In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 13-2634

TESHOME CAMPBELL,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DAN REARDON, Warden,

Respondent-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois, Urbana Division.

No. 08-2157—Harold A. Baker, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED NOVEMBER 10, 2014 — DECIDED MARCH 10, 2015

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and HAMILTON,

Circuit Judges.

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Teshome Campbell 

was convicted in an Illinois state court of first-degree murder 

for participating in a mob-style beating that killed James 

Shepherd. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the 

crime. The State’s case against Campbell hinged on the testimony of three eyewitnesses. Two of these witnesses, Dami-
2 No. 13-2634

on Johnson and Steven Peete, had been charged with the 

murder but were granted full immunity in exchange for testifying against Campbell. Both had serious criminal histories, and both denied any involvement in the crime when 

they testified at Campbell’s trial. The third witness, Rita Butler, testified that Campbell started the fight with the victim, 

but she saw the fight from inside a van that was parked 

around the street corner and facing away from the brawl.

In his federal habeas petition, Campbell argues that his 

trial counsel was ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). He contends that a number of errors 

support his claim. For example, defense counsel failed to 

impeach Johnson and Peete with the full scope of their criminal histories and the details of their plea agreements with 

the State. Campbell also criticizes his lawyer’s failure to attend the trial (or to review trial transcripts) of a co-defendant 

who was acquitted in a separate trial just weeks before 

Campbell’s trial. We do not reach these issues, however, but 

focus instead on the core of Campbell’s petition—that his 

counsel failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation 

by failing to interview three witnesses who would have said 

that Campbell played no role in the fatal attack on Shepherd.

These witnesses and at least part of the information they 

could provide were in police reports provided to Campbell’s 

lawyer before trial. Toni Leonard told police that two other 

men—not Campbell—started the fight with the victim. This 

statement flatly contradicted prosecution witness Rita Butler’s testimony, as well as the State’s entire theory of the case 

that the fight began when Campbell attacked the victim. Ms. 

Leonard also told police that prosecution witness Damion 

Johnson participated in the beating, which contradicted 
No. 13-2634 3

Johnson’s testimony that he was not involved. Another eyewitness, Leroy Hunter, told police that prosecution witness 

Steven Peete hit the victim three or four times with “something that looked like a pipe, or a big stick.” This statement 

contradicted Peete’s testimony that he was also not involved. 

A third eyewitness, Ieca Hunter, witnessed the beating but 

told police that she could not identify any of the assailants. 

According to an affidavit that was presented to the state 

courts, though, she would have been able to identify Campbell as someone present at the scene who did not participate 

in the beating. According to her affidavit, Campbell was 

standing directly in front of her house, apart from the group 

of men who participated in the beating, and he “never 

touched” the victim. Neither Ms. Leonard, Mr. Hunter, nor 

Ms. Hunter was called to testify in Campbell’s defense at trial.

The state courts assumed, as we must on appeal, that 

Campbell’s lawyer never contacted these eyewitnesses to interview them. The state courts rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim anyway, holding that under 

Strickland (1) counsel receives wide latitude to make strategic 

decisions about which witnesses to call and which theory or 

theories to present to the jury, and (2) Campbell’s lawyer reasonably declined to interview Ms. Hunter because the police 

report implied that such an interview would be fruitless. We 

hold that the state courts unreasonably applied Strickland

when they rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

That determination does not entitle Campbell to a writ of 

habeas corpus, at least not yet, but calls for further proceedings to determine the actual facts. The state courts and the 
4 No. 13-2634

federal district court rejected Campbell’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim without ever addressing key factual 

questions: whether Campbell’s lawyer in fact interviewed 

these witnesses and whether they would have testified credibly and consistently with their affidavits and statements to 

the police. On these factual issues, we have no factual findings to review and the record is otherwise ambiguous. To be 

sure, affidavits from two of the three exculpatory witnesses 

(Mr. Hunter and Ms. Hunter) say that Campbell’s lawyer

never contacted them. But these affidavits, which were part 

of the state court record, have not been tested through the 

adversarial process at any kind of hearing. There also is no 

affidavit from the third exculpatory witness (Ms. Leonard) 

or the lawyer himself, let alone a record of live testimony. 

Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Campbell’s petition 

and remand to the district court to resolve these factual 

questions, as we explain in more detail below.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Murder of James Shepherd

James Shepherd was beaten to death by a group of men 

in the early morning hours of Christmas Day in 1997. The 

beating occurred on a street in Champaign, Illinois. The State

initially charged twelve men with first-degree murder, but it 

eventually dismissed charges against four of them.1 Three 

defendants entered plea agreements and were sentenced to 

1 The State dismissed charges against Deandrea Donald, Jeffrey Dillon, Terron Lyons, and Joe Posey. The charges against Donald, Dillon, 

and Lyons were dismissed outright. Posey’s charges were dismissed in 

exchange for him pleading guilty to an unrelated felony.

 
No. 13-2634 5

varying terms of imprisonment.2 Two other defendants, 

Damion Johnson and Steven Peete, were granted full immunity in exchange for testifying against the remaining 

three defendants.3 One defendant, Theodis White, was convicted and sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment. Another, 

Bobby Joe Douglas, was tried and acquitted. The remaining 

defendant was petitioner Teshome Campbell, who was convicted and sentenced to 55 years in prison. Campbell maintains his innocence.

B. Campbell’s Trial

Before trial Campbell asked the court to appoint counsel 

for him. In January 1998 the court appointed attorney Harvey Welch to represent him. Although Campbell was facing 

a first-degree murder charge, his lawyer did not record doing any work on Campbell’s case until five months later, in 

June 1998. The first twelve entries on the lawyer’s billing 

statement are for the preparation of a trial notebook. No entries indicate that the lawyer conducted any pretrial witness 

interviews. Nor is there any evidence that the lawyer hired a 

private investigator. 

Campbell went to trial in October 1998. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the crime. The prosecution’s case 

rested almost entirely on the testimony of three eyewitnesses: Damion Johnson, Steven Peete, and Rita Butler. Johnson 

and Peete had been charged initially with Shepherd’s murder and testified against Campbell in exchange for full im2 These co-defendants were Juanchez Booker, Lynntez Holt, and 

Lamarcus Townsend.

3 Damion Johnson is also referred to as “Damion Holt” throughout 

the record.

 
6 No. 13-2634

munity. Both had extensive criminal histories. Butler was 

with Shepherd before his death on the night of the beating.

1. Rita Butler’s Testimony

Rita Butler testified that she was walking home early 

Christmas morning when Shepherd pulled up beside her in 

a van and asked her to get in.4 She agreed. Shepherd asked 

Butler if she knew where they could buy some crack cocaine. 

Butler directed him to the 200 block of Bellefontaine Street. 

