[Cite as State v. Maines, 2020-Ohio-5620.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 109196 

 v. : 

 

DESHAWN MAINES, : 

 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 10, 2020 

 

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-18-628849-A 

 

Appearances: 

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting 

Attorney, and Tasha L. Forchione, Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellee. 

Gloria L. Smith, Attorney & Counselor at Law L.L.C., and 

Gloria L. Smith, for appellant. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

Defendant-appellant Deshawn Maines appeals the six-year sentence 

imposed after he pled guilty to one count of burglary, one count of receiving stolen 
property and one count of criminal damaging or endangering. Maines contends that 

his sentence on the burglary count is contrary to law because the trial court failed to 

consider the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the 

sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing him. He also contends that 

the record clearly and convincingly does not support his six-year prison sentence. 

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

Procedural History and Factual Background 

On May 23, 2018, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Maines on 

four counts: one count of burglary, a second-degree felony (Count 1); one count of 

theft, a fifth-degree felony (Count 2); one count of receiving stolen property, a firstdegree misdemeanor (Count 3); and one count of criminal damaging or 

endangering, a second-degree misdemeanor (Count 4). 

The charges arose out of an incident that occurred on or about 

May 14, 2018, at a home on Lakeview Road in Cleveland. At approximately 12:40 

p.m., Maines broke into the residence and allegedly stole two televisions and a 

laptop. The victims were at work at the time of the incident, but the incident was 

captured on the home’s interior and exterior video surveillance system. When one 

of the victims checked the video surveillance on her cell phone, she observed the 

incident as it was occurring and called 911. Police responded and found Maines 

hiding behind an SUV across the street. Maines was arrested. A television remote 

was found in Maines’ pocket. One television and a laptop were recovered in a vacant 
house nearby. Fingerprints collected from the recovered television matched 

Maines. 

Maines initially pled not guilty to all charges. The case was assigned 

to the mental health docket and Maines was referred to the court psychiatric clinic 

for a sanity evaluation. 

On September 20, 2018, the trial court held a final pretrial conference 

to review the case status. The parties stipulated to the findings of a sanity evaluation 

report prepared by Dr. Jennifer Franklin, dated September 14, 2018. In her report, 

Dr. Franklin opined that, although Maines “was suffering from a severe mental 

disease” that “may have added an impulsive quality to his behavior,” his mental 

illness did not prevent Maines from understanding the wrongfulness of his actions 

at the time of the incident. 

The state then set forth the terms of its plea offer on the record, i.e., if 

Maines pled guilty to the burglary, receiving stolen property and criminal damaging 

or endangering counts (Counts 1, 3 and 4), the state would dismiss the theft count 

(Count 2). Maines discussed the plea offer with defense counsel and the trial court. 

Maines advised the trial court that he would like to review the sanity evaluation 

report and requested a few days to consider the state’s plea offer. The parties agreed 

to come back to court the following week. 

On September 25, 2018, Maines agreed to accept the state’s plea offer. 

The trial court conducted a Crim.R. 11(C) plea colloquy, advising Maines of his 

constitutional rights and confirming that he understood the rights he would be 
waiving by entering his guilty pleas, the effect of his guilty pleas and the potential 

sentences he faced by pleading guilty. The trial court further confirmed that Maines 

understood, prior to entering his guilty pleas, that “the maximum sentence you’re 

facing is eight years if I send you to prison” and that the trial court had not promised 

Maines any particular sentence. Maines acknowledged that no promises or threats 

had been made to induce him to enter his guilty pleas and that his guilty pleas were 

being entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Maines then pled guilty in 

accordance with the plea agreement. 

The trial court found that Maines understood the nature of the 

charges against him, the maximum sentence he was facing, the constitutional rights 

he was waiving and that he was “mak[ing] a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 

plea.” The trial court accepted Maines’ guilty pleas, found him guilty of the offenses 

to which he had pled and dismissed the theft count. The trial court referred Maines 

for a presentencing investigation and report (“PSI”) and a TASC substance abuse 

assessment. 

