NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

Nos. 120,747

 121,048

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

THOMAS C. GRIFFIN II,

Appellant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appeal from Douglas District Court; PAULA B. MARTIN, judge. Opinion filed April 10, 2020. 

Affirmed.

Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. 

Kate Duncan Butler, assistant district attorney, Charles E. Branson, district attorney, and Derek 

Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.

Before LEBEN, P.J., SCHROEDER, J., and LAHEY, S.J.

PER CURIAM: Thomas C. Griffin II appeals his conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine, contending the district court lost proper jurisdiction over the case 

based on the time it took to get a trial date. When he was charged with possession of 

meth, he was serving an unrelated sentence in a Kansas state prison, and he filed a 

request for a speedy resolution of the meth charge under the Uniform Mandatory 

Disposition of Detainers Act. 
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Griffin's appeal comes down to a single issue: did the 180-day time limit to try 

him begin to run when he gave his request to prison officials or did it start 12 days later 

when the district court and district attorney received it? At least in this case, in which 

prison officials didn't cause any undue delay, the time limit began to run on receipt of the 

trial request by the district court and district attorney. Because a trial was set within 180 

days of that date, the district court properly denied Griffin's motion to dismiss the case 

for violation of the Act. We therefore affirm the district court's judgment. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Charges

On September 27, 2017, Griffin was arrested during a traffic stop in Douglas 

County for possession of controlled substances, possession of drug paraphernalia, driving 

while suspended, and displaying a tag not assigned to the vehicle he was driving. At the 

time of his arrest, Griffin was on parole and under supervised release in Wyandotte 

County, Kansas. 

A few months later, on April 8, 2018, Douglas County prosecutors brought formal 

charges related to the traffic stop. They charged Griffin with possession of 

methamphetamine with intent to distribute, possession of drug paraphernalia (felony), 

possession of alprazolam, possession of diazepam, three counts of possession of drug 

paraphernalia (misdemeanor), and one count of driving while suspended. But on April 

19, 2018, well before the Douglas County charges could be resolved, Griffin was 

committed to the Kansas Department of Corrections in the Wyandotte County case for a 

term of 36 months. 
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Griffin's Request Under the Act

On June 27, 2018, while Griffin was still in a state prison, the district court filed 

Griffin's "K.S.A. 22-4301 Request for Mandatory Disposition of Detainer Act," which 

Griffin had sent directly to the court. The district attorney acknowledged receipt of 

Griffin's request in a July 3 letter to Griffin, but the district attorney advised Griffin that 

he needed to contact prison officials to have the proper documents prepared and 

delivered. On June 30, Griffin asked for postage from the prison to send his request.

Griffin's postage was approved on July 3. On July 6, Griffin signed a request for 

disposition under the Act; the Norton Correctional Facility records clerk certified the 

details of Griffin's sentence. On July 16, Norton Correctional Facility sent the certified 

request, by certified mail, to the district attorney. On July 18, the district attorney 

received the certified request. The district court received and filed it that same day. 

Griffin's Motion to Dismiss

Aware that Griffin had invoked the Act, the district court set Griffin's trial for 

January 7, 2019, noting January 14 was the "date for speedy trial." The State agreed that 

Griffin had to be tried before January 14. 

On January 2, 2019, Griffin moved to dismiss for violation of the Act. Griffin 

argued the charges should be dismissed because he substantially complied with the Act 

on June 27, 2018, that 189 days had passed, and he had not been brought to trial. In the 

alternative, Griffin argued that he fully complied with the Act no later than July 6, 2018, 

so he should have been brought to trial no later than January 2, 2019. 

On January 16, 2019, the district court denied Griffin's motion. The district court 

held that the 180-day period began when the district court and district attorney received 

the certificate from the Kansas Department of Corrections. 
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The Plea

Griffin's trial was set for January 22, 2019. On January 18, Griffin pleaded no 

contest to possession of methamphetamine; the other charges were dismissed as part of 

the plea agreement. The district court sentenced Griffin to 15 months in prison. 

The Appeal

Griffin then appealed to our court. The sole issue on appeal is whether the 180-day 

period for his trial had expired before he entered his plea.

ANALYSIS

The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act provides a statutory right 

for inmates in a Kansas correctional or penal institution to request final disposition of any 

charges pending against them in the state. State v. Burnett, 297 Kan. 447, 452-53, 301 

P.3d 698 (2013). The Act prevents oppression of an inmate by making sure that criminal

prosecutions pending against them aren't suspended for an indefinite time; it also

prevents delays in the administration of justice by placing an obligation on courts to bring 

the inmate to trial within a reasonable period. 297 Kan. at 453. 

Whether a defendant's statutory speedy-trial right has been violated is a legal 

question that we review independently, without any required deference to the district 

court. 297 Kan. at 451. And while a defendant usually waives any failure to comply with 

speedy-trial rules by entering a guilty plea, the Act makes the time frame jurisdictional. 

State v. Foster, No. 117,118, 2018 WL 4039455, at *3 (Kan. App. 2018) (unpublished 

opinion), rev. denied 309 Kan. 1351 (2019). Since the time limit is jurisdictional, the 
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defendant can't waive the requirement, so if the defendant is not brought to trial within 

the Act's time limit, then no Kansas court has jurisdiction over the charges. K.S.A. 2019 

Supp. 22-4303(b)(4); Foster, 2018 WL 4039455, at *3. So we must determine whether 

the Act's time limit had expired before he entered his plea. (Alternatively, we might look 

to see whether the trial date the district court had set was within the 180-day time limit. 