When they arrived, Butler saw a man on the street from 

whom she had bought drugs before. She did not know the 

man by name but recognized his face, and she later identified Campbell as that man. She took money from Shepherd, 

approached the man on the street, and bought a $20 bag of 

what she believed to be crack cocaine and returned to the 

van. Butler and Shepherd then drove to another location to 

smoke it.

When Shepherd tried to smoke it, he discovered that the 

substance was fake. Intent on getting his money back, Shepherd drove back toward Bellefontaine Street and parked the 

van around a corner, facing away from where Butler had initially bought the fake drugs from the man standing on Bellefontaine Street. Shepherd got out of the van. Butler stayed in 

the passenger seat. From inside the van, she looked back toward the corner of Bellefontaine Street and watched what 

happened next.

Butler testified that there were “a lot of people standing 

out” on the street. Butler saw Shepherd approach the man 

4 Throughout her testimony, Butler referred to Shepherd as “Jimmy 

Collins.”

 
No. 13-2634 7

who had sold her the fake cocaine and demand his money 

back. The man shouted back at Shepherd, and the two men 

began to fight. She did not see who threw the first blow. As 

the two men fought, eight or nine other people joined in and 

began hitting and kicking Shepherd. Shepherd fought back 

but eventually fell to the ground. The last time Butler saw 

Shepherd, there was “a crowd” of men beating him as he lay 

in the middle of the street. She ran away.

2. Damion Johnson’s Testimony

The prosecution’s next eyewitness was Damion Johnson. 

He was arrested in late January 1998. Upon his arrest, he 

gave police a taped statement about what he saw on the 

night of the incident. According to this original taped statement, Shepherd approached Campbell in the street. Shepherd yelled at Campbell, demanding his money back. 

Campbell and Shepherd then began fighting. Bobby Joe 

Douglas jumped into the fight, but Campbell fought his way 

out of the melee and walked over to the sidewalk. From 

there he watched the fight escalate, but he never rejoined it. 

According to Johnson’s statement, Douglas, Lamarcus 

Townsend, Juanchez Booker, and Theodis White were the 

primary participants in the fatal beating.

In April 1998, though, Johnson changed his story. In 

exchange for full immunity on the first-degree murder and 

related charges, he agreed to testify against Campbell. At 

trial Johnson testified that on the night of the incident, he 

was inside a cousin’s residence until he heard gunshots. He 

walked outside and saw a van driving down Bellefontaine 

Street. The man driving the van was yelling that he wanted 

“the real thing or his money back.” The driver parked the 

van and approached Campbell on foot. A fight broke out. 
8 No. 13-2634

Johnson testified that Campbell, Booker, Townsend, White, 

and Douglas all participated in the beating. According to 

Johnson, Shepherd did not fight back.

At Campbell’s trial, Johnson denied any participation in 

the fatal beating. He said he witnessed the incident while 

standing on a sidewalk, away from the fight. He also testified that he did not see Steven Peete kick or punch Shepherd. 

When Johnson heard police sirens, he fled the scene.

3. Steven Peete’s Testimony

The prosecution’s final eyewitness to the murder was 

Steven Peete. He testified that on the night of the incident he 

was asleep in his house when his fiancée woke him up, saying that she had heard gunfire. He opened the front door 

and looked outside. He saw a man being beaten directly in 

front of his house, about 10 feet away. Peete testified that 

when he first saw the man, he was already on the ground, 

trying to fight back. Seven or eight people had surrounded 

him and were kicking and punching him.

Peete testified that there was a streetlight near his house, 

and he could see several of the men’s faces. He identified 

White, Douglas, Booker, Townsend, and Campbell as participants in the beating. He testified that Johnson was in front 

of his bushes outside of his house, and that he was not part

of the crowd beating Shepherd. Peete yelled at the crowd to 

get away from his house, and the men dispersed. After the 

crowd dispersed, Peete went inside his house and back to 

sleep. Like Johnson, he denied any participation in the beating.
No. 13-2634 9

4. The Defense Trial Strategy

Defense counsel did not call any witnesses on Campbell’s 

behalf. The only evidence he put on was a stipulation that 

during the investigation, police seized several items of clothing from Douglas and White that had Shepherd’s blood on 

them.

During cross-examinations of Johnson and Peete, defense 

counsel did not impeach them with the full scope of their 

criminal histories or the details of their plea agreements with 

the State. In particular, counsel did not impeach Johnson 

with a prior juvenile adjudication for felony aggravated battery. Nor did he impeach Peete with a prior juvenile adjudication for felony mob action—a crime that took place less 

than three years before Shepherd’s beating.5 Both of these 

crimes were among the charges against Campbell.6

Defense counsel also failed to elicit testimony that at the 

time Johnson agreed to testify against Campbell, he was facing prison time for two reasons separate and apart from the 

5 Felony mob action, under Illinois law, consists of “the use of force 

or violence disturbing the public peace by 2 or more persons acting together and without authority of law.” 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/25-1 (1995).

6 Because defense counsel never cross-examined Peete about his violent criminal history, the prosecution was able to tell the jury in closing 

argument that Peete was “as clean as they get.” The prosecution also told 

the jury in closing: “Did you hear any evidence about Steven Peete’s horrible criminal record? Did you hear anything about Steven Peete other 

than that he’s a 19 year old with a child, a girlfriend, a job, living right in 

the middle of the war zone of Bellefontaine or this lawless area? Did you 

hear anything else about him?”

 
10 No. 13-2634

dropped first-degree murder charges: (1) he had been conditionally discharged on an adult felony conviction for unlawful use of a weapon in 1997, only one year before Shepherd’s 

murder, and (2) there was a pending petition to revoke his 

probation for a domestic battery incident. Both of these facts 

gave Johnson an even stronger incentive to cooperate with 

the State. The jury never heard these details.

During closing argument, Campbell’s lawyer offered four 

reasons for finding that the prosecution had not proven its 

case against Campbell beyond a reasonable doubt. First, he 

argued that it was too dark on the night of the beating for 

anyone to identify any suspect reliably. This theory was 

based on the testimony of a single paramedic, called by the 

prosecution, who arrived on the scene after the group of 

men had already fled. The paramedic testified that there was 

“poor lighting in the area” and called the scene “quite dark.” 

Second, counsel argued that Shepherd’s injuries were inconsistent with the testimony of Johnson, Peete, and Butler, who 

testified that Campbell struck and kicked Shepherd all over 

his body when, according to the testimony of a medical expert, Shepherd’s injuries were “confined from his neck area 

up.” Third, counsel observed that no physical evidence 

linked Campbell to the crime. And fourth, counsel argued 

that it was reasonable to infer from the evidence that Shepherd got out of his van with a gun and provoked the group 

of men into beating him, but that Campbell did not participate. The jury convicted Campbell of first-degree murder. 

He was sentenced to 55 years in prison.