Maines was sentenced on November 7, 2018. The assistant 

prosecutor, one of the victims, the investigating detective, defense counsel and 

Maines spoke at the sentencing hearing. The assistant prosecutor began by detailing 

Maines’ “lengthy, lengthy, lengthy” criminal record dating back to the early 1990s: 

Mr. Maines does have a lengthy, lengthy, lengthy criminal record. In 

his LEADS report, 92 cycles. In reality he doesn’t have quite 92 

convictions, but they do date back from 1993. They’re all separate 

instances of two thefts from ‘93, two RSPs from ‘93 — I’m sorry, three 

thefts in ‘93, another theft in ‘95, another theft in ‘96, burglary in 2000, 
drug possession in 2000, attempted robbery in 2003, another theft in 

2003, two more thefts in 2005, another theft in 2006, a robbery in 

2006, another robbery in 2008, a theft in 2008, RSP along with 

forgery, misuse of credit cards and theft in 2012, another burglary and 

RSP in 2012, another theft in 2013, another attempted RSP of a motor 

vehicle in 2013, a theft in 2016, an identity fraud in 2017, another theft 

and identity fraud in 2017, and finally one last theft out of Lake County 

again in 2017. 

The assistant prosecutor then described the incident and showed 

portions of the video surveillance footage of the incident. According to the assistant 

prosecutor, Maines first attempted to break into one of the victim’s vehicles, 

damaging the vehicle. The video surveillance footage shows that after speaking with 

a neighbor, Maines waited on the front porch of the victims’ home. Once the 

neighbor drove away, Maines pulled a tool out of his pocket and attempted to enter 

the house, first by using the tool and then by breaking a window with a brick he had 

retrieved from the back of the house. After each failed attempt to break into the 

home, Maines looked around to see if anyone was watching. Maines ultimately 

entered the home by kicking in the door. The video surveillance footage shows that 

once inside the home, Maines detached a television and associated wiring from the 

wall, placed a remote in his back pocket and picked up a laptop computer. The video 

surveillance footage also Maines carrying a television and remote out of the home. 

The state requested a minimum prison term of five years. 

One of the victims spoke regarding the sense of violation she felt as 

she watched Maines, in real time, enter, go through her home and take her 

belongings. She described the loss of security and “peace of mind” she experienced 
as a result of the incident and her continuing fear and nervousness — day and night 

— that someone is watching her or will come back to her house. She requested that 

Maines receive a maximum sentence. 

Cleveland police detective Christopher Howard, who investigated the 

incident, stated that during the 18 years he had worked as a police officer, he had 

“come across a handful of people as bad as [Maines]” and that his record was “one 

of the worst” he had ever seen. Detective Howard indicated that Maines “preys on 

the hardworking citizens of the City of Cleveland wherever he lives and steals and 

takes and does what he wants.” He stated that “maybe it’s a mental health thing” 

but that, in his view, “[t]he person in [the surveillance] video was not in crisis, clearly 

was not a mental person in crisis. It was a thief committing a criminal offense” and 

“[h]e’s not going to stop.” Detective Howard requested that Maines receive a 

maximum sentence. 

Defense counsel acknowledged that Maines’ criminal history was 

“extensive, extensive, extensive” and “horrific” but stated that “this doesn’t happen 

in a vacuum” and requested that Maines’ significant mental health history be taken 

into account when sentencing him. Defense counsel noted that Maines had been 

physically and sexually abused as a child, that “his entire life ha[d] been riddled with 

mental health issues, physical issues, with abuse issues,” that Maines had been 

repeatedly diagnosed with “severe mental health disorders” and that Maines 

continued to suffer from “tremendous physical issues” due to years of substance 

abuse and neglect. 
Defense counsel pointed out that most of Maines’ prior offenses were 

theft-related offenses that did not involve physical harm to others and that Maines 

had been imprisoned on multiple, prior occasions but that prison “hasn’t served as 

a deterrent.” Defense counsel stated that a representative from Signature Health 

had authored a report in which she proposed a plan that could get Maines “back on 

track” if he were to be placed on probation. 

Maines also addressed the trial court. He stated that he regretted 

what he had done and that he knew what he had done was wrong. Maines, however, 

denied that he went to the victims’ home with the intention of burglarizing it. 

