right to bear arms does not prohibit laws that regulate who may 

purchase, possess, and carry firearms. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. at 

2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In fact, Bruen emphasized 

that the Constitution does not prohibit licensing requirements 

for carrying a firearm in public, provided that the licensing 

criteria are objective. Id. at 2138 n.9. Bruen had no impact 

on the allocation of the burdens of proof in the prosecution of 

firearm offense, here G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).

Having concluded that Bruen does not alter the allocation 

of the burden of proof in firearm prosecutions, the issue of 

licensure as an affirmative defense has been long settled in the 

Commonwealth. And, the defendant's argument ignores the fact 

that we have "no power to alter, overrule or decline to follow 

the holding of cases the Supreme Judicial Court has decided." 

Commonwealth v. Dube, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 476, 485-486 (2003). 

Nor are we inclined to do so here. 

Judgment affirmed.

By the Court (Meade, Rubin & 

Blake, JJ.4),

Clerk

Entered: February 13, 2023.

4 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.