C. Campbell’s Direct Appeal

Campbell appealed, arguing among other things that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
No. 13-2634 11

present the testimony of two exculpatory witnesses, Leroy 

Hunter and Toni Leonard.

According to police reports in the state court record, Mr. 

Hunter lived on the street where the murder took place and 

was interviewed on February 3, 1998, after calling police to 

report that he had witnessed the beating. He told police that 

he was awakened by gunfire that night. He went to his front 

window and saw a man lying in the street. He saw several 

men running away, while two men remained standing over 

the victim. The two men were Joe Posey and Steven Peete. 

Mr. Hunter knew Peete before the incident because Peete 

lived across the street from him. Mr. Hunter told police that 

Posey struck the victim with a pistol and Peete struck the 

victim three or four times with “something that looked like a 

pipe, or a big stick.” He also told police that on the day after 

the incident, he saw Peete return to the spot where the victim had been lying. There was a bloodstain in the street, and 

Peete spit on it. Mr. Hunter perceived this gesture as a sign 

of disrespect toward the victim. During his conversations 

with police, Mr. Hunter never identified Campbell as a participant in the beating.

Toni Leonard was also interviewed by police. She was 

first interviewed on January 23, 1998, after she was arrested 

on an unrelated charge. She told police she witnessed the 

beating. According to the police report, Ms. Leonard had 

been walking toward Bellefontaine Street when she heard 

shouting. She saw Shepherd arguing with Jeffrey Dillon and 

Lynntez Holt about “dummy bags” of drugs. Dillon struck 

the victim in the head “very hard” and then Holt “hit him 

several times.” The victim fought back, and Dillon pulled 

out a pistol and struck the victim in the head with it twice. A 
12 No. 13-2634

crowd soon formed around the altercation. Deandrea Donald took the pistol from Dillon and struck the victim in the 

head with it. Terron Lyons jumped on the victim’s head. 

Johnson kicked the victim at least once. And Posey kicked 

the victim at least twice.

After her initial interview, the police asked Ms. Leonard 

to identify suspects in a series of lineups. In total, she positively identified nine men as directly involved in Shepherd’s 

murder, including Johnson. During this same period, Ms. 

Leonard viewed an in-person lineup that included Campbell. She did not identify him as involved in the murder. She 

identified another man instead.

A divided state appellate panel affirmed Campbell’s conviction over a strong dissent. People v. Campbell, 773 N.E.2d 

776 (Ill. App. 2002). The court held that counsel’s failure to 

call either Mr. Hunter or Ms. Leonard did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel “because it was a matter of trial 

strategy.” Id. at 785. The court also noted that “none of the 

testimony which [Campbell] claims Hunter and Leonard 

would have given would have exonerated” Campbell because all they could do was “further implicate Johnson and 

Peete as involved in the murder, a fact of which the jury was 

already aware,” and because testimony that Campbell did 

not start the beating would not have contradicted the State’s 

theory that Campbell participated in the beating. Id.

Justice Knecht disagreed and would have remanded for a 

new trial. He concluded that defense counsel’s failure to impeach Johnson and Peete with the full scope of their criminal 

histories and the details of their plea agreements with the 

State, as well as his failure to call Mr. Hunter and Ms. Leonard, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 787–
No. 13-2634 13

90 (Knecht, J., dissenting). Recognizing that the decision to 

call a witness is generally considered a matter of trial strategy, Justice Knecht called counsel’s failure to call Mr. Hunter 

and Ms. Leonard “egregious,” explaining: “Defense counsel’s failure to call Hunter and Leonard could hardly be 

called trial strategy. I can fathom no strategy in this case that 

could overcome the value of their potential testimony.” Id. at 

790. Campbell’s petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme 

Court of Illinois was denied. People v. Campbell, 787 N.E.2d 

160 (Ill. 2002) (Table).

D. State Post-Conviction Proceedings

Campbell then filed a petition for post-conviction relief 

under 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1 et seq. (2002), raising, as 

relevant here, the new claim that his trial counsel was also 

constitutionally ineffective for failing to call Ieca Hunter to 

testify. Ms. Hunter, the daughter of Mr. Hunter, was first interviewed by police on the night of the murder. She lived on 

the same street as her parents, and police interviewed her on 

the scene. According to the police report, she had Christmas 

lights on the outside of her house. The lights were “affecting” her vision, but she was nevertheless able to see five 

black men fighting with the victim. When the victim fell to 

the ground, she left her window and called 911 for an ambulance. The police report said: “Ieca stated that she did not 

recognize any of the subjects in [the] street and she would 

not be able to identify any of them. The only thing that she 

could tell me was that all of them were black males.”

In an affidavit attached to Campbell’s post-conviction petition for relief, Ms. Hunter explained that although she initially had “trouble seeing in full view because of the Christmas lights” on her door, she then opened the door for a bet-
14 No. 13-2634

ter view and saw “a familiar person standing directly in 

front of [her] house,” approximately 12 feet away. That person was Teshome Campbell. She “had interacted with [him] 

on numerous occasions and there was no mistaking him 

even in the dark.” According to her affidavit, Campbell 

“never touched” Shepherd. She also described her initial interview with the police on the night of the incident: “[The 

police officer] asked me if I knew who did the beating. I told 

him that I could not see the beating well and did not know 

the people. He did not ask me who else was present who I 

knew. If asked by the police, I would have said that I saw 

[Campbell] present but he was not involved in the beating.”

The state trial court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing.7 Campbell appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed. People v. Campbell, No. 4-04-0791 (Ill. 

App. Jan. 16, 2007) (unpublished order). (That procedural 

posture has important effects for these federal proceedings 

because we must take Campbell’s allegations and affidavits 

at face value.) The court explained: “[Ms.] Hunter told police 

when they interviewed her that the Christmas lights obscured her view of the beating and she did not know any of 

the men involved. Based on this statement, defendant’s attorney’s failure to speak with her himself and call her as a 

witness was not objectively unreasonable as there was not a 

7 As detailed in the state appellate court’s order affirming the dismissal of Campbell’s petition for post-conviction relief, this petition was 

actually an amended petition. See Supp. App. 85–86. The original pro se

petition was dismissed summarily on res judicata grounds, but that dismissal was reversed by the state appellate court. People v. Campbell, 803 

N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ill. App. 2004), abrogated by People v. Blair, 831 N.E.2d 

604 (Ill. 2005). Campbell then filed the amended petition with the assistance of counsel.

 
No. 13-2634 15

sound basis to believe she had any information that would 

be helpful to the defense.” Supp. App. 96. Campbell’s petition for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois was 

denied.

E. Federal Habeas Proceedings

Campbell then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 

in federal district court, raising, among other claims, ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The court denied the petition 

without an evidentiary hearing but granted a certificate of 

appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Campbell appeals from the denial 

of his petition.

II. Habeas Corpus Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a), and we 

review de novo the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief. E.g., Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 622 (7th Cir. 2012).