Maines claimed that he had gone to the victims’ home to retrieve a stolen television 

that belonged to him and that he broke into the home because he thought the victims 

were at home but were hiding from him: “I was trying to get them to come out [of] 

the house and they didn’t. * * * I thought they was hiding from me. I thought they 

weren’t coming out. And I did go in there and take the TV. I took the TV because I 

felt the TV was mines [sic].” 

After reviewing the PSI, the substance abuse assessment and a mental 

health assessment from the Centers for Children and Families (where Maines had 

been receiving services) and considering all the statements made at the sentencing 

hearing, the trial court sentenced Maines to an aggregate sentence of six years: six 

years on the burglary count, 180 days on the receiving stolen property count and 90 

days on the criminal damaging or endangering count, all of which were to be served 
concurrently. The trial court also imposed three years of mandatory postrelease 

control. The trial court waived fines and costs. 

In its November 7, 2018 sentencing journal entry, the trial court set 

forth the sentences imposed at the sentencing hearing and stated: “The court 

considered all required factors of the law. The court finds that prison is consistent 

with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” 

On November 20, 2019, this court granted Maines’ motion for a 

delayed appeal. He raises the following sole assignment of error for review: 

The six[-]year prison sentence is contrary to law and not supported by 

the record. 

Law and Analysis 

Maines argues that his sentence on the burglary count should be 

vacated because the trial court failed to consider the purposes and principles of 

sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12 when 

sentencing him to a six-year prison term. In the alternative, Maines contends that 

his prison sentence should be modified to probation because the record does not 

support the imposition of a six-year prison sentence. Maines’ arguments are 

meritless. 

Compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 

We review felony sentences under the standard set forth in R.C. 

2953.08(G)(2). State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 

1231, ¶ 1, 21. R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) provides that when reviewing felony sentences, the 
appellate “shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence 

* * * given by the sentencing court” and that it “may increase, reduce, or otherwise 

modify a sentence * * * or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the 

sentencing court for resentencing” if it “clearly and convincingly finds” that (1) “the 

record does not support the sentencing court’s findings” under particular statutory 

provisions that do not apply here or (2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” 

A sentence is “contrary to law” if it falls outside the statutory range 

for the offense or if the trial court fails to consider the purposes and principles of 

felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors set forth in 

R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing a defendant for a felony offense. See, e.g., State v. 

Clay, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108500, 2020-Ohio-1499, ¶ 26, citing State v. Pawlak, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103444, 2016-Ohio-5926, ¶ 58.

Pursuant to R.C. 2929.11, a sentence imposed for a felony shall be 

“reasonably calculated” to achieve “three overriding purposes of felony sentencing” 

— (1) to protect the public from future crime by the offender and others, (2) to 

punish the offender and (3) to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender — 

“using the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish those purposes 

without imposing an unnecessary burden on state or local government resources.” 

R.C. 2929.11(A), (B). In addition, the sentence imposed “shall be commensurate 

with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct and its impact 

upon the victim” and “consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes 

committed by similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B). 
Unless otherwise required by R.C. 2929.13 or 2929.14, a sentencing 

court imposing a felony sentence “has discretion to determine the most effective way 

to comply” with these purposes and principles of sentencing. R.C. 2929.12(A). R.C. 

2929.12 sets forth a nonexhaustive list of factors related to the seriousness of the 

offender’s conduct and the likelihood the offender will commit future crimes that 

the trial court must consider when imposing a sentence. R.C. 2929.12(A) provides 

that a court imposing a sentence on a felony offender “shall consider” the factors set 

forth in R.C. 2929.12(B) and (C) “relating to the seriousness of the conduct,” the 

factors provided in R.C. 2929.12(D) and (E) “relating to the likelihood of the 

offender’s recidivism” and the factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12(F) pertaining to the 

offender’s military service. R.C. 2929.12(A) further provides that the sentencing 

court, “in addition,” “may consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving 

those purposes and principles of sentencing.” 