Based on our analysis, the end result is the same.) 

To determine whether Griffin's statutory right to a trial under the Act was violated, 

thus stripping the district court of jurisdiction, this court must interpret and apply the Act. 

We do that independently, without any required deference to the district court. Burnett, 

297 Kan. at 451. 

An inmate may request final disposition of untried charges pending in Kansas. The 

Act requires that the inmate send the written request to three parties: (1) the court in 

which the charge is pending, (2) the county or district attorney who will prosecute the 

charges, and (3) the Secretary of Corrections. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-4301(a). Notice to 

the Secretary is not a mere formality; the Secretary must certify to the court the prison 

term the inmate is serving, the time remaining to be served, and the time of parole 

eligibility—information that could affect the setting of hearings on the untried charge. 

See K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-4302(a), (b). Once the Secretary has that information collected 

and certified, the Secretary must mail it by registered or certified mail to the court and the 

prosecutor. K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-4302(c). Assuming there's only one detainer (as was 

the case here), the inmate must be tried within 180 days "[f]ollowing the receipt of the 

[Secretary's] certificate by the court and county attorney." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-

4303(b)(1)(A). 

An inmate's substantial compliance with the Act is sufficient to invoke its

protections. Burnett, 297 Kan. at 453. Once the inmate has properly invoked the Act, the

burden to send the certified information about the inmate's remaining prison time to the
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district court and the county attorney shifts to the Secretary. Foster, 2018 WL 4039455, 

at *5 (citing Pierson v. State, 210 Kan. 367, 374, 502 P.2d 721 [1972]). As our Supreme

Court made clear in Burnett, 297 Kan. at 455, a public official's negligence cannot

deprive an inmate of the statutory right granted by the Act.

Griffin argues, based on Burnett, the 180-day period should be deemed to have run

when he substantially complied with the Act, which occurred no later than July 6, 2018,

not upon receipt of the Secretary's certification by the court and prosecutor. But Griffin's

case is unlike Burnett, in which the Secretary failed to meet his burden under the Act.

In Burnett, as in our case, the inmate had substantially complied with the Act—

sending a request to the prosecutor, the court, and the Secretary. That shifted the burden

to comply with the Act to the Secretary, but the Secretary never sent the statutorily

required certification to the district court or the prosecutor. In that situation, our Supreme

Court held that the date Burnett substantially complied with the Act was the proper date

to begin counting because Burnett should not be punished for the Secretary's failure to do

its part. 297 Kan. at 454-55, 457.

But in our case, unlike Burnett, the Secretary met his burden and sent the required

certificate. It's true that Griffin had substantially complied with the Act no later than July

6, 2018: his request was filed with the district court on June 27; the county attorney

received Griffin's request by July 3; and Griffin made a request to the Secretary on July 6.

Griffin's substantial compliance with the Act invoked its protection; the burden to comply

with the Act shifted to the Secretary.

On July 16, 2018, ten days after Griffin substantially complied with the Act, the

Secretary sent the certification to the county attorney by certified mail. The Act surely

recognizes that it will take some time in the ordinary course of business for the Secretary

to check the inmate's records, prepare a certificate of the prison time left for the inmate to
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serve, and send that information to the prosecutor and district court. And the Act quite

clearly provides that the 180-day time limit kicks in "[f]ollowing the receipt of the

certificate by the court and the county attorney." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-4303(b)(1)(A).

The district court and county attorney received the certification on July 18, 2018.

So which date controls when an inmate substantially complies with the Act and

the Secretary does too? The statute clearly tells us it's 180 days following receipt of the

certificate.

The district court and county attorney received the certificate from the Secretary

on July 18, 2018. Thus, July 18, 2018 is the proper date to begin the 180-day period. In 

computing time periods, the day of the event that triggers the period is excluded. See

K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-206(a)(1)(A); Foster, 2018 WL 4039455, at *10. Counting 180

days from July 18, 2018, the initial deadline for Griffin's trial to begin was January 14,

2019.

The court had initially scheduled the trial for January 7, 2019, which was within 

that time limit. But five days before trial, on January 2, Griffin filed a motion to dismiss. 

On January 3, Griffin's motion to dismiss was set for hearing on January 16, and Griffin's 

jury trial was rescheduled for January 22. 

Neither party has addressed that continuance in their appellate briefs, and Griffin 

has argued the appeal as a dispute about whether the 180-day clock should have started 

no later than July 6 (Griffin's view) or the date chosen by the district court, July 18. 

Griffin has not argued on appeal that even if the July 18 date is the correct one to start the 

180-day time limit, he still should win the appeal because the time from January 2 (when 

he filed his motion to dismiss) to January 16 (when that motion was heard) should be 

charged against the State, not against the defendant. We presume that the time to deal 

with this motion filed by the defendant only shortly before the trial should be charged 
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against the defendant. See State v. Woods, No. 117,294, 2018 WL 1770556, at *4 (Kan. 

App. 2018) (unpublished opinion). Adding that 14-day period to the original January 14 

deadline takes us to January 28; Griffin's rescheduled trial date (January 22) and his plea 

date (January 18) were both within that time limit.

We find no violation of the Act, and we affirm the district court's judgment.