Federal courts have authority to issue writs of habeas corpus 

for persons in state custody under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as 

amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 

Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Under AEDPA, a federal habeas petition may be granted only if a state court’s ruling on a federal 

constitutional question “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as 

determined by the Supreme Court,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence 

presented in the State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(1) & (2).

The standard under AEDPA is “difficult to meet” and 

“highly deferential.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. —, 131 S. 

Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011). Federal courts must avoid “using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the 
16 No. 13-2634

reasonable decisions of state courts.” Parker v. Matthews, 567 

U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2149 (2012) (per curiam), quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). A petitioner cannot prevail by showing simply that the state court’s decision was 

wrong. E.g., White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. —, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 

1702 (2014). He instead “must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so 

lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 

562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Our review under § 2254(d) is limited 

to the record that was before the state court. Pinholster, 131 S. 

Ct. at 1398.

AEDPA’s deferential standard of review applies only to 

claims that were actually “adjudicated on the merits in State 

court proceedings.” § 2254(d). Where state courts did not 

reach a federal constitutional issue, § 2254(d) deference applies “only to those issues the state court explicitly addressed.” Quintana v. Chandler, 723 F.3d 849, 853 (7th Cir. 

2013), citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003) (“In 

this case, our review is not circumscribed by a state court 

conclusion with respect to prejudice, as neither of the state 

courts below reached this prong of the ... analysis.”). The 

operative decision under review is that of the last state court 

to address a given claim on the merits. See Greene v. Fisher, 

565 U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 38, 45 (2011).

III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment provides that “the accused shall 

enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for his 

defence.” To demonstrate that his right to counsel was violated by ineffective assistance, Campbell must satisfy the 
No. 13-2634 17

familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, he must show that his counsel’s 

performance was deficient because it “fell below an objective 

standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 687–88. Second, he must 

show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense, 

which means that “there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694.

A. Standard of Review

Under AEDPA, “the bar for establishing that a state 

court’s application of the Strickland standard was ‘unreasonable’ is a high one.” Allen v. Chandler, 555 F.3d 596, 600 (7th 

Cir. 2009). “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not 

whether counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is 

whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 

105. “However, if a state court does not reach either the issue 

of performance or prejudice on the merits, then ‘federal review of [that prong] ... is de novo.’” Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 

F.3d 329, 350 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Toliver v. McCaughtry, 

539 F.3d 766, 775 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Porter v. McCollum, 

558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (per curiam); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534.

B. Performance

To establish deficient performance under Strickland, 

Campbell must identify acts or omissions by counsel that fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness and could not 

have been the result of professional judgment. Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 688, 690. “The question is whether an attorney’s representation amounted to incompetence under ‘prevailing 

professional norms,’ not whether it deviated from best prac-
18 No. 13-2634

tices or most common custom.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105, 

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 

the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to 

evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

1. Leroy Hunter and Toni Leonard

We begin with the failure to present testimony by Leroy 

Hunter and Toni Leonard. On direct appeal, the state appellate court rejected this claim on the merits, holding that the 

defense lawyer’s decision not to call Mr. Hunter or Ms. 

Leonard was not deficient performance. Because this was a 

merits adjudication, AEDPA deference applies and we ask 

“whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. 

at 105.8

The state court’s analysis of defense counsel’s performance was an unreasonable application of Strickland. On the 

record before the state court, it was unreasonable to conclude that counsel made a reasonable decision not to call Mr. 

Hunter and Ms. Leonard as a matter of trial strategy. The 

state court relied on the fact that counsel chose to argue that 

it was too dark at the time of the beating to make any reliable identifications. See People v. Campbell, 773 N.E.2d 776, 

8 The State agrees that the state appellate court did not reach the issue of prejudice and addressed only the issue of performance. See Appellee’s Br. 18 (“Because the state court addressed only one prong of the 

Strickland standard, this Court defers to the state court’s judgment on 

that prong, but reviews Strickland’s prejudice prong de novo.”).

 
No. 13-2634 19

785 (Ill. App. 2002) (“Defendant’s counsel chose to argue it 

was too dark that night to make identifications, for which 

there was some evidence, rather than mount a defense based 

upon the conflicting testimony of unreliable witnesses.”). 

Under the state court’s view, once Campbell’s lawyer selected this strategy, it was reasonable for him to decide not to 

present testimony from any eyewitness claiming that he or 

she could identify anyone—participant or non-participant—

on the street that night.

The fundamental problem with the state court’s analysis—which made it not just incorrect but unreasonable—is 

that it ignored counsel’s duty to perform a reasonable pretrial investigation before committing to a defense strategy.

In Strickland itself, the Supreme Court distinguished between “strategic choices made after thorough investigation 

of law and facts relevant to plausible options,” versus “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation.” 

466 U.S. at 690–91. Strategic choices in the first category are 

“virtually unchallengeable,” but those in the second category are “reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable 

professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable 

investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes 

particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. In the second circumstance, the “decision not to investigate must be directly 

assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” 

Id. at 691.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the importance of this distinction. In Wiggins v. Smith, for example, 

counsel failed to investigate the defendant’s background and 
20 No. 13-2634

to present mitigating evidence at his sentencing proceedings, 

settling instead on the argument that the defendant was not 

directly responsible for the crime. 539 U.S. 510, 515–16 

(2003). The state court held that trial counsel had not performed deficiently because “counsel had made ‘a deliberate, 

tactical decision to concentrate their effort at convincing the 

jury’ that [the petitioner] was not directly responsible for the 

murder.” Id. at 518, quoting Wiggins v. State, 724 A.2d 1, 15 

(Md. App. 1999). 

Even through the deferential lens of AEDPA, the Supreme Court held that this was an unreasonable application 

of Strickland. Where the Strickland claim involves an allegedly inadequate investigation, the proper question “is not 

whether counsel should have presented a mitigation case,” 

but rather “whether the investigation supporting counsel’s 

decision not to introduce mitigating evidence of [the petitioner’s] background was itself reasonable.” Id. at 522–23. As 

the Court put it, “Strickland does not establish that a cursory 

investigation automatically justifies a tactical decision with 

respect to ... strategy. Rather, a reviewing court must consider the reasonableness of the investigation said to support 

that strategy.” Id. at 527. The Court then concluded that the 

state court’s analysis of Strickland was unreasonable in two 

respects: (1) the state court merely assumed that counsel’s decision not to investigate further was reasonable without actually assessing counsel’s decision to stop investigating 

when they did, and (2) the state court applied deference to 

counsel’s strategic decision not to present a mitigation defense despite the fact that counsel based this choice on an 

unreasonably limited investigation. Id. at 527–28. 
No. 13-2634 21

Here, the state court engaged in a similarly unreasonable 

application of Strickland. The court merely assumed that the 

lawyer’s decision not to interview Mr. Hunter and Ms. Leonard was reasonable and then gave deference to his “strategic” decision to argue that it was too dark for anyone to 

make reliable identifications. As Wiggins also makes clear, 

the proper inquiry under Strickland is not whether it was 

reasonable for counsel to present the too-dark-to-identify 

theory, but whether the investigation supporting counsel’s 

decision not to call Mr. Hunter and Ms. Leonard was itself 

reasonable. If counsel’s decision not to investigate Mr. 