Maines does not dispute that his six-year prison sentence was within 

the statutory range for burglary. Rather, he contends that his sentence is contrary 

to law because the trial court (1) “never stated” that it was complying with the 

purposes and principles of felony sentencing,” (2) “never mentioned” the purposes 

and principles of sentencing or any of the particular sentencing factors it was 

considering when sentencing Maines and (3) “never indicated” that it was “guided 

by” the purposes and principles of sentencing or any particular sentencing factors 

when sentencing Maines. Maines also contends that because the trial court knew, 

prior to the sentencing hearing, that Maines had a mental illness and a long criminal 
history and nevertheless informed Maines, prior to the sentencing hearing, that it 

was “still considering probation,” “the trial court was required to place more findings 

on the record before Maines could lawfully sentenced to prison.” Maines cites no 

legal authority — other than R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 — in support of these 

contentions. 

First, although the trial court must consider the purposes and 

principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the relevant sentencing 

factors listed in R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing a defendant on a felony, R.C. 2929.11 

and 2929.12 are not “fact-finding statutes.” See, e.g., State v. Black, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 108551, 2020-Ohio-3117, ¶ 13; State v. White, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

106580, 2018-Ohio-3414, ¶ 9. The trial court is not required to use particular 

language, make any specific findings on the record regarding its consideration of 

R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 or give specific reasons for imposing more than the 

minimum sentence. State v. Herron, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108775, 2020-Ohio1620, ¶ 12; Black at ¶ 13; State v. Gaines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103476, 2016-

Ohio-4863, ¶ 11. 

A trial court’s statement in its sentencing journal entry that it 

considered the required sentencing purposes, principles and factors, without more, 

is sufficient to fulfill a trial court’s obligations under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. See, 

e.g., Herron at ¶ 13; White at ¶ 9; State v. Kronenberg, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

101403, 2015-Ohio-1020, ¶ 27 (“[T]his court has consistently recognized that a trial 

court's statement in the journal entry that it considered the required statutory 
factors, without more, is sufficient to fulfill its obligations under the sentencing 

statutes.”). 

 Further, ‘“[c]onsideration of the factors is presumed unless the 

defendant affirmatively shows otherwise.’” State v. Cooke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

108824, 2020-Ohio-2725, ¶ 64, quoting State v. Seith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 

104510, 2016-Ohio-8302, ¶ 12; see also State v. Dawson, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-

L-109, 2016-Ohio-2800, ¶ 15 (“Absent evidence to the contrary, a reviewing court 

will presume the trial court considered all appropriate sentencing factors, even if the 

record is silent.”). 

In this case, the trial court expressly stated in its sentencing journal 

entry that it had “considered all required factors of the law” and “finds that prison is 

consistent with the purpose of R.C. 2929.11.” See, e.g., State v. Williams, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 100042, 2014-Ohio-1618, ¶ 17 (observing that “[t]his court has 

refused to find that a sentence is contrary to law when the sentence is in the 

permissible range, and the court’s journal entry states that it ‘considered all required 

factors of the law’ and ‘finds that prison is consistent with the purposes of R.C. 

2929.11”’). Further, although it was not required to do so, the trial court explained 

its rationale for imposing a prison sentence at the sentencing hearing as follows: 

I know you know right from wrong and that’s why you had gone 

insanity defense because you knew you were doing wrong because you 

waited for those people to pass by so you could break into the house. 

Your mental illness is not an excuse. It’s not. And your record is so 

unbelievably long with similar types of incidents. Unbelievably long. I 

can’t put you on probation. You are going to serve a prison sentence, 
and once you’re released you’re going to be on PRC for another three 

years. If you violate the terms and conditions of that supervision you 

can go back to prison for up to one half of the sentence that you’re given, 

be charged with a felony called escape for failing to report. They could 

make your supervision harder or longer for you. Three years of PRC, 

that’s mandatory. 

I have a lot of people who I want to do well with their mental illness and 

I want them to succeed and I want to them to be stable and I want them 

to be healthy. That’s where I always start, period. But when I’m given 

this, your record, watching that video, so disturbing, there’s no way. 