Hunter or Ms. Leonard was itself unreasonable, then his decision not to present their testimony—and to rely on the toodark-to-identify theory instead—was too ill-informed to be 

considered reasonable. See Stitts v. Wilson, 713 F.3d 887, 891 

(7th Cir. 2013) (“If trial counsel’s investigation of a potential 

alibi defense was unreasonably limited, then trial counsel’s 

decision not to present an alibi defense is too ill-informed to 

be considered reasonable.”); Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 

848 (7th Cir. 2012) (“If ... Mosley’s lawyer never found out 

what [the potential witnesses’] testimony would be, he could 

not possibly have made a reasonable professional judgment 

that their testimony would have been cumulative or bolstered the State’s case and could not have chosen not to call 

[them] as a matter of strategy.”); Crisp v. Duckworth, 743 F.2d 

580, 584 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Though there may be instances 

when the decision not to contact a potential defense witness 

is justified, an attorney who fails even to interview a readily 

available witness whose noncumulative testimony may potentially aid the defense should not be allowed automatically 

to defend his omission simply by raising the shield of ‘trial 

strategy and tactics.’”). 
22 No. 13-2634

Giving defense counsel’s judgments the deference they 

are due, we see no reason in the record why a decision not to 

interview Mr. Hunter and Ms. Leonard would have been 

reasonable under the circumstances. Under the prevailing 

norms at the time of Campbell’s trial, counsel had an obligation “‘to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case.’” Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 

7 (2009), quoting the American Bar Association Standards for 

Criminal Justice in effect in 1985. The police reports that 

were disclosed to counsel clearly presented two disinterested eyewitnesses who would have (1) described a version of 

the fatal beating substantially different from that argued by 

the State, (2) testified that two of the State’s three eyewitnesses were, despite their denials, directly involved in the 

beating, and (3) testified they did not see Campbell participate in the murder.

Mr. Hunter’s version of the events would have squarely 

contradicted Peete’s testimony that he was not involved in 

Shepherd’s beating. In fact, Mr. Hunter identified Peete as 

one of the attackers. He told police that Peete struck Shepherd three or four times with something that looked like a 

pipe or a big stick. He also told police that on the day after 

the incident, he saw Peete return to the scene of the crime 

and spit on the bloodstain where Shepherd had been lying.

Ms. Leonard’s version of the events would have contradicted the testimony of the State’s other two eyewitnesses. 

Not only would she have contradicted Johnson’s testimony 

that he was not involved in the murder, she would have 

squarely contradicted Rita Butler’s testimony about how the 

fight began. Butler testified at trial that the fight began when 
No. 13-2634 23

Shepherd approached Campbell and the two men began 

trading blows. But Ms. Leonard told police that the fight began when Shepherd started arguing with Jeffrey Dillon and 

Lynntez Holt—not Campbell. According to Ms. Leonard, 

Dillon struck first, followed by Holt, and then Shepherd attempted to fight back.

Strickland, of course, “permits counsel to ‘make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.’” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 106, quoting Strickland, 466 

U.S. at 691. Resources are limited, and trial counsel must 

eventually shift from pretrial investigation to trial preparation. But here, nothing in the record suggests that counsel 

made a reasonable decision not to interview Mr. Hunter and 

Ms. Leonard. The obvious exculpatory value of both eyewitness accounts appears on the face of the police reports, 

which were disclosed to counsel before trial. And nothing in 

either police report suggests that interviewing either Mr. 

Hunter or Ms. Leonard would have been fruitless or harmful. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (noting that when counsel

has “reason to believe that pursuing certain investigations 

would be fruitless or even harmful, counsel’s failure to pursue those investigations may not later be challenged as unreasonable”). Because the State’s case hinged on eyewitness 

testimony, counsel’s “decision that it was unnecessary to 

look for and contact such eyewitnesses cannot be described 

as reasonable.” United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 

F.3d 219, 251–52 (7th Cir. 2003). 

The state court gave two other reasons to support its conclusion, but both were based on an unreasonable characterization of the legal significance of Mr. Hunter’s and Ms. 

Leonard’s potential testimony. The state court noted that 
24 No. 13-2634

“none of the testimony which [Campbell] claims Hunter and 

Leonard would have given would have exonerated” Campbell because all they could do was “further implicate Johnson and Peete as involved in the murder, a fact of which the 

jury was already aware because it knew Johnson and Peete 

had been charged with the murder.” People v. Campbell, 773 

N.E.2d 776, 785 (Ill. App. 2002). The court also mentioned 

that any “testimony that [Campbell] did not start the beating 

would not contradict the State’s theory that [Campbell] participated in the beating.” Id.

But the jury heard no evidence that Johnson or Peete participated in the murder. Live testimony from a disinterested 

witness is quite different from any inference the jury might 

have drawn from the bare fact that the two men had been 

charged initially but then had the charges dropped. And the 

potential testimony of Mr. Hunter and Ms. Leonard would 

have done far more than “further implicate” Johnson and 

Peete. According to their statements and affidavits, Mr. 

Hunter and Ms. Leonard would have presented a version of 

the facts markedly different from that presented by the prosecution.

It is true that under Mr. Hunter’s and Ms. Leonard’s testimony, it would not have been physically impossible for 

Campbell to have participated in the beating. It is at least 

theoretically possible that Campbell could have participated 

in the start of the beating but left the scene before Mr. 

Hunter looked out his window. And because Ms. Leonard 

could not identify everyone at the scene, it is also theoretically possible that Campbell was simply one of the men she 

saw but could not identify. But the theoretical possibility that 

Campbell participated in the beating in spite of these eye-
No. 13-2634 25

witness accounts does not undermine the probative value to 

the defense of their potential testimony. Both witnessed the 

beating, and neither identified Campbell. Each witness described a fight that differed dramatically from that described 

by the prosecution at trial.

Viewed separately, then, each witness’s testimony would 

have been very helpful to the defense. Viewed together, their 

testimony would have been even more powerful. The only 

weakness in Mr. Hunter’s testimony identified by the State is 

that he did not see the beginning of the fight. But Ms. Leonard said that she did see the beginning and that Campbell 

was not involved when the fight started among Dillon, Holt, 

and Shepherd. Thus, Ms. Leonard’s testimony could have 

filled in the key gap in Mr. Hunter’s testimony. The version 

of the events presented by Ms. Leonard and Mr. Hunter, if 

credited, would be entirely exculpatory to Campbell.

Accordingly, as the dissenting justice recognized on direct appeal, the testimony of Mr. Hunter and Ms. Leonard 

would not have simply undermined the credibility of Johnson and Peete or “further implicated” them in the crime 

(though it would have done those things, too). It would have 

completely contradicted the prosecution’s version of the 

facts. See Campbell, 773 N.E.2d at 789 (Knecht, J., dissenting) 

(“[Mr.] Hunter’s testimony would have virtually destroyed 

Peete’s credibility and contradicted the State’s version of the 

facts surrounding the beating.”). Neither of these additional 

reasons could support a reasonable determination that failing to investigate Mr. Hunter or Ms. Leonard was not deficient performance.

In sum, the state court concluded that counsel’s failure to 

call two exculpatory witnesses reflected a tactical judgment 
26 No. 13-2634

not to present their testimony and to pursue an alternative 

strategy instead. But it did not address the adequacy of the 

pretrial investigation, which was clearly established under 

Strickland as the critical threshold question. Because we must 

assume that counsel failed to investigate two exculpatory 

eyewitnesses who were known to him based on police reports disclosed before trial, there is no reasonable argument 

that counsel satisfied even the deferential Strickland standard.

2. Ieca Hunter

We next turn to counsel’s failure to present the testimony 

of Ieca Hunter. Campbell first presented this claim to the 

state courts during post-conviction proceedings. The state 

trial court denied Campbell’s petition without an evidentiary 

hearing. On appeal, the state appellate court affirmed, holding that counsel’s failure to interview Ms. Hunter was not 

deficient performance because “there was not a sound basis 

to believe she had any information that would be helpful to 

the defense.” Supp. App. 96 The state court based this conclusion on the police report: “Christmas lights obscured her 

view of the beating and she did not know any of the men involved.” Id. This, too, was a merits adjudication, so again we 

ask “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 

satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Harrington, 562 

U.S. at 105.

The state court’s analysis of counsel’s performance regarding Ms. Hunter was also an unreasonable application of 

Strickland. Under Strickland, again, counsel had “a duty to 

make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. We see no reasonable argument 
No. 13-2634 27

that counsel could have reasonably concluded, based solely 

on the police report, that Ms. Hunter was not worth contacting. The police report said:

[Ieca Hunter] stated that she looked out her 

window and saw approximately five black 

males fighting with one subject. Ieca stated that 

she was trying to see what was going on but 

she has Christmas lights on the outside of her 

house, and it was affecting her vision. Ieca stated that she saw the victim fall to the ground, so 

she left her window and went and telephoned 

911 for an ambulance. Ieca stated that she did 

not recognize any of the subjects in [the] street 

and she would not be able to identify any of 

them. The only thing that she could tell me was 

that all of them were black males.

Supp. App. 143–44 (paragraph break omitted).

The fact that Ms. Hunter could not identify any of the 

men who were involved in the beating does not mean that 

she would have been unable to identify people who were 

present but not involved in the beating. She explained this 

point in an affidavit attached to Campbell’s petition for state 

post-conviction relief. She initially had trouble seeing the 

fight because of Christmas lights hanging on her door, but 

she opened the door for a better view. She then saw Campbell standing directly in front of her house, approximately 12 

feet away. She called Campbell “a familiar person” and 

someone she “had interacted with” on “numerous occasions.” Although she could not identify the participants in 

the beating, she could identify Campbell as someone who 

did not participate: “there was no mistaking him even in the 
28 No. 13-2634

dark.” This fact was not addressed in the police report. The 

police apparently asked her to identify only those who did 

the beating. Police did not ask whether she could identify 

other people who were present but not involved.

We recognize, of course, that Campbell’s lawyer could 

not have known by reading the police report that Ms. 

Hunter could identify Campbell as a non-participant. But he 

had a duty to perform a reasonable investigation. Contacting 

one of a few eyewitnesses to the crime falls squarely within 

the core of that duty. See Stanley v. Bartley, 465 F.3d 810, 813 

(7th Cir. 2006) (“The lawyer could not know how complete 

or accurate a prospective witness’s statement to the police 

was without talking to the witness.”). From the defense perspective, witness statements to the police are systemically 

prone to be incomplete. Police investigations are generally 

focused on identifying individuals involved in the crime and 

witnesses helpful to the prosecution’s case. Their focus is not 

necessarily on clearing bystanders. It is also not uncommon 

for people to withhold information from the police, or at 

least not to volunteer everything they know when they first 

speak to police.

That is why Strickland typically demands that counsel go 

beyond discovery provided by the State and conduct her 

own pretrial investigation. See Crisp, 743 F.2d at 584 (“We do 

not agree that police statements can generally serve as an 

adequate substitute for a personal interview.”); see also, e.g., 

Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 632 (7th Cir. 2000) (counsel’s “failure to try to ascertain what exculpatory evidence 

‘new’ witnesses might have [was] flagrant example[] of ineffective assistance”); Anderson v. Johnson, 338 F.3d 382, 391–93 

(5th Cir. 2003) (deficient performance where counsel “relied 
No. 13-2634 29

exclusively on the investigative work of the State and based 

his own pretrial ‘investigation’ on assumptions divined from 

a review of the State’s files”).

We say “typically” because we recognize “there may be 

unusual cases when an attorney can make a rational decision 

that investigation is unnecessary.” Crisp, 743 F.2d at 583. But 

this is not such a case. The police report identified Ms. 

Hunter as a disinterested eyewitness to the crime. Although 

the witness’s vision that night was “affected” by Christmas 

lights and she could not identify the perpetrators, nothing in 

the report implies that contacting her would have been fruitless or harmful. Her statement to the police certainly was not 

a “blanket denial” that she knew anything about the incident, as the State characterizes it on appeal. Perhaps she 

could have described the location of the beating in a way 

that would have cast doubt on the prosecution witnesses’ 

version of the events. Or perhaps she could have told counsel about other eyewitnesses who may have had a better 

view of the incident than she did. Or perhaps, as we must 

assume for now, she could have identified non-participants, 

including Campbell. The point is that counsel could not answer those questions by reading the police report, which is 

why he had a duty to investigate further. See Wiggins, 539 

U.S. at 527 (“In assessing the reasonableness of an attorney’s 

investigation, ... a court must consider not only the quantum 

of evidence already known to counsel, but also whether the 

known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.”).

The State argues that the state court reasonably applied 

Strickland because the Supreme Court has never clearly established that defense counsel must interview witnesses 
30 No. 13-2634

named in police reports. This argument exaggerates Campbell’s position. Neither his position nor our decision is based 

on a per se requirement that defense counsel must always interview witnesses named in police reports. Rather, it is based 

on the Strickland standard itself: “a particular decision not to 

investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in 

all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Under the circumstances of this case—where (1) there was no 

physical evidence linking Campbell to the crime, (2) police 

reports named two other eyewitnesses (Leroy Hunter and 

Toni Leonard) who identified two of the State’s main witnesses as participants in the crime and did not identify 

Campbell, and (3) the State agreed to drop murder charges 

against Peete and Johnson in exchange for their testimony 

against Campbell—counsel’s decision not to interview Ms. 