And the doctors say the biggest predictor of future behavior is past 

behavior. So if I was going to predict what you would do on probation, 

my prediction would be that you would victimize another person. * * * 

And I predict that that is what would happen. That’s not acceptable to 

me. 

* * * 

Sometimes mental illness is a mitigating factor and sometimes it’s a 

dangerous factor. So with your record I have to say if you’re blaming 

this on your mental illness then your mental illness makes you more 

dangerous. 

 Maines has not demonstrated that the trial court failed to consider 

the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 or the sentencing 

factors under R.C. 2929.12 when sentencing Maines. The trial court was not 

required to demonstrate how its sentence served each of the purposes and principles 

of sentencing or to identify or explain its evaluation of each relevant sentencing 

factor in order to comply with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. 

Accordingly, we find that the trial court complied with its obligations 

under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 and that Maines’ sentence was not contrary to law. 
 Sentence Supported by the Record 

Maines also contends that his six-year prison sentence is clearly and 

convincingly not supported by the record and that this court should, therefore, 

modify his prison sentence to probation. 

Although an appellate court must conduct a “meaningful review” of a 

trial court’s sentence, see, e.g., State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97579, 

2012-Ohio-2508, ¶ 6, a trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled to deference; we 

are not permitted to simply substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. See, 

e.g., State v. Shivers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105621, 2018-Ohio-99, ¶ 9; State v. 

Franklin, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107482, 2019-Ohio-3760, ¶ 47. 

Where, as here, a sentence is imposed “solely after consideration of 

the factors in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12,” “[a]n appellate court may vacate or modify 

any sentence that is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law only if the appellate 

court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the record does not support the 

sentence.” Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, at ¶ 23. 

“‘Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof * * * which will 

produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts 

sought to be established.’” Franklin at ¶ 29, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 

469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus. This is an “extremely 

deferential” standard of review. State v. Venes, 2013-Ohio-1891, 992 N.E.2d 453, 

¶ 21 (8th Dist.). 
Maines argues that the record does not support a six-year prison 

sentence “based upon the trial court’s statements prior to the plea hearing.” 

Specifically, Maines contends that because the trial court told Maines prior to the 

change-of-plea hearing that it was still considering probation and because the trial 

court “was aware,” at that time, that Maines had a long history of theft-related 

offenses, that Maines had known the difference between right and wrong at the time 

of the incident and that Maines’ mental illness may have contributed to his actions, 

(1) the trial court could not rely on “those exact same facts” to impose a six-year 

prison sentence and (2) therefore, there is no support in the record for the trial 

court’s imposition of a six-year prior sentence. We disagree. 

At the final pretrial conference, the trial court made it clear that 

although Maines was eligible for probation, there was a presumption that he would 

receive a prison sentence. The trial court further informed Maines that, if convicted 

of the burglary count, he could receive a prison sentence of two to eight years and 

that, if convicted of all four counts, he could receive a maximum prison sentence of 

nine years, if consecutive sentences were to be imposed on the two felony counts: 

And you’re eligible for probation, but the presumption in your case is 

prison. That means I start at the idea of sending you to prison and then 

if there’s things that I think, Oh, that’s a good thing, and that’s a good 

thing, and that’s a good thing, then I could maybe put you on probation. 

So, one of the things I look at is your record and your history. That 

weighs on how I decide prison or probation, how much time. So those 

things are all up in the air. 
The trial court also made it clear that it would not decide what would 

be an appropriate sentence prior to the sentencing hearing and would, instead, wait 

to receive all relevant information before making a decision on sentencing: 

THE DEFENDANT: Do things matter, what was going on at the time 

of the situation and before the situation? Do that matter? Or it just 

matter because you did something wrong? 

THE COURT: No, I mean, I listen to all of that. So I would say the 

answer to your question is yes, it does matter. I do take into 

consideration what was going on, you know. * * * 

If you plead, then I have to listen to everything and take everything into 

consideration, not just your criminal record, but also what they’re 

saying in this [sanity evaluation report] and what you say, and then I 

have to make a decision, what I think is an appropriate decision. 

* * * 

THE DEFENDANT: * * * When I plead, if I take a plea, do I get to tell 

you what’s going on, or no? 

THE COURT: Normally, I wait until I sentence you to hear from you 

about that. So, in my head and in my brain, I look at those as two 

separate things. 

THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 

THE COURT: The plea is one thing. That’s me making sure you 

understand what you’re pleading to, what the time is that you’re facing, 

and that you’re waiving your right to a trial, that you’re giving up your 

right to a trial. That’s what I think of the plea as being. So I’m not even 

in the mind-set of thinking, Well, what happened here, what does he 

want to say. So when I come in for sentencing, then my mind is all 

about what do you have to say, and what does the State have to say, and 

was anybody injured, and what happened, and what about you, and 

what’s going on with you. * * * 

I use those things in a couple of ways, Mr. Maines. One, I’m trying to 

make a decision, do I want to put you on probation. Two, if I’m giving 

you prison time, I use those things to decide how much prison time 
should he be getting. * * * So that’s how I use the stuff. I’m trying to 

decide probation or prison. If I’m giving you * * * prison, how much 

time should I be giving you? Is it enough to give you — can I accomplish 

— can I do what I’m trying to do in the minimum amount of time, or do 

I need to give you more time? So those are the things that I have to 

make decisions about, right? * * * That’s some insight into how I’m 

thinking in my head about what’s going on. But, before we even get 

there, you have to do some thinking or you have to make a decision 

about what you want to do; and if you want to have a trial, you can have 

a trial. 

The trial court reiterated this point before Maines entered his guilty 

pleas at the change-of-plea hearing: 

THE COURT: * * * Let’s go over the penalties again, okay. Count 1 is 

burglary, carries two to eight years in prison, a fine of up to $20,000,1

and three years of mandatory Post-Release Control if you go to prison. 

Count 3, receiving stolen property, is a misdemeanor of the first degree, 

carries up to 180 days in jail, and a fine of up to $1,000. 

Count 4 is criminal damaging, it’s a misdemeanor of the second degree, 

carries up to 90 days in jail, and a fine of up to $750. 

The misdemeanors cannot be run consecutive to the burglary, so the 

maximum sentence you’re facing is eight years if I send you to prison. 

Do you understand? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

* * * 

THE COURT: All right. I can put you on probation in this case if I want 

to. This is going to be a difficult case for me to decide what to do. Do 

you understand? 

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 

 1 Although the trial court initially stated that the burglary count carried a possible 

fine of up to $20,000, the trial court later clarified that it carried a possible fine of up to 

$15,000. 
THE COURT: I haven’t promised you any particular sentence, all 

right? 

THE DEFENDANT: No. 

After the trial court accepted Maines’ guilty pleas and found him 

guilty of the offenses to which he had pled, Maines attempted to explain why he had 

done what he had done, identified steps he had taken to try and improve his life and 

described some of his current mental health and medical issues. The trial court, 

once again, stated that it had not yet decided whether to impose a prison sentence 

and was waiting to see what additional, relevant information it received at, or prior 

to, the sentencing hearing before making a decision: 

THE COURT: * * * I don’t know what I’m going to do. I’ve got to think 

about it. All right? 

* * * 

You know what, all that stuff is what we call mitigating evidence. It’s all 

good stuff, because you have to show me the good stuff to combat what 

is going on here. 

DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am. 

THE COURT: The prosecutor, she gets to speak, too. She will say 

whatever she wants or whatever the victims are telling her. Might 

sound very different than what you’re telling me. 

After considering all of the relevant information made available to the 

trial court, including the sanity evaluation report, the PSI, the substance abuse 

assessment, additional information regarding Maines’ mental health, the 

surveillance video of the incident and statements from the assistant prosecutor, one 

of the victims, the investigating detective, defense counsel and Maines, the trial 
court decided to impose a six-year prison sentence. Simply because the trial court 

had indicated it was willing to consider probation does not mean the trial court was 

precluded from imposing a prison sentence once it received all of the relevant 

information, particularly, where, as here, there was a presumption of a prison 

sentence. Following a thorough review of the record in its entirety, we find no basis 

upon which we could conclude that the record clearly and convincingly does not 

support Maines’ six-year prison sentence. 

As stated above, the parties stipulated to the findings in the sanity 

evaluation that Maines suffered from a severe mental illness but that his mental 

illness did not prevent Maines from understanding right from wrong and that 

Maines understood, at the time of the incident, that what he was doing was wrong. 

Further, at the sentencing hearing, Maines readily acknowledged that he knew what 

he was doing was wrong at the time of the incident. Although the sanity evaluation 

indicated that Maines’ mental illness could have contributed to his impulsive 

behavior, as the trial court pointed out at the sentencing hearing, and as was 

apparently clear from the surveillance video, this incident was not the result of 

purely impulsive behavior. Maines stated that he took an Uber to the victims’ home. 

Although he claimed to have broken into the victims’ home believing that they had 

a stolen television that belonged to him, he first attempted to break into one of the 

victim’s vehicles, causing damage to the vehicle. When a neighbor later observed 

him on the victims’ porch, he waited until after the neighbor left to break into the 

home. After each failed break-in attempt, Maines looked around to see if anyone 
was watching him before trying again. Further, although no one was physically 

harmed as a result of Maines’ actions, Maines stated at the sentencing hearing that 

when he broke into the home, he believed the victims were inside, “hiding” from 

him. Accordingly, he broke into the home with the understanding that his actions 

could have resulted in a confrontation with the victims, presenting a further risk of 

harm. 

Although Maines’ mental illness was one relevant factor to be 

considered in determining an appropriate sentence, there were others the trial court 

was required to consider as well, including, the economic and emotional harm 

sustained by the victims, the fact that Maines committed the subject offenses while 

under community control, Maines’ lengthy history of similar criminal offenses and 

Maines’ unfavorable response to the sanctions imposed for his prior offenses. See

R.C. 2929.12. At the time of the sentencing hearing, Maines was 48. The PSI reflects 

that from 1991 to 2017, Maines committed more than 55 theft-related offenses in 

separate incidents throughout Northeast Ohio.2 Based on his history, Maines’ PSI 

indicates that he has a “high” risk for recidivism. 

 2 The PSI reflects that, in addition to convictions out of the Cuyahoga County Court 

of Common Pleas, the Lake County Court of Common Pleas and the Summit County Court 

of Common Pleas, Maines had convictions out of the Bedford, Cleveland, Mentor, 

Willoughby, Akron, Parma, Shaker Heights, Euclid, Rocky River, Barberton, Garfield 

Heights, Lakewood, Cleveland Heights and South Euclid Municipal Courts. According to 

the PSI, prior to this incident, Maines was convicted of one or more felony or 

misdemeanor theft-related offenses in each of the following years: 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 

1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013, 

2015, 2016 and 2017. 
The record reflects that, when sentencing Maines, the trial court 

considered Maines’ mental illness as a factor relevant to his sentence but 

nevertheless concluded that, given other relevant factors, a six-year prison sentence 

was necessary to serve as a deterrent and protect the public. Given the nature of 

Maines’ conduct, the “breadth of his criminality” and the high risk of recidivism, we 

cannot say that Maines’ six-year prison sentence is clearly and convincingly 

unsupported by the record. See, e.g., Clay, 2020-Ohio-1499, at ¶ 33. 

The record reflects that the trial court thoroughly and thoughtfully 

considered the purposes and principles of sentencing under R.C. 2929.11, the 

relevant sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12 and all of the relevant information 

presented at (or prior to) the sentencing hearing in imposing a six-year prison 

sentence. Maines has not shown that the record clearly and convincingly does not 

support his sentence. Accordingly, we overrule Maines’ assignment of error. 

Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution. 
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS; 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY WITH 

SEPARATE OPINION 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY: 

I concur with the majority opinion and write separately to voice my 

concerns with the state of the mental health prison complex. Clearly, the trial court 

applied R.C. 2929.11 and the sentencing factors under R.C. 2929.12 when it 

sentenced Maines to a six-year prison term. However, I was struck by the portion 

of the record that establishes that, although Maines knew the wrongfulness of his 

conduct, he “was suffering from a severe mental disease” that “may have added an 

impulsive quality to his behavior.” That being said, I do not disregard the terrifying 

nature of what happened to the victim in this case. The victim witnessed Maines 

entering her home and had to have felt the pain emotionally of having someone walk 

freely into her home without regard to her privacy and space. We can only imagine 

what she witnessed. And yet I raise my voice to utter, the system is not working for 

either in this case, especially the victim. 

A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey has estimated that 16 percent of 

all state prison and local jail inmates incarcerated in American prisons and jails are 
mentally ill. See https://www.ncjrs.gov<pdffiles1›bja Mental Health Courts - 

National Criminal Justice Reference (accessed Nov. 12, 2020). Other researchers 

have found that found one-third of inmates have severe mental illness or substance 

abuse issues and that these inmates on average stayed in the jail 77 percent longer 

than other inmates. See https://www.cleveland.com/metro/2020/11/cuyahogacounty-jail-inmate-accused-of-beating-cellmate-to-death-placed-in-generalpopulation-despite-history-of-attacking-inmates-court-records-sources-say.html 

(accessed Nov. 12, 2020). 

This high number is traditionally attributed to deinstitutionalization 

that did not achieve the results that were hoped for, causing the criminal justice 

system to increasingly absorb individuals with mental health issues. The criminal 

justice system has increasingly come to serve as the “social service system of last 

resort.” See https:// www.ncjrs.gov › pdffiles1 › bja Mental Health Courts - 

National Criminal Justice Reference (accessed Nov. 12, 2020). For those offenders 

whose illness does not meet the test of insanity under R.C. Chapter 2945, the need 

for treatment and help remains. Often, inmates do not get proper treatment. 

Here, the record shows that Maines has a “lengthy, lengthy, lengthy” 

criminal record dating back to the early 1990s: 

Mr. Maines does have a lengthy, lengthy, lengthy criminal record. In 

his LEADS report, 92 cycles. In reality he doesn’t have quite 92 

convictions, but they do date back from 1993. They’re all separate 

instances of two thefts from ‘93, two RSPs from ‘93 — I’m sorry, three 

thefts in ‘93, another theft in ‘95, another theft in ‘96, burglary in 2000, 

drug possession in 2000, attempted robbery in 2003, another theft in 

2003, two more thefts in 2005, another theft in 2006, a robbery in 
2006, another robbery in 2008, a theft in 2008, RSP along with 

forgery, misuse of credit cards and theft in 2012, another burglary and 

RSP in 2012, another theft in 2013, another attempted RSP of a motor 

vehicle in 2013, a theft in 2016, an identity fraud in 2017, another theft 

and identity fraud in 2017, and finally one last theft out of Lake 

County again in 2017. 

To me, this shows that the court system has known for decades that 

Maines is in need of mental health treatment. However, the system has opted to 

continue jailing him with hopes that society will be safe from him for at least six 

years. The police detective and many others believe very strongly that he knows the 

difference between right and wrong. Maybe he does, but that is not the issue. 

Putting him in jail without properly addressing his mental health care is 

unbelievable. In this day and age, we know more about the brain and its control 

over behavior than ever before. Just because the justice system is weak in its 

understanding of the brain and its cognitive function does not mean that 

information is not available. 

I have talked to many friends and most are unwilling to believe that 

the criminal is not in control of his behavior. He should know right from wrong or 

have a functioning brain. Today, brain science can scan the brain and determine 

damage to the executive function part of the brain, the limbic emotional part of the 

brain, and the primitive brain. We really can determine with today’s science that a 

person does not know the difference between right and wrong, if the executive 

function part of the brain is damaged. 
The executive function of the brain controls a whole host of areas, 

which includes behavior and self-regulation. Additionally, this part of the brain is 

the youngest part of the brain. The two oldest parts are faster, but self-regulation via 

the executive function part of the brain helps us to override the default, automatic 

negative response. 

Consequently, we as a society can either recognize that the new 

mental health facility is the prison system itself, or it is not. I ponder when will we 

get tired of this existing approach.