Hunter fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, 

even after applying deference to counsel’s judgments. The 

state court’s decision to the contrary was an unreasonable 

application of Strickland.9

9 Campbell also argues that counsel’s failure to investigate or present 

the testimony of Minnie Hunter was constitutionally ineffective. The 

State argues that this claim is procedurally defaulted because Campbell 

failed to present this claim to the state courts. Campbell’s reply brief argues that he presented the claim by attaching Minnie Hunter’s affidavit 

to his amended post-conviction petition. That was not enough. Under 

AEDPA, a habeas petitioner must present both the legal argument and 

the factual basis for the claim to the state courts to preserve the issue. See 

Pole v. Randolph, 570 F.3d 922, 939–40 (7th Cir. 2009). Although Campbell 

presented the factual basis for the claim by attaching the affidavit to the 

petition, he did not present the legal argument in the petition or in his 

appellate brief during post-conviction proceedings. Rather, he argued 

only that counsel’s failure to investigate or present the testimony of Ieca 

 
No. 13-2634 31

C. Prejudice

Having determined that counsel’s performance was deficient, at least based on affidavits and police statements that 

we must treat as true at this stage of the case, we next analyze whether it prejudiced Campbell. To establish prejudice, 

Campbell “must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability 

is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.’” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011), 

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. This does not require a 

showing that counsel’s actions “more likely than not altered 

the outcome,” but the likelihood of a different result must be 

“substantial, not just conceivable.” Id. at 111–12.

“Making this probability determination requires consideration of the ‘totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.’” Harris v. Thompson, 698 F.3d 609, 645 (7th Cir. 2012), 

quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. A “verdict or conclusion 

only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have 

been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record 

support.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696. Because neither state 

court addressed the issue of prejudice, we review this prong 

of Strickland de novo. See Sussman v. Jenkins, 636 F.3d 329, 350 

(7th Cir. 2011); see also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 39 

(2009) (per curiam); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003).

The State devotes most of its brief to arguing that the 

omission of exculpatory testimony from Leroy Hunter, Toni 

Hunter, Juanchez Booker, and Lynntez Holt was ineffective. Accordingly, we hold that Campbell’s argument concerning Minnie Hunter was 

procedurally defaulted.

 
32 No. 13-2634

Leonard, and Ieca Hunter was not prejudicial.10 It approaches this issue from two angles, arguing that the prosecution’s 

case against Campbell was strong and that the probative (or 

persuasive) value of the witnesses’ potential testimony was 

slight. We disagree with the State in both respects.

The prosecution’s case against Campbell was far from 

overwhelming. No physical evidence linked Campbell to the 

crime, so the testimony of the State’s eyewitnesses was the 

most important evidence in the trial. See People v. Campbell, 

773 N.E.2d 776, 789 (Ill. App. 2002) (Knecht, J., dissenting) 

(“The credibility of the State’s witnesses was the critical issue 

in the jury’s determination of [Campbell’s] guilt or innocence.”). The prosecution’s closing argument could not have 

been more explicit on this point: “The most important evidence in this trial is the eyewitness evidence. And you don’t 

have one eyewitness. You don’t have two. You have three.” 

Supp. App. 659. Two of these eyewitnesses had been charged 

with the murder and agreed to testify against Campbell in 

exchange for full immunity. The third eyewitness observed 

the fight from the inside of a van that was parked around the 

corner and facing away from the fatal altercation. This was 

not a case where the eyewitness testimony presented by the 

prosecution was particularly strong. Cf. Morales v. Johnson, 

10 The State also attempts to refute Campbell’s argument that prejudice is established by virtue of the fact that Leroy Hunter and Toni Leonard testified in Bobby Joe Douglas’s trial and Douglas was acquitted. 

While we agree with Campbell that the circumstances of Douglas’s trial 

and his ensuing acquittal provide circumstantial evidence of prejudice in 

Campbell’s case, see United States ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 

253 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that two acquittals in other cases supported 

finding of prejudice), we do not rely on this comparison here because 

Campbell has established prejudice independent of that comparison.

 
No. 13-2634 33

659 F.3d 588, 600–02 (7th Cir. 2011) (counsel’s deficient performance not prejudicial where prosecution presented two 

eyewitnesses whose testimony was corroborated by physical 

evidence). But because defense counsel did not call a single 

witness or present any other evidence aside from the stipulation that Shepherd’s blood had been found on the clothing of 

two other men, the jury never heard an alternative version of 

the facts. As a result, the prosecution’s case against Campbell 

seemed much stronger than it should have been if Campbell 

had received effective assistance.

We must compare the actual trial to a hypothetical trial in 

which, based on the facts we must assume are true, three 

neutral eyewitnesses would have testified to a very different 

account of the fight, one in which Campbell was not a participant, and in which one of these eyewitnesses would have 

refuted Rita Butler’s testimony about how the fight began. 

We conclude that there is a reasonable probability that, but 

for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See Stitts v. Wilson, 713 F.3d 

887, 894 (7th Cir. 2013) (“And if these witnesses testified, the 

trial would have been transformed from a one-sided presentation of the prosecution’s case into a battle between competing eyewitness testimony, where there would have been a 

‘reasonable probability’ that a jury would have reasonable 

doubt as to Stitts’s guilt and therefore acquit.”). Each witness’s account would have both undermined the credibility 

of (at least) one of the State’s eyewitnesses and contradicted 

the State’s version of the facts. All three of these eyewitnesses 

were disinterested. Two of them were residents of the neighborhood who lived across the street from Peete. And none of 

them were ever implicated in the underlying crime, so they 
34 No. 13-2634

did not have the same incentive to lie that two of the prosecution witnesses did.

One clear indicator of the prejudice caused by defense 

counsel’s failure to present the testimony of Leroy Hunter 

and Toni Leonard occurred during counsel’s closing argument. He tried to argue that Damion Johnson was more likely to blame for Shepherd’s death than Campbell: “Everything that [the prosecutor] says makes Mr. Campbell guilty, 

those same factors could be applied especially to Mr. [Johnson]; presence, being named by others—.” Supp. App. 703. 

At that point the prosecution objected, arguing that defense 

counsel’s statement was impermissible because there had 

been no evidence that anybody besides Campbell was 

named by another person. The court sustained the objection. 

If counsel had presented the testimony of Mr. Hunter or Ms. 

Leonard, of course, there would have been evidence that 

someone other than Campbell—Peete or Johnson, for example—had been involved in the crime and named by others.

The prejudice caused by counsel’s failure to present the 

testimony of Ms. Hunter is even clearer. She saw Campbell 

standing directly in front of her house, approximately 12 feet 

away, separate and apart from the group of men beating 

Shepherd. According to her affidavit, Campbell “never 

touched” Shepherd. 

The State attempts to minimize the significance of this 

exculpatory testimony in a variety of ways. For example, it 

argues that the testimony from Toni Leonard would have 

been “relatively insignificant” because “none of petitioner’s 

proposed evidence undermines” Butler’s testimony about 

how the fight began. Yet on the same page of its brief the 

State concedes: “At best, Leonard might have contradicted But-
No. 13-2634 35

ler’s testimony identifying petitioner as the person who began fighting with Shepherd.” Appellee’s Br. 24 (emphasis 

added). How the fight began and who started it was a major 

theme in the case against Campbell. In its closing argument, 

for example, the prosecution told the jury: “Rita [Butler] can 

tell you [what happened] from the very beginning, from before [it] became violent what was happening. She can tell 

you about the entire interaction, but she can’t tell you about 

the ending, because she ran.” Supp. App. 660. If a witness’s 

testimony contradicts a key aspect of the prosecution’s theory of the crime, it cannot be easily dismissed as “relatively

insignificant.”

The State also argues that Ms. Leonard’s testimony 

would have been unreliable because she could not account 

for everyone at the scene and because she failed to identify 

Theodis White, who was ultimately convicted of the crime. 

Neither fact significantly detracts from the reliability of her 

testimony. None of the State’s eyewitnesses could account for 

everyone at the scene either, yet the State has found them 

sufficiently reliable to play a major role in imprisoning 

Campbell since 1998. And although Ms. Leonard failed to 

identify White, she ultimately identified nine other participants—all of whom the State charged based in part on her 

identifications. The State’s characterization of Ms. Leonard’s 

reliability on appeal is belied by its reliance on her identifications during its own pretrial investigation.

The State attempts to minimize the persuasive value of 

Leroy Hunter’s potential testimony on the ground that when 

he testified at Bobby Joe Douglas’s trial, he identified Peete 

as an assailant but did not “feel comfortable swearing” it 

was Peete. But Mr. Hunter’s qualification at Douglas’s trial 
36 No. 13-2634

does not destroy his reliability as a witness or the probative 

value of his potential testimony. His initial statement to police was unequivocal in identifying Peete as a participant. 

According to the police report, Mr. Hunter voluntarily contacted police because “he had heard that the man had died, 

and he knew that Steve Peete was still walking around free, 

and he felt that he had to come forward, and tell what he 

had seen.” And if Mr. Hunter had been called at Campbell’s 

trial and refused to cooperate, his original taped statement to 

police could have been admitted as substantive evidence 

under Illinois law. See People v. Campbell, 773 N.E.2d 776, 

789–90 (Ill. App. 2002) (Knecht, J., dissenting), citing 725 Ill. 

Comp. Stat. 5/115-10.1(c)(2)(C) (1998). Even if the jury ultimately discounted Mr. Hunter’s identification of Peete as a 

participant, his testimony still would have been valuable because he did not identify Campbell as a participant. At no 

point did he waver on that critical fact.

Because the case against Campbell was far from overwhelming and the omitted exculpatory testimony relatively 

strong, counsel’s unprofessional errors undermine our confidence in the outcome of Campbell’s trial. See United States 

ex rel. Hampton v. Leibach, 347 F.3d 219, 250 (7th Cir. 2003) 

(“Opposing testimony from other eyewitnesses to the attacks, positing that Hampton was not a participant, would 

have given the jury a qualitatively different and more powerful reason to believe that the State’s witnesses were mistaken in their identifications of Hampton.”). Accordingly, 

assuming the witnesses would have testified credibly and 

consistently with their affidavits and statements to the police, we hold that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced 

Campbell.
No. 13-2634 37

IV. Remedy

Campbell has satisfied § 2254(d) on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, but that does not necessarily entitle him to the issuance of the writ. “Whether the petitioner is 

actually entitled to relief—whether under § 2254(a) he is in 

custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 

the United States—is a separate question.” Mosley v. 

Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 853 (7th Cir. 2013), citing 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254(a). We cannot answer that question on the record before us.

Throughout this opinion we have assumed, as the state 

courts and district court did, that defense counsel did not 

actually interview these witnesses and that these witnesses 

would have testified credibly and consistently with their affidavits and statements to the police. Having concluded that 

the affidavits and statements, if true, are sufficient to warrant habeas relief, we still have no factual findings on these 

questions to review, and the record is otherwise ambiguous.

To be sure, Campbell has steadfastly asserted that defense counsel never contacted Leroy Hunter, Toni Leonard, 

or Ieca Hunter, and the State has not claimed that counsel 

did in fact contact these witnesses. Nor has the State argued 

that these witnesses would have testified differently than 

Campbell has described. But the affidavits on which Campbell relies—affidavits from Mr. Hunter and Ms. Hunter—

have not been tested through the adversarial process at any 

kind of hearing. And there is no affidavit from Ms. Leonard 

or defense counsel in the record.

Under these circumstances, an evidentiary hearing is 

needed to develop the record on (1) the extent of counsel’s 
38 No. 13-2634

actual pretrial investigation and (2) what these witnesses 

would have said if called to testify at trial. See Stitts v. Wilson, 713 F.3d 887, 895–97 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding § 2254(d) 

satisfied and remanding for evidentiary hearing); Mosley, 

689 F.3d at 852–54 (same); Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. —, 

131 S. Ct. 1388, 1412 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“For example, if the state-court rejection assumed the habeas petitioner’s facts (deciding that, even if

those facts were true, federal law was not violated), then (after finding the state court wrong on a [§ 2254(d)] ground), a[] 

[§ 2254(e)] hearing might be needed to determine whether 

the facts alleged were indeed true.”). We recognize that this 

will be a daunting challenge so many years after the fact, but 

it is still necessary.

If the district court finds that defense counsel did not investigate these witnesses (and that no other fact would reasonably justify that decision), then Campbell has proven that 

his counsel performed deficiently under Strickland. If, on the 

other hand, the district court finds that counsel did contact 

these witnesses (or, alternatively, that counsel made a reasonable decision not to investigate these witnesses based on 

some other fact), then it must determine de novo whether the 

entirety of counsel’s pretrial investigation, as well as his decision not to present their testimony at trial, was reasonable 

under Strickland. If the district court finds that counsel performed deficiently under Strickland for any reason, it should 

then determine de novo whether counsel’s errors prejudiced 

Campbell. If the district court finds that Campbell has satisfied both prongs of Strickland, it should grant the writ.

The state courts’ decision that Campbell was not denied 

effective assistance of counsel was an unreasonable applica-
No. 13-2634 39

tion of clearly established federal law as determined by Supreme Court precedent. We REVERSE the district court’s denial of Campbell’s habeas petition. We REMAND for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion.